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CHANGING NARRATIVES?

An Analysis of the Effects of the European Debt Crisis on the European Integration Narratives of the SPD and the CDU/CSU

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Abstract

With this thesis I aim to investigate the effects of the European debt crisis on the European Integration narratives of political parties. Taking an actor centred view on European integration, a qualitative analysis of the narratives in election manifestos from 2005, 2009 and 2013 for the German political parties the SPD and the CDU/CSU is conducted. The analysis is guided and structured by a typology made up of three dimensions: legitimation, identity and projection. The typology draws on multiple theories; theories on political narratives; theories explaining European integration both in terms of interests and norms; theories on identity formation and the construction of otherings.

The analysis shows that a few changes do appear as a likely result of the European debt crisis. The CDU/CSU shifts their cognitive narrative from one expressing the usefulness of European integration for Germany, to one where Germany is narrated as useful to European integration. This narrative also appears to express some patriotic sentiment. Coupled with an identity narrative with an increased focus on national identity, this could indicate a loss of enthusiasm for European integration.

The SPD’s projective narrative changes from one expressing support for a supranational European Union, to one expressing support for a federal European Union, likely as a response to some of the perceived weaknesses exposed in the structure of the European Union by the debt crisis, although it may also be argued that this shift is a continuation of previous narratives. In addition, the SPD’s narrative becomes less supportive of EU enlargement.

The analysis also exposes a few significant changes that cannot be attributed to the European debt crisis, indicating a further need for research into factors influencing narrative and policy change on European integration.

Beyond these few party specific and rather isolated changes, the results of the analysis indicate that the narratives on European integration are fairly resilient to change in terms of overall content and position. The most significant change occurring in the narratives of both political parties is the expansion and clarification of arguments, likely in order to meet increased interest in, and debate about, European integration in the electorate. As such, the results of this thesis also seem to offer support for the theory suggesting a move from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus in European electorates.
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Part 1. Framework

1 Introduction – European Integration, the European Debt Crisis and Political Parties

The purpose of the following work is to investigate the effects of the European debt crisis on the European integration narratives of national political parties, by analysing the election manifestos of the two major German political parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD over a suitable time period. However, before embarking on the research task at hand the following introduction will explain why this question is worthy of exploration, provide context in terms of the developments of European integration, the European debt crisis and the role of national political parties, point to adjoining and relevant theory and research, outline important demarcations in the scope of the thesis, and also provide a guide for the further reading and understanding of this thesis.

“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create de facto solidarity”

The Schuman Declaration 1950 (europa.eu)

Defining and explaining the progress of European integration is not an easy task, the reason for which is perhaps most aptly stated through the above quote from the Schuman plan. European integration has not occurred along a linear path towards a preordained and conscious goal, but rather been the result of multiple negotiations, adjustments, compromises and agreements.

Since the establishment of the predecessor of the European Union, the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, its organisation and competencies have continually changed. From being an organisation of limited scope and only six members, it has developed into an economic and political union with 28 member states, its competencies reaching far into what has previously been seen as the sole domain of nation states.
The process of European integration has been brought forward through a series of Treaties agreed upon by national governments, whereby authority has been transferred from the national to the European level, institutions have been created, and a legal framework codified. Scholars in the field of political science have long been concerned with answering the question of why and how this could happen, and several theories have been presented.

Whilst theories in the functionalist camp view European integration as a process mainly occurring as a result of an eventually predetermined process of interest maximation and spill over, where national governments and political parties are regarded as mere bystanders whose only really consequential contribution was to set the ball in motion at the initial stage of integration, actor centred approaches grant national political parties a central role in the development of European integration (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012). The process of European integration is seen as having primarily been brought forward as a result of national political elites making decisions (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012).

As Best, Lengyel et al. (2012) points out, different decisions have been possible in the past, and had these decisions been made differently it may have led to different outcomes. How political parties position themselves towards European integration matters to what kind of European integration appears on the world stage. Again, in the words of Best, Lengyel et al. (2012), “We pursue an elite-centred approach because the contractual nature of European unification as a sequel and system of treaties puts elites in a pivotal role. They are consignors, architects, and contractors involved in the metaphorical building of the European ‘Tower of Babylon’” (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012, 4).

National political parties are important to the process of European integration because of a combination of their pivotal role in national democracies as office holders in national governments and parliaments, but also because of the structure and make-up of the European Union (and its predecessors the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community) itself. The European Union is a system of multi-level governance in which member states are perceived as equal in that they have had to agree on developments. Although more majoritarian principles have recently been introduced to the system of European governance, and although the establishment of an European Parliament has transferred more authority over the process of European integration from the national to the European level, this does not annul the importance of the member states as driving forces behind European integration (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012).
The premise for this argument is the role political parties’ play in governing the democratic states that make up the European Union; political parties make up both the membership of national parliaments and of national governments.

National governments clearly have a greater role in European integration than do national parliaments (Bilancia 2009), although this dynamic does vary somewhat between member states resulting from different rules of conduct and operating methods as well as rulings from constitutional courts in the members states granting national parliaments greater influence over national governments in matters of European integration. In addition, several EU treaties have sought to expand the involvement of national parliaments further, in order to counter accusations relating to the democratic deficit; the Treaty of Amsterdam required that consultation documents be forwarded to national parliaments before a final decision in the European Council; the Treaty of Lisbon introduced an early warning system. In any case, given a parliamentary system, the political parties in government are likely to have a majority of the seats in parliament (or at least a near majority with the support of one or more smaller parties), giving ruling (government) parties access to the relatively limited power distributed to national parliaments.

National governments also play a much more direct role in European integration. Amongst their most important roles are contributing to the drafting of Treaties, appointing members to the European Commission, and making up the various configurations of the European Council.

1.1 Party Positioning on European Integration

Given that political parties do play a substantial role in the development of European integration, how and why their opinions and views regarding questions of European

1 The principle of subsidiarity, established in the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU), protects the right of member states to govern, and establishes that where the European Union does not have exclusive authority it can only act given that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be fully achieved by a lower level of governance (Chateu 2016). If national parliaments believe a proposal by the European Commission to be in breach of the principle of subsidiarity they may object by submitting a reasoned opinion to the commission. A vote in the commission will determine whether the proposal ought to be reviewed (1/3 of the votes) or sent to the European Parliament (2/4 of the votes) (euabc.com/word/307).
integration are formed, and change, become even more important in terms of understanding the road ahead for the European project.

Much attention has been awarded to the dichotomy of pro/anti integration, attempting to explain attitudes towards European integration through a wide array of variables, including position on the left/right axis (ideology), national interests, interest maximisation, positioning according to perceived electoral benefit and whether or not a political party is one that expects to hold political office (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002). As a result, we know quite a lot about party positioning on European integration, and the variables influencing it.

For the purpose of this thesis, these theories will be explained in a grouping of four: in terms of national interests, cleavage theory and ideology, vote maximisation, and in terms of whether a political party is in government/ opposition or more precisely, on whether or not they are a political party that may expect to hold office or whether it is one that is (systematically) excluded from power.

At the beginning of European integration, functionalist theories stood at the centre of attempts to explain how and why the process took place. Functionalist theories must be viewed in light of the era in which they first appeared. After decades of war and conflict amongst the nation states of (Western) Europe, the prospect of European integration presented itself as a hope of creating a new world order where the nationalist tendencies of nation states could no longer result in bloody conflict over territory and domination. Even political scientists appeared to be placing a great deal of hope in the emergence of a new type of political polity in which the interests of nations, and the dynamic of nation states acting in response to an ideology of national self-righteousness, could be replaced by a diverse polity acting in the interests of people(s), peace and welfare (Hoffman 1966).

The integration process itself was seen as an effect of snowballing. National governments together set in motion a process that thereafter took on a life of its own; when integration had occurred in one area, it became a self-propagating exercise where the existence of interdependence, strong incentives and institutions that acted without reference to national governments resulted in what was coined the spill over effect (Moravcsik 2005).

1.1.1 National interests
Initially the response to functionalist theories on European integration came from what has been termed the intergovernmentalist camp, placing greater emphasis on the role of national governments. Hoffman (1966), after close examination of the state and process of European
integration, found that although authority and power had indeed been handed over from the national to the European level, this was not a result of spill over, and certainly did not lead to the demise of the nation state. On the contrary, he concluded that the nation state was alive and well in Europe, and that in the process of European integration they acted in accordance with their self-interests, handing over authority in areas from which there was gain to be made, remaining firmly in charge of what he terms “high politics” (Hoffman 1966).

In this theoretical school, nation states engaging in European integration are doing so because it is perceived to be in their self-interests, and the manner by which they chose to integrate also result from a careful calculation of national self-interest. Thus, it is placed in much the same camp as other questions relating to national positioning within the global world order with the aim of maximising one’s influence on the global arena, and creating a system under which the respective nation state would gain the greatest (often economic) benefit for themselves. The question of European integration is thus placed outside the national political agenda where competing opinions vie for attention and support in the electorate.

Given that the European Union is an organisation made up of a diverse set of member states that have different histories, cultures, languages, economic and social conditions, identities and institutions, several theoretical branches view national interests and thereby national context, and the interplay between these, as the most important factor in explaining European integration (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002).

Discourse theorists maintain that embedded national identities shape views on European integration; in the realist camp it is theorised that how European integration contributes to the distribution of power on the global arena influences positions on integration; in liberal institutionalism economic national interests rather than national power on the global scene is seen as the mover of actors in shaping European integration (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002, 586).

As an interesting side note, underlining the prevalence of national interests as explanatory factor for action and change in the political sciences, Marx also saw interests as the true mover of civil society and of man, although for him interests where equated with class:

“It is, therefore, natural necessity, it is the essential qualities of man, however alienated the form in which they appear, it is interest, which hold together the members of civil society, whose real bond is constituted by civil and not by political life” (Zuckerman 1982, 138).

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1.1.2 Cleavage Theory and Ideology

Cleavage theory claims that the position of political parties in democratic, western, nation states are based on “widespread and persistent social and economic divisions” (Zuckerman 1982, 131) with the mediating factor of ideology that “provoke and express” these divisions (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002, 586). These cleavage-based ideologies are explained as worldviews through which political parties interpret political issues and social problems, and also as longstanding commitments that constrain party positioning on both old and new issues within the political system (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002). These ideological underpinnings can be summarized as class, religion and centre/periphery as described by Lipset and Rokkan in their foundational theory on social cleavages and European party systems, and also the more newly theorised “new politics” cleavage (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002).

Marks and Wilson (2000) and Marks, Wilson et al. (2002) hypothesise that political parties view European integration through the lens of their pre-existing ideologies, and as such that social cleavages are determinants of party positioning on European integration.

1.1.3 Vote Maximisation

The period prior to the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam was characterised by what the literature has termed permissive consensus, a state of affairs in which political elites where able to negotiate European integration between themselves without the interference of disinterested publics for whom the implications of the European project were limited. The aforementioned treaties, however, paved way for the development of what is now termed constraining dissensus. European publics no longer disregarded European integration as a matter of limited interest; political elites could not negotiate further integration without knowledge and interest from their electorates. The issue was no longer insulated from national political realities facing parties in other political matters; parties’ position on European integration could now affect the votes they received in national elections (Evans 1999).

In the theoretical school that see vote maximising behaviour as important mover of political parties, parties are viewed as office seeking organisation that tend to spread their positions according to the available political space in order to attract as many voters as possible (Downs 1957). It therefore follows that given the opening up of political space due to the voters emerging interest in European integration, political parties started to make note of, and adapt to, this changed reality. Marks, Wilson et al. (2002) has also hypothesised that there is a
general, bidirectional causation between the position of the median voter of a given political party and the political party’s position on European integration. By making this assertion, their argument is twofold: that political parties may display vote maximising behaviour in attempting to adapt their position to that of the median voter, but also that the causal link may simultaneously run in the opposite direction; voters may be adapting their positions to that of the political party that they support/vote for.

1.1.4 Government/Opposition Parties
The final theoretical grouping about a party’s likelihood of holding office, in this context whether or not they are mainstream parties, can be said to be closely linked to voter maximising behaviour as it relates to strategic positioning. Also finding basis in Anthony Down’s (1957) spatial modelling where political parties position themselves according to available political space in order to capture voter sentiment that has not already been tapped by other parties, the idea is that the reaction of mainstream political parties to new issues on the political agenda is to diffuse their importance, whilst parties to the periphery of the political space tend to take extreme positions on new issues precisely to tap into said sentiment (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002). It is in the interest of mainstream parties to diffuse new issues and thus prevent them from becoming of importance to the electorate because they have the effect of opening up new political space to compete on, and as such giving other political parties access to new voters and to voters that have previously made their party choice based on other issues.

The conceptualisation of mainstream parties vs. parties on the periphery of the political spectrum is often done in a manner where mainstream parties represent those that aspire, and are likely at some point in the near future, to hold office, whilst parties to the periphery are represented as those at the edges of the political spectrum that are largely excluded from government (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002).

In terms of European integration this theory also holds that mainstream parties would be supportive of European integration, whilst parties on the periphery would hold Eurosceptic attitudes (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002).

1.2 The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
The following exploration of the European debt crisis and the European response is short, and intended only as a brief introduction to the complexity of the crisis. Given the purpose of this thesis it does not attempt to give a full and all-encompassing description and explanation of
events. Such an undertaking would surely go beyond the set parameters of this work. The hope is rather that this sub-chapter provides enough of a background to clarify the complexities of the crisis and as such make its importance for the European project, present and future, clear. In addition, a sub-section will be devoted to discussing and explaining how the debt crisis relates to the above mentioned theories on party positioning on European integration. As such, the purpose is to theoretically found why the European debt crisis might be conceived as influencing the views on European integration held by political parties, as represented by their narratives.

The European debt crisis is in essence about the inability of primarily members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or the Eurozone, to repay or refinance their debt without aid from a third party. The countries that ended up receiving emergency loans, or bailout packages, from the Troika, made up of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, where Greece in May 2010, February/March 2012 and July 2015; Ireland in November/December 2010; Portugal in May 2011; Spain in July 2012; Cyprus in April 2012 (European Commission 2014, Harari 2014). Hungary, Latvia and Romania received financial assistance from the Balance of Payments Assistance Programme before they adopted the Euro as currency. Whilst for example Spain only received a bank bailout package, that is assistance to bail out banks, and therefore avoided harsh demands for austerity, others, for example Greece, received bailout packages that were coined also at aiding the country in repaying creditors, and as such had to adhere to demands for austerity from the Troika.

Though the essence of the crisis may be readily understandable its causes and effects are more complex, with a combination of some general causes and some country specific causes (Harari 2014). Part of the more general reasons behind the crisis is a combination of the structure of the European Monetary Union and the financial crisis. When the Euro replaced national currencies on January 1st 2002, members of the currency area effectively handed over control of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB), which from this point onward would set interest rates for the entire Eurozone (Harari 2014).

The single currency area, from the very beginning, consisted of vastly different economies with different needs in terms of involvement from the ECB. The currency areas largest economy, Germany, was experiencing low growth, and the ECB therefore set a low interest rate in order to help boost the economy of what was considered the engine of the European
These low interest rates, however, had an adverse effect for countries like Ireland and Spain, which were experiencing an economic boom. For these countries the low interest rates gave rise to a housing bubble that would later burst (Harari 2014).

Where central banks traditionally would have had the opportunity to allow higher inflation in order to reduce debt burdens, buying up debt to avoid default, depreciating currency to promote exports, or other policies at the discretion of an independent central bank, the crisis countries had given up independent monetary policies to the European Central Bank, and as such had very few means by which they could counter the crisis once it emerged. The ECB, on the other hand, were in a position where they could not find a monetary policy that would fit the situation in all the economies over which it exerted influence (Harari 2014).

Another general cause of the debt crisis can also be found in the introduction of a single currency to economies and states that were very different. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, the ability of countries to loan money, and the interest rates they were offered, where dependent on the credit evaluation of the individual country in question. As such, countries that banks perceived to have strong finances, and where likely to be able to repay their loans as agreed, received them at lower interest rates, whilst the opposite was true for countries with less strong finances, such as for example Greece.

With the introduction of the common currency, banks changed their practice, perceiving that the Euro countries were almost jointly liable for the loans, and as such they now all received loans at favourable rates previously reserved for the stronger economies. Thus, countries without the ability to maintain their obligations to creditors where given access to cheap loans and accumulated large debts. Although a more general cause, this is largely the explanation of the Greek debt crisis, however it cannot be ignored that Greece´s public deficits exceeded the limits set for the Eurozone already upon their entry into it in 2001 (Harari 2014).

In for example the Irish case, but also to a certain extent the Spanish case, states buckled under debt that where not largely a result of pre-crisis spending, but rather from the cost of bailing out banks that had overextended themselves, both in national housing markets, but also in relation to the United States subprime market.

With the increase of government indebtedness, as well as the admission of the newly elected Greek government in October 2009 that their public deficit was much higher than what had been previously reported, rating agencies successively downgraded the credit ratings of
several countries, resulting in the increase of interest rates, making it even harder for governments to repay loans.

The European debt crisis, as such, was largely caused by a combination of the global financial crisis (subprime market in the United States), housing bubbles, the easy availability of cheap loans after the introduction of the Euro encouraging high-risk lending practices, government income- and spending policies, insecurity in the banking sector, and government bank bailouts and the socialisation of private debt and losses. These factors were exacerbated by a European common currency and Central Bank that were unable to respond in a manner suited for all the different economic conditions under its authority.

1.2.1 The European Response to the Debt Crisis
The response to the onset of the European debt crisis by the European Union followed two tracks. A short term response aimed at coping with the immediate crisis, and a long term response aimed at preventing a reoccurrence of the crisis.

The short term response was largely aimed at creating a firewall so as to prevent the spread of the crisis to new countries through re-establishing confidence in the market and as such safeguarding the currency at large, as well as aiding crisis countries in gaining access to market financing (European Commission 2014). This was first done by establishing two temporary funds, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). On the backs of these two temporary funds the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was built. The ESM’s lending capacity is set at 500 billion Euros, and countries that have ratified the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance may receive assistance from the ESM under conditions that they commit to put in place reform measures to get their debt and spending under control (European Commission 2014). There is also a fund available to give financial assistance to non-Euro, EU member, countries experiencing crisis, and assistance from this fund is also conditional on national reform efforts to resolve the crisis and its causes.

These funds provided financing for the so-called bailout packages, with the exception of the initial Greek bailout in 2010 which was a bilateral agreement between the Eurozone countries, the IMF and Greece. Whilst the EFSM borrowed money in the market with the EU budget as implicit collateral, the EFSF received its capital through guarantees from the Eurozone countries, perhaps strikingly also from crisis-hit countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus (European Financial Stability Facility 2016). The ESM is financed largely through
contributions from the Eurozone members, the amount calculated with the use of a key found in the ESM Treaty (European Stability Mechanism 2015).

The financial aid to crisis-hit countries through either the bilateral agreement with Greece or through either of the mentioned funds, were as already stated conditional upon efforts to cut spending and on reform, often termed austerity measures. Independent of ones’ stance on the economic rationale underlying these austerity measures, making austerity a condition for financial aid in many cases had the effect of transferring additional power over several areas of policy away from national elected governments to the troika, and also to the German government and Bundestag which as the largest contributor to the aforementioned funds (BBC News 2010). Greece in particular experienced political unrest and government instability as a result of conflicts regarding the demands for, and implementation of, austerity measures (BBC News 2015).

The long term response to the crisis can in many ways be seen as a deepening of European integration, giving the European Commission and other Euro zone members substantial influence over national budgets through controls on budget deficits and public debt (European Commission 2014). The Stability and Growth Pact has been updated and reinforced as a result of the crisis, stipulating that national governments must submit their draft budgets to the European Commission for approval, and putting in place monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure that budgetary targets are met. Sanctions may be imposed on members that exceed limits on for example structural deficits as a percentage of GDP (European Commission 2014).

In addition to a strengthened Stability and Growth Pact, new surveillance mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that Euro area countries implement economic policies that promote growth, employment and competitiveness, as well as a mechanism to monitor macroeconomic balances. The latter is backed up by a sanctions mechanism to be utilised in situations where the imbalance is deemed excessive, and that the government is not seen as implementing sufficient measures to correct the situation (European Commission 2014).

1.2.2 The European Debt Crisis and Party Positioning on European Integration

As previously pointed out, the directionality of European integration has not been a development in a predetermined direction, but rather is a result of decisions made by political elites in the member states. It is possible or even likely due to the complexity of the integration process, that these decisions may even have had consequences that where not
intended or planned for, and as such the path forward from today continues to be an uncertain one. Although it is unlikely that political elites with a positive predisposition towards European integration in the member states will change their opinion on the European project itself, it is equally unlikely that “…elites are riding a one-way ticket towards a federal European state” (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012, 7.).

European integration and the European Union are not static entities where once established conditions never change, where adaptation is not necessary or desirable to the actors involved. On the contrary, the complexity of the European Union and European integration, with the involvement of multiple member states with differing political and economic conditions all subject both to local and international influence, it seems beyond reproach that actors will have to react and form opinions relating to multiple issues regarding European integration and the European Union as time passes.

The European sovereign debt crisis is the most dramatic shock the integration project has suffered. Although there have been political crises, such as the rejection of important treaties by referenda in important member states, none of these have come close to shaking the integration project at its core. The European debt crisis has exposed weaknesses in the system, both economic and institutional, it has tested internal unity and solidarity between member states, it has opened up debate about the plausibility of integrating nation states in vastly different economic and cultural conditions under one set of rules, one currency and one central bank (the EMU signatories), it has started debates over democratic participation and it has ignited old divisions in Europe, sometimes leading to outright animosity.

The European debt crisis and the resulting need for action has opened up political space for debate about the future of European integration, but also about its current state. Eurosceptic parties have been invigorated by new and strong arguments, whilst pro integration parties have struggled to find their footing in an environment where the divisions between nation state and European Union has been exacerbated; German voters may not want to pay for the perceived mistakes of Greece, Greek voters don´t want their votes to be invalidated from Berlin (or Brussels), and political ideologies struggle to adapt to a new reality beyond the realm of nations. The crisis has simultaneously blurred borders and made them more visible; it has made the European Union clearly relevant for as wide reaching policy areas as social security, employment, defence and security, democratic rights, and economic organisation.
Facing elections at home, political parties have had to respond, particularly challenging parties that support integration.

The European debt crisis has had influence on areas that touch upon the theories described earlier, explaining how political parties form opinions on European integration. The greater the difference between the member states, particularly in terms of the economy, the lesser is the likelihood that their national interests both in terms of response to the crisis and further European integration would coincide. The European debt crisis has exacerbated differences between the more prosperous member states that act as creditors and therefore lay out the conditions under which the crisis is to be resolved, and thus also to a large extent for the furthering of European integration, and the crisis-hit countries that are in a position leaving few other options open than accepting help from their partners in the European Union.

It seems obvious that beyond the common goal of a functioning European market, their national interests would diverge given their different situations and positions at the negotiating table. It also appears that the situation might require member states, perhaps on both sides of the equation, to make decisions that are perceived at least by some as running contrary to national interests. From the perspective of creditor nations, that may themselves feel the need to shore up their own economy or social welfare states, arguments may be made both in terms of national interests and voter maximisation, that spending money to salvage crisis-hit economies in other countries is less than desirable. Much the same argument could be made for debtor nations, where creditor nations in order to assure both their electorates and it appears also some perceived sense of justice, have made apparently harsh demands of austerity and reform a requirement of giving loans and aid, as well as demanding reform of the European Union system of control, regulation and supervision of national budgets and policies.

In terms of cleavage theory, or ideology, the argument is complex yet readily visible. The European debt crisis, and the response to it, raises questions relating to regulation of the economy and of the financial sector, the relationship between state and private sectors, privatisation, social welfare, workers’ rights and participation, and social justice. Perhaps the most poignant point of contention in relation to issues concerning ideology are the conditions attached to the bailout packages, amongst others placing demands on recipient countries, predominantly Greece, to cut wages in the public sector, increase the retirement age, and to privatise previously public services.
National austerity measures, largely put forth as a result of pressure from creditor nations and the Troika, have put into effect measures aimed at reducing public expenditures in much the same direction, and these measures have caused public uproar and demonstrations in the crisis-hit countries. In any regard, these are all issues that fall firmly within the economic cleavage, the left-right axis, in European party systems, inarguably the most salient in terms of being strongly present in all European Union member states. It is also on this cleavage that the large, mainstream parties are normally located. As mainstream parties, they are either office holders, or are expected to hold office, and thus they do not have the prerogative of taking on the role of protest parties, and as such merely focusing on either vote maximisation or on remaining true to an ideology, rather they are forced to take account of the prospect of governing.

As has been briefly discussed, the European debt crisis touches upon areas theorized to have impact on opinion formation on European integration. However, the complexity of the European debt crisis makes it difficult to hypothesise or predict the concrete outcomes of its influence on how political parties view European integration. The issues are interconnected; one aspect related to the European debt crisis may run contrary to a given, or perceived, national interest whilst simultaneously correspond to a given political party’s ideology; the electorate of a given member state may support one type of action overwhelmingly, whilst the action may at the same time be adverse to perceived national interests. Given these complexities, one can only hypothesise that the European debt crisis may have an effect on how political parties view European integration, though the directionality and effects of such an effect seems difficult to predict.

The theories on party positioning on European integration described so far in this introduction, and discussed above in relation to the debt crisis, are normally viewed as explaining the opinion formation on European integration in terms of support/non-support for the project as a whole. Part of the novel approach of this thesis is to view opinion formation in terms of content. Beyond simply stating and explaining through variables the position political parties take on integration itself (yes or no), or placing the positions along a continuum from strong support to Eurosceptic, this thesis will focus on what kind of narratives political parties employ around European integration. It seems prudent, in this context, to make once again point out that the theories on party positioning are intended to make up the rationale for the expectation that the European debt crisis may influence the narratives of political parties on European integration. However, this thesis does not have as
its purpose to uncover which of these theories, if any, may serve as explanatory factor for the changes (or lack thereof) in integration narratives.

1.3 Other Research

Although European integration has long been a topic of research in several academic disciplines, only recently have national politics within the member states become an area of interest. Even so, research has mainly been focused on a few select topics; how important the issue of European integration and the European Union is in national political debates often employing quantitative methods to ascertain salience (Ray 1999, de Vries 2007, Kriesi 2007); the factors influencing how actors in the process, be they political parties or the electorate, position themselves towards European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000, Hooghe, Marks et al. 2002, Marks, Wilson et al. 2002); explaining the emergence of Eurosceptic parties (Taggart 1998); the behaviour of the electorate in European Parliamentary elections (Hix and Marsh 2007, Hobolt and Wittrock 2011).

The topic of this thesis, as has been explained, is however, to look at the narratives on European integration employed by national political parties. As such, the focus is not, as has often been the case, to explain support/opposition to the integration project, but rather to look at how European integration is viewed and problematized, which legitimations are employed, how parties narrate identification with Europe and what kind of Europe they want for the future. This is a topic that has been largely neglected, given that views on European integration has been (mostly) seen in a dichotomous light. There are however a few examples of researches that have delved into the narratives, frames or discourses on European integration employed by national political parties in order to gain a deeper understanding of how they view the European project, and why they have developed the opinion that they have. Below, two examples of such studies are briefly explained.

Helbling, Hoeglinger et al. (2010) hypothesise that political parties have different expectations of the future path of European integration and that these expectations are based on their programmatic profiles which in turn leads them to represent different interests, and that the frames they employ are a product of their general position on European integration and on their position either in the mainstream or on the periphery of the political spectrum.
They collect media data from six Western European countries, and utilise a broad schema of frames to categorise the data: cultural, economic and other utilitarian. In creating subcategories below these broader frames they utilise a Habermasian distinction of general types, creating two sub-categories for each broader category in order to dichotomise their data. The subcategories or sub-frames are respectively: nationalistic and multicultural-universalist; Labour & social security and economic prosperity; political efficiency & efficacy and security & ecology.

On a general level, they affirm both their hypotheses, however, they also find that the issue at stake influences the argument utilised: 1) that the presence of a Eurosceptic party in the respective country has no visible impact on frames used by other parties, 2) that left-wing parties across borders perceive European integration as a threat to national achievements in terms of welfare, however they do so to different degrees, 3) that social democrats use prosperity frames both in support of, and in criticising, European integration, 4) that right-wing parties across borders use nationalistic frames in opposition to European integration, but again, to differing degrees, 5) that liberal parties hardly ever use prosperity frames and that Christian democrats and conservatives most often use them to criticise European integration, and finally, 6) that larger, mainstream parties support European integration because of its promises in terms of governance and efficacy, although they are not always enthusiastic about it, whilst smaller parties perceive European integration almost entirely in terms of ideology.

As a final note, they underline the importance of further research in order to disentangle the different issues of European integration, to look beyond the mere dichotomy of support opposition, but also to analyse their own data in a more detailed manner, suggesting some kind of discourse analysis (Helbling, Hoeglinger et al. 2010).

Kiratli (2015), the author of the second study, focuses on the justification and articulation of positions on Europe and European integration by political parties, as well as the conception of their country’s image within the European Union. The study is a discourse analysis, and attempts to shed light on the connection between the representations of national identities and political culture, and attitudes on European integration. It also attempts to contribute to explaining differing degrees of support for European integration in different geographic regions and point to the future of the European project.

The study is differentiated from other efforts by stating both that there is a “lack of cross national comparative and longitudinal research on the role of political parties in representing...
national and European identities and seeking to make collective (national and European) identities salient in public debates” and that “systematic textual studies of party discourses for this purpose are rare and limited to media datasets” (Kiratli 2015, 2). Through the paper, his focus is on uncovering identity representations, resulting from his theoretical presupposition that ideological cleavages, strategic calculations, national interests and domestic orientations towards Europe are all shaped by national identities and cultures.

The manifestos of political parties within three major European Union member states are studied: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. His research is based on an inductive form of discourse analysis following the typology provided by Best, Lengyel et al. (2012): the cognitive-evaluative level, about how parties see the European Union and the consequences of membership, the emotive level, about the parties emotional connection with, and sense of belonging to, Europe and their national polity, and finally, the projective level, about how they envision the future of European integration and the European Union. He finds that European integration first and foremost is seen by all parties in the study as a framework of interest, yet that the content of these national interests vary greatly across party and country. The difference in interest articulation are explained as a result of different identity constructions (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012).

Whilst, as has been shown above, studies exist that look at the narratives/framings/discourses on European integration that are both temporal and comparative in nature, there are few, if any, that also look at the impact of a specific event on these narratives, and as such there is little focus on change over time.

1.4 Demarcations and Further Reading of the Thesis

Whilst both political parties that support and oppose European integration employ narratives on the integration project, this thesis will focus on mainstream political parties, that is parties that are both supportive of European integration, and also either hold office or have the likely prospect of holding office in the near future. Although not an entirely novel approach in terms of research on European integration, there do appear to have been a focus on Eurosceptic parties in recent European integration research.

The demarcation to mainstream political parties is made for several reasons. First, a thesis of this format holds obvious spatial limitations, and some form of demarcation will as such be
necessary. Second, it is a clear methodological advantage to analyse parties that are similar in certain aspects so as to attempt to isolate differences to a few select variables. Third, it is presumed that the European debt crisis is more likely to have yielded greater influence on the narratives of political parties with a positive view of European integration than a perceivably negative event could influence narratives around a negative position on European integration (the underlying assumption is that for Eurosceptic parties, the European debt crisis may have provided additional arguments, but is less likely to have changed the narrative overall).

Fourth, as the European debt crisis touches upon issues relating directly to the economic cleavage of European party systems, or the left-right axis, it becomes natural to look to the mainstream parties, as it is on this fault line in European politics where most mainstream parties are located. Fifth, given that mainstream political parties are governing parties, their view of European integration is also more likely to directly influence the shape and content of further European integration, and as such be an indicator for the future of the European project itself. This is also in line with the fact that national governments have greater influence on European integration than do national parliaments, as has been explained earlier in this introduction. Sixth, as will be shown, it is in the purview of the thesis to look at projections for the future development of European integration and these are more likely to abound given a positive predisposition giving way for policy proposals for change.

Beyond demarcating this thesis to mainstream, or pro-European integration parties, the scope of this thesis will be further narrowed into a case study with multiple embedded units of analysis. The case selection and case description is further outlined and explained in the chapter on research design and material.

Further, it is the purpose of this thesis will look at what kind of European Union the political parties want in the future, how they see the European project in the present, how they legitimise European integration, how they identify with it, and the effects of crisis on these aspects. In other words, the thesis is built on the assumption that behind the dichotomous position of yes/no to (further) integration is an understanding of the integration process that serves both as means by which political parties legitimise with the European Union and the integration process, as indicator of identification and as an arrow pointing to the preferred content and direction of the integration process.

Such views are not static, and may indeed change over time and differ between actors. It suffices to mention that change in an actors evaluation of a polity´s, or policy´s, legitimacy
would be more likely to occur if an actor’s normative ideas about what the polity is and should be no longer is assessed to match up with the reality on the ground (Jachtenfuchs, Diez et al. 1998).

This thesis hypothesises the European debt crisis as such a possible change agent based on the arguments presented in this introduction. Additionally, assuming that support for European integration at least to some extent is value based, it is worth noting that values do not change in the short term. The European Union, however, has undergone vast and drastic changes since 1990 with for example new policy challenges over which it has been given authority, the introduction of the Euro, and enlargement into the former Eastern Bloc. As such, the European project is grasping to find an adapted institutional form that is suitable for its new situation (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003). Thus it is possible to also hypothesise that the changes occurring in the European Union over time, and the stresses it has placed on the project, has worked as primers for the occurrence of a critical juncture, where a dramatic event could trigger a substantial directional change of some sort (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003).

As is inferred by the term itself, European integration changes European reality, even more so when faced with a crisis requiring rapid and decisive response, and it thus seems unlikely that political parties would have remained stagnant in their relationship to the European project. Changing circumstances leads to adaptation, lest one wish to become irrelevant, however, the shape and content of such an adaptation is not a given. It is on this basis that the question shaping and guiding this thesis has been formed: how has the European debt crisis influenced political parties’ narrative on European integration?

In order to answer this question, this thesis will put forth a theory-based typology constructed with the intention of covering the main building blocks of a political narrative on European integration; how they legitimise their position, how European and national identities are portrayed, and their projection for the future of European integration. The research design is developed based on this typology, and the analysis will be conducted in an inductive manner, based on the theories therein.

This thesis consists of two parts subdivided into chapters and subsections. The remaining chapters of the first part makes clear the framework of the study focused on the construction of a typology upon which the research design is based, justification of the case and data selection, the research methods employed, as well as a discussion on reliability and validity and the role of the researcher in this particular analysis. The second part is the analytic part of
the thesis. It will contain the analysis of the data selected, and will compare, discuss and conclude the thesis, as well as providing reflections and ideas for further research. As appendix to this thesis translations of the data material is provided.
2 Framework of the Study

The purpose of the following chapter is to present the analytical framework of this thesis. The term ‘narratives’, as used in this work, is discussed according to relevant theory and a definition is provided, and the remainder of the chapter is a careful presentation of the three dimensions of the typology that structures and guides the analytical part of this thesis.

2.1 Analysing narratives

A narrative can be defined narrowly, or widely, according to structure or content, or depending on the field of study from which the definition originates. There seems, however, to be a common thread to the definitions, certainly beyond those that focus narrowly on its (literary) structural elements of temporally ordered events. “Yet narrative also refers to the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality” (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 315). Narratives contribute to the understanding of political realities, they give shape to ourselves as political beings, and they help us navigate in the political realm. Narratives are constructed and used not only by individuals, but also by collective units, such as nations and organisations. Amongst these organisations are political parties (Patterson and Monroe 1998).

Narratives are representations of conceptions of reality, about how the events of the world progress, and the narrators place in these events; they are infused with the values, norms and worldviews of the narrator, and as such becoming a lens through which both the explicit and implicit understandings held by the subject can be viewed (Patterson and Monroe 1998).

Somers (1994) identifies four dimensions of narrativity, categorising types of narratives into the groupings ontological, public, metanarrativities, and conceptual. Ontological narratives are expressions of who we are and place us as individuals within time and space; public narratives are the narratives of cultural or institutional forms greater than that of the individual exemplified by the family, the nation or the party; metanarratives are the master narratives, those that give representation to actors as embedded in the grand scheme of history, be they industrialisation, class struggle, communism vs. capitalism, the emergence of western civilisation or modernisations; conceptual narratives refers to narratives around concepts such as social life, culture, democracy or markets, that have intentionally been abstracted away from their real world representations. In such a manner, narrative become more, and at times different than, the temporally ordered stories so often referred to in the literary sciences.
Narratives on European integration do not necessarily clearly place itself within one single dimension of narrativity, as proposed by Somers (1994), but rather could possibly be both a public narrative and metanarrative. Although not explicitly explored in the research designed elaborated below, the typology/dimension construction and the following analysis does capture both norm/interest narrations, as well as narrations of temporal otherings which can be seen as representing a narration of a grand struggle through and against history.

Narratives on European integration, given the theoretical implications put forth above, I propose to be understood as patterns of justification, placing their understanding of European integration within a framework of their norms, values, ideas and worldview.

In order to aptly structure an analysis of such a political narrative I seek to construct a typology assumed fit to capture the explicit and implicit content of the narrative, in a manner that allows for comparison both across time, but also between parties. A typology also allows for categorisation of the content of the narrative so as to allow for comparison between similar aspects.

To do so I draw on multiple sources of theory, however it´s framework is based on a typology put forth by Best, Lengyel et al. (2012). The underpinning assumption put forth is that perceptions and views on European integration are multifaceted, and “oriented by a composite set of perceptions and sentiments which we refer to as Europeanness” (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012, 8). Europeanness is conceptualised as being made up of an emotive, a cognitive-evaluative, and a projective-conative dimension (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012).

This typology finds its source in the behavioural sciences, but also resonate in the Weberian theory of social action (Best, Lengyel et al. 2012). The emotive dimension, as described by Best, Lengyel et al. (2012), refers to the feelings of attachment experienced by actors towards European integration and unification, the cognitive-evaluative dimension expresses the degree of approval for, and view of, the current state of European integration, and the projective-conative dimension refers to degree of support for the prospect of further deepening and broadening of European integration.

In some ways, the typology I am about to construct could be said to go a long way to help decipher the level of Europeanness of a political party. However, it will do so in a somewhat different way than the typology described above. In order to best meet the research question at hand, which does not directly touch upon the concept of Europeanness, and in order to
possibly also contribute to the expansion of the research agenda in which this thesis is situated, I will somewhat restructure the typology presented, however, it will done in a manner not far removed from Best, Lengyel et al. (2012, 9): “The tripolar concept of Europeanness has obvious links to the categories of identity, representation and scope of governance”.

What Best, Lengyel et al. (2012) refers to as the emotive dimension, regarding feelings of attachment is closely linked to the concept of identity, which is about feelings of attachment to, or sentiments of solidarity towards, a particular group. Identity is also the name and focus of the dimension I have chosen to put in its place. Their cognitive-evaluative dimension will in my typology be renamed and reconceptualised in terms of legitimation, encompassing the arguments utilised by the political parties to legitimise their support for European integration. This is a widening of the scope of the dimension from simply looking at their views on the current state of the integration project, to more closely examining the expressions of why they support European integration. Further, the projective-conative dimension will be renamed projection, but will continue to focus on the political party’s support and vision for the future of European integration.

As has also been stated by Best, Lengyel et al. (2012), it is likely that the three dimensions of the typology show a weak to moderate level of correlation. This is a logical assumption, given that they are seen as aspects of the common, underlying construct Europeanness. In addition, there may also in certain instances be overlap between these dimensions, for instance in a situation where strong representations of a European identity are being utilised as legitimations for supporting European integration. Given that the purpose of this thesis is to investigate change in narratives on European integration over time, resulting from the European debt crisis, such overlap is not problematic so long as there is an analytic awareness of how, and for what purpose, for instance identity narratives are being employed.

In the following I will elaborate on my typology, and discuss some further theoretical underpinnings and linkages in terms of their theorised importance for the development of European integration, their influence on opinion formation, their potential role in a political narrative, as well as whether or not they are likely to change. A subsection in the chapter on research design and material later in the thesis is dedicated to explaining how this typology will be utilised in creating a research design conductive to analysing the narratives of political parties on European integration.
2.1.1 Legitimation

Amongst the many theoretical schools concerned with explaining the ongoing European integration two main explanatory variables crystallise, interests and ideas, amongst which interests seems to be the dominant one. The starkest proponents of the interest-based theories argue that the process of European integration emerged as a result of complex processes in which actors, both states and non-state actors alike pursued their self-interests. These self-interests can often, though not always, be summarised in terms of economy.

Few would disagree that interests are important to politics and that the integration process in part has been driven by the individual interests of European states to resolve problems they have been faced with. It does however seem unlikely given the complexity of the European polity that the integration process would have been sustained in as stable a manner as it has been, if it resulted merely from coincidence of the individual interests of its participating states.

As Jachtenfuchs, Diez et al. (1998) points out, a polity requires more than utility maximizing actors to be stable. It requires generalisierte Folgebereitschaft or a generalised willingness to comply. By this is meant a kind of diffuse support, one that is not based on specific individual self-interest but rather on belief in a certain set of values or ideas that are being ascribed to the polity. They are, in essence, a particular morality, world view, or narrative in light of which events are understood; they are a description of why actors believe the polity to be rightful and thus legitimate (Jachtenfuchs, Diez et al. 1998, Schmidt 2008).

Given the fierce theoretical debate around interests vs. ideas in some scholarly circles, one might be led to believe that they are polar opposites - that it is a matter of either or. However, as indicated by both Jachtenfuchs, Diez et al. (1998) and Schmidt (2008), there may indeed be interplay between interests and ideas. A clear and absolute separation between the two would seem to be based on an extreme realist ontological and epistemological assumption that objective interests exists, that solutions can be correct in the objective realm, and these can be differentiated, or separated, from human interpretation.

A different assumption for the ontological basis of scientific inquiry is that “while there may in fact be only one ‘true’ world out there, there are many reasonable, but distinct interpretations (or understandings) of that world” (Moore 2001, 4). From this perspective, humans view the world through a lens made up of their cognitive abilities and the grand total of their life experiences. Their identity, their personality and their cognitive skills make up a
cipher through which the reality before their eyes is interpreted and made sense of. Given such an ontological assumption, political solutions become correct and right only to the extent that they correspond to the interests and/or ideas that crystallise as a result of the interpreted reality of the actor(s) involved. In this thesis, ideology is viewed as both such a mediating factor, or cipher, as well as an ideational construct resulting from an interpretation of reality; the ideological position or belief held by an individual is a patterned construct to structure one's interpretation and understanding of the world, but also becomes a part of the lens through which reality is interpreted. From such an ontological understanding it follows that interests are not objective and materially true, but rather subjective and based on an ideational evaluation of what is or ought to be. As such, interests are also ideas, or at least ideationally based.

Such an understanding can also be found in the work of Schmidt (2008) where ideas, as they appear in political narratives, are categorised in terms of content into the dichotomy of normative and cognitive ideas. Normative ideas follow the logic of how ideas have been described previously in this section. They are more ideational and possibly even abstract in their nature, and they speak to how “policies meet the aspirations and ideals of the general public and how programs as well as policies resonate with a deeper core of principles and norms of public life” (Schmidt 2008, p. 307). In other words, normative ideas are ideational narratives that legitimise programmatic content. Cognitive ideas, on the other hand, are best defined as an interest based narrative. One in which the logic of interests and necessity are employed to legitimise positions (Schmidt 2008).

Political parties could therefore choose to legitimise European integration in terms of normative ideas, or cognitive ideas. The use of normative ideas would require narratives underlining the norms and values the European project represents, such as democracy, peace in Europe, human rights, solidarity, or any other value perceived as positive and representative of the integration project and the European Union. In the literature, when the European Union is legitimised in terms of normative ideas, it has been described as a normative power – a polity which derives its power not only over its citizens and members, but also its legitimate power in the eyes of outsiders, from the values upon which it is based (Manners 2002, Manners and Whitman 2003). These normative ideas may also be party specific, based in the ideological realm in which the given political party is positioned.
Utilising cognitive ideas, on the other hand, would require narratives that point to the utility of European integration in terms of achieving national interests, such as equal access to markets, the free movement of goods and services, the removal of customs and tariffs, and the like.

Based on an understanding of a concept described above: *generalisierte Folgebereitschaft* or the general willingness to comply, which is so important for the stability of any polity, it can be hypothesised that legitimations based on normative ideas signal a stronger support for the integration project than those based on cognitive ideas. *Generalisierte Folgebereitschaft* is not based on changing interests at any given moment, but on normative ideas of why a polity is rightful and therefore legitimate. A change away from normative legitimations, or an increase in the use of cognitive ones, could therefore indicate a slip in support for, or confidence in, the European project.

### 2.1.2 Identity

In the context of this typology, identity in many ways becomes a continuation of the above description of normative ideas, from which it cannot be entirely separated. Identity refers to “images of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an actor and formed and modified over time through relations with significant others” (Kiratli 2015, 3). It refers to “a sense of shared continuity on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and to shared memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit” (Smith 1992, 58). Adding to this, it refers to the belief that the given unit shares a common destiny (Smith 1992). As such, identities, the images of “the self”, are made up of “norms, values and discourses” that hold individuals together in a social or cultural group (Kiratli 2015, 3), and they are therefore linked to the above discussed normative ideas that make up part of the type *legitimation*. The question of overlap will be dealt with in the chapter on research design, however, at the theoretical level, it can be useful to keep the debate around normative ideas vs. interests, and the concept of *Generalisierte Folgebereitschaft*, in mind, seeing as identity is a powerful, non-material, factor that affects how individuals evaluate many political issues, amongst them European integration (Kiratli 2015).

Identities do not, however, serve only to define “the self”, it also serves to differentiate between “us” and “them”, between in- and out groups. It creates “otherings”. These otherings are usually geographic and/or cultural/ethnic/religious in nature, referring to the national identities around which most modern European nation states are built, drawing up boundaries between members of different groups and therefore different identities (Diez 2010). As a short, but serious side note, the European continent is riddled with examples of conflicts.
deriving much of its energy from these otherings, some of which continue to this day. As such, identities may be constructed to be exclusive, as they clearly define which groups belong in the community, and which groups don’t. Such exclusive identity formations and their otherings are normally constructed around ethnicity, language, religion or territorial borders.

However, as pointed out by Diez (2010), otherings are not necessarily based on the geographic or cultural dimension, but rather could also be temporal in nature. It is possible to view normative narratives about European integration as a peace project as an endeavour to differentiate Europe from its violent and conflictual past, thus creating a temporal othering. In such a scenario a perceived European identity is not based in the differing national identities of its member states, or on the territory of the European Union, which may or may not expand in the future, but rather on being different than the past. In addition to creating temporal otherings, a narrative describing Europe as a normative power based on the ideas of peace and cooperation, as opposed to its violent and conflictual past, could also be an attempt to construct a European identity based on a certain set of values. Such an identity would be more inclusive, allowing an expansion of the European Union to occur without creating conflict over identity, as well as creating a more inclusive identity in which there is room for different national identities, ethnicities, cultures and religions within the polity. This inclusivity, of course, only holds given that the value based identity construct is not coupled with indications of a belief that these values are somehow linked to a geographic/cultural/ethnic/religious community.

As is alluded to above, individuals may also hold multiple identities. Such is the case internal to nations: people hold national, regional and local identities, all partly geographic in nature, and may substitute these with identities based for example on religion or class. These identities may be seen as pieces of a puzzle, making up a wider individual identity. However, one could conceive that a disparity between a national and a European identity could result in the masses having to choose between the two identities, thus likely remaining national in their identification, restricting inclusiveness to only cover those within that specific group (Kiratli 2015).

Further, it is possible to hypothesise a link between identity narratives and support or opposition to further integration, particularly in terms of enlargement. It is likely that political parties that support further integration would have a narrative focused on commonalities
between Europeans, and perhaps also on temporal otherings. By narrating a European identity, a message is sent to the voters that their national identity is essentially a part of a European community, or even a European identity (Kiratli 2015). A political party that is sceptical of European integration, or perhaps becoming more sceptical, but that have yet to make a change in positions, would likely place greater focus on their own distinct national identity coupled with cultural/geographic/ethnic/religious otherings. An example of this is the argument that the EU-enlargement policy is not simply a matter of fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, but rather it is influenced by understandings of ideational and cultural factors, and in particular, by how the actors involved perceive the European identity and its relationship to national identities (Öner 2013). As such, the question of enlargement becomes a question of whether or not the candidate(s) for accession share a common identity and values with the members of the EU, or not.

2.1.3 Projection
Projection refers to, as is the case in the typology provided by Best, Lengyel et al. (2012), the party’s approval or disapproval of further European integration, or of a deepening of European integration if you will. In addition, it also encompasses the more concrete policy suggestions they may put forward for the furthering of the European project. As such, this dimension will capture not only a dichotomous category of approval/disapproval, but also point to which direction the political party wishes European integration to take. This is included in the dimension as a result of the temporal aspect of the research question, attempting to capture whether there is a change over time in how the political party perceives the future of the integration project should be. As such, the question not only becomes whether or not the party believes integration should continue, but how they believe it should continue (if they indeed believe it should).
3 Research Design and Material

There are several ways to analyse political narrative data as it relates to European integration, and it is not the purpose of this chapter to thoroughly expand on all of these methods. There is, however, a need to make mention of a general divide within this method-plethora as it pertains to the reasoning behind the choice of method for this thesis.

A typical way to go about analysing this type of data is quantitative content analysis with some form of coding to allow for categorisation and often word counting, regularly with the aid of computer programs, so as to for example ascertain issue salience of a given topic or to ascertain party positioning on a left-right scale (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003, Kiratli 2015, 5). Treating words as data in this manner, particularly in cases where software is utilised to code the data, raises some important concerns that make up much of the reasoning for the choice of method for this thesis.

Whilst manual coding of the data may make up for some of the issues relating to internal validity that the codes actually measure what they are supposed to measure and do not miss some of the subtleties, double entendres or peculiar semantics inherent to political rhetoric and narratives (though perhaps raising more questions in regards to reliability), the dominance of quantitative methods for analysing political narrative data may itself cause important information to be perceived as out of reach for, or unimportant to, political research.

Quantitative analysis, or word count based, methods undoubtedly has its benefits for certain research objectives, however, the substance of political narratives are not easily captured by such ordered and statistical means of analysis. Said differently, though words may be data in the statistical sense, words are much more than can be expressed through coding schemes and statistical word counts. It is in the meaning of words and how they interconnect to make patterns of justification that the core of the research question for this thesis can be found.

Whilst one could conceive of answering the research question in this thesis with a comparison of issue salience in the party manifests over time, or through comparing the word count relating to different sub topics of European integration, such approaches would overlook an important aspect of politics: the substance of the words. A political party may for example make mention of the European agricultural policy the same number of times in different manifests, but they may simultaneously express different sentiments towards it.
Research on the repetition of words and word patterns and the salience of European integration in political debates say a lot about the frequency at which European integration figures in political debates in the given polity or polities, and as such gives information about the importance of European integration to political elites, and indirectly also about the importance of the topic for electorates, however it says very little about the actual content of the political debate on European integration, beyond general policy topics.

This thesis assumes that European integration may be viewed in much the same way as other political topics in that the political content/arguments a given position contains may vary across different political actors, and also across time. European integration is viewed as a matter not simply of pro/anti attitudes, or degrees thereof, but rather as a policy question who’s development depends on how the actors involved view it, the opinions they hold according to it, the visions they confer upon it, how they relate to it, and how they see it in relation to other views they hold. Such questions are much more complex than general categorisations and word counts can capture; they are far more nuanced than a dichotomy of pro/anti, or placements on a scale between support and opposition, can conceptualise.

The analysis in this thesis moves outside the positivistic, quantiative, tradition in that its purpose it not to test predetermined hypotheses, but rather relies on inductive content analysis of party manifestos with the aid of a theoretically founded typology. Content analysis here is understood as “the intellectual process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes” (Julien 2008, 120). Content analysis is known to be a very flexible method suitable to make sense of and organise a wide range of textual data, and is a common means by which to analyse narrative data and longitudinal data, both of which is true for this thesis (Julien 2008)

By inductive analysis, in this context, is meant an approach that “primarily use detailed readings of raw data to derive concepts [and] themes […] through interpretations made from raw data by an evaluator or researcher” (Thomas 2006, 238). The analysis remains inductive even though it uses a theory based typology to structure the reading and analysis of the data for more than one reason; the typology is not made up of theories/hypotheses to be tested but rather by theories that are intended to open up space for questioning different elements of the narratives; the analysis of the data is structured by the typology, rather than strictly coded and categorised as would have been the case if a deductive approach was utilised.
Using inductive reasoning places the researcher further towards the centre of the research, making it impossible to fully fulfil the positivistic assumption of the neutral and absent researcher, though one can certainly question if this is ever possible outside the laboratories of the natural sciences and the equations on the note pad of the mathematician. It also raises important questions relating to both validity and reliability. These questions, in addition to a more detailed description of the method employed in this thesis, will be further explored below, in the sections ‘From Typology to Method’, ‘Reliability and Validity’, and ‘The Researcher in Context’.

3.1 The Case

This thesis contains a single-case design with multiple, embedded units of analysis. As will be further developed, justified and explained below, the selected case is Germany and the embedded units of analysis below the single case are the political parties SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – The Social Democratic Party of Germany) and CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern – The Christian Democrats).

The reasons for selecting Germany as case for this analysis were largely a result of a judgment based on the role played by Germany in the history of European integration, as well as in the current configuration of the European Union, particularly in terms of the European debt crisis. Germany is in many ways an extreme or divergent case in Europe, given its success in the aftermath of World War Two facing a feared trajectory similar to that of the Weimar Republic; the evidence of a Europeanised identity; its value driven multilateralism; the degree to which Germans support European integration; its role in shaping European integration largely in its own image; and its leadership and role in dealing with the European debt crisis. A change in perceptions of European integration in Germany would be significant given the important role played by Germany in the European Union, perhaps even raising questions about the future trajectory of European integration (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003, Stokes 2015).

In addition to the above factors which will be further elaborated on in the following chapter on Germany, a study of political manifestos is to some extent constrained by language. That I am able to read the data sources in their original language provides an additional argument for the case selection.
Below follows an exploration of the factors that position Germany as a desirable case in this thesis, as well as a contextualisation of Germany, the SPD, and the CDU in light of European integration and the European debt crisis. In addition, I am well aware that this thesis does not grant the space necessary for a full and in depth exploration of Christian Democracy as represented by the CDU/CSU and Social Democracy as represented by the SPD, however, a short introduction to their historical basis and development is viewed as being in order, and an attempt will be made to do this in a manner so as to shine a light on critical developments and periods that may well play into the ‘psyche´ of these parties to this day. It stands well to remember, though, that this is merely a short glimpse into the past and ‘psyche´ of these two powerful and important political vehicles in past and present Germany and Europe.

3.1.1 Germany

The recent history of Germany is in many ways also the recent history of Europe. In the first half of the 20th century, Germany played a central role in two wars, leaving behind a devastated Europe.

In the aftermath of World War Two, tensions in Europe ran high, Germany was divided between the allied victors, much of the country lay in ruins, a large proportion of its population were refugees, and its economy was in tatters. Humiliated and defeated, with a fractured institutional structure, Europe feared the repeat of the conditions under which the Weimar Republic succumbed.

It was this environment that saw the humble beginnings of European integration. Under the auspices that large parts of European industry was geared towards armament production, the pooling of coal and steel industrial resources under a common European authority was proposed as means by which to avoid a future arms race, to create incentives for cooperation, and lay the foundation for economic growth (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003).

The success factor of early integration appeared to be the duality of the approach; whilst the economic structures laid out made growth possible, the political arena for cooperation created an environment of trust under which German economic expansion could be viewed as something other than a threat, particularly for neighbouring France (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003).

The export orientation of the economy of the Federal Republic (from here on out ‘Germany’) created an incentive for Germany to support further integration, and further integration was coupled with economic growth and improvements of living standards in the previously war
ravaged German state. Germany had been embedded in the West; its state structure had become a stable liberal democracy. So much so that it began to be perceived as a model for the rest of Europe. This development, by some seen as a small miracle, given Germany’s recent history and feared trajectory, has been coined as a virtuous circle (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003).

Whilst the initial support for European integration within Germany may have been conditioned on economic growth and the resulting improvements in living conditions experienced by the German population, this support eventually diffused and turned “into a more fundamental allegiance to the West German state, ´post-national´ in character and in part projected outward onto ´Europe´. This Europeanised state identity resonated at both mass and elite levels” (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003, 60).

Whilst the traditional approach in academic circles has been to view European integration from a rationalist perspective where states unilaterally pursue national interests at the European level, Germany’s approach to European integration and European policy to a large extent remained value based and multilateral. The institutional pluralism of federal Germany limited its ability to pursue a united, grand, national strategy at the European level. However, this does not mean that Germany has not exerted power at the European level (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003). As Jeffrey and Paterson (2003, 61) has pointed out:

“The Federal Republic’s power was not, however, ´deliberate´ power – the ´forceful articulation of interests, combined with... resources for articulating leverage´- but rather ´soft´ or ´institutional´. Soft power was expressed in particular through the supply of institutional models from the domestic arena which then set the institutional parameters for decision-making at the European level”.

Instead of articulating leverage through traditional means, the German approach often took the form of side-payments; a contribution to the EU budget that was geared towards ensuring the agreement of other member states on a particular issue of contention (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003).

Germany’s attempt to recreate the German model at the European level was largely successful in some areas, and unsuccessful in others. Jeffrey and Paterson (2003, 61) refers to a few, but important, examples of German success in setting the institutional parameters of the European Union:
• “the role of German actors – public and private – in standard-setting in the European Single Market Programme;
• the impact of the Bundesbank model in providing the parameters for monetary policy at the European level from the European Monetary System through to Economic and Monetary Union;
• the impact of the German Länder from the mid-1980s in securing recognition for the regional level in EU decision-making”.

As Jeffrey and Paterson (2003) points out, this unique German approach to European policy lasted at least until the beginning of the European debt crisis, and perhaps also to this day. However, there are some signs that change may be approaching. Their view is that as the shape and direction of European integration is shifting away from being congenial to Germany, and as such, a shift in German attitudes and approaches towards European integration may also be perceivable. Several factors are mentioned as possible change makers, and amongst them are: a disadvantageous European Central Bank ‘one size-fits-all policy, the development of a European common foreign and defence policy challenging German reservations on the use of military force, economic migration from the new member states to the east, eastern enlargement causing labour market competition, the question of burden-sharing in relation to asylum seekers and refugees, the increased burden on Germany as ‘paymaster’ in terms of both agriculture and cohesion policy, and a further liberalisation of the Single Market Programme (Jeffrey and Paterson 2003, 64-66). In addition to the factors mentioned by Jeffrey and Paterson (2003), or perhaps as addition to the burden imposed on Germany as “paymaster” of EU budgets, Germany now also holds the role of ‘paymaster’ to the bailout packages and the bailout fund.

Whilst these factors, amongst several, are believed to make possible a change in the multilateral, value based, approach to European policy and interaction in the European Union, it is my belief that the European debt crisis may have an even stronger effect, or may indeed contribute to setting in motion a critical juncture in terms of the underlying views on European integration and the European Union that guides the actions taken by German actors in the European polity.

Germany’s role in the European debt crisis is also part of the reasoning behind the case selection. With its strong economy, often termed the power-house of Europe, relatively
unscathed by both the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, and its centrality to the European project, the rest of Europe looked to Germany when a response to the rapidly escalating debt crisis was required. When European leaders proposed a bailout package for Greece in 2010, however, Germany was sceptical, if not outright negative. Critics, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, feared that Greece where not doing enough to curb their debt and reduce budgetary deficits, that it would set a dangerous precedence and that other countries would soon follow in Greece’s footsteps, whilst some cited the unfairness of German taxpayers paying for the fiscal irresponsibility of others (Meo 2010, Stevens 2010). In addition, whilst most Germans have remained positive towards European integration throughout the existence of the project, the opposite was the case with the German entry to the Eurozone (Stokes 2015). Many Germans feared, at the time, that the Euro would be unstable as a result of the differences between the economies entering into it, and that Germany would be forced bear the economic brunt of integrating them. The calls for a Greek bailout seemed to confirm their initial Eurocurrency-scepticism (Kulish 2010).

In the end, however, Germany reluctantly agreed to be the paymaster of the bailouts as well, contributing 22.4 billion Euros to the 110 billion Euro package, becoming the second largest contributor only surpassed by the IMF with its 30 billion (BBC News 2010). As such, the German role became one of arbitrator, facilitator and creditor in attempting to resolve the crisis. In many ways, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been the face and de facto leader the European Union throughout the crisis, becoming amongst the most vocal proponents of placing requirements of austerity and restructuring as condition for the receipt of bailouts. As the debt crisis has progressed, perhaps the German role can be seen as the living embodiment of George Soros’ words: “In a crisis, the creditor always calls the shots” (Schwartz 2011).

Although there have been several bailouts since the initial Greek package, as well as the establishment of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a permanent bailout fund to which Germany is also a large contributor, the German position has been relatively steadfast, certainly in terms of its underlying principle: economic aid to indebted nations cannot be given unless coupled with substantial and effective reform efforts to curb government spending, increase competitiveness and repay debts (often termed austerity measures). In addition, the German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel has stood firmly against the establishment of any permanent scheme that can be equated to
joint liability for the debt of European nations, stating that Eurobonds are “economically wrong and counterproductive” and “I don’t see total debt liability as long as I live” (Euractiv 2012).

Whilst Germany’s role as paymaster to the European Union has previously been explained as a strategic choice in order to gain influence over the European Union, this approach as not been completely without reproach. Germany has paid more money to the EU budget than any other member country, in 2003 contributing 7.7 billion Euros more than the second largest contributor, only Sweden and the Netherlands pay more per capita, and receiving only about half in return in the form of agricultural subsidies to German farmers (Afhueppe, Dohmen et al. 2005). However, it does appear that the European debt crisis and Germany’s role in financing the bailouts may have strengthened this critical sentiment, as evident by the somewhat dual approach taken by Angela Merkel, resembling that of a balancing act: accepting the role as saviour of the Euro as a burden Germany has to carry, whilst paying it forward to national critics by remaining firm, almost punishing, in criticism of and requirements on the recipient nations. The approach of demanding austerity policies in exchange for economic aid is also in perfect accordance with Germany’s economic “ideology” ordoliberalism: the social market economy that is said to largely have driven the creation of the post World War Two powerhouse that is the German economy (The Economist 2015).

Ordoliberalism is an economic school of thought which differs from both laissez-faire capitalism and the ideas behind planned economies, but also from Keynesian economic thinking. Unlike laissez-faire capitalism, it believes in the need for strong state intervention in the economy in order to ensure a level playing field and create order (hence, the Latin ordo); unlike planned economies, it strongly supports the ideas of free market competition and private property; unlike Keynesianism it sees “deficit spending for demand management [as] foolish” (The Economist 2015). It is largely the last point that is reflected in the German approach to the debt crisis: even in the face of collapsing demand in crisis-hit countries, Germany has insisted on fiscal austerity where other countries, even ones governed by conservative or right wing parties, have espoused more Keynesian influenced demand management, or fiscal stimulus (The Economist 2015).

Other factors and developments that may have influenced the chosen German approach to dealing with the debt crisis, and that will certainly have played on the mind of the
Chancellor throughout the process, is what appears to be growing Euro-scepticism in the electorate. Polls show that more than half say that the next government should not commit to further loans for crisis-hit countries, should not have the mandate to forgive Southern European debt, and should not agree to any form of joint liability (Forbrig 2013, Open Europe 2013).

Despite how important it is for Germany to solve the debt crisis, and as such avoiding the collapse of the currency that they themselves are part of, they have been placed in a situation where the European Union perhaps need them more than they need them. Without the German economy as engine, and provider of credit, the European Union would have a much harder time finding the financial means by which to implement for example bailout packages.

Germany’s position with regards to the European debt crisis is unique, and as has been previously explained, the European debt crisis, and the actions taken to resolve it, put Germany at the centre of conflicting fault lines regarding national interests, the interest of further European integration, the opinion of the electorate, as well as ideology.

### 3.1.2 Political Parties

The two large mainstream parties in Germany are the SPD (the Social Democratic Party) and the CDU/CSU (the Christian Democratic Union). Since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (not including the former DDR from 1949 – 1990), these two parties have alternated in holding the office of Chancellor, with only a short interim of 9 days in 1974 when the Chancellorship belonged to the FDP (the Free Democratic Party). Although all governments in the Federal Republic have been coalition governments, the fact that the CDU/CSU and the SPD have been part of all of them speaks to their centrality to the German political system.

As has been previously stated, this thesis focuses on mainstream parties. In this thesis, mainstream parties are conceptualised with a high likelihood of holding office, and although the German tradition of coalition government increases the likelihood of parties that some may view as niche parties entering government, the overall picture is still that the CDU/CSU and the SPD are the bearers of government in Germany. Smaller niche parties are dependent on reaching agreements with either of these two larger parties in order to obtain government positions. As such, the subset of political parties to the case of Germany will be the SPD and the CDU.
3.1.2.1 The CDU/CSU

The CDU/CSU, as is indicated by the two abbreviations, in reality consists of two cooperating political parties. The CDU is represented in 15 out of 16 regions in today’s Germany, whilst the CSU is its sister party in the region of Bavaria. Further in this chapter, they will be treated as an entity, as they run for election under the same united manifesto.

The CDU is the more recent of the two mainstream parties under analysis in this thesis, founded in 1945. However, politically the party is the heir of the pre-war Catholic Centre Party (Civil Administration Division 1949). The Centre Party was founded on the objective of combatting disbelief and the resulting behaviours in Prussian society. Their rise to prominence, however, first took place during the first years of the German empire, when Reichskanzler Otto Von Bismarck’s attempted to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church by transferring power over education and the registration of births, marriage and deaths from the church to the state. His attempt, and the resulting counter-movement led by the Centre Party, was termed the Kulturkampf, ending with victory for the forces which were represented by the CDU’s predecessor (Civil Administration Division 1949).

Whilst the Centre Party certainly had conservative elements and influences, their political base was far more nuanced. There were Christian Catholic trade Unions to which they had close links, predominantly in the Ruhr, and it was strongly influenced by the Christian Socialist bishop in Mainz, Wilhelm Emanuel Kettler. Both exerted considerable liberalising influences upon the party (Civil Administration Division 1949).

Although they enjoyed success in imposing upon Bismarck his first defeat in the Kulturkampf, their importance grew greatly with the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Weimar Republic, in which they, together with the SPD, where the mainstay. However, they also contributed to the downfall of the first democratic experiment in Germany by voting for the Enabling Act of 1933 amending the constitution so as to give Adolf Hitler dictatorial power and thus ending democracy and the Weimar Republic altogether. Had they voted against the amendment together with the SPD, the proposed changes in the constitution would not have reached the necessary two thirds of the votes in the Reichstag, and Adolf Hitler would have been forced to consider illegal means by which to bypass the Reichstag. The same year they proclaimed their own dissolution (Civil Administration Division 1949).
As has been mentioned, the CDU is the political heir of the Centre Party, but they are not exactly the same. Initially their following had previously followed the Centre Party, but the CDU also expanded their base to include supporters of the pre-war Democratic party, a slightly left of centre socially liberal party, as well as gaining a protestant following (Civil Administration Division 1949). The founding principle of the CDU was that all Christians should unite in defence of Christian values, and to stem the rising tide of materialism and Russian communism (Civil Administration Division 1949).

However, as time has passed and German society has changed, what is present day Christian democracy? What is its ideology, its vision, its principles, and how does it position itself on the left-right axis?

To answer the last question first: although parties’ position on the left right axis may vary slightly over time, depending both on elite opinion, strategic positioning, or a particular zeitgeist, evidence show that:

“With the exception of the current parliament and arguably a brief period in the 1950s, the CDU/CSU has never controlled the so-called median legislator on the left-right ideological axis within the Bundestag. The failure of the CDU/CSU to control the median legislator is important because it demonstrates that the CDU/CSU has remained a party of the right rather than a party of the centre” (Lees 2013, 65).

The remaining questions require a closer look at Christian Democracy as a separate ideology and political family, which is not an simple task given the lack of substantial research on it as a political phenomenon (Turner, Green et al. 2013). However, Bale and Szczerbiak (2008, 481) manage to identify five characteristic features of Christian Democracy through a close reading of the available literature, and refer to them as making up a family resemblance, indicating that they are “not mathematically precise but nevertheless clearly meaningful and useful” in identifying Christian Democratic parties and differentiating them from non-Christian Democratic counterparts. These are, as described by Turner, Green et al. (2013, 2):

“First, there is a ‘commitment to society as an organic whole’, with a desire to promote harmony between different strands of society. Second, there is a strong support for the notion of the ‘family’, which leads both to policy support for familiar structures, and an ‘emphasis on conservative social and cultural values’. Third, there is support for ‘social capitalism’, with a qualified belief in the market, and a
recognition of the need for some intervention to support the vulnerable. [...] Fourth, there is a strong emphasis upon ´transnational reconciliation´, which during the post-war period led to a shared commitment to the project of European integration. Finally, there is an explicit programmatic commitment to Christian values, while at the same time, organisationally, Christian Democratic parties operate at ´arm´s length´ from the Catholic Church”.

Christian democratic parties are described also in terms of the concept Volkspartei, defined as political parties that have cross class and cross confessional appeal in the electorate. The term Volkspartei is often related to its closest English equivalent, the catch-all party, however, as has been noted by Turner, Green et al. (2013, 2) the difference between these two concepts are perhaps the most interesting in terms of explaining Christian Democracy: whilst the term catch-all party may described a rather opportunistic political party almost if not completely devoid of ideological and interest-based principles, Volkspartei rather represents a commitment to furthering the interest of society as a whole. This certainly also ties in to the above described family resemblance characteristic of viewing society as an organic whole, and promoting the interest of harmony amongst and between all groups in society.

The CDU/CSU seems to be a good fit for all of these characteristics of Christian Democracy, but perhaps most strikingly in terms of what can be called “the ´Christian Democratic´ model of the welfare state”, which is a manifestation of the commitment to social capitalism, to social harmony, and to family values and conservative cultural norms. It can also be said to pave the way for the CDU/CSU´s broad electoral appeal. A welfare state has cross class appeal, particularly into the working and middle classes, whilst the value conservative elements of society can be reached due to the religious and family based support structures of the welfare policies. “Founded on the principle of ´social insurance´, this model required beneficiaries to make substantial contributions in order to receive relatively high replacement rates linked to their earnings, with the focus of the system being the ´male breadwinner´ of the household” (Turner, Green et al. 2013, 2).

In terms of transnational reconciliation, the CDU/CSU has been a supporter of a form of European integration since the party´s foundation after the Second World War, which in the case of Germany, as has been further explored in the sub-chapter on Germany above, holds a specific meaning beyond mere economic interests. The party´s Christian values have found their expression in multiple ways, but perhaps most visibly so through a combination of their
socially and culturally conservative values, through their support of the mention of God both in the national and in the European constitution, clearly representing a view of the Christian faith as a uniting feature of national and regional identity.

Although political scientists argue that the Volkspartei model is in decline, the CDU/CSU seems to have maintained much of its dominance in German political life (Turner, Green et al. 2013). The secularisation of Western European society, including Germany, the decline in church attendance, and the weakening of the link between religion and party preference has also been suggested as possible future problems for the CDU/CSU. However, there seems to be a mitigating effect, namely the transference of these previously mainly religious values into secular values that still influence party preference (Turner, Green et al. 2013, 4). An additional explanatory factor for the to this date absence of the hypothesised adverse effects emanating from the above-mentioned secularisation of society might be the presence of a cultural-religious aspect to national identity.

Regardless of changes in the structural and demographic makeup of society, the CDU/CSU seems to have succeeded in maintaining support for their Christian Democratic brand of politics, winning a plurality of the votes in fifteen out of seventeen Bundestag elections since 1949, and being member of forty-two out of sixty-two governments in the life span of the Federal Republic/Germany, arguably making it one of Europe´s most successful and important political parties (Lees 2013).

### 3.1.2.2 The SPD

The SPD has been characterised as the ‘grand old man´ of European political parties, and certainly is so amongst Europe´s Social Democratic parties. It´s history started not long after the unification of Germany into one state in 1871. Founded in 1875, initially drawing its inspiration from the teachings of Karl Marx, it experienced continual growth until it was the country´s largest party by the early years of the twentieth century (Berman 1998).

Whilst the CDU/CSU partially arose to counter the materialism inherent in the ideologies stemming from the teachings of Marx, most predominantly Communism, the SPD and Social Democracy was a product of the internal divisions and disagreements within the Marxist camp itself. The Marxist doctrine, in the words of Karl Kautsky, holds that “economic evolution inevitably brings on conditions that will compel the exploited classes to rise against this system of private ownership”. With each passing day, ever larger would grow the group of “propertyless workers for whom the existing system [would become] unbearable; who have
nothing to lose by its downfall but everything to gain’” (Karl Kautsky quoted in Berman 2005). It was this very idea that social change and revolution would occur almost automatically, and that no political intervention was needed or indeed desirable that eventually gave birth to the ideas that today have become what we know as Social Democracy.

As Marx’s ideas had failed to come true, and as elected officials of Marxist bent had come to hold significant power across Europe, and perhaps particularly in Germany, the Marxist doctrine and its failure to furnish its supporters with any tools or strategy to achieve any goals, increasingly came under question (Berman 2005).

Eduard Bernstein, a prominent member of the SPD and today considered as one of the founders of Social Democracy, challenged the two main pillars of Marxism: the conception that social change came merely as a result of changes in economic structure – historic materialism, and class struggle. He argued that instead of waiting for an inevitable collapse of capitalism and hence for the appearance of socialism, one should attempt to reform the system through democratic means. In addition, he argued that there were shared interests between the working class and elements of the middle and peasant classes, and that these should be viewed as potential allies together with which socialism could be achieved.

Although this internal split between Marxist theory and reformist and cooperative praxis persisted within the SPD up until the fall of the Weimar Republic, contributing amongst other factors to the difficulty the SPD faced in responding to the reach and appeal of fascism far into the working class electorate, it is within Bernstein’s critique of Marxism one finds the strongest defining features differentiating Social Democracy from its left wing counterparts: the belief in a political path to Socialism, and cross-class cooperation rather than class conflict (Berman 2005).

With the end of the Second World War, a new Europe emerged, one that was fertile for the ideas that had steadily matured within the reformist Social Democratic parties: the notion that economic development could not, and should not, be kept outside the reach of national governments, and that the social should not be subordinated to the economic. This belief was not entirely contained to the left of the political spectrum, and the era of Keynesian economic policy began (Berman 2005).
That being said, the conflict between more traditional socialist approaches, in many ways akin to those of Marxism, and the modern, reformist view of the primacy of politics and cross class cooperation, did not disappear completely. As with the Erfurt program of 1891, containing a split between an orthodox theoretical and ideological section, and a more practical policy section, the SPD´s program in 1952 displayed many of the same characteristics; the theoretical and ideological section speaking in traditional Marxist tones about the capitalist exploitation, class struggle and socialisation, whilst the policy part of the program embraced Keynesianism and modern reforms relating to for example the welfare state (Berman 2005, 22). It was only in 1959 that the SPD seemed to fully commit itself to what we know today as the “two pillars of a modern social democratic program – a people´s party strategy and a commitment to reform capitalism rather than destroy it”, committing the party to “as much competition as possible, as much planning as necessary” (Berman 2005, 23). It was also at this point that the SPD severed its brand of socialism from that of Marxism, also explicitly attempting to reach beyond the ranks of the working class by reaching out to the church and Christian communities, as well as expressing support for the armed forces (Berman 1998).

However, where the CDU/CSU seems to have been successful in becoming a Volkspartei, whilst still maintaining bonds to its traditional core electorate, though declining, the same cannot be said to be entirely true for the SPD:

*By the 1970s, in short, the SPD has become so integrated into the system, and so inflexible and ideologically exhausted, that the partial discrediting of its leadership by economic doldrums dealt it a blow from which it has yet to recover. Over the next generation, the party haemorrhaged members and increasingly became a home for the elderly and beneficiaries of the status quo. It lost the support of the young and radical, as well as many poor, unemployed, alienated. Many of the former turned left to the Greens, and some of the latter have lately turned to right and left-wing populism. Lacking anything to offer, the hollowed-out SPD now finds itself electorally vulnerable, subject to internal dissension, and increasingly unable to generate either enthusiasm or commitment from anybody” (Berman 2005, 26)*

Whilst the CDU/CSU has managed an astonishing “rise from the dead”, becoming arguably the strongest and most powerful political force in Europe garnering cross class support for a distinct ideological project from its position right of centre and remaining large and powerful in the face of a shrinking demographic base, the SPD´s ideological project seems diffuse at
best, its base unenthusiastic if still in the fold, mired in the problem of having an ideology mostly on paper, one which it is perceived as deviating from it in practice, though now in a very different way than in the past (Berman 2005).

3.2 Data

Analysing the narrative of a political party on European integration there is a wide array of available sources suited to the task, as political parties are open organisations striving to make their policies known to the public, so as to attract voters; there are many sources of information from which one could draw knowledge about a political party’s narrative on any given topic. There are records of parliamentary debates, policy papers from governments, newspaper articles, transcripts of speeches, election material as well as other possible sources.

In this paper, I have chosen to limit the scope of my data collection to party manifestos. There are several reasons behind this decision. If the goal of this thesis was to perform a simple rhetorical analysis, media sources or speeches would perhaps have been equally well suited. However, as I am most interested in looking at the development of opinions and political preferences, party manifestos are safe sources of official party policy. Individual politicians may at times use the media to give voice to policies that are not approved by the party as a whole, as a means by which to gain electoral support, or as a way to attempt to provoke change in official party policy. Choosing party manifestos, one can be assured that what is represented is the official policy of the political party for the given electoral period. Party manifestos are also to a lesser extent than speeches directed at one individual group of listeners. They express which policies the party wants the electorate to vote for, and simultaneously it is penned with the expectation that it might one day give direction for governance. In this way, party manifestos will to a lesser extent than alternative data sources be a simple rhetorical exercise directed at one specific audience, but rather it will show ideological direction and represent the official position of the party. One will also avoid the bias of having the policy position be interpreted and presented by an individual representative of the party either through a speech or a media appearance, but also the interpretive lens of the media. It is policy ‘straight from the horse’s mouth’, and in that sense party manifestos have great authority.

Kiratli (2015) describes four reasons why manifestos of bigger parties have greater importance than those of smaller parties, as well as also surpassing the importance of other sources of political discourse and policy. He points out that these parties represent a larger
proportion of the electorate thus reflecting a greater portion of society; that political parties in and around the centre, as opposed to the left and right fringes of the spectrum, are less ideologically driven and more driven by differences in political culture and identity; that larger parties are more experienced with governing and thus their manifestos represent the world view and governing proposals of a potential governing party; and, exactly because these larger parties are potential governing parties, they have less room for strategic manoeuvring and distortion of their policy positions in order to win votes. They understand that they might have to govern based on their manifesto, and it therefore holds greater realism than one might expect from fringe parties. In short, election manifestos have been chosen for their reliability in providing information on a political party’s positions, policies and world views over time.

3.2.1 Data Selection
Party manifestos are a widely available data source, most of which have been made electronically available. In the case of the SPD, electoral manifestos can be found archived on the web pages of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) dating back as far as the Bundestag elections in 1949, and in the case of the CDU/CSU they are available on the web pages of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) also archived as far back as 1949. Potentially, one could therefore perform longitudinal studies with vast amounts of data. However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to limit the scope of the data, both as a result of the thesis question focusing on the debt crisis, but also because the method chosen necessitates manual work and qualitative analysis of a type that is time and space consuming.

The elections for which manifestos will be analysed are 2005, 2009 and 2013. The reasons for this selection are as follows. Only one Bundestag election has occurred after the onset of the debt crisis: in 2013. It is therefore necessary to include the manifestos pertaining to the 2013 election. In addition, I chose to include two data points prior to the onset of the debt crisis. First, simply to obtain more information; although manifestos are long documents, only the parts of the text pertaining to European integration will be of interest to the analysis. This is a relatively small part of the documents, especially prior to the crisis, and as a result it will be of great use to the analysis to be able to utilise more material. At the same time, there are several relevant differences between the elections of 2005 and 2009. Both elections took place before the debt crisis hit, but the election of 2009 took place in an environment of financial crisis. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that the manifestos for that particular election were influenced by the dire economic situation of the world economy and as a result also of the
European economy. As previously described, the financial crisis was the predecessor to the debt crisis, and it would therefore be useful to compare the discourse in the 2013 manifesto with the discourse both in a manifesto written before the onset of financial crisis, and with one written during financial crisis. In such a manner, it would potentially be possible to separate the political effects of the financial crisis from the political effects of the debt crisis.

From the SPD, the election manifesto “Vertrauen in Deutschland”, or “Faith in Germany”, for the Bundestag-election in 2005 contains a short chapter on Europe, European integration and the European Union. The chapter in question totals about one page, largely made up of bullet points, under the heading “We want a citizen-friendly, social and strong Europe”. The manifesto as a whole contains 42 pages of programmatic content, and the section on Europe is therefore a rather small proportion of the total content of the manifesto (SPD 2005). Further, the election manifesto “Sozial und demokratisch”, or Social and Democratic, from 2009 also has one chapter on European integration, titled “A strong and Social Europe”, making up 4 of the total 95 pages in the complete manifesto (SPD 2009). The 2013 manifesto titled “Das wir entscheidet”, or “We Decide”, with its two chapters pertaining to European integration titled “Together for a more Social Market Economy in Europe” and “For a better Europe” has about 116 pages in total, in which six make up the chapters relating to European integration (SPD 2013).

For the CDU/CSU, the 2005 election manifesto is named “Deutschlands Chancen nutzen”, or “Utilising Germany’s Chances”, and has a chapter on European integration called “New faith in Europe” of two pages, whereas the entire manifesto has 39 pages (CDU/CSU 2005). In 2009, the CDU/CSU’s manifesto was titled “Wir haben die Kraft”, or “We have the energy”, and it contained one chapter on European integration titled “Strong Europe – Secure Future” making up three out of the manifestos total of 92 pages (CDU/CSU 2009). The 2013 manifesto “Gemeinsam Erfolgreich für Deutschland” or “Collectively Successful for Germany” has two relevant chapters, “Germany’s future in Europe” and “Europe: Strong in the World”, together making up about four out of the 78 pages in the entire election manifesto (CDU/CSU 2013).
Translated versions of the analysed chapters can be found as an appendix to this thesis, so as both to allow for greater transparency, and to enable non-proficient German-readers of this thesis to gain an understanding of the background material of the following analysis.

### 3.3 From Typology to Method

The typology presented in the chapter on analysing narratives, and the theory with which it has been expanded, will be utilised in two ways. In terms of method, or research design, it will be the basis upon which I create a set of questions that will be used as a guide in analysing the data – the party election manifestos. These questions will be formed under each of the dimensions of the typology, in accordance with the theoretical foundations of the typology. Kiratli (2015), who also based his analysis of party manifestos and European integration on the typology presented by Best, Lengyel et al. (2012), operationalised his typology in the much the same manner, and although his focus has largely been on identity formation at the European level, his questions will set a point of departure for the questions used in this thesis as well.

The typology and its theoretical foundation will also be utilised in the further analysis, comparison and discussion of the data collected through the analysis of the manifestos. However, should the careful reading of the data reveal information not clearly fitting within the framework of the typology it will still form part of the analysis, discussion and/or conclusion.

The **legitimation dimension** of the typology aims to expose the arguments employed in order to justify the political party’s position on European integration. These legitimations can either be found in narratives directly connected to a justification of the party’s stance, or they can be found in the party’s narratives around positions relating to more specific policies aimed at

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2 The translation has been done by the undersigned. I am not a certified or trained translator, nor am I experienced in translating from German to English. In this instance, care has been placed on achieving a translation that conveys the intended meanings, placing lesser weight on grammar and syntax in the target language. As such, the translations are to be viewed as means by which to achieve greater transparency and as roadmap for the readers of the thesis that cannot read the election manifestos in their original language. Whilst the translations have been utilised for quotations in the thesis, the page numbers utilised as references refer to the page numbers in the original documents (bracketed in the translation).
furthering/bettering the course of the integration. The investigative questions that will be used for the purpose of locating these narratives are:

- Why does the party support European integration?
- Why is European integration a good thing?
- Why does the party support policies aimed at furthering/better the course of integration?

As might be visible, there is not a large “gap” between these questions, and they may indeed capture much of the same information, however utilising questions with a slightly different wording may help ensure that the available information is captured, through ensuring focus on the possible variations in how the narratives may be worded or directed. It is also important to note that, as is often the case with content analysis, that a single sentence or piece of text may simultaneously be relevant for more than one dimension of the typology (Julien 2008, 120-121).

The identity dimension of the typology is included in order to expose the party’s view on the existence of a separate European identity, how this identity may or may not relate to a national identity, and to find information about perceived in- and out-groups, or otherings, employed in the narratives. The investigative questions that will be used for this purpose are:

- Does a separate European identity exist?
- How does a European identity differ from the national identity
- Who, if any, are narrated as ‘the others’?
- Is there any indication of whether or not these identities or otherings are inclusive or exclusive?

The projection dimension of the typology aims at uncovering the political party’s views on the future of European integration. The goal is not to detect and refer to an exhaustive list of proposed policies over time, but to find evidence of what kind of Europe/European integration the party envisages for the future. This vision of the future for European integration may be found at the intersection between the various proposed policies, and is likely to point to a general picture of what kind of future for the European Union that the party aspires to. It may also reveal projections that are not in the party’s interests, that they do not wish to work towards, but rather that represents a prediction of, perhaps, a more pessimistic nature. The investigative questions that will be used to interrogate the narratives are:
What does the future of Europe/European integration look like?
What kind of Europe/European integration does the party want for the future?

The questions posed above are considered as a guide into the data material. It is not the purpose of this thesis to find exact answers to these questions; they are a conceptualisation of the typology presented in the framework of the study. The analysis according to these questions will be conducted in an inductive and reasoning manner, through an open categorisation and repeated reading of the data. As such, the content of the manifestos are inductively categorised according to the typology/questions and as such analysed in accordance with the theoretical framework of the study. Whilst this process is not schematically visualised in the thesis, much effort has been placed in explaining the understood meaning of the text, how it relates to the typology and as such to the theoretical framework of the thesis.

After each manifesto has been analysed in this manner, the resulting data will be compared temporally and analysed according to the research question guiding the entirety of this thesis.

3.4 Reliability and Validity

Inductive analysis, as described above, raises important, and ubiquitous questions regarding reliability and validity. In terms of reliability, referring to the consistency of a measure, and as such whether the results could be reproduced by a different researcher, the method utilised places great responsibility on the researcher. Inductive reasoning does leave open the possibility that different researchers may make different evaluations of the data, and as such may result in problems of reliability. This problem is mitigated, though not fully eliminated, by ensuring that enough weight is placed on thoroughly explaining why different parts of the narrative has been ‘categorised’ in accordance with the typology in the manner it has.

Internal validity refers to the accuracy of the measures employed; does the typology and the questions posed measure what they are intended to measure? Such a discussion must be made on two levels. The first level relates to whether or not the questions posed in the ‘From Typology to Method’-section of this thesis are accurate measures of the dimensions of the typology put forth in the ‘Analysing Narratives’-section. On the second level it becomes a question of whether the typology and the relating research design are appropriate means by which to answer the research question with its concomitant operationalisation.
The questions posed as means by which to probe the data has been put forth because they are believed to properly operationalize the dimensions of the typology. There is however no clear-cut answer to the question of whether or not they are sufficient. However, the present minded researcher will at all times keep in mind what the research question is meant to bring to light in the data material, and as such, coming across information relating to the dimensions of the typology, though not revealed by questions related to the typology, the researcher may still include the information in the analysis. As such, the lack of rigidity in the methodological approach, whilst posing problems in terms of reliability, may indeed make up for any issues that occur in terms of internal validity.

It is clear from the limited scope in terms of case and data material of this thesis that the external validity, as it refers to the generalizability of the results, is low; the results may not speak for any cases beyond those analysed because of the nature of the method and of the case, but also because of the theoretical uncertainty of this topic given the lack of research on political parties’ change in perceptions and policy positions on European integration.

As this thesis represents a novel approach to a topic which has been left largely unresearched, its main purpose is best viewed as explorative, and as such, any problems relating to external validity becomes less so. Rather, this thesis may leave open a path for further theory development and research on the topic, given results that indicate the need for research done in a manner so as to perhaps facilitate generalizability in the future.

3.5 The Researcher in Context

As has been stated by Mauthner and Doucet (2003, 415), The positivistic model of the absent or neutral researcher is reinforced by computer aided programs for qualitative data analysis as ‘the use of technology confers an air of scientific objectivity onto what remains a fundamentally subjective, interpretive process’.

Whilst this is true, there is little doubt that qualitative methods relying on inductive analysis leaves even greater room for influence from the researcher, and even more so when words and political narratives are the subject of analysis. Political texts are not merely descriptions of reality or of policy proposals, but are deeply engrained with political meaning based on the ideological lens through which the writer(s) view the world. Readers also infuse the text with meaning, depending on an interpretation of the text through the lens of their particular world view. Words may have different meanings in different political climates, they may arouse different feelings according to political leanings, and they may be intended to inspire different
reactions in the in-group than they would in any given out-group. Accordingly, different political groups have words and terms towards which they feel ownership - that inspire meaning within their context. Language is central to politics, and insiders to political groups may have a different grasp over them than others.

A researcher cannot reasonably be expected to be politically neutral. They have opinions and political affiliations in the same manner as most, if not every other, citizen. Whilst they may be expected to not allow their affiliations to unduly influence the outcome of their research, can one really claim that it is possible to erase ones world view, to shelve the lens through which one views the world?

There are plenty of ways in which these worldviews may influence research beyond the unethical misrepresentation of data and results for political or personal gain, which obviously must be avoided at any cost. Given that political research is largely a written undertaking, one in which language and words plays an obvious role, and that the researcher herself is a part of the social and political world that she studies, any researcher in the fields of social and political sciences ought to afford attention to the way in which knowledge is constructed, and how it is constituted. “Representation … is always self-presentation … the Other’s presence is directly connected to the writer’s self-presence in the text… knowledge and understanding are contextually and historically grounded, as well as linguistically constituted” (Mauthner and Doucet 2003, 416).

In the literature reflexivity is suggested as means by which to counter, or at least ensure transparency about, the embeddedness of the researcher in the social and political world that she investigates, her ontological and/or epistemological assumptions and beliefs, and other factors that may or may not influence the research at hand (Mauthner and Doucet 2003).

In research containing interviews, or any other form of interaction between the researcher and her subjects, reflexivity mainly becomes a question of research ethics in its traditional sense, and finds its expression in identifying relations or factors that may influence the responses of the interviewee or the interpretation of the data by the researcher, for example the power relations between them. Another form of reflexivity would be reflecting upon whether or not there are institutional or interpersonal contexts, for example the prospect of tenure, that may influence how the researcher frames, presents or directs her research (Mauthner and Doucet 2003). However, in this thesis, it becomes natural that reflexivity is represented as reflecting
upon, being aware of, and open about one’s own affiliations, knowledge claims, and worldviews, in addition to preconceptions and assumption relevant to the topic at hand.

Thus, I have been careful to analyse my own epistemological and ontological assumptions, and to explicitly mention them at the appropriate points in the text once they have become apparent.

Another factor which may influence my analysis in this thesis is my own political affiliation. I am a Social Democrat, and this does not merely imply that I hold particular views in given policy questions, be they related to taxation, welfare, social justice or education. More than anything, it is an identity indicator; it locates me not only in political space, but in cultural, social and class terms as well. Such is the nature of political affiliations, likening them in some respects to religious affiliations. It is the view of the undersigned that the researcher cannot, or perhaps ought not, represent themselves as empty vessels. Claims that research tasks are merely mechanical, in no way involving the cognitive skills that are inseparable from the self, may indeed end up masking bias, or preventing the focused critical readership of the research.

In any given analysis of political parties, be they Social Democratic or not, my political affiliation is worth mentioning, simply because it gives the reader of the analysis the possibility to read the analysis honestly and with a more directionally critical eye. The process of reflexivity, undertaken before, during and after the analysis was conducted, has also allowed for my own awareness to be sharpened, so as to make sure that my political affiliations have not been allowed to unduly influence the outcomes of this thesis.

Another factor coming to the forefront through the process of reflexivity has been the possible advantages that this thesis may have garnered from the presence and awareness of my political affiliation; the particular knowledge and understanding of Social Democratic narratives, words, phrases and colloquialism stemming from my political background may have helped in the analysis section of this thesis. Deep familiarity with a topic whilst undertaking research about it is a positive factor. This familiarity and knowledge about the ideological background of one of the parties under investigation has also spurred me on in gaining a deeper and more complete understanding of the Christian Democratic ideology and party, and the ways in which my knowledge around Social Democracy is structured, be they about what words represent, or more policy oriented, has inspired and guided this undertaking.
It is my belief that the process of reflexivity, and the awareness it has garnered, has allowed me to utilise the positive aspect of familiarity, knowledge and understanding resulting from my position in relation to the thesis subjects, whilst not allowing it to unduly influence or skew the analysis, and the results thereof. The research questions itself, not stipulating an answer that becomes a matter of values, aids in this process, and as such is less susceptible to unwanted influences.

Finally, a short note about my views on European integration and the European Union; my reference point in this context is the Norwegian political debate on EU membership. The Norwegian debate, with its focus on yes/no to Norwegian membership and the national peculiarities surrounding it, is somewhat removed from the narratives under analysis in this thesis. However, for the purpose of transparency, as described above, I chose clarify that my view on the matter is perhaps best explained by the word uncertainty. Although it appears unlikely that a position of ‘agnosticism’ on the matter would unduly influence my work, it has been part of the process of reflexivity.
Part 2. Analysis

4 Analysing Narratives

The following chapter contains the analysis of the party manifestos according to the typology put forth earlier in this thesis. The analysis is presented in sub-chapters according to typology dimension, and sub-ordered according to the year of the manifesto. At the end of each typology sub-chapter there is a comparison of the analysis which it follows. This comparison is conducted temporally. In other words, the purpose of the comparison is to make clearer the changes over time between the individual party manifestos, as opposed to between the parties.

4.1 Legitimation

4.1.1 “Vertrauen in Deutschland” – SPD 2005

At the outset of the manifesto chapter Europe is portrayed as an idea, as something of non-material value. Its purpose is to convey rights to its citizens. It’s utility lies in its ability to secure rights of a mostly moral character: “Freedom and justice, solidarity and gender equality must apply in all of Europe” (SPD 2005, 40). This normative idea, or “idea of Europe” as it is put in the manifesto itself, is described as having been made the guideline for German European policy by the then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) (SPD 2005, 40).

This focus on normative ideas as the main legitimation for the European project continues by placing democracy and political leadership (assumed to be in opposition to what is perceived as a more bureaucratically driven European Union) at the fore, where human rights are described as the ground upon which these normative ideas are based.

If there is a focus on more cognitive ideas, or interest based legitimations, these are also presented in the guise of value-based arguments. These are mainly about the European Union contributing to the preservation of the European social- and welfare model, largely referring to the welfare state – “collectively earned wealth”, but also to democracy and workers’ rights – “participation of individuals in society” (SPD 2005, 40). It is not surprising to anyone familiar with the history and ideology of social democratic parties both in Germany and across Europe that there would be a focus on the welfare state, worker’s rights, economic growth and increased creation of jobs, and that these are perceived as being connected both to the realm of values and normative ideas about what is perceived to be morally right and just, as well as to the realm of interests, practical policies and cognitive ideas. What is perhaps not
surprising, but still altogether noticeable and worth mentioning is that these normative and
cognitive ideas relating to democracy at the European level, efficacy in decision-making, the
protection of the European social- and welfare model and economic growth and job-creation
are largely described as strategies and goals for the future. As something that must and should
be implemented and/or increased. From this perspective, it is clear that in the ideational realm
the European Union is perceived as being unfinished – a work in progress. Much of the
legitimation for the European project is therefore based on what Europe could be, rather than
what it was at the time the manifesto was penned. An example, amongst many, is: “The
agreement on a shared, democratically legitimate basis for future work in Europe, grounded in
human rights, remains relevant and is a goal for us” (SDP 2005, 40).

The pursuit of European integration, and the support for the European project, is also
presented as a peace project. The enlargement policy of the European Union, in which its
membership base increased from the six founding members in 1958 to twenty-five in 2005, is
described as having been “in core always a peace policy” (SDP 2005, 40). It is even stated
that the honouring of agreements relating to the expansion of the European Union is a
prerequisite for peace and stability in Europe.

commitment for conflict prevention and a more just world order as preconditions for peace” is
highlighted as “a binding guideline in all international activities of the European Union” for
the SPD (SDP 2005, 41).

In other words, the legitimations provided in the 2005 election manifesto are mostly
normative in nature, based largely on an idea of what Europe is and has potential to be. The
focus of these normative legitimations is democracy, human rights and peace. The normative
legitimation of European integration can also be represented by the repeated use of the
German word “gemeinsam”, closely related to “gemeinschaft”, for which there is no one
common English translation that would fully describe the content and true meaning (SDP
2005, 40-41). Whilst being translated as “common” or “together”, or synonyms thereof, it also
projects the meaning of “togetherness” perhaps best although not completely, represented in
English by “collective”. It points to the value of a collective effort, of the ideational belief in
the benefits of community, and more than just describing the mere joining of different units
for utilitarian purposes, brings forth ideological associations for Social Democrats. As a
result, perhaps another normative legitimation can be said to relate to the more ideological
view of the strength and importance of collective action, which finds its basis in the idea that “the individual is helplessly dependent on the way the collective, society and surroundings work, and a well-functioning society is also helplessly dependent on rules for this collective life” (Carlsson and Lindgren 2007, 25). Within this ideological analysis of the importance of the collective, European integration could be viewed as yet another means by which individuals could collectively organise in a manner which, in social democratic ideology, is believed to strengthen the ability of the masses to obtain greater freedom. In such an analysis, the previously described SPD-view that the European Union is yet to fulfil its potential in terms of, for example, contributing to the protection of the European social- and welfare model as well as for growth and increased employment, adds up to a legitimation of European integration based on the idea that the construction of a European collective could, in essence, help realise some fundamental ideological beliefs held by Social Democrats.


For the CDU/CSU European integration is nothing less than “the key to lasting peace, freedom and prosperity in our continent” (CDU/CSU 2005, 35). Initiating their chapter on European integration with a formulation pointing to European integration as pivotal in the work for peace, freedom and prosperity they make it clear that at the very least there is a basic notion of a normative legitimation for the support of European integration in the CDU/CSU. This is supported by a critique of the Red/Green (SPD and Die Grünen/Bündnis 90) government of Germany at the time having acted “with unilateralism” thus dividing Europe, clearly indicating the view that acting merely in German national interests in perceived as a negative undertaking (CDU/CSU 2005, 35).

There are, however, also indications that the CDU/CSU’s support for European integration also has more cognitive legitimations based on national interests. Stating that “we will push for a thrifty EU budget, taking into account its limited effects in Germany” they tell their voters that they will support a budget of a more austere variety partially as a result of the perception that Germany reaps few benefits from EU spending (CDU/CSU 2005, 36). As such, their proposal indicates that they also hold a quid pro quo view of European integration, where their views and proposed policies are motivated by what they perceive Germany gets in return.

All in all, the CDU/CSU employs legitimations that are both normative and cognitive, balancing between supporting European integration because it represents and/or ensures the
realisation of important values and ideas, with the need for European integration also to be in line with German national interests.

**4.1.3 “Sozial und demokratisch” – SPD 2009**

At the outset, European integration is characterised as a tool, or a new and necessary arena, to implement social democratic values, and policies based on social democratic ideology and beliefs. It is characterised as “our collective chance to realise our notion of progress and social justice in the global reality of the 21st century” (SPD 2009, 85). The belief that in the face of globalisation the nation state has become too small a unit to implement social democratic policies particularly related to the economy and the regulation thereof is underlined, and the European level is described as the new and better-suited arena for such policies. Europe becomes “united in solidarity” and should “enforce the primacy of politics over the free play of market forces” and as such is narrated as the possible saviour of the values that are true and good in the face of destructive and threatening forces, in the eyes of the SPD (SPD 2009, 85). This is clearly lifting European integration up and beyond the sphere of mere interests and into the realm of normative ideas, although the separation between the two is not crystal clear. These normative ideas are also cognitive ideas in that they are both a normative, ideological value system and at the same time presented as urgent interests. They are however not objective interests, to the extent that interests can be objective, that would find support across the ideological spectrum, but rather clear results of an ideational analysis of the current situation, and as such presents itself as evidence of the notion that interests, in much the same way as ideas, are subject to bias.

Much of the narrative of the chapter is ideological in nature, and uses words and phrases that indicate that support for the European project is based on the evaluation that European integration is in the interest of anyone wanting social democracy to succeed in Germany and in Europe as a whole. The narrative that the successes of the SPD and its partners in the labour movement in Germany over the past century can and must be replicated at the European level is presented with urgency given formulations such as “it is possible to civilise capitalism”, and “In the global 21st century we have to make this argument again. Now, Europe is the arena” (SPD 2009, 85).

Further, in the ideational realm, European integration is presented as a peace project at its core. A project that is good and selfless in “enforcing human rights and international law, promoting democracy and dialogue between cultures, and that apply itself for social and environmental standards in the globalised economy” (SPD 2009, 88). In this same vein,
European integration is narrated as having potential to become a beacon for democracy and justice.

There are parts of the narrative that sway in the direction of interest-based legitimations, and some of these can be found in the proposed policies and the defences of them. These interest-based legitimations are at times overt, but mostly underlying and therefore a matter of analysis. “[…] we must make sure that the German right of participation is not undermined” and “this is also a necessary precondition to keep social welfare at a high level in Germany” are such examples, relating to the need to implement a policy at the European level in order to protect German interests from external, European, pressures (SPD 2009, 87).

Although not as clearly stated as in the above examples, yet in the same vein, are the narratives defending proposed policies at the European level. One example is “we want agreed upon minimum social standards to prevent a downward spiral of wages and social standards in Europe and to enforce social progress at the European level” (SPD 2009, 86).

One year prior to this election manifesto being penned, the EU expanded to the east, and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia as well as a few countries not formerly part of the Eastern bloc joined the European Union, thus gaining access to the Single Market. Whilst the pre-2004 members enjoyed comparatively much the same levels of social protection and wages, these new members represented a new challenge to the European Union, having lower wage levels, comparatively lower labour market standards in terms of regulation and social protection, and some also comparatively high levels of unemployment. Their entering the labour market in the European Union contributing to perceived downward pressures on wage levels and labour market standards in Germany, making it likely that the push for introduction of policies to prevent these pressures is connected to the protection of German national interests.

These are of course only national interests in so far as this type of wage competition is perceived as something negative, about which there could clearly be ideological disagreement, however, the narrative presented by the SPD makes their position clear. These types of legitimation narratives are employed on multiple occasions, and the following seems to strengthen the argument: “the following must apply across Europe: equal pay and equal working conditions for equal work in the same place” (SPD 2009, 87). Although one could make the argument that such a policy position and narrative is employed in order to prevent the exploitation of non-German workers in the German labour market, and do so without
necessarily being incorrect about the motivation behind the proposal, it undoubtedly also has
the effect of protecting German workers from competition based on wage levels and standards
of social protection in the labour market, and more importantly, of giving the impression to
voters that the interests of German workers are being taken seriously in connection with
questions of European integration.

Overall, a narrative is presented that describes European integration and the European Union
as a project with great potential and an endeavour of necessity in the drive to realise values
and policy ideas that are believed to be inherently good and morally just.

Whilst these values and policy ideas may very well have their basis in the realm of normative
ideas, the legitimations employed in order to defend the position on European integration
appears to be largely one of utility; the European Union and European integration is a tool to
achieve the policies that are presented to the German electorate in their manifesto. As such,
there are both normative and utilitarian legitimations, however as a whole they are best
understood in terms of utility.

4.1.4 “Wir haben die Kraft – Gemeinsam für unser Land.” – CDU/CSU 2009
For the CDU/CSU a “[…] united Europe offers its citizens every opportunity to realise their
future prospects and to live their lives in peace and freedom” (CDU/CSU 2009, 88). As such,
there is an expression of normative ideas as basis for the legitimation of support for European
integration. It is a project representing peace and freedom, in which all member states are
equal: “a partnership where all member states are at the same eye level” (CDU/CSU 2009,
88).

European integration is however also expressly supported because of national interests, in
which the CDU/CSU “stand for a wise national and European understanding of interests”
(CDU/CSU 2009, 88). “The European Union is the best foundation for growth, creating and
securing jobs, and social security in our country”, and “[the recent EU enlargements have
been a success and in the interest of Germany and Europe”, thus making it clear that support
for European integration is also founded in perceptions of what is the national interests, and
that the European project contributes to fulfil these. Although some of these national interests
that the CDU/CSU believes the European Union can help achieve are undoubtedly also shared
by many if not all member states of the European Union, the European Union is represented
as a means by which Germany can achieve a level of international influence that they would
have had a hard time achieving standing alone. In this vein, they express support for “a strong,
decision-efficient European Foreign and Security Policy to successfully represent our interests in the world of the 21st century” and “a long-term energy policy for the European Union, which increases the EU’s influence in the global energy markets” (CDU/CSU 2009, 89).

There is also an ideological component to the legitimations that are both normative and cognitive in nature, expressing the utility of European integration in realising these ideologically based beliefs about what is in the national interest. The goals of creating and securing growth, jobs and social security in Germany are, according to the CDU/CSU, best achieved through “the social market economy that we want to anchor in Europe and internationally […]. It is the successful and humane response to the failed systems of socialist planned economy and unbridled capitalism” (CDU/CSU 2009, 88). Differentiating their ideological approach from that of their political competition and pointing out that European integration and the European Union would be the best foundation to realise this ideological model, European integration and the European Union becomes a policy-utility, or a tool for political success. As such, some of the reasoning behind supporting the European project, the legitimations employed, has their basis in the idea that the European Union could be yet another launch pad for political success.

4.1.5  “Das Wir entscheidet” – SPD 2013

Right from the outset, European integration and the European Union are presented as an idea: “the idea that after militant centuries, Europe can provide a place where peace rules, that exports social justice and stability to the world, and is organised as a transnational democracy […]” (SPD 2013, 101). Europe is narrated as a normative idea based on the values of peace, social justice and stability, and democracy. Further, European integration is presented as the saviour of, and the last line of defence against the destruction of, the “European social model built on solidarity and a fair balance of interests” (SPD 2013, 101). As such, the legitimation of the support for European integration is largely normative in character, pointing to values that are important ideological cornerstones for the SPD.

However, as the legitimations are also based on the idea that European integration is the only way to defend and develop the social model, understood largely as the welfare state, it also becomes a matter of seeing European integration as a means by which they can implement their particular policy ideas. In that perspective there are interest-based, or cognitive, legitimations at play, although it is hardly easy in every case to clearly separate these from the more normative legitimations described earlier. In addition, the legitimations that have elements of the utilitarian, the interests-based and the cognitive, are rarely employed purely in
defence of the national interest, but rather in defence of ideology and SPD policy, although the SPD undoubtedly view these to be in the German national interest. There is also a legitimation-narrative more in terms of collective European interests: “especially in times in which it is obvious how necessary European integration is to ensure that Europe can maintain its prosperity and stability in competition with the emerging regions of the world […]” (SPD 2013, 101).

All in all, perhaps the best description of the utilised legitimations is that European integration, in addition to being a normative idea about peace, justice, stability and democracy, is an instrument, or a suited level of governance, for implementation and protection of policies and institutions that the SPD shows an almost value-based faith in the importance and rightness of; a defence of some understanding of the status quo and the possibilities of improvements thereof.

4.1.6 “Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland” – CDU/CSU 2013
A quote from the German constitution serves as a reminder of their lesson from history: “to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe” (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). European integration and their commitment to Europe are described as “a matter of common sense, but also a labour of love” (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). Continuing in this vein of normative legitimations, the European Union is described as standing for “freedom and human rights, for tolerance and peaceful coexistence internally and externally, for wealth and social security” (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). The successes of European integration are further represented in terms of the freedom to travel and associate across borders, and the removal of physical obstacles for such (CDU/CSU 2013, 8).

Beyond these normative legitimations hailing European integration and the European Union for the values it is perceived to stand for, the chapters concerning European integration in the 2013-election manifesto of the CDU/CSU continue down a different path. Whilst Germany might have some utilitarian reasons for being part of the European project and for being members of the European Union, these seems to be more in the background compared to the utility Germany serves as members of the European community and as partakers in European integration. The narrative becomes one where Germany, as the success story, is part of the European Union in order to impart important lessons on the other member states, and to lead by example. “For many in Europe and the world, Germany is today a role model when it comes to stable and sustainable development”, “The social market economy and the wise political decisions for its development, serve as an example for their own efforts”, “our
balanced economic structure with a strong middle class, a powerful industry and our social partnership of trade unions and employer’s organisations stands as a model world wide”, “with the successful policies of the CDU and the CSU, Germany has become the anchor of stability and growth in Europe (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). As a result, we have a particular responsibility in resolving the debt crisis in Europe, “we have, together with our European partners, employed debt brakes based on a German model in the Euro countries […]” and “we […] defend the independence of the European Central Bank, which was based on the model of the German Bundesbank” (CDU/CSU 2013, 8-9).

As just shown, there is no shortness of evidence for the CDU/CSU’s perception of Germany playing the part of role model, benchmark for success, and driver of positive change based on its own perceived superior economic system and social model. As such, a major part of the legitimations are based on an idea of Germany as the saviour of European integration, and that Germany is more of a utility for Europe than Europe is a utility for Germany.

As a connecting argument it seems European integration, and the Euro in particular, needs to be saved through implementing facets of the German system, both because of the values that are linked to the currency project as a whole, but mostly because of its importance for the German economy and German exports: “we stand for a strong Euro and stable prices. Both are key prerequisites for the success of our economy and the creation of new jobs. Almost 40 per cent of German exports go to the Euro zone, 60 per cent to Europe as a whole, securing millions of well-paid jobs in Germany” (CDU/CSU 2013, 9). In addition there seems to be an understanding of the world order in which the success of emerging economies is represented as a threat to European prosperity and success. Thus membership in, and the fortunes of, the European Union and European integration is seen in terms of being able to face increasing global competition (CDU/CSU 2013).

4.1.7 Comparing Legitimations

4.1.7.1 The SPD

In 2005, the SPD employs largely normative legitimations, where the values of democracy, human rights and peace are placed at the centre of what European integration is about. European integration and the European Union are presented as an idea – “the idea of Europe” (SPD 2005). This idea, based on the values of democracy, human rights, peace, justice, solidarity and gender equality, are stated as being the guiding principle of all German European policies under the SPD-led government headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
Cognitive, or interest based legitimations, are employed only to the extent that European integration and the European Union becomes a means by which to protect what social democrats consider to be amongst its core beliefs and policies: the welfare state, redistribution, and workers’ rights. As such, these interest legitimations have one foot in each camp: they are both normative and cognitive. Given in conjunction with the repeated use of the word *gemeinsam*, pointing to the collective or to togetherness, the legitimations themselves appear to be given in an ideological light. As such, the chapter as a whole represents a legitimation of support for European integration and the European Union that is about the strength and importance of the collective and of collective efforts. The construction of a true European collective could in essence, help realise some of the fundamental ideological beliefs held by the SPD.

Although the ideological, and thus largely normative, nature of the legitimations continues in the SPD manifesto for 2009, there is a somewhat different tone in the narratives. They become clearer in their representation of European integration and the European Union as a utility, or a tool by which concrete social democratic policies could be implemented at the European level, seemingly in order to protect policies and systems at the national level.

The narrative becomes one in which European integration and the European Union are the possible saviours of values, ideological positions and specific policies that are perceived to be under threat from amongst others “the free play of market forces” (SPD 2009, 85). These are normative legitimations, although matching the previously described utilitarian narratives in content, largely because they are made in a language strongly ideological in nature: “it is possible to civilise capitalism” (SPD 2009, 85). In addition, in the normative realm, there is reference to European integration as a peace project.

As in the manifesto for 2005 there are legitimations that straddle both the realm of the normative and the cognitive/interest-based, however in opposition to the 2005 manifesto these have now become more overtly about defending German policies, systems and privileges. They are about defending the German right of participation and keeping social welfare at a high level in Germany. In other words, European integration has become more overtly legitimised as a means by which to protect German interests from external, quite possibly European, pressures.

As such, their ideological bent is perhaps stronger in 2009 than in 2005, particularly in terms of questions around the economy. However, the legitimations have changed more in the
direction of the utilitarian, placing greater weight on what European integration could possibly do for Germany as opposed to the more general normative legitimations about the idea upon which the European project is based displayed more prominently in the 2005 manifesto. The narrative in the 2009 manifesto could therefore be said to be more negative in its outlook, looking to Europe for assistance in defending what is perceived as important political traits in Germany, and as such more obviously representing a fear that the nation state has become “too small” to protect and uphold these traits on its own. At the same time, the depiction is that European integration and the European Union as projects are not yet social democratic; they are not yet in the position to protect what are perceived as important traits of the German welfare state.

Whereas the 2009 manifesto’s legitimation narratives portrayed a more negative view of the future of important social democratic policies at the national level, giving European integration and the European Union role of saviour and last line of defence, the 2013 manifesto seems more pessimistic about the European project. It is narrated as an idea that is inherently good; an idea about peace, social justice and stability, and as something holding great potential, but that has lost its way.

European integration and the European Union are still legitimised in terms of utility, as a means by which to protect some understanding of the status quo at the national level, and to improve upon it. This perceived status quo, and the suggested improvements, seems to be perceived in and almost normative light, as values, rather than policies. However, the narrative shows that although the support for European integration is based on the possibility of implementing social democratic policies at the European level and thus protecting national achievements, these goals upon which the legitimations are built requires that the European Union first changes its form and content.

As such, the legitimations employed by the SPD have gone from being almost exclusively normative and of a general nature in 2005 to veering in the direction of the more utilitarian and cognitive in 2009. This utilitarian turn continued and was strengthened in 2013, where European integration is described as something that is needed and necessary for the future of Europe, and as such, support for the integration project is legitimised based largely on what it could be and do, rather than merely on what it is and does. Put differently, European integration is legitimised normatively based on what it does in the present – as a peace project, and in a more utilitarian manner based on what it could do in the future – both as a
bulwark against the pressures of global capitalism on the German social model and as a means
by which to expand and improve upon it in a European context. The latter is based on the
premise of utility because of the seeming understanding that the nation state is too small an
entity to oppose the perceived pressures: “Only in a common European federation of states
will we succeed in enforcing our interests and obtaining our prosperity in the 21st century”
(SPD 2013, 101). All in all, therefore, the legitimation narrative of the SPD undergoes a
gradual and unidirectional change towards the more cognitive and utilitarian over the entire
period.

4.1.7.2 The CDU/CSU
In 2005, the CDU/CSU employs both normative and cognitive legitimations. First, European
integration is legitimised in terms of values, through the ideas it is perceived to represent. It is
seen as "the key to lasting peace, freedom and prosperity in our continent" (CDU/CSU 2005).
Further indications of a normative legitimation is found in its critique of the behaviour of the
then Red/green government in Germany and their perceived unilateral behaviour in the
European Union, indicating the belief that going it alone and merely representing German
nation interest is a negative.

This, however, may seem contrary to the further cognitive legitimation where they propose to
work for a thriftier European Union budget at least partially because of their perception that
Germany is not proportionally benefitting from it. As such, the indication is also that the
support for European integration may also be about German national interest and a more quid
pro quo view of the project. As such, the CDU/CSU in 2005 seem to balance their
legitimations of support for European integration between the normative, value oriented, and
the cognitive, interest based.

Whilst the CDU/CSU in 2009 continues to express normative legitimations based on peace
and freedom, the focus seems to shift even more towards cognitive legitimations. These are
clearly expressed to be about the national interest, and the need to balance these against the
more European interest. As such, support for European integration is seen through a utilitarian
lens where, undoubtedly amongst others interests, the European Union becomes a means by
which Germany can achieve greater influence on the world stage.

Further, there are legitimations that straddle the normative/cognitive divide, where the
CDU/CSU indicates ideologically founded legitimations. They express that European
integration could be a means by which to implement and strengthen what they see as their
model of a social market economy, which is perceived as "a humane response to the failed systems of socialist planned economy and unbridled capitalism" (CDU/CSU 2009, 88).

Whilst there for the CDU/CSU in both 2005 and 2009 seem to be a relative balance between the normative and the cognitive legitimations, including legitimations that straddle this sometimes fragile divide, the legitimations change character in 2013. Although there are clear mentions of normative legitimations in terms of European integration being a peace project, the cognitive or utilitarian legitimations far outnumber the normative ones. As opposed to previous cognitive or utilitarian legitimations where European integration has been seen as a means by which to approach and achieve national interests and as an entity contributing to Germany, the 2013 cognitive legitimations are turned upside down. The focus has now been turned to the utility Germany serves as members of the European Union and as partakers in European integration. Germany is narrated as the success story upon which further developments in European integration, and reforms to the European Union, should be based. The extent and form of this type of narrative suggests the presence of patriotism, or perhaps even national pride in terms of particularly economic and institutional achievements.

The above legitimations are also connected to another cognitive legitimation, where the fact that a near majority of all Germany exports go to the Euro zone and a full majority to the European Union as a whole, making it in the national interests of Germany to have all member states of the Eurozone and the European Union function well in economic terms. The perception appears to be that in order for this to happen, the European Union ought to base its systems and policies on the German model. In the same vein, an economically successful European Union would protect German economic interests in the face of competition from emerging economies. As such, the underlying legitimation is that support for European integration is a matter of national economic interests, and the proposed policies to strengthen and better the economies making up the European Union and the Euro zone should therefore be seen in light of defending Germany´s export oriented economy.

All in all, the legitimations represented by the CDU/CSU have shifted from a balance between normative and cognitive in 2005 and 2009, to the more cognitive in 2013. However, the cognitive legitimations in 2013 are turned “upside down” in that they represent Germany to be in the interest of Europe, rather than the other way around.
4.2 Identity

4.2.1 “Vertrauen in Deutschland” – SPD 2005
The chapter does not in any overt way refer to identities and identity construction, either national or European in nature. There is however a few references that imply an underlying notion or understanding of identities that require further scrutiny.

First, through the reference to “the European social- and welfare model”, as well as to “freedom and justice, solidarity and gender equality must apply in all of Europe” a community of shared values and social and institutional traditions are implied. This can be read as a reference to something that Europeans share, and as such also as something that differentiates Europe from non-Europe; it indicates an othering. Coupled with the positive stance on EU enlargement, however, this othering does not seem to imply exclusiveness to the boundaries of the EU of the day, but the reference to “the European social- and welfare model” does indicate the presence of a geographically based othering, although a weak one given the inclusiveness in terms of enlargement, also relating to Turkey.

Second, yet closely related, are the references to European integration, specifically the enlargement policy, as a peace project - an overt policy strategy to secure peace and stability in the region. When referencing peace and stability in Europe as a strategy it is impossible to not evoke thoughts about the reasons why such a policy strategy would be necessary in the first place. Given Europe’s checkered past marred with bloody conflicts between states, and the rise and fall of empires. Germany having been at the centre of many such events, the framing of European integration and the European Union as a peace project indicates a temporal othering; the European identity appears to become about differentiation from the past. The question of enlargement to Turkey perhaps ought to be revisited in this respect. As has been described, although EU-enlargement on paper is based on the Copenhagen criteria, the main factors influencing enlargement has still been interest-based factors and identity-politics (Öner 2013). As such, one could say that support for the start of negotiations with Turkey, perhaps leading to accession, indicates a temporal, rather than a geographical othering, and as such a more inclusive identity formation.

All in all, therefore, the SPD in 2005 indicates an inclusive identity formation based on a shared community of values and institutions, and a temporal othering, however the references to identity are non-overt thus seemingly not a topic of great importance at the time.
With European integration narrated in a normative manner as “the key to lasting peace, freedom and prosperity in our continent” there is a tone of multilateralism in the chapter and a strong indication that these values are viewed as shared across Europe and therefore are European values (CDU/CSU 2005, 35). The idea of Europe being based on a set of shared values, and that this Europe of shared values has a geographical border is supported by the relatively speaking incautious acceptance of accession negotiations with Croatia based on it being “an economically prosperous country deeply ingrained in Europe”, and the rejection of full membership for Turkey because it “would overwhelm the integration capacity of the European Union (CDU/CSU 2005, 36).

Expressing the importance of “German expellees and German ethnic groups in Eastern Europe” as playing an important role in bridging differences and facilitating cooperation with the newly accessioned Eastern European countries speaks to be idea that national identities still carries great weight in European integration, and which coupled with a set of shared values across these national identities creates a European collective (CDU/CSU 2005, 36).

It is also possible to draw strong indications for how the CDU/CSU constructs the European Union’s others. The otherings are not merely temporal in nature, although there are some allusions to Europe’s aggressive past in the normative legitimations of Europe as a key to peace, but geographic and based on the perceived community of values ad mentioned above. This is a more exclusive type of othering, indicating a clear geographically based border for European integration.

All in all, the CDU/CSU narrates a European identity based on a shared set of values, at the same time indicating the importance of national identities in this picture. The othering narrated, that is the ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups, is more exclusive in that there appears to be a line drawn somewhere between Croatia and Turkey as to whom are European or not. This separation is not clearly and expressly drawn up.

4.2.3 “Sozial und demokratisch” - SPD 2009
There are no overt and very few underlying references to anything resembling identity politics or formation in this chapter. Where European integration could have been narrated as a natural result of Europe being a community of shared values, or an historical and cultural collective sharing a common destiny, it is rather conveyed as a utilitarian tool for achieving
policy outcomes and ideologically based goals. The only reference to any shared values, traditions, institutions or the like across Europe is the reference to “the European tradition of the social state”, indicating an understanding of a shared, cross-border, institutional, social and political tradition of strong welfare states.

In terms of pointing out the chapters’ definition of, or in this case, indication to, Europe’s others it becomes a matter at looking at the narrative around European integration as a peace project. As has been previously explained, Europe’s past is filled with conflict and war, in which Germany has played a major role. The reference to and belief in European integration as a peace project serves as differentiating the Europe of today from the Europe of years past. The European Union is given credit for stabilising Europe and creating peace amongst former enemies, and as such the othering is temporal in nature. A temporal othering is in nature an inclusive othering, as it doesn’t point to particular regions, nations, peoples, religions or the like as the others, and this inclusive othering is backed up by the overt support for EU enlargement. Indeed, the SPD goes as far as to state “keep the door open”, referencing EU membership for both Turkey and the countries in the Balkans should they fulfil the requirements.

Over all, then, it appears that the identity narrative in terms otherings of the SPD in 2009 is Inclusive, and temporal.

4.2.4 “Wir haben die Kraft – Gemeinsam für unser Land.” – CDU/CSU 2009
The European Union is represented as a partnership of equals (CDU/CSU 2009, 88), holding a shared set of values centred on its “Western Christian roots and the ideas of the enlightenment” (CDU/CSU 2009, 89), as well as “the freedom of expression, equality of women and men, protection of minorities and freedom of religion” (CDU/CSU 2009, 90), together making up a European identity. The idea of Christianity as a central part of a collective European identity finds its expression in the call for the explicit mention of God in the European Constitution. They continue by asserting that following the recent enlargements of the European Union with 13 new member states, most of them in Eastern Europe, “there must be a period of consolidation in the EU enlargement process in order to strengthen the identity and institutions of the EU” (CDU/CSU 2009, 90), expressing that the European identity is a work in progress, and needs to be allowed to set as changes are made in the European project.
The CDU/CSU states that “the EU must respect the identity of nations […]” making it clear that although there is a European identity based on a shared set of values these are at best a supplement to national identities. This focus on national identities also finds its expression in a call for the end of the “de facto disadvantage [of the German language] in the European institutions” (CDU/CSU 2009, 89), and in the persistent call for the possibility of transferring authority back to the nation states.

In terms of differentiating Europe from non-Europe, expressing otherings, the CDU/CSU makes it clear that “[…] Europe must have borders” (CDU/CSU 2009, 88). Due to the perception of a European identity based on the above mentioned values and principles, Europe’s others become more clearly defined. Turkey is defined as an other, directly because it does not live up to the values and principles of “[…] freedom of expression, equality of women and men, protection of minorities and freedom of religion” (CDU/CSU 2009, 90), but also indirectly because of the strong focus on Christianity as one of the core elements of a European identity. One that is so central that it has to be mentioned and named explicitly in the European Constitution (CDU/CSU 2009).

As such, the identity formation, and the construction of otherings are more exclusive in nature, clearly demarcating the eligibility for membership in the realm of unchanging cultural traits. Whilst a country would be able to change their economic situation and improve their human rights record, the religious affiliations of a country’s population has to be viewed as unchangeable in practical terms. It does not only become exclusive externally, i.e to countries outside the European Union, it also creates otherings that are internal to the European Union, in that both Germany and other European Union member states have relatively large and increasing Muslim as well as other non-Christian minorities.

4.2.5 “Das Wir entscheidet” – SPD 2013

In terms of identity, a sense of diversity is implied as Europe is described as comprising of “nations and people” (SPD 2013, 101), and as separate regions with separate challenges are mentioned directly. These references are however not made overtly in context of identity formation, and therefore do not imply that there is not some common European identity. The mention of a “European social model” (SPD 2013, 101) and the reference to values that are seen as shared European values rather indicates a European identity that supplements national identities. Such is supported by the description of Europe as a “federation of states” (SPD
Europe is made up of its constituent parts and the national and the European are not mutually exclusive.

There is an overt reference to Europe’s militant past, and that the European Union has brought peace, social justice and stability to the continent, and may also contribute to bringing these values and achievements to the world beyond the borders of the European Union. As such, there is a clear narration of a temporal othering, where Europe’s past becomes the others against which the European Union differentiates itself.

Last, it is worth mentioning that there are no references to either support for, nor rejection of, further European Union enlargements.

4.2.6 “Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland” – CDU/CSU 2013
A European identity is represented as being mainly based on a set of common values, related to the normative legitimations of European integration, as well as on a shared religious background. European integration “[…] stands for freedom and human rights, for tolerance and peaceful coexistence […], but represented with even more clarity and strength in terms of identity is Europe’s “[…] Christian roots and Western enlightenment ideas” (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). The CDU/CSU expresses their commitment to have the “responsibility before God” made clear in EU treaties, in the same way as it is done in the German constitution. As such, the European identity is represented as consisting of a set of common values including peace, freedom and human rights, as well as on a shared religious heritage and faith – Christianity.

Looking beyond these references to a European identity, a red thread throughout the chapters is the focus on diversity, the particularities of the different member states and on national identity. “For the CDU and the CSU the national states and the regions are the formative features of a Europe of unity in diversity”, further underlining how the European Union must respect the differences between its members (CDU/CSU 2013, 10), perhaps making it clear that beyond the features of the national identities that are shared across the member states, an active attempt towards shaping a common, more uniform, European identity is undesirable.

As a whole, the European identity is represented as being made up of the factors that the national identities of the member states have in common, as well as making diversity a feature of European identity, and as such placing even greater weight on the national identities, and the diversity in Europe.
Europe’s others are represented as more than the geographically non-European countries, but also by a set of values and by religion. Europe stands for peace, freedom, human rights, tolerance and the values of the Enlightenment, and Europe is Christian. As such, any country, people’s, regions or other entities that are perceived not to be part of this value- and religious community are represented as the others.

Turkey, at least partially geographically European, is rejected as a possible member explicitly both because of its failure to meet the economic and political conditions, as well as because of its size and economic structure. However, Turkey would also be represented as an other because of its religious heritage and affiliation. It could also, depending on one’s perception, fail to live up to one or more of the other values drawing up the line between insiders and outsiders.

This is an exclusive othering, not merely because it draws a clear distinction between Europe and Europe’s others, but because it leaves a large room for interpretation in terms of fulfilment or nonfulfillment of the values represented, making it possible to exclude even groups internal to the European Union from the European identity formation, should this be desired. The same can be said about the more absolute value of Christianity, opening up for both internal and external otherings. Needless to say, the large groups of non-Christians in Germany and Europe will not find themselves as part of a Christian community or identity. For these groups, however, perhaps the representation of European identity in the almost polar opposite way, as unity in diversity, could be more inclusive. Standing on its own, unity in diversity is a representation of identity that does not create any otherings.

All in all, the identity representations in the manifesto could be said to be based on a shared set of values and traits, some of which set up a clear and relatively unchanging boundaries as to who are on the inside and who are not. The second representation of diversity may be seen as a representation of diversity within the ‘in-group’ set up by the community of values; an exclusive, external othering is set up, but the internal identity formation is inclusive, based on embracing the diverse national identities.
4.2.7 Comparing Representations of Identity

4.2.7.1 The SPD

The SPD’s representations of identity in 2005 and 2009 are very similar. Neither of the manifestos makes any overt reference to identity or identity formation. There are however indications of an underlying understanding of identity.

In 2005, the SPD makes references both to the European social and welfare model, as well as values such as freedom, justice, solidarity and gender equality as European values, and as such indicating a shared set of values, and institutional and social traditions. Deriving from such statements is an indication that there are others that do not share these values and traditions, and as such delineating Europe from non-Europe. On its own, such an othering may be viewed as exclusive, however, coupled with both a positive stance on enlargement and the clear statement that European integration is a peace project, a more inclusive temporal othering emerges where Europe’s other is its non-peaceful past.

Although the manifestos from 2005 and 2009 are very similar with regards to identity representations, it ought to be pointed out that there is a shift towards an even lesser focus on identity and identity formation in that there are no references to a shared community of values and institutional and social traditions beyond the mention of the European social state as something shared across borders. The representations of otherings appear equally inclusive as in 2005, both in terms of support for European enlargement including the Balkans and Turkey, as well as the focus on the peace element of European integration, thus creating a temporal othering.

In 2013, the SPD appears to narrate identities in a somewhat different manner. There is a focus on, and a reference to, the “nations and people” of Europe indicating an understanding of being separate but united, further supported by referring to the European Union as a “federation of states” (SPD 2013, 101). This implicit reference to national identities and the differences between them is a new addition when comparing to the previous manifestos, however, the continued narration of a set of shared values as well as a common institutional and social tradition nuances the impression of an increased focus on national identities somewhat. Overall, the implication seems to be that the SPD’s view of identity with reference to European integration as a more complex picture of multiple identities; Europe’s identity is made up of the shared elements between the respective national identities, and that national and European identities may not be mutually exclusive. This inclusive view of identities is
supported by indication of an inclusive othering; Europe’s militant past becomes a temporal othering against which the European Union of today, having been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, may differentiate itself.

A substantial difference between the two fairly similar manifestos from 2005 and 2009, in terms of identity, and the manifesto from 2013 is the lack of overt support for further European Union enlargement, as have appeared in both 2005 and 2009. There is however, no overt rejection an enlargement either, making such a lack of reference merely a weak indication that there has been a change in policy focus, rather than a change in the understanding of identity, or in the level of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of otherings.

As such, the development for the SPD over times is to go from an inclusive identity representation coupled with a temporal othering to an even more loosely knit idea of a federation of Europe made up of a diverse set of national identities.

4.2.7.2 The CDU/CSU
In 2005, there are no direct and overt mentions of a European identity or identity formation. However, the CDU/CSU narrates Europe as having a shared set of values centred on peace, freedom and prosperity. Further, there are clear indications that Europe is perceived to have clear geographic borders that includes a Croatia which is wealthy and ”deeply ingrained in Europe”, but that excludes Turkey which the European Union would not be able to integrate (CDU/CSU 2005).

Whilst the CDU/CSU does speak of a shared set of values that appears to be linked with a European identity, there also clear references to national identities, and that perhaps a European collective identity is best created around these national identities.

Although there are mentions of the European Union’s importance in terms of securing peace in Europe, and how peace, freedom and prosperity are traits and values that are shared across the geographic territory that make up Europe, it appears that the otherings that are constructed do not refer to a time when Europe did not hold these traits and values, and that as such would have been temporal in nature, but rather a more exclusive othering based on borders set up geographically and seemingly based on the shared set of values that are mentioned above.

In 2009, the CDU/CSU presents a much stronger narrative about a shared set of values and culture as defining for a common European identity. The narrative describes these values to be clearly centred on Christianity, the enlightenment and that the community is Western. They
underline these ideas of Europe by calling for the explicit mention of God in the European Constitution that is in the process of being written, and continue by expressing the need for a halt in the enlargement process in order to consolidate and strengthen the identity formation in Europe.

In addition to narrating an identity based on western ideals of the enlightenment and on Christianity the CDU/CSU calls for the European Union to respect national identities, and that the European identity which they have described is a supplement to, or perhaps a combination of shared elements from, these national identities. This more clearly delineated identity narrative is also represented through the narrated or indicated otherings. A Christian Europe, its values deriving for the enlightenment clearly stipulates an othering, or a non-Europe, based on particularly religion, but also culture. This ‘non-Europe’ would clearly include Turkey, a country that is at least partly European according to a geographic measure, but would also appear less inclusive to large groups of Muslims and other religious minorities in both Germany and Europe as a whole.

This trend of a less inclusive representation of identity continues in the CDU/CSU’s manifesto for 2013, but some new features are added to the narrative. Whilst there is an increasing focus on values, adding human rights to the list already including Christianity, freedom and the ideas of the enlightenment, there is also an increasing focus on the national identities represented within the European Union. In such a way, a further element in terms of not just accepting, but embracing diversity becomes a part of the narrative. National identities are described as the formative elements of a European identity, and that this diversity is in itself a part of what is seen as the European identity. In this manner, the desirability of further European identity construction or formation is pulled into question, certainly to the extent that such an identity formation would create a more uniform, cross national identity.

Europe’s others are even more strongly than before represented as those that are not part of a value community set up by the mentioned features of peace, freedom, human rights, tolerance, the values of the enlightenment and Christianity. Turkey is again explicitly rejected for EU membership, and whilst this is argued on the basis of Turkey’s political and economic conditions in addition to its size, it is clear that they also fail to meet several of the identity criteria set up by the CDU/CSU.

This othering is not only exclusive in that it draws up clear borders to Europe’s members and non-members, but rather because it leaves significant room for interpretation that may also be
interpreted in an exclusive manner to groups internal to the European Union. It may also be said, however, that this part of the identity formation stands in opposition to another part, where diversity and tolerance in hailed as European values. These two last aspects of the identity narrative would on their own not create any otherings, but rather be as inclusive as an identity could be. The element of diversity to the identity is however likely a second order identity element, one that is descriptive of those that fulfil the first order identity ‘requirements’ such as Christianity and the values of the enlightenment. It is tempting to describe it as an expression on acceptance of the diverse national identities internal to the ‘in-group’ set up by the values described as making up the European community of shared values.

As such, the development for the CDU/CSU over time is to be more explicit about which values and traditions that makes up European identity and as such making the net of European identity more closely knit, whilst at the same time opening up space for difference and diversity within.

4.3 Projection

4.3.1 “Vertrauen in Deutschland” – SPD 2005
Given the nature of the questions asked, it seems natural to first point out that the manifesto remains clearly supportive of European integration. It is underlined that the SPD wants a “strong” Europe, thus stating that its support for the European project is doubtful, and that they see little reason to weaken Brussels, for example on behalf of national interests and independence. To the contrary, they express their support for the Constitutional Treaty (the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – TCE) on the basis of wanting efficient decision-making under political/democratic control in the European Union. The Constitutional Treaty contained, amongst others, provisions expanding the use of Qualified Majority Voting in policy areas that had previously been decided by unanimity amongst its member states, as well as giving legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As such, the treaty would have transferred power from national governments to the European Union, and support for it therefore clearly signals a wish for more European integration and a more supranational Europe. Such an analysis is supported by the call for “coordinated economic and employment policy initiatives […]”, particularly in the Eurozone”, indicating a belief in further European involvement in policy areas under the purview of the nation state.
Further supporting evidence for the SPD wanting more European integration is found in their clear call for enlargement of the European Union to also include Bulgaria and Romania. They go as far as stating that questioning the agreed upon enlargement to the two above mentioned countries would represent a risk to peace in Europe. Perhaps even more indicative of the strong support for more European integration, and for the relentless belief in the project, can be found in the call for EU-accession negotiations with Turkey. The question of Turkish EU-membership has been the most controversial enlargement debate in Europe and indeed also in Germany as, if accession were approved, it would become the second largest country in the Union, as well as the first member originating from outside the Christian cultural sphere. These aspects, coupled with the 2005-demographic tendency of population growth in Turkey and decline in Germany, as well as other factors, made the possible EU-enlargement to Turkey a controversial question. Clearly stating support for such a policy in the face of controversy therefore only contributes to strengthen the image of a fiercely integration-supportive SPD.

All in all, the SPD narrates a widening and deepening of European integration, as well as support for a more supranational Europe.

Through a narrative calling for the need to “prevent further centralisation”, that “the portfolio of tasks for the European Union must be limited to what is necessary”, and for the need to “strengthen the role of national parliaments”, the CDU/CSU suggests a leaner European Union in which “the principle of subsidiarity must be the yardstick for EU action” (CDU/CSU 2005, 35). The EU is supposed to legislate only what is necessary, and what cannot be legislated at a lower level of governance, for example at the national, regional or municipality levels (CDU/CSU 2005). Whilst supporting the implementation of the Constitutional Treaty, they do so with reservation. First, there seems to be a priority over which provisions in the Constitutional Treaty that holds greatest importance, these include the “Charter of Fundamental rights”, although previously enacted is given binding status beyond reproach in the Treaty, and “the provisions relating to the institutions” (CDUS/CSU 2005, 35). In addition, however, there is also an articulation that further expresses the limitations on the CDU/CSU enthusiasm for the Constitutional Treaty, as they state that “we want to strengthen the role of the national parliaments through the application of the subsidiarity early warning
system before the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty and noticeably extend the right of participation of the German Bundestag in EU decisions” (CDU/CSU 2005, 35).

The subsidiarity early warning system of which they speak is a provision in the Constitutional Treaty itself, abbreviated to EWS, in which procedures where established to ensure that distribution of power between the European Union and the member states were kept under control, proposing to give national parliaments a means by which to challenge legislation it believes to be in conflict with the principle of subsidiarity (Hettne 2014). As such, the proposal to put the mechanism into effect before its legal basis had been enacted is both an indication for support of particular parts of the Constitutional Treaty, but also an expression of scepticism thereof. After all, the proposed Constitutional Treaty had been through multiple processes in which national governments and political parties was given the chance of influencing and challenging its content before ratification would become a question.

This intention of placing limitations on European integration runs like a common thread throughout the chapter. As the European budget is perceived to have “limited effects in Germany” it should be thrifty, and it can be improved “by a partial return of responsibilities to the member states” (CDU/CSU 2005, 36). The accession of Turkey to the European Union would “overwhelm the integration capacity of the European Union”, and only countries that are ready, or mature, will be accepted into the Union (CDU/CSU 2005, 36).

Further, there is support for the reversion to the tried and tested, to the old and familiar, in order to “[recover] lost trust in the European peace and integration policy” and to create “a positive perspective for Europe” (CDU/CSU 2005, 35-36). “The German European policy on the way of fair coexistence between larger and smaller states” is perceived to have been lost alongside “the credibility of European policy and its support from people”, and must be reinstated (CDU/CSU 2005, 35). “The reliable friendship between Germany and France” will be reutilised “in a way that assures the other EU-partners, that integrates their interests and that avoids gestures of paternalism and dominance” (CDU/CSU 2005, 36).

To summarize, the CDU/CSU is supportive of European integration, yet sceptical of its reach. They express the wish to place limitations on Europe’s powers and the need to strengthen the principle of subsidiarity. The narration of a need to return to ‘the tried and tested’ further strengthens the impression that they view European integration as needing limitations, and as such also support for a more intergovernmental European Union.
4.3.3 “Sozial und demokratisch” – SPD 2009
It quickly becomes clear that the SPD remains supportive of the European Union and European integration. Suffice to say that they declare themselves “as the European party of Germany”, “the driving political force for a Europe that belongs to the citizens and that is democratic […]” and “the expansion and deepening of the European Union remains the formative basic constant of our politics” (SPD 2009, 85).

The SPD seems to advocate for the reinvention of typical social democratic policies related to the regulation of the economy and financial markets to suit the European level of governance. The wording of the chapter shows a reinvigoration of a more traditional framing of the debate in ideological terms, in which “a united Europe in solidarity can and must enforce the primacy of politics over the free play of market forces” (SPD 2009, 85), indicating not only that the political and social reality of the day (the financial crisis) in their view necessitates and makes such policies and ideological framings desirable to the electorate, but also pointing to an analysis of the European project as one that requires change to be viable in the face of economic turmoil.

In terms of the projection for the extent and direction of further European integration, the narrative clearly points to a belief that the perceived problems facing Germany, Europe and the European Union can only be solved through “the expansion and deepening of the European Union […]” (SPD 2009, 85). The chapter contains many policy suggestions that would transfer power from the national level to the European level, amongst which are: “a European social union” (SPD 2009, 86), “a European social stability pact” (SPD 2009, 86), “minimum wage regulations […] in all EU member states” (SPD 2009, 86), “a uniform basis of assessment and minimum rates of corporate taxation in Europe” (SPD 2009, 86), “cross-border collective bargaining and collective agreements” (SPD 2009, 87), and “a strong common European economic policy” (SPD 2009, 88).

The only direct reference to caution in terms of maintaining national authority over a policy area is “In this way, collective European progress can lead to more education and better social protection standards, whilst at the same time sustaining the autonomy of the respective social security systems of the EU members states“ (SPD 2009, 86).

All in all, therefore, the SPD narrates support for a deepening and widening of European integration through the transfer of further powers from the national to the European level,
indicating a view of the European Union as a supranational polity. The only counterargument is the narration of the need for protecting the autonomy of national social security systems.

4.3.4 “Wir haben die Kraft – Gemeinsam für unser Land.” – CDU/CSU 2009

The narrative in the chapter is supportive of European integration and expresses a need to expand the authority of the European Union in a few select areas. The European Union is represented as important in matters of the economy, and its competencies should be expanded in terms of guaranteeing competition, consumer protection, and removing obstacles to growth and job creation, and Europe should be a driving force for budgetary discipline (CDU/CSU 2009, 88-89).

In the areas of security and defence policy the CDU/CSU call for an increase in the capacity of the European Union, even as far as “[…] including a mutual defence commitment into the European Security and Defence Policy, in addition to the transatlantic partnership” (CDU/CSU 2009, 89). Europe should also take “[…] a pioneering role in climate protection, which can only be achieved together” (CDU/CSU 2009, 89).

Beyond these areas, and beyond the value based normative narratives and identity, however, the narrative on future Europe becomes more reserved, represented by the calls for placing limitations on European integration, and hitting the pause-button allowing for consolidation. Following the latest expansion of the European Union by 13 new members the CDU/CSU perceives a need for “[…] a period of consolidation in the EU enlargement process […]]”, meaning that Europe should not accept new members for an unspecified period of time. With the addition of further cultural and religious membership criteria to the official political and economic criteria, the message is one of caution (CDU/CSU 2009, 90).

Further in the vein of the more cautious attitude towards a deepening of the integration process are the calls for the possibility of the return of authority to nation states, against Brussels meddling in affairs that “[…] could be performed adequately or better on federal, regional or municipal political levels” and for the need for less detailed regulations (CDU/CSU 2009, 89). The rejection of the idea of European Union taxation follows in the footsteps of the same narrative (CDU/CSU 2009).

All in all, therefore, the CDU/CSU’s narrative on the future of European integration is one focused on caution. With the exception of the original area of focus for European integration
– the economy, as well as the environment and defence, they narrate a further focus on the principle of subsidiarity and the return of power to the member states. This can clearly be seen in light of viewing the European Union as an intergovernmental structure, where there are areas of cooperation for the benefit of the members, whilst the power in reality lies with the member governments and within the structures of the nation state.

4.3.5 “Das Wir entscheidet” – SPD 2013

The narrative in the election manifesto for 2013 remains strongly supportive of European integration. They espouse a federal Europe, a “European federation of states” (SPD 2013, 101), as a way to protect the particularities of national systems without sacrificing the continuation of European integration. In doing so they propose transforming European institutions into something more resembling institutions found in a federally organised nation state, such as Germany. “The transnational model will only work if we transfer the model of separation of powers that we know from the nation states to the European level” (SPD 2013, 102), the European Commission needs “to become a government that is elected and controlled by the European Parliament” and “the governments of the member states sit in a joint council” (SPD 2013, 102) thus both effectively installing the parliamentary system at the European level as well as representing national interests through a body of member state governments. The European Parliament and the joint council made up of the governments of the member states are given the right to enact law on equal footing with the Parliament, and “the government, European Parliament and the Council of the member states each have the right to launch its own legislative initiatives” (SPD 2013, 102).

In the course of overtly stating their support for, and the construction of, a federal Europe in which the “principle of separation of powers and the full parliamentarisation” of the EU applies, the manifesto also draws up a debate regarding the competencies and authority of the different levels of governance (SPD 2013, 102). “It is necessary to consider whether the distribution of powers between national and European levels have proven to be right, or whether corrections are necessary”, further underlining their support for the “principle of subsidiarity” in which decisions are to be made as close to the citizen as possible (SPD 2013, 102). As such, the ideas presented closely link up with the concept of a federal state, where the ideal is to bring decisions closer to the citizens and at the same time making sure that people belonging to diverse cultures and holding diverse identities can be united under the same structure of governance without creating unnecessary conflict.
Beyond restructuring the systems of political decision making at the European level in a federal, parliamentary manner with separation of powers, and proposing an evaluation of the distribution of power between levels of governance possibly resulting in “the return of authority to the member states”, there are other proposed major changes in the politics, policies and institutions at the European level, most of which result in a furthering of European integration in the direction of a federal Europe of a more Westphalian nature (SPD 2013, 102). They support the introduction of a single economic policy within the Euro-zone; they propose a European debt repayment fund (sinking fund in financial terms) in order to establish joint liability for debt in the Euro currency area; there is a proposal to expand union-employer dialogue to the European level (SPD 2013).

The 2013 manifesto sees an SPD that is determined to take the fight for a social democratic future to the European level. Concrete social democratic solutions and ideological positions that have been held and implemented at the national level are adapted to suit a European framework, and are presented in European terms. There is confrontational language towards what has often been seen as the central pillar to the European Union of the present – the market freedoms. The proposal, or statement, is that the “fundamental social rights cannot be subordinated to the market freedoms in the single market, but rather must come first” and “this principle must be laid down contractually in European primary law through a social progress clause” (SPD 2013, 103).

Further, there are policy steps taken to give the European level more say in national social policy, particularly to counterweigh the pressures for wage and social dumping, through the introduction of a “social stability pact” (SPD 2013, 103). “Targets [are set] for social and educational expenditures” in relation to GDP and “the same applies to living wages in all EU member states: measured by the average national income” (SPD 2013, 103). In the vein of the previously mentioned willingness to protect national peculiarities in the face of furthering and deepening European integration they “do not want European standards to replace national standards”, however the need to protect against the perceived “harmful competition towards the lowliest social rights and standards” are again pointed out. As such, given the perception that the completion of the single market has resulted in the thinning out, or making obsolete, of national regulatory regimes, in essence a deregulation, the SPD are describing ways in which reregulation could occur at the European level in a manner which corresponds to their ideological beliefs.
In short, the SPD’s 2013 manifesto narrates a future Europe that is different all together. It narrates a Europe of a more Westphalian character – a federal European state. This move towards wanting to change Europe towards a polity more resembling that of a federal nation state appears, based on the proposed policies, to be a result of an evaluation of particularly the economic and labour market effects of the current regulatory, institutional and policy regime.

4.3.6 “Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland” – CDU/CSU 2013

The CDU/CSU wants a strong Europe in the image of the German social and economic model, in which Germany takes a greater role and responsibility in creating sustainable economic growth and ensuring European competitiveness.

The CDU/CSU envisages a future in which “the world population will rise to over nine billion people, whilst the German and European population will continue to decline” and where “the flow of trade and economic power centres” will shift (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). In this rather bleak representation of the prospects of Europe in the world, the future of Europe is represented as being dependent on how “we are able to collectively master the challenges of the 21st century” (CDU/CSU 2013, 8). As such, the CDU/CSU wants a more competitive and efficient Europe, where debt is curtailed through the implementation of several economic measures that all serve to transfer power to the European level. Amongst them are a European Bank Union in which the European Central Bank supervises systemically important banks across Europe, sanctions towards countries that fail to meet the terms of a strengthened Stability and Growth Pact and Fiscal Compact, giving the European Commission further authority in monitoring and reviewing national budgets, a competitiveness pact where “nation states agree with the European Commission on concrete measures to accurately improve their situation” (CDU/CSU 2013, 10) (CDU/CSU 2013).

These proposals that serve to deepen economic integration are largely responses to the European Debt Crisis, and as such are not measures that will force substantial policy change in Germany. As the CDU/CSU writes “it is our goal to strengthen the weak and to make the performance of the best a benchmark for all” (CDU/CSU 2013, 10). It becomes clear that in the perception of the CDU/CSU, and perhaps also objectively so if “best” is to be interpreted in terms of economic performance, Germany is the best in the Eurozone and the European Union. A projection is thus put forward where Germany takes a leading role in the continuation of European integration, and where the German social and economic model is made benchmark for further development in the member states of the European Union. The CDU/CSU does draw the line as to how far they want this deepening of European economic
integration to go. Whilst they are supportive of efforts that might cost Germany money in terms of bailouts so long as terms and conditions in the form of reforms are met, they draw the line where they perceive that Germany would become jointly liable for the debt or losses of other European Union countries: “The Red/Green rely on a pooling of debt of other countries through the introduction of Eurobonds. This would result in a European debt union, where the German taxpayer would be forced to vouch in an almost unlimited manner for the debt of other countries. We reject this” and “we reject a Europe-wide deposit guarantee, as it would mutualise liability risk, and German savers would be made liable for deposits in other countries” (CDU/CSU 2013, 9).

Although advocating for stronger integration in the economic area, save for important exceptions mentioned above, there are also clear representations of the wish to limit the deepening of political integration: “we do not want a centrally organised and governed Europe” (CDU/CSU 2013, 10). As such, the CDU/CSU advocates a future European Union and European integration that relies on collective rules, regulations and minimum standards in order to ensure that the joint economy of Europe is strong and competitive and that the poor economic performance and economic governance of individual countries does not negatively impact the economic performance and prospects of others, particularly in the Euro currency area. Simultaneously they express a more sceptical view of political integration, believing that “the national states and the regions are the formative features of a Europe of unity in diversity” (CDU/CSU 2013, 10). As such, it possible to view the CDU/CSU´s projection of the future of the European Union to be one where it’s most important raison d´être is to ensure a strong and competitive European economy and European Currency, through acting as a regulating body and through performing as a control function.

4.3.7 Comparing Projections

4.3.7.1 The SPD
Throughout the time period under analysis, the SPD remains strongly supportive of European integration and it’s furthering. They do however, over time, become more explicit and firm in describing what kind of European integration and European Union they wish to promote.

In 2005 there is an expression of support for a supranational Europe, whilst no worry for the national independence of member states is present. To the contrary, there is expressed support for the Constitutional Treaty where, amongst others, there are provisions ensuring the
expansion of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) into areas where decisions have previously been made by unanimity, and as such transferring further authority from the national to the European level. In addition, the SPD also expresses support for more coordination between member states in the area of economic and employment policy, particularly in the Eurozone, further representing support for the transfer of power to the European level from national governments and elected officials.

The support for a deepening of European integration through further transfer of powers to the European level is accompanied by a support for a broadening of European Union membership to also include Bulgaria and Romania, as well as initiating accession negotiations with Turkey. As such, it can be read as a near blanket support for enlargement, as these would have been the only viable candidate countries at the given time.

In 2009, the SPD appears to reframe their narrative on further European integration in more ideological terms, where the European Union of the future is to be geared towards democratic control over the financial markets and market forces in general. Through policy proposals like initiating a European social stability pact, introducing minimum wage regulations throughout Europe, the introduction of a single uniform basis of assessing corporate taxation, setting up systems of collective bargaining and collective agreements that cross borders in Europe, as well as setting up a strong common European economic policy, the SPD appears to have become more assertive in their narrative about shaping European integration in their image.

These above mentioned policies, in addition to being clearly in the social democratic realm of ideas and interest, would serve the purpose of further transferring powers to the European level. They also appear to shift the European polity in the direction of further resemblance of nation states in that tasks that have previously only been undertaken at the national level, and as such has also been associated with nation states, are now proposed transferred to the European level. The most prominent examples are assessment of corporate taxation (although no overt proposal has been expressed to transfer the collection of these taxes to the European level), as well as collective bargaining and collective agreements between employees and employers. As such, a reregulation is proposed at the European level.

In the midst of a manifesto mainly narrating a transfer of power from the national to the European level, there is an expression of concern for maintaining national independence as well. However it might appear contradictory, the SPD nonetheless state that the proposed
policies and changes could balance collective European progress with maintaining national autonomy in terms of the peculiarities in their respective social security systems.

In 2013, the SPD appears to take the narrative of support for further integration a step further. Whilst they have previously represented European integration in terms of supranationality and unity between nation states, the 2013 manifesto overtly speaks of a federation of states. Through describing a system where a government is controlled by the European Parliament that is supplemented by a council representing national governments, they are in effect proposing a system resembling that of the federal German system.

Whilst the introduction of a federal system at the European level may appear to be a far step in the furthering of European integration, another interpretation of such a step is indicated in the narrative. The focus on the principle of subsidiarity, on an evaluation of the areas over which the European Union has authority with the expressed intent of returning powers to the member states, and on protecting peculiarities of national systems rather appears to signal that a federal European Union would in fact return power to the national level. In addition, the introduction of a German inspired federal system at the European level would indicate the support for bringing the European polity closer to a Westphalian type polity.

The narrative in the 2013 manifesto continues down the path of more strongly ideological framings of the future of European integration started in 2009, but may also be said to take a more confrontational direction. The historical mainstay of European integration, the market freedoms, is challenged through proposing a social progress clause in EU primary law, which is not to be subordinate to the market freedoms.

As such, there is a clear development from 2005, via 2009, to 2013 where the SPD gradually utilises more ideologically confrontational narratives around the future of European integration, but more significantly, where they gradually move towards overt support for a federal system at the European level. It is through the lens of this federal system that what

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3 The main pillars of the German political system are the Bundestag (the Federal Diet or elected national parliament), the Bundesrat (the federal council, representing the Bundesländer or the regional states of Germany), both of which hold legislative powers, and the Chancellor (Head of government, controlled by parliament) and the President (Head of state, elected by the Federal Convention which mirrors the political majority situation in both the Bundestag and in the state legislatures).
appears to be both support for the transfer of power from the national to the European level, and from the European to the national level, can be understood. It appears that it is a reflection of a belief that certain tasks are better and more effectively performed at the European level, whilst there is also an expression of a belief in maintaining diversity and allowing member states to remain different from each other.

4.3.7.2 The CDU/CSU
Throughout the time period the CDU/CSU supports European integration, however, a common theme throughout the entire data complex is the expression of limitations on further integration, and a narrative that shows that the CDU/CSU envisages a European project that is not heading for federalism, but rather ought to remain (or become) an entity with a more intergovernmental character.

The 2005 manifesto narrates a leaner European Union where the principle of subsidiarity is utilised as an argument for the return of authority and power to the national governments and for the strengthening of the role of national parliaments in general, and the German Bundestag in particular. There is a narrative that seems to espouse the view that European integration has veered of course, and that there is a need to revert to old ways in order to rebuild trust in the project. In the same vein, the Franco-German relationship is portrayed as something that used to be a pillar in the European Union as a whole, which contributed to the strength and success of European integration, and that ought to be reinvigorated. At the same, they express the importance of good relations between smaller and larger nations within Europe, where the larger nations, particularly through the mentioned Franco-German relationship, must be careful not act in a dominant or paternalistic manner towards the smaller member states. As such, the narrative indicates support for future integration in the vein of more intergovernmental cooperation, where larger member states carry greater responsibility yet without dominating within the European Union.

Whilst the 2009 manifesto expresses the need for the expansion of European Union authority in the areas of the economy (particularly in the Euro zone), defence and environmental/climate protection, the common theme continues to be one of caution. This is perhaps narrated more strongly than in 2005, with a focus on consolidation due to enlargements, but also through the overt expression of return of authority to the member states, without the same referencing of the principle of subsidiarity previously utilised as main
argument. Less interference from Brussels in what is perceived as national affairs and less
detailed regulations emanating from the European Union is narrated.

This trend appears to be continuing in 2013, with the narrative is further strengthened as well
as more clearly expressing the same ideas and views that have also appeared in the two
previous manifestos. The manifestos appear almost ordered like a stairway where another step
in the same direction is taken every year. Even further authority is proposed given to the
European Union in the area of the economy, and these are largely regulatory and supervisory
powers. Germany is overtly and strongly represented as the benchmark for economic policies
that should be implemented in the member states, and as the role model for the
regulations/supervision the European Union ought to promote.

Whilst the 2005 and 2009 manifestos have narrated a future European integration based on
the idea of intergovernmentalism, rather than federalism or supranationalism (although
containing elements from more than one of these more general models of governance), the
2013 manifesto narrates this view more clearly. As is to be expected, there are plenty of
proposals to deal with the European debt crisis, however, their content and narrations
represents the view that these are problems emanate and must be solved at the national level,
however much with help (bailouts) or force (regulation/supervision) from the European level.
Examples of this approach include European Commission monitoring and reviewing of
national budgets, a pact ensuring competitiveness where nations agree with the European
Commission on measures to improve national situations and the European Central bank
supervising banks. As such, the focus becomes on improving the finances and
competitiveness of individual member states and their economies. The rejection of joint
liability, European Union level taxation and the overt rejection of a centrally organised and
governed Europe, in effect a clear narration on limiting political integration, serves as a clear
indication of a view of European integration and the European Union as a more
intergovernmental project establishing an economic zone, rather than a vision of a united
Europe of a more federal nature.
5 Discussion and Conclusion

At the outset of this thesis it was expected that the European debt crisis would influence the narratives of political parties on European integration, however in an unspecified manner due to the character and complexity of the proposed change agent. As was pointed out earlier in this thesis theorists have begun to hypothesize that the European Union and the integration process, having progressed steadily for decades, might be heading in to more troubled waters in times to come. Some have even hypothesized a critical juncture, perhaps entailing deintegration. Although a critical juncture was not the expectation or hypothesis in this thesis, the debt crisis was viewed as something of a wild card in terms of its possible effects on how parties viewed European integration.

In terms of legitimation the analysis uncovered some unexpected findings. Whilst the typology set up a dichotomy believed to capture the expected forms of legitimations as either cognitive or normative, both parties at times appeared to utilize a third variant of legitimation closely linked to the cognitive type, however different enough to deserve a separate mention and discussion; the utilitarian legitimation. Whilst the cognitive legitimation is defined as an interest based legitimation, often related to national interests and somewhat removed from the typical ideologically based policy conflicts, the utilitarian type of legitimation is understood as a legitimation where the European Union is viewed as a utility for the implementation for preferred policy. This is different from a cognitive legitimation in that it also draws on the normative to the extent that it cannot be clearly separated from the value based arguments; different parties have different ideological or value based ideas about what kind of policies ought to be implemented and how European integration ought to be shaped in order to best meet the goals they have set. Both parties utilised this form of legitimation, though the SPD did so to the greatest extent. Whilst the SPD over the time period moved more and more in the direction of utilitarian legitimations and in 2013 almost solely legitimised European integration and the European Union in terms of utility, the CDU/CSU remained rather balanced between normative and cognitive legitimations though also including some utilitarian ones over time.

Although it might be possible to explain the introduction and use of utilitarian legitimations differently, it appears likely to be linked to a change in the ways the European Union is seen and understood. Whilst particularly cognitive legitimations, but to some extent also normative ones, appear closely linked to a view of European integration and the European Union as a policy, utilitarian legitimations may signal a shift towards viewing the European Union as a
polity. Given that the Treaty of Lisbon, amongst others introducing Qualified Majority Voting in many policy areas in the Council of Ministers and creating a more powerful European Parliament, was signed in December 2007 and entered into force in December 2009, the development of utilitarian legitimations or viewing the European Union as a polity rather than a policy may be linked to these changes in the institutional structures and powers of the Union. Not only did the Treaty of Lisbon bring the European Union institutionally closer in resemblance to the nation states in which political parties operate, but it made the political institutions of the European Union more independent of the political structures of its member states, as such becoming more independent as arenas for policy development. In its previous configuration it may have been natural to see it as a policy in itself as the political powers emanating from it to a larger extent where placed in the hands of national governments and politicians, as such making national debates about what to do about European integration rather than about what the European Union should do.

For the CDU/CSU another interesting, likely Germany specific, development occurred. Whilst their legitimation narratives throughout the period were balanced between the normative and the cognitive, with the cognitive legitimations becoming more prominent over the period, their cognitive legitimations changed in the 2013 manifesto. The cognitive legitimations in 2005 and 2009 served to narrate how European integration and the European Union are important to German national interests, in terms of for example market access and economic growth. However, in 2013 these cognitive national interest legitimations, though not entirely absent in their ‘traditional’ form, are largely turned on their head. A significant proportion of their legitimations are about how important Germany is to European integration and the European Union; the CDU/CSU appears to turn to narrative of a patriotic nature, indicating the belief that Germany ought to be considered as ‘benchmark’ for further development in the European Union. In a German context, expressing patriotism is a rather controversial matter. Even the most careful statements of national pride, such as merely admitting to being proud to be German has sparked national debates around what national pride is, whether or not it is acceptable to be proud of one’s nationality and country, and what this means for Germany as a society, nation and state. Political expressions of national pride and patriotism is a rather fresh development, mostly apparent on the right of the German political spectrum, appearing to be testing the waters on possible political gains from being more vocal about national pride and patriotism (Connolly 2001).
An additional interpretation of the narrative where Germany is portrayed as more important to European integration than European integration is to Germany is equally or perhaps more significant, as it might indicate a drop in enthusiasm or faith in European integration. Given Germany’s role in European integration, this would not be a development without consequences.

The identity narratives of both parties display very little in terms of changes, certainly that can be hypothesized as resulting from the debt crisis. For the SPD the 2013 manifesto does express more of a focus on national identities, however, the inclusive impression of identity representation and otherings continue throughout the period. Despite this, it does seem worth mentioning that whilst there are endorsements of European Union enlargement in both the preceding manifestos, including with reference to Turkey, the 2013 manifesto makes no such proclamation.

One may hypothesise or even say that it appears likely, given the principled nature of the support for enlargement particularly in the case of Turkey in the previous manifestos, that the debt crisis and its ensuing troubles for the European project has influenced the willingness of the SPD to support further enlargement. The accession of particularly Turkey would doubtlessly place great stress on the European Union, be it political, economic or institutional, and clearly expressing support for such a policy may be perceived as too politically risky in a situation where Germans already perceive themselves as having to carry a great burden of bolstering the European project. It may also simply be a case of a strategic evaluation of timing; that the present situation is not one in which one considers further enlargement or placing further burdens on the European Union. One cannot however rule out the possibility that a change in how one views Turkey has occurred either, making this change a result of other, external factors.

For the CSU/CSU the identity narrative evolves over the time period. Whilst the 2005 manifesto display very little in terms of clear identity narratives, beyond the mention of a shared set of common, and rather general values under which quite a bit of leeway for interpretation in terms of in and out-groups may be granted, the 2009 manifesto becomes clearer in its narration of what these values are. Christianity and the values of the enlightenment are introduced as demarcations of in and out groups, and they clearly make for a more exclusive demarcation with little room for interpretation. This is a development that continues in 2013, however the element of national identities as formative for the European
Union and European identity is also included. As such, the narration of a more exclusive European identity based on, amongst others, Christianity and the values of the enlightenment cannot be ascribed as a development related to the European debt crisis, however, the narration of the importance of national identities is an indication of a move towards a greater emphasis on the nation. In any case, it does not appear unnatural in the event of a crisis, particularly one that is perceived as caused by factors external to Germany, to turn ones outlook inward and towards the traditional nation state and national identity.

The SPD’s narrative regarding projections for the future of European integration displays some developments over the time period in question. Whilst he 2005 manifesto displays support for further integration and more supranational authority for the European Union without expressing noticeable concern for national independence and decision-making, the 2009 manifesto takes a different, more ideological turn, though still expressing clear support for the further transfer of power to the supranational level. Though not related to the debt crisis, it seems worth mentioning that the ideological shift occurs between two manifestos that have both been penned whilst in government: in 2005 under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) with the Greens as junior partner, and in 2009 under Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU/CSU) as part of a grand coalition. In 2009, Germany would also have seen the effects of the international financial crisis, and as such, the ideological shift may be related to both the effects of being “junior” partner in a grand coalition needing to more clearly express ones uniqueness in order to be noticed, and to the financial crisis.

In 2009, there also seems to be a contradiction in that the manifesto both expresses support for the further transfer of power to the European level, whilst also expressing a level of concern for maintaining national independence through the maintenance of the peculiarities of national social security systems. This contradiction may merely be an expression of the belief that the current state of the European Union acts as a threat to welfare policies held as important to the SPD, and as such they are attempting to consolidate their support for further European integration with their support for the maintenance of a particular kind of social welfare state at the national level.

One might view the move from narrating a supranational Europe to the sudden and overt support for a federal Europe that appears in the 2013 manifesto in the light of the contradiction in the 2009 manifesto. Such a model would grant substantial power to the state/regional level (in the European context this would likely mean the national level), and
would strengthen the practice of the principle of subsidiarity. As such, a federal system at the European level would both mean a furthering of European integration, but also secure the independence of the member states and likely transfer powers back to the national level. As has been pointed out, it seems likely that this change can be seen as a continuation of previous developments. However, it is unlikely that this is the entirety of the explanation. The SPD proposes to implement a common economic policy for the Eurozone and a joint liability for debt (debt repayment fund/sinking fund), both in response to the debt crisis and both likely necessitating a further political and economic integration to be feasible, which may indicate that the proposed federalisation of the European polity at least partially is a response to the perceived weaknesses of the European project revealed by the debt crisis.

Throughout the time period, the CDU/CSU seems to support a form of governance more close to intergovernmentalism rather than supranational or federal, and this continues in the 2013 manifesto. The development of projection narratives for the CDU/CSU thus appears to be one of strengthening and clarifying arguments.

As has been shown, this analysis has uncovered some changes in the narratives over time unlikely to be related to the debt crisis, and some changes that can be argued to be the result of the debt crisis. Although not a direct result of the debt crisis, some of the changes in the first category still hold significance. Both the SPD and the CDU/CSU, though the SPD to the greatest extent, appears to have started to view the European Union as a polity rather than a policy. This is significant because a view of the European Union as a polity indicates that there is at least a perception that the EU is moving in the direction of a more state like structure.

There are also some significant narrative changes that appear related to the debt crisis. The cognitive legitimation narratives of the CDU/CSU where turned upside down. Instead of narrating the usefulness of European integration to Germany, in 2013 Germany was narrated as useful to European integration. The description of Germany as role model, benchmark for success, and driver of positive change based on its own perceived superior economic system and social model appears to be part of a patriotic narrative, which as described is significant in itself in the German context. The narration of a Germany that is more useful to European integration than the other way around is also significant in that it might signal a shift in German enthusiasm for and interest in European integration. The change in the identity
narrative of the CDU/CSU clearly pointing to an increased focus on national identities might also be seen in this context.

Although clearly part of a development over time, the SPDs expressed support for a federal Europe might also have been influenced by the debt crisis. It seems likely that the move is at least partly caused by a perception that the crisis has uncovered weaknesses in the framework of European integration. Finally, and perhaps not unsurprising, it appears that the debt crisis has influenced the SPD to be less expressive in their support (or perhaps unsupportive altogether?) for further enlargement, particularly in the case of Turkey.

As has been shown, there does appear to have been several changes in the narratives on European integration throughout the time period. However, only a few can be attributed to the debt crisis. The overall impression is one where narratives appear fairly resilient to change, certainly to radical and dramatic change. Most of the changes occurring can be seen as part of a more gradual shift, and also remain largely embedded in the more general structure of the narratives.

In addition, the debt crisis appears to have served to make both parties clarify and extend their narratives, and to adapt their arguments to a changing situation. As such, this thesis indicates that views on European integration are the result of an interpretation through the lens of ideology and world-view, increasing its longevity and resiliency compared to say views held as a result of an interpretation of national interests, vote maximization or strategic positioning. Even given the stresses placed on the integration project by the European debt crisis, its ideological importance, its influence on questions relating to national interests, as well as it’s possible impact on voter opinion, the CDU/CSU and the SPD remained steadfast in their overall views and positions, adapting their narratives to changing circumstances, but not radically changing them.

This analysis also indicates that the theory of constraining dissensus is at play. Whilst narratives in 2005 where short and general, the narratives in 2013 where longer, more specific, and argumentative in nature. The parties responded to the increase in relevance of European integration to the electorate; as the European debt crisis occurred, European integration became a matter of more political contention for the German electorate, and thus the SPD and the CDU/CSU responded by taking greater care to explain and argue their opinion on European integration, which explains the clarifications and extensions of the narratives in 2013, compared to the previous years.
6 Reflections on the Study and Further Research

Although this analysis has not yielded significant findings in terms of a critical juncture or radical effects on narratives on European integration, the changes that did occur in my opinion justifies further research into how political parties view European integration. The arguments presented in the introduction still holds; European integration as it relates to national political parties, ideology, and the contents of the opinions held by political parties, is an under-researched topic.

As such, there are several avenues that ought to be explored by researchers in order to gain greater understanding of how political parties form their opinions on European integration, why they wish to shape the integration project in the manner that they suggest, and what influences play on these developments.

In order to further the research agenda into which this thesis plays, it might be of use to attempt a cross-country analysis of European integration narratives between parties (perhaps of the same party family), and rather than attempting an analysis based on a typology of the sort utilised in this analysis, perhaps basing ones typology on the theories explaining party positings on European integration would yield results suitable for theory development. Another relevant alternative would be a more open longitudinal analysis, not basing its temporal delineation on a particular event hypothesised to cause changes or shifts.

For the undersigned, it is a given that ideology and values plays a large role in determining policy alternatives and policy outcomes. Whilst general measures of policy positions and ideologies do exist, and can be highly useful in large-N studies, another approach in small-N studies may be to look at how parties legitimise their policy positions, as has been done in this study. From legitimations can be gained an important understanding of the ideological underpinnings or world views which shape the understanding of the policy question, and as such lay bare what moves the political party in a given issue. In such a manner, one can get closer to understanding under which condition policy change may occur, or at least find researchable hypotheses to that effect.

In terms of narrative research, it is clear that this type of research has limitations in terms of both reliability and validity, as has been explored earlier in the thesis. It is my belief, however, that the purpose of narrative research goes a long way in mitigating these adverse effects. If it is used as a tool by which to get at fresh hypotheses, new research avenues, theories to be tested, as means by which to explore relatively unexplored topics, it may serve
as a method that opens the way for further research conducted through methods containing less of these weaknesses. Given also that it could allow access to information/data that may otherwise lay untapped due to methodological concerns, the narrative approach ought to be given a chance, if the situation is considered suitable.

In addition to these general remarks, I would like to mention a few particular avenues for further research which unexpectedly crystallised from the above analysis, discussions and conclusion in this thesis.

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the reforms initiated by the Treaty of Lisbon have resulted in a changed European Union, particularly in terms of institutions and authority, partially as an attempt to decrease the democratic deficit. This thesis shows that as a likely result the two parties under investigation have taken steps towards viewing European integration and the European Union as a polity, rather than as a policy, although to differing degrees. Further research is necessary to gain a better understanding of how the political actors involved in both the member states and on the European level have adapted to this changed institutional environment, and also how their view on the European Union might have changed as well (for example in terms of the dichotomy policy/polity). In this context, a narrative approach may be one of several possible methods.

This thesis also shows that it is the party that shows the strongest support for either a supranational or a federal Europe, the SPD, that also display the strongest tendency towards utilitarian legitimations, whilst the party that wants to limit the reach and power of the European configuration to those inherent in a more intergovernmental system, the CDU/CSU, only introduces a few utilitarian legitimations. As such, an interesting research avenue might be to investigate the link between utilitarian legitimations, and opinions on the future configuration of the European Union (intergovernmental/supranational/federal) as well as the treatment of European integration and the European Union as a policy or a polity.

In addition, the utilisation of patriotic narratives in the CDU/CSU manifesto of 2013 appears to be an interesting gateway to a new research avenue into German political narratives, and whether or not there really is a trend towards more open expressions of patriotism. Such research would perhaps be better suited to include a wider set of data than party manifestos, and perhaps also a slightly longer time period. A possible research topic could be whether or not expressions of patriotism and national pride has moved fully into the mainstream of German politics, or whether such narratives are only being utilised for a few select debates or
by a few select parties. Further in the future, should one see that such expressions become more and more commonplace, one may also look into the effects of such changes on how the rest of Europe views Germany and Germany’s position in Europe. After all, some parts of history are not easily forgotten, and a Europe of peace and cooperation, however much taken for granted today, is not yet an event in history of particular longevity.
7 Bibliography


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8 Appendix

SPD ELECTION MANIFESTO 2005: “Vertrauen in Deutschland”

[p.40:] 23. We want a citizen-friendly, social and strong Europe

We, the social democrats, support a citizen-friendly, social and strong Europe.

Freedom and justice, solidarity and gender equality must apply in all of Europe.

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has made this idea of Europe a guideline for German European policy. We strongly support this idea.

- We want a European Union that is efficient at making decisions and that at the same time is under political leadership, its responsibilities clearly described and limited. And it’s democratic character strengthened. The Constitutional Treaty makes this possible. The agreement on a shared democratically legitimate basis for future work in Europe, grounded in human rights, remains relevant and is a goal for us.
- The basis for this is a successful strategy for more growth and employment, the implementation of which Germany will actively participate.
- We want to preserve and consolidate the European social- and welfare model. It involves the participation of individuals in society and collectively earned wealth. And it is about the formative role of the welfare state and the free access to public goods. The basis for this is a successful strategy for more growth, employment and social cohesion. Coordinated economic and employment policy initiatives are necessary, particularly in the Eurozone.
- We want a Europe you can rely on. The EU-enlargement policy was in core always a peace policy. Europe will only remain a region of peace and stability, when all agreements and commitments in terms of expansion are honoured. Those who make our partners in Europe insecure, and questions the agreements unanimously agreed on by 25 member states, represents a risk to peace in Europe. We stand firmly against a breach of promise against Bulgaria and Romania, whose accession treaties are already in the process of ratification, and towards Turkey who has fulfilled the requirements of accession since October 2005 and with which negotiations should start.
- Europe must further build on its capacity to act in matters of peace and security. For us, the common European strategy “A secure Europe in a better world”, with its commitment for conflict prevention and a more just world order as preconditions for peace, is a binding guideline in all international activities of the European Union.
15. A Strong and Social Europe

Europe is our collective chance to realise our notion of progress and social justice in the global reality of the 21st century. Where the creative power of the nation state has its limits, a Europe united in solidarity can and must enforce the primacy of democratic politics over the free play of market forces.

In the past century the SPD and the trade unions in Germany have proven that it is possible to civilise capitalism – through worker participation in businesses and enterprises, through workers´ rights, through social and environmental rules and standards, that sets limits on free enterprise, and through all having a just share in socially generated wealth. In the global 21st century we have to make this argument again. Now, Europe is the arena.

As the European party of Germany we are the driving political force for a Europe that belongs to the citizens and that is democratic and capable of acting. The expansion and deepening of the European Union remains the formative basic constant of our politics.

What we want:

Creating a Social Europe – Preventing Wage- and Social Dumping

- **Social Europe.** We want to progressively develop the European tradition of the social state. To this end, the economies in the European internal market must be bound in a political and social order. The European economic and monetary union needs to be complemented by a European social union. We want agreed upon European minimum social standards to prevent a downward spiral of wages and social standards in Europe and to enforce social progress at the European level. This is also a necessary precondition to keep social welfare at a high level in Germany.

- **For a social stability pact.** As an essential element of a future European social union we require a European social stability pact. It should set objectives and targets for social and educational issues that are based on the respective economic performance of EU member states and that are flexible to adapt to these. With increasing economic performance, countries would be committed to higher spending on education and social security systems. In this way, collective European progress can lead to more education and better social protection standards, whilst at the same time sustaining the autonomy of the respective social security systems of the EU member states.

As a second element of a social stability pact for Europe we require that minimum wage regulations apply in all EU member states. That is an important step to prevent wage-dumping Europe wide.

As a first step the social stability pact should be realised in the framework of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). If the social stability pact at first cannot find support amongst all member states of the EU, a core group of progressive EU member states could advance in the framework of a strengthened social cooperation.

- **Fighting Tax-dumping.** We want to take action against tax-dumping in Europe as well. We therefore advocate a uniform basis of assessment and minimum rates of corporate taxation in Europe.
• **Good Work in Europe.** We stand for a social progress clause in EU primary law as well as for a review of the EU Posted Workers Directive. These must go beyond the mere protection of minimum standards.

[p. 87:] The following must apply across Europe: equal pay and equal working conditions for equal work in the same place! Furthermore, the admissibility of environmental and social criteria in public procurement should be clarified and extended in EU procurement law.

• **To strengthen workers’ participation.** A constitutive element of social Europe, and a prerequisite for good work, is the principle of participation of workers and employees in factories and enterprises. The far-reaching codetermination standards in European companies (SE) must become standard and guideline for the further development of European company law. We call for a directive on the relocation of the registered office of companies, in which co-determination standards are ensured. Even with the establishment of a European private company for SMEs, we must make sure that the German right of participation is not undermined.

• **More rights for works councils.** We want to strengthen the rights of European works councils. They need to be informed at an early stage, comprehensively consulted and effectively involved in business decisions. To strengthen collective bargaining at the European level, we want to create a legal basis for cross-border collective bargaining and collective agreements.

• **For equality and against discrimination.** With an ambitious policy for equality and against discrimination, we want to make Europe a non-discriminatory area of equal opportunities. In terms of European Union legislation in the field of anti-discrimination it is important to further the development towards comprehensive protection.

• **Legal protection for public services.** We want to create more European legal protections for public services of general interest. Water supply, sewage and waste disposal, transport, airports and air navigation, important health- and social services and public broadcasters serve the common good. They may not be subjected to a one-sided coercion to liberalise and privatise.

• **European “future-pact” for work.** We need to prioritise job creation in Europe, and we therefore propose a European “future-pact” for work. All European programs must be checked for their employment impact.

[p. 88:] A Europe that is democratic and capable of acting.

• **Implement the Lisbon Treaty.** The self-assertion of Europe and the European Union in the first truly global century requires political action. We want the Treaty of Lisbon to come into force soon. Through it, the EU will become more democratic, more capable, closer to its citizens and also more social.

• **Developing Europe into a Citizens Union.** In the long term we want Europe to develop into a democratically elected civic union. The democratic Europe of the future needs a parliamentary system (government accountable to the parliament) on the basis of a European Constitution.

• **Europe as a force for peace.** We want to strengthen Europe’s identity as a force for global peace, accepting the responsibility for peace and development in the world, enforcing human rights and international law, promoting democracy and dialogue between cultures, and that applies itself for social and environmental standards in the globalised economy. We want to develop the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and in particular strengthen its civilian component.

• **Keep the door open.** We want to continue the EU enlargement policy as a successful peace policy. We support EU membership for Turkey if they meet the necessary criteria. We maintain the accession perspectives for the Balkan states.
A strong economic and industrial policy

- **Improving economic and fiscal coordination.** We want to improve coordination of economic and fiscal policy at the EU level, especially in the Euro group, and have binding regulations. We welcome the strengthening and further institutionalisation of the Euro group by the Treaty of Lisbon. Especially in the current economic and financial crisis we need a qualitative step towards a strong common European economic policy.

- **Strong SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises).** We call for a new European initiative to strengthen the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises and craft industries in Europe, facilitated access to credit and the further reduction of red tape in the European single market.

- **For an innovative Europe.** We call for greater European investment in innovation, research and development, as well as in sustainable European infrastructure, for example in the energy networks or in broadband coverage. We want to implement an environmental industrial policy in Europe. For this we need a European research initiative in environmental technologies and renewable energy.

- **Modern agricultural and structural policy.** We want equal living conditions throughout Europe. We advocate for a social and forward-looking agricultural and structural policy in the EU. The creation of jobs, education and training, research, environmental protection, support for vulnerable communities and rural areas as well as sustainable infrastructure must be made an even stronger focus in EU aid policy.
IX. For a better Europe

The European idea has fascinated people around the world – but the current shape and state of the EU is discouraging to many. This is no contradiction. In the course of ever new reforms in recent decades, in which ever new repairs and adjustments have been made, EU institutions have become so complex that no one understands them any longer. It is up to us to give the EU a form so that the fascination with the European idea becomes visible again: the idea that after militant centuries, Europe can provide a place where peace rules, that exports social justice and stability to the world, and is organised as a transnational democracy in which the regional, national and European levels respectively regulates what it does best. Such a European project is unique in history, and as a result has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The SPD as the European party of Germany is proud of this award, which belongs to the European peoples and people.

Especially in times in which it is obvious how necessary European integration is to ensure that Europe can maintain its prosperity and stability in competition with the emerging regions of the world, the government made up of CDU/CSU and FDP seems to have no enthusiasm for our Europe. In recent years they have failed, when Europe has struggled with different crises: all measures to combat the crisis have been implemented too late and only half-heartedly, thereby increasing the cost of crisis management unnecessarily. Despite the great solidarity citizens in recent years have been ready to show, the federal government responded to the crisis cold-heartedly, acting as if the problems of our neighbours and friends did not concern us. A crisis that triggered devastating social dislocation in some EU member states and that in Southern Europe has resulted in a lost generation of young people. On various occasions members of the government of CDU/CSU and FDP have even publicly contemplated the end of our common currency and thus irresponsibly fuelled speculation against the Euro and thwarted the efforts at cost-cutting in some crisis countries. As such, the federal government has contributed to Europe at times standing at the edge of an abyss, thus harming the interests of our country.

We know: if Europe fails, then the European social model built on solidarity and a fair balance of interests also fails. Europe must be the place, and more, where a model of social and sustainable democracy and market economy opposes neoliberalism and market radicalism. The cold competitive Europe must finally be opposed by a socially responsible Europe. Only in a common European federation of states will we succeed in enforcing our interests and obtaining our prosperity in the 21st century. This applies to economic, monetary and trade issues, as well as in the fields of environmental and consumer protection, conflict prevention and disarmament, and in migration policy.

[p. 102:] The transnational model will only work if we transfer the model of separation of powers that we know from nation states to the European level: the European Commission therefore needs to become a government that is elected and controlled by the European Parliament, and if necessary can be dismissed. In a second chamber, in which the governments of the member states sit in a joint council, national interests are represented. The council enacts laws on equal footing with the European Parliament. The Government, European Parliament and the Council of the Member States each have the right to launch its own legislative initiatives. The European Court is still the highest authority in the European judiciary, and as such it sees to that the fundamental rights of the citizens of the EU are not violated. Thereby, the institutions will be more clearly accountable for their decisions than before. Such reforms will help make decisions more transparent and comprehensible, and it is thus a contribution to the strengthening of European democracy.
The SPD cannot accept that voter turnout has been sinking since the first election to the European Parliament in 1979. Appeals do not help in preventing this trend, but rather it must be clearer in the future which political alternatives, and which persons, are standing for election. We therefore welcome that the European political parties competing in the 2014 elections each put forth a joint top candidate who competes as candidate for the respective party family in all EU-countries. These top candidates compete for the office of EU Commission President. The SPD is committed to only endorsing a Commission President that has run for the election based on a political programme, and that has achieved a majority in the European Parliament. Such an elected President, with parliamentary legitimacy resulting from the preceding election, makes the EU altogether more democratic. At the same time, factions that voted for or against the President will oppose each other in the European Parliament. Even so, a piece of parliamentary tradition taken for granted in the member states is brought to the European level. In addition, we also want to strengthen the efficiency of the European Parliament through supporting the introduction of elections thresholds in European elections, in Germany as elsewhere.

The principle of separation of powers and the full parliamentarisation of the EU must apply in all areas where the EU has authority. In the course of such a reform it is necessary to consider whether the distribution of powers between national and European levels has proven to be right, or whether corrections are necessary. This process could also lead to the return of authority to the member states in cases where European authority has proven unsuccessful. The SPD stands behind the principle of subsidiarity.

After the monetary union, a deepening EU must ultimately complete the economic union, which in addition to the Euro, the single market and a joint central bank needs a collective economic government. Because it has not proven successful to have seventeen or more governments in one currency area implementing their different economic ideas against each other, this common currency area must speak with one voice.

Because the Fiscal Pact and other European control mechanisms have established strict and effective requirements for national budgetary discipline, the subject of joint liability can no longer remain a taboo. Through the Euro-bailouts and the policies of the ECB (European Central Bank) German taxpayers are already liable for hundreds of billions. The SPD has supported this policy because it is in German interests to defend our currency and to prevent the currency area from falling apart. An instrument to ward of speculation against countries of the monetary union could be a European debt repayment fund (sinking fund) for all members of the monetary union.

The SPD is pleased that social democratic pressure has resulted in the preparation of the FTT (financial transaction tax) in eleven EU member states. In government we will embolden other European and EU countries to implement this tax, through which speculators contribute a fair share of public financing.

**More coordination in Europe also requires more democratic control and participation. We want to set up an economic government under the control of Parliament.** An economic government under the control of Parliament must decide the measures taken under the integrated economic policy framework. In doing so we are ensuring that in the Eurozone the measures taken under the common economic and fiscal policy are democratically legitimate. We do not want “business-as-usual” – Europe cannot continue to be a Europe of governments. It must become a Europe of citizens. To this end, the European Parliament and national parliaments must be strengthened. The European social market economy needs a strong European social union. The social union must have its basis in a
social system of values with strong fundamental social rights, as they have already been laid out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These fundamental social rights cannot be subordinated to the market freedoms in the single market, but rather must come first. This principle must be laid down contractually in European primary law through a social progress clause. In Europe, the following must apply: equal pay and working conditions for equal work in the same place. There must be no room for wage and social dumping. In addition, the scope of codetermination in European companies must be expanded, the rights of European works councils strengthened and social dialogue between unions and employers expanded to the European level. Workers from different EU countries should not be pitted against each other, but must have the chance to defend their interests’ together. We want to establish a Social Stability Pact. In order to prevent social dumping, goals and targets for social and educational expenditures must be specified – as measured by the GDP of the respective countries. The same applies to living wages in all EU member states: measured by the average national income. We do however not want European standards to replace national standards. We want to preserve national standards. We need minimum social standards to protect against the harmful competition towards the lowliest social rights and standards.

[p. 104:] We must advance the monetary union into an economic and social union. This is not about the standardisation of the best national social systems in Europe. We do however need common standards to protect our social systems and develop them to that they benefit the people. Public services must not be called into question by the EU. It cannot be so that the interpretation of the market freedoms threatens national characteristics of public services. Here, clear stop signs must apply to the EU, and these must be enshrined in the primary law of the union. **Our goal is to strengthen public services.** We guarantee the access of all citizens to these services. These are most often provided by municipality organisations and institutions at high quality. Thus, we are committed to fair rules of competition for public service providers in national and European law. We want to – also at the European level – to ensure that local authorities can decide for themselves how they perform their public duties. Water supply, sewage and waste disposal, transport, airports and air navigation, important health and social services and the public broadcaster serve the common good. We will oppose any projects containing a clause forcing privatisation. We want to improve of the countless service providers through good working conditions and protection of their rights, regardless of their legal and organisational form.

**We want to change Europe, in order to improve it. A strong and fair Europe needs to focus primarily on the major tasks of the future: the taming of the financial markets, sustainable growth through a modern, innovative industry and investments in the future, as well as a peace promoting policy towards neighbours and in the world.**

In these areas Europe needs to work more closely together through effective collective institutions, and above all, through a strong European Parliament. But we also take the concern held by many that the European Union interferes in to many areas seriously. Where tasks can be solved better nationally, regionally or locally, the principle of subsidiarity must apply. **Subsidiarity** means that policies are made at the level best suited.

To get the necessary reforms for this new Europe on the way, all existing treaties must initially be exhausted. Reform steps that go beyond existing treaties must be prepared by a convention in which parliaments and governments work on equal footing, and where civil society has effective means of participation. The next European election may already, in its new form, be the beginning of a broader debate on the future of the EU. A newly elected European Parliament and a new Commission can then pave the way for concrete reforms.
The threat is that the European Union continues to lose trust, if it does not succeed in shaping its policies in a democratic and socially just manner. To open the door to such a policy change it is important to break the majority of the conservatives and the liberals in the EU institutions and to correct their one-sided policies of austerity and liberalisation. Both the Bundestag election this year and the European election in 2014 are important milestones in bringing a new and better political course to Europe. The EU must regain trust and is dependent on the help of the governments of the member states to do it. The SPD-led federal government will do this through initiating a reform process, which will make the EU more democratic, transparent, just and efficient.
Where do we stand?

The European integration is the key to lasting peace, freedom and prosperity in our continent. Nevertheless, the European Union is currently in a deep crisis that has become visible through the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands, and in the failure of the last summit. With unilateralism, the wanton weakening of the European Growth and Stability Pact and unilateral partisanship in the European Council the Red-Green has divided Europe and damaged its credibility.

What do we want?

We need a European policy that recovers lost trust in the European peace and integration policy. We want to strengthen the Europe of the citizens, return German European policy on the way of fair coexistence between larger and smaller states and again give the people of our continent hope in their future. We see the current crisis in Europe as a chance to re-establish the credibility of European policy and its support from people.

- **We prevent further centralisation and bring back expertise.** Not every problem in Europe is also a task for Europe. The portfolio of tasks for the European Union must be limited to what is necessary; the principle of subsidiarity must be the yardstick for EU action. This includes a clear distinction between responsibilities of the European Union and the member states, regions and municipalities. European legislation must be better reviewed for their necessity and for their impact on citizens, business and government. In addition, we will only implement EU rules 1:1.

- **We will apply ourselves for progress that** includes the Constitutional Treaty, in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the provisions relating to the institutions, and to improve the division of competence as well as the improvement of the foreign policy of the European Union. We want to strengthen the role of the national parliaments through the application of the subsidiarity early warning system before the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty and noticeably extend the national right of participation of the German Bundestag in EU decisions.

[p. 36:]

- **We call for a strict interpretation of the Stability Pact,** which was diluted against our will, so that its disciplinary effects can continue to unfold. We want to secure the value of our money.
- **We will push for a thrifty EU budget, taking into account its limited effects in Germany.** The European Union also needs to save money and for this reason we support the consolidation of national budgets. The member state´s contributions to the EU budget must be fair and be measured by respective economic prosperity. The pattern of expenditures of the EU budget must be improved by a concentration and by a partial return of responsibilities to the member states.
- **We rely on a privileged partnership with Turkey. We reject a full membership because that would overwhelm the integration capacity of the European Union.** With a privileged partnership, not an unrealistic prospect of accession, we want to promote democratic rule of law and economic development of Turkey, with which we are closely linked in security policy.
• **We will only accept countries that are ready for accession into the European Union.** The accession criteria must be strictly adhered to in the accession of Bulgarian and Romania. We will make a decision on the accession treaties only after the progress reports are presented to the European Commission. We will start accession negotiations with Croatia, an economically prosperous country deeply ingrained in Europe, as soon as any remaining doubts about its cooperation with the International Criminal Court are dispelled.

• **We will again use the reliable friendship between Germany and France for a positive perspective for Europe.** We will again frame the German-French cooperation in a way that assures the other EU-partners, that integrates their interests and that avoids gestures of paternalism (condescendence?) and dominance. Trusting and close relations with all neighbouring countries and EU members is of fundamental importance.

• **German expellees and German ethnic groups in Eastern Europe have after the eastern enlargement an important function as a link in the cooperation with our eastern neighbours.** In the spirit of reconciliation we want to signal the remembrance of the injustice of expulsion with a Centre against expulsions in Berlin, and simultaneously outlaw expulsion forever.
IV.3 Strong Europe – Secure Future

The united Europe offers its citizens every opportunity to realise their future prospects and to live their lives in peace and freedom. The CDU and the CSU wants a strong and citizen-friendly Europe. Here, the Franco-German partnership is of particular importance. The hallmark of our European policy is a partnership where all member states of the European Union are at the same eye level. We stand for the way out of the crisis, because collective European action is internationally successful. We stand for a wise national and European understanding of interests. And we stand for a consolidated EU, because Europe must have borders.

- We know: a strong European Union is the best foundation for growth, creating and securing jobs, and social security in our country. The social market economy that we want to anchor in Europe and internationally is the best economic and social model in order to achieve these goals, and to secure our future. It is the successful and humane response to the failed systems of socialist planned economy and unbridled capitalism.

- We want to guarantee competition and consumer protection in the EU internal market and eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy. It remains an on-going task in the EU to avoid bureaucracy. For this we require a fundamental bureaucracy check for European decisions.

- We stand for a strong, decision-efficient European Foreign and Security Policy to successfully represent our interests in the world of the 21st century. It must be built on a more developed common security strategy, a strengthened High Representative for Foreign Policy, as well as on including a mutual defence commitment into the European Security and Defence Policy, in addition to the transatlantic partnership.

- We strive for a long-term energy policy for the European Union, which increases the EU’s influence on the global energy markets. Europe takes a pioneering role in climate protection, which can only be achieved together. The EU climate change program was largely formed by the CDU/CSU. Germany will continue to make an important contribution to addressing global climate change. A one-sided burden on a few EU countries and their economies is out of the question.

- For us it is clear: A stable currency is a prerequisite for a strong economy and a stable political situation. We stand for a Europe of budgetary discipline and fair contributions, as well as an independent European Central Bank. We reject EU-taxes.

- We want a Europe which is committed to its Western Christian roots and the ideas of the enlightenment, and that lives up to these. We maintain our goal to make this value understanding clear in the European Constitution, even with a reference to God.

- The EU must respect the identity of nations with their regions and municipalities. German is the most widely spoken mother tongue and one of the three procedural languages of the EU. We are therefore committed to strengthening the German language in Europe, in order to end its de facto disadvantage in the European institutions.

- We demand that according to the principle of subsidiarity tasks are carried out as close as possible to the people. Brussels should not meddle when tasks could be performed adequately or better on federal, regional or municipal political levels. In the internal market we need less detailed regulations and more freedom. In future EU treaty changes we want to make sure that authority can be transferred back from the European level to the nation states.
• We know: the recent EU enlargements have been a success and in the interest of Germany and Europe. Following the accession of twelve new member states and accession of Croatia there must be a period of consolidation in the EU enlargement process in order to strengthen the identity and institutions of the EU. For countries with European membership prospective holds that for the admission of new members into the European Union the accession criteria is just as important as the complete fulfilment of all political and economic criteria by the candidate countries, including in particular the freedom of expression, equality of women and men, protection of minorities and freedom of religion. Turkey does not fulfil these requirements. We hold a privileged partnership, instead of full membership to the EU, to be the right solution for Turkey.

• For the European neighbours of the EU, which cannot or still cannot be full members, we need particular forms of cooperation, like the Eastern partnership. For the non-European neighbours we need as part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy tailored partnership agreements without the prospect of membership.
1. Germany’s future in Europe

The CDU and the CSU want a strong Europe. Our lesson from history was and is the desire “to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe”, as is stated in our constitution. This commitment to Europe is for us a matter of common sense, but also a labour of love.

The CDU and the CSU are the German European parties. Under our leadership, what started as a closer economic cooperation has in 60 years become and internationally respected and influential association of states. World-wide, the European Union is of a unique calibre and legal community. It stands for freedom and human rights, for tolerance and peaceful coexistence internally and externally, for wealth and social security.

That our everyday life in Germany and Europe knows no walls and barriers; that we travel freely in Europe, reside anywhere, work and learn anywhere, shows the outstanding success of European unification for the people on our continent. This success obligates and emboldens us to continue down the path of peaceful and democratic unification of Europe.

We want a Europe which is committed to its Christian roots and Western enlightenment ideas, and that lives according to them. We remain committed to our goal of making the responsibility before God, as is stated in the (German) constitution, clear in EU-treaties as well.

For many in Europe and the world, Germany is today a role model when it comes to stable and sustainable development. The social market economy and the wise political decisions for its development, serve as an example for their own efforts. Our balanced economic structure with a strong middle class, a powerful industry and our social partnership of trade unions and employer’s organisations stands as a model worldwide. These successes bring us international recognition. An example is a BBC survey naming Germany as the most popular country in the world.

With the successful policies of the CDU and the CSU, Germany has become the anchor of stability and engine for growth in Europe. As a result, we have a particular responsibility in resolving the debt crisis in Europe. We assume this task because we know that a single currency will strengthen the economic power of Europe and that Europe is the future for a life in peace, freedom and prosperity.

Preserving Europe’s strength in a changing world.

In our generation, it will be decided if we are able to collectively master the challenges of the 21st century.

Of the more than seven billion people in the world only every one hundredth today lives in Germany. The European Union today stands for about seven per cent of the world population. Until 2050 the world population will rise to over nine billion people, whilst the German and European population will continue to decline. Today, China alone has more inhabitants than Europe, North- and Central America combined. The flow of trade and economic power centres are also shifting. China has superseded Germany as the world’s leading exporter, and continues to grow. Emerging economies like India, Brazil and many others play an increasing role.

Given these shifts in economic power we can only safeguard our prosperity if Europe remains a competitive continent that strives to be the best in the world. Thus we fight for a strong and
competitive European Union that emerges strengthened from the debt crisis. We cannot allow a return to old mistakes. For this reason we will continue to right the course in the next four years, together with our partners at the European level, by ensuring that the strengthening and advancement of the economic efficiency is basis for employment, social security and sustainability at all levels. Together, we Europeans can then continue to do our part in resolving the major global challenges.

**Successful reforms have been implemented**

Since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis three years ago we have successfully consolidated the monetary union and have implemented important reforms for lasting stability.

[p. 9:] We have, together with our European partners, employed debt brakes based on a German model in the Euro countries, through the strengthening of the Stability Pact. At the same time, structural reforms have paved the way for more competitiveness, sustainable growth and employment. Both are connected, and form the basis for winning back lost trust.

In this way, the new debt in the Euro zone has been halved in the past three years. Our partners have initiated important economic reforms. As a result, the Euro debt crisis was defused, but it is far from solved. Because the Euro remains a strong and stable currency we must stay the course and not relent in our efforts.

**Help only as a result of own efforts.**

We are committed to solidarity with our European neighbours. However: those who need help must contribute to solve their problems with their own efforts. This includes reducing debts and increasing their competitiveness through reforms and increasing investments in future education, research and technology. This is why we want to ensure that the funds of the European Union are more focused on projects that increase competitiveness and creates jobs. This is particularly true for measures against the high youth unemployment in many European crisis countries.

**Europe must ensure a stable currency.**

We stand for a strong Euro and stable prices. Both are a key prerequisite for the success of our economy and the creation of new jobs. Almost 40 per cent of German exports go to the Euro zone, 60 per cent to the EU as a whole, securing millions of well-paid jobs in Germany. A single currency is an indispensable instrument in international trade and in the global currency politics. We therefore advocate the further reduction of debt, and a strict observance of national debt ceilings.

Furthermore, we rely on balanced budgets in all EU member states and defend the independence of the European Central Bank, which was based on the model of the German Bundesbank. This has led, despite the crisis, to a higher degree of price stability. We want all Euro countries to defend the Euro together.

**No debt Union, no transfer union.**

The SPD and the Greens have during their reign broken the Growth and Stability Pact four times, as well as softened its rules. Unfortunately, they have not learnt anything. The Red/Green rely on a pooling of debt through the introduction of Eurobonds. This would result in a European debt union, where the German taxpayers would be forced to vouch in an almost unlimited manner for the debt of other countries. We reject this. Thereby the principle is “no help without reciprocity”. We do not want
that a Euro country can increase its debts at the expense of its neighbours, or that they can shirk away from uncomfortable reform efforts.

**Strengthening the Economic and Currency union.**

We want to continue strengthening the confidence in the stability of the Euro and the future of Europe. Further reforms and efforts towards a stability union are therefore necessary. We focus on three key areas of action:

**A European Bank Union**

We want an effective European banking supervision at the European Central Bank for the large, systemically important banks, as well as methods for the resolution of insolvent banks. For the other financial institutions, not least the savings and cooperative banks, the current well-functioning banking supervision remains.

We will ensure that the withdrawal of money from the Euro rescue fund for the restructuring of banks depends on the working capacity of the European banking supervisors. Savers in any EU country must be able to rely on a functioning deposit insurance system. This is ensured through the universal minimum standards of national deposit guarantee schemes. We reject a Europe-wide deposit guarantee, as it would mutualise liability risk, and German savers would be made liable for deposits in other countries.

[p.10:] **Adherence to strict budgetary rules.**

We advocate that the rules of the strengthened Stability and Growth Pact and the fiscal compact be strictly implemented. Those who violate the agreed limits of the Stability and Growth Pact can expect sanctions. As a result, we want to strengthen the capability of the European Commission to monitor and review national budgets. In addition, we are committed to developing a rescheduling procedure within the Euro zone, for countries that are no longer able to pay their debts.

**Strengthening competitiveness in all of Europe.**

We want an economically strong and successful Europe that succeeds in the global competition of the future. 90 per cent of global growth takes place outside Europe. We want to find and exploit our chances to succeed in this market with good and competitive products and services. Thus, we want to make Europe more competitive to make robust and sustainable growth possible, and to sustain and develop our social model. For this, we need a strong economic policy debate about how we can improve Europe’s competitiveness. We want to enact a competitiveness pact, in which nation states agree with the European Commission on concrete measures to accurately improve their situation. It is our goal to strengthen the weak and to make the performance of the best a benchmark for all. By investing in education, research and technology we want to ensure Europe’s opportunities in international markets. We will also support other European countries in introducing dual education, in both school and in the workplace, because it can open the path to a good occupational future.

Better language education, education transfer possibilities and social protection are further steps on the way to a common European labour market. We want to continue and expand our initiative, the EU Youth Initiative. With it, investments and measures to combat youth unemployment in Europe are under way.

**Europe needs a strong Franco-German partnership.**
Europe’s challenges are great. A trusting relationship between the partners is essential for collective success. We want to move forward with all EU partners and find ways to bring together different positions. But we also know that European integration needs a motor. Therefore, the Franco-German partnership is of particular importance. We are aware of this responsibility and want to do right by Europe also in the future.

Poland is one of our most important partners amongst the new EU member states. We want to deepen our partnership with Poland and use the manifold neighbourly relations to expand personal contact between people and develop the vibrant economic relations. This goals also serves the cooperation of France, Poland and Germany in the Weimar triangle.

Unity in diversity.

For the CDU and the CSU the national states and the regions are the formative features of a Europe of unity in diversity. We do not want a centrally organised and governed Europe. The CDU and the CSU wants a Europe that serves its citizens. A diverse Europe ensures quality of life in the regions and respects different ways of life. In order to make Europe more understandable, and in the interest of bringing Europe closer to the citizens, all European decisions should be available to all citizens in an appropriate manner. The information must be simple, understandable and easy to find. Here, the Internet offers great opportunity.

German is the most widely spoken mother tongue, and one of the three procedural languages, in the European Union. We are committed to strengthen the German language in Europe. Our goal is for German to be treated equally with English and French in the EU administration.

The EU thrives on the meeting of its peoples.

We want for the citizens to experience Europe, and that it can enrich their occupational and private lives.

[p. 11:] We are committed to the learning of foreign languages as well as for the exchange programs for young people, workers, students and researchers in Europe. In such a way, the European community can be strengthened. We want to initiate and give new life to partnerships between German and European cities, in order to strengthen the European idea and mutual understanding. In such partnerships, the exchange of experiences becomes possible, and assistance for regions and countries that face particular challenges relating to competitiveness, the strengthening of education and science, as well as the fight against youth unemployment, can be organised.

[p. 73:] 6.2 Europe: Strong in the World.

The European Union needs a coordinated and effective foreign and security policy. It must be based on a more developed common security strategy and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy must be strengthened. Therefore we want to take further steps to deepen the military cooperation in Europe while continuing to develop the transatlantic division of labour, for example by pooling and sharing previously national military capabilities. In the long term, we are aiming for a European army.

The European Union needs a strategic discussion regarding what it can and wants to achieve by civilian and military means. Civilian means, for us, has priority. The EU’s existing capabilities in civilian crisis prevention and post-crisis rehabilitation have to, in light of the linked approach of the EU and NATO, be interlocked with the military capabilities.
The European Union and its member states can provide valuable assistance in building a powerful administration in third countries. This applies particularly to the areas of police and justice. To this end, we will encourage German officials, judges and prosecutors to take part in such operations, through targeted measures.

We want the common European mission to maintain and strengthen the security of Europe to mainly be carried out in our geographic neighbourhood. Missions beyond this neighbourhood should increasingly be assigned to regional partners and organisations, for example the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which should be supported and properly prepared by the European Union and NATO.

**EU enlargements must serve the citizens.**

The recent EU enlargements have been in the interests of Germany and Europe. We believe that the countries of the Western Balkans have a prospect of membership. However, it must be ensured that new member states fully meet all political and economic criteria.

**Raising relations with Turkey to a new level.**

We see the strategic and economic importance of Turkey for Europe, as well as the diverse relationships between the people of both our countries. We would like to further deepen relations between

[p. 74:] the European Union and Turkey. A close and special collaboration serves both the people of Europe and the people of Turkey. We therefore want the strongest possible cooperation between the European Union and Turkey, as well as a close strategic cooperation on foreign and security policy issues. We reject a full membership for Turkey because it does not meet the conditions for EU accession. Given the size of the country, and its economic structure, the European would also be overwhelmed.