National representatives or autonomous experts?

A case study of the Norwegian participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism

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He possessed that opportune facility for turning out several thousand words on any subject whatever at the shortest possible notice: politics: sport: books: finance: science: art: fashion—as he himself said, “War, Famine, Pestilence or Death on a pale Horse”. All were equal when it came to Bagshaw´s typewriter. He would take on anything, and – to be fair – what he produced, even off the cuff, was no worse than what was to be read most of the time. You never wondered how on earth the stuff had ever managed to be printed.

-Anthony Powell
Abstract

Norway has had benefits from participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Union Mechanism), a network for civil protection at the European level that includes all EU member states, Norway, Iceland, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The civil protection efforts of the European Union have been understudied due to the incoherent nature of its efforts.

This case study address one gap in the literature, and investigates, by way of interviews of civil servants and analysis of documents, the type of network governance the Union Mechanism constitutes, if this has changed with amended legislation, and whether or not network participation has had any effects on Norwegian civil servant identity and role perceptions as a consequence of interactions with other network actors. The findings suggest that the Union Mechanism constitutes a participant-governed network with lead-agency traits accorded the European Commission. Overall network activity has increased with amended legislation, but there appears to be limited implications on role-perceptions and identities of civil servants representing Norwegian interest in the Union Mechanism. The findings reveal that there is a Nordic bloc, and the perceptions of being “Nordic” within the framework of the Union Mechanism is recurring among civil servants, who report that they pursue common Nordic solutions in network participation, and coordinate ahead of meetings.
Preface

I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to prof. Per Lægreid for invaluable assistance with my thesis. Without his guidance, this thesis would not have happened. I would also like to thank Ole Danielsen for valuable contributions and input.

I would extend gratitude to friends and family for their patience. Thanks also to Bjøn.

Herewith, hope it serves,

Henrik Dalstø
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

Commission- European Commission
DG ECHO- Directorate Generale Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection
DG Environment- Directorat Generale Environment
DSB- Directorate for Societal Security
EU- European Union
JD- Ministry of Justice and Public Security
NAO – Networked administrative organization
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Union Mechanism- Union Mechanism for Civil Protection
UN- United Nations
1.0 Introduction

...Norway has had great benefits from participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Through this arrangement and its financing arrangements, one has been able to finance exercises and projects, educate Norwegian personnel, exchange competences and experiences and have been granted access to relevant situational analysis and information products. EU is the most important actor in the field of civil security in Europe, also in a regional context... (inst. St. nr. 267s, 2013-2014).

This thesis is a case study of the Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism for Civil Protection, a network which is one of EU's primary resources for civil protection in the union (DG ECHO, 2015b). The International Unit of the Directorate for Civil Security (DSB) is responsible for the Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism, and it represents Norwegian interest in the network on behalf of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD) (DSB, 2014a).

The European Union has recently developed systems for crisis management and civil protection such as the Union Mechanism, and recent legislation in the area of civil protection signals increased efforts from the EU to become a visible actor in civil protection (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). The civil protection system(s) are made up by a variety of instruments and organizations, and it has proven difficult to develop a clear picture of the competences the European Union actually possesses. Scholars have noted the lack of coherence, and the lack of available information on the efforts of the EU as a problem (Larsson, Frisell & Olsson, 2009:1-2), and crisis management and civil protection efforts and systems at the Union level is an area that is under-studied (Ekengren, Matzén, Rhinard & Svantesson, 2006). This thesis will address one aspect of EU-level developments in civil protection, namely the developments of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (hence: Union Mechanism1).

1 Previously called the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (Larsson, Frisell, & Olsson, 2009).
and it will seek to address the lack of research on what has become an important resource for the protection of EU member-states, EEA-member states, and third-countries who are all eligible to receive aid and civil protection support in times of crisis and incidents (DG ECHO, 2015b).

This study will address two aspects of the Union Mechanism: its developments following a new legislative framework for the Union Mechanism adopted in 2013 (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013), and the possible impact on the roles and identities of civil servants from the International Unit of the Directorate of Civil Security due to participation in network activity (DSB, 2014a).

1.1 Civil protection vs. societal security
The terminology used in the EU and Union Mechanism are different from Norwegian usage. Norwegian terminology often refers to societal security as the concept of “…the ability society has…to maintain important societal functions, and to care for citizens lives, health and fundamental needs under different types of strain…” (white paper nr.17, 2001-2002). This concept differs from the concept of civil protection, which is the most common concept applied to similar, albeit not identical functions carried out by way of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in the existing and previous legislation regarding the Union Mechanism. A concise definition of civil protection does not exist in the legislation; rather it exists as an amalgamation of different ambitions, and will be defined in the thesis as efforts aimed at protecting:

“…primarily people, but also the environment and property, including cultural heritage, against all kinds of natural and man-made disasters, including environmental disasters, marine pollution and acute health emergencies occurring inside or outside the union…” (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

As the Union Mechanism and the activity within it is aimed at civil protection this concept will be used instead of the concept of societal security when referring to

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2 Societal security is an attempted translation of the Norwegian concept of samfunnssikkerhet, which does not readily avail itself for translation.
network activities, whereas the history of civil security in Norway will apply the Norwegian terminology.

1.2 Actualization
Civil protection has been recognized and treated as a national issue, but recent history has seen a tendency towards a more international focus on civil protection (DSB, 2014a). New structures, or in some instances civil protection systems, are emerging at the international level. Some researchers have described this as an emerging civil protection policy space (Boin, Busuioc & Groenleer, 2014). International actors such as the EU consider it in their best interest that the issue of civil security is treated as an international one, and that there exists a knowledge-exchange that can better prepare the individual actors in the face of an incident (DG ECHO, 2015b).

This study investigates if recent international developments, specifically EU-level developments in the area of civil security, may have an impact on the organizational culture of the DSB, if such cooperation places new demands on the International Unit which is the unit responsible for maintaining Norwegian interests in the network, and on the identities and roles of civil servants at the Directorate for Civil Security.

The interrelations between the DSB and EU-level civil protection actors, and implications for roles and identities of actors engaging within it, deserve attention because of new powers vested in the European Commission. The study of these developments constitutes a field of research of its own, often referred to as the European Executive Space, or the European Administrative Space (EAS) (Egeberg, 2006a; Trondal, 2010; Egeberg & Trondal, 2012; Trondal & Peters, 2013). It does also demand attention because of the inherent multi-level nature of crisis management and preparedness (Fimreite, Lango, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2011:9; Boin et al., 2014), the Union Mechanism being understudied from a Norwegian perspective. The concept of transboundary crises is also a recurring theme in research on civil protection in the EU, and deserves some attention.
A transboundary crisis is an incident that transcends territorial and sectorial boundaries, and it is assumed that national and local governing entities will have a limited or lacking capacity to handle such a crises on their own; the transboundary crises assumes an international (transboundary) dimension, and demands an international response in order to be successfully managed or contained (Boin et al., 2014). Transboundary crises by themselves are not the focus of this study; rather they are regarded as a driving force or rationale for integration of civil security systems, and emerging structures of civil security systems and crisis management at the international level (Boin et al., 2014). The DSB has been tasked by the JD with developing a plan for situations where the national capacity for maintaining civil security is exacerbated, and for which international support is needed (Supplementary letter of allocations, 2013).

These developments are ongoing, and the new legislation may suggest that these efforts are intensifying (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013), which is grounds for further inquiry into the direction which such cooperation might take. The amended legislation for the Union Mechanism draws up the direction of civil protection work in the EU, and it has been incorporated in the EEA-agreement. Norway is guaranteed equal participation in the Union Mechanism itself, and this activity is encouraged from central authorities (cf. prop. 105s, 2013-2014).

The study of EU civil protection capabilities need to account for these recent developments and activities, as the direction of the Union Mechanism is not set in stone, nor is the research on the Union Mechanism as a vehicle for civil protection fully up to date, that is to say, many of the studies have not yet accounted for the merger of humanitarian aid and civil protection at the EU level in the Commission department DG ECHO, the department for humanitarian affairs and civil protection, with the Union Mechanism being moved from DG ENVIRONMENT to DG ECHO in 2010 (cf. Ekengren et al., 2006; Åhman, Nilsson & Olsson, 2009; Bremberg & Britz, 2009; Morsut, 2014), bringing together humanitarian aid and civil protection under one Commission department, suggesting an increased effort for the EU to realize its ambitions to be a coherent coordination and support structure (DG ECHO, 2015a). The move from DG ENVIRONMENT was a result of increasing focus on civil protection in the Lisbon Treaty, and was an prompted by the Monitoring and
Information Centre (MIC), an information hub within the Union Mechanism, being upgraded from an information hub, to also serve as coordinator and contact point in crisis (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013:25-29). Bringing together the Union Mechanism with the humanitarian efforts of DG ECHO was important, as third-countries may now request assistance for humanitarian needs, and also crisis management from the same Commission department (DG ECHO, 2015a)

New structures and institutional developments at the EU level, such as the of the Union Mechanism, have traditionally come about as a response to specific crisis; there have in the words of Boin et al (2013:2-3) not been any institutional blueprint for the structures one can now observe, and there have been a focus on network governance\(^3\), rather than government. All of these factors might together prove to have impacts on the roles or identities of actors in the International Unit at the DSB engaging with network actors, its relation to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security at the national level, and its relations to the European Commission, especially its relations to DG ECHO.

An understanding of how civil servants perceive their roles in these developments is of use to scholars of European integration, as well as scholars of organization. How ties may develop between the Commission and Union Mechanism member states, which may challenge an intergovernmental understanding of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993), is of special interest to scholars researching the European Administrative Space, and this thesis could be positioned at the outer bounds of such a project, where the focus is on possible socialization, and culture of civil servants attending meetings, and participating in a European network where the Commission is also a node (Egeberg, 2006b:10-11)

\(^{1.3}\) Problem statements
The above-mentioned issues prompted the direction of this Thesis. The problem statements consists of two parts, the first concerns the recent developments of the Union Mechanism network following a new legislative framework (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). The second concerns the possibility of civil servants at the

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\(^3\) Governance is defined as ”binding decision-making in the public sphere” (Marks & Hooghe, 2004: 15).
DSB perceiving changes in role or identities due to socialization occurring when engaging with network actors at the European level.

1. **How has the Union Civil Protection Mechanism developed with the new legislative framework? Does the network constitute a distinct type of network-governance?**

2. **How has international cooperation with EU-level actors in the area of civil protection within the Union Mechanism influenced roles and identities of civil servants at the Directorate for Civil Security?**

Does the network constitute a specific type of network-governance, and does new legislation signal a change along one or two classificatory dimensions; the degree to which network activity is or is not brokered among participants, and if the administrative tasks of the network are internal or external to the members (Provan & Kenis, 2008). An outline of the developments since the previous legal arrangement for the Union Mechanism is in focus (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). The type of network structures the Union Mechanism constitutes has bearings on its functionality, and also on some aspects such as problem efficacy, transaction costs etc. with regard to the tasks it is supposed to carry out (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This problem statement is an attempt to classify the network, and trace its developments before and following the new legislative framework, as the type of network might have an influence on the civil protection capabilities that it may possess.

The second problem statement is concerned with the Norwegian civil servants from the International Unit of the DSB engaging in network activity. Researching whether actors roles and identities at the International Unit of the DSB is influenced by network participation is of relevance because it speaks to the possible formation of a secondary set of roles and expectations, and ultimately may pose a secondary identity for civil servants engaging in network activity, as the organizational culture of the International Unit of the DSB may develop due to interactions with, or dependencies on actors in an institutionalized environment (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness & Røvik, 2009:59-60), which may influence the relations between Norwegian authorities and the European Commission. If the European Commission seeks closer
cooperation in a specific policy-field, and actors come to assume new roles and identities, network influences may challenge an intergovernmental understanding of international cooperation, where national authorities is seen as the central actor bargaining in international relations (cf. Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik, 1995; Moravcsik, 1998).

This thesis is one among several studies that seeks to understand if there are national-level consequences or outcomes due to EU-level or networked (at the international level) developments (cf. Trondal, 2005; Egeberg, 2006b; Danielsen, 2009; Trondal, 2010; Egeberg & Trondal, 2012; Trondal & Peters, 2013). It is in line with studies that attempt to grasp the “hit” of Europeanization on national-level institutions, or what Olsen (2007) refers to as “central penetration of national systems of governance” (p. 70), one of five definitions of the concept of Europeanization he describes).

1.4 Theoretical intake
The classificatory ambitions of the study will analyze legislation for the Union Mechanism in a framework for network governance developed by Provan and Kenis (2008), to determine if the network has lead-agency traits, if it is an instance of a networked-administrative organization, or if the network is participant governed. Whether or not the new legislation for the network moves the network in a direction of one of the ideal-types of network governance will be gauged along two dimensions: Whether or not network activity is brokered to a large extent indicating a participant-governed network, or if there is one member which controls network activity, indicating lead-agency traits. The second dimension concerns the administration of the network and whether or not it is internal to the network, indicating either a lead-agency or participant-governed network, or separate from the members, which would suggest a networked administrative organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

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4 The reader is referred to the book by Olsen (2007) for the full discussion of his conceptions of Europeanization, and their different applications and theoretical foundations.
The second ambition is to investigate the roles of civil servants from the International Unit engaging within the Union Mechanism network. The theoretical framework is an intergovernmental perspective, which considers European integration as bargaining between nation states, with national governments as the central actor, bargaining on the international stage, in turn precluding any re-socialization towards European roles and identities (cf. Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik, 1995; Moravcsik, 1998; Checkel, 2005) and a cultural-institutional perspective on organizations, which considers the possibility of civil servants being, and perceiving themselves as being, partially socialized towards network roles and identities (Christensen et al., 2009). The cultural-institutional perspective is aided by insights from the intergovernmental literature, and the two above-mentioned perspectives can be said to represent a state-centric versus a multi-level governance approach to European integration (George, 2004) These are employed in a complementary fashion, where the goal is to gain as much insight from the case as possible, without treating contradictions between the theoretical predictions in the theoretical framework in a “competitive” strategy, where the attempt would often be at further theorization (Roness, 1997:100-106).

1.5 Data
The data utilized in the classificatory ambitions of the Union Mechanism as a distinct type of network-governance consists of one Council Decision, and one Decision of the European Parliament and Council, one is from 2007, a recast of the initial legal framework for the Union Mechanism, in 2001, and the second is amended legislation from 2013 (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). Public documents from the process of incorporating said legislation in the EEA-agreement is also used.

The data subject to analysis with regards to explaining the possible role- and identity-formation, or lack thereof through a process of socialization resulting from cooperation in the Union Mechanism, consist of nine interviews of civil servants, and of a selection of public documents. Out of the nine civil servants, four works at the International Unit at the agency, which is responsible for the DSBs international relations. One is a seconded expert to the Commission and works on civil protection
at the Commission level. One civil servant is with the Norwegian Mission to the EU, and the others work at different departments within the DSB.

The documents used for analysis are a collection of supplementary letters of allocation, detailing the desired activities of the DSB from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, government white papers, EEA-position notes, a report from the Select Committee on Societal Security, and select Decisions of the Council and European parliament, Council Decisions, and Norwegian legal documents which constitute the legal framework for the Union Mechanism as a whole, and the Norwegian legal framework as described by the EEA-agreement.

1.6 Delimiting the case
As shown, the study will not focus on the DSB in its entirety, and its focus is mainly on the International Unit of the DSB, aided by the perceptions of the Union Mechanism, and the EU as a civil protector, held by civil servants at other departments within the DSB, by the seconded expert to the Commission, and the civil servant at the Mission of Norway to the European Union. The recent developments in the Union Mechanism and on their possible impact on the roles and identities of civil servants from the International Unit are the main focus. The Norwegian contact and participation in the Union Mechanism is coordinated by the International Unit at the DSB (DSB, 2014a), and this unit will be the focal point of the analysis.

The DSB is the central Norwegian institution in focus, at the EU-level, the focus is mainly on the Commission department DG ECHO which facilitates the Union Mechanism (DG ECHO, 2015a). “The Commission” and “DG ECHO” will be used interchangeably, as the Council Decisions and Decisions of the European Parliament and Council specifies tasks for the Commission, rather than DG ECHO (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). Other studies of what has been called the European Executive Space often includes the whole of Commission, and the Council of Ministers, considering tensions between the Council of Ministers and the Commission to be of interest to the understanding of the interwoven nature of administrative systems in the EU, and the possible branches
into national and sub-national levels of governance (cf. Egeberg, 2006b; Trondal, 2010; Trondal & Peters, 2013).

The thesis does not focus on all aspects civil protection the Union Mechanism carries out. It is common to distinguish between two analytical levels of crisis management, and civil protection. One phase is the operational level of crisis management, which involves actors directly involved in crisis management. The other phase is the strategic level, and is concerned with the more general preparedness efforts undertaken by political and administrative leaders (Fimreite, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2014:16). This thesis has its focus on the latter phase, and it does not concern itself with the Union Mechanism as a crisis manager, nor its constituent parts and their functioning and coordination in the operative phase of crisis management. The reason for this is that the legislative framework describes the desired direction for the Union Mechanism, a direction that is more concerned with the development of the network in the preparedness phase (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013), developments which takes place at the strategic level of analysis. Learning from crises that has happened and applying insight to further preparedness efforts is also included what I refer to as the preparedness phase.

The development of norms and identities is considered an ongoing process (Christensen et al., 2009:59), hence the preparedness phase may be more apt to gauge these developments, rather than focusing on the management phase, which for most crises is of a short duration. The balancing of solidarity and sovereignty for the network members central to the developments of the Union Mechanism (Ekengren et al., 2006), the possible diffusion of roles and identities of the network, and the socialization of civil servants therein is considered to be a process that occurs over time (Checkel, 2005).

The DSB does have several other international agreements such as agreements with NATO, the UN, and a range of bilateral agreements, besides the cooperation with the EU through the Union Mechanism (DSB, 2014b). It is plausible that some of these

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5 Socialization of actors is often considered contingent on time involved with the socializing agent, and the intensity of the interaction between the socializing agent and the subject to the socializing mechanisms (Checkel, 2005), not something that is likely to come about over the course of the relatively brief phase of crisis management, granted that this is also plausible over time.
may also be influential on the roles and identities of civil servants, and on international civil protection policy, however, these institutions will not be given any attention unless they are proven to be important interlocutors in DSB-Union Mechanism-Commission trilateral, that is, that they are integral to EU-level as well as national-level actors. Other civil security actors might be of interest to other researchers, but they are not part of the EU-level developments that are of special interest to this thesis.

1.7 The proceedings
The thesis opens with the context for the case. The case will be introduced, the DSB and the Commission will be presented, and brief historical accounts given for both of them, along with historical account of Norwegian civil protection efforts more generally. The Union Mechanism is the responsibility of the Commission department DG ECHO, and this will also be introduced. The thesis will proceed with an overview of the theoretical context, and situate the thesis in its field of research.

A chapter on the theoretical perspectives applied in the study will be presented. First previously applied theoretical intakes to the studies of Europeanization and European integration will be presented, to give an account of how such issues have been approached in the literature, and how the theoretical positions are interrelated. Then the theoretical framework used in the analysis will be introduced: First one section for the classificatory framework of Provan and Kenis(2008), and then a presentation of intergovernmental theory, and a cultural-institutional perspective on organization is introduced. The dissertation presents expectations to findings from the theoretical framework for each of the two perspectives.

The methods chapter follows the theories chapter, accounting for the methods applied in the study, the sampling of data, and the evaluation of the data quality, with an emphasis on source criticism, validity, reliability and generalizability. The findings chapter, and findings on the network governance dimensions will be introduced. The Norwegian connection to the Union Mechanism as described by authorities in public documents will be presented to indicate any implications of participation on the formal arrangements of Norwegian network participation. This will be followed by
findings from interviews and documents relating to the activities of civil servants, and perceptions of roles and identities with regards to the participation in the Union Mechanism held by the civil servants. These will be presented in separate sections to provide clarity.

The thesis will then analyze the findings in light of the problem statements and the theoretical framework. The analysis will first evaluate the data in light of the network-governance framework to investigate if there are any changes along the above-mentioned dimensions, before proceeding with analyzing the data in light of intergovernmental theory, and the cultural-institutional perspective, and explaining how and why there have/have not been socialization of actors towards network roles and identities. The analysis concludes with a section detailing the findings of the network-governance classification, and a discussion of which theoretical intake provides the better explanation of civil servant activities and socialization/non-socialization towards roles and identities of the Union Mechanism.

A summary is presented, and the evaluation of findings in relations to the problem statement will be presented. Implications from the findings for future studies will be drawn, if there are any real-life implications from the study will be discussed, and there will also be a discussion as to whether or not the thesis could have been framed differently in light of insight with regards to theoretical intake and methodic design.
2.0 Context; organizations, players and Europeanization

This chapter opens with a presentation of the “Norwegian context”, the organization of civil security in Norway, and presents some recent historical developments. The DSB is introduced and an account of developments in its international cooperation with other civil security actors is presented. The DSB’s relation to the Ministry for Justice and Public Security is described.

The participation in the Union Mechanism is the task of the international Unit at the DSB, and this will be given special attention (DSB, 2014a). Other international relations of the DSB will be presented in a more general fashion. The research question demands an understanding of the institutional architecture of the EU, where DG ECHO a European Commission department, is seen as the central actor with which the DSB engages in the form of the network the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism is the Commission’s main vehicle for coordination of civil protection, and its development will be described in some detail as its functions and organization has developed to some extent over the years from its inception in 2001 (Morsut, 2014).

2.1 The national context

The national context lays the foundation for the possibility of agencies entering into the cooperation with international actors, and the Norwegian organization of the central government and agencies is an important factor in recent developments in international cooperation for civil protection (Fimreite et al., 2014:11-12). The DSB participates in the international cooperation for civil protection at the EU level (DSB, 2014b). The European Union organizes many of its civil protection efforts in a “networked” model, bringing together diverse actors across sectors and levels of

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6 It can be useful to clarify what a mechanism is in the EU lingo because it differs from everyday speech. The different constituent parts of the civil protection efforts of the EU could all be referred to as institutions according to Larsson et al. (2009) The concept of institutions however, is often avoided when referring to the various civil protection arrangements in the EU system, as it specifically denotes “the five branches of the Union as a political organization (for example, the European Parliament or the Council)” (ibid: 13) when referring to the EU. The different arrangements are referred to as mechanisms, structures etc. For the purposes of this thesis, the Union Mechanism will be referred to as a network, or simply the Union Mechanism to avoid confusion.
governance (Boin et al., 2014). New legislation details the desired direction for the role of the EU and Member States of the Union Mechanism, the main instrument for civil protection in the EU (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). These new developments are increasing the focus on the interrelationship between levels of administration between the EU and the national level. This is often approached in the EAS-literature (cf. Trondal, 2010; Trondal & Peters, 2013).

The EAS discusses the possibility of de-coupling from national ministries, and a re-coupling towards the European Commission and its institutions. The possibility of de-coupling of agencies from their ministries with a re-coupling towards the European Commission is dependent on the degree of agency autonomy from its parent ministry. Agencies that enjoy a large degree of autonomy from its parent ministry are more susceptible to these types of influences, and conversely, agencies which are subject to strong coordination from its ministry are not likely to be coopted in this fashion (Egeberg, 2006b:14).

The first agencies were established outside the ministries in the 1840s. Since then, agencies have been a defining organizational form in Norwegian central government. In the 1950s there was an increased focus on the role of agencies in technical as opposed to political issues, and more independent agencies were established to allow the ministries to focus on policy and planning (Christensen, Egeberg, Lægreid & Aars, 2014a:30-43). A challenge to this system has been the question of how to balance agency autonomy with ministerial control. The principle of ministerial responsibility is the underlying principle guiding the relationship between ministries and parliaments, and ministries and agencies. The minister is held accountable to parliament for activity within her ministry and subordinate agencies. The high levels of trust in the Norwegian administration has in effect provided agencies with some discretion and autonomy from ministries, a development which appears strengthened by recent structural devolution of the Norwegian central government on a model whereby vertical and horizontal inter-organizational specialization has been increased (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006:237-239).
2.1.1 Historical developments of civil security in Norway
The concept of Total Defense is central to the understanding of civil security policy in Norway. The concept or principle of Total Defense, a combination of military and civil security actors maintaining the security, sovereignty of Norwegian territory and national interests, civil and military, has been a principle for Norwegian security. In its invention, the main focus was the military aspect of crises, that is to say Norway in a time of war or under threat of war. This is no longer the case, and the Total Defense concept has been refined to also include those types of crises that involves lower levels of governance than the national, and the role of The ministry of Justice and Public Security as an important actor and interlocutor in societal security work has been strengthened(Høydal, 2007:8-9).

The field of societal security has been fraught with problems associated with coordination and unclear roles with regards accountability. These problems have been addressed in numerous government white papers, and there was an increased focus on the unclear roles following the incidents of July 22nd 2011(Fimreite et al., 2014:64-75). This will be addressed at further length when the Ministry of Justice and Public security is introduced, following a brief presentation of the guiding principles of civil security in Norway, illustrating the complicated balancing act that is civil protection.

2.1.2 Guiding principles for civil security in Norway
Civil security is organized after four main principles; the principle of responsibility, the principle of proximity, the principle of equality, and the principle of cooperation7(St. meld. nr.22, 2007-2008:10; Fimreite et al., 2014). The principle of responsibility entails that the person or entity normally responsible for an area (geographical or policy-) remains responsible for this area in the event of a crisis. The principle of proximity entails that a crisis is to be managed at the lowest possible administrative level. This principle has given the municipalities more responsibility, along with the County Governor. The principle of equality entails that the organizational forms are to remain the same during times of crisis. This latter principle has proven less effective, and crisis management often demands improvisation(Fimreite et al., 2011:16-17). The principle of cooperation entails that all public organizations with resources

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7 Cooperation is an attempted translation of the Norwegian “samvirke”
available are supposed to aid, in search and rescue-missions especially(Fimreite et al., 2014:18-19). These principles, especially the principle of proximity and that of equality do appear to come at odds with coordination by way of the Union Mechanism, but as shown, there is often need for improvisation in times of crises, and in the cases of transboundary crises, one would have to deal with a crises that cross territorial or sectorial boundaries, making the efficient coordination in these trying circumstances an integral part of crisis management(Boin et al., 2014).

2.1.3 The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (est.1818)
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD) has had the responsibility for civil protection since 1970, following the establishment of the Directorate for Civil Preparedness. Problems of coordination and unclear accountability was given attention following the Cold War, and the JD was granted responsibility as coordinating department in civil protection, with a role that spanned across sectors (Fimreite et al., 2014:63-64). The current role of JD can be ascribed to three Orders in Council. The cross-sectorial coordinating responsibilities were granted the department in 1994. In the year 2000 the ministry was ascribed a regulatory role, with responsibilities to audit the other departments regarding their civil security work, and also to carry out internal control of the other departments (ibid:40). The last Order in Council regards the role for the DSB as a civil protection actor, and it describes its desired roles with regards to coordination, and also its regulatory functions. In 2003, the DSB was established, in order that the JD could strengthen its role as “lead-agency” with regards to civil protection(ibid.:43). The policy field of civil protection was seen as being fragmented across sectors and between departments, and several actors were considered holding important roles in this field. Two reports, Buvikutvalget and Sårbarhetsutvalget, described the necessity for a less fragmented civil protection policy field, and a more prominent role for the JD was wanted(Høydal, 2007:7). The need for a less fragmented civil protection policy field became blatantly apparent on July 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2011.

2.1.4 Recent developments
Recent developments, following July 22\textsuperscript{nd} launched an investigation into the role of the Ministry of Justice and Public security. The government had proven to be poorly
shod in the face of major incidents, and there was again a focus on the complexity of the field of preparedness in Norway (Fimreite et al., 2014:67). The lack of accountability was emphasized in a government white paper (white paper 2012: 14, 2012). While there has been an emphasis on strengthening the role of the JD as coordinator in civil protection, there remains to be seen if any organizational changes, and an emphasis on the role of JD as leader, and the role of culture, will have the desired effects in clarifying accountability in a field of complex problems, and relatively weak possible sanctions from the JD (Fimreite et al., 2014:70-76). Among earlier efforts of clarification, the establishment of DSB in 2003 has been an important development (Fimreite et al., 2011:52)

2.1.4 The Directorate for Civil Security (est. 2003)
The Directorate for Civil Security is the agency responsible for participation in the Union Mechanism on behalf of the JD. The directorate describes itself thusly:

“DSB aims at maintaining an overview of risk and vulnerability in society. The Directorate shall be a driving force in the work to prevent crises, accidents and other undesirable incidents, and ensure sound emergency preparedness and efficient accident and crisis management” (DSB, 2012b)

The DSB is tasked with supporting the JD, and it has a coordinating role in matters of civil security. Its activities range from crisis preparedness to risk assessment, to being the regulatory agency in charge of product safety, in short a wide range of responsibilities (DSB, 2009). Its stated vision is “A safe and robust society- where everyone takes responsibility” (DSB, 2012b).

2.1.5 Organizational structure
Around 240 employees work at the DSB main office located in Tønsberg, Norway. There are approximately 600 employees total at the agency. The International Unit of the DSB is located below the department Analysis and National Preparedness (see: table. 1.) in the organization. It employs six civil servants full time, and it has a coordinating role with regards to the agencies international cooperation with the EU, NATO, the UN and others such as bilateral agreements, and Nordic cooperation. It is
supposed to represent Norwegian interests on the international arena with regards to its role in civil protection. It also takes on a coordinating role in civil protection efforts where it serves as contact point for the Union Mechanism and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, a communications hub of the Union Mechanism, run by the European Commission (DSB, 2012a; DSB, 2014a; DSB, 2014b). The civil servants at the International Unit of the DSB have different backgrounds with reference to education, and they have different levels of experience with international cooperation, and with the EU in particular. The International Unit is composed by a majority of civil servants with a political science education, and others with a background in defense, and nursing. The civil servants have typically worked at the unit for between 5-7 years (Informants N2, N4, N6, N10).

Table 1. Organizational Chart of the DSB

Source: DSB (2012a)
2.2. The international context
The DSB cooperates with numerous actors at the international level, based on the recognition that even though the governance of Norwegian civil security and preparedness is intended to follow goals and risk assessments established at the national level, it is influenced by international actors and other policy actors also tasked with civil security. In many instances this cooperation is beneficial and sought actively by the DSB, and the DSB recognizes that it is not insulated from international conditions regarding civil security, nor civil security actors at the international level and cooperation in civil protection at the international level (DSB, 2014b). It is expected that this will have some impact on the workings of the DSB (ibid.).

Norway, and the DSB have several agreements with civil protection actors at the international level. Some of these are international organizations such as the United Nations, the EU and NATO, while others are bilateral agreements, with an emphasis on Nordic cooperation. International civil protection efforts have an impact on all the departments at the DSB (DSB, 2014b).

Norway entered into cooperation with the EU on civil protection in 2002, and DSB has been representing Norway in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism since 2003 (DSB, 2014a). Before 2002 it participated in the “Action programme for civil protection” in the EU. New legislation has been ratified in the EEA-agreement, which describes the implications for Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism following amended legislation at the European level (DSB, 2014a). The European Commission is responsible for the Union Mechanism, and the department DG ECHO, is the central actor the DSB cooperates with at the EU level apart from other Member States (ibid.). The European Commission, and its role with regards to the Union Mechanism will now be introduced.

2.2.1 The European Commission
The European Commission is one of five key EU institutions. It is divided into two “arms” the Services and the College. The Services carry out administrative functions within the Commission, and the College is the “political” arm. The commissioners in college are responsible to their portfolio first and foremost, and not the Commission as a whole. The administration is divided into several Directorate Generals, which
corresponds to departments, and there are lines of conflict between and among the different DGs as to what is supposed to be the policy priorities (Nugent, 2001:7-9). The Union Mechanism used to belong to DG ENVIRONMENT, but is now situated as the responsibility of DG ECHO, the department for Humanitarian affairs and Civil Protection, in order to strengthen the capacities of the Union Mechanism as a coherent civil protector (Boin et al., 2013:22).

### 2.2.2 Amended legislation

There are four central Decisions that are concerned with the Union Mechanism. In 2001, a Council Decision established the “Community mechanism” to facilitate cooperation and assistance with regards to civil protection (Council Decision 2001/792/EC, 2001). In 2007 this legislation was recast, and two pieces of legislation were ratified, a Decision establishing the “Community Civil Protection Mechanism” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007), and a Decision establishing the “Civil Protection Financial Instrument” (Council Decision 2007/162/EC, 2007).

Recently this legislation has been amended to replace previous legislation with the amended provision “On a Union Civil Protection Mechanism” (Decision No 1313/2013/EU). This Decision of the European Parliament and Council contains descriptions of the intended cooperation within the Union Mechanism, and it places a special emphasis on the goals of the Commission, and of the individual Member States. It explicitly states that the Council recognizes the need for harmonization of practices, yet states that the handling of crises is to remain a matter for the member states, and EEA-member states (ibid.). It is included in full in the EEA-agreement, and it is supposed to dictate the goals and vision of cooperation from 2014 to 2020 (Prop. 105 S (2013-2014), 2014). DG ECHO is granted a more visible role in the network following legislative amendments (ibid.).

### 2.2.3 The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (Directorat Generale ECHO)

The department tasked with civil security and protection in the EU is DG ECHO. The department oversees the Community’s efforts in matters of civil protection and humanitarian aid to member states and non-members, and the two policy areas were
merged together under the same roof in 2010. DG ECHOs legal framework is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, and it is to date one of the largest providers of humanitarian aid globally (DG ECHO, 2015a; Boin et al., 2013).

The main vehicle for civil protection is found in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The Union Mechanism involves 32 states, all 28 member states, Iceland, Norway, and The Republic of Macedonia. It provides assistance in man-made crisis and natural disasters, not just for the Member States, but also for any state seeking assistance, and it has been involved in crises management in crises that has affected several non-members such as the Japanese tsunami, and the Haitian earthquake (DG ECHO, 2015b; DG ECHO, 2015a).

The Union Mechanism carries out several tasks: the operational heart is found in the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), and crisis management efforts are coordinated through the ERCC. It also monitors any crisis developments, and has at its disposal several modules of pre-planned assets and resources that can be deployed rapidly to intervene in crisis, and start rescue operations, search operations etc. (DG ECHO, 2015b). The monitoring role of the ERCC extends beyond DG ECHO and the Union Mechanism Member States. It involves a number of other EU agencies such as the European Centre For Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP), The European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), and other actors and assets that may prove integral to the early warning of a coming crisis, or may provide expertise during crisis management (ERCC-Portal, 2014).

2.2.4 Historical development of the Union Mechanism for Civil Protection
EU civil protection efforts can be traced to the Seveso accident in 1976, an accident where dioxin leaked from the Italian Seveso chemical-plant and 600 homes had to be evacuated, prompting a focus on cooperation in civil protection efforts in Europe, and resulting in the SEVESO-I and SEVESO-II directives for chemical security (Boin et al., 2013:22). The EU has since sought to, and developed systems for crisis management, and in recent years, the Union has developed diverse tools for this purpose. The parts of this system is in various degrees of completion, with some, like the Union Mechanism for Civil Protection being fully operative (DG ECHO,
2015b), whereas others are still being developed\(^8\). The developments has come about as a response to different crisis, and the system has been fraught with *ad hoc* constellations of actors (Larsson et al., 2009:1-4). The competences in the area of crisis management and civil protection have been sector-specific, meaning that the different parts are not cross sectorial, nor is crisis management and civil protection based on a single or a few pieces of legislation. The system lacks coherence (ibid.:1-4). The area of *civil protection* is one area of the crisis management developments that have become more coherent, and an area for which the EU has established competencies that are operative such as the Union Mechanism, which has been developed as a response to a series of incidents (Boin et al., 2014).

The Amoco Cadiz accident, a major maritime accident, eventually led to the creation of the European Maritime Safety Agency in 2002, and this accident along with the Seveso accident brought about the focus on creating a “Guide for civil protection” in the EU. DG ENVIRONMENT handled these accidents, and it became integral to civil protection efforts in the Union. In 1987, there was a request to develop a system for the registering of resources available in case of incident, by and to member states, and in 1991, the framework for the Civil Protection Mechanism was made. In this framework, the Commission was merely a facilitator, accorded no administrative tasks, and had no financial responsibilities, the cost of assistance in crisis was footed by the receiving country (Boin et al., 2013:23-24).

In 1997, the Guide for civil protection was reformed to an “action programme” which focused on the efforts of pooling resources, and exchange of expertise. In 2001, after 9/11, the efforts was further intensified, due to lack of appropriate means of response in times of terrorist attacks and other crisis, and the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection was established. This signaled a more coherent civil protection capability, and there were organizational changes as a consequence of the establishment (ibid.: 20-25). A Monitoring and Information Centre was introduced along with CECIS, a platform for information sharing, and there was a focus on intervention teams (Boin et al., 2013:24-26). 2004 and the Tsunami incident saw the need for other types of assistance, and the concept of civil protection modules was introduced. These are

\(^8\) The EU Mechanism is also under development, but it is currently serving its various functions with regards to civil protection, while developments occur.
pre-planned modules composed of civil protection resources for rapid dispatch to countries in need (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007).

In 2013 the legislation for the Union Mechanism was amended, and there was several changes to the existing system. These signal an increased effort for the EU to become a visible actor in civil protection (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013), and this development will be one focus of the analysis. The current organization of the Union Mechanism can be found in table 2.

A recent development has seen closer cooperation between Union-level and national level actors in the area of civil protection. It is however unclear if this is an expression of member-state solidarity, as research suggests that member states have sought to retain control over the policy process for the European Protective Space (Ekengren et al., 2006). Ekengren et al. (2006) uses the example of the “Solidarity Clause”, EU legislation detailing member state responsibility towards one another in civil protection, which states that while member states should call on other member states for assistance, the provision of such assistance is to remain voluntary for the members who may be called upon for help (TFEU art. 222, 2004). This illustrates that the balance between solidarity and sovereignty is still a contested issue (Ekengren et al., 2006). The efforts are intensifying however, and the closer cooperation is seen in the increasing cost of participation in the Union Mechanism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).
Table 2. Organization of the Union Mechanism

Source: Decision of the European Parliament and Council (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013)

2.2.5 Increased Funding
There is a trend towards increased cooperation within the EU framework (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The new legislation for the Union Mechanism increases the cost of participation for Norway, and the cost of participation increases from 3.5 million NOK per annum to approximately 9 million per annum for 2014-2020. The total expenditure on the Union Mechanism for the period of 2014-2020 is 368 428 000 euro⁹ (Norwegian Government, 2014a). The increase in funding from Member States could also signal intensified efforts at the EU level, where civil protection efforts are being discussed to a larger extent within the framework of the Union Mechanism (ibid.).

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⁹ This equals 3 089 084 566 NOK as of 01.05.2015
2.3 The EEA context
Norway is not a member of the European Union, and as such do not enjoy the same access to the policy-process at the European level. The Norwegian connection to the EU is by way of the EEA-agreement. The EEA countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein enjoy what may be called a quasi-membership in the EU. They enjoy access to the internal markets, and are expected to adopt EU legislation which concern internal market, and also other areas covered by the agreement such as consumer protection, education etc. (Egeberg & Trondal, 1999). Norway has access to the preparatory phase of legislation at the Commission, but is denied access in the Council. This has led to a blurring of the distinction between members and non-members with regards to European integration, and there is the expectation that Norway is integrated “to the same extent as full members as far as policy harmonization is concerned” (Egeberg & Trondal, 1999:134)

The Official Norwegian Report “Utenfor og Innenfor” (Official Norwegian Report, 2012:2) states that there is observable Europeanization of EU-member states, and that Norway and EEA-member states are not unaffected by this trend, though to a lesser degree than fully fledged members (ibid.; 158-160). The EU is considered as one of the most important civil protection actors with which the Norwegian administration cooperates on the international level. Norway is not granted access to discussions at the Council, and the Commission is considered the primary channel to exert influence, and register signals from the Commission regarding future civil security policies and organizing (Prop, 105 s(2013-2014), 2014).

Norwegian civil servants in departments and ministries report that the EU has some influence on their work, and many report that they have contact with members of the European commission, experts in the exchange of experts program, and in various committees and meetings fairly often. Departments report more interaction with the EU than do the directorates in relative terms, but in absolute figures directorates interact with various EU-level institutions to a larger extent than do their parent departments (Egeberg, 2006b). In the area of civil protection there is recognition of the benefits of cooperating with international actors (white paper 2012: 2, 2012:626-627). There is an emphasis on the benefits of attaining added value by pooling resources for civil protection efforts from Norwegian authorities in a European
context. This is also recognized by the EU (Norwegian Government, 2014a; DG ECHO, 2015b)

2.4 Added value
The EU considers cooperation in matters of civil security as a measure that provides value added to the community as a whole. It is reasonable to assume that this value-added will also benefit EEA-member states, and by extension, the DSB’s own efforts in its civil protection. DG ECHO states that cooperation will lead to better coordinated efforts at crisis management, and, because of a pooling of resources, less costly civil protection efforts overall. It is also supposed to reduce duplication of civil security efforts; through coordination of available resources, there is supposed to be less need for the same available resources in the different member states, and there is less need to have resources at hand in several countries if there can be expeditious deployment of resources from other member states (DG ECHO, 2014).

2.5 Summary
The International Unit at the DSB participates in the Union Mechanism, the main civil protection effort at the EU level, on behalf of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (DSB, 2014a). Norway has participated since 2002 and has recently transposed amended legislation for network participation into the EEA-agreement (ibid.). The Union Mechanism has changed with amended legislation, as the response to crises has demanded more cooperation in the field of civil protection internationally, and the amended legislation signals increased efforts for civil protection in the EU (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). The move of the Union Mechanism from DG ENVIRONMENT to DG ECHO in 2010 signals an ambition to gather humanitarian and civil protection efforts in one department, to become a more visible actor on the international stage (Boin et al., 2013). Participation in the Union Mechanism has provided added value for Norway and Member States, and is encouraged from Norwegian authorities (Norwegian Government, 2014b). These efforts may prove to have an impact on the organizational culture of the International Unit of the DSB, and may come instill in actors new roles and identities (Checkel, 2005)
3.0 Theoretical perspectives

3.1 Introduction
This chapter opens with a presentation of previous studies of Europeanization, and an account of what has come to constitute a field of research of its own, the European Administrative space (cf. Trondal, 2010). This thesis has also been aided by research in crisis management, and research in the “European protective space” has been important (cf. Ekengren et al., 2006). Theories of Europeanization, especially intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and multi-level governance theories are introduced to illustrate the developments in this field of research and the interrelations between the different schools of thought.

The chapter proceeds with an introduction of the theoretical frame applied in the study. Theoretical frames are useful in that they present the researcher with an overview of the sorts of hypothesis that can potentially prove fruitful within a given perspective (Ruschemeyer, 2009:17). The first ambition of the thesis is to classify the Union Mechanism as a distinct type of network-governance. To classify the network, the typology of Provan and Kenis (2008) will be applied. The second ambition is to account for the possible developments of new roles and identities, or lack thereof from civil servants from the DSB. An intergovernmental, and a cultural-institutional organization perspective will serve as the theoretical backdrop for the study of possible role and identity-formations due to socialization, and decision-making dynamics activated by actors engaging within the Union Mechanism, and will be presented in a separate section. The intergovernmental and organization theory make up the central explanatory theory with regards to explaining the possible socialization or lack thereof of civil servants from the International Unit engaging within the Union Mechanism network, whereas the ambitions of applying the framework of Provan and Kenis (2008) is classificatory.
3.2 The theoretical and empirical context
How previous studies and discoveries have advanced the field with regards to theory and conceptual and empirical understanding will be introduced. Central to the plurality of theoretical approaches to Europeanization and to civil protection especially is the inherent multi-level nature of civil protection and crisis management. The need to coordinate vertically between levels of governance, and horizontally; across sectors and territories, supports the notion that the traditional hierarchic understanding of civil protection systems is challenged by new structures such as networks, and needs to be understood in a multi-level perspective (Fimreite et al., 2011:9). This is evident from research in the European Protective Space, where researchers have sought to understand civil protection and crisis management in a European and transboundary context, and have attempted to map the civil protection systems of the EU, and make predictions of the prospects for the EU as a civil protector (cf. Ekengren et al., 2006; Boin, 2009; Larsson et al., 2009; Åhman et al., 2009; Boin et al., 2014; Boin et al., 2013).

An area of study that is of special interest to this study is that of the European Administrative Space (EAS). This is considered a “third wave” of studies of the EU, where perspectives on Europeanization is approached together with perspectives on administrations, and these developments are seen as possibly resulting in national-level agencies constituting a compound executive along with supranational institutions at the European (in this case the Commission) level, where the Commission develops branches into national administrations. It is considered a distinct development in the field (Trondal, 2010:17).

There exist a number of studies investigating international cooperation with an emphasis on the European Union. Studies have investigated the development of administrative center formation at the European level, and especially the degree of administrative power vested in the European Commission (cf. Egeberg, 2006a; Egeberg, 2006b; Trondal, 2010; Trondal & Peters, 2013). There have also been conducted a number of studies aimed at the possibility of this developing EU-level administration having an impact on national administrations (cf. Egeberg & Trondal,
2012; Egeberg, 2006b), and also *how* this impact might be conceptualized. The administrative bodies affected by the developments, the mechanisms by which the EU affect the national-level administrations, and whether or not organizations have been affected has been researched in a number of studies (cf. Martens, 2005; Trondal, 2005; Trondal, 2010; Gulbrandsen, 2011; Egeberg & Trondal, 2012; Trondal & Peters, 2013). A common denominator of these studies is that the European Commission is seen as a driving force for executive power formation at the international level, and because the Commission does not have any national-level representation of its own, it seeks to attach itself to national regulatory agencies, and other actors that are responsible for the policy-area of interest to secure harmonious implementation of EU regulations (Egeberg, 2006a:9-11).

Many of the above-mentioned studies entertain the possibility of agency de-coupling from their parent ministry, and a re-coupling towards the Commission. The possibility of this re-coupling towards a European administration is often attributed to a central assumption regarding the institutional arrangements at the national level; due to NPM-style reforms, or ideas, agencies have been organized “at arms length” away from their ministries, thereby weakening the steering signals from the departments (Egeberg, 2006b:10). This has in turn made it possible for agencies to serve the interests of more than one executive center; they can in a sense belong to a second executive. This phenomenon is referred to as actors being “double-hatted”, and in a sense “serving two masters” (Egeberg, 2006b:8-11). One way this has been conceptualized is that agency officials act on behalf of a transnational network where the Commission is a node (Egeberg, 2006b:10-11).

A number of studies have been conducted researching various expressions of double-hattedness. Many of these studies are case studies (N=1), and a few studies have been qualitatively oriented such as a survey of the impact of European integration on Norwegian departments and agencies (cf. Martens, 2005; Dyrdal, Lægreid & Rubecksen, 2006; Gulbrandsen, 2011). Some case-studies include studies of the IMPEL network, an informal environmental network involving the Commission and participant states, aimed at harmonization of implementation of EU-legislation at the “street-level” (Martens, 2005), a study of “sea-level” bureaucrats (Gulbrandsen, 2011) researching the use of training exercises as a
vehicle for harmonization of implementation of maritime legislation, and a study of the Danish IT and Telecom Agency (Nørgård, 2005) considering whether or not the implementation network of the regulation for the sector resembles a networked-administrative organization.

Some studies have investigated the possible Europeanization, or lack thereof in a more general fashion, through various forms of connections to the EU, such as Danielsen (2009) investigating implications from the EEA-agreement for political steering in Norway, and Egeberg and Trondal (1999) researching Norwegian integration in Europe as a non-EU member.

Common to many of the above-mentioned studies is their focus on implementation, and EU-level actors seeking to influence implementation of EU regulations after it has been transposed in national legislations. Many of the studies are concerned with what has been called implementation proper (cf. Egeberg, 2006b). While this approach has provided much theoretical insight, such an approach has limited utility for the study of the Union Mechanism. The civil servants tasked with the Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism are not tasked with implementing legislation in the sense implementation is normally conceptualized: Decision-making in specific instances or on a case by case basis, with basis in laws and regulations, supervising public and private actors, making sure that they follow said rules and regulations in an agency's regulatory capacity, and to administrate over grant schemes to said actors (Christensen et al., 2014a:14). A Council Decision provides a framework, not specific regulations to be implemented (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). This thesis instead has a focus on the possibility of civil servants becoming partly socialized to network norms and identities, and it is socialization by way of network participation that is the question at hand. To sum up the intention: The DSB engages in a network where the Commission, in the body of DG ECHO is also a node, and where the Commission might seek to exert influence over network activity.

Networks might participate in the formulation of policy at the Commission, and agencies are often tasked with representing national interests in the networks, without much outside supervision. This does not mean that ministries are not informed about network activities, rather it means that they do not often supervise
them closely, opting instead for choosing the participants in the network, in this instance the International Unit at the DSB, and providing them with instructions (Egeberg, 2006b:11). This lack of close supervision is one reason for investigating the possible diffusion of roles and identities in the network, and might present an opportunity for socialization towards network roles and identities for civil servants.

3.3 Europeanization in a theoretical context
This section will open with a brief account of the concept of Europeanization and how this has been approached in different theoretical traditions previous to the developments in the EAS. It will give an account of how the approaches to Europeanization and European integration have developed from early accounts from Haas and others (cf. Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Schmitter, 1970). The following section provides a brief description of a debate between European integration seen as state-centric, and integration as an instance of multi-level governance.

3.3.1 Integration: state-centric or multi-level governance?
Olsen (2007) argues that Europeanization is a contested term, and that it is in need of precision if it is to be applied as a theoretical concept. He distinguishes five uses that are all defined as the variable that changes as Europeanization occurs. They are: Changes in external boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization and lastly, political unification (p.70-71). These are not necessarily mutually exclusive understandings of Europeanization, and they will share some facets. Olsen also proposes that a possible indicator of a certain conception of the concepts of Europeanization is not the only way to examine if it has occurred. The conception of Europeanization that is most likely to be of utility in this study is the one of central penetration of national systems of governance:

“The third conception of Europeanization focuses on change in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and policies” (Olsen, 2007:79)\(^\text{10}\).

\(^{10}\) For a full discussion of the different conceptions of Europeanization, the reader is referred to Olsen (2007).
3.3.2 Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism

This thesis avails itself of an intergovernmental perspective on European integration, but it also draws insights from a multi-level governance perspective, which will be shown in the section on the cultural-institutional perspective. The Neofunctionalist legacy is only described because it gives an understanding of how intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and multi-level governance are related to one another. Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism approach integration from two different perspectives: integration by way of spillover effects from initial cooperation (neofunctionalism), and integration as bargaining between nation-states in a state of asymmetrical bargaining due to relative size and bargaining power of the states (intergovernmentalism). There has been a revival of parts of neofunctionalist theories, theories that to some extent have fallen out of favor, in the multi-level governance approach, which emphasize the interwoven nature of levels of governance, both national and supranational, stressing that the state-centric intergovernmental model of integration is challenged by new structures, with spans levels of governance, and has constituencies which transgress national borders, and emphasizes the need for more complex modeling of national-international relations (George, 2004).

The first set of theories to be introduced is the Neofunctionalist school. Neofunctionalism seeks to explain European integration with reference to spillover effects. Neofunctionalism departs from International Relations-theory, and considers integration as initially voluntary rational calculations, that at some point lead to spillover effects. One becomes locked-in, and further developments are largely seen as a result of this. The central idea is that the initial cooperation leads to spillover effects that are either functional, in that there is created further demand to cooperate to address incomplete integration which may undermine the effectiveness of existing policies, or political, that supranational organizations leads to further institution building. The institution building is perpetuated by the need for supranational institutions for the oversight of the economy (Moravcsik, 1993:475) This school of thought is attributed to Haas and others (Haas, 1958; Haas, 1970; Lindberg, 1963; Schmitter, 1970). Neofunctionalism accords the Commission a special role in that it has some degrees of autonomy from nation states, and may develop ties to interest groups at the sub-national level to influence policy (George, 2004:108-109).
A critique of this theoretical approach is found in that it lacks specificity for its explanations of phenomena, the theories have been charged with being not well suited to empirical observations and testing. This has led to neofunctionalism falling out of favor, and to theories seeking to address the shortcomings of the neofunctionalist tradition. One such set of theories is liberal intergovernmentalism, which builds on ideas from intergovernmental institutionalism (Moravcsik, 1993:474-480).

Liberal intergovernmentalism addresses some of the shortcomings of neofunctionalism, and understands European integration as a process of bargaining between nation states. Central to this theoretical intake of Europeanization is that preferences are formed at the national level in advance of bargaining, that states enter into bargains to achieve a goal they could not otherwise have, and that they exit bargains if they do not provide the desired benefits (Moravcsik, 1995). States are seen as the main actors in the integration, and it is assumed that the interest groups at the sub-national level does not develop lasting ties to the Commission, rather the policy-process occurs at the national level, and interest groups push for international cooperation around specific issues, rather than the Commission assuming a overarching position in the political process at the sub-national level (George, 2004:110).

3.3.3 Multi-level governance
Multi-level governance address some of the shortcomings of neofunctionalism, and posits, in the case of the European Union, that the Commission, a supranational entity, can develop ties to sub-national actors, which challenges the national central governments position as the main actor in bargains at the European level (George, 2004:111). Multi-level governance (MLG) can be defined as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks, 1993:392) Key aspects of MLG theory is that hierarchies, and an intergovernmental order is challenged by new jurisdictions that involve a multitude of state and non-state actors, at various level of governance, which includes the supranational level, of which the European Commission is treated as a truly supranational institution, which has autonomy from member states (Marks & Hooghe, 2004).
There are two types of MLG that deserves attention; type-I and type-II. Type-I MLG follows national-levels of governance up to the international level, and can be considered as nested tires of government, where the regional is nested within the national, and the national within the international. There are non-overlapping jurisdictions with reference to territory, that is, there are no state-state sub-national jurisdictions. In type-II MLG, there are non-territorial jurisdictions, where there are transnational interactions at sub-national levels of governance. The difference between the two is that type-I is general purpose, in the sense that it is a durable alternative to hierarchies, whereas type-II is case-specific, and often non-durable (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). This thesis avails itself of insight from a type-I MLG perspective, where hierarchies may be replaced or supplemented by durable non-overlapping jurisdictions where the issues at hand are civil protection. Interactions are seen as occurring in a durable fashion between national-level actors at the international level, in the instance of the Union Mechanism, as evidenced by the Council Decision, and Decision of the European Parliament and Council for the Union Mechanism (Council Decision 2001/792/EC, 2001; Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

### 3.4 The Union Mechanism as network

The first ambition of the study is to investigate of the new legislation for the Union Mechanism suggest a shift towards lead-agency traits, networked-administrative structures, or if the network is participant-governed. The new legislation may prove to constitute the intent to move from one type of network governance to another. Provan and Kenis (2008) presents a typology of networks that will serve as descriptive theory for network-level developments which is tailored to the investigation of type of network governance, and their model of ideal types of network-governance. They argue that there is a set of contingency factors that may aid in the classification of type of network-governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Organization scholars have often focused on one or more organizations within a network, rather that the governance of networks as a whole (Provan & Kenis, 2008:230). The two ambitions of the thesis differ in this respect, while the
classificatory ambition treats the network as a whole, with modest special attention given to the Norwegian participation, the second ambition is mainly concerned with the International Unit of the DSB as a node in the Union Mechanism network, and it focuses on relations between the DSB and the network at large, often conducted on a European platform.

3.4.1 Networks
In the thesis, a network is defined as any constellation of “three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal” (Provan & Kenis, 2008:231). The Union Mechanism is often referred to as an instrument, a tool, etc. but it is useful to understand it as a network of different agencies which works as contact-points in the different member-states, and also a hub found in DG ECHO (DG ECHO, 2015b). In addition to this definition, it is also useful to distinguish between networks that exist for a specific purpose; they were intentional, and networks that are a lucky happenstance of actors finding each other. When a constellation of actors is referred to as a network in this thesis, it is this former type that is of relevance, purposeful interaction among actors seeking collective goals (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This definition of networks is simple, and it does not speak to the type of network governance under study that the Union Mechanism would constitute. This will be addressed in the thesis, and the criterion for belonging to this or that type of network will be discussed in the following sections.

This study combines a “network-analytical” and a “network as form of governance” approach to networks (Provan & Kenis, 2008:232). This approach moves beyond the study of links between nodes such as the network-analytical approach, and it concern itself with the entirety of the network as the unit of analysis, as is common in the network as form of governance approach (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Governance by networks enables the participants to attain network-level outcomes that they could not if they worked alone, and the benefits of network arrangements in crisis management are found in their ability to coordinate between participants when faced with a complex issue such as a transboundary crisis (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Boin et al., 2014). It is important to recognize that networks may enable coordination, but in no way guarantees this. Other common problems with network
governance are a lack of accountability. The participants may opt in or out of the network as they see fit, and the lack of hierarchy makes the actors dependent on the continued interest in collective problem-solving in order to maintain the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

3.4.2 Classificatory dimension

There are two dimensions of special relevance to the task of discerning between forms of network governance; the degree to which network activity is brokered, and if the administration of network activity is composed by members of the network, or a separate administrative entity.

Network activity can be brokered to a large extent; one extreme along this spectrum is when all the organizations that comprise the network govern it collectively. Conversely, if network activity were not brokered at all, one organization would hold the role of lead-agency, and govern the network with limited input from others. At the middle of the spectrum, one would place a network where one organization took on some lead-agency tasks, such as a degree of coordination of activities, while leaving most other tasks to the other network members (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

3.4.3 Participant governed networks.

The first ideal-type of networks is the participant-governed network. The members themselves broker participant responsibilities in the network rather than being delegated by a lead member. This model demands member participation and agreement towards a common goal for the network. The membership in the network is based in interests in this common goal, and participation is voluntary. The degrees to which the participants govern the other types of networks are somewhat opaque with the other two ideal-types also sharing some traits of member governance of the network. For the purposes of the thesis, a network could be said to be participant-governed if there is “no separate and unique governance entity” (Provan & Kenis, 2008:234) in the Union Mechanism, meaning that the Commission, or possibly another entity, does not constitute a network broker.
3.4.4 Lead Organization-Governed Networks

Lead Organization-governed networks is the ideal-typical counterpoint of the participant-governed network, and it is often identified as a lead-agency model of networks (Boin et al., 2014:3). In a pure lead-agency type of network governance, all, or the majority, of activity is coordinated by one member of the network. The lead-agency model, unlike the participant-governed model for networks is highly centralized, and characterized by an asymmetrical power-distribution among the network participants (Provan & Kenis, 2008:234-236).

3.4.5 Network-administrative Organization

The network-administrative organization (NAO) is a type of network governance where there is an administration that is separate from the regular members. The administration does not have a stake in the network itself, and is there to broker the network activity between the members. A NAO might be governed by a single person constituting the administration, or it might have an extensive administration consisting of directors, and employees (Provan & Kenis, 2008:236). The administration of a NAO is often mandated from the inception of the network, and this type of network is the one that can sustain the highest amount of participants (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

3.4.6 Contingency factors for network efficiency

It is assumed that the form of network governance is chosen on evidence of network governance effectiveness in specific instances, that is that the form of governance is not chosen at random, but based on evidence of what has worked in the past (Provan & Kenis, 2008) Provan and Kenis (2008) argues that the form of network governance is determined by a set of contingency factors, of which they identify four; trust, the number of network participants, goal consensus and the need for network-level competencies. These factors determine the situation in which a given form of network governance is considered to be effective to accomplish network goals.

How the Union Mechanism is arranged with regards to governance can in other words be attributed to these four factors, three of which will be the included in the network-level analysis. Trust will be omitted as it is determined by the results of past interactions among members, that is, they have experiences from past interactions that will either leave a member trusting/not trusting another member. This is not
possible to gauge from the documents (Council Decision, and Decision of the European Parliament and Council), which does not speak to the individual member’s experiences from network activity directly. With the high number of participants, it is not feasible to gauge the level, type or centrality of trust, which is typical for studies of networks (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The three contingency factors that will speak to the type of governance will be presented in brief.

3.4.6.1 Number of participants

Participant-governed networks are effective only insofar that the number of network members is small. While it is not possible to determine a maximum number of participants that a purely participant governed network may have, a suggested number is upwards of six (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The efficiency of the network decreases if the participants try shared governance arrangements with several members, as the need for coordination increases. The NAO is the type of network best suited to attend to a lot of members, as administrative tasks are the sole responsibility of the NAO. Lead-organization arrangements can attend to a moderate number of members 11.

3.4.6.2 Degree of goal consensus

The second contingency factor is goal-consensus, or the degree to which members agree on the network-level goals. Participant-governed networks demand a high degree of goal-consensus, whereas the NAO and lead-agency type demands moderately high and moderate to low degrees of goal-consensus respectively. Goal consensus is integral to network-level activities, but there may arise inconsistencies between a network actors primary affiliation with the organization from which she comes, and the network-level goals, which in turn makes cooperation within a network more difficult (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

3.4.6.3 Need for network-level competencies

The need for network-level competencies is of interest because it can be considered at two levels. One is the demand placed on the Member States, and the necessary

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11 Provan and Kenis (2008) does not provide a suggestion for what a “moderate” number of network members might be, as such, the viable indications of this contingency factor is that if there is more than six network members, there should possibly be lead-agency or NAO-traits.
competencies they need to possess, to aid in the second level, that is competences for the network as a whole (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In the case of civil protection, the required network-level competences can be said to be high, as civil protection can be considered a wicked problem, a problem that defies easy solution, and crisis management will demand solutions that crosses levels of governance, and sectorial boundaries (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Fimreite et al., 2014:22). The NAO can sustain the highest need for network-level competences whereas a participant-governed network can only sustain low needs for network-level competences. In the middle range is the lead-agency type of network-governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

3.5 The International Unit: National representatives, or autonomous experts?
This section will begin with a presentation of an intergovernmental perspective, and proceed with introducing a cultural-institutional perspective on organizations. Some considerations need to be taken when dealing with the diversity of possible theoretical intakes in the organization literature. The approach taken in this thesis to the use of multiple theoretical intakes is an approach that may be called a complementary approach, that is, that more than one theory is being employed to explore the problem statements more fully. The theories themselves present competing explanations for European integration (Moravcsik, 1993; Moravcsik, 1995; Moravcsik, 1998; Christensen et al., 2009), but when a complementary strategy is employed in a theoretical framework, the inconsistencies between predictions within a theoretical framework is not considered problematic, as it is new insight that is of interest (Roness, 1997-102). An alternative approach would be to present the theories as competing, in other words that one theory would better explain an outcome than the other. This strategy is often employed for theoretical generalization, and further developments of theories (Roness, 1997:103-106)

Within each theoretical perspective, the theories are operationalized as actors acting in accord with Trondals (2010:6-9) decision-making dynamics, the perceptions that guide behavior. Trondal (2010:5) argues that there is a finite set of decision-making dynamics that guides decision-making in interactions with other international actors
within the EAS, the intergovernmental, the supranational, the departmental and the epistemic decision-making dynamic, and there are inherent tension between these. Out of the four, this thesis will consider three, and the intergovernmental dynamic will be operationalized to express actors’ perceptions in line with intergovernmental theory. The departmental and epistemic decision-making dynamic operationalizes possible decision-making dynamics in a cultural-institutional perspective

3.5.1 An intergovernmental perspective
Stanley Hoffman developed the intergovernmental perspective in the 1960s, and it can be described as a state-centric perspective on European integration (George, 2004). It was developed further by Andrew Moravcsik in the 90s, and he posits that European integration can be attributed to “a series of rational choices made by state leaders” (Moravcsik, 1998:18). There is an expectation that once state preferences are expressed in mandate, civil servants will behave in accord with this (Moravcsik, 1993:480-484), consequently, there can be no redefinition of preferences due to input from civil servants representing Norwegian interests at the EU-level, beyond the preferences aggregated at the national level (ibid.).

Intergovernmental theory considers states to be the central actor of European integration, and it is states that negotiate between themselves based on national preferences that have been generated in advance of bargaining (Moravcsik, 1995:613). The policy process at the European stage is considered to consist of a series of three stages “…foreign economic preference formation, inter-state bargaining, and institutional delegation.” (Moravcsik, 1995:612). The preference formation occurs in advance of interstate bargaining, where state and non-state interests are aggregated at the national level. National governments are seen as the only actor with direct access to the European level, and the preferences that become aggregated at the national level are reflected in the preferences and identities that civil servants are instilled with when engaging with other actors at the European level (Moravcsik, 1993:480-484).

Moravcsik (1993) emphasizes that a critique of intergovernmental theory where supranational institutions is seen as posing oppositions to an intergovernmental order
is false, and that supranational institutions do serve a function also in an intergovernmental paradigm. National governments know that they surrender some autonomy when choosing to bargain within institutions at the supranational level, but they only do so insofar as the *cost is not considered to exceed the benefits* of international cooperation. In the case of the EU, participation is only acceptable as long as it does not weaken control over domestic politics, and so long as there is some benefit to cooperation that would not be attainable otherwise, to the cooperation (Moravcsik, 1993:507). In the instance of participating in the Union Mechanism, the assumption of governmental control is not violated as long as the civil servants engaging with other Union Mechanism actors do not overstep their mandate (Trondal, 2010:6), and so long as *participation is voluntary* (cooperation is sustained only insofar as it is deemed desirable by national governments) and *beneficial* in that participation enables the administration to *attain goals that they otherwise could not* (Moravcsik, 1993:507).

In an intergovernmental perspective, actors engage on behalf of national authorities (Moravcsik, 1993), and their participation is limited to what Checkel (2005) refers to as strategic calculation. Checkel (2005) argues that when actors engage in strategic calculation alone, *no socialization occurs*. However, over time, actors engaging in strategic calculations may become locked-in in interactions, and over time come to act in accord with the norms and values of an institution, even if they do not share these same values and norms. If the incentive for sustained interactions is great enough, over time, this might develop into role-playing (Checkel, 2005), which will be discussed later in the chapter.

### 3.5.1.1. Operationalizing the intergovernmental perspective

There are two ways an *intergovernmental* perspective can be operationalized as a dynamic guiding decision-making. One, where the official acts as a “Trojan horse” when engaging with international bureaucracies, acting on behalf of the member state (Trondal, 2010:6), for the purposes of this study, this conception of an intergovernmental dynamic would guide decision-making in instances where officials from the DSB interact with DG ECHO, if the behavior is *primarily* guided by national interest as communicated through *instructions* and *mandates*, *formal* as well as *informal*. The other way the intergovernmental dynamic can be conceptualized is concerned with the *self-perception* of the official, and she is acting in accord with an
intergovernmental dynamic if her decision-making and behavior is guided by loyalty towards her national government and its “interests, concerns and institutions” (Trondal, 2010:6), for this study, this would be the case if Norwegian interests were the most important for decision-making in interactions with DG ECHO and other international actors. The Ministry of Justice and Social Protection and other important national-level interlocutors would be the main interests represented, and their concerns and institutions would be represented first and foremost. It should be noted that a criterion. In other words, if the civil servant considers Norwegian interests to be the most important in interactions with Union Mechanism actors, do not overstep mandate or instructions, and has the self-perceptions of being a national representative, the civil servant would act in accord with an intergovernmental perspective.

3.5.2 Expectations to findings in an intergovernmental perspective
The expectations from an intergovernmental perspective is that even though there may be outside influences from other Union Mechanism members attempting to influence civil servants preferences, the civil servants engaging within the network will always activate an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic when engaging with other network actors (Trondal, 2010:6-9). The civil servants will act in accord with national preferences that have been developed in advance, and exposure to different sets of roles and solutions will not lead to a development of a secondary set of identities or roles for the civil servants (Moravcsik, 1995). This effect will hold even in instances when activity has been intense, and prolonged, and there will be no observable socialization of actors. The duration and intensity of interactions is expected to have no implication for the national interests that the civil servant considers paramount, and there will be no socialization towards network roles and identities. In an intergovernmental perspective, meeting is Brussels should not encourage socialization to a larger extent than Union Mechanism activity conducted from Norway, and civil servants will view cooperation within the Union Mechanism as beneficial following from strategic calculation, hence they will weigh the possible benefits and cost of participation (Checkel, 2005).
3.6 Organization Theory: a cultural-institutional perspective
It is common to distinguish between different perspectives on organization, with a distinction between structural-instrumental perspectives and cultural-institutional perspectives being common (Christensen, Lægreid & Rykkja, 2014b). This thesis will avail itself of a cultural-institutional perspective. The structural-instrumental perspective addresses how organizational structure can influence decision-making, whereas the cultural-institutional perspective emphasizes the constraints placed on organization-building by factors such as culture, history and institutionalization, that is to say that organization-building cannot be regarded as context-independent (Christensen et al., 2014b). A central assumption in organization theory is that actors have insufficient cognitive computational powers to address and assess all possible problems and solutions, and that they act under bounded rationality, opting for achieving satisfying results rather than the perfectly rational optimum (March, 1988:270).

3.6.1. Organizational culture
Organizational structure presents the formal norms of an organization, but organizations also have informal norms and values that constitute the organizational culture. These norms and values come about by an evolutionary and natural progress which takes place over time, and actors are inducted into the organizational culture by a process of socialization (Christensen et al., 2009:52-53, 59). Organizational culture comes about through internal and external pressures, where the internal pressures are the norm and values that the members of an organization brings into the organization, and external pressures are constituted by norms and values found in the immediate surroundings, and affects culture as actors engage with or depend on actors in the surrounding environment to the organization (ibid.59). An organization is defined as “…a collectivity oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting a relatively highly formalized structure” (Scott, 1981:21) An organizational structure is defined as a normative structure that specifies who is supposed to do what, and how. This is determined by rules and roles that specify the desired behavior (Scott, 1981). The concept of institutions will take the definition of an organization that over time has been infused with informal norms and values, and that has developed institutional traits in addition to the formal structure (Christensen et al., 2009:52).
Civil servants may be exposed to new sets of roles and identities from an institutionalized environment, in this case, they may be faced with a new set of roles and identities as they attend to Union Mechanism activities, if the Union Mechanism has developed institutional traits which may influence the DSB organizational culture (ibid.:59), and this may in turn provoke a degree of socialization towards network roles and identities; actors may come to assume a sense of “we-ness” with fellow civil servants from other Member States (Checkel, 2005).

3.6.2 Logic of appropriateness
March and Olsen (1989:21-22) argue that institutions possess rules for behavior that determine the procedures chosen by actors within an organization. These rules may be imposed, or they are internalized through socialization of actors in accord with what is deemed appropriate in a given institution. By rules, they mean “the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is constructed” (March & Olsen, 1989:22). Behavior of civil servants is determined by a logic of appropriateness, in which the action deemed appropriate in a given situation is learned by a process of socialization to these rules, and where “choice involves matching a situation with behavior that fits it” (March & Olsen, 1989:23). In stead of anticipating the outcomes of a given action, which would constitute following an means-ends logic common to an instrumental perspective on organizations, the actor decides action by determining the type of situation he/she is presented with, who he/she is, in other words which identity is the most important in a given situation, and which actions are deemed appropriate in that specific situation (March & Olsen, 1989:23; Christensen et al., 2009:14, 54-55). There is however the possibility that a means-ends logic is considered appropriate in a given organizational culture, which would entail that considering Union Mechanism as positive in a means-ends calculating manner is compatible with a cultural-institutional perspective on organizations (Christensen et al., 2009:54-57).

Central to the cultural-institutional perspective is that actors may become socialized towards new sets of roles and identities, which would constitute a move from an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic and possibly come to activate a
departmental or epistemic decision-making dynamic (Christensen et al., 2009; Trondal, 2010). This will now be discussed briefly.

### 3.6.3 Identity and role perceptions in a cultural-institutional perspective

March (March, 1994) suggests that individuals may be described as having loosely coupled collections of identities and roles. If there arises conflict because a civil servant have a conflict of identity, for instance a sense of belonging to a department, and at the same time representing a strong profession, decision-making can become difficult, because identity and culture can assist in decision making, but culture can also lead to conflict if there are few guidelines and conflicting wishes from the leadership (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2014:319-321). These loosely coupled collections of identities and roles may lead civil servants to activate different decision-making dynamics to match the situation they are in, that is to say, a discussion around technical specifics of Union Mechanism activity may activate an epistemic decision-making dynamic, where the civil servant consider herself to be a neutral professional in stead of a Norwegian representative (March, 1988; Trondal, 2010:6-12)

### 3.6.4 Socialization of actors

The cultural-institutional perspective places an emphasis on the possibility of actors being socialized towards their surroundings (Christensen et al., 2009), in the instance of this thesis, actors may come to be socialized towards Union Mechanism roles and identities. Conditions for socialization of actors are described by Checkel (2005). He identifies two distinct phases of socialization, referred to as type-I and type-II socialization. The mechanisms will be elaborated on, because they are a necessary precondition to explain possible decision-making dynamics activated, and changing role and identities due to processes of socialization. They are also useful in order to gain a better understanding of key decision-making dynamics that can guide decision-making when engaging with other Union Mechanism actors.

Socialization is the process of “...inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel, 2005:804). Egeberg (1999), describes a “role” as “a set of expectations (norms or rules) that more or less specify the desired behavior of the role incumbents (p.3). An identity is described as a “conception of self organized into
rules for matching action to situations” (p.3). Internalization of norms and rules distinguishes a role from an identity; if one speaks of identity, the interests of a certain group have become internalized to such an extent that there is no need for any outside reinforcement of the values and goals of the group (Egeberg, 1999: 3).

Checkel (2005) describes the criterion necessary to provide a theoretical account of a “socialization story”. The conditions under which socialization can be established is to prove that the civil servants are exposed to socializing mechanisms, investigate if there have indeed been socialization of actors 12 and finally, to inquire if the civil servants at the DSB behave differently than they did prior to their engagement with the Union Mechanism. It is important to entertain the plausibility of the null-hypothesis in this instance, which would be that the civil servants are exposed to no socializing mechanisms, in which case, the following two conditions cannot be met, and actors can neither assume new norms and values, nor behave differently as a consequence of these new norm and values. It is still entirely plausible that actors behave differently when engaging with other Union Mechanism actors, yet without this being attributable to processes of socialization.

If the Union Mechanism has socializing potential on its members, this would entail that the members come to accept the norms and values of the Union Mechanism as a whole. It would also entail that these norms and values would be sustained even if they came at odds with expectations from national authorities, and if socialization has occurred, there would not need to be any system of reinforcement to sustain said norms and values (Checkel, 2005).

This would constitute a move from a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness, actors behaving in accord with what has worked in the past, (Checkel, 2005; Christensen et al., 2009:14). It is important not to discount the possibility that the network may not possess norms and values in a coherent fashion that would enable this process to take place. Checkel (2005) argues that a logic of appropriateness has three expressions of relevance to studies of Europeanization.

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12 There exist different theoretical understandings of socialization, and socializing mechanisms. This will be elaborated on in the theories section.
The three expressions are strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion. I will now describe these in some detail.

3.6.4.1 Strategic calculation
Without a mechanism of incentives, it is hard to conceive of actors sustaining contact, so while strategic calculations is in itself not an expression of a logic of appropriateness, it is necessary as a precondition for role-playing and normative suasion (Checkel, 2005).

3.6.4.2 Role-playing
Organizations and groups can simplify the decision-making process by providing suggested behavior; roles that civil servants can “play”. If role-playing is identified as a socializing mechanism, it would be observable that civil servants move from an instrumental logic to a logic of appropriateness, and civil servants would assume the role that would be appropriate in different settings (Checkel, 2005). Checkel (2005) argues that this type of socialization, which he refers to as type-I socialization is contingent on the duration of contact, and the intensity of this contact. In addition to this, the degree to which actors adopt a sense of community with, or assume a new roles role, is determined by their previous experiences with international policymaking, where experience with international policymaking would aid in re-socialization, whereas an actor with predominantly domestic policymaking experiences would be less likely to assume or internalize a “European” role. Role-playing differs from normative suasion as a socializing mechanism on one crucial dimension, socialization by way of role-playing is not the result of communicative processes, that is to say, civil servants may not know why they assume a “European” role (Checkel, 2005).

3.6.4.3 Normative suasion
Normative suasion socializes actors towards supranational institutions to the degree which arguments can convince the civil servant that it is “the right thing to do”; it is a mechanism of persuasion. Rather than behaving in accord with a logic of appropriateness, normative suasion is a mechanism that sees actors as following a communicative logic: through arguments and reasoning, the actors may come to
assume new roles and identities, and they may see new solutions to problems. The problems are open to re-definition (Checkel, 2005)

3.6.5. Operationalization of decision-making dynamics in a cultural-institutional perspective

3.6.5.1 The Departmental decision-making dynamic
There are two decision-making dynamics of relevance to the cultural-institutional perspective, the departmental, and the epistemic (Trondal, 2010:6-9).

The departmental decision-making dynamic considers the civil servant as a neutral professional. It is the organization from which the civil servant originates which is considered the paramount interest in guiding decision-making. For members of an international bureaucracy, allegiance will be to the bureaucracy itself, and civil servants making decisions within it will behave according to the rules and routines that are found in their primary organizational affiliation (Trondal, 2010:7). This behavioral dynamic is used describe decision-making behavior within the Commission in particular, but when used in this study, this dynamic is at play if the respondents are oriented towards their own organization, first and foremost, all other interest being represented secondary, such as intergovernmental and epistemic interest. An instance of this would be if the DSB and the international unit, which is the primary organizational affiliation for most of the interviewees, and most of the Norwegian actors engaging with the Union Mechanism, would be the primary guides on decision-making (ibid.:6-9).

3.6.5.2 The epistemic decision-making dynamic
The epistemic dynamic guides decision-making if civil servants make decisions on the basis of their functions as experts, or based on their expertise in a field. Decision-making can also be guided by outside expert groups providing an organization with this expertise. Central to this dynamic is that all other considerations than the professional or scientific reasons for decision-making are considered secondary. Civil servants are in a sense neutral with regards to politics, and their decision-making reflects this in being based on science (Trondal, 2010:7). Epistemic communities can provide policy-makers with solutions to problems for which the policy-makers lack expertise, and they can also present policy-makers with new information, and new
problems to address. If the Community Mechanism is considered an epistemic community, the diffusion of knowledge from network actors may provide states with incentives for further cooperation (Adler & Haas, 1992).

### 3.6.6 Expectations to findings in a cultural-institutional perspective

In a cultural-institutional perspective encounters with roles and expectations in the environment may present civil servants with alternatives, new solutions to problems, and new roles and identities (Christensen et al., 2009:50-59). Civil servants may be socialized, and the preferences, roles and identities that actors bring into the network may be challenged by expectations from an institutionalized environment (Christensen et al., 2009:50-59). Actors may be partly socialized towards roles and identities of the Union Mechanism, and may come to activate a departmental- or epistemic decision-making dynamic when engaging with actors from the network (Trondal, 2010:5-9). I do not expect that these new roles and identities may subsume their original identity, rather that they may add to them a secondary set of roles, and ways of matching problems with solutions. I do not expect actors to overstep their mandate, and that the potential socialization will not have any effects that go beyond the degrees of freedom the actors have when engaging with networked actors.

I expect to find that meeting that regards technical aspects of Union Mechanism activities will engage an epistemic decision-making dynamic, whereas non-technical meetings will see the civil servants activating a departmental dynamic.

I expect that the civil servant that attend more meetings in Brussels, and have a higher frequency of interactions, as well as more intensity of interactions will experience higher degrees of socialization.
4.0 Methods chapter

4.1 Introduction
This section will present the methods applied to address the problem statements, and the reason for the choice of methods. It will begin with a brief presentation of methodology, and the case study as a method; its strength and weaknesses, and attempt a definition of what constitutes a “case”, an ongoing debate. It proceeds with presenting the case, and the reason for selecting the International Unit as the focal point of the study. I will discuss the methods applied, content analysis, semi-structured interviews, and e-mail interview follow-ups, and the benefits and shortcomings to this approach. The sample will be introduced, and the method of sampling accounted for. Source criticism is discussed, and the chapter ends with a discussion on the validity of the study, its reliability, and the degree to which generalization from findings is permitted in this framework.

A central question to philosophy is how we know that we actually know something. Moses and Knutsen(2012) presents an account of the two central methodological perspectives, naturalism and constructivism, and argues that there are implications for the design of any study as a consequence of the methodological tradition one “belongs” to. The two methodological perspectives also entail a choice of methods, or rather, they often demand a certain approach to the methods one applies(Moses & Knutsen, 2012:3). This thesis draws on ideas and models from constructivist methodology. I did not seek to model the research and analysis on experimental or quantitative methods, in part because the problem statement demands an approach that is sensitive to context, thoughts, impressions, which excludes the naturalistic experiments as a possible method. Because the known sample of informants was quite small (N=6 people), this made a quantitative approach attempting statistic generalization difficult. The complexity of the phenomena is approached in a case study, with interviews and documents as the main sources of data.

4.2 The case study
The case study is one among several methods available to the social-science researcher, but it is of special interest for this thesis, as its strength is the ability to
account for complexity of current social phenomena. Yin (2014:4-15) argues that the case-method provide the researcher with the ability to focus on a specific case, to develop a thorough understanding of a phenomena, and of the different aspects of the case. A case design is also favorable in those instances where the researcher has little control of the events in question, that is to say that the researcher does not try to influence the behavior of subjects he/she is studying. The case study does not try to emulate the scientific experiment, and is apt for situations where the researcher has limited control over events (ibid:9-15). The case method is also distinguished from the purely historical method in that is focuses on current events, and seeks to answer questions of how a phenomena works, or why it works as it does (ibid: 9-15).

There is some confusion over what a case study is supposed to be, with definitions varying accordingly. Geoge an Bennet (2005) for instance define the case in a slightly different way from Yin (2014); they begin by emphasizing that the case study method is not merely the treatment of a small-N sample as opposed to a large-N study. They define a case as “an instance of a class of events”(George & Bennett, 2005:17), and illustrates what the term “class of events” mean; a democracy, an institution etc. and argues that the case-study can best be understood as the study, not merely of historical events, but of a “well-defined aspect of a historical episode”(2005:18). As such, this case can be described as a study of a class of processes of Europeanization, and network interactions in a multi-level system.

There are some common critiques that have been levied at the case-study method; there is not one common understanding of what a case-study actually entails, and what its focus should be(Yin, 2014:16-17). Other common critiques is that a poorly conducted case-study can lack scientific rigor, some observations can be taken as evidence for certain phenomena, while ignoring evidence to the contrary, and that one can follow a strand of inquiry without considering all the evidence for and against the truth of a certain proposition (ibid.:20-21). As the case does not readily avail itself to the experimental method, some scholars would doubt the voracity of findings produced from the case study, although there is an increasing appreciation for the case study method in naturalist methodology, previously skeptical to this method(Moses & Knutsen, 2012:133-134). Some of these shortcomings were
addressed by producing a transparent case-protocol, which allows for replication.

4.2.1 Analytical strategy
The analytical strategy employed in the case study is one where the researcher relies on theoretical propositions in the analysis. The theoretical propositions, and the review of the literature guide the researcher in her research priorities, and relevant context and possible explanations is gauged from previous literature and the theoretical framework (Yin, 2014:136). This strategy differs from a “grounded theory” approach, where categories are developed without reference to former theoretical propositions (ibid:136-137).

4.2.2 The choice of the Directorate for Civil Security as case
The choice of the Directorate for Civil Security with a focus on the International Unit as a case is partly due to an interest in the EU as an emerging actor in the area of civil security and crisis management, in the “European protective space”(Ekengren et al., 2006). The EU has stated that it seeks to expand its work on civil security, that transboundary crises is a threat to the union and member states, and a type of crisis that could be better managed if there was a larger degree of information sharing, and have developed structures at the international level that could facilitate communication, crisis modules, preparedness exercises, and best practices(Council Decision 2001/792/EC, 2001; Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). It is a policy area where the Union has stated that it could experience value-added by pooling resources and information.

This emergence of the EU as an actor in the field of civil security, and a crisis manager makes the DSB an interesting case seeing as it is tasked by the Ministry of Justice with representing Norwegian interests in the Union Mechanism(DSB, 2014a), and it is plausible that these EU-level developments will have an impact on the roles and identities of civil servants at the DSB. It is also of interest to see how the civil servants pursue Norwegian interests in day-to-day interactions with other civil servants by way of the Union Mechanism. This can ultimately have real-life implications for the organization for civil security in Norway, as these structures are intended to support the members of the Union Mechanism. The focus was not on any other departments or units within the DSB, for which there might also be extensive
cooperation, such as product safety etc. This was due to an interest in the cooperation in the Union Mechanism, a task of the International Unit, and Norwegian participation in it.

The choice of DSB as a case is also pragmatic. As I have shown, there have been conducted several case studies seeking to further develop and investigate the mechanisms of an European Administrative Space, and how one might prove its effects empirically, and the effects experienced by the EU on the day-to-day decision-making in, and implementation of EU-law by civil servants at the departments and the directorates. These case studies have inspired this one, and have arrived on some theoretical propositions that have aided the analysis, such as the decision-making dynamics of Trondal (2010:7-9), and the use of a framework whereby intergovernmental theory is contrasted or complimented by organizational perspectives (cf. Gulbrandsen, 2011).

4.4 The interviews

4.4.1 Sampling
Sample size is not easy to determine in qualitative research, and there are limited guidelines as to what constitute an adequate sample size. Suggestions have been provided by different scholars ranging from several hundred interviews, to a more manageable 5-35 interviews for phenomenological studies (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006:61). The key to an adequate sample in qualitative studies is data saturation, and this is defined as “…the point in data collection and analysis when new information produces little or no change to the codebook” (Guest et al., 2006:65). The informants were sampled in a non-random way, akin to a snowball method of sampling (Grønmo, 2004:102-103). The interviewees were sampled by approaching an informant in the DSB, who in turn suggested others that would be of interest. A total of nine interviewees were asked to participate in the study.

All of the informants were working with civil security in one capacity or another, mostly with an international focus. Four of the respondents were working in the International Unit at DSB. Two of the respondent did not currently work at the DSB. One was temporarily working for the Mission of Norway to the EU and the other as a
seconded expert to the Commission. They were both originally working for the DSB (informant N3, N5). The informants from the International Unit included the head of the unit, one senior-advisor with an international portfolio where the Union Mechanism was part of her tasks, one employee with a special emphasis on Nordic relations, which also included contacts with the Union Mechanism, and one with the title of “head-analyst”. The informants had worked at the international unit from 1.5 years to 11 years, with a mean of approximately 6 years (Informants N2, N4, N6, N10). The informants had different educational backgrounds, some from the political sciences, but also some with backgrounds in defense and nursing, in short, there was no uniformity among the informants from the International unit with regards to background and employment. From the other departments within the DSB, one was from the department of Logistics And Protection, one from Analysis and national Preparedness, and one from the department of Product Safety.

In sum, the informants could speak to many aspects of the international focus at the DSB in general, and the attitude towards the EU as a civil protector. The different backgrounds and tasks of the informants was also useful to develop a sense of what is and what is not the functions of the International Unit; it was beneficial to have perceptions of the tasks carried out by the International Unit by employees from the unit, as well as informants that had relations to the international unit, and could speak to the specialization of the Unit, as well as their perceptions of how tasks are shared between the DSB departments, and what the role of the International Unit was perceived to be by civil servants not directly engaged in the Union Mechanism. The distinction between informants from the International Unit, and informants from the other units were of special interest due to the more extensive degree of “implementation proper” at the other departments, hence possibly a more conventional target for studies of implementation of EU legislation and de/re-coupling towards the commission. How tasks overlapped, and how sector boundaries were blurred with regards to civil protection was also of interest.

The initial interviews lasted on average about 30 minutes\(^{13}\). The informants were also asked to provide additional information by way of e-mail given any gaps in the data\(^{14}\).

\(^{13}\) The reason for their relative brevity was pragmatic, and per the central informants suggestion.
Two of the interviews were shorter, one because the informant did not have much contact with actors at the European level, and was focused predominantly towards other international organizations. The other shorter interview was due to the position of the informant as a seconded expert to the Commission. It was discovered that there was not much ambiguity to speak of with regards to his role as an expert seconded to the Commission, and the position held by the expert did not have bearings on the socialization of actors at the International Unit as such. Two of the informants did not have a position with particular relevance to the Union Mechanism, but could speak to other aspects of DSBs international relations, and perceptions of their work with the Union Mechanism. The two informants could also describe different perspectives on DSB/EU-level interactions, and information regarding the distribution of tasks within the DSB was deemed relevant. This will be discussed further in the analysis. One interview was considerably longer, ending at approximately one hour. The interviewee was from another unit at the DSB, and could also speak to the more “traditional” approach to the Europeanization, often focused on implementation of EU regulation (cf. Trondal, 2005; Egeberg, 2006b; Trondal, 2010; Egeberg & Trondal, 2012; Trondal & Peters, 2013).

4.4.2 The semi-structured interview, and e-mail follow-up
Seeing as one of the goals of this research is to investigate whether agency- and other officials develop secondary roles or identities, one way to discover nuanced information about their own position, and an insight into organizational culture, is to employ interviews (Christensen et al., 2009:53). The interviews were qualitatively oriented. The qualitative interview differs from a quantitative interview in that it is not meant to produce quantifiable data, and is to a larger extent a reflexive process, where the researcher is free to adjust his/her inquiries on the basis of necessity or interest (Bryman, 2012:471). An interview guide prepared in advance aided the interview process.

\footnote{While 30 minutes does not seem to be time to cover much empirical ground, the interviewees were asked only very few questions meant to build rapport, and within the first minute or so the interviews followed the relatively strict schedule of necessary themes to be investigated. This was made possible because of the invitations per e-mail detailing some themes to be covered. (appendix.1.)}
The interview guide consisted of questions intended to investigate phenomena described in the theoretical framework (see appendix 1). The guide itself is supposed to aid the researcher, and is not intended to dictate how the interview is conducted, rather it is intended to give it some semblance of structure, and to make sure that the researcher touches upon information relevant to explore the problem statement. Due to the short time at the disposal of the informants for each interview, the schedule was followed more strictly, and it was not used as a mere aide memoaire.

The interviews were structured around a few different themes; the relations between the DSB and the Commission, the relations between the DSB and the Ministry for Justice and Civil Protection, whether or not there have been a shift in these relations over time, and if there are any factors that are assumed to contribute to cooperation and decision-making in interactions with other Union Mechanism actors. It also investigated if actors could potentially hamper such cooperation and make decision-making more difficult, or try to influence decision-making. The interview guide was a useful aid in that it was developed to capture relevant information, as suggested by the theoretical framework. The interview guide is typically developed as a process whereby concepts such as roles and identities is defined and operationalized so that one have some indicators for which one can later code the material, or instances of something, a process of validation (Grønmo, 2004:112, 161-162).

The relative brevity of the interviews necessitated a follow-up of the informants. Once the semi-structured interviews were transcribed, and initial coding was conducted, “gaps” in the information provided by way of the interviews was uncovered, and the informants were then asked to provide this information by way of e-mail. The e-mail interview is apt at this task, as it allows easy follow-up on subjects such as time invested in the network, number of meeting, phone-calls etc, and it allowed the interviews to focus more on the network activity and respondent perceptions of their roles and identities while engaging with other actors, network and otherwise, the central focus of the interviews.
4.4.3 Possible weaknesses in the interview process
I conducted nine interviews over the course of a few weeks. The central themes of the thesis were presented to a central informant who functioned as a gatekeeper of sorts. The reason for this is mainly that while there is an organizational map of the DSB available to the public, this does not include the people employed within a given department hence approaching each informant directly was not possible without coordinating with someone in advance and getting their contact information. The central informant was presented with the topics I wanted to investigate, and also a sketch of questions I wanted to ask the respondents. The interview guide went into details of the thesis, and there is a chance that interviewees prepared their questions in advance, even though this does seem unnecessary; the questions were not very controversial, and the respondents were not asked questions that would provoke any major conflicts of interest.

The central informant presented a number of other informants that might be of interest due to their positions within the DSB and other positions. The list was extensive, yet it remains possible that it was not exhaustive, meaning that it is possible that sources of information remain untapped.

Due to the very hectic schedule of the informants it was suggested by the central informant that telephones or videoconferencing technology be used as a means of communication, rather than attempting to arrange for face-to-face interviews. I deemed this satisfactory. The interviews were conducted over the phone; they were recorded, and transcribed to text.

This method of interviewing has its setbacks, some information, integral or otherwise, might have been lost as a result of not seeing the other person, her body-language, non-verbal cues etc. but on the other hand, it does enable the researcher to conduct interviews in somewhat quick succession, and make follow-up questions, conducted by phone or e-mail, less of a nuisance to arrange. It was also suggested by the central informant that the interviews not exceed 30 minutes, due to time-constraints placed on the informants by a hectic schedule. This was a challenge to the data-collection process, as more time would have made it possible to cover more ground in one sitting and possibly made the e-mail follow-up superfluous.
The informants appeared to speak frankly, and there were few suggestions as to the answers provided being strategic, or in other ways prepared in advance or scripted. There was also no suggestion that informants withheld information, and overall, the interview process was interesting, and an experience where my perception is that I received frank answers, and that the informants were interested in providing information on the subject, unstrained by a sense of duty, secrecy, or to provide only correct information.

4.5 Documents
For the classificatory ambitions in the study, I employed an analysis of documents. Documents were also employed to show the Norwegian authorities perceptions and position on international cooperation in a European framework. The documents in question were sampled by searching Government and EU search-engines. After central documents were identified, their references were traced to identify any other documents of interest. A list of all documents can be found at Table 2. The selection of documents are a selection of Supplementary letters of allocation\(^\text{15}\) from JD to the DSB, covering the period of 2011-2015\(^\text{16}\), one proposition to the Storting regarding the incorporation of the amended legislation for the Union Mechanism, an EEA-note regarding the position on Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism, an Official Norwegian Report\(^\text{17}\) of the Norwegian agreements with the EU, and Council Decisions, and Decision of the European Parliament and Council regarding the legislation for the Union Mechanism. For an overview of the documents subject to analysis see table 3.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 3. List of documents subject to analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council Decision</td>
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\(^{15}\) Supplementary letter of allocations\(=\) Tildelingsbrev  
\(^{16}\) These are the supplementary letters of allocation that is available from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Due to their relative uniformity with regards to steering signals for international cooperation, these were judged satisfactory to describe the steering from JD.  
\(^{17}\) Official Norwegian Report\(=\) NOU
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Responsible Authority</th>
<th>Scope</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007/779/EC</td>
<td>Recast Civil Protection Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 105s (2013-2014) to the Storting</td>
<td>Proposition to the Storting regarding the incorporation of Decision of the European Parliament and Council 1313/2013/EU in the EEA-agreement</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>The Storting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA-Note “The EU civil protection mechanism”</td>
<td>Position paper on the participation in the Union Mechanism</td>
<td>Select committee on societal security (the responsible department is JD)</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB: Trends in international preparedness work</td>
<td>Report on international trends in preparedness and civil protection as observed from the DSB</td>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB: Overview of International Engagement</td>
<td>Report on the international relations of the DSB, with references to expenditure and administration</td>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>JD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Norwegian Report(NOU) 2012: 2 Outside and Within</td>
<td>Official Norwegian report on the Norwegian agreements with the EU</td>
<td>Select Committee on the Norwegian agreements with the EU</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary letter of allocations 2011</td>
<td>Government steering instructions</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Public Security</td>
<td>DSB</td>
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<td>Supplementary letter of allocations 2012</td>
<td>Government steering instructions</td>
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<td>Supplementary letter of allocations 2013</td>
<td>Government steering instructions</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Public Security</td>
<td>DSB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplementary letter</td>
<td>Government steering</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>DSB</td>
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</tbody>
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4.5.1 Web pages
The DSB and DG ECHO also have web pages that contain information about the organizations of the organizations, the Union Mechanism, and several important pieces of information, and will also be subject to analysis. There are a number of pages not directly related to the Union Mechanism, and DSB participation in it, and the pages were included/excluded based on content. Most web pages were of a brief, descriptive nature; hence the selection process was not very complicated. It was possible to trace all relevant pages by the site-map of each respective organizations home page (DSB, 2015a; DG ECHO, 2015c).

4.5.2 Coding as deductive category application
The coding scheme prepares data for analysis. There are two main criterion that determines the quality of a coding scheme; if the codes are all-inclusive, and that they at the same time are mutually exclusive (Gorden, 1992). The material was initially coded in general categories, and the coding scheme was continuously revised and refined. The coding scheme was also guided by the theoretical propositions presented by Trondal (2010:6-9) and structured around the dynamics at play; intergovernmental, departmental, and epistemic. This is referred to as deductive category application, whereby previously formed theoretical propositions are applied in the coding of data (Kohlbacher, 2006).

The dynamics are somewhat overlapping (Trondal, 2010:6-9), and it is possible that one dynamic is more prominent, yet co-existing with another, so the codes needed to reflect this. This lead to the initial framework treating segments of texts as instances of an intergovernmental dynamic when this segment suggested that it was either purely intergovernmental in the sense that only Norwegian interests were present when engaging with other actors at the Union Mechanism, or that while other dynamics were activated at the same time, this was the most prominent, e.g. in an instance where one sought an “European” solution, Norwegian interests were the
primary motivation for the civil servant, and the role as a civil servant from Norway was sustained in the interactions with the other actors (ibid.:6-9).

4.5.3 NVIVO
For the purposes of simplification NVIVO was employed for the bulk of the data analysis. NVIVO is computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), and it is one of several tools available to researchers, that may be used for the analysis data from several different sources e.g. media, recordings, documents etc. (Bryman, 2012:591-598) Employing NVIVO, I was able to greatly reduce the time spent developing a coding scheme, as one can code in real-time, and revisit open-ended codes at later times, revising and refining the coding scheme. While I read documents for inclusion/exclusion in the study, I was able to note any notable phrases or paragraphs, and recurring themes, and make a record for later systematization. The benefits of CAQDAS also extends to analysis of interview-data, as one is able to transcribe the interview directly in NVIVO, and impose codes or notes on the audio-recording of the interview as it is played back for analysis, directly.  

4.6 Source criticism: evaluating the data
Source-criticism is mainly, but not exclusively, concerned with four aspects of sources: the sources availability, their relevance to the study, whether or not the source can be said to be authentic, and lastly if a source is credible (Grønmo, 2004:190).

With regards to the interviews, it was necessary to establish that the information provided by informants was credible. Given that it would have been quite easy to check facts in this instance, the informants credibility was mainly concerned with his/hers perceptions, which may or may not have been prepped in advance, although, as discussed this does not seem likely. It was not difficult to assess that the informants were who they said they were as they were briefed and introduced by a central informants. With regards to relevance, some information was more interesting

to the study than other information. The interview guide helped keep the informants “on track”. If a similar study were to be repeated, it would not be difficult to get access to the same informants granted that the protocol was followed, hence the critical assessment of the use of informants as a source does appear to pass muster (ibid.:122-123).

In research projects that employ a variety of documents as data, this process of critically assessing sources is especially relevant, and the availability of sources is a concern prior to, and during the research process (ibid.:190). In the instance of this project, the public documents have had good availability, as they are all open to the public, but it has sometimes been difficult to assess their relevance. Public reports are often quite extensive in scope, but registries have made the process of accessing the information with relevance more easy.

Credibility and authenticity does not pose major concerns with the public documents in this study. Reputable institutions publish the documents, and their content is neither particularly opinionated nor skewed to represent one version of the facts in question. There are however sources of data that are not made public, and sources that cannot be made public due to legislation protecting ongoing policy-processes at the EU, in particular §20 of “Offentleglova”, regarding Norwegian foreign relations interests, prohibiting policy-frameworks and other documents from being made public(Offentleglova, 19. May 2006).

4.7 Validity, reliability and generalizability

4.7.1 Validity
The validity of the study is determined by the validity of the data to investigate the problem statements (Grønmo, 2004:231). It is common to speak of types of validity, and validation can be considered a process of several stages(Adcock & Collier, 2001). The studies face validity, the degree to which it is apparent that the data is fitting to assess the problem statements can be considered to be high in this thesis Grønmo, 2004:231), as the perceptions of identities and roles necessitates that the persons who have these perceptions is used as sources. The legal documents can
also be argued to have face validity with regards to the classification of the Union Mechanism.

4.7.2 Reliability
A qualitative study is in some degrees dependent on the time the study is conducted, and it is also dependent on the researcher. Repeatability of the study is difficult as the case-protocol is developed as the study progresses, and it is therefore common to speak of a studies credibility as opposed to reliability (Grønmo, 2004: 228-229). Three ways to assess a studies credibility is by its stability, collecting data at two or more different times, and assessing them against the stability of findings from round one to round two, assessing equivalence, that is, that other researchers are asked to repeat analysis, and assess their interpretations of findings to see if they correspond to the initial findings. Finally one can assess the data’s internal and external consistency (ibid.:229-230). There has not been data-collection in separate stages; hence I cannot speak to the stability of the study. With regards to equivalence, other researchers have not evaluated the thesis and finding, apart from in discussions in seminars, where the data has been presented, and evaluated by other students and faculty. With regards to consistency, the interviews and documents have been assessed against each other, and the findings deemed consistent as a whole (ibid.:230). The external consistency concerns the findings in light of other available information or the context within which the thesis is positioned, and the thesis can be considered to be externally consistent, as the findings from interviews correspond with findings from other sources, and previous studies(Grønmo, 2004:230-231; cf. Trondal & Peters, 2013; Dyrdal et al., 2006), who also finds modest influences on civil servant perceptions following from national-level agencies and EU-level interactions.

4.7.3 Generalizability
There is some debate regarding the extent to which one may generalize from the results of a single case study. It has been argued that generalization from the case may not be desirable, whereas others claim that it is not possible(Ruddin, 2006). Ruddin (2006) contends that the context-sensitive knowledge one can attain with
case-study methodology is useful in itself, and that “general” knowledge is not always of more value than intimate knowledge with the particular case as suggested by naturalist methodology. He says that it is common to think of statistical generalization as the only way to generalize, and one should instead consider generalization from a case as hypothetico-deductive reasoning, where meaning is imposed on the case rather than drawn from it (ibid.) Yin (2014:40) considers analytic generalization as the best way to generalize from a case, suggesting that one can aid in further hypothesizing or amending theoretical predictions in light of findings from case-studies, not unlike Ruddins(2006) position. It is this latter position I take in this thesis.

This thesis does not claim to be an instance of a crucial case(Ruddin, 2006), as it does not seek to devastate another theory. It investigates the “outer bounds” of the EAS and investigates if organizations that do engage in implementation proper of EU regulations also developed close ties to the Commission in a way that resembles recoupling, as expressed by cultural variables. If this is the case, one might suggest that the observed developments of the EAS may extend further than what has been suggested, and may operate under conditions of policy-harmonization in addition to the “conventional” conception of the EAS; influences sought on implementation of regulations(cf.Trondal & Peters, 2013). Another way of phrasing this is that if the identities and role-perceptions of civil servants at the DSB are influenced to include an “European” identity that one would expect might happen to some degree when engaging in the European Administrative Space, when they do not appear to constitute a part of this, due to lack of participation in Committology Committees, expert groups etc. in the Commission, and are not in that sense involved in general policy-making and implementation of EU-legislation as is common in the implementation approach(Egeberg, 2006b), these findings might imply that there is a need for a refined understanding of Commission-network- national level agency interactions.

4.8 Caveats from the methodic design of the study
The study could benefit from a larger sample, and the total number of informants, which is considered to be possible “targets” for socializing mechanisms, are five informants, four at the international unit, and one seconded expert. The seconded
expert does not normally work at the international unit, but is on loan from another DSB department. The expert did provide data from one type of interaction with the Union Mechanism. If a similar study of the socializing potential of the Union Mechanism is to be repeated, approaching informants at corresponding agencies in other member countries should be considered. The credibility of conclusions on the basis of the small sample is strengthened by the relative uniformity of the findings; there was limited divergence in the responses provided to the questions asked. This supports somewhat stronger inferences to be drawn on the basis of the data, something that would not be advisable if the respondents were at odds on many questions.

4.9 Summary
5.0. Network developments, activities and role perceptions

5.1 Introduction:
This chapter will present findings on traits of the Union Mechanism as network. It will present findings from the legislative framework found in two one Council Decision, and one Decision of the European Parliament and Council, the first being the legislative framework from 2007 found in Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom of 8 November 2007, “establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007), and the second being the amended legislation from 2013 found in Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 “on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism” (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). These are the central legislative frameworks, and present the intended role of the Commission in the Union Mechanism, and the role for the member states as they were in 2007 and in 2013. As such they are an important source to the classification of the Union Mechanism as a type of network-governance, and the 2013 framework will be compared to the 2007 framework to see if there have been any changes along the dimensions of degree activity is brokered between network members, and if the administration is internal to, or external to the network members (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

The findings will be structured according to the time they were ratified, and the role of the Commission and the role of the member states will be presented separately. Each section will begin with a description of the general purpose of the Union Mechanism as it appears in legislation for 2007 and 2013 respectively. The contingency factors for type of network governance; number of network members, degree of goal consensus, and the need for network-level competences will also be presented because they may aid in the classification of the network.

It is important to distinguish between what the Union Mechanism is supposed to do, as gauged by the legislative framework, and the perceptions of roles held by civil servants from the DSB. There may be divergence between the described role for the
Commission in network activity, and the perceptions of the role of the Commission as reported by the informants. As the first ambition of the thesis is to classify the network as an ideal-type of network-governance, this will be based on legal documents regarding all participating members, and documents detailing the legislative process in Norway, and the perception of network participation as described in public documents. Interview data will not be discussed in this section, as the arrangements of the network such as it appears from legal and public documents, and the Norwegian authorities perceptions of it, are treated differently than the perceptions of the network as held by Norwegian civil servants attending to network activities.

5.2. Network developments
Findings on the participant/lead agency dimension and the internal/external administrative dimension will be presented. To account for any developments over time, the legal acts will be considered as representative for the period they were ratified up until any amendments were made that may have brought about a shift along either of the two dimensions, possibly moving the type of network governance closer to one of the ideal types than before. This may give the impression of punctuated equilibria, with change occurring in leaps and bounds, rather than in an orderly fashion. The data cannot confirm or contradict this position, as it is unfortunately bound by it being an instance of comparative statics\(^\text{19}\). It is important to note that the focus is on the formal arrangements of the Union Mechanism, as evidenced by the two Decisions, as opposed to more informal developments, which is also assumed to occur over time.

The focal point of the analysis is two pieces of legislations, the Council Decision establishing the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in 2007(Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007) and the Decision of the European Parliament and Council, that replaces said legislation along with the Financial Instrument which expires in 2013(Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). The Decisions have sections for “member-state shall”, and “the Commission shall”, which designates their respective

\(^{19}\) One epoch, or period between changes to Mechanism legislation is likely to be a dynamic process of change, but any such experiences would have to be obtained through different sources of data.
responsibilities. Both documents have such a section, and the findings will be structured accordingly, with one section detailing findings from the Council Decision in 2007 for the member-states and one for the Commission, followed by the same for the 2013 Decision of the European Parliament and Council. Each section will also have a segment on the general purpose and scope of Union Mechanism activity. The Norwegian connection to the network, the process of incorporating Decision No 1313/2013/EU in the EEA-agreement, and the rationale for this incorporation, and sustained network participation will be gauged from an EEA-position note, prop. 105 S to the Storting, regarding the incorporation of the Decision (1313/2013/EU) in the EEA-agreement, and an Official Norwegian Report on the Norwegian agreements with the EU (see table 3.).

5.2.1. General purpose of the network as described by legislation in 2007

The Council Decision establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism is a recast of a previous Council Decision (Council Decision 2001/792/EC, 2001), and its was recast to “…make the European Union’s emergency response more consistent and efficient” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007:1). The main focus of the legislation for the Union Mechanism is how states may provide and coordinate support to one another by request from a member state or third country in need of assistance. There is a focus on preparedness and information exchange and the Council recognizes that:

“Preparatory measures need to be taken at member State and Community level to enable assistance intervention teams in emergencies to be mobilized rapidly and coordinated with the requisite flexibility and to ensure, through a training programme, the effective response capability and complementarity of assessment and/or coordination teams, intervention teams and other resources, as appropriate” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007:2).

At this stage, there was not yet developed many modules for civil protection, a module being a:
“…self-sufficient and autonomous predefined task- and needs-driven arrangement of Member States’ capabilities or a mobile operational team of the member states representing a combination of human and material means, that can be described in terms of its capacity for interventions or by the task(s) it is able to undertake” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007:3).

It was suggested that there should be a focus on additional modules in order to “…contribute to the development of a civil protection rapid response capability” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007:2).

5.2.2. 2007: Member-state responsibilities
The responsibilities for member states mainly consist of producing information on who can serve as experts for quick deployment in a crisis, and to establish contact points for the MIC in the member states at this stage (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007). The members are also encouraged to:

“…identify in advance intervention teams of modules within their competent services and, in particular, their civil protection services or other emergency services, which might be available for intervention or could be established at very short notice and be dispatched, generally within 12 hours following a request for assistance” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007)

They are also encouraged to:

“…work on a voluntary basis towards developing modules in particular to meet priority intervention or support needs under the Mechanism…” (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007)

Member State responsibilities is concerned with the dissemination of relevant information to networked actors and to the Commission, and they shall
“...provide relevant general information on the teams, experts, modules and other intervention support...within six months of the adoption of this Decision, and promptly update this information when necessary”(Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007)

5.2.3. 2007: Commission responsibilities
The tasks of the Commission are detailed in the Council Decision as a series of objectives to be carried out. Along with the general objectives of the Decision, there are a number of tasks that are specific to the Commission. The Commission is supposed to establish the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), an information hub that serves as contact point and disseminator of information in times of crisis. It is also supposed to establish and manage the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CESIS)(Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007).

There is an emphasis on the pooling of information and the Commission is responsible for “pooling and compiling in the event of emergency, information on the capabilities of the Member States”(Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007:5). The Commission is also responsible for setting up a training program which shall have a focus on lessons-learned, and make sure that this information is disseminated to network actors. It is also the Commissions role to establish a training program “with a view to enhancing the coordination of civil protection assistance intervention by ensuring compatibility and complementarity between the intervention teams and modules…”(Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007:5).

Other responsibilities is to provide logistics support, to contribute to the development of a warning system for crisis, and to have teams of experts ready to be dispatched on short notice to assess the civil protection needs of Member states in case of incidents (ibid.:5).

5.3.1. General purpose as described by amended legislation in 2013
most substantial change may be found in the establishment of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), which replaces the MIC, and the establishment of the European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

The amended legislation signals a “strengthened cooperation between the Union and Member States and facilitates coordination in the field of civil protection” (ibid.:3).

5.3.2 2013: Member-state responsibilities
In the amended legislation, the suggestion in the 2007 Decision, that there be a focus on modules, has been strengthened, and the development of modules, on a voluntary basis is central to the amended legislation:

“Member States shall identify, in advance, modules, other response capacities and experts within their competent services, in particular within their civil protection or other emergency services which could be made available for intervention upon request through the Union Mechanism” (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013:8)

The modules are in turn expected to be ready for rapid deployment following a request by the ERCC. The modules and response capacities that are developed is voluntary for the Member States to register with the EERC, and the deployment of said resources remain within Member State control. Member states also retain the power to withdraw a response capacity from an incident if they need it for their own civil protection needs, but they need to coordinate this with the Commission (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013:8).

5.3.3 2013: Commission responsibilities
The Decision “On a Union Mechanism…” details the new responsibilities for the Commission following legislative amendments. The MIC is replaced by the ERCC, and the Commission serves as administrator for the center. The Commission also manages CECIS, and the member states coordinate the exchange on information through these capacities:
“...The Union Mechanism should be based on an Union structure consisting of an Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), a European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) in the form of a voluntary pool of pre-committed capacities from the Member States, trained experts a Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CESIS), managed by the Commission and contact points in the Member States(Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013:2).

The powers vested in the Commission are summarized in a segment of the legislation that concerns the Commissions implementing powers in Union Mechanism activity. The implementing powers conferred on the Commission also illustrates what the Commission is supposed to do with regards to its role in the Union Mechanism, and the powers for which it is supposed to implement is also the Commissions role to administrate and oversee in day-to-day network activities:

“In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission with respect to the interaction of the ERCC with the Member States contact points and the operational procedures for the response to disasters inside and outside the Union; the components of the CECIS and the organization of information sharing through the CECIS; the process for deploying expert teams; the identification of modules, other response capacities and experts; the operational requirements for the functioning and interoperability of modules; the capacity goals, the quality and interoperability requirements and the certification and registration procedure necessary for the functioning of the EERC as well as the financial arrangements; identifying and filling gaps in the EERC; the organization of the training programme; exercise framework and lessons learnt programme; and the organization of support for the transport of assistance…”(Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013:3)

5.3.4 Norwegian connection
There are limited implications for Norway following from the amended legislation. The Decision(Decision No 1313/2013/EU) was incorporated into the EEA-agreement following a proposition to the Storting. The proposition passed the same day, and the decision was incorporated as a whole into the EEA-agreement(Prop. 105 S (2013-2014), 2014) The decision was included amongst others because of the benefits
previous participation in the Union Mechanism has had for Norwegian civil protection efforts, and on advice from the Standing Committee on Justice (inst. St. nr. 267s, 2013-2014). Norway has been granted the right to participation in the Union Mechanism, and has the same access to the activity as all other member states. As a non-EU Country, Norway does not get to vote in the meetings of the Union Mechanism. The select committee\textsuperscript{20} on societal security of the JD notes that there are limited administrative consequences that follow from the incorporation of the amended legislation in the EEA-agreement, and the noticeable implications are financial, noting that:

“...the expansion of the programme [Union Mechanism] established in the new legislative framework will increase the total cost of this arrangement. This will also mean that there is an extra cost for Norway. The arrangement will have a total cost of 368,428,000 Euro for the period 2014-2020. The Norwegian expenditure increases from 3.5 million [NOK] to...approx. 9 million [NOK] per year, administrative costs included...”(Norwegian Government, 2014a).

They further note more general reflections on the Norwegian participation in the network, an the attitudes towards network participation, noting especially the importance of participation as a way of registering signals from, and influencing the Commission:

“...Because Norway do not have access to discussions in the Council, the Committee for civil protection [CPC] in the European Commission is an important channel where Norway participates expert advise, and note initiatives at an early stage. The EU appears to be the most important international actor for Norwegian societal security and preparedness on the civil side”(Norwegian Government, 2014a)

Further benefits are described, and it is interesting to note the value accorded to the resources the Union Mechanism possesses, and the implications of this access for civil protection in Norway:

\textsuperscript{20} Spesialutvalg
“…Increasing focus on preparedness, a strengthened international crisis management capability, increased predictability and availability of resources and improved support arrangements for transport provides added value for Norway. Participation in this program is very beneficial with regards for the authorities to receive specialists, European assistance in case of major incidents nationally, but also by an emphasis on prevention in third-countries. The European cooperation is in this respect strengthening the Norwegian effort for societal security and preparedness, nationally, and internationally” (Norwegian Government, 2014a).

It is evident that the participation in the Union Mechanism is valued due to its access to information and resources, but also as an arena to secure the Norwegian interests in the field of civil protection internationally.

5.4 Network structure
There are qualities of network structure that is presumed to aid/constrain cooperation in the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The aspects of the network that will be presented are the number of participants, the degree of goal consensus, and the need for network-level competences.

5.4.1 Number of participants
The number of participants is 31 countries, all 28 EU member states, and Norway, Iceland and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and this does not change from 2007 to 2013. Recently Turkey and Serbia have signed agreements to join the Union Mechanism, so the total current number of countries is 33 (DG ECHO, 2015b). The number of participants in the network can be said to be relatively high in a networked-governance context (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

5.4.2 Degree of goal-consensus
The degree of goal-consensus in the network is hard to determine from legal documents alone. With all Member States subjecting to amended legislation, this would at least suggest that there is consensus around the general aims of the Union Mechanism, which is to support the efforts of Member States in civil protection, although there may be different incentives for participation in the Union Mechanism (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).
5.4.3 The need for network-level competences

The need for network-level competences can be said to be high in the instance of civil protection. The demands placed on networked actors can be considered more modest, but the network at large needs to possess several modules, and expert and intervention teams to be efficient at coordinating in times of crises. This is evident from the legislative framework, urging members to identify in advance expert teams, modules for ready deployment, and competences that may be deployed at a moments notice to Union Mechanism members and third countries in need, as discussed above(Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). There is a need for cooperation and interaction, and the monitoring role demands that there be monitoring in each member-state which in turn demands that the members possess the necessary ability to monitor their own countries (ibid.), arguably a somewhat high level of network-level competences(Provan & Kenis, 2008).

5.5 Activities and role perceptions of civil servants.

The following sections will present the findings from interviews and documents with regards to the reported activities of the International Units cooperation and activities within the Union Mechanism. It will focus on the types of activities that occur in the Union Mechanism, and at the national level, the contact patterns for civil servants, and the perceptions the civil servants have of their role in network activity. The findings on variables related to activities and contact patterns will be presented first, and then this chapter will focus on the findings with regards to role perceptions. The theoretical predictions present contingency factors for the socializing mechanisms, that is time and intensity, as well as traits regarding strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion. As time and intensity is a precondition to socialization mechanisms(Checkel, 2005), the informants reported interactions with Union Mechanism actors this will be given special emphasis in the section on contact patterns.

The reported activity and extent of involvement will be presented to give an account of what Norwegian participation actually entails. The types of decisions made by civil servants is of interest, because if participation does not extend to much decision-
making which may in turn be subjects to pressures from other interested parties, EU-level influences would possibly be of lesser importance with regards to any possible impact on the identities and role perceptions of civil servants. There would not be decisions for civil servants to influence one way or the other, and a developed sense of “we-ness”, as is one possible outcome of socializing mechanisms (Checkel, 2005) would have limited implications for participants behavior.

5.5.1 Activities and contact pattern
A challenge when studying the Union Mechanism is that it is not immediately apparent what it is members do when engaging with one another. This has proven challenging to the research conducted on the EU as a civil protector in general, as it is hard to determine which agencies and other EU-level bodies that carry out civil protection functions (Larsson et al., 2009:1-4).

The activity ranges from General Directors meetings, where the directors of civil protection agencies meet biannually to decide upon the activity for the Union Mechanism for a given year, and meetings for the steering committee of the Union Mechanism, the Civil Protection Committee (CPC), where there is discussions regarding the budget for the Union Mechanism, experiences with regards to different programs are exchanged, and the annual works program and budget is voted on by the member states, to more informal activities occurring continuously. There is also working groups for select issues, and the person who holds the Presidency of the European Council for a given period decides upon a specific area of focus, such as host-nation support etc. In the CPC, Norway does not have a vote, but may influence the decisions taken, as their position on issues is heard in advance of voting (Informant N10).

As noted, these networks, with a special emphasis on the CPC is considered an important arena for Norwegian civil servants to promote Norwegian interests, and also to note developments and signals for the direction that network activity might take in the EU (Norwegian Government, 2014a) This section will show which types of tasks the members carry out, and what network activity consists of in the

21 That is the Commission or other actors with a stake in Norwegian civil servants making decisions in a way deemed desirable for the harmonization of practices or other desired outcomes of interactions.
preparedness phase of civil protection. The mandate and steering parameters for the international cooperation of Norwegian civil servants in the Union Mechanism will be presented first, to give an account of what they are supposed to do, by mandate and steering parameters provided by the JD. There will also be provided description on the activities of the network, where developing guidelines and policy, modules and expert teams, carrying out exercises, exchanging best practices, and monitoring for potential incidents constitutes the majority of “informal” network activities. The informants were also asked to provide information on the different types of meetings they attended, their perception of access to the policy process, and also if there was any other important interlocutors in the Union Mechanism activity. It became apparent that there was a strong Nordic bloc, which provided access to the policy processes “by-proxy”, as the Nordic countries coordinate in advance of voting.

5.5.1.1. Mandate
The method for coordinating the tasks of the International Unit is by supplementary letters of allocations, and mandate from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (informant N2). The mandate determines the types of activity the civil servants are allowed to pursue, and the desired goals of network participation. The mandate is reported to be broad in scope, and the international unit is free to pursue several goals with regards to civil protection when engaging with Union Mechanism actors. As reported by informant N10:

“…we are mandated to administrate this on behalf of the Ministry of Justice, as long as this is very much, as long as this is a matter of expertise, a lot of it is administration of resources, competence, experience, so this is an area of expertise they [the Ministry of Justice] have no problem leaving to an authority such as us…”(informant N10).

The use of mandates as a coordinating mechanism does appear to be uncomplicated, with informants reporting that they engage with Union Mechanism actors on problems or projects that remain within their mandate, and that they excuse themselves from discussions in those instances where projects and discussions revolve around areas that they are not mandated to pursue. There is also an ongoing
dialogue with the JD that is used for clarification of mandate or the desired activities of civil servants:

“…we often consult the Ministry of Justice, and we have a framework that we can act upon, and especially in those instances where we see that the problems under discussion goes beyond the mandate we have, then we consult other authorities that we feel should have a say in this before we go to the meetings, then we adhere to that, so if I attend a meeting in Brussels, and discuss problem statements that I know I have to have clearance on from home, then I will report that, or not say anything at all so that we do not commit to anything…” (Informant N2)

The nature of the mandate does not place many limits to the types of initiatives the civil servants may pursue, and they are free to engage in a range of activities in the preparedness phase because they have expertise the JD does not (Informant N10). The expertise the informants possess sometimes lead them to consult with the JD, as they need to work out the “Norwegian position” on diverse issues, and informants report that there is a dialogue with JD in these instances (informant N6).

5.5.1.2 Steering parameters
The DSB receive the annual steering parameters by supplementary letters of allocation from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The steering parameters for the DSB are, like the mandate for the participation in the Union Mechanism, of a “general” nature, in that the desired goal for international cooperation for 2015 is that:

“DSB shall, within its area of responsibility, make sure that new initiatives are identified in the Nordics, the EU, NATO and the UN, influence and anchor Norwegian positions within areas of considerable importance, and make sure that legislations are carried out in the right time” (Supplementary letter of allocations, 2015:7).

Similarly, the parameters are of a general nature for the steering parameters from 2011-2014. For 2011, the responsibilities of the DSB, with reference to national preparedness was to
“...Strengthen national abilities to provide aid in preparedness and crisis management, nationally and internationally...[provide] holistic societal security and preparedness work in international forums...[by] being capable of quickly requesting international aid and assistance in times of need (Supplementary letter of allocations, 2011:5). This supplementary letter of allocations also has an emphasis on the need to carry out exercises in the proper forums, and to provide guidelines for host-nation support.

In 2012 and 2013, there is emphasis on participation in international forums, and there is a separate section for the agencies international role (Supplementary letter of allocations, 2012; Supplementary letter of allocations, 2013). The central steering parameters are relatively similar, as are the goals of international cooperation, with the emphasis being to:

“...attend to Norwegian interests and commitments in the area of societal security with international cooperating actors, and provide assistance internationally following catastrophes”(Supplementary letter of allocations, 2012:14)

For 2014 the DSB is specifically tasked with a focus on amended legislation for the Union Mechanism, and they were asked to evaluate the Norwegian participation subject to the previous legislative framework (Supplementary letter of allocations, 2015). The evaluation is found in an EEA-note on the Union Mechanism (Norwegian Government, 2014a), and excerpts from this position note has been shown on the section on the Norwegian connection to the Union Mechanism.

5.5.1.3 Demands on reporting
With regards to international cooperation, the DSB is expected to report to JD if “...there are issues discussed in international forums that can result in a change in legislation in Norway, have budgetary consequences, or that are politically sensitive...”(Supplementary letter of allocations, 2012:18) The department also asks that any minutes from meeting be sent to them. For 2015 the reporting criteria has been somewhat amended in that the DSB also shall “...give its own assessment of how the directorate has worked with influencing and anchoring to secure Norwegian positions in an EEA-context”(Supplementary letter of allocations, 2015:7). This
additional demand on reporting is in lieu of an evaluation of Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism (ibid.).

5.5.1.4 Developing guidelines and policy
One of the tasks of civil servant cooperating in the Union Mechanism is the development of policies and guidelines for the work conducted by the members”...the third important thing is prevention activities, that is, which policies or actions we can take to stop incidents from occurring, or if they happen...that the consequences are as small as possible”(Informant N2). This activity occurs at the national level in the different member states, and also at the European level:

“...Norway develops something that is called NRB\(^{22}\), national risk assessment, and also tries to develop a European risk assessment to see what it is one should work on especially, and this represents one of the only demands from participation in the EU-cooperation, that is that every three years, Norway has to submit a revised national risk assessment to the Commission...”(informant N2).

5.5.1.5 Developing modules and expert teams
According to the Decision on the Union Mechanism, much of the network activity is supposed to be aimed at developing modules for rapid deployment, and to identify experts that may be deployed in emergencies(Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). This activity is often conducted in expert meetings in the Union Mechanism

“...[the activity of meetings] can be specific to the capacities the Union Mechanism is building...you have single meetings that can focus on specific modules, such as search and rescue modules, or firefighting modules”(informant N6).

Other informants also report that there is a focus on the development of modules and teams for rapid deployment:

“...the most important element of the legislation is how states may provide support in event of major incidents...this is what we are preparing, we develop response

\(^{22}\) Nasjonalt Risikobilde.
capacities, we develop teams, we work on facilitation so that we can assist each other rapidly…” (Informant N2).

5.5.1.6 Exercises
The member states arrange exercises through the Union Mechanism. These foster cooperation across boundaries, and members are encouraged to apply for financial support from the Union Mechanism together, that is, if countries go together for exercises, they are more likely to receive support:

“…it is possible to apply as a single country too, seek resources from the EU for projects and exercises and that type of thing, but there is also good possibilities to get resources by cooperating with other countries, and it is my understanding that this is favored…compared to some applications, if there are more countries that apply together” (informant N4).

In these exercises where one is awarded funding, there is the expectation that one uses relevant resources in the Union Mechanism system, as shown by Informant N4 talking about experiences with the exercise “HarbourEx 15”

“…there are criteria that are expected from EU, that one shall avail oneself of these rapid deployment modules, that are in the EU-system so we have teams from Austria and Sweden and Finland[coming in]” (informant N4).

HarbourEx 15 was a full-scale exercise of an incident of small likelihood, where there were contingents from numerous countries, representation of over 30 Norwegian civil protection actors, representation from the Commission and the ERCC, and a host of other actors involved. It was partially funded by the Union Mechanism, and it was one of the biggest civil protection exercises in Norwegian history (DSB, 2015b).

5.5.1.7 Exchange of information and best practices
An important aspect of Union Mechanism activity is the exchange of best practices, and lessons-learned meetings. The best practices meetings occur continually, with meetings aimed at policy-making
“...we have meetings with best practices where we for example shall make new policy, lets take for example, we have something called host-nation support that means that when one facilitates for receiving help from abroad, then all the Member States meet, and then they talk about what they have done, and then one tries to learn from each-other, and then one tries to make a [slightly inaudible: framework] on top which is similar to that of the countries...”(Informant N2)

The lessons-learned meetings occur after every major incident, and after every exercise financed by the Union Mechanism. There will be a lessons-learned meeting held after the exercise HarbourEx 15 (Informant N2).

“...one has lessons-learned meetings in Brussels where one reviews what one has learned, and how to improve, and these are the meetings we participate in, and then we take this back home to see if we can learn from this in Norway...”(informant N2)

The participants at these meetings represent various aspects of Union Mechanism activity, some are policy-makers, and are especially interested in the possibility of developing European frameworks for best-practices, whereas others are experts in various fields (informant N2).

5.5.1.8 Monitoring
A central task is the round-the-clock monitoring of potential crisis. The civil servants responsible for this task does not necessarily participate in other aspects of Union Mechanism work, as shown by informant N4:

“...there are people in my unit who participate in meetings in the EU, these are not my primary tasks, my direct contact with the EU is mostly in the form of the monitoring [in the ERCC] (Informant N4)

For informant N4 the contact with the Union Mechanism does not extend much beyond the monitoring role, and she reports that there is limited other contacts with the EU in her case, apart from in a Nordic context (Informant N4).
5.5.1.9 Contact patterns

This section will cover the reported time consumed by engaging with the Union Mechanism for civil servants at the International Unit, and the seconded expert to the Commission. The focus is on times spent in meetings, travels to Brussels, teleconferencing and so on. The length of involvement with the Union Mechanism differed significantly between the informants. The respondents were asked to contribute the length of time they had worked at the International Department at the DSB, which would in turn be interpreted as the length of time that they might be subject to socializing mechanisms\(^{23}\). While many of the informants report interactions with international and EU-level actors, it was established that the number of informants in the sample in direct contact with other Union Mechanism actors was limited. Of all the informants, four were possibly subjected to socialization mechanisms as a result of their position in the International Unit, and one informant was subject to socialization mechanisms because of his role as an expert seconded to the Commission. These interviews of these informants will be the focal point of this section, and information obtained from the other informants will illustrate the perception of the work of the International Unit as seen from other units of the DSB. These informants also contributed information of the perceptions of the EU as a civil protection actor.

\[\text{Table 3. An overview of informants, their functions, and their relations to the Union Mechanism.}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inf.</th>
<th>Primary affiliation (Secondary affiliation)</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Duration of involvement with the Union Mechanism</th>
<th>Intensity of involvement</th>
<th>Type of contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N2</td>
<td>International Unit, DSB</td>
<td>Head of the International Unit (for four years)</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Meetings and informal contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N4</td>
<td>International Unit, DSB</td>
<td>Nordic focus on portfolio, Coordinating</td>
<td>1.5 years</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>In connection with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{23}\) Length of time spent working for the International Department does not speak to the intensity or frequency of interaction with other Mechanism actors.
5.5.1.11 Civil protection committee and Directors meeting

The number of meetings that the civil servants attend differs between informants that represent Norway at the General Directors and the meeting of the Civil Protection Committee, and civil servants that participate at other types of meetings. Informant N10 reports that there are two civil servants that represent Norway at the Civil Protection Committee, and who aid the Director of the DSB at the General Directors meetings for DG ECHO. The Civil Protection Committee is the steering committee for the Civil Protection Mechanism. The informant reports that:
“…The director has two General Directors Meetings a year, they sort of make the guidelines for the work of the member states, where we participate along with him. In additions there is between four and six, last year there were several more meetings, in the…Civil Protection Committee, which has four to six meetings annually… it has been four to six meetings annually for the last six or seven years” (informant N10).

The informant who is predominantly responsible for representing Norwegian interest in this committee is informant N2, who is the head of the International Unit. Informant N10 reports that

“I am there if [name redacted] is not there, and I am at one or two meetings a year, on these things…these meetings just make the guidelines for the work, but there is a lot of work on a lot of different areas under the Mechanism itself, like exercises for example….” (Informant N10).

The General Directors meetings and the meetings of the Civil Protection Committee is as shown not the only meetings the informants attend, and the daily activity of the Civil Protection Mechanism happens outside of these meetings in more informal settings. Informant N6 summarizes this thusly:

“interviewer: how would you describe a typical meeting with actors from DG ECHO, what do you do?
Respondent: There are different levels of meetings, so there are sort of expert meetings for experts in the field, or if it is a decision-meeting, a decision-forum, I mainly participate in expert-meetings, and they, the Commission often facilitates these meetings, while the discussions occur between participating countries, and the Commission encourage [participants to make] summaries and conclusions, but in these forums, the decisions are supposed to be elevated to decision-forums, so there are not really decisions made, other than those one have been delegated to make by higher levels, but they [the Commission], are facilitators for these kinds of meetings” (informant N6)
5.5.1.12 Meetings at lower levels

The meetings at the steering committee constitute only part of the time allotted to Union Mechanism work, and other types of meetings take up more of the time of the respondents. The other types of meetings are less formal in the sense that they do not contribute guidelines for the direction of the Union Mechanism as such, rather they discuss various aspects of the work at the Union Mechanism, and contribute guidelines on modules and policy-frameworks after lessons-learned meetings and exchange of best practices. The time spent at the other types of meetings and other contacts often take up much of the civil servants time. As informant N6 states:

“Interviewer: how much time would you say goes into ECHO-related work?
Informant: about 70 percent of my time I think
Interviewer: 70 percent of the time, and there is a lot of correspondence…meetings?
Informant: Yes, daily, weekly
Interviewer: and do you have, do you travel a lot, do you meet other actors?
Informant: yes, I would say that, but we try to limit it, we try to do a lot by conferences by phone, it depends how much, how you define much, but at least once a month” (Informant N6).

The informants all report that there are informal contacts with other Union Mechanism actors, by way of telephones, e-mail, and teleconferencing. This can be done from Tønsberg, and there is not much travels to Brussels to actually meet other actors in person. This would suggest that the organizational locus is primarily at Tønsberg, with only the seconded expert reporting that he spends most of his time in Brussels (informant N3).

5.5.1.13 Access to the policy process

The informants were asked about the Norwegian access to the policy process of the Union Mechanism, and they were asked whether or not it mattered that Norway was not a fully-fledged EU member when it came to the policy process. While the civil servants concurred that this did indeed matter, and that this meant that Norway does not enjoy full voting rights, and have to be excused when there are voting on the budget and the guidelines for the Union Mechanism, the opinions as to whether or
not this was of much importance diverged. As far as the discussions in these forums were concerned, Norway was not treated as a special case (Informant N10).

5.5.1.14 Decision-making
The General Directors meetings sketches out the priorities for the Union Mechanism in a given year. In addition to this, the country that has the Presidency of the European Council can influence the types of problems that are addressed in a given period, and they usually want to steer the Union Mechanism in a given direction, that is to say that for a term, the Union Mechanism should focus on prevention, or on communications, or other aspects that are necessary for civil protection. These periods serve as the Presidents “legacy”, what they will be remembered for, as informant N10 states:

“…the country that holds the presidency may place a topic in focus for the duration of their presidency…they have their own area of focus…recently there has been a lot of attention to the new legislation, but it has often been different themes, for instance Belgium had host-nation-support that they wished to promote…..or Poland had focus on, that was risk-communication, then they focus on projects in that area, and make work projects and working groups one can join, and where you write these guidelines, which for instance was what was done with host-nation-support and cooperation, and then the Commission produce guidelines for all the members”...(Informant N10).

In addition to the priorities presented from the General Directors meetings and the Presidency, the meetings of the CPC is where the budget and annual works program is decided upon, and it is here the majority of decisions for the network is taken. Norway seeks influence over this process, but does not get to vote. It became apparent however, that the Norwegian civil servants had a channel to have their interests represented.

5.5.1.15 Interest representation by proxy
The informants recognize that in order to have their interests represented at the CPC, without access to decision-making, there are opportunities to consult with the
Nordic countries in advance of any voting, and in a sense use the Nordic countries as a proxy. There is access to the decision-shaping phase, but when there is actual voting, the Norwegian representatives have to leave the room (informant N2). The informants report that this is not often problematic for two reasons; the possibility of working out a position on policy with the Nordic states in advance, and the desire from the CPC to have consensus on policy, that is, the Norwegian representatives usually know when they leave the room what the turnout of the voting will be. As informant N2 notes on the by-proxy decision-shaping:

“…Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in particular, and sometimes Iceland, which will often have consultations before important meetings to see if we have, if we are in agreement on a given issue, and in that way may influence this issue together…” (informant N2).

Informant N10, who states that the Nordic countries have a set of unique challenges with regards to civil protection, and see benefits from working together to influence the EU, reported a similar experience:

“…we want a form of…regionalization in the developments at the EU because…the EU accepts more and more countries, and at least new types of cooperation…there is no doubt that there are differences, especially geographical and climactic differences that makes issues appear a little different here in Norway than they do in Europe…” (Informant N10).

The DSB notes the Nordic cooperation as an increasing trend, and considers the developments of a Nordic bloc as beneficial as it increases the influence of the region in international forums. The desire is that there be a Nordic civil protection region without borders, and that the Nordic countries, together may prove to have greater influence on other international organizations (DSB, 2013).

5.5.2 Role perceptions
This section will present findings on what the civil servants perceive their role to be when engaging with the Union Mechanism. The relationship between national and international actors will be presented in this section, and it is of special interest to
show how actors behave in times of conflict, that is in those instances where other Union Mechanism actors or the Commission desires decision making to go in one direction, and national authorities wants it to go another way. There were some themes that recurred in the interviews, namely perceptions of belonging to a “Nordic bloc” within the Union Mechanism, perceptions of being an expert, and perceptions of the Union Mechanism as a resource. These will be presented in separate sections, along with perceptions of the Union Mechanism held by the seconded expert to the Commission, perceptions that deviated from the civil servants from the International Unit, and which may nuance the different experiences of Union Mechanism role perceptions.

5.5.2.1 Role perceptions under conflicting interests
The informants were asked which actors would be accorded the most weight in an instance of conflicting interests between the Union Mechanism and the Norwegian interest, and this will be introduced. When asked which authorities that would be granted the most weight in a potential dispute informant N2 replied:

“…this is really very simple, we participate in the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection primarily to strengthen Norwegian preparedness, secondly because we want to participate in the European Community, and thirdly, to support the EU as a central actor in incidents in third countries, it is a matter of priority, and I think that all that participate in the cooperation have thought about this the same way, but it is no doubt that if you want to accomplish one, you have to give some on two. So it is very obvious that this is not a problem” (informant N2).

Informant N6 seconded this experience. When asked about potential conflicting interests in the Union Mechanism, the informant stated that: “this may happen, this has happened, without it having major consequences, because…this [the Union Mechanism] being voluntary work to participate in, but absolutely, it is not always consensus in these meetings…”(informant N6). The informant further stated which interests would be accorded the most weight in an instance of dispute: “…Norwegian

24 The entire conversation had focused on the possibility of conflict, and it was decided that the word dispute was more apt to describe the possibility of diverging interests, as conflict was ill fitting.
interests will be given more weight, at least that is what one tries to promote in meetings” (Informant N6).

When asked about the possibility of conflicting interest the informant N2 explains an approach that was common among the interviewees in such eventualities, that is, the informants either say nothing so as not to commit to anything, or excuse themselves from the discussions altogether:

“… there are some work dreams that may not be as relevant to us, where one want to have us join in all the same, where one [Norwegian civil servant] say that this cannot be a priority at this time. It is rare that there is a conflict between what one does in the EU, and what one does nationally…sometimes you say that we do not want to follow these ambitions because we want to prioritize other things” ( informant N2).

The informants report that there is dialogue in instances of conflicting interest, and report that they consult JD in these cases, also if they feel that there is the need to alert or notify Norwegian authorities about issues in the cooperation where the Norwegian position may contradict the Union Mechanism at large “…especially those meetings where one have, if not deviations, but that there has been a development that needs to be attended to further, this development is reported to the Department of Justice” (Informant N2).

5.5.2.2 Cooperation within the Nordics, and different civil protection regions.
More generally with reference to the desires of the Commission in the cooperation, informants report that there are diverging traditions within the Union Mechanism

“…Some Member States have a clear idea of what should and should not be EU responsibilities…sometimes one have to move away from what the Commission wants, a good example of this is critical infrastructure, where one [the Commission] had a very clear idea that one should…systematize and identify European critical infrastructure, map it, give very clear guidelines for the infrastructure, and in this issue, several of the Member States set the foot down and said that “this is too sensitive” we don’t want to do this in a European community in this way, we may
agree to some guidelines for how to administrate this, and then it have to be up to each member state to handle this how each member state feel best” (informant N2).

The informants especially points to the utility of Nordic cooperation in the framework of the Union Mechanism:

“There are major differences in the authorities [of different countries], they have completely different administrations in the Nordic countries, so we see that there is reasons for the cooperation with the Nordic countries being easier...this is because we have distinct challenges...and similar authorities...we identify very well with the Swedish, and the Danish and the Finnish sister-organizations, we have a language which makes it easy to cooperate...and there are issues we are more concerned with in the Nordics which we, through cooperation can more easily get acceptance for in the EU...(Informant N10).

Informant N2 also has an emphasis on similar culture:

“...we have what one might call a Northern-European bloc right, because we have authorities and ways of doing things...and a culture that is relatively similar, and then we have what is maybe the strongest[from our point of view], that is the Nordic bloc...”(Informant N2).

5.5.2.3 Perceptions of being experts
Some issues the Union Mechanism works on are considered to be matter of expertise, and the informants report that issues such as the technical minutiae of the modules they develop are left to them due to their role as experts25.

“...it is often the way that we know the system better than the Department of Justice...but there is good communication between us and Justice...”(informant N4).

25 Experts in the sense of having intimate knowledge with the work of the Union Mechanism, and the constituent parts of its civil protection work, not experts as is civil protection expertise, which they do not claim to possess(informants, N2, N4, N6, N10).
Perceptions of the Union Mechanism as resource

The informants from the International Unit all report that the Union Mechanism has become an important asset in civil protection (Informant N2, N4, N6, N10). Some report that the Union Mechanism and the EU has become the most important international actor with which they cooperate, superseding NATO and the UN in the cooperation on civil protection (Informant N2).

The Union Mechanism is treated primarily as an important asset to strengthen the Norwegian civil protection capabilities, as Informant N4 reports:

“...I perceive it to be a specific desire from the Norwegian side, and also the Nordic countries that...even though we are not an EU-member state that we want to...work within the system the EU has developed, so we see that the preparedness system the EU now has developed with all these units for rapid deployments that are available in a database that one can request, and that can be deployed with different units in Europe and in third countries in the world, one can see that this...has become a solid system one is satisfied with, one sees the EU as a very resourceful actor in the area of preparedness...one see this as positive to develop Norwegian capacities...and believe that this will strengthen Norwegian preparedness to participate inn the Mechanism, because it will give Norway the possibility to request these resources from the EU, and in a way it is more legitimate to ask if you contribute something yourself” (Informant N4).

A recurring theme in the interviews is the possibility of utilizing the resources that have been made available through the cooperation in the Union Mechanism. The cooperation can provide incentives for participants, and the informants recognize this, as exemplified by a quote from informant N2:

“An important thing to notice is that the EU does not only use the stick, they do have a gigantic carrot in the form of funding arrangements, and this is important of course, because one can have participation funded, projects, exercises, a lot of different things, and voluntary organizations can also get funding from them, and this is important” (Informant N2).
The informants emphasize that the funding of exercises is an incentive to participate, and this in turn has benefits for Norwegian civil protection.

5.5.2.5 Role perception at the Commission level
The seconded expert to the Commission reported somewhat different role-perceptions that that of his peers at the DSB. The expert reported that the interests of the Commission were paramount for the time he was seconded, and all other considerations were secondary. The informant emphasized that, although he represented the interest of the Commission, “…both me and the Commission, and Norway for that matter has an interest in that I should promote….information about the programs we [the Commission] have to Norway, and about the concepts that ECHO has to Norwegian preparedness authorities” (Informant N3)

5.5.2.6 Perceptions of the Union Mechanism from civil servants from other departments
The informants from other departments within the DSB reported no contact with the Union Mechanism. Some did however report to have extensive contact with EU-level actors, but in different forums, such as the Informant in charge of the Department of Product safety, who had extensive contact with regards to regulations. The informant with the Mission of Norway to the EU had limited direct contact with the Union Mechanism, but could report extensive contacts with other EU-level bodies, and his job was to observe the programs from the EU (Informant N5).

This group of informants, with limited contacts with the Union Mechanism did speak to the importance of the EU as a civil protector, and how this has become more prominent, and could also show that the direct contact with the Union Mechanism was confined to the International Unit, and the majority of the Norwegian cooperation in the Union Mechanism was handled by this department.

5.6 Summary
The Union Mechanism has developed over time to assume more responsibilities in network activity. The focus on member states activities and desired actions has also
increased in the amended legislation. With the MIC being replaced by the EERC, the Commission has assumed a larger role in the coordination of network activity.

The informants report various degrees of contact with other Union Mechanism actors. Informant N2 and N10 report that they are the ones representing DSB at the CPC and the General Directors meetings, and that the frequency of these meetings have been higher following amended legislation. They do not indicate that the frequency will remain higher, and it appears to be temporary and associated with the development and implementation of the Decision No 1313/2013/EU.

The other informants from the International Unit report that there are ongoing contacts with the Union Mechanism, but in less formal settings, such as meetings regarding specific modules, exchange of best practices and so forth. They do report to spend a large proportion of their working hours on Union Mechanism activity, but there is limited face-to-face interactions and meetings in Brussels for these informants, where meetings in Brussels occur once a month on average, and other contacts are conducted from Tønsberg. There is not an indication then, that the amended legislation entails more face-to-face interactions, even though overall network activities have increased.

From the other departments within the DSB there is no direct contact with the Union Mechanism, and the perceptions of the network do not extend beyond considering the EU to be an important asset for civil protection at the international stage.

With regards to role-perceptions, the informants do not report that their role and identities have altered much following this contact pattern, and there appears to be consensus around the Norwegian interests being accorded the most weight in all instances, but that there is a culture to cooperate with the other Nordic countries to influence network activity. This will be further discussed in the following analysis chapter.

The seconded expert to the Commission (informant N3) reports different perceptions of his role. He is sent to represent the interests of the Commission, and does so for the time he is there. It is not suggested that this will be sustained when he returns to
Norway. He also indicates that it is in the interest of the Commission and Norway that
he has contact with relevant authorities about the programs he is working on in the
Commission, and that this is beneficial to all involved.
6.0 Analysis
The analysis will evaluate the findings in light of the theoretical perspectives and in order to address the first problem statement: How has the Union Civil Protection Mechanism developed with the new legislative framework? Does the network constitute a distinct type of network-governance?

This chapter opens with the classification of the Union Mechanism as a type of network-governance, and the findings on network activities will be discussed in relations to the classificatory dimensions of the theories chapter, in order that the network can be classified as a distinct type of network-governance.

Secondly this chapter will address the problem statement concerned with possible influences on role perceptions and identities: How has international cooperation with EU-level actors in the area of civil protection within the Union Mechanism influenced roles and identities of civil servants at the Directorate for Civil Security?

The findings from an intergovernmental and the cultural-institutional perspective will be discussed separately, before a brief discussion as to which perspective has the most explanatory power, and if they can compliment one another to provide a more accurate account of the role-perceptions and socialization of actors.

6.1 Determining the type of network-governance
This section will analyze findings from the Council Decision and the Decision of the European Parliament and Council with an emphasis on positioning the Union Mechanism along the two dimensions in Provan and Kenis’ (2008) typology; the degree to which network activities are brokered among members, and whether or not there is internal/external administration of the network. It does also seek to establish if there has been any change along these dimensions since the current legislative framework was ratified.
6.1.1 Degree to which network activity is brokered

The Commission is accorded responsibilities that are distinct from the other Union Mechanism members, and it would appear to be central to network activity. With the emphasis in the legislation on the role of the Commission as a facilitator of information exchange, it is put in a position where information is routed through it. The Commission is also responsible for the implementation of the EERC, the ERCC, and CECIS, and once implemented, they have the responsibility of administrating these assets. The implementing powers conferred on the Commission also allows it to assess the Member States civil protection efforts, and available assets, such as modules and teams of experts, and it certifies these teams, and develops guidelines for the composition of teams and modules which the Member States are encouraged to adhere to (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). Discussions about modules, expert teams and resources for rapid deployment are ultimately to be reported to the Commission, as are any available teams and modules of the Member States.

The Commission has an overview of the resources available, and the Member States are encouraged to submit this information to the Commission. This would suggest that activity is at least somewhat brokered by the Commission, whereas the other members do not broker activity to the same degree (Provan & Kenis, 2008). It is necessary, however, to point out that the Commission does not have the ability to enforce activities of Member states, nor does it have the ability to force compliance, as network participation remains voluntary for the members.

The members are responsible for their own civil protection efforts, and to report contact points and available experts to the Commission. The Union Mechanism is also not supposed to obstruct the civil protection efforts for Member States, and they are free to call on, or not call on the Union Mechanism for assistance, as well as refuse to participate assets in a collaborative crisis management effort (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013; Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007). This would suggest that the Commission is a facilitator, more than a network broker per se, but it is still accorded a distinct role, whereby it is central to network activity, suggesting lead-agency traits rather than a pure form of lead-agency governed network in which the Commission is the sole determinant of network activity (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
6.1.2 A strengthened position for the Commission
The tasks for the Commission is more modest in the Council Decision of 2007, than in that of 2013 (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). In the Council Decision of 2007, there is an emphasis on the voluntary contribution of information on civil protection assets, and the identification of teams, as discussed in the findings chapter, whereas in 2013, there is an emphasis on the necessity to develop said modules further, and to further strengthen the cooperation. This would suggest that there is a development towards more network activity, and a trend towards more information being channeled through the Commission in the ERCC, which replaces the MIC (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

The role for the Commission is also more extensive, in that it is given the responsibility of administrating the EERC, the ERCC, and CECIS (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013), which may signal a move towards more lead-agency traits for the Union Mechanism as a whole, where one network member assumes more functions (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

With the ERCC replacing the MIC, and the Commission accorded responsibilities for its administration, this would signal a more prominent role for the Commission in network activities. As the ERCC is central in the civil protection efforts as a communications hub, receiving pre-alerts in advance of a potential crisis, and also a diffuser of information among the members, this would also indicate that the Commission has some lead-agency traits. The Decisions in question differ in their scope with regards to over-all activity, and with the role of the Member States and the Commission, the amended legislation is much more substantial in scope: There is an overall increase in the desired activity, as evidenced by the more detailed framework presented in the legislation (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

6.1.3 Network size, goal consensus and need for network-level competences
The number of network participants remains stable at 32 members. This would suggest that a pure shared-governance arrangement would not be effective. In
relations with the tasks the network is supposed to carry out, this would suggest that there was need for some factors of lead-agency governance. The need for coordination in times of crisis underscores this observation, and there appears to be recognition of this, where the Commission is accorded a central position in network activity in both Decisions, even if this role does not extend to much more than constituting a network hub, through which information is routed to and from network actors (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

The need for network-level competencies can be said to be high, but the very intention of the Union Mechanism is to pool resources, and to bring together experts from the Member states, so that the Union Mechanism as a whole provides a higher degree of civil protection for Member States and third countries (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013). In this way, the Union Mechanism address the need for the required levels of competences, and, as the Commission is a facilitator of the diffusion of resources, expertise, an arranger of best practices, and exercises, this would also indicate that the Commission is central to these activities, if mainly in a facilitating capacity, but still indicating some traits of lead-agency (Provan & Kenis, 2008). These findings would suggest a central position for the Commission, but the need for network-level competencies is not a contingency factor that can be used to gauge the type of network-governance beyond indicating some need for lead-agency traits in the Union Mechanism from the documents alone.

### 6.1.4 Implications for Norwegian participation

The amended legislation has limited implications for Norwegian participation in the Union Mechanism. The activity overall is increasing, as is the cost of participation (Norwegian Government, 2014a), but Norway is not in a special position with regards to the activity of the network itself (there is however implications of Norway not being a EU member, as will be discussed in the next section). As the activity of the network increases, the Member States responsibilities also changes to an increased focus on the preparatory work of the Union Mechanism, such as submitting information on teams of experts, and on available modules and resources, which could in turn become more costly for Member States. This is recognized by the Norwegian Government, and the funding for the participation in the Union
Mechanism is increased accordingly as shown (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013; Norwegian Government, 2014a).

**6.1.5 Administration of the Union Mechanism**
As shown from the findings, the Union Mechanism does not possess an administration that is separate to the network, and has an exclusively administrative role. There has not been mandated that there be an administration in its inception, nor in amended legislation (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013; Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007), hence there is no suggestion that the Union Mechanism would constitute a networked-administrative organization as is one of the forms of network-governance that was presented in the theories chapter (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

**6.1.6 Summary of the analysis of form of network-governance**
At this stage the Union Mechanism can be said to have developed from a participant-governed network which had some lead-agency traits in the role ascribed to the Commission as a diffuser of information, whereas it with amended legislation in 2013 appears to still constitute a participant-governed network, but now with somewhat more distinct lead-agency traits. The number of participants, the need for network-level competencies, and goal-consensus would all indicate that the Union Mechanism would benefit from having lead-agency traits, but there was limited change in these contingency factors between the two pieces of legislation (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Council Decision 2007/779/EC, 2007; Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

The administration of the ERCC, the EERC and CECIS is all responsibilities of the Commission, and this signals increasing activity in the network, along with a central position in the network accorded the Commission. The implications for Norway is found in that there are an increase in the desired activities of Member States, as well as increased cost of participation, but Norway is no different from the other Member States in this respect. The contingency factors of network-governance provided by Provan and Kenis (2008) are not particularly useful in gauging the type of network governance from the data, and there was need for a more in-depth look at the activities of the network in order to classify it.
6.2 Analysis from an Intergovernmental perspective
From an intergovernmental perspective, civil servants attend meetings at the Union Mechanism with predefined preferences from national authorities, and they are not expected to adhere to concerns other than those they have been instilled with from the JD (Moravcsik, 1993; Trondal, 2010:7). From an intergovernmental perspective the informants were expected to act in accord with an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic if they followed the instructions of Norwegian authorities as expressed in mandate and rules (Trondal, 2010). There was expected to be no influence on the roles and identities of civil servants, as intergovernmental theory considers that preference formation occurs only at the national stage, and that civil servants are already instilled with immutable preferences when they enter the European stage (Moravcsik, 1993).

6.2.1 National preferences and steering by mandate
The findings show that the informants consider the steering signals from supplementary letters of allocation, and their mandate to be an efficient way to coordinate their activities, and give them indications as to what it is they can and cannot attend to in Union Mechanism activities. The informants emphasize that the mandate is important in determining their activities, and that they never go beyond their brief in the cooperation. They excuse themselves from forums where issues are being pursued for which they do not have the required permissions, or say nothing so as to not commit to anything they do not have clearance for.

In an instance of dispute or disagreement between Norwegian civil servants, and other Member states, national preferences are always accorded the most weight. This is seen in all the cases of civil servants from the International Unit attending meetings at the CPC, and the General directors, and for the civil servants who mainly attend less formal meetings, and have other types of contacts such as by e-mail, teleconferencing etc. This would indicate that actors behave in accord with an

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26 That is, preferences are aggregated at the national level, and not open to redefinition at the international level (Moravcsik, 1993).
intergovernmental decision-making dynamic, as the data provides clear indications that the instructions from Norwegian authorities, *such as they are expressed in mandate is not overstepped* (Trondal, 2010:7).

6.2.2. Does contact pattern matter?
As the data shows, there are limited implications on role perceptions from the different contact patterns exhibited by informants attending the more formal meetings of the CPC, and the General Directors, as opposed to informants attending less formal meetings. The meetings of the CPC and the General Directors is arguably arenas where the *intensity* of interaction is higher, as the Member States all have a stake at influencing the Union Mechanism in a way that is favorable to their own interests, which is the primary motivation for bargaining at the international stage in an intergovernmental perspective (Checkel, 2005; Moravcsik, 1993). These meetings are also a stage where normative suasion may be present as a socializing mechanism, as the Member States engage in negotiations, and argumentation as to what should be the future directions of the Union Mechanism. As Checkel (2005) notes, normative suasion is at play if the informants come to accept the “power of the better argument”. It does not seem however, that communicative processes have influenced roles and identities in such a way, and informants instead choose to opt out of discussion where the subject is not in Norwegian interests.

The informants who attend the meetings at the CPC and the General Directors are also the informants that report the most frequent travels to Brussels, and the most contact with other network actors overall. Still they do not perceive themselves to be “European civil protectors”, rather, they appear to be guided primarily by an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic (Trondal, 2010:7), emphasizing Norwegian interests as paramount. This is likely attributable to insufficient time spent in direct contact with other actors. Even though these informants have the most direct contact with other Union Mechanism actors, still the majority of the activity is carried out from Tønsberg.

The informal meetings are more concerned with technicalities, and the stakes for participants at these meetings are lower, considering that there is mostly
development of guidelines for particular modules, or exchange of best practices, lessons-learned meetings. These meetings are not arenas that provoke much conflict of interests. The informants do not report to have to excuse themselves from these types of meetings, and they are free to opt out of activities that are not of Norwegian interest. What is however evident from the informants attending these meetings, is that there are activities considered to be theirs to manage, such as technical details of modules. There is in other words leeway for the civil servants to make decisions on the basis of expertise, while still acting within their brief.

The longest sustained interaction with the Union Mechanism was reported by informant N2 who reported being at the DSB for 11 years, of which four had been spent as the head of the International unit. Informant N4 reported the shortest duration of involvement, with only one and a half years of working for the International Unit, this informant also reported limited contact with Union Mechanism actors, with a portfolio with a focus, for the most part, on Nordic cooperation as opposed to Union Mechanism activities. One would expect then that informant N2, and N10, that had the longest time, and largest degrees of intensity of interaction to report the most exposure to socializing mechanisms, and in the instance of any actual socialization towards the Union Mechanism to report a sense of “we-ness”. The data does not support such a notion, with all the informants emphasizing the interests of Norwegian authorities as paramount in the interaction with Union Mechanism actors, more suggestive of an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic guiding behavior of civil servants (Trondal, 2010: 7).

With regards to the time involved in Union Mechanism activities, and the degrees of contact, formal and informal, there is limited differences between the civil servants, as they do not deviate from what may be considered an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic (Trondal, 2010: 6-9). The perceptions of roles and identities does not change with increasing length of time working for the international unit, nor is there evidence of role changes as a consequence of attending meetings in Brussels, as opposed to have a majority of the contact with other networked actors from Tønsberg by phone or teleconferencing. As there are limited perceptions of socialization and role and identity changes held by all informants from the
International Unit, the data cannot speak to whether or not other differences among the informants matter, such as experience working with civil protection, educational background, time spent on international portfolio and so forth.

6.2.3 Does membership in the EU matter?
One plausible explanation for the lack of socialization is that Norway is not a EU-member. The informants are somewhat divided in their opinions on how they perceive cooperation within the Union Mechanism with them coming from an EEA-country. Some report no difference, that is, in the work focusing on developing modules, guidelines etc. there is no difference with regards to membership status, as these are mainly technical issues. When it comes to the meetings of the CPC and the General Directors, this does make a difference, as civil servants get to participate in discussion, but have to leave the room when a vote is taken. They can influence decisions in the decision-shaping phase, but cannot influence network activity by voting. This may emphasize that they represent Norway first and foremost, as they are in a unique position within the Union Mechanism, but the findings do not extend to civil servants who do have EU-membership, hence it is not possible to state that membership type matters with regards to role-perceptions due to network participation.

6.2.4 Instrumental calculation as determinant of participation
What can explain sustained participation in the Union Mechanism, when the amended legislation entails that the cost of participation increases? From an intergovernmental perspective, states bargain on the international level based on preferences that have been aggregated beforehand at the national stage, in order to attain something through bargaining that they otherwise could not (Moravcsik, 1993). Bargaining, and in extension, the cooperation in the Union Mechanism, is only sustained insofar it provides some benefits that could not otherwise have been obtained, and for as long as the cost do not exceed the benefits (ibid.)

The informants all emphasize the importance of the Union Mechanism being a resource for Norwegian civil protection. By participating in the network, the civil servants report that there is access to important assets, information, and the possibility to get funding for exercises, and that these resources have been useful for
Norwegian civil protection. This emphasis would suggest that network participation is an outcome of strategic calculations (Checkel, 2005; Moravcsik, 1993). Civil servants report that they participate, primarily to strengthen Norwegian civil protection and preparedness efforts, and the participation in the Union Mechanism is motivated by access to the assets the network possesses, and the information that is made available through participation. The civil servants emphasize that there are incentives for participation in the Union Mechanism that outweighs the costs of membership, and that they do not report to participate out of a sense of obligation; sustained participation appears to be incentives driven.

6.2.5 Odd one out
One informant reports a contrasting perception of his role and identity to that of the informants who are primarily national representatives. As predicted, interactions of a higher intensity could lead to the socialization of actors (Checkel, 2005). This socialization is often attributed to seconded experts, participants in working groups and committology committees at the EU level (cf. Egeberg, 2006a; Trondal, 2010). This appears to be the case for the seconded expert to the Commission, who does not exhibit an intergovernmental decision-making dynamic, national interests are not his primary motivation (Trondal, 2010:6-9).

The informant who was seconded to the Commission as an expert reports that he represents the interest of the Commission first and foremost, and emphasizes that he is not in any way at the Commission to represent Norwegian interest. He does appear to have assumed a wholly “European” role. While this would suggest that the Union Mechanism does indeed have socializing potential on actors engaging within its framework, this may only be the case for experts seconded to the Commission, although it does speak to the predictions of intergovernmental theory inaccurate in this instance, as it precludes any national civil servants from being socialized towards supranational institutions. It should be noted that in his capacity as a seconded expert, he is instructed to assume the interests of the Commission.

This does not however suggest that this role is sustained when his duration of stay terminates, and he is to return to the DSB. While he may represent the Commission for the duration of his stay, this may be the informant behaving in accord with a logic
of appropriateness, where it is seen as the right thing to do for the time being (March, 1988). Loyalty to the Commission is what is required; hence that is what he projects.

6.2.6 Challenges to an intergovernmental perspective
The data suggest that there are three findings that do not confirm to the predictions of intergovernmental theory. The informants report that they are free to pursue issues, and to manage resources, such as modules, without interference from JD, referencing their expertise. This would suggest that while Norwegian interest remain paramount, their mandate is of a nature that allows for some leeway, and that the preferences for the activities is not so specific, as to specify what the preferences is to be in all instances of Union Mechanism activity. This demands that the intergovernmental order be considered more nuanced, as all preferences should have been aggregated at the national level, and they should not be open to re-definition when civil servants enter into the European stage. This redefinition, if only concerning technicalities and minutiae of modules and other capacities, does not square with the vision of national authorities as the central actor entering into bargains, if participation is to follow a strict intergovernmental understanding of Europeanization (Moravcsik, 1993).

There is not room for aspects of Union Mechanism activities where the civil servants can consider themselves experts, as they are only supposed to act as national representatives, yet, in addition to their mandate, the informants report that there is an ongoing dialogue with the JD, and at times the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work out positions on the more technical aspects of the activities of the Union Mechanism. These instances are often prompted by the civil servants themselves, suggesting that they want the JD primarily, and in some cases the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to know what it is they are working on in Union Mechanism activity, and also the types of issues that may arise.

This dialogue would also suggest that while there is recognition of the JD as the “owner” of the tasks associated with Union Mechanism participation, the technical issues the network attend to is at times better understood by the civil servants from the International Unit, as reported by the informants. The informants themselves present viable courses of action, and determines in dialogue with the JD the
Norwegian interests and actions taken. This is also not in line with an intergovernmental perspective, as there should not be any to- and fro- in network activities, the position should have been worked out in advance, and acted upon accordingly (Moravcsik, 1993). This will be further discussed in the section of the analysis from a cultural-institutional perspective.

Secondly, there is the emergence of a Nordic bloc within the Union Mechanism, where the DSB coordinate with other Nordic agencies advance of the meetings of the CPC and other Union Mechanism activities, and seek to influence the network together. This is an “informal” practice, and is not mandated. It is also interesting to note that existing cooperation between the Nordic countries has developed to a viable channel of influence over network activity, as regional challenges in civil protection is being moved to the European stage.

Thirdly there is the matter of the seconded expert that have come to assume a fully “European” role, while he is seconded to the commission, he is not in other words a “Trojan horse” engaging in Commission activities on the behest of Norwegian authorities (Trondal, 2010:6-9). This will also be discussed at further length in the following section.

6.3 Analysis from a Cultural-institutional perspective

The cultural-institutional perspective assumes that the Union Mechanism may gradually become institutionalized if it is infused with informal norms and values (Christensen et al., 2009:52). The civil servants may be partly re-socialized towards network roles and identities (Checkel, 2005), expressed as role-playing or normative suasion. Following from these processes, the informants may come to exhibit decision-making dynamics other than the intergovernmental (Trondal, 2010:6-9). This section will attend to the findings that did not conform to the expectations of intergovernmental theory, namely that the informants had, in some areas of network activities, perception of being experts, as opposed to just national representatives, that there exists a Nordic bloc which coordinates in advance of voting to work out
their position, and that the seconded expert reported an altogether different perception of his role in network activity. This section begins with a discussion of whether or not the Union Mechanism can be said to possess institutionalized traits, a precondition for any influence on organizational culture (Christensen et al., 2009).

6.3.1 Does the Union Mechanism possess institutionalized traits?
As far as a network as an organization can be institutionalized, the Union Mechanism appears from the evidence presented to possess some institutionalized traits. The informants reports that the EU, and in extension, the Union Mechanism has become the most important civil protection actor at the international level, and considered by informants to have become more important than NATO and the UN (Informants N2, N3, N4, N6, N10). There is also the perception of the Union Mechanism as being an important resource for the member states to fund exercises and training, it is an important stage for the exchange of information on best practices, and on the available assets and modules of the member states. Overall, network activities has increased with amended legislation, as shown in the section detailing the development of the Union Mechanism following the amended legislation, the most important civil protection actor at the international level, and considered by informants to have become more important than NATO and the UN (Informants N2, N3, N4, N6, N10). There is also the perception of the Union Mechanism as being an important resource for the member states to fund exercises and training, it is an important stage for the exchange of information on best practices, and on the available assets and modules of the member states. Overall, network activities has increased with amended legislation, as shown in the section detailing the development of the Union Mechanism following the amended legislation, (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

The network does also appear to have developed informal norms and values. The network was supposed to cover all member-states, and to encourage common solutions, but as the network has developed, there is now an increased focus on regional cooperation, and this has in turn become encouraged by the Commission, initially opposed to such a development. This does indicate that the network adapts to the requests of Member States with regards to their local challenges, and the Commission, originally encouraging common efforts, has in turn come to change their stance on the activity of members, without this being reflected in the formal arrangements of the Union Mechanism, as expressed in the amended legislation (Decision No 1313/2013/EU, 2013).

Another trait indicating the institutionalization of the Union Mechanism is the efforts taken to achieve consensus in the CPC when the members vote on the annual works programs. Simple majority would have sufficed, but the Member States encourage that there be consensus on the decided program. The informants report that they already know in advance what will be the turnout of a vote. The informants do not say
that this is a practice that is subject to rules, and it is a norm as opposed to an instruction, the perception from the informants is that this is considered “appropriate”, and may be an expression of a Union Mechanism “culture”(Christensen et al., 2009:52-53).

These findings could together suggest that the Union Mechanism has moved beyond being merely a network organization, and towards being an institution. The members value the network as a resource, there are certain ways to do things beyond what is expressed in rules and instructions, which would indicate the existence of some informal norms and values, and there has gradually become more focus from Member States on the Union Mechanism as an arena for civil protection efforts, all indicating a shift towards the network possessing institutional traits(Christensen et al., 2009:52). This would in turn suggest that there could be network roles and identities for the civil servants to be socialized towards, yet they do not exhibit much change in perceptions of their role and identities, as discussed.

6.3.2 Identities and role perceptions
While the data does suggest that the Commission may provide civil servants engaging within it with at least a secondary set of roles or identities as evidenced by the seconded expert emphasizing the Commissions interests as paramount with regards to decision-making (informant N3), this may not be the case for the Union Mechanism network, and the other informants involved in Union Mechanism activity, primarily with a perception of the Commission as facilitator as opposed to network participant, does not report feelings of “we-ness” within the confines of the network. This does not discount the possibility of a Union Mechanism identity, which may exist, but it does suggest that the Norwegian civil servants engaging with other Union Mechanism actors do not experience a perception of a secondary “European” identity, nor do they report that there is any sense of “we-ness” in the interactions. This suggests that for the most part, the civil servants do not engage in role-playing or normative suasion, and they are not exposed to socializing mechanisms to a degree that fosters socialization towards a network role(Checkel, 2005). The informants do however report perceptions of “we-ness” with regards to the cooperation with the other Nordic countries.
6.3.3 Nordics
The perception of the Union Mechanism as a possible socializing agent does appear to need more nuance, as evidenced by the recent trend towards regionalization of the civil protection efforts of the network. The Union Mechanism, which did initially seek wholly European solutions, does now encourage regional cooperation in recognition of the different civil protection challenges to the members of the network (informant N2). The emphasis on Nordic cooperation, and the informants reporting that they coordinate with other Nordic countries in efforts aimed at persuasion and influence in the network when voting, and discuss their positions on issues ahead of meetings suggests that there are limited perceptions of having an identity as a “European civil protector”, rather that the network may encourage different blocs of already culturally similar countries which share similar challenges to cooperate within a Union Mechanism framework.

Instead of one coherent network identity, this may suggest that there are different regions to which an official may have a perception of belonging within the framework of the Union Mechanism, and it may prove to be a vehicle, in the instance of the Nordics, to be a socializing agent fostering Nordic cooperation in civil protection, within the framework of the Union Mechanism. The perceptions of a strong Nordic bloc is as shown encouraged from the authorities (DSB, 2013), and the trend towards cooperation and coordination between the Nordic countries is expected to increase.

6.3.3.1 Why cooperate with the Nordic countries?
The civil servants do report a sense of “we-ness” with the “Nordic” bloc, and they report that it is easier cooperate with other Nordic countries. Challenges that are unique to the Nordic region has led the informants to see the benefits of exploiting already existing cooperation to influence network activities. This is expressed in the possibility and encouragement from the Commission of countries coming together when applying for funding for exercises, where countries are rewarded for applying together, and where there are additional rewards for exploiting and using the existing modules.
6.3.4 Epistemic decision-making
The perceptions of some areas belonging within the civil servants expertise, as opposed to matters of national interests is also evident from what the civil servants report, and do not report to the JD. While they are instructed to send any minutes from meetings in the CPC to the JD, and also to report if the issues they pursue may have administrative, legislative or economic consequences for the Norwegian administration, there are aspects of the activity that is not reported. The issues that go unreported are of a technical nature, and associated with minor aspects of work on specific modules, and other technical specifics of little relevance to the work of the JD and their role as “owner” of the tasks of international cooperation in civil protection. The emphasis is on the distinction between issues that are of relevance to the JD, and on issues of a technical nature with limited implications for the overall cooperation and Norwegian position in the cooperation.

While these findings do defy the predictions of intergovernmental theory (Moravcsik, 1993), it is unclear if the civil servants consider themselves as belonging to an epistemic community. They do feel that there are issues that are of limited interests to the JD, for which they have the requisite expertise, but the overall perceptions of their role is not as the “expert professional” (Trondal, 2010: 6-9), and the perceptions of belonging to an epistemic community appears to be secondary to a perception of being a Norwegian representative. There is also

6.4 Are civil servants national representatives or autonomous experts?
The analysis would suggest that the civil servants attend meetings at the Union Mechanism, and carry out other tasks in relations to the network with Norwegian interests as the primary guide for decision-making. The intergovernmental perspective presents a more correct portrayal of civil servant behavior, and the findings would suggest only limited deviations from an intergovernmental perspective. It is of special relevance to note that the mandate and instructions, such as they are expressed is not being overstepped by civil servants, who when there are issues around what the Norwegian preferences are, excuse themselves from discussions, and do not commit to anything for which they do not have clearance from the JD.
The informants emphasize that the incentives for participation found in funding for exercises, access to information and modules, and participation on lessons-learned meetings as well as best-practices meetings has strengthened Norwegian preparedness efforts, and that the incentives for participation outweighs the costs, in a way that suggests that participation is primarily driven by strategic calculation (Checkel, 2005)

7.0 Summary and concluding remarks

1. *How has the Union Civil Protection Mechanism developed with the new legislative framework? Does the network constitute a distinct type of network-governance?*

2. *How has international cooperation with EU-level actors in the area of civil protection within the Union Mechanism influenced roles and identities of civil servants at the international unit at the Directorate for Civil Security?*

7.1 Network developments and classification
This thesis has sought to classify the network in the ideal-typical model of Provan and Kenis (2008), and has considered whether or not the network has moved along one or two dimensions with amended legislation for the Union Mechanism. In 2007 the Union Mechanism could be classified as a participant-governed network with some lead-agency traits. The amended legislation signaled a strengthened role
as lead-agency for the Commission in the network, and the Union Mechanism can now be classified as a participant-governed network with more prominent lead-agency traits. The lead-agency traits were evidenced by the Commission being accorded special responsibilities, in 2007 with the administration of the MIC, and CECIS by the Commission, and in 2013, the administration of the ERCC by the Commission.

The network does not appear to have moved to a large extent along the participant/lead-agency dimension, and the network remains somewhere in the middle, with much of the activity, such as the development of guidelines, and works, programs, the exchange of expertise and lessons-learned meeting occurring between the members, with the Commission assuming the role of facilitator, but the Commission is still central to the network in that much information is channeled through the Commission, and the members are supposed to report on their modules and teams for rapid deployment, as well as reporting to the ERCC if an incident appears to be about to occur, as well as coordinate efforts through the ERCC in the operational phase of crisis management.

The Commission is central in that it constitutes an information hub central to network members, and may aid in the process of coordinating interventions, and that it has a central role in the deployment of resources in third countries. The exchange of experts program and its responsibilities for administrative functions would indicate that the network does indeed possess lead-agency traits, but not in the sense that the Commission may dictate the activity network members, and member states are free to opt out of network activity, and the reporting of available teams and assets are voluntary, in that member states are encouraged to provide information, but the Commission does not have the authority to command such actions.

This thesis has investigated the socializing potential of the Union Civil Protection Union Mechanism. At the current stage of its development, the Union Mechanism does not appear to socialize the actors to a large extent. The decision-making dynamic that is most often evoked in decision-making when engaging with other Union Mechanism actors is an intergovernmental dynamic, all other being activated to a lesser degrees. The lack of contradictions between the Union Mechanism intent,
and the desired outcome of Norwegian participation in it suggests that the socializing potential is hard to determine accurately without reference to the specific interests of actors. The network norms and values do not diverge from the norms and values of the Union Mechanism.

The civil servant from the DSB seems to partially activate an epistemic decision-making dynamic, reporting that their role of experts is important, and that their mandate facilitates this role. The emphasis on the mandate being important, in that there are few limits to the possible problems the civil servants may attend to in the framework of the Union Mechanism, and they consider their expertise to be of interest and relevance to Norwegian civil protection efforts. With regards to their role as experts, this becomes apparent in the emphasis on dialogue with the Ministry of Justice and Public security, with civil servants reporting that they in a sense may contribute valuable expertise, and the know-how necessary to attend to some of the more intricate workings of the Union Mechanism, a responsibility they feel is left almost entirely in their hands as far as the options they explore do not go beyond their brief.

Member states appear to be able to agree to only those policies and activities which they find beneficial, and may opt out of the programs which they do not want to participate on. The Commission also recognizes that there should not be any conflicts with regards to already existing bilateral and other agreements between member states in civil protection, and this does appear to strengthen cooperation, as participants do not feel that they forsake sovereignty in favor of solidarity in the Union Mechanism, a notion that may over time encourage the cooperation, as it appears to constitute a wholly positive enterprise for the member states which may take from the cooperation more than they put in, and the sum of the whole does appear to be bigger than the constituent parts.

Findings in relations to previous research
The findings of this thesis can be seen in relations to the EAS literature. As in the EAS literature, this thesis finds modest European-level influences on the perceptions of the role of informants(cf. Trondal & Peters, 2013).
Implications for theory
The findings of this study do not necessarily extend to other agencies interacting with EU-level organizations and actors. This thesis does not support the notion that agencies can be re-coupled towards the European Commission, nor does it discount the possibility of this happening. The Union Mechanism does not appear to constitute an arena that can re-socialize national-level actors at the present. Seconded experts may assume a supranational decision-making dynamic, but with a sample of n=1 any form of analytic generalization is not advisable. This may change with the new legislation if it does, as intended, foster closer cooperation, and a strengthened role for the EU as a civil protection actor.

Practical implications
With regards to practical implications from the study, the focus on Nordic cooperation in civil protection, and the encouragement from the Commission to seek regional solutions to challenges with regards to preparedness may lead to a more prepared Nordic bloc of the Union Mechanism. The exchange of best practices, and the availability of modules tailored to meet the unique requirements of Nordic civil protection may prove beneficial in the event of a crisis.

That Union Mechanism members pool their resources may over time lead to more efficient civil protection efforts, because the members do not need to possess all necessary resources individually, and may come to rely upon the rapid deployment of relevant modules in case of an incident. As such, member states which may not possess the necessary resources themselves may also strengthen their civil protection systems by appealing to the Union Mechanism in the event of incidents, and the civil protection capabilities for the EU as a whole appears strengthened through the efforts of the Union Mechanism.

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**Public Documents and web pages**

Appendix 1 Interview Guide

Intervjuguide

Introduksjon

- Hva heter du?
- Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt ved DSB?
- Hva er din rolle ved DSB?
- Hvor lenge har du hatt oppgaver tilknyttet samordningsmekanismen?
- Hvilken utdannelse har du?
  +fleire spm til å "sette an tonen"

DSB, JD, Nettverk og Kommisjonen

Samarbeidet

- Er dette arbeidet underlagt retningslinjer fra Kommisjonen?
- (Hvis ja, be om utdypning, hvis ikke, følge opp om det er forventninger i mer bred forstand til arbeidet, eller ønsker om å trekke arbeidet i en retning.)
- Deltar du i andre nettverk på EU-nivå som arbeider med problemstillinger knyttet til ditt fagfelt eller ansvarsområde?

https://http://www.regjeringen.no/link/c553f3e84cb0474bb20fb1b64a334601.aspx?id=2306217.
• Hvor ofte har du kontakt med nettverket? hvor mye tid går med på dette, møter, reiser, etc? Hva jobber nettverket med? Hvilke mål skal nås?
• Hvordan kan et typisk møte med Kommisjonen beskrives, her kan der være flere aktører, echo, byråer etc., hvem er det man har mest interaksjon med.
• Hvilke mandat har dere i møter i tilknytning samordningsmekanismen?
• Mer spesifikt knyttet til Echo, og samordningsmekanismen; hva preger samarbeidet mellom dere og dem?
• Har du kontakt med Kommisjonsansatte per telefon eller mail i noen grad?
• Hvor ofte har dere møter? Hvor ofte må du reise? Tid som går med til dette
• Deltar du i møter for policy for samordningsmekanismen som Civil Protection Committee?
• Hva går eventuell kontakt ut på? Er det et fokus på felles utfordringer, samarbeid, gode løsninger etc.
• Er det utfordringer knyttet til at EU ikke har et eget samfunns sikkerhetsbyrå, slik som DSB, men at oppgavene er fordelt mellom DG ECHO, og flere andre byråer?
• Får dette noen konsekvens for interaksjon med aktører på internasjonalt nivå?
• Utveksles det erfaringer eller "best practices" med tilsvarende direktorater i andre land? For eksempel DSB sitt "søsterdirektorat" i Sverige?
• Opplever du at det finnes et faglig felleskap rundt utfordringer du kan møte i ditt arbeide? Utveksles det erfaringer med andre fagfolk på eu-nivå? Er det andre aktører som er viktige i forbindelse med utveksling av ideer eller erfaringer?
• I møtet med andre aktører i internasjonale fora, stiller du med instrukser om hva du er forventet å gjøre, hvordan norske interesser skal promoters etc?
• Er det krav om rapportering i etterkant av utvekslinger av informasjon, møter, konferanser etc. med andre, internasjonale aktører?

• Oppstår det noen gang konflikter mellom aktører som har interesser av at anvendelse av lovverk gjennomføres på en spesifikk måte? For eksempel mellom JD og nettverk, eller JD og Samordningsmekanismen?
• Er det i slike tilfeller som dette, en dem sine hensyn som veier tyngst? Gjøres det forsøk på å ivareta flere interesser samtidig? Står det faglige sterkt, altså kan det oppstå konflikter hvor faglige vurderinger kanskje tilsier at nettverket sitt forslag kan virke bedre enn JD eller kommisjonen sitt?

Om internasjonalisering
• Har det vært tiltagende fokus på internasjonalisering?
• Har dette endret seg over tid? Blir det øket fokus på EU-deltakelse?
• Hvordan vil du beskrive denne utviklingen; er det i hovedsak norske interesser som skal ivaretas og hevdes, eller jobber man mer internasjonalt, og deler felles interesser?
• Utvikles det et slags felleskap med andre aktører som møter like utfordringer?
• Har det vært økende press fra EU-hold, eller er det i hovedsak frivillighet og fordeler ved deltakelse det appelleres til?
• Opple ver du at Norske interesser blir godt ivaretatt i møtet med EU i forhold til samfunnsikkerhetsarbeidet?
• Opple ves samarbeidet som fruktbart?
• Norge står litt i en særstilling ovenfor EU, merkes det i ditt arbeid eller dine møter med aktører på internasjonalt nivå at Norge ikke er et medlemsland?