The Good Beating

Social norms supporting men’s partner violence in Tanzania

Hilde Jakobsen

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Til Farfar, Jakob Benedikt Jakobsen.

To a man who has often resisted the hegemonic norms of his times.
**Scientific environment**

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Acknowledgements

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Reconnecting with feminist activism has helped me finish this PhD. I am grateful for having met the inspiring Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE), the brave and eloquent Rachel Moran, and the inclusive Women’s Front of Norway. But most of all I am grateful for having met Agnete Strøm. Thank you for your undeterred perspicacity, and for looking out for me.

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Finally, my greatest thanks go to the men and women who generated the data for this study. They gave me two precious hours of their busy lives. They were open-minded and generous enough to say ‘ok’ when I asked them to discuss questions that must sometimes have seemed bizarre. They forgave the clumsiness of this bumbling mzungu. They were gracious. They made this thesis, which I call ‘mine’, possible.
Abstract

This thesis is a qualitative investigation into the discourses that support wife-beating in Tanzania. Tanzania is recognised as a particularly peaceful country in the region. Nevertheless, one in two Tanzanians say a man can be right to beat his wife, according to the 2011 Demographic and Health Survey. What is the meaning of the violence that enjoys such wide support? Which wider discourses and shared social values does the support draw on and refer to? These questions are explored by analysing the transcripts of 27 focus group discussions conducted in two disparate districts in Tanzania: Arumeru and Kigoma-Vijijini. The data were analysed in a constructionist manner, as public discourses constructed collectively.

The thesis comprises three articles. The first concerns the data generation method. The power difference between researcher and researched, and the positionality of the white researcher in Tanzania, posed challenges to the data quality. I describe how maximising the distinguishing features of the focus group method, by decentering herself and encouraging interaction between participants, enabled her to address these challenges.

The second article speaks to ongoing debates on the relationship between partner violence and gender. It interrogates the ideal good beating that was constructed from the main interpretive repertoires that recurred across most groups, for resonance with theories of gender as a multilevel social structure. It concludes that hegemonic gender norms are among the norms supporting the good beating, and that the beating that is widely supported enforces the performance of gender, maintains gender hierarchies, and is in itself an enactment of gender.

The third article examines the data for insights into how non-state violence can constitute social order. Here the good beating construct illustrates critical theories that reconceptualise social control and deviance as censure, as well as Gramscian notions of how coercion and consent combine in hegemony. This analysis speaks to the dilemma of how to interpret women’s support for practices that feminists claim
repress women, arguing that the dichotomy between consent and coercion is a false one. It concludes that wife-beating, where supported by community norms, can be seen as community norm enforcement.

The thesis relates the findings presented in the articles to how law, deviance, social control and censure have been theorised in criminology and socio-legal studies. It shows how theorizing on these issues can improve our understanding of non-state violence in the Global South and can in turn be improved by such an understanding.

In particular, it shows how the hegemonic norms connected to wife-beating can be seen as non-state law. The legitimated beating is that which controls deviance and upholds community norms of social order. The ‘law’ it enforces and upholds constitutes an informal marital contract whereby husbands control their wives’ labour – a law which undermines structural gains towards gender equality.

The study has implications for how critical criminologists and other socio-legal scholars can engage better with Southern empirical realities. It recommends that they recognise that informal hegemonic norms at community level can play the same ruling role as that which makes formal law, law, in continuation of a colonial strategy of ruling by proxy. Regarding policy and practice on violence against women in East Africa, the conclusions of this study illustrate that serious progress requires a change in gender ideologies of inequality.
List of publications


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# Contents

**SCIENTIFIC ENVIRONMENT** ........................................................................................................ 4

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .................................................................................................................. 5

**ABSTRACT** ......................................................................................................................................... 9

**LIST OF PUBLICATIONS** ................................................................................................................ 11

**CONTENTS** ....................................................................................................................................... 12

1. **INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH PROJECT** .................................................................................. 15
   A. **How the Research Question Emerged** .......................................................................................... 15
   B. **Research Question** ...................................................................................................................... 17

2. **THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND** .................................................................... 18
   A. **Gender Relations and Domestic Violence in Tanzania** .................................................................. 18
      i. **Gender relations in Tanzania** ..................................................................................................... 18
      ii. **Domestic violence in Tanzania** .................................................................................................. 22
   B. **Researching Domestic Violence** ................................................................................................. 26
      **Feminist conceptualizations of VAW and gender orders** ................................................................. 28
   C. **Africa in Social Science** ............................................................................................................... 33
      i. **Applying “Western” theory to Africa** .......................................................................................... 33
      ii. **Pulling up the drawbridge, or being quarantined?** ................................................................... 34
      iii. **An orientalist approach to couple conflict in a Tanzanian community** ................................. 36
      iv. **The Global South as the future of social science** ....................................................................... 41
   D. **Law, Deviance and Social Control** ............................................................................................... 42
      **Law and social control in Africa** ..................................................................................................... 46
   E. **Violence and Social Order** ............................................................................................................ 49
   F. **A Gramscian Approach to Community Norms** ......................................................................... 53
      **Relating hegemonic theory to this research** .................................................................................. 57

3. **METHODOLOGY** ......................................................................................................................... 59
   A. **Consultation with Tanzanian Researchers and Activists** ............................................................. 59
   B. **Data Generation** .......................................................................................................................... 60
      i. **Why Focus Group Discussions?** ................................................................................................. 60
      ii. **Site selection and sampling** ....................................................................................................... 61
      iii. **Recruitment and selection of participants** ................................................................................ 63
      iv. **Group composition** ................................................................................................................... 64
      v. **Facilitating discussions** .............................................................................................................. 65
vi. Transcription and translation ................................................................. 67
C. ETHICS ................................................................................................. 67
D. DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 69
   i. A constructionist approach to FGD data ............................................ 69
   ii. The analytic process ....................................................................... 70
   iii. What is left out? ............................................................................ 74
4. FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 75
5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION .................................................................. 79
   A. IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................. 79
      i. Gender and domestic violence in Tanzania ................................. 79
      ii. Theorising gender and hegemony .............................................. 81
   B. LIMITATIONS .................................................................................. 82
   C. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................ 84
REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 87
APPENDICES .......................................................................................... 99
Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.

1. Introducing the research project

a. How the research question emerged

This thesis is about the social norms that support men’s physical violence against their female partners in Tanzania. It was while working in a violence against women (VAW) intervention in Western Tanzania that I came to see this type of knowledge as important. I was evaluating the United Nations Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) programme in the Great Lakes refugee camps there, which was to be the first of its kind, and the forerunner to GBV programmes in refugee and other displaced people’s camps across the world. The programme catered for refugees from neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The staff on this programme consisted of frontline workers from the refugee communities, middle managers from Tanzania, and top managers from various African, Asian and European countries. As is common in the humanitarian sector in Africa, this last group of ‘international’ staff had never lived in the country before, nor did they know Swahili, the national language. My position, then, as a white and therefore undeniably ‘international’ colleague, who had grown up in this ‘outpost’ and understood some of what my Swahili-speaking colleagues said, was an unusual one. From what my Tanzanian colleagues said between themselves and to me on the one hand, and what my European ‘compatriots’ said to me and to them on the other hand, I gained two very different impressions of the GBV programme. The Europeans assumed all staff on the program shared the programme’s stance on violence against women and the need to fight it. The shared mood I gathered from discussions with and between Tanzanian staff, however, suggested a different view of VAW and thus premise for the programme. According to this view, some forms of violence were clearly bad, but it was out of the question that using physical force

1 I call this ‘wife-beating’, since that is the most commonly used English term in Tanzania. Since this is not the term commonly used in the Euro-American research literature, I will use the term ‘domestic violence’ when discussing that literature. However in my use of the term ‘domestic violence’, I refer to the phenomenon that is known as ‘wife-beating’ in Tanzania. In limiting my focus to men’s physical violence against female partners, I do not mean to deny the existence of other violence.
against a woman, or coercing her to do something against her will, was bad in itself. Thus violence against a woman should not automatically be treated as something to be stopped. Most such cases should, and were, dealt with as a mutual conflict, and solved by counselling the woman to behave better.

When colleagues spend hours, even days on end together, travel to remote field sites and tackle challenging conditions together, it is hard to believe that they are completely unaware that their views on the very topic they work on together diverge so dramatically. Indeed the Europeans’ view of VAW was no secret, as it was also the official agenda. Nor did the national staff seem to deliberately keep their divergence from this official view a secret. On the contrary, several national staff would open discussion on what is ‘really’ VAW. While these discussions would have juxtaposed the two understandings of VAW and made the divergence clear, the overture was always closed by the other side. I found the remarks with which this was done, particularly interesting. The reasoning for not having an open discussion between European and national staff, when the possibility arose, was always a combination of leaving the “cultural” to the field staff, and not wanting to hear tolerance of VAW. I interpreted this partly as pragmatic career choices to avoid inconvenient truths, but also as a more innocent belief in the prevailing paradigms of cultural sensitivity and adaptation to local norms, a belief that was unaccompanied by an awareness that these paradigms have their limitations. As a result of this discrepancy within the programme, the intervention that was intended to reduce the dangers women faced, actually increased them (Jakobsen, 2002).

My overwhelming impression from this experience was of how young European graduates arrived in Africa saddled with ideological baggage that restricted us all. This ideology seemed to demand that local understandings of VAW be placed in a box called ‘culture’ without so much as looking at them, and that once placed there, those understandings could not be taken out, discussed, or dealt with at all in any meaningful way. It made it impossible for any of us to actually engage with the very phenomenon we were working with, namely the VAW that was not already being prevented.
Subsequent experiences in the sector strengthened this impression. Eventually, a research idea emerged. I wanted to take these local meanings of wife-beating, which are so clearly there, yet so hidden, out into the open, and explore how we can look at them, analyse them, and engage with them critically. Not doing so can have real, human, tragic consequences, as my evaluation showed (Jakobsen, 2002).

b. Research Question

This research project essentially aims to answer one central question:

_What is the meaning of the wife-beating that is widely supported in Tanzania?_

To answer this question, I generated data on the social norms, common values and shared meanings that people referred to when discussing the rights and wrongs of wife-beating. In analysing these data, I asked myself the following questions: What does answering this research question tell us about how norms, power, consent and coercion are connected? What role do the norms supporting the beating play? How do they relate to the beating itself, to the violence and its effects? Why does the meaning of the supported beating matter? In relating my analysis to theory, I found that it spoke to two specific questions, which I used to organise the findings presented here. These questions are, “What is gendered about wife-beating in Tanzania?” and “How does support for wife-beating in Tanzania relate to social order?” Nevertheless, the main focus of the project remains the central research question.
2. Theoretical and contextual background

a. Gender relations and domestic violence in Tanzania

i. Gender relations in Tanzania

By socio-economic indicators, Tanzania is a Least Developed Country (LDC). Its GDP per capita is 608 US dollars. However, it is also known as a remarkably peaceful country. While neighbouring states have been plagued by conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, Tanzania boasts a tradition of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians and 122 ethnicities. It is also the most economically equal society in East and Southern Africa, with a Gini Index of 38 (World Bank).

Like the respondents in this study, the majority of Tanzanians (70%) live outside the urban centres in households engaged in small-scale agriculture (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013a). Three in four adults have agriculture, livestock or fishing as their primary activity (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013c). Most households (70%) own their own land, and the mean area of land owned is 5.6 acres (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013a, 2013c). One in ten Tanzanians live below the food poverty line which measures extreme poverty, and 28% of Tanzanians live below the basic needs poverty line. Literacy rates are high, but educational levels are low. Only one adult in five are illiterate, but four in five never reached beyond primary school (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013a).

Housing conditions give an idea of people’s everyday lives. A fifth of Tanzanians live in houses with cement walls, and a further 50% have walls of baked or sundried bricks. Sixty-five percent have iron sheet roofing, and 18% have electricity. However firewood remains the main source of energy for cooking for seven of every ten households (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013a).

Regarding equality between men and women, Tanzania ranks in the more unequal end of the various international indices (Klasen & Schüler, 2011). The disproportionate time burden placed on women by the sexual division of labour is
now recognized as the main obstacle to improvements in women’s status (Leavens & Anderson, 2011). The division of labour time is most commonly estimated to be 12 to 16 hours per day for women, and 6 to 8 hours per day for men (Leavens & Anderson, 2011). Ninety-eight percent of rural women are engaged in agriculture, where it is not only housework and care work that is considered women’s work. Women are responsible for growing food for the family through subsistence farming, and for a substantial part of the labour involved in the husband’s cash crop farming. As wives carry farm supplies and produce as well as firewood and water for the household, women spend nearly three times as much time in transport as men, and transport four times as much in volume (World Bank, 2007). It is through this arrangement that 88% of Tanzanian women can be classified as unpaid family workers on land they do not own (Warner & Campbell, 2000).

A sexual division of labour that constitutes an intra-household rent agreement in this way is not uncommon in agrarian African societies (Darity, 2012). However, the proportion of women who work in agriculture in Tanzania (81%) is much higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (55%) (Leavens & Anderson, 2011). Bryceson (1995ba) connects this division of labour to the organization of agriculture where land is abundant and capital investment in farming is extremely low. It is this form of ‘hoe agriculture’ that most Tanzanians are still engaged in (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013b). Bryceson’s theorization of hoe agriculture outlines the role of female labour in rural Tanzanian gender relations:

Economic differentiation tends to be limited to that on the basis of age and gender, rather than class. Labour rather than land is the limiting factor of production, so control over labour is the source of male power and authority in the society. But control over female and youthful labour is technically problematic given hoe agriculture. Hoes are designed to be handled by only one person. The work process, although facilitated by collective effort, can be readily pursued by single individuals. Thus, ideological controls of an imperative nature must be exercised in order that men retain their ability to appropriate the labour power of their social subordinates. (As their control
over male youthful labour has ebbed away)…, male control over rural female labour has gained in importance. The tension between the technical possibility of women acting as direct producers and their social designation as men’s means of production, lies fundamentally at the heart of Tanzanian gender relations. It is the axis around which negotiations between the sexes take place.

(Bryceson, 1995a, pp. 47-48)

Foremost among the “ideological controls” that Bryceson says male control over female labour requires is the cohabitation or marriage contract. By this she means not a tangible written contract, but simply “the cultural norms pertaining to the intra-household pooling of individual entitlements” held by the social groupings the spouses belong to (p.43). In addition to the organization of the agricultural economy, larger historical forces such as migration, slavery and colonialism have shaped the current Tanzanian marriage contract (Bryceson, 1995a).

In the ensuing scholarship, the question of whether and how events in the 1980s and ‘90s changed the marriage contract is debated. The crisis in the Tanzanian economy and the ensuing Structural Adjustment Plan increased households’ need for cash. As a result, women entered the informal sector in large numbers, engaging in petty trading and other income-generating activities (Mascarenhas, 2007). The disagreement is over whether this weakened men’s control over women. The paid labour added to the burden of unpaid productive and reproductive labour allocated to women. Moreover, this pre-existing burden was increasing, as the AIDS pandemic raised the demand for unpaid care-work. To the extent that women’s entry into the cash economy led to a redistribution of unpaid labour within the household, it was not to men that the burden was shifted, but to children and poorer relatives (Koda, 2000).

However, Tripp (1997) argues that even though income-generating activities have added to women’s workloads, these activities have also made women more independent. In many cases, the income gave a wife more autonomy from her husband and more leverage in negotiations with him, and through the activities that generated it, she developed social networks of her own. Some evidence suggests that
this development made women more successful in resisting labour exploitation in the better-off rural households (Mbilinyi, 1991).

Have women’s informal micro-enterprises transformed the Tanzanian marriage contract? In many ways, the norms that Bryceson (1995) describes as the marriage contract at the time of this development are not so much challenged by these enterprises as they set the terms for them. The activities rural women engage in are those they can reconcile with the responsibilities and resources the contract has allocated to them. This is why their enterprises remain small-scale, informal and precarious, offering little opportunity for growth or upward mobility (World Bank, 2007). Moreover, as wives increased their contribution to the household income, some husbands responded by reducing theirs, passing on the financial responsibilities for the children to the wife (Warner & Campbell, 2000). Thus, an overview of the scholarly debates on women’s changing position in the 1990s concluded that “in formal terms their legal and social position has improved, but in some respects their material position has declined while the ideological legacy of the past has hardly been dented” (Creighton & Omari, 1995; emphasis added).

More recent research shows that norms of wifely servitude continue alongside women’s paid labour. Not only rural smallholders, but even young men at university in the capital expect women to work longer hours than them and to serve their husbands at home (Feinstein, Feinstein, & Sabrow, 2010). The expectation of female subservience continues to circumscribe women’s opportunities in waged labour in the formal sector in cities (Fischer, 2014). Moreover, survey findings of who controls women’s income now show that rather than challenge the norm that husbands are entitled to the fruits of his wife’s labour, women’s paid labour conforms to this norm. In 2009, only 28% of rural women controlled the income they earned as their own. Almost a quarter of rural wives reported that their husband alone controlled the cash the woman had earned (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). This is in line with findings on general decision-making in marriages. When asked whether they had a say in decisions about their own healthcare, about major household purchases, or
decisions to visit family or relatives, one in three rural women replied in the negative to all three questions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

Nevertheless, change is underway. Severe limitations on women’s ability to own their own land have maintained a material basis for the intra-household rent agreement described above. Women own less than one-fifth of all titled land, and their plots are generally smaller and of lower quality than men’s plots (Leavens & Anderson, 2011). In 2014, however, a new constitution was proposed which explicitly guarantees equal land rights to women. This is expected to be approved in 2015.

ii. **Domestic violence in Tanzania**

Men’s physical violence against their female partners is currently a universal phenomenon. The pursuit of accurate and reliable measures of the scope of this violence is ongoing, as are efforts to arrive at international statistical standards that make such prevalence data comparable across countries and regions. This latter has been explicitly prioritized by UN and other international and regional bodies in the past decade (UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 2010). The World Health Organisation’s multi-country study on women’s health and domestic violence found the lifetime prevalence of physical partner violence ranged from 13% in Japan to 51% in rural Peru (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2005). The United Nations Statistical Division’s latest global overview of prevalence studies finds lifetime prevalence rates ranging from 6% in China to over 48% in Zambia, Ethiopia and Peru (UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 2010, p. 131). The latest regional survey of VAW in the EU, found that 22% of ever-partnered European women had experienced sexual and/or physical violence from a partner (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014).

In Africa, one in three women have experienced physical partner violence, according to a systematic review of prevalence rates across the continent (Alhabib, Nur, & Jones, 2010). However, Prabhu et al. (2011) point to the wide range of prevalence
estimates—from 18 to 71%—to illustrate that survey accuracy is especially challenging on this continent.

In Tanzania, two in five women are estimated to have experienced physical partner violence (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Table 1 draws on the prevalence data which are presented as comparable in the UN Statistical Division’s overview of prevalence rates, to give an idea of how prevalent this violence is in Tanzania in comparison to some European and African countries.

**Table 1. Prevalence of partner VAW in percentage of ever-partnered women aged 15-49.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam)a</th>
<th>Tanzania (Mbeya)a</th>
<th>Tanzania (national)b</th>
<th>Ethiopia (rural)a</th>
<th>Zambiaa</th>
<th>England &amp; Walesc</th>
<th>Norwayc</th>
<th>Germanyc</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical violence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lifetime</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Past year</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td><strong>Physical and/or sexual violence</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lifetime</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44*</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past year</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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*Current/most recent partner only. Sources: (a) WHO Multicountry Study of Domestic Violence and Women’s Health; (b) The 2010 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey; (c) United Nations’ The World’s Women, 2010.

One striking feature of these Demographic and Health Survey results is that the number of Tanzanian women who say they have experienced violence in the past 12 months is very close to the number who say they have ever experienced it. This could
mean either that the survey failed to capture memories that were over a year old, or that the violence was a stable feature of the lives of the women who experienced it.

Studies of how the violence correlates with individual and household characteristics have yielded mixed results. McCloskey et al. (2005) found a correlation with some of the indicators they used to represent gender inequality in their household survey of Moshi Urban district in Northern Tanzania. Women they interviewed whose husbands made a low-level financial contribution, who had only primary school education or less, and who had co-wives, were more likely to report abuse. Interviewees who said they had trouble conceiving were also at a higher risk, they found, but so were women who had five or more children.

Analyses of the data from the 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, however, show no significant correlation between violence and educational levels. Furthermore, they show that women’s employment – often used as an indicator of women’s empowerment – is associated with higher risks of violence. Vyas and Heise (2014) found this association to hold even after using Propensity Score Matching to account for underlying differences between women who were engaged in productive work outside the home and women who were not. However, they also found that in rural areas, women who were paid cash for productive work outside the home were not at higher risk. They explain this by the likelihood that the work was agricultural work and thus did not violate the prevailing norms of expected wifely behaviour.

The 2010 Demographic and Health Survey questionnaire also includes questions about husbands’ controlling behaviours. Almost half of ever-married women said their husband insisted on knowing where they were at all times. Of the women who said their husband exhibited five or more controlling behaviours, 75% also said he used physical violence.

Both 2004 and 2010 versions of the Tanzanian Demographic and Health Survey included questions on attitudes towards wife-beating. In 2004, 42% of men and 60% of women said a man could be justified in beating his wife for at least one of five
specified reasons given. By 2010 this had fallen slightly, to 38% of men and 54% of women (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

Two aspects of these data merit particular attention here. The first is that more women than men support wife-beating. This finding has been reproduced across Sub-Saharan Africa (Uthman, Moradi, & Lawoko, 2009). It raises a question on which this study sheds light: How can women comply in their own subjugation? Or, conversely, is wife-beating oppressive to women if women themselves support it? The second aspect of the data is simply that wife-beating is widely tolerated and justified in Tanzanian society. This resonates with qualitative studies by feminist activists and health professionals (e.g., Laisser, Nyström, Lugina, & Emmelin, 2011; McCleary-Sills, 2013; Tanzania Media Women's Association, 2013; USAID, 2008). A recent research report by Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) found that wife-beating was considered so normal and legitimate as to be a non-issue (Tanzania Media Women's Association, 2013). Similarly, health service evaluations cite women saying they expect beating as a part of marriage, and that men and women blame women for causing it (McCleary-Sills, 2013; USAID, 2008). Respondents near a hospital in Dar Es Salaam said women accept a certain amount of violence as a form of discipline (Laisser et al., 2011).

Wife-beating is not formally criminalized in Tanzania. The 1971 Law of Marriage Act forbids spouses from inflicting corporal punishment on one another, but no sanction is attached to this. Violence against women features prominently in official government discourse in terms of international legal instruments and policy documents. For instance, the Tanzanian government has ratified all the major international human rights instruments pertaining to VAW (World Bank, 2007). More unusually, it lists domestic violence in its National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (MKUKUKUTA) as one of the targeted poverty indicators (USAID, 2008).

Civil society activists, however, argue that official plans and policies do not translate into improvements in women’s lived realities (Women's Legal Aid Centre, 2007). The National Plan of Action for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against
Women and Children (2001) remains largely unimplemented (USAID, 2008). A variety of NGOs run legal aid programmes to help women navigate the justice system, but these are largely limited to the capital and cannot under the current legal system represent a woman in violence cases. Gender desks have been set up in some police stations, and there are two shelters for survivors of VAW in Dar Es Salaam. Overall, formal support services for survivors are minimal, and almost non-existent outside the capital (USAID, 2008). The overwhelming majority of VAW is never reported, neither to police nor to health or social services. An investigation into survivors’ help-seeking pathways concluded the following:

…even when a survivor does seek help, her pathway frequently begins and ends with the family. For example, a married woman who experiences partner violence is expected to first speak with her husband’s family members. While some mechanisms exist for family meetings to address such marital issues, the ultimate goal of any actions taken is to reconcile the marriage, and not necessarily to address the woman’s needs or concerns.

(McCleary-Sills, 2013, p. vii)

Nevertheless, there has been promising change since the time I generated the data presented in this thesis. In 2011, a set of policies to improve the health sector’s response to VAW were put in place. This, together with the recent establishment of a national multi-sectoral committee on violence against women and children, are taken by practitioners as signs that the Government of Tanzania is increasing its attention to VAW (Betron, 2013).

b. Researching domestic violence

The body of research on domestic violence is vast. Rather than attempt an exhaustive overview of the field, I will highlight two aspects of the Anglophone literature that are relevant to the research presented here. I will then describe how these play out in
the Sub-Saharan region that Tanzania is part of. Against this general background, I will give a more detailed account of feminist theorising regarding how the violence is related to the unequal gender order often referred to as patriarchy.

The first aspect of the literature is the imbalance between quantitative data, mostly on the individual level, and social theory. Several scholars (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Hunnicutt, 2009) have pointed out that the proliferation of statistical data on the prevalence of the violence, and its correlation with other factors (variously identified as causes, effects, ‘risk factors’, ‘protective factors’, ‘predictors’, ‘costs’, ‘needs’ or ‘vulnerabilities’) has not been accompanied by comparable gains in our theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. As Dutton (2004) has pointed out, the ‘ecological model’ commonly presented in lieu of theory is in fact no theory at all, but simply a framework by which to organise risk factors (p.168).

Exceptions to this include feminist researchers who have continued to generate data-driven theoretical observations (e.g., Stanko, 1997; Stark, 2007; Westmarland & Kelly, 2012). This is not surprising given that it was feminists who first placed domestic violence on the research agenda, precisely because they saw it as connected to structures of power and control in society, rather than as an individual ailment. However, the second aspect of the literature worth noting is that it is dominated by approaches that either ignore or reject feminist conceptualisations of the violence (Dragiewicz, 2011; Hanmer & Itzin, 2013; Winstok & Eisikovits, 2011). The Conflict Tactics Survey (CTS) connected with the ‘gender symmetry’ approach described in Article 2 is the most widely used survey instrument globally. Related to this are arguments such as Felson’s (2002) that VAW reflects violence in general, not gendered power relations. Feminists have lobbied for terms that made it clearer that their concern was with men’s violence against women than the term ‘domestic violence’ suggested. The terms most widely used now in the Anglophone literature, ‘intimate partner violence’ and ‘family violence’, are no less clear on this than ‘domestic violence’ is. As I explain in Article 2 of this thesis, the increasingly popular terms “gender-based violence” and “gender violence” do not necessarily denote a feminist approach to the violence, and are most commonly used for other
forms of VAW than domestic violence. Already in the 1990s, feminist VAW researchers remarked how swiftly domestic violence had been appropriated by non-feminist actors, as Kathleen Ferraro did in the US: “How has a feminist-inspired movement to help battered women and control male violence turned into an apolitical ‘women’s issue’ promoted by some of the most reactionary and exploitative politicians and institutions?” (Ferraro, 1996, p. 78). Feminist approaches dominate neither interventions against, nor research on, domestic violence (Bumiller, 2010; Kelly, 2005).

How are these tendencies reflected in the literature on domestic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa? As I describe in Article 2 of this thesis, social science in Africa is heavily influenced by the international development industry. Most of the research on VAW is geared instrumentally towards donor-funded interventions, which are largely limited to health services, or women’s empowerment projects described as “less-than-radical gender interventions, in which gender is applied as a depoliticized, technical device, generating log frames and statistics, but doing little to challenge unjust gender relations” (Mama, 2007, p. 153). As a result, there has been a surge also in Sub-Saharan Africa in quantitative and applied research without a comparable increase in publications that relate domestic violence to social theory, let alone feminist theory.

**Feminist conceptualizations of VAW and gender orders**

The idea that violence is important as part of an unequal gender order—the subordination of women to men—is central to feminist understandings of violence against women. Both feminists and their critics, however, have pointed out that the exact role of violence against women in the gender order remains unclear. Which causes which between the subordination of women and violence against women? Do men abuse their wives because power inequality means they can? Or is power inequality a result of their ability to abuse their wives? Is the violence facilitated by women’s subordination? Or is it provoked by their lack of it? Is VAW a last resort for those men who lack the means that more powerful men have of dominating women?
Or is it, on the contrary, a means at the disposal of men whose domination is so secure that they can get away with violence? Is violence a sign of power, or of weakness?\(^2\)

Feminist activists have pointed to male domination both as the intended effect of VAW (since Dobash & Dobash, 1979), and as the root cause of VAW (Johnson & Ferraro, 2004). Empirical research on the relationship has reflected rather than resolved this ambiguity, and consists mainly of quantitative macro investigations into whether gender inequality is a predictor of the violence. The results, as reviewed by Hunnicutt (2009), are mixed, with a decrease in gender inequality predicting both increases and decreases in VAW.

Meanwhile, research on male perpetrators of VAW has found that they typically choose for their victim a woman they have some power over (Horvath, Kelly, & Britain, 2006), but also that they see the violence as a way to assert power over the woman they victimize (Hearn, 1998; Messerschmidt, 2013b), and that they depict the partner they beat as dominating them (Anderson & Umberson, 2001). Some researchers have concluded from such findings that men who beat their wives are motivated not by power, but by their perceived powerlessness (Messerschmidt, 2013a), and that this form of VAW is best understood “not as an expression of power, but rather as an instance of its collapse” (Kimmel, 2002; also endorsed by Ray, 2011). As Johnson (1995) points out, however, this is not to say that VAW is actually an underdog’s last self-defence against female supremacy. Instead, he posits, the actual rise in women’s power against which VAW is a backlash is a rise large enough to threaten men’s sense of dominance, but not large enough to attain equality, let alone dominance. The perpetrators themselves assess the increase in women’s status as not only one that must be negated with violence because it threatens the gender order, but also one that still can be negated with violence because it has not

\(^2\) This conundrum has implications beyond the academic. The question of whether increased gender equality leads to more or less violence against women is also a real-world concern for policy-makers, practitioners and activists. For example, in one discussion among technical experts on GBV at the senior inter-agency level, several EuroAmerican practitioners said the increased VAW was due to too many women’s empowerment projects, and was solved by setting up equivalent projects for men.
overturned the gender order. In the model Stark (2007) builds from his work with victims and perpetrators, the historical trend of women moving up the gender order is accompanied by husbands’ increased use of coercion to control their wives. He describes this upward movement as women moving “up to inequality” to emphasise that it does not take women up to equality with men, let alone domination over them (p. 171).

Nevertheless, scholars leave themselves open to charges of self-contradiction when they present men’s VAW as a result of threats against their superiority while simultaneously supporting gender equality as the solution—as Anderson (2009) points out in her critique of Stark’s (2007) model. The clue to resolving this, she claims, lies in understanding gender as a multilevel social structure.

The concept of gender as a multi-layered social structure emerges from an integrative body of theory developed by several scholars (Ferree, Lorber, & Hess, 1999; Martin, 2003, 2004; Ridgeway, 2007, 2009; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004; Risman, 2004, 2011; Risman & Davis, 2013) who understand gender as “an institutionalized system of social practices for constituting people as two significantly different categories, men and women, and organising social relations of inequality on the basis of that difference” (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004, p. 510). Conceptualising gender as a multilevel structure makes it possible to think of different dimensions of the gender order being created, maintained or challenged in different ways at the same time. While the precise wording varies among the models (Risman, 2004), the levels are typically described as the macro/structural/institutional level, the interactional/interpersonal level, and the individual/personal level. Inequalities at one level can influence inequalities on other levels, but whether and how this happens is left open to empirical investigation. The precise form an unequal gender order takes varies across time and place, not only as a whole, but also in each of its dimensions, which in turn may influence one another in varied ways. As a result, a multitude of different constellations of unequal gender orders are possible.
In Africa, the indicators used to measure ‘gender inequality’ in social research and the health and development sector that dominates it are socio-economic indicators, such as sex-disaggregated data on education, income, employment, and political office. It is these indicators that interventions aimed at reducing violence against women through ‘women’s empowerment’ refer to. When we understand gender as a multilevel social structure, we can see that these indicators capture only one level of the gender structure, namely the institutional or macro level of gender inequality. The full picture of how VAW relates to the gender order is only revealed when we include also the interpersonal and individual levels of gender, and the dynamics between these levels (Anderson, 2005). Gender inequality at the institutional level does not provide the full picture of the gender order, since it leaves us guessing as to the shape of the gender order at the other levels. However, examining gender at the middle level can give useful insights into gender at the two other levels, according to Ridgeway (2007, 2009). In particular, the ideological dimension of this interpersonal level—the cultural norms governing how men and women relate to one another in social relations—is key to how principles organising society at the macro level are derived from individual differences (Ibid.). Similarly, Risman (2004) points out that it is knowledge about the gender structure at this “dimension of cultural interactional expectations” that is useful for social change, “as it is here that work needs to begin” (p. 446). In international policy and practice, the neglect of such norms of everyday interactions between men and women is associated with the loss of feminist framings of VAW (Kelly, 2005). The conceptualisation of gender as a multilevel structure that I will work with, then, is one that pays particular attention to the ideological dimension of the entire structure, but especially at the level of interpersonal relations.

The extent to which the gender inequality represented by socio-economic indicators coincides with the gender inequality found at other levels, and the dynamics that result between the levels, is key to the relationship between the gender order and VAW (Anderson, 2005). In addition, disjunctions between ideological and other dimensions can explain incongruities in empirical research on the role of VAW in patriarchy, according to Hunnicutt (2009). She claims that the reason macro studies of the relations between VAW and gender inequality have yielded mixed results is
that they fail to consider the degree to which the ideological dimension of gender inequality coincides with the macro dimensions they measure. She points out that where some structural constraints to gender equality in the political and economic spheres are removed, but at the same time, norms and values that prescribe gender inequality in these spheres remain in place, then the apparent advances towards a more equal gender order may be accompanied by increases in VAW. This would not actually be a case of VAW caused by gender equality, but if we did not look at the ideological dimension of the gender order, we might well conclude that it was. If we looked at all dimensions, we would be able to see that it was in the absence of a change in the ideological dimension of the gender order to accompany the reduction of structural gender inequality that VAW increased.

The particular importance of social norms, values and beliefs regarding gender—the ideological dimension—in understanding the role of VAW in patriarchy is recognized by several scholars, including Anderson (2005), who points to findings that the empowerment of individual women in India led to more intimate partner violence in areas where cultural conservatism was high (Koenig, Ahmed, Hossain, & Mozumder, 2003). It is because “gender ideology that favours gender inequality can diminish structural gains” made towards gender equality that Hunnicutt (2009, p. 566) recommends that feminists build theory on how VAW and male dominance are linked by mapping the variety of not only structural but also ideological shapes that patriarchy takes across time, space and material contexts. The data presented here contribute towards this.

The multilevel model of gender enables empirical investigations of how gender order and VAW are related beyond the one-dimensional question of which-causes-which. The multiplicity of levels is one reason why the model makes it possible to research such relationships “without accepting simplistic unidirectional arguments” (Risman 2004, p. 434). Another is its incorporation of Giddens’ (1979) notion of structuration, by which the social structures which constrain people’s choices are themselves the product of people’s choices. The social structure of gender is thus characterised by the duality of structure, which Giddens describes as
…the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitution.

(Giddens, 1979, p. 5)

Framing gender as a dual structure makes it possible to understand causality between the gender order and VAW as recursive: The gender order may shape the choice of whether or not to be violent, but violence may also shape the gender order. When both are possible, it is no longer the either-or question that is the obvious line of inquiry into understanding how violence against women relates to their subordinate position in the gender order. Among the other lines of inquiry that seem more promising as a result is the one pursued here: how norms supporting the violence relate to the gender order.

c. Africa in Social Science

This research project necessitates clarification on two issues. What place is there for “Western” social science in Africa? And what place for Africa in social science? I will deal with each of these two questions in turn.

i. Applying “Western” theory to Africa

Using social theory to understand empirical data is a mainstay of social science, yet fraught with particular ethical and epistemological difficulties when the empirical reality studied is situated in Africa. Since almost all scientific theory can be labelled “Western”, to apply theories from social science to African empirical realities, as I do in this thesis, is to expose oneself to charges of racism and imperialism. I will therefore address these charges here, separately from the specific theories I aim to use.
ii. **Pulling up the drawbridge, or being quarantined?**

Transposing Western constructs to developing countries without attention to
difference and local context does smack of empire, and has quite rightly been charged
with ethnocentric imperialism. As well as being ethically objectionable, it makes for
inaccurate science and ineffective interventions. In this sense, the postcolonial
critique of the wholesale export and imposition of constructs, theories and methods
that are developed in the so-called West, without contextualization, is a necessary
one.

It is precisely to steer clear of such continued injustice, however, that several scholars
in and of the post-colonies question the ethical and epistemological superiority of the
stance that “Western” theory should not be used in the Global South. They reject the
claim that this is a counter-stance to ethnocentric imperialism. The work of post-
colonial philosopher Uma Narayan, for instance, exposes the logical and ethical
fallacies by which Western scholars claim ‘their’ social science does not apply to the
so-called Non-West. For example, by explaining how “Western”, “non-Western”, and
the *difference* between them were themselves “politically motivated colonial
constructions” for imperial purposes, she shows that it is a mistake to equate cultural
imperialism with the assumption of *sameness*, and to thereby think that respecting
non-Western *difference* is a counter-stance to imperialism (Narayan, 1998, p. 89).

One implication of this is that attention to difference does not in itself make social
science less imperialistic than assumptions of sameness. Cain (2000) builds this
argument by positioning sameness and difference as two equally problematic starting
points, the first ‘occidentalist’ and the second ‘orientalist’. Social scientists engaging
with Southern empirical realities need to beware of both these twin evils, she
emphasizes, since orientalism—assuming that ‘Other’ societies are completely
different from our own, that ‘they’ are everything that ‘we’ are not—is no less
ethnocentric than the occidentalism it seeks to avoid\(^3\).

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\(^3\) This is a simplified version of Said’s (1978) more complex concept of ‘orientalism’. 
For postcolonial theorist Mbembe, it is “in relation to Africa that the notion of otherness has been taken farthest” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 2). He describes the implications of exempting Africa from social science and “all that holds elsewhere” as offensive, if not racist:

Whether in everyday discourse or in ostensibly scholarly narratives, the continent is the very figure of ‘the strange’. It is similar to that inaccessible ‘Other with a capital O’ evoked by Jacques Lacan. In this extremity of the Earth, reason is supposedly permanently at bay, and the unknown has supposedly attained its highest point. Africa, a headless figure threatened with madness and quite innocent of any notion of center, hierarchy or stability, is portrayed as … a bottomless abyss where everything is noise, yawning gap, and primordial chaos.

(Mbembe, 2001, p. 3)

The stance that Africa is too different from “the West” for social scientists to use “Western theories” there, then, is not a stance against ethnocentrism, imperialism and racism. Furthermore, seen from the vantage point of social scientists actually working in and on Africa, it does more harm to African social science than good. Sociologist Ari Sitas describes its “counter-damage”: reducing “a complex intellectual heritage in one grand counter-gesture” leaves little “creative breathing space for sociologists in the South” (Sitas, 2006, p. 360). Similarly, in gender studies, African social scientists have described how the fixation with difference and “Africanicity”, a preoccupation they attribute primarily to Westerners and anthropologists, has undermined possibilities for critical social research in Africa (Lewis, 2004, 2008; McFadden, 2004). Their argument that the stance serves to depoliticize research on issues that are essentially about power relations, makes sense: a stance that isolates a society as an “exception, its power relations exempt from theoretical analysis” would logically benefit the more powerful within that society (Mbembe, 2012, p. 11).

From an African vantage point, then, the prohibition against using non-African theories to understand social phenomena in Africa seems not so much a case of
African social science pulling up the drawbridge against imperialism, as it is African social science being placed under embargo, or quarantined. Thus the task of a researcher who wants to add usefully to an understanding of power relations locally without repeating imperialist mistakes of the past is more complex than a simple insistence on the non-applicability of ‘Western’ theory can afford. However, also when it stops short of explicitly prohibiting theory, the orientalist approach is still one of the two routes that Cain warns criminologists to steer clear of when engaging with the Global South. Instead, she recommends finding a way *between* (or perhaps beyond) orientalism and occidentalism. This is what I try to do in the research presented here.

The route Cain (2001) recommended over a decade ago remains the road less-travelled, in that a post-colonial qualitative researcher in Africa is still expected to take an orientalist approach. Coincidentally, the work she points to as exemplifying orientalist approaches to Africa deals with couple conflict in the exact same location as one of my field sites. I will now build on and extend her critique of this work with my own. The purpose of this is to concretise what the above somewhat abstract critiques of orientalism entail in critical criminological engagement with African empirical realities, in order to explicate my own position.

### iii. An orientalist approach to couple conflict in a Tanzanian community

“Let us take our point of departure far away. Let us move to Tanzania. Let us approach our problem from the sunny hillside of the Arusha province.” This is how couple conflict in Tanzania first enters the criminological literature. The article to take Tanzania as its point of departure was a seminal one: Nils Christie’s (1977, p. 2) “Conflict as Property”, published in a flagship journal over three decades ago, is currently a criminological classic, and a foundational text in restorative justice and informal dispute resolution.
It is also, I will argue, a classic example of how not to approach the Global South as a critical criminologist. I do so in order to illustrate the pitfalls that face any social scientist aiming to make theoretical sense of empirical data from the Global South, and to explain how I chose to navigate this difficult terrain.

Nils Christie uses the case from a community court in Arusha as an illustration of his larger argument that the formal criminal justice system in “our” societies amounts to the ‘theft’ of conflicts from victims and neighbourhoods by bureaucrats and professionals. He introduces the case as a “happening”. He describes it as happy and lively, and eventually tells us that it is a court case. The case being tried is that of two “former lovers”, he informs us: she wants to break it off, and the purpose of the court is to determine how much she owes him for clothes she has worn and expenses he has covered.

He then completes the description by saying that the points worth noting are those on which it differs from Western court cases, and listing these. The parties to the conflict were at the centre of the room, spoke actively and were eagerly listened to; their friends, neighbours, and relatives, as well as the wider audience, chipped in but did not take over; the local party secretaries took a back seat, and there were no reporters, because “everybody” was there.

What role does this foundational text of community justice give to Tanzanian empirical data? The description of how a conflict between a couple is dealt with by a Tanzanian community serves simply as a colourful and exotic illustration of what “we” in modern societies have lost. Christie then proceeds to his argument proper, which is that “we” have too many professionals, and have lost our neighbourhoods and sense of community—yet can, through the lesson to be learned from this happy happening on those ‘sunny hillsides’, regain what we have lost.

The trouble with this approach, as my above demarcation of “we” suggests, is that it centres around the West: the writer and the reader are both presumed to be Western, and the reader’s existing and also desired knowledge is presumed to be about Western empirical realities. Where is the presumed reader ‘coming from’, in terms of
what she is already familiar with, her pre-existing knowledge? Certainly not Africa. Africa is “far away” from the “here” of criminological inquiry, although thanks to Christie, she will get a glimpse into it. Nor is Africa where she wants to go: this criminological article does not aim to help her make sense of criminological phenomena in Africa. African empirical realities are interesting only in so far as they help us see Western empirical reality in a new light.

This dependence of Christie’s story on a Euro-American vantage point is more easily seen by considering how the story holds up when surveyed from a vantage point outside of Euro-America. Obviously, for a reader based in Tanzania, Tanzania is not “far away”. However, seeing a European present “the sunny hillside of Arusha province” as far away from himself, also seems bizarre. There is not, nor has there ever been, any “Arusha province”, but that is a minor detail. The region known as Arusha is cold and misty. It is not “sunny” by Tanzanian standards, and even less so in an African perspective. Due to its cool climate and high altitudes, Arusha accommodated some of the earliest European settlers, schools and hospitals in East Africa. Because of the infrastructure that has resulted from this continued Euro-American influence, as well as its low temperatures, some Tanzanians will say that Arusha is kama Ulaya: like Europe. Thus Arusha is neither sunny, nor provincial, nor far far away. As will be seen in Section 2D of this thesis, the court that Christie saw was itself a product of this western influence, rather than an indigenous African ‘other’ way of doing things.

What we also see when we look at Christie’s Tanzanian case from a less Eurocentric vantage point, is a number of cracks that he glosses over. From a non-white vantage point, the most conspicuous detail in the room into which Christie invites the reader, is not the ways in which Tanzania is different from Europe. The most conspicuous detail, in fact the elephant in the room, is his own white self. To what extent is the story he tells us simply a reflection of how things are presented to “wazungu”

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4 This is the Swahili term used to refer to white people/foreigners. It is sometimes derogatory.
him? How would *he* know, for instance, that the man and the woman were eagerly listened to, and that the relatives merely contributed, but did not “take over” in having their say, and that the audience were joking in a good-natured way, and not jeering in a mocking way? Such nuances and meanings are not easily conveyed in translation. Christie never mentions that the story he tells us is what was translated to him, but the languages involved make it unlikely that it was not. Christie glosses over the effect of his own positionality on the story he tells.

Also absent from Christies account are power relations within the scene he describes. He presents the case as an innocuous one: A man and a woman were “lovers”, and now she wants to “break it off”. The community simply wants to help the couple by making sure this happens in the correct way: calculating the cost of clothes worn is complicated. While Christie presents the community process as an ideal for emulation, an observer more familiar with power relations in this empirical context will see warning lights making them wary of such an idealization. From this vantage point, the “investment” Christie refers to, that the woman is asked to return, is all too recognizable as “bride price”, which often ends up with the woman’s parents. If that is the case, then this is no simple lovers’ tiff, with relatives benignly trying to help the young couple calculate their debts fairly. Such a recognition would throw into disarray Christie’s entire analysis of the actors’ respective roles and the idealness thereof. Or to put it more bluntly, as an actual Tanzanian reader of Christie’s anecdote did: “This is just a story of how a community gathers to decide whether a woman is allowed to end her sexual relations with a man without returning him certain items, even the clothes off her back. I mean, *how black must we be*, for you guys not to see that?”

Thus Christie’s celebrated description of a Tanzanian community response to a couple’s conflict is inaccurate and idealized. His depiction of the Tanzanian model is informed not so much by a contextual understanding of Tanzania, as by a

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5 This is how a Tanzanian student responded to this article after I had shared it with her by email, as explained in Section 3A.
disenchantment with the Western model. One might argue that this does not matter, since the focus is not on Tanzania, but on critiquing the Western criminal justice system. To argue thus, however, would only bring the eurocentrism into sharper relief: Non-Western empirical realities are only interesting for the pedagogical contrast they provide to the real scientific endeavour, which is to understand to the West.

Nevertheless, the suggestion that all the writer sees in Tanzania is Tanzanians’ blackness, seems at first like an unfair accusation of racism. After all, it was by refusing to take the role expected of him as a Norwegian in 1970s Tanzania, a role he found imperialist, that Christie arrived at his alternative reading of Tanzanian empirical reality. In what was the heyday of European ‘experts’ teaching Tanzanians in villages across the country how to build new institutions, situating the ‘expertise’ among the villagers themselves, and saying it was European institutions that could learn from them, was a way to turn the tables on the white arrogance he felt expected to step into.

What the Tanzanian reader is reacting to, however, is the orientalism that results from an unreflective reaction to occidentalism. In other words, when our main goal in relating to African empirical realities is to remember to factor in and valorise difference, we fail to recognize familiar phenomena as familiar when we see them among the Other. Thus when a Tanzanian reader says “This is just a story of (X). How (Y) must we be (to you), for you not to see that?”, he is critiquing the writer for not recognizing the familiar and unexotic phenomenon X because of his exaggerated and inappropriate focus on difference Y. Regardless of whether Y is skin colour, what he is reacting against is orientalism, which he denounces as racist.

Christie is far from the only social scientist whose attempts to avoid ethnocentric imperialism have resulted in an orientalist approach that is no less fraught with it. Indeed, efforts to escape the “West is Best” narrative frequently end up in the equally West-centred narrative of the “Big Bad West” (Narayan, 2013). Christie’s approach matches what Africanists Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) describe as a
romanticisation of African realities on the basis that they are not like “us” —which is no less self-obsessed, they point out, than a rejection of African realities on the basis that they are not like “us”. Overturning the occidentalist approach to the Global South in this way, they argue, is a widespread approach that “courts the same self-obsession [it] faults.” (p.116). It is simply “turning the story upside-down, while leaving intact the Manichean dualism that holds Euro-America and its others in the same fixed embrace.” (p.117)

iv. The Global South as the future of social science

While the prospects of engaging theoretically with African empirical realities have been marred by the West-obsessed framing of the continent as Other, Africa-focused criminologists have been making do by ‘looting the conceptual toolbox’ (Dixon, 2004). The past decade, however, has seen a shift in Western academia away from the questions of whether Western theory can be applied to Africa, and whether ‘they’ are similar or different to ‘us’, to questioning the value of social theory that excludes Africa. I read this development optimistically, as signalling an emerging recognition of the value of studying Southern empirical realities not for what they tell us about the West, but because we need social science that can make sense of more than a minority of human society, and that for social theories to be truly social, they need to speak to Southern as well as Northern empirical realities.

A growing number of social scientists from disparate disciplines are beginning to question the assumptions by which Tanzania, like the majority of the world, has been firmly placed outside the remit of modernist social science (e.g., Aas, 2007; Aas, 2012; Bhambra, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; Connell, 2007, 2011; Rosa, 2014). They claim that social theory is flawed as a result of these longstanding assumptions, and that the greatest potential for its improvement, and in that sense the future of social science, lies in the Global South. According to Comaroff and Comaroff (2012), this is not only because of the contemporary historical events, such as the changing geographies of centre-periphery, but also because precisely the traditional “ex-centricity” of the Global South makes it a vantage point from which
universal issues may be grasped more acutely, both theoretically and empirically (p.117). Referring specifically to Africa, they argue that social science needs “Theory from the South” to help make sense of phenomena in modern society. Their “Theory from the South” differs slightly from Connell’s (2007) “Southern Theory”. By it, they mean not theory made by Southerners, or theory simply about the South, but rather, “about the effect of the South itself on theory, the effects of its ex-centricity” (2012, p. 2). Similarly, even in criminology, including Southern realities is being recognised as “not only a question of epistemological justice, but increasingly also an analytical imperative and an opportunity for theoretical innovation” (Aas, 2012, p. 16). The assumed role of the state is one of the ways in which criminology’s inattention to Southern modernities has inhibited theoretical development, and where de-parochialisation opens up new opportunities (Aas, 2007, 2012). Two criminological concepts whose theoretical shortcomings have already been linked to unexamined assumptions about the role of the state are social control and deviance.

d. Law, Deviance and Social Control

Until Stanley Cohen, among others, directed a more critical light on it, ‘social control’ was understood mainly as a positive mechanism by which society prevented antisocial behaviours such as delinquency, crime and sexual deviance. However, as this critical approach to social control became popular, he complained that social control had “become somewhat of a Mickey Mouse concept” (Chunn & Gavigan, 1988, p. 107). As studies “unmask[ed] seemingly benign bureaucratic institutions and the medico-legal professions as social control multiplied into a tedious repetition” (Chunn & Gavigan, 1988, p. 112), the concept was reduced to a way of discrediting any state action, and thereby lost its analytical value.

Social control’s twin concept, deviance, was also debunked for lack of analytical precision in the 1980s. Deviance is dead as a concept, claimed Sumner, the moment we realise that what the phenomena we study as deviance have in common is no
inherent quality, but merely the fact that they each break some rule created by people in power (Sumner, 1994). To examine drug use, delinquency and cross-dressing for causal explanations of deviance is to side blindly with the state, he claims, since it requires a naturalization of the state’s labelling of these disparate phenomena as ‘deviance’.

Sumner’s obituary sparked a debate about what, if anything, could be salvaged from the “death of deviance” (Ben-Yehuda, 2006; Konty, 2006; Marshall, Douglas, & McDonnell, 2006). Konty (2006) suggests a return to Becker’s (1966) original definition of deviance as a methodological one: we can tell what behaviour is deviant by observing what people treat as deviant. Ben-Yehuda (2006) recommends using deviance in tandem with social control, focusing on morality and power as the key ingredients of both.

The use of social control as a “Mickey Mouse concept” that could portray any action of the state as social control, reflects a certain unreflexive fixation with the state that overrode engagement with the concept’s analytical meaning. Investigating the ‘deviance’ of certain behaviours requires a similarly unreflexive understanding of the state’s labelling of those behaviours as ‘deviant’. Against this background, I choose to decouple the concepts from the state, by focusing on power and ideas of right and wrong without fixing an assumed role of the state. I also heed Konty’s (2006) methodological advice, and treat what people treat as deviant as data to be analysed.

While Sumner declared deviance a defunct object of study once we see the rules as simply the creation of people in power, I use ‘deviance’ precisely because of that: for what the rules reveal about power (Adler & Adler, 2006). In using the terms social control and deviance, I do not to assume that rules are agreed on with full and free consent; rather, I use the concepts to examine relations between community norms and coercion. I use ‘deviance’ as Marshall et al. (2007) reconceptualise it: “behavior that breaks a rule within a social group and is labelled with disapproval” (p. 218). Understanding deviance not as explanation but rather as an instance of rule-breaking allows us to examine “what rules are broken, according to whom” (Ibid., p. 80). A
study of deviance and social control is then a study of *who rules*. I define social control as an effort to enforce a shared rule in response to a perceived violation of this rule.

If deviance is not defined by official rules, but rather by what participants perceive as deviance, then law-abiding behaviour may be deviant, and criminal behaviour may be social control. Most of the studies that take the decoupling of the state to this conclusion draw on Donald Black’s (1983) theory of “Crime as Social Control”. He posits that behaviour deemed crime by state law is sometimes in itself an effort to define or respond to someone else’s conduct as deviant. Such studies have presented not only vigilantism (Weisburd, 1988), but also acts as diverse as genocide (Campbell, 2009) and suicide (Manning, 2012), as forms of self-help by citizens who enforce rules when the state does not.

While the ‘death of deviance’ debate challenged criminology’s state alignment, legal pluralism challenged ‘state centralism’ in legal theory and socio-legal studies. Legal pluralists critiqued the presumption that the state was the sole contributor to social order through law and had monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Twining, 2009b). They drew on Tanzania and other post-colonies for examples of the wealth of ‘other’ laws, primarily in customary law. As with studies of social control and deviance, the retrospective reckoning of this scholarship has revealed a number of problems with legal pluralism (Melissaris, 2004, 2013; Tamanaha, 1995, 2008; Twining, 2009a, 2009b). My four main concerns, among those raised in this literature, are as follows.

First, there was continuous slippage from descriptive to normative, an idealization of legal pluralism, with several writers prescribing the informalist ideas (Melissaris, 2013; Twining, 2009b). This problem was further compounded by a second issue: the inattention to how Customary Law was an invention for the purposes of colonial governance, and very much a reflection of power dynamics (Tamanaha, 2008; Twining, 2009b). I describe the shape this took in Tanzania in Section 2D. Thirdly, legal pluralism remained largely statist in character, in that it focused on what was formalized as Customary Law and how that related to state law (Melissaris, 2013;
Finally, the question of what law is remained unanswered, with critics asking whether decoupling law from the state did not mean that we had to treat all social control as law (Melissaris, 2013; Tamanaha, 2008; Twining, 2009b).

One conclusion drawn from this reckoning is that legal pluralism is more valuable as a radicalization of the way of thinking about the law than as a legal theory (Melissaris, 2013). Law can be studied as discourses that are reduced to binary schema of legal/illegal, allowed/prohibited, rather than as structure. Seen through such a “normative pluralist” lens, formal state law is only one of many forms of social practice concerned with ordering relations between persons (Twining, 2009b). Alongside it, many informal normative orders exist which also maintain social order within a group. Law, then, is defined as what people in a social group label as law—or, more precisely, what they see as common shared norms of interaction that everyone should comply with and that should be enforced by sanctions and punishments (Tamanaha, 2008). This makes it possible to identify norms by their social control and regulative functions regardless of their relationship to the state legal apparatus.

The re-conceptualisations that emerge from the appraisals of each of these two separate fields—deviance and social control on the one hand, and legal pluralism on the other—point in a common direction. Normative pluralists acknowledge that their approach might also be called pluralism in social control, since it encompasses most forms of social control (Griffiths, 2003; Tamanaha, 2008; Twining, 2009b). What the actors themselves see as law and deviance in their group has become the central starting point to both fields. It is data on this that I present in this thesis.

The definition of law used in this study, then, will be one from the revised social control and deviance literature that is compatible with normative pluralism, namely “a system of rules with a regime of punishments attached to ensure compliance, where the sanction attached makes people obey” (Marshall et al., 2006, p. 88). It may
be informal, and it may or may not involve the government, but people understand it as commonly shared rules worthy of enforcement.

**Law and social control in Africa**

The decoupling of law, social control and deviance from the state increases the concepts’ affordances for understanding African empirical realities. Within African Studies, political scientists and historians have documented a considerable grey area between state social control and individual deviance, in which a variety of non-state actors enforce law and order.

We need a basic awareness of the historical role and political nature of this grey area if we are to understand how social control and deviance play out in Tanzania. One common approach that lacks such an awareness, and thus illustrates its importance, is that which links colonialism to crime in Africa by claiming that colonialism weakened norm enforcement at the community and family level by disrupting African structures and replacing them with alien institutions (Arthur, 1991; 1997; Stamatel, 2009; Sumner, 1982). The good intentions of this approach resemble those of Christie’s: it seeks to avoid colluding with colonialism by siding with traditional African community norms against “Western” state institutions.

A brief look at the historical role and political nature of the grey area of non-state norm enforcement in East Africa reveals that the entities this approach supports are not in fact counterweights to colonialism, but rather agents who were deeply embroiled in the colonial endeavour. Colonial powers controlled their subjects through indirect rule, which meant that social control and norm enforcement by non-state actors was in itself a strategy of colonial rule. Colonial rule was enacted through intermediaries presented as “traditional African” institutions. The social control mechanisms of institutions such as family, tribe, community and chieftdom were strengthened during colonial times for the purposes of colonial rule.
The “African institutions” that post-colonial states inherited, then, were those which had served the colonial strategy of indirect rule. Post-colonial states largely continued this strategy of rule by intermediaries, maintaining social order through a multiplicity of social control agents (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2008, 2010; Bagayoko, 2012). This post-colonial continuation of colonial strategies, of ruling by proxy and relying on more or less invented ‘traditional’ actors to maintain law and order rather than seeking a monopoly on law enforcement, is typical of the bifurcated African state (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2008, 2010; Mamdani, 1996).

Rather than being undermined by colonial governance, then, social control at the level of local communities and families formed part of colonial and post-colonial governance. Customary law was a colonial invention, and community norm enforcement in general was at the heart of indirect rule, imbued with considerable power by colonial and post-colonial regimes (Lovett, 1996; Mbilinyi, 1988; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Studies of normative pluralism in Africa show how colonial rulers strategically left indigenous norm enforcement on the community and family level largely alone, and enforced pre-existing agents of social control there more often than they abolished them. Where they did introduce transplanted state law, it was never effective in dictating everyday social life, nor did they ever intend it to be (Tamanaha, 2008). Both during and after colonial rule, behaviour at this level has often been governed by community norms, and state law has been largely impotent (Tamanaha, 2008). Some Africanist scholars even go so far as to claim that the historical and foundational social contract for most Africans is not between the state and individuals, but between communities and individuals (Leonard, 2013).

The balance of power between formal state law and informal community norms in Africa differs, then, both from the ‘modern’ states with which criminologists are more familiar, and from the Africa they have imagined. Like Christie’s (1977) community-owned court case, presided over by Party Secretaries who took a back seat, the community in the bifurcated African state enforces its norms with the blessing of the state, not in competition with it. We can only see community norms as the opposite of colonialism if we are unaware of the dynamics of collusion,
compromise and power-sharing at the centre of colonial governance. Sustained colonial rule was not a product of force alone: it was also a negotiated compromise between coloniser and colonised.

This is particularly important in relation to gender. As African feminists have pointed out, the compromise between colonizing and colonized from which institutions of colonial and post-colonial control derive, was negotiated between men at the expense of colonised women (Manji, 1999; Mbilinyi, 1988; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Studies of the legal pluralism that resulted have shown how the realms relegated to customary law, namely the realms of community and family, are the same realms which most affect women’s everyday lives, to a greater extent than men’s (Manji, 1999). In addition, the lens of normative pluralism allows us to see that this insight applies not only to the norms formalised by the colonial and post-colonial state through Customary Law, but also to the enforcement in these realms of community norms whose sanctioning by the state is not formalized with the official label ‘law’. The community and family institutions that were vested with norm-enforcing power, whether formal or informal, by the colonial compromise, were the institutions through which men controlled “their” women (Lovett, 1996; Manji, 1999; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003).

This characteristic of African colonial history in general has been confirmed in historical accounts from colonial Tanzania (then Tanganyika) in particular. Lovett (1996), for instance, has shown how men who supplied the colonial economy with migrant labour could in return count on the colonial regime to support their community’s control over their wives, with specific reference to one of the regions (Buha, now Kigoma) studied here. On a national level, Mbilinyi has shown how the colonial state made strenuous efforts to keep women forcibly subjugated to their husbands (Mbilinyi, 1988), and how such colonial strategies to control women not only endured in the post-colonial period, but were revitalized then (Mbilinyi, 1997). Ivaska (2002) has shown how official authorities in post-colonial Tanzania appealed to the unofficial enforcement of community-level norms to control women.
Against this background, it is not surprising that a women’s rights lawyer I spoke with in Tanzania claimed that it was not the alien institutions that colonialists imposed that harmed women the most, but rather the community norm enforcement mechanisms that they invented and reinforced. Studies that take as their starting point women’s everyday lives to see what colonial and post-colonial regulation most affects women, find that state law intervenes very little in East African women’s lives, and is often less powerful than informal community norms. For instance, most cases where women claim state law is broken, are never judged by state law, but are settled instead according to informal community norms (Manji, 1999).

A closer look at the historical role and political nature of the grey area between state social control and individual deviance, then, shows that the non-state enforcement of community norms in Africa was vested with power by colonial and post-colonial regimes, and played a key role in securing a particular political order between colonisers and colonized, and between men and women. Community norms and their enforcement are not outside politics. Rather, just as the debates over deviance and social control have shown formal law to be about who rules, community norms and their enforcement are no less political.

e. Violence and social order

When the bifurcated African state shares power with a multiplicity of social control agents, it also shares the right to the legitimate use of force (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2008; Bagayoko, 2012; Leopold, 2005). As Ebo (2007) points out, “the postcolonial African state has hardly had a monopoly of legitimate force at any point in time” (p. 38). When such non-state actors use violence against citizens, then, they are not usurping the state’s prerogative, but rather carrying out responsibilities the state has shared with them as intermediaries. Their violence, then, is not deviance from the

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6 Personal interview with a lawyer in an organization giving legal assistance to women, Dar Es Salaam, August 2006.
social order. On the contrary, it maintains and enforces the prevailing social order. This non-state violence is social control, and as such, reflects who rules.

Tanzania features prominently in the literature on African rural communities engaged in such “private” violence to maintain law and order (Cleaver, Franks, Maganga, & Hall, 2013; Kelsall, 2003; Miguel, 2005; Tanner, 2010). Community responses to cattle-rustling, for instance, the so-called SenguSengu, have attracted considerable attention from Western researchers (e.g., Abrahams, 1987; Bukurura, 1994, 1995; Fleisher, 2000; Heald, 2002, 2006; Paciotti & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2004; Paciotti & Hadley, 2004; Weisburd, 1988). Scholars classify it as vigilantism or community-up policing, thus acknowledging it as “actions taken to control behavior deemed to be deviant, outside the purview of the official justice system” (Fleisher, 2000, p. 209). In other words, this “private” violence is norm-enforcing: a form of social control. Moreover, the violence of the SenguSengu is neither on behalf of the state nor rejected by the state (Heald, 2007). This non-state actor’s use of violence to maintain social order on the local level is tolerated by the state insofar as the order it maintains is compatible with that of the state. In this sense, it instantiates the post-colonial strategy of states ruling by proxy instead of seeking monopoly on legitimate violence. Pertinent to my research is the hitherto-uninvestigated question of whether wife-beating plays a similar role.

What is the sociological importance of such African cases where order is maintained by non-state actors’ use of force? According to traditional understandings of the scope of the discipline, the answer is ‘not much’. The founding fathers conceived of sociology as the study of modern society, and built on, rather than challenged, the prevailing Westphalian understanding of the modern state as that in which the use of violence by non-state actors to enforce social order was delegitimised—that is, where the state sought monopoly on legitimately ordering violence. Thus, empirical examples from Africa of non-state actors using legitimately ordering violence simply confirm that African societies lack the key characteristic to be studied as modern societies, and are thus outside the scope of sociological theory.
As long as African cases of legitimate uses of ordering violence by non-state actors are interpreted as locating Africa outside of social theory, such cases cannot be used to speak to social theory on the relation between violence and social order. Sociologists of violence in “Western” societies, however, are increasingly calling for a re-examination of how violence relates to social order (Walby, 2013). Ray (2011), for instance, in reviewing the scholarship on the role of violence in social order, claims that social theory has neglected the ordering role of violence. What this critique amounts to is the claim that even in supposedly “modern” societies, ordering violence takes many more forms than law enforcement by state actors; thus the violence-order nexus cannot be reduced to a simple division of the state’s legitimate violence as the use of force for law and order on the one hand, and the delegitimised violence of citizens as deviance from the social order, if not rebellion against it, on the other (Ray, 2011). Walby (2013), for instance, interprets the fact that violence against women and ethnic minorities was never fully outlawed in the UK and US as signifying that even in these quintessentially “modern” societies, the state “shared the monopoly on violence with racists and misogynists” who used it to enforce racial and gender orders (p. 100). On this basis, she points out, we can question whether any society has ever qualified as “modern” by these criteria.

Questioning the grounds on which ordering violence has been equated with state violence undermines entrenched perceptions not only of divisions between modern and non-modern, but also of the opposition between violence and social order. The re-conceptualization that this makes possible, claims Walby (2013), is a more accurate one, in that most violence is perpetrated by the more powerful against the less powerful, and thus does not fit the image of the underdog’s revolt against the social order. While individuals’ violence has been studied as an outcome of social order, this re-conceptualisation demands that we also look at how violence constitutes social order.

Ray (2011) highlights feminist research on violence against women as the exception to the general scholarly neglect of the order-violence nexus, and Hearn (2013) points to domestic violence research in particular as a promising arena for developing
sociological theory on how violence actually relates to social order. One example of this is how feminist research on domestic violence in rural North American communities has challenged the collective efficacy/social disorganization theory of crime. According to this theory, crime signifies a breakdown in social order: the community lacks ‘efficacy’ in social control, and is not organized enough to mobilise its shared norms against violations of those norms (Sampson, 2008). Rural communities are presented as particularly high in collective efficacy and thus low in crime. As critics have pointed out, however, this assumes that the community’s norms that are enforced coincide with official criminal law, and that violations of them thus coincide with violations of criminal law, i.e., “crime” (Barclay, Donnermeyer, & Jobes, 2004). Collective efficacy may prevent some crimes, explains rural criminologist Donnermeyer (2012), while facilitating other crimes: it all depends on what these shared norms are that the community is efficacious in mobilising. DeKeseredy and Schwartz’ (2009) research on communities with strong collective efficacy shows domestic violence as illustrative of this. Men’s violence against their wives did not signify a breakdown in social order, or a failure in collective efficacy. Rather, the violence was facilitated by the community’s mobilization of shared norms. Thus domestic violence shows the following. Insofar as a community’s norms concern ideals of what the social order should look like, whether a particular form of violence is facilitated or prevented by those norms depends on its compatibility with the social order they prescribe. In other words, rather than being a sign that the community was unable to enforce social order, tolerated domestic violence was violence that was compatible with the particular social order prescribed in that community.

The idea of domestic violence as the social control of women in modern society challenges the assumed antithesis between individuals’ violence and social order that is supposed to distinguish contemporary Western societies from African ones. However, in the literature on social control and deviance, studies of the social control of women in modern societies rarely analyse domestic violence as a form of this, but focus instead on the scientific ‘management’ of women by state bureaucracies and the
medico-legal professions. In this they reflect the debunked understandings of social control and violence described in Section 2D of this thesis, whereby individual violence is deviance, and the agents of social control are large formal institutions. One exception is Gagné’s (1992) ethnography of impoverished communities in rural Appalachia, which analyses husbands’ violence against their wives as social control.

Nevertheless, thanks to the increasing recognition that the antithesis between individuals’ violence and social order does not hold even in the most ‘modern’ societies, the ordering nature of non-state violence can finally be analysed sociologically, rather than just used as a contrasting illustration of what is outside the scope of sociological inquiry. In other words, the findings presented in Article 3, of how wife-beating is legitimised on the basis that it constitutes and maintains a certain social order, can contribute to social theory, and more specifically, “theory from the South”, as the Comaroffs (2012) call it.

f. A Gramscian approach to community norms

How can concepts derived from Antonio Gramsci’s work help to make sense of how people talk about wife-beating in Tanzania? Gramsci’s theory of hegemony deals with the roles power, violence and norms play in relation to one another, and thus seems a promising framework for understanding what norms surrounding VAW reveal about power relations. However, Antonio Gramsci theorized hegemony to make sense of the communist party’s difficulty in overturning unequal class relations at a specific historical moment in history. Thus the power he speaks of is that of the state, civil society and the bourgeoisie, not men’s power over women, and the violence is that of the state and the political classes, not that of husbands against wives. My choice to deploy Gramscian hegemonic theory to analyse how people talk about wife-beating in Tanzania thus involves some adaptation. Fortunately, as Stuart Hall (1986) pointed out in using Gramsci’s analysis of class relations to analyse race relations, this way of adapting and extending Gramsci’s notions in order to make
them speak to current social questions is in itself a continuation of Gramsci’s own approach to social analysis. I will therefore use his notions of hegemony, consent, coercion and common sense as they account for the stability not of class relations, but of gender relations. This has proved a fruitful interpretation in social science (e.g., Cockburn & Ormrod, 1993; Connell, 1987; Gottfried, 1998; Hearn, 2004; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004).

The basic notion of hegemony that I draw from Gramsci’s work (Gramsci, Hoare, & Nowell-Smith, 1971) and interpretations of his work (Bates, 1975; Jones, 2007; Liguori, 2009; Ludwig, 2009; Stoddart, 2007) is as follows. Hegemony is a form of domination of one social group by another, where the dominated consent to their domination despite the fact that it disadvantages them. This is achieved by a combination of consent and coercion, which also depend on one another. The ‘common sense’ among the dominated has incorporated the ideas by which they are dominated.

Gramsci distinguishes between hegemony and domination based on force alone, referring to the latter as ‘simple dictatorship’ (Bates, 1975). Through hegemonic processes, most people in a given society come to accept the practices that ensure that one group dominates over another as a given, even as desirable. In absolute hegemony, then, domination requires no use of force at all. However, Gramsci does not treat hegemony as a fixed state of completion, but rather as a dynamic process in which coercion plays specific roles. When applied to data on the meaning people give to wife-beating, then, hegemonic theory could aid in understanding the role violence against women plays in the domination of women. This role is debated, as I explain in Section 2B. In particular, his theorisation of consent and consensus within domination, and indeed as a prerequisite for successful hegemonic domination, addresses the otherwise puzzling fact that such violence against women is in fact supported by most women, as surveys show (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). In presenting his theory, I will now highlight the parts I draw on before summarising how these resonate with my research.
Consent and coercion operate as one

While liberal theory assumes one excludes the other, hegemony is achieved as consent and coercion operate in tandem. Coercion works best when the subaltern consents to ‘legitimate’ forms of coercion, and the possibility of coercion maintains consent. So closely do the two re-enforce one another that they are in fact indivisible: the distinction between them is only an analytical one, suggests Gramsci, in order to think about two specific ways of exercising power (Ludwig, 2009). He likens hegemony to a centaur in order to illustrate the indivisibility of coercion and consent in a situation of hegemony. Like the man and the beast in the centaur, coercion and consent, when combined in hegemony, are not two discrete entities, but rather merge into one, and operate as one.

Shared social norms are crucial in hegemony

What role does this give community norms? Ordinary people’ worldviews and ideas of right and wrong are central to consent. On a group level, hegemonic consensus is achieved when the idea that the social order of domination is right and proper, and for the good of everyone, is incorporated into the worldview shared across a social group. The dominant group cannot simply impose these ideas onto the social group, but must make social and ideational compromises to win their consent and achieve hegemonic consensus, and must continue to do so. The manufacture and maintenance of consent is continuous.

Gramsci speaks of the worldview into which these hegemonic ideas must be incorporated, as the realm of “common sense”. The “common sense” of a social group is the implicit conception of life and morals most widespread within a social group in one particular place and time, ‘common’ in the sense of a low common denominator. While Gramsci described ‘common sense’ disapprovingly, as the most primordial level of ideology, he insisted that all social strata had a ‘common sense’ guiding the everyday lives of individuals within it, and that in this way we are all “conformists of some conformism” (Gramsci et al., 1971, p. 324). As Liguori finds in his examination of references to ”common sense” across Gramsci’s notebooks, common sense is conservative, traditionalist, and resistant to innovation, “stuck in the
idea of objective and never-changing truths”: in short, an obstacle to social transformation (Liguori, 2009, p. 126). Nevertheless, insists Gramsci, engaging with the realm of common sense is crucial for both making and breaking hegemony. Achieving hegemony requires making sure “common sense” contains an endorsement of the order of domination. Once hegemony is achieved, subalterns cannot challenge it without breaking with the “common sense” of their subaltern group (Liguori, 2009). In any struggle over hegemony, then, the battle over “common sense” is an inevitable and decisive one. It is from this realm of “common sense” that my data are drawn.

**Violence on standby coaxes consent**

In a hegemonic state, the presence of hegemonic norms within “common sense” is enough to ensure the conformity of most people most of the time. The coercive apparatus is thus merely kept on standby, for moments of declining consent, or for individuals who deviate from the norm (Bates, 1975; Stoddart, 2007). However the fact that violence is kept in the wings does not diminish its role, since the effect of coercion is not limited to the “moments of force” in which it is actually used. As Atack (2006) points out, although it is only applied in marginal, deviant cases, coercion is always latent in hegemony. Although the self-governing individual who can govern himself outside of the actual ”moment of force” is the ideal of hegemony, the apparatus to carry out violence in this “moment of force” is “constructed for all society in anticipation of moments of crisis in command…when spontaneous consensus declines” (cited in Bates, 1975, p. 353).

**Consent makes coercion look freely chosen**

Both the achievement of a hegemonic consensus through the subalterns’ endorsement of norms that supported domination, and the coercive effect of the violence waiting latent in the wings, rely on coercion and consent working in tandem and reinforcing one another. While the threat of force coerces consent, consent makes coercion look like freedom. In Gramsci’s words, obtaining subalterns’ “consent and collaboration…turn(s) necessity and coercion into freedom” (cited in Ludwig, 2009, p. 98). This
mutually reinforcing dynamic between violence and widely shared, apparently “freely” endorsed, norms is another dimension I will look for in the data.

Ideas exist alongside material realities
Gramsci’s focus on how the consensus around hegemonic truths enables the reproduction of domination is an emphasis on the role of ideas in structures of inequality. However, this emphasis on the role of ideas in shaping behaviour is not a denial of the significance of material realities in these same processes. He emphasises that “ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, but not reducible one to the other” (cited in Atack, 2006, p. 94) His development of the concept of hegemony, however, was a critique of what he saw as the reduction of ideas to material conditions in the “economistic” theories that dominated the left at the time (Ludwig, 2009). He argued that if, at one historical moment, the socio-political order did take a form that corresponded to the economic requirements of the mode of production specific to that same historical moment, then this correspondence was not automatic. Rather, it was as dominant groups led subalterns, through hegemonic processes, to ‘choose’ what was in the dominant group’s interests, that economic requirements were met (Ludwig, 2009).

Relating hegemonic theory to this research
Hegemonic theory resonates with my data and research questions in several ways. The type of data corresponds closely to the realm of common sense, which is a crucial site for the struggle for hegemony. Secondly, hegemony theorises the relationship between the elements that make up the topic of the research: violence, consent and domination. In particular, it offers some ways of thinking around the puzzle that is women’s consent to violence against them. Thirdly, the fact that the theory acknowledges both material reality and the importance of ideas, yet offers a counterweight to economic reductionism, is particularly relevant to understanding violence against women in a context of material poverty. Lastly, framing what research respondents say as ‘common sense’, allows me to place them on equal
footing with any other social group, since each has its ‘common sense’, to which “we are all conformists” (cited in Jones, 2007, p. 48).

The conceptualisations I use of social control, deviance and law are also improved by relating them to Gramscian notions of hegemony. Doing so yields a more complex understanding of the point that ‘rules are created by people in power’, namely that hegemony is enabled when norms that serve the domination of one group by another are incorporated within the realm of ‘common sense’ (the worldview shared across a social group). Insofar as violence is an effort to enforce a shared rule, and thus ‘social control’, violence is also hegemonic coercion.
3. Methodology

a. Consultation with Tanzanian researchers and activists

Before I began my fieldwork, I spent some weeks in the capital, Dar Es Salaam, waiting for my research permit. I used this time to connect with researchers, activists and others working on gender and violence issues at NGOs, think tanks and the University of Dar Es Salaam. Speaking with them, and reading the grey literature I found through them, gave me an idea of the general state of knowledge on the topic. I also asked for their opinion on my research project.

This consultation informed my decisions throughout the project. Two of the reactions I met with as a young white woman there to study ‘violence against women’ had a particularly strong influence on my decisions. Both were reactions of dismay and contempt. The first was from a female academic, who sardonically remarked how people come from Europe to do research in Tanzania, and yet after lots of fieldwork, taking lots of people’s time, all they go back to write about is themselves. She said it seemed like it was all just about self-discovery, and asked whether research in Tanzania could not be about Tanzania. The second reaction was the expectation I met in many governmental and non-governmental offices that the violence I was interested in was the culture-specific practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). “I know. You mean FGM,” was a typical reaction, in a tone that communicated how predictable people like me were. It sometimes took a while to convince them that I really was interested in ‘just beating’.

The insights I gained and the contacts I made through this consultation also shaped my analysis. Several years later, when I came across controversial research publications (notably, the article I critique in Section 2C), I shared it with some of the people whose advice I had first sought in 2007, and asked what they thought. The same networks have helped me to share the first two articles in this thesis with policy-makers and activists.
b. Data Generation

i. Why Focus Group Discussions?

Michelle Fine (1989) has problematized the particular consequences individualistic research methods have in the field of violence against women. I wanted to look for answers to my research question not ‘inside the bodies and minds’ of individual women, but instead in the shared social norms that she says individualistic methods vindicate (p. 551).

Bloor et al. (2001) argue that for data on shared social norms, the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) method “should be the sociological method of choice, providing concentrated and detailed information on an area of group life which is only occasionally, briefly and allusively available to the ethnographer over months and months of fieldwork” (p. 6). I was not interested in which positions people took on wife-beating, but rather in the ways in which they argued for those positions. As ‘sceptical enthusiasts’ of the method emphasise, while questions of which points of view people hold are better answered with surveys (such as the Demographic and Health Survey), “focus groups are better for exploring how points of view are constructed and expressed” (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999, p. 5).

I also hoped the method would help mitigate some of the problems related to my positionality. I did not believe people would be able to have a relaxed or even remotely normal conversation with someone of my conspicuous whiteness and privilege. I anticipated any interview with someone like me to say more about how respondents saw me than about how they saw wife-beating. I did not want to waste people’s time getting data that I could only use to say something about me, and how people saw me. I agreed with the criticism of this that I had received from the female academic in Dar Es Salaam. Focus group discussions offered a way to get data on what people said to one another instead of to me. The method is said to offer ways of shifting power and attention away from the researcher and over to fellow participants (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999; Bloor et al., 2001; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2013; Puchta & Potter, 2004).
ii. Site selection and sampling

Insofar as violence against women is seen in a negative light, it is presented in public discourse as something ‘others’ do—in Tanzania as in other societies. The precise dimensions along which the violence is distanced from ‘us’, however, differ from society to society. For example, in some European countries, violence against women is perceived as particularly prevalent among Roma communities. It is important to bear the specific ‘distancing dimensions’ in mind when sampling, because they can be used to invalidate research results. For example, if membership in a Roma community were a distancing dimension in Hungary, then regardless of whether Roma communities actually did have higher rates of VAW than the Hungarian average, findings from a Hungarian study could easily be discounted in Hungarian popular opinion if most of the respondents were found to be from Roma communities.

I had already heard several ‘othering’ strategies in Tanzania by which people distanced their own group from VAW. I had often heard, for instance, that people in the deep countryside were more traditional and therefore more violent to women. Meanwhile, in the countryside, I heard that people in the big cities lost their bearings under modern Western influences, went running after money, and ended up beating women for no good reason. Also between Muslims and Christians, educated and less educated, rich and poor, this blame shifting was often mutual: each group placed VAW with the other. The only othering I did not hear reversed was the idea that Masaai peoples are more violent to women.

My sampling and site selection aimed not to disprove any of these popular theories, but to make sure my findings could not be discounted by any of them, regardless of their validity. I thus made choices so that my respondents could not be placed easily in one or the other of these groups, and my findings written off as merely characterising an otherised group. The result is that the respondents represent a cross-section of Tanzanian society as regards VAW differences.
As a midway between deep countryside and inner city, I chose villages within a day’s travel from a regional capital. I chose two regions from opposite ends of the national continuum as regards socio-economic indicators and “Western” or “modernising” influence. I chose the first, Kigoma, because it was a region I was familiar with, but also because it is one of the least researched and least accessible regions. I chose the second, Arusha region, because of its position at the other end of the socio-economic spectrum, and because it is one of the best known to Western researchers. I chose one district in each region with villages within a day’s travel of the region capital: Arumeru district near Arusha town, and Kigoma-Vijijini district near Kigoma town.

Kigoma is situated in the Westernmost part of the country, on Lake Tanganyika, which forms the border with Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. It is the region the furthest away from the country’s commercial capital, Dar Es Salaam, and its capital has historically been the least connected to national infrastructure and socio-economic development. Ha (or Buha) is the main ethnic group, and formed, in precolonial times, part of the Interlacustrine Kingdom that included most of Rwanda and Burundi. Due to cross-border trade and migration, a small minority of Kigoma residents are of Burundian and Congolese descent. Formerly a station on the Swahili trade route, Kigoma has a strong Muslim heritage, and the Kigoma-Vijijini district includes both Muslim and Christian residents.

Arusha region, by contrast, is a region with a strong missionary and therefore Christian heritage. Home to some of the first European-style schools and hospitals, as well as to a large proportion of the white settlers, it has been at the forefront of political and economic developments in both colonial and post-colonial times. It is currently a hub for two major industries, tourism and agribusiness. The regional capital, Arusha, is within a day’s drive of both Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi. Its airport, the nation’s second largest, places it within daily reach of European capitals. The villages in Arumeru district, then, although no closer to town than those in Kigoma-Vijijini, are more exposed to foreign and/or modern influence than similar villages elsewhere in the country. The main ethnic groups in Arumeru district are Arusha and Meru, with Arusha forming part of the larger Nilotic group popularly known as the
Maasai. Most district residents are Christian or animist in their religious practice, with Muslims a considerable minority.

In each of these two districts, I chose ten villages. In Kigoma, choosing villages within a day’s drive from town meant that I excluded lakeside villages without road access which were within a day’s boatride from town. In Arumeru, I excluded Masaai villages that served as ethnotouristic destinations for visitors who wanted to see a “Maasai homestead”. Within these limitations, I made sure that the ten villages I chose in each district covered the main lines of diversity in that district.

iii. Recruitment and selection of participants

I followed the official procedure for research access as set up by the Tanzanian government. After I had applied for and been granted access first at national, then at regional and district level, the district commissioner in each district wrote me a letter of recommendation to give to the officer of each of my chosen villages. When I went with this to each village office, the village officer invariably offered to help me in gathering my respondents. I had only to say my time and place, and whom I wished to meet. I accepted this offer, and gave my specifications.

Is this form of recruitment ethical? Does it not bias my findings? These were two concerns that initially made me hesitate in accepting this offer of assistance. In terms of ethics, how could I be sure that the “voluntary” nature of participation was real, if my respondents had been ordered to participate by a superior, on my behalf? In terms of bias, how could I be sure the officer had not deliberately biased my findings by carefully selecting respondents who would only say what he wanted me to hear?

I dealt with my concern over voluntary participation as follows (beyond, of course, telling the officer that participation was voluntary). I told the officer he did not need to be there himself for the meeting. When the meeting started, I thanked everyone for coming, and made it clear that all I had asked of the officer was to get a chance to meet them to ask them a favour. Once I had asked them, whoever wanted to leave,
could leave, and I would keep no record of who stayed or left. My question was whether any of them would be willing to sit there and discuss for one to two hours. In this way, if the participants had not showed up to the meeting voluntarily, they could choose whether to stay for the Focus Group Discussion or not. One to three people out of ten to twelve typically left at this point.

After having conducted a few discussions like this, I decided my concern about the village officer biasing my findings though his recruitment decisions was exaggerated. Typically, the offer of assistance was a disinterested one: a standard dutiful response to the letter from his superior asking him to assist me. Moreover, even if, for some reason, officers across several villages tried to bias my sample in the same direction, and also succeeded (which was improbable), this bias would not automatically transfer onto the subsequent stages in the method - the data generated and the implications drawn from them – in the way they would in a quantitative study.

iv. **Group composition**

Returning, then, to the point where the village officer asked me whom I wished to meet with: I explained that I wanted to meet with one group of men and one group of women, and that I would want each group to discuss amongst themselves. I would then ask for a specific group of men or women, for example younger men, or wealthier women. Sometimes I would ask instead what the main lines of division were in that village, what type of women would speak more freely to one another. Sometimes this resulted in my meeting with a pre-existing group, such as a women’s cooperative, and young men who played football together. In one village, the officer suggested I segment men by age as there had been specific intergenerational tension in the past year, and this might be distracting if I set up a discussion with old and young men together.

Within each village, I met with one group of women and one group of men. Again, I made sure the main lines of diversity were covered between the groups, but this did
not always mean segmenting groups by each dimension. For example, in some villages where both Muslims and Christians lived, the religious diversity was factored in through one group with both Muslim and Christian respondents. Moreover, not all groups were segmented beyond the male-female segmentation.

v. **Facilitating discussions**

The discussions typically took place in a respondent’s home, or in a communal building. There were usually eight to ten respondents, myself as the white female researcher, and my male research assistant of Meru ethnicity.

My first attempts at focus group discussions (FGDs) were a failure, in the sense that they did not generate the type of data that I had chosen the method for. They generated data on what some people say to a white researcher who asks about wife-beating, but this was not my research topic. I wanted participants to exchange opinions and arguments between themselves about the rights and wrongs of wife-beating, and experimented with different ways of facilitating the discussions in order to make this happen. I saw my undeniable whiteness and all the associations attached to it as a hindrance to that. Although I could not pretend that I was not there, or that I was not white, I could shift participants’ focus away from me while they spoke, at least by removing myself from the visual centre of attention, and setting up activities that made participants focus on one another. This is how I ended up facilitating the FGDs the way I did: for most of the time, participants discussed among themselves with neither me nor my assistant present, and through role-plays and vignettes that prompted and guided them into discussing directly with one another. The entire discussion was voice recorded with their permission.

The conversation-starters I used consisted of vignettes, role-plays and group debate exercises. Although I alternated between role-plays and vignettes, the questions I

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7 Issues relating to the use of FGDs are more thoroughly addressed in Article 1.
used these methods to ask remained the same. Across groups, I prompted discussions around the following questions.

- A younger woman comes to tell you she’s had enough of being beaten. She wants it to stop. What would you say?
- A man tells you he beat his wife yesterday. What might he tell you, for you to chastise him about it? What might he tell you, for you to say he was right?
- A man says he’ll never beat his wife. What do you think of this man?
- Do women sometimes get beaten without deserving it?
- Can a man sometimes be right to beat his wife?
- What should one do if one hears one’s neighbour beating his wife?

Each of these conversation starters did not spark a lively discussion in every group. Sometimes, a group would find one question too similar to the previous one, and ask to move on since they had already covered it. Sometimes a question would remain unanswered, because the discussion that followed it veered off track, and nobody in the group brought it back again. However, for most of the time in most of the discussions, discussions were lively and enthusiastic, and I had the impression that many participants enjoyed it.

When I wanted the reticent to participate more, or when I wanted disagreement to be more clearly voiced, I used specific debate exercises to make the tos and fros of the arguments more visible. In a ranking exercise, groups were given cards with various scenarios written on them, and asked to rank them in order of good and bad, better and worse. Participants moved the cards up and down the scale, explaining their reasoning to the others as they did so. In a position placement exercise, each participant, on hearing a vignette, would choose his ‘position’ on the question by placing his unique pawn in one of three areas marked “Right”, “Wrong”, and “It depends”. In the ensuing discussion, participants could then challenge co-participants to defend the position that they had clearly taken, or try to convince them to move their pawn to another position. This often resulted in a game-like atmosphere, where getting more people to “join their team” was an incentive for participants to convince others of their chosen position on a question.
According to Ryen (2011), it is by focusing on the *hows* rather than the *whats* that contemporary qualitative methodology can avoid the “old stereotypes of the unfamiliar” for which research methods are critiqued as imperialistic (p.445). The point of these discussions was not to learn *what* each person genuinely believed about the issues discussed: this is something FGDs cannot reliably say anything about. Nor was I interested in *what* the group finally decided in the ranking and positioning exercises. What I wanted was to hear *how* the participants argued when they spoke with one another about the rights and wrongs of wife-beating, and *how* they interpreted one another’s arguments. When a person was asked by fellow-villagers to explain why wife-beating in this case was right or wrong, which lines of reasoning did that person choose? Which values or ideals did (s)he appeal to? Her responses reflect her assessment of which argument is most likely to ‘fly’ in the group. Once she says it, the group’s response indicates whether it did in fact ‘fly’. I interpret this perspicacity, this ability to tell which arguments will ‘fly’ in the group, as an awareness of the hegemonic norms in the group.

vi. **Transcription and translation**

The discussions took place in Swahili, with participants sometimes switching into their local languages – Kiha, Kimeru or Kiarusha. I asked native Swahili and Kimeru-speakers to assist in transcribing and the discussions, and sought additional advice from Kiha- and Kiarusha-speakers where there were significant discussions conducted in those languages.

**c. Ethics**

I obtained official permission to conduct this research in Tanzania through the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) in Dar Es Salaam, and subsequently from the Arusha and Kigoma Regional Offices, the District Offices of Arumeru and Kigoma-Vijijini, and from each village office.

In addition to the normal procedure of explaining that participation was voluntary, I gave the recruited participants the opportunity to leave before the discussion and at
any point during it. The fact that some participants did leave, indicates that many saw opting out as a genuine possibility. This gave me the impression that the participants who stayed did not feel compelled to participate against their will. In other words, in addition to being able to say I had obtained ‘informed consent’, I gained some reassurance of the relative freedom with which this consent was given.

Participants’ freedom to leave without explanation during the discussions was especially important because of the topic of the research. Ethical guidelines on research on domestic violence (eg. World Health Organisation, 2001) warn researchers that they may cause survivors undue stress by making them talk about, or listen to talk about, the violence. I tried to decrease the chances that anyone felt compelled to participate in a discussion that caused them discomfort.

The nature of the topic also made it important for me to keep the conversation away from actual cases of wife-beating, and focused on opinions about it. Article 1 in this thesis describes how I achieved this.

When I left the voice-recorder on and left the discussion, I made it clear to the participants that their voices would be recorded. When some asked how this affected their anonymity, I promised that nobody would hear their voices except myself and the three people who helped me transcribe and translate the discussions. I deleted the recordings after transcription.

As the participants shared their time and knowledge with me, I looked for ways of reciprocating after each discussion by sharing knowledge that I had access to that could be useful to them. In some groups, this resulted in a simple reversal of roles, as respondents spent a half-hour or so asking me questions, as random as the ones I had asked them. In others, participants sought concrete practical information on issues they had thought of during the discussion. I also had informational material I had brought with me from NGOs in the capital. Some of this seemed to be appreciated information, for example, a booklet from the Legal and Human Rights Centre explaining your rights if you are stopped by the police, and one from HakiElimu on how to organise to improve the quality of education at your local school.
d. Data Analysis

i. **A constructionist approach to FGD data**

Having ensured the focus group discussions generated the type of data the method is good for (as described in Article 1), I also analysed the data as such: as interactive, group-level data on shared social norms. In other words, I did not treat the data as a source of information on what actually happened regarding wife-beating, or what individuals’ “real views” were. Instead I treated them as public discourses constructed collectively (Puchta & Potter, 2004; Smithson, 2000). As Smithson (2000) points out, taking the interactive nature of FGD data seriously makes it possible to analyse them for dominant normative discourses: participants reproduce normative discourses in the accounts they give one another, as they refer and defer to the discourses they assume to be dominant. This matches what I had aimed for in de-centering myself from the discussions and promoting inter-participant interaction: for the talk recorded to be accounts participants gave to one another, as they held one another to account for the positions they took on wife-beating. As Smithson suggests, then, I focused my analysis on “the discourses which are constructed within this group context” (Smithson, 2000, p. 110).

I analysed the data in line with what Silverman (2006) describes as constructionist analysis, which approaches the data as a way to tap into the respondents’ ”general understanding of the stock of meanings and their relationships to each other” (Silverman, 2006, p. 134). According to Ryen (2008), taking a constructionist approach is one way to address the critique of Western research methods in non-Western contexts. As she suggests, I treat talk as performance to particular audiences, and treat non-Western respondents as “competent players” (p.455) – or “perspicacious performers”, as I phrase it in Article 1 (p.123). Moreover, I treat their accounts of why the beating under discussion is right or wrong as drawn from the discursive resources available in society. The question

*What discursive resources for justifying wife-beating are available?*
guided my analysis of the data in the direction of the overarching research question,

*What is the meaning of the wife-beating that is widely supported?*


### ii. The analytic process

Figure 1 gives an overview of the entire process through which the data in the transcripts were distilled into the findings presented in the articles. For the sake of brevity, I am describing the process as a linear one, but it also included continuous iteration between the stages. I often went back a stage to incorporate what I found in the next stage into the decisions I made at the previous stage.

#### i. Developing a coding frame

I began generating the thematic ideas (‘codes’) I would use to categorise the content of the transcripts during data generation. As I describe in Article 1, when the first FGDs didn’t work, I started playing around with different ways of conducting them. The field notes I took during this process to keep track of what worked and what didn’t included my observations of what types of topics people seemed ready to talk extensively about. These observations became my first code memos, in which I wrote themes that came up in discussions (see Appendix 1 for an example of an early ‘codebook’). In developing the ‘coding frame’, I kept the frame separate from the data, going back and forth between the data and the frame to refine the frame. At first my codes were descriptive—simply summing up what was said—but in the course of
Figure 1. The Analytic Process
the iterative refinement process, I began to use more analytic codes, to capture what is implied by what is said: the logic of the argument and the mores it is referring to (Gibbs, 2008, p. 43).

ii. Extracting the dataset

I then applied the codes in the final coding frame to the transcripts, and drew out the parts that illustrated the codes, to form my dataset. According to Potter, “sifting relevant materials from a large body of recording and transcript” in this way is the principal task of coding in discourse research (2009, p. 615). I was glad to discover, on listening to the recordings, that the participants had felt free to use the FGD to discuss other topics than those I had asked them about. The divergences ranged from discussing the price of some goats one participant had just bought, to conversing with a neighbour who greeted the group on passing by. While this was the loss of control I had aimed for (e.g., Bloor et al., 2001, pp. 48-49), it meant that not all parts of the transcripts were worth analysing. Rather than select only the parts where respondents did not digress from the set topic, I used the coding frame to select the relevant parts (see Appendix 2 for an example of this). My aim in this stage was to extract a dataset of all the sections that could tell me something about the respondents’ own logic on wife-beating, as this was what the codes sought to capture: what Bloor et al. (2001) call ‘logical analysis’. I returned to the transcripts several times in the course of the subsequent analysis in order to check that I had not left out sections whose relevance only became clear later on in the analysis.

iii. Identifying commonalities across the dataset

As mentioned while describing my site selection, a central concern I had in designing the research was that the findings not be written off as pertaining only to ‘other’ groups in society. In terms of analysis, this translates into a wariness of ‘cherry-picking’. Silverman (2009) describes this concern well:

Paul ten Have notes the complaint that … ‘findings… are based on a subjectively selected, and probably biased, ‘sample’ of cases that happen to fit the analytic argument’ (1998: Ch.7, p. 8). This complaint, which amounts to a
charge of anecdotalism, can be addressed by what Ten Have, following Mehan (1979) calls ‘comprehensive data treatment’. This comprehensiveness arises because…‘all cases of data…are incorporated in the analysis’ (1979:21).

(Silverman, 2006, p. 298)

A data treatment is comprehensive, according to Silverman, when the generalisations it yields can be applied to all the relevant data. To avoid charges that I cherry-picked data to fit my analysis, then, I decided to focus only on the themes that recurred across more than ten groups (see Appendix 3 for an example of an early attempt at identifying such commonalities). Rather than present a wide range of findings, I would analyse the few findings that recurred across most groups, for the insights that were the most generalizable. Once I had identified the codes that served as the ‘lowest common denominator’ in this way, I highlighted the sections of the dataset that were coded with these codes. I did not remove the other sections from the dataset, because I wanted to be able to re-visit my decision if new connections emerged between the themes during the subsequent analysis.

iv. Making sense of how the themes relate to one another

This stage overlaps with the previous one. It is where the analysis proper started: reading the transcript selections to understand how the respondents’ talk achieves the legitimation of wife-beating, and how the various elements of the ‘discursive repertoire’ they draw on fit together. In all discussions, distinctions were made between beatings that could be legitimated and those that could not. In this sense, an ideal good beating that could be legitimated was constructed in all discussions. I therefore named this construct ‘the good beating’ and used it to organise the discourses legitimating wife-beating. Although this was compatible with all the recurring themes, some did not fit neatly into the organising scheme. I kept these to one side, in case they would fit better with a future organising scheme.

v. Making theoretical sense of the data

Having immersed myself in the most recurrent discursive repertoires, I searched for theories that not only resonated with this selection of my data, but also advanced my
understanding of them. No one theory addressed every theme, but I arrived at two bodies of theory that did so between them. I present one of these in Article 2 and the other in Article 3.

iii. What is left out?

The entirety of the analytic process can be seen as a whittling down of the data to arrive at its robust core. Articles 2 and 3 do not present the entire range of themes that emerged in discussions, but rather the themes that form the core of that range, in that they are the ones that recur across most discussions. However, in reducing the data to its lowest common denominator, a significant portion of the data was set aside. Examples of the types of data left behind can be seen in Appendices 5 and 6. While the entire range of data cannot be presented here, it is important to see the findings that are presented here in the context of this range rather than as a summary of the range.
4. Findings

The data generated by this investigation exceed those presented in the articles. In addition, the findings that are presented in the articles exceed those which were anticipated, in that they also include methodological findings. In the course of pursuing the research questions, I generated new knowledge to fill a gap in the methodological literature. My first article presents this new methodological knowledge, and the remaining two present the core empirical findings of the investigation, in light of two respective bodies of theory.

The methodological findings presented in Article 1 address data quality concerns that I discovered in the course of my first focus group discussions (FGDs). Using the method in line with existing knowledge on how to do so in the Global South, in order to generate precisely the type of data FGDs are best for, failed to generate this type of data. This was how I discovered that the existing literature did not include knowledge on how to achieve the defining characteristic of FGDs—inter-participant interaction—in a Southern context like Tanzania. I generated this knowledge through a trial-and-error process that spanned more than a dozen focus groups.

My findings here can be grouped into three. First, the initial ‘failed’ FGDs show how easy it can be to create research encounters that resemble FGDs yet lack the defining feature of FGDs—intra-group discussion—and thus do not produce the type of data the method is best for, namely interactive data on shared group norms. My research shows how unreliable and misleading data generated through such ‘group interviews’ can be.

Secondly, and in contrast, the final ‘successful’ FGDs, which were characterised by inter-participant interaction, show that when this defining characteristic of FGDs is ensured, the method has an additional benefit. It offers a way to address some of the threats to data quality posed by steep power gradients, positionality and alterity affecting much research across difference in the Global South.
Finally, the process itself of tweaking the FGDs to achieve interaction yielded new insights into how exactly positionality, alterity and steep power gradients can affect data quality. I found that the positionality issue of how the respondents perceived me, my role, and their role in relation to me, over-determined what they said to me. I found that when respondents spoke to me across such a steep power gradient, their talk reflected guesswork about how best to relate to me more than it reflected the issues I wanted to understand through their talk. No amount of skilful self-deployment, or changes in how they saw me, changed this, as long as the power gradient between the respondents and their audience remained the same. It was only when their co-respondents replaced me as their audience that this power gradient changed. When, for a respondent, speaking to the researcher entails speaking across a steep power gradient, FGDs can circumvent the threat this poses to data quality in a way that the most skilful self-deployment cannot, by simply removing the researcher from the conversation.

Through the process described in Article 1, I found a way, despite my undeniable white privilege, to generate data in Tanzania from which I could glean insights into hegemonic norms. From these, I constructed a hegemonic ideal. This ideal constituted the meanings of the wife-beating that was discussed as widely supported across a wide range of groups, and I called it ‘the good beating’. In Articles 2 and 3, I describe this finding as it relates to two debates in the literature which, though interrelated, are most usefully addressed independently and in turn.

**Article 2** presents the good beating as it relates to debates about the gendered nature of domestic violence. It shows how the good beating is justified as a way for men to ‘do gender’ and to make sure women do, too. In this sense, many of the norms that discussions refer to as rendering some beatings ‘good’, are hegemonic *gender* norms: they hold people accountable to their sex category. The good beating is ‘good’ because spouses should behave in certain ways, based on their sex. In this sense, the violence supports, and is supported by, the use of sex as a primary cultural frame, which is how biological sex is constructed into gender, and how gender becomes a multilevel social structure.
What is the content of these sex-based behavioural prescriptions? A man should maintain a position of dominance in the household. A woman should show respect for her husband by doing as he told her, or risk social denigration. Thus the social meaning of the beating found here means that a husband could enforce accountability to certain behavioural expectations with a good beating because society expected women to perform that same behaviour. The behaviour the good beating enforces is that which society allocates to wives, and the behaviour it enacts—being in charge—is behaviour allocated to men. In this sense, the findings contradict the gender-symmetry claim that equates husbands beating their wives with wives beating their husbands.

This article shows that the expectations that spouses perform gender was intricately intertwined with the understanding discussants had of the wife-beating that is supported. It also describes how this gender performance that was expected of husbands and wives was not purely discursive-symbolic, but was intended to have concrete material consequences. Beating was deemed good insofar as the structure whereby the wife works for the husband was good—a structure similar to the structure ordained in the “marriage contract” Bryceson (1995) describes.

In Article 3, I present the findings within the good beating ideal that illuminate the socio-political role of violence and how it constitutes social order. The very distinction between this and ‘bad’ beatings’ actually safeguards the legitimacy of the social order in the way that the approval of all beating could not. Moreover, the grounds on which this distinction is made concerns specifically the effectiveness of the beating in directing the wife’s behaviour. While bad beatings were ‘dictatorial’, good beatings governed wives in a reasoned and reasonable manner. A good beating aimed at punishing wifely deviance from norms of obedience. When a wife knew this could happen, this knowledge alone could deter her from deviating, as she self-censored her behaviour in order to avoid a good beating. This self-censoring effect defined the good beating. In this sense, wife-beating was legitimated as a form of social control and censure that made wives ‘self-governing’.
Thus the meaning ascribed to the wife-beating that was widely supported was violence that constituted social order. In addition, the social meaning ascribed to a beating was what determined whether it could have such an ‘ordering’ effect. It was the perceived social legitimacy of the good beating that made it possible to achieve an ordering effect with it. It was women’s approval of the norms that supported the good beating that secured its intended effect: their approval made it a legitimate censure that women self-censored to avoid. In this sense, women are complicit in husbands’ coercive control over wives. At the same time, however, the norms to which women give their ‘consent’ are norms which are enforced with violence. The good beating is thus a case of hegemonic norms giving power, which in turn is power to enforce those norms. In this way, the research found that violence and support for it work together to diminish women’s room for manoeuvre. Norms secure the controlling effect of the violence, and the violence coerces consent to the norms. Coercion and consent coexist.
5. Concluding discussion

The article format limits the extent to which I could pursue the implications of the findings I present there. I will now outline the directions in which I see these implications could be pursued. I will then discuss the limitations of the research presented here, including outstanding ethical concerns. Finally, I will highlight what can be concluded from this study, as pertains to research on the one hand, and policy and practice on the other.

a. Implications

From the stance I took in Section 2 C, understanding social reality in Tanzania is no more peripheral to the social scientific endeavour than understanding Northern realities is. I will first explore the implications of the findings for understanding gender and domestic violence in Tanzania. In addition to being a social scientific endeavour in its own right, understanding a Southern empirical reality also has implications for general social theory. I will therefore go on to outline some implications of these Tanzanian findings for theorising gender and hegemony beyond Tanzania.

i. Gender and domestic violence in Tanzania

One implication of the findings is that wife-beating can serve as a form of social control in Tanzania, as legitimate as formal law enforcement. The hegemonic norms enforced by the beating fit the definition of law presented in Section 2 D: a system of rules with a regime of punishments attached to ensure compliance, where the sanctions attached (such as beating) makes people obey. They were the norms that respondents across discussions referred to as commonly shared norms of interaction that everyone should comply with and that should be enforced by sanctions and punishments. In other words, they were what people themselves saw as law, and thus what normative pluralists label law. Insofar as beating is a response to a wife behaving in a way that is disapproved of as rule-breaking, it is legitimated. This
means that insofar as violence is the social control of deviant wives, it is legitimated violence.

Thus the findings imply that the colonial and post-colonial strategy of ruling through informal law enforcement at community and family level is continued in contemporary Tanzania through the wife-beating that is tolerated. Like the men in the SunguSungu vigilante groups, husbands are non-state agents who use violence to maintain what the community sees as law and order, neither on behalf of the state nor rejected by it. As with the vigilantes’ norm-enforcing powers, the norm-enforcing powers vested in husbands do not give them free rein to use violence any way they like. The violence that both types of non-state agents can legitimately use is violence that controls deviance and upholds community norms of social order.

The study’s findings on gender norms have implications for our understanding, not only of the violence in Tanzania, but also of gender relations there. In the mid-90s, as explained in Section 2A, scholars concluded that improvements in women’s legal and social position had not been accompanied by an equivalent change in gender ideology. In particular, the norms prescribing spousal relations that gave husbands structural advantages over their wives limited the extent to which women could benefit from their social, economic and legal gains. The findings presented here suggest that this is still the case. The precise content of these norms may have changed, but much of the ‘law’ that the good beating enforces is law about how husbands should control their wives’ labour, and is in this sense as much of a ‘marriage contract’ as the one Bryceson (1995) describes.

This has implications for how wife-beating in Tanzania relates to the changing gender order there. Is wife-beating men’s last defence against women’s domination of Tanzanian society? Or at least a sign that Tanzanian women’s empowerment has gone too far? The findings imply that wife-beating in Tanzania resembles the situation described in Section 2B instead, where gender inequality at the ideological level exceeds gender inequality at other levels. It is the lack of progress towards gender equality at the ideological level, and the fact that progress there lags behind
progress in, for example, formal access to education and employment, that is connected to wife-beating. The connection is recursive: the unequal marital contract legitimates wife-beating, and wife-beating enforces the unequal marital contract. In the past in Tanzania, the maintaining of “the cultural norms pertaining to the intra-household pooling of individual entitlements” (Bryceson, 1995a, p. 43) known as the marital contract has been found to limit the equalising effect of women’s access to independent income, as described in Section 2A. Another implication of the good beating ideal, then, is that it enforces norms that can undermine hard-earned structural gains in Tanzanian gender equality, a possibility described by Hunnicutt (2009) in section 2B.

ii. Theorising gender and hegemony

The insight just presented is an example of how some aspects of social theory developed in the Global North can improve our understanding of power relations within Southern empirical realities. The study as a whole can be seen as an illustration of this. It shows that feminist conceptualisations of how VAW in a society relates to the gender order, especially where gender is theorised as a multilevel structure, can help to make socio-political sense of VAW in Africa. Moreover, this study contributes to the mapping of the variety of not only structural but also ideological shapes that patriarchy takes across time, space and material contexts that, according to Hunnicutt (2009), further theorising on this topic requires.

In addition, the findings illustrate the Gramscian concepts reviewed in Section 2F. The norms supporting the good beating exemplify the ‘common sense’ by which people can accept as a given, even as desirable, the practices that ensure that one group dominates another. The crucial role played by shared social norms in hegemony is illustrated by how the good beating relies on norms supporting the gender order for its intended ordering effect. This also illustrates how coercion and consent do not rule one another out, but rather work as one. The good beating is an example of a hegemonic process, in that it coerces subalterns into ‘choosing’ what is in the interests of the dominant group.
b. Limitations

One limitation of this study is that the implications listed above remain largely unexplored. What is more serious, however, is that the findings are easily assumed to imply much more than they do. In stressing the importance of the hegemonic nature of the norms, I may give the false impression that ‘the good beating’ is a beating all the respondents supported, and, by extension, all Tanzanians support. This is not the case. The data analysed here are not data on individual opinions of wife-beating. Moreover, whether I interpret what a person says as evidence of the good beating does not necessarily mean that they support it, only that the way they talk about it suggests they reckon with it as a widely held ideal. In this way, also arguments against the good beating serve as evidence of what the good beating is. I have tried to be clear that the focus is on what is supported as good beating, rather than how widely it is supported. The latter question is better answered by survey data such as the Demographic and Health Survey data. Despite including a cross-section of respondents, my sample places certain limitations on the generalizability of my findings. I did not use large numbers and statistical tests to state with confidence that there is a high probability that this is what most people in Tanzania believe. The study is probably a less accurate depiction of norms among the growing minority of the population who live in Dar Es Salaam, than it is of rural and peri-urban residents. Given the rapid pace of change also in rural and peri-urban areas of Tanzania, it may no longer be an accurate depiction of those areas either.

Another sampling factor that decreases the generalizability of the findings relates to urbanisation. Since carrying out my fieldwork, I have become more aware of how in places like my field sites, many households have family members working or studying in Dar Es Salaam or other cities who still ‘belong’ to the village. Thus the most wealthy or educated village members, and the ‘modern’ or ‘urban’ influence they represent, were not included in the discussion groups, and my results may be skewed towards the less wealthy, less educated and more ‘provincial’.
The study may be misunderstood as saying that there is no resistance and negotiation around the hegemonic norms presented here. By pointing out the duality of social structures and the recursiveness of interconnections, I have tried to avoid presenting people as either fully victims, dupes of their culture, or fully agents, responsible for their own suffering. Nevertheless, the focus has been on the factors supporting violence and inequality, not on the resistance and resilience of individuals facing violence and inequality. This may give the impression that such resistance does not exist, and that the negative factors I describe go unchallenged. Within such an impression, Tanzanian men and women do indeed seem to lack any agency.

With hindsight, I might have reduced the chances of such a misunderstanding by giving more space to the evidence of resistance that I did find despite not looking for it. The very existence of a ‘good beating’ reveals a recognition that women are all too capable of agency and resistance. Almost all the descriptions of ‘behaviour worthy of beating’ could be termed ‘resistance’. In addition, in many discussions it was clear that respondents who argued against the good beating understood it as a dominant ideal in society – and still they opposed it. The data cannot be interpreted as evidence that there is no resistance to the good beating ideal in Tanzania, and that total or permanent hegemony has thus been achieved.

Nevertheless, focusing the study on violence and inequality rather than on resistance to these is not something I would change. This is because I think knowledge about the forces that the people who are resisting are up against is more useful for their resistance than knowledge about the strength with which they are already facing those forces. This is in line with the pleas of feminist scholars in Tanzania, for example Mbilinyi (1992) who warns researchers against “highlighting strengths and silencing the sheer pain of living lives with few options” in their attempt to avoid negative stereotypes of African women (p.66).

Two ethical issues remain that I have not succeeded in solving. The first concerns the people who participated in the focus group discussions. At the time of my fieldwork, I was glad that they did not see the discussion as a job they were paid to do, and that
many seemed to enjoy the discussions, and, as the recordings showed later, used the
time to discuss their own issues. When I afterwards offered to answer their questions,
and shared booklets and other information that might be useful for them, I felt I had
found a way to make the information-sharing go both ways. Since then, however, I
am less satisfied that this constitutes ‘reciprocity’ between us. I have benefited from
our encounter more than they did. Moreover, I have not found a way to make the
knowledge I generated from the encounter useful to the residents of the 20 villages I
visited. I have, however, shared it with Tanzanian NGOs and governmental service
providers, some of whom work in these regions.

The second ethical issue that remains unresolved concerns my privilege as a Europe-
based researcher vis-à-vis researchers from, and based in, East Africa. My choice of
theories to use and literature to refer to has been led not by solidarity with Africa-
based scholars, but by what helped me to make sense of my data. There is a
difference between saying that theory is inapplicable to Africa if it originated
elsewhere (a stance I reject in Section 2 C), and citing Africa-based scholars in
recognition of the sheer perversity of the global inequalities that divide academics. I
have not shown this kind of solidarity in citations. Where I refer to works by scholars
based in Africa, I do so simply because I need to build on their knowledge.

c. Conclusions

What is the meaning of the wife-beating that is widely supported in Tanzania? The
answer this study has produced is as follows. It is as a way of making wives’
behaviour conform to certain social norms that beating is deemed ‘good’. It is the fact
that these norms are gender norms that makes this violence ‘gender-based’: the doing
of gender is cyclically intertwined with the beating that is widely supported. The
good beating enacted masculinity and enforced submissive femininity. A beating was
understood as enforcing gender norms, and the endorsement of those gender norms in
turn supported the beating.
How does support for wife-beating in Tanzania relate to social order? The good beating was understood as the legitimate social control of deviance. The socio-political role of violence in ordering society was central to the meaning of the beating that is widely supported. It was as a form of norm enforcement – violence that served to punish, discipline and maintain law and order – that beating could be ‘good’. The norms the good beating was supposed to enforce, and the norms that supported it, are what secured the good beating’s intended ordering effect.

What conclusions can be drawn from this regarding ways of researching criminological and other socio-legal issues in the Global South? Attention to the power dimensions of state law, of formal law enforcement, and of the social control of deviance has characterised critical criminology. This study has shown that informal hegemonic norms at community level can play the same ruling role as that which makes formal law, ‘law’. Thus critical criminologists engaging with African empirical realities should be prepared to take the same critical stance towards local community norms and the social control those norms entail as they do to state law and state social control. This is a way of taking the effects of the South’s ex-centricity on theory seriously, and using it as an opportunity for theoretical innovation. In other words, it is ‘Theory from the South’.

What conclusions can be drawn from this study, that are useful for policy and practice? The study demonstrates the crucial role that norms governing interpersonal power relations play in violence and inequality. This implies that policy and practice aimed at counteracting violence and inequality cannot succeed by bypassing norms. The study confirms Gramsci’s point that social transformation is not possible without engaging with the ideological or ‘common sense’ dimension. In Tanzania, the informal “marriage contract” is a lynchpin in the complex and recursive nexus between wife-beating and gender inequality. Tinkering with the individual injuries caused by the violence while shying away from any contact with the fulcrum around which the entire machinery pivots, will not bring about the social change needed to end the violence and inequality. As Risman (2004) points out, the norms governing interpersonal interactions is where work for social change must begin. This study
shows the importance of addressing the ideology of gender inequality in order to achieve any real progress on violence against women and women’s status.

In addition, this study is a reminder to aid workers in general, not just those working on gender-specific programmes, that community norms are political. They both reflect and maintain power relations: in this sense they are all about ‘who rules’. Practitioners and policy-makers in many health and development NGOs in the region support hegemonic gender norms in their efforts to gain credibility as ‘respecting local culture’. This study has shown the coercion by which people less privileged than them ‘choose’ to conform to those norms in Tanzania.
References


Winstok, Z., & Eisikovits, Z. (2011). Gender, intimate relationships and violence: Introduction to Special Issue on Current Controversies on the Role of Gender in


Appendices
Appendix 1. Codebook

This is the first coding frame I developed from my coding memos.

Adjust behavior
Appearances
Appropriate behavior
Avoid beating
Bad Beating
Bad mood
Beat for behavioral change
Beat for refusing sex
Beat in anger
Beat so she won’t rebel
Beat with a purpose
Beat without purpose
Beating better than desertion
Beating is likened to formal justice system
Beating is oppression
Beating lays down the law.
Beating may make her rebel more
Beating in the past
Chain of command
Chastise
Children misbehaving
You must control

Comply vs deviate
Control income
Control is subjugation
Corrections
Cruelty
Deterrence
Development / Community well-being
Deviance
Discipline
Display deference
Drunken beating
Excessive injuries
False rumours cause beating
Good wife
Harmony
Headstrong
Her reputation
Hierarchy
His reputation
Husband is teacher
Infidelity
Jealousy
Laziness
Make wife work so kids don’t starve
Man in charge
Materialism
Must beat rationally
Must get along
Not enough children
Not getting a son
Obedience
Offence after warning
Offence intentional
Offence proven
Offence repetition
One-way violence
Orderly
Other ways besides beating
Poverty
Relative poverty
Respect
Respect=work
School fees
Stigma
Stubborn
That’ll teach her!
To beat=to be the boss
Togetherness
Train a wife
Unemployment
Veracity of accusation
Wealth
What can make her listen?
What will the neighbours say?
Who should control whom?
Wife goes walkabout
Wife is competing with you
Wife is like child
Wife is not a donkey
Wife is not a slave
Wife is your equal
Wifely care and love for others
Wifely greeting
Wifely self-sacrifice for family
Will she listen?
Women’s increasing rights
You keep quiet when you’re beaten rightly
Appendix 2. Example of data left behind when the transcripts were coded and the dataset was extracted. The strikethrough marks the data that was left uncoded and not extracted.

**TRANSCRIPT**

M3: Envy can be another thing causing trouble in families. You may see your relatives eating well and enjoying a good drink, and there you are, eating alone and no drink. That can make you envy your brother.

M4: So you feel you bad, and you go home. Then when you get home-

M3: You see your wife, she is there. She is just there, doing her work. Pam! You beat her. Just because you are feeling bad.

M2: Eh? But it's not her fault-

M3: It's not her fault. But you slap her, I tell you!

M2: That one is not good, I think.

M4: It's not good at all. At all. Because she?

Others: Didn't deserve it.

M5: Ok, that is a clear case. But what about this - (noise)

M7: Welcome, man... We just started without you.

M8: Give him that seat.

M4: The officer was there?

M9: Not yet.

M4: So you didn't see him?

M9: He wasn't there. The door was locked. I will try again tomorrow. It's ok.

M4: But this guy, why is he never there?

M9: Maybe the rain.

M1: That's what I was telling you, since last year-

M4: That guy-

(noise)
Appendix 3. Identifying commonalities across the dataset.

This is an example of an early attempt to group codes into themes and check their recurrence in dataset. I repeated this step by regrouping the codes into other themes and checking for the recurrence of those themes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Does theme recur across main divides and in over 10 groups?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased economic pressure</td>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School Fees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make wife work so kids don’t starve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beating enforces community norms</td>
<td>Like formal justice system</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the community</td>
<td>Must get along</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wifely love and care for others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable beating</td>
<td>Must beat rationally</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veracity of accusations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offence repetition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beat with a purpose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beat without purpose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemned beatings</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drunk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not her fault</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Random</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excessive injury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power relations</td>
<td>Wife is competing with you</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women’s increasing rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chain of command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man in charge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beating is oppression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Your wife is your equal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To beat= To be the boss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife should obey</td>
<td>Will she listen?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Your wife is not your slave/donkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man in charge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train a wife</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control is subjugation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect = work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Beat for refusing sex</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infidelity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jealousy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not enough children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4. How I grouped the codes into themes that made up the good beating.

The codes are not the data, but the keywords that I used to label the data with in order to sort through the dataset. The codes marked with an asterisk(*) are worded in the way that arguments against the good beating were worded. For example, a participant who rejected what was being discussed as the good beating, did so by saying “You’d beat her so she works better? A wife is not a slave.” Both he and those he argued against saw the ‘good beating’ being defended as one that made a wife work. It was because they disagreed on whether making a wife work was good that their support for the good beating differed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Article</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital relations of inequality</td>
<td>Chain of command Control is subjugation Good wife Hierarchy Respect = work Wife is not a donkey/slave* Wife is your equal*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Head of the House’ masculinity</td>
<td>To beat= to be the boss Control income Man in charge Who should control whom?* You must control Wife is competing with you</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing submissive femininity</td>
<td>Appearances Appropriate behavior Display deference Social stigma of ‘bad wife’ His &amp; her reputation What will the neighbours say? Wifely greeting</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The bad beating</td>
<td>Bad mood Beat in anger Beat without purpose Beatings in the past Cruelty Drunken beating Excessive injuries False rumours For a one-off mistake Undeserved Arbitrary</td>
<td>2 &amp; 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The good beating is reasoned and reasonable</td>
<td>Beat with a purpose Beat without a purpose* Different from past dictatorship Must beat rationally Offence after warning Offence intentional Offence proven</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The good beating effects behavioral change | Offence repetition  
Orderly  
Veracity of accusation |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Beat for behavioral change  
Beat so she won’t rebel  
Chastise  
Corrections  
Deterrence  
Deviance  
Discipline  
Harmony  
Headstrong  
Obedience  
Stubborn  
That’ll teach her!  
What can make her listen?  
Will she listen?  
Train a wife |
| The good beating makes women ‘choose’ to comply | Adjust behavior  
Avoid being beaten  
Comply vs deviate  
Her reputation  
You keep quiet when you’re beaten rightly  
Laziness |
| One of many means of control | Other ways besides beating*  
Beating is like the formal justice system |
| Asymmetrical | One-way violence |
| **UNTHEORISED** | **Beatings lays down the law**  
**Beating is like the formal justice system**  
**Must get along** |
| | **LEFT BEHIND** |
Appendix 5. Elements of the good beating that were left behind as data were selected for Articles 2 and 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Excerpts from dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman1: Should he beat you? It really depends on whether you are guilty. Let’s say the time he wants to eat, you’re just carrying on with your talking at your neighbor’s. So you’re late to cook: he is right to beat you! But then, you know, if he comes home loud and drunk, and starts to beat you without reason: no. But when I’ve done something wrong: of course. Woman2: It’s like the government of a place, it has its laws. Leaders have made their laws in the village. Now if you go against those laws they set, if you’re punished, it’s right. But then if a leader or someone just wants to cause trouble for you, he may make up some false excuse to sue you, you did nothing wrong but you are punished: that’s not correct.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man1: This dream, that you should not beat your wife – Man2: A dream! With no sense! Man1: Exactly. Why shouldn’t there be laws in a marriage? Laws to halter (kuzorotisha) her.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman: It’s like the laws of the village. If you go against them, you deserve punishment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man: If she gets angry and opposes you, it’s your duty to beat her. Because people must live by respecting one another and knowing who is the boss. They must know what the rules are. You must beat her.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman: A woman who’s beaten a lot is one who doesn’t accept that it’s her husband and not her who makes the rules.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman1: He cannot beat me. Woman2: But if you’re a rule-breaker? Woman1: Still, he shouldn’t beat me. Woman3: But if you break the law, I tell you! Woman4: You mean there should be no law? If he cannot beat you, it means you can do as you like! Woman2: Lawlessness! A mess! Just because “he cannot beat me.” Woman1: You say I was in the wrong? Woman3: Imagine you did wrong, my sister! Woman1: Ah! Ok then. Of course I must take it (a beating).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Beating is like the formal justice system</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Man:</strong> She can forget the rules. Maybe she might think the rules are not important. Or she is above the rules. That’s why it’s risky (for a man to say I will never beat my wife).</td>
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<td><strong>Man:</strong> I think beating her is not right. Because you are two adults, you are making the rules together. If she doesn’t follow them, I cannot just force her to follow them. I must ask her why.</td>
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<td><strong>Man1:</strong> When a thief has been sent to prison for three years, will he steal again? A wife has this nature, she tends to test the rules. You need to show her what? <strong>Others:</strong> The rules. <strong>Man1:</strong> You need to show her the rules. You need to beat her.</td>
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<td><strong>Man:</strong> If there were a court, he could take her there. But there isn’t. He has to punish her himself.</td>
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<td><strong>Man:</strong> It depends on if she did it on purpose. A magistrate, in court, he cannot sentence you for an accident. But if someone is doing bad intentionally, they must be sentenced! Sentenced and punished. Otherwise you are saying it’s ok for them to do this. A wife also can do bad on purpose.</td>
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<td><strong>Woman1:</strong> I agree with her. In this case, I would also say, I should be punished. But sometimes, you know, people are innocent and are still punished. Like you find an innocent man being sent to jail. Sometimes a husband can be like a corrupt judge. <strong>Woman2:</strong> It’s true. He has his own reasons for punishing you. Even if he knows you did nothing wrong.</td>
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<td><strong>Woman:</strong> I think it is never ok for him to beat me. Even if I did wrong. Because he is my partner, we are equals. A marriage is not a court. He is not my judge. That’s why I say it’s not ok.</td>
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<td><strong>Man:</strong> If I don’t beat her, she and the children will break the rules of society. Even the children will be delinquents.</td>
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*Adhibu (punish, sentence, pass judgment on, chastise, cause pain)*
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Must get along</th>
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<td>Woman: Some women cause conflict: they like to fight. She needs to learn it is better to just get along.</td>
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<td>Man: You need to beat her for the family to live in peace.</td>
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<td>Woman: These women who get beaten a lot, everyone knows they don’t know how to get along. You don’t take her seriously. She’s in the market, she says something, you just continue without listening to her. She is not respected in the community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woman: A woman must love all people, serve all people. Even if he’s beating her with kicks.</td>
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*Kubaliana. Kupendana. Kukaa na amani. Kuendelea salaama. Kustarehe.* (To live in peace, to get along, to be on good terms)