The Politics of Housing Delivery: A Comparative Study of Administrative Behaviour in South Africa and Zimbabwe

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Bergen, May 2005
# Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 2  
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 7  

## PART 1 .......................................................................................................................... 9  
### Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................... 9  
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 9  
The Nature of Service Delivery in Africa .............................................................................. 11  
Giving or Aiding? State Provision of Housing .................................................................... 13  
Comparative Analysis in Transitioning Societies ................................................................. 19  
Why Compare Harare and Cape Town? .............................................................................. 24  
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 28  
The Data Collection Process ............................................................................................... 28  
Gender and Research in a Divided Society ......................................................................... 31  
Structure of the Thesis ......................................................................................................... 33  

### Chapter 2 .................................................................................................................... 40  
Towards A Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................... 40  
The Process of Service Delivery .......................................................................................... 41  
Leadership and the Bureaucracy in Service Delivery .......................................................... 43  
Neo-patrimonial Bureaucracies ............................................................................................ 45  
Critique of the Neo-patrimonial Theory .............................................................................. 47  
The Analytic Framework ...................................................................................................... 51  
Addressing Causation ......................................................................................................... 52  
‘Liberation culture’ ............................................................................................................. 52  
‘Liberation logistics’ ............................................................................................................ 56  
Africanisation ....................................................................................................................... 57  
State autonomy .................................................................................................................... 58  
Civic organisation ............................................................................................................... 60  
Combined Influence-High and Low Intensity ..................................................................... 61  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 62  

## PART II .......................................................................................................................... 65  
### Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................... 65  
Housing Delivery in Colonial Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) .......................................................... 65  
The Colonial State .............................................................................................................. 65  
The Colonial Religion ......................................................................................................... 68  
The Development of African Housing ................................................................................. 71  
Analysis of the Colonial Housing Delivery Practices ......................................................... 77  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 79
## Chapter 8

Collective Action for Accessing Housing Resources ................................................................. 182
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 182
The Homeless People’s Federation .............................................................................................. 182
Capacity Building—Technical Support and Resource Substitution ........................................... 184
Utshani Fund ............................................................................................................................... 191
The Victoria Mxenge Housing Savings Scheme .......................................................................... 196
Gender Power Struggles .............................................................................................................. 201
Silver City Housing Project ......................................................................................................... 203
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 206

## Part IV

Chapter 9 ...................................................................................................................................... 210
Comparing Regimes ...................................................................................................................... 210
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 210
The Significance of Names .......................................................................................................... 211
The Effect of Time on the Comparison ...................................................................................... 211
The Concept of a House .............................................................................................................. 212
The “Liberation culture” and Housing Distribution: Capturing Similarities and Differences ................ 213
Liberation Logistics ....................................................................................................................... 215
The Effects of Africanisation ....................................................................................................... 216
State Autonomy ............................................................................................................................ 218
Civic Groups: The Quest for Autonomy or State Resources? ...................................................... 219
Intensity of the “Liberation culture” .......................................................................................... 222
Other Key Factors ....................................................................................................................... 225
Continuities and Discontinuities—the Legal and Institutional Framework ................................. 225
Trust Relations ............................................................................................................................ 230
Liberationist Citizenship .............................................................................................................. 232
Benefits of ‘Active’ Citizenship ................................................................................................... 232
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 235

Chapter 10 ..................................................................................................................................... 238
Conclusion: Revisiting the “Liberation culture” .......................................................................... 238
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 238
Impact of the Findings on Studying Service Delivery ................................................................. 241
Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Liberation culture” Theory .................................................. 244

## APPENDICES

Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................... 247
Appendix 2 .................................................................................................................................... 248
Appendix 3 .................................................................................................................................... 249
Appendix 4 .................................................................................................................................... 250
Appendix 5 .................................................................................................................................... 251
Figures

Figure 1 Direct interface between service provider and client........................................ 42
Figure 2 Service delivery process in a housing unit...................................................... 42
Figure 3 Processing an Application.............................................................................. 96

Tables

Table 1 The Capital Subsidy Scheme............................................................................. 160
Table 2 Provincial Housing Directorate Gender and Racial Make-up......................... 167
Table 3 Federation Membership December 1999...................................................... 193
Table 4 Victoria Mxenge Committees ....................................................................... 197
Table 5 Summary of the Comparison......................................................................... 213
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAB</td>
<td>Bantu Advisory Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAAB</td>
<td>Bantu Affairs Administration Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCC</td>
<td>Cape Town City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTMC</td>
<td>Cape Town Metropolitan Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHB</td>
<td>Central Housing Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South Africa’s Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHCS</td>
<td>Department of Housing and Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Development Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>Department of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAD</td>
<td>Hostel Dwellers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPZ</td>
<td>Housing People of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Housing Savings Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDT</td>
<td>Independent Development Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKHC</td>
<td>Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>Mass Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Member of the Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLGRUD</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNAECC</td>
<td>Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPH</td>
<td>Ministry of Construction and Public Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHB</td>
<td>National Housing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>National Housing Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>New Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDF</td>
<td>National Slum Dwellers’ Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAB</td>
<td>Peninsula Administration Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>People’s Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHB</td>
<td>Provincial Housing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>People’s Housing Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAHPF</td>
<td>South Africa Homeless People’s Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South Africa National Civic Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPARC</td>
<td>Society for the Protection of Area Resource Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
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ZCTU  Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZHPF  Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation
PART 1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Housing and land distribution are contested issues in Africa partly because of the uneven distribution of resources dating back to the colonial era. A century later and years after decolonisation, it is now a question of efficient and effective housing land delivery, the working of the state and its administrative apparatus. Service provision in Africa, though fraught with many problems, is structured on the basis of formalised rules and regulations as in developed countries. This thesis addresses the question of how housing delivery takes place in different political regimes. The fundamental objective is to understand who gets housing when, how and why in post liberation war countries through a comparative approach involving two case studies of two housing regimes in two urban settings: Harare Municipality in Zimbabwe and the Cape Town Metropolitan Council (CTMC) in the Western Cape Province in South Africa. Central to this process is the identification of key factors that help in explaining how housing delivery takes place in these political regimes.

The colonial legacy, coupled with the new values adopted by the liberating regimes, has had a profound effect on the administrative systems that evolved in most of Africa. Most liberators in Africa openly aligned themselves with the Marxist-Leninist ideology and this strongly influenced state organisations that later emerged when these countries attained their independence. Whilst Migdal (1987) acknowledges that it is possible to come up with typologies of administrative systems in developing countries, he encounters limitations in doing so because what he terms peasant traditional culture dominates the populations of these countries and this complicates the task of comprehending administrative behaviour.¹ However, this argument fails to take into account the highly bureaucratised set up of all African governments, and restricting the scrutiny to structural and cultural analysis without taking cognisance of the historical evolution of these states cripples the debate.
The study does not claim to be the first to explain service delivery (Blau 1963; Lipsky 1980; Bleklie 1996) but it makes further strides in analysing the impact of liberation wars on service delivery in post-colonial societies. Literature on administrative behaviour has argued that African states are neo-patrimonial states that largely serve the ego of the ruling elite and several distributional systems have been studied using this approach (Callaghy 1984; Sandbrook 1985; Joseph 1987; Medard 1991; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Most of the literature in the field has sought to explain why bureaucracies in Africa do not work efficiently and most answers recognise African tradition as a strong influential variable (Hyden 1983; Moyo 1991). Within these explanations, the influence of the governing experience in exile that was generated by the liberation wars has not been paid attention. The central theme of this study is thus to critically analyse the nature of service delivery in post-liberation war states in Africa, that is, what informs on these public officials’ action orientations?

The issues considered in the study are: a critical analysis of the role played by what I call the ‘liberation culture’ in the decision-making process in housing resource allocation. The ‘liberation culture’ manifests itself as a distinct type of organisational culture that gives rise to administrative behaviour that is essentially party driven. The ‘liberation organisational culture’ delivers its services selectively to segments of the polity that identify with the prevailing political leadership’s ideology. It defines who its clients are in the population according to their political affiliation above all other identities (see elaborated definition in chapter two). Its role is viewed partly through an analysis of the relationship amongst housing delivery organisations (agents), the political leadership, and the clients (the house seekers). Such an analysis demands answers to the following questions: How does this relationship define the citizens in each country? Which identities get prominence in accessing public services and how are these developed? Who gets defined in this way? And what conceptions of citizenship are implied in these resource allocation processes?

This chapter introduces the background on housing service delivery and discusses some of the approaches used in housing delivery in developing countries. It also discusses the
rationale for comparing the two cities, Harare in Zimbabwe and Cape Town in South Africa as well as the methodology used in this study. Finally, it lays out the structure of the thesis. The central aim of this study is therefore to analyse and explain how the ‘liberation culture’ influences housing distribution in post-liberation war states. To do this implies first developing the ‘liberation culture’ theory from its origins and identifying its constituent elements that are based on four variables: ‘liberation logistics’, state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation. At the empirical level, this involves analysing the impact of the ‘liberation culture’ on housing distribution.

The Nature of Service Delivery in Africa

Service delivery has long been recognised as the centre of control and steering for the public servants who ultimately allocate the resources (Lipsky 1980; Bleklie 1996) but in developing countries, these services are largely delivered by partisan political systems. Lemarchand (1988:151) describes these political systems as short lived since they rely on a *quid pro quo* for votes. In the classical bureaucracy, Self (1972) and Peters (1984) explain this process as being dominated by the career conflict between the official actors and the public servants. The locus of this conflict is in the organisationally based careers of public servants and in the partisan orientations of politicians (Barlow 1984). Thus for the public servants to act their part in service delivery, they have to constantly play politics (Gautam 1993:113). The conflict extends further to clients as they increasingly feel alienated in the resource allocation process. Barlow (1984) points out that many African states are trapped in obsolete law and order rather than development oriented structures. They have public servants that are domineering rather than service oriented and they use coercive rather than persuasive rhetoric. How then does service delivery take place in law and order administrative systems?

Service delivery in post colonial regimes has taken different forms which all have a common manifestation of inequity and unfairness. For instance, there has been a perpetuation of skewing general services (e.g. health and education) in favour of urban areas. The historical background, the nature of the political system and the mode of governance determine to a large extent, the way housing resources are distributed in these
transitioning societies that also have the unenviable task of redressing historical imbalances and they perpetually claim to do so. Some of the postcolonial countries came about as a result of violent struggles that were fought in exile where a new and different type of organisational culture, the ‘liberation culture’, emerged. I am arguing that the ‘liberation culture’ orients service delivery in favour of party loyalists. This culture was a fusion of the military nature of the liberators (political parties) fighting the war and the service delivery structures (military organs) that handled the logistical arrangements for the exiles. These exile time structures later transformed themselves in order to deliver services democratically in the new political dispensation. It therefore becomes important to ask, How does service delivery take place against such backgrounds and what influences the decision-making processes?

This fete can partly be accomplished through a critical analysis of the evolution of this ‘liberation culture’ (which has its roots in the liberation struggles) and its infusion into the normal bureaucratic ranks involved in the housing delivery process. Thus the political and administrative history of the service delivery structures in the post liberation war post-colonial societies are an important part of the study for as Shaw and Martin (2000) point out, understanding the causes of the disadvantaged requires analysis of both agency and structure. “Liberation culture” alone does not inform on the housing/service delivery process in Zimbabwe and South Africa as the process of delivery takes place in the face of several constraints amongst them endemic poverty, lack of land in urban areas, uncontrolled inflation and increasing prices and the lack of good leadership in most government organizations. There are many other factors that require analytic scrutiny but the ‘liberation culture” does appear to have an upper hand in that policy considerations that have to do with redistributive justice are more or less always tied to the suffering people experienced under colonial regimes and during the liberation wars. The aim is therefore partly to explain the contribution of the ‘liberation culture” to the erratic housing service delivery patterns in the two countries.
Giving or Aiding? State Provision of Housing

The last decade has seen developing countries embrace the notion of housing provision as an industry\(^7\) that has local linkages and a massive potential for generating income for the owners.\(^8\) This is substantiated by the paradigmatic shift from perceiving a house as a product of economic development to tie in with the reality in developing countries of a house as part \((tool)\) and parcel \((benefit)\) of economic development. In all African countries, a greater part of the economies\(^9\) run informally with private houses serving as operational bases in one form or another for the diverse informal economic activities of the occupants. What a house is has thus clearly not remained static over time and space. First of all, it still provides not just shelter but security. However, this security is also in the form of wealth that creates opportunities for income generation through informal trading and lodging.\(^10\) Low-income groups in particular regard housing as an investment for old age as well as the assured future accommodation of children and their families (Rakodi and Withers 1995:381; Miles 2001). It is an asset on which they can rely on when other sources of income are inadequate or non-existent (Miles 2001). For women in particular, it aides in reducing their vulnerability by making them urban residents who can create and extend avenues of accessing social capital.\(^11\) This locates housing at the crossroads of employment creation in two ways, providing the house itself \((infrastructural\, provision)\) which in turn provides space for economic activities. An urban based house has therefore evolved into a status symbol that gives a sense of belonging and worth that also facilitates access to other state resources.

This perspective has led to a general shift from the commodification of a house to recognizing its value as a lifetime “project” that serves future generations. The result is less emphasis on the resale value of a house during the construction phase (Smit 1995). For the low income categories, this fits in with the traditional concept of “housing as a process which starts from a minimum package and grows overtime, under the user's control and within their means” (Uche 1999:183). There is therefore a commitment by the poor to sacrifice their meager resources in order to get a house in this approach. On the other hand, the commodification of housing emphasises the exchange value of the house and (artificial) standards are upheld to maintain and increase the resale value as with middle
and high-income categories. Consequently, a house is perceived as something that has to be finished according to specific standards before it can be used (ibid:183). This puts housing out of reach for the poor and the scarcity of essential services in general in Africa has forced the poor to look inward into their communities for solutions to their problems.\(^{12}\)

Housing provision has been politicised in modern societies and even more so in developing countries as it is recognised as a basic and social good,\(^ {13}\) a human right and more importantly, as a political good\(^ {14}\) in itself. Governments are thus always involved though this varies from direct to indirect involvement. And even though institutionalised rules and regulations standardise the housing programmes, housing processes are open to various influences amongst them general market tends, the policy environment as well as design and construction (Rakodi and Withers 1995:371). Uche (1999:178) has criticized the tendency by many governments in the developing world to introduce housing policies without adequate knowledge of the nature, scope and dimensions of the housing problems in their urban and rural areas. For instance, evidence from much of South Africa shows the unsustainability of public housing delivery due to high delivery costs and that this would only benefit a limited target group (Smit 1995). Where capacity is low and political contestation is difficult, housing resources are always the most affected as governments openly go round in circles discussing housing problems without providing workable solutions. And in situations where ruling elites have to house themselves and their ‘others’ first, the problem is exacerbated by the corresponding stifling red tape that inevitably pushes up the costs of organising to access housing resources. Previously, the lack of a house disenfranchised people in post colonial urban settings but this has ceased to be so as elections in these areas are no longer determined by one’s rate paying status.\(^ {15}\) Still, social and economic marginalisation occurs in the types of resources the poor can access. For as Holton and Turner (1989) pointed out in their classical study on race, community and conflict, the allocation of housing represents a major determinant of life chances.

The state has traditionally been viewed as having two main options in housing provision for the poor. One is welfarism, where it actually provides the houses itself and the other is the support approach, which is when it supports the popular self-housing provision efforts.
The welfare approach views all social services as ‘social goods’ resulting in a top-down non-participatory system of provision that tends to treat all home seekers as a homogeneous group (Smit 1995). The engineering techniques utilised in the latter approach have resulted in poor quality housing in developing countries and have further stratified society and until recently, it was the only option for the lowest urban based income groups (ibid). In this approach, the state perceives its role as that of balancing and stabilizing people’s lives by intervening in both civil society and in the operations of the markets.

Though the intervention is justified as being based on the principles of social rights, social justice, social equality and redistribution, Kenny (2002:289), criticizes welfarism as a one sided approach to solving problems as professionals only get to define and determine intervention strategies for the poors’ needs they would have articulated. Her argument is that the needy are reduced to subjects who are screened for specific solutions. The paternalistic authority relations implicit in the approach eventually undermine active citizenship, as professionals only get to speak and act on behalf of the welfare recipients. One of the main criticisms against welfarism is that it does not empower people to look inward in terms of problem identification and trying out solutions. The second one is that it fragments societies as it views the individual as the root of the problem. As Kenny points out, the solution to improve the individual without paying due attention to the societal structure is doomed to fail (ibid:289). And lastly, the approach constricts political space as the opportunity to engage and debate problems is curtailed. Most of its energy is spent on drawing boundaries on who qualifies for state aid and who does not.

The support approach, a response to the failures of welfarism, urges the state to facilitate and aid community-based initiatives (Smit 1995:28). And community self-help approaches are partly a counter to the failed welfarism attempted at independence by the various African states. Some analysts have perceived them as a reaction by the local level to the sense of loss of economic control at the national level (Craig et al 2000:326). In this approach, the state, in addition to providing most of the infrastructure and services, prescribes laws defining the parameters on what individuals and communities can do, and
most importantly, it ensures access to affordable well located land and technical assistance even though the major role of constructing the house falls on the end-users (Smit 1995:28). The approach has been tried successfully in Sri Lanka in the Million Houses Programme but it is not without its demerits. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe are currently trying this approach with the poor. As this study shows later, states very often fail to respond appropriately to community initiatives (that is, social capital at work) and neither do they have the institutional capacity to manage the communication processes that determine the success or failure of participatory projects. Smit (1995) locates the problematic of the support approach on its core reliance on the social capital found within specific communities and yet its success also depends on a host of other factors such as technical skills, financial saving potential and community cohesiveness.

A third approach, the market approach, preferred by the World Bank, does not address the housing needs of poor communities since this is a profit driven exercise. All the housing development projects are expected to benefit contractors who establish the physical structures. For instance, in South Africa, private contractors do not find it profitable to build houses for less than 20 000 rands and this excludes at least 65 percent of the population (Smit 1995:29). In Zimbabwe, only a small pre-determined low-income category qualified for houses under the market approach (Rakodi and Withers, 1995). The poor did not stand a chance with housing where minimum wages determined access. Also under this market housing provision, the contractual obligations, especially those requiring collateral, exclude many aspiring house-seekers as the process is cumbersome and often humiliating. With its emphasis on individualism and instrumentalism, the market approach structures social relations differently in societies (Kenny 2002: 294).

Much of the current dominant discourse on housing delivery in developing countries has been shaped by Habitat International’s ideals. The activist approach favoured by the institution has carved itself a niche and woven its strategies around the support approach. The activist framework advocates structural or collective solutions to vulnerabilities triggered by marginalisation, social justice and inequality (ibid:287). Kenny (2002:292)
points to the space occupied by this activist arena as extending beyond the realm of politics, governments, political parties and experts:

It defines politics as a process which stretches from the level of micro politics such as the daily experience of ordinary life, to wider questions of resource allocation and the self determination of communities.

She gives the activist approach credit for offering a global platform where housing interests and community development of the poor can be articulated. Within the approach, community organizations organize around the discourse of affinity, compassion, trust, cohesion and social mobility. It also feeds into the rights-based approaches that also falls within the enabling approach that advocates a supportive regulatory framework. Power (2003) notes its embodiment of key concepts such as partnerships and decentralization which refer to the contributions of all actors (public, private and community) that spell out the rights and entitlements which the poor can get from the state. The state’s role and responsibilities towards the citizens are defined directly or indirectly which implies using other facilitating agents to realize human rights through housing rights. This implies the presence of a transparent communication process and space for citizens to express their demands. Within the approach, there is a general assumption that the poor require solidarity networks and collective representativeness to achieve their goals and more importantly, to guard against encroachments by other groups -boundary establishment-(Conway et al 2002). Participation by the poor in particular, is thus secured and underpinned by a commitment to mutuality, and political mobilization provides a way of giving organized expression to solidarity, advocacy and self-determination as well as seeking to alleviate suffering through the deliberate establishment of patronage ties (Kenny 2002:291). However because of this tactic, the strategy builds in contradictions into the task of creating confident citizens.

Kenny (2002:291) applauds the social change that occurs in communities built as a result of the activist approach. This occurs at three levels with structural change as the first one. Here political and alternative mobilisation strategies provide the material resources and decision-making processes that define the house-seekers’ self-determination. The second change occurs at the ideational level whereby participants embrace the value of the
synergy created by interdependence and the corresponding values of mutuality, reciprocity and compassion. The last change takes place at a technical level where they apply knowledge in mapping out their problems and ultimately develop the craft competence to propose workable solutions and implement blue prints. Even in the presence of evidentiary support for the activist approach, some skeptics have cynically recommended that community development “shouldn’t be taken too seriously” (Jackson 2001, cited in Martin and Shaw 2000:405). However, community development has scored some successes in establishing social cohesion through the self-provision of services such that many international agencies have utilized this avenue to reach marginalized communities.

An integrated approach, inclusive of the support/activist, welfarist and market, is probably the best solution for recognising heterogeneity within society as it is a holistic approach on all development related issues and above all, it emphasizes social inclusion (Majale 2004). In this approach, housing is provided at three levels: the national level, the local government level and the grassroots-community level through a combination of the various approaches discussed earlier. Variations in the roles each level plays are found in different countries and these are to a large extent, determined by the historical background of housing delivery in that country. For instance, in the absence of strong local government as in South Africa before 1994, the national government usually took the responsibility for delivery with the local government level providing support services only. This study analyses housing delivery through the activist/support approach as it recognises the role of communities in the self-provision of housing and creates opportunities for them to be partners in the development process. The approach requires that the poor be organised into groups in order to access housing resources and this is one of the reasons why the study focuses on housing delivery to housing cooperatives in both Harare and Cape Town. It also gives an understanding of how social capital amongst the poor can increase its worth and how local knowledge can be utilised when engaging with the state.
Comparative Analysis in Transitioning Societies

“Comparability is not an inherent characteristic of every given series of objects. It is rather a quality which is attributed by the point of view of the observer.” (Rustow cited in Doggan and Pelassy 1990:152).

Many studies on African political regimes have generally used wholesale explanations that presumed the phenomena under study to be a generic feature of every regime. Concepts explaining bureaucratic behaviour such as neo-patrimonialism and authoritarianism are often applied indiscriminately to all African bureaucracies without detailed attempts to account for the historical differences contributing to such perceptions and generalisations. Such homogenising concepts that do not capture diversity, have partly led to the failure to prescribe relevant solutions for the perceived development crisis in Africa. To avoid this, Ragin (2000:5) advocates looking for heterogeneity rather than homogeneity between and amongst the cases as this enhances the dialogue between ideas and evidence. However, framing operational concepts large enough to encompass slightly differing situations remains a challenge in the comparative exercise (Doggan and Pelassy 1990).

The comparative approach enhances the understanding of the historical processes underlying the public officials’ action orientations and the institutional struggles involved in the resource allocation processes between the two case studies, the housing regime in Harare in Zimbabwe and Cape Town in the Western Cape province in South Africa and the two are further compared to the neo-patrimonial bureaucratic theory which has been in vogue for some time in explaining resource allocation in African regimes. As with most comparativists who do qualitative analysis, the aim is also to develop theory in order to contribute to interpretations on organisational culture and administrative behaviour in Africa (Ragin 1987:11).

The comparative framework for the study emanates from the attempt to contribute to the development of a theory of organisational culture and its effects on administrative behaviour in the allocation of state housing resources in environments where new values, norms and new knowledge emanating from the experiences of the liberation wars operate. During the war, another comrade’s life, needs and survival all depended on the next
comrade. Hence trust was crucial as a comrade was expected to sacrifice everything for another comrade and ultimately, for the struggle. However, some of the practices inculcated a habit of sanctioning unethical behaviour, a norm that later became difficult to drop. For instance, if a comrade ‘organised’ illegally to acquire something that was not available in the camp (e.g. soap, sugar and meat), and was not caught- then it was acceptable to do wrong things as it demonstrated a certain capacity in outwitting the system. Common statements like ‘Longa (ronga) wakachenjera’ - meaning ‘organise for what you need, just don’t get caught’ - became part of the war lingo and this was perceived as demonstrating exceptional organisational skills (in the negative sense).28 Likewise, many ethically wrong acts that supported the cause of the struggle were equally sanctioned. The struggle was clearly supreme irrespective of the repercussions. These patterns were internalised by a generation of people who were involved in the war as fighters, refugees and villagers.

The specification, liberation wars in postcolonial states, delimits the boundary of the study. Liberation wars were part of the anti-colonial/liberation struggles that took place all over the African continent in the second half of the 20th century. They are different from the liberation struggles in that they included a violent war and the notion of a government in waiting in exile. New knowledge emerged partly as a result of the governing experience in exile and the internal struggles to dismantle colonialism. The study details how the new logic, the “liberation culture”, influences allocative decisions in the allocation of land for housing and how it shapes the identities that facilitate access to housing resources.29 The analytic framework therefore centres on the intersection of several concepts: ‘liberation logistics’, state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation. These concepts are linked to the “liberation culture” concept in that they combine differently to define its quality and intensity in the different countries and the mode of organisation to access this resource generates additional explanatory concepts, political identity and ‘liberationist citizenship’ that are also part of the outcome of the resource allocation process. I argue that the “liberation culture” has an exclusivist orientation in service delivery and that it engenders the formation of new political identities and constructs a new conception of citizenship through the allocation of housing resources.30 I endeavour to demonstrate how this
perception was shaped through a comparative approach that is heavily influenced by Charles Ragin (1987) in his book, The Comparative Method.

A comparison of the two countries raises critical questions: How does one develop a comparative framework for countries that differ on a number, if not on almost all the variables? And how does one move from within-comparison to between comparison\(^3\) when one country has had over twenty years to shape the bureaucracy and the other has only had just over eight years? This time difference implies the use of extreme caution in doing the comparison itself as within variation may sometimes be greater than between variation (Oyen 1990:7; Sheuch 1990:30) but the time dimension here would indicate that even between variation may be great.\(^3\) Within variation here refers to the two time periods in each country as well as similarities and differences in how different organisations access housing resources. Between variation refers to the comparison between the two countries across all the dimensions. And an important question (initially posed by Ragin 1992) is, What is this study a case of? At the macro level, it is a case of the ‘liberation culture’ in two countries but administrative behaviour is found within organisational settings and this denotes another layer of what the case is. Units of observation are implied in the framing of concepts used in this study and they are the national system and the organisational (also called the group levels in this study) since the service seekers under scrutiny are organised as groups around the resource they seek.

African countries all attained their independence through nationalist struggles marked by differences pertaining to each’s specific situation. After the power hand-over, political organisation differed widely as did the regime changes that occurred later on. Such events require capturing the uniqueness of each country as the same causes never produce the same results because they could never be combined in the same way (Doggan and Pelassy 1990; Ragin 1987). It is this combinatorial causation that demands the use of the comparative approach as it is better equipped to address heterogeneity in a non-reductionist way. More importantly, as Ragin emphasizes, it incorporates historical analysis, a key strategy in addressing diversity which acknowledges that historical facts emerge from a combination of factors that is unique. Doggan and Pelassy (1990:127) concur that making
use of the historical method enables finding out the uniqueness of each nation. The historical approach thus makes it possible to address the question; Could there be unique system specific variables that would lead to predictions of different outcomes for the two countries?

Macridis (cited in Doggan and Pelassy 1990:151) provides a comprehensive explanation of what comparing achieves:

Comparison involves abstractions, concrete situations or processes can never be compared as such. Every phenomenon is unique, every manifestation is unique, every process, every nation like every individual is in a sense, unique. To compare them means to select certain types or concepts, and in so doing we have to distort the unique and the concrete.

Macridis’s perception encapsulates the entire research process in that it caters for the movement between theory and the empirical. Moreover it stresses that comparison is both a subjective and an objective exercise meaning that in studying one phenomenon, no two researchers are likely to study the same processes in the same way even though they may apply similar concepts. Bendix (cited in Skocpol 1984:370) captured the essence of comparing best when he pointed out that comparative analysis;

increases the visibility of one structure by contrasting it with another…. By means of comparative analysis… I want to preserve a sense of historical particularity as far as I can, while still comparing different countries. Rather than aim at broader generalisations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at least similar questions of divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers.

Many comparative studies proceed along the approach advocated by Mill’s (1967 [1843]) ‘method of agreement’, which makes it possible for comparative historical analysis to identify cases that share the phenomenon to be explained. The hypothesised causal factors are present in the cases even though variation in other elements that have alternative hypotheses can also be present. The other approach, ‘the method of difference’ allows comparative historical analysis to contrast cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesised causes are present to other cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are absent even though these negative cases are as similar as possible to the positive cases in other respects. A combination of the two approaches is also popular as juxtaposing
positive cases alongside negative ones highlights the contrasts.\(^{33}\) However both approaches appear to favour multi-case studies as opposed to binary comparison. The latter also gives more room for innovation and swiftness in movement from one level to another during the analysis.

This study proceeds by way of establishing concepts that capture the particular features of each case and the case patterns are then contrasted. As Skocpol (1984) argues, this calls for the use of explicit concepts to define topical concerns thus guiding the selection and presentation of patterns from the cases. Comparison here also sharpens particularistic descriptions as opposed to merely exploring causal generalities. Housing delivery and the influence of the ‘liberation culture’ is compared between the two countries, Zimbabwe and South Africa and then it is also compared at a theoretical level to the neo-patrimonial model, the negative case in this study as it does not have ‘liberation culture’ manifestations. The use of the two-country comparison is to emphasise similarities and contrasts in the distributional processes. This takes place in two stages, first distinguishing the operational networks in each model and then analysing the distributional patterns of each model.

In the ‘liberation culture’, the ruling party’s network shapes, prioritises and determines who gets state resources. The party network, by this I mean the party candidates controlling different networks in society, penetrate the state and act to orient resource allocation in favour of party loyalists. Where ethnic cleavages determine resource allocation, the ‘liberation culture’ would therefore supersede this as it cuts across ethnic lines and affinities even though liberation struggles were very often affected by ethnic factions.\(^{34}\) The attributes of the party network, the distributional pattern that requires individual service seekers to render loyalty to the party and that collectively organised groups must align themselves to the party in order to access some resources, shows a marked contrast to the all embracing neo-patrimonial theory. The concept neo-patrimonial\(^{35}\) state may well be used to explain the distributional patterns in the two cases. In the neo-patrimonial model, the society penetrates the state from below. The beneficiaries of the allocation system are defined by their relationship to the dispenser of
the service, usually the president. The pattern then develops in what I visualise as a 'vacuum cleaner' effect in that it sucks up everyone in some direct loyalty relationship to the next one in the hierarchy. This, however, fails to take into account the power of collectively organised groups. In this study, I use both country cases in the endeavour to explain the party penetration of the state and society.

**Why Compare Harare and Cape Town?**

In order to compare something across systems, it is necessary to be confident that the components and their properties are the same or indicate something equivalent (Sheuch 1990:53). Halevy-Etzioni (1990:118) concurs that comparison aims at analysis of the *genus* and *differentia specifica* of a social system hence minimisation must lie in the comparison of countries in which the cultural contexts surrounding the something to be compared are as similar as possible. I concur with him that comparing wholly identical phenomena makes little sense as do totally dissimilar ones. The interesting range lies in between and what is important is to highlight the contrasts and single out differentiating factors. Halevy-Etzioni recognises the limitations in identifying contexts that are similar hence he proposes placing boundaries around the phenomenon to be compared.

In this study, I draw the boundaries as follows: [a] The two countries in this study are a result of long violent exile-style liberation struggles and wars and [b] The wars all had the same aim but they differed in magnitude and impact and neither was a military victory as negotiations paved the way for the transition to democracy. Zimbabwe’s struggle was rural based and yet peasants were later marginalized in the new political order whereas South Africa’s struggle was waged by the working class and the urban poor. The two groups were less marginalized leaving them with the potential later on to act dynamically on the national political stage (Cronin 2001). The histories and the economies of the two countries developed similarities that were shaped to a large extent by the need to resist the liberation war as well as to attain majority rule. Although their political paths diverged after the attainment of independence, the ruling parties in both countries maintained similar populist ideologies (Nzimande 1994; Phimister 1994). Ideological shifts in Zimbabwe make it essential to note the point of divergence in the organisational cultures that
developed in the post independence bureaucracies as the ‘liberation culture’ prevailed throughout these periods. There was emphasis in the early eighties by the state on collective organisation as a preferred mode of societal development. However, it is important to remember that Zimbabwe’s socialist policies were later affected by the dominant global liberal economic environment.

In adherence to Halevy-Etzioni’s (1990:116) prescriptions, the two cases also allow interesting contrasts along numerous dimensions. This avoids the pitfalls of the most similar systems design as propounded by Mills. Przeworski (1987 cited in Dogan and Kazancigil: 1994) have strongly criticised the approach:

I do not know one single study which has successfully applied Mills cannon of only differences [most similar systems design in the Przeworski-Teune, 1970 terminology] I continue to be persuaded indeed, that the ‘most similar design’ is just a bad idea. The assumption is that we can find a pair (or more) of countries which will differ in all but two characteristics and that we will be able to confirm a hypotheses that \( x \) is a cause of \( y \) under a natural experiment in which \( ceteris paribus \) holds. There are no two countries in the world, however, which differ in only two characteristics and in practice there are always numerous competing hypotheses.

Zimbabwe is a former settler state (1890-1980) whereas South Africa experienced colonisation much earlier (17th century) and more intensely as the Dutch came to consider themselves as indigenous inhabitants. This colonial history has had important implications for both organisational and societal development. There are key similarities stemming from this legacy that have had a significant effect on the development of organisational culture in the postcolonial bureaucracy. For instance, organisational design was largely in favour of delivering services to the white race. Such experiences have significant implications for the present day behaviour of the bureaucracy.

However, important differences do exist and these affect the intensity of the “liberation culture” in each country. For instance, Zimbabwe gravitated towards authoritarianism by choice due to efforts by the ruling elite to consolidate its hegemonic status, and yet it can be argued that South Africa was forced by the political circumstances of a negotiated victory and a commitment to lure foreign investors to remain authoritarian since the
The maintenance of law and order was essential (Nzimande 1994). The countries differ with regard to their levels of economic development that is, their major exports and revenue sources. Zimbabwe’s mainly agrarian economy generates nearly half of its export revenues from cash crops. On the other hand, South Africa has a diversified economy. This financial strength opens up the system and broadens knowledge networks in all areas. Efficient and effective decision-making is thus a sine qua non for keeping the South African economic system in order. The question here is: How does one account for the competence extended to the public service sectors especially when dealing with low-income significantly diverse black groups?

This reference to the economic differences has important implications on two issues; the continuing struggle in both countries over the redistribution of land and the dominance of ownership of this resource by one racial group, the whites. And secondly, the level of organisational skills required to keep each system functional also differs. Africans seeking housing have over the years forced themselves (squatted) on both government and privately owned land in a bid to locate themselves closer to modern resources and other opportunities. How the two governments have responded to this spectre is an issue requiring close analysis as the responses varied. However, since the strongest common denominators for both countries is the history of a liberation struggle and the presence of inherited law and order administrative systems, bureaucratic action would be best analysed in each setting through using the same variables. An important fact is that South Africa shares a similar history and the same socio-political dynamics that are similar to those found elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. On this Mamdani (1996) cautions, “South Africa is not an aberration, but very much part of the experience that has shaped contemporary Africa.”

Horowitz (1985:17) cautions that, "Comparability does not imply perfect identity or even close similarity, but rather a restricted range of differences." Both countries waged long protracted struggles against the white minority regimes, Zimbabwe until 1980 and South Africa until 1994. New values, norms and knowledge shaped by the war experiences can thus be said to be present in both countries after the wartime experiences even though there
were differences in some respects. A major difference was that South Africa’s struggle was trifurcated. First, there was the exile group that accumulated a new governing experience in liberation camps that were scattered in several African countries. Then there was the prison group that was incarcerated mainly on Robben Island and finally, the civic groups that played a crucial role in dismantling apartheid through civic disobedience. Merging the three groups of experiences of these groups required bargaining and compromising on strategies for change thus mediating on any ideological extremism.

Zimbabwe’s war was led by the two separate exile groups in the Mao style of peasant society penetration. Mediating influences were largely absent leaving the knowledge generated through the war process almost intact. By the time South Africa achieved majority rule, the socialist tempo had changed tremendously due to the responses to the globalisation discourse of which respect for human rights and safeguarding property is a main feature. The differences thus imply seeking for continuities and discontinuities within this global realm when analysing policies. Thus for Zimbabwe, its socialist flirtations in the early eighties demanded going back to relate housing policies to the socialist agenda over time and space.

Even though Zimbabwe started off as a multi-party democracy in 1980, it has steadily experienced the erosion of democracy (Sithole 1987). The country is nominally democratic, one party holds a complete monopoly on political power and economic resources and executive authority is rarely challenged. Contestation and participation by opposition movements and civic organisations is severely constrained. South Africa began its independence with a rather precarious transition to democracy. The rift between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ has continued to widen as the inherited bureaucracy has yet to orient itself to the equitable delivery of services. In social services delivery, housing in particular, both countries have fallen in line with the World Bank’s recommendations and have taken what Bond (2000) calls a rather disturbing back seat. However, with governments largely facilitating access to the key resource in housing land, both countries have encouraged low-income earners to organise collectively in order to facilitate access to resources. That South Africa allows civic organisations political space in the decision-
making arena makes it a challenge to explain how the ‘liberation culture’ manifests itself, where the value carriers are located and how it is contained when the political space is open.

Though governance styles in the two countries differ, the two countries were selected because of the need to explain the influence of the liberation war knowledge and experiences on public officials’ behaviour in service delivery. What needs to be underlined is that the countries were selected for specific analytic requirements and not on the basis of their geographical proximity even though important analytic issues tend to present themselves in countries that cluster together in a region (Rustow and Erickson 1991:17).

Methodology

The Data Collection Process

The section presents the research experience, the nature of the data collected and where it was collected from. Asking questions on accessing housing land in two countries where land has been a controversial issue for over a century evoked a lot of concealed emotions in both the researcher and the researched. Dealing with the patronising tendencies of those hanging on to the land and of those speaking on ‘behalf of those needing the land’, unmasked the fears of the speakers more than it helped to explain the frustrations endured by the house seekers. This confirms that many of the assumptions that we make when we plan to do fieldwork turn out to be very much ‘off the mark’ as very often, a different picture emerges.

To understand the dynamics and trajectories in low-income housing provision, I first identify two time periods for the development of African housing; the colonial era and the contemporary majority rule period. Empirically, analysing variability in how the “liberation culture” regimes orient housing provision in favour of party loyalists required delving into all aspects of housing delivery. This ranged from the formulation to the implementation of housing policies [watching out for continuities and discontinuities] across regimes; the arrangement and relationships amongst housing institutions (as well as structures), power relationships and reforms over time; actors in these institutions (that is,
who they are, politically) their attitudes towards transformation and clients or the beneficiaries of housing services. This involved identifying low-income housing schemes from 1994 for South Africa and 1980 for Zimbabwe. Service seekers in developing countries have been increasingly compelled to organise collectively for public services hence housing co-operatives as opposed to individuals were used as the unit of observation even though data was collected from individuals. It was in this regard that I visited the sites and interviewed members of the ‘community’.

Unravelling the complexities of resource allocation in Cape Town kicked off with a document search composed of: [a] Policy documents and official records of the government; [b] Academic reports including commission of enquiries that represent the ad-hoc nature of policy making processes in much of Africa and these provided guidance and clarifications in key policy areas and issues; [c] Literature, both theoretical and practical literature on resource allocation in sub-Saharan Africa and [d] Anecdotal evidence from media reports and official records and evaluation reports of civic organisations. Perusal of these documents formed the basis on which the housing co-operatives were selected. In Cape Town, the Development Action Group (DAG) and People’s Dialogue (PD), the technical wing of the South African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF), were the dominant technical Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in housing delivery assistance and the research started off by scrutinising their work with housing co-operatives and I soon caught hold of some of their ‘success’ stories. Successful in the sense that they had managed to accumulate enough financial resources and secured land for building their houses. Many others were relying on these as ‘role models’ and were still in the formative stages. In Zimbabwe, their equivalents were Dialogue on Shelter, the technical arm of the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF) and the Housing People of Zimbabwe (HPZ).

In both countries, the Homeless People’s Federation organises and mobilises the poor in self-help housing initiatives. The federations are made up of hundreds of autonomous housing co-operatives called Housing Savings Schemes (HSS) that have strong networks that organise for housing resources. The housing savings schemes are vertically linked to
the federation with the latter doing all the lobbying for all the cooperatives at all levels of government and it incorporates the individual co-operatives in organising to get land which is the most difficult resource to access. The dynamics between these co-operatives, the civics and the state are the focus of the analysis as it is in these relations that the ‘liberation culture’ manifests itself. Two cooperatives were selected: One co-operative in each federation was selected for in-depth study in each country, and another co-operative or housing delivery scheme outside the federation was also chosen and analysed to highlight the differences. The SAHPF’s Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme in Phillipi and the DAG’s Salt River City Housing Project in Lost City were chosen for the study in Cape Town. A Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF) housing scheme, Mavambo, and one from those organised by the HPZ, Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative (KKHC), were also part of the study.

The disruption of public service provision to Africans in Cape Town in the early nineties left me unsure of what to expect. Sorting out the complex maze of public institutions tasked with housing delivery proved to be a daunting task as the old apartheid housing delivery institutions for African services still existed on paper albeit with unspecified functions. On the ground, some other institutions had emerged but without resources and specified functions with regard to housing service delivery. After making sense of this and of the burgeoning ‘democratic’ local government structures, I made the decision to focus on the former Cape Town City Council (CTCC now the CTMC). Mainly because it had a large population of the poor African community in need of housing and also most of the former (apartheid) black local authorities fell within its jurisdiction.

The Housing Departments were my focal point and as I was studying the poor’s self-help initiatives in housing provision, it was essential for me to identify officials at the local level in collective housing delivery schemes. In comparison to Harare (Zimbabwe in general), Cape Town (South Africa) is a very research friendly environment (perhaps it is the exhilaration of finally being open to the public?). Public officials readily granted interviews to students as part of the public relations dimension of their jobs and the few that considered themselves too busy would always refer me to some other official at more
or less the same level as themselves. Interviewees were thus selected on the basis of prior information and knowledge I had on the operations of the departments and their roles in the delivery process. This warm reception eased my tension in the initial stages that I went through as I tried to schedule appointments for interviews.

In Zimbabwe, getting access to information from government departments was complicated by heightened suspicions arising from the emergence of a new political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), that posed the first real threat to the ruling party/government since 1980. Cooperative members that had acquired land were uneasy about being interviewed at a time when tensions were high in the townships on who was supporting the new party. The ruling party youth went on a path of terror from February 2000 after the government’s draft constitution was rejected by the public. Interviews with members had to be arranged secretly and they took place in very neutral territory such as the shopping complexes in the suburbs. Bureaucrats were not spared of this terror as they too were on uneasy about who had sent me to do this research. An unexpected question threw me off balance, “Surely, why would the Norwegians want to know about low-income housing in Zimbabwe?” The point was that the statement echoed the mistrust that now characterises public institutions in Zimbabwe. Persuading interviewees to tell their experiences turned into an art and once they were in charge of selecting the venue and the time, cooperative members in particular readily agreed to share their stories.

**Gender and Research in a Divided Society**

That I am a woman and a black person had never caused me problems since joining the academic profession in 1996. My research experience in Cape Town left me more aware of who and what I am. Being patronised was the least of my expectations but my experiences showed the danger female researchers can be subjected to. In at least six of the interviews I held with white male public officials, their first statement after I had introduced myself was, "The first thing you must know is that our blacks are not like you, they are unambitious and do not want to work hard." I had learnt quickly from the first two interviews not to disagree with this but to simply ignore this stated ‘fact’ and hastily change the subject in the direction of my enquiry. The effect of this stereotyping directed
me to focus more on the way the housing plight of the low-income community was perceived by the bureaucrats who were mostly white. Their dismissive gestures and the unsympathetic (prejudicial) words conveyed a lot to me that I had not anticipated. It therefore made sense for me to listen to their stories, anecdotes and experiences in their seemingly ‘half-hearted’ attempts to deliver housing to the poor.

However, in a period of three months, I conducted twenty-three formal interviews in Cape Town that averaged two and half-hours each. Initially, a questionnaire was used as a way of focusing the discussion, but during the very first interview, the benefits in allowing my respondents to tell the ‘housing story’ as they had experienced it became evident. In this way, more information than originally expected just poured out. The bureaucrats portrayed images of a betrayed group that was struggling to maintain its dignity in the face of the challenges confronting it. On the other hand, the service seekers were determined to win at whatever cost. The determination was clear in their voices and actions. I could not help but empathise with them as I listened to their stories of their never-ending struggle for the restoration of dignity their generation had not experienced. As I toured their new communities and went inside some of the houses, the enormity of their task overwhelmed me since the houses were just completed shells on the outside, with all the interior work yet to be done four years after the building process had started. Even though, I had sensed the uneasiness in the beginning when I had first explained my nationality during the introduction. Their main fear was that the South African government was sponsoring my studies (at their expense) and once I had shown proof of where I was studying and the name of the sponsor, they became very friendly and cooperative. All the bureaucrats I interviewed were also very interested in knowing the sponsor for my studies.

The most puzzling aspect of this interviewing process was the distorted truth or simply ‘misrepresentations’ told by both the public officials and the housing co-operative leaders. As I went through the process of backing up the interview data with documentary evidence, I quickly realised that both parties, the bureaucrats and the cooperative members, had yet to learn the value of truth telling during interviews. The question was why? My interpretation was that the bureaucrats lied to justify their prejudices that the African
community was simply a migrant group with homes elsewhere\textsuperscript{47} and the co-operative leaders were equally keen to disassociate their political affiliation from their struggle for housing resources. The cooperatives’ leadership clearly wanted more disadvantaged voices on their side as the Western Cape provincial government was the only province that remained in the former apartheid hands and the ANC was in a campaign mood to win over the provincial leadership. It was therefore essential for them to mobilise their fellow disadvantaged, mostly African, communities. Politicians were the only group that admitted that civic group leaders in the cooperatives had knowledge of working the system as they were ANC cadres on a ‘mission’. Detailed informal conversations held with many more informants (ten detailed), most of them blacks from the informal townships, helped to verify the facts.

In Zimbabwe, the actual facts were revealed at the end when I moved from one type of cooperative to the other type. For example, the ZHPF were unaware that I had already been to the HPZ and went on to expose all their housing networks with the ruling party and how they were the favoured group in collective housing land provision. On going back to the HPZ, to verify these relationships, officers were only willing to discuss this dark side of their organisation outside their offices. I could not help but conclude that development organisations tend to rehearse the stories they tell researchers and outsiders. In this way, only their capabilities and professionalism are positively projected. Unravelling such complexities called for extreme caution in verifying all the information from the interviews. This background sets the scene for the rest of the study.

**Structure of the Thesis**
The thesis is organised into four parts. The first part, composed of chapters one and two, introduces the problematic of housing delivery. The literature review and the argument of the ‘liberation culture’ are developed in chapter two where the latter is positioned in relation to two other resource allocation models: the neo-patrimonial and the classical Weberian bureaucratic cultures. The processes of resource seeking and allocation to the beneficiaries is the main focus. Whereas the “liberation culture” favours ruling party loyalists, the neo-patrimonial bureaucratic culture dispenses services to family, cronies and
network clients who sustain the system and the Weberian bureaucratic culture services those deserving of the service when it is their turn to be recipients. Clientelism is found in both the neo-patrimonial and ‘liberation culture’ bureaucracies but the organisational patterns differ. My argument is that the ‘liberation culture’, which orients service delivery in favour of party loyalists, contributes to the explanation of the pattern of housing provision in post liberation war countries. The party affiliation dimension stressed in the study highlights the dynamics in service provision to collectively organised groups seeking services that are ultimately consumed at the individual level. The other five key variables, ‘liberation logistics’, state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation as well as that of political identity that form the comparative framework utilised in the study, are also developed in this chapter. The intersection and interaction of these variables is explored and their influence on the ‘liberation culture’ is assessed.

Chapters three, four and five make up the second part and they analyse housing delivery in Harare, Zimbabwe. Chapter three sets the stage through a historical journey into the provision of housing for Africans during colonial rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe since 1980). This historical journey through a political economy approach sheds light on the current housing scenario in terms of physical layout and problems of access. The racial allocation of services is particularly important in that it established an avenue for discrimination by the new independent government to justify its actions as looking after its own. At the same time, it could use the same avenue to mobilise for support in its power consolidation exercise. Insight into the housing regime for Africans during the colonial period allows us to find answers to the questions on the character of the colonial state and how African housing allocation contributed to the consolidation and maintenance of its hegemonic position.

The move to the contemporary period in Zimbabwe takes place in Chapters four and five where housing delivery under the ZANU-PF era since 1980 is discussed. The early heavy socialist emphasis had not prepared the government for citizens who might want to make their own initiatives to provide housing for themselves outside its channels. This unexpected and unwelcome initiative was very much a response to the global discourse on
housing provision by the poor for themselves and it threatened the state’s position on resource allocation. The goal of creating citizens with a socialist identity stalled service delivery and thus encouraged the emergence of other powerful ideas that challenged the socialist project.

In part three, the case of Cape Town Metropolitan Council unfolds through three chapters: six, seven and eight. Chapter six discusses housing delivery approaches for Africans in Cape Town before the new democratic dispensation in 1994. Through the concept of space, I explain how the resolve of Africans to ‘hang in there’ in urban communities in South Africa is expressed in their defiance of the apartheid state’s policies. This laid the platform for the community organising that later surfaced to challenge and engage with the state in demanding housing services. The chapter also discusses the citizenship status of Africans as defined by resource allocation. It also shows the capacities and ingenuity the poor people have in solving their own problems. Chapters seven and eight focus on the current housing delivery regime under the ANC national government and the New Nationalist Party (NNP) provincial government of the Western Cape. This chapter demonstrates the use of knowledge gained in the struggle to defeat bureaucratic hurdles and institutional arrangements that did not result in complete liberation of all people as illustrated by improved and equal access to services. Transforming the attitudes of the Afrikaner bureaucrats to ‘include’ housing provision for the African community as a national agenda proved to be a challenge that required the house seeking communities to be more daring and confrontational at times in their dealings with officials. The dynamics in land seeking highlight the problems of state capacity faced by unrepresentative bureaucracies.

The comparison between the two cases takes place in part four, chapters nine and ten. Here I compare housing regimes between the different time periods in each country, white minority rule and majority rule, between the Harare municipality and the CTMC, across the NGOs, as well as across the four housing cooperatives. Through an analysis of the legal and institutional continuities and discontinuities, the presence and intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ is compared alongside other variables that influence housing delivery.
The differences and similarities between the strategies utilized by home-seekers in the two countries give indicators on the trajectories likely to emerge in the countries with regard to service provision. They also show the shouldering of responsibility for self-provision by citizens in capacity starved states.

In the conclusion in chapter ten, I discuss the theoretical implications of the empirical findings and relate them to the neo-patrimonial theory. The strengths and weaknesses of the ‘liberation culture’ theory are also discussed here as well as the implications for further research.

Endnotes

1 See Hyden, G. (1983) No Shortcuts to Progress, University of California Press Berkeley, in which he explains how Africa’s bureaucracies are dominated by the economy of affection and how this orients service provision in favour of kinship ties.

2 Liberation wars are a variation of liberation struggles since some countries experienced non-violent struggles for independence. Whilst many countries only experienced mass riots and some violent acts of civil disobedience, some actually went through long protracted struggles. This variation undoubtedly influenced governance in the new independent countries.


4 This study recognises the existence of conflicting organisational cultures. However, organisational culture here is viewed as the negotiated outcome of social interaction from shared symbols and meanings. It thus affirms itself as sets of beliefs, values and norms that shape relations and behaviour.

5 It has become increasingly difficult to separate actions that redress historical imbalances and those that benefit ruling elites. For instance, the elites benefit first and most from economic liberalisation programmes and yet these are packaged and presented as creating space for black entrepreneurs. The Black Economic Empowerment policy in South Africa has benefited many of the ANC top leadership just as much as all other policies have benefited the same group in Zimbabwe and even Zambia too.

6 An analysis of the President of Zimbabwe’s Opening of Parliament Statements show the party’s heavy reliance on support generated from promises to redistribute resources equitably. The land issue is a good example of one such resource that has been promised to the public every year since during the war.

7 The process of housing delivery qualifies it as an industry that has both backward and forward linkages with other sectors of the economy. The industry contributes at least 2-8 percent to the GNP in developing economies and in some countries between 20-50 percent of reproducible wealth. At the local level, low income groups build a house and rent out rooms which generate income for reinvesting in housing again and the business sustains itself. See The Community Action Group on Housing Report, (2002) on a Study on the Contribution of Urban Housing to National Economic Development in Zimbabwe, Harare, December Issue. See also Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. (1995) “Sites and Services: Home Ownership for the Poor?” Habitat International, vol.19 no.3, (pp371-389) p382.

8 A Habitat International conference devoted a significant amount of time to developing policy documents around this discourse that could be used to lobby governments. See Erguden, S. (2002), “Low Cost Housing: Policies and Constraints in Developing Countries, Conference Paper for the International Spatial Information for Sustainable Development, Nairobi, Kenya 2-5 October.
In 1999, President Thabo Mbeki made a famous and controversial remark to the effect that South Africa is divided economically as it is politically. He described the South African economy as having two parallel economies, one formal (and white) and one the other informal (and black).


This is even more so in dual economies, where women were traditionally rural citizens with the men being urban based for employment reasons. See Miles, M. (2001) ‘Women’s Groups and Urban Poverty: The Swazi land Experience’ in A. Tostensen, I. Tvedten and V. Mariken (eds.) Associational Life in African Cities-Popular Response to the Urban Crisis, Nordiska Afri Can institutet.

See D. Dewar’s, (1982) Alternative Strategies for Housing: The Case of South Africa, Working Paper no26, November, in which he blames the application of western ‘paper planning approaches’ that have pushed housing out of the poor’s reach.

Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys has shown that many Africans, 22 percent in the 2002-2004 surveys, define poverty in terms of lack of shelter. Again 28 percent say that it is one of the most important problems. See Bratton, M., Logan, C and Machado, F. (2001), Compendium of Comparative Data From a Twelve Nation Survey, Afrobarometer Working Paper no11, www.afrobarometer.org.


In Zimbabwe, the Local Authorities Amalgamation Act of 1993 removed the voting restrictions placed on citizens who did not own property in urban areas.

Citizenship here is used to show that people are not only concerned with gaining the political rights to vote but also wanted to be involved and given the space to take part in the social sphere to have economic rights, human rights and the chance to participate freely in the decision making structures. See Taylor, V. (1997) Social Mobilisation Lessons From the Mass Democratic Movement, South African Development Education and Policy Research Unit, School of Government, University of the Western Cape.

There is much debate on what the term empowerment means. I use it to refer to the capacity to provide for one’s basic needs, taking on the task and sharing the responsibility in engaging with housing authorities, knowing how to work the system and fighting it too.

The idea of self-help housing (site and services schemes) originated in the Housing and Finance agency in the United States of America well before the World Bank packaged it in the seventies. It was first promoted by the United States’ development agencies, then by the United Nations for the British Colonial Office as it made sense as an element of indigenous economic and cultural development as well as meeting the grounds of financial expediency. However, the World Bank has been blamed for ignoring the problems encountered in the earlier initiatives such as failing to consider existing housing provision systems in some countries. See Richard Harris (1998) ‘The Silence of the Experts: Aided Self-help Housing 1939-1954’, Habitat International, vol. 22 no.2, (pp165-189), pp165-167.

New services are always part of a housing package and many development projects are part of housing projects, hence in the market approach, private businesses have the chance to benefit from both the houses and the services projects.

All World Bank housing projects were financed through local building societies and to safeguard the domestic banks’ investments, there was an agreement with local authorities on a minimum income cut-off point for aspiring house owners.

Habitat International is a non profit housing organisation which has been coordinating housing provision for the poor in over one hundred countries since 1976. The organisation does not discriminate against home seekers but emphasizes that participation of groups is on a willingness to work according to the principles of the organisation and the ability to pay on the non profit enterprise.

In the rhetoric of housing, the symbolic meaning of community requires both control and avoidance through the production and maintenance of boundaries. First, community is about setting up social and physical boundaries- who is in and who is out. Anthony Cohen (1993) described community as a ‘boundary expressing symbol’. See Cohen, A.P. (1993) The Symbolic Construction of Community, Routledge, London. The symbol can evoke a sense of shared experience and identity without actually sharing a common meaning among all those who use it because it allows adherents to attach their own meanings to it. Young (1995 cited in Kenny 2000) argues that it is social mobility that produces community, meaning it is the ability to mediate
the experiences of life. On this he concurs with Kenny, who states that “community is identified as the site for the forming of identities and fulfilling social needs. Community reinforces the social ontology of individuals being constituted and defined by their social attachment.” See Sue Kenny (2002) Tensions and Dilemmas in Community Development: New Discourses, New Trojans?” Community Development Journal, ( pp284-299) p291. Selznick (1966:2 cited in Smith 1998) alerts us to the elusiveness of the concept of community in the study of society. This is because it is difficult to pin down as it takes on many different meanings. In general, community is conceptualised as being a group that either shares a physical space, a trait, or a common culture (Cohen 1993). The image of community conveyed in the rhetoric of public provision presumes that sharing a physical space produces a common culture, implying that when only poor people live together (as in housing projects for the poor), a culture of poverty is produced. This makes Ferdinand Tonnies (1887) remarks on community formation essential. He stated that human relationships are underlined by the differences between the unity and community found in pre-capitalist societies (Gemeinschaft) and Capitalist societies (Gesellschaft). Gemeinschaft occurs in small social settings where solidarity is produced by “exclusive living together” while (Gesellschaft) is attributed to large-scale impersonal settings that produce an ‘artificial construction of an aggregate’ (Smith 1998:50). A number of views have been presented on why people are drawn to community. One is the desire for an imagined better world that finds comfort in numbers as Sennett (1970) argues for its positive value in “The image of purity it portrays and how it is a collapsing of the experiential frame, a condensing of all the messy experiences in social life, in order to create vision of unified community identity”. See Sennett, R. (1970) The Uses of Disorder Personal Identity and City Life, Alfred Knopf, New York. And Smith, goes further and posits that it requires the absence of a community in order to justify the creation of one. See Smith, J.L. (1998), Cleaning up Public Housing by Sweeping Out the Poor”, Habitat International, vol.23 Issue 1, March (pp49-62) p50.
23 Power (2003) points out that the terms central to participatory development which came into use through colonial anthropology like community, village, local people and so on, are elements in colonial and post-colonial discourses which depict the world in terms of a distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’. In the contemporary era, participation and partnership are thus ways for development agencies to counter accusations of neo-colonialism as reflected in the language of partnership used in post-colonial times. See Power, M. (2003) “Re-Imaging Postcolonial Africa: A Commentary on Michael Watts’s ‘Development and Governmentality”, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 24(1), pp49-60.
26 The study will focus on housing delivery as the contested resource.
27 This evidence was part of my experiences during the liberation war in exile.
28 It is important to point out that the ‘liberation culture’ exists alongside other organisational cultures such as those found within the Weberian bureaucracy and those to do with ethnic loyalty. These would naturally prove to be pockets of resistance to the threatening dominance of the ‘liberation culture’.
29 The main resource under discussion is land but in South Africa, state financial resources are also part of the housing resources.
31 A logical assumption would be because that one case is ahead of the other by fourteen years.
In Zimbabwe, the dominant ethnic group was the Zezuru but tensions were noticeable in the leadership amongst all the major groups - the Kalangas and Manyika who complained about the heavy presence of Zezurus in the party hierarchy. In South Africa, ANC leadership was dominated by the Xhosas and a mix of the many other groups. However, the Zulus, who make a significant proportion of the African community, formed their own party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and political tension has always been high in KwaZulu Natal province where that party dominates.

I am grateful to Jan Froestad for suggesting this concept to me.

Questions have been raised on the nature of South Africa's liberation wars, but the fact is that by the early eighties, the ANC's external presence had grown tremendously. Apart from the thousands of Umkhonto Wesizwe cadres in camps around the region, the organisation had a large educational complex in Tanzania - The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom Centre, an administrative headquarters in Lusaka, a diplomatic presence in over 30 countries and several hundred students in foreign universities. See McKinley, D.T. (1997) The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, Pluto Press, London, p51.

Emphasis added.


The ANC warns that it is a fallacy to treat these as distinct categories since the truth is that the majority of individuals were in two or more categories such that the ANC is a unity of various political strands. See ANC Document, (1996) “Challenges of Leadership-the Current Phase”.

The first serious challenge emerged in the June 2000 parliamentary elections that saw a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) winning 62 percent of the 150 seats. However, the constitution allows the president to appoint 30 non-constituent members and this effectively reduced the opposition's seats.

This widening gap between the rich and the poor has been blamed for the increased crime, which has resulted in opposition parties calling for tougher measures against criminals which the ruling party resists as it would make the state more authoritarian. In any case, justice for the black community might not be realised considering the dominance of white officials in the judiciary system. Transformation has been slow. For instance, in 1994, 94 percent of the judiciary was white and in 2003 there were still 66 percent white judges and a few blacks, 23 Africans, 6 Indians and 4 coloureds.

Note the bureaucratic authoritarian states of Latin America that Juan Linz has studies over the years and the Asian Tigers.

Dispossession of the indigenous people’s land was institutionalised and legalised by the 1913 Natives Land Act which reserved 13 percent of largely infertile land for Native Reserves for Africans and 85 percent for white development in South Africa. Zimbabwe too had equivalent laws.

In one interview, the respondent, a senior coloured official, after inquiring into my marital background, began to play the song Secret Lovers that was sung by Atlantic Star. The song was programmed to replay itself throughout the interview and as my anxiety for my safety mounted, I decided to cut the scheduled two and half hour interview to just one hour since I was failing to concentrate on the interview and kept watching the interviewee’s every move. In three other interviews with white males, the offers to provide me with real juicy documents were tempting but as this could only be done after five at specific venues, I politely declined and lost out on the opportunity of getting what they categorised as first grade information. Perhaps these ‘valuable’ documents could have provided more insights into the housing delivery dynamics?

Many foreigners have become victims of the xenophobia that characterises the social relations between foreign and local blacks in South Africa. Hostilities are fuelled by the paranoia that relatively better educated foreigners crowd the job market.

Or perhaps they simply told the housing story as it should be told?

There is bureaucratic consensus that Africans have their homes in the former homelands of the Ciskei and Transkei. They just come to the Western Cape to work.
Chapter 2
Towards A Theoretical Framework

Introduction
The concern of this chapter is to critically analyse the nature of the organisational cultures in post liberation war bureaucracies in Southern Africa. The aim is to develop and locate the ‘liberation culture’ that contributes to explaining administrative behaviour in these states. The literature review therefore concentrates principally on demonstrating the differences and convergences between neo-patrimonialism and ‘liberation culture’ as well as other concepts that denote gift giving practices. This thesis takes the position that because the ‘liberation culture’ tends to group its clientele, it has divisive and devastating resource allocation consequences on the poor as it skews resource distribution amongst them. For them, the vote is the only asset (political resource) they have to trade for material basic necessities that should be respected as a basic human right and desperation for these votes by the dominant and often liberating parties, has affected trust relations (Lemarchand 1988).

Peters (1984) made a distinction between rationalist/deductive cultures and inductive cultures in his attempt to explain administrative behaviour. The former is associated with the bureaucratic concepts of universality and impersonality and these cultures emphasize the deduction of specific statements and action from general statements of principles. Decisions made in such a milieu are difficult to query because of their impersonality and the fact that they are made in a legal environment that minimises personal discretion. On the other hand, in the inductive culture, administrative and legal decisions are almost inherently individualised and each case is always treated differently. Generalisations are not the norm and decisions cease to be impersonal. Each case has different criteria and the decision-making environment is filled with uncertainty. Conflicts naturally emanate from the formal rules resulting in informal practices. This cultural system is conducive for the development of the ‘liberation culture’, as each client’s proximity to the party has to be continuously assessed.
This informality is what allows the “liberation culture” to manifest itself strongly and to spread like a wild fire. For example, the many new (black) bureaucrats who came into public administration after independence empathized with other blacks and they naturally preferred to make them first in service provision, the comrades empathized with other comrades and collaborators and they treated them likewise, and because of the upper hand they had as victors in the struggle equation, they instilled fear into most other functionaries who feared being labeled anti-revolutionaries (Weiss 1994). The rigidity of the professional bureaucracy also made it possible to justify altering decision-making criteria in the mobilization process to fulfill ideologies of the new ruling parties. Insight into the service delivery process in different service areas as well as on the key actors studied in housing delivery in Harare and Cape Town aides in the development of the argument. The chapter starts off with an explanation of the process of service delivery. After this comes a discussion of the role and quality of leadership in service delivery. This is then followed by a brief presentation and a critique of the neo-patrimonial theory and finally, a discussion of the analytic framework for this study which is organised around the concept “liberation culture”.

**The Process of Service Delivery**

Public servants help to define one’s citizenship status as they control who has access to which goods (Lipsky 1980). The same process provides parameters for self-definition and identity imaging by service seekers (Holston 1998). The identity that allows the accessing of desired goods get prominence and tends to be pushed to the fore when necessary. The process of service delivery is thus important in shaping the various forms in which identities are developed. Service delivery is a process that consists of, and is shaped by several processes depending on the nature of the required service. The two examples below show the differences in the process in different service delivery agencies:

**A. Service delivery process in a maternal health unit**

In a maternal health unit, a woman requiring either pre or post-natal health care presents her body and the experienced symptoms for examination. In this situation, the service is consumed immediately in the presence of the service provider and the quality of the
service is therefore largely shaped by the discretion of the agent and the perceived needs of the client. The one person attending to her makes the most appropriate decision to address the issue and the treatment, if any, is applied more or less instantly. Consideration of other factors is done by the one attendant. Even if the case is eventually referred to a specialist, only the individual’s medical history as well as the current position are taken into account.

**Figure 1 Direct interface between service provider and client**

Need identification → assessment of need → Service allocation  

Source: Adapted from Blekleie 1996.

**B. Service Delivery in a Housing Unit**

**Figure 2 Service delivery process in a housing unit**

Internal factors
- Criteria for service qualification
- Regulation-policy environment
- Equity considerations
- Intra bureaucratic politics

Interface with client → consideration of felt need → Allocation of service

Extraneous factors
- Political
- Financial
- Social

Source: Constructed from Barlow (1984), Gautum (1993), Blekleie (1996) and Prottas (1979)

In the case of a housing service where consumption occurs much later, the process is influenced by many factors and variables and at the individual level, several studies have illustrated the discriminatory tendencies of bureaucracies as being in favour of those that are relatively well off financially and politically (Ostrom 1976; Peters 1984; Sjoberg 1986; Blekleie 1996:16). These internal factors emanate largely from the institutional arrangements for service delivery while extraneous factors arise from the operational
environment of the concerned agency. The challenge that arises here is to identify the key factors in the environment that contribute significantly to shaping the behaviour of those who dispense the public services. This implies answering the question: How do housing delivery institutions mediate between environmental processes and housing decisions? This brings in the question of leadership, a key ingredient in efficient delivery.

**Leadership and the Bureaucracy in Service Delivery**

Success in service delivery depends to a large extent on the capacity to mobilise, manage and optimise the available resources and this requires visionary leadership and managerial excellence. Whereas African politicians have come up with grand visions, the managerial excellence dimension is yet to be achieved. It is therefore necessary to focus on the concept of leadership so as to be able to demarcate the boundaries of politicking, efficient and effective service delivery since African leaders are judged more on their ability to deliver rather than their means of selection (Chabal 1992). The ‘liberation culture’ values are inculcated into the decision making process by the leadership which plays the value articulation role whilst management translates these into tangible services. In most of Africa, effective control over the bureaucracy is largely exercised by individuals, politicians-(especially the top leadership) and at times ministers who have both the president's ear as well as some administrative capability. The political leadership has the upper hand in this relationship hence their ideology, preferences and values largely shape the service delivery process. The leadership has the entire state machinery at its disposal to utilise in its pursuit of a hegemonic position and this has very often been used to signal to the bureaucracy that the leadership’s continuation in office is always in the public interest (Migdal 1987:235).

Zimbabwe has experienced such an approach to power consolidation since independence in 1980. For example, projects initiated by other groups in society outside the party structures were denied both recognition and access to state resources. Likewise, those who voted for the only other party that had won two seats in the 1985 national elections, ZANU Ndonga, were also denied food aid in times of drought and no new physical developments took place in their areas. They were constantly accused of being opposition members and
demands were that they had to toe the party line if they wanted state aid and recognition. This of course contributed to the stifling of any initiatives emanating from civil society. In 1999, an ANC leader in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Sbu Ndebele, made similar threats that public goods would be denied to those who chose to place their loyalty anywhere else other than with the ANC.

The relationship between the public servants (professionals) and the political leadership (harbouring the ‘liberation culture’ mindset in this case) results in what Barlow (1984) calls a confidence gap. This ‘confidence gap’ is a result of the tension between politicians and public servants who constantly blame the other when service delivery does not take place according to expectations. This is evidenced in politicians who tend to view bureaucrats as lacking expertise, loyalty and competence in resource allocation. The two sides mistrust and suspect each other of furthering their own ambitions at the expense of socio-economic development. This same ‘confidence gap’ also exists between the public servants and the citizens especially in domineering and authoritarian administrative systems. Public servants are accused of being obsessed with getting respect they believe they deserve such that they overly assert their authority to make up for administrative deficiencies they may have (ibid). Barlow emphasises the result as the alienation of the general public. The root cause of this ‘confidence gap’ is the quality of political leadership at both the political and civil service level in the public service. It is further exacerbated by the operational environments of the two conflictual power centres that are supposed to harmonise their goals for the good of service provision. This study attempts to explain how collectives of the poor take advantage of this gap to get favourable outcomes from the housing delivery process.

Ayoude (1988) criticises African political leaders as behaving in a naive manner when they promise to meet infinite wants with finite resources. This action, which he refers to as ‘deficit promising’, has largely contributed to the low morale among the African populace with regard to service delivery. For instance, before and after independence, the liberating parties, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the ANC in South Africa, emphasized the redistribution of land in particular. This drummed up expectations that have slowly faded
into oblivion for the majority (Kriger 1992; Alexander 1995; Ranger 1995). At the same time, the political changes in Africa have altered the requirements and relative values of different types of leadership. This has made it more important to build and maintain political coalitions to dominate and subordinate which implies the use of conservative skills of statecraft (Rossberg & Jackson 1982:187). For instance, both ruling parties have shown a tendency to appoint leaders on the basis of their demonstrated loyalty and or length of service to the party. Again, both the ANC and ZANU-PF have openly demonstrated their power by imposing leaders on the electorate. This makes it imperative to explore and explain how service delivery takes place in transforming societies.

Ayoude (1988) also blames the leadership crisis in Africa on culture since many communities sanction authoritarian styles of leadership since the belief is that this yields results. He concludes his analysis of leadership traits in Africa by prescribing the following as good state leadership traits: the organised and continuous flow of information; information dissemination to public servants; information to the media and more importantly to the public; consultative policy making; efficient management practices and commitment. The question to be answered then is, to what extent do these attributes exist amongst Zimbabwe’s and South Africa’s political leadership and housing delivery agents?

**Neo-patrimonial Bureaucracies**

That African states have largely failed to approximate the rational-legal mode of operation cannot be disputed. With Weber’s patrimonialism at the centre, political and administrative institutions acquire their legitimacy from organising according to a legal-rational logic (Medard 1991; Bratton & van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2001). And it is in this legitimation attempt that professional bureaucratic practices get undermined. An important observation is that neo-patrimonialism takes different forms in different countries and to some extent, according to the Anglophone and Francophone divide. On the one hand, there is convergence between the two traditions in the reasons for its proliferation and sustenance, as well as in the outcomes: an anti-developmental state in which resource allocation is determined by some calculated gift giving practices. On the other hand, the French approach appears to be apologetic of the consequences of neo-patrimonialism as
they credit it with a functional role of reconciling traditionalism with modernism in the quest to deal with citizens’ expectations from the state (Medard 1991).

Neo-patrimonial institutions are hierarchical organisations with impersonal spheres of competence, but are occupied by bound officials who function in a formally bureaucratic manner. The form of recruitment does not matter because officials enter into a relation of personal loyalty to the ruler. Literature on neo-patrimonialism points out that the main distinguishing characteristic of neo-patrimonial bureaucracies is the location in a patrimonial power structure (Medard 1991, Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Patrimonialism can take many forms that are all associated with gift giving thereby developing a level of trust among the clientele. These many forms are what makes it necessary to distinguish neo-patrimonialism from the ‘liberation culture’ and the other forms such as prebendalism and other gift giving practices that are associated more with personal gain rather than amassing public support. Patronage, a major feature of the cultures mentioned above, involves the dispensing of state resources to third parties in return for political support of some kind, while prebendalism would involve the use of state resources for personal advantage by officials (Joseph 1987). Patronage includes manipulation, symbolic ambiguity and power accumulation and patrons and clients are both not interested in generality of equality and legal rules as they are only interested in persons. Patronage can thus be used as an informal means of persuasion and coercion through the selective allocation of resources (Lemarchand 1988).

A key feature is that in neo-patrimonial bureaucracies, loyalty and kinship ties hold the system together. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue that neo-patrimonial bureaucratic logic is the main feature of African politics. They arrive at this observation after an analysis of how the ruling class personalises the bureaucracy. This assertion is in concurrence with other theorists such as (Zolberg 1966 and 1968; Clapham 1982; Callaghy 1984,1987; Medard 1991 and van de Walle 2001). The two point out that neo-patrimonialism takes three main forms: presidentialism, clientelism and the abuse of state resources and all three forms have enhanced the predatory nature of the African states. Both the state and society are characterised by the individual penetration of the party and
society through a subordinate interconnection of relationships that ensure loyalty and dependence on him. This successfully turns public office into a coveted price that encourages officials to concentrate on wealth accumulation before they fall out of favour. The subversion of the state’s administrative apparatus results from this systematic patronage and clientelist practices to maintain one’s hegemonic position. 

Critique of the Neo-patrimonial Theory

Whilst I concur with the application of neo-patrimonialism as an over-arching concept that explains administrative behaviour in Africa, this study proposes and discusses the role of the ‘liberation culture’ in influencing administrative behaviour. The quest is to prove that post liberation war African bureaucracies do have a different additional causal dimension that informs on their action orientations. As with the neo-patrimonial model, much of the effort is concentrated on survival of the ruling class and yet as mentioned earlier, some degree of democratic procedure is essential for legitimising governments’ actions. Equity laden procedures assure the stability and orderly continuity of any system. However, unlike neo-patrimonialism that has withstood the test of time and government change, the ‘liberation culture’ is a recent phenomenon that emerged out of the exile style liberation struggles after the seventies in Southern Africa in particular. It therefore offers more in explaining the variation that requires attention in neo-patrimonial regimes as it addresses the historical specificities of these countries. This therefore becomes a departure from the validation of an apriori theory such as neo-patrimonialism (Chabal 1992).

The ‘liberation culture’ is a distinct type of organisational culture that exists in post-liberation war bureaucracies in Africa yet efficient and effective bureaucracies are a must for Africa as they have the attractive potential of eliminating the prejudice of personalism and replacing it with a system of accountability at both the technical and the moral level of responsibility (Moyo 1992). The historical development of African bureaucracies is laden with political rivalry, political and ethnical intolerance and managerial incompetence such that the organisational cultures that exist do not cultivate an atmosphere that allows for the characteristics of the professional normative oriented Weberian bureaucracy to guide and rationalise administrative behaviour (ibid). This study argues that the ‘liberation culture’
manifests itself as a distinct type of organisational culture that triggers administrative behaviour that is essentially partisan. With its origins located in the guerrilla liberation warfare logic, authoritarianism is tolerated just as much as loyalty and continuous mobilisation are valued. Idiosyncratic, institutional and cultural values all coalesce to build and reinforce it. Institutionally, the political leadership is the crucible in which the culture emerged and survives and the party is the dominant vehicle through which it operates.

The ‘liberation culture’ has elitist tendencies when dealing with individuals but with the poor, they have to benefit as organised political groups. Differences arise in that the ‘liberation culture’ carefully selects its clientele from within the general public. It is not haphazard and it has a mobilising effect in those clients who are desperate for services. Also opportunists can get organised and benefit from the distributional process. This orientation of the ‘liberation culture’ raises some questions on the neo-patrimonial model as put forth by Bratton and van de Walle in their 1997 book, Democratic Experiments in Africa.

As with other theorists from the French West African tradition (Medard and others), Bratton and van de Walle did not consider the party as pivotal in the resource allocation process and the ordering of patron and client networks. Considering that the theory had its origins in French West Africa where the party was not important in the resource transaction processes-the big man was, they may have overlooked its importance in their later studies in British Southern and Central Africa. In their model, benefits ultimately flow upwards to the strong man -at the helm of the party- and to other beneficiaries through the abuse of official resources. What they appear to miss is that whilst they flow upwards, they are also extended to the party thus strengthening the party horizontally. The party gets recognition for its ability to deliver where the government fails. Secondly, the party itself abuses the national resources. Individuals in the system benefit and even more so does the party especially when goods can be denied to seekers until they acquiesce to some level of political correctness. At mass rallies and during election campaigns, politicians in both the ANC and ZANU-PF tend to emphasize that the party has done ‘this’ and ‘that’ for the people. Hence the resourcefulness of the individual is ultimately extended to the party and
it is in turn sustained by the party. That capacity is only there as long as one works within the party.

The ‘liberation culture” is clearly not a subset of neo-patrimonialism and an analysis of its character attempts to show these differences. It is an independent concept that contributes to the explanation of service delivery in post liberation war states. However, a question that requires an answer is: Is the ‘liberation culture” peculiar to post liberation war states only? A bureaucracy with the ‘liberation culture” exhibits similar characteristics to the neo-patrimonial bureaucratic culture but it takes a point of departure when it gets to identification of the client who benefits from the distributional process and to the penetration of state and society by the party. Whereas a neo-patrimonial organisational culture largely services its own members as the clients, the “liberation organisational culture” delivers its services selectively to segments of the polity that identify with the prevailing political leadership’s ideology. Decisions here are essentially party driven. It defines who its clients are in the population according to their political affiliation above all other identities. Officials may enter the administrative system on merit but their actions are neither impartial nor neutral and they are also not the only beneficiaries of the system. Officials’ actions are not at all sanctioned by the formal ethical codes of a rational-legal institution. This implies that there are prospects of professionalising the ‘liberation culture” bureaucracy once the carriers and socialising agents of the ‘liberation culture” values get out of office. The ‘liberation culture” cannot therefore be a generic governance style or a transitional experience as socialisation agents can manouvre to sustain it beyond a generation as happened through the Ministry of Information and Publicity in the President’s Office in Zimbabwe that launched a campaign after 2000 to preserve the liberation mindset and culture intact by insulating locals from global experiences.

Again, proving the existence of a ‘liberation culture” as distinct from other organisational cultures required the study to focus on specific decisions taken in housing delivery and the criteria used to make those decisions. This meant analysing whether the criteria used to allocate housing resources was informed by the “liberation culture” and whether such allocative decisions could have been made otherwise. The “liberation culture” is exhibited
in administrative behaviour that is consistent with the desire to maintain political
hegemony and bureaucracies that are dominated by the “liberation culture” distribute
housing resources to loyal party members through extra legal criteria. The “liberation
culture” violates patterns of trust and reciprocity, which should be essential features of any
society. Trust becomes party bound and it rests on the awareness of party rewards for
loyalty. Party loyalists trust the resource allocation agents to provide them with a service
not because they deserve it or because it is their turn in the queue, but because their
dispositions and affiliations indicate that it shall be so. The nature of reciprocity that
develops here is vertical patron-client oriented.

The “liberation culture” places the official agent in a three dimensional quandary as he has
to conform to conflicting demands in the service delivery process. Ekeh (1975) made an
observation that African public officials have one leg in the public sector and the other in
the private sector in their permanent quest to augment their salaries. What Ekeh did not
foresee was the development of another leg - the party, in the new independent states that
proclaimed socialism as their official ideology. This party leg has grown to be the
overriding leg in post-liberation war bureaucracies\(^{11}\) in terms of conformity and adherence
to the party’s ideology and rewarding that loyalty. This implies that the public official is
more like a tripod stand, which has to balance on all three legs with the party as the
strongest leg.

As in neo-patrimonial bureaucracies, patron-client relations become the central aspect of
institutional patterns in the “liberation culture”. The party is the utmost patron with the
president presiding over it of course. Public officials are clients at the top level because
they are to a large extent, dependent on the patron (the party) for their offices and access to
national resources and more importantly, the opportunity to distribute the goods available
in their area of work. They in turn lengthen the chain by creating other clients and here
they too become the patrons\(^{12}\) - all in the name of the party. Essential services become
readily available in return for loyalty to the party. The relationship is based on loyalty and
trust and each must honour the obligations of being patron and client. Inherited
administrative systems in Africa are also partly to blame for creating room for these
tendencies to emerge and dominate the resource allocation process.

During the years in exile, for ZANU, the Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union and the
ANC guerrillas, authoritarian rule was the norm. Decisions were made by the top military
bodies and passed down the chain of command until they reached the guerrilla cells on the
ground. The covert nature of operations meant there was little room for dissent and those
who opposed the liberation army/party line were accused of being collaborators. Politics
was about asserting authority and this stifled any alternative developments. A culture of
denying services to the opposition and intimidating citizens for compliance emerged
during the war. At independence, these traits were all infused into the state organs. With
the position of the “liberation culture” elaborated, I now turn to the analytic framework
applied in this study.

The Analytic Framework
Analysing administrative behaviour in the two countries requires organising concepts into
an analytic schema that allows for diversity. As Ferrari (1990:77) cautions:

No theoretical comparison is possible in social science unless reference is made to
concepts entailing a general status and that the only chance to make such concepts
truly comparable consists of submitting them first of all to analytic scrutiny.

Historical outcomes emanate from causes that combine differently over space and time and
how this results in similar outcomes is underlined by different processes (Ragin, 1987). At
the same time Ragin cautions against harbouring presuppositions that the same causal
factors do result in the same way in the cases under scrutiny. The historical event of the
liberation wars and its attendant ‘liberation logistics’ combine with different factors to
determine a similar outcome (“liberation culture”) in different contexts. These factors
combine to influence the development, intensity and influence of the “liberation culture” in
service delivery. As indicated earlier in the introduction, “liberation culture” is the focal
organising concept in this study meaning that the rest of the analytic concepts are placed in
relation to it. The following key concepts were used to distinguish the intensity of the
‘liberation culture’ in the two countries: ‘liberation logistics’, Africanisation, state autonomy and civic organisation and they are the next subject of discussion.

But first what do I mean by these concepts, liberation logistics, state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation? Secondly, how do they straddle time differences in the two countries and how does the analysis proceed?

Addressing Causation

“Liberation culture”

In this study, ‘liberation culture’ is defined as a set of values and norms favouring those who identify with the liberation movement. The organisational culture it breeds aligns decision making to the party’s ideals. The ‘liberation culture’ is not client oriented in the sense prescribed by the Weberian bureaucracy. It is an exclusionary distributional system that selects its clientele distinctly by political orientation. It is inclusionary in that whoever joins the political grouping that is distributing the resources will also benefit. The country’s historical development, the liberation movements’ experiences and the administrative environment influence it. Decisions emanating from such a culture are justified as being politically correct and the dominant political party’s priorities assume a superior status to the government departments. The organisations’ orientation, the employees’ loyalty and the perception of organisational goals are all geared towards enhancing the contemporary ideological disposition of the political leadership. A bureaucracy harbouring the ‘liberation culture’ does not allocate resources equitably, professionally, efficiently, effectively and competently. It works against the tenets of the ideal bureaucracy.

This definition brings in the concepts of access and equity. According to Schaffer and Lamb (1981:1-4), access encapsulates the action involved in acquiring a service in terms of the disbursement arrangements that entail delivery. The action of acquiring a service brings in the issue of structural relationships that define the transactions. Thus 'prioritisation' in service delivery processes raises questions of equity in any distributional exercise. Being a social construct, equity can be either inclusionary or exclusionary in that very often,
different institutional mechanisms arise to address the same question. For Schaffer and Lamb, to understand the concept means comprehending political action and public action as a political fact that deals with public policy and state action that covers institutional, political and collective phenomena. Its advantage is that it provides a lens through which the encounters between the state and its citizens can be scrutinised. This interplay between social and political forces in addressing equity concerns what the two describe as the ‘irony of equity’ (ibid:1-4). This irony, to them, is most noticeable in public action that arises from the intention to correct inequities from the operation of institutions and rules in addressing colonial injustices.15

The ‘liberation culture” does not address issues of equity, economic and social justice in service delivery. Much of the effort is concentrated on activities that are disruptive of planned development. Anti-democratic and unprofessional behaviour is the norm in the ‘liberation culture” and it condones non-accountability, inconsistency, concealment and parochialism in the decision making process. The ‘liberation culture” has four main attributes. It is operational when there is (a) the open circumvention of laid down criteria for allocative decisions in favour of party loyalists, (b) when legal codes are universal but interpreted in a particularistic manner; (c) when individuals organise as groups to access services under party guidance or party steering and (d) when willingness to be compliant to party dictates is discerned. Particularism refers to a situation when bureaucratic action is ordered by something other than prescribed rules, e.g. the ruler’s preferences, kinship connections, political connections (Blomkvist 1995:299) and party preferences.16 This raises an important question, what sort of identities and notions of citizenship are implicit in the ‘liberation culture”?

March and Olsen (1995:64) view identities as taking different forms over time and space. They argue that, because political life is organised by conceptions of identity and the appropriate behaviour associated with that identity, individuals learn to evoke identities and rules by experiencing positive consequences of having done so in the past. Identity formation is thus a continuous exercise, which is continuously adjusted to match the survival dictates of the environment (Chabal 1992). Though the identity formation process
results more from shared history than from those who share experiences by virtue of a common social position (Giddens 1991:97), identity formation in Africa first cut across socio-economic positions and these later coalesced to form political identities (Mamdani 1996; Ranger 1996). March and Olsen (1995) emphasize the importance of political identities which they note to be vehicles of political mobilisation. As new groups interact, they modify their own identities and build new ones through imitation and contradiction. The denial of political space for Africans shaped this development. By its nature, colonialism required a reconstruction of social and individual identities. And in many instances, these were identities that enabled access to state institutions and resources.

Colonial governance subverted African individualism, independence, privacy, self-determination and responsibilities creating subjects rather than citizens (Mamdani 1996). In white controlled space, as in employment, individual autonomy in identity formation was undermined and Africans were expected to assume and project identities of ‘subservience’. However, many did put on their other hats when the situation permitted it. African identity thus evolved as a result of the pattern of colonialism and the subsequent imitation of beneficial identities it encouraged. A lot of literature notes that the post-colonial state has assumed the paternalistic tendencies of the colonial state and has moved on to redefine political identities in terms of the power consolidation requirements of the new rulers. On this, Ranger (1996) warns against the danger of glorifying the colonial state and crediting it with shaping the behaviour of the current regimes. This would in this case, leave out the role played by the beneficiaries of the housing schemes in this study in reformulating and fixing their identities to suit pursuits of the new incumbents as well as their own interests. This means addressing the question of how political identities develop and relating them to political mobilisation strategies utilised in the two countries.

By its orientations, the “liberation culture” breeds and encourages the development of new political identities. And to speak of any identity requires an analysis of the processes of inclusion and exclusion at all levels including the internal and external definitions (Schlesinger 1991:173). The question here is what sort of political identities emerged as a result of collective action to access housing resources? Political identity here refers to
the part of identity that becomes dominant in the struggle for control over the allocation of resources and power residing in the state (Jung 2000:9). Mackenzie (cited in Schlesinger 1991) cautions that rather than assume the existence of identities, it is necessary to discuss the conditions under which it is possible to realise "common purpose" for it is in these actions that a definition of collective identities is constructed. The nature of clientelism in housing resource distribution very often requires that home-seekers have an identity that appeals to the ruling class or rather that benefits their mobilisation aims. Jung (2000) views political identity as existing at both the collective and individual level and further defines collective identity as ‘the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences and shared solidarity’ (ibid:17). Who is in the group, why the collective exists and who the collective exists in opposition to, are fluid ways that renegotiate the political space and salience of the group over time. In this study the ‘liberation culture’ is located in the political leadership whereas appointed bureaucrats and house-seekers may not necessarily have it but realise the value of political facilitation.

On the other hand, sharing a network for Mackenzie implies sharing an identity especially if the same ‘social space’ is also shared. Schlesinger (1991) concurs with both views when he concludes that, the activism of contemporary social movements entails a highly specific conception of collective identity. This presents a radical departure from given conceptions of identity consisting of a tradition with which individuals identify. Belonging to normatively regulated associations does not always confer identities, instead “…groups through their action, participate in the formation of identity, which is the result of decisions and projects, rather than conditioning and bonds” (Melucci 1982 cited in Schlesinger). This perception of identity formation credits agency and not necessarily at the expense of other environmental factors. Political identity in this study is emerging as a result of the interaction of closed access to housing resources, political mobilisation, collective action, loyalty and allegiance. Collective action in the two cases explains the formation of political identities that result from the housing allocation process.21
‘Liberation logistics’

I use this concept to refer to the way resources were allocated during the war by the liberation movements and that was to supporters and loyalists of the liberation war. It formed the larger part of the basis of the ‘liberation culture’ that ultimately determined the nature of governance in exile that resurfaced after the war. The liberators’ mobilisation strategies ensured the sustenance of the war and provided radical challenges to existing power structures (Alexander 1995). This cultural trait was carried over through the adoption of ‘liberation logistics’ as the unofficial guiding principle in resource allocation after the war. It is thus imperative to explain how ‘liberation logistics’ evolved and was sustained. The concept is both theoretical and practical in that it refers to the resource allocation process between the liberators and the civilians. It rotates around ‘political mobilisation’ in its effects in the carving out of identity boundaries on who is in and who is out (Longva 1995). Political mobilisation strategies ensuing from the ‘liberation logistics’ lead to bureaucratic action that tended to exclude some on the basis of political affiliation and select others on ostensibly neutral criteria for benefits. Unrestrained ‘liberation logistics’ would therefore result in a high intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ and consequently, a relatively unfair distributional model.

In the analysis, it is therefore essential to study the results of mobilisation and not just the process since both can have different outcomes (Longva 1995). A central hypothesis is that the ‘us’ and ‘them’ nature of service delivery evolved as part of the ‘liberation logistics’ and that exit options were effectively sealed off by the categorisation as a sell-out if one chose neutrality. Use of the concept ‘liberation logistics’ requires one to move back in time to each struggle era and exercise judgment on the nature of transactions over resources. Within the countries, the actors (liberating forces) who made decisions are as important as the beneficiaries (loyal masses). At the national level, this focus is at an ideological level and in relation to the background of the leaders. In the housing delivery process, it is at the practical level and can be discerned in the nature of the interaction between house seekers (cooperatives) and the delivery agents. A second assumption is then that: After independence, the new political leadership harbourered a mind set that was imbued with the ‘liberation logistics’ as a guiding principle in resource allocation. Service seekers organised
as collectives made it easier to select and give options for inclusion and exclusion by those controlling the resource. How then did this mindset permeate the bureaucracy?

Africanisation

The concept Africanisation, an indigenised version of affirmative action, is applied to administrative reforms that took place in the newly independent African states after the withdrawal of colonialism. The concept became universal to many of the countries on the continent in the early sixties. Here it is defined as the infusion of party loyalists to key and strategic positions in the bureaucracy. It therefore becomes a 'legitimating action' in that the process of transforming the bureaucracy was assumed to give it a representative face (Appiah 1995). Staffing the bureaucracy with indigenous officials was highly symbolic of the new assumption of power and in many cases, the white officials simply left the public offices and the countries altogether.23 The assumption was that it is always necessary for a new state to establish a basis for political support as the leaders needed to legitimise their own position and to maintain a certain basis and backing in their competition for political power (Peron 1994). In this sense then, 'legitimacy' is defined as a justification of a right to do specific and distinct things such as enforcing commands that cannot be countermanded, and to have a monopoly of such legitimate enforcement (Barker 1990:23).

Whilst the concept refers to affirmative action in that it aims to address historical injustices and imbalances emanating from the colonial mode of governance, many African leaders emphasized the point that Africans (blacks to be precise) were the targeted beneficiaries of the policy. In this sense, Africanisation, is an exogenous act that explains institutional change that lies at the heart of populism (Appiah 1995; Masunungure 1998). It thus had an emblematic value as well as being populist (Ramphele 1996; Mamdani 1996). In Zimbabwe, it is thus problematic to apply the equally universal concept of affirmative action because equal opportunity to employment did not exactly extend to women and other minorities who were also nationals in those countries. The experience of colonialism is thus essential to the application of the Africanisation concept as it adequately makes reference to the presence of the influence of a previous minority and illegitimate element in public offices.24
The administrative reform policies subsumed under Africanisation simply emphasized the urgency and necessity of having Africans in public offices. By the time South Africa could also redress its imbalances, the catastrophes from the Africanisation processes were clearly written all over the wall. Hence the country has been cautious enough to encapsulate it as affirmative action for its previously disadvantaged who were mostly blacks (Jordan 1994a). The implication of this for analysis is that searching for the influence of this variable occurs at virtually every level in the Zimbabwean bureaucracy where it started of in the usual pigmentation sense, then moved to Shona elements, then to ZANU-PF loyalists (Masunungure 1998). Whereas in South Africa, tact is essential to identify the beneficiaries of this policy wherever they exert influence from. Opposition to Africanisation would therefore lower the intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ as pockets of resistance can break the pace of unprocedural decisions and inequities. An important issue then becomes that of state autonomy that is critical in determining the bureaucrats’ extent of dominance.

**State autonomy**

Nordlinger (1981:10) identifies three levels of state autonomy; the highest level being the one in which the state exercises absolute autonomy in the face of opposition by enacting policies that suit its preferences. The middle level reflects the use of bargaining and negotiations to persuade differing preferences to go along with it implying some form of trade-off. The lowest level mirrors the presence of consensus or the absence of contestation in which the state acts unilaterally. This ordering projects the relativity of the concept of state autonomy as each level can encapsulate the different categories of autonomy over time and space. Gran (1987), drawing on Nordlinger’s conceptualisation, defines state autonomy as a state-society relation where the state has the upper hand in unrestrained action towards the fulfilment of its goals. He thus concurs that state autonomy is always contextual in that whenever the state policies are uncontested on a specific policy, it has autonomy but this status of the state varies according to issues and more importantly, it depends on the organisational capabilities of those that are threatened by the state’s actions in its guardianship role over the public. This is reflected clearly by his quote of Nordlinger
(cited in Gran 1984) that “a state is autonomous to the extent that its own preferences coincide with its authoritative action”.

This definition brings in the rest of the regime concerned with that ‘specific’ issue and indicates potential tension within the state on certain issues. When these intra-state wrangles occur and bureaucrats resist, Gran notes the absence of autonomy. The limiting of the absolute power of the state by other private interests is implied in this concept. For transitioning societies, state autonomy makes a significant contribution to the explanation of developmental successes and failures. State resources benefited one segment of every colonial community, the white community, and years later, the protection of property rights gives largely the same community a strong and loud voice in constraining the state in redistributive efforts. This is why Gran points out that autonomy is dependent on the actors in the system, their relations and what the whole system is going through at that point in time.

Tripp (2001) views the major setback in governance in Africa as the absence of political space for societal actors to mobilize autonomously from both the state and the party in power. Even though he concurs with a wide range of literature that points to the question of either too much or too little state autonomy as the major constraint in politics, for him the absence of societal autonomy is responsible for the failure of society to affect public policy and demand transparency and accountability. This weakens the state by denying it the legitimacy it needs and yet its crucial role is to depersonalize the forms of governance prevalent on the continent. And contrary to Bratton’s (1989) argument that there is total disengagement between states and society, Tripp sees this as a matter of the degree to which the two sides have autonomy. One argument is that the engagement capacity for society is weakened by a state’s possession of coercive power. Associational autonomy is important for other reasons amongst them avoidance of state organised patronage networks as well as creating capacity to challenge distributional patterns that create inequities and expand organisational goals beyond the usual confines (ibid). The degree of state autonomy with regard to housing policy formulation explains the successes and failures in
housing delivery to the poor. Weak state autonomy would therefore result in a low intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ as unfairness gets checked by the other stakeholders.

**Civic organisation**

The concept of civil society is very fluid and assumes many meanings across time and space such that its utility in comparative analysis has become highly contestable (Bratton 1989:52). However, the fact that it is always defined in relation to politics with the state gives it explanatory power (Chabal 1992). Its attraction lies in that it provides the essential formula to examine state society relations in Africa as it straddles the political activity realm (Bratton 1989; Chazan 1994; Nordlund 1996) and it is further laden with implications for strategies on making claims upon the state. Keane (1998:37) argues that the concept is used as an ideal type and so to make empirically analytic interpretations requires observing civic organisations in action. Hence deconstructing their methods to interpret their language and read meaning into their actions is critical (Chabal 1992). Their collective action dimension and interaction with institutions in the quest to make political claims are what makes them the focal point in public issues (Bratton 1989:57).

Once they are in the public realm, power becomes a strategic issue for them. Power, the ability and capacity to coerce others to act in one’s favour, is therefore central in the analysis of state society relations in this study. How then do state actors’ exercise power in the capturing of self-help initiatives? Is power simply used to control or exercise the state's hegemonic status? If power is conceived of as a disciplinary tool, then 'marginalisation avoidance', itself a form of power, compels service seekers to conform to 'liberation logistics' requirements. I am therefore arguing that what I call *manoeuvring capacity*, which refers to the power displayed in the strategic options pursued by civic groups to access resources, shows the relative power position of service seekers. Recollections of previous actions and current observations of exchange processes are utilised in designing organisations in a way that makes it possible for authorities to step in and steer civic organisations at times. This capacity is tied to the concept of autonomy in that political space open to the civics denotes the power and influence they can exert on the state. Organisational resources such as leadership skills, finance, horizontal and vertical
alliances and the politically correct patron very much define the power base of resource seeking civic groups. The neutralisation of potentially explosive power centres becomes a state concern and co-optation\textsuperscript{26} of the ‘voice’ within the civics is often used to check the power of the civics (Bratton 1989). Where civic organisation and influence is relatively high, the intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ is mediated and its impact on housing distribution equally lessened.

**Combined Influence-High and Low Intensity**
Ragin (1987:25) views outcomes in their totality\textsuperscript{27} as he attributes this to the presence of ‘the right ingredients’ mixed appropriately and so the absence of one ingredient would imply the absence of change. I differ with him on this observation as he views change in total terms only and ignores the magnitude of change. Both the presence and absence of a factor is largely a question of scale. How these conditions –‘liberation logistics’, Africanisation, state autonomy and civic organisation combine- and the outcome itself, can be a matter of magnitude of the phenomenon under observation. Differences in the levels of change can be points of study as much as total change is usually the focus. In any case, change is very often a relative issue which removes the idea of ’absolute’ change Ragin points at.

Focusing on the multiplicity of causality can possibly blur the equal multiplicity of outcomes, meaning that variation exists in the outcomes in a way that requires studying processes intensely. It therefore makes sense to categorise both causes and outcomes bearing in mind the tendency of some factors to straddle boundaries of categories and also the complexity of assessing how much of what is less or more, or high or low. However, Ragin (2000:32), acknowledged thirteen years later that, "while outcomes may not be exactly identical, the researcher must show that the outcomes in selected cases are in fact enough alike to be treated as instances of the same thing". These later observations influence the development of my argument. Various combinations of the four factors would therefore imply varying degrees of intensity of the ‘liberation culture’. This would mean that whereas outcomes would be similar, the processes might differ as dictated by the
intensity of the culture and the tactics essential for organising successfully in making claims against the state in each case.

**Conclusion**

To investigate the validity and strength of this ‘liberation culture’ theory, I intend to compare two housing regimes, one in Harare and the other in Cape Town. This will be done through a historical scrutiny of the housing delivery institutional set up, the home-seekers strategies in organizing for housing resources and the actual housing delivery experiences of the selected groups. Whereas it must be acknowledged that there are many other factors that skew housing delivery, the ‘liberation culture’ appears best poised to explain these processes especially when its about the poor, a constituency that dominant parties claim to represent and speak for. With gift giving as the convergence point between the various types of neo-patrimonialism, the cases go beyond the current era to tease out the nuances that contribute to the relevance and application of the ‘liberation culture’ theory. The essence of the comparison is to highlight crucial differences and similarities in processes and behaviour in the two systems and in this way, the general applicability of the theory can be tested and validated.

Through the ‘liberation culture’ concept, the aim is to critique as well as enhance the explanatory power of the ‘neo-patrimonial’ theory that has assumed dominance in academia in explaining postcolonial states’ resource allocation orientations. It is in this comparison at an abstract level that the weaknesses and strength of the analytic framework can be found. Whilst the ‘liberation culture’s’ relevance becomes pronounced in the strength of the ‘party penetration of state and society’, its major weakness is that it focuses on the allocation of goods to collectives. And yet it is mostly when goods are allocated to individuals that other tendencies that usually occur alongside discriminatory behaviour can be observed.

This analytic framework allows for the use of an alternative lens to scrutinise and organise empirical materials on housing provision in a rather different way as shall be explored in the remaining chapters. The next chapter looks into housing delivery in a colonial regime.
with the aim of identifying pointers to the accommodation of the ‘liberation culture’. Chapters five and eight focus on the application of the ‘liberation culture’ in the explanation of housing resource allocation.

Endnotes

1 Emphasis added.
3 See Peters, G. (1984) The Politics of Bureaucracy, Longman, New York and London, 2nd ed., on the definition of intra-bureaucratic politics that he uses to explain the tactics bureaucrats utilise to consolidate their own political power. He accuses them of defeating politics by obfuscation, delay and the use of rules, regulations and procedures. Politicians rarely comprehend the procedural mechanism or the sustenance of policy and consequently they are at the mercy of the public servants.
4 Barry (2002), points out that politics can often be profoundly anti-political in its effects by suppressing potential spaces of contestation; placing limits on the possibilities for debate and confrontation. His point is that a compromise always has to be worked out even though it is important to be cautious that the need for a common view does not make the fact of disagreement evaporate. See Barry, A. (2002) ‘The Anti-political Economy;’, Economy and Society, vol.31 no2, (pp268-284) p270.
7 Patrimonialism covers empirical phenomena like clientelism, comradeship, patronage, tribalism, prebendalism corruption, predation- that denotes the absence of boundary recognition between public and private spheres by politicians and public servants and these are legitimate acts in patrimonial rule. Legitimacy is thus highly contested in neo-patrimonialism because of the tolerance and acceptance of these practices in reality.
10 Chabal comes close to such an approach as he acknowledges the variation introduced by liberation wars in his discussion of revolutionary theory. He also admits the force of the party as the ultimate vehicle for mobilisation towards transformation in regimes with such a history. See Chabal, P. (1992) Power in Africa-An Essay in Political Interpretation, Macmillan, London.
11 Even in some countries that did not experience violent liberation wars, the party leg still became the overriding leg. Tanzania is a good example especially in the early years of independence.
13 ZANU-PF, the governing party, fought the liberation war separately with ZAPU-PF against the colonial government. The two parties later merged under ZANU-PF in 1988 as a result of the Unity Accord that ended the siege against ZAPU.
14 See Nhongo-Simbanegavi’s unpublished doctoral thesis in which she explains how the then Minister of Women’s Affairs publicly refused to acknowledge any women’s groups that existed outside the party organisation. These were labelled opposition and all their efforts in carrying out their work were consequently frustrated. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, J. (1997) Zimbabwe Women in the Liberation Struggle: ZANLA and its Legacy 1972-1985, Department of Economic History, University of Zimbabwe.
15 Emphasis added.
16 Emphasis added.
18 On this, Chabal concurs as he argues that missionaries in particular were manipulated by the converts who acquiesced to the identities they sought to impose. See Chabal, P. (1992) *Africa Works*, Cambridge University, NY.
19 Collective action here refers to mass organisational models that are built on the assumption of a homogeneity of interests that are to be dealt with through community leadership (Reed 1979). Implicit in the idea is that the collective groups are to be created and mobilised as a passively homogeneous mass that is activated by a leadership elite. It is important though to be cautious about the concept as it overshadows analysis of cleavages or particularities. See Reed, A.L. Jr. (1979) “Black Particularity Reconsidered”, *TELOS*, no39.
20 This does not mean that an individual with a different political affiliation cannot get these resources. It is mostly the large poor groups that tend to be affected by the syndrome.
21 Public servants have very often been pressurised into toeing the party line as statements by senior politicians often threaten their jobs if they are not sympathetic to the ruling party.
22 The two definitions (“liberation culture” and ‘liberation logistics’) are to a large extent coined from my experiences in the liberation struggle.
23 For example in Zimbabwe, there was a mass exodus of white officials in 1980 and 1981.
24 Illegitimate in the sense that colonial rule was resisted by the indigens from the very onset. Indigenous peoples were on the periphery of the colonial regimes and never accepted their rule as legitimate.
25 Foucault’s (1980) notion of power as a disciplinary force that defines subjects provides critical insight into the identity formation process resulting from the resource allocation procedures. Foucault’s view explains the tolerance for deviant bureaucratic behaviour due to the fear of losing out. Its weakness is that it gives a one sided view of power which is assumed to reside in the hands of the authorities. See Dreyfuss, H.L. and Paul Rabinow (1982) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, The Harvester Press.
27 Ragin was more concerned with causation and did not emphasize the differences that are often found in the same outcome. See Ragin C. (1987) *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, University of California Press.
PART II

Chapter 3

Housing Delivery in Colonial Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the housing delivery regime for Africans during the colonial period and it seeks to find answers to the following questions; How did the character of the colonial state map out the post-colonial state’s service delivery practices? What was the role of African housing allocation in the colonial state’s consolidation and maintenance of its hegemonic position? and How did the colonial state redefine the gift-giving tradition for Africans? Attempts to answer these questions make it possible to identify the path the colonial state mapped out for resource allocation. Focusing on relations between the colonial state, the municipal authorities, the police and different groups of the subjects (urban based Africans), the chapter demonstrates the struggle for control over people and space by an administrative system that was obsessed with maintaining law and order. In this section, I look into housing delivery in the colonial state with a view to finding indicators on how the “liberation culture” fitted snugly into the inherited bureaucratic arrangements. Tait’s (1997) political economy approach to the analysis of urban development in Rhodesia and Southern Africa provides the most illuminating details on housing provision for Africans in the colonial state.

The Colonial State
Research into housing delivery in developing countries has tended to assume a neutral state which allocates resources in accordance with technical criteria such as efficiency and equity (Dewar 1982; Smit 1995; Rakodi and Withers 1995; Tait 1997). This, Rakodi and Withers 1995 argue, usually leads to managerialist explanations for analysing the outcomes of housing polices which leaves out historical institutional analysis that encompass state orientations over time. This makes the character of the colonial state the starting point for understanding the housing regime in Zimbabwe. For it was just as patrimonial –in terms of racial discrimination- as the post-colonial state has become. The colonial state evolved out of the conquest of different chiefdoms in Rhodesia, starting with
the establishment of a province in Bulawayo, then to Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) and finally to Harare. The chiefdoms were incorporated under one new authority through the use of a bureaucracy that reflected British institutional patterns for its colonies.¹ Alongside this forced unification, there arose a “systematic distrust of power” (Basil Davidson cited in Mamdani 1996:40). The state established separate structures for the conquerors with the vanquished natives being ruled through a system of indirect rule² in which local traditional authorities were detached parts of the governance structures. The question is, how do we define a state to capture the unorthodox practices in colonial Africa?

Several authors view the state as an organisation with structured authority relations, that co-opt people into its realm and that works towards the achievement of specific goals (Gran 1994:16). Gran views the state as embodying class interests even though it has a degree of autonomy from those interests and he rests all authority with it. Whereas this ideal definition may apply to both western and developing states, for the developing countries, this definition requires broadening because the nature of the state formation delegitimised the state in the people’s eyes and whereas it may have had authority, it never had legitimacy³ for the Africans. The colonial state did not have autonomy from class interests (which were couched in racial terms) but it deliberately designed itself to fully represent white interests and to totally repress black interests as evidenced by the laws on physical segregation. Furthermore the colonial state deliberately ignored issues of social justice for the black race thus further reducing the legitimacy of the state. Whereas legal recognition by a remotely located monarchy might have lent the legal legitimacy required, the turn of events in Rhodesia from 1964-1979 when the settler government declared the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI),⁴ clearly eroded any legitimacy there might have been even for the British monarchy. How then is the state defined to reflect this context?

The Marxist perception of the state as organisations servicing class interests and the capitalist mode of production offers more insight into the colonial state (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). Though Marx puts this in the context of working class conflicts against other classes, the analysis works equally well for classes based on race as one race automatically
attains superiority over the other and fights constantly to maintain this self appointed privileged position. Analysis of the class structure of a society at any point in time may thus provide useful insights into the relative balance of power as classes always attempt to advance their interests, *inter alia*, by means of influencing the actions of the state institutions (Rakodi and Withers 1993:17). However, Rakodi and Withers caution that it is important to be on guard not to neglect processes of class formation which produce change over time, and not to adopt rigid categorisations which may not be appropriate for the analysis at hand. The balance of power between economic and political class interest and their ability to influence government and wider state actions vary over time which makes it essential to make the colonial state and its service delivery policies the starting point for explaining contemporary housing policies in Zimbabwe.

Another theoretical view is that the state is merely an instrument of the ruling class, used to maintain its dominant position and the subordination of other class groups. The colonial state in Africa reflects this perspective clearly. The state was an instrument of the colonial power and it was used to advance its political and economic interests. One perception is that it was a strong interventionist state which represented the interests of settler farmers, local mining, industrial and commercial capitalist interests, subsidiaries of multinational capital, white middle classes and white workers (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). All sections of the white controlled economy shared an interest in ensuring the availability of cheap black labour and this was the primary influence in the urbanisation policy especially housing development (Rakodi and Withers 1993:37). Mamdani (1996:19) points out that the colonial state was a double-sided affair primarily because of the divisions over race with one type of governance over the citizens (white) and the other over the subjects (all other races). This implied the politics of accommodation, *(on the part of the settlers)* with them directing colonial development as long as they had the upper hand.

These state society relations redefined the concept of citizenship in a way that exalted white supremacy and hegemony. Citizenship came to be defined as ‘a privilege for the civilised man’ who then could enjoy all his civil rights but for the so called uncivilised native, political rights in particular were seriously and systematically denied (ibid:17). This
categorisation and treatment as subjects was the root cause of all anti-colonial resistance and it made Africans defiant from the very beginning. The only advantage the African appreciated from the colonial state was its use for the pursuit of self-interest as it was authoritatively imposed and perpetuated racial differences. The colonial state became responsible for engendering social change that had repercussions for social structure, social status (Appiah 1995:77) and political mobilisation and these changes can be analysed partly through the concepts of identity and citizenship.

The Colonial Religion

After the colonisation of Zimbabwe in 1890 by the British South African Company, the colonisers immediately institutionalised a political economy that was anchored in the ideology of racism. Racism became the state ‘religion’ which overlapped or coincided with class differences (Masunungure 1997; Evans 1997). This made race the organising principle on which national resources were authoritatively allocated and authoritatively denied such that power and all socio-economic resources were skewed in favour of the minority ruling white race. Race was, in Masunungure’s words, the ‘inner iron law’ of the settler political economy. Rhodesia’s own blend of apartheid consisted of firstly, defining people as belonging to distinct races, secondly, formulating laws which gave different races differential access to resources and thirdly, forcing a geographical or spatial separation of the races in terms of residential places, land ownership and work and lastly, adoption of the principle that services and other benefits for Africans should be financed by the Africans themselves in their respective residences (Musekiwa 1994:54).

Colonial development policies for Africans were strictly anti-urban and the colonial powers clung to their policy that any kind of development for Africans should be confined to their ‘natural rural habitat’ (Tait 1997:153). Tait points out that in the British colonies, any encouragement of African urbanisation was considered detrimental to native development, because of the ‘detribalising’ effects of long-term exposure to town life (Mamdani 1996). The African worker was seen as an object of colonial urbanisation and in no way as an urban subject. He was merely tolerated as a temporary labourer and was in theory, expected to return to his home after the termination of his employment (Evans
Influx was thus to be controlled, cultural differences were to be maintained and social control became even more important to the settler government (Rakodi and Withers 1993:59). The housing conditions of Africans reflected the perception that colonialism was only interested in the physical maintenance of the African urban labour force, whilst denying them any human rights of habitat.

Institutional design centred on keeping the public service in white hands as evidenced by the 1931 Public Services Act, Chapter II, Section 8 (I) which stated in very explicit terms who would serve in the public service:

- That Public Service shall consist of all persons in the employment of the government of the colony included in:
  - (a) the administration and clerical divisions
  - (b) the schools division
  - (c) the professional and technical division
  - (d) the general service
  - **but shall not include any native or coloured person.**

The need to uphold the racist ideology resulted in an extra ordinary emphasis on security by the colonial state and this resulted in the development of authoritarian administrative systems that were closely woven, centralised and hierarchical (Masunungure 1997). The excessive pre-occupation with maintaining law and order manifested itself explicitly in the designing of housing for the black population in urban areas. All colonial policies converged on the fundamental principles of strict ethnic and racial segregation between the whites and the various indigenous population groups. This segregationist principle was to become the decisive element in colonial town planning that translated the policy of divide and rule into spatial dimensions (Tait 1997:151; Evans 1997). As in the South African apartheid model, Africans were banned from the city altogether with the labour force contained in separate townships. In other countries, the basic pattern of racial zoning was employed and modified by the colonial powers in question. In some areas where the traditionally built-up towns were unsuitable for the colonial type of city layout, European cities were built on adjoining sites (ibid).
The most prominent and systematic feature of colonial cities was the basic town planning structures and layouts that reflected the need for social and military control of the native quarters and hygienic protection of the European residential zones from these areas (Zain 1989, Evans 1997 and Tait 1997:151-152). The creation of healthy environments with low housing densities and abundant surroundings became an obsession for the planners. European quarters were spaciously designed for the residence of colonial administrators and their families with ample leisure (clubs, parks, sports grounds) and other urban facilities with bungalow style houses with gardens (Tait 1997). Between these and the African quarters, buffer zones such as native markets, railways, industrial areas or other geographical barriers separated the races. The native quarters for housing the indigenous labour force were contained in townships built in village style, with provision for the control of influx and movement. Colonial cities were thus an attempt at creating ideal urban layouts that targeted the white community only as Dewar (1980:42) observed:

God, Greed, Gold and the Flag motivated all settler activity. Amongst this strongly class-conscious imperialist group, the indigenous African was generally considered a backward, illiterate heathen unworthy of social intercourse as an equal, fit only for menial labour and the object of charitable works.... The distinct racial differences of colour and appearance served to emphasise ethnic cultural differences and to facilitate the creation of unsympathetic stereotypes...The apparent and obvious ‘differentness’ (sic) between the two groups progressively exacerbated inter-group relations, reinforced attitudes and justified planning polices of separate development.

During the Federation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi), from 1953-1963, there were some half-hearted attempts at non-racism under the ‘partnership’ racial policy but these were confined to service in the public service in Southern Rhodesia and they did not spill over into geographical issues and social contact (ibid). After the break up of the federation in 1963, the new white minority government under Ian Smith ushered in a new era, the UDI, which saw a tightening of the racial policies and an increase in the surveillance of white residential areas to keep blacks out permanently. The logic of UDI was to curtail any liberal racial tendencies with regard to the governance of the country.
Tait (1997:154) explains how the colonial powers were able to control mobilisation, movement, and utilisation of African workers by sheer political, military and administrative force. The degree of African involvement in the capitalist sector was regulated by taxation, resettlement programmes, or by destructive intervention into indigenous subsistence production systems so as to create a dependency on monetary income. These mechanisms were manipulated by legal means such as the terms of labour or by pass laws that forced migrant labour to return to the subsistence sector (Evans 1997). Colonial rule in the rural areas was contradictory as the traditional productive system had to be maintained because it served as the reproductive base for the circulatory labour migration to urban areas and yet its destruction was necessary to get the men to go to work. A complex and contradictory legal framework was established to sustain the colonial economy that backed the colonial religion.

**The Development of African Housing**

All the new urban settlements established after the 1890 conquest over the indigenous chiefs required African labour. The Africans were coerced into working for the settlers through the establishment of taxes (hut and cattle taxes), which required them to seek employment to raise the money (Devittie 1974). The African men were considered as single males which meant that single accommodation was provided but the influence of the cash economy caused some changes in the families’ lifestyle and some began to bring their families into urban areas. Colonial era policies defined blacks as temporary citizens in urban areas and this was legally effected through laws such as the Land Apportionment Act (no 30 of 1930) which divided the country into African or black and European or white areas with all urban areas designated as white areas (ibid). Blacks were in urban areas for the sole purpose of employment after which they would retire to their rural homes. The provision of housing tied to employment safeguarded the government’s ability to prevent permanent urbanisation of the workforce and it kept wages low (Rakodi and Withers 1993:26). The diversification of the colonial economy required more African labour and this increased the African population in urban areas and Africans living illegally openly evaded restrictions to residence (Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni 1999).
The mobility of African women was an unpredicted phenomenon (Barnes 1999; Muchena 1980). How to deal with African women in urban areas became a problem for the colonial policy because the Native Commissioners were at a loss as to how to apply their regulations and rules such as the 1889 Vagrancy Act and the Pass Consolidation Act of 1901 to women. The laws were applied to ‘natives’ who were defined as male and they also applied to urban areas only (Barnes 1999:97). Urban and rural men pleaded with the state to institute measures that would control female mobility into urban areas and in 1931, the Chief Native Commissioner took new initiatives to discourage women from entering town. Vagrancy laws were to be enforced strongly on women and lists of those ‘Native Females Alleged to be Prostitutes’ or those who earned a living by ‘doubtful means’ were compiled and the records were kept by the police (ibid:99).

The women were often rounded up⁹ and sent back to their rural areas and the state believed it was working in the best interests of the native society as stated in one of its clauses in the 1936 Natives Registration Act: “To safeguard Native Society, especially its womankind”. Barnes (1999a) argues that this clause was used to maintain the patriarchal nature of the African society and to limit the influx of African women into urban areas by pretending to protect their morality in urban zones that were dominated by African men. This moratorium meant housing could only be allocated to males but the passing of new legislation much later made it possible for females who were assisted by their white employers to get tied housing too. This was frowned upon by the African community as traditionally, it was unacceptable for a woman to own a house on her own. Amazingly enough, the more controlling the system became, the more the women flooded the urban areas and resisted their deportation to rural areas by simply returning again (Barnes 1999a). The rounding up of illegal town dwellers also extended to males and even children such that many resorted to sleeping away from their homes at night to avoid detection. Therefore a house in town did not guarantee security, which eroded the little space that had been carved out for the urban Africans. The same defiance was to be experienced again after 1980 when squatters refused to vacate areas they would have occupied illegally.
Allowing a significant proportion of Africans to reside in urban areas proved to be economically beneficial to the white community as a surplus population of job-seekers sustained capitalistic productive efforts (Tait 1997:153). This was essential because in times of economic crises, workers could be dismissed and rehired afterwards directly from the townships without the need to re-launch recruitment schemes in the African rural homes.\textsuperscript{10} The 1930 depression affected the white working class badly and led to the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1934 which formalised racial discrimination in urban jobs. In 1936, the Native Registration Act was passed which required all blacks to possess valid registration documents only obtainable if they were legitimately employed. This law was backed by the 1889 Vagrancy Act, which permitted authorities to evict unemployed blacks, and sent them back to the rural areas of origin (Devittie 1974). At the same time, the agricultural land for each African family was limited by the Land Husbandry Act (1951) such that the blacks had to search for employment to augment their depleted subsistence agricultural produce.

These laws fuelled tension over space between the races as the blacks were legally denied the enjoyment of the fruits of their labour in towns. The Morris Carter Commission, established to examine the land issue, reported in 1925 that the municipal native locations and townships could never satisfy “the requirements of all sections of the native urban population” (Southern Rhodesia 1925). The report recommended that only those natives working for Europeans should live in urban locations and that native townships in native areas or reserves should be established to provide the necessary urban environment for ‘detribalised’ Africans and a few of these were eventually established. The inconsistencies and contradictions of colonial policies concerning African development reflected white uncertainty over the ideology of racism, and years down the line, the new Zimbabwe government experienced the same inconsistencies reflecting its doubts over the ideology of socialism against the competing capitalism pushed for by the International Monetary Fund from 1981. For instance, a major contradiction was that it wanted to uphold equality in housing allocation through a state controlled-market mechanism (Tait 1997).
In the British colonies, the London Colonial Office, in its traditional paternalistic fashion, began in the late twenties to raise queries on the social welfare of Africans and colonial administrators had to take into account development plans that involved investment in facilities for Africans in urban areas (Tait 1997:154). New town ordinances were passed in which the African worker was permitted to reunite with his family in urban residences and was granted a permanent stay for the duration of his working life (ibid). Industrial developments after the Second World War triggered a heavy influx of Africans into town which led to the passing of the Native Urban Areas Accommodation and Registration Act (no.6 of 1946). The act limited the residents occupying any city space to labourers and their spouses and children. The Act also required employers either to provide free accommodation on approved private premises or to hire accommodation in the townships for their employees. If they hired accommodation, then the employer was responsible for the rent. Accommodation in town was thus tied to employment and had to be vacated when the occupier left his place of employment (Musekiwa 1994:51). Unemployment meant no recognition as a town's person, therefore no accommodation could be accessed without this status (Mutamiri 1991:2).

The type of accommodation provided for those not accommodated on white property was thus single accommodation in native locations or townships adjoining European areas and did not cater for families. With time, this arrangement complicated the enforcement of the Land Apportionment Act and the consequent amendment resulted in the Land Tenure Act (no 55 of 1969), which allowed rigid control over the indigenous population in towns (ibid). This new law emphasized the necessity of establishing African townships with local authorities also required to provide adequate housing for urban based blacks who had families. Though this was an official Act, the municipalities were reluctant to provide decent accommodation for blacks to purchase hence developments were very slow, sporadic and frustrating (Musekiwa 1994:47). The opening of Kambuzuma township in 1963 was the first step in the relaxation of the tenure legislation and from then on, half-hearted attempts were made to create a permanent urban African population (Tobaiwa 1990:2).
It was only in the mid-fifties that the government realised that most of the local authorities were failing to cope with the influx of Africans in urban areas and the increasing demand of accommodation for the married (ibid). In this period, the Todd government, a liberal government, erected thousands of houses in government owned townships in the larger centres (Butcher 1986). St. Mary’s in Chitungwiza was started in 1956 to cater for the airport workers. Dzivaresekwa, located thirteen kilometres west of Harare, was developed in 1961 to accommodate domestic workers in the north-western European suburbs. Mabvuku and Tafara were developed east of the city centre, Glen Norah was located in the south east and Mufakose in the west. All townships fell within a similar radius of the city centre reflecting the regime’s policy of locating Africans as far away as possible from European residential areas.

Public sector urban development and housing policy response in Africa in general during the fifties and sixties were primarily concerned with providing a minimum standard of shelter and services for the African population in order to protect the public health of the whites (ibid). The era made use of standardized match-box type houses using technologies and materials suited for mass production (Smit 1995). Surveying and servicing costs were minimised by neatly laying out the houses. The ultimate aim was to ensure order and control. Policies of the period were primarily motivated by the desire to ensure the sustained reproduction of labour power in the cities (Evans 1995). This emphasis on single type accommodation contributed significantly to the current shortages in housing urban dwellers.

Up to the sixties, urban African townships were the locus of the anti-colonial struggle and they provided the space for African associational life even though African organisational politics was marginalised after the locus was moved to the rural areas with the start of the liberation struggle (Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni 1999:1). Associational life for Africans was characterised by discontinuities as colonialism and settlers destroyed all old structures and created new ones thus effectively destroying the social space within which black organisations could contest white hegemony (Nordlund 1996:19). Private houses filled that gap by providing alternative space. Owning a house could elevate one amongst the
Africans’ social circles and more importantly, it also provided the nationalists with venues for political meetings, which were always rotated amongst different houses to avoid detection as one stood to lose the house if they got caught. Officially acceptable and tolerated African associational life was confined to savings schemes and to the sustenance of traditional life such as burial societies. But first and foremost, owning a house opened the door to many opportunities; it provided a means of earning an income and supplementing the income earned from either formal or informal employment. It was a base for engaging in informal trade and when pressure for accommodation increased after 1939, house owners took in lodgers who would occupy one room and they would pay the owner of the house a monthly rental. Secondly, it provided access to public schools for one’s children. Overall, it gave hope to the Africans of mobility from their subject status to at least ‘second class citizens’.

In 1961, the Land Apportionment Act was amended twice (nos. 37 and 66 of 1961) to regularise a number of anomalies in the legislation and to provide for the introduction of home-ownership schemes in the municipal townships (Tobaiwa 1990). However, limited financing of African housing militated against the mass transfer of urban houses to Africans and only a handful could afford the full cost of a house and land. Also Europeans objected strongly to having native locations near their residential areas. This resulted in their residences being located far from their work places and this increased costs for the Africans to commute to work. Amenities for the Africans such as clinics, recreational centres and their welfare services were financed by the Africans themselves through levies on the sale of beer in the townships (Musekiwa 1993). Europeans were clearly unwilling to subsidise African housing even though they required their labour.

In 1971, the government relinquished all responsibility for the administration of all its peri-urban high-density locations (African townships) to the municipality. By the mid-seventies, the housing situation in the African townships had deteriorated considerably with demand for housing rising continuously and rural-urban migration triggered by the liberation war worsened the situation. This pressure saw the mushrooming of informal settlements to the south of the city and the government intervened to remove the squatters.
(Tait 1997). The council was forced to initiate innovative low cost housing schemes. These consisted of a core house comprising of a washing area, cooking area and one tiny bedroom on a two hundred square metre stand. The rest of the house had to be completed by the owner within ten years and even though Africans scrambled for these houses, they criticised their cost and location which was right at the periphery of the city such that transport costs were high for the residents since most of them mostly worked in the city, twenty-two kilometres away (Mutamiri 1991).

**Analysis of the Colonial Housing Delivery Practices**

Service delivery in the colonial state departed from the Weberian model and factors other than race also came into play. As a collectively defined racial group, race determined the state’s priorities in housing provision and the quality, but there was equal treatment for the racial group. However, at the individual level, non-bureaucratic behaviour manifested itself in several ways. Whereas proof of employment was the only official criterion, ethnic affiliations tended to influence access to housing with migrant labourers usually being the most favoured. As aliens, their right to residence could be revoked at any time which made them vulnerable and forced them to be submissive at all times. They were the perfect image of subservience that the settlers wanted to promote. Also, if one belonged to a tribe favoured by the District Superintendent allocating houses, then chances of accessing a house sooner increased. When Africans were in charge of allocation, they tended to give preference to their tribesmen such that a pattern could be seen in where the Zezurus were accommodated, the Malawians\(^{13}\) and the Manyikas.\(^{14}\) Deference was another extra-legal criterion. How a house-seeker presented himself to the decision makers mattered a lot and if one was perceived to be a potential troublemaker, then delays were unavoidable.

Recommendation from a white employer was another extra-legal criterion that facilitated access to housing and land. From as early as 1913, Africans who attempted to apply for garden plots within the vicinity of urban areas were only recognised if their applications were channelled through their employers (Thornton 1999:29). This, according to Thornton, made the acquisition of residential plots a reward for long-serving wage earners of various firms in town. It became for some, a form of gratuity for unquestioning service and
loyalty. For example, the Beira and Mashonaland Railway Company applied successfully on behalf of their Chief Messenger whom they had employed for a number of years and whom they described as “the type of native we should be encouraging” (ibid). The tradition of gift giving thus began to take on a new and different dimension for the Africans who usually gave gifts as tribute and for other traditional reasons. Ordinary Africans without traditional positions of authority were now on the receiving end of the gift-giving practice after being defined as deserving such treatment by the whites.

The whites gave access to land or housing for loyalty whilst in employment and indirectly for protection from the legal and administrative system. The important issue was that, an avenue had been opened to circumvent the laid down procedures for Africans to acquire housing or land as a recommendation from a white employer ensured access to state resources. This particularistic behaviour was probably pursued because of the lack of legitimacy that surrounded housing allocation and it aided in the development of a subservient African. The idea was to cultivate more grateful Africans thus guarding against and keeping a check on an undesirable African urban population, but still, there was no social justice in the way the state allocated its resources and this lesson was not lost on the nationalists after independence. In the same vein, they quickly learnt to use state resources to reward their supporters and to mobilise support for their policies. Identifying with the liberation struggle later became one of the unofficial criterion in resource allocation.

**The Colonial Legacy in Housing Provision**

In spite of all the changes and tolerance towards African presence in towns, Tait (1997:155-156) points out two issues that remained unaffected: First, legally, Africans remained second-class citizens without the right of permanent residence or freedom of movement although they now had the permission to live in towns with their families for the duration of their working life as they were now expected to leave after retirement. Secondly, with respect to residential circumstances, the population growth of African dwellers was channelled into the already existing geographical and spatial patterns laid out for native housing. However, new residential categories and housing standards were created for Africans. Settlement areas and housing conditions attained marked internal
differentiation according to whether Africans qualified for municipal housing, for employers’ housing or were singled out for unauthorised housing areas. In other words, the urban segregationist policy remained, now only to become moulded around the emerging class differentiation among Africans (ibid).

Postcolonial housing provision continued to be based on the original colonial layouts that were incorporated into new master plans (Rakodi and Withers 1993; Tait 157). For Tait, problems arose since the dichotomous, segregationist colonial structures were not questioned but were functionalised by the new elites in the context of their new ideology of socialism. These principles of segregation of urban areas are what are largely referred to as the ‘heritage of the colonial city’. Tait (1997:156) sums up these developments:

> Segregationist notions were to a large extent formative for the newly emerged urban social relationships among Africans to which tribal values did not provide sufficient counterbalancing orientations: the stereotypes of class and social differentiation were learnt from the principles of power imposed by colonial rule, and they were derived from the attitudes of European residents who often adhered to apartheid social perceptions. But the heritage of the ‘colonial city’ is not the exclusive key to understanding prevailing .... provisions and the uncurbed dynamics of growing urban disparities. The observed failure of sovereign African governments to decolonise the African metropolises and to develop an appropriate concept of an African city in accordance with given needs and cultural traditions, clearly relates to the wider economic and social disparities pertaining to the formation of post-colonial peripheral capitalism and its urban based power structures.

Whilst the colonial government felt it was its duty to liberate Rhodesia from the Africans, the new independent government sought to liberate Zimbabwe from the colonial mode of governance and this is reflected in the ambiguities present in postcolonial housing delivery. Housing provision and other urban developments continued to be built around racial, cultural patterns of differentiation and party politics exacerbated the problems as party identity was set to become a criterion for access to some public resources.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has attempted to demonstrate the establishment of selective oriented service delivery institutions and how they skewed the services in favour of the white community.
This lesson was not lost to the new independent era elites who had made as many promises to the equally many constituencies that had served them and that would remain crucial for their staying in power. The discussion shows that service delivery in the colonial period was shaped by the tensions between the struggle for hegemony by the colonial settler government and the fight for recognition and acceptance as citizens by the blacks.

At the national level, race was the extra-legal bureaucratic criterion for allocating housing resources. Africans were in one clear category and the struggle for access to resources took place within that confined space. Bureaucratic rules as set by the governing system were thus adhered to. At the individual level, the colonial bureaucracy considered employment as the most important and it was the only written down criterion, followed by white employer recommendation. There was no correspondence between the ideal and what existed on the ground, a trend that continued to exist in the new independence dispensation. This erratic behaviour was a result of the ambiguous legal framework the bureaucracy operated in. Housing in urban areas can thus be viewed as ‘sites of struggle’ because it was the fight for space that culminated in a liberation war. It was also the space that conferred a more desirable citizenship status.

Ranger (1999:62) uses the concept ‘invented traditions’ to explain the colonial attitudes of ethnic stereotyping in discrimination. Whites categorised Africans by tribes and decided what each was good for in employment and this also determined other economic and social benefits. For example, he explains how blacks manipulated this stereotyping and would take on Zulu or Portuguese identities in order to land specific jobs. This means that blacks would reformulate their original identity to suit the circumstances that would ensure their economic survival and access to other opportunities. This assumption of survival ensuring identities was to be replicated time and time again during the country’s transition process to a majority rule democracy. Identity formation in response to demands for compliance started early in the colonial era. For the Africans, citizenship status was defined in the context of residential space they occupied and this resulted in the emergence of double identities. Double in the sense that Africans very often assumed one identity to access
public goods and services (the socio-economic identity through employment) and another (the political identity) to change their subject status.

The ambiguities that had existed in the colonial housing legal framework were reflected in the new post 1980 housing policy environment. The loopholes in administrative laws including the institutions of acquiring compliance were thus inherited with the net effect of causing turmoil in the housing delivery process. The advantages of ambiguities were that they could be interpreted and bent to suit different circumstances and in doing so, they sanctioned discrimination against others. The numerous laws and regulations succeeded in creating distance between the white supremacist residential space and the labouring blacks but it also became a breeding ground for paternalistic tendencies in post-colonial administration. The same paternalism reappears in the “liberation culture” in the sense that those who led the struggle tend to patronise those seeking legitimate services from the state. A selective orientated organisational culture and administrative behaviour had been institutionalised by the time the new independent state took over. The “liberation culture” that later developed in the bureaucracy had lessons to draw from as the ambiguous operating environment endorsed unfairness. A fusion of the war time experiences combined with the inherited inequities further nurtured the “liberation culture”.

The new state’s orientation required new political identities and their development could be realised faster through the allocation of resources such as land. The leads to an important question: What identities did the “liberation culture” require? This question is answered in the next two chapters.

Endnotes

1 Colonial practices varied and were determined by a combination of factors ranging from direct to indirect rule, the assimilation of indigens, as well as the number of settlers and natural resources in the colony.
2 Some authors, Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton University Press, New Jersey and Masunungure, E. (1998a) Africanisation of the Public Service in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, State Power Consolidation and Patron Clientelism, Unpublished Paper, Department of Political Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, question the system of indirect rule. The colonial state required instruments to penetrate the rural areas and naturally they turned to existing institutions, secondly the Native Commissioners' presence at the local level implies the presence of the central government at the local level. Can the use of traditional institutions be then termed indirect rule? If so, then, can the use of the same institutions by the new independent states be also termed indirect rule?
Authority and legitimacy go hand in hand but here I am questioning electoral legitimacy for the African and not legitimacy derived from performance, an issue that arises later in the post colonial period when the public looks across time to compare current regimes with the colonial state’s performance in service delivery.

The Ian Smith government proclaimed UDI after the break up of the Federation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in 1964. UDI was characterised by a high degree of paternalism and the strong repression of African political aspirations. The idea was to prevent the country from going the Zambian and Malawian way of attaining majority rule. The British government condemned this action but did not use any force to reverse the decision. Instead, sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia which made the country more determined to maintain its status with help which could only come from the equally racist apartheid South Africa.

South African historians have documented the segregation policies of the apartheid states. The native was permitted to enter the white cities and towns only to minister to the needs of the white man and was expected to depart when he finished his service. See Wilkinson, P. (1998) “Housing Policy in South Africa”, Habitat International, vol.22 no.3, pp215-229.

Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. (1993) Land Housing and Urban Development in Zimbabwe, Occasional Papers in Planning Research, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Cardiff, define social control as being exercised by means of official socialisation, institutional incorporation, cooptation, accommodation and coercion. Official socialisation refers to the discourse of development by which an official ideology and appropriate values and attitudes are diffused theoretically. In such premises, social mobility was prescribed by the state which legitimised inequality.

The federation broke up after Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) became independent.

Night raids or inspection ‘spaktion’ for illegal Africans in urban residential areas took place at night.

The recruitment exercises were usually violent resulting in the destruction of homes to flush the men out to the cities when their labour was required.

These were house owners in the sense that they had the agreement with the municipality. A lodger is a person who secures accommodation in a house owned by someone else. Unlike with other forms of accommodation arrangements, lodgers share the same house with the owner. Many complain of too many restrictions imposed by owners who argue that these are designed to cut down household costs.

Interview with an African senior citizen in Highfield township.

Many Malawians trekked to Rhodesia from the early 1930s onwards to seek employment on the white settler establishments. Most ended up as farm labourers or domestic servants.

Interviews in Highfield.

Emphasis added.

Chapter 4

Housing the Masses in Zimbabwe

Introduction

This chapter presents findings on how victims of a socialist project avoided marginalisation through the deliberate engagement of those who control the resources. This organisational capacity of the poor as well as the initiative was very much a response to the global discourse on housing provision by the poor and it threatened the state’s position on resource allocation. To fulfil the promises of the struggle, the independent state had defined its major challenge as the deconstruction of the colonial mentality, reshaping ‘contaminated colonial’ identities, defining a new kind of citizenship and the development of a political culture that would under-gird the socialist rhetoric (Appiah 1995:2). The goal was clearly to create a citizenship with a socialist identity. The inevitable fact that it had to step into colonial authoritarian shoes of governance and ambiguities complicated its tasks as it meant a prolonged continuance with colonial institutions and processes. The ideological shifts in the inherited institutions required adjustment of the bureaucratic authoritarian nature of the state, and yet such a movement to a democratic state by a regime with a military bureaucratic type of organization proved difficult. In this chapter, the emphasis is on the politicisation of the bureaucracy, that is, the inculcation of the “liberation culture”, the institutional redesigning for equitable service delivery and the impact of these processes on housing provision.

The centralisation of power completed by the former colonial state continued to serve the hegemonic agenda of the ruling party. To consolidate its hold on society and impose the identity it desired, all socio-political organisation had to take place within the government’s realm which could not be separated from the party especially at the policy level. Perceptions of the state derived from the colonial era, that the state serves the pursuit of one’s interests, and the liberators’ belief in ruling perpetually as a reward for liberating the country, nurtured the spread of the “liberation culture”. This makes it mandatory to examine the historical background of the housing delivery institutions and
more so, of the agents. Through this historical analysis, I intend to explain the striking continuities that have had a bearing on housing delivery.

The organisation of party politics in Zimbabwe embraced all categories of people and cut across classes especially in urban areas where most members of the working class were not directly affected by the war. These groups needed to be mobilised urgently and the allocation of resources was the best modus operandum for creating and maintaining a political support base. Those Sandbrook (1985) calls the marginalised labouring poor,¹ became quite active in mobilising the urban public to rally behind the party and playing the surveillance role with regard to party issues. The emerging indigenous businessmen as well as the working class were both significant in the development of housing after independence.² Many of them aligned themselves with the party to insure and secure the prosperity of their business. Other beneficiaries included a significant proportion of those who participated in the liberation struggle and even those who had ventured into business independently (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). The interests of the ruling party therefore need to be explored in order to understand the nature of housing policies the new government came up with.

This makes it possible to answer why the urban local government institutions carry out specific housing related tasks and why the official actors behave in a particular way against a background where the state continuously projected a nationalist-populist image. All service delivery was envisaged to take place within the inherited institutional structures that were originally designed to cope with relatively slow growth for different races (clients). Zimbabwe inherited and comfortably pursued the colonial regimes’ commitment to orderly urban development and economic activity (Rakodi and Withers 1995:372). According to the two, this was aided by the strict anti-squatting policy as well as the relatively higher proportion of a formal workforce, and a well-defined housing finance system through the banks. Also some commendable local administrative capacity made it possible for public agencies to deliver services.
Bearing in mind that under the colonial regime the residential circumstances of Africans were perceived as an integral part of the racist and segregationist system, it was inevitable that high expectations were raised by the housing policies of the independent government (Tait 1997:209). However, it became clear with time that there was no progress towards achieving an egalitarian society as proposed by the government’s socialist philosophy. Instead, social structures initially encouraged by the colonial state were used by the new ruling elites as reinforcement of their own political and socio-economic interests (ibid). For instance, traditional rulers, who were at first marginalised in the power restructuring game, were later recognised as part of the essential structures for garnering rural votes. Segregation continued between races and classes and was encouraged rather than counteracted by town planning and housing policies. The pattern of residential zoning continued in the new high density areas, and there was a stark difference between these and the privileged spacious housing provision built with state aid by top civil servants and political elites (ibid).

**Politicismation of the Bureaucracy**

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) pointed out the effects of the war in Zimbabwe in 1983, ‘The political experience learnt in fighting a seven year guerrilla war is leading to increasingly repressive measures and an increasing authoritarianism.’ What the EIU disregarded was that as with all colonial regimes, Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) was an autocratic state and this legacy of authoritarianism was embraced by the new political leadership in the new dispensation after independence (Moore 1994). The state had remained in Young’s (1986) words, alien to the core, erected upon a command relationship and shaped by its vocation of domination. Later on the state became placid due to fiscal pressure but still it left little room for any likely contestation.

As can be expected, Zimbabweans who were directly affected by the war were quick to adapt to the liberators’ style of governance. Deference and subservience were encouraged and intimidation and the constant threat of death ensured compliance and patience from the citizens during the war. Decisions in the villages were increasingly left for the guerrilla’s approval, which meant seeking assurance that they were politically acceptable and not
reflecting a different ideology that contradicted the liberators’ (Kriger 1992; Moore 1994; Ranger 1996). And in South Africa’s liberation struggle, to question authority was not just tantamount to rebellion but was treated as such. This was essential since liberation movements aimed to achieve gains for the dispossessed majority through revolutionary mobilisation\(^4\) (Taylor 1997:10). In this atmosphere, innovation, negotiation, compromise and transparency were taboo and so rule through fear became entrenched. This decision-making milieu often caused confusion as contradictory directives were frequently issued.

A new organisational culture thus emerged at the advent of independence. Government departments developed a tendency to wait for most if not all decisions to emanate from higher authorities. The principle of democratic centralism that had been advocated and practiced during the war began to sprout in the bureaucracy. Decisions and resource allocation were increasingly made on how they would reflect on the party. It thus became normal to be rewarded for loyalty and to be denied a service if one’s political orientations were not acceptable and in this way the ‘liberation culture’ was nurtured.

The next step is to understand how this ‘liberation culture’ managed to permeate the public service. This was achieved through politicisation of the public service. Politicisation here means public servants openly aligning themselves with the party in power against the opposition parties (Barlow 1984: 23). Politicisation therefore illuminates how public servants came to define their role and why they act the way they do in service delivery. This does not mean ignoring the role of structures in influencing behaviour of the public servants but several studies have demonstrated this link (Simon 1965; Blau 1963; Lipsky 1980; Peters 1984) and I intend to dwell more on the effects of politicisation.

**Africanisation or Administrative reform?**

In 1981, the Presidential Directive on Africanisation rocked the bureaucracy by hurtling qualified but inexperienced blacks\(^5\) into senior positions. The Public Service Commission was tasked with implementing the directive with the aim of advancing suitably qualified Africans to senior positions\(^6\) and especially to the politically sensitive posts.\(^7\) This led to an immediate withdrawal by most of the white officials. For those who stayed on longer,
professional and ethical tensions mounted almost overnight. The different backgrounds of officials manning the bureaucracy exacerbated the tension. There are those who are called the ‘locals’ who climb the local organisational hierarchy through experience and the ‘cosmopolitans’ who come in at a higher level because of high qualifications, usually degrees. The locals obviously have to teach the cosmopolitans (new superiors) the ropes and this causes resentment. Adherence to rules and regulations would normalise or minimise tensions in professional bureaucracies but in the ‘liberation culture bureaucracy’, fear and intimidation obligated the locals into ready submission since the superiors had qualifications (liberation war credentials) other than formal university degrees. This ‘local cosmopolitan’ struggle has had its own effects on service delivery. Hostilities became the order of the day immediately after independence as one public servant in Zimbabwe put it in 1980;

In 1980, when we started, we were administering with emphasis on power. The rationale was that it was a government system that came about through a war situation, and so a military type of approach was in place. It derived from the party. The threat to the newly-won independence through hostile forces, both external and internal, required government institutions that would demonstrate change…

And another remarked in 1992,

So there was this mutual distrust at first. Then there was the inexperience of the new ministers and the new civil servants. They had to learn on the job and many of us had to do the teaching. This also caused tension as always between teacher and pupil, especially if the pupil is several notches in rank above the teacher. I would say that for the first six months, no one really knew what was going on. I remember that time as a series of never ending meetings.

Masunungure’s (1994a) analysis of the Africanisation project which he terms blackenisation, give an explicit account of the new government’s intentions. For him, blackenisation was designed to counter and neutralise those who, “by the acts of commission or omission might have been unsympathetic to the government’s policies, socialist or otherwise” (1999a:14). Even though this was a constitutional provision to balance national representativity, the net effect was to disable those who might have challenged the state’s intentions. The Presidential Directive thus served as an instrument of power consolidation in as much as it became a mechanism for maintaining a network of patron-client relationships (ibid:15). The party needed something concrete to use in the

The first major task of the party was to gain control of the state machinery. The Presidential Directive, with particular emphasis on African advancement, was issued to allow appointments to senior positions in the army, police, judiciary and civil service of those loyal to the state. Without this control, there was no way the party could guide government in implementing its policies.

Clearly, both trust and distrust were factors in entrenching the “liberation culture”. Furthermore, liberation wartime service in exile made it difficult to question authority. Resource allocation decisions tended to depend more and more on particularistic criteria as illustrated by the case of Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative that is discussed in the next chapter. A retired Zimbabwean white public servant made the following comment during an interview with Weiss (1994), “Civil servants became accustomed to special directives to assist a particular individual or company and began to indulge in similar practices themselves.” Another effect of this political muddling was the abuse of resources. For instance, the then Ministry of National Housing collected vast amounts from civil servants and citizens alike in a Pay-For-Your-House Scheme which did not take off partly because the collected funds were channelled into constructing houses for the political leadership and partly because they were deposited into the bottomless treasury fund (The Independent 1997). After public outcry two years later, the policy was quietly abandoned and some citizens were lucky to get their money refunded. Those that did not get their refunds were quietly allocated state land four years later in a new house provision scheme in which people were encouraged to build their homes. The idea was noble but no mortgage financing was provided to build the houses and the cost of the houses they had initially invested in had more than doubled by then.
Service Delivery in the New Era

The government’s housing policy, aimed at upholding its socialist egalitarian and democratic principles, was stated in the Transitional National Development Plan (1982\83 – 1984\85:1). To realise these goals, five policy measures were adopted: the adoption of free hold tenure (home ownership); the adoption of an aided self-help approach; the establishment of building brigades; the formation of building cooperatives to complement the aided self-help approach; the introduction of rent control regulations and the involvement of the private sector in the provision of low income housing. These required the collaboration of other institutions. A decade later, the government had formulated several ‘housing policies’ which were all justified as augmenting the initially talked about housing policy dubbed ‘Housing For All by Year 2000!’ The piling policies affected the capacity of the implementing authorities who laboured to interpret and draw the parameters for implementation. I now briefly discuss each policy and how it created room for the ‘liberation culture’ to penetrate. An important point to note is that at the time of policy formation, the ‘decision makers’ had neither the time nor the analytic capacity to enable them to assess the magnitude of the housing problem of the urban poor. They were thus not able to identify the poor in the urban black population.

The introduction of rent controls came about because African housing was mostly rented with many of the tenants having lived in the same house for over thirty years. Private property owners were hiking rents at an alarming rate in response to the increased demand for housing after independence. This prompted the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), which was part of the Rent Board, to issue the Rent Regulation (SI 626 of 1982) and according to these regulations, the landlords could not increase rent without approval of the Rent Board. The logic was that rent controls would prevent the transfer of income and wealth from the poor tenants to the rich house owners. This would keep down rental costs of new houses in order to stabilise the cost and volume of house construction (Lindbeck 1967 cited in Makwembere 1998:2). The idea was also to help low income families to compete with other house-seekers in the housing market but the net effect was the withdrawal of private investors in rented housing provision.
Council and government flats and houses were not affected by the rent controls as they were reasonably priced and subsidised but almost all government houses were allocated to returning war veterans\textsuperscript{11} in 1980 who, at the lower level, shared the houses and they never paid for their accommodation. Public housing was not meant for their permanent occupation, but there was silence on the issue. Demobilisation packages had been offered to war veterans in 1980-82 to help them start their reintegration into civilian life. Eventually, the war veterans had to pay for electricity and water. Some moved out when they got married or relocated to elsewhere but some stayed on and in some cases, one got to stay behind and continued to occupy the house. By the time these units were finally sold off by the government in 2000, many war veterans had moved out as they found the cost of running a house in the former white areas unaffordable (Interview 2000). Immediately after independence, the government was concerned with accommodating war veterans and thus had a welfare approach in housing delivery.

Still, the prioritisation of war veterans was evident in the ad-hoc housing policies of the day. The MCPH came up with a Standard Priority System for the allocation and regularising of ownership of houses developed by public funds and its Section 9.1 (a) stated that priority was to be given to the applicant who had lived and worked in that local authority longer than other applicants on the waiting list irrespective of when they had registered. Movement from one employer to another within the same local authority did not affect this criterion, but movement into a different area that lasted for more than twelve months meant a loss of privilege. This section of the policy alone was enough to throw the allocation process into turmoil since the council’s manual system did not provide a system for checks. Again, the immediate clause after this derailed the entire process and all the criteria that had been established was subverted. Section 9.1(b) stated that:

The length of residence in the area does not apply to ex-combatants’ period of absence during the liberation struggle. If an ex-combatant decides to settle in any local authority area and decided to enlist with that particular local authority’s waiting list, then the number of years in the struggle as authenticated by the appropriate authorities should be counted as part of the ex-combatants’ length of stay in that particular local authority area.
Proving who was a genuine ex-combatant was difficult as many people who had been outside the country for different reasons claimed to have been in exile for political reasons and since they were working with ZANU-PF, they felt they also qualified to be categorised as ex-combatants. The young men and women (mujibhas and zvimbwidos) who had helped the ex-combatants with information and other logistical arrangements also demanded to be identified as ex-combatants and they therefore presented themselves as such. Local authority officials were uncertain about these various identities and because these groups could prove their participation in the struggle, they were given top priority in many allocative decisions. Well-known or connected party supporters were also lumped unofficially into this category and catered for under the provisions of the Standard Priority System. The ‘liberation culture’ was clearly in motion. By 1998, the government had made a special provision to have 20 percent of all land allocations set aside for war veterans after arm twisting and strong lobbying by the group.

The aided self-help schemes and the building brigades were initially designed to work hand in hand. This facility provided space for the activist approach but unfortunately, it could not work in a heavily controlled policy environment with many curbs on associational activities. The schemes arose out of the reasoning that beneficiaries to the schemes would mobilise resources, such as labour, savings, building materials, transport and tools with minimum assistance from the local authority (Harare City Council 1983). The local authority provided tracks of land divided into plots that were supported with basic services like water, roads and sewerage. Individuals would apply for land and when it became available, the allocating authority would inform them. In 1983, the MCPH issued a circular (no.8) instructing all local authorities to stop using private contractors for all the housing schemes that were funded by the government.

The local authorities were to employ persons with skills that met the requirements of the construction industry. By 1984, thirty-three local authorities had established their own building brigades but still the construction costs were not affordable for many house seekers, which left the cooperatives as the next best option. The building brigades approach was also aimed at alleviating unemployment that was high amongst ex-
combatants and the urban youth. This implied the engagement of semi-skilled labour for the high-density areas where construction demand was highest. Most of the builders were recruited from the party ranks. The lack of skills resulted in sub-standard houses and the public was not impressed with the brigades. It quietly ignored them and resorted to the use of private contractors. Even the local authorities were unhappy with the standard of work and the council’s building inspectors disqualified a lot of their buildings (Harare City Council 1983).

The policy of creating housing cooperatives was adopted with the aim of encouraging people to uphold the egalitarian and equity principles of the new government. Home seekers were expected to pool resources together to achieve affordability and were also expected to work collectively to construct each member’s house in the African communal tradition of nhimbe (Makwembere 1998). The only complication was that both labour and ability to afford financial contributions to the scheme determined membership. A more detailed discussion of this approach of housing delivery is presented in the next chapter.

A Divided National Housing Policy?
In the foreword to the National Housing Policy, the President admitted that since 1980, the government had been allocated huge amounts for the housing sector to no avail (National Task Force Housing: 2000):

It has been proved beyond doubt that Zimbabwe has enough resources in terms of both financial and professional skills to meet its housing requirements. What is lacking is the mechanism to marshal these resources where they can be utilised for housing development.

Again, twenty-two years later, both the central government and the local government levels continue to allocate land for housing under presumably the same policy. And yet from as early as 1985, the government acknowledged these problems, “Administrative and policy confusion between council and central government delayed planning for housing delivery immediately after independence” (Transitional National Development Plan 1983: 374).
In 1997, a National Housing Convention brought all actors involved in housing delivery (private, public and NGO’s) together to draft a national housing policy. A housing task force was immediately set up to work on this but somehow the momentum died down before anything was done. A National Housing Trust, composed of stakeholder technical teams responsible for coordinating housing delivery was also established as well as plans for a National Housing Bank to fund low-income housing. None of these noble plans managed to take off. The then Minister of Housing, Ignatious Chombo, was blamed for destroying three years of preliminary work by setting up parallel independent committees to duplicate the work agreed on at the convention. As a result, a coherent national housing policy never came to fruition and the policy remained fragmented until early 2000. The lack of political commitment was clear from the very beginning and whereas it may have looked like inefficiency then, it all began to make sense after the June 2000 parliamentary elections when war veterans seized and allocated urban land to themselves and to other loyal ZANU-PF members and supporters.

A national housing policy was finally produced late in 2000 and only became functional at the beginning of 2003. The policy came about as a result of the government’s commitment to the 1996 Habitat Agenda. The Agenda endorsed the universal goal of ensuring adequate shelter for all and making human settlements safer, healthier and more liveable, equitable, sustainable and productive. The Habitat Agenda was ratified by national governments during the United Nations’ Commission on the Human Rights Settlements Second Conference in Turkey. All governments reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the principles of the Agenda through national policies and legislation.

The new housing policy was linked to economic development such that housing delivery would be recognised as contributing to the economic recovery of the country. Though the policy outlines strategies for addressing low income housing needs, it still fell short of allocating resources to the process (for example, through subsidies and credit facilities). This policy is thus likely to marginalize the poor even more! Also the major institutions, the National Housing Finance Bank and the National Housing Trust that are envisaged to deal with the housing process, were yet to be set up in 2002. As with many of Zimbabwe’s
policies, the national housing document dwells on the problems besetting the housing industry and goes into the history of housing delivery without spelling out distinct policies in what is going to be done, when and for whom. A welcome development was that the policy discarded the customary norm that women cannot own property in their own rights. However, the problem is that Section 23 (3) of the constitution still allows for discrimination against women in terms of customary law even though they can be granted security of tenure in the housing delivery system.

The 2000 housing policy was formulated in the absence of comprehensive information on housing needs in the country. Some pre-independence sections were retained in toto such as the Building Act of 1979. This act established the Housing and Guarantee Fund that provided security to civil servants, government members, and non-civil servants to enable them to acquire loans from building societies to purchase homes. The minister was the sole manager of this fund as well as the National Housing Fund that was meant to advance funds for housing to local authorities, cooperatives, institutions and individuals (Munyuki and Jasi 2002). The absence of procedural guidelines in all these instances left the system open to abuse especially as section four of the act specified that “any person” qualified for consideration. There was no limit in the numbers of guarantees for loans which an individual could get and this absence of procedural fairness was used for self-enrichment by top office bearers who got multiple guarantees. Each applicant got different conditions depending on who they were. And the absence of special redistribution clauses meant the minister could go on pretending that the poor did not exist and yet many undeserving people benefited under the vague criteria. The state has no obligations to pursue certain economic goals that would benefit the under-privileged classes. There is no provision for the right to housing in the constitution and the constitution does not recognise any social redistribution rights (ibid).

Since 1980, the fragmented post-independence housing policy had emphasized home ownership as the major form of tenure with a small percentage being developed for rental purposes. From 1982 to 2000, the United States International Aid Agency (USAID) and the World Bank facilitated housing programmes for the low-income category and their
approaches dominated housing delivery in Harare.\textsuperscript{16} There was no major housing policy until donor fatigue set in and the new 2000 policy coincided with the end of the two donor projects. Throughout this period, the lack of a clear legislative, institutional and administrative framework resulted in overlaps, duplication and confusion among the housing delivery institutions and this resulted in wastage. Actors in the relevant departments at the different levels have had to work in an environment of ambiguity as central government continues to exercise strong influence.

The local authorities and public institutions inherited strong ideological commitments to the control of physical development and economic activity in urban areas from the settler regime. The government kept the residential areas segregated on the basis of building standards\textsuperscript{17} and income levels even though the government eliminated the parallel systems of representation. There was no commitment to reducing the differential standards between spatially segregated residential areas (Rakodi and Withers 1993). In 1980, the new government adopted the ‘One City’ concept as a restructuring approach that required departments to provide common services that were to be shared by all city residents irrespective of race or area (Musekiwa 1993). The concept emphasized the equal distribution of services and facilities to all sectors of the community and provided uniform tariffs and a common rating system. The permanent secretary of the ministry of housing stated in 1983,

\begin{quote}
Ours being a people oriented government bent on achieving socialist goals, our housing policy is a redistributive mechanism for redressing colonial income and wealth inequalities. The geographic polarization of the nation reminiscent of the colonial days is being dismantled.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Noble as this idealism was, the political will was not readily forthcoming.

The council deals with housing allocation to urban residents only and it uses its own procedures. It acquires land, services the areas by providing basic infrastructure and recreational facilities. It then allocates the land according to a waiting list that includes both low and high-income earners. The two groups are separated according to land availability and affordability. The low-income earners get land in former African
townships and the high-income earners in the new suburbs that are designed according to former colonial standards in former European areas that are now called the low-density areas. Local authorities have used their housing waiting list as the sole instrument for the allocation of serviced residential stands. In order to be registered, one has to fill in a form and pay an annual registration fee to the authority and service is on a first-come first-served basis. Each year the register is updated manually when one pays the registration fee. The initial registration date remains a person’s priority date for allocation. Other criteria for allocation is: salary (a set amounts demarcates the boundary between the low and high incomes), formal employment status, proof that one is an urban dweller,\textsuperscript{19} proof of registration on the council’s waiting listing, and usually, it is better to be married since single people who attempt to get land are questioned thoroughly and are still asked to produce proof of marriage or of divorce.\textsuperscript{20} However, this only occurs when a single woman’s application manages to get considered.

In Harare, many public actors in the municipalities are involved in providing a single house and the same procedures apply to big projects as well. Every single application goes through a maze of departments and the net effect is long delays in decision-making. The diagram below shows the departments that assess every application and they are not organized hierarchically.

**Figure 3 Processing an Application**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Office</td>
<td>land ownership &amp; agreement of sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Office</td>
<td>verification of existence of land and dispensation of certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>granting building permits &amp; ensuring compliance with Town Planning Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Planning</td>
<td>survey of stands boundaries &amp; checking building lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Survey</td>
<td>sewer connection to main lines, water provision &amp; compliance with building by-laws, fee payments, supervision of construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sewerage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City architects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City treasurer (if process went to tender)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuation and Estates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>land costing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal office</td>
<td>assess implementation strategies/environmental impact assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, the government uses other criteria to allocate land irrespective of whether one is an urban dweller or not. It has a lease arrangement where ‘the poor’ can also buy land. And it has its own low-income target group. The only critical requirement is proof of availability of funds for development. Whilst this also makes it possible to cater for the informally employed people, single women with money and those who choose not to register on the council waiting list, it is also open to abuse for patronage purposes. The government services its own land and allocates it in liaison with the city council to prevent the double allocation of land to the same person. Only the government checks on council allocation but the council does not check on or question government allocation. Hence, it is very possible for one to have both council and state land.

Information on government land allocation is privy to only those who know about the scheme and it appears to target senior public servants and politicians. There is no waiting list and applicants are screened with each housing project. This leaves far too much room for interference in the decision making process. It also makes it possible to allocate land to specific individuals according to extra legal criteria. Though both the government and the council deal with the same urban dweller and the same Surveyor General’s office, land provision is duplicated and the government finds it desirable to keep a strong hand in the allocation process. For example, all new housing developments in Glen Lorne and Philadelphia were allocated to senior party and government officials and connected businessmen who are closely aligned to the party (Interview-Machipisa 2000).

**Rearranging the Same Old Institutions**

Immediately after independence, the government went about rearranging housing delivery institutions. Most of the changes were aimed at eradicating racial biases. This had been made clear during the struggle that this would be the final step in legitimising the new order and completing national liberation. Some housing functions were moved from the Department of Works that previously dealt with former white residential areas to the Department of Housing and Community Services (DHCS) that reported to the Health and Housing Committee. This new department had four divisions that supposedly had different functions but there were strong duplications. The DHCS division took over the overall
administration of housing allocations, handling agreements of sale and of loans between purchasers and building societies, transfers, cessations and cash builders. It also provides information and orientation to new and prospective purchasers on various housing schemes, monitors projects and ensures that beneficiaries make maximum use of the aided self-help schemes.

The department also liaises with donor agencies like the World Bank and USAID in the administration of housing projects in the city. Within this division, the most important office is that of the Senior Area Administrative Officer who is responsible for the administration of the housing waiting list and the selection of potential beneficiaries. The office is also responsible for the administration and management of new housing schemes; interviewing, screening and informing beneficiaries on aspects and benefits of the schemes to find out if registered persons wish to be considered for particular schemes. This is only done after an analysis of an applicant’s income and checking out if the applicant has no other registered property with the registrar of deeds. The same office also monitors illegal settlements in all residential areas in the city and either evicts or regularises their occupation by including them on the waiting list.

The institutional rearrangement process allowed confusion in the operational procedures of many departments. Opportunists took advantage of this chaos and for instance, with regard to rented accommodation, councillors would constantly recommend to the District Officer to register some occupants irrespective of the home seekers’ priority dates (Chidyausiku undated:29). A tendency to give directives over the telephone also developed and this rendered the waiting list useless. Since its inception, the division was inundated by calls from “superior authorities” to provide housing services to some occupants who did not even appear on the waiting list. The appointments of senior personnel in the DHCS was done by the minister hence to maintain the good links, it became departmental policy not to disappoint the minister (ibid:30). Running an efficient and effective council was thwarted by councillors who refused to increase land prices as they argued that it would unnecessarily burden the low-income group with high mortgage costs. Political expediency logic dominated over cost effective logic because the interference deprived the local
authority with revenue that could have been used for further provision of housing (Musekiwa 1993). These problems, especially the interference, led to the establishment of an Allocations Committee in February 1990 to ensure just allocations.

The Housing Management division dealt with the post allocation phase of housing provision and carried out the following task: drafting leases and purchase agreements; the administration of allocated stands, issuing and the certification of plans as well as effecting transfers from the council to purchasers; the repossession of stands due to default or non-payment and non-development, the sale of rented houses; processing extensions to existing properties of adjacent or vacant stands; monitoring development and the building process in liaison with the District Officers and the Department of Works. In addition, it also carries out research on housing policies and procedures.

On the other hand, the District Administrator manages more or less similar areas. The office is responsible for all the residential properties and related aspects such as housing allocation, development, electricity, water, road works, and storm water drainage. It also collects revenue on rentals and other charges in respect of housing and trading premises. The overall aim is to improve standards of living and expand the revenue base but the fragmentation delays decision-making and opened up opportunities for interference in the system. Compartmentalisation thus eroded the authority of the bureaucrats and the duplication of functions caused bureaucratic inertia.

**Civic Organisation**

Trade unions, the backbone of most of civil society organisation were never part of the liberation struggles and strategies partly due to the exile nature of the operations of ZANU-PF. The four black umbrella trade unions in the country were all affiliated to four different political parties by the end of the seventies. These weak ties meant that the unions, students and church associations had limited track records of active resistance against colonial and settler rule in the country (Nordlund 1996:193). It was thus not a surprise that there was no force to challenge and keep the new government on its toes after 1980. The first five years of independence were characterised by limited civil society activities mimicking the
pattern all over Africa where there was an uneasy relationship between the state and the civil society (Chazan 1988). Most of the activism was by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace that was tracking the dissident war in Matabeleland through its vast parishes and engaging the government by reporting the army’s excesses to the police. From 1980, the government set out to control the trade union by organising it closely under its ever-watchful and paranoid eye. The first umbrella union organization, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was located in the same physical space as the party headquarters and the first secretary general was a political appointee and also the step-brother of the president. Unprecedented strikes in the early years of independence had resulted in the banning of strike action and this weakened the union’s bargaining position (Nordlund 1996). This paternalistic relationship and mobilisation ensured that workers would submit to the authority of ZCTU as they would to the party.

It was therefore not a surprise that the first groups to organise for housing evolved out of trade unions rather than from the residential communities of aspiring home owners. This was because housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe were and have remained largely organised around securing a house only. And by the late eighties, it was apparent that the government’s efforts in housing delivery were unsuccessful. Even though cooperatives predated the independence era, there was an upsurge in their growth in the first years of independence in all areas of development. Encouraged by the government’s socialist orientations, many were organised around income generation projects. The housing cooperatives were therefore a response to the failures of the urban councils to provide housing. Unfortunately for them, as with other civic groups in the country, the ruling party pervades their entire fabric from conception to registration. In turn, the cooperatives in particular have become schooled in attracting political attention that is beneficial to them. The important outcome is that the party gets the recognition for any initiatives embarked on by the public.

The government systematically restricted the autonomy of trade unions through the Labour Relations Act and by 1995, this had spread to the voluntary organisations through the Private Voluntary Organisations Act of 1995. The fear of being deregistered and
marginalised curbed their autonomy (Nordlund 1996). The government persistently pursued a strategy of cooperation and in the process violated civic and political freedoms.

The absence of a clear ideological path was quite evident in the civic groups that later organised in the late eighties to deal with resistance to neo-liberalism’s demands for good governance. These ranged from the traditional students and trade unions as well as new and broader coalitions such as the National Constitutional Assembly and the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress. All demands were connected in one long chain from those for a wage increment, higher education grants to a new constitution as well as a new government. The government structures that later appeared under the administrative reforms in rural areas also served to fill the void created by the lack of civic groups and these all put pressure on the public to conform to the government’s one party logic. These were the Ward and Village development committees that were part of the broader rural administrative structures. Manned by political party loyalists, they were to act as state agents in sanctioning development projects in their areas.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the housing delivery framework in a country where the leadership realised its capacity problems but did not act to remedy the situation. Maintaining a state of chaos was an obvious strategy that would work to the ruling party’s advantage. The dominance of the party dictated that disorder was beneficial for its mobilisation strategies and allowing it to hold onto power. The absence of strong mediating factors such as civic organisations and a strong opposition exerting a permanent watch that would scrutinise and act against the state’s capacity in delivery, left room for the government to pass regulations that allowed for particularistic criteria to determine the allocation of housing resources. As Blomkvist (1995) pointed out, particularism does not imply the absence of rules, and for Harare the problem was that of too many rules that created some form of anarchy.

The almost overnight transformation of the bureaucracy opened up room for the manifestation and entrenchment of the ‘liberation culture’. Confusion caused by the fear
of the ‘comrades in charge’ who were changing the rules faster than they could be implemented, opened up for the use of particularistic criteria in housing allocation. In any case, some laws were formulated to cater for specific interests signalling the importance of attending to enclaves the ruling party considered to be important. The separate housing land allocations handled by both the council and the central government allowed for the ‘liberation culture’ to work even with individuals even though this moves closer to cronyism and corruption. Here the council clearly is responsible for mass housing provision for the poor whereas the central government widens the inequality gap by concentrating on the ‘haves’. Politically connected groups and individuals therefore became better positioned to access housing land.

The chapter also demonstrated how the value carriers of the ‘liberation culture’, the political leadership’s attempts to legally validate the rights of certain groups, such as war veterans and party youth brigades, to be prioritised in benefiting from state resources. More importantly, it showed the pockets of resistance created by professional bureaucrats from the previous system who insisted on doing things by the book such as insisting on working according to waiting lists and eventually ignoring the youth building brigades into extinction. Again political maturity with regard to strategizing for state resources was demonstrated by the trade union, showing that it is a force that holds a key to the levelling of the playing field with regard to resource allocation as well as democratisation.

The milieu surrounding housing land allocation in Harare raises questions on the successes that can be scored from the transformation of the bureaucracy in the face of weak institutional capacity. In fact, it demonstrates that justice becomes more elusive for the groups that live on the margins implying that perhaps there is a need to come up with various models of transformation that do not lead to manipulation and impoverishment in the values of the bureaucracy. The next chapter explores the dynamics in self-housing provision by the poor in Harare.

Endnotes
draft constitution in February 2000, war veterans led violent Tension Management, Deviance and S... who made up 0.05 percent of country. Most of the arable land proposed new constitution would have addressed the long standing inequitable land ownership pattern in the nationwide land invasions to force the redistribution of land. The argument was that the go... materials and professional institutions to a housing convention in 1996. The number of Blacks in unestablished posts increased from 43 percent to 74 percent in the year following the directive and in the top positions, there were 134 officers compared to 142 whites. See Masunungure, E. (1998a) Africanisation of the Public Service in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, State Power Consolidation and Patron Clientelism, Unpublished Paper, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

Sugarman, B. (1968) uses the concepts locals and cosmopolitans to explain the administrative backgrounds of public officials. See his article “Tension Management, Deviance and Social Change”, Social Quarterly, 10 Fall, pp62-71.

Interview with the Permanent Secretary for Local Government and National Housing, cited in Hammar A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S., (2003), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business, Weaver Press, p 140. Refer to this for a critical historical analysis of the administrative backgrounds of public officials.

See Ruth Weiss, (1994) Zimbabwe and the New Elite, British Academic Press, London, p133, in which she explains the stratification of black society through Africanisation. Top black civil servants joined the political and educated elite, while lower scale civil servants became part of the black petit bourgeoisie.

It is important to note that there will always be a thin line between Zimbabwe’s war veterans and refugees since guerrillas who proceeded for training were kept in ‘refugee camps’ for logistical reasons.

This is similar to the Tanzanian concept of Ujamaa where the public voluntarily pools their labour and rotate tasks for the different members in times of planting and harvesting.

The ministry invited all interested parties from government departments, local authorities, building societies, pension funds estate agents, land developers, manufacturers, contractors, suppliers of building materials and professional institutions to a housing convention in 1996.

After the public rejected the government’s draft constitution in February 2000, war veterans led violent nationwide land invasions to force the redistribution of land. The argument was that the government’s proposed new constitution would have addressed the long standing inequitable land ownership pattern in the country. Most of the arable land (about 85 percent) was still in the hands of a few white commercial farmers who made up 0.05 percent of the population.
Most of Zimbabwe’s five-year plans suffered from the lack of operational detail. Targets were not set and resources were not identified and tied to the plans. See Zimbabwe’s First 5 Year National Development Plan 1980-1985.

Half of the plots in the World Bank’s funded project (1200 of 2550 plots) were allocated to employers so that their employees would pay back directly to the company (tied employment). Government was relying on short term loans hence it had to adhere to a set income level. Plots were very often too expensive for those at the top of the waiting list leaving room for malpractice. The successful replication of the World Bank’s projects was impossible due to government allocations of capital funds and bureaucratic procedures. See Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. (1995) ‘Sites and Services: Home Ownership for the Poor?’ *Habitat International*, vol.19 no.3, (pp371-389) p371.

To aid cooperative’s housing efforts, the council relaxed building standards for them. They were allowed to use cement blocks, farm burnt bricks and informal sector manufactured windows and door-frames. Still, a lot of their resources got consumed by basic infrastructural servicing for water and sewerage and the minimal housing structure of a four roomed wet core house for each member.


The local authority waiting lists was only revised in 1984. Criteria up to then had remained that of male heads of households in formal or licensed private employment, who were legally married with a certain income level and with dependants. Since then the employment criterion has remained, and single, divorced, widowed men and women with dependants now qualify if they meet the prescribed income ceiling level.

The Ministry of Housing states that between 1995 and 1999, 21 percent of serviced stands were allocated to female households.

Chaloz and Duloz account for this abuse of power as the ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ which treats that which is abnormal as normal. Rule bound political and economic behavior is abandoned in favour of a system where all transactions are negotiable and this is the case in Africa where politics is all about resource exchange to buy loyalty. See Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P. (1999) *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrumentalisation of Power*, Oxford, Currey.
Chapter 5

The Evolution of Housing Cooperatives

Introduction

This chapter analyses the dynamics in housing delivery through cooperatives in Zimbabwe. African countries that encouraged the setting up of socialist orientated cooperatives perceived the cooperative nature of rural African communities as being a major feature of the African people that could be easily adapted to by the urban based people. This view proved to be the nemesis of the cooperative movement in Africa. In Zimbabwe, the government saw this as an instrument to distribute resources and to reorganise society after independence. By 2000, fifty percent of the housing cooperatives in the country had mushroomed due to the belief that joining a cooperative would enable them to jump the housing waiting list queue. However, differences in status, power, authority and economic resources reduced the number of people who could participate in the cooperative ventures.

During colonial governance, cooperatives were strictly controlled and were largely confined to credit associations or to serving traditional family requirements (e.g. burial societies). With independence, they assumed a strong position that was used to facilitate the mobility of the poor to a higher level economically and socially and housing cooperatives were no exception. Much of this has to do with perceptions of cooperatives that governments have. Unfortunately, modern cooperatives are largely a creation of the state unlike traditional cooperation that was confined to a village or a community’s needs in which there was no emphasis by members on carving out exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries. Marxist-Leninist theories influenced most of the cooperative regulations and the by-laws that were adopted by African countries (Chingosho 1996:12). State influence and direction steers the development of the cooperative as Worsely (cited in Makwembere 1998:15) noted:

... “cooperativism” today is not simply the coming together of autonomous producers or consumers on the market to pool their resources against common enemies as in the 19th century but the typical development increasingly is the utilisation, sponsorship or incorporation of cooperatives within policy frameworks that are set by those who control government.
An ideal type definition is also offered by Munker (cited in Chingosho 1996:14) who views cooperatives as:

Organised group action to improve the economic and social situation of persons of limited means by way of mutual assistance and by means of establishing a joint enterprise which is financed, controlled and used mainly by the same group of persons.

Munker’s definition implies social equity, democratic control, self-reliance and independent leadership. However, the term independent leadership requires further analysis as it determines the success or failure of the housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe. The term implies that the cooperative leadership should be free to run the affairs of the organisation without the interference of outside agencies of which they may be a part of, as well as from government officials and politicians. This interference is illustrated in the case of Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative (KKHC) in Mabvuku and Mavambo Housing Scheme in Hatcliffe. The difference in the two perspectives can be attributed to experiences from former communist states that controlled the virtual space in peoples’ lives. Worsley’s definition offers more for many African countries as a group’s relationship with the state determines the success and the extent of manoeuvring capacity the cooperative can have.

**Cooperatives for Housing Delivery**

Government acceptance of housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe was a response to an initiative by external agents, the Canadian Conseil de Dulogement Communitare that carried out a study on the feasibility of housing delivery through housing cooperatives in the country in 1983. A new NGO, the Housing People of Zimbabwe (HPZ), emerged out of these efforts in the same year and it was tasked with giving technical and managerial support to housing cooperatives. By 1995, there were more than five hundred and sixty five housing cooperatives in the country. These cooperatives were registered under the Cooperative Act of 1990 and their aims were distinctly to finance, manage and administer the construction of housing for their members (Vakil 1994). Under the HPZ’s tutelage, the cooperatives were expected to find their own land, service the land, arrange their own legal
registration and seek their own finances for building (Housing Cooperative Development Manual, 1990).

Generally, the success of housing cooperatives in developing countries was aided by large tax exemptions and large subsidies in the form of cheap loans granted by government. However, in Zimbabwe, housing cooperatives pay tax on interest accrued from all their savings and they pay another five percent of the property’s value in stamp duty that is collected by the deeds office. They also have to produce twenty-five percent of the total loan cost or collateral when they borrow money from the banks. It is surprising then that many cooperatives sprung up in such a rather unfavourable economic climate. Many problems continue to surround the operations of housing provision through cooperatives in the country. To begin with, the government has always expressed scepticism or doubt about cooperative housing. They were accused of posing a big headache as they disadvantaged individuals on the waiting list but the municipal housing department decided to give them priority dates too on a separate cooperatives waiting list.

This has resulted in the cooperatives remaining marginalised as it takes them a very long time to get registered and even then, they still lack recognition and acceptance as a major player in housing provision. For instance, only Harare municipality in the country has set up a Cooperatives’ desk that does not make allocative decisions except for assisting cooperatives with information on how to proceed with self-housing provision. On their part, the cooperatives had high expectations of accessing land immediately once they were organised collectively. On one occasion, federation members who had turned up to register on the council waiting list were turned away by officials because “the members that had come to register at that time were too many” (ZHPF 2001). Also both government and donor assistance has not be forthcoming. Worst of all, possible financiers, the building societies, dismissed them completely as potential clients and have continued to ignore their existence. Another source of scepticism is caused by the fact that some cooperatives disbanded immediately after they had acquired the land and the former members then pursued building as individuals. The democratic processes in the cooperatives also work to
their disadvantage as elections often remove the entire board such that that there is no continuity when a new board steps in (Interview 2000).

Generally, relations between housing cooperatives and government are embroiled in mistrust. They are characterised by rumours and lack of knowledge of each other’s requirements and practices. This is worsened by the fragmentation amongst the different stakeholders which has been blamed for the mistrust and lack of cooperation. Due to the lack of a common vision, local authorities view housing cooperatives as aiming to disturb order and procedures and housing cooperatives equally view them as arrogant and disrupting their objectives and plans. One member lamented during a workshop,

They do not believe in us as cooperatives. They see us as a nuisance and make us beg for their charity. They treat us as individuals and not as cooperatives. To get rid of us they give us virgin land, usually rocky or poor soils and they do not tell us what is involved in housing development.

Even though the new national housing policy recognised the role of housing cooperatives and communities in housing provision, housing cooperatives still lack recognition as entities. The failure to design a policy framework that would guide operations between cooperatives and authorities has left the playing field uneven with regard to the practices and attitudes toward cooperatives. All local authorities in the country deal with them differently. This lack of consistency has led to discontent amongst the cooperatives. For instance, the allocation of stands can be determined by the savings accumulated by the group in one local authority area and in another, by the needs and the potential of the group. Again, conditions for the purchase of land vary across the local authorities. The authorities insist on treating them as a collection of individuals by interviewing each member when they want to allocate them land whereas the ideal situation would be to allocate stands to the cooperative and not to individuals. This is because it would be more desirable to leave the vetting of members to the cooperatives as they have mechanisms for holding each other accountable. For instance, their constitutions spell out how to deal with a deceased member’s interests and also how to buy out those who want to leave the cooperative.
The HPZ has been making efforts to lobby government to review these policies amongst many others (HPZ 2002). It succeeded partially in pushing for joint ownership of property for married home seekers and managed to get local authorities to encourage joint ownership amongst home seekers, but still the legal requirements fell short of complementing these efforts. The relevant housing act recognises a ‘natural person’ who is clearly defined as male. This has contributed to overwhelming numbers of male members in housing cooperatives. In the HPZ’s cooperatives all over the country, at least seventy percent of the members are all male even though it is the women who participate and attend meetings. Patriarchal attitudes towards property ownership dominate as evidenced in a cooperative started by soldiers’ wives in a Harare township, Glen View. Though this was the women’s initiative and their organisational skills that set up the cooperative, the husbands simply marched in and took over the membership claiming that they were the ones whose salaries were paying for the cooperatives’ contributions. This effectively disempowered the women and within a few months, the cooperative had atrophied because the women simply stopped organising to get housing resources (Interview-Barbara Kohlo).

Such problems contributed to the mushrooming of different categories of cooperatives. These were mostly work-based, community based, professional based and those formed by the least paid workers in urban areas, the domestic workers. Members naturally tended to form the groups according to classes but in many cases variations began to emerge after the construction of the basic units. In some cases, bigger extensions or ‘mansions’ began to go up signalling the members’ access to building resources. The middle class cooperatives encountered more difficulties and did not welcome technical assistance. The low-income cooperatives showed more of a communal spirit and have generally had a higher success rate even though it takes long for them to have the houses. Other reasons for the poor’s success are the high social capital they have to rely on. Many of them belong to burial societies and other informal support networks for credit and other activities. These small issues tie them closer to each other and strengthen their trust. They are more willing to learn and show an eagerness to develop community facilities as they cannot easily afford market options.
It is also logical for expectations to differ when you have the poor and the ‘haves’ contributing to a common fund. An experience in Mufakose turned sour for some poor women fruit and vegetable vendors and lodgers who had mobilised other women from different socio-economic backgrounds to join their cooperative. When the building exercise was under way, allegations were levelled against the women managing the cooperative. The ‘upper class’ women (salaried and self-employed) took over the management of the cooperative and a complicated battle ensued. The women went to the ruling party, ZANU-PF, for arbitration and invited political steering and organisation for themselves as the party seized control of the cooperative (ibid). Another problem was that politically organised cooperatives tended to have complicated technical processes. This is because the politicians/patrons influenced members to disassociate themselves from their technical NGOs. Where this happened, the members often lost money they paid willingly because of their trust in the politicians. Local authorities too have been known to give negative advice to cooperatives about the technical NGOs and this encouraged them to withdraw and refuse the technical advice (Interview).

Barbara Kohlo, the managing director of HPZ, testified to the amazing transformation that takes place when poor people who never dreamt of owning a house finally get one. She describes it as very empowering, as denoting a new status for one within a community. She gave an example of a now proud cooperative in Hatcliffe where domestic workers speak of themselves with pride and look out for each other. In the event of a death in the community, they can be heard asking, ‘Who died? Is it a lodger or is it one of us?’ Thus owning a house makes them think differently of themselves and of others and they also behave differently toward those of the same status as them. Boundaries emerge where associational activities of house owners become oriented at supporting each other in the event of a crisis in the family. On the other hand, lodgers also look out for each other. Many of the new owners use their houses to generate income. Barbara emphasized that the desire to own a house is very strong in both sexes. For men, it is for security and economic reasons and for women, it is for their welfare and economic gains as well.
The HPZ describes itself as being able to ‘win the hearts of the government/ruling party’. As one officer put it, “If we do something, we know we will get land.” Since 2000 when the controversial land reforms started in the country, the trust now boasts of good relations with the Minister of Lands, Dr. Made and the former chairman of Harare Municipality, Dr. E. Chanakira. The relations are attributed to their ‘successful lobbying’. This is important to them considering that some cooperatives have been waiting for land for at least four years and some for as long as seven years. The NGO is thus perceived by other players on the housing market as belonging to the ruling party camp. The advocacy officer in particular is accused of associating with ruling party heavy weights. The results of this relationship are the frequent donations of land by the government and the municipality to the HPZ itself and not directly to the cooperatives. In this way, the NGO can service land, build low-income structures and then sell to lower income brackets. The trust also assists the beneficiaries to access housing loans. The problem is that the trust does not actually reach the poor who have erratic incomes but those with low-incomes only. Kugarika Kushinga was one such cooperative the HPZ tried to assist.

**Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative**

Kugarika Kushinga cooperative was initiated by eleven men who were tired of life as lodgers and dancing to the whims of the landlords. They felt very insecure as they could be kicked out at any time by their landlords as there were no legal leases to protect them. The eleven used to rotate meetings at each of the member's lodgings to discuss problems lodgers faced and it was out of this agonising that the idea to start a cooperative was born in 1986. Three officials were appointed by the eleven, these were a chairman, a secretary and an organising secretary. The organisation followed the same organisational structure as that of political parties in the country. Two of these officials also held influential positions in the ruling party. The chairman was the secretary for a cell in Mabvuku and the cooperative secretary was a branch leader. These political positions had significance in that they gave the leaders a platform from which they could spread their ideas to a wide audience. It also provided a vantage point from which they could recruit members. Their positions earned them trust from aspiring members and membership in the cooperative increased rapidly.
The massive mobilisation of home seekers by the cooperative attracted the attention of the party and the police. The police, believing that they were acting to safeguard the interests of the party, arrested the cooperative’s leadership. The real reason was that more people were attending the cooperatives’ meetings than the party’s meetings hence the cooperative was competing with the party for supporters so charges that the cooperative was holding illegal meetings and plotting to overthrow the government were drummed up. The message to the public was that any organisation to access national resources had to take place within the confines of the party. Organising outside the party realm was not to be tolerated. After the leadership was released, they were informed by the police to seek the government’s approval if they were still determined to form a housing cooperative.

The arrests disrupted the membership of the cooperative and a significant number, including some founder members, became disillusioned with the process and consequently withdrew from the cooperative. Only the chairman and the secretary pursued their dream and began to undertake research into housing cooperatives. A lot of their time was spent shuffling between the Ministry of Cooperatives and the city council which were both grappling with this new concept in housing delivery. The public itself was unsure of who should provide housing between the council and the government. Political problems also threw spanners into their efforts. The Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives (MNAECC) advised the cooperative to put its proposal through the party political hierarchy, meaning that they had to go through the branch, the district, and then the provincial level after which it would get to the ministry. Party permission was given in 1988 after which the two members began to recruit again. But still, registration was impossible since there were no by-laws for housing cooperatives. The ministry only began then to formulate by-laws for housing cooperatives.

Capacity problems that existed in the cooperative were also evident in the ministry. For example, inconsistencies in the records kept by the cooperative showed the lack of planning capacity within the cooperative’s leadership (Mudonhi 1998; Kamete 2001). Even years later 1996, the MNAECC’s register showed the KKHC as having a membership of one thousand and six hundred. All the members were also registered on the
council’s housing waiting list. In that same year, the cooperative’s chairmen gave a figure of two thousand but admitted that the records needed updating. In 1998, the chairman gave a figure of one thousand and eight hundred members but still there were gaps in his register reflecting that the actual number of members could be less than this. Most of the one thousand and six hundred founding members were in the low-income category comprising of domestic workers and vegetable vendors. The popularity of the cooperative grew and more members joined in. At the same time, many founding members were forced to resign due to financial hardships or to the death of a breadwinner. These sold their shares to the public who immediately occupied the same status and priority ranking as their predecessor had prior to their departure. This later caused an up-roar during the allocation process when new members got houses before the founding members. This, the chairman accepted as operational inefficiency due to poor record keeping (Interview Matienga).

Seeking for suitable land became the next problem and the Town Clerk was uncooperative as the idea still puzzled him. He finally gave in and gave the cooperative some land in Kuwadzana, some twenty-six kilometres from where the members lived and the cooperative resisted, arguing that they would prefer land in their current residential area. They later got land in their preferred location in 1992 for twenty houses only. The Cooperative was also finally registered in that same year and construction started. Realising the need for political recognition and acceptance from their previous experience, the cooperative organised for the president to officially open the first twenty houses that were ready for occupation. It was then that they got a chance to tell the president in person their frustrations in getting land for the now 2000 members. They emphasized their wish to be allocated land in their area in Mabvuku and the president praised them for organising within party structures and emphasized that this should set the example for all other efforts to access public resources. The president asked the members if they knew of any ideal land in their area that could be used for cooperative housing development and the members quickly pointed out to land that was adjacent to their first twenty houses (Interview-Matienga 2000).
The president then openly and publicly asked the Minister of Public Construction and National Housing and the Town Clerk whether there was any reason why the cooperative could not have the land it wanted for housing development. On viewing the intended land, the president walked for about eight kilometres and stopped because he was tired. He then told the audience that the cooperative could have all the land stretching from where he started walking up to where he stopped (35 hectares). This virgin land had been reserved as a buffer zone between the railway line, Circle Cement (a cement producing factory) and Mabvuku Township. In addition to the cement dust factor, part of the land is swampy and required special reinforced foundations (Mudonhi 1998). Healthwise, it was an unsafe area for residential purposes. More importantly, council procedures for land allocation and plans for the land were silently shelved. But for the cooperative, open identification with the ruling party opened access for them to get land. A precedent was thus set for other cooperatives to organise around the system by incorporating political heavy weights.

KKHC developed six roomed houses on this land at an average cost of fifty thousand Zimbabwean dollars each. Using the cooperative’s monthly contribution, a private contractor was hired to construct the first twenty houses. Although building large houses was everyone’s dream, the idea was to cater for those who would not be able to afford to extend the houses later on. However, this plan was dropped during the construction of the next two hundred and eighty houses when four roomed core houses only were built at a cost of forty thousand Zimbabwean dollars each (Kamete 2001). After this, the site and services strategy began to dominate. This allowed for parallel construction in the sense that infrastructural services were provided simultaneously with the actual construction of the house.

In the allocation of the first twenty houses, two families shared a house on a rental basis from the cooperative. These families were chosen from the register according to their register number and the level of monthly subscriptions. In the second phase, the first priority was given to those families who were sharing the first six-roomed houses. Each family now had its own unit and more members from the register also got some of the two hundred and eighty one houses. Accusations of favouritism surfaced in the cooperative
with the leadership being accused of allocating completed houses to relatives and friends and not following the cooperatives registration list which showed membership dates. Though this illustrates that tension will always be present between collective interests and individual interests, it also demonstrates the opportunities for corruption that emerge when clientelism generally orders and structures the distribution of collective goods. Criticisms for personalizing the cooperative by the secretary also arose and members resented being treated as objects. Unspecified bureaucratic procedures and requirements threw spanners into the operations and behaviour of cooperative officials who naturally sought to develop the empires they had initiated.

The housing cooperatives are generally affected by low levels of literacy and the lack of technical expertise and management skills. In 1998, members of KKHC were contributing one hundred and sixty five dollars a month and the present value of the units then was one hundred thousand dollars. The one thousand and eight hundred members at the time would therefore have had to raise two hundred and ninety seven thousand dollars every month (Mudonhi 1998). At this pace it would have taken around fifty years for all members to complete these houses. The HPZ offered them an alternative cost effective strategy that would house all the people in a reasonable time period. The strategy outlined how to settle all members on three hectares of land in five hundred cluster houses with rentals set at eighty dollars per month. The members of the cooperatives rejected this alternative as they did not comprehend the benefits of such a strategy (Interview 2000). They felt that the houses were substandard and resented the advice as undue political interference and steering in their decision-making.

The desire to control the fate of cooperatives by the ruling party influenced the course of events in the cooperative. One official in the housing hierarchy remarked that, ‘Cooperatives are infiltrated by politicians after being initiated by poor people. Patrons interfere on allocation and if you are on your own, you get nothing’. This hampers the cooperative’s efforts to get land. Cooperative members openly acknowledge that on their own, they have no capacity, and no influence, hence they readily accept to be used for political gain by the patrons as long as they gained too. The subtleness of the party
interference is noted from a comment by one interviewee, “In many instances the party does not directly interfere but individuals do so in the name of the party”. The HPZ noted that;

Cooperatives co-opt politicians if they think they can influence or facilitate access to land. The politician then goes to threaten the local authority and accuses them of sabotaging the party's intentions. Depending on the calibre of the politician, this works sometimes so it is important to go through the right politician, it works to get land.

These practices have compelled many cooperatives to strategically position themselves to access land. Some cooperatives were mobilised from the onset by politicians with the goal of seeking political mileage and also using their funds as collateral for their own personal business. For instance, a ruling party member of parliament, Nyasha Chikwinya, used the group’s funds to finance her personal business ventures.

To begin with, KKHC could only take off the ground with the party’s blessing. The relevant government ministry felt it did not have the authority to register the cooperative outside the party’s preferences and organisation. Both the ministry and the city council struggled to accept the cooperative and the saviour, ZANU-PF, intervened on behalf of the cooperative to hasten the process. The cooperative’s ability to get registered and to secure land was facilitated by the cooperative’s relationship with the party. It can safely be concluded from this case and some others referred to in this study, that the cooperative movement in Zimbabwe was forced to seek support for housing initiatives through the assumption of new politically correct identities as party loyalists and adherents. They had begun a self-identification process with the victors of the liberation struggle.

**The Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation**

By the time the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF) came into being, the cooperatives formed earlier had set the tempo with regard to political manipulation in order to access housing land. Just like the SAHPF in South Africa, the ZHPF is also a network of community based savings schemes of the homeless urban poor. Members are from squatter settlements, holding camps, backyard shacks and lodgers who largely constitute the urban poor. This group has erratic incomes well below four thousand dollars per
month, a figure less than half the eight thousands dollars cut-off amount that was set by USAID housing programmes for the poor in the early nineties. Together with Dialogue on Shelter, the technical wing of the ZHPF, the two organisations work to tackle the issue of homelessness amongst the poor. In addition to lobbying the government on behalf of the poor, the two organisations also try to incorporate house-seeking communities in negotiations with local authorities. This has resulted in the reduction of red tape that very often prevents the poor from approaching bureaucrats. An unfortunate reality is that the government in Zimbabwe continues to treat the federation’s efforts as a once off project and not as an ongoing empowerment process.

The ZHPF kicked off in the tourist town of Victoria Fall. The town has experienced rapid urban population growth rates since 1990 but the municipality never kept official records on the people in informal settlements. In less than ten years, the federation groups in that area had grown to fifteen with a total of fifteen thousand members. The first saving scheme started there and with the aid of the SAHPF, an enumeration exercise was undertaken which revealed that for the fifteen thousand people living in the shacks, there was one toilet for every five hundred and seven shack dwellers and just one water source for every one thousand three hundred and fifty people (Dialogue on Shelter and ZHPF 2001). This analysis by a community perceived as illiterate showed the local authority the poor’s resolve to address their housing needs. As with their South African counterparts, the ZHPF also ritualised community shack counting and enumeration as evidentiary support for their land seeking strategies. The reliable statistical data they provide shows the bureaucrats their hidden capacity to ‘self-organise’ to address their community’s needs. The group was then eventually allocated free land on which they could build their houses. The only problem was that the land was not serviced and the group was to provide the essential services themselves. The five hundred and sixty five plots assigned to them cost around forty million dollars to service and the group needed to borrow money for this preliminary exercise.

The federation then established community banks all over the country in the form of housing savings schemes. A loan fund called the Gungano (gathering) Urban Poor fund
was established to manage the housing and income generation loans. The savings groups used their savings as collateral. These community financial institutions were designed to act as social safety valves and members rely on them in times of crisis. Each federation member contributes five dollars a month and each can access a loan of up to thirty thousand dollars repayable over fifteen years at a very low interest rate of 1.25 percent per month. Crisis loans do not attract interest and small business loans attract a nominal cost of four percent and borrowers do not have to provide collateral security (ibid). The fund does not give loans to individual members but to the saving scheme. A major setback was that though the fund got some seed money from the donor community, it has been unable to secure additional funding from the government.

Highlights of the federation’s work include the December 1998 five-day meeting to launch its chapter on housing for the poor in the country. Delegates came from all countries where the federation operates, India, Cambodia, South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Senegal. Before that, the federation only had five groups, but following that widely publicised launch, the groups grew to over fifty that were scattered all around the country. At the occasion, the then Minister of Local Government and National Housing, John Nkomo, took advantage of the international significance of the occasion and pledged twenty five million Zimbabwean dollars to the Special Urban Poor Fund. By 1999, there were over one hundred and forty saving schemes and about twenty thousand members. A successful model house exhibition aided by the South African counterparts was partly responsible for mobilising many poor people to join the schemes.

Names of the many groups all reflect hope and a sense of fulfilment: Zvishamiso-(Miracles); Mavambo-(Beginnings); Ruzivo-(Knowledge); Zvikomborero-(Blessings); Batsirai-(Help Each other); Zvido Zvedu-(What We Desire); Vimba-(Be Trustworthy) and Tazvida-(We like it). The joy experienced in owning a home cannot be missed in the community. Whilst some say there are no more landlord dares (court/reprimanding sessions) some go further to explain the tensions in this relationship (Interview-Mai Chiremba).
…now there is no “hagging” and “trouble” from landlords. We faced hardships as lodgers as we could not afford to do our everyday chores without the approval of the landlords. Rents were being raised to fix us should we buy things like a television set or anything the landlord didn’t have. Our own children could not play radios at a moderate volume/ it was difficult.

A major problem that has affected the groups in Zimbabwe is the high HIV-AIDS death rate amongst the founding and key members of the federation. The leadership in all the cooperatives have been affected by the disease. For example, in Dzivaresekwa, all four founding members who went on an exchange visit to South Africa are all late. All the members agree that;

…the major problem we have is Aids. As the federation, our emphasis had been around building houses. But increasingly because people are dying and people are sick, we are realising that we might not even be able to build those houses and live in them because we will have died. Because in the federation we say that we die together, we have emphasised around health issues related to Aids and HIV…we are looking around at how people can eat healthy and also some herbs that might build a person’s immunity and also help them fight opportunistic infections.

Through the engagement of municipality officials and exchanging knowledge on government requirements with regard to housing and the poor’s ideas about housing themselves, the federation boasts that they have destroyed the myth of officialdom that kept the poor from seeking services. The homeless poor in particular have always been suspicious of local authorities who organised their evictions and relocations from one holding camp to another. Worse still, is the fact that the poor do not bother to register on the waiting list as they know they will never be considered for housing by the local authorities. Local authorities were always viewed apprehensively and were mistrusted because of their role in sanctioning evictions. On the other hand, councils have made it clear that they do not condone squatter settlements as they promote immoral activities. Such prejudices made the poor feel that government offices had nothing to do with them unless if they required an identity that would enable them to vote.

The ZHPF housing schemes do not feel confident enough to approach the authorities in search of housing land. They believe that they have to use the technical NGO, Dialogue on Shelter, in order for them to be heard. The Land Committee comprising of members from
all the affiliated housing schemes and Dialogue on Shelter approach the authorities to negotiate on land for the different schemes. Like with the other schemes, members of Mavambo openly admit that they submissively approach the officials and take them on foreign tours, a treat that bureaucrats and politicians live for, to orient them with similar initiatives in other countries. When lobbying for land, they take into consideration what other national, regional, and international schemes have done hence the inclusion of government officials on federation exchange tours. Deference is another tactic they utilise to be heard as one remarked, “Tinotonyengetera vakuru vakuru vanenge vari pabasa ravo”.

Convincing officials of the potential of their ideas costs the federation immensely. In Gwanda, land for twenty stands was donated after the federation had bumped into the Town Clerk at a conference in Namibia where he was shown federation houses and met homeless Namibians who had made a similar dream come true. Another delegation from the Harare City Council accompanied federation members to South Africa and after the trip, the chairperson of the committee that was running the council donated one hundred and fifty stands to the federation and promised to improve cooperation. The Victoria Falls federation members went on a visit to Pakistan and included some council members in their delegation. The idea was to expose these officials to how Pakistani federation members were dealing with problems of infrastructural provision for poor housing cooperatives. On their return, the council officials promised to increase their support for the federation’s activities.

Both politicians and bureaucrats take political risks when they attempt to change procedures to accommodate a new innovative idea from the community but they can also gain political mileage from the same exercise. Public officials tend to be more threatened when they have to deal with large numbers of the poor to address their needs. Politicians thus emerge as winners, who play the role of patrons or benefactors when their constituencies benefit. Unfortunately, the frequent changes that take place at the top (ministerial positions) also disturb any progress that might have taken place with regard to processing cooperative requests. For instance, in 1998, the federation took the then
minister John Nkomo and Nyasha Chikwinya, the member of parliament for the area, on a federation trip to South Africa. Less than two years later, both politicians were out of office without making any changes in favour of housing the poor. The cooperatives were thus frustrated by the new incomers who brought in new policies and approaches to dealing with cooperatives. Housing institutions are thus blamed for advocating policy changes that eliminate the low-income categories from getting houses and the task of sensitising each new incumbent is costly for the cooperatives.

**Mavambo Housing Scheme**

The group started under the ZHPF in 1997 in the township of Hatcliffe with an initial membership of two hundred and eighty. This figure has since gone down to two hundred and forty. The current residents of Hatcliffe Extension were evicted from a farm located on the periphery of Harare that was once owned by the late Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the president of the opposition party, ZANU Ndonga. The brutal decision to evict them after the state seized the farm was purely motivated to stamp out any support for the opposition party. A clearly traumatised woman narrated their ordeal during an interview,

> Houses were burnt to the ground, a lot of families lost their belongings, over eighty families were moved to Hatcliffe where frequent fights erupt, some nearly fatal as people impatiently wait for their turn to get safe drinking water.

Mavambo was the first group of former evictees to get financial assistance from Dialogue on Shelter. However, only five of the members have remained very active in organising for housing resources and the rest attribute their angst and lethargy to untrustworthy treasurers who were accused of squandering the members’ collections in the formative stages of the group. A significant percentage of the members do not even know the membership size of their group. The patriarchal nature of the Zimbabwean society tends to rear its ugly head as many women echoed the following sentiments, “We only have one male member in our scheme (a twenty six year old) as most husbands died and the remaining males have no time to waste. Housing is confined to women.”

Organising for housing has forced NGOs and CBOs working in the area to come together as the Community Action Group, a civic forum on housing that lobbies for housing
delivery to the poor. This group approaches both ruling party and opposition politicians
(members of parliament and councillors in particular) to lobby for recognition by the
government. This arrangement and the confusion it caused has made it easier for ambitious
politicians to bulldoze and extend their tentacles and influence to specific housing
schemes. In Mavambo, a ruling party member of parliament, Nyasha Chikwinya, assumed
leadership and steering of the scheme. She openly stepped into an already formed housing
cooperative and promised to deliver housing. Assured that they had a member of
parliament from the ruling party pushing for their cause, the members willingly poured all
their savings into an account she had created. She was later accused of spending the money
on her fuel buying ventures.

Mavambo openly acknowledges that the ruling party, ZANU-PF has helped them more
than the opposition party to acquire land. This is despite their having an opposition party
member of parliament for their constituency. A member expressed their position, ‘We
engage politicians to get sympathy from the government/ZANU-PF. We use this as a
strategy to win the hearts of the government’’. Another made a more revealing revelation,

The opposition MDC has lost touch with us. We voted for Trudy Stevenson
[opposition party] in June 2000 and since then she has visited us only twice. The
reason being that we seem to sideline with ZANU-PF. This is the case as we want
land from the ruling party. Nyasha Chikwinya [ruling party] is very helpful even
though she is not our member of parliament, she has helped our community with
education fees, sinking boreholes, setting up a benevolent fund in our area. Should
we show our true colours of sideling with the MDC, obviously we will be evicted
from this area!

What is not lost on these members is that the ruling party does control the resources and
the opposition cannot make them act otherwise. This is supported by a statement made by
one interviewee, ‘We are forced to support the ruling party on this issue as they are the
custodians’. Despite all this hide and seek with the world out there, the members feel that
they are independent of political steering in their activities. Another group leader pointed
out, ‘Politicians, we only use them to open doors for the poor, to negotiate with local
authorities and the government.’’ The more subtle simply say, ‘We use parliamentarians
now and again.’’
Three other cases illustrate these trends. Tashinga Domestic Workers Cooperative had the then mayor of Harare as patron on their formation in 1987. The cooperative was applauded for taking the right political approach to solving their housing needs as the cooperative was formed within the party structures. Within less than two years, the cooperative was allocated land for housing outside the usual council waiting list regulations (Parade 1994).

In 1996, the ZANU-PF member of parliament for Mabvuku organised some home seekers in her constituency into six housing cooperatives. Six months after the formation, two of the cooperatives, Tavepamberi and Hondoyakura, were allocated land even though they did not meet the financial qualifying requirements for housing land allocation and they were not yet officially registered as cooperatives. Another one, Independence Cooperative, was registered very quickly and land was allocated more or less at the same time as the registration. Two of the cooperatives, Zororo and Tadzikamidzi, refused to go through the party process of acquiring party cards and attending rallies and meetings and so they pulled out of cooperatives that were steered by members of parliament and decided to apply for land as independent cooperatives. Six years later in 2000, they were still to be registered (Interview with cooperative members).

However, contradictions are very evident in that Mavambo does not allow the presence of party paraphernalia during their meetings. They emphasise that no one is allowed to wear a t-shirt or use a cloth bearing the president’s face or the main opposition party’s (MDC) logo. The reason for this reveals a lot more than the intended objective,

> We need to show our true colours [demonstrate non-partisanship] to the outside world as this will end up tarnishing our name and thereby jeopardising our future funding prospects from well wishers who are mostly anti-ZANU-PF.

The members have thus become experts at displaying the appropriate faces depending on the observer with the full bowl! As can be expected, some groups are quick to change with the tide:

> We don’t worry about the arrogant ones, like Didymus Mutasa, (the defeated ruling party candidate in Kuwadzana) we don’t fight the ones that are working for us. We are working with the ones that are for us and get them to our side-like the Mudzuri (a former MDC opposition party mayor of Harare administration).
Fortunately for Mavambo, housing land is allocated to the group and the group then has the responsibility to allocate to individual beneficiaries according to the group’s own waiting list and the council’s list. This avoids the double allocation of land to the same individual on the two lists. Criteria used by the groups ranges from ‘the most active’ to the ‘most paid up’ members and this is not necessarily according to their joining date or the time one has spent in the group. The low levels of activeness are attributed to laziness by most members of the housing scheme. Most of the income generating projects started by many members withered over time as those running the projects did not invest time and commitment to the common cause. All the same, members pointed out that the reason the cooperative was not into big income generating projects was laziness. Some pointed out that they had their vegetable gardens and so they did not have to start something big. The only project Mavambo members had tried to establish was a beer outlet. The bar closed down after operating for a short time due to poor management.

As the 2000 parliamentary elections drew closer, the ruling party promised to allocate land to the homeless in Hatcliffe and many of these were federation members. As usual, nothing was done after the elections. The saving schemes members were quick to point out that this was nothing new as from 1980 to 2000, most housing schemes that were implemented by the government had followed the previous regime’s blue-prints. During the 2000 land invasions, some federation members were forcibly involved in seizing land. This move divided the federation members and since the body is not strongly centralised, no blanket policy was taken by the federation. Housing scheme members agreed that because the land invasions were politically orchestrated and tightly controlled by the ruling party via liberation war veterans, it would be complicated to expect to get land without taking part in the violence. A group in Dzivaresekwa that occupied land was quickly taken over by war veterans who beat up and intimidated the savings scheme leadership and forced the members to contribute their savings to the veterans themselves.

The housing schemes do not seem to have understood the concepts of housing scheme and cooperative in the same manner as their other counterparts in South Africa. For example, the treasurers of all the savings units report directly to the federation and not to the
schemes. These attitudes can also be explained by the way the government sometimes responds to the cooperatives’ request for land, and to break their mobilisation power, the members are sometimes scattered in different locations in other townships. Some from Mavambo were allocated land in Dziveresekwa extension (twenty kilometres away) which is a swamp such that many people do not know of the location of this new housing area. The area has seven hundred legal occupants and about four hundred illegal occupants. The government also relocated squatters evicted from Epworth and Churu farm to the same place and this was meant to be a temporary housing area for three months until the occupants could be moved elsewhere. Ten years later, they are still there. In their words, “The Mugabe regime and the Tavengwa’s City of Harare were not going to do anything about their situation and so we had to wake up!”

Conclusion
In this chapter I have used historically, structurally and agency grounded analysis to map out the *modus operandum* in service delivery in a country where political space has been dominated by one party for over two decades. The poor house-seekers are very clear of the capacity of the government to deliver land for housing and have thus prepared themselves to be as crafty as necessary in organising to tackle the system. This manoeuvring capacity is portrayed through deferring to the political leadership accordingly and yet they continue to send warning signals, as when they vote for the opposition party members, that they are aware of the nature of clientelistic distributional pattern of resources in the country. In this case, they cease to be just passive subjects as they demonstrate the capacity to articulate their problem and take advantage of what the different identities can deliver.

The housing cooperatives in Harare are very much aware of the obstacles they face in organising for state resources hence they readily acquiesce to party steering to get land for housing. Even though they too manipulate the politicians, they still emerge as the losers in that the empowerment process does end abruptly as they do not extend this social capital to the broader political process as they remain inward looking. The problem is that home seekers fail to look beyond the house itself as it is in the act of building the broader community that value essential for participation in the democratic process is fostered. The
global networks have worked to spread the demystification of the state and this knowledge has helped to cross essential bridges but the real test is in whether citizens who deliberately defer to patronage can become critical citizens who demand excellence from the public system. Only then can party patronage decline and the inequity gap be narrowed.

A major success was that the housing cooperative movement compelled the government to acknowledge its potential as a cooperative housing desk was eventually set up to gather and dispense knowledge on cooperative regulation and to possibly monitor the agenda of these numerous groups. This shows the possibilities of the emergence of challenges that are likely to arise from other sources that may eventually counter the ‘liberation culture’. If people can acquiesce, they can easily revolt for the same reasons.

The chapter has also demonstrated that patronage style politics can be selective and co-exist with the neo-liberal expectations to roll back the state. As illustrated, the federation in Zimbabwe was denied recognition for its loose networking style that had massive potential mobilisation that would have allowed it to encroach on the ruling party’s constituency - the poor. And yet the HPZ was accepted as a friend by the government and yet it applied neo-liberal logic to its housing cooperatives – a lower working class constituency that could afford bank loans.

Endnotes

1 HPZ is a non-profit organisation registered under the Private Voluntary Organisations Act, PVO 14/92. It provides training and technical expertise in all aspects of cooperative housing. It assists cooperatives to acquire land, service it and secure mortgage finance from financial institutions for building operations.


3 This is the lowest unit in the party hierarchy that goes up to the Polit bureau.

4 For instance, ZANU-PF party membership cards must be shown in order to obtain food aid. Just recently in 2002, the Daily News of 19th November, reported an increase in such accounts. Again war veterans who denounced the government for orchestrating the farm invasions, were labeled sell-outs and denied land during the recent fast tracking land reform programme and their pensions were terminated. (Reported in The Zimbabwe Independent, 18 October (2002). In another natural resources management programme, officials whose loyalty to ZANU-PF was doubted lost their posts. See Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (eds.) (2003) Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business, Weaver Press, p140.

5 The campaigning period prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections saw many cooperatives acquiring free land, amongst them were Harare North Housing Cooperative-1800 stands; Mudhudhudhu-16 stands; Gondoharishari (meaning beggars cannot be choosers) and Highlands Housing Cooperative each got 100
stands. Since 2000, some Harare residents have begun to reject indigenous names for their residential areas as this is associated with low township status.

6 A delegation of federation members also visited Mahila Milan in India to get an idea of how the federation organized itself in the country.

7 Holding camps were a result of the government’s intolerance to squatting. Squatters were evicted from their sites and moved to ‘temporary camps’ where they were to stay until they moved to permanent areas.

8 At the time the exchange rate was: 1 US dollar = 54 Zimbabwean dollars.

9 This was just a general purpose fund for the poor and the money was not necessarily for housing development. In this way, there was no commitment to easing the poor people’s housing plight.

10 English translation: ‘We resort to sycophancy in order to get attention’.

11 The Housing People of Zimbabwe, Intermediate Technology Development, Habitat for Humanity and the Forum on Housing are some of the organizations in the Community Action Group.

12 This varies from scheme to scheme. Some mould bricks and others sell used clothes and vegetables.

13 For instance, the chairperson of Mavambo describes the group as being different from a cooperative because they have a fixed subscription of ten dollars per month and three persons designated to collect the money each month end.
PART III

Chapter 6

Housing the ‘Aliens’ in the Cape Town Metropolitan Council

Introduction
This chapter examines housing provision for the Africans in Cape Town and discusses their citizenship status as defined by the resource allocation pattern. It attempts to establish the basis for the requirement of political facilitation that perhaps only a ‘liberation culture’ could provide in the absence of resources and other innovative capabilities. It also shows the capacities and ingenuity the poor people developed then to solve their shelter problems. Problems that were part of the complex institutional structure continued to loom large over the new democratic bureaucracy after 1994 and it is thus important to trace the rationale behind this design as the ghost proved to be difficult to exorcise. Through crafty institutional design, ingrained racial superiority attitudes shaped by exclusionary orientations, housing delivery to the Africans was effectively slowed down.

The character of the South African regime up to 1994 makes housing provision in the Cape Town metropolitan area unique as it was determined by nothing more than the necessity of controlling the influx of Africans into white areas and maintaining the apartheid social order (Hendler et al 1985; Maylam 1995; Crankshaw and Parnell 1996; Lalloo 1998; Wilkinson 1998). As with the rest of the colonial cities, housing provision over time developed in relation to the migrant labour system and this relationship carved out the entire space occupied by Africans in urban areas. Mamdani (1996) pointed out the stark differences;

On one hand, there was a fully developed capitalist system that compared with the west and on the other was a colonial state dimension with all its accompaniments of indirect rule and separate development.

The government systematically divided South Africans into racial and ethnic categories reinforced through ideology, political institutions, law and economic rights such that every district, street and buffer strip served a purpose as it was part of an identifiable group area (Zain 1989:1). However, where one could buy a house was tightly restricted with each of
the defined racial groups having a finite number of discrete, well segregated residential areas allocated to them and each group struggled to maintain its identity. Each ethnic identity had neatly cut physical boundaries (Maylam 1995).

The destruction of African subsistence farming and self-sustaining activities became necessary to create labour for the capitalist ventures (Evans 1997). All South Africans had identity books in which they were defined by race and if they were black, they were further divided by ethnic group and these classifications determined where one lived, worked, their income, who to marry, where to travel and how far, what areas to enter as well as which schools to attend (Jung 2001:16). Understanding the dynamics of this regime can thus be successfully done through the use of the concept of ‘space’ as it applied to the different racial groups. The concept of space cuts across all time dimensions in the South African administrative systems, making it a useful analytic concept to discuss housing provision in racialised spaces. Space here is conceived not only in its physical sense but in its totality. All social relationships occur in distinct physical spaces that create room for accessing economic and more importantly in colonial states, political space. This access to political and economic resources is important in that it opens access to other resources in society.

Lalloo (1998) points out the advantages of this perception of space since ‘space as arenas of citizenship, defines the variation and gradations in the pattern of citizenship”. Space is therefore conceived of as ‘room for strategic manouvre’ that is dependent on resource availability to contending forces in a given political system (Simkins 1988:8). The apartheid housing policy itself defined African citizenship differently as spelt out by their residential space; migrant workers lived in hostels and township dwellers and rural women lived in townships. Townships engendered no sense of belonging as citizenship was denied Africans through land policy and housing policies. This confirmed that it was a place for Africans in transit only as it endowed a sense of impermanence, and successfully denied them access to physical privilegeds enjoyed by the white citizens. Allegiance, a sense of belonging and shared community are all constructed around the notion of an abiding place
and locations reinforced the identity of abstractions rather than human beings with streets not bearing names but numbers (Lalloo 1998:9).

But are racial categories and their space alone adequate to explain service delivery in the country? This brings in the concept of identity. Bureaucratically and legally predefined identities merged with the already shifting identities the ‘natives’ had and this caused confusion even though there might have been consensus on certain issues. What then, were the other dominant identities that interwove with the racial cleavage? And how did this scenario trigger room for the ‘liberation culture’ in the housing delivery process?

**Determinants of Black Housing**

National government and local government relations contributed immensely to the delivery of housing for blacks. Both institutions did not clearly want to be burdened with accommodating the natives in their urban creations hence policies on housing provision were kept in a permanent state of confusion through legal requirements (Evans 1996; Kraak 1981; Elias 1980). From 1822 when the first institutions were established to provide services, none of them served the black population until after 1923 when the Natives (Urban Areas) Act was effected.3 Housing was placed under the public health department in 1897 as a response to the overcrowding that was later believed to cause the bubonic plague of 1901 and influenza in 1918 (Kraak 1981). It was thus important to attend to the housing needs of the coloureds and the blacks to ensure the public health of the whites. Segregation became necessary to attend to the white health needs but justification for this also spilled into all social issues (ibid).

The initial step of segregation on the grounds of health hazards became a social institution in which the segregation of the black and white groups was not only legitimated from a health point of view, but was also transformed and sanctioned into a situation where each racial group was to develop its social identities without social friction (Hansard 1950). The South African Native Affairs Commissioner had investigated what could be common ‘native policy’ and sanctioned that blacks be located away from other population groups (Elias 1980:25).
The 1897 Public Health Amendment Act gave municipalities the power to erect dwellings for the poor with the approval of the registered voters in that locality. However, no action was ever taken to build housing for the poor and a new legal instrument was effected, the Municipal Ordinance no 10 of 1912 which made local authorities responsible to the Provincial Administrator (Kraak 1981). It was only after 1916 that the first housing scheme for coloureds was started as a response to the devastating effects of the influenza epidemic (Jack 1981a:12). Even then, the scheme was for municipal coloured employees and not the poor or the low-income groups. Years later, attempts to put up a coloured housing scheme at Klipfontein were strongly opposed by the whites because ‘It would bring the dagga smoker, the drunkard and the ordinary criminal from District Six to a district with a European population and where a big girls school was to be erected” (ibid 68). This stereotyping of other races contributed immensely to the municipality’s inaction in dealing with the housing problem.

The flu epidemic in particular caused the amendment of the Public Health Act (no36) of 1919 and the establishment of a new institution, the Public Health Department. The amended act had a whole chapter on matters of ‘Sanitation and Housing’ and it spelt out the roles of local authorities in dealing with sanitation and overcrowding (Elias 1980). A ‘Housing Commission’ was also mandated with investigating housing conditions of the major urban centres and most importantly, it had to advise on whether it made sense for the national government to provide finance to local authorities for providing housing for persons of limited means including coloureds and natives (Elias 1980; Kraak 1981; Wilkinson 1998).

The main concern of the commission was the position of ‘poor whites’ who could not afford an economic rental. The Report of the Housing Commission (1920) noted that;

Poor whites were living in the most degrading and undesirable conditions in many towns …and the importance of maintaining the prestige of the white race … (the whites) should be compelled to reinstate themselves in what must be their proper standing in the social scale.
The recommendations advised a more systematic approach to the housing problem and proposed that town planning legislation be effected and this was done in 1927 under the Town Planning Ordinance no.13 of 1922. This ordinance became preoccupied with ideological aims of separating the different population groups by means of barriers and buffer zones and this was twenty two years before the Group Areas Act of 1950, which formally legitimated the residential separation of the various races in the country (Jack 1981a:41).

The Housing Act no.35 of 1920 came into being as a result of the commission and it aimed to provide loans with public money for house construction and to empower local authorities to make such provision. A housing loan fund was provided to give loans to local authorities for building new housing schemes. An important co-ordinating institution, the Central Housing Board (CHB) was also established in 1920 and it was tasked with enquiring into new schemes and identifying the need for such schemes and this was to be done in conjunction with the Minister of Public Health under whose administration the Housing Act fell.

In 1923, the government passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Act which residentially discriminated against the Africans by restricting them to locations situated on the outskirts of the cities. In Cape Town, it was to places like Langa and Ndabeni. Housing for Africans was therefore regarded as a separate issue to that of whites and coloureds (Jack 1981:22). The act made it possible to move ‘illegal’ Africans into a site and service scheme which was a controlled squatter camp that was later developed into a massive new black township called Khayelitsha-meaning a new home. The moving of Africans was intended to ease the housing plight of coloureds by removing competition for resources. ‘Illegal’ Africans were also expelled to Transkei and Ciskei under the same act. The same act prohibited blacks from owning land in urban areas and its amendment in 1930 authorised the local authorities to exclude African women from their areas of jurisdiction unless they had certificates to prove that accommodation was available (Brand 1981:15). After 1945, the laws were tightened due to the influx into urban areas after the Second World War and black women were only allowed to join their husbands in the Western Cape if they had
permits issued by the registering officer of the area to which they wished to travel to (Jack 1981). This was complicated by the fact that one needed to get there first to obtain the permission. A further amendment in 1937 meant that black men had to show proof of being employed or of bona fide visitor status as municipalities were allowed to remove ‘surplus’ Africans and send them to native reserves (ibid 1981).

To circumvent the problem of dealing with the national government, Cape Town passed the Municipal Ordinance no.23 of 1919 which empowered the municipality to advance loans to people of limited means to provide homes for themselves (Brand 1981). Since the scheme was based on the principle of the ability to pay, only whites benefited as they had high salaries within the limits of the schemes; that was 360-600 pounds per annum then (ibid). The municipality also established a Housing Estates Committee in 1919 which assisted on all matters pertaining to housing such as controlling the various housing schemes and selecting ‘suitable tenants’ for these schemes and other council dwellings, collecting rents and to implement the Municipal (Provision of Homes) Ordinance. In 1925, the municipality tried to push the question of financing housing schemes for the poor into government hands as they were unwilling to incur costs through the provision of cheap and sub-economic housing (ibid). The government made it clear that responsibility for better housing lay with municipalities and provincial authorities and not with government. Its only responsibility was to provide financial facilities and assistance (Jack 1981a:53; Wilkinson 1998).

**The Definition of Africans by Space**

All Africans who came to Cape Town solely for temporary employment which expired hopefully on retirement or on cessation of employment were classified as migrants. Accommodation for these ‘oscillating’ migrants was in the form of hostels or labour compounds. Ramphele (1990:115) quotes Dewar (1982) who succinctly sums up the accommodation of Africans in hostels in South Africa; “They are all simply unifunctional sleeping areas with little sense of place.” All aspects of life for migrant workers revolved around a bed. A bed was the basis for relationships within the hostels, between the hostels and between work places and hostels (ibid). One’s very identity and legal existence
depended on one’s attachment to a bed. When one’s family joined them, they became members of ‘bed-holds’ and the only access to this space was through a male bed-holder. Ramphele argues that hostel dwellers perfected the art of managing limited space in all its dimensions because their mobility was circumscribed by massive legislation which first defined them as temporary migrant workers without any organisational space either due to the Riotus Assembly Act, the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. Restrictions on physical space constrained the creation and utilisation of other space such as economic, social and intellectual. Carving out intellectual space in particular became a risky affair as fear and lack of trust between people drove organisations into secrecy thus encouraging even more authoritarian practices within the nascent political organisations (ibid 72).

Legal urban residence depended on employment, duration of that employment and availability of approved accommodation. Likewise access to a bed depended on employment. Armed with a job contract, a man or his employee could apply to rent a bed in one of the available hostels. The applicant would then go to the housing officer in a township in which there was a hostel with a vacant bed and depending on availability, a bed would then be allocated. Residence was open to any ‘male Bantu’ over 18 years old, who was in bona fide employment with legal permission to be in an urban area (Segar cited in Ramphele 1991:119). Initially, only women with legal permission to be in Cape Town were allowed to be in the hostels during the day but definitely not during the night (Selvan 1976:3). Owning a bed in a hostel thus denoted a new status for a family and bed-holds were often handed down from father to son, going back a generation or two, and eventually some wives inherited their husbands’ beds after they died (ibid 165).

A prerequisite for contract workers was that hostel accommodation had to be provided by the employer so workers were forced to retain their jobs in order to remain legally in Cape Town. Rent for the space was usually deducted automatically from their wages. Most of the hostel dwellers with families owned shacks in squatter camps for their families which meant they paid double rent every month (Motsamai 1984). They could not afford to give up the hostel or employer accommodation because it was a security measure against the
government’s impromptu removals of the family’s informal shacks. Vacating hostel accommodation meant going back to the bottom of the list to start all over again (Zain 1989:64). The hostels did provide security as a home and many were compelled to join the security and defence forces for this reason and more importantly, to be exempted from the pass laws and the Bantu classification (Motsamai 1984:37). Such submission was also viewed as a demonstration of loyalty to the state.

Selvan (1976:2) and Kraak (1981:7) categorised the African men living in the Cape Peninsula according to the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act’s no.25 of 1945 requirements (as amended). First, there were men who were born in urban areas and qualified for permanent residence in the urban areas. Then there were workers who came to the urban areas on contract before 1968, these men were entitled to remain in the urban area in terms of Section 19(1)b of the act provided they did not leave the employ of the particular employer with whom they had contracted for a period of ten years. This meant they were able to fulfil the requirements of Section 10(1)b which qualified them for permanent residence (Selvan 1976). These two belonged to the category of what was termed local men and mobility into that status could be acquired by serving one employer continuously for a period of ten years. The status was important in that it determined where one could live. Thirdly, there were men who had entered into employment contracts after 1968 when new legislation had been passed which restricted the legal rights of contract workers to a much greater degree than before (Kraak 1981).

The new stipulation was that all contracts entered into with men from the reserves were to be for a maximum of one year and at the end of the contract, the men were to return to the reserves in order to enter into new contracts of employment. Accommodation for this category was designed to be very temporary indeed in the hostels or barracks so as to discourage any ideas of permanent settlement in urban areas (Zain 1989). This category was referred to as migrant or contract workers. The final category consisted of those men who were defined as living ‘illegally’ in the townships or in the squatter camps.
There was a clear distinction between local Africans and temporary migrant workers (Kraak 1981). Local men were housed in ‘Special quarters’ and these were bachelor quarters with rooms with one or two beds in each. Even for the locals, it seemed as if the favoured or lucky ones got rooms there (ibid). The African officials of the hostel boards lived in these special quarters but even though, they shared ablution facilities with the rest of the men. The only difference was that they had more dignity because they had more space and consequently, more privacy when sleeping only.

It is important to point out that hostels did not have public facilities of their own (that is: educational, medical or recreational) and they had to depend on the limited public resources of nearby townships (Selvan 1976). Only beer-halls were readily provided. Hostel dwellers’ reliance on surrounding township facilities became the source of many conflicts over commercial activities which township residents felt was their domain (Ramphele 1991:343). Township dwellers had a choice in who they shared their homes and resources with, whereas hostel dwellers were viewed as having no institutional attachment since they shared their ‘impersonal space’ with total strangers (ibid). All accommodation in the hostels was for bachelors only. The beds were usually bunk-beds and they were grouped in sets of two, meaning that four men slept together in a group with no walls between the beds (Selvan 1976). Their houses were the beds they slept in and in most cases, they had to provide their own mattresses (Ramphele 1991). The ablution facilities were usually owned by the companies with the men occupying the hostel and each toilet usually served nineteen men and each shower, twenty men (Selvan 1976:23). Some hostels were built by companies but the housing board owned them all. This situation has spilled into the current era where responsibility for renovating and upgrading the hostels is tossed back and forth between the local authorities and the companies.

Influx control regulations created criminals out of ordinary Africans who dared to seek job opportunities in the prescribed areas (Maylam 1995). The control measures required all African males above sixteen to carry a ‘pass’ or ‘reference book’ which indicated their legal status. Between 1916 and 1986, there were more than 17 million⁹ prosecutions for offences related to these laws and for Cape Town in particular, more women than men
were arrested under the pass laws in the entire country (ibid). Cape Town did not have hostels to accommodate African females hence the special assault on women aimed to curtail the development of African family life in the Cape Peninsula (Ramphele 1991:115). This, according to Ramphele, contributed to the breakdown of trust relations between spouses as many men resorted to extra-marital relations to fill in the absence of the wives who at times turned up on the unsuspecting husbands.

Residential territories were designed differently with whites occupying more space and in the African areas, there was no choice of routes or any other space. Security was of paramount concern to the white community and so the most important consideration in construction was the speed with which the African areas could be sealed in the event of trouble (Smit 1996). Effective surveillance of the movements in these areas was thus facilitated by the prison layout of the hostels and townships (Evans 1995). The purposes of trips was easily determined as opposed to the white areas that had many access roads thus providing the residents with a degree of anonymity and safety as their destinations and routes were unpredictable (Dewar and Uytenbogaardt 1995:22).

The laws and ordinances promulgated and passed between 1879 and 1935 together with the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act no.25 of 1945, the Group Areas Act of 1961 and the Slums Act no.53 of 1934, all contributed to the neglect of African housing provision and this affects the current national housing shortage (Evans 1995; Smit 1996). The instruments all aimed to keep the ‘undesirable African’ from urban areas. The Consolidation Act in particular deterred the development of housing schemes involving employer participation because of the requirements of permanent residence after ten years of uninterrupted service by individual aspirant house owners. Exclusionary housing provision started long before the official adoption of the apartheid policy in 1948.

A policy was designed to phase out African labour in the Western Cape province which was officially declared to be a ‘Coloured Preference’ area which meant that before employing an African man, the employer had to produce proof that there were no coloured men to fill the vacancy (Wilkinson 1998). It then became the Bantu Affairs Administration
Board’s (BAAB) responsibility to find local black men to fill the job and if there were none available, the workers were engaged from the Transkei or Ciskei\textsuperscript{10} and the board became responsible for allocating the workers beds in any one of the hostels. If the employer had not build a hostel, then the men were placed wherever a bed was available which often resulted in the mingling of contract workers with local men in the townships (Ramphele 1991). This complication sometimes made it impossible to categorise housing as being exclusively for local men or contract workers. However, a distinction was made between the two groups of men in the hostels as migrant workers slept on the ground floor and local men on the other floors (Selvan 1976:3-7).

\textbf{Apartheid Housing Delivery}

The apartheid government that came in 1948 continued with the union government’s segregationist tendencies in service delivery in a more extreme manner. The Group Areas Act of 1950 gave rise to the Apartheid city which placed individuals in different racial and socio-economic characteristics or ‘class’ identities in the same geographic space. A massive relocation of the African community took place during this era and between 1960 and 1983, more than 100 000 African had been relocated in urban areas and over one million resettled in the homelands (Evans 1996:65). The forced relocations contributed to uncertainty, ill feeling and further distrust in respect of relations within the African community itself, and between it and the government. Years later, the Theron Commission (1976) reported that many coloureds were still uncertain about the permanency of declared coloured group areas as they feared that no matter wherever they settled, ‘the Group Areas’ would catch up with them (Brand 1981:10).

Racial definitions dictated administrative behaviour as administrators differentiated between whites and coloureds on the basis of an individual’s demeanour towards officials when it was unclear what one’s racial category was. If one deferred and called the official ‘Baas’ (boss), he was classified as a coloured. Such problems of boundary definitions led to the official position that;

\begin{quote}
A person’s first or initial classification need not be his final classification...the director general [for] internal affairs may reclassify him, or a race classification board may order a reclassification.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}
Every year there were thousands of petitions for reclassification for different reasons from marrying into a different racial category (Jung 2001), to improving employment opportunities or even to improve the children’s chances of a favourable racial classification. And of course, a favourable racial grouping implied improved access to resources especially housing. This resulted in the increased tendencies to manipulate one’s racial identity.

A culture of mistrust was thus entrenched and whilst it marginalised Africans, it gave coloureds a ‘sense of rootlessness’ which had a negative effect on the housing problems of the coloured community. Concealing one’s African identity became an art to avoid removal as exemplified by the following quotation from the life-story of one African woman: To hide her part African identity, she and her siblings were forbidden to speak Xhosa outside the house. Their mother kept a stone on the stove with a bit of engine grease on hand for them to press the curls out of their hair, lest the police should arrive with their metal combs to test for ‘bantu’ blood (Mail and Guardian 2000:39).

Thus a non-African identity helped to some extent to secure one’s rights to reside in urban areas and consequently, to get a higher priority in housing provision even though they would continuously be threatened by the Group Areas Act. Raids on African accommodation intensified during the apartheid regime (1948-1988) and those rounded up were sent to the site and service schemes in Nyanga or Langa. Screening occurred at these sites and in 1958 after one such raid, 4000 families were found to qualify for housing and they were consequently moved into sheds and each of these sheds housed four families (1981:26). Illegal families with no homes or relatives in the homelands were classified as ‘displaced people’ and they were allowed to erect their own shacks at Nyanga West (ibid.). Being defined as displaced was thus an avenue for staying in town and victims hoped they would be able to secure employment someday thus elevating one’s family’s status to qualify for state resources.
In terms of the Housing Act of 1957, the Bantu Housing Board was established to deal with the requirements of Africans within urban areas. In particular, the board reviewed the applications made by local authorities for state funding to purchase land upon which black accommodation could be built and to finance these loans, a National Housing Fund was established (Evans 1996; Evans 1997). Unfortunately state funding was influenced by the notion that Africans were temporary residents in urban areas. The result was to shift the burden of housing provision onto the Africans themselves and as building societies could not finance Africans households to build on land they did not own, the majority resorted to squatting. The state then began to provide sites and service schemes in a bid to compel African to provide their own homes. A site for a household was a concrete slab on less than 150 square metres of land with a toilet and a water tap (Smit 1995). The rationale behind this kind of service provision was provided by the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. E.G. Jansen who believed that it was impractical to think that (Morris 1981:48 cited in Evans 1996:70):

.. the native who has barely left his primitive conditions should be provided with a house which to him resembles a palace and with conveniences which he cannot appreciate and which he will not require for many years to come.

The principle of home ownership was adopted to encourage individual construction of houses on the serviced sites. However, the ownership scheme was confined to a 30-year lease period which could be cancelled any time. Africans were clearly not considered as being indigenous to the Western Cape region hence little housing was provided to them for this reason (ibid 72). The rate of housing delivery was clearly dictated by black labour requirements in urban areas. The establishment of Bantu Advisory Boards (BAB)\(^ {13} \) in the early seventies was an attempt to deal with all this legal and administrative fragmentation and more importantly, it linked the control of labour to the urbanisation of the African. Unfortunately the officials were often accused of corrupt practices (Wilkinson; 1998). The control and finances of urban locations was moved from local authorities to the centralised BAAB. The control and accommodation of the Africans was now subject to the uniform policy of a central authority and more importantly, location control was linked even more to the dictates of labour allocation (Kraak 1981:8). The boards were made directly responsible for the housing of workers according to their status and the system for securing
employment was reorganised differently. Native Commissioners in the reserves became responsible for organising jobs for the black population such that Africans in the reserves had to apply to the commissioner (Evans 1996).

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963 closed any loopholes that had been left by the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945. For instance, regulations were imposed on the number of African women who could be granted housing rights within the urban areas and this applied to non-productive blacks (Wilkinson 1998). Also new regulations in June 1968 stated that only African males over twenty one could receive housing permits in urban areas. In that same year, home ownership rights were withdrawn and local authorities instructed not to issue leases to Africans residents on land located within the urban areas because they could now own and provide their own houses in the homelands (ibid 74). In 1972, the state announced that Africans renting municipal houses would bear the full costs of maintaining and improving the houses even though the houses would remain the property of the municipality. Five years down the line, the state reintroduced the leasehold rights after realising the need for more skilled African labour to cope with the pace of industrial developments and also that it was impossible to remove all Africans from urban areas (Evans 1996).

The reserves that had been set aside by the 1913 Land Act assumed a new status when they became what the government called independent. African development was to be contained within these homelands or ‘Bantustans’ as they were officially called and blacks could seek work in the now separate South Africa (Mthuli 1987). Independence in the homelands, Transkei in 1976 and Ciskei in 1981, stripped the black population of the basic right of citizenship (Brand 1981:19). Following these developments, there was a massive deportation of blacks to the homelands which was viewed by the urban African dweller as forced citizenship when one could no longer generate wealth for the white bosses (Mthuli 1981:47).

The late eighties saw the abolition of the influx control legislation and housing delivery shifted to a more market oriented process which saw state provision of houses decreasing
significantly. The problem was that housing provision remained an essentially ‘top-down’ approach and did not take into account the specific requirements of different households (Smit 1995). All houses were provided on a mass scale and they conformed to the same specifications (Evans 1996:80). They continued to be located far from the city and employment opportunities in particular.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 fragmented institutions and these ‘gate keepers’ restricted access to housing opportunities. From 1983, the state adopted a policy of providing subsidised completed housing units on a rental basis for those earning 150 rands per month (coloureds) and for the aged (Zain 1989:9). Serviced plots were also made available for home ownership schemes for those earning between 150 and 1000 rands per month. Housing subsidies were provided for three categories up to 1989: those in government housing earning under 1200 rands per month; first time home buyers for a house of 60 000 rands or less and employees who received company subsidies (mostly whites). The irony of this was that 82 percent of the Coloured population and 100 percent of the African population qualified for the subsidies but only an insignificant proportion were able to access the subsidies (ibid). Some Africans in the 1000-1200 rands income bracket could gain access to starter houses through the House of Representatives or the South African Housing Trust and the houses were ‘serviced core’ units of up to two rooms. Whites could buy on the private market with their subsidies. The rest of the African households could gain access to serviced sites through the Cape Provincial Administration or the South Africa Independent Trust (ibid).

African housing had separate restrictions and until 1986, state policy restricted the provision of land and accommodation in order to implement influx control. Land in Khayelitsha was designated for development and occupation after the 1987 Black Communities Development Act which helped to reduce the procedures for proclaiming land for African development (ibid 1989:11). Official waiting lists for Africans were misleading as many of them did not see the point in applying for official accommodation. For instance, in 1986, 7422 African families appeared on the Development Board’s waiting list, but by 1988, 800 388 were on the lists. A survey conducted by the Urban
Policy Research Unit revealed that 60 percent of these had registered because of pressure from the forced removals (Smit 1995).

Urban African communities were unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of the local authorities and they loathed both the quality of their houses and their councils because they felt inadequately represented (ibid 84). Rental increases that were forthcoming from these institutions were therefore ignored and civic disobedience became the norm with regard to housing services. The African local councils were immobilised by boycotts of payments for all services. Africans were trapped in a socio-economic position in which they could not afford to accumulate resources to cater for their accommodation needs (Mthuli 1984). This succeeded in preventing their economic mobility and confined them to relative and absolute poverty. Women in particular suffered the most as housing provision discriminated against them with regard to allocation, systems of tenure and access to all the relevant institutions (ibid).

Increased nationalist demands put pressure on the government to reform which forced it to map out a new urbanisation strategy that aimed to redistribute resources in a manner that accelerated class differentiation such as the 99-year leasehold of homes to a select layer of residents who were termed ‘responsible Africans’ (Zain 1989). The redistribution was selective and targeted at those townships termed ‘oil-spot development’ that were categorised most likely to pose potential security problems. The idea was to contain the spread of nationalist influences by addressing distressing material needs such as housing and general community development and this involved differentiating amongst the Africans and introducing a more ‘propertied class’. These developments were initiated and monitored by the National Security Management System which put massive administrative powers in the hands of the security forces. The security forces had demanded more authority in order to contain African nationalist aspirations and this led to the circumventing or truncating of traditional bureaucratic procedures (Marais 2001:47).
Communal Organising for Housing

Around 1900, the white community began to organise for housing provision and the Citizen’s League was formed to help poor whites own houses. The government generously donated ‘free’ land for their ventures but this same gesture was not extended to the African community. For the Africans, the Hostel Dwellers’ Association (HDA) became the first civic organisation around housing issues. It was an initiative that aimed to instill a spirit of self reliance and to heal the wounds caused by the migrant labour system (Russell 1984 cited in Ramphele 1991;352). It was also a response to the political crisis which had resulted in hostel dwellers being used by the government to attack local township residents. African communities, accustomed to the government’s strategy of creating cleavages amongst them, had learnt to exploit such cleavages for their political survival.

The Western Cape Men’s Hostel Association was formed in 1983 with the broad aim of improving the welfare of hostel dwellers and more specifically, to fight for the God-given right of people to live with their families near their places of work, to work for full residence and employment rights and to campaign for the provision of family housing and special married quarters (ibid 354). The HDA’s membership was exclusively male until 1986. Female presence was unacknowledged by the hostel dwellers themselves who, like the government, also viewed them as illegitimate. The argument was that women participation in the HDA would complicate male bonding. A more likely excuse would be that not everyone would get fair representation since not all the men could afford to have their wives in the urban areas. This exclusion of women later affected the loyalty of members in the organisation as women were accused of negatively influencing their men behind closed doors. This recognition of the women’s power over men as individual’s opened up space for them in the HDA (ibid 361).

Organising the hostel dwellers was a complicated task as the issue of trust in the organisers irked the hostel dwellers. The risks of trusting the organisers and their fellow residents and meddling in politics at the same time militated against the organiser’s efforts and a significant amount of time was spent on cultivating trust amongst the hostel dwellers. More ever, the better off in areas such as special quarters and Old Flats in Langa were not
keen to participate in the association and the HDA concluded that it was because ‘they did not feel the pinch of dehumanisation to the same extent as the rest of the hostel dwellers’ (ibid 357).

The HDA had a hierarchical structure with the regional level at the top going down to local branches at all the hostels in the Western Cape. The local branches were run by executive committees and separate women’s committees were subordinate to the men’s committees. Regional executives were elected annually at the general conference but this was a mere formality at all the levels as most committees were returned unopposed (ibid). Continuity of the leadership was clearly preferred. From its inception, the HDA developed close contacts with local civic, trade union and ‘progressive’ political organisations and it also adopted the rhetoric that was associated with popular mass based political groupings in South Africa. It also became an affiliate of Cosatu which placed it in the sphere of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The HDA thus completed the politicisation of hostel life.

**Funding Black Housing**

The Local Loans Act no.19 of 1926 affected the financing of building schemes within local authorities’ jurisdiction as they could no longer obtain funds from the sum voted for in parliament through provincial administrators (Elias 1980:97). Instead, the local loans were controlled by the Public Debt Commission which gave funds on a priority basis. Elias argues that the CHB feared that housing claims could be subordinated to what appeared to be more urgent claims in the local authorities hence Section 7 Clause 10 of the act was for the establishment of location and native villages, the erection of and the granting of loans for the erection of dwellings for the occupation of the natives and coloured persons. Elias observed that this simply meant that funding for black housing no longer came from a parliamentary vote under the Housing Act except by special permission from the Native Affairs department. In fact, it was official government policy that: “The success of the policy of segregation in urban areas may be said to depend on the fact that the provision of housing for the natives in locations does not become too heavy a burden on the general body of ratepayers” (ibid:70).
To cut down on expenditure in black housing, the CHB distinguished between the minimum type of accommodation required by the non-European and recommended the smallest unit as having one living room and two bedrooms (Smit 1995). This measure was not adhered to in white housing. The paternalistic justification provided by the board was that “if success was to be attained, the scheme must be conceived along lines which do not disregard the habits and customs of the native” (Elias 1980:112). By 1929, the CHB reported that the CTCC had not applied for or spent a single cent from their allocated housing money and in 1934, the board was given wider discretion in granting loans for native locations but it continued to finance them as economic loans (ibid).

The Peninsula Administration Board (PAB) was established as a separate legal entity with self-financing powers in 1973 by the former Department of Administration and Development with the aim of centralising the administration of all African townships (Evans 1997). Previously, administrative responsibility was split between the CTCC and the Divisional Council of the Cape. All the functions of the local authorities were assumed by the new BAABs which were responsible to the Bantu Affairs Department and all staff from the Native Affairs department were transferred to the BAAB. Its income was derived from rent, service levies, profits on liquor sales and from a Bantu Services levy\(^\text{15}\) which was imposed on local employers of African labour. Local authorities had a monopoly on beer sales in locations and the logic was, “The more a community drinks, the more will be available to spend on amenities”\(^\text{16}\) (Kraak 1981:24). A permit fee for whites to enter African locations and cemetery fees also provided additional income. The PAB was always affected financially by the political unrest in urban African areas. Deficit accounting became an institutional aspect of township financing especially as the government had made it clear that “It was not the task of the state to provide subsidies for the housing of Bantu who were temporarily rendering services in white urban areas” (ibid 16).

The officially recognised BABs were not respected by the African community as they considered them to be unrepresentative institutions without legitimacy. Instead community associations that sprung up from the communities were recognised by the blacks and the
government decided to capitalise on this by planning to establish community councils (ibid). Again, the African communities rejected these councils as experience had destroyed their faith in government promises. They remained sceptical of the proposed community councils as they would not provide them with a genuine power base. The declaration of the Western Cape as a coloured labour preferential area implied that local Africans were mere temporary residents and this was an important fact to remember (Smith and Digby 1978:6).

A setback was that the PAB owned all land and property within the African residential areas but it was not empowered to sell land which meant no one in these areas could own land. On the other hand, criteria for accessing family housing was tightened; Section 10\(^{17}\) of the Bantu (urban areas) Consolidation Act dictated the terms of an African’s presence in a white urban area (ibid). It specified that an African could reside in an urban area in the following circumstances: (a) if he had resided there continuously since birth; (b) had worked there continuously for one employer for ten years; (c) had been there continuously and lawfully for fifteen years and had thereafter continued to reside there, and was not employed outside the area and while in the area had not been sentenced to a fine exceeding R50 or to imprisonment for a period exceeding six months; (d) was the wife, unmarried daughter or son under 18 years of age of a Bantu falling into classes (a) and (b) and ordinarily resident with him and initially entered the area lawfully; or (e) had special permission to be there.

This act together with R.74 and R.1036 of 1968, legislated that in order to qualify for a family house, both husband and wife must be in the area legally.\(^{18}\) But a woman could not be a tenant of a house unless she was a widow of a tenant with dependant children (Smith and Digby 1978:10). Accommodation was to be leased on a monthly basis to residents of the township. The lease was only renewed monthly upon the payment of rent. The tenant could not remain unemployed for more than thirty days. The lessee could not leave the site for more than thirty days without notifying the Township Superintendent and the lease could be terminated if in the opinion of the Superintendent, the tenant ceased to be a ‘fit and proper person to reside in the Bantu residential area’.\(^{19}\) Housing shortages and backlogs continued to increase as the government did not have plans to build more houses
for the African population. Families on waiting lists were expected to live as lodgers with a tenant family and this overcrowding led many into erecting temporary shacks in squatter settlements where they could at least have a house of their own.

Overcrowding was officially tolerated and institutionalised and profited from by the PAB. Any person who was not a tenant of a house (i.e. married but did not qualify under section ten) and who was over the edge of eighteen (including the tenants of children) was defined as a lodger and was obliged to pay a monthly lodging fee to the board and even whole families were also expected to live as lodgers (Kraak 1981:16). As a result of the struggle against the injustices of apartheid, a climate of civil unrest was created in the locations and mistrust in the bureaucracy manifested itself in the form of rent and service charge boycotts (Smit 1995:10).

Up to the eighties, bureaucratic processes for new housing schemes in Cape Town were delayed and frustrated by the numerous institutions the applications had to go through. For instance, processes for township development required a minimum of 9-12 months excluding anything up to three months of the waiting period for the approval from the Surveyor General (Kraak 1981). The change to the Tricameral Parliamentary System (1986) weaved in more complexities into the delivery process as all proposals now had to go through coloured Management Committees, local authorities, committees and departments connected with the various Houses of Parliament. The Cape Town Divisional Councils were replaced by the Cape Town Regional Services Council which played a dual role of regional authority and local authority for what were previously divisional council areas which compounded confusion and caused further delays (Zain 1989:12).

After 1983, coloureds were for the first time allowed to purchase the public dwelling rental accommodation they occupied under the Government Sales Campaign and all new units for those earning over one hundred and fifty rands were to be provided on an ownership basis. Four years later, African tenants of the council houses in Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu were allowed to obtain 99-year leasehold agreements on their rented dwelling, implying that in the near future (probably after 99 years), black prospective owners would
be allowed to convert 99 year old leasehold to full ownership (ibid). These changes boosted coloured investment in housing but the Africans were unmoved as they regarded their conditions with suspicion, for the lease implied that they still would not own the houses hence there was no point investing if their progeny would not inherit the houses (ibid 13-14). They were clearly unwilling to take the risk to invest in the houses.

At the beginning of 1990, government loans were provided to the better off blacks and coloureds to purchase houses resulting in 175 000 house seekers accepting the loans. Later, civil unrest caused a lot of defaults amongst the households that had accepted the loans and this compelled the government to set up a parastatal, the Independent Development Trust (IDT),\textsuperscript{20} in 1994 to provide sites and toilets for the African population. The rationale was, as Zach de Beer\textsuperscript{21} put it (Bond 2000:128),

> When people are housed-more especially when they are home owners, they are not only less likely to be troublesome. They are also likely to feel they have a stake in the society and an interest in its stability.

Still safeguarding the public health of the white community remained paramount, hence the provision of a toilet and a water source.

**Conclusion**

Housing delivery approaches used prior to majority rule in 1994 defined Africans as a homogeneous entity and ignored the specific needs of communities and individuals over time. The ‘utility’ of the urban African, engineering criteria such as the required size of the workforce, the existing houses, and the calculated number of Africans per room determined the course of housing delivery. As a racial group, Africans were treated equally with respect to housing allocation but differentiation in the delivery system set in later as a measure to appease politically conscientised African urbanites and to divide them by making them aware that some could belong to a superior and appreciated class. Even though, their *de facto* status remained that of aliens. In both urban and homelands, they remained subjects with limited rights and access to resources. Too many rules allowed particularistic criteria to determine access to urban residence at the individual level even though it had to be in line with how that ethnic group was housed. Particularism thus
engendered and exploited the cultural diversity of the black people of South Africa as well as fuelling a culture of distrust and a spirit of demanding what citizens should generally enjoy without having to fight for.

Africans were from the beginning defined as what I would call ‘roaming citizens’ who “…would live as a migrant and temporary sojourner group, …denied the full rights of colonial settlement, including rights to land ownership-the ultimate means of attaining functional control” (Davies 1981:37 cited in Evans 1996:41). Their citizenship status shifted depending on the space they inhabited at different times. Citizenship was for Africans defined in the context of the physical space they occupied in the homelands and in urban areas and this shifted according to one’s employment status over time. The identity of these subjects depended on the actions of the state-a state that sowed the seeds of distrust in the bureaucracy, for it was the bureaucracy that defined the African identities and determined what their lawful occupations could be and where they could set up a home according to what they first racially were, followed by other assigned categories.

The ‘enclosure’ townships they lived in also became the political space they occupied as most struggles took place in the African residential areas. New knowledge in managing the limited space they had emerged and later became available for the struggle for full citizenship in the province after majority rule in 1994. Discrimination and manipulative practices that spilled into the post 1994 era had been nurtured in the apartheid state. Particularism at the racial and ethnic level, as well as a multitude of conflictual rules and regulations made it easier for the new rulers to use the housing resources as a mobilisation tool and particularism shifted to the political affiliation level.

It was not a surprise then that the HDA politics on housing closely resembled the nature of the liberation struggle as evidenced by the designs to exclude others groups due to the lack of trust. A characteristic that we shall see resurfacing again in the post apartheid phase amongst the poor house seekers. How then could the new government set about restoring the citizenship of people who had been made migrants in their own country? Later,
political facilitation located in the “liberation culture” value system re-emerged as a result of the need to break these ideological barriers.

The next chapter explores the post apartheid housing delivery approaches under an ANC led central government and a NNP led provincial government.

Endnotes

1 A divided state such as South Africa makes it mandatory for any analyst to refer to racial categories. ‘African’ refers to indigenous people who inhabited the country before the arrival of the Europeans; ‘coloured’ refers to the products of miscegenation, that is, to people of mixed race origins; ‘Indian’ refers to the descendants from Asia; ‘white’ refers to the descendants of European settlers as well as Afrikaners who are Dutch descendants and ‘black’ is an inclusive category for all those who are not ‘white’. (See South Africa’s Constitution and Marais, H. (2001) South Africa’s Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition, Zed Books, NY, p6.

2 This concept was used by Mamphela Ramphele to explain the housing of hostel dwellers in apartheid South Africa. See Ramphele, M. (1991) The Politics of Space: Life in the Migrant Labour Hostels of the Western Cape, DPhil thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town, p73.

3 Prior to 1901, black workers in Cape Town provided their own accommodation, some in squatter camps in what is now Woodstock, others in compounds in docks, but most in District Six as lodgers among whites and coloured elements of the working class. They simply located themselves wherever they could find space which could be outside compounds, on white owned properties or in shacks on municipal land. See Kraak, G. (1981) Financing of African Worker Accommodation in Cape Town, SALDRU Working Paper no35, University of Cape Town, p5 and Evans, P.D. (1996) Confronting Black Low Cost Housing Delivery in the Western Cape Metropolitan Area: A Critical Appraisal, MA Thesis, Department of Environmental and Geographical Science, p51.

4 This act formalised the segregation that had been taking place from the late 19th century by stipulating amongst other provisions that racial residential zones were to have boundaries that prevented contact between different races, that appropriate land be set aside for all social classes present (or likely to emerge in that race group, as well as local services and amenities) and that access to working areas and other amenities should not traverse the Group Areas of other races.


6 Mamphela uses the concept ‘bed-hold’ to denote the residential space occupied by blacks who were allowed to stay in urban areas. See Ramphele, M. (1991) The Politics of Space: Life in the Migrant Labour Hostels of the Western Cape, DPhil thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, p119.

7 Intellectual space is defined as the symbolic framework within which social interaction is conducted. It provides the capacity for critical awareness of one’s environment and the position one occupies in the power structure of one’s society. It is space that allows individuals the capacity to demystify ideology and to limit the impact of the constraints of a hegemonic order on social relations. Realisation of this space is through physical, social, political, economic and social psychological space. See again Ramphele, M. (1991) The Politics of Space: Life in the Migrant Labour Hostels of the Western Cape, DPhil thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town, p73.

8 The word Bantu, initially an Anglocisation of the African word meaning people, was used derogatorily in South Africa in the same sense as Kaffir.


10 These were rural reserves carved out in the 1913 Land Apportionment Act.

11 These were prefabricated galvanised iron sheds that stood next to brick lavatories. There was no privacy for each family and families attempted to create privacy by demarcating their space with either cloth, plastic, zinc or cardboard.


13 The Bantu Services Levy Act no64 of 1953 provided that employers of African male labour were required to contribute monthly to a levy fund, the proceeds of which would be used for water, sanitation, lighting installations and roads in locations. The levy was abandoned in 1973 and was replaced by labour bureau fees.

14 The African communities did try to resist the provision of beer-halls in their locations. In Langa, in 1960, all the existing beer-halls were burnt down by rioters but the government raised loans and rebuilt new fireproof ones which were destroyed again in 1976 during political unrest. The burning of BAAB installations precipitated the financial crisis of these institutions. See Kraak, G. (1981) *Financing of African Worker Accommodation in Cape Town*, SALDRU working paper no35, pp26-46.

16 Section 10 also spelt out trading rights that could be enjoyed by local African traders. It allowed them to form trading partnerships and the Gazette stated that ‘No site shall be allotted in future to any trader, partner or company shareholder who does not hold a Homeland’s citizenship certificate and who does not live within the African residential areas. Only residentially qualified African could form companies where shares could be held. These restrictions forced many blacks into informal activity which was not condoned by the state.

18 Men who qualified in terms of section 10 but were single or whose wives were not section 10 candidates were forced to live in the hostels or as lodgers of married tenants. Single women did not have the choice of hostel accommodation. They could either become lodgers or live in domestic servants’ quarters. See *Kraak, G. April (1981) Financing of African Worker Accommodation in Cape Town*, SALDRU Working Paper no35.

19 Government notice R.1036 14/6/68 Chapter 2, Clause 15 (ii) (g).

20 The IDT was nicknamed, ‘I Develop Toilets’. The parastatal-cum NGO was founded in early 1990 by former President de Klerk who later turned it over to the Urban Foundation. This was a privately funded think-tank and housing developer composed of academics and dealers set up by the Anglo American Corporation after the 1976 Soweto Uprising. IDT was allocated 2 billion rands to implement the oil sport strategy. See Bond, P. (2000) *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-Liberalism in South Africa*, Pluto Press.

21 One of South Africa’s leading capitalist politicians in the eighties.

22 From 1923, the Stallard Commission arbitrarily defined all Africans as aliens in all the urban areas of the country.
Chapter 7
The People’s Housing Process

Introduction
The chapter analyses the current housing regime through an analysis of the housing policy, implementing institutions and the bureaucrats’ action orientations. It also demonstrates the use of knowledge gained in the struggle to defeat bureaucratic hurdles and institutional arrangements that did not facilitate access to resources for previously disadvantaged groups. Manifestation of the “liberation culture” in the home-seeking ventures of the poor are also explored here. An important question to be answered here is; Why have some civic organizations (as opposed to individuals) managed to make significant gains in accessing housing resources? Does this imply that state capacity can only be realized through civil society? And is the cooptation of civil society the only possible answer to the redistribution of resources and service delivery in general? There is therefore a need for historical analysis to understand housing delivery in Cape Town as this involves the transformation from rural space to confined urban space for African households through different vehicles and mediums. A question emanating from this process is: How is trust cultivated in this housing delivery environment?

An estimated 20 percent of Coloureds and 80 percent of Africans in Metropolitan Cape Town live in informal housing or in overcrowded conditions¹ (Smit 1995:20). Housing is a social responsibility of the government and this is enshrined in the constitution. According to Smit, Housing is a primary determinant of the manner in which individual households are incorporated into an urban system (ibid) and since apartheid excluded blacks in its distribution of urban space, it becomes imperative to ask to what extent the new regime has reincorporated the low-income group into the mainstream urban space. Balancing the population and financial resources for housing provision is complicated by previous policies since the provision of loans and subsidies for black housing was pushed to the periphery by the previous government. The Government of National Unity (GNU) inherited complex and multiple government departments that performed the same tasks for the racially defined sections of the population that were located in different geographic
spaces (Marais 2001:67). How then does such a system function equitably? The maintenance and reformation of such a complex administrative system depleted resources that could have been channelled towards the development of the previously under privileged black race.

**Housing the ‘Wretched’ in South Africa- Post 1994**

Housing delivery for the low-income category in South Africa is organised such that house seekers have to access land and also the financial subsidy if they are first time home owners.² Theoretically, the subsidies target the poor but the practicalities of disbursement show a deviation. The housing policy was formulated in capitalist tones that ensured that private businesses would benefit tremendously thus becoming welfare recipients themselves (Bond 2000). How then has the ANC, with its socialist ideals circumvented the policies it did not have a high degree of autonomy in articulating? The invoking of liberation struggle tactics (knowledge) resurfaced in many communities and it becomes interesting to untangle the complex relationships between and amongst the political parties, the poor masses and civic organisations that are involved in housing provision. Doing this successfully brings in the debate of the state, the party and civil society in Africa. The African post colonial state has been observed to capture as much of civil society as it can manage with the aim of achieving political and economic hegemony (Chabal 1992:249). Civil society becomes the tool of this hegemonic appropriation and the strong civil society that emerged to fight political repression in South Africa is no exception. Constitutional constraints emphasizing the protection of property rights left marginal room for the redistribution of resources but tactics from the struggle through the civil society have evolved into a force to reckon with.

The absence of a national housing policy stalled the development of housing provision for Africans as fragmented decision making frustrated all initiatives and efforts during the 1994 transition when confusion was at its peak. The CTMC, which was illegitimate anyway in the eyes of the African people, had its little authority further undermined in the process. People lost trust in the council and turned to extra-legal solutions to their problems. The result was anarchy in the reallocation of existing houses. Self-allocation of
vacant council housing became common as the unauthorised occupation of council houses spread in all areas. A major cause of this problem was the waiting list which was growing at an alarming rate every month as people signed on without fully understanding what to expect from the council- a rental house or a new ownership project house (Cape Argus 1995).

Almost eight years later, allocation problems still dominated the housing resource allocation processes. For instance, towards the end of 2002, an Irish entrepreneur donated thirty million rands to build homes for the shack dwellers at Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay, one of the most affluent areas in Cape Town. One year later, only 250 of the 455 beneficiaries received their title deeds for the houses built with this money. The process was fraught with many problems amongst them the continued influx of new shack dwellers into the area, bureaucratic resistance, opposition by the white community in Hout Bay and even more alarming, internal political problems. One intended beneficiary commented: “The process of plot allocation has become politicised. It is not being done legally but in the interests of the ruling party. If you don’t vote ANC, you won’t get a house.” ³ Several ANC committees took it upon themselves to define eligibility criteria and went on to allocate the homes. In another incident in a different housing project for fire victims, a homeless woman lamented, “Why are they building homes for the Joe Slovo residents and many more who were not born here and took no part in the struggle?” (Cape Argus 2004).

Just after 1994, the media played a huge role in exposing the irregularities in housing provision. For instance, the council’s waiting list was useless as it was not part of the new post 1994 housing policy. It was only applicable to the previous government’s rental housing stock. In some projects, beneficiaries were drawn up from council waiting lists and in others, a separate beneficiary list was drawn up. Confusion was exacerbated by waiting lists of the previous era which were not respected due to the element of inequity in them. In the Cape Metropolitan area, the main beneficiaries seemed to be the largely African population from informal settlements who got incorporated into the projects (Thurman 1999:24; Interview 2001). Many waiting lists existed in different institutions
largely because prior to 1994, the sixty-four local authorities did not keep waiting lists since housing was traditionally a provincial responsibility.

When the rental stock became vacant, the council was to procedurally and appropriately allocate it to the next person on the waiting list in terms of clear criteria. But overzealous councillors tended to influence the allocation process by putting undue pressure on the officers in charge of the allocation (City of Cape Town 1997:3). A form of remuneration for the civics also took place when recommendations were made to the council on allocation decisions. Street committees in particular were the structures that decided on who should obtain access to council stock, who should share their house and with whom, and who should be evicted. At times departing tenants, neighbours or gangs allocated vacant council housing making it impossible for those on the waiting list to get a chance. An unusual practice of tenants swapping their council houses also became common and contributed to problems of jumping the queue (ibid:4).

In addition to influencing allocative decisions, councillors were known to interfere in the award of tenders to housing developers, promising beneficiaries the impossible with regard to housing and they deliberately promoted the interests of one organisation relative to similar such organizations (City of Cape Town 1991:4). The behaviour of some councillors and officials implied that council decisions required the ratification or endorsement of external structures such as the Reconstruction and Development Programmes forums (RDP), street committees and Civic and Ratepayers Associations (ibid.7). Confusion on who to report to and be accountable to threw the entire council into turmoil and ground it to a standstill. Years of racial policy, bad administration, political turmoil, lack of political direction, gangsterism, and poor economic circumstances all grounded housing delivery (Cape Argus 1995). Allocating houses became a nightmare in Cape Town as allocation criteria was never clarified during the transition period. The illegal occupation of newly built houses increased with Africans often forcibly occupying houses built for coloureds on the grounds that their ownership was illegitimate because houses were allocated on a racial basis. The council was thus ignored as a major role player in housing delivery by both the government and the house seeking communities.
The National Housing Policy

During the struggle, the ANC had advocated a people-centred process in which communities could play an important role in housing provision. The constraint was that this had to be achieved through the private sector. At the change over to majority rule in 1994, it was essential to reassure the west that South Africa was still a safe destination for investment and was generally responding to the globalization discourse on housing as led by the World Bank (SAHPF 1998; Laloo 1999; Bond 2000; Wilson and Lowery 2003:48).

South Africa's land and housing policy therefore followed the same trajectory as most third world countries: the shift from government provision of housing stock towards deregulation, allowing market forces to dictate access to land and shelter; the acceptance of squatters as economic refugees requiring basic services that are to be delivered by private contractors and releasing state land on the periphery of the cities for would be squatters and illegal occupations (PD, 2001:9). This for South Africa, had started in the eighties, spearheaded by academic and other institutions such as The Urban Foundation\(^5\), IDT and the National Housing Forum (NHF),\(^6\) which set the framework for the development of a low-cost housing paradigm in South Africa. This paradigm heavily influences the housing policy of the day, which is sarcastically referred to as “government–driven housing intervention for private sector profit without risk” (ibid:9).

During the 1994 election campaign, housing was made the number one priority of the impending government and was strongly emphasized in the RDP that was dubbed as the ANC manifesto (Wilkinson 1998). The aims were to meet the basic needs of the majority, develop human resources, build the economy and democratize the state and society. To achieve its promise to deliver the five million houses that would wipe out the housing backlog, the ANC appointed one of its most respected politicians from the South Africa Communist Party, an ANC alliance group, Joe Slovo,\(^7\) as Housing Minister in the GNU. Slovo immediately worked to bring all stakeholders in housing provision to a public forum called the Botshabelo Accord where all pledged to play their part in housing delivery in the new political era.\(^8\)
The key features of the new housing policy which emerged at this forum were: a Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, whereby government would compensate banks (up to 80 percent of bond value) which could recover unpaid loans to new home buyers; a Builder’s Warranty which aimed to assure home buyers of the quality of the workmanship by the construction industry and a Capital Subsidy Scheme under which individuals or groups could apply for grants of up to 15 000 rands to build a new house (Ministry of Housing 1997). The scheme was funded by the National Department of National Housing (DOH) and administered by the provinces. The subsidy was designed to be accessed via a developer who would shoulder the responsibility of overseeing the development of the physical structure. This according to Bond (2000:149), was in line with neo-liberalism as developers would get their profit via banks that would also profit. Then land costs, municipal fees and infrastructure costs would also be deducted from the 15 000 rands leaving very little for the actual house itself. In an environment with a multitude of legislative blockages, constitutional constraints (protection of property rights) market limitations, high land servicing costs and a rather hostile bureaucracy, the policy slowly faced problems in addition to consolidating existing inequalities by developing new projects in formerly designated black areas. Those with higher incomes were favoured because they had the capacity to gain access to credit and the private sector developers targeted them (ibid). There clearly was an inequitable allocation of funding between different low-income groups.

Six years later, in May 2000, the new Housing Minister, Sankie Mthembi Nkondo, announced publicly that the policy had failed to work as it became clear that the promised one million houses had failed to materialize. Only 92 000 houses went up between 1994 and 1997 (PD 2000:2). Mass housing provision for the poor through ‘mobilising’ the private sector’ was clearly the wrong approach. In the People's Dialogue's (2001:3) words,

    The ANC had assumed wrongly that the country’s highly developed capitalist system, with its world class banking system, construction companies and abundant private sector finances, could meet the housing needs of largely unemployed and poor people.
Its main setback was its lack of relevant knowledge and relative inexperience in policy formulation. This made the party to lose out to the traditional ‘experts’ (Gusler 2000; Lalloo 1998).

The housing policy, one of the concrete products of the Botshabelo compromise, reflected the tensions between the needs of capitalism and the realities of service provision to multitudes of poor people. The policy was based on people’s participation but it was drafted by government technocrats and private sector consultants who severely restricted real participation by fitting the People’s Housing Process\(^\text{10}\) into an institutional framework driven by market related and bureaucratic forces (People’s Dialogue 2001:1). The need for a consensus was essential. Waldron (cited in Barry 2002:271) makes this clear;

...the need for a common view does not make the fact of disagreement evaporate. Instead it means that a basis for common action in matters of justice has to be forged in the heat of (the) disagreements.

From 15 March 1994, the subsidy, a once off payment provided the product price of the property was 65000 rands or less, replaced all previous state family housing subsidy schemes and the following criteria was used for qualification: South African Citizenship or a permanent residence permit, marriage (in terms of the Civil Law or of a Customary Union) or living with a long term partner; being single, over 21 and with dependants; a household earning 3 500 rands per month or less, a spouse or a partner who had not previously owned property or benefited from any other state assisted subsidy scheme\(^\text{11}\) including the IDT capital subsidy scheme and that one understands what a contract means and the responsibility that goes with it. This last criterion left the system open to different interpretations and was loaded with mistrust.

Many criticisms have been directed towards the housing authorities for the insensitivity they portray in administering the subsidy scheme (Moss 2001). Initially, the subsidies were released on completion of development and yet no finance was made available during the construction phase. A major setback was that the poor were not in a position to ever afford mortgage repayments and none of those involved in the policy debate took cognisance of this.\(^\text{12}\) The release of the subsidy was based on the transfer of individual title to owner even
though occupancy rights might have been established and recognised by local authorities or other land owners. Secondly, subsidy applications remained complex and inaccessible to the poor (See appendix 3 on the various categories of subsidies). The national housing policy was clearly concerned with quantity and profit. The end result was that the rather small subsidy ended up being tied into site and infrastructure services by private contractors (PD 2002). See table 1.

### Table 1: The Capital Subsidy Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly beneficiary income</th>
<th>Subsidy amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to R800</td>
<td>R15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R801 to R1 500</td>
<td>R12 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1 501 to R2 500</td>
<td>R 9 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 501 to R3 500</td>
<td>R 5 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The state and the business sector do not trust the poor as reflected in the complexity surrounding the inaccessibility of subsidies by the poor. And lastly, implementation guidelines were criticized vehemently for making subsidies accessible only to big contractors which exacerbates the marginalization of the poor. The four types of subsidies spell out different requirements as they need an intermediary to act on their behalf. The patronising tendencies of the bureaucracy are revealed in that the poor black communities are assumed to be incapable of organizing access by themselves.

Economic theories of trust organise financial transactions around mistrust resulting in numerous contracts to establish some compliance. This explains the maze of guidelines for accessing housing subsidies. In order to establish and enforce trust, a credible outsider, usually a housing developer, was required to manage the money individuals borrowed. This ensured that the money would be definitely used for housing (PD 2000). This implied mistrust since constant surveillance of the poor was to take place through a third party. The subsidy system itself excludes some categories of citizens such as single people with dependants in rural areas as one must be married or cohabiting or have one or more dependants. Naturally, many manipulate this and quickly assume the identity of a married person by quickly finding a partner. Dissatisfaction with this was displayed clearly by one irate new house owner towards a project manager who reported the encounter, 'He told me
Part of the problem has been that information on house seeking has not been readily available for the majority of house seekers. A survey by Thurman (1999:18) revealed that the majority of those who had managed to get into new council housing schemes got the information from a diverse range of sources including street committees, community leaders, neighbours, developers, councillors and council officials. Blacks, new immigrants in particular, rely on informal information networks and on social entry systems through local civic structures or community leadership to organise settlement. These traditional informal institutions screen new candidates and accept them into the community where some get to hear of the subsidies. Many others did not know about the subsidies, the house designs and the contractors. The bureaucrats did not bother to embark on an education campaign to inform citizens on how the new housing policy worked and how house seekers could prepare to access the subsidies.

This is not surprising since, in general, bureaucrats tend to prefer the middle class who can afford to pay their way as their systems are not flexible enough to be responsive to different needs (Jenkins 1999). The poor in Cape Town thus avoid dealing with the bureaucracy in property dealings and carry out transactions informally (Smit 2001). Developers in particular were accused of concealing information and personalising the subsidy application process (ibid:19). This is because they are better positioned to access information on public services. A big problem is that the current policy favours a specific form of housing, the single plot per household, which marginalizes the poor as they cannot be located in inner city areas for many reasons (ibid 2001), amongst them the lack of land in those areas. This contributes to the silent attitude of the bureaucrats as it avoids having to deal with informed clients.

Realising the problems faced in organizing to access both the subsidies and the land, the ANC saw the opportunity to facilitate this access with the ultimate aim of improving their
political gains in the province. In 1998, the ANC Housing Desk began to concentrate its energy on:

...a campaign ...calling on the local governments who are owners of the assets or will soon become the owners, to provide a further discount on the price (of housing) to ensure that transfer of ownership can happen at minimum cost to the purchaser. This will also be seen as a major gain by a key sector we are trying to organize.

The ANC had begun to use housing resource allocation as a political mobilisation strategy.

**Institutional Framework for Housing Delivery 1993**

The first institutional framework for the new political dispensation was established in terms of the Housing Arrangements Act of 1993. The GNU immediately embarked on a massive institutional restructuring of housing delivery structures. The DOH in collaboration with the NHF and nine Joint Technical Committees, formulated the national housing policy in 1994. Section 2 of the Housing Arrangements Act (No.155 of 1994) made provisions for the establishment of the National Housing Board (NHB) that replaced the former apartheid National Housing Commission and the South African Housing Advisory Council (DOH 1994:4). The NHB also replaced the Development and Housing Boards of the three Own Affairs Administration. At this time, the NHB calculated that at least 5 percent of the national budget had to be allocated to housing each year in order to cater for the estimated 370 000 housing units that had to be constructed annually to address the backlog of one and a half million units which was estimated to grow at 198 000 units per annum (ibid 1994). This institutional building and restructuring took place against the background of ANC promises that should it come into power, one million houses would be built for low-income groups for the first five years during its tenure.

The new DOH was tasked with reconciling the different ideologies of the stakeholders in the formulation of the housing policy. However, since the process was dominated by conservative bureaucrats, it naturally depended more on its other conservative NHF and DBSA consultants (Laloo 1999). This effectively excluded the other progressive technocrats and South Africa National Civic Organisation (SANCO) who had been part of the architects of the RDP housing programme (Bond 2000:138). According to Bond, this
exclusion has been blamed for the heavy pro-capitalist tones in the implementation of the subsidies. Though the national level was dominated by the ANC politicians, they were overwhelmed by the capacity of the other more experienced stakeholders—(apartheid technocrats in particular), who, in the true democratic fashion, also participated in policy formulation. Complications arose because at the provincial level in the Western Cape, the NNP held the reigns as it had won the majority vote in the elections. Political commitment at this level and the municipal level was therefore crucial for the success of any policy especially one targeting the poor Africans. This commitment has not been readily forthcoming and has contributed significantly to the development of events with regard to housing provision.

The NHB allocates funds from the National Housing Fund to the PHBs (made up of representatives of housing consumers and deliverers), which in turn allocates them as lump sum capital subsidies to approved projects. The PHBs are responsible for the implementation of the housing policy at the provincial level including the distribution of subsidies to individuals or other project end users. They are also mandated with ensuring that integrated development takes place within the low-income communities in the housing delivery process. Capacity building within self-organising communities also falls within their realm of responsibility. The PHBs are at a vantage point as they advise the provincial Members of the Executive Council (MECs) on housing policy matters. This gives the board more power over the politicians as it makes all the decisions and signs the cheques for housing resources. And since it is accountable to the NHB, it can effectively bypass the MECs in the implementation process. With MECs being accountable to the electorate and to the legislature, tensions in the working relationship are inevitable. Problems arise between the politicians and the implementors which can be resolved by having independent PHBs so as to minimize the confidence gap that arises in the resource allocation process.

For housing projects to qualify for funding from the PHBs, they had to be initiated through “social compacts” which were forums that encompassed all affected stakeholders in an area with a housing need (PD 1995; DOH 1997). The stakeholders are from diverse
backgrounds such as civics, trade unions, employers, developers, political organisations and local government. The important criterion for them was that they had to be a legally recognized body that could be ‘trusted’ on behalf of the house seekers (ibid). The memory of defaulting house owners haunted the bureaucrats hence the need for an institution to minimize the risk was essential. Conservative attitudes within the Housing Board were soon softened by the real threat of mass action by house seekers. For instance, in 1994, the board turned down a subsidy application by one of the country’s largest and oldest housing cooperative, the Seven Buildings Project in Gauteng (PD 2001). It argued that the group was ineligible for public funds because of their collective ownership form of tenure. Eviction notices were then served on the group and more than 500 members staged a sit in until the minister of housing assured them that they would become the government’s pilot scheme in social housing (Bond 2000:140). This successful cooptation, as a pilot scheme, into the ANC’s party programme, signal led the power collective action had over the bureaucracy.

Land availability is also an important criterion for project subsidy funding but the housing delivery institutional set up does not reflect the provision of land for low-income housing. According to the 1996 Green Paper on Land, the government\(^\text{18}\) owns a huge portion of the country’s land that is equal to about one third of all the land, yet responsibility for this resource is not specified and housing projects have to scour for what they consider to be suitable land for their needs. As early as 1993, the ANC had shown clearly that it did not trust the Western Cape Provincial government to act in the best interests of the urban poor by calling for a freeze on all city development on publicly-owned land with the intention of first identifying all such land and transferring its ownership to a Public Land Trust which would then assess development needs with high density housing receiving priority (Cape Argus 1993). The Department of Land Affairs was just as fragmented as the DOH but it moved more swiftly in redefining its role in land provision for housing. A piece of legislation, the Development Facilitation Act, was designed to circumvent the red tape that was blocking the release of state land for low-cost housing (PD 2001). This ‘fast tracking’ was aimed at reducing delays in state land release from eighteen to six months.
Western Cape Provincial government refused adamantly to implement this act (ibid) and effectively slowed down housing provision for low income groups, Africans in particular.

An obstacle has been the apparent indifference shown by councils in the poor support they give to the PHP. In addition to an overwhelming desire to control the housing delivery process, a rather stagnant bureaucracy and a lack of political will all combine to retard housing delivery. The bureaucracy clearly did not consider the order as ‘legitimate’ and this Lipsky (1980:16) attributes to the fact that lower level bureaucrats do not necessarily share their superiors’ goals. Hence the refusal to carry out orders on land release was not just slippage between orders and implementation.

**Local Government Housing Institutions**

From 1909, South Africa has had a three-tier government system with the provincial level in between the central and local governments. Central government develops policies and distributes resources to provincial governments that then become responsible for implementing the policies and the transfer of resources to the public through the local authorities. Municipalities therefore continue to derive their power from provincial ordinances and can only carry out activities specified by the central or provincial ordinances. The Local Government Transition Act (209 of 1993) set out the reorganization of post apartheid local government that took place in three phases, the pre-interim, the interim and the final local government dispensation (Behrens et al, 1998).

During the pre-interim phase, existing local authorities were replaced with nominated but more representative, transitional local government structures. In the interim phase, democratically elected transitional local government structures were established and the final phase was after the first national wide municipal elections that took place much later in the Western Cape as consensus over boundaries delayed progress. The re-organisation of local authorities in Cape Town was delayed because of political disputes over sub-structure and boundaries. White communities were not willing to share resources with former poor black areas and they did not trust the ANC’s proposals for new boundaries that had re-distributional consequences. In the first two phases, local government structures
within metropolitan areas were transformed from Regional Services Councils, City Councils and Municipalities to Transitional Metropolitan Councils and Transitional Municipal Substructures (ibid:7).

The housing responsibilities of all these authorities were never clarified as the Housing Act itself simply stated that municipalities were to engage in lower income housing provision in a variety of ways that ranged from facilitating housing development by developers to administering national housing programmes (PD 2002). This situation contributed to hesitancy by local governments to take the initiative in housing delivery as they naturally resisted being treated as mere agents of the provincial level in housing provision. Local authorities were tasked with the realisation of the holistic approach in that community developers were to manage infrastructural provision as well as management of the new residential areas. They were also to ensure that housing providers complied with and adhered to municipal building standards. However, provisions of sections 6 to 23 of the Expropriation Act, 1975 (Act no.63 of 1975) allowed municipalities by way of notice in the Provincial Gazette, to expropriate any land required for the purposes of housing development in terms of any national housing programme but once again, the CTMC never used this facility (PD 2000). For instance, as late as 1996, the province had continued to spend 61 percent of its allocation on projects approved under the previous government thus effectively ignoring African housing needs (Mayibuye 1996).

Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing- Transformed Bureaucrats?
The apartheid state itself had behaved in the manner most post-colonial states have. Its bureaucracy was just as bloated by duplicated functions for the different racial categories and was stuffed mostly by white officials (Gusler 2000:23). For instance, twelve departments were involved in housing delivery before 1994 and an immediate task for the new government was to reform the institutions as well as make them representative of the population. In 2002, the senior management of the Western Cape’s government departments was very much the same as before 1994 with 70 percent being white males (See table 2). Honouring constitutional provisions pertaining to the creating of a representative bureaucracy such as Section 212(2) which states that: “The public shall…
(b) promote an efficient public administration broadly representative of the South African community” have remained elusive (South Africa Constitution 1996). As can be expected, there was a partial paralysis of governance emanating from the integration of old apartheid bureaucrats with newly elected and newly appointed officials. The new practice of governance in a democratic society was complicated by the dominant old mind-sets that stifled effective development.

Table 2 Provincial Housing Directorate Gender and Racial Make-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from information from the Professional and Technical Services Department and the Housing Settlements Department.

Further complications arose from the mistrust harbourted by both sides as Maphai (1995) noted,

The new (ANC) government came to office distrusting the career bureaucracy. They suspected it to be salted with holdovers from the previous administration and to be unsympathetic to their priorities. They believed they (old bureaucrats) would sabotage their efforts.

Many of the new public managers continued to implement policies that had cosmetic rearrangements that fitted the new political order such that the past continued to set the example and standard (Human 1998). More ever, because of the coalition governance style, it became difficult to Africanise the public service since compromise was an essential part of the resource allocation process. The apartheid system had deprived most Africans of the necessary education to man responsible positions in key areas of the public service hence the public service gravitated on on the basis of the inherited expertise that is located in the old bureaucrats. The power of the colonial inertia was grossly underestimated hence the culture of mistrusting authority remained intact.

By the beginning of 2000, the inherited bureaucrats were no longer protected by the ‘sunset clauses’ of the negotiated settlement. These clauses guaranteed the position of incumbent civil servants for five years. The ANC agreed to refrain from purging the civil
service thus leaving much of the institutional culture and personnel intact. To bypass these provisions and infuse new blood through the affirmative action programme, the ANC put in place a voluntary severance scheme. The affirmative action policy in South Africa was a deliberate attempt to form part of the new citizenship status for the previously disenfranchised blacks. The result was that the old bureaucrats who stayed on became more resistant to change in order to safeguard their careers, a move that has affected service delivery.

Politicians in the province have been known to pressure government officials (many of them old anti-apartheid activists) to provide them with ‘legislative provisions’ to use against land invaders (PD 2001:10). On the other hand, the civil service officials who have to implement the policies have demonstrated an eagerness to pursue a more accommodating approach that includes not taking any action. Eight years into the ANC’s term of office, these officials continue to define the context in which land availability, service delivery and the construction of formal houses take place. Development tribunals decide on how land is to be used but the Western Cape’s provincial government has consistently refused to use the Development Facilitation Act to release land. The national government has powers of expropriation but even if it gives the land, the process of rezoning causes delays and problems notably because the provincial level has power over local authorities in rezoning land for low-income residential purposes (ibid).

Thurman (1999) conducted a survey in 1998-1999 that captured the attitudes of the public officials in dealing with the housing problem. Her findings confirm that paternalistic tendencies became a way of dealing with the Africans for many of post-apartheid’s bureaucrats as the PHB’s Billy Coetzee’s sentiments revealed;

I think we are concentrating too much on turning people into home owners …they (Africans) are not trained to be homeowners, they don’t necessarily want to be homeowners, they just want a roof over their heads…may be we should be spending money on creating job opportunities and upgrading squatter settlements and spending money on services… I think they (Africans) will look after themselves when it comes to housing…
The head of research in the CTMC housing department cynically commented, “These people do not want land, they are interested in the top structure only.”\textsuperscript{21} The housing director of the CTMC was also in the same boat when he concurred, “There is no such thing as a housing problem, there is only an employment and income problem”. And most incredulous of all was the 1995 research report by the National Business Initiative, which claimed that blacks actually liked living in shacks (Bond 2000:144). This was reminiscent of the attitudes that had been exhibited more than fifty years before. An acting Commissioner of Lands in South Africa in 1949, E.R. Cousins, had remarked in a report that influenced the state’s behaviour towards housing provision for blacks then; “There are far more individual Africans who would be prepared to build suitable houses for themselves than I had thought”. The response was that “they [Africans] be granted as much latitude as possible…let [them] do [their] own work …and not be too particular about the results” (Harris Richard 1998:181).

It is against this background of the need for a representative bureaucracy that the ANC developed a Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy\textsuperscript{22} in 1996 with the intention of seizing control over the entire state machinery and extending hegemony over civil society. The policy document stated that the ANC must strengthen (its) leadership in all other sectors of social activity [outside of the state] including: the economy, arts and culture, mass popular organisation, mass communication, recreation, education, sports and science and technology (ANC Discussion Documents 1997 and 1998). A National Deployment Committee headed by the ANC deputy president and Deployment Committees at the provincial and local government levels were consequently set up. From 1994, many career civil servants who retired or took retrenchment packages were replaced by ANC members or veterans of the struggle but this was not coordinated which undermined the collective mandate as some believed in the independence of the civil service and some adhered to party discipline (Democratic Party 2001:41).

According to the terms of the policy, the National Working Committee,\textsuperscript{23} the supreme body of the ANC, was mandated to deploy ANC cadres to all state institutions including the public service, local government administration and statutory bodies.\textsuperscript{24} The cadres in
all spheres were expected to defend and implement the will of the party leadership with maximum political discipline prevailing (Democratic Party 2000:iii; Friedman 2004). The understanding was that constitutional constraints could be bypassed if loyal people were placed in strategic positions. A deployment strategy to ensure loyalty to the party became crucial as stated in the party’s Challenges of Leadership Document; 

It is not individuals as such who are in government, but ANC members deployed to fulfill a function. The parameters within which they carry out their functions are defined by the ANC and they should account to it (ANC Discussion Document 1997b).

The NEC publicly condemned its own cadres in 1997 for not showing more loyalty to the party; “You are not only ANC cadres after hours” (ANC-NEC Report 1997). At the party’s 50th National Conference in Mafikeng, the party resurrected and reaffirmed the principle of democratic centralism in a conference resolution. This fuelled and confirmed fears that a new class loyal to the party and whose positions depended on the party staying in power was emerging (Democratic Party 2000).

Mandela’s (ANC-NEC Report 1997) statement at the Mafikeng conference signified a move from the ANC’s earlier commitment to a non-partisan civil service as he spelt out;

Our starting point as we tackle the task of further strengthening the ANC must be based on recognition of the fact that fundamental social transformation of our country cannot happen without the people who understand and are committed to bringing this transformation about. In other words, to discharge this revolutionary task ahead of us, we need battalions of revolutionaries who are as ready to serve the people as have been the generations of cadres that preceded them.

Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s successor, echoed the same sentiments at the same venue. He emphasised that there was;

…a need for a strong ANC made up of honest and dedicated cadres because this is the only political instrument that the masses of our people have in their hands to carry out the many and difficult tasks we have to discharge …without a strong ANC dedicated to the service of the people by word and deed, the ordinary masses of our people would have no political organisation to advance their cause and protect their interests.
The Public Services Amendment Act which contained a new clause authorising the President and the premiers to make appointments and other career incidents came into effect on July 7 1999. Deputy ANC President Jacob Zuma acknowledged in parliament that though the ANC had established these deployment committees, the identification of people, not just from the ANC but those committed to the ideals of the constitution and with the necessary skills for particular positions would be encouraged hence the normal and transparent employment procedures would still be followed (DP 2000:21). With this strategising, the ANC got a good grip on most power centres in most of the provinces except in Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Western Cape. But still, the ANC uses every opportunity it can get to infuse loyal civil servants through the affirmative action policy. The question then is: Is representativity then indistinguishable from ANC control?

Perhaps Friedman (2001:3) aptly rationalises these actions for a hurting nation,

> Many of the leaders including the president are also products of exile. They have experienced a type of politics different from that required now. In exile it was unwise to trust anyone except your closest connections-the new and unknown ‘friend’ you embrace is as likely to be a spy as (much as) an ally. The demands of an underground fight encourage secrecy and centralization. Inevitably these habits now influence the way in which we are governed.

In the Western Cape province, to improve the level of tolerance for cultural differences in a heterogenous community requires the creation of a representative bureaucracy. This transformation has been slowed down by the power struggle between the ANC and the NNP. The affirmative action policy sought to correct imbalances in the bureaucracy by making it representative. Some analysts accused the NNP of using the coloureds to shield themselves against the ANC’s policies (Wilmot et al 1996:85). Since before 1994, The NNP has continued to carve an image of the ANC as destructive with its commitment to Africanisation, a perception confirmed when African squatters invaded houses built for coloureds (ibid 35). The affirmative action policy was resisted and portrayed as “a threat to the positions of coloureds- a new form of swart gevaar (danger posed by blacks)”. For coloureds, the threat became real that blacks would take over their homes, jobs, social and economic opportunities.
The ANC has not penetrated the coloured community where it was largely viewed as the face of black majoritarianism hence the coloureds did not trust it as it was unsure of its intentions (James, 1996:40). A further setback was that in coloured communities, it is not easily allowed to change one’s political stance because changing to adapt to a shifting political environment is regarded as evidence of opportunism, of blowing with the wind and of a deficiency in core political values (ibid:40). As a group that is still seeking for an identity, it is important for them to be suspicious of all political action. An expression they frequently use with regard to housing resource allocation is: ‘Before we were not white enough, now we are not black enough” (Wilmot 1996; People’s Dialogue 1999).

**Steering or liberating? The ANC’s Role in Housing Delivery**

As an opposition party in the province, the ANC works directly with the national government and civil society in housing delivery. For effective co-ordination of the party’s policy and monitoring activities, a housing desk was set up at the provincial level. The desk includes ANC officials at all levels: Western Cape Members of Parliament and Members of the Provincial Legislature standing committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee as well as the National Council of the Province’s permanent delegates dealing with housing; councillors serving on housing committees in the Metropolitan Local Councils and Transitional Local Councils; ANC regional representatives, alliance partners, ANC aligned officials in housing departments at the provincial and local government levels; ANC comrades working in housing and development NGOs and ANC members in the province with knowledge of housing delivery (Interview 2000).

The desk organises monthly meetings that are intended to facilitate and work with civil society since informal associations in particular require assistance. The ANC housing desk also invites all concerned and interested parties in housing projects to debate contending issues especially access to land in metropolitan areas and financing of housing ventures. The party’s position is that land should be free for all those on full subsidies. It therefore commits itself to help identify land, campaign for that land and attempts to win the battle for that land at no cost (Interview 2000). This stance annoys the provincial government...
which argues against this as they feel it would create inequities amongst poor home seekers.

The ANC housing desk tasks itself with concentrating all the knowledge on land availability in its hands because it argues that the people are still disempowered and, in any case, it is difficult for them to access all information from the maze of institutions. The homeless poor are usually ignorant of all the legislation that is passed and illiteracy and fear of authority compound their problems. City officials have been accused of selling available city land on the market disregarding the needs of the poor (PD 1999). This reflects the agenda of the council as being driven by profit maximisation through and through. The absence of both a representative and responsible bureaucracy to act as a watchdog against these practices compounds the problem as do the policy differences between the national government (free land for the poor) and the provincial government (sell all land at market price) (ibid).

In this Western Cape province, the ANC has organised more with regard to housing than the government and in the provinces where the ANC dominates, more houses were delivered. Due to its influence, and its education campaign, the poor have come to realize that they do have a choice on where to stay and owning a house has become very important such that poor people are willing to sacrifice their lives for a house in areas where job opportunities and better livelihoods are more likely. Initially, housing was not important for Africans in the Western Cape because they were told that their houses must be in rural areas and so they had continued to invest in temporary shacks with the hope of eventually returning to their rural homes. For the politicians, the black majority was positioned as being central to the creation of a democratic non-racial, non-sexist society. Pallo Jordan (1994), a high ranking government official and a veteran of the struggle, made this clear, “Would the ANC profit by trying to ponder to the baser instincts of the Coloured and Indian working people?”

The ANC helps to organise communities even though they maybe out of ANC structures and it clearly does not matter where they are from.33 The party is recognized for its
historical role in black communities which earns it trust that is based on evidence of commitment and follow up by officials handling the issue. In the words of the ANC Provincial spokesperson on housing,

When communities are blocked by officials, they come to the ANC first or later… no trust for bureaucrats because of unrepresentativeness, also individual members help to break down trust.

For instance in 1999, the housing desk tried to engage the housing board with a view to developing criteria to prioritise ‘certain applications’. The ANC has always considered itself as having broad responsibilities for grassroots development and on top of its agenda is transformation and ultimately political power. It thus takes ‘on the bureaucracy’ by facilitating meetings with officials and assuming an activist role that involves campaigning and mobilisation. This strategy has earned the housing desk the title, ‘the ANC shadow department to the MEC housing department’. The ANC adamantly states that (Claasens 1991:43),

The redistribution of the land is the absolute imperative in our conditions, the fundamental national demand. It will have to be done, even if it involves some economic cost, in order to continue to mobilise the people whose support has brought the democratic forces to power.

The ANC housing desk admitted that it tells the people to make more demands on the system and it provides the information which is the power they need (Interview 2000). Many CBOs usually go through many ANC structures and the ANC tends to take charge of the townships. There are also complementary organisations but these pose no threat to the ANC which rests in the comfort that “Though everyone can get land under the ANC, once they join the project, they join the ANC”. However, intolerance to independent organization is explicit as evidenced by councillor Sidina’s remarks, “You cannot organise projects within ANC as SANCO or as an individual. That is not tolerable”.

The ANC’s influence is visualised more in the attitude of its councillors who dominate the low-income areas. These play both a positive and a negative role depending on who is delivering the product and who is benefiting. With housing as the ultimate public good in Cape Town’s urban politics, ANC councillors bear the burden of being judge and jury with regard to African housing delivery. For instance, supporting ‘toilet houses’ was deemed
catastrophic for one’s political career and yet being sidelined by private providers meant sidelining the party itself in the development of these new communities (PD 2000). Being between a rock and a hard place was a fatal place for a mobilising party.

The councillors’ negative role came to the fore in the Gauteng province when they delayed the housing provision process by fuelling tensions within projects that did not recognise them as steering the housing delivery process (ibid). Acting as guardians of the people, the councillors acted to inform the house seekers of the profit margins the developers concealed from them and the variations in price and expenses of similar housing schemes which all exposed the developer’s profiteering from the subsidy. Armed with this information, beneficiaries increasingly refused the houses provided by private housing providers.

**Civic Organisations**

Civic associations played a critical role in mobilising for the transformation of the political system and through SANCO, they contributed significantly to the collapse of local government institutions\(^3\) (Tapscott 2000). SANCO’s vision was to build a socialist movement consisting of the poor and the marginalised of society (Umrabulo 1999). Civic associations in this context refers to bodies representing specific interests of residents within a geographical area. Many sprung up from 1970 onwards and most were fronts of the national liberation movements.

The civic organisations emphasized the destruction of apartheid rather than the movement to socialism as the goal of the national liberation struggle and neglected many other social issues (Bond 2000; Tapscott 2000). This was to be expected since in non-democratic societies, political mobilization tends to take precedent over community development (Miraftab 1997:362). The liberation struggles facilitated the growth of civic associations in townships which were previously insulated from political activity, while existing associations were often at the centre of mobilisation of the anti-apartheid campaigns (Houston 1999:260). Their challenging of the dominant system was also evident in the new structures created by them during the second half of the eighties. The introduction of street
committees constituted a challenge to the authority of local government in particular. Many civics stepped into the vacuum created by the collapse of the local authorities in 1985, and established ‘people’s councils’ that performed limited administrative and judicial duties (Tapscott 2000). Their strategies took the form of challenging state power by directing their activities at opposing all forms of apartheid oppression and exploitation which township residents were experiencing. They began to link local demands such as rent and consumer boycotts with national political demands. The boycotts were well supported and played a central role in the collapse of the black local authorities in the mid eighties (Smit 2001).

Such organisations usually dealt with local governance issues, service delivery and meeting basic needs in addition to challenging the political system when the ANC and PAC were banned. The civics promoted populist principles, encouraged popular participation but they also resorted to coercion and violence when compliance was not forthcoming (Tapscott 2000:11). However, they also demonstrated a willingness to be tolerant of authoritarianism as one civic leader commented, ‘We don’t mind a bit of authoritarianism as long as the ANC delivers’. Their significance was that they could be counted on to circumvent constitutional constraints and institutional blockages through their vibrancy. On remarks that South Africa still has a liberationist culture, another civic leader replied that blacks had a culture of entitlement just as most whites had a culture of priviledge. And another stated that since little had changed in South Africa, they saw no reason why should they pay for what was still apartheid with regard to social geography and poverty (ibid 119).

In many instances, activists leading civic organizations used the symbols and rhetoric of the ANC to curb an independent spirit from emerging within their communities (Marais 2001). Independent organizational initiatives and ideological heterogeneity was suppressed by force prompting Friedman (Mail and Guardian 2001) to conclude that ‘the symbolic strength of the exile movement often weakened attempts to build grassroots power within the country’. Many of the civics maintained a lobbying role at the expense of their grassroots links (Wilson and Lowery 2003:49; ibid 268). Most of the CBOs that united
under the umbrella of SANCO which had a close alliance with the ANC, were ‘closed’
groups of politically committed cadres who enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the people
but were inexperienced in democratic governance, development or social upliftment (PD
2001:3). The struggle had socialised them into a culture and a practice of sacrifice, warfare
and authoritarian command.

Many civic leaders in the fight for housing land were also ANC supporters seeking to
mobilise their communities within the context of the national liberation struggle (DAG
1999:5). Liberation tactics earned them the trust of their communities as evidenced by
Goniwe Park residents who refused to approach the responsible government authority and
instead went to a civic group during a land dispute. ‘This was because the people trusted
the civic to take up their issues effectively. They had no faith in speaking to the white
people’ (ibid 9). Civic organisations can thus be said to be located in the arena of local
government where they act as checks on the untrustworthy officials. Thurman (1999:9)
noted the comments of one civic official;

   It doesn’t pay for us to spend late nights in council meetings making decisions if
   they are not implemented. We do have some uncooperative officials; therefore,
   there must be a civic to ensure implementation of the decisions that are made by the
council.

It is through these links with civic organisations that housing delivery has made some
commendable progress. It was within these civics that the cat and mouse game with civil
servants took form. The Homeless People’s federation arose out of this background.

Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the relationship between the institutional framework for housing
delivery and the housing policy formulation and implementation processes, the attitudes of
key bureaucrats and other stakeholders. Successful access of housing resources requires an
effective navigation of the terrain of conditionalities that determine housing provision for
the poor. An important issue is that the ANC realized its relatively weak autonomy with
regard to policy formulation and the constraints it placed on its redistribution project. This
was a key decisive factor for its success in organizing legally within the party, though this
was outside the government system, to facilitate housing delivery for the poor. Coupled
with a rather slow and frustrated affirmative action programme in the province, managing the knowledge system in housing delivery was crucial as that information was the essential ingredient in the face of a hostile bureaucracy. All the same, the motivations of the ANC were clear through out-continuous mobilization. Lessons from the struggle remained a reservoir for the ANC cadres especially when they sought to empower the poor with information for challenging a resistant system. And it is important to underscore that the resistance was not only a racial issue but a professional bureaucracy struggling to maintain its merit with regard to adherence to rules and regulations—however unjust.

Civic groups have proved to be a real force on the development landscape in South Africa as they have been able to lobby government successfully on many policy issues. Many of the skills in negotiating and bargaining were learnt in the struggle hence the tendency to resort to military-like arm twisting tactics. This has also been aided by bureaucrats and politicians who at times connive with civic leaders and at times hold back due to a general lack of administrative capacity and protection of their interests. Even though, the new regime has yet to achieve integration of the poor Africans into the mainstream both physically and politically. All housing projects continue to be located far from employment and other opportunities.

This chapter also challenges Africanisation as an administrative reform project since legislation appears to have the same effect in redressing inequalities and facilitating implementation. That housing bureaucrats resisted and ignored both also points to the need for further research on attitudes and values of not just post liberation war bureaucracies, but all post colonial bureaucracies in general.

Endnotes

1 There is an estimated 15 million people who are squatting in shacks in South Africa’s cities and there are gross inequalities in housing provision See Baumann, T, Bolnick, J. and Mitlin, D. (undated) “The Age of Cities and Organisations of The Urban Poor: The Work of the SAHPF and the People’s Dialogue on Shelter”; IIED Working Paper No.2 on Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas.

2 This is against the African mode of service delivery where in many countries, only civil servants were assisted with government guarantees to access private financing for housing (as in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Ghana). At the same time, of the 1.6 million houses delivered by the government since 1994, only 30 332 were paid for by subsidies channelled through private developers.


3 The Cape Argus of 11 February 2003.
4 The RDP was considered as the ANC’s manifesto during the 1999 elections. It spelled out the ANC’s economic and social policy framework and in particular, the people-driven approach and community involvement in housing delivery. Ben Turok (cited in Gusler 2001:20) has described the RDP as a symbolic gesture to contain expectations after the struggle. See Gusler, F. (undated) Toilets in the Veld: Similarities in the Housing Policy of the New South Africa and the Former Apartheid State, Paper submitted to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional Planning.
5 The National Housing Forum (NHF) emerged out of the Congress for a Democratic South Africa that took place in 1990 at the height of the struggle for democratic rule. The DBSA and IDT were also working to reform apartheid and deliberations amongst a variety of actors led to its establishment. Major coalitions formed around the business interests and the Mass Democratic Movement. The later was pursuing the creation of a new citizenship by reducing inequalities and opening up space for citizen participation by the blacks. See Lalloo, K. (1998), “Arenas of Contested Citizenship: Housing Policy in South Africa”, Habitat International, vol. 23 no1, (pp35-46), p6.
6 The National Housing Forum itself was a means of compromising in order to redress historical imbalances hence the inclusion of all categories of interest: business (was over represented with 10 of 19), political (only stood for African interests but they were divided over ideological issues which weakened their bargaining position: ANC, Cosatu, AZAPO and PAC), development and civic. The NP stayed outside the process of formulation and was therefore able to criticise the NHF publicly for failure to deliver when it had allocated it 1.2 billion rands for housing subsidies. See Lalloo, K. (1998) “Arenas of Contested Citizenship: Housing Policy in South Africa”, Habitat International, vol.23 no.1, (pp35-46) p7. The Nationalist Party later pulled out of the forum and went on to allocate 200m rands for subsidies to be distributed by the NHF which was still finding its way. This was possible through influence exerted via its parastatals that remained in the forum (IDT, SAHT and DBSA). The idea was to avoid the outcome of any subsidy policy as an ANC victory which would have swayed black voters in its favour. See Gusler, F. (2000) Toilets in the Veld: Similarities in the Housing Policy of the New South Africa and the Former Apartheid State, Paper submitted to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for the degree of Mater of Urban and Regional Planning, p25.
7 Clause Slovo went out of his way to reassure whites that the ANC would not nationalise their property.
9 Contradictions were inevitable since from a neo-liberal perspective, optimal output and efficiencies are not possible when there is state control and management of society’s resources and instrumentalities. See Sue Kenny (2002) “Tensions and Dilemmas in Community Development: New Discourses, New Trojans?” Community Development Journal (pp284-299) p293.
10 The People’s Housing Process refers to when people requiring shelter take it upon themselves to organise usually in groups to provide their own shelter with state assistance.
11Previously, housing subsidies were given to whites only under sections 10A,10B,10C and 10D of the Housing Act(4 of 1966) See Juta’s Statutes of South Africa 1999 vol.6, Juta and Co. Ltd.
13The Hostel Upgrading Programme provides state assistance for the upgrading of publicly owned hostels. The subsidy is received by the local authority (owner of the buildings). The upgraded units can then be managed as rental stock or sold to the residents. It allows R15 000 per family and R3 750 per individual. As with the individual subsidy, the hostel subsidy goes to an institution rather than a person, and ex-tenants can also apply for a home ownership subsidy. The Discount Benefits Scheme promotes home ownership for long term tenants of public rental stock. Tenants receive a maximum discount of up to R7 500 on the historic cost of a property. In the event of a subsidy not covering the cost, the tenant must make up the balance.
14 Financing institutions: The National Housing Finance Corporation was later established in June 1996 to facilitate the provision of finance to those who do not have ready access to formal credit markets and institutions. It was also tasked with funding and managing alternative tenure and finance delivery processes. The National Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency was established (October 1995) as a short term measure with the aim of inducing finance flows into low income housing by providing bridging finance to developers and to beneficiaries of such projects. Initial funds came from the RDP Fund and the Open Society Institute of New York. Servcon Housing Solutions was established in June 1995 to specifically address issues arising from the bond boycotts. Non-performing loans were taken over from the banks and absorbed into Servcon to build investor confidence in housing. The Indemnity Fund was established in June 1995 as a
short term mechanism to facilitate the flow of new lending by accredited lenders while underwriting defined political risk and containing the exposure of the state.

A broad media housing information campaign was only launched in 2001.

MEC are the elected provincial government officials. With an Nationalist Party official at the helm of office, the independent boards would have ignored MEC officials who were accused of being insensitive to the housing needs of the poor.

A social compact is an agreement between developers, community agencies, local authorities, and beneficiaries that was to be signed before subsidies could be delivered. The requirement was later dropped in 2001. See Gusler, F. (2000) Toilets in the Veld: Similarities in the Housing Policy of the New South Africa and the former Apartheid State, Paper submitted to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional Planning.

This includes central government, parastatals and quasi-government organisations. Most of this land especially that held by the Departments of Land Affairs, Public Works and Transport, the Defence Force, Provincial governments and municipalities is described as ‘superfluous’ by the 1996 Green Paper on Land.

The NNP dominated provincial government also refused to implement the 10 Point Procurement programme that aimed to ensure equity in the awarding of tenders to emerging black service suppliers. The NNP has consistently demonstrated a lack of reprioritisation on favour of the needs of the poor in the Province. See ANC Policy Discussion Documents (2001) A Development Oriented Growth Path for the Western Cape.

Joe Slovo suggested the sunset clauses in 1992 as a way of keeping the GNU intact with representative members from various interests for a predetermined period. Even though, the whites distrusted him due to his communist background and that he was the first white minister in the ANC cabinet fuelled their fears of nationalisation.

Interview with Jens Kuhn.

The policy states that the ‘immediate priorities’ for deployment are: First, ‘those who serve in elected positions during this term of office and those nominated to serve in such positions through our list processes,” and then “those from the broad democratic movement [i.e. previously deployed ANC cadres] who are already placed in managerial positions in various areas of social activity”- the ‘experienced and loyal cadres... demobilised from active struggle” and then last and least, ‘those falling outside these categories, but are members, supporters and [apolitical but democratically minded] fellow nationals”. See ANC Policy Document (undated) Challenges and Tasks: Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy, and DP, (2000) All Power to the Party, Discussion Document, p41.

Real power within the ANC resides in the National Working Committee which is the organ’s politburo. It meets more than fortnightly and is responsible for the day today running of the ANC. Even though, the National Executive Council is the highest organ of the ANC which determines policy within the framework set by the national conference. It has a broad policymaking and oversight role.

Strategies for this are outlined in the ANC’s publication, Umrabulo, 4th Quarter 1996.

See also Marais, H. (2001), South Africa’s Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition, Zed Books, NY, who remarks that the ANC has a documented history that confirms its adeptness at nurturing and consolidating loyalty and consent.

Part of the ANC discipline aims to ensure that its members and cadres internalise the liberation struggle principles, strategies, norms and organisational culture through political education, public debates as well as taking on specified responsibilities. See ANC Document (1997) Organisational Democracy and Discipline in the Movement.

This ANC Discussion Document was prepared by a cadre who is also an academic, Joel Netshitenzhe.

The ANC’s NEC complained that the ANC members in local government were not being sufficiently loyal to the party. See ANC-NEC Report Consolidating the NDR: A Year for Re-Affirming the ANC Cadre, January 8 Statement 7 of 1997.

President Mandela’s Report to the 50th National Conference of the ANC, 16 December 1997.

This province was in the control of the Inkhata Freedom Party, a party formed along ethnic lines by some Zulu politicians.

Simply put, affirmative action is a programme of preferential policies based on membership in a specific group. In the South African sense, it is targeted at the black majority and women who were discriminated against during apartheid’s affirmative action for the white community. The Homeland policy cut across legitimate principles underpinning citizenship and the result manifested in a virtual absence of blacks from
the decision-making processes in government. Coloureds had a privileged status in comparison to Africans but still they were also treated as second class citizens and are considered as beneficiaries of affirmative action too by the ANC. However poverty surveys reveal a colour dimension—that 95 percent of South Africa’s poor are Africans, 5 percent are coloured and 1 percent are Indians making it logical that Africans should be the major beneficiaries of any corrective action. The NP has resisted the policy on the grounds that it denied the merit principle and created too much room for state interference in the economy. See Jim Peron, (1992) *Affirmative Action, Apartheid and Capitalism*, Free Market Foundation Paper no. 9, Pallo Jordan (1994) *Affirmative Action and the New Constitution*, ANC Discussion Document and Ramphele Mampela, 1995, *The Affirmative Action Book: Towards an Equity Environment*, IDASA, Cape Town.

32 For example, an NP councilor orchestrated the take over of coloured housing in Tafelsig in Mitchells Plain and this fanned the already existing tensions. See Williams, B. (1996) The Power of Propaganda eds. Wilmot, J. Caliguirre, D. & Cullinan, K. *Now that We Are Free: Coloured Communities in a Democratic South Africa*, IDASA, Cape Town, p25.

33 Interviews with Cameroon Dugmore and Councillor Sidina, February 2001.

34 Memorandum form the Provincial spokesperson to the ANC Report of 26 October 1999.


36 ANC organised with UDF to form SANCO. SANCO initiated the payment boycotts that paralysed the Black Local Authorities.

37 Civic associations, student, youth and women’s organisations took root in scores of towns and villages throughout the country. These were provoked by the state policy during the period and the numerous popular struggles against the terms of labour reproduction and the changing material conditions within the country as a whole and its effect on the black population. They emerged in response to a wide range of political, economic and social factors and in some cases as a result of the organisational efforts of activists and the emphasis of these organisations was on the mobilisation and organisation of people around the concrete particulars of their everyday lives. See Houston, G.F. (1999) *The National Liberation Struggle in South Africa*, Ashgate, Sydney, p260.
Chapter 8
Collective Action for Accessing Housing Resources

Introduction
This chapter looks into the PHP activist approach and the tactics used by the poor in the self-provision of housing by the SAHPF and the Silver City Housing cooperatives. The realization of dreams very often requires energy to translate the vision into reality and members of the housing schemes in this chapter demonstrate that resilience. Developmentalists believe that there can be no social change to the benefit of low income communities if the poor do not participate in designing, managing and realizing that process of change (Mitlin and Patel 2002:128). This is because when professionals are the agents of change, the locus of learning is viewed as shifting from the community.

This chapter demonstrates the application of liberation struggle knowledge to counteract bureaucratic hurdles that blocked transformation as demonstrated by improved and equal access to services. Persuading the Afrikaner bureaucrats to ‘include’ housing provision for the African community on the provincial agenda proved to be a challenge that compelled the house seeking communities to be confrontational at times in their dealings with officials. The dynamics in land seeking highlight the problems of state capacity faced by unrepresentative bureaucracies.

The Homeless People's Federation

Most of the important knowledge for our development was buried in our communities, like gold buried deep in the earth. If we wanted to get stronger we needed to dig it out and use it. For a long time now we have allowed others to mine the knowledge in our settlements for their own profit (Homeless South African cited in Biti et al 1998:19).¹

The SAHPF has received tremendous attention in the last few years from both academics and the media. Much of the attention has been on the achievements of the federation in regenerating social capital for development and the power of community solidarity in poverty alleviation (Patel and Mitlin 2002; Bond 2000). My focus is on how the group strategically manoeuvred through the use of patronage, to organize access to housing land.
The SAHPF is a network of homeless communities made up of women’s savings groups in South Africa’s informal settlements. The network arose as a result of a People’s Dialogue on Land and Shelter conference that was initiated by the Catholic and Welfare Development of Cape Town. The idea was conceived in 1991 after a coming together of South Africa’s grassroots liberation movement, development ‘professionals’ and an experienced social housing movement from India, The National Slum Dwellers’ Federation (NSDF) (PD 1994). It was also a response to the lack of housing and basic social services provision by the apartheid government in the eighties.

Everyone involved in housing initiatives for the poor wanted space in the dialogue initiative. To make sure the poor would have space to talk, each NGO working with the homeless was required to bring along five shack dwellers who would engage in dialogue whilst the NGO’s observed and shared knowledge from their experiences (Wilson and Lowery 2003:52). A strong lobby of ANC activists and civic leaders tried to discredit the people’s housing process from the very start, arguing that the conference lacked credibility because it had not ‘received a mandate’ from either the liberation organisations or the communities (PD 2001:3). The expectation was that the organisers would seek the ANC’s blessing in this endeavour. At this first conference, the group split into two with some believing that the ANC would deliver houses for them whilst they sat back and the other group was willing to address their housing problems³ (Wilson and Lowery 2003:52).

With about half the delegates willing to focus on socio-economic issues as opposed to political issues, and with the influence of the international network delegates, the conference culminated in the establishment of horizontal relations through exchange programmes amongst the international squatter organisations in India and South Africa (PD 2001:3). At this conference, the delegates were highly critical of all the political parties’ housing policies and they therefore formulated their own people-centred housing policy especially after the ANC had diplomatically urged them on; ‘In terms of the ANC style, whatever policy is decided upon, will be discussed with the people. It is not ANC style to make decisions from above” (PD 1994:4). The ANC continued to be cautious on
criticisms pertaining to the formulation of the ANC’s housing policy which had initially excluded the poor.

From then on, the People’s Dialogue\(^4\) began to mobilise thousands of homeless poor families into Savings and Loan Schemes for housing\(^5\) resulting in the official launch of the South African Homeless People’s Federation\(^6\) in March 1994 at a People’s Dialogue Housing Policy Conference. The People’s Dialogue\(^7\) then assumed the role of a professional, technical-administrative supporter for the federation and the homeless people organised themselves (Biti et al 1998:15). The PD’s role as professionals (facilitators) became that of legitimising the federation’s approaches especially bridging the knowledge gap between the white bureaucrats and the black community since framing the choices and options proposed by the poor was considered as requiring ‘expert knowledge’ (Fraser and Lepofsky 2004).

All the saving schemes in the federation are autonomous groups with the right to make their own decisions as long as they resolve to do so through collective action sanctioned by the federation. Throughout the federation, membership consisted of ‘anarchist cells’ with a high level of participation, but always following the direction of the core group as Wilson and Lowery (2003:53) point out, ´The federation kept them in tow in terms of exercising self discipline so that they would be included in the land accessing process”.

**Capacity Building-Technical Support and Resource Substitution**

The development of both vertical and horizontal relationships by the People’s Dialogue brought in new knowledge in organising for housing resources. From the very beginning, the organisation established very close working relationships with three NGOs in India, The NSDF, Mahila Milan and the Society for Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC)\(^8\) (Biti et al 1998:10). The link started way back in 1989 when delegates from these three organisations met some ANC workers in Bangkok in 1989. The Indian groups became determined to help the South African black community live a decent life (SPARC 1992:23). Their strategies in India, another highly divided society, provided invaluable knowledge. These international linkages and exchange visits expanded to include several
other countries such as the Phillipines, Namibia, Senegal, Kenya and Zimbabwe and continuous exchange programmes of the homeless and poor continue to influence strategies in the different countries. Intra-country knowledge exchanges between different federation communities capitalise on this knowledge and add on their own.

Many home seekers joined the federation adding to the pool of skills already in it (PD 2001:6). For the People’s Dialogue accepts and respects that:

Only the poor themselves can truly understand their situation in the context of developing strategies to address poverty. Only they can understand their needs and priorities, the resources that they can offer, the social and political constraints that need to be overcome, and the opportunities that each specific context offers. Moreover, only the poor themselves know what they are prepared to do in order to address their needs (cited in Biti et al 1998:11)

To assist with technical capacity, Building Information and Training centres sprung up as a logical response to the building activities of the HSS. Here, all housing information was collected by the federation members themselves and was shared with other communities via practical and on-going training processes that took place on a regular basis through exchange programmes. They thus effectively maximized on local knowledge and its applicability to their different contexts.

The establishment of a revolving fund was essential for the federation to mobilize funds since government subsidies involved complicated procedures for both individuals and groups. The HSSs that make up the federation are independent units with their own distinct identities but they all do the following: survey and enumerate settlements, identify land, allocate sites, negotiate for tenure, design their own houses, determine levels of income and affordability, build the houses and control their own housing loan fund. The schemes are dominated by women, 85 percent of the members are women, but men are not excluded as long as they are very poor and live in shacks or in informal settlements (Interview-Rose 2000). In every scheme in every region, many members of the federation tell stories about the obstructions by civic organisations, residents committee and political parties who felt they had to be consulted in the initiative (PD 2000). Though the federation was composed of independent units, the federation tasked itself with lobbying national leaders and
canvassing for resources from all units at the national level first and the provincial level later on (Interview 2000). The house seekers were thus in a position to exercise power that would save them from marginalisation by the authorities who controlled access to the desired resources.

During the first democratic elections in 1994, there was a dramatic increase in land occupations all over the country that were well planned. From the onset, the group took advantage of the democratic elections and occupied land and all invasions were carefully planned (PD 1995). These included plans for basic services such as water supply and roads. The first nationally coordinated land invasions undertaken by the federation took place in March 1997 after the leadership had put in place a “24 point plan” to prepare groups for successful invasion (See Appendix 4). The plan has remained in place and it prepares schemes for rapid site development. Groups wishing to occupy land are required to show that they have followed the steps outlined in the plan so that the federation can support them and how soon these steps can be completed depends on the attitude of the federation leader (Biti et al 1998:43). The main setback for the federation was that housing subsidies were only allocated to those already possessing individual land title and there were only two such communities in the federation. Any other housing collective organisations could not access this state resource designed for the poor. The much talked about equity principle was thus not fulfilled. The federation then tasked itself with acquiring land for its schemes through a combination of invasions, negotiations with owners and purchases facilitated by the Department of Land Affairs (ibid 1998:3).

The complex bureaucratic arrangements surrounding the subsidy compelled the federation to make contact and lobby the then Minister of Housing, Comrade Joe Slovo. Part of the federation’s strategy involved penetrating new territory through the leadership of the organisation that enjoyed support within the “community” and inviting dignitaries to attend special ceremonies. These were, as expected, people who had influence in the sphere of land and shelter (PD 1997:26). Noting that the federation was an institution for mobilising and empowering the poor, Slovo pledged to release twenty million rands for their projects (PD 2001:13). As a devoted communist, the assumption was that he was the official that
could handle a people’s organization (ibid). He lived up to the expectation as he demonstrated how people’s organisations could access state resources outside of the normal channels.

For instance, in Kanana, Gauteng Province, a savings scheme that had invaded land made links through the federation to the Minister for Land Affairs. The Minister openly supported the federation’s initiative in Kanana and urged his officials to use the new legislation, passed by the ANC led government, to fast track the granting of tenure for the people of Kanana (PD 1999:10). After the approval, the Lekoa Town Council in which Kanana fell, applied for subsidies on behalf of all the families in the settlements in Kanana, Election Park and Freedom Square. Inspite of this support, legitimation of the federation’s activities upset the new ANC councillors the most. For they had been the loyal comrades who fought apartheid violently and now the federation members in Kanana were making the comrade councillors look useless in the eyes of the people. The women in the savings scheme were viewed as ‘a handful of agitators who were causing all the trouble and standing in the way of (party official) development’ (ibid 11)-my emphasis. This split the loyalties of members between the federation and the councillors.

Even though the federation got the support of one of the country’s most influential politicians, it failed to penetrate the ‘zone of indifference’ that is, the civil servants responsible for policy implementation to get them to understand the logic of a people’s housing process. The Housing Department spent a good fourteen months debating with their private consultants on disbursing the twenty million rand loan (ibid 12). This was eventually consolidated into a ten million grant and the department’s efforts were concentrated more on getting the federation’s own new fund (Utshani fund) to operate within a framework devised by them. This would have given bureaucrats more control over the federation’s housing delivery process. Senior technical advisors to the minister insisted that the ten million rands be a once-off grant that was never to be repeated by government. The federation resisted the bureaucrats’ efforts to establish a government trust for managing the funds and the uTshani Trust was eventually set up within its structures for managing the funds.
Since the national government developed the housing policy and distributed the necessary resources, it was imperative to get the support of the provincial government, which has the responsibility for policy implementation and transferring resources to home-seekers. The Western Cape Provincial minister promised his support after attending a federation’s field day and observing a model house constructed by the women. However, more than a year later, the subsidies had not yet been released for the actual buildings to start. The next institution to be lobbied by the federation was the Land Affairs department. Derek Hanekom, the then National Minister for Land Affairs, was invited to speak at a conference on Land Invasions and Eviction in 1994. He later travelled with the federation to India to meet the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) and Mahila Milan members to get insight on their shelter provision strategies and on return, he visited many informal settlements all over the country. After all these visits, a steering committee representing both the Department of Land Affairs and the SAHPF was set up and later, Hanekon offered a matching grant of ten million rand to be used for financing land acquisitions by the federation members.

The federation tried from its inception to have the subsidies for its members channeled through it. This meant adherence to bureaucratic criteria that; they be registered either as a voluntary association (not-for profit) or housing association and that bridging finance would have to be provided by the federation members. The Director General of the DOH offered his support to the federation and the proposal was accommodated into the subsidy-channelling scheme. Through the NHF and the stakeholder consultative forum, private sector representatives fought hard to reverse this bending of the rules. The ANC had lived up to its dictates, that “….it has a direct interest in supporting its allies and their organizational and policy making capacity”¹³ (ANC Document 1998). On the other hand, the private sector did succeed in ensuring that this modification of regulations could only be applied to the federation groups and could not be applicable to all community organisations that were saving for housing (Biti et al 1998:31).

Contrary to the PHB’s stance that project subsidies are processed on a first come first served basis, the federation’s experience again demonstrated that project subsidies do not
depend on a waiting list. They proved that pressure can be exerted on the PHB to process them expeditiously depending on the tactics utilized by the applicants. For instance, one group outside the federation occupied the provincial housing offices and threatened the officials until they gave in within a matter of hours. As with local authorities, the provincial officials lack the capacity to work with poor communities and to empower them (Interview–Pat Matolengwe 2000). Communities mistrust local authorities to act in their best interests in accessing project subsidies, which justifies their reliance on technical NGOs. Fortunately, most people in the NGOs came from the ANC and have experience in struggling against the dominant behaviour of the government institutions and they at times act according to this struggle logic.

The minister of housing’s death in January 1995 threatened to upset the federation’s gains, but the new Minister, Sankie Mthembi-Nkondo promised to continue with the pledged support. After two months in office, she visited one of the HSS to inspect a house they had built and there she publicly and formally pledged the ten million grant offered earlier to uTshani Fund (PD 2001:14). The Minister chose a highly public event, the inauguration of the Victoria Mxenge scheme in Phillipi, for the presentation. At this same time, two new advisory boards were set up to advise the Minister on policy as well as a Housing Support Task Team whose task was to design housing support initiatives together with officials from the national and provincial housing departments. The federation was then co-opted to sit on both boards with People’s Dialogue sitting on the Support Task Team (Interview Hoffman). Once inside the housing institutional set-up, the federation strengthened its alliance with SANCO, a people’s organisation, which also sat on the Task Team. Later on, the Minister accompanied the federation to India to get first hand experience of how the NSDF was building its own houses with government support and the Task Team also got an opportunity to visit India thus exposing the other technocrats to what a people’s housing process involved.

The last months of 1995 were characterised by continuous contact between the federation and the national departments of housing and land affairs at the ministerial and director general level. By the end of November 1996, the national department disbursed financial
resources to provincial departments to support these people’s housing initiatives and the provinces proposed sixty-three such centres and eighteen of these were the federation’s building and technology centres. The rest were expected to follow the federation’s initiatives. Both politicians and government officials began to make public reference to the federation’s mobilisation approach in a bid to gain political mileage. Towards the end of the year, the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki and President Nelson Mandela visited the federation’s international conferences and selected projects (ibid 15). The federation was projected as what the ANC was about, people’s empowerment, reconciliation, reconstruction and redistribution. And in the Federation’s own words (PD 2001:21);

... a visit from a member of the government is an honour that cannot be quantified. The presence of leading figures of the government, from the president to members of the cabinet to more local pillars, encourages new members to join the federation and regalvanises older members into action.

An irony is that the federation realises that the government gave it a ‘gift’ as evidenced by the questions it poses for the rest of NGOs’ and CBO in the development process (ibid 22); What is the government’s motivation? Who will benefit from the interaction in the long term, whatever the short-term benefits may be? Will this strengthen or undermine the central dynamic of the community organisation, that is, that thing which gives it its vitality?

The question is, did the federation take advantage of the populist discourse or did the national leadership take advantage of the mobilisation channel that existed within the federation structures? Provincial housing departments were clearly under immense pressure because the federation enjoyed a high national profile and had strong links with national ministers. The National Housing Board recommended that uTshani Fund could serve as a conduit for subsidies of federation members, making it possible to bypass intermediaries demanded by the system (ibid:19; Baumann et al undated:8). There are clear tensions and conflicts of interests between provincial governments and the centre as reflected by the departments’ fear to support the federation’s effectiveness because the federation was regarded as the “sweet heart” of the politicians at the centre (ibid 50). Most
important of all was that the ANC feared and distrusted the federation’s mobilisational capacity.

With these events, a selective resource distribution process was clearly in motion. Land Affairs Ministers and Housing Ministers tend to make regular visits to savings schemes, seeking to identify with and be seen to identify with the federation. The federation and People’s Dialogue representatives were consequently co-opted into at least ten working groups on housing at all the three levels of government (Biti et al 1998:2000). The climax for the federation was when it secured an agreement to have 20 percent of the land in any low-income housing scheme reserved for its members in every new public housing scheme. Thus belonging to the SAHPF facilitates access to land resources for house seekers.

**Utshani Fund**

Utshani Fund is the federation’s own revolving finance scheme for housing. The credit mechanisms are controlled by the HSSs. The fund was designed to provide bridging and topping up finance to low-income groups and all loans must be repaid within fifteen years. The People’s Dialogue secured the initial funding from MISEREOR, a German donor agency, after ‘Comrade’ Joe Slovo’s initial donation of ten million. Other donors later provided more funds after this demonstration of political commitment. All the money is distributed as collective loans to HSS, which in turn gives them out as individual loans for either income generation activities or building purposes. The loans are repaid to the fund collectively which places the responsibility of loan repayment on every member.

Security for the repayment of these loans is primarily through peer pressure in the social network of savings’ groups and the broader federation. Loans are given in small groups of about ten to fifteen and future lending is tied to the performance of existing loans (PD & SAHPF 2000:10). Building loans are given to scheme members in the form of materials. Crisis loans for medical bills, school fees, funerals and other problems attract a 1 percent interest rate and income generation loans a 2 percent rate. The loan terms are flexible and
they recognise the diversity within the communities hence the terms take local conditions into consideration.

The fund is managed by a Board of Governors composed of all the ten regions’ conveners, the People’s Dialogue director, a nominee from the Ministry of Lands and the Minister of Housing, Sankie Mthembi-Nkondo (1997-2003) is the patron. The board makes lending decisions based on the merits of the project proposed by the scheme and the intimate knowledge of the history and capacity of the borrowing scheme which is located in the leadership. Some criteria that ensures the democratic functioning and continuity of the group’s activities are that the scheme: should have maximised female participation in the group, practise daily savings and banking, have internal loan management mechanisms, hold regular meetings, have sub groups with leaders, have completed all preparations for the actual building itself (modelling, costing, mapping etc) and the groups must agree to future participation in all federation activities (PD 1998:25). Each scheme is required to come up with 5 percent as a deposit of the loan to be borrowed. This helps to provide insurance for those who might die during their loan-servicing period.

The saving process promotes regular interaction and enables the emergence of strong bonds that translate into support systems for their communities. Lending decisions are made democratically on the basis that one saves regularly and that they attend the scheme’s fortnightly meetings often. Mistrust sets in when the better off are involved in housing schemes because many groups have experienced a 20-30 percent drop out rate after some members acquired their houses (Interview 2001). But the poor feel that if beneficiary selection was done correctly, there would not be this problem because for them ‘poverty does not end with a house’ (Biti et al 1998:36). Many members have made it clear that they also do not want people who have already acquired developer-built houses to be part of their savings schemes or to access uTshani funds for extending their homes. These self imposed boundaries serve to define federation members as an exclusive group of the poor who have special rights to land for housing.
From the federation’s experience, savings carve out space for women’s participation in informal settlements because they are the ones who demonstrated the most interest in saving for houses\textsuperscript{17}. Community organisations become empowered to manage financial resources through the house and community building process. The federation boasts proudly, with mobilisational undertones, that; “We do not collect money, we collect people” (Baumann \textit{et al} undated:5). Their mobilisation capacity was one of the reasons why they were perceived with suspicion by political parties and government as an emerging political threat\textsuperscript{18} (See table 3). The highest number of members are found in the two provinces that do not belong to the ANC at the provincial level, the Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal. An emerging question here is: What explains the variation in the mobilisation capacities of the federation in these different regions? This perhaps could be an indication of the level of difficulty the Africans experience in accessing the Western Cape bureaucracy in order to benefit from state resources. Another explanation could be that the ANC led provinces have inculcated a culture of complacency amongst home seekers who wait for government delivery. However, the government has also delivered more in those same provinces. The ANC won the first local government elections in the CTMC but it was still in opposition at the provincial level.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Region} & \textbf{Groups} & \textbf{Households} \\
\hline
KwaZulu & 685 & 6 000 \\
Eastern Cape & 89 & 6 000 \\
Southern Cape & 23 & 2 500 \\
Western Cape & 264 & 18 000 \\
Northern Cape & 4 & 200 \\
Free State & 67 & 3 000 \\
Gauteng & 173 & 10 000 \\
North West & 53 & 3 500 \\
Northern Province & 16 & 900 \\
Mpumalanga & 14 & 500 \\
Total & 1 288 & 80 600 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Federation Membership December 1999}
\end{table}

\textbf{Notes:} The latest count revealed that the federation’s membership had risen to 530 000 households in 1 500 savings schemes by March 2000. PD and SAHPF (2000) \textit{An Alliance at the Cutting Edge}, SAHPF, South Africa, p5.

Of all the processes in the federation’s housing process, the uTshani fund is the focal point for building trust relations for as the PD says, ‘it is the glue that holds community groups
and underlies their other activities” (PD undated:3). Saving collectively brings families together and they learn to trust one another. This trust provides the basis for effective collection. Savings are the one resource that enhances the women’s citizenship status as it buys them bargaining power. After all, the communities go through the process of identifying and discussing common development priorities together. The different experiences people had in their struggles against apartheid constrained the development of natural association bonds and coupled with the relationships of authority and leadership in that same period, it became necessary to have a starting point for building trust relations (Patel and Mitlin 2002). The desperately poor are never in a position to reciprocate hence assistance rarely comes their way from the usual social networks but within a collective saving scheme, capacity for them to reciprocate into the collective fund was created (PD 1996). Built on the concept of collective savings, the federation succeeds in mobilising poor people as savings ensure high participation levels and mutual interaction amongst members. And because they risk all they have, the poor have a material stake in the organisation and in its planning and decision-making.

The federation is sustained by the HSSs and encouraging community members to save has been the biggest challenge. Members are encouraged to save according to their financial capacity on any day because the important issue is the frequency of saving, rather than the amount saved (Interview). The reasoning is that poor people do not necessarily have stable incomes hence they need to save whenever they can. Though most active members save once every four-five days, the daily collections are recognised by many to be important in strengthening contact between members and in assisting the poor to save (Biti et al 1998:16). Regular contact is maintained amongst officials and members and this promotes the search for compassionate solutions when a member is going through a crisis. As the women put it, “...the savings method and the crisis and income loans are given to create trust” (i bid). 19

Women’s dominance of the saving schemes and their participation is strongly felt since they steer the strategies needed to solve their housing problem. As Baumann et al (undated:ii) noted, in general, the collective approach appeals to women more than men.
They hold most of the posts in the schemes but at the national level, their participation was less evident until 1996 when at least 60 percent of these positions were filled by women. Members of these savings groups were noted to have confidence and cohesion that is rare amongst communities anywhere. However, despair sometimes sets in as one leader remarked, “We have waited for three hundred years for justice, now with our government, we expect miracles” (PD 1998). 20 One woman put it in the following words (PD 2000:8):

We are poor, we have no money. If we went to the banks to borrow some, they would chase us away. So if we need money, we have to look for it inside our own community. And that is actually how our savings scheme began. What we really wanted was money for houses. If we have our own plots of land with decent homes on them, many of our difficulties will be overcome.

What the members mean by a house is thus very different from how government bureaucrats, professionals and businessmen define it. The members’ conception is of an empowerment process that allows them to pool all their resources, money, knowledge and skills to build self-sustaining communities. Many unaffiliated savings schemes observed and acquired knowledge of the operations of the federation’s schemes and later approached them for membership. This boosted their skills with regard to organizing for housing. The black (poor in particular) people have developed confused identities based on promises so they assume identities that yield benefits. Many just care about basic survival. Most are loyal to the ANC but they deviate for economic reasons. The use of Afrikaner surnames and wanting to belong in the apartheid state shaped many identities in which one could achieve anything if they were white or coloured—a stunt that raises questions on how far people will go to gain respectability and elevate themselves in their society. Owning a house gives blacks a new identity and it fulfills what they believe about themselves, “You have to be something in order to achieve something”. There is a certain pride that comes with owning a house. One informant, Bheki Nkonyane (2001), lamented to me:

..the first human experience comes with owning a house, the first sense of self …I am nothing without a house. It is the first step to having property, it belongs to me, I can gain lots of things…credibilities. If you have got a house you are worth something. I personally believe that I need to own a house, a sense of having something, it is the only thing most blacks can own. You can do so many things. It helps break racism.
The Victoria Mxenge Housing Savings Scheme

The Victoria Mxenge HSS was started in 1992 by a group of twelve women and in less than two years, it had grown to two hundred and eighty women and six men (mostly married) from Khayelitsha Site B informal settlement. The group, after being inspired by the Indian group, Mahila Milan, have been building their homes and community ever since. From the beginning, the saving scheme was viewed as a political party and no one liked their mobilisation capacity. The leadership maintained this figure because they wanted to keep the group manageable hence they encouraged the formation of separate schemes in the same area. The federation acknowledges that it is women who are the most affected by landlessness and homelessness as they are the ones who transform the plastic shacks into homes and maintain them (Interview Hoffman). In South Africa and other countries, women are usually the ones who confront eviction authorities and yet most housing schemes are traditionally dominated by men. It had come as no surprise then when after the initial meeting, the women’s response to the call to organise for housing under the federation was overwhelming.

The scheme started off with three treasurers who collected the savings and managed the scheme’s account. The organisational structure was later altered to cater for the practicalities of housing provision (See table 4). After the construction of the houses was completed (save for the finishing touches), a Community Property Association of eleven members took over the running of the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme. They rotate holding all the portfolios including the leadership. The majority of the members of Victoria Mxenge (70 percent) are unemployed with an average income of less than six hundred rands per month, hence everyone was encouraged to save whatever they could everyday. The women had first organised themselves into small groups and approached financial institutions where they confirmed the discrimination against women finance seekers. The women spoke of ‘interrogation’ even if one had deposit money that qualified them for credit. Some of the questions they found humiliating were: ‘Are you married? Do you own property and do you own a car?’
Table 4 Victoria Mxenge Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Supervises development. Negotiates for grants and loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Negotiates title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>Manages savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Conducts participatory research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House model</td>
<td>Facilitates house designing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>Arranges functions for visiting groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Co-op</td>
<td>Costs building materials. Builds houses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The local authority also did not like the idea of savings schemes and tried to avoid the scheme when it sought their help for the ‘social compact’ requirement in accessing housing resources. After several unfruitful visits to their offices and broken appointments, the scheme resorted to trade union tactics to force them to accept and act on their demands. They locked up the officials in their offices until they signed the ‘social compact’ that was needed to access the subsidies for the development of new housing projects (Interview - Rose Maso).

Even with a signed ‘social compact, the scheme failed to access any state owned land for housing despite persistent negotiations with concerned authorities. State land had its own bureaucracy and the absence of land release systems and policies, the lack of information regarding ownership and political infighting all worked against the scheme. For instance, the group identified a piece of land at the corner of Landsdowne and Jan Smuts roads in 1993 and approached the local authority in a bid to secure the land. After several years of negotiations in 1999, the council finally told them the land belonged to the education department. On following this up, the education department revealed that it had forgotten that it owned the land as it did not have records and absolutely no idea that it owned the land. It was finally discovered that the land belonged to the law enforcement department (Interview Pat Matolengwe). The group was tossed back and forth between the province and the CTMC whenever they identified land they found suitable for their scheme. One of the scheme’s leaders summed up the bureaucratic inertia with regard to land release for low-income housing:

We started the negotiations (with the local authority) for land and everything was good between us, we have a good relationship but the delivery is just not there. The bureaucracy is stopping everything that we have done all these years. You go back and the people have gone and there is no communication, you have to start afresh.
Another problem that complicated the scheme’s work was ‘Colour politics’. Coloured politicians often objected openly to the development of land they had earmarked for their people (Thurman 1999:61). The ANC housing desk in particular played a big role in the scheme’s efforts in providing information on who owned the land the project would have identified as suitable for their needs.

When the People’s Dialogue informed Victoria Mxenge members of the availability of three hectares of land in Phillipi which was being offered by the Catholic Welfare and Development, the scheme elected five members as a land committee that would negotiate on their behalf as a community organisation. The entire scheme supported the negotiations by turning up in large groups and preparing fervently for the land. They compiled a document titled “What we need now is land” which included their income status, household details, savings record, migration histories and housing requirements and this they circulated to the broader Cape Town community. After competing against twelve other NGOs outside the federation, the scheme finally got the land, which they now own communally, after a gruelling nine months. After establishing the actual size of the land which was thirty thousand square metres, the group agreed on one hundred square metre plots for each member and left room for a church and a health centre. Even with this little land per household, only one hundred and ninety members could fit on this piece of land and this complicated the allocation process.

To do the allocations fairly, the scheme had to elect and register a trust, the Victoria Mxenge Board of Trustees. The board is run by the homeless and no professionals sit on this board. Six members are from the scheme, one is from the province’s federation structure, one was nominated by the national federation and the other is an honorary member from the Indian partner, Mahila Milan. The other ninety members who did not get stands in the same area accepted the decision in good faith and remained as faithful as before and helped in the building process. For them, the investment was in the reciprocal action they would get when their turn came. By 2001, the deal on land for these remaining members had been finalized.
However, a long struggle ensued during which the group tried to get government support and approval for their work and to determine under which new local authority they fell under. By the time their new local authority, the CTMC, decided to acknowledge their efforts, the group had already received approval from the national and provincial authorities as an innovative approach to housing delivery. The ANC led CTMC, manned by apartheid bureaucrats, responded negatively with the aim of deterring similar people from organising housing projects. The council’s Engineering Committee, pointed to what they called imminent structural defects in the houses because of the quality of the land they had built on and the quality of the buildings. The land required draining as it was on marshland and this had forced the scheme to hire an architect on a consultancy basis to manage the process. The council clearly perceived this as a challenge to its role in managing communities and its obsession with control rang loud and clear as one official raved and ranted: “.the PHP, not everyone wants to do it, and it is not an option for mass or fast delivery, and you can’t control it!” (PD 1997). Skepticism towards the efforts were the order of the day in all formal institutions as many posed a rhetorical question, ‘How could poor, uneducated people, especially women, manage something as complicated as housing development?’ (Biti et al 1996). The scheme finally succeeded in earning the support of the Provincial Minister of Housing, the Cape Provincial Administration Board and the Regional Services Council of Civic groups and political parties through inviting them to their public meetings.

The Victoria Mxenge group applied for their 12 500 rand subsidy and stated that they wanted the money to be paid directly to their HSS and that the council should install water and sewerage service connections free of charge. The fact that the scheme’s community was established under the Less Formal Township Establishment Act that sidelined the usual regulations and standards for township development in low-income areas worked to their disadvantage. Enacted at the national level, the act placed implementation responsibility on the province, and it stated that some land use and building regulations were not applicable to informal settlements, site services projects and incremental housing (DOH/National Business Initiative 1997). The act was a way of getting around the administrative complexities associated with racially biased local authorities. Obstacles
emerged later after the local government elections that required the province to approve the establishment of a township under the act only after approval by the local authority. This automatically introduced delays in securing approval from both authorities. The national government may have acted in good faith to avoid insensitive bureaucrats, but the net effect was that it showed a continuation of the parallel development attitude since standards of service delivery were allowed to differ. The act might have solved one problem but it clearly perpetuated the previous government’s approach to accommodating the poor. Worse still, it sanctioned the insensitivity of the local authority officials as they refused to provide services or to bill the residents for services they organised for themselves. These were for sewerage, water and electricity.

A notable personality and the major driving force in the Victoria Mxenge scheme was Patricia Matolengwe, a Regional Executive Member of the ANC and a branch executive of its Women's League. She was tasked by the ANC Women's League with organising the women in Khayelitsha even though she argued that everyone is apolitical in the federation when organising for housing, ‘We don't want to involve that word [politics]. We do not mention politics at all or anything of that nature’. However, councillor Sidina’s words were more revealing of the party's ambitions of a continuous celebration of freedom and to carry on with the traditions of the liberation struggle experienced in the country as outlined in the document on the character of the ANC: 29

All PHP projects are ANC initiated and organised…accessing public of ficials and going through the bureaucratic maze requires ANC facilitation. Many projects in Khayelitsha are organised like that and there are only three or four successful ones as the Victoria Mxenge. It is difficult to get land in this province-the army helps because the top positions are Umkonto Wesizwe 30 and they can discuss land …can make use of army land, you get the list of army land first, then go to the Ministry of Defence and negotiate on land for free for the poor.

Recognising her mobilisational and organisational capacity, Patricia was co-opted into the PHB where she contributes to decision making on resource allocation for housing delivery in the province. Patricia’s experiences (her now expert knowledge) 31 was considered as being universal in applying to South Africa’s national housing problems. To be able to manage parallel ambiguous and complex relationships with government departments and other NGOs calls for a higher level of political sophistication which Patricia represented as
a high ranking official in the ANC’s Women’ League and in the federation. Over time, politicians, officials and activists all develop tactics in managing and redirecting political disagreement. They do this through the use of institutional procedures, containing party discipline and the use of patronage amongst other strategies (Barry 2002:271).

This cooptation by the state does affect community organizations that rely on social capital and trust. Co-opted leaders are inevitably distanced from their communities and in turn, they tend to treat all other communities as alike in their new roles which puts them in the interface between communities and the state (Craig et al 2000:329-330). With the ANC in the lead, this cooptation signalled the tendency towards a movement to a corporatist model of community development which sought to control participation (Smit 2001). The co-optation sought to harmonise community efforts with ruling party efforts but all under the government’s banner of success. At the same time, it also sent signals to other collectivities of how success was prescribed.

**Gender Power Struggles**

This self-housing provision experience created confidence in poor individuals to devise alternative means of pooling their meagre resources and acting positively to improve their living standards. It enabled women who are usually excluded from decision-making processes to be empowered with knowledge they generate within their own communities. They developed the capacity to bargain for recognition and acceptance by authorities, and to influence their development strategies. Many members of Victoria Mxenge all agreed with Rose Molokoane’s, (cited in SAHPF 2002) views that;

…a person becomes more confident in approaching life in general as now you have some people to share your experiences with, to give advice to and get advice from…And if you are alone, two definitions will become a difficult choice but if you are with other people you will get some stories from other people and become confident to say it is not me alone who is facing this kind of challenge. So by challenging the challenges collectively, it is easier and lessens the risk of how to resolve the problems.

The mood in the Victoria Mxenge community was expressed by a 97-year-old woman who spoke full of emotion, “You feel like you have something now, something permanent. You did not have pride before, but now you do” 33 However, the experience was not as smooth
as the women had another battle to deal with, the patriarchal attitudes that have haunted housing provision in most of Africa. A woman in the scheme explained their struggles against many odds in building their houses (PD 1997:9):

> Most groups are now building houses. In the beginning, men were not so interested, but now they come into help us. Men do not want to work for nothing. But we are unemployed, and in the end get a house! We do everything: saving, planning, making models of houses, affordability studies and finally the building. We spend a long time preparing to build houses...and we have to repay loans. We are selling meat, sweets, fruits and vegetables to get money to feed our children...This shows us how to solve problems, it is really empowering us.

The whole process was a learning experience for the women as they came to realise that it was not easy to own property because it has to be done through marriage. Women are not recognised in the policy for housing even though they shoulder the burden of housing provision at the household level. However, many of the female heads of households in the project got the title deeds in their maiden names even though most are married. For some, the subsidy was accessed in the husband’s name yet the women were the ones involved in the actual provision process and were also the scheme’s members. Some husbands had discouraged their wives’ from participation in the scheme but the women defied and dismissed the husbands’ attitudes,

> Men do not have the experience that we have, they thought of houses as construction only and they only have the experience of being labourers in this process as they are used to being labourers at their work places.34

This assumption of male dominated terrain by the women caused negative feelings after the houses were completed. The men openly argued that it was culturally wrong for women to own the houses. There were incidences of increased domestic unrest between 1998 and 1999 as the men became aggressive fearing eviction by the women. Some women openly regretted participating in the project but a collective decision was later taken to reincorporate the men if they were willing to work in the scheme. The scheme had tried in the beginning to appoint men into some of the committees but none of the appointees ever fulfilled their role, hence women were co-opted to replace them (Interview-Pat Matolengwe 2001).
A depressing fact is that the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme is built next to a waste dump and this affects both the health and property values of this community. The toxic waste, smell, mosquitoes, marshes and flies all wreak havoc on this new development and since the trash is never covered, dust during the summer has contributed to the increasing number of asthma victims (PD 2000). Ross Demolition, a private company, dumped concrete on this site such that there can never be development on this land as removing the concrete would be very expensive.

In 2002, dynamism slowed down in the federation and the problem was located mainly in the leadership. A confidence gap had grown between them and the communities they served. Part of the problem was that the leadership had never been democratic in the federation as it was on a self-inclusion basis that was determined by one's level of activism in the organization and their other positions in the ANC effectively blurred the accountability lines (Wilson and Lowery 2003:55).

Despite these problems, the group managed to develop a close community with a strong sense of unity. They hold weekly meetings and attendance is always above one hundred and fifty members at any time. The committee members meet once a week and all the committees work together on a daily basis thus keeping the momentum on housing provision. Federation meetings are punctuated by spontaneous singing giving members a chance to let out emotions. Hoggett and Miller (2000:360) support this outlet of emotions and the role it plays in democracy,

Democracy has to be convivial; a sense of duty and responsibility is no longer enough to sustain people's participation, getting involved has to be enjoyable or else the majority of people just won’t bother. Moreover conviviality builds trust that in turn enables the expression of differences, often in playful or ritualized ways which enable aggression to be harnessed constructively.

**Silver City Housing Project**

This housing project was organized by a group of homeless Africans who were outside the federation. In October 1993, a group of Africans invaded houses that had been built for the coloured community in Lost City. Faced with an election the following year (1994), the
apartheid government felt it had to evict them and this was done by providing them with alternative land and nine square-metre shacks across the road from the houses they had occupied. After the relocation, the group began to negotiate with the council for permanent ownership of the land. For six years, the group was tossed back and forth different government agencies believed to own the land, but the owner of the land was never identified. Their efforts were further derailed by the involvement of the ANC, the Pan African Congress (PAC) and SANCO who all claimed to further the group’s cause but instead, they quarrelled and disagreed amongst themselves on strategies and priorities. The ANC was incensed as it saw SANCO as meddling in political affairs instead of attending to civic matters. The beneficiaries eventually took it upon themselves to organize to get the land and formed the Tafelsig Development Committee. The group was rather slow to organize for housing and was only concerned with security over the land as reassurance that they would never be evicted again was important to them. They eventually just settled and began to build their homes on what was meant to be temporary land. The authorities turned a blind eye to the developments surrounding the group’s efforts to provide themselves with decent housing.

Savings groups had existed within the group before they began to save seriously for housing in 1999 as a response to Minister Sankie’s call to participate in the PHP as organized projects. In this earlier phase, the savings were organized around networks of friends who rotated credit (stokvels) and they mainly sponsored income-generating projects that served the group’s basic needs. The housing savings group, with two hundred and fifty members, one hundred and thirty of them men, became involved in all processes concerning owning a house and a critical issue was the need to educate members about home ownership because they “were used to cheap life in a shack and therefore needed to understand the value of a house”. Responsibilities for housing provision were shared between the sexes with young unemployed men acting as the major drive in the scheme. Public meetings were organized to sell the idea to people from diverse backgrounds and in this way, bricklayers, carpenters and plumbers came forward to sell their labour to the project. This meant that project members only required training to manage the house building process. DAG, the equivalent of Peoples’ Dialogue, offered training to monitor
the building process and recommended the establishment of a management committee with technical expertise.

The project has kept a simple management structure. At the top of the hierarchy are the beneficiaries and immediately below them, their chosen representatives who are organized into committees led by a treasury, a chairperson and a secretary. At the lowest are the management staff who do the technical work. The management staff report to the committees and the committees report to the beneficiaries in weekly meetings. The staff is paid monthly salaries from the government grant of five hundred and seventy five rands per month per subsidy beneficiary. This money is to aid in capacity building for the duration of the project and to buy tools that revert back to the state when the project ends. In this way, the equipment can be passed on to the next housing project. Although the staff members were some of the leaders in the formation of the project, they moved on to become full time employees of the project. The treasury collects the fixed amount of twenty rands per month from every beneficiary and up to one hundred and fifty rands per month for the actual houses. Members can borrow from the savings and pay back within the stipulated time and credit is also rotated in the project. There are no written down rules and regulations to enforce paying back as the project relies on the community’s moral sanctions to monitor compliance. The unspecified sanctions just emanate if you default and unorthodox means (including violence) are often utilized (Interview-Mandisa Dlanjwa 2001). There is an option for those in the project to stay on and continue to save or to pull out after their houses have been completed but the project is not organized to go beyond the delivery of a house.

The management of the project are all ANC members as are the majority of the project members. That the management belongs to the ANC is important in that ‘they know where to go when they need facilitation’ and they have done this at all the stages in providing their own houses. A notable and prominent figure in the project is Mandisa Dlanjwa who has experience in community organization and is well placed and connected in the ANC and openly admits that she knows her way around when she requires doors opened. During my interview with her, she suddenly called out to colleagues in an adjacent room, “Is there
anyone who is not ANC in this project?” An expert at cat and mouse games with the bureaucrats, she gets her way most of the time when she believes the officials are being unreasonable and as they openly believe that she is ignorant, she plays the ignorant aggressive service seeker when necessary. In one incident, the City Planner demanded a plan for a structure she had planned to transform into a crèche for the community and she told him to come back the next day to collect it. On the following day, she waited for the official to turn up and in his presence, she drew a rectangle and indicated the positions of the windows and doors and handed it to the official. Shocked and numbed, the official shook his, uttered that she was mad and left. She never heard from him again and the cooperative continued to build many more houses without plans. The plans are only drawn up at the end and submitted to the officials when it suits the project.37

Conclusion
This chapter has shown the sometimes ‘silent’ strategies of the ANC of planting leaders amongst the people to steer and organise them to make claims upon the state. And many interviewees concurred that “Sooner or later you join the ANC even if you are not when you first join these housing groups.” The normal course of service seeking does not take place in the CTMC as groups plan to deal with the rules and regulations before they even approach officials. Interacting with the bureaucrats appears to drain housing cooperatives of their time and energy as they spend a significant amount of time preparing to deal with them. This implies the presence of a clandestine mentality and attitudes reminiscent of struggle logic. One main tactic the cooperatives and civic groups use is to lobby the national level such that by the time they get back to the provincial level, they would have made their issue part of the national agenda. However, the government’s response breeds the application of particularistic criteria and it sanctions political steering as ANC cadres are largely responsible for mobilising the poor house seekers.

The allocation of subsidies to Victoria Mxenge only and not to all other house seekers is very much a manifestation of the liberation logic as is the steering of the group by ANC leaders. The pedestal the cooperative sits on reflects ANC capacity in delivery and the
federation, with its reserved land allocation, serves as a route for effective mobilisation and inclusion is by choice.

Endnotes

1 This realisation dawned on a South African team that had gone to India on an exchange visit. Indian slum dwellers demonstrated immense skills in organising for housing through the use of knowledge and skills within their communities. See PD (1997) Regaining Knowledge – An Appeal to Illusions, Manual for Innovative, Community –Based Shelter Training Programmes, p19.

2 The People's Dialogue was born out of a grassroots conference for the urban poor held in Seoul, South Korea in 1989 and it inspired a similar meeting in South Africa. The People's Dialogue on Land and Shelter was then conceived later in the same year with the aim of offering an alternative to that offered by other NGOs and development agencies. It was initiated by the Southern African Bishops Conference and the Southern African Catholic Development Agency and the targets of their efforts were the under-represented women and squatters. See Biti, B., Hasan, A. and Mitlin, D. (1998) Evaluation of the People's Dialogue and the Homeless People's Federation, International Institute for Environment and Development, p8. In a way, the SAHPF was the coming together of sectors of South Africa's grassroots liberation movement.

3 The vote was split 55 to 45 who wanted to give it a try.

4 It became registered as a sub-committee of the Southern African Catholic Development Association which entitled it to use its welfare organisation number, 08 800512 000 0. This gave it the legal status required to act as a support organisation for the federation.

5 By December 2000, there were 15 000 registered savers in the different savings groups and more than 13 000 of these were led by women. At first, the public was skeptical of the federation's activities and viewed it as a stokvel where members access the funds they pool by drawing their share on a rotational basis. See PD (undated) An Alliance at the Cutting Edge, SAHPF, South Africa.

6 There are ten fully-fledged regional federations, which combined to form the SAHPF. A region needs to have a minimum of five savings schemes, with a minimum of seven conveners elected from the savings schemes who keep the activities of the federation going (they serve for two years). Each region has a networking team, training unit, technical and building support team, land unit, housing loan unit, housing savings scheme support and a shack counting and enumeration unit.

7 People's Dialogue's responsibilities involve obtaining resources for the federation, providing professional support in formal negotiations and neutralising the politics of the country-racism- through creating space for the federation.

8 The NSDF is a loose network of slum dwellers in which members participate in organised struggles of the urban poor. They have demonstrated an immense capacity in mobilising poor communities. Mahila Milan, (Women in Togetherness) is a federation of women's collectives which organises and trains women to solve their shelter problems collectively through initiating savings schemes and developing other relevant skills. SPARC is a registered society founded by a group of professionals-social workers, researchers in social science and other branches who shared a need to establish an organisation that interacts with grass-root organisations as a partner rather than as a patron. SPARC defines an Area Resource Centre as a space where different communities of the urban poor who share common problems and issues come together to reflect and analyse their problems with the aim of developing solutions. It provides professional support to NSDF and Mahila Milan.

9 White officials were overwhelmed by the invasions that were occurring all around them but they knew enough not to evict black squatters when Nelson Mandela was getting into office. PD (1999) The Liberating Power of Self Reliance, p5.

10 Of 16 schemes in the Federation that acquired land, only three groups purchased their land, the rest was acquired through land invasions.

11 It is important to stress that land invasions were to be resorted to only as a last resort. This was one of the conditions for getting the federation's support.

12 The government's People's Housing Process policy has remained marginalised within the Housing Department as less than 1 percent of the subsidies had been spent in this area by 2002. See Baumann, T.,


The People’s Dialogue was in the process of decentralising fund management to the regional level. At this level, a regional loan fund to which all groups make a monthly contribution, the Ingolobane, would give the schemes loans. Ingolobane, (the granary) is for financing large production and enterprise loans.

Women are usually viewed as the community managers who deal with basic necessities like water, and sanitation.

An example is that of a group in Siyanda, north of Durban, which decided to join the savings scheme but the political leadership in the settlement regarded this as a threat. All the houses of the members were attacked and the organiser, Mr. Ndaba, was killed. The whole group fled permanently from the area. See People’s Dialogue Newsletter (1998) uTshani Buyakhuluma, Issue no7, May, p7.

This is not to say that there were no problems in the group as both members and leaders were distracted from their original mission and became more interested in accessing the loans. See Wilson, P.A. and Lowery, C. (2003) ‘Building Deep Democracy: The Story of a Grassroots Learning Organisation in South Africa’, Planning Forum, no.9, p53-54.

Quote from Iris Namo, director of Dialogue on Shelter in Johannesburg.

The scheme was named after the late Victoria Mxenge, an ANC liberation heroine and campaigner for the rights of poor women.

The tiny plots in Khayelitsha were given to the members after they fled from the vigilante-related violence in Crossroads in 1985.

This shows the half-hearted attempts at addressing problems of the ‘Previously Disadvantaged People’ since disadvantaged black women are asked to provide a financial guarantee of 5 percent of the housing project when they sign up for contractor provided housing.

Many people who failed to service their loans were compelled to lie to financial authorities about their status so they could qualify for housing loans.

The social compact is an agreement with the local authority for approval by the provincial government that a housing cooperative was a ‘recognised community’. After 1997, it was no longer a requirement to get the social compact which complicated the entire process for project subsidy seekers.

The area is surrounded by informal settlements called Sweet Homes, Pola Park, Siyahlala and Samora Machel.

An article appeared in the Cape Argus on May 15th, 2000, castigating the Victoria Mxenge houses as structurally defective. It explained how the Engineering Committee had expressed its concern to the provincial and national authorities on this kind of community mobilisation through attacking the low-lying flood prone area in which the houses were built. The council therefore refused to accept responsibility for maintaining the services and roadways which had been built on ‘uncompacted’ land. As a result, the residents of Victoria Mxenge have never received an invoice for services rendered despite several visits by Masakhane Campaign officials. Also see Thurman D. (1999) Development Action Group, South Africa, p36.

Usually the Land Use Ordinance is commonly used for major private development projects under the jurisdiction of a local authority. Implementation responsibility lies with the local authority.

Mckinley points out that the ANC was more than an organisation for many people and that even after it was banned it remained a cultural presence that became a reference point in conversations. But the important issue was that it remained a reservoir of support for the organisation. See Mckinley, D.T. (2004) The African National Congress (ANC) Underground Between Rivonia and 1976, Paper presented to the ICS/SOAS conference, ‘Looking at South Africa Ten Years On,”London, 10 -12 September.

This was the ANC’s military wing.

How knowledge is acquired marks the distinction between local knowledge and expert knowledge. The latter can be supported by scientific qualifications and can be quite mobile. The former is confined to residential space and history—it is the most critical part of the knowledge chain that ‘experts’ very often have to build on.
In some liberal democracies as well as in autocratic regimes, the state has very often stepped in to manage segmented claims expressed by the marginalised or suppressed. The state tends to license such specific interest institutions to devise and control the strategies of managing diversity and contestation and the resultant politics of national identity. Such corporatist strategies for hegemonic control imply attempts to unify heterogeneity by seeking for new myths of organic national unity. See Brown, D. (1997) “The Politics of Reconstructing National Identity: A Corporatist Approach”, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol.32 no.2, pp255-270.

Interview with Vuyiswa Zantsi recorded in People’s Dialogue Newsletter, October 2000.

This conflict is an on-going thing between the ANC comrades and SANCO civic leaders with the latter viewing themselves as the legitimate representatives of the community. Local government leadership in particular posed a major problem and increased friction between the groups as SANCO had expected that during the cadre deployment strategy, local government positions would be left to them. See Umrabulo (1999) for an elaboration of these differences.

Patronising tendencies of the bureaucrats were very evident in this oft repeated belief that blacks did not appreciate the value of a house.

See Smit who explains a similar event that occurred in the Kanana Project in Gauteng when a housing project was threatened with eviction for health reasons as the project did not have water facilities. The leaders organised and paid (bribed) council workers to steal the water and sewerage plans of the entire system in the area. They were also shown how to connect themselves to the main service points so they could have water. This group later joined the federation so as to get recognition and acceptance. Smit, W. (2001) “The Changing Role of CBOs in the 1990s, with Emphasis on Their Developmental Projects” in A. Tostensen, I. Tvedten and V. Mariken (eds.) *Associational Life in African Cities-Popular Response to the Urban Crisis*, Nordiska Aficainstitutet.
Part IV

Chapter 9

Comparing Regimes

Introduction
The comparison takes place between different time periods in each country that are defined by white minority rule and the current majority rule regimes. Across the two country cases, it takes place between the two municipalities and amongst the cooperatives. Though the comparison is across all the issues as outlined in the first two chapters, much of the focus is on the interplay amongst the four key variables: ‘liberation logistics’, Africanisation, state autonomy and civic organisation. However, the study also identified other key issues that influence housing delivery. These merit attention and they are the legal and institutional framework, trust relations and the patterns of citizenship construction emanating from the house seeking processes. Through an analysis of the legal and institutional continuities and discontinuities, the presence and intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ is also compared alongside the four variables. The differences and similarities between the strategies utilized by the home-seekers in the two countries give possible indicators on the trajectories likely to emerge with regard to service provision. They also show a shift in values amongst the poor as they increasingly shoulder the responsibility for their individual welfare- a much required characteristic for citizens in capacity starved states.

A brief analysis of the significance of names given to housing cooperatives by the members, the effect of time on the comparison and the concept of a house, sets the stage for the comparison. This is followed by the section on the war time resource allocation models (liberation logistics), the infusion of their modus operandi into the post colonial bureaucracies (Africanisation), the extent of state autonomy as well as the patterns of engagement utilised by civic groups in their claims on the state and party actors. A comparison of the intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ in the two cases follows the comparison of these four variables. Finally, the other factors, the continuities and discontinuities, trust relations and citizenship are compared and contrasted.
The Significance of Names

To begin with, an interesting comparison can be discerned in the significance of names given to housing settlements by the homeless poor. The names given to residential areas are a critical part of a people's history. As with names of people, they very often intend to keep some memories alive. In Harare, the names signify hope, some general optimism as well as some jubilation at times. They convey more of what the people have experienced and come to realize, as well as their aspirations to rise to the political realities of the time. However, the names are also laden with innuendos of what to expect in addition to telling the stories of the cooperatives’ struggles. In Cape Town, due to the pretense that African housing demands do not exist, the names of housing settlements reflect appreciation for what leaders of the struggle have achieved. The naming therefore takes the mode of praise appreciation. The implication being that only the struggle logic can overcome the hurdles. This can be also interpreted to mean that the poor very much refer to the memories of the struggle and still identify strongly with the liberators. Perhaps it also echoes Thabo Mbeki’s words that the poor black people in South Africa have nothing but the ANC.

The Effect of Time on the Comparison

A crucial fact to remember when doing the comparison is that ZANU-PF had had more time to entrench its legitimacy than the ANC due to the twenty years it had been in power at the time of the study. The ANC was, just after six years, still trying to prove itself by appealing to the many constituencies where its credibility on its calibre (educational) and expertise in running a government was questioned. The local colored, white and Indian communities were part of the broader business and international communities that required appeasement.

The time it took to transform the bureaucracy too had an effect. For Zimbabwe, transformation was almost an overnight event. There was thus less resistance to the ‘liberation culture’ as many of the particularistic tendencies became infused with the party’s rhetoric. Initially, resistance to move towards liberalism was led by workers and students immediately after independence in 1980. Later on, the same forces, plus
intellectuals, led the crusade against the one party state the government tried to go for in the mid to the late eighties. In South Africa, the presence of many forces exerting a countervailing influence such as trade unions and civic groups have always acted to constrain excesses. At the same time, the same forces continue to exercise their power and the emphasis is now on the need to join forces to transform the system. The extensive finance capital also forced the ANC to reach out and carve a legitimate space for itself. The liberation mode for South Africa thus requires different mechanisms in which the value generated by liberation experiences becomes indispensable.

The Concept of a House
A convergence point for the poor across time and space in both cases is the essence of what an urban house means. Besides the more general effects of providing security, income generation and a status symbol, the one important issue that emerged from the communities in this study is the affirmation of being ‘a somebody’ that comes from owning a house. As one citizen lamented, “The government regards us as being like our shacks-useless. Without a house, I am a nobody with no rights, no say.”¹ A house symbolizes who the person is and infuses people with a sense of identity. This makes the idea of belonging central to understanding citizenship.² Prior to majority rule in both countries, urban land/house ownership allowed a citizen to have an active voice for it was only when one owned it that they could participate in some governance affairs. Ignatieff (1991:26) captured this categorically, "Without property, a citizen cannot be independent, without the income of property, an individual will not have the leisure necessary to be a good citizen". Simply put, owning property gives one the peace of mind and security that allows one to pursue higher ideals, its absence means the lack of capacity to pursue the same ideals that the propertied enjoy. Until 1993 in Zimbabwe, only urban dwellers belonging to the propertied class could vote in local government elections. The new house owners in the cooperatives in this study demonstrated the emergence of boundaries that are constructed from a sense of belonging to the propertied class as well as to urban space.
The “Liberation culture” and Housing Distribution: Capturing Similarities and Differences

Table five above shows the differences and similarities amongst the four factors that determine the intensity of the “liberation culture” in each country. Implicit in these differences is the fact that different factors combine differently and with varying intensity to produce the “liberation culture” and this determines its impact on housing distribution. Whilst a cursory glance at the factors would lead to the conclusion that outcomes would be different, the combination of these factors does result in what can be treated as very similar outcomes.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Harare</th>
<th>Cape Town</th>
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<td>Liberation culture</td>
<td>Maintenance of hegemonic status- Mobilisational goals</td>
<td>Revolutionary mode Mobilisational goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberation logistics</td>
<td>Exile governing experience Peasant rural mobilisation Guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>Exile governing experience Urban worker mobilisation Civic disobedience/sporadic military disruptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africanisation</td>
<td>Uncontested, covers virtual bureaucracy Institutions remodelled, new bureaucrats</td>
<td>Resistance, slow change process, top officials New institutions, old bureaucrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State autonomy</td>
<td>Lack of local contestation Despotic environment</td>
<td>Constrained, local opposition Open political space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic organisation</td>
<td>Change oriented civic leaders-new generation Deference high</td>
<td>Struggle experienced leadership Struggle tactics- Deference to ANC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cursory glance shows that the ‘liberation culture” outcome for Zimbabwe is determined by its high intensity and is directed at the maintenance of ZANU-PF's post 1980 hegemonic status. Even then, the mobilisational undertones are always present. The 2000 events that saw the main opposition party, the MDC, intrude on its traditional territory that
included the entire country, has forced the ruling party to intensify its unfair land
distribution as party loyalty has become even more important. Cape Town, South Africa,
has a mediated intensity of the ‘liberation culture’ due to the presence of contesting forces
that rationalise some possible excesses. The result is what can be termed a ‘fairness’ that
has mobilisational tones for those Africans who may not necessarily be ANC loyalists.
This is because for the ANC to wrestle the province from the NNP requires extensive
mobilisation of the Africans partly because the majority in the province, the Coloureds,
cannot be counted on to gain political mileage by the ANC and mainly because its actions
are open to wide scrutiny by other opposing forces.

That ZANU-PF waged a peasant based struggle alienated the urban working class in
Zimbabwe leaving them without adequate knowledge on how to contest its hegemonic
position. Anti colonial struggle tactics such as demonstrations by urban workers were
ruthlessly put down leading to sporadic episodes of protest against what were considered to
be undemocratic acts by the government. Thus ‘liberation logistics’ largely remained raw
and in high gear until its infusion into the extant bureaucratic culture. On the other hand,
the widespread nature of the liberation struggle gave the ANC the advantage of starting off
with the need to reconcile the various brands of the struggle logic. Mediation was not just
from opposition parties but also from the many groups that were allied to the ANC. This
consequently set ‘liberation logistics’ in a relatively low gear.

The rapid and highly successful Africanisation project worked to ZANU-PF’s advantage as
contestation and alternatives to its discourse were absent. The physical presence of black
officers led to the neglect in creating new institutions and the drafting of extensive pro-
poor radical legislation. The cosmetic changes that were done did not disturb the basic
principles that were simply amended to capture distinct constituencies and reporting
structures were simply altered to reflect the power of the new incumbents. In Cape Town,
resistance by the inherited institutions and members of the ANC alliance all coalesced to
slow down the transformation process. Confinement of the changes to the top echelons of
the ANC and the challenges posed by the establishment of new institutions mediated on
the impact of the Africanisation process leaving it relatively weak especially in the Western Cape Province.

The lack of consultation and contestation in housing policy formulation and the general mono-party decision making style places Zimbabwe in the high state autonomy realm. Under normal circumstances, this would have been a vantage point for the government to deliver housing to many home seekers but pursuance of its own rhetoric determined otherwise. For South Africa, housing policy formulation constraints posed by the democratic process restrained the government leaving it in a position of weak autonomy. The open political space built in some form of equity for the stakeholders to influence the process but for the poor majority, they lost out, making the ANC anxious about prospects for mobilisation since in this set up, it was destined to fail in its delivery promises.

Vibrancy in civic organisation is a post 2000 phenomenon in Zimbabwe. The leadership in virtually all civic organisations does not have the struggle experience depriving them of the knowledge requisite for dismantling the now anti-revolutionary mindset. Up to the late nineties, the different generation leading the civic society was concerned with changing the plight of workers leaving organisations and groups dealing with housing to grapple with strategising to acquire the resources. The result for them was high deference to the ruling party in the absence of a strong civil society that would have enacted measures to oppose the overbearing party dominance. On the other hand, the civics in South Africa harbour much of the struggle experiences which they direct at both the resistant bureaucracy as well as at other forces. Adeptness at manipulation of authority thus places the civics several notches above their counterparts in Zimbabwe. The insensitivity and ineptitude of the Cape Town housing bureaucracy also requires high organisational skills to stimulate a response from them. The following sections look at these issues in more detail.

‘Liberation Logistics’
Exile governing experience was by nature ad-hoc and generally reactive. Guerrilla warfare is an unpredictable venture and it thrives on always being one step ahead of the envisaged enemy. The need for secrecy and the capacity to sustain the liberation wars required such
organisational approaches. However, for Zimbabwe, intimidation of the peasants during the struggle effectively disempowered them as they continued to fear to express their demands or voice their opinions well after the war ended. For the urban workers, their alienation during the struggle left them vulnerable for mobilisation through various means by the ruling party. And housing land allocation was just one amongst many. As was the pattern during the war in ‘liberated zones’ that were controlled by the war veterans, resource seeking and allocation was determined by the uncertainty and tension caused by failing to demonstrate open loyalty to the liberators. Years after the war ended, ZANU-PF still intimidates citizens who align themselves with opposition parties by destroying their homes as has happened after every election since 1985. The actual use of violence and not just threats, has left ‘liberation logistics’ in a high mode of operation especially where the poor masses can be targeted directly.

In South Africa, secrecy and trust were equally upheld values but with many players on the liberating scene, there was room for variation that converged on the same principles. Urban workers were faced with the options of boycotting official institutions spontaneously, belonging clandestinely to political parties as well as to civic bodies that generally took over management of the African communities. With the ultimate goal the achievement of liberation, some unity was inevitable and compromises toned down extremities. That many variants of the struggle logic continue to demand to be heard moderates the actions of the ANC that could easily fall out of step with democracy in the attempts to be popular with the poor public. This constraint on ‘liberation logistics’ is crucial in a democracy even though some confusion undoubtedly arise as the same voices also make the loudest noises on criticising government for slow delivery. The advantages of such a scenario are that the system can be manipulated to dispense favours sporadically to certain groups first by the ANC as the dominant party and secondly by all the groups when they refer to struggle promises and experiences.

The Effects of Africanisation
The socialist era sanctioned the politicisation of the public service and the costs of this process on developing countries’ administrative systems severely depleted resources
because of excessive patronage, which affects professionalism in service delivery. However in both countries, it was essential to realise wartime promises through official channels hence key officials/strategists had to be appointed to head the various departments of the public service. Both municipalities experienced bureaucratic tensions caused by the political leadership's thriving on political promises. The appointment of party loyalists led to a period of confusion in decision-making and consequently, the implementation of policies. The over centralised decision making structure and the need to ensure that administrative decisions were in line with the socialist ideology (for Zimbabwe) further confused public servants who became unsure of who to serve and to what extent (Weiss 1994). On the other hand, the treatment of Coloureds, Indians and Africans as one group of blacks who were beneficiaries of Africanisation complicated transformation of the bureaucracy as much as the categories complicated the definition of targets for housing delivery. Thus the confidence gap was just as wide in both countries.

The process of politicization itself changed cultural meanings, definitions, boundaries and hierarchies and the party identity became primary through politicization (Jung 2001:258). Party identity became important for both public officials (in Harare) and for the home seekers in general. Jung set out five variables for investigating political identity: political institutions, mobilizing discourse, material conditions, available ideology and organization. Conditioning variables are the material conditions, organization and available ideology that frame the cognition of those who are mobilized even though they are usually also linked by some other network shaped by similar variables. Political institutions and mobilisation discourse are essentially top down and are deliberately involved in the manipulation of identities (ibid:236).

The identities of the bureaucrats who were beneficiaries of the Africanisation process responded to the new incentives that were ushered in by the liberating parties. Likewise the identities and groups constructed out of the house seeking experience were defined and laden with content under the changing conditions that gave more meaning to some boundaries. However, how long the constructed identities last and whether they will continue to be constructed around the same issues, may shift with time. Associational
identities in particular are taken up as a matter of choice and can thus be discarded when they no longer serve the purpose (ibid). This has been seen in the three cooperatives that were simply interested in getting houses. Members withdrew their activism once their goals were met losing the momentum of community building and a possibility of replicating the efforts *enmasse*.

Because ruling party affiliation proved to be essential in both countries, a representative bureaucracy would go a long way towards professionalizing housing delivery in Cape Town by removing all the racial tensions and insensitivity that is directed at accommodating poor Africans. In Harare, a professional culture would restore respect for the rule of law.

**State Autonomy**

For South Africa, a negotiated power transfer bound the state’s autonomy in almost every housing policy direction resulting in ‘minimal autonomy’ that constrained the new democratic government’s capacity to act as it may have wished. The housing formulation process and its numerous commissions bear testimony to this fact and yet autonomy in terms of goal formulation is important for exercising political power (Gran 1984). Though state autonomy was constitutionally restricted in the power hand-over process, with regard to pursuing its policies where the private sector was not necessarily directly concerned as in housing for the low income group, the state failed to exercise considerable autonomy. The state had vast tracts of state land at its disposal but the vertical power dispersal system impinged on its use particularly in Cape Town. This was even more so in the redistribution of land, a key resource to housing the more than twenty million homeless urban blacks. This qualifies South Africa to be a state with weak autonomy according to Bayart’s (1993:8) classification of African states.

The decentralised nature and structure of the government also bound the central government’s autonomy in that the provincial level of government can interpret policies contextually and challenge the central government if a constitutional provision can be interpreted to have been violated. Power is thus dispersed vertically because of the
provincial government’s constitutionally defined autonomy and control of lower levels. With regard to housing policies, the state clearly lacked autonomy throughout the system from policy formulation to implementation. Bureaucrats, fearful of the pending Africanisation, were in a position to connive with the private sector actors to defeat any public sector provision of land or housing (Wilkinson 1998; Gusler 2000).

In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF dominated the local housing policy arena and the ruling party’s ’consensus’ reigned in many policy areas and this provided room for the government to draw up new legislation that openly rewarded specific sections of the population such as the war veterans. Ideological uncertainties generated by the mobilisation discourse of the liberation struggle heightened expectations and at the same time, they stifled any debates that might have arisen in the housing policy formulation process. The state had enough autonomy that it did not bother to attempt to formulate a post-colonial housing policy until almost twenty years later! And when it did, both the process and the result did not reflect the input of civic groups and other stakeholders. Civics that participated in the process referred to it as a sham for it did not reflect the outcome of the deliberations. The policy remained as vague as many other development plans and for the government, the advantage lay in that it would be difficult to pinpoint blame in the event of the failure to deliver. Part of the problem was that modelling the housing convention along the South African lines that had taken place ten years earlier is likely to have offended the government. This explains why the policy process was only a consultative process at the deliberation stage and yet when it came to the actual formulation, the ministry acted alone and consequently ignored the inputs of other stake-holders. However, the civic groups were driven by global forces and the government too had made global commitments hence some superficial attempt at redressing the problem was essential.

**Civic Groups: The Quest for Autonomy or State Resources?**
The autonomy of civic organisations is best brought to light by comparing the successes of the two different housing cooperatives: the two in a dominant party system (Zimbabwe) and the other two in a multi-party system (South Africa), and in their willingness to surrender their autonomy in order to benefit from state resources. Other important issues
are the extent to which authoritarianism is concealed in the organizations and how far they have been able to survive capture by the state. To begin with, as explained in chapters one and two, both countries share a similar history of disrupted civic organisation during the period of colonial rule and as non-state actors, they could not organise on matters of common consent within public space. Due to this historical background, an exclusionary vision of civic organisations emerged in both countries in that territorial and social space was segregated. Other races, notably coloureds and whites in both countries, still do not participate in organising for housing resources and when they do, it is in separate organisations with different resource bases.

Zimbabwe’s corporatist strategies, inherited from the colonial state, created a political culture that did not allow for the separation of state and civil society (Nordlund 1996:205). Organising as groups with an alternative voice and approach was thus heavily circumscribed. Government restrictions on the autonomy of civil society was eventually pronounced in the Private Voluntary Organisations act of 1995 which structures society-state interactions and censors civic organisational life in the country (ibid). The absence of relatively autonomous actors in the civic realm especially in the first fifteen years after independence compounded the problem. However, the international ties established by civic groups working on housing issues have allowed them to gnaw at the power of the state and influence decisions even though they never had distinct ideological inclinations and were just concerned with countering the incapacity of the state when it came to housing issues.

The HPZ, partly because it arose in an environment where banks and the working class poor were involved, required political facilitation as progress was retarded by the slow bureaucracy and working with donor funds meant that timeous implementation was essential. This target group of the lower working class also explains the dominance of men in its housing schemes as salaried applicants only qualified for the low interest bank loans. The major weakness was that the global networks of the HPZ did not embrace the empowerment, self-reliance discourse and the government was therefore more comfortable
with them. They were organising within an existing system, they recognised the role of the party and established a rapport that saw them being prioritised in housing land schemes.

The ZHPF’s approach of collecting people and organising independently of the party was bound to run into problems sooner or later. Though the federation attempted to remain detached from party politics, the housing cooperatives fell prey to the politics of the time as politicians sought them out and they in turn, looked for politicians who could deliver their housing needs. The cooperatives thus benefit from both avenues, belonging to the federation where global skills and tactics are learned, and deferring to the party where the only likely quick access to housing land can be found. This manoeuvring contributes to the lack of interest in building communities and not just houses. Here the poor seem to be more concerned with fitting in into urban areas by owning a house and joining the urban community in general.

The Silver City scheme was, like the Harare cooperatives, not interested in building communities or generally changing the life of the poor, but were just concerned with the security and opportunities an urban house provides. The short term goals of the scheme make them less of a threat when compared to the federation with its mammoth organizational structure and thousands of members who do not have a defined means as such of sustaining themselves in urban areas. Realisation of the real hurdles and odds against this group is what led the SAHPF to develop liaisons with the politicians from the ruling party who have always claimed that the poor were their constituency. With urban poverty on the increase, political support was imperative as bureaucrats were unlikely to accommodate their demands.

In South Africa, civic associations formed during the struggle for liberation became the pillars of civil society in black residential areas. The numerous civics that emerged in response to a wide range of political, economic and social factors were all concerned with creating a culture of democracy and the SAHPF demonstrated this clearly. However, the Silver City project does not hesitate to resort to violence to enforce compliance where money is concerned. Its mechanisms differ radically from those of the SAHPF indicating
the problems likely to emerge when collective organization becomes a basis for laying claims on a state perceived as unresponsive. Ties bound by coercive methods to enforce compliance are unlikely to be unsustainable and often tend to be very short lived. On the other hand, the SAHPF has conditions that are designed to exclude those who waver in their commitment. And around the world, it is common practice that homeowners’ associations use their powers to exclude, discriminate and segregate and the cooperatives in this study were no different (Holston and Appadurai 1999:5).

A positive point is that the members in the cooperatives in both countries had ties that bound them long before they began organising for housing. First of all, the cooperatives in the study cut across ethnic groups and emphasized other cleavages such as income and class. This does not mean that ethnicity has lost its explanatory power as a basis for self-identification or associational activity (Reed 1979:15). What has changed, according to Reed (1979) is the distinctiveness of the institutional forms which were the source of group consciousness in the first place and traditional ethnic ways have to compete for survival where massification determines likely success. Secondly, they lived in the same communities and were already involved in other cooperative ventures such as the stokvels (credit rotation schemes). The social capital generated in these informal associational activities proves to be credible for encouraging self-help initiatives even though more research requires to be done so as to be able to predict the prospects of success with each group.

**Intensity of the “Liberation culture”**

Resource allocation processes in the two countries raise important questions of how the state distinguishes between citizens collectively. There are differences between the strategies used in Cape Town and Harare. For instance, in Cape Town—South Africa, there is collusion between civic organisations and some bureaucrats who are ruling party members/loyalists to circumvent bureaucratic criteria that is interpreted as thwarting the efforts to redistribute wealth and extend services to the previously disadvantaged black community. The black community is thus perceived as one group of citizens but within it, submission to party steering further distinguishes between the citizens as shown by
privileged accorded to the SAHPF. Citizenship rights within this newly defined party community occurs as an end result of the allocation process. Organisations may be ANC led and initiated, but inclusion is broad in that all desiring the resource will benefit and ultimately render their loyalty to the benefactor, the ANC. In Harare-Zimbabwe, politicians openly allocate and prioritise land for housing to groups acknowledged as belonging to the party. The order is reversed in that you first identify with the party and become part of its community, then access is opened. Identity with the ruling party tends to come first irrespective of how service seekers organise to access the service. The choice of whether or not to organize with the party leads to exclusion and can cause blockades and frustrations in accessing housing resources.

Zimbabwe aimed to disable citizens in so far as they could exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities. Obfuscated administrative procedures contributed to hollow citizenship tendencies that characterised the politics of allocation dictated by the ruling party/government. The amount of autonomy the new governments enjoyed in planning for redistribution of housing resources determines how much of the war-time knowledge they could draw on. Reforming the inherited bureaucracies by making them more representative through Africanisation, successfully instilled much of the ‘liberation culture’ values. The work of civic groups organising for housing facilitates the application of the ‘liberation culture’ to large visible groups. It also partially completes the ruling parties’ rhetoric on the deliverance of war-time promises. It is in these civic groups that political identities took shape either at the beginning or at the end of the organising for housing process.

Some theorists have argued that a vibrant and associational life expressed in wide participation in voluntary association equips citizens to reject patron clientelism. And this study finds contradictory evidence in both countries that a ‘liberationist’ kind of citizenship evolves out of the house-seeking process when people are poor and access to resources has many blockages. Because of the racial factor in Cape Town, the ANC embraces all blacks and exclusion is either by choice or extreme poverty. Where the ANC initiates and engineers the housing delivery process, service seekers are compelled to identify with the ANC as an end result of the patron-client relationship. The institutional
culture from the previous era is still dominant in Cape Town forcing the ‘liberation culture’ to function in a revolutionary mode.

In Zimbabwe, the presence of state autonomy in housing policy formulation, combined with Africanisation (“liberation culture” value carriers) and the absence of a vibrant and autonomous civil society strengthens the “liberation culture” and it permeated public institutions with relative ease. The community solution was part of the hegemonic apparatus of the state aimed at organizing consent and managing dissent (Kenny 2002:410). There is thus a high intensity of the ‘liberation culture” as mediating forces are largely absent. On the other hand, the relative absence of state autonomy in South Africa, combined with the contested Africanisation process, constraints the utilisation of liberation war time knowledge and experience and retards its infusion into public institutions. However, civic organisations, in whose leadership this knowledge resides, challenge the system from below and enforce the ‘liberation culture” amidst much manoeuvring and strategising. There is therefore a low (or mediated) intensity of the “liberation culture”. Varying strategies are therefore utilised in the two countries in allocating state resources and consequently, different mechanisms are employed by both the seekers of services (who may have more room to challenge the state) and the ruling party.

In the Western Cape, political space is more open for contestation as evidenced by the visibility of opposition parties that constantly keep government in check. Generally, the political environment is more open and supportive of civic society involvement. Real opposition to the rulers poses a threat that constantly keeps them in line with regard to exercising tolerance and delivering on promises. All contestants are interested in protecting their constituencies and are also open to manipulating the mobilisation power that lies in meeting delivery promises as well as in courting others. A recent study on land redistribution by Gran (2005) supports this. The study revealed that there is more transparency and less corruption but also more resistance to change in the Western Cape bureaucracy.
Other Key Factors

Continuities and Discontinuities - the Legal and Institutional Framework

The similarities between the Apartheid and the ANC led governments’ housing policies, as well as the Rhodesian and ZANU-PF’s, are better understood as continuities. Nowhere is this clearer than in the financial arrangements for assisting housing provision for the poor. Any changes that took place were incremental rather than radical as would have been expected in the face of the demands for housing expressed by the increasing numbers of the urban and homeless poor. For Zimbabwe, the government never intended to integrate the poor into the city. Right from the beginning in 1980, with land still abundant and the city surrounded by farms, all new housing developments were on the periphery of the city and the new government continued to expand away from the city and the low-income areas were located next to other low-income areas. Since the initial housing projects for the poor were financed by the World Bank and USAID, low income did not exactly target the poor as a basic salary was required to qualify for the projects. With the banking system acting as intermediaries, suspect applicants were screened out and for a long time, the council had control over housing developments. Problems arose when funding began to dwindle and as it also became clear that the government had neither the plans nor the capacity to address housing needs of the poor.

Whereas legal provisions were altered as a matter of urgency for Cape Town’s house-seekers, Harare maintained ‘the revised’ institutions, kept most of the old legislation, and infused new bureaucrats at all levels of government. Legal acts in particular were used to facilitate access to land by the political leadership in Harare as chapter four illustrated and old institutions simply got new or additional functions. Whereas South Africa used legal provisions, e.g. the Development Facilitation Act, to facilitate access to land, the Zimbabwe government thwarted self-housing efforts by the poor through enacting legal provisions that emphasized order and control such as the Cooperative Act. The reverse happened in Cape Town, new institutions emerged overnight, with new legislation and unfortunately, for a change oriented regime, old bureaucrats in virtually the entire bureaucracy. Just as the struggle was protracted, so is the demise of apartheid and though most of the ANC cadres in the public service man the top positions, the senior bureaucrats
are largely from the apartheid era and nowhere is this more prominent than in the CTMC housing departments. Despite the radical housing institutional building in South Africa, all efforts appeared to be incremental due to the resistance by other actors especially at the provincial level. This ‘zone of indifference’ had the old previous regime members as the dominant actors. The Zimbabwe ‘zone of indifference’ had other causal elements, amongst them the fear of Zanu-PF’s wrath if wrong decisions were implemented or rather if the wrong beneficiaries appeared in the picture and paralysis was caused by the fear of major deviations from party policy procedures.

Maintenance of the subsidy policy illustrates the rampant nature of incrementalism in ANC housing policy. The ANC left the 1993 interim subsidy intact when it got into office in 1994 (Wilkinson 1998:225; Gusler 2000:31). To begin with, the capital subsidy and the trust guarding element, the social compacts, had been part of the Nationalist Party policies espoused in the IDT. The subsidy remained a once off grant, values were increased from 7500 rands during the IDT phase to 15 000 rands by the White Paper even though inflation eroded the actual values (ibid). As can be expected, qualifying margins for the subsidy rose too from less than 1000 rands per month to less than 3 500 a month, and the provision mode remained the same with business-government and NGO partnership playing important roles and all emphasizing freehold tenure (Gusler 2000). The main difference was that whereas the IDT delivered to communities, the NHF shifted delivery to communities organized as projects as the White Paper had broadened the scope to reflect the heterogeneity in the society. Individual subsidies were provided for the first time to Africans and institutional and consolidation subsidies were also introduced as these would be extended to the majority of the African population in urban areas (ibid).

The search for both domestic and international legitimacy affected the ANC’s options with regard to housing delivery (Bond 2000). The ANC’s incremental approach, which left much of the institutional memory intact, was described partly as a means of appeasing the white community by bowing to the demands of neo-liberalisms. Conforming to neo-liberal principles was important in the global economy and this was a key determinant in articulating housing provision in the developing world. The housing policy therefore
emerged as a tool for legitimizing the ANC in the eyes of the white business community in particular (ibid). Courting the minority white group’s trust contributed to the establishment of an orderly transformation but still, the ANC owed the African people what they expected in a democratic order. It was this debt that partly forced it to quickly co-opt the federation’s strategy and bless it as an answer to the poor’s housing problems. Both governments’ responses to the neo-liberal and global communal initiatives dictated similar responses to housing the poor. That is, a shift to a market oriented approach and embracing the activist approach that appeared to solve problems of urban poverty. However, housing approaches continue to emphasise ownership whereas in the rest of the developed world, more people rent housing in urban areas. The African reality of low populations, coupled with land availability allows for this owner housing approach even though congested cities like Cape Town have begun to run out of space (Smit 2001).

Even though there is convergence in the incremental nature of housing delivery across the two countries, the South African regime has a developmental approach to housing delivery as it provides all resources required for housing. That housing is a constitutional obligation also gives the ANC an edge at the implementation level. On the other hand, Zimbabwe’s welfarism ends with land provision as the only housing resource that government feels it has some obligation in providing and there are no mechanisms for ensuring equality in the rather idiosyncratic allocative procedures. Housing delivery is not obligatory on the government as it is not enshrined in the constitution as part of the local government functions. This silence on what the government is mandated to provide as part of the housing package leaves room for opportunism. Communities are thus seen as taking the responsibility for the self provision of housing within the limits prescribed by both the legal framework and the party.

Both governments have a monopoly on housing delivery for the poor and this positions the home seekers directly against them. On the other hand, the ruling parties have traditionally influenced popular sectors and have played the major role in mobilizing grassroots communities (Miraftab 1997:369). Ruling parties thus resent and tend to view NGOs as “stealing their clientele by providing social assistance outside state defined channels”
For Cape Town, the solution to NGO steering lay in the co-optation of the leadership in the driving organizations into provincial structures thus creating new loyalty demands. The implication was the toning down of poor groups’ demands such that they were forced to fit into the bureaucratic mould in addition to allaying the ruling party’s fears of the mobilisation power of the self-help housing institutions. The SAHPF, instead of viewing the government as protecting its space ‘through exploitation of the opposition’s discourse’, decided to develop amicable (patronage) relations with government and consequently lost much of its autonomy (Baumann et al, undated). However, this was an essential strategy to avoid exclusion. Land ended up being given to the SAHPF not as a ‘citizenship right, but as a favour by the government/ruling party to serve them through an extra-government channel” (Miraftab 1997:368). It is therefore essential to always remember that ‘people have never got anything without having to give something-often political- in return” (ibid:371). Political movements do not regard empowerment of the poor as something to be praised and supported lest they view themselves as comprehensive liberators, rather, their successes are assumed to have been achieved by virtue of the party’s ascendancy (Baumann et al undated:35).

Inspite of its controversial origins, the SAHPF was successful in lobbying the state and ended up being co-opted thus effectively silencing its confrontational stance with regard to accessing land. Its mobilization capacity had triggered uneasiness on the part of the government. The other cooperative, Silver City Housing, was not threatening to build a community and was just bent on solving its shelter problem at a very micro level. This alone was not a challenge to the state’s capacity, hence support in terms of ignoring legal requirements and tools was readily available. Officials, by choosing to ignore the self-help efforts of the Silver City Cooperative, sanctioned these initiatives by default as the poor continued to realize their dreams.

Though the federation appeared on the scene much later in Zimbabwe, its impact has taken very long. The government’s initial response was that such an organization that demanded land as a citizens’ resource was encroaching on government territory and consequently sought to challenge its capacity. This affected ZHPF’s plans, but because the HPZ
reorganised and ‘respected’ the ruling party’s authority, it was readily recognized and won favours from the government with regard to accessing land. The relationship demonstrates a clear tolerance for clientelistic politics. The question is, what explains this variation between the two governments, that in Cape Town-South Africa, the federation wins the governments’ sympathies and yet that same federation - following the very same logic, fails to win ZANU-PF’s heart and yet the ruling parties have somewhat similar ideological leanings and centralizing tendencies? One obvious reason is that both parties were anxious of the federation’s capacity to mobilize the poor but one chose to neutralize through cooptation and the other, through the most different response, did nothing to frustrate the initiative and simply expected them to defer to political steering. The other is that in South Africa, scrutiny of policy implementation is a reality whereas in Zimbabwe, the state has made itself immune to criticism.

Mechanisms in organising for houses by poor house-seekers differ in many respects as do the allocation procedures, but courting official support is one area where global influences play a major role. One technique used by the two federations to influence relevant authorities is to invite foreign visitors who would have gone through the same experience to highly publicized events where local politicians will be invited to officiate thus lending legitimacy to the whole initiative. This has been found to have a profound impact on both the attitudes and perceptions of bureaucratic officials and politicians who would otherwise dismiss invitations by poor homeless people (Baumann et al, undated:36). International presence thus aids in encouraging desirable official support. In many other cases, government officials and politicians have been known to offer substantial support to projects, not just housing, that would have achieved significant political presence.

The successes and failures are also explained by the different organizational capacities of the civic organizations in the two cases. In Cape Town, the civics operate in a more democratic environment that allows free expression such that citizens can organize and act freely to influence policies. Also in the province as a whole, the ruling party was the main opposition party from 1994 until after 2000. It was also the only party concerned with the plight of the poor Africans and though it equally feared the impact of the power
independent civics would have on its political constituency, it equally realized the political
gains to be made out of the entire endeavour at the national level. In Harare, the closed
political space did not allow much room for civic bodies, especially those representing the
poor, to organize and influence the policy process. ZANU-PF has thus continuously
rejected riding the same global bandwagon as everybody else and this the government has
consistently demonstrated in the last six years which have seen political space shrink even
more.

Trust Relations
Mistrust was evidently higher in Cape Town in the financial arrangements, in the actual
delivery of the houses and in ensuring access to state resources. This was evidenced by the
requirement of a social contract to be signed by a trusted intermediary as has been shown
in chapter seven. Like South Africa, Zimbabwe too used and trusted private companies to
deliver housing for the poor. For example, a private company, Brian Colquhoun, Hugh,
O'Donnell and Partners, were the project managers in some of the major housing schemes
implemented by the Municipality of Harare in the eighties. In fact, mistrust of the poor has
always been a fact as evidenced by the automatic deduction of rents from salaries thus
restricting both employment and accommodation related mobility during the white
minority rule era. The democratic era ended such practices.

At the same time, the dominance of the ruling ZANU-PF stifled initiatives and generally
retarded progress. In fact, mistrust created by uncertainty over how the party would react
defined the space in which organizations could organize for housing resources. It was no
wonder then that trade unions, that from 1981, had demonstrated the audacity to challenge
the state, were again the first ones to form housing cooperatives. It is also important to
remember that during this phase, the government encouraged ‘workers’ to organize and
buy into the capitalist ventures around them. Mistrust then was between the ruling party
and any other pockets that might have demonstrated some form of organisational prowess
that posed a challenge to its centralising tendencies. As time went on, and aided by a
restricted political environment and a largely partisan bureaucracy, mistrust against anyone
organizing outside the party channels increased. Successful poverty alleviation
programmes such as those ran by PLAN International in Matebeleleland and other provinces, were all ignored. Problems in housing delivery can thus be attributed to a large extent, to the lack of political will.

There are many layers of lack of trust in the Cape Town housing regime. These are between blacks and whites; between coloureds and whites; between political parties and the public-the poor in particular; between political parties and bureaucrats and between the homeless poor and bureaucrats. The tension caused by the suspicions between and amongst these groups negatively affect the housing delivery process. A major setback is that both Harare and Cape Town have housing implementation processes that emphasise the commodity value of a house. Because of this emphasis, the net effect is the hindrance of housing delivery as such housing is expensive to provide, it requires expansive land and can only accommodate a few people. Also the well off inevitably show resistance to the location of low-income groups near their affluent areas.

White residential suburbs in Cape Town resist black areas sprouting up near their communities and coloureds equally resist this (despite their being a part of the black community). A coloured man vented his and many others’ hatred, ‘We can’t live next to these [African] people. It is just not right’ (Thurman 1999). The problem is that the affirmative action policy lumps everyone else into the black category and this increased the competition for resources as statistically, the Africans, who are the majority population group, will benefit more. This fuels the resentment especially amongst the coloureds who had become accustomed to the coloured preferential area treatment in the province. Fear of loss of this priviledge and a desire to continue to be higher up on the social rank by one notch is thus clear. The irony is that the coloureds quickly claim their blackness only when it is about employment opportunities as they want to benefit from the affirmative action policy that recognizes them as beneficiaries.

Another incident that was loaded with mistrust was the unwillingness by bureaucrats to subsidize poor people whom they defined as not necessarily affording the houses they had built. This would have sent the wrong signals to the poor blacks and perhaps encouraged a
heavy influx of newcomers to the city. Therefore the CTMC refused to show any signs of accepting the self housing initiatives by refusing to provide connection points to the main sewer and water lines for the Victoria Mxenge community. Resistance by both communities and institutions to the location of poor blacks near their affluent areas and closer to town revealed the hard core stereotypes of the ‘African’.

**Liberationist Citizenship**

“Neither nationhood nor citizenship is a thing; both are processes which involve, inventing ‘the People’”⁶ (Howe 1991:128).

**Benefits of ‘Active’ Citizenship**

Through social and political action in the process of organizing for housing resources in which power is demanded and claimed from below, the poor home-seekers in this study have repoliticised citizenship (Shaw and Martin 2000:410). They have bridged the gap in which citizenship is on the one hand, an individually ascribed status and on the other, a collectively asserted practice. When the poor can force inclusion there can be hope for democratic renewal as Friedman (1992 cited in Shaw and Martin:410) noted, “Without democracy there can be no politics and without a genuine inclusive politics, the claims of the disempowered will not be heard.” Because citizenship is in conformity with an ethos of civic virtue, duty and obligation and because rights of citizenship adhere to the identity of citizen, they depend on being recognised as a proper citizen.

Citizenship⁷ rights and obligations provide techniques for the state to intervene in the lives of citizens especially where there are dominant ruling parties and where civil rights are curtailed. The traditional conceptions of citizenship and their categorizations are restrictive in explaining the outcomes of administrative behaviour in post liberation war states as some elements of all three variations tend to straddle all the three distinctions. Liberation struggles/wars were the midwife to a new conception of citizenship that was couched in terms of the liberation ideology and experience. If citizenship entails the protection of the citizen against the arbitrary exercise of state power, the post liberation war states constructed new notions of citizenship that pose a challenge to this ideal as they depended on loyalty and submission to some extent. However, globalisation processes of social
liberalization and democratization have enabled the homeless in South Africa to contest political space and struggle for resources. Poor communities were compelled to explore and devise innovative ways of internal organization and governance-(Baumann *et al*., undated:1).

Citizenship as an identity that is defined by rights and duties and by an awareness of others in a similar position (March and Olsen 1995:56) strengthened the bonds of the federations’ members in both countries. Citizenship denotes sharing rights, duties and responsibilities and citizens have free speech, free association and free access to information but the last element is difficult for home seekers in both countries to access partly because of hesitancy by the bureaucracy in empowering groups that demonstrate initiative and capacity in solving their problems. The state has rights and obligations in relation to its citizens and it has latitude in meeting expectations towards citizens; it makes policy decisions about the level of protection or constraint that it extends to citizens and it provides differentially in terms of categories of citizenship (Walters 1989). There therefore resides in citizenship the possibility of unequal treatment by the state as captured by Walters (1989:160) in his definition:

> Modern citizenship is a set of normative expectations specifying the relationship between the nation state and its individual members which procedurally establish the rights and obligations of members and set of practices by which these expectations are realised.

Barker (1990:3) argues that whilst all citizens are subjects, not all subjects are citizens and the character of the government determines alterations in these positions. Subjects, in the manner that Mamdani (1996) describes them, do not play a role in shaping the government and yet citizens on the other hand engage in politics and influence government. The successes of the SAHPF in gaining government recognition, even though this ended up being perilous for them, proves that citizens can have both the statuses of citizen and subject and this position is very much a situational issue. If poor groups can force the government to act otherwise, then the assumed passivity of subjects falls away as there is evidence that they can reconfigure their status in some instances in the post colony. However, in Zimbabwe, the situation is different in that the poor, irrespective of their
innovative capabilities, constantly need to defer to political authorities to enjoy their full rights and are thus kept largely in the position of subjects.

Generally, in the struggle for resources and the search for social justice, house seekers become ‘active’ citizens who demand new rights and articulate new agenda for citizenship (Holston 1998:39). This results in what Wilson and Lowery (2003:48-50) describe as the ‘building of community, voice, connection and power through their organisation ... the building of deep democracy.” In deep democracy, citizenship is conferred by personal engagement and not just through the usual expressions of choice through elections, but through exercising the democratic arts of participation. The process is based on public conversation, hinges on tolerance, and is thus a product of social learning. Deep democracy ‘culminates in the enfranchisement of the self in daily life, transforming one’s self identity into one of inclusion in, and responsibility for, an expanding circle of community.” (ibid:50). The actions of people in the distinct housing communities studied here must be viewed as a legitimate expression of active citizenship as well as the essence of democracy itself (Shaw and Martin 2004:410).

Lalloo (1998:2) criticizes South Africa’s housing policy for perpetuating the unequal forms of citizenship inherited from the apartheid era. Its reproduction through a people oriented discourse legitimizes this continuity. However, he acknowledges that it is important to stress that many other factors can be blamed for this amongst them the bad timing of the negotiations; the manipulation by the apartheid state and the failure to connect housing policy with critical issues of citizenship, property and space.

Holston (1998:39) points out that urban spaces and the experiences of those who live in them ‘become both the context and the substance of emergent forms of citizenship’. He defines this as ‘insurgent citizenship’ that depicts claims for inclusion and recognition that challenge the state’s traditional position as the only legitimate source of citizenship rights, meanings and practices. The locus of this insurgency is as Holston (1998) argues, in organized grassroots mobilization that are driven by experience and everyday practices that radically empower, parody, derail or subvert state agendas signifying the tensions inherent
in clamouring for citizenship. The alternative planning forms of urban housing embarked on by the poor question the whole notion of national governments’ capacity to organize public spaces as containing pre-defined identities. These new ‘insurgent settlements’ introduced for Cape Town, racial and radical new identities that threatened the very essence of what Afrikaners had sought to preserve for generations. In Zimbabwe, mutant forms of citizenship were a result of the hegemonic project of the ruling party.

The regimes in this study can be viewed as having a 'liberationist conception of citizenship'. This refers to the selective nature of resource allocation that constructs citizenship by party affiliation- that is, one becomes more of a citizen when they toe the party line. Citizenship in liberation war societies is thus both part and parcel of the struggle as it was a claim for rights. And through (liberation) political citizenship, space was created for the poor to claim social citizenship by fighting for inclusion into the urban space.

**Conclusion**

The comparison in this chapter has illuminated the similarities and differences in the two housing regimes as well as in the operational mechanisms of the ‘liberation culture’. The convergences and divergences indicate that different factors work differently and follow varying processes in dissimilar environments to produce similar outcomes- particularistic behaviour in resource allocation that has implications for the mobilization of party support. Though there are many similarities, it is important to highlight that the ‘liberation culture’ functions in different modes in the two regimes. For South Africa, it functions according to a revolutionary logic as evidenced by the strategies and tactics of the different actors, and for Zimbabwe, the hegemonic consolidation mode is prevalent. This revelation implies that South Africa, being the new comer to majority rule, will to some extent, follow the Zimbabwean trajectory.

However, we have to exercise caution in interpreting the power demonstrated by the poor in this study. Though they may have organized successfully, Chambers (cited in Craig et al 2000:331) warned on being realistic since the poor can be taught to analyse their situation
but this does not guarantee that they will be recognized just because they can generate new insights on the socio-economic fabric of their communities. Zimbabwe has simply turned them into part of the party agenda.

Hoggett and Miller (2000:358-359) also warn against perceiving groups as the answer to development problems. This, they argue, is because groups often tend respond to uncertainty by generating emotional cultures one of which is the Messianic deliverer and this can send wrong signals to parties with hegemonic tendencies. On the other side, community development members tend to develop deep reservations about the issues they organize around and they anticipate the reactions of those in authority to their problems. The collective expressions of their angst, struggles and ambitions are crucial for them to establish their sense of self. Hence being a collective a ides in the creation of new sentiments that are likely to be sustainable and this positions them as a crucial vehicle for participatory development.

Endnotes

1 Raboroko Pule, a member of the Kanana Residents Committee, used his own initiative to allocate idle land he identified near the township of Sebokeng in Gauteng. His explanation was simple, “You just can’t wait for something. You have to do something. Land in South Africa is not a problem. The problem is getting that land to the people.” See “Homeless but not Helpless”, People and the Planet, vol.5 no.2, 1996, p3

2 Citizenship is a strategic concept that is central in the analysis of identity, participation, empowerment, human rights and public interest. Its analytic value, is further enhanced by Will Kymlicka's argument that “most liberal theorist have recognized that citizenship is not just a legal status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, but also an identity, an expression of one's membership in a political community”. See Kymlicka Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

3 The three layers of administractive governmental units are: the central government and a central legislature; a provincial government for each of the 9 provinces and a provincial legislature and a local government level.

4 Even though administration is decentralised, beyond this veil there is a party with centralising tendencies, the ANC.

5 Efforts to locate this housing policy document were futile even though bureaucrats insisted that it existed and even though, they were yet to see it in 2000 when the interviews for this study were conducted!


7 Many studies distinguish amongst three traditional conceptions of citizenship; liberal, libertarian and republican (as originally defined by Miller). The liberal conception views citizenship as asset of rights that must be enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question and these Marshall classified as civil rights, political rights and social rights. Everyone is to enjoy entitlements which stand apart from and to some extent conflict with the outcomes of a market economy driven by considerations of efficiency. Here the equalising tendencies of citizenship are stressed even though there are limits. Rights are inherent in the individual and are guaranteed with minimal obligations to the community (Ndewa 1997). The libertarian conception (which is not discussed here) views the citizen as a rational consumer who through contract and choice can gain access to a range of public goods. It hinges on the fact that citizenship at its core concerns
common rights and goods enjoyed in common. The republican conception sees the citizen as someone who plays an active role in shaping his society through public discussion. Rights are thus acquired through civic practice that upholds obligations to the community. It adds to the liberal conception of citizenship as a set of rights, that a citizen must be one who thinks and behaves in a certain way by identifying with the political community to which he belongs and is committed to promoting its common good through active participation in its political life. See Ndegwa, S. (1997) “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Tradition Moments in Kenyan Politics”, *The American Political Science Review*, vol.91 no.3, September, pp.599-616. Homogeneity is assumed and it becomes a possible goal in this conception and non-participation has exclusionary repercussions. Here there is more tolerance or diversity as citizens simply have to justify the positions they take on issues without giving up their other identities.

Wilson and Lowery (2003) point out a number of concepts that frame deep democracy at the applied level. These are social capital, non-violent dialogue, listening, negotiation, conflict resolution, community participation, appreciative inquiry, communitarian thought and it also borrows from the literature on learning organisations. Appadurai (cited in Wilson and Lowery 2003) has used the term to refer to the ‘efforts to reconstitute citizenship’ and he outlines three ways of doing so; the first is when the poor take the initiative and the responsibility to direct and manage their own development through active dialogue, a transparent and inclusionary process; the second way is when the poor directly engage the key and relevant state authorities and lastly, when the poor recognize the value in solidarity and become horizontally networked. See Wilson, P.A. and Lowery, C. (2003) “Building Deep Democracy”, *Planning Forum*, p.51.

There are many ways of feeling collective sentiments and not all are positive. For instance, racism is an organised constellation of feelings that include fear, hatred and contempt. See Hoggett, P. and Miller, C. (2000) “Working With Emotions in Community Organisations”, *Community Development Journal*, vol.35 no.2.
Chapter 10

Conclusion: Revisiting the “Liberation culture”

Introduction
This study has, through a historical analytic approach, explored the politics of housing delivery dynamics in the post liberation war countries. The focus of this comparative study has been both theoretical and empirical in the attempts to analyse the impact of the “liberation culture” on housing delivery in the post liberation cities of Harare in Zimbabwe and Cape Town in South Africa. The aim of this concluding chapter is firstly to summarise the major findings, and secondly, to revisit some of the significant theoretical and empirical findings and how they relate to the issues raised in the second chapter as well as in the rest of the study.

This thesis has also attempted to isolate and demonstrate the importance of capturing the variation in neo-patrimonial bureaucratic cultures through the development and application of the “liberation culture” theory in explaining housing distribution in post liberation war bureaucracies. The study was based on several assumptions, amongst them that the values and norms harboured by post liberation war bureaucracies, the “liberation culture”, orient service delivery in favour of party loyalists resulting in the creation of exclusionary distributional systems that discriminate on the basis of political criteria. Another assumption was that the exclusivist orientation of the “liberation culture” in housing resource allocation encouraged the formation of new political identities thereby constructing a new conception of citizenship. In addition to the four main causal factors, ‘liberation logistics’, state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation, the “liberation culture”’s” intensity is influenced by the effect of the strength of other political and environmental forces such as the country’s historical trajectory, liberation struggle experiences and the general administrative milieu. As a result, varying intensities of the “liberation culture” produce similar outcomes through different processes and varying combinations of the causal factors.

238
Through a comparative approach, I tested this theory empirically through an investigation of housing delivery to low-income groups in the CMTC in Cape Town, South Africa, and Harare Municipality in Harare, Zimbabwe. Through comparing and contrasting housing delivery to these housing cooperatives, it became possible to tease out the differences in the intensities of the ‘liberation culture’ as well as identify the variations in the mechanisms utilised to access housing resources by the poor in the different regimes. The ‘liberation culture’ was identified as manifesting itself in the following ways:

(a) the open circumvention of laid down criteria for allocative decisions in favour of party loyalists,
(b) the interpretation of universal legal codes in a particularistic manner;
(c) when individuals organise as groups to access services under party guidance or party steering and
(d) when there is evidence of a willingness to be compliant to party dictates.

The major findings confirmed these manifestations in both cases even though there were different processes and mechanism that had outcomes qualifying to be regarded as instances of the same thing (Ragin 1987).

Both cases show the particularistic interpretation of legal codes in allocating housing resources to exclusive groups. In South Africa, the SAHPF was prioritised in first, receiving funding (10 million rands) for supporting the housing efforts, secondly, in the awarding of state subsidies directly to the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme as well as to the Utshani fund or the SAHPF, and thirdly in getting 20 percent of any land reserved for them in all low-income housing schemes. In Zimbabwe, the network of beneficiaries of this party reward is broader. To begin with, the HPZ gets frequent donations of land for developing their housing packages which they then sell to low-income groups. Secondly, the war veterans, under the War Veteran Association, have 20 percent of land distribution schemes reserved for them. Thirdly, many of the cooperatives outside the ZHPF were prioritised in housing land allocations even if they did not meet the criteria as illustrated in chapter five. Even those that were in the federation can become prioritised too if they align themselves to the party.
To demonstrate the open circumvention of laid down criteria for allocative decisions in favour of party loyalists in South Africa, Minister Joe Slovo demonstrated the power of the socialist ideology by sanctioning that Kanana housing cooperative be granted tenure even though the group had settled itself illegally. A new law, passed by the ANC led government, was applied retrospectively to the group that had subsequently joined the federation to legitimise its position as qualifying for housing resources under its auspices. Likewise, the president of Zimbabwe allocated housing land to Kugarika Kushinga according to his fancy without cognisance of town development plans.

In both cases, access to housing resources is acquired through groups deliberately organising to appoint patrons with enough political clout to realise the group’s goals. The SAHPF appointed the second minister of housing in the ANC government, Sankie Mthembi Mahanyele as its patron. Party penetration of the society is evidenced by the fact that many of the community based organisations are led by appointed ANC cadres and this can be attributed to the fact that many still belong to the generation that participated in the struggle and they are very much aware of the tasks confronting the party and the obstacles it faces. Both Patricia Matolongwe and Mandisa Dhlangwa belong to the ANC women’s league. In Zimbabwe, the extensive power of party penetration is revealed in that the HPZ, a technical NGO, was only able to make gigantic strides in delivery housing through the deliberate cultivation of patronage links with the ruling party’s land issuing authorities in the country. Other cooperatives that had chosen the independent route quickly realised their errors in that they were denied access and humiliated by having to endure long waiting periods. Access was determined by open alignment with the ruling party in Zimbabwe and for South Africa, by conniving and strategising clandestinely to beat the system. The ANC was looked up to as the last resort or the highest court of appeal by the homeless poor. Though these are different processes, the important issue is that priority was determined by party intervention.

The Janus faced attitudes of Mavambo cooperative in Harare show a willingness to be compliant to party dictates and yet the members are equally aware of the patron-client trap they are in. Members do talk of embracing and developing a healthy democratic political
culture when they identify with the opposition, but at the same time they are realistic enough to know that only open alignment with ZANU-PF opens access to resources. As for cooperatives in Cape Town, the reality of the situation requires tacit knowledge that unfortunately mostly resides in the ANC cadres across civic groups in the political arena. The cadres facilitate access under the ANC banner which underscores the importance of the party for the poor home seekers.

Finally, the regimes in this study were viewed as having a liberationist conception of citizenship. This refers to the selective nature of resource allocation that constructed citizenship by party affiliation. Demonstrating party loyalty became essential in organising to access state resources even though the processes differed between the home-seekers in the two countries.

**Impact of the Findings on Studying Service Delivery**

Without being blinded by pessimism, the general findings indicate that since the advent of majority rule, these countries have utilised ad-hoc and reactive resource allocation models that have mobilisation implications as they distribute housing resources in favour of party loyalists. Whereas Africans had largely been a homogenous group to the colonial housing officials, the ‘poor’ Africans have evolved as a homogenous group in the new dispensation. Deferece to political officials has been complicated by the extant deference to bureaucrats carried over from the colonial era. Political affiliation has supplanted ethnic criterion in terms of organizing for housing resources. Reasons of expediency can possibly lead to the advantages of homogenizing behaviour and yet the underlying tensions might be radically different. The literature on neo-patrimonialism has dwelt on the craftiness of politicians and the elite and largely painted the ‘clients’ as passive recipients of resources. The power of these subjects in orienting the behaviour of the leadership is thus ignored. Collective action and the organisation mechanism these groups rely on has been demonstrated as having a significant impact in this regard implying that the same energy can be channelled to both the consolidation of democracy (*in South Africa*) and re-democratisation (*in Zimbabwe*) of these countries.
This study has also examined the relationship between the empirical findings and the
liberation culture and at a theoretical level, how the findings relate to the neo-patrimonial
type. Insights into the relationship between the party and the citizens in house seeking
communities emphasize the differences and how these can be further used to critique the
neo-patrimonial theory. Collective action models do appear to challenge many of the tenets
of the neo-patrimonial theory and public goods that are organized for collectively but that
are ultimately consumed at the individual level, tend to stress the theory as they demand
more rigorous and intense explanations that call for new theories to capture the variances.
They also do not take into account the power groups have even though the groups may
derer to party authority to some extent in the end. Again, at some stage in the service
seeking process, the neo-patrimonial theory falls short of recognizing the role of the party.
It also fails to point out the implications of the impact of re-education on the regeneration
of professional and ethical values in the bureaucracies. The ‘liberation culture’ theory can
thus make a significant contribution to the analysis of resource allocation models in post
liberation war countries even though the universe of such countries is small. That is, it
points out the source of the values and norms and this gives it a vantage point for analysing
organizational cultures.

A question that emerges from this study is: Is the party patrimonialised? The question can
be answered through a critical analysis of the formal party rules and norms versus the
housing delivery institutions’ rules and norms as has been done in chapters four and seven.
But when we ask: Is Zimbabwe a party state? These two cases and the ‘liberation culture’
shed some light on how we can begin to make the distinction between personal rule and
party rule. Party rule broadens the network of beneficiaries even though it is still an
exclusionary system whereas personal rule centres everything around the president.
Zimbabwe is closer to this model even though the party gets the credit and beneficiaries
extend gratitude to both the party and the president. What is then the place of the political
party? As in much of Southern Africa, the party tends to reign supreme, but with the new
winds of change blowing, contestation is increasingly emanating within the dominant
parties as has happened to some extent in, Zimbabwe (though nascent) and in the ANC
alliance.
An interesting observation is that the current political leadership in both countries may have led in the struggle and set the pace for transformation, but political savvy and maturity appears to reside more and more in the trade unions which might offer a countervailing influence to the “liberation culture”. This also points to the need for an effective opposition to keep the dominant party in check. As illustrated in the study, real vibrant democracy took place in Cape Town where political contestation was heavy. This however does not imply ignoring the intrusion of formal institutions as they are the crucibles in which the “liberation culture” manifests itself.

The incorporation of contending forces by dominant parties does not augur well for democracy and both the ANC and ZANU-PF are culprits. Co-optative measures have become inextricably linked to strategies of containment that minimize opposition through a form of social management (Reed 1979). Potentially antagonistic forces are thus channelled into a system of centralized management. And becoming part of the system implies being part of the regulating system hence any excessive disruptive patterns are prevented. Liberation movements have been instrumental in this kind of domination and there is a need to do further research related to a reconstruction of colonial conquest and resistance in order to inform on how to break these patterns of social dominance.

The “liberation culture” introduces a set of dominant actors, the leaders of the struggle, who also have other identities. In addition to their usual official and political roles, they also are keenly aware of the need to keep the spirit of the struggle alive as this is their main basis for legitimacy. Both their legitimacy and integrity are viewed as being intertwined with a skewed conceptualization of the whole notion of liberation and transformation and this representation of the people conceals the hegemonic pursuits which keep the distance between the leaders and the led (ibid). Documented failures in terms of good governance and equitable, effective and efficient service delivery, all work against them hence tight control and centralized decision making provides an opportunity for clinging onto power.

This study also casts doubts on the models Africa has chosen to achieve representative bureaucracies. Does the affirmative action model -Africanisation- provide an adequate
answer? Is pigmentational representivity worth the sacrifice of professionalism? Though this might have been essential to legitimize the democratic institutions, it is clear that a new model that emphasizes merit ought to replace the now obsolete Africanisation model. Though Zimbabwe’s Africanisation was not as disastrous as in many other countries due to a reliable pool of relatively highly educated people, the political appointments stifled initiative and innovative capabilities have to be generated. South Africa has a bigger hurdle as it needs to generally develop the requisite manpower that is balanced across the races and this takes time. Even though, the exercise can be thwarted by the previous regime’s officers who can deliberately withhold important information to frustrate change. Astute people with the right professional ethos and values are therefore essential for any tremendous change to occur and emphasis should be on an equity oriented approach. It is therefore the role of further research to point out these alternatives.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Liberation culture” Theory**

Does the ‘liberation culture” theory contribute to an adequate explanation of housing distribution? Firstly, given that it has its own set of values and norms that are imbedded in distinct institutions, and transmitted by specific value carriers, the theory adds value in explaining the process by which different bureaucracies acquire certain characteristics and how these relate to other sub-cultures. Prospects for its professionalisation are also implied in all these processes. Its sustenance beyond a generation might be likely, but the real challenge is to analyse what will replace it as particularism can easily become ingrained in the mind of the public and can be nurtured differently. The “liberation culture’s” strength lies in its ability to explain housing distribution that occurs under the activist or support approach that targets the majority of the citizens in these post liberation war countries who are in the low-income bracket. The approach draws on high publicity stunts that attract the political leadership, the bureaucrats and the public’s attention. The setback is that whilst it can explain delivery to collectives, it requires a more tedious approach in the attempt to apply it to the explanation of individual beneficiaries who get government loans to buy houses on the market and as well as those singled out as qualifying for housing welfare.
On whether the liberation culture has got universal, relative, specific or comparative power, the answer is that all theories attempting to explain organisational culture in post colonial states emphasize different issues. For instance, the economy of affection stresses the impact of familiarity that is bred through ethnical ties and prebendalism’s emphasis is on the abuse of resources for personal gain. The “liberation culture” emphasises the historical significance of the specificities of exile liberation war experiences. The complex mixture of those that we call neo-patrimonialism therefore risk becoming a melting pot of the specifics that analysts do not bother to tease out and yet puzzles to the African anti-developmental spectre may often lie within these non nuanced distinctions. This implies a further need for research to capture the variations that often tend to present themselves as obvious in African bureaucracies.

What then are the strengths and weaknesses of the “liberation culture” theory? Much of the relevance of the findings has to do with the democratization process in post liberation war transitioning societies. That the party is the main vehicle for the enculturation of the “liberation culture” creates room for professionalizing the culture as new generations will eventually take over and neutralise the loyalty demands of the liberation war since many would not have had the exile experience. In this sense then, there are prospects for redemocratisation of the party. The implication being that even one dominant party states stand a better chance of moving closer to democratic forms of governance than the many ‘neo-patrimonial’ African states that experience personal rule. In so far as the theory is party based, it is thus useful for providing insights into democratic theory on the ways in which civic groups manouvre and trigger room for active participation by ordinary citizens in the political space. And contrary to the neo-patrimonial strong man arguments, there are clear prospects for democracy building as the poor increasingly demonstrate capacity to manouvre for inclusion.

Concluding this discussion requires an answer to the question: What are the methodological implications of using this framework? To begin with, the analytical framework has a historical basis and contributes to explaining contemporary resource allocation processes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The conceptual clarification
made it possible to understand the nature of service delivery and the role of agency in the struggle for resource allocation in post liberation war regimes. Above all, it allowed the results to generate insights of general application and flexibility was maintained throughout the study as the concepts became amenable to modification when new and more knowledge came up (Ragin 2000:31). The study showed the advantages of focusing on unique historical circumstances to enrich grand theories as well as expose their omissions which are not necessarily deliberate. Even though, it is essential to explore whether the “liberation culture” theory can be validated in countries that experienced relatively peaceful liberation struggles. And this is a task for another research project.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1

List of Interviewees in Cape Town

Patricia Matolengwe  South Africa’s Homeless People’s Federation - National Convener, Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme- Initiator
Rose Maso  Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme
Tholiswa Mbeki  Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme
Nokhangelani Roji  Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme
Cameron Dugmore  ANC Provincial Spokesperson on Housing
Councillor Sidina  Provincial Regional Executive Member of the ANC, Councillor for Gugulethu, former
Bheki Nkonyane  ANC Parliamentary Housing Committee
Charles Croeser  CTMC Housing Department - Project Manager
Paul le Roax  CTMC Housing Department - Manager of New Housing, ISLP
Jens Khun  CTMC Housing Department – Research Manager
Belinda Fortune  Provincial Housing Department-
Moven Bregman  Cape Town Housing Company-Chief Executive Officer
Michael Hoffman  People’s Dialogue -Director
Warren Smit  Development Action Group-
Mandisa Dlanjwa  Silver City Housing Project Coordinator, Phakamani Women’s Community Development Project Group Member
Thembile Bulana  Silver City Housing Project Management Team Member
Zanoxolo Lupuzi  Silver City Housing Project Management Team Member
Appendix 2

**Harare Interviewees**

- **Mr. Machenjedze** Harare Municipality- Cooperatives Department
- **Mr. Mutambanenyoka** Harare Municipality- Cooperatives Department
- **Mr. Sphuma** Harare Municipality- Cooperatives Department
- **Machipisa Funny** District Administrator, Harare City Council
- **Barbara Kohlo** Director, Housing People of Zimbabwe
- **Mugove Hamadziripi** Director, Housing People of Zimbabwe
- **Betsheba Biti** Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation
- **Godwin Matiyenga** Zororo Housing Cooperative Member
- **Mai Mashamba** Treasurer of Mavambo
- **Mai Chisakarira** Founding member of Mavambo
- **Mai Khumalo** Founding member of Mavambo
- **Mai Manjeni** Founding member of Mavambo
- **Mai Chakaza** Founding member of Mavambo
- **Mai Bwanali** Founding member of Mavambo
- **Viola Chizengwe** Member of Mavamvo
- **Davious Muvindi** National Coordinator of ZIHPF, Chairperson of Ruzivo Housing Saving Scheme, Hatcliffe Extension
- **Sekai Chiremba** National Coordinator of ZIHPF, Nhamo Yapera Housing Scheme
Appendix 3

Types of Subsidies

Project linked subsidies
The project-linked subsidy is obtained in order to implement a whole project. It provides for individual ownership of what is termed by the government ‘housing opportunities’. As with all subsidies, the application and approval is currently carried out by the PHDB. A significant number of documents must accompany the application and in addition, the department sets out more criteria for assessing the viability of the project.

Individual subsidies
These give individual access to a housing subsidy to acquire ownership or upgrade an existing property that is not the product of a PHDB subsidy. It also allows one to purchase a serviced site and construct own top structure. It can be used in two ways: on a non-credit linked basis-where only the subsidy is used, or on a credit-linked basis, where a formal home loan is obtained to purchase a property.

Institutional subsidies
These are obtained by an institution as opposed to an individual. The subsidy is available to institutions such as housing associations or cooperatives that have to be established in accordance with legislation such as the Companies Act, Share Blocks Control Act or Co-operatives Act. Unlike the other subsidies, the amount does not work on a sliding scale, and the full R16 000 applies. The subsidy guidelines allow for sale of the individual unit to the tenant after a holding time by the institution of four years.

Consolidation subsidies
These are available to individuals who have received housing assistance either directly from the state or through the IDT in the form of a serviced site under the previous government. The subsidy provides up to 8 000 rands to households with incomes of R1 500 or less for the provision or upgrade of a top structure. It can be acquired through the project linked or individual route.

Appendix 4

24 Point Plan to Secure (Invade) Land

Land to be identified (plus at least one alternative)
Negotiations, security, legal, construction, uTshani teams to be set up
Land owner to be identified
Negotiations for land to be started
Report back meeting on negotiations
Complete list of families to secure land by purchase or occupation to be compiled
R100 contribution for expenses to be incurred to be deposited in HSL
Layout completed, sites allocated
Identity documents issued
House modelling and costing completed
Land registry compiled
Subsidy applications completed
Local officials invited to negotiate with HSL
uTshani Loans completed
Video teams ready
Materials purchased
uTshani loans released
Final preparatory meeting minutes. Report back on negotiations and development of systems
Media, officials and ministries informed
Transport ready
uTshani loans used to purchase building materials
Subsidy applications submitted
Agreement to purchase or secure land finalised. In case of negotiations failure or deadlock, planned occupation proceeds
House construction starts

Appendix 5

Project Assessment criteria

Inclusiveness of social compact-the degree to which all relevant stakeholders are included in the compact underlying the project proposal and the significance and impact of the exclusion of any stakeholders

Housing needs-the extent to which the project satisfies the housing needs of an identified target market and the relative urgency of such needs

Location-extent to which location of the project facilitates access to employment opportunities, infrastructural services and transport

Holistic development-the degree to which the provides for the variety of community needs in a balanced and integrated manner

Community Self management-extent to which project can generate knowledge for its sustenance

Sustainability-the degree to which the project promotes the sustained physical and social development and vitality of the community

Employment potential-extent to which project creates employment

Norms and standards on health and safety of authorities and acceptability to client community

Planning and design-extent to which this will contribute to a wholesome living environment that will instill pride and a sense of belonging amongst prospective residents

Affordability-extent to which new community can afford residential property costs

Compatibility and environmental impact-on the surrounding development

Technical feasibility-effectiveness of construction methods in relation to geo-technical and topographical characteristics of project site

Replicability-extent to which methods are replicable and contributing to a sustainable housing delivery process

Accountability and gearing of public resources-extent to which project utilizes state financial support effectively and efficiently by providing value for money

Local authority capacity-the capacity of the relevant local authority to deliver and perform effectively and productively
Socio-economic multiplier effects-project's contribution to optimising the longer term social and economic benefits of the project to the target community

Choice-extent to which a project affords beneficiaries a choice in satisfying their housing needs

Stakeholders-degree to which these support the project and extent to which they have agreed to cooperate in its implementation

Value for money-to be received by beneficiaries in terms of the pricing of products to be offered

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