Figurations of the Future
Forms and Temporalities of Left Radical Politics in Northern Europe

Stine Krøijer

An excellent, intriguing book [that] puts forward a number of connected theses, in activist politics... the emergence of a certain regime of temporality with 'cosmological' import and the priority of form over content in the generation of a certain indigenous concept of style that is importantly different from the classic Birmingham-school notion.

Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

The robust notion of style, which goes beyond earlier theorizations derived from cultural studies, is especially important. At its best, Figurations of the Future provides a compelling ethnographic description that generates important theoretical insights.

Maple Razsa, Colby College

Built around key events, from the eviction of a self-managed social centre in Copenhagen in 2007 to the Climate Summit protests in 2009, this book contributes to anthropological literature on contemporary Euro-American politics foreshadowing recent waves of public dissent. Stine Krøijer explores political forms among left radical and anarchist activists in Northern Europe focusing on how forms of action engender time. Drawing on anthropological literature from both Scandinavia and the Amazon, this ethnography recasts theoretical concerns about body politics, political intentionality, aesthetics and time.

STINE KROJER is Assistant Professor at the University of Copenhagen and is working on autonomy, anarchism, environmental and forest politics and the Amazon.

Cover image © Berit Nørgård
Ethnography, Theory, Experiment

Series Editors:
Martin Holbraad, Department of Anthropology, University College London
Morten Axel Pedersen, Department of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen
Rane Willerslev, Department of Anthropology, Aarhus University

In recent years, ethnography has been increasingly recognized as a core method for generating qualitative data within the social sciences and humanities. This series explores a more radical, methodological potential of ethnography: its role as an arena of theoretical experimentation. It includes volumes that call for a rethinking of the relationship between ethnography and theory in order to question, and experimentally transform, existing understandings of the contemporary world.

Volume 1
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL TROMPE L’OEIL FOR A COMMON WORLD
AN ESSAY ON THE ECONOMY OF KNOWLEDGE
By Alberto Corsín Jiménez

Volume 2
FIGURATIONS OF THE FUTURE
FORMS AND TEMPORALITIES OF LEFT RADICAL POLITICS
IN NORTHERN EUROPE
By Stine Krøijer

Volume 3
WATERWORLDS
ANTHROPOLOGY IN FLUID ENVIRONMENTS
Edited by Kirsten Hastrup and Frida Hastrup

Volume 4
VIOLENT BECOMINGS
STATE FORMATION, SOCIALITY, AND POWER IN MOZAMBIQUE
By Bjørn Enge Bertelsen
List of Illustrations, Figures, and Maps vii

Acknowledgements x

A Note on Anonymity and Fieldwork xiii

A Note on Language xv

Glossary xviii

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xxiv

List of Key Historical and Contemporary Persons xxvi

Introduction 1

Chapter 1. Violence. War, State, and Anthropology in Mozambique 26

Chapter 2. Territory. Spatio-Historical Approaches to State Formation 56

Chapter 3. Spirit. Chiefly Authority, Soil, and Medium 90

Chapter 4. Body. Illness, Memory, and the Dynamics of Healing 121
Chapter 5. Sovereignty. The Mozambican President and the Ordering of Sorcery 160

Chapter 6. Economy. Substance, Production, and Accumulation 197

Chapter 7. Law. Political Authority and Multiple Sovereignties 229

Conclusion. Uncapturability, Dynamics, and Power 263

Bibliography 271

Index 311
**Illustrations**

0.1 Remnants of a military vehicle destroyed during the civil war   6

1.1 View of the mountain Bengo   34

1.2 The *goero* that the author shared with António and Ana’s son   45

1.3 *Mhamba* with *tchirenge*   47

2.1 Rebels beheaded by colonial Nguni forces following the 1917 Bárùè rebellion   67

2.2 Samora Machel as reproduced in a Chimoio mural   72

2.3 Interior wall in a Chimoio secondary school celebrating Frelimo   77

3.1 *Acidente mágico* (magical accident)   92

4.1 Banner of a *n’anga* in Chimoio   124

4.2 *Tchitumba tchonanga*   127

4.3 The Zionist church *Zione Jerusalem Kanaan Jehova*, Chimoio   128

4.4 Objects João brought the *profete*   132
4.5 Example of objects used for possession by a n'anga 135
4.6 N’anga administering hot stones to the concoction 136
4.7 João sitting stooped over the fumes 137
4.8 Kutenda adzimo edu, Honde 143
4.9 A gotokoto photographed as it was running away 147
5.1 The head of AMETRAMO in Manica Province, Mr. Cerveija 165
6.1 Digging António’s grave together, Honde 205
6.2 Bhutu on mussekessa leaves as part of kubatidzana 206
6.3 Salt and the flesh of the hen put into the sadza pot as part of kubatidzana 206
6.4 The production of charcoal, Honde 207
6.5 A pendekari, pot for cooking sadza 213
6.6 Women walking with maize to the mill in Chimoio 215
6.7 Theft of mandioka (cassava) from someone’s machamba, Honde 221
7.1 Xylogravure (woodcut) by Matias Ntundu Mzanyoka of colonial-era tax collection 232
7.2 The tire procured to burn the mbava 237
7.3 Street children sleeping in front of a bank, Chimoio’s bairro cimento 244

**Figures**

1.1 Layout of typical Honde household 33
4.1 Muturica interior as seen from above 140
4.2 Simplified layout of kutenda adzimu edu 141
Maps

1. Political map of Mozambique xxvii

2. Simplified map of administrative districts and their borders,
   Manica Province xxviii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Seeing a book published signals closure: an end to searching for analytical angles, theoretical direction, and, most importantly, capturing the elusive ethnographic realities at the heart of the anthropological endeavor. While this book centers around a single author, and although flaws, faults, and other shortcomings are my own, I am greatly indebted to a number of people and institutions who have aided me in a host of ways.

Most importantly and above all, I am greatly indebted to all the people of Honde and Chimoio who shared with me their time, efforts, help, concern, and knowledge. Had I not been received so hospitably in, first, Honde in 1999, I sincerely doubt this book would ever have seen the light of day. This muZungu is forever thankful for having been given the chance to participate fully in their daily life—in multiple periods of fieldwork from 1999 onward. Maitabassa maningue!

At the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Bergen I could include everyone, as almost all have, at some point, contributed positively to the project. However, I would like to thank, in particular, Bruce Kapferer, Ørnulf Gulbrandsen, Knut Rio, Annelin Erikse, Margit Ystanes, Ceciie Ødegaard, Vigdis Broch-Due, Edvard Hviding, John Christian Knudsen, Iselin Å. Strønen, Andrew Lattas, Espen Helgesen, Tord Austdal, Synnøve Bendixsen, Ståle Knudsen, Olaf Smedal, Michelle MacCarthy, Alessandro Zagato, Theodoros Rakopoulos, Anna Szolucha, Maria Dyveke Styve, Mari H. Korsbrekke, Jacob Hjortsberg, Axel Rudi, Mohammad Tareq Hasan, and Ruy Llera Blanes for being fantastic colleagues, critics, and discussion partners. In addition, the whole group of past PhD students deserves special mention, including Bård Kårtveit, Jessica Jemima Mzamu, Samson Abebe Bezabh, Janne Bøe, Rita
Cunningham, Jon Harald Sande Lie, Alexander Manuylov, Robert Mongwe, Eria Olowo Onyango, Rolf Scott, Hanna Skartveit, Inger Lise Teig, Dinesan Vadakkinyil, Mathew Varghese, and Zerihun A. Woldeselassie. Thank you all.

UiB Global, formerly the Centre for Development Studies, at the University of Bergen (UiB) has also kindly facilitated parts of the research drawn upon here. I am grateful for the opportunity to have been part of such an open-minded institution and research environment for so many years. My thanks here are extended to all academic and administrative staff, including Anne K. Bang, Erlend Eidsvik, Per Ditlef Fredriksen, Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland, Leif Manger, Nefissa Naguib, Kristin Holst Paulsen, Ove Stoknes, Inger Thorsen, Terje Tvedt, Ole Reidar Vetaas, Terje Østigård, and many others. A special thanks also to Tore and Eva Sætersdal for being so inclusive in helping me facilitate my project and for welcoming me to their home in Vila Manica.

As all projects do, this one has depended on the goodwill and support of a number of institutions and funding bodies. Thanks to the Meltzer fund for financing several periods of fieldwork in Mozambique as well as participation at academic conferences. Fieldwork funding was also received from the Faculty of Social Sciences, UiB. In Chimoio and Maputo, the staff of ARPAC—Instituto de Investigação Sócio-Cultural greatly facilitated my work through the help of people like Arlindo J. S. Simbine and Alberto Folowara. My thanks are also extended to Joel Tembe at the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique in Maputo for aiding my archival work there and for also permitting the reproduction of certain historical photographs. I am also grateful to the Universidade Católica de Moçambique in Beira for helping me in my first attempts at research in Chimoio in 1999, in particular former rector Michael Schulteis and Dr. Conde of the faculty of English.

A number of people have in different ways shaped my thinking about Mozambique and need to be mentioned. These include, in no particular order whatsoever, Aslak Orre, Einar Braathen, Randi Gressgård, Christine Jacobsen, Valentine Daniel, Hege Toje, Inge Tvedten, Anne Mette Teigjen, Esmeralda Mariano, Carmeliza Rosário, James Bannerman, Christy Schuetze, Stephen Lubkemann, Martin Holbraad, Allen Abramson, Thomas Blom Hansen, Nicolas Argenti, Helene M. Kyed, Morten Nielsen, Celso Inguate, José Adalima, Armando Marques Guedes, Paula Meneses, Sandra Manuel, Alexandre Mate, Signe Arnfred, Are Knudsen, Sheila Pereira Khan, Ketil Foss-Hagen, Sandra Roque, Abel Nassone, Giovanni da Col, Ana Maria Gentili, Randi Kaarhus, Ana Bénard da Costa, Amy Schwartzott, Ana Margarida Fonseca, Paolo Israel, Michel Caheh, Juan Obarrio, Jeanne Penvenne, Jason Sumich, Siri Glop-

Thanks are also extended to the people that have made this book possible, in many ways, including the anonymous referees (two of which were positive and one poisonous) who undertook the considerable critical work; Kjell Helge Sjøstrøm, who has aided with designing maps; and the fantastic people at Berghahn Books, including Duncan Ranslem, Jessica Murphy, Ben Parker, Vivian Berghahn, and Marion Berghahn. I also would like to thank the copyeditor Ryan Marsteller for a fantastically thorough job on the manuscript and extend my warm thanks to the photographer Sergio Costa who permitted me to use his brilliant photograph on this book’s cover. Also, I greatly appreciate having received funding from the Norwegian Research Council to have this book published, as well as having received a grant from the University of Bergen to make it available as an Open Access book.

I probably owe the fact that I am (still) sane to my two sons Mats and Eirik who are always playful, inquisitive, and fantastic. Most of all, however, I would like to thank my wife Anne Synøve for bearing with me through it all and for always letting me go and come back. Time and again. Thank you.
A NOTE ON ANONYMITY AND FIELDWORK

In this book, both the names of Chimoio’s bairros and the name of the rural community which I call “Honde,” in which fieldwork has been carried out over several different periods, remain undisclosed. I have also chosen to anonymize the names of all interlocutors, barring those who are prominent public figures and therefore could not for the sake of analysis remain anonymous. In the few photos of people I have included, their faces have been digitally obscured. The decision to anonymize was one I did not reach lightly. In one sense, the book loses important dimensions of what one could term the vitality and presence of ethnographic detail by not being able to, for example, convey full life stories replete with photographs, names, and ages or to present localities with detailed sociological data in terms of, for example, lineages, political positions, occupation, and income.

There are, however, several reasons why I still chose to anonymize: I have undertaken fieldwork in the same localities for this book as I have for earlier works—for my cand. polit. thesis (2002), for instance—and as I anonymized then, I need to do so now to avoid possible “deanonymization” by “reading backward.” Arguably, this might seem overly pedantic, cautious, or self-centered. However, during 1999–2000 and due to the politicized nature of the ethnographic material collected in the context of election campaigns between the dominant parties of Frelimo and Renamo, I experienced unwanted attention because of my research from both Mozambique’s security apparatus and the police (see Bertelsen 2002: 18–24 for details). Most importantly, however, so did my interlocutors. Thus, during the remainder of the 1999–2000 fieldwork and in subsequent years in 2004, 2005, 2007, and 2008, I adopted a number of in-field methodological measures to protect the identity of
people I met—a measure Sluka (1995: 280) has entitled (and endorsed) as “methodological camouflage” in contexts one could term repressive. The cases of attempted lynchings and the circumstances around these are specific ethnographic examples of contexts where such “methodological camouflaging” has been used. Outside the field, however, a logical further step has been to also anonymize sites and names of people in written works. The decision to anonymize has been persistently implemented in all publications based on my material from the locality I call Honde and the city of Chimoio.
Coming to Mozambique for the first time in 1998, I spoke basic Portuguese, and my knowledge of chiTewe, the predominant local language in Chimoio, the capital of Manica Province, was virtually nonexistent. After nineteen months in the field from 1999 onward, I greatly increased my knowledge and command of both languages. Chimoio is characterized by complex, historical patterns of migration and contemporary rapid population growth. In terms of language, this means that people constantly, in a bricolage fashion, engineer their own particular ways of talking in social settings, mixing elements of, among others, Portuguese, chiTewe, chiNyungwe, chiNdau, chiSena, and chiManyika—all languages spoken in Central Mozambique. In addition, the recent upheavals in nearby Zimbabwe have meant an influx of thousands of Shona- and English-speaking refugees. This social dynamic creates difficulties for one learning the two traditionally dominant languages. Thus, during fieldwork, I communicated in both Portuguese and chiTewe, mixing and matching expressions, syntax, and glossary from these languages and others in a fashion trying to mimic my interlocutors—often to great public amusement. Textual and linear representation will necessarily only bleakly reproduce this vastly creative use of language. However, despite the confines imposed by the written form, I have retained some vernacular expressions to highlight especially important terms or for other analytical aspects. This move aims also to visually display key elements of the empirical as well as to make accessible for the reader the inevitable analytical mise-en-scène techniques of selecting some terms over others as significant.

My approach also impinges on both orthography and denotation of categories of people, aspects which vary greatly in written contemporary
as well as historical sources. A brief example illustrates how “ethnic” and linguistic categories often are jumbled together and how spelling differs. Mark Chingono (1994a: 130; 1996: 15) terms both ethnic identity and language in the Chimoio area as “Shona” when describing Chimoio and immediate peri-urban areas. Contrastingly, Suana (1999: 5) describes “Teve” culture, Alexander (1994: 37) employs the term “Matewe,” while in some texts both language and culture are referred to as “chi-Teve” (Kyed 2007c), “Kiteve” (Newitt 1995: 43), “Quiteve” (Isaacman 1973: 70; Newitt 1969), “Tebe” (Firmino 2002: 79), “Xitewe” (Desrosiers 2011), and “Tewe” (Centro de Informação e Turismo de Moçambique 1975: 21). Artur (1999a: 19–21), a Mozambican sociologist who has worked extensively in Chimoio, provides the terms “Va-Tewe,” “A-Tewe,” and “Kwa-Tewe” but ends up with calling the people “A-Tewe,” their area “U-Tewe,” and their language “Ci-Tewe,” or, in vernacular, “shitewo” or “shitewe.” However, not sticking with these distinctions, Artur terms the language “Ci-Teve” and the people “Va-Tewe” in a different text (1999b: 52, 69), thus complicating the issue further. Françoise Legrand (1993: 32) distances herself from other terms, dubbing language and ethnic identity “Chiutee.” Legrand’s term resembles somewhat official statistics where the language category “Chitwe” appears (Instituto Nacional de Estatística 1999b: 51). Finally, based on extensive knowledge of the Manica past, historian James Bannerman criticizes the use of the terms “Quiteve,” “Teve,” and “Têue” and argues for “Tewe” being the correct rendering of the term (2007, 2009). In this text I will follow Bannerman in using the term “chiTewe” for the language spoken and “maTewe” or “aTewe/atewe” for the group of people identifying themselves (or being identified as) this category.

Finally, in order to attain a basic level of orthographic consistency, I have consulted numerous works. For non-area specific Mozambican Portuguese terms, the text has not only depended on general works of Mozambican history and society (Newitt 1995; Pélissier 1994a, 1994b) but also some contributions to the study of Mozambican languages (Lopes et al. 2002; Dias 2009) and works on language use and policies (Firmino 1995, 2002; Figueira 2013). Shona, a language very similar in many respects to chiTewe, is standardized, and I have used its main dictionary (Hannan 1984 [1959]) as the authority on spelling in some cases. More importantly, besides consulting my interlocutors, I have also made use of several theses (e.g. Mtetwa 1984; Neil-Tomlinson 1987; Neves 1998; Allina-Pisano 2002; Luedke 2005; MacGonagle 2007) and some sociohistoric works on the area (e.g. Artur 1996, 1999a; Liesegang 1996; Suana 1999; Chapman 2010) to check my particular spelling against those of other scholars. Thus, the glossary—as well as the spell-
ing throughout the text—clearly lacks the orthographic consistency that one could ideally have expected. Put differently, while the glossary and spelling in general in this book reflects my own incomplete control of chiTewe, my lack of linguistic anthropological training, and the absence, as far I know, of any comprehensive, written and available dictionary of chiTewe, it does build on long-term ethnographic engagement with the area and other written sources.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aldeamento</td>
<td>Communal village constructed by the late Portuguese colonial state (P).¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aldeia comunal</td>
<td>Communal village; postliberation communist institution initially created to augment peasant agricultural production (P).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aridzi wo nhika</td>
<td>Lit. “owners of the land/territory”; term for the group recognized to be autochthonous to an area and holding sets of land-use rights (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autoridade</td>
<td>Term created by Mozambican government decree (no. 15/2000) to denote a new type of local authority within a scheme to decentralize the state structure (P).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comunitária</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baba</td>
<td>“Father”; term designating a paternal genealogical parent, any elderly paternal relatives to ego, or often elderly men (M).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baba mkuru</td>
<td>“Great father”; term for (often elderly) high-ranking men (M).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bairro</td>
<td>Quarter or section of town (P).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bairro cimento</td>
<td>“Concrete quarter”; normally constituting the city center and middle-class areas, encircled by shanty towns (P).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baixa</td>
<td>Portuguese term for matoro (M).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhutu</td>
<td>Crushed husks and casks for maize; bran (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bonde</td>
<td>Sleeping and sitting mats made of reed or bamboo; sometimes still used to wrap around corpses when these are interred (T).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
capulana  Large or small colorful cloth worn mostly by women as wraparounds, to carry babies on their backs, or to transport goods on their heads (M).

chamboco  Penal instrument used from the colonial period onward; first made from rhinoceros hide, now more often plastic or wood. Term from Malay sambuk, Indonesian cambuk, and Dutch sjambok (M).

chil  Exclamation in oral Mozambican Portuguese, used to underline a particular point (M).

chiTewe  Language of maTewe (T).

chupa-sangue  Nocturnal creature or being that sucks the blood, vampire-like, out of its victims (M).

cuchekera  A blood sacrifice, often for economic gain and often involving the death or disease of kin, workers, or intimate others. A technique of uroi. (T)

curandeiro/a  Male/female healer-diviner/traditional healer. See also n’anga (P).

dhuli  Mortar in which maize, sorghum, or other grain is pounded with a pestle (T).

djangano  Work party wherein participants are given duro for a given task, e.g. weeding a machamba (T).

duro  Beer made from bran or sorghum (T).

dzindza  Enlarged family or kin group (T).

eh pah!  Exclamation in oral Mozambican Portuguese to express surprise or to underline a particular point (M).

feiticeiro/a  Male or female sorcerer. See also muroi (P).

feitiço  Sorcery. See also uroi (P).

gamba  Very powerful and destructive spirit borne out of violent acts (T).

gombwa  Territorial, ancestral spirit, often seen as protective (T).

gosho  Large, handheld rattle used in ritual accompanying dance (S).

gotokoto  Spirit goat; a goat, often black, ritually treated by a n’anga, into which a malevolent spirit from a person is transferred (T).

grupos  Lit. “dynamizing groups”; Frelimo’s combined local party committees, production councils, and organs for political education (P).
gwanza  Path, track or (dirt) road in nonurban areas (S).

kudusa tchikume  Lit. “take out danger”; denotes rituals in which danger is removed from the body by steam, smoke, or washing (T).

kuembera  Clapping of hands as a sign of gratitude, deference, greeting, or ceremonial participation (T).

kufunga taiyao  Lit. “closing of the property”; ritual protection of property from thieves, assailants, uroi, or pfukwa (T).

kugatsirwa muiri  Healing of the body at a n’anga often through the particular ceremonies of kudusa tchikume or kufunga muiri (T).

kugatsirwa pananga  Consultation with a n’anga; also denotes in general terms healing and spirit-possession sessions at a n’anga (T).

kupindamadzwadhe  Ritual act by man and woman for protecting their offspring and resuming sexual relations, held approx. six months after birth of a child (T).

kurha nhama io munhu  Lit. “the lust/hunger for the meat of a person”; used to describe the craving for human flesh that characterizes certain uroi (T).

kutenda adzimo edu  Lit. “thank our spirits”; ceremony held annually or prior to or following important events to ensure the protection of the vadzimu (T).

machamba  Plot of land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes (M).

magwere  Generic term for maize. See also ufu (T).

mai mkuru  “Great mother”; term for (often elderly) high-ranking women (T).

makomerede  From “comrade”; term for (mostly) ZANLA guerrillas and later Zimbabwean soldiers who were in Mozambique during the 1970s and 1980s, especially also pertaining to their (often vengeful and powerful) spirits (T).

masoko  Piece of news, gossip, as in asking for m. in social settings (M) (T).

matambudziko  Lit. “sufferings”; term for expressing the seriousness of afflictions, mishaps, or illnesses that an individual or collective suffers (T).
**maTewe**  Local term for dominant ethnic group in and around Chimoio (T).

**mato**  “The bush,” i.e. that which is uncultivated or wild (P).

**matoro**  Riverine plot of agricultural land, often seasonally flooded (T).

**mhamba**  Initiation ceremony guiding “entries” and “exits” to areas (M).

**mhepo**  Lit. “wind” or “air”; the force of a ubiquitous spirit of air that, wind-like, disarranges social and physical contexts (T).

**mhondoro**  Spirit lion, i.e. a lion possessed by chiefly or other ancestral spirits (T).

**mhondoro dwozutumua**  Spirit lion with destructive purposes; sometimes alleged to be created by sorcerous means (T).

**mitupo**  Totemic clan (T).

**mudoe**  Large tree, often with broad trunk and large crown. M. is a sacred tree under which ceremonies may be held by a tchirenge and is often also found growing near households of n’angas (T).

**muroi**  Sorcerers or witches; peddlers in “black magic.” Also known by the Portuguese term feitiçeiro/-as (T).

**mussekessa**  Tree central to traditional ritual practices such as kubatidzana; Lat. Piliostigma thonningii (T).

**mussoco**  Head tax payable to colonial authorities or concession companies (M).

**mutombo**  Lit. “medicine”; denotes a range of substances that may heal afflictions and bodily wounds, cure and prepare foods, and be used for protective and destructive purposes in contexts of uroi and magic (T).

**muturica**  Main house of every rural compound, usually also containing a raised internal granary for maize (T).

**muZungu**  Term meaning “white foreigner” (M/T).

**n’anga**  Male/female healer-diviner or traditional healer (also spelled n’yanga) (S).

**ndimo**  The growth in itself; the vital power that makes the plant grow fast and which gives it strength (T).
<p>| <strong>nharumbi</strong> | Person, often elderly, leading funerary preparations, at times with spouse. Tasks include oratory parts at interment and following rituals and, importantly, the post-death washing of the body (T). |
| <strong>nhika</strong> | Territory, soil, ancestral land (T). |
| <strong>nipa</strong> | Illegal homemade liquor, widely consumed, often distilled from fermented corn or millet with sugar (M). |
| <strong>pamsoro</strong> | “If you permit me” or “excuse me,” often spoken in relation to asking permission to enter a compound, or when approaching a river where one hears there are people washing or bathing, etc. (T). |
| <strong>pendekari</strong> | A clay pot for preparing sadza over a cooking fire (T). |
| <strong>pfukwa</strong> | Bad, evil, or vengeful spirit; also spelled <em>mpfungka</em> (chiSena), or <em>mpfungua pfhuku</em> (Mozambican Portuguese) (T). |
| <strong>pfumo</strong> | Aide to a régulo or a subchief; concerned with tax collection during the former Portuguese colonial state (T). |
| <strong>pindai</strong> | “Come in,” “enter,” or “go on”; reply after someone has asked permission to enter a household, continue on their path, cross a river at which people are bathing, etc. (T). |
| <strong>portugaro</strong> | Red wine; from “Portugal,” meaning wine from that country (T). |
| <strong>profete</strong> | Healer or diviner connected to an African independent church (T). |
| <strong>régulo</strong> | Traditional or Portuguese-appointed chief (M). |
| <strong>sadza</strong> | Porridge made from maize, sorghum, cassava, or rice that constitutes the staple food for lunch and evening meals (M/T). |
| <strong>Secretário do bairro</strong> | Secretary of a bairro within the formal postindependence structure of governance (P). |
| <strong>tchawiwi</strong> | Territorial and roaming spirit; causes profound disorientation (T). |
| <strong>tchianhu wo atewe</strong> | Lit. “our ways”; chiTewe term designating modes of thought, practice, ceremony, logic, and outlook of the maTewe (T). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tchibalo</td>
<td>Colonial forced labor system in existence until 1969; also spelled chibalo (M).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tchikume</td>
<td>Term for embodied substance of danger (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tchikwambo</td>
<td>Powerful and destructive spirit borne out of violent acts (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tchiphoko</td>
<td>Ghost; often caused by the death of drugged soldiers or sorcerers (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tchirenge</td>
<td>Often translated as “rainmaker”; ritual specialist also concerned with ceremonies pertaining to cosmological and agricultural dimensions (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tchitumba</td>
<td>Circular building of the n’anga and, often, also the profete in which kugatsirwa pananga are held. The mutombo, ritual attire and other material of the n’anga or profete, is held there (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tchitumwa</td>
<td>Powerful drug shaped as small bundles and related to uroi, made from the liquids of corpses to attract money or provide invisibility, or made from lion skin in order to instill fear (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tsika</td>
<td>Lit. “tradition”; chiTewe term designating inherited custom, convention and broader outlook of the maTewe (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ufu</td>
<td>Flour of maize made from dried cobs (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uroi</td>
<td>Sorcery, “black magic,” witchcraft (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vadzimu</td>
<td>Spirits of a family, dzindza, or close kin; ancestral spirits (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zinhambuya</td>
<td>Bad spirit of ego’s grandmother that especially affects female grandchildren by creating fertility problems or harming or killing grandchildren’s children (T).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zwidoma</td>
<td>Sing. tchidoma; dwarf-sized husband and wife couple generated by uroi, used nebulously to accumulate money and resources (T).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

1. “P” signifies a Portuguese term, “M” signifies a specific term of Mozambican origin and use (spelling taken from Lopes et al., 2002), and “S” designates a term from the Shona linguistic group used locally (spelling derived from Hannan (1984 [1959])). “T” signifies a chiTewe word, the local language spoken in Honde and Chimoio.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMETRAMO  Associação da Medicina Tradicional de Moçambique (the Association for Traditional Medicine in Mozambique).

Companhia, the  Short for Companhia de Moçambique—a concession company that between 1890 and 1941 ruled 140,000 kilometers of land mainly in what was later to become the provinces Manica and Sofala.

FADM  Forças Armadas da Defesa de Moçambique (Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique). National army following the implementation of GPA.


FIR  Força de Intervenção Rápida (Rapid Intervention Force). A special unit of the Mozambican national police force.

FPLM  Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican People’s Liberation Forces). Frelimo’s preindependence military wing.

Frelimo  Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique). Mozambique’s liberation movement and now-dominant political party.


IMF  International Monetary Fund.


OMM  Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Organization for the Mozambican Woman). Frelimo’s women organization.
ONUMOZ Organização das Nações Unidas para Moçambique (United Nations Operation in Mozambique).

OP Operação Produção (Operation Production). State-run campaign to reorganize and relocate urban people identified as unproductive in 1983.

Parama “Traditional army” operating during the civil war led by the curandeiro Manuel Antonio (also spelled Naparama, Naprama, and Barama).

PIDE Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (Portuguese secret police) between 1945 and 1968.


SAP Structural Adjustment Program. Schemes run by the World Bank and/or the IMF to implement policy changes in development countries, in Mozambique since the 1980s.

ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the forces of ZANU.

KEY HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSONS


Dhlakama, Afonso (1953–) Current president of the political party Renamo and followed André Matsangaissa as leader of the guerrilla group Renamo from 1975 onward and throughout the civil war (1976–92).


Machel, Samora (1933–86) President of Frelimo from 1970 until 1975, when he became Mozambique’s first postindependence president. A political hardliner and militant, Machel was killed in a mysterious plane crash in South Africa in 1986.

Ngungunyane (1850–1906) Last ruler of the Gaza state. Arrested by the Portuguese in 1895, taken to Lisbon, and eventually exiled to the Azores where he died in 1906.

Nxaba (d. ca. 1835) Nguni leader. Established tributary state in the 1820s in Manica that was to be integrated into the Companhia de Moçambique.


Map 1. Political map of Mozambique.
Map 2. Simplified map of administrative districts and their borders, Manica Province.

Dhlakama, Afonso (1953–) Current president of the political party Renamo and followed André Matsangaissa as leader of the guerrilla group Renamo from 1975 onward and throughout the civil war (1976–92).


Machel, Samora (1933–86) President of Frelimo from 1970 until 1975, when he became Mozambique’s first postindependence president. A political hardliner and militant, Machel was killed in a mysterious plane crash in South Africa in 1986.

Ngungunyane (1850–1906) Last ruler of the Gaza state. Arrested by the Portuguese in 1895, taken to Lisbon, and eventually exiled to the Azores where he died in 1906.

Nxaba (d. ca. 1835) Nguni leader. Established tributary state in the 1820s in Manica that was to be integrated into the Companhia de Moçambique.


Map 1. Political map of Mozambique.
Map 2. Simplified map of administrative districts and their borders, Manica Province.
Introduction

On 29 September 2015 a motorcade comprising a number of cars holding Afonso Dhlakama, his aides, and soldiers drove along a main road from Chimoio in central Mozambique toward the city of Nampula when they were attacked—apparently by the forces of the Mozambican state. Dhlakama, the long-term leader of Renamo, the country’s largest opposition party, had just spoken at a rally in Chimoio. The attack left a number of people dead, but Dhlakama himself allegedly escaped quite spectacularly: He transmogrified into a bird, a partridge—the symbol of his party Renamo—spread his wings, and flew off.

Various and conflicting accounts of the attack broke on social media a mere hour after it happened. However, a key element in coverage in Mozambican papers and on social media was that so-called traditional leaders confirmed Dhlakama’s transmogrification and escape (Cuna 2015). I spoke with my interlocutors in nearby Chimoio and Honde by telephone in the days that followed, and they also confirmed the story, with one elderly man expressing with some glee, “The state should have known he would escape like that! Dhlakama has a lot of power from tradition.”

This book is not only about disentangling key national events such as these—events where forces of the state allegedly seek to eradicate the leader of the political opposition by violence, or about what could easily be labeled beliefs, cosmologies, even ontologies of this particular part of Mozambique. Rather, it examines the multiplex, historical, and contemporary relations between hierarchically oriented structures, state (for short), and what lies beyond: the domain of the social, including what is often referred to as “tradition.”
Analyzing the Mozambican historical trajectory and complex present also seems pertinent at this juncture. In 2015, forty years since Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, the country’s fourth African president, entered office as the candidate of the independence movement turned political party, Frelimo. A mature post-colonial state by all accounts, Mozambique has by no means seen either a peaceful colonial era or postindependence period: as the country enters its fifth decade of independence, the national army and the wider state security apparatus still struggle to maintain control; indeed, they have been involved in armed combat with and deployed heavy artillery against parts of the Renamo political opposition and its guerrilla army from 2013 and up to the current moment in the spring of 2016.

This is a resurgence of violence between the state, dominated by the Frelimo party in power since 1975, and the opposition party Renamo, which fought the Mozambican state between 1976 and 1992 during the country’s so-called civil war. However, this is not a case of armed guerrillas at the outskirts of the political order waging war against its center; instead, Renamo was—and has been for more than two decades—running in the presidential and parliamentary elections, attaining at times almost half of the votes (Azevedo-Harman 2015). Moreover, from 21 October 2012 to early 2014, the leader of Renamo hid in the bush from government troops attacking Renamo bases, as his deputies simultaneously continued their work in parliament. 2015 and 2016 have seen similar forms of violence exerted against government posts and officials, against civilians and against Renamo premises and representatives, as well as having made road traffic perilous in central regions (Barbier 2016).

Violence has also resurged in other contexts. In February 2008 and September 2010, major urban riots rocked Mozambique. In many cities, including the provincial capital of Chimoio in Manica Province, the rioters assumed control of state infrastructure, attacked police stations, and engaged in extensive looting of shops and markets. In the late 2000s, a wave of popularly organized acts of summary justice, so-called linchamentos, became prominent and lethal ways of resolving the problem of crime in both peri-urban and urban environments in Mozambique.¹

The intensity of violent clashes with the armed opposition as well as the proliferation of urban riots and spates of lynchings undermine the image of a country that had successfully emerged from violent decades of upheaval—first liberation war (1964–75) and then civil war, which started in 1976 and ended formally in 1992. More crucially, however, clashes, riots, and lynchings all indicate how processes, spaces, and domains of the state are regularly challenged by formations beyond its control. Building on long-term fieldwork in and around the city of Chimoio
in central Mozambique, this book asks why processes of state formation have constantly been challenged by clashes, riots, and lynchings, bearing in mind that these are recent expressions of similar forms of violence and protest. Crucially, it makes the claim that addressing and analyzing such forms of violence are essential to any understanding of state formation in general and the postcolonial state more specifically.

Throughout the book, several questions are posed: How are we to grapple with such paradoxes as continued war and politics as usual, where an opposition party wields its own army and a state employs its army and security forces against its political opposition? What are the underlying currents that fuel and trigger violent events, such as lynchings and riots? Beyond journalistic discourses, in what ways are such and prior events interpreted by the large segments of people occupying spaces external to the elite-controlled domains of rapidly accumulated wealth in Mozambique's urban centers? How can we understand the tensions between processes of state formation and state ordering on the one hand, and various forces external to or uncontrolled by the state on the other? Put differently, how does the other of the state, what we sometimes call society, stand in relation to African statehood?

It is the contention of this book, however, to go beyond such tropes of state-society divisions so often imposed from the outside. Often presuming, evaluatively, a weak, limited, or strong state, the wider society is seen as that which is not (yet) under state control. By contrast, this book starts from the point of view of seeing the state not as a finite entity—a controlled apparatus of borders, politics, personnel, bureaucracies, and budgets—but rather as an always-emergent form of power and control identifiable at multiple societal levels. In looking at the state from this perspective, this book seeks to present an alternative to the institutionally based visions of the state and its emphasis of lack and stasis, analyzing instead, perhaps, its features of excess and emergence. Moreover, as argued by Jean and John Comaroff (2012), the global south in general and Africa in particular must be approached not only as empirical and theoretical testing grounds but should be seen as prefiguring future global developments of statehood, society, and capitalism more generally. As such, the trajectories of violence and statehood in Mozambique carry wider import.

**A State of Unease**

The relations between what one might conceive as state formations and society are riddled with antagonisms and ambiguities in postcolonial
Africa as elsewhere. However, in many African postcolonial countries, the state order is frequently perceived and experienced as a hostile entity to those external to its resources and capacities, as a formation interlocked with global reconfigurations of power or as historically shaped hierarchical orders of subjection and exploitation (Reno 1999; Crais 2002; Argenti 2007; Piot 2010). As a developmental state, Mozambique has received vast amounts of aid after emerging from its devastating civil war (1976–92) that followed independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. Arguably, given the impact of IMF- and World Bank–driven restructuring of the country from the mid-1980s onward, it turned into what Obarrio (2014) has aptly called a “state of structural adjustment.” Following the end of civil war, it has in donor circles been hailed as constituting a model for postconflict development—an argument often backed up by macroeconomic indicators.

Yet, Mozambique has increasingly attracted critique from scholars concerned with how resources and capital are seemingly condensing around elites related to the dominant Frelimo party, with how class stratification is becoming more pronounced, and with the geopolitical concentration of resources and economic activities around the capital of Maputo in the extreme south (see, e.g., Cahen 2010; Hanlon 2010; Sumich 2015). In a context of recurring unrest, emerging critique, and, arguably, entrenchment of Maputo-based elites, it seems worthwhile to pursue how the postcolonial state formation is imagined and experienced from its margins—that is, from provinces beyond Maputo and from circumstances of impoverishment external to the powerful centers of political and economic elites.

This book is, then, such an empirically founded contribution toward these issues using mainly ethnographic material based on multiple periods of fieldwork from 1999 to 2011 in largely impoverished communities in the rural-urban continuum of Chimoio and Honde, Manica Province, central Mozambique. Over a total of twenty-one months, I followed the flows of people, resources, and substances between different localities and, therefore, various domains of authority (statal and other), diverse notions of territory, production and exchange, shifting perceptions of legal conflicts and their resolution, and broader sociocultural dynamics of health. I have been able to participate in such a rural-urban continuum with the assistance of individual interlocutors as well as living in poor households that frequently, and sometimes seasonally, relocate between the urban, peri-urban, and rural localities.

My focus in the field was continually informed not only by contemporary concerns relating to the current developmental national state order but also by how the trajectories of the state kind articulate antag-
onistically with its purported subjects. This general historical pattern of tension and antagonism—as reflected in the urban riots of 2008 and 2010 and the rise of lynchings throughout the 2000s—is especially clear when seen from the perspective of Manica Province in general and from Honde and Chimoio, in my case, in particular. First, both the gradual incursions of the Portuguese traders from the 1500s onward and, later, the rise of the Nguni kingdoms in the period 1830 to 1890—an effect of the *mfecane* upheavals of Southern Africa—may be seen as emerging formations of the state kind. For example, subsequent Nguni kingdoms of the nineteenth century expanded violently in Manica Province by destroying existing territorially based polities through warfare and subjected its population through systems of tribute, taxation, as well as enslavement. Such violent dynamics were continued under the concession company Companhia de Moçambique. Funded with international capital and ruling Manica Province from the 1890s to the 1940s as a sovereign state formation within the Portuguese imperial realm, the Companhia developed directly from the structures of the Nguni kingdom through, for instance, employing detachments of Nguni warriors in violent campaigns of tax collection and pacification. With the decline of the Companhia (formally abolished in 1941), the late colonial state furthered and refined existing practices of taxation and forced labor, encapsulation of people in protected villages, and encompassment of traditional authorities within colonial structures of governance. Although Mozambican independence in 1975 signaled an end to colonial relations of extraction, informed by a socialist ethos the postcolonial state under Frelimo attacked what it termed “obscurantism” through a program of social transformation that included the abolishment of traditional authorities, the construction of collective villages for rural production, and the cleansing of the cities of unproductive elements. Thus, the postcolonial state’s policies mirrored previous state formations’ in its attacks on crucial dimensions of the social such as kinship, the organization of agricultural production, and relations between territory and ancestral spirits. Further, while arguably complex in terms of dynamics and causes, the ensuing Mozambican civil war also violently engaged and enlisted dimensions of kinship, magic, spirits, and chiefly polities against the previously-mentioned policies of the postcolonial state. Following the end of the civil war in 1992, a reorientation is evident on the part of the postcolonial state in which a policy of “recognition”—a local derivative of a global order of governance (Tan 2011)—is implemented wherein those deemed “traditional authorities” are enrolled in politics of decentralization, frequently creating local situations of ambivalence in terms of authority and power.
This broad historical trajectory comprises central aspects of the historical patterns of state-society relations in Mozambique as viewed from the province of Manica. In approaching these through seeing state formation from outside elites internal to it or beyond its power centers, I will highlight what is arguably a frequently overlooked but nonetheless key dimension to such a state-society conundrum: the traditional field’s relations to processes of state formation. Beyond identifying these processes historically, such a focus is informed by the fact that terms such as tradição (“tradition” in Portuguese), tsika (“tradition” in chiTewe), or tchianhu wo atewe (“the way of the maTewe”) are employed by many in and around the city of Chimoio to denote multiple aspects—often explicitly seen to contrast the state order and regularly invoked for framing key experiences and dynamics. For example, the terms are used to describe the destructive and constructive energies of uroi (sorcery)—energies frequently seen to upset the hierarchies of formal social organization such as age, gender, or cycles of production, accumulation, and redistribution. Moreover, uroi is widely perceived as doubly appropriated as well as having appropriating capacities related to agents and prominent sections of state elite, and it is seen as partly constitutive of a reality external to and inimical of the formal state order—a realm framed with the terms tradição, tsika, and tchianhu wo atewe. Further, despite often lamenting what many argue is a current disintegration of “traditional

Illustration 0.1. Remnants of a military vehicle destroyed during the civil war. The burned and corrugated metal is a material reminder of the war’s destruction, and the metal curiously enough (or not so curious) remains largely uncollected for re-use. Honde, 2004.
ways,” a range of people—from the tchirenge (rainmaker) in the rural location of Honde to the Frelimo party secretary in Chimoio—underline the constantly changing and open nature of the traditional field.

The force of what my interlocutors frame through the terms tradição and tchianhu wo atewe is, then, considerable, informing perceptions of contemporary and past state dynamics. In using the term “traditional field” here I do not seek to fully emulate, appropriate, and redeploy what one might broadly call non-Western perspectives—although several contributions to the so-called ontological turn contribute crucially to reformulating anthropological theoretical, methodological and analytical approaches to alterity and difference (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2014 [2009]; Holbraad and Pedersen 2016; see also Bertelsen and Bendixsen 2016). Nor do I seek to resurrect or reformulate the colonial category of “tradition” that has rightly been discarded. Rather, I utilize the concept of “traditional field” to grasp experiential dimensions and broad historical trends that crucially shape contemporary and past dynamics of statehood, sociality, and power as these unfold. Further, its characteristic of constituting a nonentity by virtue of its openness and its continuity through change has informed my decision to call it a “field” more in the sense of force field than any cadastrally demarcated or unambiguously circumscribed social entity. I approach it, therefore, not as a constituent of an ontologically consistent and stable reality, but as a term that captures the cosmogenetic force of the social or, better, sociality’s constitutive ontogenetic thrust. But how should we, in more theoretical terms, grasp these dynamics of state and, conversely, the forces that shape lynchings, transmogrifications, and the everyday in places like Mozambique?

**State Formation and the Social**

Approaching the state as an order of externality has been the long-standing position of the so-called neopatrimonialists in their analysis of the African state (e.g. Bayart 1993; Mamdani 1996; Chabal and Daloz 1999; cf. Gulbrandsen 2012). Further, important contributions to understanding the structure of war—and its violent labor and dynamics of order and upheaval—have come from approaching state in this way. One example is Danny Hoffman’s rich work on young fighters in Sierra Leone and Liberia and he defines the state as “a hierarchical mode of organizing power that appears as a tendency or impulse through history” (Hoffman 2011: 7). Such an approach to the state has also, of course, been theoretically and empirically charted for anthropology by Pierre Clastres (1998
Violent Becomings

[1974]), contained in his notion of “society against the state.” Based
on Amazonian ethnography, Clastres's claim is radical by arguing for
the existence of powerful social processes that antagonistically ward off
nascent hierarchical orders of the state kind—in Clastres's material ana-
yzed in the context of the headman whose powers were always already
effectively curbed. Despite its ethnographic situatedness and tendency
to pose an evolutionary argument, Clastres's state-society opposition has
currency outside its Amazonian sociopolitical context.3

Clastres's general point about a friction between statist dynamics
and society carries import also for my analysis of the instances and vio-
lence of this relation. As a discursive object, lived reality and social and
cosmological ontology (see also Rio 2007), what I call “the traditional
field,” comprises a crucial aspect of the nonstate domain of sociality.
More specifically, however, and in opposition to positions that endorse
a very strict and somewhat totalizing reading of ontology in terms of
confining this to a postpolitical or apolitical radical otherness (Pedersen
2011; cf. Vigh and Sausdal 2014), my understanding of seeing the tra-
ditional field as integral to social and cosmological ontologies is attuned
to Kapferer's reminder “that ontology realizes its meanings, and exerts
the force of its logic, only through the ideological action of human be-
ings in a social and political world” (2012 [1988]: 80). Conceptualizing
the traditional field in terms of such a reading of ontology also means a
narrowing of a project, potentially too totalizing or overly encompass-
ing, of mapping Mozambican state-society opposition historically and
contemporarily.

A warning is now in order: by using the term “the traditional field”
to encompass this ontological dimension of the social and the cos-
mological in order to also reflect my interlocutors’ terms tradição and
tchianhu wo ateve, I do not allude to notions of (supposedly) premodern
social orders or cosmologies. Nor do I attempt to reactualise, resurrect,
or redefine any opposition between “modernity” and “tradition.” Such
approaches represent impasses, not least because these analyses neces-
sarily primordialize or primitivize (see also Englund and Leach 2000).
This analysis, therefore, neither approaches the traditional field as some
sort of originary order (and, thus, as a residual category of modernity or
its Other) nor as a reality wholly created by colonialism or other forces.
Contrary to representations of the traditional as stagnant or primordial,
I emphasize its vitality and dynamic through constituting a social and
cosmological domain of the potential. This, I argue, is evident empiri-
cally in subsequent state formations’ inability to contain and capture the
potentialities inherent to the field: from evasive maneuvers under the
early and late colonial state to the current postcolonial state’s struggle to
contain effervescent riots, spates of lynchings, or processes of healing in the face of *uroi*, the very dynamic of the state is challenged. This capacity for deterritorialization and rupture in relation to the state order, as a highly volatile and rapidly changing domain, means that the traditional field is understood as a space of the virtual wherein new realities are emergent. Through analyzing specific empirical instances where these new realities are actualized—that is, progressing from the domain of the reality of the potential to the actual—I identify specific creative instances where the traditional takes shape in relation to and, frequently, in opposition to state ordering.

But “the traditional” is not the only problematic term when approaching these dynamics. What we normally define as “the state” is for Mozambicans frequently referred to as *o estado* (the state), *o governo* (the government), *o partido* (the party, i.e. Frelimo), or simply as just *Frelimo* (the Frelimo party). These terms encompass everything from everyday interactions with corrupt police officers to historical experiences of abolishment of chiefhood in the early postcolonial period. In order to analyze these disparate experiences of state ordering within the rural-urban continuum, the text will pursue processes of state formation mainly in Manica Province from the mid-1800s onward with an emphasis on the postindependence era.

For these reasons, my argument departs from current debates on the postcolonial state where positions diverge between those arguing for continuity between the colonial and postcolonial state and others emphasizing a more or less radical rupture. By instead tracing how the traditional field constitutes a specific site of potentiality, this book is not primarily concerned with breaks or continuities or, necessarily, the formal administrative and governmental apparatus of the nation-state. This largely noninstitutional approach to both the state and to the field of the traditional is, again, reflected in and informed by the empirical material at hand that ranges from early state formation, colonial dynamics of capture, and spirits of territorialization and deterritorialization to dynamics of healing and the current postcolonial state’s approach to *uroi*. As all are firmly based on the specific empirical context of the rural-urban continuum studied, the approach taken resembles a contribution toward seeing the state “from below.” However, this particular metaphor reinserts an unfortunate imagery by seeing the state as an already existing institutional arrangement or apparatus hovering above its subjects in a Leviathan-like fashion. In this book I will instead entertain the idea of the state as perpetually unfolding. This non-Leviathan-like character is also apparent when it comes to state sovereignty, which, I argue, in the present postcolonial era is distributed to the peripheries and with
opaque and contested ties to a center. In this sense, the argument deviates from a vision of the monolithic state by seeing it as perpetually emerging and, importantly, in conflict with nonstate domains of the social in general and the heterogeneous field I choose to call “the traditional” in particular. Instead, I argue, what is identified as the state is always in a process of becoming, not being. Following such an argument of dynamic emergence, the conflict between the traditional field and the state will always encompass and foment novel potential configurations.

State Recognition and Its Politics in Africa

One such event of tentative encompassment occurred with two decrees (decretos) issued in 2000 by the Mozambican government. They aimed at formalizing the positions of so-called autoridades comunitárias (“community authorities”), a term invented within the context of such decrees (Buur and Kyed 2006). The notion of “community authority” was designated to include prominent secretários do bairro (secretaries of parts of the city) as well as important religious leaders and so-called “traditional leaders” such as régulos (chiefs). Simply put, the decrees were oriented toward co-opting into the state administration those who were identified as de facto influential persons within the local community. For Mozambican régulos, the implementation of the decrees has compelled them to enroll within the formal state apparatus, including being vested with conflict-resolution powers, the possibility to tax state subjects, and the right to dress in uniforms strikingly similar to those of the colonial period. This move places the régulo in a highly ambivalent role, representing, on the one hand, the local community vis-à-vis the state and on the other representing the state itself (see also Kyed 2007b, 2009; Forquilha 2010).

Such an inclusionary move has a specific trajectory, and in current, largely aid-saturated Mozambique, the prominent development discourse is rife with allusions to a broader, global ideology of decentralization. Such discourse is often coined in rhetorical expressions, such as “moves toward strengthening local governance” or “steps in the process toward greater decentralization” (see also Obarrio 2014). The rationale for decentralization may be understood when considering that Mozambique has had a virtual one-party system with Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), the liberation movement and later political party, holding power since independence in 1975. Further, the period immediately following independence was dominated by two intertwined processes: on the one hand, the postcolonial state’s tentative
construction of a strict party and cadre structure steeped in an ideology of state centralism; on the other, its attempted eradication of what they saw as traditional structures, agrarian practices, and bodies of knowledge. These twin postcolonial processes profoundly transformed Mozambican society. In light of this political history, any inclusion of non-centrally dictated processes or agents of governance seemingly conforms to a globalized rhetoric of decentralization.

However, in practice, the process of “recognition”—supposedly one where inhabitants in an administrative area select “their” community authority thereafter to be registered with state administration—has engendered complex and conflict-ridden local authority structures. In the impoverished parts of Chimoio and the rural community of Honde such processes of “recognition” have meant that problematic dimensions of territory, authority, and autochthony have resurfaced—some of which are rooted in the civil war. Moreover, the frequent paradoxical effect of doubling representation for the dominant political party by instituting a new “community authority” and retaining their party secretary—both from Frelimo—has met with resistance and discontent as the practice seems also to marginalize further nonstate-based forms of authority, such as the régulo. The process of decentralizing power to “de facto” authorities has in the fieldwork localities thus created a highly ambivalent and complex situation where different domains of authority interpenetrate and conflict.

This development is a tangible and recent example of the predicament of the traditional field as it has been subjected to and embroiled in a number of political and violent dynamics in the circumstances of colonial rule, extending through the anticolonial struggle and into the era of independence after 1975. The Mozambican government’s move in 2000 is, of course, not unprecedented in Africa: for one, Gluckman et al. (1949) emphasized half a century ago the degree to which local political authorities are also always embedded in and comprise crucial parts of social organizations. As such, Gluckman’s seminal work represents a reminder to not merely restrict an analysis to political offices and formal structural relations between, for example, state administration and régulos or, later, so-called community authorities. My position in this book is informed by Gluckman’s in terms of probing the ambiguities of the traditional field as an aspect of the social and explicitly analyze dimensions crucial to its relation vis-à-vis the state order in, for example, territorial, spiritual, economical, or legal domains. However, in contrast to Gluckman’s systemic approach emphasizing the ambiguous position of the headman between state and society, my approach is also premised upon the force and dynamic of the social. Such recognition of the force
and dynamic of this field presents scholars with several puzzles. One such is: Why the seemingly increased political preoccupation with this field at this stage of the postcolonial state?

Admittedly, current attention follows decades during which newly independent African governments were concerned with modernization. For example, Tanzania and Angola’s national liberation movements and governments-to-be both embarked on socialist-inspired policies of ousting colonial and “traditional” relics, like the chiefs, from power (see Orre 2010; Scott 1998: 223–61 respectively). Similarly, in postliberation Mozambique, modernization’s goal was “not only the eradication of underdevelopment, but also the creation of a socialist society based on a workers-peasants alliance and … aimed at creating a ‘new man’, i.e. one emancipated from the oppressive weight of tradition” (Macamo and Neubert 2004: 65; see also Farré 2015). These processes in Mozambique and elsewhere are reminiscent of what Scott (1998) terms “high modernism,” central to which are processes of erasure or confinement of what is perceived as irrational, backward, and primitive—“the oppressive weight of tradition.” Such confinement may take the shape of state-dominated processes of “folklorification” wherein certain groups of people, practices, or beliefs are redefined merely as the objects of “ethnotourism” (Alonso 1994). Erasure, on the other hand, may mean attacks on chiefly powers and their polities, as was the case in Mozambique postindependence (West 2009). However, the current recourse to and reintegration of régulos in Mozambican systems of governance opposes such high modernist trajectories of either erasure or confinement.

A second puzzle: Why does this political reemphasis on the traditional seemingly encompass Francophone, Lusophone, and Anglophone postcolonies, all of which had distinctly different types of colonial systems as well as divergent trajectories of colonial representation (Cooper 2005)? From South Africa (Oomen 2005), Botswana (Gulbrandsen 2012) and Cameroon (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000) to Southern Africa (Guedes and Lopes 2006; Hinz 2006) and West Africa (Perrot and Fauvelle-Aymar 2003) more generally, there are different yet similar reorientations and reemphasises.

While I will refrain from attempting to answer these two puzzles here, several strands of scholarship have attempted to do so directly or indirectly, and I will revisit some in order to position my own argument about Mozambique. First, the last decades of Africanist research has seen a renewed interest in the politics of identity, autochthony, and rights, a vibrant new politics of belonging that in some contexts bypasses formal political structures and parties and in others becomes integral to these (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004; Obadare and Wil-
lems 2014). This field has generated numerous analyses oriented toward locating and recognizing local or African politics as relevant and important (Vaughan 2005) and, alternatively, criticizing visions of democracy, participation, and rights that are seen as projected onto African realities from Euro-American contexts (Englund 2006, 2011).

Second and contrastingly, a far starker approach to African political realities is increasingly influential in academic circles in which the African postcolonial state is seen to be decaying in most aspects and at multiple levels. This view typically characterizes what is seen as disintegration or nebulous transformation by depictions of increasing nepotism, corruption, and violence (Bayart 1993; Bayart et al. 1999; Collier and Vicente 2012). A related argument focuses on a disintegration of postliberation national unities (ideologies, cosmologies, etc.) in tandem with the crumbling of the formal state apparatus and bureaucracy—processes manifesting as disenchantment with national identities and histories (Werbner and Ranger 1996; Werbner 1998b, 2002) or as persistent preoccupations with a colonial past still terrorizing the present (Mbembe 2010).

Third, a theoretically informed and textually minded approach is voiced particularly by Achille Mbembe (2001, 2003). In his vision of the postcolonial state and state of being/subject, any meaningful sense of political ideologies has evaporated and the social and political world is deadened. These worlds are shaped by a politics of “necrophagous” violence where the subjects toy with power and its subjectifying force while engaging in carnivalesque consumption in grotesque circumstances. Contrary to Bayart’s position, the postcolonial subject for Mbembe exerts a certain agency by engaging and conniving with power or its symbols—albeit not to tangible emancipatory effects in a material sense.

Fourth, there is to some extent an anti-Mbembian and anti-Bayar- tian stance that identifies an increased interest in judicial mechanisms, rhetorics of law, and the legal corpus to address a wide range of social, political, and other ills (J. L. Comaroff and J. Comaroff 2006; Obarrio 2014). This position emphasizes a rampant and expansionist judicialization of social life, politics, and governance in general, but a judicialization that does not necessarily correspond with either a “rule of law” in a conventional sense or with the rhetoric of rights. It points, rather, to appropriation, mimicry, and transformation of legal texts, logics, and bodies reinserted into both novel social and political formations (Roitman 2006; Pratten and Sen 2007a) and into criminal and shadowy contexts of violent extraction (Nordstrom 2007; Mattei and Nader 2008; Ellis and Shaw 2015).

This latter trend is intimately related to a fifth strand of scholarship, namely, that where “tradition” and “traditional leaders” are treated as
integrative into local and national governance schemes. For the context of Mozambique, such an approach powerfully informs the current (and often celebratory) rhetoric of “legal pluralism” and the alleged salience of integrating the formal legal state apparatus, traditional courts, and community courts (Meneses et al. 2003; Santos 2006a, 2006b; Pimentel 2009; Kyed et al. 2012), a dimension analyzed in chapter 7.

On Potentiality and Partiality

What I have sketched as five approaches have all informed this book’s analysis of the predicament of state formation and the traditional field, and I will refer to, directly or indirectly, these debates throughout. Nonetheless, what all have in common on an explanatory level is that they arguably represent partial approaches as the field of the traditional is understood in terms of autochthony, belonging, and identity (Virtanen 2005a, 2005b) or focus on processes relating to or negating the possibility of national unity (Englebert 2002). Further, there is a tendency to reduce the state to a one-dimensional mechanism of exploitation usurped and employed by self-serving elites (see, e.g., Bayart 1993; cf. Gulbrandsen 2012). Lastly, elements of judicial and conflict-resolution mechanisms within the traditional structures are seen to mirror and, importantly, complement the formal legal and statal machinations in several analyses (see, e.g., Santos et al. 2006a).

This book deviates from these partial approaches in mainly two respects. First, instead of departing from notions of governance, belonging, or politics—an approach often rendering the traditional field a residual category—the starting point will be the domain of sociality and the traditional field itself. Second, my argument is therefore to retain the notion of the traditional as an analytical entity encompassing a range of logics and practices that must be seen in relation and that are irreducible to their parts. By proposing an analytical approach privileging unity over partiality, I do not mean to convey images of immobile entities with clear-cut boundaries but rather underline the traditional as dynamic and shifting yet particular and singular (Badiou 2005 [1988]). The book attempts to capture ongoing and changing empirical configurations of the traditional field and state formation with the term becoming—a term underscoring their dynamic and manifold aspects not retained by the (static) being (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]; see also Viveiros do Castro 2014 [2009]).

The emphasis of becoming is related to another point: the impossibility of the presentist “now.” While emphasizing the ethnographic ma-
terial collected during numerous periods of fieldwork in the rural-urban continuum of Chimoio and Honde, the analysis will be strengthened by a longue durée perspective. This provides the opportunity to present and analyze formative moments of particular crisis and depict how these impinge on the present in terms of, for example, the spirits of war (chapter 3) or popular reappropriation of discarded legal notions (chapter 7). Such an approach conforms with Gledhill’s (2000 [1994]) and Sahlins’s (2004) separately made arguments for anthropology’s need to privilege historization. Conversely, confining the analysis to the “now,” to an ethnographic presence in a shallow sense, fails to recognize not only the importance of time-depth but also the considerable human variation in temporality and its manifestations (see also Nielsen 2014).

By including a historical dimension, I specifically look into how the potential of the traditional emerges in fields such as territory, justice, healing, sorcery, and economy in different Mozambican state formations. These notions and practices are crucial ethnographic entry points for analyzing how the state is implicated in, projects itself into, and is imagined in social contexts. Such a general focus rests on a stubborn assumption: that it is, in the face of a pluralizing, individuating, and disintegrative tendency in much recent anthropology, still meaningful—both analytically and empirically—to retain a notion such as “the traditional field” and see this as a domain of the social. This does not imply, of course, a return to either a folkloric vision of “tradition” in the singular as an encapsulated entity belonging to the domains of the museologically nonpolitical or being the object of ethnopolitics (but see Englebert 2005 for such a use of “tradition”). However, retaining the term “traditional” also implies being aware of its potentially problematic dimensions.

First, the term “traditional” may rapidly become associated with former anthropological notions—such as the prerational (Lévy-Bruhl) or primitive (Lévi-Strauss) rearing their ugly heads. Thus, the term is imbued with political cum scientific connotations that are troublesome in that this way of conceptualizing has modern proponents in what Paul Richards (2005) has called “the new barbarism” school, most famously and vocally represented by the writer Robert Kaplan (1997). Kaplan and others are highly influential in privileging the ideal of the modern “now” over the forces of a nontemporal, dark, and primitive “Africa” that is, in Eric Wolf’s (1982) sense, still without history.

Second, and more importantly, there are a host of more theoretical problems if one upholds a dualism seemingly dividing the world temporally into premodern, being traditional, and modern, being the unavoidable but desirable end product along a linear temporal continuum.
For one, this notion of a flawless and rational modernity belies the constant frictions that makes the very term “modern” problematic (Latour 1993). To invert, the cleanliness of the modern is constantly made dirty by practices that were thought to be relegated to the undesirable residual category of the modern—tradition. Nevertheless, in some works, a somewhat monolithic and unidirectional modernity is invoked in an analysis wherein Africans are seen to presumably employ their nonmodernity in relating to, be anxious about, or denounce such modernity (see, e.g., J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff 1993). In other more recent attempts, modernity is frequently detotalized and instead construed as being open-ended, multisemeric, and relational (see, e.g., Geschiere et al. 2008).

Arguably, many of these approaches fail to ground or empirically frame modernity, and the term could perhaps instead be pluralized into multiple modernities (Englund 1996b), if not be avoided altogether (see Englund and Leach 2000). On the other hand, these dichotomy-producing analyses seem to purify the categories for the simplicity of arguing for the alleged invented nature of “tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992 [1983]) or, conversely, for the heroics of resistance to the colonial or postcolonial state by employing more or less nontainted indigenous traditional resources (Scott 1985). In a critique of the “invention of tradition” thesis, Sahlins (2002: 4) has pointed out its skewed, Eurocentric, and, surprisingly, ahistoric leanings:

What else can one say about it, except that some people have all the historical luck? When Europeans invent their traditions—with the Turks at the gates—it is a genuine cultural rebirth, the beginnings of a progressive future. When other peoples do it, it is a sign of cultural decadence, a factitious recuperation, which can only bring forth the simulacra of a dead past.

Following the thrust of Sahlins’s argument, when non-European peoples attempt to discard (presumably invented) traditions, these attempts are frequently interpreted in terms of mimicry. One Mozambican example: analyzing the fractured sovereign status of the Mozambican state given donor power, Hall and Young (1997: 220n11) call the 1991 political program of Renamo, Mozambique’s main political opposition party, an “absurd mimicry of the US constitution.” Such allocations of “mimicry” effectively preclude novel analyses of state formations as these are always already invented in another, and allegedly more appropriate, Western context.

A third problematic dimension impinging on a notion of the “traditional field” is the extensive conniving between anthropology as a discipline and the colonial state project (Asad 1973; L’Estoile et al. 2005).
As Gledhill points out (2000 [1994]: 69), “Anthropologists were part of a larger colonial power structure, and that affected their analyses.” The anthropologists of the Lusophone world were no exception to this rule (Thomaz 2005). In the era of colonial anthropology, the conceptualization of what was represented as “traditional” was merely one of the foci that have subjected it to later criticism. Evans-Pritchard’s (1957 [1940]: 7) description of the scope of his work on the Nuer underlines this orientation: “We have endeavoured to give as concise an account of their life as possible, believing that a short book is of greater value to the student and administrator than a long one, and, omitting much material, we have recorded only what is significant for the limited subject of discussion.”

Hence, one scope of some colonial monographs was to produce a limited yet manageable—in also its Foucauldian governmentality sense—account of ways of life and, as such, cater also to the needs of the colonial administration. This has given the research within this area a dubious complicit ring to it, and it has also formed academic schools of thought on how to relate these issues: in many countries terms denoting matters local and nonmodern, as with kastom in Melanesia (see, e.g., Keesing 1992), have been produced by the machineries of (colonial) statecraft and the near universal ideology of nationhood. Comparatively, in Mozambique the term tradição is used in popular and official discourse alike to denote such disparate issues as the formal authority of traditional leaders (Lundin and Machava 1998), ceremonies hailing the Mozambican president in “traditional ways” (Israel 2006), and vaginal practices integral to female sexuality and bodily aesthetics (Bagnol and Mariano 2008).

This means that the self-evident English translation of the term, tradition, is problematic as it necessitates a wide range of clarifications regarding to which order the concept belongs. Seemingly this might be evaded by differentiating between tradição for officialist discourse and tchianhu wo ateve (“the way of the chiTewe”) or tsika (“tradition”), as previously mentioned, where the latter designates the whole field of the rural-urban continuum studied. However, such a distinction would attribute clear divisions where there are none empirically, as people use the terms interchangeably, as also already mentioned. Analytically such a division would also belie rather than elucidate the relations between local practices, perceptions, and relations and wider regional, national and historical dimensions to the terms and their usage.

My argument is contrary to this: I view the traditional field as being subject to and the object of specific historical trajectories transforming and inscribing meaning to its contents rather than erasing it. By the field
of the traditional, this book explores, on the one hand, the empirical domain described by my people as *tradição* (tradition) or *tchianho wo atewe* (the way of the chiTewe). On the other hand, the term *tradição* is also frequently employed by the state or its agents in both local and national contexts. By employing “traditional field,” I seek to embrace this whole unruly and contested domain of the social. Sometimes, however, I will use the term “tradition” or *tradição* when referring specifically to the official domain and politics and also sometimes use *tchianho wo atewe* if that reflects more correctly my interlocutors’ view. As identified by the latter, the traditional field harbors potentialities that challenge the formal colonial or postcolonial state structure. The analysis will identify these within polities in Manica Province at different periods in terms also of how these polities may be seen as structures of the state order in a Deleuzian sense. Thus, “field” in the analytical term “traditional field” denotes here not so much a distinct, static, or clearly defined hierarchical or institutional domain of the social as an unruly and contested entity of potentialities—a fact I only gradually came to appreciate through my fellow travelers in the journey to make sense of the world as it appears in Chimoio and Honde.

**Carmeliza’s Tradição—or Getting a Grip**

When men and women in Honde and Chimoio used notions such as *tradição*, *tsika*, or *tchianhu wo atewe*, the concepts were related to in a multitude of ways: as abstractions of practices preceding colonialism, war, and independence; as idealized moral or cultural orders; or as terms denoting particular groups of people or individuals being, implicitly, more or less “traditional.” However, one pervasive element was continually communicated: the openness and unboundedness of *tsika*, *tradição*, or *tchianhu wo atewe*. This openness finally dawned on me during a conversation in 2005 with an elderly woman, Carmeliza, from Honde. While sitting in her courtyard, as I had many times since 1999, I asked her about historical differences pertaining to things such as household organization, land tenure, and taxes. After having answered the specific questions, always providing new details, she clearly wanted me to understand an additional facet:

> You know, Bigorn [Bjørn], things change but also they do not change here. We go because of war, because Frelimo wants us to do this and that. And we come back. We do the same things even though we do different things. Our *tradição* is an open *tradição*. Yet our *tradição* is always the same. Do you understand?
Short of making me stop engaging in a simplistic conversation of the sort “what was different then from now,” at the time I was unsure if I comprehended fully what she was saying. With hindsight, however, I see that she wanted me to understand the necessary dynamic and ever-changing nature of what I have called the traditional field.

To recall, one might argue that if not defined properly, the term tradition reifies, fossilizes, or entitles features of social life that need to be approached as changing, open, and contested. One may further argue that by pluralizing and deentifying into traditional one will purge the term of some of its connotations of “olden days” or “primordialism”—as previously detailed—and contrarily underline its constantly changing nature. This is, of course, a crucial argument that this work seeks also to support and substantiate. However, by purely underlining its non-stasis, one may fail to appreciate how the traditional field, as I have termed it—even though it has been and is constantly challenged, violently coopted, or sought to be abolished—has retained certain sets of logic that have continuities in the longue durée.

Precisely therefore and to undermine arguments of the neoprimitivist kind, I aim to contextualize the traditional field historically and ethnographically. Moreover, through showing how it is often violently forged by macropolitics and colonial and postliberation policies and politics, the trajectory of a particular social reality may be mapped and analyzed. Put differently, it is thereby seen as a field that is relative to other social formations and continually in a process of emergence. Such emergence, and I stress this, entails that the traditional field is not necessarily and exclusively exterior to state dynamics. Rather, the traditional field is often also interpenetrating with state dynamics—as the previous example of community authorities indicates.

More generally, retaining the term the traditional field as a unit of analysis also serves as an argument against compartmentalization into specific subtopics. A single focus, for example, on merely legal pluralism would confine the traditional field’s relation to the state apparatus to purely judicial and administrative aspects, thereby subsuming it to statal logics and systems and inadvertently capturing it by state terminology, so to speak. This thematic approach means that the format of this book does not conform to a coherent, monographic representation of a single community. As I have also underlined in other works (2002, 2003, 2007, 2011), it is problematic to analyze “local communities” in Mozambique as coherent and whole in any meaningful sense of the term as the ruptures in practices, social relations, territorial or political orientation, simply are too great and many to argue for continuous, single communities. But how are we to grasp such elusive entities analytically?
Assemblage, Formation, Becoming

As I have emphasized and as they are employed here, the terms “state” and “traditional” are neither to be taken as terms corresponding to demarcated empirical institutions nor to representational universals, i.e., tradition versus modernity. Rather, in this book they are to be understood in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of assemblages that have certain qualities or directions, that have some endurance, and where the parts are to a lesser or greater extent internally related. In an interpretation of the Deleuzian vision of assemblages, Manuel DeLanda (2006: 253) claims these “are not Hegelian totalities in which the parts are mutually constituted and fused into a seamless whole. In an assemblage components have some autonomy from the whole they compose, that is, they may be detached from it and plugged into another assemblage.” Although DeLanda is right in accentuating shifts and interchangeability—a plasticity concurrent with Carmeliza’s tradição as well as with the Deleuzian vision—the dynamic itself engenders considerable friction. This is so as the transference of “components” to other assemblages—to use DeLanda’s mechanistic metaphor—is regularly contested, as such shifts may challenge particular social realities. Thus, although acknowledging DeLanda’s emphasis on the reallocation of components, the social and material contexts in which these take place have, as the historical relations between the traditional and state in Mozambique will show, “a certain autonomy from the whole” only so far as simultaneously recognizing the violence, friction, and, sometimes, resistance that such shifts entail. Further, as assemblages are impermanent and open to destabilization (deterritorialization in Deleuzian terms) and stabilization (territorialization) the relations between these are crucial.11

My material from Mozambique therefore lends itself to seeing “traditional field” and “state formation” as subsequent and shifting assemblages characterized by processes of territorialization and deterritorialization. This is what I have until now termed the “tensions” between state and the traditional field. This work will, therefore, also attempt to analyze particular instances of detachment, reappropriation, and transformation of the components of each assemblage. As this book approaches state dynamics as unfolding and emphasizes a noninstitutional perspective, the term “assemblage” intuitively seems to correspond clearer with the material at hand than the centric notion of “formation.” However, both terms have salient aspects making them retainable.

For one, assemblage seems to imply an always already deterritorialized social field in which every element playfully can (be made to) fit with every other. Put differently, there is an absence of value in some of
the applications of the notion to, for example, processes of streamlining corporate organizations (see Fuglsang and Sørensen 2006b). Such absence of value is not supported by my material: as I will explore in the book, the potentiality of the social in general and the field of the traditional in particular lie precisely in valorization of elements and structures that are frequently antagonist to statist dynamics and ordering. Frequently such valorization is actualized through deterritorializing and rhizomic processes that challenge the arborescent structures of state ordering. Second, state formations can, contrary to what the notion of assemblage may imply, also be seen to be characterized by endurance in terms of reproduction and transformation of systems of governance, networks, and practices, comprising what Foucault (1980) calls a “superstructural” arrangement.12

Thus, in lieu of a novel concept combining the virtues of the centric “state formation” and the noncentric “assemblage,” both will be used in a complimentary fashion in order to identify contrasting aspects of statehood. State formation is, therefore, here taken to mean specific and identifiable empirical formations of the state kind—as, for example, the Mozambican postcolonial state. I further see assemblages as particular configurations of state power or the traditional field, characterized by fluidity, impermanence, and change. The notions of assemblage and formation thus bring forth contrasting dimensions of the state in the colonial and postcolonial period. Contrastingly, the terms statist dynamic(s) or state order are theoretical notions that denote a universal hierarchical ordering integral to all social formations—not necessarily only within empirically identifiable state formations.

Using the term “assemblage” to denote both the traditional and state is not an argument of these sharing similar orientations and dynamics; as the ethnographic material will substantiate, a characteristic of the traditional field (as integral to sociality) in the Mozambican context is its deterritorializing, mobile, and horizontal orientation. Such an orientation is contrasted with a statist dynamic characterized by forms of territorialization and capture that are vertical in orientation. These characteristics or orientations, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize (1986, 2002 [1980]), are conflicting and adverse modalities of power or organization. This means that these are conceptualizations of dynamics of social formations and power and not concepts descriptive of entities in the empirical or ethnographic realm.13

There is an unwillingness in this book to reduce the analysis to dichotomous universals, as these always de-represent certain singularities or particularities. Thus, rather than moving away from the particular instances of tension between state formation and the traditional field—a
retreat into theorizing—I valorize and bring forth rather than occlude
the ethnographic. This insistence on the empirical allows for the forma-
tion of concepts that may grasp the unending flux in a context marked
by relations and constellations which are constantly forged and disas-
sembled. As such, analytical concepts such as being (of persons or other
units of analysis) or entities (as clearly demarcated, internally consistent
and stable units) are highly problematic as they project analytical freeze
frames onto what cannot be frozen. The alternative path chosen here is
to underline the perennial becoming of social formations. But if we are
to take seriously, as this book does, Carmeliza’s insistence on the recur-
cence, perhaps even recursivity (Holbraad 2012), of the traditional, how
may we grasp this theoretically—as well as analytically—beyond seeing
it in terms of perpetual becoming?

As I have already suggested, what I call the traditional field encom-
passes not only a range of outlooks, repertoires, and logics but also prac-
tices and physical set-ups in time-space, and I suggest here that the field’s
potency may be grasped through the Deleuze-Guattarian term virtual.
Rather than referring to “virtual realities” or simulacras of the empirical,
virtual denominates that which is “real without being actual” (Deleuze
and Guattari, quoted in Albertsen and Diken 2006: 242). The term vir-
tual is opposed to the notion of actual describing the tangible “state of
affairs”—for example, observable social processes (Deleuze and Guattari
1994 [1991]: 155). Contrary to this realm of the tangibly empirical,
Deleuze posits and accords a reality to the virtual and is adamant in his
critique of philosophers (as Leibniz) who frequently confl ate the virtual
with the possible in a process where “the possible is opposed to the real;
the process undergone by the possible is therefore a ‘realisation’. By con-
trast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by
itself” (Deleuze 2004 [1968]: 263; see also 240f).14

This view of virtuality as an analytical term encompassing empirical
reality is helpful to appreciate the explosive potential—being real with-
out being actual—of the traditional field that is actualized in particular
events: from the mobilization through and cannibalization of notions of
the traditional during the civil war by Renamo to current dynamics of
popular justice in 2008, including the lynchings of thieves (see chap-
ters 1 and 7 respectively), the particular configuration at the time of
the reality of the traditional field had very visible effects—also in terms
of shifting relations to state formation processes. Analytically, such a
view accords agency to the traditional field at a structural level wherein
the emergence of the state is undermined by forces of the social in the
process from virtual to actual. Further, such instances in which the state
order is effectively attacked or otherwise challenged in terms of its dom-
inance can, I claim, be seen as instances of actualization of forces arising from the virtual of the traditional field. By seeing the traditional field in terms of great creative and destructive potential—the generative force of its virtuality—I map particular tensions between the assemblages of state and the traditional field. Thus, while the basic Deleuze-Guattarian notions presented serve as an overarching analytical apparatus for grappling with a highly heterogeneous ethnographic reality, contrasting and alternative theoretical approaches will be introduced in analyses in subsequent chapters throughout. Further, the text will relate extensively to ongoing debates on Mozambique and the colonial and postcolonial state as well as within anthropology—an ambition also reflected in scholarship on Africa and anthropology in the postcolonial era (Ntarangwi et al. 2006; Zeleza 2006; Santos and Meneses 2010; Devisch and Nyamnjoh 2011; Nyamnjoh 2012).

At the most general level, this book contributes to the growing literature on the traditional field and state formation in Africanist anthropology and in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally by underlining how tensions between these assemblages are keys to understanding the postcolonial state. Specifically, it argues for approaching the traditional field and state formation as comprising variously related, opposed, and integrated assemblages. This particular optic contributes both to a theoretically informed understanding of domains of the traditional as one of potentiality as well as to seeing state formation as a perpetual and violent becoming. Such an argument effectively shifts analysis from the orthodoxy of juxtaposing “modernity” and “tradition” or institutional approaches to the state by demonstrating how assemblages of statist dynamics and the traditional field violently impinge on, shape, and are forged by people’s lives empirically.

Notes

2. For such an argument, see, e.g., Clément and Peiris (2008). For a critique of the postconflict framework, see Darch (2015).
3. For a critique of its evolutionary bent, see Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]: 393ff).
4. A key symbolic debate within postcolonial studies is whether to hyphenate (“post-colony”) or not (“postcolony”). Proponents of the former claim there is a need to (also) textually separate the field of study from the colonial discourse.
Violent Becomings

(see Ashcroft el al. 2005), while scholars such as Appiah (1992), Webner and Ranger (1996), or Mbembe (2001) argue that precisely the intimate relations between regimes merit nonhyphenation. Siding with the latter, I employ the term “postcolonial” so as to not exclude a priori possible important similarities and continuities existing between the two eras or entities (cf. Bayart 2010).


6. See also Cooper’s (2005: 113–49) trenchant critique of the conflicting uses of “modernity” and “modernization” in relation to both studies of colonialism and colonial contexts.

7. See also Webner (1986) for a critique of monolithic modernist representations.

8. But see also a revision of this thesis ten years on (Ranger 1993).

9. The colonial politics of anthropology in Mozambique was the subject of a heated exchange between the American anthropologist Marvin Harris (1959, 1960), who visited Mozambique in the 1950s, and the contemporary doyen of Portuguese anthropology, A. Rita-Ferreira (1960, 1961). The debate revolved around explaining Thonga migration to South African mines, but more importantly it addressed being critical to (Harris) or supportive of (Rita-Ferreira) the Portuguese colonial enterprise. Harris also wrote a damning report (1958) on Mozambican labor conditions that influenced political levels within the United States as well the UN system to take a more critical stance toward Portuguese colonialism.

10. These predicaments did not end with Evans-Pritchard and his era or with the fall of the colonial empires and its subsequent redefinition of anthropology as underlined by the critical works of Price (2004) and González (2004). In the specific context of African anthropology, some, as Archie Mafeje (1996), would argue that the foundations and historical complicity with colonialism fundamentally undermines the anthropological project, while Pierre (2006) calls for a radical rethinking of what he argues is anthropology’s implicit notions of race and “African exceptionalism.” While Mafeje’s and Pierre’s points are valid, the force and potential of anthropology in contexts such as Mozambique means that a critical reflection on the discipline’s assumptions needs to continuously be undertaken. This can only be done in an anthropology that is practiced, not abolished, due to past and, perhaps, present sins.

11. Fuglsang and Sørensen (2006a: 15) have proposed seeing the concept of assemblage as a contribution to understanding social ontologies, leading them to argue—with yet another technical metaphor—that “the assemblage constitutes the decisive materiality of the social bios.”

12. The argument of the hegemonic endurance of state order is also highlighted by Badiou (2005 [1998]: 110; see also 2012), who argues that even after radical political changes such as revolutions, revolutionaries such as Lenin “despaired over the obscene permanence of the State”—a thought resonating also with
Gramsci (quoted in Alonso 1994: 381), who claimed the state could be seen as a “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.”

13. Such an approach to the empirical material may seem a misapplication through the seeming conceptual stasis of “state formation” and “the traditional field” while Deleuze insisted on dynamics and speed. Perhaps. However, as Žižek points out (2004: 13) in an analysis of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* (2004 [1968]), an application of what Žižek terms the “core of his thought” is both tenable and advisable. I believe that by, in all modesty, interpreting some “cores of thoughts,” this book also develops and tests the analytical worth of a Deleuzian approach to the material at hand. Following Žižek, such deviation from the “letter of thought” allows, then, for a Deleuzian optic expressed in the argument of seeing the traditional field and the state as comprising particular assemblages. An additional element here is the proliferation of philosophical concepts construed by Deleuze (sometimes with Guattari). In a philosophical engagement spanning several decades, numerous published works and several orientational and, indeed, conceptual shifts (as from “desiring machines” in *Anti-Oedipus* [2004 (1972)]) to “assemblages” in *A Thousand Plateaus* [2002 (1980)]) and in a work some have (in an anti-Deleuzian and striating fashion) summed up in 150 key terms (Parr 2005), it is virtually impossible not to extract and adapt from the vast corpus for analytical purposes. Further, I will in some places in the text write “Deleuzian,” “Deleuze’s,” etc., and in others “Deleuze and Guattari’s” or “Deleuze-Guattarian,” etc. This discrepancy indicates a fuzzy authorship/coauthorship on part of the two philosophers, as discussed by Genosko (2001) and Dosse (2010 [2007]). However, when writing “Deleuze’s” or “Deleuzian,” I allude to notions developed or works authored in the main by Gilles Deleuze. Conversely, “Deleuze and Guattari” or “Deleuze-Guattarian” denote in the main coauthorship of notions or works, although the distinction remains debatable, as noted.

14. Deleuze’s position is radical in an ontological and epistemological sense by according a reality to the virtual that normally is represented as a bleak reflection of a universal starting point—the real. Precisely to avoid such a relation of inferiority between notions as in the dualism real-virtual, Deleuze claims that virtual should be seen in relation with actual and that both are instances of the real: “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual … Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract; and symbolic without being fictional” (Deleuze 2004 [1968]:260; see also 1988 [1966], 2006 [1977]) and Deleuze and Guattari 1994 [1991]. So crucial is this distinction with the possible that interpreters of Deleuze, for simplicity, sometimes denote the terms virtual/real and actual/real (see, e.g., Boundas 2005).
How is one to make sense of state formation as a predominantly violent process? More concretely, how is one, as an anthropologist, to understand one’s interlocutors’ repeated insistence on life being a sustained period of suffering (sofrimento)? One point at which to start is with the most recent large-scale period of violence, namely the Mozambican civil war (1976–92). During this phase of violent upheaval, the traditional field was implicated in complex ways and its reality as a domain of the potential was actualized in various manners vis-à-vis state dynamics and war machine dynamics. By describing the civil war as it was experienced and as it unfolded in Honde and Chimoio, this chapter gradually zooms in on and historically contextualizes what I term the rural-urban continuum of fieldwork sites. In introducing the fieldwork sites, I will also emphasize how Honde and Chimoio must not be seen as pristine localities into which one enters but rather physical sites in which social configurations, practices, memberships, and the field of the traditional have been continuously and violently altered by ongoing processes of state formation—most recently and most dramatically by the civil war.

**Independence and Civil War**

The space on the East African coast that gradually became Mozambique was under Portuguese colonial rule for almost five hundred years until its 1975 independence. The process of colonization and state formation
Violence was multistranded and gave rise to various forms of territorialization and structures for capturing the labor force of the population—also including non-Portuguese polities of the state kind. Freedom was, however, achieved in 1975 in Mozambique as in Portugal’s other African colonies.

Independence was, arguably, to a large extent a result of a coup d’état on 25 April 1974 that toppled Salazar’s authoritarian government in Portugal, as well as the recognition by the new regime of the vast financial resources being squandered in the country’s colonial wars (Newitt 1995). Reflecting a broader African trend, different movements aiming to liberate Mozambique had been formed during the late 1950s and early 1960s, culminating with the forming of Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Dar-es-Salaam in 1962 from three previous liberation movements.1 Frelimo’s prominent leaders were often black Mozambican intellectuals who had attended mission schools, and some—such as its first president, the anthropologically trained Eduardo Mondlane—had also received foreign education. From 1964 onward Frelimo fought militarily for independence, operating from so-called “liberated villages” under their control within Mozambique and, initially, also from guerrilla bases in Tanzania.2 The protracted struggle between the colonial army and Frelimo drew large parts of the colony into the armed conflict, as the Portuguese extensively utilized methods of dirty warfare, including massacres (Reis and Oliveira 2012). Further, the colonial state also encapsulated the rural population in so-called “protected villages” in order also to insulate them from rebel influence.

This territorial war dynamic enmeshed a large part of the rural population in the modus operandi of two opposed formations of military power: the guerrilla movement and the colonial state. With the transition to independence in 1975, Frelimo restructured, transitioning from a mobile guerrilla movement to a political party dominating a territorial state. Nonetheless, the newly independent Mozambican state was in crucial ways also shaped by the militancy embedded in the Frelimo movement since 1964, an orientation often accorded to the change of leadership from Eduardo Mondlane (who was killed by a letter-bomb in 1969) to Samora Machel.3 Samora, as he is (sometimes affectionately) called in Mozambique, was the leader of Frelimo from 1969 and the president of Mozambique from independence in 1975 until he was killed in a plane crash in 1986.4 During his rule, a party-state was erected that was characterized by a strongly vertical and militarily informed organizational structure dividing o povo (the people) into different sections serving the nation and the party: one section for women (OMM, Organização da Mulher Moçambicana, the Organization for Mozambican...
Violent Becomings

Women), one for youths (OJM, *Organização da Juventude Moçambicana*, the Organization for Mozambican Youth), a trade union (OTM, *Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique*, Organization of Workers of Mozambique), as well as local, so-called grupos dinamizadores (“dynamizing groups”)—party groups that educated politically and organized people around party initiatives and production schemes.

Frelimo had barely begun to implement these radical politics from the late 1970s onward before, perhaps paradoxically, being challenged by a guerrilla movement: Renamo—*Resistência Nacional Moçambicano* (Mozambican National Resistance). What is generally acknowledged is that Renamo was partly created by Southern Rhodesia around 1976 as a direct result of Mozambican independence in 1975. Renamo’s two aims were to target mainly Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas—black liberation fighters struggling for a liberated Zimbabwe—which operated from bases in Mozambican hinterlands, and also to wreak havoc on the new majority-ruled state of Mozambique. Effectively, Renamo may early on be seen as Southern Rhodesian guns for hire (Newitt 1995: 564). Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 most researchers point out that the political control and logistical support of Renamo was transferred from Salisbury to Pretoria’s BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) and SADF (South African Defence Force). Renamo thereby became integral to Apartheid South Africa’s policy of regional destabilization as a defense strategy.

However, from here diverse views and conflicting analyses emerge as to the nature of Renamo. On the one hand and emphasizing the movement’s roots, many scholars also lay the heaviest responsibility for the extremely violent dynamics and development of Renamo within Mozambique on exogenous factors. They argue that Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were directly involved and also point out that SADF forces participated in battles on Mozambican soil, ran army bases, provided logistics, and also killed Frelimo activists abroad. This claim, however, is contested by researchers that stress endogenous factors, and these especially point to Renamo’s popular base from which it drew support among the disgruntled Mozambican civilian population due to (at least) two much-criticized Frelimo strategies: forced villagization for increasing agricultural production in the early 1980s and attacks on traditional authority, especially the régulo (chief), bolstered by the rhetoric that traditional practices (however conceived) were “obscurantist” and therefore counterproductive. Both policies, some claim, contribute strongly to explaining a widespread peasant support for Renamo during the civil war.

Opposing this latter view, and rather indicating strong exogenous interests in Mozambique, is the far from insignificant role played by...
 Violence

foreign interests. This adds to the points made about Southern Rhodesia’s and South Africa’s interests and direct involvement in the war, corroborated by former SADF chief Magnus Malan who claimed to have helped create Renamo (L. Magaia 1988: 6). The propagandist support of Renamo—dubbed “freedom fighters” or likened to the contras of Nicaragua by the right wing in United States—also materialized through the training of troops and provision of weaponry and money (ibid.: 3). Reflecting the cold war context, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Eastern Bloc countries also had interests in Mozambique’s postindependence development, and all had in different ways invested politically and with capital. Further, following independence, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic provided military logistics, expertise, and capital to Frelimo and its army FAM (Forças Armadas de Moçambique).

Given these global political currents, Mozambique was embroiled in a “cold war turned warm.”

Beyond causation, Renamo’s early cross-border raids soon developed into a large-scale civil war encompassing more or less the full territorial expanse of Mozambique and lasting until a General Peace Agreement (GPA) was reached in 1992. Away from macropolitics, on the ground the civil war was exceptionally brutal as the so-called civilian population became the object of control and, conversely, a target for all sides in the conflict. Figures may indicate the scale of damage and violence. Through 1992, of Mozambique’s mid-1980s population of 13–15 million, 1 million had been killed, 1.7 million were refugees in neighboring countries, and at least 3.2 million were deslocados (“uprooted”), typically living around major cities, often in abject poverty (Hanlon 1996).

Following the civil war, Mozambique had in 1992 the lowest GDP per capita rate in the world (Braathen and Palmero 2001: 270), and large parts of the physical and administrative infrastructure of the postindependence Frelimo state had vanished (Hanlon 1996: 15).

A key aspect of this account of the country’s recent political history from late colonialism to the post–civil war period is that Mozambican processes of state formation are invariably related to violence. However, a superficial assessment of recent developments in Mozambique might argue that the violence of state formation and the relevance of wider social, political, and cosmological issues have ground to a halt with the 1992 GPA. Such an argument is flawed for several reasons, but perhaps most importantly by undercommunicating (or worse, miscommunicating) the multiple prolongation of war dynamics in different guises in peacetime. For instance, on the national political level, bellicose rhetoric still permeates election campaign periods and beyond (see Bertelsen 2004). Such rhetoric was evident in the five presidential and parlia-
mentary elections held in the post–civil war period: 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014). More importantly, the civil war and its violence is seen as continuing in popular experiences of war, illnesses derived from spirits born of war, and wartime identities still in operation, negation, and contestation—as well as in the direct violent confrontations and warlike scenarios described in the opening pages of this book. Such presences evidence long-term processes of erasure and inscription of violence and I have earlier (2002, 2004) termed these “reconstructive practices.” Arguably, these characteristics must be understood in terms of tensions and frictions with important nonstate domains, for example the traditional field. Such antagonisms were played out and are still powerfully present in memories of the violence that characterized civil war in Honde and Chimoio, Manica Province, where we now turn.

“Leaving Culture for the Bush”

However, fronts on the Mozambican ground of the civil war were everything but “clear-cut” in a formal, military Clausewitzian sense. There was no chess-like movement by generals of pieces representing units on a board. Neither were fronts renegotiated in military theaters of war—a dominant trope in media-disseminated imageries of warfare. Instead, various armed groups with shifting agendas and aims violently targeted the rural population, contributing to a complex situation in which it was difficult for ordinary people to “find the frontlines” (Nordstrom 1999) and distinguish between fighting parties. Nonetheless, juxtaposed logics of war did exist, shaping FAM’s and Renamo’s practices. As an opposition force, Renamo relied heavily on support coerced from the civilian population. The group’s methods included widespread terror, the killing of civilians, and press-ganging young men to murder kin and family members before bringing these to their camps so as to preclude or make very difficult their future return. In the rural locality of Honde where I have done fieldwork, many who stayed instead of fleeing to urban centers or participating actively in the war were abducted by Renamo. Stories of these abductions are often recounted in social settings, and one man, a local musician, shared his with me in 2000 shortly after he had resettled in Honde. He was captured when local Renamo forces entered the village one day in 1981:

They came when I was working on the machamba [agricultural plot of land]. Many fled, but I just heard noise from a compound nearby. I went to see, and they were robbing goats and other things. I knew the men from before.
They were from ——. When I asked what they were doing, they said, “War is war.” They forced me to come along with them. I was six years with them in a base near Muzingaze. I was forced to play music for them on my guitar from early morning. They danced and drank. If I stopped they said they would kill me, so I played. There was very little food in the base, and I was often hungry. When I ran away in 1986 to Zimbabwe, there was very little food there as well. It was hard.

However, Renamo is not the only perpetrator in stories of abduction and forced recruitment.\(^{20}\) During the civil war, the poor equipment and general state of the army was common knowledge, and it attracted few volunteers. FAM, for the most part, controlled many towns, and the Mozambican state continuously attempted to recruit young men (and some women) in them. One method, I was often told, involved the army occasionally cordoning off the cinema, when it was operating, and filtering the audience for men between the ages of 17–18 and 40. The “recruits” were immediately herded onto army trucks bound for military camps, and sent more or less directly from there to war.

Reflecting the two snippets mentioned, a trait of such post hoc stories in Honde and Chimoio is, precisely, to attribute violence to both FAM and Renamo. Often recounted in collective settings, and as Naguib (2009: 141) puts it in a recent work on Palestinian women, “stories are memories of the past merging with current life.” Merging the past with the present, violence is the single most important trope in stories emerging from the experiences of war and in understandings of the present, the past, and the present past. Violence is, however, not a singular force here and crucially also includes also the fear of nocturnal attacks, coping with the sights of violated bodies, or seeing charred homesteads as images of violent attacks on sociality and the cores of meaning. This perspective is expressed also in the following excerpt of a story recounted by a young man, Younas. During a conversation with me and others in Honde in 2000, he recalled atrocities committed during the mid-1980s:

> During the war, a lot of bad things happened here, a lot of bad things indeed. If you walked down the road you would see all sorts of things. Often, you saw people who had had their heads cut off. Or people impaled with the sticks coming out of their mouths or their sides. Often they had bananas stuck in their mouths, just like animals. But no one, not even their families, dared to bury them. The corpses were left to rot. There is still a lot of problems from this. Eh pah! A lot of problems, my friend.

Younas’s story is not unusual and reflects similar accounts circulating in Honde. As I have argued elsewhere (Bertelsen 2002), the processes of collective and individual recall is imperative to postwar reconstructive
practices addressing sociality. However, quite a number of the stories told in Honde do not only encapsulate a uniquely local perspective or situation. In keeping with its destabilization ethos, Renamo frequently wiped out visibly important physical structures that the postliberation state had constructed: rural schools, health posts, and agrarian seed and equipment shops were razed and a number of teachers, nurses, and rural shopkeepers were killed or violently attacked. In one sense, Renamo’s destruction effected a *deterritorialization* of the Mozambican state’s visibility by erasing buildings and communication infrastructure and killing its agents. Exceeding such deterritorialization of the state, however, the violence heavily affected rural Honde where almost all inhabitants’ houses had been consumed by fire, their maize mortars (*dhuli*) burned, or the main house (*muturica*) looted and razed. Understandably, many who were able to flee Honde emphasize how the violence thereby transformed the very core of being. In the voice of Ana, a middle-aged woman from Honde, in 2000:

> It was hard to know where they were, so when you heard rumors that someone was coming, you fled. You brought your *bonde* [straw mattress] and a few things and ran into the night. Sleeping in the *mato* [bush] at night, sometimes up trees. And then eating wild fruits because of hunger as we were like monkeys. Ah! It was bad, really bad. Living like that, like animals is no good. When you return home, your house would maybe be burnt, the chickens gone, the maize gone, the goat gone. All had gone. *Eh pah!* It is hard seeing that. Everything had changed.

Violence as encompassing and total, stemming from people roaming around, “someone” not necessarily identified as Renamo or Frelimo (or Southern Rhodesian soldiers or ZANLA fighters for that matter), Ana’s story encapsulates not merely the acts of inflicting physical hurt but how mortal fear instilled flight. The flight is very significant in this respect, where the locus of the home is left for the *mato* (the bush) where one is turned into living like—and, thus, becoming—an animal. Violence is here experienced as erasure of meaning in terms of effacing and debasing households and familiar structures—not merely in terms of aggressive and pain-provoking physicality. Most explicitly, this perspective came across to me when sitting with a friend of a friend—a middle-aged man from Honde. He had previously been a farmhand at a white-owned Southern Rhodesian farm prior to Zimbabwean independence but was now working as a peasant in Honde. He said,

> You know it [the war] started here in Manica? Ah, it was bad in the times of the war. They put children into *dhuli* [mortars for crushing maize] and the mother or father had to crush it, killing their own child. They burnt the
houses, and often the ufuminya [maize meal] too. They put heads on sticks just to say “Here we kill people.” Can you imagine that? They destroyed everything. I did not want that. I did not want to leave culture for going into the mato.

The image of “they”—contextually being Renamo—as a destructive force cannot possibly be expressed stronger than through being forced to leave “culture” (cultural) for the mato. The existence of the term mato habitually underlines the ongoing social and political constitution of landscape and space that allocates domains with danger, ambivalence, and relative safety. In the context of war, however, mato provides a particularly powerful metaphor for violence that upsets and redefines notions and boundaries of bush and culture, household and violence. In relation to war, Renamo is portrayed as belonging to the very same bush.24 Further, the debasing effects of violence—the animal-like and bush-like behavior—is contrasted with the threatened “culture,” a cherished world of houses, children, and machamba, the small plots of agricultural land each household or kin group cultivates. The view of “meaningless” violence (as with no intent but destruction) is dominant in this account as the perpetrators are known as “they.”

Conversely, there are others who tell explanatory stories that seem to “understand” if not endorse violence, not merely as acts of utter destruction, but rather as seeming to imply a re-inscription of meaning through a form of violence that was necessary to readjust certain societal contexts and redress flawed politics. Such stories of how past violence redressed certain structures may be represented by what a young Honde man told me in 2000:

Figure 1.1. Layout of typical Honde household compound with a few minor surrounding machambas.
Before there was an *aldeia comunal* [communal village] here and Frelimo had all the power. Renamo did not want that. They wanted people to return to the *mato*. So they destroyed the *aldeia comunal*. But why did they kill people? They had to rob and loot to survive.

In this story, the violence is clearly attributed to Renamo, and their intentionality is narrated as aiming to disrupt the workings of the *aldeia comunal* and the alleged omnipotence of the Frelimo state. The use of violence represents a means to an end, and the killing of people is explained in terms of appropriation necessary for survival.

Mirroring the stories of capture and abduction, not merely “Renamo,” or “they,” but also “Frelimo” is invoked as erasing and re-inscribing society and the landscape with new meaning through violence. In Chimoio there is a mountain whose peak is raised some two hundred meters above the rest of the terrain. When viewed from the east and west, the mountain has the facial contours of an old man, hence the Portuguese name Cabeça do Velho, meaning “The Old Man’s Head,” or Bengo in chiTewe. In both Honde and in Chimoio, people’s relations to Bengo are strong as the mountain is seen to be powerful in terms of *tchianhu wo atewe* (“our ways”, i.e. that of the maTewe): important ancestral spirits

*Illustration 1.1.* View of the mountain Bengo (or Cabeça do Velho in Portuguese) as seen from Chimoio. 2005.
inhabit the mountain, several graves for lineages of régulos are buried there, and a key régulo resides close by as to be within close proximity of the autochthons and to guard the chiefly tombs (see also Artur 1999a).  

Prior to the civil war, sacred goats grazed the grassy slopes of the mountain. The animals would reverently be left alone, except for ritual occasions, as they embody vital relations to ancestors. But in a range of stories I heard, FAM soldiers killed the goats during the civil war and savagely devoured them. The wide circulation of the soldiers’ sacrilege, thus, popularly epitomizes Frelimo’s and the state’s perceived antagonist role toward tchianhu wo atewe—the killing of goats severing or transforming ancestral relations. In the context of this story, violence amounts to erasing aspects of the traditional field and re-inscribing new meaning in the landscape: Razed of visible ancestral significance and inscribed with the death of the goats, Bengo has become, ambivalently, both mato and an area de-/re-territorialized by the Frelimo state. Further, these civil war acts are frequently brought up in conversations and underline, more generally, the presence of the past. The case of Bengo and the FAM soldiers’ attack on it is for many both an expression of Frelimo’s antagonism toward the traditional field and, also, shows how violent state dynamics can foment ambivalence within it.

Attuned to the multistranded and complex dimensions of violence in the Mozambican civil war, Carolyn Nordstrom (1997: 141) argues that the phenomenon of violence is “culturally constitutive” and that it “forges, in fact forces new constructs of identity, new socio-cultural relationships, new threats and injustices that reconfigure people’s lifeworlds, new patterns of survival and injustice.” She further states that both during the civil war and after, “Mozambicans are concerned not only with treating the wounds of violence, but with treating violence itself by defusing the cultures of violence that the war created” (1998b: 115, italics retained). This view is in opposition to what she dubs Western notions of violence where it, she claims, is entified, has a specific nature, and is given (ibid.). Contrarily, Nordstrom argues that “Mozambican concepts of violence” are radically more dynamic as violence is seen as made—a fluid cultural construct put into action by those seeking to control others (ibid.). Nordstrom’s approach, being an anthropology of process rather than place and influenced by Appadurai’s (1996) notion of “ethnoscape,” privileges the “warscape” as an analytical entry that entails decontextualizing violence from its specific, experienced locations.  

Claiming a “Mozambican concept of violence” may be both reifying and “exotifying,” as there are clear limits to claiming the civil war violence should be experienced as similar in Maputo, Hondo, or Ilha de Moçambique. More importantly, however, Nordstrom develops a the-
oretical argument that claims violence in the context of Mozambique is dehumanizing in terms of meaning being erased by violence. While it is crucial to recognize the intensity, scale, and suffering inherent to the civil war, to a certain extent Nordstrom’s position posits its violence as un-human or un-social. By extension, by allocating such un-human or un-social violence to perpetrators or actors, these necessarily come across as beastly and animal-like because of perpetrating erasing and in-human violence. Such a reading is strengthened by a point Nordstrom, interestingly, argues, namely that violence is senseless, or that if it has “sense,” it is solely within the context of being de-ordering and de-basing (1997: 166): “This is not mere disorder, for disorder is part of ontological order—a fact and a fiction appreciated in cultural lore. Worse: The world has been un-ordered. Human nature isn’t. World process doesn’t. Sense can’t.”

Meaning and its erasure is, then, Nordstrom’s all-encompassing focus, and within this frame of mind there neither seems to be space for assessing instrumental means and ends of violence, on the one hand, nor to see violence as, complementarily, also a force reordering and reinscribing as well as erasing. For, when the total, all-erasing violence has left its toll in Nordstrom’s analysis, humans are virtually tabula rasa in an empty and vast landscape, in a near “cultural void.” Caught between meaning and meaning, “they are left with the choice of accepting a deadened world or creating a liveable one” (Nordstrom 1997: 190).

My fieldwork data contradicts such a vision of totalizing, meaningless violence, although it is important to emphasize that the “senselessness” of violence is how, as we have seen, some interlocutors described and narrated civil war. Nonetheless, this does not preclude analytically integrating such statements in wider social and political contexts. Rather, conveying stories of senselessness is a manner in which to represent suffering or other sentiments to listeners—including the researcher. Extensive suffering is evident from other studies as well as my own material through that the civil war created what Wilson (1992) calls “cults of violence.” Moreover, as reflected in the previous stories, the violence wrought onto and engulfing vast tracts of the rural hinterland in Manica Province was extreme in its levels of human suffering and scale. However, it was nevertheless also frequently directed at control and capture of the civilian population, and it must therefore be seen also to constitute a dynamic of power. The violence of the war should, then, not be extracted or exempted from power or sovereignty—as might be an analytical effect privileging largely the dehumanizing and disordering aspects of civil war as well as the exceptionalizing notion of warscape and “Mozambican concept of violence” reflected in Nordstrom’s anal-
ysis. Instead it should be approached as internal to adverse, different, and sometimes antagonistically positioned formations implying that violence was not randomly performed. As the case of Bengo illustrates, an important aspect of it was related to the confrontation with or violent appropriation of the field of the traditional and to the “bushification” of villages and physical structures related to the state order and society. How should, then, these wartime dynamics of violence be analyzed?

War Machine and the State

The war destroyed a lot. When Frelimo came, they came as enemies. When Renamo came, they came as enemies.

Tchirenge [rainmaker], Honde

The important reports of F. Legrand, made during the civil war, underline how people constantly moved between zones as well as to and from other provinces and Zimbabwe, making migration, movement, and periodic halts prominent features of the period (1993: 21). But Legrand goes further and notes that “the border between Renamo zones and Government areas has not been as ‘waterproof’ as we had thought and many circulated from one zone to another.” Legrand’s reports conform with my own findings from the area, where it is clear that zones purportedly under the domination of an armed group may not be seen as total, for instance in terms of people being identified as having singular or mutually excluding political identities. Rather, there existed (and exists) a spectrum of affiliations and in the zones, conceptual and experienced differences between being punished, enslaved, or protected were unclear. This flux may go some way in accounting for both Renamo’s and FAM’s often violently enforced biopolitics of herding, coercing, or kidnapping people in and between zones.31

Many stories encircle this theme of abduction, coercion, and, in the end, transformation to becoming “one of them,” the story of the guitarist being merely one example. Another was provided by a Honde woman I will call Nzereki. The mother of twelve children, she worked hard tilling the soil of her machambas in Honde until she died in 2008 at more than ninety years old, her husband having passed away in the late 1960s. During the civil war of the early 1980s she was already an elderly woman and came to suffer due to her association with some Frelimo sympathizers. Together with a few of her nephews, she was captured one day by a group of Renamo guerrillas and taken to one of the camps in the Gorongosa area in neighboring Sofala Province. She recalled the
hard life in the camp numerous times and explained it this way to me during a conversation in 2005:

N: I was taken there and we walked during the night, in the mato. In the camp it was very hard and little food. We had to dig up roots from the ground to eat because there was no food.
B: Did you escape?
N: No, after a few years they let me go. I was taken there to be disciplined [ficar disciplinado].

After returning to Honde, she widely supported Renamo as, indeed, the majority there did. Nzereki also regularly confirmed this support when talking to me and others.

Affiliations in Honde were, thus, the subject of violent shifts during the civil war—also due to the proximity to bases of ZANLA guerrillas. The involvement of Southern Rhodesian troops, ZANLA fighters, Renamo troops, FAM soldiers, and others produced complex trajectories of war in Honde. This climate of fear and uncertainty may account for some of the punitive measures taken against “traitors” or “informers,” where it was important to inscribe the bodies with violence. The corpses thus displayed along Honde’s paths and roads may have also served to demarcate the zones and their borders, thus stressing what happens to traitors, squealers, and go-betweens as attempts to curb the flux of people identified by Legrand. This aspect reinforces the argument that borders, zones, and bodies constituted such important domains of control.

Given these characteristics of the war, its violence also needs to be seen as a dynamic practice of power. Two of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2002 [1980]) concepts, “state” and “war machine” (hereafter unemphasized by quotation marks), elucidate two modalities of power characterizing the Mozambican civil war in Honde and Chimoio. In employing the terms to the context of Sinhalese sorcery, Kapferer (1997: 284, italics retained) notes that “the war machine … and the state describe power in its dynamic as this materializes in a diversity of structurating processes on the ground.” As with Kapferer’s analysis of the Sinhalese context, the fruitfulness of the terms resides in their capacity to describe unfolding processes on the ground without reducing these to institutional approaches. For the notions of the war machine and the state, as argued by Kapferer, are to be seen as concepts meant to analytically capture dynamics and practices of power. These are interwoven but separate, antagonist but dependent; hence, one cannot be perceived without the other. Put differently, the war machine is “rhizomic,” implying that it “connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature” (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]:
Violence with “no beginning or end” (ibid.: 25). This indistinct, complex shape is complemented by a fluidity and mobility, and its form is normally exterior to the state apparatus. The State (or state dynamics), on the other hand, is characterized by territorial control, immobility and hierarchy, and Deleuze and Guattari assert that “the State has no war machine of its own” (ibid.: 355).

These two modalities are applicable to some of the bellicose features of Renamo and Frelimo practices. Moreover, they are applicable to appreciate the logic inherent to the violent dynamic of state formation and its relation to the domain of the social in general and the traditional field in particular in Honde. Frelimo, in control of the government for most of the postliberation period, fits such a notion of state dynamics (“the State”) as it sought throughout to expand its control of territory. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “One of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns” (2002 [1980]: 385).

As we will see, a central thrust of Frelimo’s postindependence politics was precisely the reordering of urban and rural space involving the transformations of communal villages (aldeias comunais) to protected villages. In the above, Renamo’s practices exhibit war machine dynamics as these confronted and “dehierarchized” the emerging state order. In practice this was done through razing physical structures such as roads and government or Frelimo party buildings and killing state representatives in especially rural areas. In erasing visible signs of the state formation, the war machine, in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, deterritorializes through being “directed against the State, either against potential States whose formation it wards off in advance, or against actual States whose destruction it purposes” (ibid.: 359). In terms of actual warfare, Renamo also fits the notion of the war machine as “guerrilla warfare explicitly [aimed] for the non-battle” (ibid.: 416, italics retained).

Dynamic, powerful, and often fluid fields such as that of the traditional field—including domains of magic and sorcery—are in processes of appropriation and territorialization also “metamorphosized.” During war, in their becoming integral to an expansive war machine that recruits through violence, coercion, and abduction or the subject of a state dynamic razing sites of the traditional (i.e. Bengo), the potentialities of the traditional field also arguably foment novel forms integral or antagonistic to war violence.

In Honde, upon Renamo’s arrival, the régulo that I call João was in the same way as Nzereki captured and taken to a camp in Gorongosa under unclear circumstances. Instating a local man in his place as régulo and ousting the party secretary of the Frelimo state, Renamo sought to rule Honde. However, within a short period of time there were, people
agree, so many problems for the new régulo in terms of relations with the soil and its lack of growth (ndimo), bad spirits (pfukwa), and a general absence of ancestral protection that Renamo decided to bring régulo João back. His reinsertion into Honde, however, was not as unproblematic as that of Nzereki: Having been forcibly relocated and having, in a sense, thereby severed his relations with soil, spirits, and tchianhu wo atewe, many allege that he had become mato—bush—by his (involuntary) affiliation with Renamo, the war, and its violence. Thus, in the case of régulo João, the trajectories of abduction, transformation, and return are more problematic than those of Nzereki, as his intersect with and are implicated in Renamo’s tentative violent transformation of local polities. Ultimately, this was seen as challenging the forces of tchianhu wo atewe, thus imbuing his return with ambivalence.

Such civil war dynamics of the traditional field during were not confined to Honde. In the Zambézia Province, Northern Mozambique, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a group called Parama (or Naparama) emerged (Wilson 1992). This peasant militia group or “traditional army” (Nordstrom 1997: 57) comprised several hundred or perhaps thousands of men armed with spears and other nonmodern weaponry. They used red headbands to signify spiritual endorsement and protection of their struggle. All had also undergone rites of vaccination against being harmed by bullets or other objects of war that were, crucially, deemed nontraditional (see also Kastfelt 2005; Nicolini 2006). Socially, politically, and militarily Parama constituted a considerable force in Zambézia, troubling both Renamo and FAM in the area of its operation. Initially it also enjoyed considerable popular support as a force protecting the peasants, following a strict, ritually sanctioned code of conduct, and being directed against external violent forces. However, after some successes in attacking Renamo bases, it increasingly affiliated more closely with FAM, and its tight links with notions of ritual cleansing and taboos on rape, etc., disintegrated (Nordstrom 1997: 57–62). Parama gradually assimilated with the dominant state force, FAM, and became indistinguishable from its objectives and (violent) practices.

Further, neither did Renamo necessarily adhere to conventional guerrilla strategies nor limit its operations to the national context. In a lucid ethnographic work on the Kaerezi on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, Donald Moore (2005) portrays how memories of Renamo attacks are still vivid. Also, Moore (2005: 44) claims that attacks by Renamo in Kaerezi “followed kinship or political networks across the border; reprisals and the settling of old scores produced collateral damage” (Moore 2005: 44). Put differently, the civil war in Kaerezi unfolded in ways reflecting social organization and the immediacies of local politics.
Both Renamo’s dislocation and relocation of régulos in Honde, the potency (and demise) of the Parama in Zambézia, and the unfolding of the civil war in Kaerezi underline a general point: the movement and action of the war machine also follow, feed on, and transform existing social structures and orders, such as systems of kinship or religious rites. Contrary to statist dynamics, the shape of the war machine does not aim to control territory or win battles but rather exploits and is fueled by, for example, logics of kinship, the politics of traditional authority, or dynamics of magic and the religious domains.

As reflected by some of the experiences and stories told in Honde, the dynamics of the civil war are irreducible to guerrilla groups and the Mozambican state, Renamo, and the FAM. Crucially, the state transforms itself into a war machine as it engages in guerrilla war: appropriating capabilities of swiftness, engaging in deterritorializing practices, and engaging existing features of social order as that of magical protection against bodily harm during warfare—as in FAM’s engulfing and eventual deterritorialization of Parama. By this transformation, the state form of sovereignty may be seen to expose its powerful and violent potential and practice in a situation of crisis and war. Conversely, Renamo is drawn toward sedentarization by creating permanent camps where captured—such as the entertaining guitarist, Nzereki, or régulo João—are held, exhibiting state dynamics in a Deleuze and Guattarian sense.

Both processes are evident in Honde where the Frelimo state rarely emerges as a form of power imposing order, stability, or peace, but is in popular discourses cast as “dirty” or “bad.” Further, as demonstrated, in-war and postwar distinctions were and are difficult, and the stories and contestations reflect the opacity of the wartime practices of the now political parties (but see Emerson 2014). In Honde, the operations and practices of Renamo, FAM, ZANLA, Southern Rhodesian, and Zimbabwean troops, soldiers and armed bands entailed violence of an unending and ambivalent character. Both the metamorphosis of the war machine (as in its appropriation of the traditional authority of the régulo) and the transformation of state dynamics (as in the engulfing of Parama) occasioned contested processes of erasure and reinscription of meaning through violence carrying import for postwar social and political processes.

As concepts, notions of war machine and the state are ways to understand modalities of power rather than these necessarily corresponding to the sum of either Renamo or Frelimo practices. However, as concepts they serve to grasp important dimensions of power and violence that were especially visible and tangible during the period of the civil war as they unfolded in concrete settings—as that of Honde. Moreover, the civil war dynamics represent a crucial event in which the virtual of
the traditional field was actualized. For instance, this occurred through the ambiguous figure of régulo João, through the formation of Parama, or through the embroiling in and fueling of the Renamo war machine in kinship structures and antagonisms on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique borderland. The civil war thus provided instances wherein the traditional field was constantly reformed, highlighting its trait of perpetual emergence and openness. Let us look closer, however, at this Honde fieldwork context as well as Chimoio and the fieldwork undertaken in both.

The Rainmaker-Agronomist, or the Rural-Urban Continuum of Field Sites

My fieldwork has mainly been carried out in peri-urban and urban environments around the provincial capital of Manica, Chimoio, as well as in a nearby rural community I have chosen to entitle Honde. By following people’s movements between the rural and the urban sites—visiting kin, bringing goods to the market, going to town for work, walking back to Honde to see to their machambas (agricultural plots)—I undertook all fieldwork in what I term a rural-urban continuum of field sites during eight periods from 1999 to 2011, totaling twenty-one months, visiting also briefly in January 2016.

The city of Chimoio is a medium-sized Mozambican city holding 170,000 to 200,000 inhabitants at the time of the first fieldwork of some duration in 1999, increasing to officially 238,976 in 2007 and probably reaching around 250,000 in 2016.38 Reflecting the violence of the rural hinterland in Manica Province, the number of inhabitants increased rapidly during the civil war as refugees fled from the war-torn rural areas, and by the early 1980s Chimoio had doubled its number of inhabitants.39 It is spatially organized around a so-called bairro cimento or “concrete quarter” with a grid of paved streets, concrete buildings housing government offices, and upper-middle-class apartments and houses—some in the old Portuguese colonial style from the time the city was named Vila Pery.40 The bairro cimento is encircled—one could also say encapsulated—by poor bairros with only a few dirt roads providing access by car. These bairros are populated by the impoverished majority of Chimoio’s inhabitants and sometimes also lack electricity and public lighting, most coming into existence during the rural influx during the civil war years of especially the early 1980s. Houses often bear the imprint of poverty, made as they are of (often unburned) mud bricks with only straw and plastic roofing or, more rarely, corrugated iron sheets.
Spatial organization also testifies to the predominantly hasty formation of *bairros* where households are visibly linked by paths that follow intricate and crisscrossing patterns rather than the quadrangular grid of the *bairro cimento* and the few middle-income *bairros*.

As laid out in the introduction, there is a layered structure of authority and formal political organization in the *bairros*. This includes the apparatus of the Frelimo party secretaries and their adjuncts, the recent institution of community authorities, so-called community police and community courts, as well as influential representatives of the Renamo opposition and traditional healers (so-called *n’anga* and *profete*; see chapter 4). Fieldwork, as well as the pursuit of life, in these *bairros* entails a form of “social navigation” (Vigh 2006) between the previously mentioned, often adversely positioned structures of authority and organization in a context sometimes dangerous—also for the anthropologist—in terms of levels of crime, violence, and insecurity. In socially navigating these *bairros*, I have largely developed and benefited greatly from networks of interlocutors and kin from the rural locality of Honde and their crucial relations with Chimoio.

While these relations vary in time-depth and strength between persons and households, in general relations were most strongly forged during the civil war when many fled Honde and established themselves in Chimoio. Following the war and returning to Honde from a number of localities (including Chimoio’s *bairros*), many households retained their plots of land with houses in the *bairros*, often having one or several family members living in these. Much of my time during fieldwork was therefore devoted to following the movement of people in their everyday lives and through the seasons between rural and urban households—a movement imbuing the social world with the constant flow of personnel and goods. As the relations between the urban and rural settings of Honde and Chimoio are thus interconnected, this obviates upholding strict urban/rural distinctions (see also Sheldon 1999, 2003). Thus, barring their spatial location, these are not urban households in a strict sense as the majority of them enjoy long-term personal, kin-based, or economic relationships with rural households and their encompassing social organization. Crucially, a vast majority of poor *bairro* households are dependent on their sustenance and reproduction through connections (kin relations, the lease of plots of land, etc.) for the production of maize and other foods. This latter point entails a cycle of seasonal relocation between urban and rural localities that necessitates a dynamic approach to the task of mapping household memberships.

While living in several households in especially two impoverished *bairros*, I also frequently experienced the frustration at the lack of sala-
ried work and the often concomitant colonial nostalgia for a time when Chimoio was, apparently, industrialized and orderly. The latter point on industrialization might not, however, merely be cast as nostalgia: for decades Chimoio's textile factory, TextAfrica, had over four thousand workers as well as some other sites of industrial production providing wage labor opportunities prior to the destruction inherent to the liberation war (1964–75) and the civil war (1976–92). The gradual shutdown during the 1980s and the lack of ordinary wage work has meant that informal businesses in the legal, semilegal, and illegal economies are important aspects of daily life. For the poor majority, a diversity of income-generating activities in these economies is central, supported by and in conjunction with a rurally based agricultural production of staple foods.

Contrasting Chimoio’s bairros, what is striking in Honde, the rural community about a two-hour walk from Chimoio in which I have conducted fieldwork, is the way in which production and life seem to revolve around agricultural cycles: days are organized to a large extent around the work on the machambas (nonflooded agricultural plots of land), where staples such as maize (magwere), sorghum (mapfunde), sweet potato (madima), cassava (mandioka), groundnuts (nyimo), peanuts (mandui), and various types of beans, fruits, melons, and pumpkins are grown. This is complemented by work in the matoro—low-lying plots of seasonally flooded agricultural lands typically on riverbeds or close to streams or rivulets. In the matoro (or baixa in Portuguese as it is also often called), crops such as taro (madumbe), sugarcane (musare), tomatoes (matimati), and a wide variety of bananas (makobo, nzarapera, verdiano, tchinakanaka, mafigo, and maraboa) are grown. The annual agricultural cycle divides work into clearing, planting, weeding, and harvesting with, for example, the harvest of the main staple magwere (maize) in the machamba being roughly four to six months after its early harvest in the matoro. A comparatively poor community in an already poor province on a national level, Honde’s agricultural cycle and its maintenance is crucial to people there. Households are scattered across the landscape some thirty to one hundred meters apart where gwanzas (paths) connect and cross the machambas interspersed among households. These may be seen as etchings or engravings of the depth of social relations on and in the landscape, and the gwanzas least traveled between households are uniformly seen as indicating a problematic relation.

The gwanzas radiating from the household I lived in during most of my fieldwork in Honde were well-traveled and maintained and belonged to António and Ana while I lived there in 1999 and 2000. Staying there as a member of their household, I was accommodated not in the...
muturica but in the so-called goero built by their second-oldest son who was then thirteen or fourteen. The goero, being a very rudimentary hut, is created by a male youth when he reaches the age of around twelve as one of the visible signs that he is embarking on adulthood and will, in time, create his own household (see also Suana 1999: 63). Set up in the compound of his parents, the youth will gradually start sleeping in the goero instead of the muturica, and in this case the son was accompanied by a neophyte of anthropology.

Practically, fieldwork in 1999–2000 and in consecutive periods concentrated on participating in the rural work cycles on the machambas and in the compounds, ritual and social life, and engaging people in conversations. As households and social domains in Honde and, also, in the bairros around Chimoio are often spatially segregated in terms of gender (as well as age), access to women on par with those of men remained difficult. However, by returning over a period of many years, I was gradually able to speak with and also, to some degree, follow the activities of women. An additional dimension complicating fieldwork was the attribution of the category of muZungu, a Shona and chiTewe word meaning “white foreigner.” In Honde and Chimoio this racial conception was double informed by the context of the aid and development industry on the one hand, and by the context of white people, particularly farmers and businessmen, from Zimbabwe or South Africa on the other. Both are, mildly put, undesirable conceptual positions to hold.
up during fieldwork. However, as my “family” led by Ana and António had installed me in one of their son’s goero and in all contexts referred to me as their son, the category of muZungu gradually gave way, at least in Honde and in parts also of the relevant bairros in Chimoio, to a more unclear but, for the anthropologist, more productive status of the non-insider and nonoutsider.

Nonetheless, entering the locality of Honde to undertake fieldwork is not necessarily straightforward and involves more than locating a family kind enough to host an anthropologist. In this rural environment, entries and exits are strictly governed in terms of formal permissions from local government. In order for all foreigners or professionals to enter and stay in a zona (literally a “zone”), one needs to obtain formal credentials, so-called credenciais, issued from a government or government-related body. For Mozambicans, similar procedures of obtaining permission exist for issues such as land-use or setting up houses. Thus, for the foreign anthropologist and Mozambican alike, before staying in or working in a locality, the relevant document needs to be brought before and accepted by the local party secretary, community authority, or the régulo. Also, beyond these bureaucratic procedures, the fieldworker’s entry to stay for a longer time in 1999 was addressed through a ritual called mhamba—one of several types of ceremonial acts normally executed to communicate people’s entries to and exits from zonas.43

In my case, the mhamba was conducted by a tchirenge—a title often translated as “rainmaker” and a figure commanding great respect.44 In general he (female tchirenges are unknown) secures relations between land and soil, spirits and rain through rituals effected in front of a sacred tree, mudoe. For Honde, he is a man that is frequently approached also in reproductive matters pertaining to particular households—as in a man’s or a woman’s difficulty in conceiving. He is, moreover, a figure always included when Honde is confronted by extraordinary situations—as, for example, the return of Honde’s inhabitants after the civil war. Thus, upon his and a few other households’ return in around 1996–97—when people in Chimoio started trusting that the peace of 1992 actually was going to last—the tchirenge organized a communal ceremony that included representatives from all Honde households. Narratives of this particular ceremony include that the tchirenge asked all the gombwa, the territorial spirits of the land (see also chapter 3), to accept their return and to forgive them for the blood spilled on the soil. To everyone’s mind, this was crucial to not only be able to reenter the territory of Honde and relate to its spirits but also to reengage relations postwar.

In the particular mhamba of 1999 I took part in—the first but not the last—around twenty elderly men and women gathered in front of
Honde’s mudoe tree as tchirenge invoked and communicated with the powerful spirits of the land. In some sense, the tchirenge as a representative of the autochthons, the group identified as aridzi wo nhika (owners of the land), safeguarded my entry into the social world of Honde. The mhamba was followed by drinking traditional beer, duro, made of maize or sorghum, as well as festive dancing accompanied by songs about my allegedly great fertility and virility in all fields of life. During subsequent fieldworks, similar rituals have framed my (re)entry into Honde.

This ethnographic vignette—serving as a rudimentary presentation of the rural aspect of my fieldwork sites—also conveys part of my early impressions upon visiting a community such as Honde. At first, for me the figure of the tchirenge easily came to represent a doyen of “ancestral ways,” an epitome of “tradition” in the singular. Further, it was also tempting early on in this first fieldwork to contrast the nonmechanized agricultural cycles around which the attention to machamba and matoro are organized to something other—external to the world of Honde—in, for example, the deployment of the (all too) common binary concepts of “tradition” and “modernity” in order to structure the Honde material.
Portraying Honde this way would cast it as a “traditional community” organized along ancestral ways.

However, numerous anthropological studies from the 1950s onward, including the works by Clyde Mitchell (1956) and Bruce Kapferer (1972) associated with the influential Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, have irrefutably established that the formal and bureaucratic domains of state formations and nonstate domains are inextricably related within the same modern field. Thus, also in the context of Honde, I soon came to see the metanarrative of modernity and its necessary composite other as nonviable, first and foremost for its tendency to project ahistorical assumptions onto complex ethnographic contexts that also all have particular historical trajectories. Such a distinction would, then, also belie the social facts and individual and communal trajectories—for example that the tchirenge is also an agronomist: before the civil war, he worked for several years as a teacher at a provincial college near Chimoio. Further, Rui, a man assisting the tchirenge in the mhamba ritual, is a welder and a car mechanic. Prior to the civil war, he worked twenty years in different repair shops—a point he frequently underlined by showing me his welding tools still kept in his Honde home. Also António, the man married to Ana in the household where I lived, had previously worked in Southern Rhodesia. Later on and for fifteen years he worked as a mechanic at TextAfrica—at one point Southern Africa’s largest textile producer (Pitcher 2002: 107f).

Such a list could be made longer but what I emphasize here is that what may at first seem like a rural, “traditional” locality is molded by the long-term violent postcolonial and colonial trajectories—a process exemplified at the community level by the violent scattering of Honde’s members during the civil war and its reconstitution in the years following the GPA in 1992. Thus, the simplified category of “peasant” carries little meaning beyond being an occupational status, and the category of “traditional community” similarly belies the heterogeneity of orientations, experiences, and knowledge of people living in Honde.

The Virtual and Actual of War

What do these points imply in terms of state formation and the traditional field specifically? First, one could be tempted into arguing for alternatives to the categories of “modernity” and “tradition.” For this particular part of Mozambique (and, indeed, large parts of the country) one could attempt to portray such contexts as “postindustrial” due to the shutdown of key factories following the wars and partly mis-
managed privatization practices (Jones 2005; Hanlon 1996). However, the term “postindustrial” provides no explanation beyond alluding to a presumably uniform “poststate,” which corresponds neither to past nor present. Moreover, it would, perhaps, serve to give credence to the brutal Portuguese colonial regime characterized to a large extent by different forms of extractive economies undergirded by violent coercion, as will be developed in some detail in chapter 2.45

Inherent to both notions of “traditional” and the descriptive term “postindustrial” are the fallacies characteristic of modernity’s lesser Other within an optic of linear historical evolution.46 As Latour has argued in his archaeology of the term “modern” and its implications for social science constructions of objects, subjects, and society, “modernity has never begun. There has never been a modern world” (Latour 1993: 47). What the ethnographic vignettes of rainmaker-agronomist and the peri-urban communities with rural-urban networks of households has indicated is the need to “debunk” (Latour 1993) the explanatory potential of employing a tradition-modernity linearity on the material at hand. Overall, the vignettes indicate the need for a theoretical framework in which the traditional field is not cast as essentialized and as harking from time immemorial by adherents thus locked up in a (likewise) traditional world—a vision that would replicate the modernist linear argument of the universal sequence: standstill—rupture—modernity. This has two implications: First, it is necessary to analyze actual practices and instances—historical and present—of how the traditional field and state formation engage, conflict, and interpenetrate. It is therefore suggested here that following the flows in the rural-urban continuum under study provides one such entry point into this conundrum. A second implication is that it is necessary to see the traditional field in terms of its dynamic, not its stability. To reiterate: I propose that it is analytically rewarding to conceive of the traditional field as being a domain of potentialities, in terms of becoming and not being, emphasizing thus its movement and changeability instead of replicating images of its presumed stasis. In this chapter these potentialities of the domain of the traditional—its virtual—were revealed through how Renamo and FAM, as well as the Mozambican state, became embroiled in war machine and statist dynamics that fomented, interpenetrated, and were in conflict with dimensions of the traditional field. Concretely, this materialized in terms of the rise of Parama or Renamo’s trouble with replacing and reinstituting a régulo in Honde, the integration of local political and kinship dynamics within Renamo expansion, and warfare in Kaerezi or the FAM’s soldiers razing Bengo, respectively. Arguably, the civil war as it is very rudimentarily sketched here represents an event in terms of peri-
ods of extraordinary intensity and productive transformation where the virtual potentialities of the traditional field are actualized. The unfolding of the civil war as such an event is presented here and provides an analytical approach to the violent dynamics of civil war that is also attuned to the dynamics of power and vaster social and political upheaval within which the stories of violence from Honde need to be interpreted.

Although the civil war is an exceptionally violent, destructive and formative period in terms of both processes of state formation and the dynamics of the traditional field—as has been sketched here from the perspective of the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio—we need to also turn to a longer perspective on the diverse forms and dynamics of state formation to be able to analyze these beyond the notions of war machine and state. In chapter 2, such a historically informed analysis is undertaken in regards to the spatial and territorial dimensions in Manica Province.

Notes

1. Opello (1975) and Alpers (1979) both explore the early political shaping of Frelimo. See also Munslow (1983) and Hanlon (1990 [1984]) for overviews of early Mozambican foreign-based nationalism and Mateus (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of Frelimo’s founding elites in comparison to other Lusophone liberation movements.

2. See Nwafor (1983), Saul (1979), and Coelho (1993, 1998) for details of the early phases of the liberation war.

3. Murdered by a letter bomb in Dar-es-Salaam on 3 February 1969, Mondlane’s death is generally thought to have been orchestrated by Portuguese intelligence (Mateus 2004: 171–172). However, some also attribute his death to have been facilitated by elements within Frelimo (Newitt 1995).

4. As with Mondlane’s assassination, Machel’s death in a plane crash is enshrouded in a lot of political spin, and a range of different theories exist as to why the plane crashed, as summarized by Robinson (2006). On the importance of Machel for Mozambican independence, for the Frelimo party, as a political strategist, and as president at war, see Munslow (1986), Christie (1988), Liesegang (2001), or Sopa (2001). For a helpful review of Mozambican historiography, see Pitcher (2009).


8. See Geffray and Pedersen (1988), Geffray (1990), Cahen (1993), and J.-C. Legrand (1993) for analyses based on such an understanding. An often overlooked early anthropological attempt at analyzing the Mozambican conflict as more than an effect of external aggression was also done by Meillassoux and Verschuur (1985).

9. The image of Renamo as God-fearing anti-communists turned out to be a success among many extreme right and Christian organizations. It has been documented that the International Freedom Foundation collaborated with BOSS and supplied Renamo with thirty tons of weapons via Malawi in 1991 (Dinerman 1994: 570). Other US extremist organizations that supported Renamo were Christ for the Nations Inc., the Believers Church, and the End of Time Handmaidens (Newitt 1995: 570; see also Austin 1994).

10. See Müller (2014) for analyses of aid from the GDR and Vanneman (1990) for Mozambique's relationship with the Soviet Union. Sitoe (2003: 25; see also Alden 2001: 15) argues that the Soviet Union's 1982 refusal to let Mozambique join Comecon heavily influenced Frelimo's subsequent reorientation westward and led them to approach the Bretton Woods institutions that transformed economy and society from the mid-1980s onward.

11. This perspective is also supported if looking at other African states that were involved directly and indirectly. For instance, Malawi's “President for Life” Hastings Banda actively supported Renamo (Africa Watch 1992: 132; Finnegant 1992: 160f).

12. Mozambican historiography is fraught with a bitter strife about interpretations of, in particular, the “civil war.” As Sidaway states, “Even now, to call it a civil war is to be seen to have accepted a particular interpretation” (1998: 246). I have extrapolated elsewhere (2002, 2004) on the definitional struggle of calling the war “civil war,” “war of destabilization,” or “postliberation war,” and I will not deal with these here. For the sake of simplicity I will use “civil war” to denote the period between 1976 and 1992.

13. Of these, 1,058,500 were registered in Malawi in 1993; Zambia had 25,400, Zimbabwe 137,900, Tanzania 20,000, and Swaziland 24,000 (UNHCR 1993). These numbers are, however, contested: Rupiya (1998) claims 5 to 6 million refugees, while Juergensen (2000) writes what he calls “internally marooned” to have been 4.5 million.


15. The 1994 and 1999 elections have generally been regarded as “free and fair” by the international community (Mazula 1995; Harrison 1996; Carter Center 2000). The 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections have attracted more critique in
terms of suspicion of different forms of electoral manipulation, ballot stuffing, irregularities in terms of funds management, illicit use of state resources, and distribution (see, e.g., Ostheimer 2005; Israel 2006; de Brito 2010; Azevedo-Harman 2015).


17. Commenting on “Operation Desert Storm,” Feldman notes that “the visual mastery of the campaign pushed all other sensory descriptions outside the perceptual terms of reference [and] precluded any scream of pain, any stench of corpse from visiting the American living room” (Feldman 1994: 408; see also Vinílio 2005 (1998)). Such sanitizing techniques are integral to the discourse of fronts and theaters of war and the point remains that the representational politics are as crucial in issues concerning warfare as other issues.

18. For representations of the civil war as chaotic, see Derlugian (1990), Alden (1996), and Nordstrom (1997). For an important counterargument, see Lubbemann (2008 esp.).


20. FAM was Mozambique’s postindependence army until soldiers from the FAM joined forces with Renamo guerrillas, comprising the new Mozambican army, FADM, as part of the GPA in 1992 (see J. Honwana 1999 for details).

21. Renamo’s violence has often been interpreted in directly instrumental terms: “Officials of FRELIMO, and of the administration, are priority targets. In rural areas their physical elimination serves to isolate communities and remove them from the rival authority of central power” (Hall 1990: 52). For general analyses of Renamo violence, see also Minter (1989), Weigert (1996), Hultman (2009), Coelho (2011 [2009]), and Emerson (2014).

22. Notions of the bush, the wild, and processes of “animalization” are recurring in many conflicts as, for example, Malkki (1995), Nordstrom (1997), and Alexander et al. (2000) have all noted. Their analyses correspond with the more general argument of the bush beyond the village constituting the Other of any social organization and, as such, a center of sorcerers and destructive forces (Gluckman et al. 1949: 93).

23. “Their own” indicates here the child of their household, neighboring households, relatives, visitors, or from their dzindza. Dzindza connotes kin group or family group, normally patrilineal relations. “Their own” has, then, wider connotations to the dissociation from and of community such an act entails.

24. The image of the bush is also relevant in relation to views on contemporary politics as when one person argued that due to electoral fraud in the general presidential and parliamentary election in 1999, Renamo had really won. Therefore there was a lot of discontent among people. “But,” he said, “no one wants to return to the bush. No one wants more war” (see also Bertelsen 2003).

25. The aldeia comunal (communal village) was a postliberation institution implemented to augment peasant agricultural production, also in Honde. Aldeias comunais will be thoroughly analyzed in chapter 2.
26. Interestingly, while Artur (1999a) claims that the mountain is called Chindaza in chiTewe, such a term is unknown to my Honde and Chimoio maTewe interlocutors who claim it is exclusively called Bengo in addition to its Portuguese name.

27. Most of these goats were so-called gotokoto in chiTewe (and Shona) that are created to contain and handle evil spirits (pfukwa). Gotokoto goats are treated especially in chapter 4.


29. Nordstrom's approach is effectively summarized by Löfving and Macek (1999: 5) as “the meaning of violence’ is itself a contradiction in terms; the experience of war implies a loss of the conceptual and epistemological framework that previously provided means to interpret the event of life and the death of others.”

30. In this I follow Blok (2000: 24) who notes that researchers too often “speak of ‘senseless’ violence in cases where easily recognizable goals and obvious relationships between means and ends are absent.”

31. Anthropologically, “war” has conventionally been conceived in terms ranging from “an armed contest between two independent political units, by means of organised military force, in the pursuit of a tribal or national policy” (Malinowski, quoted in R. B. Ferguson 1984: 3) to, more simply, “intergroup aggression” (Livingstone, quoted in McCauley 1990: 1). A number of these classic anthropological approaches conjure up images of structured and formalized armed conflicts that are unhelpful in terms of understanding the trajectories of war in Manica Province—as well as elsewhere. As Simons (1994: 94) points out for war more generally, “The orderly Clausewitzian connections between governments, armies, and people have largely been dissolved.” This means that approaches delimiting the war to a “civil war” between two struggling parties represented by FAM and Renamo is problematic. Such distinctions are easily made by scholars, such as in Dolan and Schafer's otherwise interesting study of processes of reintegration and demobilization where they, to my mind, simplify the civil war's complexity by using a crude dichotomy of “soldiers” and “civilians” (1997: 106ff; but see also Schafer 2007). Wiegink's in-depth, grounded study of the complexity of the very notion of return and reintegration among former Renamo guerrillas is more insightful here (Wiegink 2014).

32. As previously noted, Mozambique became enmeshed in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle by accepting bases of ZANLA guerrillas in the country, who operated mainly from Manica Province and into Southern Rhodesia. As a result, Southern Rhodesian troops raided and bombarded camps as well as terrorized the rural areas of Manica, including Honde. From people recalling the presence of ZANLA guerrillas in Honde, it seems there was a great deal of ambivalence toward them. This is also corroborated by Zimbabwean memoirs where this ambivalence toward the “freedom fighters” frustrated the ZANLA—especially as these were also under attack from Renamo guerrillas: “In these accounts of MNR [Renamo] attacks, one child [i.e. child soldier] says that the Mozambican villagers were ‘cheering on’ the MNR while they were attacking the [Zimbabwean]...
refugees, while another child says that the Mozambicans had alerted them that the MNR were about to attack” (Hayes et al. 1992: 72). Be that as it may, Manica Province—with the so-called Beira corridor where the main oil, gas, and petrol pipeline to Zimbabwe cuts across the landscape surrounding Chimoio—was strategically important: during the early 1980s, armed groups, often alleged to be Renamo, blew up parts of the pipeline numerous times purportedly to damage the Frelimo state and Zimbabwe. However, evidence suggests that the company Lonrho with interests in the pipeline in 1982 “signed a secret protection agreement with Renamo leaders covering the Beira oil pipeline” (Vines 1998: 66). On the other hand, with South Africa as a main Renamo backer in the 1980s prioritizing the destruction of the pipeline, a compromise between Renamo and Lonrho was made where “Renamo would carry out symbolic attacks on the pipeline” but not destroy it completely (ibid.).

33. The mutilated body inscribed with violence corresponds to Feldman’s (1998: 229) argument that the individual body “becomes the material and visual bearer of discriminating histories.”

34. Or, as Patton (2001 [1984]: 1287) puts it, “Whereas the [war machine] mobilizes an autonomous flow of violence against the State, the State itself deploys a structural, legal violence—a violence of capture, whose institutional manifestations are juridical and penal, institutions of capture and punishment, police and prisons.”

35. Although applied here to look at specific war dynamics, it may be noted that the “war” of the war machine for Deleuze and Guattari is often articulated as potential (or “virtual”) and as multiple.

36. In chapter 3 I also provide an analysis of these relations between people, soil, and spirits in the context of state formation, war, and deterritorialization.

37. See also, again, J.-C. Legrand’s (1995) analysis of the multiple reasons for Renamo raids and forced capture of the civilian population in Manica Province supporting that these practices are irreducible to military causation.

38. INE (1999b: 3, 2007) and Martinho (2002: 13) provide the relevant numbers and projections here.

39. For an account of Chimoio’s history, see Artur (1999a), which, curiously enough, avoids the civil war years altogether. However, a good account of the civil war years in Chimoio can be found in Mark Chingono’s work (1994, 1996) focusing especially on the war’s structural effects in terms of gender and the informal economy.

40. There is a rather large literature on various distinctions between so-called formal and informal parts of Mozambican cities, and in, especially, the literature on Maputo, the formal, concrete part is often called bairro do cimento or, formerly, cidade de cimento (see, e.g., Jenkins 2013; Bertelsen, Tvedten, and Roque 2014). In keeping with my Chimoio interlocutors’ usage, however, I will employ the short term bairro cimento.

41. Manning (1996: 186) alleges that the end of TextAfrica’s production was directly related to the civil war, as a large cell of Renamo supporters “was made up of employees of TextAfrica.” While this allegation is hard to verify, it may partially explain why state support for TextAfrica’s production gradually dwindled.
42. Rural poverty is dire in Manica Province, making it a poor province in an impoverished country. Manica’s under-five child mortality rate was 245.8 of 1,000 births in 1997 (INE 1999a: 14), while the average for Mozambique in 2000 was 200 (Black et al. 2003).

43. As should be clear in subsequent cases and chapters, my approach to the term “ritual” is largely in keeping with the Deleuzian approach argued by Kapferer (2004b), namely seeing it as a virtual domain that eludes strict or necessary (representational and other) links to conventional or ordinary understandings of reality.

44. The spelling of *tchirenge* is chiTewe while, for example, Rennie (1984: 186) spells it *chirenje*. Hannan (1984 [1959]), however, reproduces neither spelling nor does he propose similar terms in his Shona dictionary. Interlocutors provided diverse explanations as to the term, varying from “son of kings” to “son of Mwene Mutapa”—the latter referring to Mutapa empire rulers (ca. 1430–1760) who also dominated large parts of Manica Province (Mtetwa 1984).

45. The nostalgia for the Portuguese colonialists is prevalent in many parts of Mozambique, and racialized narratives abound of the alleged inventiveness, prosperity, and productivity of the white man (*brancos* or *tugos* or *muZungos*) as opposed to assumptions of the black man’s (*pretos* or *Africanos*) inertia or laziness and mere capacity for destruction. But compare also Englund (1996a) for an analysis relating this nostalgia to fertility and former patronage, and Teixeira (2003) for an analysis of how Portuguese are seen as “white vampires” with a black heart in the figure of the *chupa-sangue* (see also chapter 6).

46. While the concept of hybridity seems to overcome modernity’s linearity, it nonetheless relies on a vision of a mix of two conditions where, as an intermediate condition, the hybrid in many senses remains impure and transitory.
Every human society has some sort of territorial structure. … In studying political organization, we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force.

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1955 [1940]: xiv)

What does the notion of territory entail for state formation? As Elden (2013) has made clear in his recent genealogy of territory, it may be seen as a spatial extension of state power. While Elden’s point is crucial, in this chapter I will entertain the idea that the colonial state form is not different in its key dynamics from later state forms, as well as certain African polities, and in this way the chapter challenges the idea of the colonial state as radically different from earlier or later state forms. While basing myself on information from Manica Province, the empirical material expands beyond these demarcations and involves also crucial elements from the greater Shona-speaking area, Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, and other areas. Manica Province is, thus, part of a much larger political field.

Theoretically, of course, there is a long-standing interest in a territorial approach to past and present formations of state. As, for example, Foucault (2007 [2004]: 96]) argues, sovereignty is exercised on a terri-
tory and, consequently, on its inhabitants. In the characteristic manner of the Foucauldian genealogy, this notion of territory is integral to a formative triangular order that also comprises security and population—an order crucial to his overall analysis of biopower and the state form. While recognizing these Foucauldian insights, this chapter will nonetheless approach territory not merely as a static receptacle of sovereign or state power or terrain for the exercise of biopower but will also focus on its shifting and multiple aspects through the concepts of territorialization and deterritorialization. These concepts are not only meant to emphasize the physical, horizontal, and geologically bound spaces of the earth or tracts of land in a cadastral sense but also to incorporate dynamics of inscription, erasure, and interpretation onto—and into—spaces.

Specifically, I underline here the particular directionality of the territorializing dynamic inherent to state formation in what came to be Manica Province. The gradually more territorially dominant state formations simultaneously deterritorialized orientations, claims, and logics related to the traditional field, as well as undermined or incorporated rival polities. Thus, a main claim of the chapter is that the traditional field is the subject of processes of deterritorialization at historical points of state expansion.

A final point: This argument of an increasing deterritorialization of the traditional field neither forms a linear, historical argument where a territorial nation-state in a tautological fashion is simultaneously posited as the logical outcome of a unidirectional historical trajectory or being the point of departure analytically projected backward (cf. Galli 2003: 229), nor is it reducible to a critique of Portuguese colonialism in sovereign-territorial terms—although its brutality and violence is a central argument of this book as a whole. Instead what is underlined in this chapter is how various dynamics of state formation and the traditional field are embroiled in conflicts of territoriality. These conflicts continue through the precolonial and colonial periods, through the liberation war and the civil war, and, not least, in the present context of the postcolonial Mozambican state.

**Becomings of State in Manica Province**

And the closer one gets to the periphery of the system, the more subjects find themselves caught in a kind of temptation: whether to submit oneself to the signifiers, to obey the orders of the bureaucrat and follow the interpretation of the high priest—or rather
be carried off elsewhere, the beyond, on a crazy vector, a tangent of deterritorialization—to follow a line of escape, to set off as a nomad …

Gilles Deleuze (2006 [1975]: 15)

State orders in Manica Province have multiple origins—and competing perspectives also abound in the literature as well as in Honde. One type of historical perspective covering this period from the 1500s onward is what one may call a Lusocentric perspective on what was to become Mozambique. From this mainly colonial perspective, the Portuguese gradual penetration and control over territory, people, and economy is represented as inevitable and facilitated by some key transitions. First, there was the transition from being dominated by the mobile Swahili or Muslim trade caravans forming routes of extraction to a more sedentary and nodal system of Portuguese control of ports and the so-called feiras (marketplaces). A second transition in this perspective is traced via the emergence of merchant colonial capitalism in the 1800s through concession companies that led—ultimately and unavoidably—to the erection and dominance of the colonial (and, later, postcolonial) state.1

This Lusocentric narrative is, of course, not without basis in historical fact if, for instance and in teleological fashion, projected backward in time from the height of Portuguese colonialism in the 1950s. Such a view is also concurrent with the civilizationalist and evolutionist underpinnings of late colonialism that was given a particular Portuguese intellectual flair in Lusotropicalism. This was an ideology with strong roots in the works of Gilberto Freyre (see, e.g., 1961) and politically used to disseminate a myth of the necessity and, indeed, benevolent presence of the Portuguese in its colonies.2 Celebrating the gradual Portuguese control and (supposed) societal and economic development, Lusotropicalism conforms also to a particular Lusocentric articulation of the “colonial settler paradigm” of state formation. However, such a view, awarding agency and inevitability predominantly to the Portuguese, may be contested on several levels.

If starting from dominant historical discourses of Portuguese colonialism, Portuguese involvement in Mozambique was predicated upon non-Portuguese polities in early and late phases of their colonial dominance. As Newitt (1973: 38; see also Rita-Ferreira 1999) points out in relation to an analysis of trade as such, “The Portuguese did not pioneer trade on the East African coast or in the interior. The Muslims had opened all the trade routes and even established a pattern of settlement long before Vasco da Gama’s first arrival in 1498.” Further, during the
1500s, the Portuguese presence was more or less restricted to being em-bedded in, for example, Mwene Mutapa’s empire (Alpers 1970; Beach 1994a), where Portuguese traders were allowed to provide trade goods to the larger polity but directed through and controlled by its center. In the 1500s, the Portuguese were, in politico-administrative senses, akin to the Swahili traders who had formerly dominated trading routes. Practically, this meant that the Portuguese paid so-called curva—a type of tribute—to the Mwene Mutapa and were given ceremonial equipment (spears, shields, etc.) in return. The curva meant the Portuguese traders were required to approach the king barefoot before laying fully prostrate in his presence, and in return they were allowed very limited trading privileges. Such tribute and subordination were long-standing features of Portuguese politics toward polities other than Mwene Mutapa’s—as is exemplified by the “twenty-four parcels of cloth worth two hundred and seventy-eight xerāfins and four tangaś” that were paid to the king of the Quitevē in 1612 (National Archives of Zimbabwe 1989: 265). These examples demonstrate that the integration and, sometimes, subordination of Portuguese colonial interest in polities external to its nascent colonial state were long-standing characteristics (see also Bertelsen 2015).

If starting neither from a Lusocentric perspective nor from dominant historical analyses but from the concrete context of the chiTewe-speaking inhabitants of Honde and Chimoio, its polities and practices are arguably the result of century-long processes of loss of territory, over-rule, and invasion at the hands of both invading Nguni forces from the 1830s onward and, before and after, Portuguese colonial forces. Instructive in this regard is Mtetwa’s (1984) analysis of the rise and fall of what he terms the Uteve from 1480 to Nguni overrule in 1834. He traces imperial continuities between the Mwene Mutapa conquerors of the fifteenth century and the kingdom of Uteve that from that time until 1834 “occupied a significant portion of Mozambique’s coastal plain in what is now Sofala province and parts of highlands of the Manica province, as well as the adjoining eastern districts of Zimbabwe” (1984: 320). However, the Uteve polity was continually challenged by internal rivalries as well as the incessant Portuguese search for gold, their raiding armies, and their land grabbing. Mtetwa also notes what he calls “forced trade,” wherein the Portuguese gave merchandise to village chiefs who, in a thwarted version of reciprocity, needed to repay them with gold. Such forced trade shifted the focus from food production to mining with detrimental effects on political stability and social integration (1984: 331, 342). Together, these processes considerably weakened the Uteve state to such a degree that, as other Shona imperial polities did in the early 1800s, it gradually disintegrated.
The gradual disintegration of the Uteve state coincided with the rise of one of Southern Africa’s most prominent political, social, and territorial upheavals: the Nguni migrations that from the 1830s swept across Southern Africa—a composite force so considerable that it destabilized Portuguese attempts at controlling the African populations and territories (Abraham 1961: 216). These Nguni migrations were part of the dramatic political, social, and territorial reordering known as the mfecane, wherein vast groups in the short span of a few years moved northward from South African origins on journeys involving conquest, strife, and, ultimately, resettlement. The territory of what was to become Mozambique was also a repository of this influx. In detailing the Nguni migrations from what is now Maputo to the Zambezi River, Liesegang’s work (1970) shows such a pattern of gradual penetration, raiding, and settlement to conform to several distinct Nguni groups’ movements.

The arrival in Manica Province of the Nguni force led by Nxaba in the 1830s most likely centered in and around the Gorongosa region, a region that Renamo, interestingly, later also favored. The Nguni under Nxaba formed polities that enabled and enacted new systems of dominance and extraction (Newitt 1995: 260). Initially, Nxaba and his groups raided extensively and attacked Portuguese camps and settlements as well African polities and kingdoms. The already weakened Uteve kingdom, for instance, was raided at least five times between 1830 and 1833 (Liesegang 1970: 325). MacGonagle (2008) makes the important point, however, that the Nguni gradually developed into a permanent occupying and dominant force as the early Nxaba raids spearheaded the formation of more elaborate and permanent Nguni tributary states. The rise of these state formations founded on conquest and invasion profoundly changed the political and social landscape, introducing a “military aristocracy of non-producers who appropriated the surplus. Although the king and royal wives cultivated his fields, and supposedly the other Gaza Nguni likewise, much of their food seems to have come from tribute and expropriation” (Rennie 1984: 182–83).

Through forming political and military deputies with armed followings, ndunas, Nguni rule expanded to dominate vast areas. Several features of the nascent Nguni state formation make it, arguably, more developed, centralized, and brutal than the formations of the Uteve, Mwene Mutapa, and others that preceded it. For one, it was characterized by the violent enabling of systems of subservience and raiding, effecting an unprecedented extraction of surplus foods and other goods from peasants. This harsh sociopolitical system was supplemented by the use of unfree and forced labor and internal slavery. Portuguese official João J. da Silva described such a raid in 1830 (quoted in Liesegang 1970: 325):
They [Nxaba and his followers] attacked Quiteve in 1830, and, after committing all kinds of hostile actions, passed on to Manica and Changamire. They took all cattle which existed in these countries to the general deposit in Quissanga; as well as the nearly grown up boys and girls, the first as soldiers and the second as wives, killing the rest, even babies.

Enslavement—especially a strong feature of Gazaland in southern Mozambique but also widespread in Manica Province—was imperative to the formation of productive units, reproductive logics (including slave wives and children), and the slave-soldiers of the *ndunas*. However, with the fall of the Gaza Nguni state in the late 1890s, these slaves “were liberated from their masters to become servants or to enter the market as cheap migrant and forced *chibalo* labour” (Harries 1981: 329).

The Nguni polity was characterized by rigidity in the sense of regular extraction of labor. However, at the same time, *ndunas* were characterized by movement and unpredictability in terms of their targets, resulting in raids and, subsequently, enslaved captives. This and other features have led Rennie (1984: 185) to make the point that the *ndunas* were political chiefs controlling people. As such, the *ndunas*’ violent extraction and taxation resonate with later polities—especially the colonial state and the later Renamo movements. This resonance is not one of necessarily historical continuity in a causal sense but one of similarity in that these polities are always *external*—imposed from and originating from what is perceived as outside or, as de Heusch (1991) has argued, “elsewhere.”

Rennie’s argument about the externality of the Nguni state in terms of being nonterritorial and oriented around the control of people is perhaps most clearly evident in the problem of autochthony, allochthony, and sorcery—problems that troubled consecutive Nguni rulers throughout the 1800s. One facet of this is that other rulers and chiefs—also the influential Ngungunyane (1850–1906), who ruled a vast territory between 1884 to 1895 that included Honde and Chimoio—employed strict measures against suspected sorcerers (Bertelsen 2012). MacGonagle (2008: 50), for instance, chronicles the use of impalement of suspected sorcerers at the order of Ngungunyane, who were then left on display at the crossroads—a violent practice later to be a feature of the Mozambican civil war. The power of sorcerers—whether from rival or subordinate lineages or beyond—was seen to pose a potential threat to the king. Thus, in order to secure his rule, Ngungunyane needed to eliminate or co-opt these sorcerous threats—a dynamic intimately relating sorcery and sovereignty also to be developed in more detail in chapter 5. A second facet is also underlined by Rennie: despite military and political overrule, the Nguni rulers were not well integrated into what
one may call autochthony-based understandings of ritual and political power. This led to a situation of “ritual insecurity” (Rennie’s 1979: 271; 1984: 183), and numerous accounts of the feeble relations between soil, spirits, and the Nguni polities testify to this. In one such, Ngungunyane summoned Munjakanja, a rainmaker of great renown, to his court to deal with serious drought. The two previous rainmakers summoned had been killed in his court after failing to produce rain. In court, Munjakanja produced rain but it fell so heavily that Ngungunyane “had to request him to stop it” (Rennie 1979: 271). The lack of rain, plagues of drought, or destructive deluges are, of course, signs of chiefly or royal failure to acquire access to the fertility of the heavens and the soil—a failure ultimately founded in sovereign allochthony producing weak and ambivalent relations to spirits or deities.9

This sovereign barrenness, if one may use such a term, of the externally imposed rule also had its antecedent during the civil war, as we have seen. There, the Renamo-imposed replacement of régulo João ran across problems both in terms of relations to ancestral spirits and relations to rain and the fertility of the soil, as well as in other aspects. As I will further develop in the following chapter, territory, soil, and spirits are key sites of antagonism toward the Nguni state formation—initially an external state formation and approached in a similar manner as to how current and more recent state formations are also experienced in Hondo and Chimoio. Nguni subjects also had more practical ways of resisting the Nguni overlordship: people hid foodstuffs out of the sight of tax collectors, reduced their overall production, shifted household sites to less productive areas so as to escape tax collection, cultivated millet “which the Nguni do not like” (Rennie 1984: 183), or migrated to areas outside Nguni control. Together these form what we may call “lines of flight” directed against the violent, repressive, and brutal regime of Nguni domination. A central orientation of the lines of flight in this context is how these are nonconfrontational in a direct or physical sense. Crucially, by employing and tapping understandings of relations between soil, spirits, and people, such lines of flight comprise evasive maneuvers away from the repressive dynamics of the state.

This evasion or resistance, however, was not in any way composite. The Nguni state form violently “acculturated” through, for example, the forced piercing of ears of male subjects as signs of subordination. Further, it also offered possibilities for sociopolitical and economic mobility for non-Nguni that could align with ndunas (MacGonagle 2008b; Rennie 1984). Through the period between the 1820s and late 1800s, a Ngunification of features of social, political, and ritual organization and practice therefore arguably took place. On the other hand, an anal-
ysis emphasizing “Ngunification” or “acculturation” will miss significant elements of transition and continuity in forms of statehood. As Newitt (1995: 261) points out, the particular Nguni formation of a tributary state gradually developed into the concession company Companhia de Moçambique—herafter called the Companhia—from the late 1800s. Further, the Companhia’s violent techniques of capture, taxation, and forced labor exhibit similar statist dynamics as the Nguni state—the resemblance and continuation being all the more clear as the Companhia employed vast numbers of ndunas and Nguni mercenaries directly as a company police force and in campaigns of pacification. Thus, the usefulness of employing the distinctions “Nguni” or “Companhia de Moçambique”—or “Portuguese” and “indigenous” for that matter—is instructive merely to a certain point, especially in terms of sequence and periodization. Arguably, it is more rewarding to approach the noncolonial origins of Nguni domination and previous state formations in more theoretical terms exhibiting the statist dynamics identified by Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]): capture of people and labor, vertical systems of tribute, and striation of space are features of both the gradual territorialization of Portuguese as well as Nguni states.

In sum, until the rise of the Companhia in the late 1800s, Honde and the wider area of Manica Province was embroiled in subsequent turbulent developments characterized by occupation, overlordship, and extraction following the waxing and waning of multiple state formations that vied for control. It is, therefore, faulty to see the last five hundred years of politico-territorial history in terms of an irreversible movement toward Portuguese control—a control that even during the twentieth century was in many respects illusory as we will also see. Further, the Uteve, the Portuguese, and the Nguni also illustrate that movements between control and conquest, between autochthony and allochthony always imply dimensions of territorialization and deterritorialization, as well as forms of contestation internal to or outside formal polities—the generation of lines of flight. State formation in this historical period must thus be seen in terms of a contested becoming and one characterized by violence—features that became even more pronounced with the emergence of the late colonial state.

The Violent Capture of the Late Colonial State

With the defeat of Gungunhana and with our effective and real possession of the lands, the rebellions ceased and today the peoples are perfectly pacific and obedient to
the authorities to whom they present their problems to be resolved and to whom they pay the tribute of vassalhood, through the hut tax or the *mussoco* [head tax].

Fernando de Sacaduro (1928a: 59)

Fernando de Sacaduro was a long-term employee of the Companhia (1891–1941)—a dominant power in Manica and parts of Sofala and by far the largest of the chartered companies in colonial Mozambique. The overlordship of private companies such as the Companhia was crucial to further Portuguese territorial control and the people inhabiting it. As Sacaduro makes clear, the defeat of Ngungunyane was crucial for the emergence of the Companhia, as British and Portuguese interests in the 1880s had clashed over the control of the Manica territories. This clash put Ngungunyane’s control under pressure, leading him to make a dramatic maneuver in 1889: he relocated with tens of thousands of followers (and captives) from Manica to the Sabi area in southern Mozambique. Ngungunyane’s departure (and imminent downfall) and the subsequent ending of rivalries between British and Portuguese interests led to the formation of the Companhia, which was also set up with British capital in 1891—a polity that was to rule until 1941 (Neil-Tomlinson 1987). As a sovereign formation in its own right, the Companhia is therefore inseparable from Mozambican colonial history.

As Sacaduro’s quote shows, hut tax as well as *mussoco* (head tax) were vital sources of revenue for a company founded on what one might term vassalage. So significant were taxes that in 1900 “hut tax had become the second-most important source of the company’s income” (Newitt 1995: 408). Integral to a regime of taxation was also the need to control people and capture and access their labor. While analyzing the brutal forced labor regime within the Companhia’s territory, Allina (2012) argues that the representation of the Portuguese colonial state as weak is false. Conversely, Allina thoroughly documents how, indeed, the Companhia wielded executive powers and enforced a brutal extraction of labor by violent means. Such brutal extraction of labor was, of course, legally ramified in terms of the African’s “moral obligation” to work. The labor law of 1907, for example, designated that Africans should work for 120 days of each year at the mercy of the Companhia.

Mirroring the situation under Nguni rule, also these colonial measures were met with resistance. Throughout its existence, the Companhia therefore resorted to various forms of violent capture of labor to fulfill a vast and growing local demand for cheap labor at farms owned by Germans, French, Portuguese, and others. One example from as late as 1911—twenty years after the Companhia’s inception—illustrates...
this: Given the task to provide labor to Manica’s many maize farmers, the Companhia’s police and administrators continuously recruited “hap-hazardly” and even the company officials themselves saw this violent predation on local African households as “insane” (Allina-Pisano 2002: 183–84). Despite attempting to devise systems of labor recruitment that were predictable and effective, these violent sweeps in which company police forcibly abducted Africans persisted at least until the 1930s (Allina 2012). Later, African labor was regulated in different laws facilitating the organization of mandatory and forced labor in the decades after World War II—as noted in High Commissioner António Enes monumental report (1971 [1946]: 495–513), which details, among a range of issues, the obligation for “blacks” to work.13

As in Angola (see M. Harris 1958; Anderson 1962a), the forced labor regime was integral to the Portuguese colonial administration and companies ruling under and colonizing for it. The rise of the Companhia thereby also illustrates how the Portuguese colonial form gradually takes on the shape of a more pronounced territorialized state structure. Yet this emergent territorialization of the late 1800s to early 1900s did not merely impose its designs onto the social and political landscape. Virtanen’s (2005a: 369) careful study of territorial organization in the Chimanimani area of Manica Province shows this pattern: the establishment of the Companhia in 1891 there also “represented a direct continuation of the Gaza administration. Having failed to establish control over its territory during the early 1890s, the company entered into an agreement with Gungunhana [Ngungunyane], the ruler of Gaza, whereby the king would provide the company with soldiers and administrative officials in order to impose their joint authority and collect tax from the population.”

The hybrid polity of Ngungunyane’s empire and the nascent Companhia state, although short-lived, demonstrates how the perpetual nature of attaining control is integral to state formation. As illustrated by the Nguni domination of Manica Province throughout practically the whole nineteenth century, it was also a form of control the Portuguese previously largely had failed to obtain in what was later to become Mozambique. Analytically, Portuguese appropriation and redeployment of Nguni practices of violent capture, taxation, and forced labor underline continuous modes of domination and, thus, enduring aspects of state presence and formation. As Neil-Tomlinson (1987: 300), having worked on the Companhia’s formative period (1892–1910), writes, “As the mechanics of forcing labour became institutionalised and direct physical violence was replaced by the indirect implicit threat of violence, so the forms of [African] resistance changed from confrontation to evasion in
the form of hiding, movement and emigration.” Similarly, Lubkemann notes that for the Machaze area, from 1912 to 1917 the area’s number of inhabitants shrank from 26,677 to 17,535, as many “fled across the border into Rhodesia where they did not face the same demands on their labor” (Lubkemann 2000: 80). Comparable situations of flight, hiding, and evasion may also be found elsewhere in Manica Province and has also been documented for the concession company areas in Zambézia Province, Northern Mozambique (Bertelsen 2015).

Further, despite its gradual refinement in practices of domination, the colonial state administration nonetheless regularly employed violence against populations to quell resistance and to subordinate these to colonial machinations. Pélissier (2004) has chronicled the Portuguese colonial campaigns from 1844 to 1941 and quotes the governor of Beira who, in a 1917 letter, gave instructions to his military commander to use the fifteen thousand Nguni mercenary fighters at his disposal to embark on a punishing expedition after the so-called Bárue rebellion of 1917—Bárue being located just north of Chimoio and Honde (see map 2.1). The Bárue rebellion was the last of the large-scale rebellions against the Portuguese for fifty years before Frelimo initiated its military struggle in the 1960s. The instruction given by the governor to the military commander upon his departure underlines the correspondences of violence and capture between the colonial state and the Nguni state (quoted in Pélissier 2004: 288):

You must burn all the rebel villages destroying all the fields, confiscating all their cattle and taking as many prisoners as possible including women and children. It is indispensable that these actions be carried out as rapidly and violently as possible in order to terrorise the local population and prevent further revolts.

This violence enacted by Nguni soldiers under the Portuguese state was also noted by British officials, who recorded in 1917 that “all leaders of the rebels who are caught are beheaded and their heads given to their wives to carry home, if the wives are caught with them” (quoted in Isaacman 1976: 170). Again, the forms of violence executed by the Portuguese state in terms of beheadings, impalement, enslavement, and bodily mutilation are similar to preceding periods and, especially, the period following it—the civil war.

In Manica Province, the results of such a long-term process of violent capture and spatial reconfiguration—by no means confined to the era of the Companhia—in practical terms entailed the transfer of control of land to Portuguese and other European farmers and the subordination of African populations to their production schemes. Neves (1998)
details also how the forced labor regimes in the period after World War II period reinforced a long-term trend of evasion from repressive forces through migration. As we saw previously, from the Nguni raids to the Companhia’s wild sweeps to recruit labor, African communities met these with lines of flight, often in a very concrete sense of permanent or temporary relocation. For instance, Neves shows how in the period after World War II period the great demand for child labor on white settler farms and sugar plantations in Manica, Chimoio, and Buzi—and later for cotton producers and in the textile industry at the previously mentioned TextAfrica in Chimoio—affected African communities. One effect of such a regime was that a vast number of children were sent especially to Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) where child and juvenile labor on white farms was in demand (Neves 1998: 196–232). In the above trajectory of state power—from the Nguni state to the Companhia’s dominance—two aspects should therefore be noted.

For one, the expansion, domination, and extraction comprising key aspects of state formation is characterized by a certain wildness and unpredictability. Such colonial and colonizing madness, if one may use such a term, is evident in the sweeps and the predatory roaming of violent tax collection of subsequent assemblages of states—be they Nguni polities,
the Companhia, or later Portuguese colonial administration. For African inhabitants, these assemblages of the state kind were viewed as inimical polities of conquest ruling through “controlling people” (Rennie 1984) or as “kings from elsewhere” (de Heusch 1991; MacGonagle 2008). The assemblages of state were, in short, experienced as allochthonous and external predatory forces—a destructive expansive presence generating mass migration from Manica Province, as argued above. Second, such colonial wildness and gradual capture of people for work (or their flight from it) was concomitant with Portuguese reterritorialization of Nguni domains from the late 1800s onward. Increasingly, such land was controlled and developed—territorialized—by European farmers.

The brutal regime of forced labor, tax burdens, and migration as flight undergirds how capture and evasion is central to statist dynamics. Through violent and gradual territorialization a more permanent state formation with a more pronounced vertical and arborescent structure emerges. On the other hand, the violence of the raiding of labor power by company police through, for example, the practice of capturing of so-called *recrutados* (forcibly recruited Africans) or recapturing those who had fled, so-called *evadidos*, exhibits a modality of power that is nomadic, dynamic, and rhizomic—the war machine. In the case of the Nguni mercenaries it comprised a machinery of violent punishment and capture deterritorializing the polity of the Báruè rebels. These were also, of course, features of the less territorially based polity of the Nguni state as we saw previously. Both notions of war machine and state, again, should be understood as relatively distinct modalities of power and not in institutional, formal senses. Such an understanding of state formation in Manica Province in this period to encompass both modalities of power—the rhizomic, horizontal, and deterritorializing war machine versus nascent arborescent and territorializing statist dynamics—may also be projected backward in time to at least two distinct historical periods.

The first is that of the so-called Portuguese “seaborne empire,” which comprised a system to the extent that certain nodes supported and directed the flow and accumulation of resources toward certain centers. These nodes, however, did not amount to strongholds in the territorial terms of statehood. As Young (1994: 50) has pointed out, the Portuguese empire around 1550 was “a loose-knit mercantile state … based on domination of the Indian Ocean trading routes, and a nucleated string of outposts at key commercial intersections whose central base was Goa.” This “mercantile state” may be seen as a form of nodal state where territorial dimensions are yet embryonic and not fully developed—or as characterized by “gradations of sovereignty and sliding scales of differ-
entiation” (Stoler and McGranahan 2007: 9). With Deleuze and Guattari, one could say that this imperial formation had yet to unite its war machine dimension with a striating, ordering, and sedentarizing modality of power congruent with the territorial state form.

The second era was the one introduced by the scramble for Africa that inaugurated a shift in the Portuguese state’s relation to its colonies. After the Berlin conference of 1884/85, territorialization was imperative as possession became key to colonial powers’ sovereign claims (Herbst 2000: 71–96). For Portugal this implied even stronger involvement of private interests. As we have seen, this initiated the era of company rule when in 1891 the territories of Manica and Sofala were granted to the Companhia. From the imperial center of Lisbon, the Companhia’s abolition in 1942 was viewed as “re-incorporation” and “territorial unification” of the empire (Portuguese government 1942: 239).\(^{20}\) While Portugal formally unified its territory, on the ground private concessions were to a large degree continued from 1935 to 1965 (see also Neves 1998). However, whereas the fragile “territorial unification” and state formation continually had been challenged by “lines of flight” under successive state assemblages prior to the 1960s, this was more directly challenged with the appearance of guerrilla camps and “liberated zones” in the context of the liberation war fought by Frelimo from 1964 onward.

**Guerrillas and States, or the Violence of Capture (1964 to 1992)**

Africa, *this Africa*, is hostile. It stubbornly resists the penetration of the colonizer. There are excessive elements of resistance and these elements present themselves in many and varied forms.

*From article in the journal* **Notícias da Beira**, 1962\(^{21}\)

With Frelimo’s first attacks on the Portuguese colonial state in 1964 in Northern Mozambique and coming across from bases within Tanzania, the guerrilla movement launched its struggle for liberation. Gradually, Frelimo managed to establish so-called liberated areas also within the Portuguese colony itself, setting up protected villages that housed the populations of such zones effectively becoming, in Michael Panzer’s term, a “proto-state” (2013).\(^{22}\) Specifically, in this period Frelimo oscillated between two different practices. First, it was characterized by classic guerrilla-style attacks on a state formation—moving swiftly, aiming at the small-scale military confrontations or the destruction of
infrastructure drawing on Mao’s “thousand small cuts” (Coelho 1993: 174). Second, the establishment of camps or protected villages were pivotal to not only strategies of deterritorializing the Portuguese colonial state—by perforation of its sovereign territory, so to speak; crucially, postindependence, they were also to inform the party’s politics of re-structuring the countryside. In both practices, Frelimo was dependent on the labor, food surplus, and (sometimes coerced) support of the so-called civilian population—living among, sometimes off, and frequently also supported by it.

The Portuguese colonial state’s response to Frelimo attack was four-pronged. First, the Portuguese used conventional military might in the form of regular armies and heavy equipment in large-scale operations. For instance, the so-called “Gordian Knot” operation in the province of Cabo Delgado in May and June 1970, led by the notorious General Kaulza de Arriaga, involved around 35,000 battle-ready soldiers. Also, the colonial army engaged in massive air bombing of Frelimo camps, and they sought to “open” the mato by using bulldozers to recapture liberated areas (Newitt 1995: 531). Such recapture was not merely of space but also, as noted previously, of people—as evident from a summing up of the Gordian Knot operation: “The result was 61 bases occupied and 165 weapons caches and hide-outs destroyed, 651 guerrillas killed, 1804 captured and 6854 peasants retrieved” (Coelho 1993: 182, italics added).

This control of people found its articulation also in a second approach, namely, the attempted insulation of the African population from the contagious and destructive influence of Frelimo guerrillas. Informed by development schemes under the reformed Portuguese Estado Novo following World War II, a deepened colonial grip on the productive, reproductive, and social practices of the African population was attempted (Sidaway 1991). Coelho (1993) describes how, in the neighboring province of Tete, the large-scale construction of aldeamentos (protected villages) formed part of an attempted containment of nationalist aspirations both before and during the war of liberation. In Tete Province, the Portuguese created a total of 251 aldeamentos between 1971 and 1974, holding a total of 286,000 people or 70 percent of the population in the province.23

However, such capture in the guise of aldeamentos was also related to a third Portuguese strategy, namely, attempts to encompass and redeploy elements of the traditional field against the Frelimo guerrillas—what the Portuguese and, later, Frelimo identified by using the composite term tradição. As we saw above, the Portuguese presence had historically in various ways been integral to traditional polities and rulers. However, as the colonial state formation settled more firmly after World War II,
it gradually subordinated especially chiefs (régulos) to colonial regimes of taxation, overseeing recruitment of forced labor, etc. During the liberation war, the chiefs and their ritual, social, and political organization was targeted especially, and Coelho (1993: 177) details how the Portuguese formed “small detachments and integrating peasants recruited by their chiefs and using traditional weaponry.” Such detachments, more than being directly militarily effective, were seen as crucial for creating allegiances between the colonial forces and villages as well as signaling the acceptance and recognition of traditional and ritual authority by the colonial state. They were also prime examples of “psychosocial action” (Coelho 1994: 74) integral to the Portuguese war machine in early phases.

Finally, both regular army platoons as well as secret police (PIDE) agents extensively utilized terror by undertaking flash attacks on villages that they sacked and burned, either killing people or abducting them to detention camps where they were interrogated as to their allegiances (Coelho 1993). The deployment of scorched-earth tactics, torture, killing, and capture of people by mobile units made up of militias, secret police, native detachments, and the like were crucial elements of Portuguese counterinsurgency against a “hostile Africa” (Reis and Oliveira 2012).

The clear similarities between the Portuguese violent mode of capture and punishment during the war of liberation and the punishing campaign in 1917 against the Báruè rebels conducted by Nguni mercenary soldiers needs little further explanation (see also Bertelsen 2011). Suffice to ascertain here that these long-term practices of territorializing colonial state dominance and, thus, deterritorializing opposing forces (from the Báruè rebellion to Frelimo guerrillas) arguably are predicated upon the capture of people, labor, and territory by overt or structural forms of violence. Put differently, the gradually more developed striation, reordering, and homogenization of the colonial state at all times was supported by a war machine deployable against opposing and disordering elements—elements often seen as integral to tradição and in this way comprising an assemblage with a deterritorializing orientation.

Escalating to a large-scale war during the early 1970s, the struggle between the colonial army and Frelimo drew vast tracts of the country into the armed conflict, as the Portuguese employed a dual strategy of torture and encapsulating rural populations into protected villages.24 The waging of war meant that large parts of the rural civilian population became enmeshed in the modus operandi of two opposing formations of military power—the guerrilla movement and the colonial state. With the transition to independence in 1975, the guerrilla movement moved
into the urban centers and capital, hitherto domains under the control of the colonial state, and became Mozambique's postindependence sovereign power.

Following a few years in power, Frelimo sought to eliminate what it defined as traditional authorities and influence. Those whom Frelimo defined as régulos, or persons who controlled what might be termed ritual authority and who manipulated the cosmologies integral to the moral order of local populations, were to be denied their authority and influence as these were based on “obscurantism” (obscurantismo). Instead these positions were to be assumed by party secretaries and party groups (grupos dinamizadores) (Santos 1984). New institutional arrangements in the form of popular courts (tribunais populares) were introduced and were to replace, for example, chiefs’ courts, which were seen to have functioned in the interests of the colonial administration (Sachs and Welch 1990). The postcolonial Mozambican party-state with a strong centralist leaning had been established.

Frelimo’s radical postindependence project of state-building and societal transformation was deeply antipathetic to a considerable array of traditional agencies, and not just those obviously integral to the former colonial administration. More broadly, Frelimo’s attack on the traditional field and the construction of a state-ordered social polity conforms well with Clastres’s reading of state formation as necessarily being ethnocidal (ethnocidaire) in its unifying aspects (1974: 107). Clastres’s vision of the state is essentially one of a machinery of governance antagonistic

Illustration 2.2. The figure of Samora Machel as reproduced in the so-called Praça dos Heróis (Heroes’ Square), Chimoio, 2000.
to multiplicity and oriented toward creating an order of “the One”—alluding to singularity, a monopoly over violence, and the figure of the sovereign (1998 [1974]: 215–18). These dynamics of state as violently creating oneness resonate with the rhetoric of a necessary national “ethnocide” by Samora Machel who shortly after became Mozambique’s first president (Machel 1974: 39):

To unite all Mozambicans, transcending traditions and different languages, requires that the tribe must die in our consciousness so that the nation may be born.

Samora’s vision implemented in Frelimo’s postindependence societal cleansing was seen as imperative to realizing Mozambique’s new political order (Dinerman 2006: 48). Although with considerable impact in many fields, the transformative effects of these radical visions were nonetheless incomplete as the country became embroiled in the civil war (1976–92) between a Frelimo-dominated state and the Renamo guerrilla movement. As we have previously seen, Renamo also capitalized on popular antipathy with Frelimo’s antitraditional politics by declaring itself as the protector of “tradition” and waging what they called “a war of the spirits” (guerra dos espíritos) against the Frelimo state. In the context of war, Renamo appropriated and redefined key elements of the traditional field. It did so by installing régulos (chiefs) in the areas it controlled and by, effectively, recreating or reaffirming ritual authority in its domains. However, Renamo also employed conventional military strategies that resonated with historical experiences: its raiding and capturing of rural populations, its formation of camps, and its establishment of relations of tribute, taxation, and agricultural production in its zones of control mirror features of the Nguni tributary state in addition to the Companhia’s raids, forced labor, and abduction—as well as certain features of the colonial state. Despite its violent practices, Renamo’s embracing of tradição and the spirits meant that in places like Honde, its guerrillas were received by many as liberators of the tchianku wo atewe that was attacked by Frelimo and Machel and supplanted with party secretaries and an aldeia comunal.

Simultaneously, the FAM supplemented regular warfare with guerrilla tactics, crucially including the use of traditional resources as n’angas (traditional healers). Such surprising similarities between Renamo and FAM also emerge in popular experiences, as these two narratives of former FAM fighters from Honde illustrate. During an interview in 2005 with a male nurse around forty-five years old whom I have called Armando, a man who had served in the FAM for five years during the civil war, he brought my attention to the fact that the FAM also needed
spiritual protection in its struggle, and in so doing effectively reterritorialized healing capacities of the traditional field into apparatuses of capture for the FAM. An excerpt from the interview may illustrate this:

B: There in the FAM, you needed to protect yourself?
A: Yes, you had to! I ate nhimo [a type of bean] to protect myself. And I always wore a black bracelet. It protected me good!
B: Were you protected in other ways?
A: Yes, we had n’angas [traditional healers]. But they were there more to control that no one ran away.
B: So, they were there to control, not protect or heal?
A: Yes, to control. If there had been no n’angas, many would have run away.

This excerpt also illustrates how there are important elements of capture in FAM that mirror Renamo practices—elements pertaining to the redeployment of traditional forces within the state’s military force, as well as a sense of being seized by an apparatus of the state that is reinforced by traditional means. A similar experience of abduction and capture was also the subject of bitter recollection by Eduardo who served in FAM from 1980 to 1986:

E: I was born on Ilha da Praia in Cape Verde. I came to Mozambique and stayed near Marromeu [Zambézia province] for thirteen years. In 1980 I went to the army.
B: But you were not Mozambican?
E: It was search and capture [busca-captura], Bjørn! I was in Messica [in Manica Province] and—BAM—the army arrived and abducted people. I said “I am from Cape Verde!” But they did not listen. From there I was sent directly to Manhiça near Maputo to an instruction camp for three months and then to the front.

Corroborated by others from Honde, both accounts underline how the traditional elements were not only the subject of attack but appropriation on the part of Frelimo and FAM—in addition to the capture of people being central also to the army’s overall war effort. To generalize from the above violent trajectories ending the Portuguese colonial domination and the violent first decades of the postindependence state, three elements stand out. First, the recurring oscillation between wild forms of capture of people—from the Nguni raids and the Companhia’s labor recruitment sweeps through Renamo’s and FAM’s practices of capture and abduction. A second recurring feature is the sustained feeding on and reordering of labor and, effectively therefore the African population’s relations with land and soil. Third, the postcolonial state, as also
seen above, related largely antagonistic to the authority, organization, and cosmology of the traditional field as such. In postcolonial Mozambique, similar elements affected the rural and urban landscape and its inhabitants.

**Communalizing the Countryside, Purging the Cities: Early Postcolonial State Formation**

The *imperial spatium* of the State and the *political extenso* of the city are not so much forms of a territorial principle as a deterriorialization that takes place on the spot when the State appropriates the territory of local groups or when the city turns its back on its hinterland.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1994 [1991]: 86)

Frelimo’s construction of a party-state involved the reordering of Mozambique’s rural areas. In part, these state-orchestrated practices directed at space and labor mirrored the *aldeamentos* of the late Portuguese colonial state by also being constructed as bulwarks against an external threat—for the Portuguese Frelimo and for the postcolonial state Renamo. However, the postcolonial state’s scope was wider and guided by ideas beyond military concerns. Creating what it called *aldeais comunais* (communal villages) from the 1970s onward, the newly independent state attempted to reorder both relations between labor and the land by breaking up, rationalizing, and reordering land tenure systems, as well as to create territorially protective units against Renamo (see, e.g., Sidaway 1991; Coelho 1998).²⁶ In ways resembling Tanzania’s villagization programs in the same period (Scott 1998), Mozambique’s *aldeias comunais* centered around collective production of crops under a novel organization provided especially by the party-state’s *grupos dinamizadores* that were supported by the party apparatus of nearby cities. Communal villages were, thus, central to aspirations for constructing a socialist society, reflected in the Frelimo Central Committee’s statement in 1976 (quoted in Egerö 1990: 77): “The communal village constitutes the spinal column of the development of the productive forces of the countryside.”

As the state formations of the Companhia and the colonial state before it, the *aldeias comunais* in Honde and Manica Province were also introduced by local state agents. However, as Clarence-Smith (1989: 7) identifies, the move to villagize and reorganize should also be seen as grounded in what he calls an “uncaptured peasantry”—a peasantry
that, Frelimo’s leadership feared, could destabilize the development of the postcolonial state.\textsuperscript{27} Many scholars have therefore interpreted villagization as driving a dangerous wedge between the Frelimo postcolonial state and the peasantry, thus paving the way for Renamo recruitment and support in their “war of the spirits.”\textsuperscript{28}

These critical points resonate with experiences from Honde where one, post hoc, is hard-pressed to find anyone who would portray these collective experiments as successful or as remotely related to “development”—however one would define that. When exploring these elements in Honde, it is also evident that the modus vivendi of the late Portuguese colonial state was understood as benevolent to the relations between soil, territory, agricultural production, and people. The late tchirenge of Honde (d. 2008) expressed such a sentiment in one of many conversations I had with him. When I asked him in 2007 about relations to the Portuguese and his task of securing rain, he replied,

\begin{quote}
T: In their time, all was clean. At times if we suffered bad from drought, the Portuguese would call me to make rain. Afterwards everyone would give me ufu [maize flour]. We also had one régulo and two pfumos [régulo’s adjuncts]. But now people can just go and make a machamba [agricultural plot] in the cemetery! It is because of this that we have great problems with drought here.

B: When did these problems begin?

T: It all started with Frelimo. They came with people from Zambézia, from Tete and they all started giving orders around here. When the régulos left, people who were maSena [from a neighboring province] also came. And they did not know anything as they were not from here! This created great problems.
\end{quote}

The tchirenge’s account is one coated in colonial nostalgia—one neither compatible with other accounts of domination, violence, and exploitation by the colonial regime nor his own often harsh accounts of life under the Portuguese. However, despite, or perhaps because of these limitations, the tchirenge’s projection backward of a time characterized by a productive relationship between people, land, and ancestors underlines important distinctions between the colonial and postcolonial state in rural Honde. First, it highlights that the Portuguese colonial state by its policy of indirect rule had, in one sense, successfully captured the capacities of the traditional, a seizure subsequently deployed to feed its own system of exploitation of the African population. Second, although the advent of Frelimo initially enjoyed considerable local support in Honde, it was eventually seen as utterly destructive to fertility, soil, and ancestral relations to the point that the Portuguese were grad-
ually imagined as more capable of securing these. In urban settings, the reordering of space, labor, and people followed similar but also divergent trajectories.

One of the most important changes to the territory of the cities post-independence was to minutely reinscribe its urban landscapes at a range of levels in a narrative of the epic (Bakhtin 1986)—effectively merging Frelimo’s past liberation struggle and the party-state’s ongoing fight for a socialist Mozambique. This postindependence celebration of the epic-ness of the liberation struggle meant the urban reinscription through renaming of large territorial entities where the capital Lourenço Marques became Maputo and Vila Pery became Chimoio. Further, new names to the bairros typically memorialized dates of heroic struggle as in Bairro 25 de Junho (Independence Day) or dates within a larger socialist cosmology as in Bairro 1 de Mayo (1 May). In addition to the painting of political murals on the inside of classrooms, such inscriptions are crucial aspects of Frelimo’s cultivation, dissemination, and mise-en-scène of the party as eternally safeguarding the past, present, and future of the nation. This cultivation is, also, in keeping with Frelimo’s appropriation and reformation of socialist state centrism as found also in Angola and Tanzania.²⁹

The postliberation inscription of semiotics of territories and institution onto the urban landscape itself of novel cosmologies of epic proportions comprises significant aspects of state formation as well as regime signifiers.³⁰ But such techniques of inscription are also integral to a double process of erasure and reinscription that effectively disembeds mean-

ings and memories and replaces these with insignia and semiotics of the state—an integral part of statal chronopolitics (Gonçalves 2012). These aspects of postindependence state formation at the level of territory and space underline a complexity that transcends the cadastral demarcation of borders or technologies of urban planning (cf. Sidaway and Power 1995). Arguably, these instances of deliberate changes to urban physical as well as semiotic space by local agents of the state may be analyzed as instances of the territorializing dynamics of state formation—a process that is always necessarily ongoing.

One such important yet, interestingly, incomplete change occurred during fieldwork in January 2007 in Chimoio where many people increasingly made reference to a Praça Gungunhana (Square Gungunhana), after the Nguni ruler Ngungunyane explored earlier. Querying people about this novel space, it turned out that this was the former Praça OMM (Square OMM) dedicated to Frelimo’s Women Organization (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana) that was now, apparently, being renamed. For Frelimo, in majority in the city council of Chimoio in 2007 as for the whole postindependence period, the shift from spatially celebrating OMM is understandable as the organization has considerably weakened (Disney 2008; Arnfred 2011). The move to include a former Nguni ruler is born out of a recent shift in national Frelimo rhetoric where Ngungunyane is increasingly reinterpreted as having fought an anticolonial struggle. In other words, in Frelimo elite circles Ngungunyane is in the process of entering the pantheon of national liberation guarded and erected by Frelimo.

Among interlocutors in Chimoio, however, the spatial reorganization of a prominent square was a popular topic. Many who were critical of the Frelimo government interpreted it in terms of the dominance of the Nguni era and southern Gaza as having found yet another expression. In the words of Afonso, an elderly Renamo veteran:

A: Frelimo would like to put the Shangaan [the dominant ethnic group in southern Mozambique and Gaza] everywhere! This is not something new.
B: But Ngungunyane—is he not from here?
A: Ah! They say that. But he is much more from the south than from the center. Samora [Machel] asked for the bones from Portugal because he died in São Tomé and Principe. The bones are there in Maputo.

For Afonso, the renaming in Chimoio was an insidious way of reasserting the southern primacy of the Shangaan group over the center, a Shangaan dominance popularly thought to be integral to Frelimo and thereby to build on the Gaza origins of Nguni polities. By recalling and celebrating the brutal rule of an invading king from the south who had
also enslaved many maTewe, maSena, and maNdau (ethnic groups that also constituted important parts of the Renamo movement [see MacGonagle 2008]), for several the dominance of the south had found yet another symbolic manifestation. The yet unfinished change of name from Praça OMM to Praça Gungunhana thus exemplifies the ways in which state formations always work semiotically toward reterritorialization and deterritorialization. Nevertheless, the renaming also evidences, as reflected by Afonso above, how state semiotics are frequently counteracted by popular practices of renaming—either by necessary shifts in the state’s own narratology, from OMM to Ngungunyane, or in alternative and oppositional understandings of reterritorialization, as in the shift being interpreted as yet another expression of attempted dominance by the south and the Shangaan (see also Werbner 1998b, 1998c).

A second key element in the postindependence urban reconfiguration was the 1983 ousting of traditional and parasitic elements from the cities in sweeping campaigns of social cleansing. The campaign, entitled Operation Production (Operação Produção, OP), entailed that urban people found to be lacking various forms of identification proving grounds for residency (as students, workers, or residents) were deemed parasitic. In vast campaigns in Mozambique’s major cities, people were apprehended in the streets, judged in “verification posts” (postos de verificação) under the popular tribunals, and frequently airlifted to agricultural “production centers” in the northern province of Niassa (Nielsen 2014). Often left with little and inadequate equipment, the predominantly rural untrained urbanites were meant to clear virgin land and support the agricultural basis of production of independent Mozambique. Some allege that as many as 50,000 people from Maputo alone were sent to Niassa (Jenkins 2006: 117) under OP, while the number for Chimoio and other cities remains uncertain.

The state-ordered capture of unproductive elements of OP mirror similar ways in which the colonial state in Manica under Companhia rule and beyond rounded up people for forced labor in broad sweeps. To recall, these were relocated to work for the state in road-building or under slave labor–like conditions on commercial farms often run by German, French, and other owners. OP also reproduced, with a twist, the forced ruralification of Africans under colonial rule where “an integral aspect of state ‘capture’ of urban territorial control … was the social and economic exclusion of indigenous Mozambicans (indígenos) whose legal status prevented them from purchasing [urban and rural] land” (Jenkins 2006: 110).

However, OP did more than clear the cities of urban marginals in the sense of being a state apparatus for capturing elements of the urban
labor force that were seen to parasitically feed off the productive rural population. It also entailed a crucial dynamic of cleansing the cities of what were, to use a dominant Frelimo term, “obscurantist” and, thus, potentially subversive elements. In practical terms, Alcinda Honwana details (1996: 42) how in Maputo the Mozambican state also used OP to forcibly oust traditional authorities from the city by relocating these for work in the rural areas. However, the views on traditional healers (curandeiros), for example, underlying such eviction is contained in transcripts of court cases, some of which were reproduced in the journal J ustiça Popular published by the Mozambican ministry of law. The case number 374/83 of the Tribunal Popular da Cidade de Maputo (Popular Justice Tribunal of Maputo), for instance, deals with a traditional healer who was to be forcibly sent out of Maputo, and whose case was brought before the court on the grounds that he had previously worked at TEXLOM (a factory of cloth) until 1981 (Justiça Popular 1984: 39). In their verdict, the Popular Justice Tribunal upheld the decision and their verdict is instructive in terms of expressing the state antagonism to traditional healers at the time (ibid.):

1. There is no recognition on the part of the State for the activities of curandeiros [traditional healers].
2. With Operação Produção the curandeiros are equated with unemployed and odd-job men.

With OP’s purge of traditional and contraproductive elements from the cities, the postindependence state cleansed its urban spaces of what it saw as dangerous nonmodernity, making its landscape inscribable for socialist meaning and susceptible to surveillance (Scott 1998; West 2005). Further, by reterritorializing the country in terms of relocation of people and productive forces, Frelimo somewhat unwittingly confirmed an urban bias that had hitherto only been suspected. On the other hand, the dynamics of the civil war also drove people back from rural areas toward the cities in large number. There, living in slum-like conditions in bairros, those who had relocated to the cities reterritorialized, expanded, and redefined its spaces, reestablishing firm links between the rural and the urban in the process through continuous migration between localities and households, as the rural-urban continuity of Honde and Chimoi exemplifies.

Although instances of state formations may be disruptive and not developmental, and although both the colonial and postcolonial state only penetrated the countryside to a limited extent (see also Pitcher 2002: 97), the (predominantly) violent reorganization of the rural (and urban) communities demonstrate the state order’s impact, particularly during
the period of almost consecutive warfare from 1964 to 1992. Nevertheless, the examples discussed also, and again, show similarities with long-term historical practices. As an effect, the forms of domination, the practices of capture of people and labor, and the re- and deterritorialization of the traditional field cannot, therefore, be relegated to an analysis of wartime (or Mozambican) exceptionalism. Rather, these are crucial elements of state capture and the lines of flight it foments.

**Three Captures, Arborification, and Multiple Lines of Flight**

Frelimo’s transition from a mobile, heterogeneous guerrilla movement to a sedentarized, territorial party-state also characterizes other Sub-Saharan liberation movements turned political parties in power—ZANLA of Zimbabwe and MPLA of Angola being cases in point. This gravitation toward stable, unitary, and hierarchical order may be understood in terms of *arborification*, a central statist dynamic (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]).³⁵ Such arborification in the form of the joining and concerting of multiplicities (i.e. several liberation movements) to form an increasingly hierarchical, unified order can clearly be identified in Frelimo’s transition from being a political movement with guerrilla incursions into Mozambique via the setting up of camps and culminating with the territorial state formation postindependence. Historically, a dynamic of arborification also characterizes Nxaba’s transition from an orientation around raids to the development of a mature tributary state polity. A similar form of arborification also runs through the development from wild raids and labor sweeps of the early Companhia to the reordering of rural space and encapsulation of rural people in *aldeamentos* of the late colonial state. As also seen previously, these sequences of arborification constitute moments of violent becomings of statehood in Manica Province (and elsewhere in Mozambique) and are, as shown, distinguished by various forms of violent capture of people.

However, a second type of capture also stands out from the material: that of labor. Again drawing on Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]: 490), when being subjected to arborification of the state form, a shift from what one may call *free action* to *work* takes place that involves the capture of the former. Using spatial and territorial conceptual language, Deleuze and Guattari describe the disciplining and transformation of this action into work as being related to an opposition between the smooth space characteristic of free action with the striated space produced by the machinations of the state.
Viewed in this perspective, the different becomings of state in Manica Province have, in all their complexity, been forcefully oriented toward striating space by making it visible, surveillable, and apt for reordering. This striation is identifiable from the early Portuguese attempts at extraction, rerouting, and integration into the imperial polities of Mwene Mutapa, as well as the later, much more pronounced attempts to reorder the space of African communities to tap their workforce and surplus through mechanisms of forced labor. The spatial aspect of striation became even more prominent in the colonial and postcolonial creation of aldeamentos and later aldeais comunais—bolstered by the Portuguese racialist legal obligations for Africans to work (Freyre 1961)—and the socialist ethos of rural production (Isaacman 1978b; Bowen 1986), respectively. Needless to say, such statist dynamics of reordering the spaces and transforming free action into work were tangible and, often, violent processes. Crucially, they deterriorialized African communities’ and polities’ organization, extracted agricultural work, and disembedded labor from its encompassing social, political, and cosmological circumstances of production and reproduction. In short, this historical disembedding of labor through violent capture and striation of space also provides an important backdrop for understanding current visions and experiences of nebulous and dark economies.

However, a third dimension of capture—that of the traditional field—is also evident. Although the advent of the postcolonial state entailed some degree of liberation of the masses from the onslaught of repressive and racist colonialism, Frelimo’s project was considerably more ambitious on behalf of the social than that of the colonial state. To recall, the colonial state attempted to subordinate, encapsulate, and integrate traditional practices within its apparatus of governance as evidenced by the tchirenge’s memories of being summoned by Portuguese authorities to conjure rain, or as in the colonial state’s general politics of indirect rule wherein régulos were used as tax collectors or as authorities for policing. These colonial Portuguese attempts at encapsulation of the traditional field also had their precedents in, for example, Ngungunyane’s different attempts at securing rain through summoning rainmakers, as we also previously saw.

Conversely, at a national level Frelimo attempted neither to encapsulate nor to subdue but to eradicate this social and political system that was seen as (at least) double in its evil. For one, the traditional field was seen to reflect obscurantism and, thereby, to comprise the epitome of the irrational. Hence, on the part of Frelimo there were few approaches toward appreciating the organization of labor, production, and land tenure encompassed by traditional institutions or the social organiza-
tion of reciprocal and agricultural relations between the living and also
the living and dead. Instead *grupos dinamizadores* spearheaded com-
munalizing labor and land according to the common, popular good as
expressed and organized by the party-state. Further, and in part contra-
dicting the first evil, it was regarded as lacking social or other value as
it had, in a sense, become “contaminated” by the Portuguese. This point
was commonly expressed in terms of *régulos* spoken of as mere colonial
pawns and not representatives of people or communities. Interestingly,
in this view of colonial contamination there is a sense of the chiefs hav-
ing been, perhaps, something else (genuine? nonrepressive? free?) at
some point.

With the advent of the civil war and in thoroughly opaque and con-
flicting ways, Renamo’s attacks on the state apparatus, its *war of the spir-
its*, and its protection against Frelimo’s vicious assault on the *tchianwu
wo ateewe* initially enjoyed some success—also in Honde. However, as
Frelimo before it, the dynamic of Renamo also gradually arborified.
From the outset being a classical guerrilla movement roving the *mato* in
rhizomic fashion and evading the domains of the state (such as cities),
living off the land and its people, Renamo gradually took on statist dy-
namics in terms of controlling and capturing labor, territory, and people
in camps materializing in nascent tributary states in its zones of dom-
inance or influence. Renamo’s gradual arborification and its capture of
the traditional field were, of course, also features of the colonial state,
late and early, as we saw, for example, in the Portuguese formation of
chief-led detachments with traditional weaponry against Frelimo. Fur-
ther, the same state capture of the actualizations of the potentialities of
the traditional field was seen with Parama’s gradual integration into FAM
or with the FAM traveling with *n’angas* so that its soldiers would not
dare run away, as seen previously.

While the three instances of capture and the tendency toward arbor-
ification above have demonstrated both similarities between precolo-
nial and colonial forms and the limits to state rule at intervals where it
was challenged by what I have seen in war machine terms or as other
deterritorializing forces, it is also clear that different state practices of
capture and territorialization generated *lines of flight*. The many escaping
the state’s apparatuses of capture to Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and
South Africa, especially following the intensification of *tchibalo* (forced
labor) by the Companhia, exemplify such unsettling lines of flight: only
between 1912 and 1917, the population decreased in Mossurize in
Manica Province from 26,677 to 17,535 due to migration (Lubkemann
2000: 80).36 This leads Lubkemann to conclude that “it was under the
Companhia’s rule that migration increasingly was developed in Machaze
as a tactic for resisting the coercive might of the colonial state” (2000: 82). This dynamic of flight and migration is central as it counteracted the frequently violent capture of the rural population through *tchibalo* in Manica Province. It also has important precedents, as we saw above, in the practices of hiding and relocation when confronted with the Nguni state’s capture and taxation.

To reduce these lines of flight to merely evasive maneuvers or to label them by tropes of “resistance” in a political sense would be to underestimate the potentialities inherent to the domain of the traditional as a part of the wider social order. In circumventing, fleeing, subverting, and evading the different forms of capture and violence integral to state formations, the *virtual potentialities* of the traditional field are engaged forming specific *actual trajectories* or *lines of flight*, effectively deterritorializing processes of state ordering and capture. As Mbembe (2010: 48) has established for the African colonial encounter more generally (and resonating with the Mozambican case), “it is evident that, from beginning to end, it [the colonial encounter] was shot through with lines of flight. The colonial regime dedicated most of its energies either to attempting to control these flights, or to using them to as a constitutive dimension, even a decisive dimension, of its auto-regulation.” Further, lines of flight from the state apparatus are, as Raunig (2010: 57) reminds us, simultaneously also movement that are creative and instituting and not, therefore, necessarily only evasive. Conversely, sometimes, wide-ranging destruction may be generated, and the formation, development, and violent practices of Renamo provides, as such, an example of what Deleuze and Guattari call *lines of destruction* (2002 [1980]: 205, 229). In their action, Renamo as a nomadic guerrilla capitalized on popular opposition to Frelimo’s attack on the traditional field. Concretely, Renamo developed rhizomically into an extremely violent war machine feeding on and sustained by dynamics of kinship as well as notions of the land, spirits, and ritual in a violent actualization and appropriation of potentialities of the traditional field. While unsettling profoundly the postcolonial state, Renamo also changed into a rigid, segmentary, and arborified form of tribute state in many of its areas of dominance. Deleuze and Guattari conceive of any assemblage as territorial, as noted in this chapter’s epigraph. Such always ongoing but never complete territorialization or striation of space is an instance of what I have termed the perpetual *becoming* of state formation.

Beyond the continuities demonstrated in forms of capture, the lines of flight, and the processes of (de)territorialization inherent to different state forms, the material here supports one of the central arguments of this book: the contested nature of the perpetual and enduring becom-
ing of state formation in Manica Province, an argument formed especially against the Lusocentric position of Portuguese gradual control. In this chapter such state becoming has been argued in terms of territory, and it has been underlined that as a territorial assemblage, the state will necessarily aim to control and reorder the social realities it seeks to dominate and, in doing so, necessarily deterritorialize dimensions of the social—including the traditional field. However, while having sketched main trajectories of territorialisation in this chapter in terms of capture, arborification and lines of flight in general, and shown how these also involve the traditional field, I have only to a limited degree shown how these processes are understood and how their effects materialize from the point of view of the rural-urban continuum under study. This is the subject of the following chapter.

Notes

1. On the feiras, early trade and commerce, and political formations see Chanaiwa (1972) and, especially, Bhila (1982).
2. As expressed by Torres (1973), this racist vision of harmonious coexistence was disseminated regularly right until the liberation of Portugal’s colonies. Freyre’s vision was integral to Salazar’s Fascist politics and the creation of the so-called Estado Novo (“New State”) that reordered Portuguese society—also in its colonies. For some analyses of Freyre-Salazar links, see Enders (1997), Léonard (1997), and Macagno (2002).
3. This point has also been made by Chanaiwa (1972: 431, 433), building on the rich historical and ethnographic sources collected by Theal (1964 [1898]).
4. Portuguese obsession with gold is well-documented from the 1600s onward (National Archives of Zimbabwe 1989: 361–84; see also Balsan 1970).
5. The historian David Beach (1994b: 111) has claimed that by the late 1600s the “great era of state formation” for the Shona had ended.
6. A classic argument emphasizing the European slave trade’s impact on mfecane was made by Omer-Cooper (1966). This has been challenged by Eldredge (1992) who argued that internal political and social forces shaped mfecane and, thus, critiques Omer-Cooper’s position as problematic as it, claims Eldredge, solely privileges European (historical) agency.
7. Ngungunyane, also spelled Gungunhana, Gungunyane, and Ngungunyana, was a key transitional figure to the late colonial period (Bertelsen 2012). See also Wheeler (1968), Isaacman and Isaacman (1977), Liesegang (1996), Inguane (2007), Garcia (2008) for succinct analyses of both his contemporary political role and also for his lasting importance in colonial and postcolonial literature, politics, and historiography.
8. Details as to how and where the witches were killed are, alas, beyond the scope of the present chapter. Suffice to say here that, as Jacobson-Widding has shown (1999: 305), orifices of the body are seen to be vital gates to self and
personhood; thus, impaling is equal to an attempt to erase, in a total sense, a person. Further, the crossroads or junction, where the witches were left, are seen as dangerous, “hot,” potent, as well as places of healing in many contexts (Gelfand 1947; Jacobson-Widding 1989).


10. The text’s original reads, “Com a batida do Gungunhana, e com a nossa posse efectiva e real das terras, cessaram todas as rebeliõe e hoje os povos encontram-se perfeitamente pacifcos e obedecendo ás auctoridades, a quem apresentam os seus milandos para serem resolvidos e a quem pagam o tributo de vassalagem, por meio do imposto de palhota ou de mussoco.”

11. Allina (2012), thus, explicitly critiques the presumed feeble nature of the Portuguese colonial state as argued by Duffy (1962) and the more controversial argument of underdevelopment made by Perry Anderson, contained in the quote, “Portugal, an imperial power, has the economy of an underdeveloped country” (1962a: 86). Although rewarding, this discussion on the comparative feebleness/nonfeebleness of the Portuguese colonial state largely falls outside the scope of this book and will not be addressed directly.

12. Interestingly, the colonially enforced obligation to “work” was hailed as an important element of the Companhia by the French government surveyor M. Guillaume Vasse (1907: 264).

13. The mandatory and forced labor regimes comprise particularly brutal aspects of Portuguese late colonialism and have, justly, been the subject of early critique by, for example, Marvin Harris (1958) and Perry Anderson (1962a, 1962b, 1962c). Anderson (1962b: 95), in particular, grasps the extent of violence to African communities that the forced labor entailed, citing a 1947 visitor to Angola who claims forced labor at some level is worse than slavery: “Today, the native is not bought—he is simply rented from the government, though he may have the status of a free man. His master could hardly care less if he falls ill or dies as long as he goes on working while he lives. When he becomes unable to work or when he dies the master can always ask to be supplied with another labourer. Only the dead are really exempt from forced labour.”

14. See Artur (1996) for details of the rebellion and the chief Makombe leading it.

15. The vast regional political economy of labor recruitment to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa has, of course, been analyzed extensively (see, e.g., the classic study by Wolpe 1972). Suffice to say here that such illicit recruitment in the Companhia's territory was a recurring problem throughout its rule. Alfredo Augusto Freire D'Andrade (1906: 360; see also M. J. Murray 1995), the Companhia’s director, writes for instance of court cases against a J. A. Jackson, a former native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia, who was arrested when “crimping natives” to Southern Rhodesia.

16. See also Taussig (1987) for a compelling comparative argument on relations between wilderness, colonialism and state formation.

17. Portuguese official records from 1967 show that Manica Province was a site of gross inequalities “where 451 European estateholders owned 670,000 hectares, while 135,000 Africans cultivated one-third that amount” (Isaacman 1978a: 11).
18. This aspect related to another critique of dominant colonial history arguing for territory being constitutive of the colonial state. Contrarily, Allina-Pisano (2002: 82; see also Allina 2012) argues that control of labor power is more fundamental to both workings of the colonial state as well as to its relations with its subjects.

19. The Portuguese extraction of resources and revenue under its well-cultivated self-image as an empire, rested on at least two additional factors. First, the Portuguese established their dominance in the Indian Ocean at a fortuitous time prior to the rise of the Dutch and English claims, the consolidation of the Moguls on the subcontinent, the rise of the Ottoman empire, and “the resurrection of the Persian state by the Safavids” (Young 1994: 51). Second, the very format of the empire, with the extremely limited territorially expansionist drive, implied that few resources were bound up in attempts at attaining sovereign territorial control.

20. The World War II context for this “reincorporation” is not coincidental. In Portugal at the time, the rise of the republic after the ousting of the king in 1910 led to a gradual recognition of both a need to reform state administration and to reassume control of the colonies: “Most of it was controlled directly or indirectly by foreign capital whose concessions—granting quasi-feudal rights over the population—were giving rise to abuses that were becoming increasingly embarrassing and unacceptable” (Newitt 1995: 390).


22. See especially Coelho (1989, 1993) for in-depth analyses of protected villages with an emphasis on the Tete province.

23. The figure of 70 percent may be contested, as people regularly fled from the “protection” offered by the aldeamentos during warfare, and the calculation also includes people living in the cities that were controlled by the Portuguese (Coelho 1993: 228ff). However, the high figure and formation of aldeamentos indicate both scale and direction of Portuguese attempts at “insulating the population from Frelimo propaganda” (Newitt 1995: 473).

24. For detailed reports documenting torture of political prisoners by the Portuguese colonial state in Mozambique in the period 1963 to 1974, see Editões Afrontamento (1977), Mateus (2004), or A. Magaia (2005).

25. Similar attacks on “superstition” or “colonial relics” were integral to the modernist drives of many postindependence African states, as argued by Donham’s (1999) analysis of Ethiopian “Marxist modernism,” in Sanders’s (2008: 96) description of the abolishment of chiefdoms in independent Tanzania or in Orre’s (2010) account of liberated Angola’s uneasy relationships with the sobas (chiefs). However, such a common postindependence policy was not universal, even among presumably politically related movements like Frelimo and Zimbabwe’s ZANLA. As Lan (1985) has thoroughly analyzed, traditional dimensions in Zimbabwe were engaged with rather than attacked both during war and later by the independent state.
26. Not all provinces were the subject of intense villagization. According to Sidaway (1991: 277), Manica Province’s number of total population “captured” by aldeias comunais rose from 0.09 percent in 1978 to 25.4 percent in 1982/83—being in this year the province with the third largest percentage of population in aldeias comunais after Cabo Delgado (87.3 percent) and Gaza (50 percent). For an interesting case study and actor-based analysis of aldeias comunais in Gaza and Maputo, see Casal (1996).

27. A similar position is also expressed by Sidaway (1991: 274): “In post-colonial Mozambique, the policy of concentrating the rural population into aldeais comunais always had political dimensions of extending state ‘control’ beyond the official aims of rural socialisation and modernisation. Frelimo sought to incorporate, or to borrow Hyden’s (1980) term ‘capture’ the peasantry within the nexus of the modern (socialist) state.”

28. For other analyses of this crucial expression, see also Cardoso (1988), Geffray and Pedersen (1988), Geffray (1990), Roesch (1992), and Bowen (2000).

29. The political aesthetics of socialist Mozambique are clearly shaped by historical trajectories of colonialism, indigenous art forms, as well as international politics, as demonstrated in Sahlström’s (1990) intriguing comparison of political posters from Ethiopia and Mozambique.

30. Elsewhere (2002, 2004) and informed by Bakhtin (1981, 1986), I have developed the argument of epicness as central to ongoing Frelimo efforts to construe itself as the collective, moral national force giving birth to the nation as well as safeguarding its continued existence against internal and external forces.

31. Although OMMs relation to Frelimo is crucial for understanding the gendered dimension of Mozambican politics and the changing role of women from the time of the liberation struggle until today (see West 2000 for an interesting ethnographically based analysis), this falls outside the scope of this book. However, see the interesting studies made by Silva and Andrade (2000), Arthur (2004), and Arnfred (2011) of the politics of women inside and outside OMM and their ambivalent relation to Frelimo.

32. A significant number of slaves and (later) semi-free laborers were exported to Cape Verdean, South African, or Indian Ocean destinations (Capela and Medeiros 1987; Zimba et al. 2006) in addition to being part of systems of slavery internal to Southern Africa (Harries 1981).

33. Both Sidaway’s (1991: 259) and Jenkins’s (2006) analyses of Mozambican postindependence spatial organization have asserted that the Frelimo leadership of the 1970s and 1980s cannot be understood in terms of either anti- or pro-urban biases in planning, policy, and praxis as these all shifted and were, to some extent, self-contradictory. Following their argument, OP cannot unequivocally be seen to express a general antiurban stance.

34. Throughout Mozambique’s recent history and especially after the urban immigration from the 1960s on, the poor urban and peri-urban areas have represented governmental and territorial challenges for colonial and postcolonial administration (Grest 1995; Sidaway and Power 1995).

35. “It is not so much that some multiplicities are arborescent and others not, but that there is an arborification of multiplicities. That is what happens when the
black holes scattered along a rhizome begin to resonate together, or when the
stems form segments that striate space in all directions, rendering it compara-
ble, divisible, homogenous …” (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]: 506).
36. For works on Mozambican labor in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, see also
Adamo, Davies and Head (1981), and Neves (1998). Labor migration to South
Africa and, especially, mine workers has been epitomized by legendary anthro-
pologist Ruth First (1983; see also Covane 2001).
The sovereign deals with a nature, or rather with the perpetual conjunction, the perpetual intrication of a geographical, climatic, and physical milieu with the human species insofar as it has a body and a soul, a physical and moral existence; and the sovereign will be someone who will have to exercise power at that point of connection where nature, in the sense of physical elements, interferes with nature in the sense of the nature of the human species, at that point of articulation where the milieu becomes the determining factor of nature.

Michel Foucault (2007 [2004]: 23)

This vision of sovereign power hovering above the relations between natural and human elements is relevant beyond genealogical analyses of biopower, pastoral power, and governmentality. If we go beyond Foucault’s near exclusive context and subject of enquiry, Europe, these relations move to the forefront of social and political life. In Honde, crucial interconnections between polities of chiefly rule and traditional authority, cosmologies of land and the well-being of its inhabitants, and soil are present in a number of contexts. We have seen indications of this previously through Renamo’s appropriation of the traditional field, in Ngungunyane’s problematic relations with rainmaking capacities, or in the FAM soldiers’ capture of the capacities of traditional healers to discipline its troops. Importantly, these relations are addressed and also man-
ifest themselves in everyday practices—what we may, perhaps glibly, call the sociality of bios.

Whereas the preceding chapter mapped historical patterns of statist dynamics of territory and capture of people, labor, and space, this chapter explores the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio to trace specific instances of deterritorialization. Based on analyses of notions and practices of *tchianhu wo atewe*, territory (*nhika*), as well as specifically mapping different types of spirits with varying capacities—*tchiphoko*, *pfukwa*, *tchawiwi*, and *mhondoro*—the chapter substantiates the virtuality of the traditional field by arguing these spirits to be powerful actualizations opposed to territorializing statist dynamics. But in order to provide such a genealogy of spirits in the context of the violent processes of state formation, we need first to turn to the soil of Honde and its vital capacities of crop growth—*ndimo*.

**Autochthony, Rain, and an Enfeebled Soil**

Honde’s undulating hills are dotted by scattered household compounds surrounded by *machambas*, plots of cultivated land. In the wet streams or humid riverbeds, or in rivulets and crevices, there are a number of low-lying *matoro* plots crucially yielding crops during the so-called “months of hunger” (January to March) before the main *machambas* start producing. Households variously participate in cash crop economies where the most common produce is tobacco (sold predominantly to Zimbabwean and US companies) and tomatoes, lettuce, bananas, and mangoes sold in informal markets in and around Chimoio. Interspersed between and on compounds, *machambas*, and *matoros* are fruit trees, permanently uncultivated areas such as traditional graveyards, or plots that lay fallow or are deserted. Agricultural practice is characterized by significant ruptures, as during periods of warfare, and also has considerable intragenerational diversity and seasonal shift. These ruptures and cycles also reflect *longue durée* colonial and postcolonial systems of capture of populations, their labor, as well as urban and rural space.

Looming particularly large on people’s horizon is the rupture entailed by civil war violence—impinging heavily on agricultural practices, perceptions of the soil, and the sociopolitical organization of territory. Effectively causing Honde to be vacated from the early 1980s onward (see also Bertelsen 2002 for further details), the civil war left the soil largely fallow and uncultivated for more or less a decade until in the 1990s. Then, individuals and families started recultivating after returning, more or less permanently, from Chimoio’s *bairros*, from Renamo camps.
to which many had been forcibly abducted, or from other locations to which the war had dislocated them.

According to local land tenure, one should then assume that as seeds again sprouted from the soil left fallow for such a long time, the earth should yield richly. This is, for instance, the case with crops like cassava (*mandioka*), where it is perceived that the *machamba* must be left uncultivated for a certain number of years to recuperate. Following this logic, the postwar soil should locally be seen as fertile and rich, especially around 1999 when I first started doing fieldwork.¹ Not so: there was constant talk of the frail and low maize stalks and, as time passed, how meager the harvested crops were. If it had not been for the explanations given, these complaints about low yields might merely have been meant to divert unwanted attention from one’s own large produce—considering that the farmer having a larger crop than others might be suspected of being involved in dark economies of accumulation. Such nebulous economies involve the use of *uroi* (sorcery) or zombie slave labor (*kurima no zwiphoko*) to magically and illicitly augment one’s yields and work capacity on the *machamba* and *matoro*.²

Illustration 3.1. The conspicuous red piece of corn within the otherwise ordinary (and well-ordered) cob is called an *acidente mágico* (magical accident) and for informants highlights the interconnectedness of soil, crops, and sociality. Honde, 2000.
Significantly, in Honde, instead of implicating *uroi*, it was alleged that prior to the war, the soil yielded more and induced the crops with *ndimo*—a term used for both the capacity to grow and to designate a concrete substance vital to this. Due to the civil war, however, significant aspects of *ndimo* were destroyed resulting in less produce postwar. That *ndimo* is imperative for success in growth was pointed out to me in 2000 in a conversation with an elderly man, the brother of the *tchirenge*:

The maize needs *ndimo* to grow. If there is none, it will grow very, very little and become very weak. This is good soil, not like in [a location with sandy soil some kilometers away]. Here we used to grow big cobs of maize [*magwere*], big cassava [*mandioka*], a lot. Now after the war, there is a problem with the soil. There is little *ndimo*. What we need now is fertilizer, you know, the kind you just take in your hand and throw on the ground. Before the war we did not need it. *Ndimo* is better, but there is little of it now because of the war.

As the latest rupture, the civil war and its upheavals incapacitated the soil and violently restructured people’s relations to it. The powerful notion of *ndimo* captures this sense of how the past is inherent not merely to bodies, spirits, and narratives, but also in places, landscapes and the very soil itself. *Ndimo* highlights the vital relation between territory and people through informing and shaping the very productive capacity of the community. Moreover, it induces crop fertility with sociality where its productive and generative characteristics are seen to have been severed by the violence of the civil war. The enfeebled soil with its weakened *ndimo* may not only be viewed as a distinct casualty of civil war violence but rather as a materialization of the ongoing statist deterritorialization of the postcolonial period—hereunder Renamo’s appropriation, feeding on, and thwarting of traditional leadership (e.g. the dislocation and relocation of *réguio* João mentioned previously) and the Frelimo state’s reordering of the soil and people’s relations to it with the formation of *aldeias comunais*.

Despite the feebleness of the soil postwar, however, distinct elements of territorial and social orders do endure, particularly land tenure arrangements, the production cycles, spatial arrangements, as well practices safeguarding conditions for the strengthening of *ndimo* and frequent and adequate amounts of rain. The former, *ndimo*, is ideally constantly regenerated through the engaging of the *aridzi wo nhika*—the term for the group of people who are recognized to be autochthonous and to hold sets of land-use rights. The *aridzi wo nhika*—which literally translates from chiTewe as “owners of the land” or “owners of the territory”—were dispersed during wartime as all others. However, most assumed their former positions upon return to Honde postwar without
anyone contesting their rights to their quite valuable lands close to Chimoio. The *aridzi wo nhika* of Honde belong to the same *mbizi mitupo* (zebra clan), with taboos against eating the meat of zebra and certain other animals and birds, while the majority of people in and around Chimoio belong to the *tchimoyo* (heart) *mitupo*.

Henri Philippe Junod, son of the famous missionary and ethnographer Henri Alexandre Junod, argues in an early article (1934) that the *mbizi* clan’s relationship to the zebra was central to a comprehensive system of patrilineal clan membership. Junod’s (1934: 31) observations still have validity as the consequence of breaking the taboo of zebra meat consumption is similar to today’s consequences. In one such Honde case, a man was given meat of unknown origins when he was working at TextAfrica in Chimoio in the 1970s. As this was, unfortunately, zebra meat, his front teeth rotted away shortly thereafter. In social settings he is still often ridiculed for not having taken greater care when he received the meat—a fact he, grudgingly, accepts. Importantly, his missing teeth display the violation of clan taboos to all.

Nonetheless, there is one notable exception to the *mbizi* clan dynamics from Junod’s period: the zebras that then provided protection and premonitive guidance in times of dangers no longer roam the *nhika*—the territory—of Honde. As all other game, the zebras were hunted and eaten by the Renamo, FAM forces, and the Zimbabwean *makomerede* (from “comrade”) during the civil war. The violence of the civil war thereby created a situation where the protective capacities of clan membership through the roaming of the zebra as well as the very capacity for life itself, *ndimo*, are targeted and weakened. Confronted with these challenges to sociospatial organization, the figure of the *tchirenge* again assumes importance and leads the *aridzi wo nhika* in questions of land, soil, and territorial spirits (*gombwa*), as well as in safeguarding rainfall. In annual ceremonies for rain usually held in *gumiguru* (November in chiTewe), the *tchirenge* organizes the brewing of *duro* beer made from maize bran or sorghum, as well as the necessary clearing of a ritual space in front of the *mudoe* tree where communal rituals are often held. During a period of ten days to a week before the ceremony, all family groups (*dzindza*) contribute bran, sorghum, or sugar to the beer brewing, materially underlining the communal effort involved in asking for sufficient amounts of rain and at correct times. Come the day of the ceremony, postmenopause women and middle-age to elderly men gather in the morning in a semicircle in front of the *mudoe*—women and men in opposite spots. During the ceremony, the *tchirenge* with an assistant will kneel in front of the *mudoe* and make appeals to the *gombwa*, pour libations of *nipa* (homemade liquor), *portugaro* (red wine of Portuguese
origins), and sometimes duro on the ground or where the trunk meets the soil. Kuembera—the ceremonial clapping of cupped hands—is done and the tchirenge or his assistant will also drink a cup often of portugaro and nipa mixed. Afterward, the duro is passed around and the ceremony's more informal and festive part gradually replaces the solemn plea for rain—a plea integral to maintaining good relations between people, soil, and ancestors, as well as between the tchirenge and the aridzi wo nhika. In a conversation with the tchirenge in November 2005 after having participated in the rainmaking ceremony, I asked him which spirits he addressed. He replied,

I ask all spirits here. The spirits of my family, the spirits of the dzindza, the spirits of Tanzania, Zimbabwe. These are all persons who died here and some did not receive ceremonies in their homes. It is important to ask them for help as well.

The spirits of the tchirenge's own dzindza are integral to those of the aridzi wo nhika. This fact is unsurprising given the dominance of this group, which claims, and is related to by state agents and people in Chimoio alike, itself as autochthonous to Honde. However, the inclusion of spirits born of war and violence is more surprising. During the civil war, the great number of, first, ZANLA guerrillas and then Zimbabwean national soldiers aided FAM forces in the area as did some groups of Tanzanian soldiers—both nationalities known as makomerede. Especially many Zimbabwean makomerede were killed by either Renamo forces, FAM forces, or by desperate local people robbing them. As the untended corpses of the makomerede rotted away in the mato without family or kin securing their transition from human form to becoming revered spiritual beings, these concerns are instead belatedly addressed by the aridzi wo nhika in the figure of the tchirenge.

The tchirenge's inclusive move of spirits of also nonautochthonous origins challenges the somewhat static connections often made between territory, spirits, and people in analyses. This view is found in Bourdillon's assertion, based on his Korekore Shona material, that there is an asymmetric relation between autochthony and allochthony in their perceived capacity to secure rain and fertility (1987: 258–60). This runs counter to the Honde example where nonterritorial spirits are ritually integrated at several levels. For one, these spirits of Zimbabwean and Tanzanian makomerede and others are addressed in general rituals which, crucially, acknowledging their existence. However, and more significantly, they are also integrated into the most central assertion of reproductive and productive capacities of the community—that which secures the vital resource of rain, good harvests, and the well-being of the living. The
tchirenge's inclusion of *makomerede* and other allochthonous spirits is therefore instructive for appreciating the flexible and dynamic nature of the traditional field. By invoking, recognizing, and including these spirits of allochthonous origins, their destructive potential is acknowledged and encompassed. This potency is born out of their violent death, which, as these were left unburied outside the domain of sociality (in the *mato*), can produce a *pfukwa*—the collective term for a range of malign, vengeful, and powerful spirits. Thus, from being relegated to the edges of sociality, harboring danger, and potentially wreaking havoc as *pfukwa*, the centripetal process of integration of the spirits inaugurated by ritual bring these into the heart of social, territorial, and practical regeneration and continuity.

As the dynamic of postwar rainmaking above shows, the very soil of Honde has been stained by the blood of the civil war and general postindependence social upheaval—a rupture testified to by postwar produce being poorer than that of prewar territory. Beyond the concerns with *ndimo*, changes are also expressed as seeing *tradição* having been forcibly weakened with disastrous disintegrative effects. As the *tchirenge* voiced in 2000:

T: Now there is a lack of *tradição*. This all happened before, you know, in the time of Samora [Machel] when they said there should be no *tradição*, no ceremony, no nothing! Before there would always be rain, no problem except in years of drought. No matter, it would fall on 15 November each year. But now, ah, there is no rain even on 16 November! Before there used to be always, always, a ceremony for the rain, wishing for it to come. Now, ah, people just want to make a ceremony when it is dry. This is wrong. … When the new people [Frelimo Party secretaries] came they did not know anything; they were from Cabo Delgado and Zambézia, not from here. They did not know how to organize things because of this.

B: You were not allowed to make ceremonies?

T: Hell! No, no, no. No one was allowed. There were no *régulos*, no *tchirenge*, no nothing. It is only after the war of Dhlakama that we have started again. Because he said, “You can pray and do your ceremonies.” He introduced democracy. But a lot of people forgot a lot while this was illegal. Like now, a girl may go down to the river to fetch water in a pot for *sadza* [maize-meal-based staple food], and she would not even now she is doing something wrong!

B: So *tchianhu wo ate*we has changed?

T: Yes, it has changed a lot. It continues but in another form. It is like with other things, like the church. Before there was the Catholic church and the Muslim church. Now, ah, there is Zione, Mapostore, Assembleia de Deus [charismatic or Pentecostal churches]. Only in [a nearby larger locality] there
are eight different! But it is all just a trick, they are all churches for eating [Igrejas de comer]! You make your own church and you say, “Everybody has to pay me MT 10,000” [USD 4]. After six months you have a church and a lot of money. Is this right?10

Evident in the tchirenge’s narrative is how he sees tradição itself as having suffered from the damages inflicted by the civil war and by Frelimo policy. For the tchirenge, imposing allochthonous party secretaries from the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Zambézia, Frelimo’s prohibitions of ceremonies, and the rise of a range of expansive charismatic and African independent churches are all signs of a weakened traditional field. Such framing of weakening within experiences and practices of the soil, land, and rain is commonplace. These sentiments were also voiced by Eduardo, a former soldier in the FAM during the civil war. When visiting his household, I asked him during conversation about tradição and its strength after the civil war. He said,

Here the tchianhu wo atewe is very strong. Before you could not cross a river before asking permission. You had to pick a leaf from a plant on the riverside and drink some of the water from the river. That is how you asked permission before you crossed. But now, ah, people just cross. There is no respect. But tradition is very strong so because of this lack of respect there are problems. This is why there is much more uroi now than before.

Eduardo’s and the tchirenge’s visions of tchianhu wo atewe converge in their emphasis on the troubled relations between people, ancestors, and soil in the absence, subsequent nonpractice, and erosion of knowledge and recollection of traditional ways. What I have seen as processes of deterritorialization related to subsequent state formations above is here expressed in terms of the fractured relations to the ancestors and the radical discontinuity especially entailed by the civil war. Such a context of fracture opens up for increased uroi and paves the way for those whom the tchirenge perceives to be charlatans of various churches. However, knowledge of and reverence for traditional ways of relating to work, soil, and territory—as in the breech committed by the young woman with the sadza pot or people crossing the river disrespectfully—is never universally socially distributed nor, of course, has it ever been.

This nonuniversal distribution of knowledge corresponds also to the feature of contestation and dynamicity inherent to the traditional field: influenced directly or indirectly by the larger Frelimo modernist project, this dimension has been seen in significant socioeconomic changes to organization of land tenure, household organization, and produce of a kind that came about after the civil war. Shortly after returning to Honde
postwar in 1996–97, several women told me that a meeting was held in which the problem of men drinking nipa (liquor) was discussed. Nipa, I was told, made the men “lazy” as they would drink instead of work the machambas each household tended together. Further, when harvest came, men would carry off substantial parts of the crops to Chimoio to sell and proceed to spend their profits on extensive drinking sprees. Collectively Honde women thus decided that this system of machambas tended to by households needed to be ended, and—to much protest from the men—they introduced a radical systemic change that divided plots within households, each machamba tended separately by the wife and husband.

A dimension highlighted by this shift was the control women have in the households over preparation and, sometimes, the buying of foodstuffs—aspects integral to the gendered control of substances of production and reproduction. By altering these aspects that are seen as integral to and engrained in tradição, women gained control over produce and increased access to income generated from the labor on the machambas. This again, one must perhaps assume, shifted the gendered balance within the household somewhat in the favor of women.11

The reluctant postwar return included new forms of seasonal or sporadic relocations between Honde and Chimoio households that have also effected changes to the socioeconomic organization of labor on the machambas. However, these changes—which at least many women would subscribe to as positive—do not, of course, amount to gendered “emancipation” in any comprehensive sense. The basic patriarchal (and gerontocratic) structure of social organization in Honde in which female and male chores are spatially and hierarchically ordered prevails also postwar.12 Also, despite sociospatial shifts and in the control with produce, the changes occurred within a dynamic understanding of tradição where crucial dimensions of the flow, circulation, and control of productive and reproductive substances, hereunder especially magwere (maize) from the machambas, is intimately and strongly related to the domain of women (see also Bertelsen 2014b).

Despite these gendered changes to land, however, by women and men alike, transformations of Honde society and the relations to and workings on the soil are predominantly understood in terms of a violation of relations to the ancestors through periods of nonveneration and nonpractice of rituals. The lack of ndimo, the infrequency of rain, and the people’s problematic engagement with the nhika itself are experienced as unsettled by past and ongoing violent events. However, the nhika, with its enfeebled soil, also harbors significant spirits of disorientation and vengeance and ghosts of past transgressions.
Deterritorialized Spirits and Spirits of Deterritorialization

The enfeebled soil, the depletion of the zebra impacting *mbizi* clan membership, the changes to rainmaking rituals, and the alterations to gendered socio-organizational land tenure have their corollaries in the powerful presence of deterritorialized spirits and spirits of deterritorialization. Evidenced also by the presence of *makomerede*, the locations of Chimoio and Honde in the Beira corridor transformed these into heavily contested war zones during the civil war. Only in Southern Rhodesian soldiers’ attacks on ZANLA bases on 23 December 1977 in what was officially called “Operation Dingo,” two thousand guerrillas were killed (Flower 1987: 193).\(^{13}\)

The presence of these past struggles and dead soldiers is still experienced in tangible ways—most notably in the form of *tchiphoko*, a form of ghost, and as *pfukwa*. In Honde the majority of both are seen to be born out of the war, but the *tchiphoko* differ from *pfukwa* or other spirits in the importance given to the particular bodily condition at the time of violent death. The majority of the *tchiphoko* of Honde and surroundings are former *makomerede*, and being for the most part of Shona origin,\(^{14}\) the *makomerede* are in what we may call an “ethno-territorial” sense seen to be endowed with considerable powerful magical knowledge as well significant spiritual power. Upon death and as we also have seen in the case of the *tchirenge*’s inclusion in rainmaking ceremonies, the spirits of the *makomerede* are territorially and powerfully present in Honde. However, many of these are neither benign nor can they be placated through the social and cosmological mechanisms of inclusion represented by the *tchirenge* and others. For one, the deaths of many *makomerede* were neither committed by Southern Rhodesian troops nor Renamo guerrillas but rather by local people in unclear circumstances of predation. When talking to people in Honde about these deaths that generated the *pfukwa* of *makomerede*, I received responses often alluding to nefarious sorcery of the basest kind—the consumption of human flesh.\(^{15}\) A former Renamo guerrilla that had operated in the area during the civil war explained to me in 2005 the many and dangerous *pfukwa* in Honde:

> During the war, there were many people who ate the flesh of the *makomerede*. The war was very bad, you know. People did a lot of bad things. And because people ate the flesh of these, there are a lot of *pfukwa* from Zimbabwe here now.

This (bellicose) consumption of human flesh is central to the notion of *uroi*—and, in turn, *uroi* is central to the spirits’ deterritorialized state of anger and destructive potential. The *pfukwa* born of a person having...
been killed and robbed of goods—consumed in a social if not carnal sense—will potentially wander far and wide in search of his or her killers or their kin. Roaming the territory of Honde’s *aridzi wo nhika* are deterritorialized spirits, *pfukwa*, whose destructive capacity transcends the absorptive inclusionary practices of the *tchirenge*.16

However, there is also another presence making itself felt in the *nhika* of Honde—the *tchiphoko*. These are ghosts (and not spirits) generated often by wartime deaths, but where the potential transition to a spiritual state has been thwarted by the person's use of *mutombo*—traditional medicine, often obtained from a *n'anga* (traditional healer, see also chapter 4). Usage of such *mutombo* in warfare has, of course, a long history in Mozambique as well as in other African contexts (Nicolini 2006) and more generally (Whitehead and Finnström 2013; Farrer 2014). However, this usage is often marked by transgression and its price: while it may protect you in battle and beyond, it might also make you vulnerable to dying under its influence as it hampers your normal moribund journey from body to spirit, instead transforming the nonbodied person into a ghost—a *tchiphoko*.

In the war zones of Honde, the Zimbabwean use of *mutombo* had a corollary in the prowess with which Renamo troops also tapped this magical resource. As we have also previously noted, Renamo guerrillas did not merely see themselves fighting an ordinary war but—in the words of their leader Afonso Dhlakama—a “war of the spirits” (see also Wilson 1992: 541). This war of spiritual and medicinal proportions was often waged between Renamo and ZANLA guerrillas prior to Zimbabwean independence in 1980, when Renamo to some degree was sustained from Salisbury (now Harare). Later, Renamo also engaged postindependence Zimbabwean troops put there to guard the precious Beira corridor as well as to aid embattled FAM troops.

This protracted period of warfare has generated numerous places recognized as sites of battles or massacres that host *tchiphoko*. One such place, a hilltop not far from Honde, is generally regarded as haunted and to be avoided. As one young man explained in 2008,

> We have a lot of these *tchiphoko* here. A lot. Many of them are Zimbabweans. Those are much more dangerous than Mozambican ones, stronger. Haven’t you seen them at the mountain of . . .? At night *tchiphoko* come out from there. There was an entire troop of Zimbabweans who were killed there by Renamo. Just like that. It is very dangerous there. You cannot go there, and especially not at night!

Knowledge about the presence of *tchiphoko* is widely distributed, and also children will know of haunted and perilous places. In a landscape inscribed by war’s violence and destruction, sites of *tchiphoko* together with
spots where massacres took place and compounds that were razed constitute points of particular sociospatial and cosmological import. These are spots bearing particular witness to the past and are largely avoided when moving through the landscape. Gwanzas, the paths between compounds and localities, therefore index not only the fastest route but are also patterns manifesting evasion of potentially dangerous spots. The gwanza least traveled, very visible due to high grass or little dirt exposed to the feet, therefore often passes through or close by areas with tchipoko.

The tchipoko and gwanza in different but similar ways reflect ambivalence toward the past and the unease with which knowledge of the violence is inscribed and embedded in the nhika of Honde. However, walking the gwanza, one may also come across another spirit—tchawiwi. Tchawiwi is a category of spirit that has strengthened itself in the post-war period and also has a significant presence in urban and peri-urban areas. Being a spirit of the territory, the tchawiwi is not ancestral in the term of belonging to any particular lineage or person. Its force is, however, distinct in the ferocity of its attack and its immediate effects—differentiating it from general ancestral spirits (vadzimu), territorial spirits (gombwa), the pfukwa, and the tchipoko. Characteristically (and significantly) the afflicted is on the move—between two rural localities, between bairros in the city, or in transit between cities—when its presence is felt as a sudden and profound sense of disorientation and loss of general purpose. In a profoundly existential sense, the tchawiwi leaves one lost and displaced in—very often—settings that are quite familiar under normal circumstances. A typical experience was one recounted to me in 2005 by a young man living in Honde:

I was on my way one morning to [a nearby rural community] to drink duro when it happened. I was crossing a river and went into the forest. Going on the same gwanza I always use. Then, BAM! Chi! I did not know where I was anymore! I did not know what I was doing! I lost my way completely! I did not know what to do and I walked around aimlessly in the forest. The tchawiwi made me lose my way. Then, in the afternoon, I found a big tree. And I rested there a bit before I opened my bag of tobacco. I then knelt down, asked for my senses to come back to me, and did the huembera [ceremonial clapping of hands]. And then it [the gwanza] came back to me! I knew where I was—the path was only ten meters away!

In this and other experiences, the force of the tchawiwi is undeniable, as is its characteristic movability and flexibility. Further, it is seen to cover great distances and travel at great speed. In almost nomadic fashion, it is beyond emplacement—contrary to the case of the tchipoko. However, there is also another noteworthy dimension to the tchawiwi and that is how people perceive its purpose. An elderly woman in Honde, who is
the granddaughter of a chief from a formerly dominant lineage, underlined the *tchawiwi*'s significance in a conversation in 2008:

This spirit is movement. It is moving all the time—it may be here it may be there. You do not know! But it is there to protect *tradição*, to protect *tchianhu wo atewe*. When you encounter this spirit, you will think: “What is my plan? What am I about to do? What is good? What is bad?” *Tchawiwi* is not very dangerous but it is very, very important.

One dimension evident in this explanation of *tchawiwi* is that it is a de-territorialized spirit of *tchianhu wo atewe*, its roaming envoy, in a sense. It has the paradoxical capacity of appearing and disappearing abruptly when people are on the move, while at the same time posing fundamental questions regarding existential and social matters within a traditional framework. By decoupling your sensory system from the territory you are familiar with, the *tchawiwi*'s capacity is also one of reframing your understanding of self within the larger social and relational settings. In the attack, disorientation, and reframing, key concepts of morally right behavior are woven together with territorial and traditional dimensions of existence. This moral, social, and existential dimension is compounded by an additional comment frequently made that if attacked, “you will go uncontrolled” (*andar descontrolado*). In this context, “uncontrolled” is understood as purposeless movement and loss of direction. However, “uncontrolled” also suggests giving in to dark urges of criminal deeds, of being unfaithful (*andar fora*—“go outside”—again a territorial or spatial metaphor), or summoning the forces of *uroi*. Thus, a powerful creation or actualization of the traditional field, the *tchawiwi* forces onto its hapless victims a sense of self-comportment and self-reflection in regards to existential, social, and communal matters.¹⁷

Together, *tchawiwi* and *pfukwa*—spirits of deterritorialization and de-territorialized spirits respectively—are experienced as fundamental and often painful reminders of both past acts of violence and present transgressions. These experiences are compounded by the spatial presence of persons whose transition to spiritual existence was precluded by the double-edged capacity of *mutombo*, producing *tchipoko*. The crucial dynamic of *nhika*—territory—involved in these three entities is also central to the capacities of the *mhondoro*.

**The *Mhondoro* Deterritorialized and Reterritorialized**

The term *mhondoro* in its basic Shona sense means “lion” but more commonly refers to “a spirit of a deceased person of eminence held to reside
in the body of a lion when not communicating from time to time with the living through an accredited human medium—socially recognized as a source of supernatural power, authority and sanctions,” as Abraham defined it (1966: 28). In more ways than one, the *mhondoro* is the supreme entity coalescing the various ways in which *nhika*, the traditional field, and its beings—both human and animal—are integrated. The *mhondoro* or “traditional lion” (*leão tradicional*), as people in Honde and Chimoio often call it, differs in terms of capacity and orientation from what people recognize as and call “natural lions.” Often called *shumba* or *leão natural* in Portuguese, this type of lion is seen to be dangerous and potentially lethal. However, the ferocity and predatory being of the *shumba* can always be resisted and evaded by eliciting the services of a traditional healer (*n’anga*) and engaging traditional ways of protecting one’s body and belongings. A critical distinction is made, however, between the *shumba* and two other capacities and shapes the lion may take—both of which are generally termed *mhondoro dwozutumua*. Both shapes comprise “traditional lions” in the sense of being nonnatural in origin and spirit if not in guise.

The significant differences between the two shapes dawned upon me during fieldwork in May 2008, just as a *mhondoro dwozutumua* ravaged a neighboring community to Honde. There it devoured three women who had been walking on a main *gwanza* in the daytime. The animal or animals (people disagreed whether it was a group or one single animal) had attacked and killed the women, bit off their heads, and dragged their bodies into the *mato* to consume. Following the attack, 19 people speculated in conversations revolving around past and present contested political and social issues. A conversation I had with a young man who divided his time between tending his *machamba* and *matoro* in Honde and participating in *jumpaboda* (from the English “jump the border”)—the illicit practice of cross-border smuggling between Zimbabwe and Mozambique—was typical. As many others, he was certain of the nonlocal origins of the lions:

R: The lions were sent. That is what they say.
B: Who sent them?
R: They were sent by a country. They say it is Germany. The lions are here to create confusion [*confusão*].
B: Why Germany?
R: To kill and create trouble. Don’t you remember the case of eucalyptus trees and the way the Germans hunted our children? It is the same thing. They send bandits and they send lions and leopards.
B: But are they made?
R: They say they were raised in a park or perhaps outside the country. And there they were left with nothing to eat for two days. Then they were dropped off close to Gondola [a town near Chimoio].

B: Is it not possible to make a ceremony or protect oneself against these?

R: Mano [brother] Bjorn, if it had been a natural lion [leão natural], then you could make a ceremony to protect. But with this type that is made, you cannot. This type is called *mhondoro dwozutomuu*. It is made to bite, to kill this one. The traditional type of *mhondoro dwozutomuu* is to guard and roar only, not bite and maim like this. This type we have here is not new but it is different from the traditional lion. This one is very bad for the *machambas* here. No one wants to go. And the community police as well will not go.

B: Why do you not get arms?

R: Yes! But the government cannot do it—they have no power. You need special arms to do it. Renamo say that if it had been them in power, this could not have been possible. Renamo is more traditional. They could end this problem. But Frelimo are related to the bandits and want to fill their bellies only.

Evident in this case are several dimensions—one of which pertaining to a persistent preoccupation with international aid and transgression. In these popular conceptions, Germany and Germans are central to important accounts of abduction, killing, and consumption of children in Honde and beyond. In the account above, the young man mentions a specific project from the late 1990s wherein a German aid organization decided to use a swath of land close to Bengo (the prominent and traditionally important mountain overlooking Chimoio) to develop eucalyptus trees, supposedly as cash crops for surrounding communities. The project was apparently unsuccessful. The aid workers, however, made a more lasting impact as they stayed in Honde and other localities for some time, and a rumor developed that they hunted and devoured children. In many settings in Honde and beyond, therefore, “Germany” and “Germans” denote transgressive practices of *uroi*, such as the sorcerous consumption of human flesh. A second dimension relates to the divergent traditional capacities of Renamo and the Frelimo state: whereas Renamo’s past and present affinity with and embroilment in the dynamics of the traditional allocates them with considerable force, Frelimo is rendered impotent in relating to or confronting these threats—not even having appropriate weapons at their disposal.

Such aspects are largely absent in many analyses of the *mhondoro* phenomenon in Southern Africa—typically revolving around transformation of polities, the politics of mediumship, autochthony and allochthony, and issues of land. In contrast, the present analysis of the contemporary *mhondoro* phenomenon will revolve around the crucial
and conspicuous absence of the protective variety of mhondoro. At one level, such absence is telling of the dynamics of territorialization and violence in which the assemblages of state and the traditional field are crucially present. Naturally, the absence of the traditional and protective mhondoro dwozutumua has been a recurrent theme during fieldwork, and the following conversation in 2005 with Soares, an elderly male member of aridzi wo nhika in Honde, is instructive in this regard. As so many others from aridzi wo nhika, he complained about the current situation. This prompted me to ask why he or others could not ask the ancestral spirits (vadzimun) for protection and help against external threats like thieves or other problems:

S: Ah, we are suffering! We are still not “in line” [Ainda não estamos em linha]. But it is all beginning anew. Bit by bit.
B: You could ask the spirits to help, no?
S: Yes, we could. And we do. But before we used to have the mhondoro here as well. If there was a thing that was not good, you would hear it roar. And everyone … the régulo, his councilors, everyone would sit down and talk. We would resolve it there; understand why he roared.
Alfredo: [Interrupts and laughs] It was because I was sleeping around with other women!
S: [Laughs] Yes, it was like that. Today we have only the vadzimu [ancestral spirits] to ask for help. They will help. If it is this year or next, we do not know.

These firsthand glimpses from 2005 and 2008 both indicate the way in which the mhondoro is absent or transformed. Such an alteration is crucial as the mhondoro in Zimbabwean and Mozambican ethnographic analyses regularly is given prominence and is examined as a spirit of the “clan,” “tribe,” or family (Gelfand 1977), as a “national guardian spirit” of an ethnic group (Isaacman 1973), or in terms of control over land (Spierenburg 2004: 140–76). Further, for the context of Zambézia, Schoffeleers points out its plasticity in underlining that “in Zambézia famous persons, even missionaries and Portuguese traders, could become acknowledged territorial spirits (mhondoro)” (1992: 129). Thus, though it varies according to region and time, the mhondoro is one of the most powerful spirits that roams the land, and it is called forth in the context of possession to protect land, clan, and totem or to uphold cosmological and social order. However, there is also a crucial dimension of nonautochthony and detrerritorialization that profoundly shapes the mhondoro’s trajectory in time and space.21

In Garbett’s (1966) careful analyses of spirit mediums among the Korekore in Zimbabwe, this nonautochthonous and detrerritorializing
capacity is evident in his meticulous underlining of both lineal and territo-rial aspects of mediumship, on the one hand, and the formation of hierarchies of mediumships both integral to and independent of traditional polities and the colonial state administration on the other. A crucial claim in Garbett’s analyses is how “the territorial boundaries of the chiefdoms do not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of the spirit provinces. One spirit province may have boundaries which overlap with two or more chiefdoms” (1966: 144). The Korekore term mhondoro ye nyika that Garbett (1969: 107) translates as “spirit province”—a term that one may also interpret as underlining the man-animality character of the mhondoro spiritual guardian being and its relation to soil and territory—is nhika in chiTewe. Thus, the territoriality of the mhondoro and the power of its mediumship constitute politico-religious potentialities of great importance in the Korekore cosmological and social order.

In a review article on mediums, spirits, and societal change during the Zimbabwean liberation war, Schoffeleers (1987) points out another crucial yet intricate dynamic: that of the tensions between autochthony and conquest in the historical formation and development of the mhondoro spirit cults organized around or by a medium. According to Schoffeleers and mirroring Garbett’s analyses, the crucial dynamic of the mhondoro consists, on the one hand, of being embedded in the soil and territory—the nhika—and integral to the social and political formation of past and present autochthons. On the other, there is what one may call a centripetal orientation where it may attack the stability and order of its polity of origin. Such potentiality of attack may also be directed outward in the form of a capacity for expansion and in roaming beyond the territorial confines of the nhika and the sociopolitical formation of the aridzi wo nhika. This latter movement is centrifugally oriented toward conquest and expansionist modes of political strife involving processes of territorialization and deterritorialization. There is, thus, a double orientation in the mhondoro phenomenon where it is at once oriented toward nhika, or autochthony, and expansive conquest, or allochthony. This complex dynamic has led Garbett (quoted in Schoffeleers 1987: 148) to propose that the tense relationship between autochthony and conquest relating to the mhondoro “generates a contrapuntal process in which mediums act to weaken strong structures and strengthen weak structures, which gives to mediumship its characteristic movement between radical and conservative phases.”

Even though there are significant differences between the particular sociopolitical context of the Korekore and the contemporary Honde context—Southern Rhodesian settler colonialism and the Mozambican turbulent postcolonial order, to mention one element—Garbett’s anal-
ysis highlights dynamics of and tensions within the traditional field’s territorial orientation that have great validity beyond the Korekore case. In addition, another distinction of great import between the Korekore context and the present Honde must be made. In the latter context the relationship between nhika and mhondoro has been severed. According to one source, the last mhondoro medium in Manica Province and among the chiManyika was a certain Muredzwa, daughter of Mutasa Tendai, who died in 1933 (Abraham 1966: 29n1). This corresponds to my findings during fieldwork in Honde where all concur that there are, at present, no active mhondoro spirit mediums in the vicinity. Some also allege that the “the traditional lion is dead” (see Bertelsen 2003). However, even though the 2008 case evidences that the death of the mhondoro must be seen as prematurely announced, both historical and contemporary analyses suggest that the modes of interaction between people and mhondoro as well as polities and practices of mediumship have been fundamentally transmogrified. Arguably, the transformations have been most crucially experienced through severing the relationship between nhika and mhondoro. I will here outline some consequences of this severing concerning a territorialized and deterritorialized dimension of potentiality and before analyzing continuities in novel and present contexts of man-animality shape-shifting.

First, in Manica Province the potentiality of the mhondoro operating within a spirit realm was one where the mhondoro spirit “becomes the source of the fertility of the land” (Sætersdal 2004: 181–82). However, this mhondoro was not of the centric and sedentary kind; rather, its character and orientation was one of movement and speed. It was simultaneously embedded in the landscape and the very texture of the nhika, but it also appeared in situations where the social and moral order was threatened. In such cases—as we saw in the 2005 case where the roars of the mhondoro effected a collective addressing of ills affecting the community—it intervened to rectify.

With the mhondoro’s capacity of embedded movement—suddenly appearing and disappearing—its territorial orientation contrasts sharply the demarcations of formal polities of the state kind characterized by lines, formal hierarchies, and comparatively unambiguous spatial entities. Within the apparatus of traditional polities, as Garbett points out, it may work to weaken strong structures and strengthen weak structures. Its mobility is crucially both within and outside these polities and entities, resembling the agility, speed, and potency of the assemblage of the war machine kind (Deleuze and Guattari 2002 [1980]). However, with the ferocious Mozambican civil war, the attacks on Honde by Renamo violently transferred the mhondoro to the outside of the formal polities—
polities that had already been targeted by the colonial encounter and Frelimo’s postliberation social and political reordering. In the majority of accounts in Honde, the arrival of Renamo entailed the abduction of the mhondoro to the guerrilla movement’s headquarters in the natural park of Gorongosa. The mhondoro was thereby deterritorialized, reterritorialized, and sedentarized in the nascent Renamo polity of Gorongosa. Put differently, in terms of the assemblage of war machine developing into state—a process that Renamo in both a theoretical and practical sense undertook—the mhondoro was one such constituent part.

The violent de- and reterritorialization of the Honde mhondoro into the assemblage of the Renamo war machine invigorated it in powerful ways. For one, the mhondoro’s transferal from Honde to Gorongosa illustrates how the relative autonomy of assemblage components unfolds in the context of the civil war. In the case of Renamo, the violent appropriation of traditional “components”—to use somewhat machinic and technical terms—contributed to deterritorialize tchianhu wo atewe. However, it also served to bolster Renamo’s “war of the spirits” against the Frelimo state form—a war where the former’s particular sociopolitical force was premised on its self-styled protective role vis-à-vis the traditional field. With the end of the civil war, Renamo’s territorial domination of Gorongosa (at least in formal political terms) dwindled, and the mhondoro was again severed from its territory—this time from what we could call “the nhika of Renamo.” Its potency intact, its movement was again open to appropriation—and its force to reapplication.

For people in Honde, therefore, the reappearance of the malevolent and destructive mhondoro dwozutumua attacking, killing, and devouring three women in 2008 is conceived both as an effect of historical deterritorialization as well as in relation to the recent experience of German sorcerers. In this way the mhondoro dwozutumua emerges as the potent and malign version of the protective mhondoro that still has not reappeared after its violent deterritorialization at the hands of the colonial state, the Frelimo state, and the Renamo war machine. The 2008 trail of blood testifies to its lack of territory and mediumship, yes, but also to broader concerns of the traditional field as a whole where the protective apparatus of the state is seen as feeble. With a likewise enfeebled Renamo, Honde inhabitants were right to fear new attacks from forces of predation that have appropriated the mhondoro’s expansionist capacity and centrifugal orientation. On the other hand, the corresponding centripetal orientation, in other words its capacity to attack and weaken its polities of origin, may be actualized in future processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization where the mhondoro yet again may become integral to novel polities or sociopolitical forces of expansion or domination.
Man-Animality and the Deterritorializing Force of the *Mhondoro*

However, the *mhondoro* also exhibits what I choose to call “man-animality”—or what some early explorers to Africa called *lycanthropy* (Foran 1956): the transmogrification from human to animal form and back. The term “man-animality” seeks to analytically capture the continuum of transmogrification entailed by the dynamic shifts between different animal and human forms—a capacity of immense potentiality. Man-animality (or lycanthropic capacity) is well-documented in anthropological literature on Central and Southeastern Africa and to a large extent explored and understood solely in terms of sorcerers or witches. Linking man-animality to *uroi* is also the prevailing understanding in Honde and Chimoio, where accounts abound of both sorcerous shape-shifting and the use of animals for violent attack, murders, and predation.

However, man-animality is also part of political trajectories and its cosmologies and, particularly, popularly attributed to Renamo’s Afonso Dhlakama’s wartime ability to evade capture by FAM forces. Frequently in these accounts—and often narrated by people claiming to have witnessed it—Afonso Dhlakama undertook such a shift during a siege of Renamo’s headquarters of Casa Banana in what is now the national park of Gorongosa in central Mozambique. After being cornered and militarily outwitted, Dhlakama transformed into a partridge, spread his wings, and flew away to escape capture or death. This lycanthropic capacity of Dhlakama is long-standing in popular knowledge, and in the attempted ambush on his motorcade to assassinate him on 25 September 2015—allegedly undertaken by Mozambican security forces—Dhlakama is again widely perceived to have become a partridge. Specifically, local leaders in the District of Gondola explain in an interview on 26 September 2015:

> The association of Renamo with a partridge is not merely symbolic. Every time Dhlakama is involved in an ambush, he transforms himself into a bird and in this shape only with difficulty can someone identify Dhlakama in combat.

A striking feature of these powerful narratives from the civil war and from the increasingly violent tensions between the Renamo opposition and the government in 2015 is that Dhlakama in *becoming* (not being) a partridge in a decisive moment embodied or, perhaps better, *animated* the Renamo party’s symbol: the partridge (*a perdiz*). Dhlakama’s man-animalistic character and practice underscored the partridge as the *mitupo* of an imagined clan of the party. The vivid imagery of Dhlakama becoming animal may also be extended to his rain-bringing capacity—a feature whose social and political impact following the contested 1999 gen-
eral elections and the subsequent flooding I have elaborated elsewhere (see Bertelsen 2004). Rain and the capacity to control and direct water is integral to a region-wide perception linking power, sovereignty, and water, as Joost Fontein has also argued for Zimbabwe (2015a, 2015b). Both, Dhlakama’s man-animalistic character and rain-bringing powers reflect an appreciation of his alleged chiefly chiNdau origins—origins that would endow him with these specific traditional potentialities.

In the case of Dhlakama, the affinity with mitupo, territory, and its beings carries even more weight as there is a seeming continuity between Renamo and the well-established chiefly power to command the mato and its animals in cosmo-ontological understandings of power’s animalistic nature. Such continuities are not without precedent: as noted early by Earthy (1931b), there was in the 1800s a great chiNdau chief, Mafaringani, who refused to submit to the Nguni conquerors and their armies (see also chapter 2). At his command, Mafaringani kept wild animals like lions, leopards, and hyena that he had brought to his homestead and domesticated. The chief used the animals to hunt wild game for himself and his group. Mafaringani’s domestication and ruling of nature—of taming the ferocious nature of mato itself—were seen as testifying to his control of the great power associated with chiefhood and territoriality. It was also a vital source Mafaringani tapped in his fight against the Nguni invaders. Several scholars have also documented how dominance over and affinity with animals are in keeping with sorcerous potentialities. Shropshire (1929: 62), for one, documents how every Báruè chief of the Mutasa dynasty “at the time of his old age [must] sit on a live crocodile caught by [the man] Sa Humani from the Hondi River.” Another example is given by Garbett (1966) when describing the succession of mhondoro “spirit guardians” (mediums). Upon the death of such a spirit guardian, his spirit will live for some time with a lion host in the forest. Thereafter, the spirit will exit the lion host and the forest and find a man that it will trouble and make to act strangely, “making him wander through the forest and eat raw meat like an animal” (1966: 146).

The capacities to tap, rule, and accommodate the animalistic potentialities are also, then, crucial capacities of sorcerous shape-shifting, as we will also see in subsequent chapters. In this context, however, the transformative capacity of Dhlakama underlined not so much sorcery as the multiple and intimate connections between political formations, territory, and human-animal interaction and transmogrification. First, Dhlakama’s chiefly capacity is underscored by the transcendence of his human form into the mitupo of an imagined clan. Second, and more theoretically informed, Dhlakama’s actions may be understood as an instance of Garbett’s argument of the mhondoro cult’s capacity to weaken strong state orders
(and vice versa): by becoming animal and by employing the territorial potencies of the traditional field—a fact substantiated by the capacity to transmogrify into a partridge—Dhlakama’s man-animality embodies flight and mobility as powerful capacities in defiance of state apparatuses of capture. Both transmogrification and flight are contrapuntal elements, to use Garbett’s terms, to political formations of the state order type—the Frelimo state. Thus, Dhlakama’s lycanthropic shifting into a partridge and Renamo’s de-/reterritorialization of the mhondoro to Mozambique’s epicenter of spiritual power, Gorongosa, represent formations of political and social order that attack the formal state apparatus.

However, the reterritorialization of the captured Honde mhondoro at Gorongosa was not too successful as the case from 2008 also testifies: the resurfacing in Honde of mhondoro dwozutumua that are reared for malevolent uses by (agents of) foreign powers (Germany) also signaled the dwindling power and capacity of Dhlakama (and, perhaps, also being indicative of the disintegration of the Renamo party as such, see Cahen 2010). Further, it also supports—yet in a novel setting—Garbett’s initial thesis about the complex relationship between mhondoro cults and political formation steeped in the logic of autochthony and conquest. For Dhlakama and the Renamo movement—in the 2000s often sedentarized in Maputo, the Mozambican territorial heart of political power—the relationships between soil, ancestors, and polities that were violently forged during the civil war and epitomized by the capacity of the party’s figurehead to transform himself into a partridge and to control mhondoro have been challenged by reterritorializing capacities of alternative (and destructive) formations of political and social order originating from outside Mozambique but bred in Gorongosa.

In both its capacity for protection and destruction, the mhondoro thereby continues to reterritorialize through its flexibility, mobility, and rapacious appetite to maim and maul. These dynamics confirm the key ambivalent role of mediumship and its guise in the form of lion, on the one hand, and territorially in the form of spirit realms on the other, as argued by Garbett and others. However, in the recent contexts of upheaval—including the colonial state apparatus’s embroiling of traditional polities and cosmological order, Frelimo’s attack on what it saw as tradição, and Renamo’s bellicose appropriation of the same—a crucial trajectory of deterritorialization and reterritorialization can be identified.

First, it is clear from the previous cases that the structures governing the nhika and its traditional polities in Honde and beyond are characterized by flexibility, durability, and adaptability. This point was, of course, recognized by Garbett’s insistence on the contrapuntal dynamic of the mhondoro mediumship’s capacity vis-à-vis strong and weak structures.
In this dynamic of, for lack of a better term, counteracting practice, one may find the mechanism of a check on the pervasiveness of power in polities of chiefly rule. Empirically, this interpretation resonates with the mythical origins of the *mhondoro* cults in Zimbabwe and Malawi. One example is provided by Schoffeleers’s (1987: 148) critique of David Lan’s argument that the mythical origins in so-called “Guruswa”—meaning “long grass”—of the *mhondoro* cult of Mutota from Zimbabwe should be understood as a directional indication of lineage and home area (rather than a specific geographic area), as well as harboring all life. In contrast, Schoffeleers makes a comparative note and points out that “Chipeta,” the mythical place of origin related to the Mang’anja *mhondoro* cult in Malawi, is likewise cast as an originary source of life and, furthermore, “is also invariably described as a stateless society” (ibid.). This leads Schoffeleers to argue that the “Guruswa” in Lan’s case may also be associated with a chiefless society—an orientation that is, of course, also compatible with the contrapuntal dynamic insisted on and described by Garbett.

If we were to take the ideal of the chiefless society argued by Schoffeleers and the contrapuntal dynamic of Garbett together, an argument along Pierre Clastres’s (1998 [1974]) line of thought emerges. To recall from this book’s introduction, for Clastres the order of any state formation is inimical to multiplicity and the instating of sovereignty and hierarchy—the creation of what he calls “the One”—implies a wider antagonist relationship between society/sociality and the formation of state orders. Based on fieldwork in the Amazon, Clastres identified a number of practices that short-circuited and prevented potential and nascent hierarchical formations—especially the formation of strong chiefs and headmen (1994 [1980], 1998 [1974]). In his work, Clastres distinguishes how these social mechanisms work to prevent and attack hierarchy and the formation of the state order.

In similar fashion and informed by Schoffeleers, Garbett, and Clastres, one could argue for the *mhondoro* phenomenon exemplifying the ways in which the traditional field may serve as a repository of capacities for critique, attack and subversion of hierarchical and extractive polities. As should be clear from preceding chapters as well as subsequent chapters, there has been no lack in Honde of colonial, postcolonial, and wartime political formations directed at the extraction of resources, capture (of people, territory, labor power), production, and control. If held together by what I have argued is both a *centripetal* and *centrifugal* orientation of the *mhondoro*—i.e. both directed toward autochthony/its own polity of origin and allochthony/conquest of other polities and territories—both the mythical ideal of the chiefless society and its contrapun-
tal dynamic constitute features conforming to that of the war machine: it is both inside the state apparatus and tentatively controlled by it—i.e., the traditional polities among the Korekore, the Renamo abduction, and tentative control in Renamo’s Casa Banana headquarters in Gorongosa—as well as outside attacking polities and society, as in the most recent attacks by the *mhondoro dwozutumua*.

Despite its periods of absence, the *mhondoro* is vital to animating and socializing landscapes in terms of collective meaning, delineation, and productive capacities. In other words, the *mhondoro* and the *longue durée* popular recognition of its productive and protective capacities comprise a perpetual dynamic of territorialization and reterritorialization of landscape and space in the face of the colonial state, the violent forces of the colonial army, the liberation army, or the postcolonial state. The powerful and shifting spatial and territorial cosmologies and arrangements associated with the *mhondoro* may, therefore, be seen as a form of symbolic and practical sovereignty in its own right. As such it counters that of the formal, secular, and order-inducing state form.27

In countries outside Mozambique, it seems that the position of *mhondoro*-mediumship was a more long-standing practice than in the colony. This does not mean, however, that the view of *mhondoro* and the force of the lion in relation to *tchianhu wo atewe* faded away, but rather that the setting of this force and guardian spirit constantly seems to have been dislocated (see also Bertelsen 2003). As Abraham (1966) also argues, so-called *mhondoro* cults were repositories of what he calls “historical consciousness,” and they were crucial to intra- and intergroup conflict resolution. In addition, these cults also served as a dynamic protecting people against the potentially self-serving interests of a king or chief. With the coming of the colonial state in the guise of Portuguese settlers—often prospecting for gold and seeking control of territories—the *mhondoro* cults seem to have served, argues Abraham (ibid.), mediatory or resisting purposes vis-à-vis the colonial enterprise. Abraham (ibid.) cites an example during the Bárue rebellion in 1917 in which local *mhondoro* mediums attempted to intervene (presumably because they thought the rebellion would result in a devastating defeat, which it did). Much more recently, Schuetze (2015) analyzes how the *mhondoro* was seen to intervene directly in Gorongosa in 2006 when a British man serving as “community liaison” in a context of heavily contested natural park development transgressed a sacred mountain site. As the Brit returned from the visit, his brand new car mysteriously caught fire. This was interpreted clearly as an instantiation of the *mhondoro* intervening to protect the territory by undercutting the business-driven, state-led natural park development project.28
As a territorial spirit, the *mhondoro* thus represents a larger sociopolitico-cosmological dynamic with a mediative and flexible telos. With the Portuguese, the deterritorialization of the territorial *mhondoro* serves to exemplify the effects of colonialism as it was experienced in the province of Manica. Thus, the *mhondoro* is a practical example of the dislocating forces of violence and the encroaching colonial state, as well as testifying to the de-/reterritorializing potentialities inherent to the traditional field.

This does not mean, however, that the cases of the *mhondoro* merit the construction of an analytical narrative with the rhetorical chain being one of primary and pristine territory and order, followed by disorder and deterritorialization, and ending in a novel order and reterritorialization. This linear mode of representation and, indeed, the linearity of conventional history obfuscates the particularities of the crucial dynamics here: the centripetal, ordering, and territorializing aspects of state (here: colonial state polities) and the deterritorializing, reordering, and centrifugal aspects of the traditional field (here: mediumships and *mhondoro*). This is also evident, for example, in the case of precolonial states, as for Shaka Zulu: “In other cases conquerors have been powerful enough to wipe out the religious establishment and install their own functionaries, a prime example of this being Shaka, who upon rising to power, chased all ‘rainmakers’ from his kingdom” (Schoffeleers 1987: 148). Thus, in order to demonstrate political as well as cosmological supremacy, Shaka had all rainmakers killed in order to create the impetus for the new, well-ordered state and military machinery—a strategy resonating also with Ngungunyane’s killing of rainmakers. This example can also be mirrored in Samora Machel’s vision of a state and nation cleansed of superstition, colonial artifacts, and mindsets and rejuvenated and reordered in the image of scientific socialism. The juxtaposition of the two final examples, Samora and Shaka, demonstrates at a very basic level the dynamics and frictions between the state and its Other.

Machel’s and Frelimo’s deterritorializing attack on what they construed as *tradição* and what people in Honde and Chimoio saw as an attack on *tradição* or *tchianhu wo ateve* also meant inhabitants experienced themselves as vulnerable to the ferociousness of *mhondoro dwozutumua*: no longer embedded in polities deemed traditional nor controlled by Dhlakama, the *mhondoro dwozutumua* is now beyond perceptions of *autochthony*. Rather, it has been appropriated and reapplied by foreign agents of destruction and *conquest* in the form of external forces (i.e. Germans are seen to have also reterritorialized the former Renamo territory of Gorongosa). The subsequent forms of deterritorialization entailed by consecutive state formations in Manica Province—the most recent being
the postindependence state—has not, therefore, simultaneously engendered protective measures. The case of the *mhondoro* of 2008 exemplifies the last in a long line of effects of deterritorializing processes of state formation in Manica Province and Mozambique.

**Animal, Violence, and Deterritorialization**

Sociopolitical practices of the soil form crucial parts of experiences and perceptions of the traditional field. Nonetheless, these practices and understandings have been constantly attacked by different state formations and threatened by upheavals of war and violence. As an effect, the very soil itself is seen as enfeebled by the lack of *ndimo*, and the very relations between *nhika*, *vadzimu*, and people are weakened. A central feature of this situation is the creation of wild, deterritorialized spirits or spiritual beings—such as *pfukwa*, *tchawiri*, *tchiphoko*, and the *mhondoro*. Such beings point to the fact that as an assemblage, the traditional field constitutes a force that is somewhat unbound, mutating into novel forms and, thus, dangerous to the sedentary state formation. From the tentative, violent, and ultimately failed inclusion of the rainmaker under Ngungunyane to Frelimo’s unsettling of relations between soil, ancestors, and people runs a line of deterritorialization challenging the state and asserting itself as a part of an assemblage other than the state—that of the traditional field. Further, the urban territory is also the subject of constant renegotiation both historically and contemporarily. This was evident both by the reinscription of Ngungunyane into the urban landscape of Chimoio and the prior purging of the urban landscape of unproductive elements. For Honde, the profound violence of the past century has entailed a sense of loss and deterritorialization of *nhika*.

Overall, this chapter has shown that becoming of state in Manica Province does not conform to a linear process ending with the formation of the colonial or postcolonial state but as permanently being in the process of emergence. Territorially based—as all assemblages—the violent capture and territorialization of this becoming has entailed that crucial aspects of *tchianhu wo atewe* are experienced as unsettled and deterritorialized. However, this does not mean that the urban landscape—the predominant focus of the next chapter—is devoid of dangerous spirits or their interlocutors, or that the potentialities inherent to its assemblage have been muted, neutralized, or immobilized. As we shall see, the situation is rather the opposite, wherein the state is, yet again, engaged in a battle to control the unruly field of spirits, bodies, and their potencies.
Notes

1. The soil fertility of Manica Province is subject to comparatively high levels of depletion due to erosion and intensive farming (Folmer et al. 1998; Jansen et al. 2008). Generally, Mozambique’s soil belongs to the broad category of luvisols, which are sandy and nitrogen deficient, although regional and local variations make “any generalizations about ‘African soils’ highly problematic” (Scoones 2001: 19).

2. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with uroi and economies respectively.

3. For some early analyses of mitupo (also spelled mutupo or mutupu) rich in ethnographic detail, see Burbridge (1924), R. Baker (1925), Bullock (1927, 1931a, 1931b), and Earthy (1931a). See also Bannerman (2009) for a rough overview of mitupo in Manica Province.

4. H. P. Junod (1934) relates the mbizi clan to the ethnic category of Ndau, which, he claims, also dominates areas around Chimoio (then Vila Pery). This definition is problematic as it presupposes chiTewe as a category subordinate to Ndau—a hierarchy for which it is difficult to find an empirical basis. For another highly interesting but not wholly unproblematic construction of Ndau-ness projecting a sense of ethnic identity backward in time, see MacGonagle (2007). See also Sacaduro (1928a, 1928b, 1928c, 1928d) and Suana (1999) for works constructing contemporary and historical chiTewe as an ethnic category. For an analysis of H. P. Junod’s work more generally, see Macagno (2009).

5. See also Earthy (1931a: 78; 1931b: 101). In addition to the physical consumption of (parts of) the animal, Jacobson-Widding interprets mitupo prohibitions to encompass male-female sexual relationships: if these share a mitupo, they will effectively “eat their totem” by having sex and may suffer by losing their teeth, breaking their legs, or enduring cracks and sores on their bodies (1999: 297).

6. Hannan (1984 [1959]: 191) spells this spirit gombwe and lists it as a “hereditary name (especially chieftainship),” “a guardian spirit,” and a “medium of tribal spirit.” In contrast, in Honde it is predominantly related to as territorial and as denoting guardian spirits in the plural.

7. This term for “November” is noted as early as 1796 by the Sofala governor, Carlos José dos Reis e Gama, in his famous Reposta das questoens sobre os cafres (“Reply to the questions about the Kaffirs”), reprinted in Liesegang (1966 [1796]: 23). Interestingly and in contrast, Hannan (1984 [1959]: 199) lists Gumiguru as “October.”

8. In these rituals, women of a child-bearing age were never included. The importance of women that are either prepubertal or postmenopausal has been explored in terms of rainmaking by Sætersdal in the more complex elaborate rainmaking rituals among chiManyika close to the Zimbabwean border (2004: 178–94). Vijfhuizen (1997), likewise, interprets rainmaking in a Zimbabwean context to the importance of women in the rituals. In one of her influential works on Shona material, Jacobson-Widding (1999: 184) relates the participation of postmenopausal women in rainmaking ceremonies to gendered hot or cold distinctions. Although the aspect has not been studied in any detail in Honde, it is likely that the inclusion of this category of infertile women bear
similarities to dynamics identified by Sætersdal, Vijfhuizen, and Jacobson-Wadding respectively.

9. Interestingly, while these spirits are “de-allochthonized” by the autochthonous rainmaker, the forcing of rainmakers’ capacities by state formations that are seen as externally created or imposed by conquest is problematic. This we have seen in the case of the Nguni head Ngungunyane who summoned the rainmaker Munjakanya but was unable to control and contain his forces, which flooded the lands, underlining what I argued was the barrenness of externally imposed rule in general or allochthony more specifically (see also Bertelsen 2004 for an argument of postwar political cosmologies involving such capacities).

10. The connotations of the term commuter (“eat”), as in “Churches for eating,” is a significant aspect of responses to the vast array of Pentecostal and charismatic churches in Mozambique’s rural and urban areas. The conflicts between these congregations’ so-called profetes and traditional healers, n’angas, will be dealt with in chapter 4.

11. But for an argument about the marginalization of women from land, see Kaarhus and Dondeyne (2015). More generally, the Mozambican literature on gender, war, and social change is substantial. However, there is little agreement on whether Frelimo’s liberation war and postindependence project, the civil war, and the ensuing post–civil war liberalization with a proliferation of informal markets has entailed improved economic, political, or social positions for women (see Urdang 1989; Waterhouse and Vijfhuizen 2001; Sheldon 2002; Bonate 2003; Chapman 2010; Arnfred 2011; and Katto 2014 for some positions within this debate). Interestingly, using material from wartime Chimoio, Chingono (1994, 2015) argues convincingly that the urban experience of (also many originally rural) women during the civil war created spaces for entrepreneurship that shaped the broader social organization and also, consequently, gender roles. If Chingono is right, however, it might also be these experiences that induced Honde women to shift their traditionally recognized responsibilities in terms of productive and reproductive capacities to what they saw as their advantage.

12. Visualizations of such gendered separation and a general overview of a compound are provided in figures 4.1 and 4.2 in chapter 4.

13. This figure is contested and for instance Mubaya et al. (2016) reports more than three thousand were killed. Generally, this so-called “Chimoio massacre”—as it is widely documented that many of those killed were children and other non-guerrillas—has a prominent role in the postcolonial memory politics of both Zimbabwe and Mozambique with, for instance, a memorial erected at the site near Chimoio (see also Werbner 1998a, 1998c).

14. Roughly, ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army), the forces of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), dominated the Shona-speaking areas and also the Mozambican areas of operation while ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army), the forces of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), dominated Ndebele-speaking areas of the west and southwest of Zimbabwe. There has been tension during the liberation war and beyond between these parties as well as, evidently, between Ndebele and Shona in general.
15. While *makomerede* guerrillas were normally under strict guidance from so-called *mhondoro* mediums in Zimbabwe in terms of conduct, when crossing into Mozambique they saw themselves as free from these as they also then had crossed into another “spirit province” where they no longer were autochthonous. This led many to have unrestrained sex, consume taboo foods, and generally behave wildly (Lan 1985:218). See also Garbett (1966, 1969) for politico-religious aspects of spirit provinces and spirit realms.

16. A number of works exist on the different spirits across Mozambican regions. See, for example, A. Honwana (1996), Igreja (2003), Luedke (2005, 2006), Marlin (2001), and Schuetze (2010).

17. The *tchawiwi* resonates with other moving spirits, especially those associated with wind. In an early travel diary, Eckersley (1895: 42) notes that it is curious how “the Manyika” he encounters in his travels in the vicinity of Chimoio are perturbed and hide when they are met by winds. These winds were perhaps perceived as *mhepo* and thus dangerous to the travelers. *Mhepo*, literally meaning “wind” or “air,” is the name of a particular spirit whose foremost capacity is to disarrange and complicate a household in a material, relational, matrimonial, and wider social sense. The similarities to the likewise territorial *tchawiwi* is evident in its destructive effects, although greater capacity is normally ascribed to the *tchawiwi* and the *pfukwa* than *mhepo* (see also Suana 1999: 115). *Mhepo* in Gelfand’s classic analysis of what he calls the “tribal tutelary spirits” is seen as connected to *Mwari*—the supreme being whose ubiquitous presence is likened to that of air that passes in and out as breath in the form of *mhepo* (Gelfand 1959: 13). Friedson’s (1996) work on the Tumbuka healing practices in Malawi also devotes ample space to *mphepo*, which he translates as “spiritwind.” Also D. Moore in his rich ethnographic work from Zimbabwe notes how wind in the case of a prophet from a charismatic church is related to her capacities when she climbs a mountain ridge, as she explains, to “be where there is more wind. We go where there is more power (*simba*)” (2005: 234). However, winds may also be destructive, and they are the sign of armies of witches, an aspect H. A. Junod noted in his studies of Thonga society (1962 [1912]: 510): “If a tempest has uprooted trees and broken branches, people are sure to say that the ‘army (yimpi) of the baloyi [witches]’ has passed in the shape of a terrific storm during the night.”

18. Even though some Portuguese-language texts and sources refer to the term as *mpendonolo* (Oliveira 1976: 103) and *pondoro* (Sacaduro 1928c: 379), and other English language works spell it *mondoro* (Burbridge 1924: 18ff), *mpondolo* (Marwick 1965: 90), or even *mpondoro* (Claudio 2006: 55f), in keeping with the chiTewe pronunciation this text will use the term and spelling *mhondoro*.

19. I made several attempts to locate the families or households of the three women, establish their names, search for news in the Beira-based regional newspaper *Diario de Moçambique*, as well as talk to a wide network of people in Chimoio to establish additional facts concerning the case, which happened a few days prior to my arrival. Only some non-Honde-based people supported the story, while others doubted it. However, the unanimity that characterized the fear of the *mhondoro dwozutumua* in Honde testifies to its significant impact.
20. For some classic studies, see Burbridge (1924, 1925), Morkel (1930), Holleman (1953), Abraham (1966), Garbett (1967), and Isaacman (1973). More recent studies, such as Lan (1985), Schoffeleers (1987, 1992, 1999 [1979]), Spierenburg (2004), and Israel (2009, 2014), analyze more directly the integration of the mhondoro in political strife, colonial encounters, and forced migration.


22. But also see for example Ruel (1970) on “were-animals” in Banyang communities in Cameroon. Further, a well-known variety of this man-animal relationship is the so-called “sorcerer’s familiars,” that is, animals that are the sorcerers’ servants, messengers, spies, harm-doers, or thieves. Examples include the owl or the hyena among the Cewa (Marwick 1965) or the sending of leopards, lions, snakes, or oxen to “inflict bodily injury upon him,” as Schapera describes with the Tswana (1970 [1952]: 113). Such pan-African accounts are also reflected in Manica Province where a rich depository of stories on man-animal relations in Manica Province is documented by Artur (2013).

23. See, for instance, H. A. Junod (1962 [1912]a, 1962 [1912]b) and Shropshire (1938: 177ff). The limitation of examples to this geographic-ethnographic context does in no way preclude comparisons with other historical periods or regions of the world—although this is beyond the limits of this text. See, for example, sources as disparate as Viveiros de Castro (1998, 1992 [1986]) and Fausto (2004, 2012) on the transformative capacity of shamans into jaguars in Amazonia, M. A. Murray’s (1918) early anthropological analysis of witches shape-shifting in Great Britain and France, or Stewart and Strathern (2004: 148f) who point out that lycanthropy was the subject of a Papal Bull of 1409 attacking the problem of men and women that in the guise of wolves devoured children. Based on archaeological, ethnographic, and historical data, T. Taylor (2002: 241) also argues that shape-shifting is global, being “bears in Scandinavia, wolves and dogs in Greece and Rome, tigers in Malaya, hyenas and leopards in parts of Africa, jaguars in South America, and so on.” Taylor’s argument is supported by Behringer’s (2004: 12–13) generalizing and universalizing argument that transmogrification or shape-shifting is a universal characteristic of the witch.

24. My translation of the quote “A associação da Renamo com a perdiz não é mera simbologia. Sempre que Dhlakama é envolvido numa emboscada, ele se transforma em uma ave, de tal forma que dificilmente alguém pode identificar Dhlakama em combate,” taken from Cuna 2015.

25. Comparatively interesting, also Jacobson-Widding documents how, for instance, the current Chief Mutasa in the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe is approached by women who “crawl slowly towards the king on their knees, with their gaze fixed to the ground, pretending to growl like a lion,” thus underlining the king’s lion (shumba) potential (1990: 50). These intimate links between sovereignty, the forest/bush and its animals, and chiefly or kingly authority and power are, however, not confined to the larger Shona areas as Luc de Heusch has shown based on Central African and other material (Heusch 1991).
26. For an excellent comprehensive analysis of war and postwar realities in Gorongosa, see Wiegink (2014).

27. There is, of course, a great difference between the colonial state formations of the Portuguese and the formations of the Gaza state in this respect, as seen in the preceding chapter. The Gaza state, although sharing a number of features of statehood with the colonial state—and in many respects sharing more features with a conventional nation-state than the fragile colonial state—was also predicated upon an orientation toward integration with notions of land, its ownership, and spiritual protection and order. Nevertheless, as argued above, it was largely experienced as inimical and external for the majority of non-Nguni inhabitants in Manica Province.

28. Matema and Andersson (2015) also present a comparable case of mhondoro attacks in the context of contested conservation developments in northern Zimbabwe. Also in that case the mhondoro is seen to act violently, unpredictably, and autonomously on behalf of the territory.

29. In Honde terms, the mhondoro could, thus, be seen as a midzimu ye nhika in contrast to the spirits of the domestic sphere and relevance—the midzimu ye pamusha.
4

Body

Illness, Memory, and the Dynamics of Healing

There is a veritable cult of health among the Southern Bantu, but the physician is more a physician of the soul than of the body.

Rev. Denys Shropshire (1938: 107)

When residents of Chimoio and Honde talk of the forceful and potentially perilous dimensions of spirits, healing, and illness, they frequently relate them to *tchianhu wo ateve*. Spirits, which embody various potencies and capacities, are integral to diurnal and nocturnal lives in urban and rural contexts alike. As shown previously, a wide range of spirits exhibit dynamics of re-/deterioralization. Further, people relate to ancestral spirits, so-called *vadzimu*, in annual private rituals to secure the well-being of their *dzindza* and household, or they participate in more elaborate communal rituals led by authorities like the *tchirenge*, who invoke the ancestors’ protection from drought. In these rituals, the territorial ancestral spirits (*gombwa*) constitute (assemblages of) persons without bodies that participate, shape, and intervene in the social practices, all while being integral to the soil and the very landscape and its yields, as we saw in chapter 3.

In this chapter, we will turn to another crucial dimension, namely how in times of illness, distress, and recurrent problems people frequently elicit non-biomedical assistance from various forms of healers. Analyzing bodily and spiritual afflictions and their remedies, this chapter will describe a contested topography of healing and argue that this
social field is one characterized by spirits and healing potencies constituting forces that inherently upset hierarchical and structured sociopolitical orders of the state kind. Specifically, this chapter will analyze the categories of n’anga and the profete—two powerful figures who intervene and are implicated in the domain of bodily and spiritual healing.

Often entitled curandeiro (male) or curandeira (female) in Portuguese, the n’anga may be described as a “healer-diviner” with multiple spirits at her or his disposal (or mercy, depending on perspective). Approaching a particular spirit and eliciting its power is undertaken in ritual settings by the n’anga to locate causal patterns and attempt various treatments of a range of individual or collective afflictions. However, during the last decades, the n’anga has in these regions of Mozambique been challenged by a second figure, the so-called profete (see also Maxwell 2006; Luedke 2011). The profete treats less by means of autochthonous or nonautochthonous terrestrial spirits, being more fully integrated within a Christian framework wherein, especially, the power of the Holy Spirit, the force of God or energy in various versions of scripture, is tapped directly in healing rituals. Whereas the profete is related to that broad variety of Christian-oriented congregations dubbed African Independent Churches—and often Zionist churches among those—the n’anga’s healing authority is situated within the context of remedial plants and substances, insights into the malevolent forces employed by the muroi, and knowledge of what is perceived as the tchianhu wo atewe of treatment.

The vibrant and expanding practices of the n’anga and the profete capture key cosmological relations between body, spirit, and the past that are ubiquitous in people’s everyday lives: the production of food and the construction and repair of houses, the circulation and movement in the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio, the toiling in machambas or urban markets, the cycle from birth to death—all also concern the well-being of the living by addressing the specific and tangible transformation of bodies into spirits, spirits reinserted into bodies in their possessive states, or the needs for bodily protection and evasion of danger. Being central to sociopolitical realities in Chimoio's bairros and Honde both, the n’anga and the profete address the vitality of life on several planes as well as the import of body and spirit and the potencies involved in the configuration of these.

Specifically, this chapter will substantiate and elaborate further the argument of deterritorialization that characterized the mhondoro and other spiritual forces and argue that the domain of spirit, illness, and ritual is largely rhizomically directed. Through exploring cases of healing and suffering in the context of n’anga, profete, and family rituals, it will be evident how these are irreducible to the private, personal, or
individual domain. Rather, in these settings the violence of the state and the processes of capture and deterritorialization described earlier are experiences both inscribing themselves in the landscape as well as sedimented in practices related to illness, spirits, and ritual. This is not to say, however, that relations between spirits, illness, and ritual may be seen as unidirectionally conditioned by—or being depositories for—sociopolitical processes of state formation. Rather, the opposite position will be presented. First, by emphasizing the social forces inherent to the domain of ritual, illness, and spirits, the chapter will highlight that despite forces of violent territorialization and the perpetual becoming of state, the potentialities contained in this field remain one of perpetual change and redirection—often against forces of the state order. This will particularly be evident in the case of the n’angas and the profete. Second, the chapter questions two related dominant trends in analyses of illness, healing, and spirits. For one, it aims to broaden the scope of earlier works that, albeit rich in ethnographical material and important detail, tend to rest on insular analyses of bodies, spirits, and matters, often confining them as a result to the spaces of the ethnic, the traditional, or the religious. Also, the chapter will contrast analyses that, despite frequently being well-attuned to sociopolitical trajectories and evidencing theoretical sophistication, might nevertheless be said to subscribe to a vision of commodification and marketization of the whole field of healing practices—often also interpreting these practices within a framework of an (alleged) global onslaught of neoliberalism with (again alleged) universally comparable expressions or local forms. While acknowledging the impact of neoliberal reform for reordering Mozambican society, this chapter will highlight the necessity of incorporating state practices and interventions for understanding these dynamics.

Through presenting the historical trajectory of individual healers, this chapter shows that their formation and potentialities as well as private rituals of healing are intimately linked to the processes of deterritorialization and to historical instances of state formation—both described in previous chapters. On the basis of these points and the material that will be presented, this chapter will argue for the potentialities and dynamics of these fields comprising rhizomic forces of deterritorialization that upset and evade sociopolitical orders of the state kind.

**Bodies and Spaces of Healing and History**

The narrow red clay paths and minor roads meander between households through the bairros. These maze-like neighborhoods encircle and
Violent Becomings

contrast the world of the urban center, the *bairro cimento*, with its rigid grid of paved roads that crisscross a landscape of cement houses, private cars, and businesses—the domain of politics, wealth, and the state. The glaring difference between the spatial orderliness and forced directionality of the *bairro cimento* grid and the non-grid of the paths and communication routes in the *bairros* constitutes an almost iconic spatial image of the state project and its encompassment by the social: changeable, dynamic, and “noncadastralized” paths versus the striated urban spaces of the state.

In contrast to such slightly romantic juxtapositions, however, it is important to note that Chimoio *bairros* have been forged by violent trajectories from the colonial period through civil war. These historical realities impinge on the present in ways that are irreducible to universalizing accounts of barren, postcolonial slums (cf. Davis 2006). Moreover, *bairros* are urban and sub-urban spaces replete with social organization, services, and facilities. The kiosks (*banca fixas*) selling basic goods in markets or along the paths are as ubiquitous as the businesses of making and selling *nipa*—the strong homemade liquor—in households doubling as bars. But there are also other significant, visible features of the *bairros*, namely the healing practices of *n’anga* and *profete*.

**Illustration 4.1.** Banner of a *n’anga* in Chimoio, January 2007. In addition to using the term “traditional healer” it also uses the Portuguese term “*curandeiro*”—probably to underline the *n’anga*’s versatility. The banner illustrates afflictions that may be cured, which are “tuberculosis, diarrhea, asthma, evil spirits.”
In many Sub-Saharan African contexts, an argument can be made for the commercialization of “traditional healing,” and that this trend has reached great proportions—especially in the cities (Sanders 2001: 174–77; Simmons 2006). Many interlocutors also testify to the impurity of urban healers “soiled”—in a sense—by the lure of money, by severing relations with ancestral wisdom, or being suspected to also peddle in the dark arts of nebulous accumulation of which urban rather than rural areas are seen to be more prone. Expressed by the *tcirenge* above, in popular discourse many also equate the *profete* and the *n’anga* with the so-called “money churches” (*igrejas do dinheiro*)—churches widely believed to solely be set up in order for money to condense around its central preacher or leadership. For vitally important concerns of health and well-being, great care as well as skepticism is therefore taken by families and individuals to choose a *n’anga* or a *profete* that is “pure,” whose *mutombo* (medicine) is powerful, and whose treatment is effective. In the rural-urban continuum of Chimoio and Honde, the skepticism toward urban healers frequently involves either the suffering to relocate to sites of treatment and power or to attract these healing agencies to the site of affliction by calling on *n’angas* and *profetes* to travel. But why such a prevailing connection between the urban and the impure?

For one, the notion of urban impurity relates to the practices by the immediate postcolonial Frelimo state, which included the cleansing and reordering of urban space—especially during its period of *Operação Produção* and its villagization campaigns in the early to mid-1980s. As detailed earlier, this entailed an ousting of traditional elements from the cities, not a total erasure of their social, political, and broader societal role as was Frelimo’s aim at the time. Rather, traditional elements of healing and authority shifted toward the rural areas, underlining the state- and Frelimo-centric aspects of the urban formation. Importantly—and this is a general point—state space is neither experienced as neutral nor should be analyzed in terms of neutrality. This is substantiated by the violence of state becoming in terms of the civil war, the postcolonial purging of urban domains, the Frelimo state’s subsuming and reorganizing of the social according to party doctrine—all processes testify to how dimensions of past state violence is also spatially embedded.

Moreover, the ousting from the cities of people deemed traditional intersects with the fact that for many in Manica Province (and generally in Mozambique), Gorongosa comprises the ultimate site of power and potentiality in terms of healing, power, and the traditional (see, e.g., Igreja 2014; Wiegink 2014). This territorialization or, rather, *spatialization* of potentialities of healing and power feeds into past and present...
politics as Gorongosa was a zone dominated by Renamo during the civil war (and continues to be a hotbed of violent strife from 2010 onward).

In sum, the dual elements of a striating (urban) postindependent state and the locus of Gorongosa feeding into different national cosmologies of spiritual custodianship jointly produce a preference for and ideals of the rural in terms of healing. Constituting a particular tangible line of flight in a Deleuzian sense, these dimensions seem more salient for explanation than universalizing theories of commodification and neoliberalism (Pfeiffer 2006) or conceptualizations of an urban modernity undermining the existence of healers (cf. Englund and Leach 2000).

In generalized discourses, the trope of the mato or, at least, the nonurban is therefore represented as an ideal context for healers. This allocation of power to the nonurban may partly explain the skepticism toward urban healers frequently perceived as involved in money-making scams, being without real power (i.e. lacking the authority of autochthony), or being tricksters or malevolent characters altogether. However, in my material, most interlocutors seek assistance more or less in their immediate environment, identifying potential healers by a combination of following word of mouth, a healer’s general reputation, a person or family group’s kin relation to the healer, proximity, and the expenses involved. Although the nonurban ideal (and its epicenter often cast as Gorongosa) remains important, accommodation to immediate needs becomes the dominant social practice, entailing one to maneuver between alternative sources of addressing affliction.

In identifying a n’anga or a profete, there are signs to look for. For the n’anga this is often the tchitumba tchonanga—the characteristically circular building where the therapeutic sessions and consultations (kugat-sirwa pananga) take place. It is considered that the tchitumba tchonanga structure more directly taps into the spiritual and traditional field and a similar circular design still dominates muturica (houses) in rural areas such as Honde. In the bairros, however, square houses made of mud, wood, or (burned or unburned) bricks with roofs of plastic, thatch, or corrugated iron predominate.

In structural terms, the round shape may be integral to an overarching and regionally widespread aesthetic encompassing astronomical and geometrical dimensions, as the important works of Mozambican ethnomathematician Paulus Gerdes underline (see, e.g., 1991, 1993–94). A more immediate explanation, however, has been provided by people in Honde and Chimoio: the round shape evades the creation of crevices and corners—spaces of danger where pfukwa or spirit animals sent by muroi may lurk. This benign roundness of shape and smoothness of surface find their corollary in the notion of crossroads, as we saw earlier,
which are dangerous as they constitute intersecting lines and thereby potentially opposing and conflicting trajectories and forces. The malign potential in both crossroads and the rectangular hut are similar in the sense of being examples of what one may term “nonsmooth” space. Smoothness allows for general visibility, not in a formal Benthamian panoptic or in an institutional sense of bureaucratic transparency, but in a social sense: locating the round shape visible from all sides renders the space of the n’anga and others open to the gaze of the household, community, and neighbors. Given the ambivalent role of the n’anga—widely seen as potentially delving into as well as warding off uroi—visibility provides a potential check on his or her practices. Through being set apart from the rest of the household and the surroundings in general, the tchitumba tchonanga comprises a visible marker of the prospects of healing and of the potencies of the traditional, as well as embodying a powerful spiritual locus in the social and physical landscape.¹⁰

For the profete, the marker of their practice, abode, and place of healing is often in close proximity to the so-called African Independent Churches, where they frequently hold prominent positions as so-called bishope or president (see also Luedke 2006, 2011). The Zionist churches in Chimoio flourish (Pfeiffer et al. 2007; Seibert 2006), and new congregations are formed each year. The new churches often center around individual characters, and, given the ebbs and flows of powers to heal

Illustration 4.2. Tchitumba tchonanga or “the house of the n’anga” with its typical round features. The house is made exclusively for kugatsirwa pananga or “consultation and healing at a n’anga.” Chimoio, 2005.
Violent Becomings

and obtain contact and rapport with God, congregations often disintegrate as followers dwindle. However, this rise and fall of congregations, the constant revisions and reinterpretations of scripture, and the novel practices also testify to the volatility, dynamism, and constantly mutating character of the African Independent Churches more generally.

Historical inquiry indicates that the penetration of Manica’s urban and rural landscapes by, especially, the Pentecostalist movements has persisted for some decades. Maxwell, for example, examines the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God movement, which set up its first congregation in Chimoio in 1970 and by 1977 had fifty congregations in Mozambique (2006: 99). Further, research suggests that after World War II, African Independent Churches—many of them Zion-oriented—grew rapidly (Seibert 2006). The Portuguese colonial state, fearing that these could foment anticolonial activity, surveilled these closely (ibid.). Newitt also notes that after World War II, colonial police authorities had records of over thirty such churches in Manica and Sofala—the largest having three thousand members (1995: 478). Compared to other Southern African contexts—as in Angola which has had strong religious-political currents in, for instance, the so-called Tokoist Church (see Blanes 2014)—in

Illustration 4.3. The Zionist church Zione Jerusalem Kanaan Jehova, where Shona is spoken and which in January 2005 had six profetes under the leadership of one of these who additionally held the position of bishope. The male entrance is on the left and the female entrance is on the right. Chimoio, 2005.
Mozambique, however, the presence of churches was not strong except in the south before the end of the Portuguese Republic and the formal creation in 1933 of Salazar’s fascist *Estado Novo* (“New State”) that lasted until 1974 (Newitt 1995: 436).

Combined, the comparatively weak standing of missionaries and churches set up by non-Africans together with the long-standing formation of African churches and congregations in Manica Province point to the force of deterritorialization and lines of flight that we saw earlier—processes exemplified by the constant migration to and from Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and beyond as we also saw in the previous chapters.11 In Manica (as elsewhere), both the Pentecostalist movement and African Independent Churches must therefore be approached in terms of historical origins, their appeal to communalities, and their creation of new socialities, rather than be reduced to African responses to the onslaught of neoliberalism, as some argue (see Pfeiffer et al. 2007; Pfeiffer 2002 in particular) where the churches are in effect represented as merely reactive to external intervention and force. This argument problematically resembles the colonial settler paradigm of state formation addressed in chapter 2 in that both allocate agency nearly exclusively to external, powerful, and formative forces in the guises of European colonialism or neoliberalism respectively.

Both *profetes* and *n’angas* are, thus, long-standing and crucial parts of the social and physical landscape of Chimoio. Their practices and their engagement with spirits also constitute forces that upset sociopolitical orders—also of the formal state kind—and thus bear resemblances to the *mhondoro* mediums of former polities as argued in the preceding chapter. The similarities rest with the centrifugal and upsetting capacities of the *n’anga* and the *profete* and how these capacities are met by the current state formation’s attempts at control—attempts mirrored historically from Ngungyane to Dhlakama. Although similarities abound, the powers and capacities wielded by *n’anga* and *profete* diverge in significant respects, as we shall see in the subsequent cases.

*Profete* Healing: Extraction and Consumption

Visits to the *n’anga* or the *profete* are made with prospects of healing, locating causal relations behind afflictions or misfortune, or warding off or protecting against further mishaps and disease. Often—and as a test of the *n’anga*’s prowess and capacity—one does not appoint a time for the first consultation. At these first visits, the *n’anga* or *profete* will in conversation with the visiting person and their companions talk and
tell more than listen, creating in a sense a speech genre (Bakhtin 1986) wherein his or her authority over the ailings and sufferings of the patient is asserted. The patient, if convinced by the utterances (in a Bakhtinian sense) of the n’anga or profete will then agree on a certain time to return to address the specific problems.

An outline of a typical visit to a profete may elucidate the logics of treatment involved. In João’s case from 2005 it was in order to obtain two interrelated objectives: kufunga muiri, “the closure of the body,” and kudussa muia zacaipa, “the pulling out of an evil spirit [from the body].” João, a man in his forties, had his house repeatedly broken into and he has been mugged once. In addition, he has fallen sick several times during the past year, a threat to his productive capacities in the machamba as well as to his role as protector of his wife and their household’s four children. João’s ailments are thereby not restricted to his body and person alone, but they threaten his household and kin, underlining how well-being needs to be seen as relational and irreducible to individuation (see also A. Honwana 1996, 1999). After consulting kin, close family, and friends, João was in the end given a recommendation for a particular profete by his mother, who attends the church where the profete holds the position of bishop (bisape).

At around 5:00 PM, João arrived to the courtyard of the profete. I was waiting there, as João had allowed me to accompany him. Early the same morning, we had been there together for the first part of the treatment, which came in the form of copious amounts of liquid mutombo held in a five-liter plastic bottle containing a slightly brownish, milky liquid. This bottle given to João, and he was told to drink a large cup morning, noon, and night. Made with water, condensed milk, Zimbabwean Tanganda tea, salt, sugar, and various other ingredients, the mutombo, according to the profete, “washes the stomach and the insides.” Now, however, we sat and waited for the profete, and João took the opportunity to again comment on her virtues. When I queried as to why he trusted her, he commented her physical stature: “She is fat. That means she has a lot of power.” “Why?,” I asked. “I do not know. It is like that,” he said, having proven his point. And he was right: in a context where many bodies are shaped by hard physical work and life-long toil and evidenced by a diet high in carbohydrates and hardly any fat or protein, many profetes’ bodies stand out, literally, by being (and referred to as) very fat.

After João arrived, we were immediately sent by the profete’s assistant, her niece of around fifteen, to the room used for healing. The room is located in a rectangular structure—unlike the round structures of the tchitunga tchonanga—made of mudded walls and with a plastic covering for a roof. The few objects in the room consisted of some plastic bot-
tles, 1.5 to 5 liters, containing liquid and nonliquid forms of mutombo, a bonde (a woven straw mat) on the floor, and a white robe as well as several headscarves hanging from the ceiling. The two of us sat down on the floor and the profete immediately entered. João hastened to give her the objects he was asked to bring: a piece of red, white, and black cloth; a few pieces of corn; some beans of the nhimo type; and a broken piece of a pendekari (a clay pot for preparing sadza). She received the items and put them beside her for later usage. She then put on the white robes and a white headscarf and sat down in front of us. In the forehead of the headscarf was a red star shaped like a starfish. Tied around her waist was a string rope in red, black, green, and blue that corresponded to the colors of crosses—one for each color—on her robes. She smeared some Vaseline on her arms and face and started to blow softly in a small metallic flute while beating a black, slender, wooden rod on the ground at the same time. Following this, she bowed her head and spoke in a subdued voice in chiTewe, appealing to the spirits to reveal themselves. These immediately appeared in the form of a powerful, hoarse and dark “HE!” uttered by/through the profete. She called for her niece to be present, and the young girl again entered the room bringing Tanganda tea. Thus began a more intense part of the ceremony, and both niece and profete each sat with two ceremonial rattles (gosho) in their hands. The women turned toward João and started to sing and use the rattle; after a while, João joined in the singing as well. Sometimes the profete would let out the same deep, hoarse voice, a sure sign of a pfukwa. Increasing in intensity, she finally stood in front of João, put her hand on his head, spoke intensely, and, at the height of rattling, singing, and talking, with a dramatic hand movement pulled out something from João’s body.

Following this, she sat and spoke with her normal soft, light voice, but it was impossible to communicate with her. Both the niece and João uttered things like masquati (“hello” in chiTewe) without her responding initially. She uttered only sofreu maningue (“he suffered a lot” in Mozambican Portuguese) and replied to herself with the affirmative ehe! (“yes”). The niece stood and left the room, returning with a cup of water on a plate for the profete. The profete sipped and suddenly blew water with great force in João’s face, startling him. She then gave João the shard of the pendekari holding the three pieces of cloth. After she instructed him, he spit on them. She then took the shard to the doorway and left it there. She would later take these out and destroy them securely—having extracted the danger from João’s body.

This was followed by another session of prayers with the dark, hoarse voice, where she stood before João, holding him on his stomach, and interrupted the flow of words with a violent “HE!” several times. Having
finished this the profete sat down, leaned her back to the wall beside João, and spoke to him about his now newly acquired protection. Meanwhile, the niece had collected a twig from a bean plant (ndodzi), which the profete used to beat him with lightly while saying his name at the same time. With no other formal ending, the session ended, and the profete removed the robes.

Illustration 4.4. Objects João brought the profete photographed before they were presented. Chimoio, 2005.
In this ritual and the preparatory visit in the morning, there are elements of extraction and consumption that are important to the dynamics of healing for both profete and n’anga. Central to the possession of the profete was the extraction of tchikume—danger—from the body of João. Tchikume is seen as a dangerous matter that has entered the body. While in the body, tchikume will infect and affect relationships and the immediate surroundings of the afflicted by endangering, making ill, creating destruction, or generating death. Again, treating tchikume is central to healing, underscored also by its dramatic extraction at the height of the ritual. In terms of post-extraction treatment, tchikume is usually transferred to a vessel such as clothing or a coin (as we will see later) and either burned or buried (at a crossroads or deserted site). Ritual and bodily logic, however, demands that once opened and tchikume has been extracted, the body needs to be filled with protective and benevolent mutombo so as to prevent new affections of tchikume and to kufunga muiri—“close the body.”

The forms of mutombo used by n’angas and profetes vary greatly, and especially the former use a vast array of different herbs, leaves, roots, and other drugs derived from flora or fauna. These may be administered as concoctions, bundled up in small packages worn close to the body, smeared on the body directly, or infused in either boiling water where the fumes are inhaled or the water itself is used on and in the body. As mentioned, many profetes are consciously seeking to distance themselves from n’angas, often through using mutombo to a much lesser extent. Some profetes, therefore, rely solely on the power of water that they have previously treated ritually, as well as the force of the scripture, prayers, or the Holy Ghost, which these profetes access, channel, and redirect.15

The extraction of tchikume, however, needs to be complemented by consumption in order for, in this case, João to achieve renewed protection. A trend among profetes in Chimoio seems to be the provision of large amounts of mutombo in a liquid form for consumption over a longer period. In João’s case, the liquid has strong symbolic and material connotations and similarities to other fluids and their strongly gendered and healing potencies. Especially, it is akin to a vaginal fluid in frequent use by married women for the cooling of sick children, the tempering of drunk husbands, or the cooling of corpses of husbands (Jacobson-Widding 1989: 29; see also Bagnol and Mariano 2008). Jacobson-Widding argues that vaginal liquid shares some properties with mother’s milk in terms of neither being hot nor cold—thus capable of cooling down dangerous conditions like disease. Luc de Heusch (1982a), the influential structuralist, developed the notion of thermodynamics as an approach to ideas of cold, heat, gender, authority, and a range of other
dimensions. In the Manyika material, Jacobson-Widding (1989) has, however, developed a related argument that approaches disease, healing, and the agents, situations, and circumstances as connected with destructive (but also constructive) heat and fever in contrast to its corollary in cooling down. Jacobson-Widding extends these gendered material symmetries to also propose that the semen is the “white blood” of men where vaginal fluid is the female equivalent, and that when these mix during intercourse, a powerful and productive meeting between ancestral forces takes place (1989: 41).

De Heusch’s basic thermodynamic as developed in Jacobson-Widding’s Manyika material significantly mirrors my own from Honde and Chimoio—and very clearly in the case of the profete’s mutombo “milk” given João: the mutombo underlines her soothing, cooling, and protective capacities by alluding to fluids known for their benevolent effects within the dzindza. In this session, the milky mutombo was used together with salt—a very potent agent used to cool down the magical power of uroi (see, also, e.g., Kalofonos 2008: 160). For João, it is probable that salt was an important part of the treatment as it “washed” the body and, thus, defused tchikume possibly still lodged within his body. This technique to cleanse the body has its parallel in the defusing of uroi or other attacks on physical structures, such as a house. For instance if one wishes to ward off attacks, salt should be sprinkled around the house, in its doorways, and also, sometimes, on the perimeter of the swept area immediately between mato and courtyard in order to prevent its power from materializing or repelling attacks by muroi. When consumed orally and as it courses through the body, the potentially dangerous orifices are then protectively “sprinkled” in the same way as the openings and peripheries of the household or other territorial and spatial zones of danger. Protecting the orifices carries import, as it is through these—especially the mouth—that dangerous matter, for instance poisoned sadza, enters the body (see also Bertelsen 2011, 2014b).

Another significant ingredient in the mutombo was the Zimbabwean Tanganda tea—crucially demonstrates the strengths of the healing agent (n’anga or profete) by providing a (tangible) relation to the powerful Shona. As we have seen, the makomerede spirits are manifold, angry, and potent in postwar Manica given their propensity toward vindicating themselves after having been killed unlawfully or without proper funerary rites. In the life story interviews I have conducted, a great deal of the n’angas and some profete possessed (or were possessed by) Shona spirits from the time of the war or previous instances of predation.

Together, these potent ingredients made the milky liquid with a brownish tint a powerful concoction that through consumption extracted fur-
ther potential *tchikume*, secured protection, and asserted the authority of the healing capacities of the *profete*.

**N’anga Healing: Addressing Matambudziko, Extracting Tchikume**

Similar elements of healing can also be found in the account of a young man in his early twenties from Honde named Celso who needed to consult a *n’anga* for protective purposes in 2007. Celso was the second oldest son of Ana and Antônio in the household where I lived in Honde, and I have known him since his early teens from my first fieldwork in 1999–2000. Although not yet a man who had established his own household or with a wife for whom he had paid bride-wealth (*kurora*), Celso’s afflictions were of a similar kind to João’s. Living in what he perceived as poverty and tending his *machamba*, his crops did not yield well and he suffered from recurrent *malaria*. In his own words, his life was one of *matambudziko*—“sufferings”—a plural term often used to describe a composite condition of experienced poverty, marginalization, and lack of well-being deriving from present and past conditions and problems. However, as the suffering had recently increased, Celso used money he had pooled from his family (especially his elder brother and sister, father, and a maternal uncle) to visit a *n’anga* who would

![Illustration 4.5. Example of objects used for possession by a *n’anga*. Chimoio, 2005.](image-url)
hopefully end or ameliorate his troubles. Celso was adamant that all n’angas in Chimoio were charlatans interested only by his money. Thus, he decided to visit a woman living on the outskirts of a much smaller nearby town, Gondola, who had come recommended by acquaintances but whom he had not yet encountered. He suggested I could join him.

Upon arrival after a three-hour trip by bus and on foot, we sat and chatted with the n’anga under the mango tree providing shade over the

During the conversation—which related to everything else than the purpose of our visit—we were treated to water, fruit, and a lunch of sadza and beans. After some time, we were both invited into the tchidoma tchonanga. As in similar visits I have made, the n’anga had a range of mutombo in different woven containers upon display, a ceremonial rattle (gosho), and different and potent parts of animals and birds. First, Celso was asked to wipe his face, forehead, and back of his neck with an MT 1,000 coin (about USD 0.20). While resembling other

instances I have participated in—i.e. to preliminarily extract *tchikume*—here, however, the *n’anga* took the coin, looked at it, and beseeched the spirits, “Show what he has brought.” During the ceremony in the *tchidoma tchonanga*, Celso was not asked any direct questions, but the *n’anga* gained insight into his situation through a powerful so-called *tchikwambo* spirit that had possessed her after she had given birth to her fifth child. To locate the source of the afflictions, she varied between asking the *tchikwambo* spirit and throwing eighteen halved dark brownish *mungoma* nuts on the *capulana* (cloth) in front of her. The ways in which these arranged themselves when thrown and collected, again and again, gave her more information for locating causes and prescribing remedies for Celso.

As in the example of the *profete*, an important contribution to Celso’s condition of *matambudziko* was the lack of spiritual and bodily protection that had allowed *tchikume* to enter, making him the object of envy of others and also making him vulnerable to disease. After the *n’anga* had located causes, she opened the containers holding a wide range of *mutombo* and selected and prepared three. The first, made of a root, was to be infused in a bucket of water when Celso returned home and into which he was to insert his left foot only. Left, in this and many other contexts, signifies deviation, things past, and is generally associated with negative issues. By extracting *tchikume* through washing this particular foot, the difficult past condition of *matambudziko* is, literally speaking, left behind, and the strength of the right foot—associated with moving forward without deviation—is empowered and reasserted. The second piece of *mutombo* was to be mixed with a bit of Vaseline and deposited in a *pendekari* pot no longer in use. Thereafter the pot was to be put on the fire while Celso stooped over it and inhaled the smoke from the mix as he would be underneath a piece of *capulana*. This measure would end the problems of attracting the envy of others. The third, made into a bundle the size of a button and fitted in the wallet, was to generally protect against danger and be carried at all times. After paying for the services, Celso was told to return in a week for a second part of the treatment.

Celso completed the cleansing measures he had been instructed to undertake, and we returned the following week. The *n’anga* then executed several rituals aimed at extracting residual *tchikume* from his body. The most elaborate and lengthy of these consisted of Celso sitting stooped over a pot of boiling water in which several pieces of wooden and herbal *mutombo* were floating while under a piece of red and white cloth. The concoction was kept at a boiling temperature and emitted a lot of steam, as burning hot stones from the fireplace were added to the pot three
times. Likewise, fresh pieces of mutombo were also added three times. The heat and steam under the cloth made Celso sweat profusely—the sweat containing the tchikume from his body and dripping into the pot. While he stooped over the pot, the n’anga stood over him, three times dashing him with a green twig that she had previously dipped in the boiling hot water. After some twenty minutes, the n’anga in a dramatic move tore the cloth off of Celso’s body, asking him to empty the pot outside the swept courtyard and, therefore, in the mato (bush). Emptying the pot signaled the disposal of Celso’s last remnants of tchikume.

**Kutenda Adzimu Edu: Ritual, Family, and Protection**

For both profete and n’anga, we see that access to the body of the afflicted and extraction of tchikume from it are complemented by the consumption of mutombo to re-close and re-strengthen it. The rituals of Celso and João can be usefully contrasted with another—the kutenda adzimu edu, or “thank the spirits”—that is held annually in all rural households in Honde (and in many urban ones as well). The mnemonic aspect is important, as the risks of spiritually induced misfortunes or other mishaps in the wake of forgetting the vadzimu spirits are great (for the living). If forgotten, one risks the vadzimu will abandon their protective measures, provoking, for example, miscarriages, serious illnesses, or agricultural pests in the machamba (such as swarms of grasshoppers). But at important occasions—for instance after someone has survived a serious accident—there is also a need to reinforce the protective measures secured by the vadzimu. In these situations, returning to one’s dzindza and paternal family’s household is crucial and often prioritized before consulting a n’anga or a profete to close the body or to secure one’s own household against enemies.

The ritual at the paternal household itself is often quite simple, as it was in Paulo’s case when we entered his paternal family’s muturica in Honde one early January morning in 2007. Paulo had just been released from prison in Chimoio where he had been held on suspicion of having committed theft and immediately returned to Honde upon being let out. Only close family members (besides the anthropologist) were gathered in the dimly lit house that grew even dimmer when the door was closed. Paulo respectfully presented his father with five liters of portugaro, one liter of nipa, and an old 1,000 MT coin. The father thanked the son for bringing the gifts, and then we gathered around a tin plate (normally used for serving sadza)—women on the one side, men on the other, and children outside the adult circle. Women sat on several bonde,
men on low benches, while Paulo’s father commenced by standing on his knees, beating his palms against each other rhythmically (kuembera), and calling on baba (father). All women and men present joined in on the kuembera, clapping rhythmically while Paulo’s father poured nipa onto the plate after first having put the 1,000 MT coin there. While clapping, he asked the spirit of his baba and other vadzimu to renew the protection of Paulo, Paulo’s family, and himself. Then he continued by pouring red wine onto the plate, the two liquids mixing until becoming a pink fluid with the coin glimmering faintly in the dim light from the cooking fire. The kuembera continued while Paulo was given a tin cup of nipa to drink, followed by Paulo’s father, and then the other men. The same procedure was repeated with the portugaro, and then a third round was passed with a mix of portugaro and nipa. After this the kuembera stopped, the door to the muturica opened, and there was a general mood of relief as the ceremony had been conducted well. In the hours to follow, the good mood continued as all participants—including the women—drank the remaining portugaro and nipa in a festive manner.23

This petite and obviously greatly varied ceremony of kutenda adzimu edu is important neither for its rich symbolism—although there are some aspects on which I will elaborate—nor for its material dimensions, but rather for its social and spiritual significance and its proliferation. All households and larger family and kin groups—dzindza—hold (or aim to hold) such ceremonies annually and after important events and mishaps. They are, thus, important loci for establishing and reconnecting rela-

Figure 4.1. Muturica interior as seen from above.
Rituals with as well as placating their powerful and important vadzimu. As such, **kutenda adzimu edu** is oriented toward generating familial lineage cohesion, underlining the socially important aspects of unity, continuity and mutual support—as in the case of Paulo. The thoroughly social, familial, and practical orientation of **kutenda adzimu edu** also demonstrates the predominantly non-professional and noncommercial aspects of spiritual and religious activities for the majority of people.

### Healing, History, and Hierarchies of State and Sociality

Oftentimes, the noncommercial aspects of healing are neglected—especially in studies that are informed by understandings of a materialist bent. These often portray dealings with (ancestral and other) spirits as enshrouded in a veil of suspicion where the analysis often casts doubt

**Figure 4.2.** Simplified spatial layout of **kutenda adzimu edu** carried out within a **muturica**, as seen from above.
on the experiential and fundamentally socially significant realities of ritual and healing. West and Luedke’s (2006) analysis of healer-diviners is a case in point: in foregrounding aspects of *bricolage* and entrepreneurship among the *n’angas* and *profetes*, on the one hand, and accentuating the fluidity of practices or nascence and demise of spiritual types on the other, these analyses do underline important features of the *n’angas* and *profetes*. Simultaneously, by imposing a universalizing template of entrepreneurship they are reductive in the sense of *eclipsing* the central social realities of healing *ichikume*, the volatile nature of spirits, and the vitally important familial rituals. In these analyses healing practices are seen as largely money-making devices for those speculative enough to enter these supposedly murky and unenlightened (in all senses of the term) domains. By extension, these positions also by default relegate those remaining practitioners of the field (who cannot be identified as dynamic entrepreneurs) to a residual category: the necessarily stale, nondynamic domain of “folk medicine” with its implicit and explicit antimodernist assumptions.

As tentatively outlined ethnographically in the cases above, one alternative to the entrepreneurship perspective is to recognize the penumbra between fluidity, experience, and potentiality—or the “agency of intangibles,” as Blanes and Espírito Santo (2014) usefully coins it. If applying such a perspective on the three cases above, the vibrancy and potency of its social reality remains prominent. By underlining the importance of the social I mean, of course, in no way to banalize, dehistoricize, or “culturalize” the rituals and their cosmologies by presenting them merely as ubiquitous practices and beliefs held equally by all—devoid of dimensions of gender, power, discontinuity, and distribution. Quite the opposite: as practiced now the rituals are historical products in the sense of both linear time represented in master narratives of history, as well as the particular histories of individual households, dzindza, and their members embedded in particular (collective or individual) memories or speech genres. With Deleuze (2004 [1968])—always celebrating and emphasizing the (potential for) “non-stasis”—one could claim these rituals are perpetually in states of *becoming*, not *being*, as in given a predefined shape, scope, structure, linearity, and trajectory. What is in the making or becoming arguably reflects deeper social and cosmological structures beyond the disparate and particular—structures that also evidence symbolic and systemic continuities in time-space (see also Abramson and Holbraad 2014). Put differently and very concretely: the calling upon *baba* (father) during the *kutenda adzimu edu* expresses what one can analyze as hierarchical and patriarchal features of social organization in the rural-urban continuum under study.
In these ritual contexts, the active and collective remembering of the paternal spirit serves to mirror and reinforce the nonspiritual and mundane social and spatial organization of the bodies of the yet undead. How individual bodies are positioned vis-à-vis others in ritual settings involves articulations and registers of hierarchy, familiarity, and formality crucial to social order. For instance, when approaching classificatory (that is, genealogically or status-wise) elders, one’s posture should feign inferior physical height, lowered toward the ground in an embodied display of respect. This means that if the classificatory elder is seated—on a low wooden bench or a wooden chair as often is the case with men—one should refrain from standing beside or directly in front of the elder and preferably find a seat on a lower point and at a certain distance. One should also refrain from physically approaching someone of superior status face on, drawing nearer instead from a slightly askew angle, and stopping at a respectful distance. One’s presence should be made known by exclaiming *pamsoro* (“excuse me”)—which is granted by the reply *pindai* (“come in”)—or by uttering the title of the one approached in a respectful manner, such as *baba* (“father”), *baba mkuru* (“great father”), or *mai mkuru* (“great mother”). In addition, one should evade direct eye contact—at least this goes for the first part of the encounter and before one is familiar—as this might be interpreted as a challenge to preestablished hierarchical relations. Another example of such hierarchical, striating, and, ultimately, arborescent dynamics within the social order, is the *kuembera*—the clapping of hands in certain rhythms and sequences after a decision has been reached or a session of sorts has begun.
to engage in the *kuembera* is seen as disrespectful as it is one of the most visible (and audible) signs of deference to authority or commitment to community. The *kuembera* also reveals crucial gendered dimensions of bodily comportment and posture. When meeting in a ritual setting (e.g., *kutenda adzimu edu*), for example, while men and women will be seated in separate spaces, women will always face the main spectacle, orator, or other event from an angle, slightly askew.25

Such arborescent bodily registers of hierarchy and gender are, however, constantly challenged by the dynamics of *n’angas* and *profetes*, as a great number of these are female who possess—and are possessed by—a range of powerful male spirits, which, crucially, originate in nonlocal geographical contexts (typically Zimbabwe, Malawi, Gorongosa, southern and coastal Mozambique, etc.). In this way, the rhizomic character of these female healers is fueled by an allochthonous potentiality—a force uncontained by and antagonizing toward the gendered, hierarchical, and, in the context of Honde, patriarchal structure that is, ultimately, also an order of the state kind. Put differently and as part of a broader field (rather than a striated hierarchical order), the rhizomic dynamic may in this context be seen as an “interlocking web. It is a conjunction of dynamic relations—producing bulbs here and there, interweaving with great complexity, reaching outward in its continuing growth. It represents the principle of dynamic, varied pluralism that absorbs the hierarchical structures of the tree” (Kurokawa 2001[1988]: 1028).

For female *n’angas* and *profetes*, the gendered aspect of such a rhizomic, multiplying orientation is crucial, as their prevalence, influence, and potentialities significantly—and commonly—reorder relations within households, sometimes also hierarchical relations between husband and wife or father and son. Thus, in their differing capacities, *n’angas* and *profetes* have significant leverage in terms of changing trajectories of particular *dzindza*, households, and individuals to the point of challenging arborescent hierarchies of sociopolitical order—whether these are embedded in the formal bureaucratic apparatus of the state or that which is often represented as *tchianhu wo atewe*. Moreover, these female *profetes* and *n’angas* are also in themselves inverting and traversing hierarchies by establishing themselves (as) beyond the confines of bounded gendered social and physical space.

Such capacities to challenge are, of course, also conditioned by noteworthy sediments of the longer process of colonization, commodification, and bodily toil—sediments especially evident, perhaps, in the *kutenda adzimu edu*: here, the *portugaro* signifies the blood and sacrifice of former generations’ deaths at the hands war or colonial or state-organized violence. This blood is diluted by or mixed with *nipa*—which represents
the sweat of ancestors’ bodies.\textsuperscript{26} The use of \textit{portugaro} and \textit{nipa} in \textit{kutenda adzimu edu} and also in rituals of rainmaking seen in chapter 3 indicate a continuously generated social formation of memory of a violent past—often expressed in ritual and communal contexts.\textsuperscript{27}

Given the long history of state capture, the extraction of labor from households, and the predation by colonial and postcolonial violent forces, “Portuguese blood-wine” and ancestral sweat seem appropriate vehicles for expressing exploitation, loss and suffering. However, they are \textit{not} merely material reminders of past injustice and violence; rather, they must also be seen as evocative and multisemic symbols (\textit{Turner 1991 [1967]}]) of power, vitality, and life—dimensions that are reasserted in the ritual settings of healing. The white of \textit{nipa} corresponds in color to protective ancestral spirits, \textit{vadzimu}, an element also evident in the \textit{profete’s} cloth, the \textit{n’anga’s} use of cloth covering for, for example, Celso, and the black and white cloths of rainmaking ceremonies. Additionally, red indexes the most powerful spirits, those often borne out of violent deaths, such as the \textit{gamba} and the \textit{tchikwambo}. \textit{Gamba} is recognized as the most powerful of the two and often emerges as a result of killing and robbing travelers or returning labor migrants (often from South Africa or Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe).\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Tchikwambo} is also the result of violent death in war or conflict, or as a result of murder.

Both \textit{gamba} and \textit{tchikwambo} are, thus, important spirits within the generic category of evil spirits, \textit{pfukwa}, in the sense that both will tirelessly search for the killer or his or her kin and, when found, will cause misfortune and illness.\textsuperscript{29} Most \textit{n’angas} (but also many \textit{profetes}) will possess \textit{tchikwambo}, \textit{gamba}, or a great deal of other spirits—spirits that have at one point approached them and that they have either appropriated or become mediums for—depending on perspective. However, ordinary people afflicted with \textit{tchikwambo} or \textit{gamba} will seek a \textit{profete} or \textit{n’anga} to locate causal relations, often resulting in the spirit demanding compensation. Compensation may take several forms and I will briefly mention only two that are most relevant.

The creation of a so-called \textit{gotokoto} (“spirit goat”) comprises a key form and entails purchasing a regular goat (preferably black and male) and bringing it before a \textit{n’anga}. The \textit{n’anga} will then ritually transfer the malevolent spirit into or onto the animal. To ensure that the spirit stays with the goat and does not regress to its former victim, a piece of cloth (often red or black) is tied around its neck into which some MT coins are put. The spirit—malevolent and greedy—will then pursue the sound of the money, and the \textit{gotokoto} will be let loose in a deserted area in which it will roam freely. Recognizable by the cloth tied around its neck and acknowledged as a mobile vehicle of considerable destructive
and unpredictable forces, the gotokoto must be avoided, apprehended for neither sale nor consumption. If caught or consumed, the potentially rhizomic capacities of the gotokoto’s spirits may again be directed against the sociopolitical order, as well as against individuals or dzinda.30

Another measure available—and one that is arguably important given Mozambique’s long trajectory of conflict—is that of the marriage of women to malevolent spirits. Such prospective male spirit-spouses, born out of violence, are usually unwilling to accept compensation (for instance in the form gotokoto); or there are spirits that, for various reasons, reject being incorporated within localized spirit realms (as was the case with many makomere de spirits in chapter 3). In order to refrain from further damage to dzinda or individuals, especially in the domains of fertility, health, and reproductive capacities, a solution for the spirit’s afflictions is to marry a woman. This arrangement, where women married to spirits are called mukadzi wo mudzimu, meaning literally “wife of the spirit,” involves a process wherein women will gradually train to become n’anga (or, more rarely, profete) in order to placate, soothe, and “cool” the “hot” rage of a particular pfukwa. The element of cooling down is integral to a wider system of hot/cold distinctions—elaborated earlier in terms of healing—in which a newly created spirit is commonly considered “hot.” This potentially destructive heat of a new spirit is commonly counteracted in various ways—from duro (traditional beer), central to burials, being poured on a recent grave to gravesites for important aridizi wo nhika (owners of the land) being located in cool surroundings, typically close to streams or under shadowy trees.31

While mukadzi wo mudzimu is well-known across various social and political contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa (and beyond),32 in Honde a key dynamic revolves around placating the sorrows of the spirit who—bereft of life and therefore also reproductive possibilities—cannot beget children. Spirits lacking children will generally be believed to have few family members or kin to commemorate them and will sometimes be forgotten, although there is always the opportunity of becoming socially incorporated through communal rituals—again as we saw in chapter 3 in the rainmaking ritual where spirits of makomere de and others were recognized and placated. There is also a considerable emancipatory element involved for the woman being possessed by and marrying the spirit—she thereby wields a great force and considerable power in matrimonial and social aspects alike. In terms of marriage, the existing husband (if there is such) will become second to the primary male spirit-spouse. This also entails that all children born after becoming mukadzi wo mudzimu belong to the spirit-husband. As also noted, many mukadzi wo mudzimu also become n’anga, a role in itself dually commanding great
respect in most social circumstances but also challenging gendered hierarchies and arborescent orders more generally.

In all three ritual cases noted earlier and inherent to the dynamics of gotokoto and mukadzi wo mudzimu, extracting tchikume from either the individual or social body, often through a vessel such as a coin, is a central element. Paulo, therefore, wiped his head and torso with a coin, swiping off—as it were—the tchikume of his body in a practice called kudusa tchikume, transferring it to the metal object at the center of the metaphorical blood of violence and war and the sweat of forced or unforced labor. In the first case previously discussed, the tchikume was taken care of by the profete directly; in the second case, the n’anga indirectly handled it by having Celso pour out the concoction; and, finally, in the familial situation of kutenda adzimu edu, the tchikume was dissolved in the plate. This extraction and redirection of tchikume is always followed by insertion of mutombo and also the closing of the body or property. Such extraction and consumption constitutes significant elements of bodily-spiritual interactions in which the potencies of substance (bodily, medical, diabolical) are treated, their circulation ensured or enhanced, or their destructive entry or circulation barred or repelled. Gotokoto and mukadzi wo mudzimu show, however, to what

**Illustration 4.9.** A gotokoto photographed as it was running away—the tied cloth around its neck is visible. Honde, 2005.
degree interaction with the vadzimu is embedded in the spaces of everyday life. Contrarily, and this is important, it is not relegated to a domain of specialization, commercialization, or being solely under the control of ritual specialists. Further, both the cases of gotokoto and mukadzi wo mudzimu evidence that particular spirits and their forces are in excess of what can be placated by healing and the power of n’anga and profete alone.

Even though these ritual practices and social realities have also been interpreted as reflecting historical points of great violence and upheaval (in terms of portugaro and its interpretation as forced labor, for instance) or war (in terms of the prolific tchikwambo), there are important longue durée elements present in contemporary practices of the profetes and n’angas, if compared with historical sources. In Santos’s description from 1609 of the annual ritual of the Quiteve king for honoring his father, for instance, one may recognize contemporary features of both n’anga and profete practices in bodily possession (Santos 1964 [1609]: 197):

The devil enters into one of the Kaffirs of the assembly, saying that he is the soul of the dead king, father of him who is engaged in these ceremonies, come to converse with his son. The demoniac becomes as one into whose body the devil has entered, stretched on the ground disfigured, deformed, and out of his senses, and while he is in this state the devil speaks through his mouth in all the foreign tongues of other Kaffir nations, which are understood by many of those present. Besides this, he begins to cough and speak like the dead king whom he represents, in such a manner that it seems to be his very self, both in voice and movements, by which signs the Kaffirs recognise the that the soul of the dead king has come as they expected.

Here we see voice, bodily movements, the languages spoken, and even the coughing as important traits for evaluating the power of the possessed (or “demonic” in Santos’s term) and his or her relation to the spirits. These features are crucial aspects of current healing rituals, and some spirits are, for instance, known to cause their mediums to cough profusely. Also, if possessed by the spirit of a makomerede, for example, the medium will then comport herself or himself in a soldierly fashion and speak Shona. Together, the bodily and vocal practices of a n’anga or profete constitute significant performative aspects of possession and healing, also mirroring nonritual or nondivine aspects. Put in another way, they articulate and become forces of the past that impinge on the present to resolve contemporary situations of danger—tchikume—or bodies afflicted with this.
Healing and the Force of Becoming

The presence and extraction of *tchikume*, the closing and cleansing of the body, and the rituals of *kutenda adzimu edu* exemplify how spirits, illness, and ritual engage with the domains of constructive and destructive forces. These dealings and their potentialities have led some to make distinctions between “sorcery of construction” and “sorcery of destruction”—a dichotomy proposed by West in his important book *Kupilikula* (2005) on political authority, governance, and sorcery on the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique. Although arguing for a historically informed vision of sorcery, West retains the notion that both *mitela* (equivalent to *mutombo*—medicine) and sorcery are forces that are in themselves neutral: “Muedan sorcerers—like the medicinal substances they used—could either protect or harm, cure or kill, feed or devour, construct or destroy” (2005: 75). West shows in his rich ethnographic account just how powerful sorcery is and how this is related to, interpreted by, and confronted by *kupilikula*—a Shimakonde term meaning to annul or undo.

Although analytically weaving together a sophisticated tapestry of historical and contemporary political dynamics, practices, and discourses, West's basic distinction between the potentialities of sorcery of construction and destruction seems to be too crude in comparison to my material. Here *mutombo*, the forces of spirits engaged through *n'angas*, *profetes*, and, even, rituals as *kutenda adzimu edu* are inherently ambiguous and irreducible to destruction or construction. Subsequently, to engage healing contexts is therefore seen to always be potentially dangerous as these might elicit or provoke malevolent forces. Although people allege that virtually all *n'angas* and *profetes* engage in nebulous affairs, rarely does one find those that acknowledge their meddling in such: as a rule of thumb, and for fear of being labelled a *muroi*, such capacities are always allocated to other *n'angas*, *profetes*, or to *muroi* themselves. However, when interviewing Celso’s *n’anga* in 2007—during our third visit—she came close to acknowledging precisely such ambivalent (or potentially sinister) dealings:

**B:** The problem of *muroi*, is it big?
**N:** Yes! It is very big. There are a lot of people who suffer from this.

**B:** Can one protect oneself against this problem?
**N:** Yes. I can give protection. And I can even send spirits to create confusion and disorder [*confusão*] in a family that has killed someone.

**B:** Ah yeah? You do this a lot?
N: Yes. A lot of people want this.
B: Does it require a lot of work?
N: It is a lot of work, this. And you need to make a big ritual.

Through description and analysis of the rituals and the practices of extracting *tchikume*, of addressing the work of *uroi*, of placating aggrieved *tchikwambo* and *gamba* spirits, the work of *n’anga* and *profete* have been portrayed as being that of protection and healing—solely in terms of warding off evil and destruction. However, what is admitted in the interview with this (and other) *n’angas* (and also *profetes*) is how frequently they not only repel forces of destruction and evil but actively engage, take on, and embody these capacities. People in Honde and Chimoio know, acknowledge, and fear this, and for these reasons the visibility of the house of a *n’anga* is important, as well as to circumscribe their work with taboos and prohibitions. Socially and in everyday life, *n’angas* and *profetes* are therefore ambiguous: their powers are extensive and their practices are irreducible to categories of destruction or construction but are framed as murky and perilous. Such potentialities do not easily translate into a neat dichotomy of “sorcery of construction” and “sorcery of destruction,” nor is it easy to see sorcery and *mutombo* as inherently neutral—as West also argued—as the powers in operation are far too pervasive, ambivalent, and unpredictable to fit the categories of instigators of destruction and construction. Their unpredictability and the shifting, murky, and enormous force of *n’angas* and *profetes*—for example in the potencies of powerful spirits attacking suddenly—underline the vitality, dynamic, and force of this field (see also Obarrio 2014).

As also mentioned above, a common analysis in this field is what one may term the *entrepreneurship approach* in which *n’angas* and *profetes* are understood as maneuvering within a social space that is, in turn, manipulated for economic ends (see, e.g., Luedke and West 2006; Pfeiffer 2006; Simmons 2006). Surely, some elements may elicit support for such an argument. For one, those seeking treatment are often called “clients” (clientes) by the *n’anga* and *profete*, an appropriation of terminology of the formal medical apparatus that is then reinserted and reanimated in novel settings outside originary discursive and institutional constraints (cf. also West and Luedke 2006: 8). Another element is related to payment: in their works on Chimoio, both Pfeiffer (2002, 2006) and Seibert (2006: 64) argue for a key distinction between *n’anga* and *profete* being that the former accepts payment while the latter, they argue, rarely does.
However, based on the material in this chapter as well as my fieldwork material in general, I have found little or no reason to make distinctions between n’angas and profetes in terms of seeking compensation for their work. Thus, despite the wide acceptance of monetary payment and appropriation of the biomedical or institutional rhetoric of clienthood, the entrepreneurship approach is reductionist in its individuated and universalist economist leanings. A related problem concerns its presentist leanings—the construction of the world of healing entrepreneurship as devoid of violent historical trajectories. An approach seeking precisely to contend with the force of historical trajectories in the present is that of memory. As Jennifer Cole has demonstrated in her works on Madagascar (1998, 2001), memory needs to be approached beyond being an individual faculty as well as a vehicle of political power or empowerment. Cole, developing thoughts from the classic work on social memory by Maurice Halbwachs (1980), thereby critiques the idea that memory is merely an artifact of the present, a construction projected backward, subjected to presentist politics. Such a limited approach, she contends, underestimates “the memory community, [which,] while political, is also moral” (1998: 105).37

Applied to the material from Honde and Chimoio and reflecting Cole’s argument, one may argue that as a considerable social force, the past assumes a directionality of its own wherein it is impossible to analytically pin this force down and subject it to dichotomous functions (i.e. sorcery of destruction pitted against sorcery of construction) or individualize and fragment this into n’angas and profetes being agents of a universal entrepreneurial spirit. Rather, the forceful, ever-changing shape of healing resides in its capacity to always supersede, challenge, and counter forces and dynamics of the ordering kind. As a force of the social beyond simply being a bearer of a particular memory (collective or individual), the ritual practices of n’angas and profetes exhibit dynamics similar to the mhondoro previously analyzed: integral to polities and social orders, yet with the capacities to unsettle and destabilize through, for example, being possessed by powerful allochthonous spirits such as mukadzi wo adzimu that upset (often gendered) social arrangements and hierarchies. This unsettled, noncompartmentalized, nondomesticated, and nonstable past—a past with no stable memory community upholding it—is integral to considerable forces of destabilization or, better, deterritorialization. Concretely, this force can be recognized in terms of memory—social, political, and moral—but importantly, and as Werbner points out, must be seen as a present past that is unpredictable and nonconfined.
Healing Bodies, Engaging Pasts, Unsettling Orders

Analyzed in this and previous chapters, such pasts reflect more than a century of wars, movements of people, escape from state capture, and forced migration to the South African mines or farm work in Zimbabwe—aspects which have meant that there are elements one could portray as “Zimbabwean,” “Malawian,” or “Shona” in the present past. This analytical “originist” or “authentist” inclination in denoting elements of healing construes or upholds problematic and analytically unhelpful dichotomies of things Zimbabwean or Mozambican, things chiNdau, chiSena or chiShangaan, imposing unfounded orders and forms of stability.

The tack taken here is different: as healing and its domains constitute an effervescent, expanding and transforming field, then framing this into an analytical optics of being—the present being the endpoint of a process that has now ground to a halt—the n’anga and the profete and their movements are thereby, literally, frozen, immobilized, and emplaced. This portrayal would belie the field’s unruly and continuous becoming where novel spirits may be appropriated or enter involuntarily the healers and nonhealers, and where the capacities to accumulate new spirits and techniques of healing, etc., involve a perpetual movement—in a cosmological and spiritual sense. It seems, therefore, that the practices of healing, the spiritual domain, and the afflictions of illness and mishaps may be approached as historical artifacts—sedimented from the violence of past and present conflicts as the civil war, the violence of colonialism but also exhibiting long-term structural continuities. As attempted here, such a historically informed approach needs to be complemented by one that emphasizes the distinct vibrancy characterizing this particular field—its perpetual becoming and not being.

This chapter has presented and analyzed some features of the continuing dynamic characterizing the field of healing, spirits, and illness. In particular, this dynamic is one not captured by the arborescent hierarchies of gender and patriarchy, bodily comportments, or institutional arrangements inherent to the state dynamic. Contrarily, the force of spirits and their attacks continually upset stable social and political arrangements—steeped in the historical trajectories of colonialism and violence. Further, the profoundly rhizomic character of spirits’ capability to attack and take possession of people therefore profoundly challenges and, at times, alters gendered, hierarchical, and patriarchal orders.

This general dynamic pattern bears similarities to the capacities and multiple orientations of the mhondoro, as analyzed in the foregoing chapter. Historically embedded and at times also challenging its polity
of origin, the *mhondoro* may be seen and experienced as a force reaching beyond the boundaries of polities and social systems. Similarly, the unpredictable force of the spirits’ capabilities for alteration remains beyond the apparatus of capture of formal social and political organization—as is also the case with the nonstate hierarchical system of *régulos* (chiefs) or *aridzi wo nhika* (owners of the land). In practical terms, these orders—in themselves often having a state dynamic in the Deleuze and Guattarian sense—are constantly challenged by several instances: the *mukadzi wo adzimu* in the sense of both attacking the institutional arrangement of marriage as well as redirecting and reallocating the productive and reproductive capacities and capabilities of the woman afflicted. Understood more theoretically, if kinship is perceived ideally as a system of descent and categorization informing and structuring patterns of social order, then the sudden and violent redirection of flows of life and reproduction involved in terms of the *mukadzi wo adzimu* is an actualization of the virtual potential of the traditional field in terms of upsetting the state dynamics of kinship.

Further, characteristic of both the unpredictability of the potentialities of spirits of *makomerede*—i.e. when, how, and where these will impinge on the social order—and their potencies when having appropriated someone—i.e. when a woman has become a *mukadzi wo adzimu*—the *makomerede* spirits are heterogeneous, multiple, and always mutating. Thus, as other spirits of the *pfukwa* kind (e.g. *gamba, tchikwambo*), vis-à-vis the political and social orders, they constitute lines of flight that upset the arborescent and hierarchical sociopolitical realities into which they are otherwise constantly sought embedded—i.e. through ritual as we saw in previous chapters or through institutional arrangements such as the *mukadzi wo adzimu*. Such lines of flight circumvent and upset apparatuses of capture and the territorialization processes central to the state order—the deterritorialized *makomerede* spirits epitomizing such lines in the same way as the free-roaming and highly visible *gotokoto*. Further, such evasion and deterritorialization are also characteristic of the forces that churches, waxing and waning with their *profetes* and *n’angas*, seek to tap.

Overall, the potencies of the field exhibit profoundly rhizomic characteristics in their constantly shifting, unpredictable, and—often, not always—anti-institutional or a-institutional orientation. However, as emphasized earlier, the traditional field’s trajectory often involves aspects of (unfinished) pasts impinging on dynamics of the present with tremendous force—as in the spiritual appropriation of, in particular, women that undercut the ideals of the sociopolitical orders. Thus, the field’s potencies in its dynamic of appropriation of past suffering (i.e.
makomerede spirits) is capable of upsetting and destabilizing the hierarchical, arborescent, and, ultimately, state-like features of social and political organization in the urban-rural continuum of Honde and Chimoio. With Clastres, one might say that the (state-like) oneness of society—with régulos, bodily registers of hierarchy, gendered realities of subordination, and patriarchal arrangements—is constantly challenged and deterritorialized by the plural actualization of the profoundly social potencies and forces of spirits and healing.

These challenges are, however, not uniquely poised against arborescent sociopolitical orders. Rather, they are also central to a far more tangible apparatus of capture directly integral to the postcolonial state that, as we will turn to now, explicitly and directly aims to control and tame not merely forces of healing but also uroi—sorcery.

Notes

1. The spelling n’anga is consistent with Hannan’s Shona dictionary (1984 [1959]), Jacobson-Widding’s (1989) ethnographic works on the Manyika (e.g. 1989), and Gelfand’s texts on the Shona in general (e.g. 1977). Some elderly people claim that in chiTewe a n’anga is known as chiremba. However, despite being in use in the neighboring chiManyika dialect (see also Hannan 1984 [1959] under the spelling chiremba) tchiremba seems to be very rarely invoked in Honde and Chimoio. I have therefore chosen to use the term n’anga.

2. Profete, obviously derived from “prophet,” is sometimes spelled profeta (Lubkemann 2000), which seems to reflect the Portuguese word with the similar spelling. However, in keeping with the pronunciation, I retain the spelling profete.

3. Lambek’s (1996: 236) tentative definition of spirits and possession is employed in this chapter: “Possession refers to the relations that particular disembodied creatures (‘spirits’) engage with particular human hosts, such that the host is periodically ‘absent’ from her own body, replaced by the voice and persona of the spirit.”

4. See also Gelfand (1977) and, to some extent, Jacobson-Widding’s more recent works (1999).

5. See, for example, Luedke and West (2006) for a “Southeastern African” expression of this type of analysis, as well as Pfeiffer (2002, 2006) and Luedke (2011) for analyses based on Manica Province material.

6. Beyond my own ethnographic material, key historical (Theal 1964 [1898]; Liesegang 1966 [1796], 1996) and older ethnographic sources (Bullock 1927; Shropshire 1938; Holleman 1953; Gelfand 1977) will be used.

7. This point may of course also be expanded to the globe, as seen in many attempts to link (conceptions of) modernity or postmodernity to the rise of spiritual movements, the growth of globalizing faiths, or the augmentation of religious
dimensions to society. For one such powerful and incisive crypto-Marxist argument of an encroaching and ascending global “capitalist spirituality” seen to smooth out resistance (conceived broadly), see Carrette and King (2005).

8. When reexamening Evans-Pritchard’s classic work on Azande (1976 [1937]) and contrasting these with South American and Circumpolar ethnographica, Taussig (2003: 303) has pointed out that it may precisely be in the dynamics of skepticism, its techniques (or technicality), and the nature of its public secret that magic’s power lies. Thus, skepticism should not be, in Taussig’s view, external to magic itself (see also Guyer 2013; Igreja 2015b).

9. For a layout of these compounds and houses, see figures 1.1 and 4.1.

10. Being integrated yet separate, powerful yet mysterious constitutes also, of course, the ambivalent position of those living alone, of which people often say “Wakaramba kuanda ndimuroi”—“The one who does not want to live with others is a witch.” Thus, spatial separation indicates an ambivalent social position of those meddling in spiritual affairs—benign or malevolent.

11. While there is not sufficient room for this subject in this book, there are several important works that delve into the role of the different churches and missions in Mozambique: see, e.g., Morier-Genoud (2006) for a case study on the politics of the Catholic Church from Salazar’s Estado Novo until independence; see Cruz e Silva (2001) for an argument for the role of the influential Protestant and other missions in southern Mozambique in the formation of early nationalist and independence sentiments; see Helgesson’s (1994) monumental work tracing the Catholic Church and especially its relation to the Protestant missions from the Gaza empire to independence in 1975. See also Engelke (2007) for a Zimbabwean, Englund (2004) for a Malawian, Jean Comaroff (1985) for a South African, and Blanes (2014) for an Angolan case exploring the potential, diversity, and orientation of these churches. Further, works pertaining specifically to Manica Province or Chimoio on the churches include Fry (2000), Pfeiffer (2002), and Luedke (2005). However, in spite of the enormous recent attention these churches have engendered in anthropology, and contrary to some representations, they are not, as some would like us to think, of course, new phenomena, as Sundkler’s (1964 [1948]) seminal work points out.

12. See, for example, Luedke (2005, 2006) for analyses of the spiritual and political hierarchies of the Zion churches.

13. A majority of the profete I have met, however, have had round buildings conforming to the ideal of the tchitunga thonanga.

14. The colors red, white, and black are, of course, core symbols in many Sub-Saharan contexts—a subject, for example, of Victor Turner’s classical interpretation based on Ndembu fieldwork in Zambia where “whiteness=semen, milk; redness=menstrual blood, the blood of birth, blood shed by a weapon; blackness=feeces, certain products of bodily decay etc.” (Turner 1991 [1967]: 107, see also 57 for an interpretation of these in a color triad). For an analysis of the colors of particular spirits based on Manyika material corresponding and complementing Turner’s tripartite distinction, see also Jacobson-Widding (1999: 123).
There are also several examples from the literature of this approach to cleanse the field of the profete of traditional elements, especially within the Zionist vein of the African Independent Churches. Engelke (2005, 2007), for example, argues on the basis of an analysis of the Johane Masowe movement in Zimbabwe that mundane objects like water and pebbles form crucial parts of healing and ritual practice, starkly contrasting most profetes and all n'angas in my material in their emphasis on the need for (also) mutombo.

For an analytically rich archaeological analysis of Southern Africa between 1300 and the 1800s using the thermodynamic approach to social and state formation, including its material and gendered aspects, see Fredriksen (2009).

Works on the profetes' use of these liquids from other areas have also found that dangerous matter may enter the body through the anus by way of an enema (see, e.g., Chapman's [1998: 189] thesis based on work in nearby Gondola, Manica Province). I have not found such instances in my work, but the idea underlines the fact that orifices essentially are entry points for tchikume as well as mutombo, a view in keeping also with Jacobson-Widding's (1999: 305) general argument about orifices being vital gates to self and personhood. This point is also supported by the long-term oral administration of poison to suspected muroi, the so-called lucasse test, a practice documented as far back as the 1600s (Santos 1964 [1609]: 204).

Despite using the term “life story,” I am aware of the theoretical and analytical problems pertaining to constructing the narrative of a (individual/individualized) life, in keeping with Bourdieu’s (1987) trenchant critique. However, for simplicity’s sake I choose to retain the term as the narration by those interviewed predominantly took the shape of a linear narrative conforming largely to conventional understandings of the concepts of “life history” or “life story.”

The term “malaria” frequently denoted a wide range of afflictions ranging from being feverish and displaying biomedically identifiable symptoms of malaria (and even AIDS) to various other bodily and social afflictions. Consequently, in conversations “malaria” is commonly invoked to indicate a lack of well-being.

Numerous Mozambican and Zimbabwean works have for almost a century analyzed and referred to tchikwambo (also spelled chikwambo), and it the workings of this persistent category of spirit vary somewhat across time and space. Consult Davies (1931), Earthy (1931c), Gelfand (1954), Maxwell (1995), Fry (2000), Pfeiffer (2002), or Massart (2011) for contrasting descriptions.

The usage of such nuts in divination and healing is well-known among Manyika, other Shona groups, as well as throughout Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. In Shona literature the act of divination is known as hakata, and its objects are variously made of animal bones, sticks, stones, seeds, or, as in this case, halved nuts of the mungoma (sometimes also spelt mungongoma) tree (“pod mahogany” in English, Afzelia Quanzensis in Latin). See especially Bullock (1927: 156ff), Tracey (1934), or Gelfand (1964: 75–85) for analyses of hakata as a technique of Shona n’angas, and Wim van Binsbergen (1995) for a comparative argument of the hakata being part of a larger complex of related Southern African healing practices—varieties that in southern Mozambique
also include sets of shells or bones called tinhlolo (Granjo 2007; Thornton 2009) or tinxhlolo (Polanah 1987).

22. Family members here include father, mother, and male and female siblings and their young children.

23. The ritual described resembles the basic structure of what Jacobson-Widding (1985: 11ff) calls “family prayers”: they take place in the cooking hut early in the day; women and men are on each side, a coin is put in a wooden bowl, kuumbera is performed, and the father kneels down and addresses the ancestors directly. However, Jacobson-Widding emphasizes strongly the paternal aunt’s role and argues for the ritual centrality of female ancestors. In Honde, although female ancestors, especially the paternal mother’s spirits, are seen to possibly foment illness, disease, and difficulties in conceiving and bearing children through a spirit often called zinhambuya, neither the paternal aunt nor other female ancestors were prominent in the kutenda adzimu edu I attended.

24. In the case of Chimoio, this position is expressed by Pfeiffer, with whose works (e.g., 2002, 2006) I have already extensively engaged.

25. See also Jacobson-Widding’s (1989: 36) analysis of greetings, face-to-face encounters, and seniority.

26. The use of the plate as we saw in both the case of the profete and the kutenda adzimu edu is also well-known from a range of other ceremonies. See, for instance, Gelfand’s analysis of a sweet beer that is poured onto a plate mixed with medicines for the mhondoro (1970).

27. I have dealt at length with the formation of violent memory in Honde and Chimoio elsewhere (Bertelsen 2002).

28. There is a rather large literature on the gamba. Marlin, for example, acknowledges its complex origins, but his analysis revolves around the violence and displacement of the civil war (2001: 122ff), as does much of the work of Mozambican anthropologist Victor Igreja (e.g., 2003, 2015a, 2015b). Earlier writers from the Shona and Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia context, such as Gelfand (1977) and Bullock (1927), sometimes refer to gomba but classify this particular spirit as one of many types of mashave spirits—that is predominantly malevolent, powerful, and foreign (i.e. nonancestral, locally territorial, or familiar).

29. There is considerable fear of gamba, making it an apt threat. If one is being beaten or robbed, uttering “You will suffer with gamba” at the culprits is believed to cause them to suffer within a year’s time.

30. I was repeatedly told during fieldwork that no one will dare kill this animal for meat or sell it at the market, as the cloth around the neck signifies danger. Thus, quite a number of gotokoto are seen in Honde and other peri-urban areas around Chimoio in an area where the consumption of meat—and protein in general—is comparatively low even by African standards (see Pfeiffer, Gloyd, and Li 2001). However, persistent rumors indicate that the so-called maQuelimane (people from the city of Quelimane) have slaughtered and killed gotokoto in Chimoio, and this is why they are now afflicted with gamba and tchikwambo. It should be added that such dangerous behavior correlates with the commonly held view of Quelimane as Mozambique’s gangster capital. Thus, breaches of social norms are also complemented by transgressions of cosmological
boundaries—with dramatic repercussions for the maQuelimane, whose market stalls in Chimoio were also specifically targeted during the popular urban uprisings in Mozambique in 2008 and 2010 (see Bertelsen 2014 for details).

31. Such importance of coolness and affinity with rain and water is also integral to rainmaking capacities and chiefhood. Following this, chiefs, for instance, are often buried on mountaintops in order for their bodies and spirits to both be near the soothing and cooling rains and safeguard their continued pouring (Sætersdal 2004).

32. Pfeiffer (2002: 186–88) terms the phenomenon mukadzi we mupfukwa—wives to pfukwa spirits. In Honde and Chimoio 1 generally found that women who marry male spirit-souses are entitled mukadzi wo adzimu—wives to spirits (see also Schuetze 2010). However, a large percentage of the spirits that take wives would be termed pfukwa spirits. A. Honwana underlines similar dynamics in southern Mozambique between pfukwa spirits, wives and the past (2003: 71–74). Comparatively interesting, Kamp explores how the Afro-Brazilian idea of pombagira—spirit-spouse—is integral to Maputo’s urban Pentecostal setting and resonates with local Mozambican notions (Kamp 2011, 2015).

33. Such consumption may also be on a metaphorical level, as through the practice of what in chiTewe is called kuchekwa nhora, whereby cuts are made in the body into which mutombo are inserted. On nhora incisions in general, see also Gelfand and Swart (1953) and Gelfand (1964: 156) for Shona examples, Amaral’s (1990: 307–18) analysis of Mozambican Yao ritual incisions and tattoos, and, finally, West (2007: 86–93) for a case from the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique wherein incisions were made as part of non-biomedical “vaccinations” against uwavi (sorcery).

34. The way in which missionary and ethnographer Henri Philippe Junod describes kuembera resembles the present form: “When a woman meets another woman, she greets her by clapping hands, which is the greeting of man to man also; only when a man claps, he does it with the fingers in front, whereas the women clap their hands with crossed palms” (Junod 1936: 296; see also Morier-Genoud 2011 for an analysis of H. P. Junod’s work).

35. For instance, n’angas are meant to avoid drinking alcohol, meddling in petty affairs, or having extramarital sex, as all these activities are seen to tap their powers and capacities (see also Bertelsen 2013).

36. There are clear analytical limits to emphasizing a sharp distinction between supposedly different spheres of “Western medicine” and “African/traditional medicine” as these often rely on dichotomies of “modernist/modern” versus “traditional” terms—or even “premodern” and “modern” (see Fumo 1998 for such an analysis). In addition, the notion of linearity and development in which the “nonscientific” will gradually be eroded, cracked, or banished by the light of “scientific medicine” occludes the complementarity and conflict, the commensurability and the bricolage within the medical field—what Hokkanen (2006) in an interesting analysis of medical missionaries in Malawi calls “medical culture,” which was also related to the colonial-era “bioprospecting” within medicine (Hokkanen 2012). For other approaches to the complex field of medicine, illness, and healing in Mozambique, see also Shapiro’s (1983) analysis
of medicine’s integration into the Portuguese colonial project or Meneses’s (2004b) argument for a holistic approach to the field of health in contemporary Mozambique.

37. Cole’s analyses of the present moral impact of violent colonial memories in Madagascar resonate with Lambek’s (1996, 1998) view of memory as a form of moral practice within another Malagasy location. Arguing that the memorial practices of mediums and spirit possession also constitute moral practices, Lambek seeks to explain how these make up a process of redressing the past, of processing the past in the present. Evaluating the past and the present through possession, the practice also addresses significant moral dimensions. Werbner’s work contrasts slightly that of Cole and Lambek by highlighting the social practice of memory in his analyses of postwar Zimbabwe (1991, 1998a), emphasizing particularly the telling of histories and the unease with which the past is treated, as well as the moral impact these have in his Matabeleland work (Werbner 1998c: 98). However, to particularize these memories would be wrong as “responsibility cannot be narrowed down. It must make demands beyond the temporal interest of the immediate moment” (Werbner 1995: 105). Reflecting also the positions of Cole and Lambek, Werbner’s work, thus, also emphasizes how the force of memory—in terms of stories told or possession—cannot be confined or individuated.
Why does the Mozambican state attempt to control uroi—a force that is seemingly incompatible with the state rationale of both the postindependence Afro-Marxist era as well as the post–civil war period of neoliberal democracy? This chapter will broach this question through untangling the problematic relations between spirit and state within the context of AMETRAMO (Associação da Medicina Tradicional de Moçambique—the Association for Traditional Medicine in Mozambique), a state-sanctioned institution organizing so-called traditional healers. I will argue that the case of AMETRAMO exemplifies a statal mechanism for capture and control of the force fields and potencies of the n’anga and the profete by employing specific techniques. Important constituents of these techniques involve, especially, proceduralization, bureaucratization, and standardization in terms of making the practices of these types of healers legible and eligible for state reterritorialization. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, these attempts at striation and reordering also here set off new lines of flight that undermine, confront, or evade the statist dynamics and the state’s machinery of control. In the context of this chapter and building on the insights of the former, the lines of flight index specific evasive, constructive, and potent practices and potentialities that are related to spirits and uroi.

Representing these practices or dynamics in generic notions of “resistance” would be a misconstrual—at worst, perhaps, also a delusion of the politically romantic kind (Brown 1996). However, most importantly, resistance is a term often confined to dualisms and dialectics of...
oppressor-oppressed or hegemony-resistance that serves to conflate the complexities of state and what is beyond into neat, dichotomous units (Scott 1985, 1990; but see Theodossopoulos 2014). In contrast, the optic of lines of flight, it will be argued, shows the recurrent yet changing dynamics produced by the triadic structure of state, *uroi* (sorcery) and spirit—a structure that produces numerous points of tensions between the assemblages of state and the traditional. Empirically, in this chapter *uroi* will be contextualized in relation to the state order both in terms of AMETRAMO as well as in the figure of the sovereign—the Mozambican president. However, given the scope of the material as well as the nature of sovereignty, beyond tapping into the theoretical insights from Agamben, de Heusch, and Deleuze and Guattari, this chapter will also compare the material with analyses from the Sudan, Rwanda, and Latin America. Concretely, this chapter probes the analytical validity of the argument of the king’s two bodies in terms of the figure of the sovereign and the power he wields. As such, the chapter’s focus shifts from the formation of the state and its violence articulated with the traditional field at the periphery to scrutinizing central state institutions. In this way the chapter contributes further to an understanding of the becoming, imaginary, and magic of the postcolonial state that is Mozambique.

### A Need for Order: Beginnings of AMETRAMO

To recall, both the Mozambican colonial and postcolonial states have related variously and contradictorily to the field of the traditional: during late colonial times, the *régulos* were often forcibly integrated into the colonial machinery of control, while what was deemed “traditional” during postindependence was attacked, sought to be eradicated, or radically refashioned by the Frelimo state (see also Israel 2014). Toward the end of a civil war in which the traditional field was appropriated and refashioned by Renamo, the Mozambican state altered its position toward what it termed tradição. With the consent of the Mozambican state, in 1992 the organization AMETRAMO was established. Crucially, its creation followed the Mozambican state lifting the ban against traditional healing—a ban upheld until 1986 (West 2005: 210f).

When founded, the explicit aim of AMETRAMO was to reorder Mozambique’s so-called “traditional medicine,” and from its outset it has been related to provincial and state policies and officialdom. This is visible, for instance, in that AMETRAMO follows the bureaucratic logic of the Portuguese colonial state (as the postcolonial state also does to some extent) and is divided into a national, provincial, and local organizational...
body. Far from being a bureaucratic formality, this gives the organization rapport and legibility with the Frelimo state at different levels. As West has also noted for the northern region of Cabo Delgado, what people referred to, understood, and acted according to was that the “central” AMETRAMO office doubled with the local party headquarters (2005: 214f). Similar understandings were also routinely expressed in Chimoio.

Of more immediate interest is the fact that the emergence of AMETRAMO bespeaks a Mozambican state that became increasingly geared toward controlling what it could not eradicate. The n’angas, the profetes, and other experts of the Mozambican medico-traditional field—politically shunned during Samora Machel’s rule (1975–86) and ousted from the cities during Operação Produção as we saw in chapter 2—were gradually seen as keys to relegitimize Frelimo. Simultaneously, by recognizing them Frelimo would undermine Renamo’s support among the rural and urban populations as a custodian of tradição. Such conclusions were drawn after the military non-victory of Frelimo in the civil war, the party’s postwar failure to regain popular loyalty in former Renamo-dominated areas, the defeat in the socialist battle to erase “obscurantism,” and the continued importance of those “relics of colonialism”—régulos. For Frelimo in the early 1990s, defeats on these fronts meant that it was not only opportune but necessary to facilitate the formation of an organization that sought to control an unorganized and, thus, threatening field that had also become a domain of Renamo: that of traditional medicine and the accompanying field of sorcery and spirits.

If unfamiliar with the field of bodily healing, one might be led to think that AMETRAMO’s meddling with this field constituted a marginal affair. The sheer numbers reveal such a view to be unfounded: in 2005, within only the province of Manica, AMETRAMO had 1,506 members according to their own numbers.3 While this scale crucially indicates AMETRAMO’s strength as part of what is normally labeled “civil society,” what concerns me here is instead its establishment and practice as a vehicle to striate, order, and establish statal sovereignty within and over the unruly and dangerous field of healing, uroi, and spirits.

**A Head in Our Midst**

The perils of this field dawned on me during one of many visits in 2005 to AMETRAMO’s Chimoio offices. As most structures outside the bairro cimento, their offices consisted of a rectangular building made of mud bricks, painted in white, with a tin roof. The building had two rooms: one for meetings and one office, both with very basic facilities. In the
adjacent courtyard, I met Mr. Cerveija, the president of AMETRAMO in Manica. Cerveija, himself a n’anga from Gorongosa, is regarded as a powerful healer and is regularly invited by the governor of Manica Province to participate at different official ceremonies. He is also well-known as someone who fought Renamo during the civil war and is strongly affiliated with Frelimo. Over many meetings throughout the years, he (and others related to AMETRAMO) have explained the work, scope, and ambition of the organization in various ways. However, during our first encounter in 2005, Cerveija explained to me that the scope of the organization was fourfold:

The first is to organize the n’angas. The second is our social role to resolve conflicts. The third is our cultural role. And the fourth is to resolve problems in the communities.

This first explanation conformed well to the official discourse of the need and necessity to include the traditional field of medicine, where the n’anga is represented as central to improving public health issues (see also Green 1997; Agadjanian and Sen 2007). This is, however, a n’anga that is integrated in the logic of the state in terms of being a card-carrying member of AMETRAMO. Contrarily, a nonmember n’anga can be suspected of harboring loyalties other than to the state and the party. As preceding chapters on Frelimo’s postcolonial development have shown, these loyalties would most probably be discursively represented or politically imagined as “anti-social” or as potentially creating confusão—“confusion” (Kyed 2007a). In the dominant Frelimo state optic, other polities or orientations are routinely cast as potential threats to the state’s ongoing project of social ordering—what I have in previous chapters identified as territorialization. “Organizing” the n’angas, as Cerveija put it, is also thereby indicating a state mechanism aimed at co-opting their potentialities and neutralizing nascent or existing antistate orientations that they may be suspected to be part of.

However, in new conversations in 2007, Cerveija divulged other and more pressing concerns that he experienced AMETRAMO to be up against:

B: What are the most important tasks for you here at AMETRAMO?
C: The primary task for us now is sorcery [feitiçaria, Portuguese for uroi]. It is a big problem and it is increasing in strength all the time. One problem concerning sorcery is that there is no law against it. It would have been much better if there were a law against the problem of witchcraft—it would give us more power in resolving cases.
B: How do you resolve cases now, then?
C: We can catch the witch [feitiçeiros, Portuguese for muroi] and speak to him or her. But we cannot use the chamboco [whip used for corporal punishment] here! But this would have been very good if we could [laughs]!

The explanatory shift on the part of the president was, of course, also the result of a gradually more intimate relationship between him and I as our relationship deepened, our conversations multiplied, and I participated in AMETRAMEO's everyday practices. One effect was that the initial officialese rhetoric, in which uroi was accorded a miniscule role, gradually gave way to a sharing of his frustrations of the challenges—politically and cosmologically—that AMETRAMEO faced.

Matters came to a head—literally—on a hot afternoon some days later in 2007 during an AMETRAMEO meeting of n’angas and profetes in Chimóio. The meeting was explicitly called to discuss the annual renewal of membership fees, news on membership cards to be issued from Maputo headquarters, and to debate, revise, and harmonize rates for the healing of various afflications. During the meeting, about forty profetes and n’angas—80 percent of them women—together with the anthropologist, the president of AMETRAMEO, and his secretary were seated inside the premises. The different issues were presented by Cerveija and many women punctuated the decisions with ululation while the men nodded. All seemed to be going smoothly until a single issue threatened to throw the whole meeting into chaos. The commotion began when Cerveija related the following:

I have heard that yesterday a profete got caught in [Chimóio's] Bairro Josina Machel. She was selling a human head. She went to the cemetery and took up the body of a person from the grave. She then cut off his head, put it in a plastic bag, and went back to her house. It was a member [of AMETRAMEO] and one of her neighbors that called the police.

All sitting along the walls or on the floor on their mats now rose, shouted, and talked loudly. Cerveija tried for about ten minutes to calm matters. It was evident that this piece of news had sparked off tensions among those present. In the heated discussion, a division between n’angas and profetes crystallized: the profetes emphasized that the culprit was not first and foremost a profete, while, in contrast, the n’angas strongly emphasized that the opposite was true. Thus, a kind of a “structural-cosmological” schism became visible (and tangible)—and one that Cerveija clearly wished to prevent from becoming destructive in his attempt to defuse the tension:

We cannot have two agendas or organizations here. We cannot have confusão [confusion]. We need one agenda only. This agenda is to cure people. This
is the work of the n’anga and of the profete. We cannot have contradictions between the n’anga and the profete. If a person would like to change [from being a n’anga] to being a profete, we do not have any problems with this. If a person would like to change from profete to n’anga, we do not have any problems. We would like to construct, not destroy. And if we do not manage this, we will destroy AMETRAMO. You, mothers [women], are the most difficult. You need to work on this division. She [with the head] that went to prison, no one should visit her. It was her work. And her alone. From today, I do not want to hear this talk [of a division between profetes and n’angas].

This calmed matters for a few minutes. However, in the ensuing discussions many complained that it was a problem that Cerveija had made it clear in the initial statement that the muroi was a profete. Again, Cerveija tried to calm everyone down by joking that there is no difference between profetes and n’angas—that he himself was both at the same time! This attempt at defusing was met with laughs and smiles. But many also solemnly shook their heads incredulously at Cerveija’s claim of being able to appropriate two such adverse healing agencies.

AMETRAMO’s relation to the case of the profete caught with the head—an act of uroi—illustrates empirically the way in which the state, in the guise of Cerveija as a state agent, is involved in an attempt to control the unruly field of spirits, uroi, and healers. By pointing out the benevolent ideal of curing to the group, Cerveija also critiques those meddling in the darker arts of uroi experienced to foment problems—confusão. But how are we to understand uroi in this context and beyond? And why should the state—here through AMETRAMO—meddle at all in the affairs of healers and uroi?

Illustration 5.1. The head of AMETRAMO in Manica Province, Mr. Cerveija, photographed in AMETRAMO’s offices. Chimoio, 2005.
The concept that I have until now interchangeably dubbed “uroi,” “sorcery,” or “witchcraft” is a complex matter impinging on the lives and deaths of people in the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio. Moreover, by merely employing the analytical terms “sorcery” and “witchcraft,” I relate directly and indirectly to an enormous corpus of ethnographic and Africanist material. Rather than providing a full review of this vast scholarly corpus, I will select some works to frame the discussion ethnographically and emphasize how uroi relates also to dynamics of statehood and sovereignty. Crucial to this is the shift in explanation of AMETRAMO’s tasks from 2005 to 2007—a shift involving going from implementing ideas of radical societal transformation to increasingly focusing on the impact of uroi. And, indeed, there is ample—especially Africanist—research that argues that such a change has taken and continues to take place in many African contexts undergoing rapid political shifts. Geschiere (1997, 2013) builds his argument on the conception that “sorcery” (maka) in Cameroon may be interpreted as a form of political action, akin also to notions in Western democracies of wavering between desires to seize power and feelings of impotence. The language of witchcraft, Geschiere argues, is thus a modern conception that one should neither “esoterify” nor relegate to a premodern domain. A related reading is launched by Jean and John L. Comaroff (1993). They propose approaching modernity as a global force that is sweeping in its commodification and generative of novel formations and configurations of capital, markets, and labor. In this context, they see witchcraft as a “finely calibrated gauge of the impact of global cultural and economic forces on local relations, on perceptions of money and markets, on the abstraction and alienation of ‘indigenous’ values and meanings” (1993: xxix).

Both Geschiere and the Comaroffs are insightful and influential contributors to a broad trend in recent “witchcraft studies” in Africa and beyond that, in different ways, pegs the understanding of witchcraft to various visions of modernity in the form of commodification, multiparty democracy, capitalism, or globalization. These contributions are important, as these processes are central to understanding current political and social processes and transformations in Africa and beyond. However, there are several aspects of these understandings that emerge as problematic in relation to the case of AMETRAMO and uroi.

First, there is a certain conservative bent in such analyses in that they, often inadvertently, subscribe to a (somewhat nostalgic) vision of coherent pasts that are now subjected to fragmentation or fracture. This
claim is implicitly or explicitly premised on an idea of the disintegration of a past societal whole wherein what is termed “witchcraft” had a more or less clearly defined role, place, or was circumscribed by definite practices. Now, however, witchcraft is presumably a language that is no longer integral to particular social and political formations. Rather, in the “modernity of witchcraft” argument, “witchcraft” has instead become a reactive mode of understanding and interpreting universal processes of modernization/modernity. As Englund pointed out in a critique of this argument by the Comaroffs’ approach, witchcraft is in this way seen as “an argument about modernity, not merely viewed as operating within modernity” (1996b: 259, italics retained; see also Bonhomme 2012). Such critique might have led Geschiere et al. (2008) to argue for a relational and open-ended concept of modernity applied to African realities. To some extent this obviates Englund’s critique; however, “modernity” is still retained as an analytical point of departure where the notion of relationality underlines its necessarily external position vis-à-vis the (presumably nonmodern) Africa. These aspects of “dislocation” or “externality” of the “modernity of witchcraft” argument are also consistent with the more general discourses about modernity itself captured in the familiar terms of disenchantment, fragmentation, etc. What is problematic here is the degree to which these reduce witchcraft and sorcery to reactive categories and modes of understanding and interpretation external to (a vision of) modernity. This is opposed to a view that accords potentiality to uroi itself as a significant social dynamic and as a continuously unfolding and changing force. Conversely, an approach not according such potency “flattens” in my view an understanding of uroi to the point of precluding analyses of why state apparatuses of capture, as AMETRAMO, aims to order, control, and tap the forces of uroi and its agents.9

A second problem is the often alarmist tones in reporting and analyzing witchcraft—a timbre of sensationalism that anthropologists should be wary of. This alarmism is especially evident in reports claiming dramatic increases in sorcery, witchcraft, and evil (see, e.g., Haar 2007), and it is instructive in this regard to be reminded that previous reports of such increases are recurrent in anthropological analyses from Southern Africa. Among others and based on fieldwork between 1934 and 1945, Hilda Kuper reported that the Swazi “complain that batsakasi [witches and sorcerers] are more common now than in the past” (1963: 66). Hilda Kuper represents one of many who within the last fifty years have reported that people allege that sorcery has increased locally. For example, Marwick (1965: 92) also notes that among the Cewa “a majority of informants believe that there are more sorcerers nowadays [1953]
than there used to be.”¹⁰ In light of such historical claims, the reports from the 1990s onward of dramatic increases in sorcery bespeak at best the results of long-term processes not readily encapsulated by the alarmist reports. At worst, they may rest on flawed analyses of societal change and its relation to sorcery and witchcraft.

These problematic dimensions of the “modernity of witchcraft” approach have led me to be rather cautious of subscribing to a popular view in Honde and Chimoio where some people would complain about increases in uroi. Instead of endorsing and re-representing these claims of increases—a move that would implicitly involve a comparison and a subsuming of the material to supposedly larger and more universal processes—I find it more useful to look at the particular social and historical processes that have produced these reports and cases. Interestingly enough and contrasting the widespread assumption of a universal African increase in sorcery, people in my material are in great disagreement as to whether there actually has been an increase in relation to the immediate postcolonial period, to the period of civil war, or to the colonial period. However, a significant shift which is often pointed out and about which there is some degree of agreement, is the reorientation from a collective organization of sorcerers—a (counter)society of sorcerers, if you will—to increasingly singular acts of uroi perpetrated by individuals. In light of the previous material also on the deterritorialized spirits, the shifting roles and capacities of mhondoro, and the general upheaval in territorial dimensions of social, political, and cosmological domains, this change from collective to individual seems to parallel more general trends of deterritorialization and upheaval. For example, in narratives about uroi and muroi in the late colonial period and prior to the liberation war, people often underline the orderly ways of dealing with these phenomena. Carmeliza, the elderly woman living in Honde that attempted to make me understand the changing, open, yet continuous nature of tradição that I quoted in the book’s introduction, is also the paternal granddaughter of a former régulo. In this excerpt from an interview made in 2005, she explains the differences in dealing with muroi now as compared to the colonial era of the 1950s and 1960s.

B: In the colonial period when you were young, if you caught a thief [mbava], what would you do?
C: [Laughs] We would beat him very much!
B: Where? At the court of the régulo?
C: Yes. But first in the place where he was caught. Afterwards in the house of the régulo himself.
B: And did you beat muroi [sorcerers] as well?
C: Yes. You had to. OK. First we went to a n’anga to sort out the particular case [i.e. finding out whether or not they were muroi]. And afterwards they had to pay a fine.

B: But did you beat them until they died?

C: No. Very, very much, yes. But not until they died.

B: Are muroi different today than in the past?

C: Ih! They are. Uroi before was much stronger than today.

B: In what way?

C: Before it was much easier to kill people. And the ways to resolve uroi was also different.

B: How did you solve the cases?

C: Nowadays uroi is organized much more by everyone themselves. Everyone goes by themselves to the n’anga to become drugged [ficar drogado] or to find a solution to their problems.

Narratives such as Carmeliza’s reveal crucial shifts in how uroi is addressed. In the late colonial period when communities were seen as tightly knit, populous, and resourceful, these faced “countersocieties” of witches that worked together to attack individuals, to dig up corpses to devour, to predate upon live human flesh, to kill relatives or others in the community. Likewise, resolving uroi cases was part of the polity organized around the paramount figure of the régulo, who elicited the assistance by a n’anga, if need be. In contrast, today, both actions to counteract and to become empowered by mutombo are more individual, mirroring, thus, the violent and disintegrative transformation of polities at the hands of both the immediate postcolonial state as well as Renamo. This shift is also reflected in the practices surrounding deaths in which foul play is suspected. Increasingly, upon death, a plant that is often explained to derive from Gorongosa will be planted on top of the grave. This plant will rapidly grow stronger in the following period, and at the instant when the plant’s first leaf falls to the ground, the sorcerer or someone within the sorcerer’s family will die. This way, one may find out who is responsible for someone’s death. This practice effectively allocates “executionary agency” to the plant and signals a break with the formerly quite common practice of engaging the wider community through employing a n’anga to name the guilty.

However, despite Carmeliza’s insistence that past uroi was more powerful than the present—a reflection also correlating with her claim that tradição was more potent before—uroi is experienced as a tremendous force that (still) permeates, destroys, and empowers a range of social relations, practices, and cosmological domains. Undeniably, the term uroi
corresponds to certain aspects or understandings of what has variously been termed “witchcraft,” “sorcery,” or “wizardry” in the vast corpus of witchcraft studies preceding the “modernity of witchcraft” paradigm presented and critiqued earlier.14

At first glance, there seems to exist a distinction of “witch” and “sorcerer” corresponding largely to Evans-Pritchard’s pioneer Azande work (1976 [1937]) and all those following him. In chiTewe the term muroi (singular) denotes a person who is often characterized by shape-shifting characteristics and whose being has a predatory orientation on kin relations, family, and people. As I argued in chapter 3, the shape-shifting characteristic and capacity is not exclusive to muroi but may also apply to powerful individuals such as chiefs, kings, and healers—as evidenced in the case of Dhlakama transforming himself into his mitupo animal, the partridge, and escaping the forces of the state during the height of the civil war. What is significant in the case of the shape-shifting of muroi, however, is their use of other animals as vehicles of harm or accumulation, as well as becoming these animals—especially predatory, or nocturnal ones.

Unbeknownst to the victims, the muroi will frequently amass a person’s labor power—for example by making him or her work at night on their machamba or matoro. This form of personal aggrandizement through predatory practice inverses social and kin ideals in a rural setting in which the coordination of labor power is of prime importance to the reproduction and well-being of individual households and families. Contrarily, mobilization of labor power is normally circumscribed by institutional arrangements such as, for example, djangano which mobilizes neighbors, kin, and dzindza for a specific labor-intensive task, like the weeding of a machamba. During work and, increasingly, as the task nears completion, the participants are given traditional maize or sorghum beer (duro), underlining the collective and reciprocal ethos. Djangano can be called by anyone who has the need for labor power and the resources to brew beer.15 Conversely, the muroi’s clandestine eliciting of labor power from one’s fellows negates or inverses the reciprocal and collective mechanisms of djangano.

Further, muroi are also said to be driven by an almost insatiable lust for human flesh—kurha nhama io munhu. This appetite is so strong that the muroi will nocturnally reopen fresh graves to feed their necrophagous desire, or will attack victims and devour their limbs while they sleep. Victims will normally wake up with just minor bruising as the muroi will sew them up after devouring the flesh. Slowly, however, victims will weaken after repeated attacks and may eventually die if they are not treated. Reflecting this clandestine and nocturnal activity, a gen-
eral characteristic of the *muroi* is that they act shrewdly, underlined by the covert accusation in the phrase “they know something”—that is, they possess a profound knowledge that is employed secretly for personal gain and to the detriment of others.

Another figure of fear stalking the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio is the *wakamba*. This is a person who has elicited the services of a *n’anga* to become drugged strong *mutumbo* (medicine), in keeping with the *n’angas’* and profetes’ ambiguity as discussed in the previous chapter. A person having become *wakamba* is seen to be guided by hatred, envy, and greed, often combined with ideas of personal aggrandizement in terms of social hierarchies or positions at work. For a high monetary price, the *n’anga* will give *mutumbo* to the *wakamba*, and this will empower the recipient, inflict danger upon others, or amass material wealth, especially in the form of money.

Beyond reflecting Evans-Pritchard’s basic distinction between “witch” and “sorcerer,” *muroi* and *wakamba* seemingly correspond to the classic typology of “night witch” and “day witch” as also argued by Krige and Kringe (1956 [1943]: 250–53). However, in people’s experiences, the categories are indistinct and most of my interlocutors are much more prone to use the term *uroi* for all kinds of practices and potentialities—effectively a blurring of seemingly distinct traits that also Marwick identified in his Cewa material (see Marwick 1965: 81–82 especially). For a start, persons who are identified as *muroi* are regularly seen to also engage in the use of *mutombo*—as the following case shows.

In Honde, a senior man that we may call Rui, a respected member of the *aridzi wo nhika*, is widely considered to be a *muroi*. Born around 1940, Rui is married with seven children and is a comparatively successful peasant in terms of generating a small income from selling agricultural produce (especially tomatoes) at the markets in Chimoio. The suspicion that he is a *muroi* had been directly and indirectly conveyed to me at numerous occasions by neighbors, kin, and even members of his own household. A decisive event around 2000 that pushed people to believe he was a *muroi* was repeatedly recounted to me. One version is contained in the following excerpt from an interview I recorded with Adama, an elderly man from Honde in 2005.

A: Rui likes meat a lot, you know. One time, it could have been in 1993–94, he went out at night like a sorcerer [*muroi*]. He left his body in his house. It was just his spirit [*espirito*] that left. That spirit went to a cemetery where there were persons who had just been buried. He tore off a part of the body of one of these persons here [*points at his stomach*] and brought it back to his house. There, Rui ate a little and the rest he tied with string from the roof, inside the house.
B: Was this to save the meat for later?
A: I do not know. But what happened was that the meat went bad after a while and became full of insects [bichu]. And the insects started to fall down on the floor of the house, making noises—TAT! TAT! TAT! People in Honde started to talk, then, that “this is uroi, this.”

B: But why did people enter his house?
A: It was his wife that called them to have a look at the insects! She did not know what to do. No one dared to talk to Rui directly about this but all said to his wife that “perhaps he is muroi.”

B: And afterward, what happened?
A: Well. When Rui returned from his machamba a lot of people had gathered outside his house. No one still dared say anything, they just stood there. And he did not say anything either, he just entered his house without saying anything. And afterward he beat his wife very severely. She fled from him to her family in ______ and stayed there.

B: [Remembering Rui as having beat his wife also during my fieldwork] But he beat his wife also in 1999 or 2000, didn’t he?
A: Yes. Rui beat his wife twice. The first time was in 1993 or 1994. And the other time was in 1999. The last time the wife was drunk—she and Rui were at a place where they served traditional beer [duro]. While there she repeatedly told all present, “Rui, why are you eating the flesh of other people?” For this, he beat her again.

B: Thus, it was not only once that he ate human meat?
A: No. Meat is his vice [vicio]. When deaths occur, he will always go. He then takes the meat from the bodies at night. To eat.

B: But can you see from the bodies of the dead that there have been parts taken out?
A: No. They close up [after having taken out meat] real good.

B: But muroi … Do they eat meat to make drugs or medicine [mutombo]?
A: No. No, it is not to become drugged [drogado]. But if you eat the meat of another person you become very powerful, yes.

B: Are there others in Honde also—others with the kurha nhama io munhu?
A: Yes. Do you remember that old man who lives close to ______?
B: Yes?
A: That one! He is very dangerous, as well. And eats meat, as well. He is the grandson of [a well-renowned former régulo].

B: But do the muroi know each other?
A: Yes, they do. And they help each other as well. For example, Rui knows who the other muroi in Honde are. He knows very, very well. “This is my night-time friend” [mimics Rui’s voice and manner of talking]. But he would never say this or who they are.
All other versions that broached this particular instance of uroi also highlighted Rui’s kurha nhama io munhu—his lust for human flesh. However, it was also widely believed that Rui had undertaken other dark measures of uroi. Specifically, he was seen to have engaged the forces of the lion—as we discussed earlier a potent animal in the form of the mhondoro. Rui appropriated lion capabilities with the aid of a n’anga in a ritual during which he consumed a piece of the animal's hide. His consumption is believed to generate an authority residing in and emanating from his bodily person that is physically experienced by others as a sense of fear in his presence—akin to that, obviously, one would experience when confronted by a lion or a mhondoro. Again, and as in the case with djangano, Rui’s actions represent an inversion of a dimension of sociality in terms of tapping the forces of a guardian of the field of the traditional (mhondoro) for personal gain.

In conversations, Honde residents confided that Rui showed signs indicating that he was a muroi, a significant aspect being that he often ate alone, which was evidence of greed and antisocial behaviour in the presence of his (non-muroi) kin and family. Resembling the context of the n’angas and profetes discussed earlier, this manner of describing someone is an important constituent of what one might call a speech genre (Bakhtin 1986) of uroi. As a constantly evolving, dynamic, and embracive notion of a body of expressions and notions, the speech genre of uroi may be seen to include a number of covert ways to allude to the possibility of someone being a muroi.

Beyond taking his meals in solitude, a more visible, tangible, and distinguishing feature pertaining to Rui are the rich yields from his machamba and matoro—produce that provides him with comparatively higher income from cash crops such as tomatoes (matemate). As widely documented from Southern Africa, conspicuously successful crop yields are frequently related to engaging in different forms of magic or other illicit behavior. As Gluckman (1963 [1956]: 96) noted more than half a century ago, “Exceptional achievement is bought at the cost of one’s fellows. The man who is too successful is suspected of being a witch and himself is suspicious of the witchcraft of his envious fellows.”

In the speech genre of uroi in Honde (and also Chimoio), several varieties of augmenting one’s yields are envisaged. As mentioned above, one powerful measure is to covertly drug others to perform labor on one’s machamba during the night or invisibly—a practice called kurima no zwiphoko. Another variety is to use powerful mutombo to make maize stalks, watermelons, sweet potatoes, beans, or other crops increase in size, grow faster, elude the gaze of thieves, or repel pests. While kurima no zwiphoko is clearly seen as uroi, the use of mutombo is something ev-
everyone engages in, either privately or with the aid of a n’anga or profete. However, there are more powerful and somber mutombo obtainable by engaging in illicit and transgressive activities such as forms of sacrifice or incestuous relationships.19

Rui was thought to have engaged both kurima no zwiphoko and the dark varieties of mutombo to enlarge and protect his crops, and the few public and many clandestine accusations against him were all subsumed under the term uroi. His case also reflects the many urban instances of uroi that people are preoccupied with. In conversations, people will often discuss a particular muroi as operating or—as in the case with the profete with the human head in a plastic bag—having been caught, talk of pending trials against muroi who have killed, or talk of suspicious behavior of people.20 One such case from autumn 2005 may be instructive to appreciate the multiple dimensions of uroi—also in urban settings and, crucially, involving dimensions of politics and sovereignty.

The particular case came to my knowledge through a quickly spreading rumor of a man who had been caught eating human flesh in Bairro Primeiro de Maio in Chimoio. After hearing the rumor, I traveled the following day to his home and discovered a number of other people who were also curious of this man. He was, however, not there, and his home looked like it had been attacked. The bystanders were more than willing to divulge what had occurred, and I spent the next few days conversing with a number of inhabitants of this and other bairros about the muroi. The following is a typical version that I recorded from one of these conversations:

X: There is a person who has eaten another person! He ate all the flesh of a child.
B: Is it true? Where?
X: Yes, it was there in Bairro Primeiro de Maio. There lived the young man who ate many people. He also ate big persons.
B: How did he do it?
X: This guy went to the cemetery the day after a young girl had been buried. The following day a young boy discovered that the grave and coffin had been opened and went to tell the girl’s family. The family went to look and the body of the girl was gone.
B: Eh pah! And it was this young man who had robbed this corpse?
X: Yes! But still they did not know what had happened. The father went to the [local] radio station and had them ask, “Who stole this corpse?” After this the mother of the girl saw a man who was selling the girl’s blanket. This blanket was bought in South Africa. And the mother went to the police to have him arrested.
B: And then he was arrested?
X: No! This guy was very, very strong [forte]! Two armed policemen did not manage to apprehend him. They had to call in the FIR [Mozambican special police forces to make them apprehend him].
B: And did the FIR manage?
X: Yes, after a long time. He was very strong! In his house there was a small mountain of human bones. A veritable mountain! He said to the police that he had eaten people for ten years. It is a long time!
B: Is he in the Cabeça do Velho [the provincial prison] now?
X: No. This young man was very, very strong and Mozambican president Guebuza said, “I want to see this person.” So, he was sent with a plane to Maputo.
B: Will Guebuza kill him, you think?
X: I do not know. Guebuza … chiiiiiiiiii … he is also very, very powerful [poderoso].

The young man’s despicable actions and the reactions of the state in the form of police and president structured all the popular discourses around this case. Just about everyone seemed to have masoko (news) about it, often containing gory details of the number of victims, how his home reeked of rotting flesh, or how impressive the mountain of bones was. Crucial here is how such details are seen to demonstrate the hideous manner in which the young man empowered himself. By transgressing, or, rather, inverting behavior that is seen as morally acceptable and even human and by gorging himself on flesh, his disgusting acts tapped illicit human energies. Now contained within his body, these energies enabled him to also attack “big people,” as the quoted interlocutor has noted.

Importantly, “big people” [pessoas grandes] do not primarily allude to bodily size, although one might be led to think in those terms given the objective of human flesh consumption. Rather, it points to persons wielding considerable socioeconomic or political power, as politicians, higher-ranking bureaucrats, or businessmen. As analyzed in the foregoing chapter, in terms of hierarchies and bodily comportment, a young, impoverished man would usually behave deferentially around “big people.” However, by devouring them he demonstrates a force superior to “big people”—despite the fact that these are also thought to safeguard and strengthen their positions by uroi. This element of force was also demonstrated in the need to call in the FIR—the special police unit—to apprehend him after the ordinary police failed. However, this should not simply be interpreted that the FIR was more powerful in the conventional sense of the term, i.e. having more efficient arms; rather, the FIR is seen to be linked to the state apparatus in a much more direct manner.
than the regular municipal police or the novel institution of “community police” (see also chapter 7). Thus, their successful intervention and the subsequent transfer of the *muroi* to Maputo underline the importance of the Mozambican president’s interest: Guebuza himself wanted to “see this person.”

These cases, urban and rural, have demonstrated varied imaginaries of as well as experiences with *uroi*. In opting for retaining the term *uroi* and translating it as “sorcery,” I mean to analytically denote a diverse range of practices and potentialities. It is also a choice made so as not to impose a dichotomous typological rigidity (i.e. sorcery versus witchcraft) that is unsupported by the material. More importantly, however, the term *uroi*—as experienced in a variety of forms—retains the open-ended, dynamic, and forceful capacity that is identifiable in Honde and Chimoio: individual, relational and collective; diurnal and nocturnal; involving *mutombo* or not.

Thus, when Cerveija related the problem of the *profete* caught with the human head, both the *n’angas* and the *profetes* present identified immediately the act as being one of *uroi*. There is, however, an additional yet central element here: How are we to understand the direct intervention of the state, in the form of AMETRAMO and Cerveija?

**Uroi and the State**

Yet, all power, when it calls itself sacred, also becomes terrifying, steeped in sorcery.

Luc de Heusch (1985: 216)

By attacking the *profete* caught with the head through AMETRAMO, the Mozambican state actively intervenes in a case of *uroi*—a field that permeates nigh all aspects of life as we have seen. For one, the *profete* case involves the order of the state oriented toward striating a field it deems unruly, disorganized, and potentially dangerous. This tentative striation of *uroi* space cast these as forces still beyond the grasp of the state and is oriented toward imbuing them with legibility, control, and organization—an extension of the long-term state optic of attaining control over societal and cosmological unruliness, which is lumped under the generic term *confusão* (confusion). As has been discussed, the political genealogy of *confusão* spans the period of attack on obscurantist politics immediately postindependence to a branding of all opposition as fomenting a form of disorder that is inimical to state, society, and people in general.23
The use of *confusão* by state agents, as Mr. Cerveija of AMETRAMO did, alludes also to forces that would prove elusive to a formalistic approach to state formation and state-society relations. Cerveija used it explicitly above in his admonition to “the mothers,” the female *n’angas* and *profetes*, that created not only *confusão* with their actions but presented themselves as dangerous for the state order due to the destructive force of their inimical relations. Thus, the *profete/n’anga* schism constitutes a case of negative potency of considerable force wherein also its intimacy with *uroi* is a constitutive part—as evidenced by the commotion at the news of the *profete* with the head.

AMETRAMO’s attempts to neutralize the forces of *uroi* underline how, more generally, sorcery both impinges on and is integral to social and political realities. As summed up by Kapferer (2002: 14),

Sorcery is the imaginal formation of force and power that is to be expected in social circumstances that are disjunctive or in some sense discontinuous. Its concept in many different ethnographic contexts revolves around the magical capacity to work with the very potencies of difference, differentiation, division, opposition, contradiction and transgression. It gathers the force of such potencies, harnessing them to the purpose of destruction or to conjunction…. Sorcery is a thoroughgoing force of the social and the political.

Kapferer’s assertion of sorcery as a profoundly social and political phenomenon underlines its integration with the logic of the state: Confronted by forceful threats within social and political realities, the state form is oriented toward attempting to assert or reassert supremacy as well as to redefine the fields of the social and political from whence the dangers arose.

In keeping with this orientation, one such technique employed was the familiar statal mechanism of *bureaucratization*. By imposing the definitions of “traditional medicine-men” onto the field of healers, spirits, and *uroi*, the state tentatively reterritorializes the same field it sought to eradicate under Samora’s rule (1975–86)—as we have seen earlier. The rise of AMETRAMO post-Samora signals a departure from a confrontational modernist state order characterized by attacks on “obscurantism”—a term conflating vast and complex social and political institutions, practices, and cosmologies beyond the state (see also Israel 2014: 154, 167; Obarrio 2014: 16, 46–47). Nonetheless, the emergence and continued importance of AMETRAMO signals a well-known statist reorientation wherein the state abandons a project of eradication and attack on forces antagonistic to it, turning instead to one of encompassment, reordering, and reterritorialization (Kapferer and Bertelsen
2009). There is, of course, a historical parallel here, namely the case of the mhondoro that was identified as a dynamic variously internal and external to different polities but always with the potential to upset and challenge them. Similar potentiality for upsetting the state order may be found in the schism between n’anga and profete as well as in the very labile and forceful realm of healing, spirits, and uroi itself.

Second and more significant perhaps, AMETRAMO’s measures are also state attempts at either neutralizing or feeding on the explosive potentials of popular perception—evident in the tension between n’angas and profetes. In the discourses of profetes, n’angas are frequently cast as devil worshippers and evildoers as they do not necessarily recognize the authority of the Holy Ghost, the sacraments or the Bible, or other dimensions of the Christian faith. Similarly, profetes are seen as being evil and considered muroi in n’angas’ portrayals due to many profetes’ association with Zionist or Pentecostal churches and their (alleged) negligence of ancestral spirits and ritual. This schism and mutual antagonism between the two groups is actively cultivated by both—a cultivation of difference that neglects the wide array of similarity in practices, perceptions, and techniques of healing and dealing with uroi and spirits.24

The distinctions between n’angas and profetes generate considerable social and political tension also directed against the state, as in accusations against state organs or its agents of clandestinely hiding, representing, or using the nebulous force of either n’angas or profetes (depending on which group is making the claim). From the perspective of state bureaucracy and the elite, if the state through AMETRAMO and organs such as FIR manages to redefine the field, this will allow the state to make legible and, thus, manageable the forces of uroi, the potencies of healing, as well as the spirits that are appropriated by both n’angas and profetes. In the state optic of health management, the n’angas and profetes may be seen as nodes or regulatory entry points for state intervention and control if their forces and potentialities are coordinated and effectively bifurcated. Put differently, what is defined as the potential for benevolent healing is sought to be subsumed under state technologies of medicine and health. Conversely, what the state identifies as the malevolent forces—that of uroi in the form of nefarious consumption of bodies or trafficking in body parts—are also relegated to the state domain but confronted by its agents of law. Such a statist bifurcation and redefinition represent, from a bureaucratic point of view, a domestication and neutralization of the forces and potencies involved.

However, and third, AMETRAMO’s mode of engagement and the powerful experiences of state intervention against the cannibalistic sorcerer reveal that these do not merely reflect Mozambican historical tra-
jectories nor emanate from universal traits of ordering. The formation of AMETRAMO in significant aspects also echoes a dominant and shifting international trend of understanding health, well-being, and medicine. As such, AMETRAMO may be seen to be informed by the international trend of “recognition.” As part of this international trend, the World Health Organization (WHO) has for decades also understood health as transcending the confines of biomedicine and in its definition has embraced a wider understanding, emphasizing also communal, collective, and relational dimensions (A. Honwana 1996, 1999; Igreja 2004; McKay 2012; Shapiro 1983). Reflecting this trajectory, Langwick (2015) has argued that while the Tanzanian state increasingly seeks to “recognize” and reorder traditional medicine also according to neoliberal restructuring, also traditional medicine and its circumstances prove unruly.

Be that as it may, in the aftermath of the Mozambican civil war, the WHO’s non-biomedical approach also informed visions of “reintegration” and “reconciliation” at both practical levels of demobilization of soldiers as well as official discourse. The conflict- and trauma-solving societal potential outside institutionalized legal or therapeutic frameworks has also been recognized by many observers, but only to a small extent seen in terms of simple “reconciliation.” Nonetheless, the formation of AMETRAMO may usefully be seen to also be a concretization of increasing international non-biomedical rhetoric of health and well-being.

More broadly, AMETRAMO is also a product of Frelimo’s reorientation toward and increasing dependence on policy shifts, according to, especially, the Bretton Woods institutions from the mid- to late 1980s and onward—institutions whose dominant discourse for a sustained period of time was antistate in its demand for decentralization, economic liberalization, and liberal democracy. In a country emerging only in 1992 from a devastating civil war, Cramer links Mozambique’s postwar military demobilization to a parallel economic demobilization of the state—exemplified by Mozambique suffering “the largest privatization programme in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” which involved corrupt accumulation and rampant asset stripping (2007: 266). Such “economic demobilization” went hand in hand with the Washington consensus’ rhetorical as well as practical attacks on the state in the 1980s and a global trend critics have called “the production of a weak state” (Santos 2006a: 43). As sketched earlier, from the mid-1990s donors reoriented, and one practical outcome of this was the formation of AMETRAMO.

If we step back from the hands-on world of international policymakers, the Mozambican state’s appropriation of or, better, absorption by these often donor-driven discourses also provides novel state mecha-
nisms for capture, domestication, and appropriation of forces that are potentially destructive to and antagonistic toward the state order. To be more specific: AMETRAMO’s form of capture might be seen as one that is “culturifying” and “localizing” by disembedding particular practices and spaces of healing, destruction, and empowerment from their distinct social and political frameworks and particular historical trajectories. Thus, the double-edged recognition on the part of AMETRAMO entails attempts at an effective *desocialization* that is recognizable in and integral to a universalizing politics of health embedded in an overarching system of governance and, ultimately, state order.

In the state optic, *uroi*, the roaming spirits, and, also, unregulated ritual practices—represented by *n’angas* and *profetes*, as well as the domains of the household—are perilous, as they are generated and accessed by powerful nonstate agents. By evolving along trajectories that evade the propensity of the state for striation, sedentarization, and integration in forms of bureaucratic order, the dynamics of spirits, *uroi*, and ritual practices in general assume some of the same potentialities as violence in being rhizomic and a-structured—a force in themselves, perpetually expanding and transforming, and both beyond as well as constitutive of and embedded in the social. As Kapferer (2001: 69) has noted in a distinctly antifunctionalist (conceived broadly) argument on the force of violence, “Violence is not simply a product of certain kinds of social context, it is also, despite its manifest asociality, obviously an agency in society and constructive of social contexts.” The same nonfunctionalist approach as Kapferer has argued for violence in the context of Sri Lanka (and beyond) may be extended to the case of *uroi*, the spirits, and their interlocutors or intermediaries in terms of the unpredictability of their force and directions. However, significantly, the attempts to control this field through instruments of state power, such as AMETRAMO, enters the domain of the empirical—exposing the long-lasting spirit of the state’s dealing with *uroi*.

**Spirit of the State**

I start here by describing a measure taken against sorcerers in the late 1500s in Mozambique—an ordeal described by Portuguese contemporary sources (Santos 1964 [1609]: 204–5):

The second oath is called by the Kaffirs the oath of the xoca, which is the iron of an adze heated red-hot in the fire; it is then taken out with pincers and held to the mouth of the accused, who is told to lick the red-hot iron with his tongue, and if he is not guilty of the crime with which he is charged
the fire will not harm him and his tongue and lips will not be burnt; but if he is guilty, the fire will burn his tongue, lips, and face.

What is important to notice in this account is how the veracity of the case of alleged sorcery is controlled by and intimately related to the apparatus of the state. In the late 1500s, it was a crucial feature of the disciplinary and ruling apparatus of the king to decide if unlawful witches or sorcerers were operating in his terrain. These witches were seen to destabilize and threaten the authority of the king and the well-being of his subjects. This could, of course, merely be one singular historical instance of a particular king’s manner in which he attempted to establish control. However, in an interview with Cerveija in 2007, it was revealed that in AMETRAMO the test of the iron hot adze is also used to decide in cases of accusations of sorcery. Here I have asked Cerveija how AMETRAMO in practical terms decide whether a person they have apprehended is a muroi or not:

C: Well. We work with a small adze that we put into the fire. It is about twenty centimeters. It is made of iron, so it becomes very hot. We leave it there for an hour. If the accused touches it without burning, he or she is innocent. If he is burnt, he is guilty.

B: Do you still do this?

C: [Very vague] Now we do not do this. But we still have this system to decide whether someone is innocent or not.

What is striking is the similarity between practices described from the late 1500s within the realm of traditional kingdoms and techniques that are, maybe, still relevant in 2007 in a state-controlled organization for traditional healers. This durability in terms of techniques reveals important aspects of long-term preoccupation with and exposure to the destructive potential of witches. Further, sorcery and its containment, control, or dominance is also revealed to be at the heart of the royal as well as multiparty state form: in the former case, a witch or a sorcerer that was not sanctioned by or in the service of the king posed a challenge to sovereign power itself. Likewise, in the work of AMETRAMO, the forces of uroi need to be addressed as they may work destructively in society and against state authority and order. This is also formalized in the sense of serious cases of accusations of uroi being transferred to AMETRAMO from, for example, community courts or even the police (see also Bertelsen 2013). In 2007 AMETRAMO therefore proceeded to work proactively by penetrating urban and rural communities where sorcery had been revealed and attempted to deal directly with the alleged sorcerer. For Cerveija this engagement reflected the group’s altered role:
The things have changed slightly. Before we were often given cases by the police or by community leaders. Now it is much more direct—we may hear of cases in the bairros and we will go there to investigate. Or, as often, there are people who come and talk to us or to accuse others. Many times, the whole family will stay here when we resolve matters.

The way in which AMETRAMO president Cerveija deals with uroi and the field of n’angas and profetes is undergirded by a triangular power base. He is vested, first, with the power of the state as illustrated by the capacity to channel resources from Maputo, wield stamps and letterheads, etc. Second, his power in terms of being a formidable n’anga is well-known, harboring a range of spirits. Third, and somewhat paradoxically as he is also a state agent, his origins within the Gorongosa mountain range, the powerhouse of the traditional field in Mozambique, imbues him with extraterritorial and allochthon powers and evokes respect and fear.

It is important to bear in mind here that, and as indicated previously, AMETRAMO at times operate like an extrajudicial and extralegal body within the state apparatus by deciding on guilt in cases where conventional forms of evidence is absent. AMETRAMO’s use of the “trial by fire” test may therefore be seen to comprise a sort of powerful “spirit of the state” that is invoked to decide on guilt and to fend off uroi. As such, AMETRAMO transcends the confines of a formalist Weberian vision of the state as its state organ transforms administrative tasks of conflict resolution and societal order into veritable duels against sorcerers—present and potential alike (see also West 2005). Using age-worn mechanisms of ascertaining guilt through an adze of metal and tentatively subjecting n’angas and profetes to the logics of state sovereignty and the definitional category of “traditional medicine,” it is clear that the case of AMETRAMO explodes notions of bureaucratic structures or “recognition” (whatever that means) of the field of non-biomedical forms of healing. What emerges from the material is a state propelling itself with great intensity into the lighter and darker, violent and vegetal dimensions of mediating between spirits, bodies, and matter. In doing so it also illuminates the occluded or at least more subtle workings of the state.28

AMETRAMO may, thus, be seen as an expression of state sovereignty within the field that one might call the “supernaturally social.” However, the organization does more than substantiate Agamben’s (1998 [1995]) general argument about the frailty of human life in the face of power and the practice of defining certain categories of humans as disposable or beyond the law. For, in this setting where state meets the violent powers of sorcery and the n’angas and profetes that operate within this realm, law in the form of the authority of AMETRAMO meddles with what evades
and—in some senses—negates the state: the sorcerer and their interlocutors that feed on the feeble which comprise structures and practices of power uncontained by the state apparatus. Here, the sorcerer is not only part of the state, but by way of its territorializing dynamic or its making of “oneness” (Clastres 1994 [1980], 1998 [1974]), the state also propels itself into the domain of sorcery by establishing courts and laws founded on that which transcends and subverts the surfaces of everyday sociality. Such law-making and the continuous establishment of sovereignty are recognized well beyond the apparatus of the state’s often derelict offices in all Mozambican cities and in some rural areas. The analysis of AMETRAMO provides, therefore, an argument against a formalist approach to state formation and orders and underlines the need to scrutinize the state well beyond the paraphernalia of bureaucracy, its territoriality, or its very visible (and tangible) and violently enforced “rule of law” (see also Obarrio 2014).

The very existence and operation of AMETRAMO also demonstrates to the full “the mythical foundation of authority” in which the dealings of AMETRAMO are seen as natural by a great number of people (if not legitimate—as many do not recognize the legitimacy of the Frelimo state). Thus, AMETRAMO’s practices must not only be reduced to a case of a postcolonial African party-state encroaching on a field to gain legitimacy or—at least—attempting to gain control over an unruly and powerful terrain and its people. Instead, complementing such an analysis must be a recognition of AMETRAMO as establishing an entry point to scrutinize the state and its sovereign forms—hereunder its apex, the president.

**Sorcery, Bodies, and Sovereignty**

In Southern Africa, figures of sovereignty, such as kings, chiefs, or rainmakers, are frequently represented as the prime sorcerers of their realms (see, e.g., Gluckman 1963 [1956])—a vision still very much present in current understandings of hierarchy and power. As touched upon in chapter 3 and argued elsewhere (Bertelsen 2004) when attributed to antistate forces in the person of Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama in the context of elections, rainmaking and sorcerous potentialities shape powerful perceptions of politics and political action. The parliamentary and presidential elections of 1999 are a case in point as these were followed by large-scale floods and my interlocutors in Honde and Chimoio (as well as elsewhere) interpreted these as having been created by Dhlakama in response to alleged electoral fraud by Frelimo. This Mozambican case
of what one may call a “political cosmology” bespeaks, therefore, the relations between the sovereign's body and his powers—political and sorcerous. This imaginary of state power in the body of the king is, however, not just confined to Southern Africa. A brief look at two cases from southern Sudan and Rwanda may be instructive in such regard.

In a highly interesting and detailed volume examining the social, political, and symbolic forces and dynamics of rainmakers and kings, Simon Simonse (1992) argues that these figures may be seen as doubly sacrificial and wielding great powers. He builds on a vast array of anthropological material on regicide and the king's body in South Sudan, ranging from the Seligmans' classical treatise (1932) to Schnepel's more recent (1991) analysis of Shilluk shrines and ritual. Simonse's analysis revolves around the dual themes of rainmaking and kingship, dimensions of power that are intimately related in his material from the Lulubo, Lokoya, and Lotuho in South Sudan. In one case, serious drought ravaged the region in the period 1982–84, and the rainmaker was increasingly singled out as the rainstopper or droughtmaker by her community. As a culmination of increasingly more public accusations and actions taken to bring rain (i.e. the exhumation of corpses of elders and throwing these into the river), the ritual experts in the rainmaker's community informed her that would be killed. In a highly nonritualized fashion, on 8 July 1984 the rainmaker was taken to a place in the bush where a fire was lit, and under the auspices of the mojomiji, the ritual expert, a group of three (a leper, a blind man, and a lame man) beat her to death with sticks and threw her into the flames. After her death, her belly was opened and mixed with substances from a nonedible melon, and her corpse was thrown into the bush. In the days following her death, rain came in large amounts, contextually both underlining her power as a rainstopper and providing evidence that her powers had now been released (Simonse 1992: 366–372).

Interestingly, Simonse also exemplifies with a king's death in the area and underlines that this bears similarities to that of the rainmaker, arguing how the period of royal death is one in which the forces of the king must be contained within his corpse. Contrarily, and if released, “the violence contained in the corpse may emerge and disrupt the community” (1992: 382), causing crop pests, disorder, and impede the provision of rain. It is therefore vital to plug the orifices of the king's corpse upon death to contain the power of kingship in a dangerous transitional period (1992: 383). In the case of an Ikang royal death, similar relations are expressed: the king's body is also closed but left on a platform normally used for drying sorghum—exposed to the sun for days. It is left there until the abdomen bursts open, the contents are distributed,
and “peace, rain and food [are] believed to spread over the land …” (1992: 384). In both instances—the violent death of the rainmaker and the nonviolent death of the king—regenerative forces are contained within their bodies—forces that are potentially benign if contained and transferred or distributed in correct ways.33

Similar care regarding the king’s body is found in de Heusch’s (1982b [1972]) examination of central African foundational myths—an analysis complementing Simonse’s assertions of the bodily significance of royals. De Heusch (1982b [1972]: 237f) argues that the ways of treating the king’s body—by mummification, dismemberment, or by placing the bodily remains in jars, or, prior to death, suffocating the king to death—are linked to dry and wet cycles of agricultural production. Arguably, such a structuralist argument is, perhaps, somewhat too generalizing given the less than perfect correlation to specific contexts and annual cycles of production and reproduction. However, the theme of the king’s body is also explored in terms of the dangers of violent death of the sovereign where great apprehension is also taken to obstruct or, rather, impale the orifices of the body to let open the beneficial and forceful flows that hitherto had been corporeally obstructed by, and contained within, the royal body.

This is the concern of Christopher Taylor’s (2009) reexamination of imaginaries shaping sovereign and political power during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In the context of genocide, Rwanda’s president Habyarimana was in popular cartoons depicted as a formidable being that prevented the flowing of imaana—a powerful and central life-giving force. Thus, his figure was in breach of the sovereign’s central regulatory and circulatory function for the well-being, fecundity, and fertility of his realm, and in these same cartoons, he was drawn as impaled and, thus, violently “reopened” to allow imaana to flow anew.

One dimension to be elicited from these African examples is the centrality of the corporeality of kingship, statehood, and sovereignty—also a fundamental theme in political philosophy more broadly. A relevant entry point in regards to the above Mozambican material—and, indeed, the dimensions of kingship and rainmaking from the Sudan and also Central and Southern Africa in general—is Agamben’s (1998 [1995]) refreshing rereading of Kantorowicz’s classical treatise on the The King’s Two Bodies (1997 [1957]: 91–103). Kantorowicz states that the physical, organic body of a particular king and the body of kingship are separate, as reflected in expressions like “the king never dies” or “the king is dead. Long live the king.” Agamben critiques this by claiming such a separation is rooted in Christian mythology of the perpetuation of “Christ’s mystic body.” Building on examples from the Roman and Greek
antiquity, Agamben instead proposes that the king should be seen as a form of *Homo Sacer*—a figure that can be killed but not sacrificed. Upon death, a king or an emperor's body should therefore be seen to have “not two bodies but rather two lives inside one single body: a natural life and a sacred life” (1998 [1995]: 100). This sacred life is accessible and potentially dangerous at the time of death, and, again building on Greek and Roman material, Agamben argues (1998 [1995]: 98) that “the first consequence of death is the liberation of a vague and threatening being … who returns, with the outward appearance of the dead person, to the places where the person lived, belonging properly neither to the world of the living nor to that of the dead.”

Although informed by a rather limited set of classic European empirical material, Agamben’s critique of the purportedly Christian imagery at the heart of Kantorowicz’s notion of two bodies is instructive as it points to dimensions of sacrifice, liminality, transgression, and, above all, the apex of the political system where power condenses around the king. The element of danger and transgression—an element recognizable in the Sudanese cases above—is also clear from his emphasis on the substances of danger—life itself contained within the sovereign body—that is threatening to the “non-deadened” world. Death and the ritual transference between it and life is potentially extremely destructive, productive, and disruptive—seen in the cases of the rainmaker and sovereigns (kings and presidents) in the Sudan and Rwanda. Agamben underlines time and again the relation between sovereign power and death, in contrast to the perpetuity of *dignitas* argued by Kantorowicz, and one whose excess and whose body represents “the cipher of the absolute and inhuman character of sovereignty” (1998 [1995]: 101).

If Agamben’s consideration of sovereign power and the king’s body is correct, the sorcerer apprehended in Chimoio and brought by FIR agents directly before the president in Maputo perhaps becomes clearer. The character of the president, a figure containing within his body powerful substances, is also at the apex of a system of purported absoluteness. This is evident from the imaginaries of the president—and perhaps solely him—being powerful enough to confront (and “see”) the sorcerer that, through transgression and consumption of men and women, artificially created forces within his body that were radically and increasingly experienced as threats against the lives of others. Neutralizing the dangers of this sorcerer necessitates the forces of someone equally or more powerful. The president co-opts these forces by containing them within his body, so to speak.

Such co-optation, on the other hand, makes the president protrude as an immensely potent twilight figure and one that, in this case, acts
in the interest of his subjects by appropriating the destructive forces contained in the body of the necrophagous sorcerer of Chimoio. Neutralizing him, the president defuses the potentialities generated by his sorcerous actions and, thus, also precludes the generation of evil spirits following the sorcerer’s death should he have been killed by people. On the other hand, the actions by the president also strengthen and empower him further, impregnating him against attack and bolstering his sorcerous powers of extraction, accumulation, and dominance, as many see it. In this imaginary of the state, the president, thus, attains the familiar role of supreme sorcerer (see also Kapferer 2002: 15). The potencies of urois, therefore, are integral elements not only in the figure of the sovereign president but also in testifying to the dark potencies harbored by the hierarchies of the state.

However, this interpretation needs to be supplemented by another dimension that is also, at the same time, a criticism against the absoluteness of the sovereign figure as argued by Agamben. In an incisive critique, Laclau (2007) argues that Agamben’s vision of the nomos of the camp as the ultimate sovereign expression, his insistence on the totalitarian project of politics and law, and the ways in which the Homo Sacer is integral to the formation of sovereign, in sum, underlines a form of political nihilism and totalitarianism. In the realm of Agamben’s dynamics of sovereignty and the bare life upon which it inscribes itself, it is inconceivable to identify forces, agencies or potentialities that fundamentally challenge such a formation. Thus, and in keeping with the thrust of Laclau’s critique, the vision of the Agambenian sovereign formation is of a power that perfectly encompasses its human subjects and their social and political capacities. Conversely, one does not find in Agamben’s analysis, neither internal to the sovereign formation nor external to it, articulations of potentials for forces, agencies, or agents that may destabilize or, even, are in discord with the sovereign.

Applied to the material on the king’s or rainmaker’s body and power—in the form of potentiality or force, for example, as expressed in the imaginary of the sorcery of power, politics, and the king—Agamben’s totalitarian sovereign eclipses too perfectly his own as well as wider domains of control and influence. Rather, and against Agamben, there is every reason to emphasize that power, in this case that wielded and, indeed, embodied by the sovereign, transcends the confines of what can be regulated and domesticated, appropriated and controlled absolutely and perpetually.

This does not imply that the figure of the king as the supreme sorcerer is faulty. It means, however, that the figure of the king as the supreme sorcerer is an image that is constantly blurred, so to speak, by
the action of his purported subjects. In the realm of sorcery and its relation to sociality and politics, this can be imagined empirically as the immense force with which new formations in the cosmological domain emerge as well as the speed and force with which these become enmeshed in ongoing social and political realities. One such example has been given earlier in the state’s attempt to bureaucratically striate the field of profetes and n’angas. However, as the case of the profete with the human head shows, the forces of uroï that AMETRAMO members also potentially engage in transcend the machinations of statehood itself or state bodies and technologies. Another example may be the rainmaker from Sudan in Simonse’s material who was no longer able to contain the forces of power conveyed upon her. A third might be the powerful cosmologies of regicide at work during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 wherein the body of the king needed to be violently reappropriated in order to reopen the forces of imana to let these again flow into the rivers of the nation and regenerate the polity.

These three instances point to what one might call the perpetual excess of power present within and confronting any state formation (see also Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009: 6f). Further, the popular imagery of a state or sovereign’s absoluteness resembles the splendor of sovereignty being absolute et perpetuelle—as elaborated famously in the mid-1500s by Bodin (Bodin and Franklin 1992 [1576]). For Bodin, sovereignty is fantastically imagined and revolves around totalitarian, millenarian, or other revolutionary transformations by the state of the social and political order. Interestingly, Bodin also saw such transformation giving rise to sovereignty as, indeed, integral to a struggle against sorcerers, witches, and “demon-maniacs”—beings that were to be violently defeated but whose powers sometimes were, in Bodin’s view, appropriated by kings and rulers (Bodin, Scott, and Pearl 1995 [1580]).

The case of AMETRAMO is, thus, not unique, and similar situations have been conceived in other empirical contexts. On a general level, these cracks, so to speak, in the edifice of the (postcolonial) state have also been recognized by Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 4), who argue that “although sovereign power always seeks to project itself as given, stable and natural, it never completely manages to achieve the status of a ‘master signifier’ that can stabilize a social order and a set of identities.” Empirically, one might compare the dynamics of AMETRAMO to another postcolonial context—as analyzed by Taussig in his Magic of the State (1997). His work analyzes the state order through focusing on intersections of “state magic” enshrined in national narratives of liberation or national monuments devoted to the Liberator with the popular magical practices of a character Taussig calls the Spirit Queen. In explor-
ing state imaginaries, institutions, paraphernalia, and practices, Taussig claims that “it is not the healer who is mystical, but the state” (1997: 125). Specifically, Taussig in a number of ways evokes how the potentialities in the imaginaries of liberation and statehood, commanded and created by the state, constantly transcend its institutional and discursive frameworks.

Taussig’s work—although given a specific experimental shape and theoretically steeped within the specific optics of Bataille and Benjamin, among others—shows empirical instances of how the state creates and is dependent upon magic, i.e. imaginaries. At the same time, the project and intrusion of the state into the realm of the social will routinely be met with processes of appropriation destabilizing the cosmologies of state sovereignty.

These visions of sovereignty, from Bodin through Hansen and Stepputat to Taussig, indicate practices that destabilize, appropriate, and re-/deterioritinalize the statal project, and can be further understood through Deleuze and Guattari’s vantage point in seeing the state as an ordering dynamic, oriented toward striation, sedentarization, legibility. A case in point can be AMETRAMO’s propelling itself into the social formation of the healers in order to create a legible, well-ordered space, catering also for multinational donors seeking to attain “recognition” of benevolent cultural forms, which I have identified as being a project of AMETRAMO. Such a project of ordering is also in line with Cerveija’s attempt to make the n’angas and profetes stay clear of uroi. The project of the state order is, however, nonabsolute in the sense of comprising a project in the becoming. Adapting to constant novel and rapidly changing social realities and orientations, any state order will always already constantly reorient itself and its strategies in order to meet, control, and reterritorialize these circumstances. To invert Bodin’s classical notion of sovereignty, the perpetual character of sovereignty needs rather to be conceived as the perpetual becoming of sovereignty of the state. Moreover, at any point in its creation of striated spaces and arborescent hierarchies of subjects, the state order is constantly challenged by lines of flight. These lines constantly imbue—within the state order itself—a dynamic that is unsettling. Further, lines of flight, as we also saw previously on the becomings of regimes of state in Manica Province, are also generated by the state order itself—its actions, or rather, the effects of its actions generating new forms of dissent, disorder, and challenges to the hierarchies, systems of empowerment, and accumulation and bureaucratization that the state logic commands, directs, and is defined by.

In this sense, sorcery can be conceived as such a line of flight—cutting through the fantasies of absoluteness and perpetuality and challeng-
ing the very state order. A similar argument has also been launched by Geschiere (1988) on the basis of his material from the Maka in Cameroon, pointing out that they exert a form of revanche on the state or state elites by engaging in sorcery. Following Bayart (1993), he comments on the relationship between sorcery and the state that “a basic ambiguity seems to be that the less structured these popular modes are, the more they remain ‘invisible’ and therefore the harder for the state to combat” (Geschiere 1988: 37).

In being a particular form of the rhizomic, a character of which is also invisibility, lines of flight are changeable and unreignable—in the sense of both rei(g)ning in and be governable. The Maka case corresponds in various aspects to how both AMETRAMO and bodies of state attempt to contain sorcery. They have failed, however, also as sorcery is at once exacted against the state and by the state—in that the state, also, creates its own sorcerers to combat. Further, sorcery is uncontainable due to its rhizomic structure by following a multitude of potential lines of kinship and sociality and transforming these, possible configurations are at the same time also, to a large extent, unpredictable. This feature of sorcery haunts all polities seeking to control its force—from Ngungunyane to Samora Machel. Moreover, these features of the state engaging in, co-opting, and seeking to control uroi imbues the state with lines of deterritorialization. Geschiere is partly right, therefore, in ascertaining that sorcery can be a popular mode effecting a revanche on the state by society (Geschiere 1988).

In a reassessment, Bruce Kapferer (2002: 3) pointed out that a significant virtue of Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1976 [1937]) was that “magical practice is not here [in the book] reduced to terms that are external to it.” Kapferer’s support for such a position that make accessible and demonstrate magical practice in itself has also guided the writing of this chapter. Similarly, I have tried to show how an approach that largely understands the practices of n’angas and profetes in terms of effects of commodification in the wake of neoliberalism is flawed, as it reduces these practices and realities to be purely reactive to external processes. In the contexts of Honde and Chimoio—and, indeed, the wider Mozambican context—the potentialities of magic and sorcery are thoroughly embedded in processes of state-making. This also entails the state propelling itself into, and also to some degree constructing, its sorcerous opponents. Further, what I demonstrated is that the assemblages of state and the traditional field in the domains of sorcery and magic are both intertwined, and that these, therefore, constitute crucial empirical sites for analyzing potentialities, dynamics, and tensions within and between them.
Notes

1. The change in official Frelimo discourse as well as (partly) state practice was also related to decentralization drives coming into vogue in the early 1990s with the increasingly important international donor community, including the Bretton Woods institutions. As these had become integral to the Mozambican economy, the international reorientation effected a change in Frelimo rhetoric as well as practice. See Adam (1996: 128ff) especially for documenting these aid flows and their influence in Mozambique in the 1980s and early 1990s. For two critiques of the “Washington consensus”–driven decentralization drive, see also Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1996: 139–99 esp.) and (Orre 2010).

2. On AMETRAMO compared to other African associations of so-called “traditional medicine,” see particularly Green (1996), and on its relations with the Mozambican state, see also the many important contributions by Meneses (2000, 2004a, 2004b, 2006).

3. All numbers provided by an organization with an interest in aggrandizement could, naturally, be questioned—although it reflects a national figure often cited of seventy thousand healers. Here the point is not the number’s accuracy, but rather that it indicates the importance of this field and, moreover, reflects the numbers of members encountered in various settings during fieldwork.

4. As Mr. Cerveija is a high-ranking public figure in Chimoio, his name will not be anonymized as this would be a near impossibility without “fictionalizing” to an untenable level. Further, it was also made clear with Mr. Cerveija that these were interviews and he explicitly gave permission to use the material collected. See also “A Note on Anonymity and Fieldwork.”

5. The card reflects the Frelimo state’s obsessions with identification and bureaucratic tokens, as also identified and analyzed by West (2003).

6. The concern with confusão is also a legacy of the organizational, territorial, and political dimensions of the postcolonial bairro associations, wherein all households would be included in a group of five houses with a leader, integrated into a unit of twenty-five houses with a head, and again reporting to the overall chief of the area, the secretário do bairro. Further, movement between bairros or areas would in much of the early postindependence era be subject to permissions provided in a document, the so-called guia de marcha, that had to be presented to the leader of the area one was traveling to (see, e.g., also Kyed 2007b: 72).

7. Actions by AMETRAMO to reorder the field of n’angas and profetes include suspensions of members and are regularly reported—as in a case from 2013 where fifty members in Inhambane were suspended for, among other things, having meddled in sorcery, having been involved in the transfer of children as payment for debts, or for having exorbitant rates (see Iva 2013).

8. For other interesting framings of “modernity” and Africa, see Moore and Sanders (2001), Meyer and Pels (2003), Macamo (2005), and Kiernan (2006).

of “othering” and “racializing” Africa and, thus, their approach to the topic of witchcraft as integral to what Trouillot (2003) has argued to be “savage slot” topics.


11. Societies of witches are the subjects of various ethnographic accounts in Southern and Eastern Africa. In H. A. Junod’s classic account, he writes that “these baloyi [sorcerers] know each other. They form a kind of secret society within the tribe, and they assemble during the night—in their spiritual bodies—to eat human flesh in the desert” (Junod 1962 [1912]b: 506, italics retained). Also, LeVine (1963: 226) describes how Gusii witches in Kenya operate in groups to sate their lust for human flesh, while Marwick describes a “guild” of witches in his Chewa material (1965: 77–79). This sociality—or perhaps “asociality”—of sorcerers in the invisible realm is also key to West’s (2005) analysis of current and past sorcery from the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique.

12. The use of plants is yet another instance in which material objects (plants), spiritual beings (mhondoro), and healing capacities (n’angas) emanating from Gorongosa (and as referred to in previous chapters) are seen to be more potent than those pertaining to Chimoio, Honde, or the immediate surrounding area.

13. For a similar transition from naming the witch by a nganga (n’anga) or a community in Zimbabwe to indirect treatment or indirect accusation, see Gelfand (1964: 46f) and Bourdillon (1987: 187ff).

14. As West (2007) has pointed out in a critical methodological self-reflection relating to researching sorcery, one treads so near to one’s subject of study that after some time one might be regarded as a practitioner of its arts oneself (see also Favret-Saada 2015 [2009]). As such, uroi is a dangerously elusive force, and during fieldwork different, often contradictory pieces of evidence of its dimensions emerged—also in my work in Honde and Chimoio.

15. Bourdillon (1987: 74) provides details as to the djangano practices for Shona peoples in general. For a classic study of the institution of the beer party and social change, see also Barth’s (1967) study of Fur in Sudan.

16. West (2007) notes an instance where the throat meat of a slain lion is used for similar purposes.

17. However, eating alone does not, unambiguously, signify antisocial behavior: in popular corruption discourses in several African countries, the metaphor “eat” (comer in Portuguese) covers both the physical act of consuming food as well as engaging in systems of corruption (see, e.g., Bayart 1993; Argenti 2007: 88f). Eating with others can then, paradoxically, also index specific antisocial, colluding, and predatory forms of consumption. The community of corrupt consumption, if we may call it that, to many people’s minds is more akin to the nocturnal necrophagous feasts of a society of muroi than households sharing their daily meals with members or visitors—as indicated also in Geschiere’s book Modernity of Witchcraft (1997), whose original subtitle in French reads Sorcellerie en Afrique. La viande des autres (1995), a title more directly addressing the aspects of human flesh, labor, and corruption than the English edition. Conversely, therefore, the former Mozambican president, Samora Machel, is
hailed in popular and Frelimo discourse alike as one who always “ate alone.” His solitude was, thus, seen as evidencing his noncorrupt character—in opposition to popular perceptions of today’s prolific and profitable networks of politics and business. On food taboos, social organization and cannibalism in Mozambique in general, see Huhn’s insightful work (e.g. Huhn 2016).

18. See also Hilda Kuper’s analysis of two main types of so-called “murders for doctoring,” namely “agricultural fertility” and “personal aggrandizement” (1963: 66). When describing “agricultural charms,” Burbridge (1925: 26) also notes this aspect: “Perhaps in no instance does the sinister influence of this man [the ‘witch doctor’] appear in darker colours than in the conditions annexed to the use of this agricultural charm divisi. These conditions, sometimes incestuous, sometimes murderous, always inhuman and unnatural, were eagerly complied with by the superstitious idler, not witting that by the sweat of his brow he must eat his bread. In sloth he sat with his friendly benefactor by his side pulling the right string to set the mechanical forces free which were to fill his grain-bin.”

19. Enslaving others for agricultural work is documented already by H. A. Junod (1962 [1912]: 514f; see also Beidelmann 1963: 66; Marwick 1965: 76; Ellis and Haar 2004: 123) while Geland (1964: 71–72) and Marwick (1965: 809) explore sacrificial killings of kin and use of their body parts or mutombo to augment yields. Several analyses also relate agricultural or economic productivity to incestuous and sorcerous relations (Aschwanden 1982 [1976]: 101f; Jacobson-Widding 1989: 40, 1990: 54). However, enslavement and zombification imagery is also frequently analyzed as reflecting histories of capture, slave trade, and forced labor—as, for instance, Argenti (2007: 93–120 esp.) has argued for West Africa and Zimba et al. (2006) have for East Africa.

20. Though differences in how male and female muroi operate are acknowledged, in my material there are no clear indications of numerical predominance for men or women. In this chapter I have therefore not elaborated on the gendered facets of muroi, spirit possession, or related aspects. I will, however, return to gendered and bodily dimensions in chapter 6 in the context of accumulation, production, reproduction, and economy.

21. The person is here referring to Força da Intervenção Rápida (FIR)—a national rapid intervention police force under the national police (see also Bertelsen and Chauque 2015).

22. Putrid, smelly, or otherwise contextually revolting matter is frequently linked to forms of moral transgression—also in Chimoio and Honde. For instance, as will be dealt with in chapter 6, the water used to wash corpses in Chimoio’s provincial morgue is regularly stolen by thieves who, it is believed, will consume this liquid in order to render themselves invisible—invisibility being a well-known trait of muroi. See also Telle (2003) for an exploration of relations between theft, sorcery, and odor in Lombok, Indonesia.

23. See also Kyed 2007a for a case of the Mozambican state agents’ use of confusão to assert state authority.

24. As argued in chapter 4, differences between profetes and n’angas are frequently overstated in many analyses. Although, of course, the increase in the profete category is interesting, the great number of similarities between practices is
often misrepresented when analysts subscribe to the dichotomy vigorously professed by their interlocutors. Pfeiffer (2006: 81), in a sense, also confirms and reproduces this imagined schism between the n’angas and the profetes, writing that “the extraordinary expansion of Pentecostals and African Independent Churches (AIC) … in Central Mozambique represents a dramatic shift away from reliance on ‘traditional’ healers.” This claim is unsupported by my material and contrary to the analysis undertaken here.

25. See C. Taylor (1994) for an academic proponent of the “recognition trend.” However, the term “recognition” and its African policy implications has been, rightly, critiqued for a failure to appreciate complexities such as the politics of identity, ongoing formations of hierarchy, gendered inequalities, and the hybrid and fluid nature of cultural institutions. Englund and Nyamnjoh (2004) and Englund (2006) offer some general critiques of “recognition” within Africa, while Nielsen (2007) provides a useful critical reading of the Mozambican politics of recognition.

26. See Lundin (1998), Bertelsen (2002), Schafer (2007), and Wiegink (2014) for some critical works. There is, however, both a danger in simplifying trauma (see Broch-Due and Bertelsen 2016) and overstating the potential of nonstate capacity. As Alden (2002: 353) wryly remarks, this focus may translate (too) easily into an inexpensive manner in which reintegration is achieved: “A sort of utopian methodology of reintegration becomes possible which is self-administering and entails virtually no costs for the international community.”

27. Although I will not develop this here (as it is part of the overall argument of this book), it may also be made into a case against the “invention of tradition” thesis by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992 [1983]), where the force, violence, and apparatus of colonialism is seen to dislocate and refigure the traditional to such an extent as to sever the relations between past and present forms and formations.

28. At one level AMETRAMO also represents what one may call the exteriorization of the mystical foundations of the state and authority—an argument well-known from Foucauldian (1977, 1980) interpretations of Benthamian panopticons to the perennially violent state at the heart of Agambenian (2000, 2005) understandings of sovereignty. Applied to postcolonial Africa, Werbner (1998a, 1998c) in particular has pointed out for Zimbabwe the political significance of the state’s perpetual cultivation of statal and national lieux de mémoire (Nora 1989) furnished with national cosmologies where inherent spirit-making and the invocation of divine support from national unknown dead (the grave of the unknown soldier) and the fathers of the nation (leading figures of the liberation movement) are prominent (see also Lan 1985; Fontein 2015a). The contradictions inherent in the state’s celebration of national heritage sites devoted to past battles and present political purposes, often at odds with local understandings of these events and protagonists, have been explored well by Celso Inguane (2007) at heritage sites in southern Mozambique. These nationally and locally celebrated heritage sites continuously reconfigure and rescript time and space into national cosmologies that form repositories of symbolic and political capital to be used pragmatically by the wielders of statehood—in Mozambique the Frelimo party. More broadly, of course, the specific configurations of time and
space from Zimbabwe and Mozambique also exemplify the trope of the epic employed in narrating the nation (Bakhtin 1981, 1986), testify to the mystical foundation of state, and indicate the necessity of a cosmological undergirding of sovereign power. This latter point—far too often overlooked by political scientists preoccupied by attempts to locate political games of “strategems and spoils” (Bailey 1980 [1969]) or in portrayals of an Africa-wide “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993)—is an important backdrop for understanding the various configurations of state, hereunder the flourishing of a state organ for dealing with spirits and sorcery such as AMETRAMO.

29. Crucial links between sovereignty, royal bodies and cosmology is also well-known outside Africa, as within a Hindu royal context treated, for instance, in Terje Oestigaard’s (2005: 7–45) detailed analysis of how king sacrifice, cremation rites, and cosmologies are closely related within the Nepalese context and to the death of the country’s last king, King Birendra.

30. Ripping open the belly of a killed rainmaker is also described by Seligman (1932: 293).

31. A similar analysis of *wei*—“breath” or “life”—is made by Schnepel (1991: 46–48) in his reanalysis of older material by Frazer, Seligman, Evans-Pritchard, and others on the Shilluk. The containment and correct treatment of *wei*, and its safe transference to the king’s successor, he argues, is a key to the practice in the foundational myth of kingship of smothering or burying alive the king. See also de Heusch (1982b [1972]: 33) and Seligman and Seligman (1932: 91, 292) for cases of plugging the orifices of killed kings and rainmakers.

32. Simonse (1992: 383) exemplifies: “The Lulubo (and the Fajelu and the Nyangbara) removed the leaves for plugging the body (*imuture*) before the grave [of the king] is closed and take them to a stream or to a cave in the mountain. The *imuture* is removed from the corpse by old men, preferably a sister’s son to the deceased, and given to old women. These receive it kneeling in an attitude of intense respect. They carry it to the river or the cave in a solemn procession, kneeling at stations during the procession, their heads bent down and singing royal mourning songs (*owilara*) and they move their hands as if they were harvesting sorghum and millet.”

33. The relations between the figure of the sovereign and fertility is, of course, well-known from a host of anthropological literature, including the classic analysis of the *Incwala* first fruit ceremony by Gluckman (1938). Further, Frazer, for instance, in his sweeping encyclopedic style, also includes the “Quiteve” king (building on Theal 1964 [1898]) in a summary of different African and non-African kingdoms in which the ideal of a king’s unblemished body is vigorously guarded, and regicide or the king’s suicide is expected if the ideal is breached (Frazer 1993 [1922]: 265–74). However, for an incisive critique of Frazer’s style of reasoning and analysis relating to divine kingship, see Leach (2011), while Evans-Pritchard’s (2011) critical engagement with Frazer remains more cautious.

34. A vision of an excess of power is also central to Mbembe’s (2001) notion of the postcolonial state, and in his perspective its subjects are seen to connive and toy with power and its symbols.
35. Specifically, Taussig underlines similarities between national monuments in the form of statues and spirit possession (1997: 166): “A statue is a site for philosophical meditation, where force and image lock together. Spirit possession shares these properties of the statue.” Describing how popular magical practices in terms of bodily posture, visions of the Liberator, violent potentialities, and the death at the center of sovereignty are all invoked and appropriated in rituals of spirit possession, Taussig argues how these reflect dimensions of statehood enshrined and ritualized in national memorials. Another example of such mirroring is in the case of the M-19 guerrilla movement stealing the Liberator’s sword from a national museum in 1974 (1997: 189–95). Appropriating the sword from a sacred site of the state, the museum, was a revolutionary act seeking through the imaginary of the Liberator to recast the nation by appropriation and redefinition of a key state fetish. As such, the sword-taking, a potent symbol of state sovereignty, challenges key magical workings of the state and its sovereign symbols.

36. This point is argued in Deleuze’s (2006 [1975]: 66) highly accessible *Two Regimes of Madness* and summed up in a quote celebrating the potentiality of escape from arborescent structures: “The secret is to become invisible and to make a rhizome without putting down roots.”

37. An aspect not pursued here but worth mentioning is Tilly’s (1985: 171) relevant argument about the state, protection and threats: “To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket.” The AMETRAMO case seemingly both supports as well as challenges Tilly’s assumption about “imaginary threats,” as the state here is embroiled in dynamics both external and internal to its workings—the borders between the two being highly negotiable, contextual, and, for analytical purposes, almost indistinguishable. However, by leaving the politics of “obscurantism” behind through forming AMETRAMO to engage sorcerers on different planes, the state is increasingly locked in and integral to dynamics in which it has less and less control.
In *After Kinship* (2004), Janet Carsten employs “substance” to delineate important dimensions of classical understandings of kinship and personhood. She does so by reinterpreting Schneider’s (1980) studies on American kinship and revisiting Marilyn Strathern’s (1988) analyses of Trobriand kinship and in/individuality. Based on these reinterpretations and, more generally, extensive comparisons between Indian, Melanesian, British, and American cases, Carsten specifically recontextualizes and questions the components of kinship as *code* and *substance* as argued by Schneider. Concentrating on substance, she argues that the term has a range of different connotations but is used in diverse ways, ranging from the stuff of relations to body tissue. Importantly, Carsten highlights problematic notions of metaphorization in this regard, and her work is a contribution to grounding and, literally, substantializing the debate on kinship components.

Informed by Carsten and others, this chapter will analytically revolve around the *substance* of kinship in two ways. First, it will see substance in relation to life’s beginning and end in terms of reproductive capacities, bodily potentialities, and liminal states of households and their members. Second, by focusing on substance and the first domain, it will broaden an understanding of economics by grounding such terms as exchange, commodification, production, and accumulation.

Through analyzing these two aspects, the chapter develops material that, directly and indirectly, relates to a protracted history of violent state intervention, control, and extraction of labor—as identified especially in chapter 3. Complementing and strengthening the argument of chapter 3
by using contemporary material, this chapter argues that state intervention, control, and reordering constitute violent intrusions intimately related to commodification and the market. Such an analysis also supports a central claim of this book, namely, that approaches to “state” are irreducible to examining formal bureaucracies, spatial domains of control, or societal functions—although these are also central aspects of the Mozambican postcolonial state. The state must instead be understood in terms of wider societal orders as well as in terms of social imaginaries as seen from particular localities.

Regulating and ordering flows of substance are central to the domains of production and reproduction, and this argument will be thoroughly developed in the context of *kubatidzana*, a household ritual following death. Thereafter, the gendered dimensions of such ordering will be explored in the domain of women and their relation to markets and accumulation—in particular the phenomenon of so-called *zwidoma*.

*Kubatidzana* and *zwidoma* crucially capture dimensions of production and reproduction beyond reductively economistic terms, and these phenomena will be related to technologies of dark accumulation, especially the tapping of live and dead bodies. Such draining goes beyond the satiating of the lust for human meat (*kurha nhama io munhu*), which was analyzed in chapter 5. The tapping of bodies of labor power as well as the extraction of liquids from corpses are integral to both popular critiques against the state elite as well as *muroi*. In sum, the chapter therefore asks: In what ways are the regulation and tapping of various forms of productive and reproductive cycles—so integral to the traditional field—agonistically related to the domains of state, accumulation, and commodification?

### Approaching Economies, Capital, and the State

Much of what is written about economy in Mozambique and, indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere may be divided into two camps. The first genre of literature is econometrically or statistically inclined, geared toward accumulating, analyzing, and presenting quantitative data based on samples, national statistics, estimates, and macroeconomic indicators (Clément and Peiris 2008; Cunguara and Hanlon 2012). Often generated by the development industry as part of what one may call *developmentalism*, this discourse is prevalent in academic analyses and beyond on countries such as Mozambique.

However, while important, this vein of literature will not be touched upon to any great extent here. Rather, a second vein of literature revolves
around issues seemingly more at the heart of the matter to the discussion on “economy” in relation to state formation and the field of the traditional. In anthropology, a large number of works address neoliberalism and globalization and the shifts this recent development of the capitalist trajectory has implied (see, e.g., West and Sanders 2003; J. Ferguson 2006; Ong 2006; Han 2012; Carrier 2016). A significant attempt at capturing anthropologically these transnational flows of capital, the formation of novel fiscal and monetary technologies, the (alleged) downsizing of state and capital, etc., have been launched by the Comaroffs in the term occult economies (J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff 1999, 2001; see also McNally 2011). A central thrust of the argument of the Comaroffs is that the seemingly intertwined—or twinned—trajectories of the occult and neoliberalism/capitalism have reached a particular stage—usually denoted “late capitalism.” Further, in South Africa, for example, this idea is represented in terms of “an explosion of occult-related activity—much of it violent, arising out of accusations of ritual killing, witchcraft, and zombie conjuring—since the late apartheid years” (J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff 2001: 20). At one level, the development of capitalism has been argued to have progressed thus far as to elucidate what one might understand as the spectral foundation of finance capital and profit in general, dimensions that feed into the cosmologies and practices of the occult.

The aim here is more modest, namely to contrast this oft-professed vision of an “explosion of occult-related activity” in the context of my material from Mozambique. For it is not only the Comaroffs who argue for such a connection, as was clear from the preceding chapter: in different guises, the argument of witch hunts, magical potions, muti murders, etc., is represented as being related or in opposition to “capitalism,” “modernity,” or “globalization” (but see Gulbrandsen 2002 for a critique of such a view). However, anthropologists like Pfeiffer (2006) and Chapman (2004), basing themselves on Manica Province material, raise a similar “spirituality in response to capitalism-induced poverty” argument.

For Pfeiffer and Chapman, the practices of profetes and n’angas represent different responses to the poverty and insecurity created by neoliberalism or capitalist development in general—implying, then, that this situation is novel and that there is a direct relation or causality between the domains. Further, Chapman and Pfeiffer may in their analysis be seen to categorize such popular practices of healing as being merely reactive (i.e. interpreting people’s spirituality as flight), resisting (politically), or being subdued (turned subaltern, marginalized, down-trodden under the iron wheels of an ever more expanding and, in a social sense, perverse capitalism in its “late stage”—as some hopefuls would have
Historically and factually problematic, this approach disregards both the autonomy of the social and the creativity of the human faculty and practice. Let us recapitulate before presenting some alternative modes of understanding.

As seen in chapters 4 and 5, the transnational, translocal, and what we may call “transtemporal” dimensions to accumulation and well-being are reflected in cases of disease, uroi, and poverty. Within this horizon, some particular powerful loci are Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa, which is unsurprising given the region’s political economy and history of labor migration. Further, detailing the Companhia’s operations in Manica in chapter 2 revealed historical migration patterns from and to especially Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe for seeking work, evading often brutal and deprivning conditions of the colonial state and its companies or farmers, or simply fleeing the violence of war and repression. Historically forged, the ties between groups of people in Manica and contemporary Zimbabwe are strong—solidified also by kinship ties and the transborder characteristics of chieftaincies informing popular experiences of sovereignty and authority. However, illicit and transgressive forms of empowerment and accumulation penetrate or transmute tradição and are seen to both emanate from and be contained by the geopolitical space of Zimbabwe. These experiences with and visions of Zimbabwe in Manica Province reflect long-standing antagonisms inherent to the formation of forces of labor, extraction of productive and reproductive resources, and accumulation of material goods (see also chapter 2). Arguably, in current Mozambique processes of extraction, accumulation, and the reformation of labor are processes still impeding heavily on everyday life in the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio.

A nonformal approach to economies, initially sketched earlier, implies analytically recognizing sociality or “community,” as argued by Stephen Gudeman (2005), for example. Contrasting universal models of economy—the domain of homo economicus and econometrics—Gudeman sees local models as open-ended and without inherent structure, informed by metaphor as well as “means-to-ends-calculation.” Importantly, “local models are always in the making, and malleable. … Consisting of practices and narratives, they may be written, oral, or sketched in earth” (Gudeman 2005: 114).

Such an inclusive reading of economy is also retained here, although the term “local model” to some extent subordinates and provincializes certain conceptions, experiences, and practices in the economic domain. While such are undoubtedly locally and socially embedded, these may also be seen as “social imaginaries” (Castoriadis 1987 [1975]; Charles Taylor 2002). Complementing and expanding Gudeman’s open-endedness...
in a radical fashion, Castoriadis, for instance, argues that the social cannot be reduced to coexistence or mechanistic approaches to institutions and relations, but must be seen instead as “a magma, and even as a magna of magmas”—by which I mean not chaos but the mode of organization belonging to a nonensemblizable diversity, as exemplified by the social, the imaginary, or the unconscious” (Castoriadis 1987 [1975]: 182).

Recognizing the force of the social and cosmological—also aspects drawn from previous chapters—a concrete analytical approach to the economic domain is needed to probe the imaginaries of bodily, reproductive, and accumulative dimensions, asking how these conflict with the economies of the state, i.e. its networks, elite, and money-making practices. As will be made clear and which qualify Gudeman’s and Castoriadis’s positions especially, these social imaginaries should be seen not merely as reflections of or as reactions to global processes of capitalist expansion and transformation (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000); rather, they should be seen as points of potential for transformation as well as alternatives to state-dominated discourses and practices of business, economic growth, and production. To extend this, instead of presuming and applying universalizing templates of capitalism onto diverse social and political realities, a recentering of the social and the state as a way to uncover historical and contemporary trajectories, as well as a demonstration of their potentialities, will be undertaken.

Such localization and recentering also makes sense in a context as aid-saturated as Mozambique—a country whose international patronage is constantly changing, currently from Euro-American superpowers (humanitarian and otherwise) to, especially, China. Very concretely, the nation-state’s imbrication in decades of shifting international constellations and orientations has meant the rhetoric of “development” (desenvolvimento) is ubiquitous in Mozambican society.

Honde and Chimoio is no exception, and crucially desenvolvimento was related to ambiguously or negatively. A frequently voiced opinion was also repeatedly expressed to me by Younas. He is the second oldest son in António’s and Ana’s house—a person who operates as a petty trader among other minor businesses in an informal market in Chimoio. Having had a stall at the (now defunct) Chimoio market Magapata, Younas questioned if development had occurred at all in postwar Mozambique: “Development [desenvolvimento]? Ah, it is not true! Development only means that everything is becoming more expensive,” he frequently complained. He often followed up by claiming that the fruits of his labor—the surplus he gained from his dealing and the general work he put in—was accumulated by others, sucking away both his labor power and his resources. A similar understanding was expressed
during one of the brutal forced labor regimes in Manica in the 1930s. Laborers who were caught and inserted into the regimes of picking maize or other agricultural work developed songs depicting their life. In one of these, Tapera, the chorus goes, “We are all finished,” having led Neves (1998: 182) to claim that “the workers may have felt their very life force slipping away from them.”

These two snapshots from different historical periods both point to processes of extraction, how these are of a corporal nature and imbricated in wider power structures. In Younas’s case this was related to the forces of “development”—a term invariably connoting the Frelimo party elite, the rich, and the Maputo-based higher echelons of state power. In the case of the maize pickers of the 1930s, the life force and labor power was sapped away by regimes facilitated by the colonial state machinery. Both point to the inherent conflict between the state and the social, premised upon the state as organizing the very conditions for the extraction of capital and labor, as also identified by Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980], 2004 [1972]).

This antagonistic relationship between capital (the market) and the community also informed Stephen Gudeman’s analysis (see, e.g., 2001). His take on economic anthropology is one that recognizes the profound importance of the distribution of both models of economy—for example, the idea of desenvolvimento—to nonmetropolitan peripheries and models of transaction, accumulation and production (see also Löfving 2008). The shift in emphasis from market in terms of commodified exchange and as a sole source of value to a focus on production and other noncommodified domains of value is one in which this text is in agreement.

Gudeman’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s general observations about state, capital, and commodification thereby seem relevant to the Honde and Chimoio context of agricultural production, the past and present violence of the state and sociopolitical transformations. But one may also go deeper into these relations—by drawing on notions of exchange as presented by David Lan (2000 [1989]). Based on long-term fieldwork in the Dande section of the Zambezi valley, Lan analyzes shifts in the power relations between chiefs and mhondoro mediums in the context of colonial transformations involving the loss of land, the imposition of taxation, and the remolding of chiefly authority by the colonial state. He found that to people’s minds, the integration of chiefs within the state apparatus demonstrated the institution’s antagonism toward ancestors and its protection of witches. Paradoxically, it thus shifted power from chiefs and their polities toward mediums—also as the impact of colonialism affected a number of cycles of exchange. At one level, Lan’s analysis reflects the basically antagonistic relationship between domains
of chiefhood and spirit mediums—and more broadly statehood and the traditional field—as demonstrated also in chapter 2. However, I will also argue that the conflict Lan identifies may be used to analyze the cycles of exchange in relation to understanding economic processes and the role of the state—also in Honde and Chimoio.

**Death, Gendered Reproduction, and Substance: The Ritual of Kubatidzana**

As shown in chapters 3 to 5, in Honde and Chimoio, production and labor at the center of this domain is thoroughly corporeal—as both Younas and the Tapera labor song from the 1930s indicated. While both these empirical snippets do express antagonism toward both capital and state, one cannot, however, thereby assume that there is a nascent class consciousness or other collective emancipatory aspirations or projects at work. Such a perspective—and following a classic Marxist understanding of social process, revolt and transformation—would superimpose a default politico-analytical process onto a complex relationship. Rather, the state’s intrusion into the cycles and flows of substance, bodies, and (re)productive labor casts the state as a usurper of life forces themselves. In doing so, the state is frequently cast as a muroi also in the context of Honde and Chimoio. Moreover, anthropology has asserted as much—the production, distribution and consumption of food is intimately related to both gendered reproductive capacities of kinship and household as well as wider social dimensions of community (for two classic analyses, see Goody 1976; Meillassoux 1981 [1975]). The relations between the preparation, distribution, and consumption of food is crucially also related to imagery, control, and practices of sexuality (Arnfred 2007).

In the everyday life in the rural community of Honde and in the peri-urban bairros of Chimoio, the preparation of food and its distribution is highly gendered and age-differentiated: the oldest woman (or elder women) in the household prepare all meals, often aided by younger female members. The symbolic dimensions and intimate relations between reproduction, food, and gender are particularly evident in ritual contexts—as that of kubatidzana.

As mentioned already in chapter 1, from my first fieldwork in 1999 in Honde I have for the majority of the time stayed in the household of Ana and António. António is a man of much renown in Honde and has earlier been affiliated with Frelimo, as well as has been counted as part of the aridzi wo nhika. The civil war in Mozambique and the economic
problems of the country, however, had transformed him from working in the 1960s and 1970s as a mechanic at TextAfrica in Chimoio to becoming a peasant again post-civil war. His wife Ana comes from a locality quite far from Honde and has been married to António since the early 1980s—the marriage conforming to the exogamous rules as defined by marrying outside one’s clan, in António’s case being the mbizi mitupo (zebra clan). During the almost ten years I knew him, António’s health deteriorated gradually, and while in Norway in mid-April 2008, I received a phone call from one of his sons informing me that his father was terminally ill—neither n’anga, profete, nor hospital could restore his health. In late April António died in the house of his oldest son, Francisco. Coincidentally, I was going to undertake some fieldwork at that time and arrived, unfortunately, in Chimoio two days after António had died. I was, however, able to partake in mortuary rites, ceremonies, the burial, and preparations for these.

The transition from embodied person to ancestral spirit is crucial, as touched upon in previous chapters. On 3 May, before being buried, the body of António was therefore brought from the mortuary in Chimoio by truck to his Honde home. The task of taking particular care of the body falls on the nharumbi—a role usually immediately given to a male or female affine or neighbor after death has occurred (see also H. P. Junod 1936: 309). The nharumbi’s task is emotionally intense and includes, crucially, washing and tending to the corpse, organizing mortuary rites, and aiding the widow. In sum, the nharumbi will spend almost all of his or her waking hours tending to, guarding and supporting the successful transition of the deceased.

In this case, the task fell upon the husband of António’s oldest daughter, as he had also been present when António died. Arriving at his house, the nharumbi laid António out under a raised maize granary, and all those who wanted to see the body could—some expressed grief by crying. After some time, the coffin was draped in its black and white cloth and the funeral procession of about sixty people walked to the shady, cool grove that is the burial ground for Honde’s aridzi wo nhika. While there, all men took turns in participating with digging the grave while the women sung songs both to the praise of António as well as songs to mock, warn, and ward off potential muroi. All were relieved when the nharumbi and the tchirenge together decided that the grave was deep enough and that no big rocks had been uncovered when digging. Rocks or pebbles in this context would signify that the very soil or territory itself—the nhika—refuses to host the body. This would, then, have meant that the vadzimu were inimical to António’s transition to become one of them: an ancestral spirit.5
After the coffin had been lowered by lianas onto a base of four pieces of wood, the bonde (sleeping mat) was cut with a machete and thrown into the grave, as were most of António’s clothes. Significantly, the tchirenge emptied onto the coffin a plastic bottle containing ash, ufú (ground maize flour), and water from his home, all collected by Ana. With the immediate mortuary rites taken care of, the grave closed, and flowers planted and watered, the funeral procession returned to the home of António and Ana. There, the washing of hands to confine death and tchikume (danger) was undertaken, followed by the serving of food, and general conversation and remembrance into the night with songs, drinking, and dancing. This day ended the public part of mortuary rites. For the family, however, and for the theme of this chapter, the equally important ritual of kubatidzana took place two days after the burial.

The spatial context for the kubatidzana ritual was Ana’s and António’s home, and Ana and all António’s children were present, as was António’s half-sister Maria. Sitting in the courtyard early in the morning, we all observed how Maria and Ana killed and slaughtered a hen. The intestines, head, and feathers were put on a large leaf of a plant (gwenahamba). Thereafter, the dry, crushed husks and casks of maize, bhutu, were put on the leaves of the plant mussekessa (Lat. Piliostigma thonningii)—a tree Francisco told me is important “for tradição.”
After the bhutu had been laid out on the mussekessa leaves, all António’s children, including me, were called forth one by one. All knelt down behind a dry stalk of maize laid out on the ground and pinched some bhutu off the individually prepared mussekessa leaf. Everyone then dipped their bhutu into water held by a large shard from a broken pendekari (sadza pot) and returned to the leaf and kneaded the bhutu with the wet fingers. While doing this, all were instructed to say in chiTewe,

Father, I come here as your [son or daughter] to touch this bhutu since we are together. I will dip into this water for my father so that he will stay fresh and not become dry.

Sitting behind the dry maize stalk was important, several people told me, so that “we will not bring tchikume to the maize in the machambas.” Notably, there were two exceptions to touching the bhutu directly—two of António’s daughters with babies were not permitted to. As these women had not yet attended a ceremony entitled kupindamadzwadhe for resuming sexual relations with their husbands after partition and for protecting the baby, they were in danger of ruining the maize produce by touching the bhutu directly. These two women, with the babies on their backs, sat hunched and held the maize stalk from António’s sister who touched the bhutu and water—effectively carrying out a ceremony by proxy in lieu of the taboo on their direct participation.

Now mid-morning and with the sun burning, this part was followed by one in which all again gathered around Ana and Maria, and this time all washed their hands in the same broken pendekari, which had been

Illustration 6.2. Bhutu on mussekessa leaves while the hen is slaughtered in the background. The faces of the participants have been obscured to retain their anonymity. Honde, 2008.

Illustration 6.3. Salt and the flesh of the hen put into the pendekari, the sadza pot. Honde, 2008.
filled with fresh water. Thereafter, everyone took a piece of meat from the hen, a pinch of salt, and mutombo—in that order—and put the items in a pan for cooking. While doing this, all repeated in chiTewe, one after the other. “Father, today we are touching your body with this salt and this mutombo.”

Younas explained to me immediately afterward, “It is for all of us to be able to eat meat again. You need salt to eat meat. Always. And the muotombo cleans everything.” I asked him, “But why do you need to eat and kill a hen?” He answered, “The hen does not breathe? Is it not like a person? The hen has blood, it breathes—it is like our father. For this it is important.” What is evident here is the importance of the family’s ritual consumption of the deceased’s flesh—safeguarded by the potency of salt which is often used to ward off muroi or, as we saw in chapter 4, integral to the liquid mutombo of the profete.

After everyone had put in their share of meat, salt, and mutombo, all gathered around the pan and together lifted it onto the three stones that make up the outdoor hearth. After placing the pot on the three stones, everyone walked in different directions away from the hearth to the perimeter of the swept area and beyond, collecting firewood. When Ana and Maria had organized the firewood, the nharumbi was called forth to light the wood with some matchsticks. Again, some elements were explained to me, this time by Felicidade, one of António’s daughters, after which I asked why charcoal was not used (which was kept a few meters away) and why they did not ask for fire at the neighbors (as is usually done by sending a child over to obtain a smoldering piece). She explained that it could be dangerous to get a piece of charcoal that is bought as “no one knows what might have been done to it and by

whom.” For the same fear of contamination by *tchikume*—spreading or receiving—other households are not asked for fire until at least seven days following death.7

When the meat, salt, and *mutombo* have been well-cooked, all of António’s children are again called forth to the hearth where the meat is served on one plate, and the *sadza* (also cooked on the hearth) is served on another. One after another, we pinched one piece of *sadza*, lifted it to our face, smelled it and threw it on top of the intestines, head, and feathers from the hen still laying beside the hearth. Felicidade explained: “When you do this as part of *kubatidzana*, if someone would like to poison you their *uroi* will not work. You do this to prevent an attack. You do it to finish *tchikume*.”

Taking care with food given to you also extends to precautions when visiting the home of someone you mistrust or suspect might be a *muroi*. However, it would be insulting to directly smell and discard a piece of offered food. What is quite common instead is to follow one (or both) of two strategies: First, you refrain from taking your piece of *sadza* and relish until you see where the owner of the house takes his or her pieces from. Following this lead, you will then dig your fingers into more or less the same spot so that you will not be tricked into consuming *sadza* drogado—drugged *sadza*—that may have been put on another side of the plate.8 Second, you could take a piece of *sadza* and, instead of throwing it away, you could drop it on the floor, feigning that it slipped out of your grip. By excusing yourself for your mistake, you will defuse the potential *mutombo* in the remaining *sadza*, and you will not be socially exposed to the much more dramatic and potentially damaging act of intentionally smelling and throwing away food.

In the context of the *kubatidzana*, however, following the discarding of *sadza*, all were again called forth to pinch a new piece of *sadza*. This time, all dipped the *sadza* into the *pendekari*, took a piece of meat there, and ate both. It is imperative here that all consume a piece of meat but that the chicken bones remain unbroken—contrary to the breaking of the bones for eating the coveted marrow which is always done otherwise. “You cannot break the bones of your father,” as Younas commented to me. Gradually, however, the carefully sequenced sampling of meat and *sadza* gave way to a form of inversion: Everyone, irrespective of age, gender and status, quickly and simultaneously gorged on the remaining *sadza* and meat, stuffing ourselves with the food. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the normally highly structured distribution of meat, sequence of eating, and gendered spatial separation of eating places that structure all social gatherings and family meals. When the meat and *sadza* had all been devoured, the *pendekari* with the broth and the *mu-
tombo was jointly lifted by all, and we took turns sipping right from the pan. “It is like father’s blood. You cannot leave it,” Younas commented.

Meat, sadza, and broth now consumed, Maria collected all utensils and material items that pertained to the ritual, among them the piece of wood used to stir the sadza, the knife used to kill and cut the hen, the pendekari, and the intestines of the hen. While she collected these things, all others brought various items (wooden benches, chairs, machetes, etc.) that they wanted to keep from the cleansing that would ensue and deposited them outside the perimeter of the courtyard. Subsequently, the nharumbi initiated the courtyard sweeping, followed by all others, both men and women, joining in a few minutes after. A visual sign of upheaval and cosmological disorder, a courtyard remains unswept after death until the kubatidzana is carried out. The considerable amount of debris (twigs, husks, etc.) that had accumulated was now carried away by the nharumbi and an elderly female neighbor.

The courtyard now again swept clean, portugaro and nipa were brought forth and mixed in a tin cup. As in rituals explored in chapter 3 and 4, the two liquids also likely signify blood and sweat in this context—here, António’s. Before the liquids were consumed, however, the nharumbi was presented with gifts for his services, including a liter of nipa reserved only for him, a small hen, and, significantly, a large plate of so-called konde maize meal. The value of konde resides in the fact that it is pounded at home and not in commercial maize mills, which are highly ambiguous and commonly feared as sites of uroi (see Bertelsen 2014b). At all future annual ceremonies for António, the nharumbi will also be given konde, nipa, and a hen. The presentation of the nharumbi’s gifts and the drinking of blood and sweat in the late afternoon marked the end of kubatidzana, and neighbors and visiting relatives now moved into the compound to socialize and drink.

To compare, it seems that the ritual of kubatidzana was both more elaborate and common in the region in the early twentieth century. However, some central elements of structure and sequence continue to hold sway—as the quote by H. P. Junod (1936: 309) illustrates, based on research in nearby Sofala province, “A special hen is killed, and everyone in the village has to eat a part of it. If any one is absent at the time of the burial, a bone of the sacrificed hen is left hanging at his door, and he must touch it before entering the house.” Similarly, in the case of the kubatidzana following António’s death, an unbroken bone from the hen was kept in Ana’s house and given to kin that were absent from the funeral. Upon visiting, these kin are presented with the bone, which they must bite—the hard part of the corporal substance of the diseased. Arguably, the bone, unbroken, kept, and bitten, is but one of several
examples of substances in different forms and shape that are at the center of the ritual. As Carsten (2004: 125) notes, building on Roy Wagner, substance as a term may be seen to be transmitted by way of having a relational quality, be characterized by substitutability (or analogizing capacity), and to provide contents to form. These dimensions of substance are to varying degrees present in the following elements of kubatidzana.

For one, a central component is the consumption of all parts of the deceased's physical body (the flesh of the hen) and blood (the broth from the hen and the portugaro)—but not the bones that remain unbroken. Death and fertility, in terms of the slaughtering of the hen, and food being the antithesis to death, are also central dimensions. The control, reordering, and reinitiation of sexual relations post-death is also another feature, as none of António's sons or daughters can have sex after death has occurred before kubatidzana is undertaken. To not undertake measures to reorder entails attracting and fomenting tchikume, as the widow's sexuality is then potentially lethal for both her future sex partners and her children—contaminated by and radiating death, so to speak.9

Another crucial dimension pertains to the opposites of wet and dry—characterized by bhutu/konde and water, bone/maize stalk and broth/meat. This ritual juxtaposition of wet and dry alludes to fertility and infertility, as well as corresponds with the resting ground of the bodily remains in the fertile, rockless, humid ground into which António's body was placed—a resting place wherein he was also given ash, ufu, and water from the household to underline the link of substance between death and life, dry and wet, infertility and fertility. Yet other dimensions pertain to the disorder brought forth by death—symbolized strongly by the broken pendekari, which, as Gosselain argues (1999), is a symbol of sexuality and matrimony. Breaking it and serving from it underlines—again—the relation between substance and its vessels, bodies, and reproductive capacities.

The dimensions that I have here merely hinted at may all be understood in terms of substitutability, relationality, or contents to form and may all inform full-fledged analyses of the bodily, sexual, relational, and reproductive forces at play in kubatidzana. However, for the purpose of this chapter, the central point here is more limited: to underline that it is imperative for Ana and all other close kin to execute kubatidzana in order to both resolve a dangerous situation post-death as well as to contribute to António's smooth transition from embodied person to ancestor. Moreover, the many aspects of kubatidzana also point to a number of potent aspects regarding wider connections between production and reproduction—relations that are important for the continuing of
productive and reproductive cycles in terms of offspring, fertility, and food. These gendered relations concerning reproduction and the control of substances are not only central for warding off tchikume within the household—aspects that crucially come into play during kubatidzana—but they also comprise a central context for understanding the intrusive nature of commodification.

Ufu and Zwidoma: Actualizations of Female Capacities and Accumulation

António’s death, burial, and kubatidzana ritual showed the centrality of foodstuffs to productive and reproductive dynamics—life and death. Magwere (maize) is chief among these foods, as it is stored in the center of the household in granaries close to or within the muturica. Ufu, konde, and bhutu as instances of magwere are central not just to rituals such as kubatidzana or burials and mortuary rites but also to communal rituals. It is also the staple food consumed within the household each day. In controlling the production of ufu from sowing the seeds to pounding in the heart of the household in a dhuli (mortar), the reproductive ethos of sociality is ensured, especially by its female members. Further, the relations between ufu and women’s bodies are also one of intimacy—affirmed when hunching over their cooking pots. As described ethnographically and analytically elsewhere (Bertelsen 2014b), women, when cooking, are seen to be able to employ, one could say deploy, their vaginas to thicken the sadza through the smoke and fumes circulating between body and the pendekari where the sadza is made.10

However, the ingestion and consumption of foodstuffs are also potentially dangerous occasions, as the gates to the body are opened to possibly penetrative and malign forces of uroi or other harmful mutombo. As we have seen in earlier chapters and as Jacobson-Widding has pointed out based on her study of Manyika ritual and gendered cosmologies, the orifices are of central concern: “By letting other people ‘enter’ through these gates or by letting them enter symbolically by sharing the same food, you let them become part of what is located inside your own body, that is, your ‘self’” (Jacobson-Widding 1999: 305). Hence, it is through ingestion of mutumbo by respiring its fumes, both elements seen in chapter 4, that renewed protection against tchikume is ensured. Ufu, therefore, in terms of both origins, production and circulation and in ritual as well as everyday settings of consumption, may be seen as a manifestation of dimensions of sociality and of gendered reproductive capabilities, while at the same time being a shared substance.
At another level, *ufu* and *magwere* may also be seen as central in the
gendered transformative potential that came to fore in the alterations
in terms of *machamba* and land in which women assumed a more cen-
tral role in the production and control of the sociopolitical and socio-
economic space of the *nhika*, as developed in chapter 3. These may be
viewed not necessarily as a movement informed by the emancipatory
politics of Frelimo state politics and its women’s organization, the OMM.
Rather, it may be seen as a reassertion of the centrality of control of
production, consumption, and circulation of the most vital ingredient
of a household—its *magwere* that is to become *ufu*. This assertive move
by the Honde women can, thus, be seen as one made against the com-
modification entailed by, first, the early postcolonial modernist state or,
secondly, the economic opportunities brought by war and upheaval in
which many sought to make money off sale. Gendered entrepreneurship
as occasioned by war is argued by Chingono (1996, 2015), for example,
on the basis of material from Chimoio, who contends that women seized
economic opportunities laid bare, so to speak, by the onslaught of war
by establishing themselves as, e.g., traders.¹¹

Contrarily, my material from Honde and Chimoio indicates processes
that reassert the control by women of productive and reproductive
forces in ways that are oriented against the gendered subjection of maize
to the market. This point also underlines the nonstatic dimensions of rel-
ations between nurturing, production, and sociality—a fluidity crucial
to analyses of rural and peri-urban society in Mozambique and beyond.
With Deleuze (2006 [1977]) one might conceive of such a gendered
transformation of control over *machambas* in terms of an “actualization”
in the domain of the real of the potencies inherent in “the virtual” of the
traditional field. To recall, albeit irreducible to notions of “potential,” the
virtual may nevertheless induce or bring about processes of becoming
in the form of actualization. In this particular context, the virtual of
the social imaginaries centering around food, reproduction, flow of sub-
stances, and the body was actualized in circumstances that transformed
the gendered social order of production and land use.

Such an interpretation of the extension of female control over *nhika*
and produce may also inform historical analysis of the struggle against
a range of state dynamics threatening the basic reproductive and con-
sumptive logic outlined in earlier chapters. For one, there is the line
from tributary regimes to local chiefs and other often far more hierar-
chical regimes: from the distant chiefs of Nguni domination to the co-
lonial machinations of the early colonial regime, these different regimes
operated various forms of politics of tribute and taxation in food. Sec-
ond, the production of food was curtailed at several historical intervals. For instance, this was done through allocation of large tracts of land to farmers of German, British, Portuguese, and French origin on which *tchibalo*—the forced labor regime—was systematically imposed, deviating productive capabilities from the household systems of reproduction. Further, the system of communal villages and collective farms—experiments effectively destroyed by the war machine of Renamo—were also, in this optic, state order mechanisms that deviated and rerouted foodstuffs and their labor, as well as comprised violent deterritorializing systems of reorganization, as detailed in chapter 3.

This brief revisiting of historical dimensions serves to underline the long-term trajectories of struggle against the violence of the state order—especially being antagonistically oriented toward colonial systems of extraction, postcolonial high modernism in collective farms, and (post)war state-sponsored capitalist expansion (Geffray 1990; Bowen 2000). However, the frequently violent tensions between processes of state formation and the potentialities of sociality—hereunder the traditional field, and a key argument of this book—may be located also in the intimate and gendered practices and perspectives on the production, circulation, and consumption of foodstuffs.

It is, as also argued earlier, commonplace to both identify and analyze women as related to food and cooking in African households, often emphasizing the gendered role as related to foodstuffs and nurture within the household. But this gendered practice of nurturing the immediate needs of household members goes beyond the household’s confines—it extends into the surrounding society. Women visit each other with foodstuffs, borrow utensils for cooking, make and distribute pottery for making food, borrow *ufu* from each other. And very importantly, when harvest of the *magwere* is done, women gather at each other’s households to help peel it—to prepare foodstuffs. In relation to the earlier argument about death brought by the poisoning of food, the very act of preparing this basic nurturing component, the *ufu* that will be made into *sadza* twice a day, is an act of social intimacy that effectively links households. This is also evident in the way women (or, sometimes, men) will upon departure provide the guest with a number of foodstuffs to bring home with him or her—signaling an extension of the nurturing capacity of the household.

Women’s practices thereby transcend or, at least, challenge the boundaries of the household (so often imagined by the analyst) and underline how women embody the generative potential of the social and of community as such. In no way merely relegated to a biological reproductive ethos, this socially productive dimension of women highlights how
women nurture society and how they, simultaneously, are nurtured by society. Women are, in this sense, both social and relational, and their practices are public in that meetings go on in the households and on the gwanzas that cut through mato or machamba where people socialize, meet, and talk. Walking the gwanzas often with foodstuffs en route to urban markets or homebound with goods, women embody and energize the important circuits that gwanzas represent and at the same time exchange pieces of masoko (news) and stop to visit familiares and friends.

In such a way women assume the positions not only of nurturers but also of key practitioners of the domains of the social. Perhaps one may argue that the social practices of women—in terms of hospitality, changes to land tenure and the nhika, the moving of ufu through the landscape—exhibit expansionist, centrifugal, and rhizomic movements that are opposed to forms of striation characteristic of the state order as well as patriarchal structures.\(^{13}\)

Nevertheless, the productive, reproductive, and generative social capacities of women are also circumscribed by social imaginaries of the female muroi—often instantiated through the figure of the zwidoma (plural, tchidoma singular). Zwidoma\(^{14}\) are, in most instances, related both to women and to increasing wealth. This excerpt from a 2007 interview in Chimoio with José—a prominent member of AMETRAMO as well as a n’anga—indicates some of these dimensions:

J: **Zwidoma** are a tiny couple which may be used in maneuvers to get rich. They are people that are around forty centimeters tall. They may be used to take money out of the houses of peoples. One may use them to get rich in five years. After five years, you may die or become very ill but rich. They are people of **uroi**, right?

B: Yes …

J: Therefore, they need to be treated well as it is they who do all the work. They do not eat anything but meat. The only thing they cannot eat, are vegetables. They need meat only! The mother of the family who does this maneuver [i.e., controls and creates the *zwidoma*] needs to cook a large pot of meat each day because they eat a lot.

B: Are there many who have these in Chimoio?

J: **Chi!** Plenty of people have this.

B: And when you die after five years, what happens to the *zwidoma*?

J: They disappear. Another thing with this richness. A man called ______ here became very ill when he became rich. I told him, “Let’s go to the hospital,” but he never wanted to go. He refused, really. And each time after he had finished being ill, a new car or minibus [for his transport company] came to him. Each time!

B: So, you need to become ill to become rich?

J: Yes, it demands a lot [**custa muito**].

B: But these *zwidoma*, are they dangerous?

J: Yes, they might be. They may kill your children. It is dangerous to play with them. There was this man here who did that. He was in the traffic police in Chimoio and called ______. You have heard, haven’t you? [Calls out to the woman running the bar]

Woman: Yes, I have. [He] became very rich.

J: Yes, yes. Only when you do this maneuver, you cannot be unfaithful [literally “go outside,” **andar fora**]. It is dangerous.

B: And he did this? Was unfaithful?

J: Yes! He was unfaithful and died. But his mother still has all the money.

B: So, the money does not disappear when you die?

J: No. Your family may be left with a lot of money.

Many characteristics of the *zwidoma* resemble two other prominent sacrificial logics in Honde and Chimoio. One is *cuchekera*, a form of blood sacrifice seen to be undertaken for economic gain, and understood as often involving the death or disease of kin, workers, or other intimates. Allegations of having undertaken *cuchekera* are frequently made against local successful businessmen. The other sacrificial logic, also previously
analyzed, is zombification, where one’s own or others’ physical body and energy are slowly sucked dry through (here complicit) engagement with *uroi*—a sacrifice of either self or others inherent to the perennially double-edged character of sorcery.

The *zwidoma* also reflect these sacrificial logics, and their transgressive character is amplified by their minuscule size as well as their grotesque diet of meat. In her Zimbabwe material, however, Jacobson-Widding also points out another distinguishing feature of the *zwidoma*: they are directly related to women, cooking, and sorcery, and she describes the *zwidoma* as the female witch’s familiar. These witches are “recognized by her dripping or ulcerous nipples. [They are] constantly suckling small creatures, … who are called *zwidoma*” (1990: 57). Further, the *zwidoma* are “dwarfish” and are thought to inhabit “the ground under a woman’s cooking hut” (1999: 303). Jacobson-Widding’s characteristics of the *zwidoma* complement mine: the important gendered dimensions in allocating agency and control to women and mothers, the relations to cooking and food (i.e. cooking hut and meat lust), the extractive capacities (milk from “ulcerous nipples” and illness), and the relation to *uroi*.

The characteristics of the *zwidoma* constitute another empirical instance of how the practices and capacities of *uroi* must be emplaced centrally within the household and among its members. Further, inverting the productive and assertive aspects of substance, nurture and reproduction evident in *kubatidzana*, the *zwidoma* nevertheless also indicate the intimate relationships between production, circulation, and consumption of food, gendered notions of “enriching,” and the illicit yet productive inclusion of direct female reproductive capacities in food preparation (see also Geschiere 2013). The reproductive and nurturing female capacity as central to household food production is, then, expressed and underlined in the case of the *zwidoma*—accounts of which are readily shared by both men and women. However, the ability to deviate these flows of productive and reproductive resources and capacities are not only central to domains of the living, female body, and food but also in the potentials of the bodies of the dead.

**Tapping Dead Bodies: Corporeal Potentialities**

There are multiple significant connections between the materiality of the body, death’s occurrence, and the power and potentialities occasioned by the corpse. Generally, in Honde and Chimoio death is potentially regarded as bodily and socially contaminating, and children are therefore normally prevented from being in contact with its circumstances.
But this goes further: children are commonly not often exposed to even knowing about death having occurred. Instead, they will be told that the person was lost and will only circumstantially know of his or her death, or they will find out later (see also Suana 1999).16

The ritual of *kubatidzana* also shows that burials and its rites comprise events of potential dangerous contamination. Similarly, after the burial, the family will check back on the grave every day or so to check to see that it has not been opened or tampered with—they will often sweep the area around the grave so that the footprints of evildoers may be seen (see also Bourdillon 1987: 203).17 This practice is related to the potentials inherent in the body even after the spirit has left: the soft tissue, liquids, and vital organs of the body can be very powerful and sinister components used by *munhu* and others—especially in terms of the meat lust (*kurha nhama io munhu*) that we saw in chapter 5. However, corpses may also be exploited by the immediate family, a possibility made clear in a February 2007 case.

Over a period of several weeks in 2007 I accompanied António, the man who passed away in 2008, and often one of his oldest sons on several visits to a *n’anga*. During these trips, it came to the fore that António had once attempted to tap his father’s corpse. It also became clear that this was done under extremely difficult economic and social circumstances of poverty and hunger during the civil war around the year 1989, and António wished to obtain *tchitumwa*, a form of *mutumbo*, from a *n’anga* to ameliorate the situation. Upon his father’s death and at the *n’anga*, he was given a little ball made of string to be put under the corpse of his father lying in their home which would “drink [chupar] his liquids.” If filled with liquid, the *tchitumwa* drug has the capacity to attract money and resources to its bearer: “Everything becomes very close,” as one of his sons put it, expressing a vision where riches seemingly condense around (apparently unproductive) owners.18

António’s plan was foiled, however, as the *tchitumwa* ball was discovered when mourners led by the *nharumbi* came somewhat early to wash the body. Upon intercepting the *tchitumwa*, no one voiced their suspicions and it was merely discarded. Still, following the burial, António’s persistent accidents with a motorbike, his loss of material items, and his bad luck with money illustrated to all involved that the spirit of the father had become a *tchikwambo*, pursuing his son for his greed. In the decade or so that I have known the family of António and Ana, much monetary and other resources have been devoted to becoming reconciled especially with the *tchikwambo* spirit of António’s father, including creating a *gotokoto*, holding *kutenda adzimu edu*, and seeking the help of *n’angas* and *profetes* (see also chapter 4).
António’s heinous act may be understood in terms of how corpses are perceived. After death has occurred, the liquid produced within a corpse is treated as doubly extremely dangerous and immensely empowering. This liquid is, then, in a very tangible way, the potest stuff of life, extracted from the body of the once alive to be consumed by the potent to be. For this reason, as well as for that of kurha nhama io munhu, a fresh grave is always watched over or protected by magical plants or observers, as was done in António’s case where also we visited each day looking for footprints. Prior to burial, a corpse is also always carefully treated and regularly inspected for signs of illicit and nebulous extraction of liquid or other body parts. In watching both the grave and the corpse, people attempt to ward off potential muroi—nocturnal witches that not only exhume the corpses to sate their appetite for human flesh but also extract the liquid to use in nebulous ceremonies of empowerment.19

Corpses and graves as nebulous sources of power are also reflected in urban contexts. In Chimoio, for instance, several break-ins in 2000 were reported at the provincial morgue (Casa Mortuária do Hospital Provincial de Chimoio), from which the body of a baby, an urn, and several liters of water used to wash corpses were stolen or sold (see Megajornal 2000: 2). Allegedly, the liquids obtained directly from bodies or used to wash them have the capacity to endow their user with invisibility as well as the capacity to attract riches—much like the tchitumwa.

Empowerment by morbid liquids within this particular context is, again, not a modern-day novelty and arguably reflects a long-term concern with the body and its potentialities—an aspect that was also discussed in chapter 6 in terms of the sovereign’s body and the body of the muroi. Thus, a Portuguese account from 1609 (Santos 1964 [1609]: 289) also evidences such relations and concerns:

It is related of this [king] Monomotapa [Mwene Mutapa] that he has a house where he commands bodies of men who have died at the hands of the law to be hung up, and where thus hanging all the humidity of their bodies falls into vases placed underneath, and when all has dropped from them and they shrink and dry up he commands them to be taken down and buried, and with the fat and moisture in the vases they make ointments with which he anoints himself in order to enjoy long life—which is his belief—and also to be proof against receiving harm from sorcerers. Others say that with the moisture he makes charms.

There are clear analogies here to other practices related to the importance of both the particular tissue of the body and watching the body itself. A long-standing practice relating to the drying of the bodies of
chiefs’ and other important figures is central to this—as evidenced by the description from 1796 by the Portuguese governor of Sofala, Carlos José dos Reis e Gama, who sent a letter in the form of an “ethnographic questionnaire” to the colonial administration (Liesegang 1966 [1796]: 18–19): The body of the king, surrounded by important women and men, is left to decompose on a wooden platform in his home. The liquid and soft tissue falling down is collected by different vessels and guarded. When the process has completed, the remains of the body on the platform, bones for the most part, are then wrapped in a skin and buried as part of subsequent ceremonies.

Both historical accounts illustrate some of the rationale for the empowerment by morbid liquids from the morgue or, allegedly, at the court. But the case of Mwene Mutapa especially adds a further dimension to power as integral to imaginaries of statehood, sorcery, and transgression—a theme also developed in chapter 5. As the general practice of watching both grave and body shows, the body should be unblemished, as any disturbance could enrage the deceased’s spirit, as in the case of António’s father’s spirit transforming into a tchikwambo. Moreover, the body is a desirable object for witches or sorcerers craving flesh and empowerment through access to human bodies—living or dead.

Interestingly, the use of bodily liquids for nefarious purposes is neither limited to the Mozambican context nor to the Southern African one. For instance, a central concept informing Whitehead’s work from Amazonia is that of kanaimà—a notion denoting sorcery linked to shamanic practices with wide circulation in the region (Whitehead 2002, 2004). Victims are violently attacked by this form of dark sorcery, their orifices and bodies mutilated precisely and extensively, their bodies implanted with magical substances, and the products thereof exploited by the sorcerers. Whitehead analyzes this phenomenon widely in historical and ethnographic terms, but the aspect of what he calls “violent hunger” seems to connote imaginaries of human destructive potential that are somewhat similar to those evident in the kurha nhama io munhu (Whitehead 2002; see also Fausto 2007).

The potential to usurp the force or flesh of other is also contained in Andean images of the process of transferring body fat, the life force and the corporeal essence of others. The Andean figure of the kharisiri or pishtaco—a dreaded nocturnal figure with white skin—appropriates the body fat of his hapless victims by ripping them open, sucking the healthy fat out their bodies, and stitching them together again before dawn (Weismantel 2005; Blaisdell and Ødegaard 2014). Similarly, the figure of the white Portuguese as vampire and blood-sucker, a so-called chupa-sangue, is also present in many popular perceptions of the ma-
Tuga—the name given to colonial Portuguese—in Mozambique (Teixeira 2003; see also Bowen 2001).²²

Exchange, Substance, and the Sorcerous Sovereign

The imaginary of Mwene Mutapa's usurpation of the tissue of slain corpses immediately resonates with the narrative of Guebuza not only bringing the muroi to Maputo but also, ambiguously, both neutralizing and feeding on his potentiality, as described in chapter 5. In addition, it points to exchange, the appropriation of (vital) substance, and the hierarchies inherent to polities or any social order.

As argued by Rio and Smedal (2008: 240), an important dimension in social and political order revolves around notions of “finite pools of life substances” and the political economies associated with these. Such finitude of substance seems appropriate as a dimension of kubatidzana also as it may be seen as a ritual of both reinscription of novel routes and capacities for (finite) life substances inherent to the household's reproductive capacities and regulation of which forms are inimical to the formation of commodities, a realm beyond the finite pool. A breech or, better, contamination of the circulatory logic in the finiteness of these “life substances” would be represented by, for instance, the insertion

Illustration 6.7. Theft of food is seen as a dramatic tapping of resources. Here you see the traces after a case of nocturnal theft of mandioka (cassava) from a machamba in Honde, 2005.
of food products into the ritual domain as well as, conversely, the extraction of specific foodstuffs, such as konde, from the domain of the ritual, the household, and the nhika.

Similarly, Lan (2000 [1989]) points to an antagonism toward certain commodities in Dande, Zimbabwe, one expressed by the so-called mhondoro mediums (see also chapter 3). In an analysis of the mediums' antagonism toward the state and its paraphernalia, Lan shows, for instance, how samples of crops meant for the market cannot be part of ancestral offerings. Such a division finds clear resonance with the distinction between konde and ufu—where the former would be given to nharumbi—indicating an antagonism toward markets and commercial maize mills, sometimes also expressed when discussing zwidoma. However, what is crucial in this context is that basic notions of cycles of exchange, which are challenged, lie underneath such antagonism. Lan posits four cycles of exchange: First, between people and ancestors, epitomized by the offering of beer on the ground for ancestors (see also chapter 2 on nhika)—a plea where rain (water) and plentiful crops (grain) is asked for in return. Second, within the lineage there are ongoing cycles of exchange in terms of a redistributive ethos of sharing food and resources. Third, an exchange “between lineages at marriage” in which men often work for their fathers-in-law for a number of years. Fourth and directly relevant is an exchange between chief and his subjects in terms of labor on the chief’s fields. Lan describes this cycle as consisting of “labour in exchange for economic security either in direct exchange for access to land or grain, or in indirect exchange for rain” (Lan 2000 [1989]: 201). In a context similar to the one identified in Manica Province, Lan argues for processes that thwarted these cycles of exchange where chiefs became loyal to the state in a context of super-exploitation, loss of land, and violence. Thus, Lan argues that the Dande ancestors, through the mhondoro mediums, demonstrated an opposition to state by denouncing the commodities around which it seemed centered.

What is crucial about Lan’s work is that it exposes the ritual and everyday practice of containment within a finite pool of life substances seen as pivotal for securing the well-being and socio-moral order of the community. However, these practices are also oriented toward preventing these cycles from being siphoned off to nefarious purposes. In this context, the work of the sorcerer is the work of individual empowerment through the appropriation of these substances in two ways. First, the life substances appropriated may be inserted into novel settings. This may be understood in the context of the hunger for meat in general and especially human meat. It may also be seen in the context of siphoning off life forces through zombification or bloodsucking (by the feared
chupa-sangue). Second, there is a fear of the sorcerer expanding, by illicit means through mutombo, the finite pool of life substances and its socially sanctioned closed system of circulation. An expansion and siphoning off of substances may destabilize the system and throw off balance its circulatory logic. The machinic imagery of balance and circulation used in this interpretation is not intended to launch a (crypto)functionalist argument of systemic self-containment or units in perfect balance but, rather, to indicate the social practices of control that grapple with substantial forces threatening the socio-moral order.

Informed by this potential for thwarting systems of exchange, the state in the context of Manica similarly emerges, historically and presently, as a locus for diverting productive cycles—as the entity blocking meaningful exchange in Lan’s understanding of the term. Instead, substance, in terms of food especially, is usurped by machinations of the market and the muroi—both understood as integral to state formation. As a consequence, therefore, the cycles of exchange in Honde that control the circulation and containment of the finite pool of life sources—often intimately related to female reproductive and productive capabilities—is constantly challenged by processes of state formation and commodification. In this way, the transformations of exchange, flow of substance, and dynamics of reproductive capacities thereby resonate directly with the imaginaries of violent appropriation and death. Put differently, these are fundamentally experienced as oriented antagonistically toward the social order of productive, reproductive, and bodily capacities, as ritually expressed in kubatidzana. Such an analysis seems more adequate than a conceptualization in which economy becomes spectral, ghostly (and ghastly) in its present excess—both in spiritual and monetary terms.

As in many other African postcolonies, the state order is experienced as comprising different repressive, extractive, and violent entities and practices (Mbembe 2001, 2003, 2006). As we saw in chapter 5, the order’s head, the figure of the sovereign, is ultimately ambivalent in his dual appropriation and neutralization of uroi, testifying to his own sorcerous powers. Such an interpretation, wherein the work of the muroi siphoning off and illicitly expanding vital and destructive substances, bears resemblance to the overt and covert practices of the state. Overtly, the state order wields various apparatuses of capture of labor, as argued extensively earlier. Further, and covertly, through state elite’s entrepreneurial collusion with businessmen of foreign provenance (Indian, Chinese, Brazilian, South African, Pakistani), it is also understood to be an apparatus feeding not only on commanding the regular market and its commodities but also as woven into criminal economies of violent extraction and sorcerous predation (see also Sumich 2013).
Thus, the entrepreneurial class, the Frelimo party, and the state apparatus coalesce in imaginaries of accumulation of wealth and transgression for economic purposes. However, similar understandings of connections between class, capital, and state are also widely supported by critical analysts of the Mozambican state formation and its class of beneficiaries (Shabangu 2012). This post-war development of asset-stripping, the blending of legal and illegal businesses, and the widespread use of the state apparatus for purposes of amassing wealth has led Cramer in a sobering analysis to term Mozambique as a “gangster democracy characterized by sharp inequalities” (2007: 269). Supporting Cramer’s bleak assessment, perhaps one can also, once again, invoke Gramsci’s claim: “The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their history is essentially the history of States and of groups of States” (1996 [1973]: 52).23

The Mozambican postcolonial state is, of course, not unique in being experienced and envisioned in terms of its sorcerous doings and practices. In an analysis of the Nigerian economy, Apter (1993: 126n13) argues that it is characterized by what he terms “alienated production” in which the Nigerian ruling class is a “state class” whose political economy is “based less on the exploitation of wage labor and more on the exploitation of state power, wealth and resources.” As such, Apter continues (ibid.), “the state has become the ultimate witch, appearing to grow rich at the expense of its ‘children.’” Similarly in Mozambique, the comparatively amazing wealth that seems to condense around both the Frelimo elite as well as the predominantly party-connected business class eludes both conventional economic analysis of legal economies as well as popular imaginaries of enrichment from Honde and Chimoio (Jones 2005; Sumich 2008; Castel-Branco 2014). Such visions of what one might term dark accumulation on a local and national scale is corroborated by the state’s failed redistribution of resources, its corruption, and its entanglement with international legal and illegal business activities, including its standing as a regional hub for illegal drugs (Hanlon 2004; Reisman and Lalá 2014). Commodities, money, and wealth condense around party figures and elite, and the state protrudes as a machinery to thwart and tap cycles of exchange and extract life substances from living and dead bodies—the state emerges as a muroi similar to persons harboring zwidoma in their households.

In seeing the postcolonial state formation of Mozambique as lacking redistributive elements, the sorcerous sovereign needs to be understood in terms of its rhizomic orientation—its capacities for indulging in uroi, commodification, and nebulous economies. By sorcerously mining bodies and including these substances in nefarious economies of accumula-
tion, the state order exposes its antagonism toward the social as well as its deterritorializing orientation. Such mined and dissected bodies and, in general, lines of flight are antagonistic to the state's formation and stability and work in a deterritorializing fashion. Sorcery, in terms of both being at the heart of the state in the figure of the sorcerous sovereign and seen to fuel economies integral to the state elite as well as muroi (such as zwidoma) are reflected directly in concerns with substance, exchange, and reproductive and productive capacities within the domain of the households in Honde. Life and death and the substances and rituals of circumscription and regulation, such as kubatidzana, are thereby directly oriented against such predatory destabilization and commodification.

More broadly, such destabilization—in this chapter approached through moving from productive and reproductive economies and cycles of life and death in the household through processes of commodification, thwarting the cycles of exchange, and uroi—point toward the continuous creation of a postcolonial state formation that is noncomposite in sovereign terms. In the next chapter I will pursue these dynamics of deterritorialization further in the context of law in the peri-urban settings of the bairros of Chimoio, arguing that these processes may be seen as the formation of multiple sovereignties.

Notes

1. While the porosity of the African colonial and postcolonial state does not only apply to Mozambique, some good case studies exist, such as Englund (2002) on the Mozambique-Malawi borderland, Lunstrum (2007) on the tri-country Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, and, finally, Roque (2013) on the country's historically contested southern border to South Africa. Needless to say, people not living in the immediate vicinity of a border area are integrated into social, economic, and political dynamics transcending national territory—the ubiquitous black market trade only being one example. Hughes's (1999) important work on the Mozambique-Zimbabwe borderland in the Chimanimani area exemplifies these deep connections beyond the immediate border area itself, as does the important work of Allina-Pisano (2003), D. Moore (2005), and Dube (2015).

2. For some relevant critical overviews of aid, development, and its politics and impacts—Euro-American and Chinese—see, for example, Hanlon and Smart (2008), Brautigam and Ekman (2012), Chichava and Alden (2012), and de Brito (2015).

3. Or as Surin puts it in a reinterpretation (2005: 265): “As a result, there is a constitutive antagonistic relation between State and labour, especially since the State supplies capital with its models of realisation, and so there is also necessarily an antagonism between capital and labour.”
4. See also Sheldon (2002) and Penvenne (2015) for two contrasting but equally brilliant overviews of women’s work historically and contemporarily in rural and urban contexts in Mozambique—in Beira and Maputo respectively.

5. Based on material from Zimbabwean evangelical church movements, Engelke (2005; see also 2007) has argued that rocks and pebbles (as well as water) by definition are empty of signification and symbolic value. For this reason, Engelke argues, these material forms are embraced by the Christian charismatic movement of Friday Masowe Apostolics in their aspirations to liberate themselves from the Scripture. The case of the burial above indicates, perhaps, that Engelke’s bold statement about the universal “cultural neutrality” of rocks or pebbles is not without exception.

6. Retold by several male and female interlocutors, the ritual of kupindamadzwadhe is said to normally take place around six months after birth. It is initiated by the father, who returns home to the mother and presents her with razor blades. Both then lay down inside their house with the baby between them. If they both agree that it is time, the husband first shaves off and discards the pubic hair of the wife, and then the wife does the same to the man. The couple then proceeds to have sex. The following day, early in the morning, the husband with an erect penis will gently use this to massage the baby’s back for a few minutes, the mother often being present. The purpose of this “tapping” is to secure a strong and well-developed back of the baby. The different elements together signify a return to normal sexual relations between wife and husband, as well as securing the baby’s benevolent development.

7. As a great range of ethnographical and ethno-archaeological works in the area and beyond has established, fire—muriro—is central (see, e.g., Sætersdal 2004 for an ethno-archaeological exploration of fire’s importance to early rainmaking practices). Also, the ash from burned charcoal is, of course, associated with a number of issues, such as sexuality (linked to fire), uroi, dangerous debris, and death, and was therefore included in António’s grave (see also Aschwanden 1982 [1976]; Jacobson-Widding 1999).

8. H. A. Junod (1962 [1912]: 512f) also points out the dangers of eating food and how the potential poison contained in it might transform itself into a destructive animal that kills and consumes you. For a contemporary exploration of ensorcelled food within a prison context and beyond, see Bertelsen (2011).

9. Contrary to that of widowers, the sexuality of widows is commonly the subject of kupinda kufa—a practice implying that the widow has sexual intercourse with the brother-in-law or another male relative of the deceased thirty days following death, if the widow is of the age that she may remarry, i.e. can have more children. The ritual sexual intercourse is surveilled by elder relatives of the deceased, and the widow and the brother-in-law are asked a great number of detailed questions following the act in order to ensure all is carried out correctly.

10. See also Bagnol and Mariano (2008, 2012) for an overview of a wide range of vaginal practices in Mozambique.

11. Whether market liberalization, commodification, or deregulation is analyzed as beneficial or detrimental to women often reflects whether the analyst identifies
these processes as either emancipatory of structural constraints inherent to social organization or sees them as a further marginalization or entailing a loss position. For three positions based on Mozambican material, see Monteiro (2002) arguing for further marginalization of Mozambican urban women, Sheldon (2002) and Sender et al. (2006) arguing for these processes having differentiated outcomes, and the previously mentioned Chingono, contrarily, arguing for new opportunities given Mozambican women by war and deregulation (1994, 1996, 2015).

12. This is, of course, not restricted to African contexts. T. Taylor (2002: 241) cites a work by Agnes Murgoci in 1926 that presents an ethnographic example of a Romanian woman whose bread was so delicious that a large part of the village consumed it: “The rumour spread that she knew how to take bread-making power away from other women and she was accordingly considered a vampire, sucking vitality from others.”

13. For a similar argument from Ambrym, Vanuatu, see also Eriksen (2008: 55–81).

14. The notion of anapatch, a chiSena term describing a phenomenon nearly identical to zwidoma, is often also used in Chimoio. Its Chimoio use indexes how terms as well as different understandings of relations and processes related to uroi (and other dimensions) migrate and are constantly relocalized and appropriated—features central to the openness of the traditional field, as Carmeliza made clear in the introduction to this book.

15. Conflicting understandings of death also make it a controversial issue in the hyper-rational contexts of biomedical organ transplants, where seeing death as an open-ended process and not a clear-cut event, for example, is contentious but supported by biomedical considerations (Lock 2002). Thus, the bodily potencies of not only the dead per se but also the “becoming-dead” (to reiterate Deleuze and Guattari) are not merely confined to the world outside hyper-rational biomedics but speak instead to such human issues as vitality and death. As Oestigaard (2002: 23) writes, “A corpse has certain human attributes but it lacks the most vital characteristic—life…. It is not living but still organic. It does not have the physical properties that characterise stable man-made artefacts or natural objects and yet it is not inorganic. It is not a human being but still among us in a human form.”

16. The potential contamination of death and the practice of allowing children to remain ignorant of a person's death are also mentioned by MacGonagle (2007: 65) in her work on the maNdau—an ethnic group conventionally seen as territorially neighboring the maTewe. From Bourdillon's (1987: 202) work on the maShona, one may also learn that children also were earlier shut away in a hut or granary, as the sight of the corpse would make them blind.

17. See also Gelfand (1968: 135) noting this practice for the maShona in general.

18. As with almost all types of mutumbo, this also has a wide specter of effects and capacities. Some report it also to be made from lion's skin. In this context, however, it is used by thieves to instill fear in people and avoid being caught.

19. Bullock (1927: 318) notes that the fear of “necromancers” commonly induced people to nocturnally watch graves. This habit had dangerous consequences
for travelers who might unknowingly be in the vicinity of a grave, and Bullock
warns that “one straying by accident in the vicinity of such a watched sepulchre
might meet his death before he could show that he was no necromancer.”

20. Bourdillon (1987: 201) argues that in some instances this was done to chiefs’
bodies and that “pots were placed under the corpse to collect the body fluids,
and any maggots falling from the body were carefully collected to be buried
with the corpse since they may contain the spirit of the dead chief.”

21. See also Taussig (1987: 237–41) who in a historically informed approach
toward the colonial origins of the use of Indian body fat—leading back to the
treatment of wounds for the conquistadors—terms nakaq. This figure, nakaq,
also operated in the southern highlands of Peru and was identified to likewise
be of either white or mestizo origins.

22. In other African contexts, similar figures in various guises, from different ori-
gins, and who participate in similar practices are known in historical cases from
Zimbabwe (Burbridge 1925) or from instances such as White’s (2000) broad
comparative approach. Outside Africa, figures attacking to drink blood or take
out other fluids or substances, “vampires,” are known from places as far away as
Amazonia (Wilbert 2004: 34) and, of course, in Europe (Behringer 2004: 154).

23. This is not to say that capitalism assumes and effects uniform social formations.
As Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]: 436f) comment, “When international
organization becomes the capitalist axiomatic, it continues to imply a heteroge-
neity of social formations, it gives rise to and organizes its ‘Third World’.”

24. In Deleuze’s sense, a “body without an organ” “is not the origin of the social but
its limit, its delirium, its ‘tangent of deterritorialization, the ultimate residue’”
(Albertsen and Diken 2006: 233, quoting Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1972]).
Foolish labourer
Nonentity, him no get money
Look him sandals e don tear finish
Look him trouser e don tear for yansh [ass]
Look him singlet e don dirty finish
Look him body e no bath this morning
Look him pocket e don dry finish
You go suffer for nothing
You go suffer for nothing
You no know me sha?
I be General for Army Office
I be Officer for Police Station
I be secretary for government office
You foolish labourer, you go suffer for nothing
Nonentity, you go suffer
for nothing
Na that time dem go start dem

Power Show
Na wrong show O
Power Show na wrong thing

Fela Kuti, “Power Show” (1981)

Since the General Peace Agreement was signed in 1992 the legal, administrative, and political sectors of Mozambique have undergone multiple reforms that have exposed the complexity of its historical trajectories of
law, violence, and authority. From the perspective of those living in the impoverished and frequently dangerous and violent urban and peri-urban bairros, a great variety of agencies and authorities can be approached at times of difficulty or trouble. These range from n’angas, profetes, and police agents to government bureaucrats and Frelimo secretaries.

This chapter explores the general situation in the marginalized communities making up the rural-urban continuum of Chimoio and Honde, and where inhabitants of these take it into their hands to administer summary justice without direct reference to any state or other relatively independent agency. The chapter will deal with the complex relations between state institutions and agents, on the one hand, and other non-state and more traditional arbiters and the socio-moral orders that are relevant to their practice on the other. As argued in this chapter, the potencies of the traditional field are also in this case of law and political authority of an encompassing character, a characteristic frequently lost or overlooked by approaches underlining offices, roles, and formal, administrative structures and relations. Traditional authorities’ importance reaches into what are often conceived of as the more dominant and official domains of state and government practice such as that of protection. I demonstrate this position by examining two specific events where summary popular justice threatened but was ultimately resolved by the accused, whose life was in the balance, by recourse to traditional and other agencies and faculties.

The ethnography presented throws into question the worth of such long-standing notions as “legal pluralism” in accounting for processes described in the rural-urban continuum under study. The argument I develop also has relevance for other concepts such as Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s notion of “the heterogeneous state” (2006a)—a concept he and others have used to describe the present, postcolonial configuration of Mozambican law and legality. I replace such concepts with the idea of multiple sovereignties, which addresses more adequately the ethnographic material presented.

Historical Formations and Reformations of Law and Political Authority

Any analysis of or approach to contemporary law in Mozambique is inseparable from the particular trajectories of legality in the Portuguese colonies—trajectories that distinguish themselves on several levels in comparison to, for instance, British or French colonial legal systems. First, one needs to appreciate that the Portuguese colonial legal system,
to a much higher degree than in the French and British, catered to the subordination of the African to changing but persistently violently upheld systems of forced labor.¹

As documented especially in chapter 3, there is a line of capture and exploitation running from the era of Ngungunyane through the Companhia rule to the late colonial state and beyond. This form of capture of labor, most violently expressed through roaming bands of recruitment teams integral to the Companhia’s rule, was thoroughly embedded within the Portuguese legal framework throughout the entire colonial period. Even though slavery was formally abolished in 1869, a de facto practice continued well into the twentieth century in many areas of Mozambique (Capela and Medeiros 1987; see also Harries 1981). As also dealt with in chapter 2, various new laws were introduced by the Portuguese, among these a new labor code in 1899, which tied the civilizing of Africans to an obligation to work. As Roberts and Mann note in a comparison of French, British, and Portuguese colonial legal systems, these laws made Africans “liable to compulsory labor either for the colonial state or for the private sector. Failure to work in the Portuguese Africa was thus a legal offense, contributing simultaneously to the criminalization of the bulk of the African population and to the emergence of myriad forms of resistance to colonialism” (Roberts and Mann 1991: 30). Throughout the Mozambican territory—and as argued in relation to the rise of the Companhia and the colonial state in chapter 2—the 1899 labor code was violently implemented through direct capture of labor and an increasingly excruciating tax regime (see also Bertelsen 2015). Such state action fomented large-scale and long-lasting transcolonial flights of labor from the colonial regime to neighboring, and comparatively less harsh, regimes.

A second important feature of the Portuguese colonial administration was the legal separation into metropolitan and native law—one for Portuguese citizens and one for African subjects not yet civilized enough to take part in the fineries of Portuguese law, protection, and citizenship. This strict separation was introduced despite a complex colonial trajectory of Afro-Portuguese interaction, including a proliferation of people identified as racially mixed (Zampanoni 2000, 2008) but in keeping with the ideological smokescreen of Lusotropicalism in part provided by Salazarian ideologue Gilberto Freyre (1961). As treated earlier, Lusotropicalism emphasized the intimate, well-functioning, and benevolent interaction between the Portuguese colonial state and Africans while simultaneously supporting the central legal regime of the indigenato (native group). The indigenato regime effectively bifurcated Mozambican inhabitants into civilized citizens (civilizados) and native subjects (indígenes) and provided administrators and régulos of the latter with wide-ranging authority to
judge, sentence, and punish, often physically, their native subjects (Pennevenne 1995, 2015; O’Laughlin 2000; see also Mamdani 1996).

The indigenato regime was also integral to a third general element, namely, the violence with which Portuguese colonial law was enforced, a feature persistently noted by scholars (M. Harris 1958; Lemos 1965; Pélissier 2004). In particular, corporeal punishment was widespread, and the dreaded chamboco (a whip made from rhinoceros hide) or palmatória (a wooden paddle-like instrument) were both used by administrators, police, and Portuguese citizens for penal purposes (see also Bertelsen 2011).

Illustration 7.1. Xylogravure (woodcut) by Matias Ntundu Mzanyoka (b. 1948) of Mueda, Cabo Delgado, and reproduced with kind permission. The xylogravure depicts tax collection during the colonial era. Please note the vital foodstuffs—chicken and eggs—on the Portuguese colonial official’s table, while a cipai (police man) to his left wields a palmatória and surveys the payment.
Given such a trajectory of racialized legal separation upheld by violence under colonial rule, it is unsurprising that upon independence Frelimo embarked on a total reformation of the legal system. Specifically, the postindependence state targeted the institution of the indigenato in order to achieve a legal system commensurate with the liberation of the Mozambican people after Portuguese subordination. To recall from chapters 1 and 2 especially, in this process, those whom Frelimo defined as régulos or persons who controlled what might be termed ritual authority and who manipulated the cosmologies integral to the moral order of local populations were to be denied their authority and influence as these was based on “obscurantism” (obscurantismo). Instead party secretaries and party committees (grupos dinamizadores) would assume these positions (Santos 1984), as also seen earlier. New institutional arrangements in the form of popular courts (tribunais populares) were introduced to replace, for example, chiefs’ courts, which had functioned in the interests of the colonial administration (Isaacman and Isaacman 1982; Sachs and Welch 1990). Further, as detailed in chapter 1, during the civil war Renamo capitalized on popular antipathy with Frelimo’s anti-“obscurantism” politics by waging what they called “a war of the spirits” against the Frelimo state. In so doing, Renamo appropriated and redefined key elements of the traditional field by installing chiefs in the areas it controlled and by, effectively, recreating or reaffirming ritual authority in its domains (Geffray 1990). The thwarting of Frelimo’s radical project by the civil war and Renamo’s wartime appropriation and redefinition of the traditional field effected highly ambivalent and often antagonistic relations with the state order—as argued in preceding chapters.

However, the official “recognition” of so-called traditional authorities post–civil war has complicated further the image of the Frelimo party-state. As treated earlier, this recognition has meant that régulos, once imperative for Portuguese colonial administration, again have become politically, legally, and administratively important. These reforms express distinctly postwar discourses of legality, also international ones, and in 1990, the Mozambican constitution was accordingly changed from the radicalism of a socialist legality to fit “a new imagined order of liberal democracy” (O’Laughlin 2000: 5). This order provided space for nonstate legal and administrative entities.

These attempts at state deregulation and efforts to bring the authority of the state and that of the traditional field into greater conjunction must be understood against this backdrop of postindependence politics and the civil war (see also Bertelsen 2002, 2003). The process can be exemplified through the official decree from 2000 (presented in the introduction) whereby the so-called “community authorities” (autoridades
comunitárias) were created. Community authorities are meant to be local-level representatives vis-à-vis the state apparatus, and the decree mentions party secretaries, régulos, or “other legitimate leaders” as to whom these might be. At the same time, the decree does not revoke any powers vested to authorities of the formal state apparatus, such as party secretaries. Therefore, the seemingly straightforward process of “recognition” of de facto authorities may rather be described as a process of sedimentation, wherein an increasing number of overlapping and structurally adverse authorities derive potency from present as well as past political structures, cosmologies, and violent conflicts (see also Bertelsen 2004, 2009; Orre 2010).

Such problematic processes related to the creation of community authorities are identifiable in both rural and urban fieldwork locations. For instance, in Honde and other nearby rural locations, the processes of recognition of new community leaders have meant that Frelimo party figures have assumed power in areas that staunchly vote Renamo at general national or local elections. An elderly man and outspoken Renamo supporter in Honde expressed his bitterness about this development in a conversation in January 2007. He said,

This is a Frelimo maneuver to dominate! It is always like this when Frelimo does a thing to rule. Frelimo does not want to choose a person who is from the totem clan [mitupo] of an area—they will choose a person affiliated with the party. Therefore, now they choose people from Frelimo to become community authorities. But Renamo is to blame as well as they were thinking it was a good thing and were not smart enough to understand what Frelimo were about to do.

A similar tendency of Frelimo dominance may be seen in urban bairros where most community authorities were located. When I discussed this with people in the bairros, most saw Frelimo dominance as natural (but not necessarily desirable) given both the party’s propensity to expand its powers as well as its long rule. A judge in a community court explained it to me this way in a conversation in May 2008:

B: Do you still have both community authority and a party secretary here?
B: The community leader … he or she could be anyone, no?
J: No way! The community authority has to be from the [Frelimo] party. He cannot be from another party.
B: Who decides that? That the leader has to be from Frelimo?

J: It's the government [o governo]! It is they who decide. Until far over there [gestures toward the city limits where the machambas and mato replace the bairros] in the mato, it has to be Frelimo. It is like this.

Frelimo's continued dominance in what one might call a doubling or at least extension of its powers seems to be the tangible effect on the ground in Honde and Chimoio of both the discourse of “recognition” and the current state deregulation. Such a situation sustains the old cleavages and ambivalences between Frelimo and non-Frelimo domains and between state order and the traditional field. It is also further complicated by the presence of a resource-strapped, inefficient, and often corrupt public bureaucracy and police with a presence often limited to the bairro cimento. In surrounding bairros, however, these agents and institutions of the state order frequently operate virtually autonomously or independently of the bureaucratic authority in which they are formally embedded. Rather, their official positions within the state order form the basis for novel methods of control that are entirely outside the rules of bureaucratic hierarchy and legitimacy (B. Baker 2003; Bertelsen 2009; see also Albrecht and Kyed 2015).³ As explored in the previous chapter, these novel forms of control are often oriented around violently supported profit-making in the formal, informal, and illicit economies. This development has led analysts to claim that the Mozambican state itself is threatened by powerful criminal networks which provide a “parallel power base from which to challenge the structures and capacities of the state” (Gastrow and Mosse 2002: 18).⁴

Uncertainty as to who wields power and authority after the present restructuring is particularly problematic at the grassroots—in the everyday world of often dangerous bairros. In several Chimoio bairros, community authorities are generally understood as being integral to the state apparatus of Frelimo, meaning that a great number of inhabitants neither consult nor trust them. Instead inhabitants may address representatives of Renamo, criminal networks, traditional authorities, n’angas, profetes, pastors or other formations of authority with their diverse problems and preoccupations. For ordinary inhabitants, these complex sediments of overlapping and conflicting state and nonstate authority structures create dramatic situations of insecurity where fundamental needs for protection, justice, and conflict resolution are at stake. This situation is experienced as existentially threatening and one in which the line between life and death is fragile, narrow, and crucial (Bertelsen 2009, 2013, 2014a).
Burning Thieves: Popular Justice Invoked and Reorganized

As across much of Mozambique, in Chimoio’s impoverished bairros, crucial elements of day-to-day life include the struggles to establish certainty in a reality where many feel vulnerable or powerless against criminals and other agents of violence and predation. In these struggles, the conflicts between and partial nature of the various authority structures—from the national police force to the community authorities—fail to adequately resolve people's concerns. As a way of administering justice in the face of these dangers, a common and popular long-standing practice has been the beating of thieves. However, in Chimoio during the first months of 2008, twelve alleged thieves were not only severely beaten but also subsequently burned to death. Relative to the significantly larger cities of Beira and Maputo, Chimoio’s much higher rate of summary justice is telling of its intensity. In this period, the summary justice of burnings usually developed along the following pattern: A shout of “Mbava!” (“Thief!”) would be heard in a marketplace or a street, and many would participate in a chase to catch him. When the crowd apprehended the thief, it would beat him senseless with fists, sticks, and stones. The call would soon change to “Kupisa munhu!” (“Burn the person!”) or “Kupisa mbava!” (“Burn the thief!”), followed by a more or less collective effort to provide dry grass, wood, petrol, and preferably a tire. The collected flammables would then be heaped upon the semiconscious person and lit, consuming the life of the alleged mbava. Once death is confirmed or inferred, people would move away and leave the charred and smoking remains of the mbava in the same place as he was killed.

During an afternoon in Chimoio in May 2008 I followed a case of a mbava that had been caught by neighbors when breaking into a bairro house. After severely beating the young man with sticks and fists, the house-owner, his neighbors and other bystanders prepared to burn him. The lynching was aborted, however, after someone telephoned the police, who actually appeared, somewhat to everyone’s surprise. Upon arrival and very reluctantly, the police officers dragged the severely beaten thief onto their truck and took him to the hospital. I sat on the back of the open truck en route to Chimoio’s central hospital, being somewhat surprised when the police officers all agreed that it would have been better if the mbava had been killed. “Why did you not burn him? You should end these things here [i.e. in the bairros],” one of the officers half accused and half asked my friend, who was also sitting in the truck and whose house the mbava had broken into. “He was a thief and even carried tchitumwa,” the officer added. (To recall from chapter 6, tchitumwa...
is a *mutombo* made from nebulous liquids such as the blood or liquid of a corpse, procured from a *n’anga* and used both to protect the thief’s work as well as indicative of his association with *uroi*. For all involved, the *tchitumwa* found on the thief’s body was akin to a smoking gun.

After accompanying the police truck with the thief to the hospital, my friend and I visited the thief’s family so he could notify them of what had occurred. With the single exception of the thief’s mother (and, perhaps, the unknown person calling the police), all, including others

---

**Illustration 7.2.** The tire procured to burn the *mbava* in the case in question. Chimoio, 2008.
of the thief’s kin, expressed the view that the culprit should have been killed there and then. At the compound of the thief’s family, his young brother told us,

It would have been better if you had come here to say that “you know the mbava ended his life there with the population and I came afterwards.” That way, his mother could not do anything about it.

Indeed, the thief’s mother mustered all kinds of moral force and personal strength. What followed for my friend were two days of being coerced to accompany the mother to police stations and the local court administration in her attempts to set her son free. That my friend accompanied the mother of the mbava may seem puzzling. However, the two were related, and she was a well-known profete, so she combined to coercive effect threats of uroi to kill or hurt my friend with arguments about the obligations of kinship.6

Crucial social, territorial, and political dimensions emerge in this form of summary justice. For one, the circumstances of a mbava’s death—caught in the act and, thus, justly killed by a collective agent—will avert the basis for potentially retributive acts against the killers by both the thief’s kin as well as the state’s apparatus of justice. Put differently, the moral authority of the public collective is generally accepted by various forms of authority and agency. This moral authority of the act is also reflected in that no harmful or vengeful spirits of the dangerous tchikwambo type are generated from such a (non)person justly killed. Importantly, a thief’s antihuman and antisocial character is also expressed and underlined discursively, epitomized in the phrase não é pessoa isto—“this is not a person.” This comment is frequently uttered by bystanders to burnings and in post hoc conversations. As the killing of a mbava in such a way is neither met by immediate retributive acts nor will elicit any spiritual danger, nor will it require attempts at freeing the mbava by bribing the police, burning “is ended there,” as one man put it during an interview.

Burning therefore involves a severing of relationality, and the act ruptures the life-cycle transition from bodily to spiritual being upon death. And there is, seemingly, a stark contrast with how António’s body was cared for, treated, and guarded—physically, ritually, and socially—as we saw in the previous chapter. However, one may also argue for the summary justice of burning to address the social in seeing it as an encompassment of and attack on matters antisocial. In such a vision, the perceived justness and finiteness of violent death precludes reinsertion into society of the destructive, antisocial potencies of the mbava. Perhaps paradoxically, practices of instant and popular execution can thus
be understood as a defense of the social and society rather than being sociality's other, the figure of the *mbava* becoming both the state's and society's other, a being, or, rather, nonbeing or “nonentity,” as in Fela Kuti’s opening phrase in this chapter’s epigraph, that is devoid of value to neither formation.7

There are ample comparative and historical indications of such (non)beings becoming vulnerable to general, indiscriminate, and lethal violence. Based on Shona material, Bullock (1927: 308) for one argues that “a thief, caught in the act, might be killed.” That anyone can kill the witch, the adulterer, and the thief—that these are effectively *Homo Sacer* in Agamben’s sense (1998 [1995])—is also noted by Santos in an early historical source (Santos 1964 [1609]: 212). Although one should be wary of drawing all-embracing parallels between the worlds people like Santos and Bullock attempted to describe and the violent context of Chimoio’s postcolonial, peri-urban *bairros*, it seems certain that individuals identified as antisocial, especially in terms of sorcery or theft, in many present and past contexts have run the risk of being subjected to severe and often lethal violence.

At the time of the burnings and beyond, a police policy was that burnings were not tolerated in Chimoio’s *bairro cimento* and very few instances have also been reported from there. Contrarily, burnings are more frequent in the *bairros*, and as of my last visit in January 2016 instances are still reported from time to time. This territorial division is seen by *bairro* inhabitants as endorsed by state agents: in public meetings in the *bairros* in early 2008, the president of Chimoio’s city council, as related to me by many friends and interlocutors, wholeheartedly supported burnings. However, the council president underlined that this was acceptable only as long as this was done, precisely, in the *bairros*.8 His message was very popular among most *bairro* dwellers. But the territorial division of law effectively argued by the state representative also corresponded to the views of many police officers, who complained about being called to the *bairros* when its population should—as we heard earlier—“end these things [t]here.” Effectively, the city council’s president exemplifies de facto state reordering of territorial arrangements for the execution of summary justice in moments of social upheaval: by condoning and ordering the practice in certain territorial domains, state authority is asserted, and legitimacy to the practice is conferred.

Such state involvement in what one might call a territorial “zoning of a death-bringing practice” has its corollary in postmortem practices. Upon death, the thief’s often charred remains are allegedly collected by the police or municipality workers and transported to Chimoio’s outskirts, where they are unceremoniously dumped. By refraining from
bringing the body to the morgue and subsequently burying it (see chap-
ter 6), and instead transferring the scorched remains to the margins of
sociality where the city and settlements meet the *mato* (figuratively if
not factually), crucial links and boundaries between both sociality and
domains of state control are emphasized and generated by state agents.
Such allocation to or identification with the *mato* is not unique to the
*mhava*'s charred remains: as explored in chapter 1, Renamo is frequently
associated with the *mato*, while *muroi*, likewise, are seen to hold noc-
turnal feasts devouring human flesh, also in the *mato*. Further, in the
ritual of *kubatidzana* in chapter 6, material items having belonged to the
deceased as well as general rubble are likewise conferred to the *mato*.
The “bush” in these and other contexts, as well as in that of the *mhava*,
thus represents zones of violent death, debris, and antisocial forces (see
also Alexander et. al 2000). My interlocutors also do not find it unnat-
ural, therefore, that the remains of lynched thieves are, allegedly, left at
Chimoio’s outskirts.

At the level of politics, these dramatic shifts in both practices of pop-
ular justice (from beating to burning) and state territorial organization
of justice must be seen against the backdrop of particular events around
23 February 2008 in Chimoio. At the time, a particularly brutal gang
of (alleged) Zimbabweans committed violent robberies and rape in the
*bairros*. In response to public outrage, the police arrested gang mem-
bers only to release them a few days later. Unprecedented rioting in the
heart of the *bairro cimento* ensued in which some shops were sacked, car
traffic was blocked, police vehicles were burned, one police station was
invaded, and another police station was under a fourteen-hour siege by
people hurling objects at it. Significantly also, two of the alleged Zimba-
bwean robbers were caught by the rioters and burned to death—initiat-
ing a particularly intense period of summary justice.9

Beyond its material destruction, the riot’s broad popular participa-
tion and the way it initiated the execution of summary justice entailed
significant changes. First, the direct attack on the apparatus of the state
implied a perceived shift in people’s relation to the police: “Before we
used to be afraid of the police. Now they are afraid of us,” a young male
friend told me. This man, originally from Honde but often peddling
goods on the streets of Chimoio, had for several years been harassed by
local police that extorted bribes from him on the street—a not uncom-
mon practice among Mozambican police officers. In this man’s opinion,
the riot had successfully renegotiated dimensions of state and policial
authority to the advantage of what he saw as *o povo* (the people).

Depending on who was asked, some interlocutors would attribute
the lynchings to either Frelimo or Renamo involvement, orchestration,
or targeting. In the former pro-Frelimo argument, the lynchings were related to a narrative of criminals being sent to Mozambique to “destroy” and “destabilize,” stirring memories of the “war of destabilization” as the civil war was often called, wherein the enemy was often (but not always) identified as external in the form of Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. State officials also accused an “invisible external hand” of being behind the riots. This latter narrative is also related to a stubborn rumor of the thieves being German or being controlled by Germans. Beyond the narrative of external destabilization, into which Germany would rhetorically fit, relating to Germany can be understood also within local contexts of failed development projects, rumors of child-snatching, as well as the historical trajectories of colonialism in which German farmers were important in some areas around Chimoio (see esp. chapter 2).

In a more pro-Renamo argument, lynching was explained as a political protest against Maputo and Frelimo. As one young woman originally from Honde but now living in Chimoio said, “It is not the president who orders these killings. But Frelimo is eating with the mbava. And for this the people [a população] decide to kill mbava.” This political argument is related to a second change that became apparent around the time of the riots—that of the reinvoking and popular reappropriation of popular justice. Given increased levels of violence and the rising uncertainty as to who are de facto authorities in the ongoing process of sedimentation of authority outlined earlier, embracing ideas of popular justice in the face of state authority confining itself to the bairro cimento was argued by several as necessary, and elements were used as slogans by even more. The reorientation toward ideas of popular justice resembles Frelimo’s introduction of justiça popular (“popular justice”) in the early 1980s. The similarity in sentiments voiced in Chimoio and surroundings in 2008 is striking to the ideas written in the 1980s (Sachs and Welch’s 1990: 117):

[If] people lose respect for the legal system—the people feel that it is not protecting them, it’s protecting the parasites, it’s protecting the crooks and the black marketers, it’s protecting the people who’d be only too happy if apartheid came to their country, then there is no legality, there is an absence of legality.

Informed by such analyses in the early 1980s, Frelimo attempted to revolutionize the legal sector of society. Under Samora Machel’s presidency (1975–86) Frelimo introduced public flogging and beating of thieves as a measure to achieve a socialist legality in the form of popular justice in politically and socially adverse circumstances (Sachs and Welch 1990: 111–16). This form of popular justice continued throughout the civil war and only came to an end in the immediate postwar period. Never-
theless, with Armando Guebuza’s 2004 presidential election, Samora’s thoughts on justice and thieves were resurrected and became prominent in official rhetoric.

For many bairro dwellers, Guebuza’s rhetoric was understood as a return to a Samora-style hardline against mbava—a stance also often understood as related to the recent of police death squads in Mozambique (see Bertelsen 2009 for details). Although circumstances around these death squads remain murky, people have portrayed them as consisting of motorcycle police who execute criminals. In 2006, evidence surfaced for the existence of these death squads, as eight police officers were sentenced for abducting eight men from prison during 2001–5 and executing them on Chimoio’s outskirts (Agencia de Informação de Moçambique 2008). The tendency here to remove people from the center—in both the sense of state and urban grid—to the periphery correlates well with the logic of disposing the charred bodily remains of the lynched in the deadly and violent space of the mato (see also Granjo 2009).

The 2008 riots, the burning of thieves, and the formation of police death squads point to a reappropriation of popular justice by bairro inhabitants, as well as state agents of the police. Such a reappropriation is informed by memories of the Samora era being to a large part also sustained and enabled by the Mozambican president Guebuza and Chimoio’s top-level political apparatus, as we saw earlier. In sum, this novel formation of summary justice is born out of a proliferation of partial authority structures, a fragmentation of policial authority and a de- and reterritorialization of state orders and practices of justice. In terms of the domain of legality, the historical dimensions of summary and popular justice exemplify Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s important point about law’s durability, underlining that “legal revocation is not social eradication” (Santos 1987: 282). Nevertheless, as my analysis has made clear, the invoking of popular justice in the development of the burning of wrongdoers is also intrinsic to the ongoing reordering of the sovereign and territorial domains of the Mozambican state.

Violence, Law, and Insecurity in the Bairros

In situations where the sovereign and territorial domains are changing, the presence of the nebulous art of accumulation through transgressive acts—important aspects around which many bairro dwellers and people in Honde alike order their lives—adds an additional element of insecurity. Such a vision is one in which violence, fear, and power are interlinked with the production of riches through forms of uroĩ, including the
abduction, killing, and consumption of fellow humans. These predatory beings are seen, also, to live and work in the bairros, which we saw in chapter 5 in a case where a muroi was caught. From time to time accusations of uroï are also vocalized in the public sphere at meetings with community leaders, in community court trials, at AMETRAMO, and in other places (see Bertelsen 2013). Still, accusations and experiences of these dark forces and their agents are more often semiprivate; the forces and spirits related to sorcery are confronted and sought repelled in sessions with n’angas or profetes. In Chimoio, these measures are conceived in terms of kufunga muiri, “the closing of the body”—as we saw in chapter 4—but also kufunga taiyao, “the closing of the property.” In the latter concept, mutombo provided by a n’anga or profete is placed on or buried in doorways, floors, corners of the property, or other sites of danger. Such emplacement (and other protective measures) is typically done at twilight, as the limbo between night and day is the most productive or “hot” period in terms of potency of the mutombo (see also Jacobson-Widding 1989: 33). Both protection of body and house and property are essential measures taken to ward off potential attacks from muroi and other ill-doers.

Alas, in Chimoio’s nocturnal bairros, not only muroi are feared but also the agents of the state in the guise of the so-called policia comunitária (“community police”)—a novel form of decentralized state authority akin to the community authority and created within the same political context.11 Members of this community police force are mostly recruited among local young men in the bairros, and the unit is meant to be auxiliary to or supportive of the regular police and accountable to local leaders. The workings of these groups and the degree to which they are seen to be accountable, to borrow a rights and democratization term, to local populations vary greatly. As such, they represent emerging and novel forms of law and political authority at the margins of the formal state apparatus. Further, they also frequently pursue “justice” through the exaction of corporal punishment during their nocturnal rounds. In many cases the community police are armed with sticks and sometimes knives when patrolling the bairros at night to frighten off or intercept thieves and troublemakers.

However, the institution of community police had in at least one Chimoio bairro in late 2005 developed into a structure that had the reputation for operating on both sides of the law. Apparently, its members were involved in everything from extortion and protection rackets to outright break-ins, violent crime, as well as collaboration with criminal networks. On a lesser scale a similar situation has also developed in Honde where the majority of the young men involved in the community
police in mid-2009 were subsequently imprisoned for a period for the theft of ufu and goats.

As the community police members largely are recruited locally, receives little or no remuneration from the state, and is not given uniforms or other forms of identification, structural and economic constraints effect a development largely according to existing logics of legal practice, violence, and political authority. Such development, interestingly, sometimes also turns the community police against the formal state apparatus and its party, Frelimo, as the following example from Beira, the second largest city of Mozambique, demonstrates. There, the head of the community police in Bairro Ndjalane, Afonso Henriques, was accused by inhabitants of having established corporal punishment as the main means of, in his own words, “establishing order.” As the city of Beira in general is a staunch Renamo area, it is conspicuous that Frelimo members and local party secretaries seem to have especially been targeted by Henriques’s form of corporal punishment and his community police in his attempt to “establish order in the zone.” But more interestingly, Henriques denies all these charges of acting politically and says he is a “slave of the people”:

My party is the people. I was a soldier before and now I sought to use my talent for protection in our bairro. I am an honest citizen who manages to support my family through fishing on the beach of Ndjalane.12

If the accusations of violence against Frelimo members and leaders are correct, it is not important whether the local head of the community police was informed by party sympathies (themselves relating to the pe-
period of the civil war in which identities and loyalties were shaped, albeit ambiguously) or not, but the fact that the logics of military protection and violence is seen as informing local police duties is significant.

Both examples of community police work—the nocturnal vigilante groups of Chimoio and the militarist head of police in Beira—demonstrate the different shapes and constellations of law and political authority emerging in the bairros. Together with the ongoing fear of uroi and its dynamics of predation and protection as well as the rise of summary justice, the unruliness of the community police contributes to a social and existential climate of fear. This materializes as dreading to “be disposed of,” to be violently attacked and consumed by muroi, and to be on the receiving end of a bullet fired by more or less corrupt community police, ordinary police, or criminal networks.

Given violence and economic uncertainty, many young men in the bairros become street peddlers of illegal and legal goods while maintaining kin relations with rural households. These kin relations across the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio provide vital access to machambas and matoros, meaning basic food security for many households. Nonetheless, material conditions, household and neighborhood constellations, and relationships regarding social, spiritual, and economical dimensions in the bairros are chronically instable.

A friend, whom I call Paulo, maintains these important kin relations while also attempting to enter the wage labor market. In early January 2007 he and an acquaintance were hired as bricklayers for putting up a banca fixa—a small roadside shop selling dried fish, sugar, oil, and biscuits—in a bairro different from his own. However, a week after starting work, Paulo was nearly killed when he was mistaken for a burglar. According to Paulo and witnesses, he was attacked by the banca fixa’s neighbors who, ignoring his protests, mobilized, beat him, burned him with sticks, and chopped at his limbs with machetes. Following this violent intervention they dragged him unconscious and bleeding to the police station in the bairro cimento where he was locked up in an overcrowded cell.

I arrived to do fieldwork a week after his imprisonment and was rapidly inundated by his friends’ and relatives’ claims of Paulo’s innocence. When I visited him in prison he was still seriously injured and unsure of surviving, as poor conditions such as overcrowded cells and extremely bad food and water promote disease there. Many prisoners and nonprisoners alike are also certain that the prison’s sadza is deliberately poisoned with cement to kill its inmates. As such, the image of the state as a muroi poisoning the food of its victims is here invoked more or less directly, an analysis of which was also made in chapters 5 and 6.
In response to Paulo’s life-threatening circumstances in prison, his relatives mobilized in different ways. His parents moved from their Honde household to their daughters’ homes in the bairro so that they could visit Paulo daily and support him, even though this relocation broke the vital agricultural cycle during the rainy season. In addition to his parents bringing vital food and water, they engaged a host of other resources to save their son: they bribed prison guards to bring in medicine for his open wounds, mobilized an extensive network of kin to insist Paulo’s innocence, and the family visited and bribed different agents of the police in order to obtain information regarding evidence and the pending trial. A literate relative contributed by recording a written account of Paulo’s version of the events to be given the judge in court. Party secretaries and community authorities, among others, were asked to intervene to stop the trial. Paulo’s father, together with the anthropologist, also contacted the accusing family to reach an understanding in the form of compensation. Unfortunately, all attempts failed, and two weeks later a provincial court sentenced Paulo to two months in prison. The sentence was, however, converted into a fine, and within days the sum was collected with contributions from the entire dzindza, effecting Paulo’s release.

However, despite Paulo’s release, both he and his kin were unsure of his continued survival. To me, Paulo reflected on the people who wanted to kill him for a robbery he claimed he did not commit; on the neighbors’ hatred now that he was believed to be a mbava; on the bricks and metal sheets stolen from his home while he was incarcerated; on the need to renew traditional protection of self, body, and house after narrowly escaping death both within prison and without it:

To die here does not cost much. Many people would like to be rich and powerful. That is why one has to protect oneself. You can have somebody killed here for USD 50. And it is easy to die. Chi! To die here does not cost much.

Paulo’s expression of existential uncertainty accurately describes a common sense of being at risk—a sense one may appreciate given the increasingly violent practices of popular justice as well as the violence and danger of life in the bairros in general. However, in contrast to the earlier case and near death of the mbava caught red-handed where only his mother supported his continued life, the murky circumstances around Paulo’s near death at the hands of the banca fixa’s neighbors meant a broad mobilization of kin and family in order to effectively restore Paulo’s personhood and avert new danger. The first measure was to consult a n’anga to both cleanse his body of danger (kudusa tchikume), protect the body anew (kufunga muiri), and comprehend the wider circumstances of his predicament, practices also analyzed in chapter 4. Crucially, by
consulting a n’anga, Paulo’s dzindza sought both causal connections as well as remedies to his obviously unprotected bodily and spiritual condition. Moreover, this interest reflected that the danger afflicting Paulo was one potentially harmful for the entire dzindza. Paulo’s condition was therefore of collective concern.

With the aid of spiritual guidance, the n’anga located several dangerous and harmful forces, the most important of which was Paulo’s paternal grandfather who had been a hunter—a powerful and dangerous figure across Southern Africa. The n’anga divulged that this hunter had on his travels killed and robbed humans as well as hunted animals. To recall, in opposition to the near lynching of the mbava above—which would not have created a harmful and dangerous tchikwambo spirit as the thief is seen as justly killed—the murders of hapless persons do normally create vengeful tchikwambo spirits. Once created, the tchikwambo will at some point in time seek vengeance or recognition from the killer’s dzindza, and in this case Paulo was attacked. However, in addition to unveiling the tchikwambo, the n’anga pointed out a female neighbor who had used uroi against Paulo. She envied the metal sheets on Paulo’s house, his radio, and other commodities—an envy he was conscious of and through the years frequently discussed with me as “very dangerous.” This form of envy correlates with the use of uroi to harm specific others. The dangerous dynamics at work that the n’anga pointed out were accepted by Paulo, his father, and Paulo’s dzindza, and so the n’anga generated ritual measures for both Paulo’s renewed protection and the tchikwambo’s appeasement.

Paulo’s case highlights both collective and individual dimensions to the apportionment of blame for his unprotected and dangerous condition—individual in terms of his private accumulation without redistribution creating dangerous uroi, and collective as the vengeance enacted by the tchikwambo born out of Paulo’s paternal grandfather’s violence. Paulo’s paternal grandfather transgressed both boundaries for moral behavior but also the hunter’s traditional role. Further, his accumulation in a poor bairro entails perilous social differentiation by creating an enabling environment for uroi. Equally important, conspicuously rapid or (other) suspect accumulation is understood as evidencing breeches of the socio-moral order, being signs of attacks on the relational basis of sociality, as explored also in chapter 6. In sum, the causal structures revolve around issues pertaining to past events reactualized in, for example, the tchikwambo as well as to material accumulation as such.

The collective recognition of Paulo’s dangerously unprotected state by the dzindza therefore transcends his near-death experience at the hands of the banca fixa’s neighbors, the following imprisonment under
lethal conditions, or the sentencing in court. Further, Paulo’s and his kin’s quest for protection is irreducible to being shielded against the violent greediness of others—directly in the form of *uroi* or indirectly as the vengeful and destructive *tchikwambo* born out of Paulo’s grandfather’s murderous acts. Instead, the practices and struggles oriented toward renewed protection reflect a sensitivity to the violence shaping and dominating many marginalized and poor postcolonial African areas where life is experienced as being unprotected against a host of visible and invisible perils. His experiences and conviction about these perennially tangible and present forces of power and appropriation support similar analyses in other African contexts (Sanders 2003; Ashforth 2005). Further, the recent massive increase in the summary justice of burning would leave the chances much slimmer for Paulo to survive had his ordeal taken place in 2008 or 2009 instead of 2007.

**A “Heterogeneous State”? A Critique of Visions of Legal Pluralism**

The complex avenues of protection, justice, and socio-moral order pursued in both Paulo’s and the *mbava*’s cases contrast frequently disseminated rosy images of a Mozambican state that has been hailed for its economic growth, postwar political stability, and politics of decentralization and deregulation in terms of, for example, the establishment of community authorities. Based on the ethnographic material, one could argue instead that the state is effectively involved in a process of transformation in which several of its erstwhile domains of law and control are distributed among ostensibly nonstate or “undercover” state functionaries. The brutality of this particular transformation is characterized by degrees of popular appropriation of the state’s ultimate capacity to, if necessary, kill its own citizens or subjects.

In legal anthropology, the concept *legal pluralism* was seemingly developed precisely to grapple with these complex situations of state and nonstate systems and understandings of justice and legality. Empirically, colonialism formed the backdrop for developing *legal pluralism* as a notion that describes various legal, political, and administrative formations arising from the superimposition by the British and French of their law onto indigenous legal processes in Colonial Africa (Merry 1988: 870). Theoretically, in its most basic sense, *legal pluralism* is often defined as “the situation in which the ‘law’ that obtains in a social field consists of more than one set of binding rules, whose behavioral requirements are different and sometimes conflicting” (Griffiths 2004: 870). This basic
understanding, *classic legal pluralism*, gave prominence to legal bodies and institutions (Merry 1988: 872). However, from the 1970s onward, there was a growing dissatisfaction with established dichotomies (e.g. “dominant law” vs. “servient law”) to address what was increasingly seen as complex situations (Chiba 1992 [1989]: 416).

Similarly, Pospíšil underlines a pluralist intake to law by reminding us about Weber’s insistence on the existence of several legal systems within society—as opposed to the simple dichotomies of folk law and state law. Such a non-state-centric and nonformal legal approach allows units such as criminal gangs, death squads, and vigilante groups to be included within the definition of law. Writes Pospíšil (1974 [1971]: 125), “Thus the existence of social control, which we usually call law, is of vital necessity to any functioning social group or subgroup. As a consequence, in any given society there will be as many legal systems as there are functioning social units.” However, despite their incisive critique of dichotomies of state/formal law and other forms of law—a critique for which they should be applauded—Pospíšil and others, in their line of thought, still seem to perpetuate the imagery of distinct social units to which a law fits perfectly—without friction. As Pospíšil (1974 [1971]: 125) comments, “Law thus pertains to specific groups with well-defined membership; it does not just ‘float around’ in a human society at large.”

The so-called *new legal pluralism* that arose from these strains of critique against mainstream legal scholarly works also looked to non-colonized, industrialized countries, emphasizing the flaws of systemic dualism as “plural normative orders [that] are part of the same system in any particular social context and are usually intertwined in the same social micro-processes” (Merry 1988: 873). One specific merit of *new legal pluralism* in both Western and non-Western worlds is its rejection of ready-made models of (and for) relationships between law, state, and authority. This open-endedness allows for diversity and hybridity, and it approaches actual practice over legal texts, giving it analytical leverage by not privileging formalistic, hierarchical, and Western notions of legality.

Given the above cases, the idea of legal pluralism seems to correspond to some empirical features of the Mozambican situation with its proliferation of legal mechanisms, diverse distributed authorities (police, community authorities, *n’angas*, etc.), and the quite significant influential criminal networks (Chachiua 2000; Reisman and Lalá 2014). However, this complex situation cannot be conceived as one of relatively harmonious coexistence and complementarity, implied in the usage of the concept of legal pluralism, but rather one of opacity with consid-
erable tension and conflict. This basic problem of the legal pluralism approach becomes clearer when examining the prominent legal theoretician Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s analyses of Mozambique.

Often sensitive to the country’s historical trajectories, Santos traces its legal historicities as comprising aspects of Portuguese colonial law that continued after Independence (1975), what he calls “customary law,” religious laws, and new postindependence laws, among others. These all coalesce into a legal formation that Santos defines as a heterogeneous state or sees as a system of legal hybridization (2006a, 2006b). His approach assumes importance in an analysis of several aspects presented earlier—for example the work of the n’angas and the profetes. However, his presentation of the traditional authorities will be used here to exemplify the problematic aspects of his notion of the heterogeneous state, as Santos’s discussion of the role of so-called traditional authorities, another arm of the heterogeneous state, tends to downplay the violent historical trajectories of their legal role. Santos’s description of the règulo evidences this (2006a: 41n4):

The règulo’s position is passed down from generation to generation, according to a hereditary system. Thus, where such a position still exists, its legitimacy derives from family lineages often going back to precolonial times.

Although Santos is sensitive to the historical and political transformation of traditional institutions (see esp. 2006a: 60–70), this view neither corresponds to the necessarily dynamic nature of the traditional field per se nor to its subjection to particularly violent transformations throughout the colonial and postcolonial period (West 2005, 2009; Israel 2014; Obarrio 2014).

Further, the state-centric character of Santos’s analysis is also problematic. This is apparent in his presentation of the turbulent postindependence period where the Frelimo state under Samora Machel, as argued above, sought to eradicate traditional structures. This violent attack—which fueled Renamo’s war machine—is effectively glossed over as Santos claims that traditional structures merely were “legally suspended for a while” (Santos et al. 2006b: xii). Similarly, the popular courts established in the same period are described as “the guarantors of the implementation of popular justice” (Gomes, et al. 2006: 203), a reproduction of the contemporary narrative of their official objective.

The absence of some critical distance to Mozambique’s often violent transformations—as we saw above in the violence of popular justice under Samora—and analytical proximity to state processes and rhetoric produces in Santos’s writings an image of a heterogeneous and somewhat benevolent state. In Santos’s vision, this state is rife with creative
instances of legal plurality but largely devoid of the politics and violence permeating society and legality. Hence, in his quest to expose novel formations of legality, the Santosian concept of the “heterogeneous state” romanticizes and depoliticizes past and contemporary stark realities of social life. In this optic, the state is invariably the prime mover, the ultimate ordering authority or, at least, the entity around which normative orders condense. This state-centrism undermines the analytical worth of such concepts in ethnographic contexts of violent and murky spaces where different sovereign agents and agencies exact justice—and where discarded legal logics—as that of popular justice—may be popularly invoked, appropriated, and reorganized in novel and complex forms of state and nonstate order.

A similar form of state-centrism is evident in Santos’s vision of law, explicitly through “interlegality,” a term describing the production of a dual “hybridified” legal structural framework and practices where various orders dynamically intersect, in turn creating codes that constitute new legal spaces (Santos 1995). This conception of state and non-state legal mechanisms operating simultaneously rests on the assumption of a benign form of state/nonstate complementarity that is neither evident in the ethnographic material presented earlier nor easy to recognize in other Mozambican scholarly works dealing with state and the traditional field, such as Harrison (2000), Florêncio (2005), or Kyed (2007b). In this way, Santos’s notion of heterogeneous state underscores the problematic dimensions of the legalocentric orientation of much legal pluralism where, as Tamanaha (1993: 193) has pointed out, even nonlegal, normative elements are seen as constitutive parts of or attached to the state.

The Rise of Multiple Sovereignties

Santos’s work illustrates the more general problem that legal pluralism came to be “dominated by academic lawyers rather than anthropologists” (Fuller 1994: 10). Fuller might have been right in ascertaining bleak prospects for the anthropology of law in the early 1990s. Now, however, this certainly seems to be changing with a broad and renewed interest in state, law, and society, and the increasing influence of anthropologically oriented works by, for example, Agamben (1998 [1995], 2005) and Burke (2007) marks a return to fundamental theoretical issues.

Informing empirical contexts often characterized by high levels of conflict, this reorientation is particularly evident in the growing anthropology of violence from the 1990s onward, in what some call anthropo-
ology’s “statist turn” as well as an increasing preoccupation with the complexities of the global flows, identities, and globalized machineries and regimes of governance. All three trends underline the relevance of analyzing legal regimes, the politics of globalized discourses on development or human rights, and the dynamics feeding, policing, and structuring these trajectories. This renewed theoretical focus on violence, state, and authority in situations of conflict and poverty—as the one Paulo barely survives in and as a mbava sometimes die in—makes increasingly relevant an anthropology that is capable of transcending the state-centrism inherent to notions such as the heterogeneous state and, more generally, to the field of legal pluralism.

This return to legality, order, and disorder also reflects the complex empirical conjunctions between distinct legal regimes and processes of mimicry between legal and nonlegal bodies of law (J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff 2006), as well as new directions within anthropological studies of crime, state, and authority in general (see, e.g., O. Harris 1996; Parnell and Kane 2003; Mattei and Nader 2008; Goldstein 2012). Such approaches have contributed to a more theoretically refined and empirically grounded analysis of relationships between ordering, disordering, and governing structures and logics. Informed by these and other recent works, I will here suggest that the term multiple sovereignties may be more analytically helpful for legal anthropology than the heterogeneous state.

Derived from early theoreticians of state such as Hobbes and Bodin, sovereignty in this sense is often taken to mean “a set of principles that define appropriate governance structures” and further that “there could be one, and only one, source of the law, and that this source, the sovereign, was either in practice or in theory not subject to any higher authority” (Krasner 2004: 14706). Born out of the context of European history, this approach privileges a monist, hierarchical, and absolutist vision of sovereign power—akin to Clastres’s (1998 [1974]) vision of the state as “the One” applied to the Mozambican context of Samora Machel’s societal transformation and attacks on “tradition” (tradição) above. This vision has been critiqued and scrutinized thoroughly by Foucault’s work, which rejects analyzing power and domination as springing from a single source. Instead, and in line with his capillary understanding of power, he proposes focusing on “the manufacture of subjects rather than the genesis of the sovereign” (Foucault 2003 [1997]: 46). The Foucauldian analysis, prone to historicization of power and governance, is alert to the pitfalls of the “overvaluation of the state,” as in the lyrical Nietzschean vision of the “cold monster” or as in analytically “reducing the state to a number of functions” (Foucault 2007 [2004]: 109).
Following Foucault and other critics with him, the initial “absolutist” vision of the sovereign and lawgiving monarch under the sole authority of God has given way to a variety of approaches sensitive to current global mosaics of power and domination (Ong 2006; Duffield 2007). This challenge to the monolithic, vertical, and absolutist aspects of national sovereignty emphasize instead its uncontrolled and nonfinite aspects. In these nonfinite spaces, “wild” forms of sovereignty emerge that create “a domain of bare life upon which the sovereign power or their agents can demonstrate their sovereign power—that instituting, originating power which is outside all constraint” (Kapferer 2004a: 7). This accentuation of unrestrained dimensions to fragmented sovereign power also informs what I term multiple sovereignties. As evident in the earlier cases, the notion of multiple sovereignties highlights some features of postcolonial realities where people experience being unprotected against a host of sedimented authority structures. This emphasis resonates with J. L. Comaroff and J. Comaroff’s (2006: 35) approach to postcolonial law and (dis)order wherein aspects of horizontal and partial organization are highlighted in their definition of sovereignty, which means “the more or less effective claim on the part of any agent, community, cadre, or collectivity to exercise autonomous, exclusive control over the lives, deaths, and conditions of existence of those who fall within a given purview, and to extend over them the jurisdiction of some kind of law.”

Such a pluralized notion of sovereignty opens up for partial and contested authority structures, without losing sight of legal, political, and violent aspects of state reordering as in the territorial dimensions of the case of the burnings. Understood thus, sovereignty includes or, better, merges law and politics more effectively than conventional legal pluralism or the Mozambican “heterogeneous state” in a Santosian sense. In contrast to Santos’s emphasis on complementarity and hybridization within a legal-systemic framework, such an analysis may grapple with popular struggles to gain control over lives experienced as fragile and unprotected in the type of poor bairros in which Paulo lives and thieves die. Further, it will have the potential to identify the ongoing formations of multiple sovereignties: from the corruption of the national police force to the position of the community leader wedged between state and community, from the régulos’ management of an ambivalent traditional field to criminal gangs’ violent extortion, from the force of uroi to the n’angas’ protection against violent attacks, harmful spirits, and occult economies.

Understanding sovereignty in terms of being multiple and “wild” in the sense of being uncontrollable also sheds significant light on the re-
cent attacks on the Mozambican postwar configuration of legal and justice sectors. As argued above, in the 2008 as well as 2010 riots against police stations and police cars prior to the spate of burnings, the notions, experiences, and memories of popular justice of the 1980s were reappropriated. The intensity of the physical attacks and burnings effectively redefined notions and practices of popular justice and also reorganized spaces and domains of state order. To such a presentist perspective could be added a diachronic element, as Mozambique may be analyzed historically as lacking complete territorial, political, or administrative control. This situation is evident in the historical trajectories from the colonial vesting of sovereign powers to concession companies in the late 1800s and early 1900s (M. Harris 1958; Serra 1980) to Samora Machel’s attempt to erase the traditional field postindependence, which again was challenged during the civil war by Renamo, a bellicose sovereign formation in its own right. These glimpses of historical dimensions indicate certain advantages of a historically informed as well as ethnographically based analysis of Mozambican legal and political landscapes, as a significant feature of the two cases is precisely the shifting, antagonist, and historically shaped relations between multiple sovereignties.

The historical dimension to Mozambican sovereign formations corresponds partly with other analyses of African politics of life, death, and law. Hansen and Stepputat, for example, go far in their critique of what one might call the “state of the state’s alleged sovereignty” (2005: 27) arguing that “in parts of Africa, the territorial sovereignty of the postcolonial states has been eroded . . . to such an extent that it only exists in a formal sense, devoid of any monopoly of violence and replaced by zones of unsettled sovereignties and loyalties.” Although I endorse the general thrust of Hansen and Stepputat’s argument, they should not be read in the vein of conceiving the state as failed—as in some recent representations of especially the African (postcolonial) state—or as frail in the sense of being impotent, shrinking, or withdrawing (cf. Strange 1996). Rather, as Mbembe argues (2000), the new sovereign formations that challenge conventional territorial nation-states point instead to the increased importance of locating, understanding, and relating dynamics of nonstate and state sovereign forms similar to the kinds at work in the bairros of Chimoio.

Donald Moore’s brilliant ethnographic work on farmers in Kaerezi in Zimbabwe (2005: 219–49) is instructive in this regard. Moore exposes how notions of sovereignty are integral to cosmological aspects of the traditional field and to nonstate authority alike—in his work he dubs these notions selective sovereignties. Cosmologies, Moore shows, are related to dynamic interpretations of traditional forms of sovereignties
that are varyingly congruent with, antagonistic toward, or overlapping with statal structures. Thus, Moore warns against the dominant contemporary argument of global *deterritorialization* to emphasize rather the *reterritorializing* aspects of sovereignty in the forms of, for example, rainmaking or chiefly rule: “[These comprise] specific articulations of multiple forms of sovereignty and hybrid spatialities that coexist in the same geographical territory” (Moore 2005: 223). The similarities between Moore’s analysis of the rural Kaerezi material and the above urban material are evident, in particular the multiple nature of historically formed sovereignties within specific (rural and urban) territories.

Given the context of the death squads or the spontaneously formed and dissolved vigilante groups that lynched alleged criminals, clear-cut membership-based groups related or integral to these sovereignties are difficult to identify. Thus, contrary to Pospíšil’s notion of law being the characteristic of clearly demarcated groups, law does float around, become appropriated, contested, may be reinserted in a morphed form in novel contexts, or be reapplied with deadly force. Multiple sovereignties in this sense are characterized as shifting, incomplete, and without necessarily corresponding to distinct social groups. Instead they may be linked to social and cosmological ontologies of justice, rights, and evil or the many letters of state law—colonial, postcolonial, international. As such, the sovereignties formed are highly contingent, volatile, and fleeting but not decoupled from historical trajectories, the formation of the state, or the traditional field.

Many nonstate sovereign practices are socially embedded to the point that one may argue that the formations of violence born out of the contexts of uncertainty are social in their targeting of the antisocial. First, such formations of multiple sovereignties comprise a defense of the virtues of the social and protective of the social in attacking transgressors—the *mbava*. However, these formations also attack the state and its continuous repressive, extractive, and inadequate institutions and practices that feed on the people and, thus, the social—eating their produce, their lives, and their force as a *muroi* is known to do, as seen in chapter 6.20

At the analytical level of the state as a hierarchical, arborescent formation, the rioting, death squads, and summary justice represent rhizomic dynamics similar to the attacks on edifices, structures, and agents of the state during the civil war. As in the civil war, a predominant image of the state in the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio was that of an organization inimical to the social—epitomized in the construction of communal villages, collective production, and attacks on traditional structures of governance. The state—as the antisocial *muroi*—was er-
ratically attacked by the multiple, horizontal war machine of Renamo that—feeding on the social—maneuvered evasively and with speed around and within state domains to challenge and destabilize the state. Notions of such attacks on or challenges to the arborescent order of the state have been introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (2002 [1980]: 358) in the (much overlooked) concepts of “bands” and “packs” seen as rhizomic forms:

Packs, bands are groups of the rhizome type, as opposed to the arborescent type that centers around the organs of power. That is why bands in general, even those engaged in banditry or high-society life, are metamorphoses of a war machine formally distinct from all State apparatuses or their equivalent, which are instead what structure centralized societies.

The notions of the rhizomic character of the “pack” or “band” immediately find certain factual resonance with the previous material: groups of people immediately form, mobilize through kinship, neighborhood, and telecommunication networks, and make a decision within a dynamic and intensified atmosphere to kill the *mbava* before finally dissolving prior to (infrequent) statal intervention. As the quote also indicates, there is a certain affinity between the war machine model of human action and practice and the pack through a metamorphosis of the former (see also Hoffman 2011). If we turn to vigilante groups, there are metamorphic processes involved in moving from both ideals and practices of popular justice of a socialist legality and from a context of traditional law structures addressing theft and *uroi* to a postcolonial (and definitely postsocialist) present where both strands of legality are appropriated, morphed, and redeployed.

This ongoing metamorphosis of law in terms of lynchings is complemented by a transmogrification in the interior of the state (to be in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari’s differentiation between a state interior and exterior): the police increasingly move around in bands—predative, punitive, and exploitative—moving out from the well-ordered grid of the *bairro cimento* to enter the *bairros*. In the form of, for example, death squads, as we have seen in this chapter, this practice entails a particular form of lethal power, executed within a complex context of politics and personal gain.

Perhaps more intensely than in other instances of antagonism between state formation and the traditional field, the domains of law explored ethnographically earlier show the continued becoming (and metamorphosis) of state. Further, and central to this chapter, this becoming within the current postcolonial situation of crisis generates a number of fleeting, overlapping, but frequently powerful sovereignties with ca-
pacities for exacting justice and violence. These multiple sovereignties have great potential, as a state’s orientation toward order, striation, and legibility will be constantly upset by dynamics of the war machine kind, fragmenting and transmogrifying its legal, political, and administrative apparatus by creating spaces of ambiguity through the formation of community authorities, the territorial zoning of death-bringing practices, or the creating of police death squads.

Through material collected from 2006 to 2009 especially, this chapter suggests that an empirically grounded analysis of summary justice practices in the bairros provides an opportunity to map the formation and development of multiple sovereignties. Methodologically speaking, the notion of multiple sovereignties of state and nonstate origin can be identified ethnographically by privileging a focus on actual protective practices and understandings of security, blame, and danger rather than a legalocentric point of departure that presupposes the existence of formal institutions or the state’s complementarity with nonstate institutions. Put differently, such a legal anthropology would tap the theoretical and analytical potential of the notion of sovereignties as well as incorporate logics and dynamics often overlooked in legal analysis. In such an examination, for example, uroi could also be seen as a sovereign formation by involving the capacity to kill, dominate, and accumulate in ways not dissimilar to state agents. Within this optic, the use of a n’anga to prevent attacks bears similarities to seeking the support of local community authorities. Further, the invoking and reorganization of popular justice underline, paradoxically, the vitality and force of the social in popular reactions to the repressive capacities of unrestrained and multiple sovereignties. Applied thus, the notion of multiple sovereignties analytically frames some of the bairros’ dynamics of power and authority and how they often doubly connote violence (extortion, muggings, killings, or uroi) and protection in the form of, for example, the closure and cleansing of the body and community through lynching.

Sovereignty is, then, not exclusively reducible to state, territorial entities, or “states within the state”—although, as seen in chapter 5 in particular, the figure of the singular sovereign, the One at the apex of the state order, looms large on the cosmological horizon. Yet within the present Mozambican context, sovereignty is not captured by a dualism of state versus, for example, régulos in terms of influence, authority, and capacity, as some contemporary analyses of Mozambican past and present dynamics infer. Rather, by incorporating cosmological, traditional, and socio-moral dynamics, an analysis may be undertaken of concrete situations where dimensions of security and protection are crucial, shifting, opaque, and often absent. This situation in which no singular overarch-
ing, dominant, and distinct law-regulated or rule-bound legal entities from which to seek protection exist, nor do any neutral and noncorruptible legal contexts, is the world Paulo and his kin navigate and thieves frequently die in. As argued above, this world is not represented well by Santos's analysis of Mozambique as a legally plural country where the state is heterogeneous. Instead, it points to a complex and sometimes chaotic existence where local tribunals and police units with formal protective capacities must be understood also in terms of plasticity and unpredictability. Importantly, for Paulo and others, this entails that one necessarily needs to protect oneself, one's body, and one's property also by employing ambivalent yet potent traditional resources and by invoking supportive kin networks. However, it also involves the reorganization of a form of popular justice involving the burning of thieves in demarcated domains—a logic and practice of summary justice shaped by officially discarded visions and practices of legality that are, nonetheless, still central to reconfigurations of the current postcolonial state order in Mozambique.

Beyond being an exploration of another instance in which the tensions between the state and the traditional field is apparent, this chapter has raised a critique against a strict definition of legal pluralism as merely describing a situation in which multiple legal systems *qua* systems are seen to be coexisting. In postcolonial contexts such as Mozambique, the unifying potential of the legal pluralism approach in a legal-systemic sense is limited if it is correct that, as the Comaroffs argue, *plurality* is "endemic to the postcolony" (2006: 35). On the other hand, the Comaroffs' confining of plurality to the postcolony (notice the singular term) may suggest that its correlate, *singularity*, was a predominant feature of colonial (or precolonial and modern) state formations. As also has been the argument throughout this book, this is, of course, not the case. In this and the foregoing chapter, the text has suggested the flaws of both sweeping representations of a single dystopian landscape of postcolonial justice, as in a Comaroffian sense, or the excessively romanticizing vision of a heterogeneous state, as in the Santosian notion. Rather, I have suggested the analytical advantages of historicizing and "ethnographizing" the continually ongoing constructions, practices and forms of sovereignty that people are subject to, resist, or appropriate and, thus, transform. This chapter has argued that the notion of multiple sovereignties has significant potential to probe the complex dynamics and logics, the historically sedimented authority structures, and the human beings navigating these contexts.

The territorial zoning of a death-bringing practice is, then, conditioned by dynamics of de- and reterritorialization. Painfully present for
most poor people, this includes tentatively confining spatially the destructive potentialities of the popular reappropriation of past legal logics resurrected and merged with understandings of corporal and legal punishment of muroi and mbava. Put differently, it is also a spatial expression of ongoing fragmentation or multiplication of sovereign formations characteristic of the Mozambican postcolonial state. Such multiplication and zoning is, of course, not entirely new: from the territorial division of power between concession companies like the Companhia to the opaque and shifting FAM or Renamo zones of death or protection during the civil war, the current production of multiple sovereignties exhibit similar dynamics with historical instances described throughout this book. These are instances in which the ongoing becoming of state exudes violence doubly: as a challenge to state formation and as the assertion of state formation.

Notes

1. Key works here include M. Harris (1958), J. Heald and Manghezi (1981), Ishemo (1989), and O’Laughlin (2002). This chapter draws in part on material previously analyzed in Bertelsen (2009).

2. For some analyses of this, see Florêncio (2005), Buur and Kyed (2006), Buur, Silva, and Kyed (2007), West (2009), Forquilha (2010), and Obarrio (2010, 2014). Further, the Mozambican social sciences have been instrumental in this reorientation. Domingos do Rosário Artur (1999c), for instance, asked which place there should be for “African tradition” in decentralized governance, while the well-known Mozambican philosopher Severino Ngoenha entered the same field (see, e.g., Ngoenha and Castiano 2010). Many such approaches, however, build on a statist bias undergirded by a view wherein the state’s modernity is encapsulating, and dominant but may accommodate a subordinate space (and function) for “African tradition”—a hierarchizing dynamic similar to that also affecting the Mozambican state’s approach to traditional medicine as we saw in chapter 5 and as critiqued by Meneses (2000, 2004b).

3. My claim directly challenges a UN report (Naudé et al. 2006: 65) stating that 90.5 percent of Mozambican respondents have “high levels of appreciation” for police performance. However, undermining this seemingly positive figure and, contrasting, underscoring Baker’s point (which I endorse) is the fact that, according to the same report (ibid.: 118), a whopping 96.4 percent responded that they chose not to report corruption cases to the police. This latter figure is also more in accordance with my analyses from Maputo (see also Bertelsen and Chauque 2015).

4. For a comparatively interesting analysis of criminal gangs as states in Nicaragua, see Rodgers (2006).

5. Contacts in Chimoio’s media and justice sector in May 2008 argued that the real number of burnings is significantly higher than the official number due to...
the unpopularity of these instances among donors and politicians in Maputo. However, the national estimate of twelve is based on a number given by Carlos Serra (2008: 9), a Mozambican sociologist with a research and monitoring project on lynchings.

6. Less than a month after having been hospitalized and then imprisoned, the mbava in question was released in June 2008. He was neither prosecuted nor tried, and his release illustrates, perhaps, aspects of the rationale behind protests against how the whole legal and justice system may be manipulated—a key dimension of the 2008 and 2010 riots in Chimoio and elsewhere (Macamo 2011, 2015; Serra 2012; Bertelsen 2014a).

7. A similar argument has led Carlos Serra (2008) to argue that lynchings are not manifestations of disorder but protests against disorder.

8. Some analysts claim that there are connections between economic regimes and the (alleged global) rise of vigilantism. Based on fieldwork in Cochabamba, Bolivia, Goldstein, for one, emphasizes how neoliberal structural violence produces a political order where lynching “fulfils the highest mandate of neoliberal rationality” and fills the gaps of a receding state (Goldstein 2007: 248). However, although Mozambique has suffered a neoliberal onslaught in the form of the Bretton Woods institutions since the mid-1980s (see Pitcher 2002), it is difficult to successfully explain the rise of lynchings at this particular moment of time to be the end result of over twenty years of economic policy. Significantly, there have been earlier periods of lynchings, and, for example, twenty were beaten or burnt to death in Maputo in August and September 1992 (Agencia de Informação de Moçambique 1991), undermining a strictly economic argument. Further, as analyzed by Penvenne (1982), riots, lynchings, and vigilantism were also recurrent features of colonial Lourenço Marques, and at least from the 1930s and into the 1950s protesters sometimes also killed policemen and soldiers, as these were involved in robberies and rapes.

9. These events in Chimoio coincided with rioting in Maputo following the government’s suggested hike in costs of public transport due to the rise in global fuel prices. After days of extensive rioting in the capital, the government withdrew its decision to raise prices. The Maputo protests spread to other cities and developed according to local contexts and concerns. Thus, the demonstrations and clashes with the police in Chimoio may have been facilitated by the foregoing events in Maputo—especially by way of example. For news coverage of the 2008 riots, see Hanes (2008) and for a comparative analysis of the riots, see Bertelsen (2014a).

10. As Pratten and Sen point out (2007b: 13; see also Kirsch and Grätz 2010), “contemporary vigilantism relates both to the fragmentation of the sovereignty of nation-states and to the dependence that states have on the vigilance of their citizens.” This is not to say such forms of vigilance are necessarily destructive, as demonstrated by S. Heald’s (2005) material on the so-called Sungusungu groups in Tanzania. Heald argues that the Sungusungu vigilante activity may be seen to reform, reclaim, and transform the state into being more responsive to local priorities (2005: 282).
11. For two overviews of the interconnections between law, policing and community authorities, see also Kyed (2014) and Kyed et al. (2012).
12. All quotes taken from Notícias de Moçambique (2005) and translations mine.
13. Ashforth’s works on Soweto also include a recurrent theme of situations of existential uncertainty (see, e.g., 2005), and it is most consistently developed in the book Madumo (2000), which is devoted to the spiritual, economic, social, and kinship dimensions of the troubled titular man. Madumo’s tale resonates with Paulo’s in many respects.
14. Turner’s classic analysis of Ndembu illustrates this where “successful gun-hunters are regarded as sorcerers, who acquire their power in hunting from killing people by means of their familiars” (1957: 32). Also, in an equally classic anthropological treatise, H. A. Junod (1962 [1912b]: 59) points out that hunters are seen as magico-powerful in Southern Mozambique.
15. As conspicuously visible markers of economic differentiation, corrugated iron sheets are significant long-standing items prominent in sorcery and zombification accusations in many African contexts. Ardener’s (1970) historical analysis of correlations between plantation economy fluctuations and “witchcraft beliefs” among Bakweri in West Cameroon represents an interesting attempt to relate economic and sorcerous dimensions—also to corrugated iron sheets used in housing. See also Englund’s analysis (1996b) of witchcraft and accumulation in a Malawian case in which, again, corrugated iron sheets are prominent as coveted items.
16. For critiques of glossed-up versions of Mozambique’s present social and political condition, see Moran and Pitcher (2004), Cramer (2007: 259–72), and Castel-Branco (2014).
17. In Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft (1922) Weber writes, “For the sake of terminological clarity, we categorically deny that ‘law’ exists only where legal coercion is guaranteed by the political authority. There is no practical reason for such a terminology. A ‘legal order’ shall rather be said to exist wherever coercive means, of a physical or psychological kind, are available…” (Weber, quoted in Pospíšil 1974 [1971]: 104).
18. From Maine’s Ancient Law (1963 [1861]) and Malinowski’s Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926) to at least the 1970s there was a sustained interest on both sides of the Atlantic for the relationships between law, society, and the state—exemplified in Africanist works by Turner (1957), Allott (1960), Gluckman (1967 [1965]), and S. Moore (1978). But as Fuller (1994) rightly laments, due to what he sees as destructive methodological debates especially between Paul Bohannan and Max Gluckman and the subsequent narrowing of legal anthropology to conflict resolution mechanisms, larger theoretical approaches were overshadowed. This “contributed to the subdiscipline’s desultory state in the 1970s” (Fuller 1994: 9). In a short introduction to legal anthropology, however, Sally Engle Merry strikes a more positive note, writing that “by the 1970s, the debate over the definition of law became increasingly sterile and was largely abandoned in favor of understanding law as a social process” (Merry 2004: 8489). Be that as it may, the point remains that legal anthropology and links
between anthropology and law are generally recognized to have been weakened (see also Donovan and Anderson III 2003).

19. For the anthropology of violence, see for example Aijmer and Abbink (2000), Ferme (2001), Broch-Due (2005), and Whitehead and Finnström (2013); for examples of “statist anthropology,” see Scott (1998), Friedman (2003), Krohn-Hansen and Nustad (2005), and Gulbrandsen (2012); and for some approaches to globalization, see Trouillot (2003), Ong (2006), and Mignolo and Escobar (2010).

20. A similar sense of relating to the state with violence and antagonism is argued by Kapferer (2003: 265) in his analysis of cases brought before the Suniyma shrines in Sri Lanka: “They expressed not merely uncertainty as to outcome but a sense that the instrumentalities of power and the state were in an exclusionary and violent relation to them.” Further, such an antagonist relation to the state is also argued to be integral to the rise of nonstate security forces in Lombok, Indonesia (Telle 2009).
Conclusion
Uncapturability, Dynamics, and Power

Ethnography harbors the power of critique—political, social, and theoretical. Ultimately a capacity to destabilize, this orientation also applies when writing an account of the violence inherent to processes of state formation in Mozambique. While such critical potential may be realized in a number of ways, here I have privileged perspectives forged on the margins of the centers of power, supplemented by historical sources. But there is more to it than this: by privileging a decentering of institution-based notions of the state informed by multiple readings of Deleuze, a wholly different picture of what a state is—and might be—emerges. Such a venture has also been inspired by what Biehl and Locke point out in a rethink of the relations between anthropology as a politically critical discipline without being co-opted by distinct domains of philosophy and policy making (Biehl and Locke 2010). Following their argument, the skewed, nontotalizing image and imaginal potential of ethnography is valid, important, and essential. A kindred call for a Deleuzian anthropology has also been framed by Viveiros de Castro through deploying the terminology of ontology as an “anti-epistemological and counter-cultural, philosophical war machine” (2015: 2; see also Bertelsen and Bendixsen 2016).

This whole book has been conceived within a similar frame of thinking anthropology as a discipline that is fundamentally critical, subversive, and unrestrained—a perspective where, therefore, notions of violence, state, power, and sociality have been approached in a spirit of, indeed, experimenting with both theory and ethnography. Put dif-
ferently, informed by long-term fieldwork engagements with people in Honde and Chimoio, my reading of the state in Mozambique aims to provide such a slightly askew (and thereby critical) portrayal of current, dire, and frequently violent circumstances among the predominantly poor in the country.

Through the analysis of both contemporary and historical dimensions to the state form and the whole field of the traditional, it is evident that in Mozambique these assemblages are variously and intimately connected—one articulating the other—as well as juxtaposed in often significant ways. By exploring what I have called the traditional field, I have started from the notions that people themselves employ—tradição, tsika, and tchianwo wo ateve. As is clear for people in the urban-rural continuum studied, these crucially frame ongoing and generative processes wherein new social realities are continuously formed. The traditional field, then, is a domain of potentiality and emergence inherent to sociality that impinges on and molds people’s lives in fundamental ways. It is also, however, a domain of potentiality that subsequent state formations often seek to incorporate, capture, defuse, eradicate, or accommodate. Thus, based on the empirical ethnographic and historical material at hand, I have argued that the relationship between this traditional field and subsequent state formations has predominantly been one of tension and antagonism.

I have analyzed the shifting relationships between statist dynamics and the potentialities in the domains of territory, justice, and law; body and spirit; economy; politics; and others—the distinction between the fields reflecting, as all analytical distinctions, categorizations made by the analyst rather than by immediately being empirically evident or articulated by people. However, in all the chapters concerned with historical and contemporary material from the urban-rural continuum of Honde and Chimoio, I have explored particular empirical points of entry into the overall problematique of the traditional field and state formation.

In chapter 1, through following the development of the civil war in Honde and Chimoio, I argue that the traditional field was violently both de- and reterritorialized by different statist dynamics. Further, I argue that, in particular, the potentialities of the traditional field fed and fueled the war machine dynamics that were characteristic especially of Renamo’s expansion and attacks on the Frelimo-dominated state order. In using the civil war as a point of entry into presenting the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio, I also make an argument for the need to approach the traditional field as always in emergence and, thus, becoming.

In chapter 2 I develop a spatio-historical argument revolving around trajectories of subsequent state orders. I follow specifically the rise of the
Nguni tributary state formation of the nineteenth century and its transmogrification into the concession company the Companhia—as well as later colonial and postcolonial state formations. Analyzing these, I underline how the capture of people, labor, and also the traditional field was a crucial feature of all such formations, evident especially during crisis and war, although one contested by lines of flight. Further, analyzing the postcolonial state formation, I argue that a societal reordering through processes of de- and reterritorialization is central to state dynamics, and that in the case of Mozambique this also targeted the traditional field in both rural and urban settings.

Chapter 3 develops from this premise of deterritorializing statist dynamics and violent upheavals of war by analyzing entities central to people’s understandings of tradição, tsika, and tschianhu wo atewe, particularly in Honde. By literally working from the ground up through examining how the soil is understood to be depleted of its vital growth power (ndimo) by these processes, the chapter traces these effects in the form of changes to the socio-spatial organization of labor and the challenge of a range of powerful entities derived from the civil war, especially pfukwa, tchipho, and tsawiwi. Further, I follow the historical trajectory and contemporary violent presence of the mhondoro—through its civil war relocation by Renamo to Gorongosa and its current mediumless ravages at the behest of sorcerers. An argument is made that the mhondoro constitutes a particular powerful dynamic that, internal or external to formal polities, commonly works disarrangingly and, often, against statist dynamics as these are manifested in polities, state formations, or other arborescent or hierarchical formations of the state kind.

In chapter 4 I turn to the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimioio, and privileging largely peri-urban contexts, I analyze the divergent but similar healing capacities of n’angas and profetes as well as a family ritual addressing ancestral spirits to argue for the considerable force these represent in addressing social and other ills. Moreover, I highlight the rhizomic characteristics of these healing capacities, rituals, and spirits that are dynamically engaged through the profetes and the n’angas vis-à-vis, ultimately, arborescent orders of the state kind. The chapter further underlines the shortcomings of an economically centered entrepreneurship approach to these capacities and dynamics.

Chapter 5 turns to the ongoing processes wherein the postcolonial state attempts to reorder the dynamic and upsetting capabilities of the traditional field identified in chapter 4 through what I argue is an apparatus of capture, AMETRAMO. The chapter approaches the organization of AMETRAMO through a particular case of uroi, exploring it as a considerable destructive and empowering force also integral to popular
imaginaries of the sovereign—the Mozambican president. In doing so, I again emphasize a trajectory of destructive potencies of *uroi* and their integrality to imaginaries of the state and the sovereign in a temporally longer perspective than what is frequently argued.

Chapter 6 returns to the urban-rural continuum in exploring reproductive and productive dimensions of substance through a gendered approach that underscores how current processes of commodification, exchange, and production are understood to be integral to the state-elite’s illicit and nefarious accumulation through a vast array of techniques related to *uroi*. I substantiate this argument by departing from the ritual of *kubatidzana* following the death of the father in the Honde household where I lived during fieldwork to explore the gendered dynamics of reproductive and productive capacities and how these are seen to be related to the bodily capacities of the living and the dead. I also argue that some current universalizing models of neoliberal development for statehood and economy—as well as critiques of these—fail to appreciate these crucial dimensions.

In chapter 7 I draw closer to the ongoing dynamics of formation of power in the postcolonial state by following some recent cases of summary justice in Chimoio’s *bairros*. Through interpreting these in the context of successive authority structures—some of which were imposed by the postcolonial state—I make an argument in this chapter for the current situation being dominated by the rise of what I term multiple sovereignties—formations of power that compete, overlap, and wax and wane within the overall framework of the postcolonial state apparatus. In making this argument, I explicitly critique the alternative notion of Mozambique constituting a “heterogeneous state,” as argued by Boaventura de Sousa Santos.

In all chapters, I approach the overall focus on the traditional field and state formation from a range of different perspectives rather than make an extended case study or confine the analysis to a singular and specific empirical domain of the social. These alternative analytical approaches are, of course, entirely possible, and an analysis solely of the workings of AMETRAMO and its relations to the healing capacities of *n’angas* and *profetes* could, arguably, have provided a context-sensitive, ethnographically rich, and more sociologically based study than the one I have provided. The choice to pursue the dynamics of the traditional field and state formation in a variety of contexts, instead of confining the scope to, for example, AMETRAMO, is informed by the notion of *events* and their unfolding—as the one that introduced this book wherein Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, transmogrified into a partridge.
As I have shown, events constitute particular intense moments in which the potentialities of broader social formation or statist dynamics are actualized, and I have in this book followed such processes of unfolding empirically with regard to processes of state formation and the traditional field. Describing such events from the onslaught of the civil war to the case of uroi at AMETRAMO, I have sought in each chapter to capture the broad range of contexts within which the violence of state becoming may be approached in light of its often antagonistic relationship with the potentialities of the traditional field. This becoming underlines how the state order is ongoing, contested, and dynamic and wherein the hierarchical, sovereign, territorial, sedentary, cosmological, and other dimensions of statehood are constantly unsettled by rhizomic forces. Given this, and being a central argument of the book, the historical and perpetual instances of state becomings may also be seen as inherently violent processes.

This position has been substantiated in two ways. First, I have argued that the domain of the traditional field as integral to the wider context of the social, may be approached in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of virtuality—that which is real without being actual. In the chapters I have demonstrated how this virtuality is actualized in concrete empirical settings and how these often work rhizomically to deterritorialize the arborescent structures of the state order, or, as Deleuze puts it: “in a social field rhizomes spread out everywhere under the arborescent apparatuses” (2006 [1977]: vii). In this book such “arborescent apparatuses” have included formal polities challenged by the forces of mhondoro or uroi or gendered social hierarchies confronted by potentialities of healing and spirits.

Second, I have pointed out that the potentialities of the traditional field—often tentatively subject to the state in processes of capture, as in the capacities of past and present rainmakers—frequently relate to dimensions, orders, or components of the state order constituting, thus, assemblages wherein elements from the traditional field comprise parts. However, as the case of rainmaking and, in addition, the examples of tentative relocation of régulos in Honde by Renamo show, these assemblages are contested, violent, and, thus, often fleeting—proving to be failing and, ultimately, short-term constellations.

I, thus, argue that the traditional field is fundamentally uncapturable in terms of processes of the state kind successfully encapsulating, striating, or defusing its potentialities—an argument supported by the field’s durability confronted with violent processes of deterritorialization by subsequent state formations and statist dynamics. Such perspectives on the traditional field and state formation may be useful as many con-
temporary approaches—reflected in different chapters—often see the traditional field from an analytical position that is statist in its orientation (i.e. normatively or prescriptively arguing for the traditional field as “integrateable” with the state), is locked within a divisive optic of modernity and nonmodernity, or is concerned with the task of allocating or multiplying modernity onto, for example, African contexts.

Similarly, as shown throughout, the analytical construction of the party-state or the Frelimo state in terms of unity, coherence, and territorial dominance has been predominant among researchers on Mozambique. However, such forms of representation, with their emphasis on formal, institutional, and systemic approaches to the state, often exclude or miss the longer historical trajectories of friction between statist dynamics and what I have termed the traditional field. Rather, the ongoing, dynamic, and perpetual reemergence and regeneration of the traditional field in the face of the deterritorializing ruptures of colonialism, the postliberation societal reordering, the violent appropriation during civil war, and the structural violence of the post–civil war period effecting deeper economic schisms points to a force that is considerable in its potentialities. My analysis of such potentialities—what my interlocutors call tradição, tsika, or tchianhu wo atewe—amounts to a form of counterhistory writing in the face of state-centered (institutionalist or formalist) approaches, on the one hand, and the modernist approach on the other where the traditional is but an impotent relic or is marginalized by analytical culturalization. This counterhistory writing, however, should not be cast in terms of heroic resistance but rather should be seen as complex and multistranded encompassing practice and notions of the everyday as well as the potentialities privileged here. As a domain of the potential, its virtuality is actualized in a range of ways that I have outlined in the above chapters. Crucially, these potentialities are actualized in manners that differ—from the rhizomic fueling of Renamo’s violent expansion to the unsettling yet empowering capacities of the mhondoro and uroi, from the lines of flight under the onslaught of the Nguni and the Companhia state formations to the explosive potentials of summary justice in postcolonial Mozambique. Further, the rise of what I argue are multiple sovereignties is of particular interest in this respect as they, again, show the force and dynamics of the traditional field in being involved in the merging and transmogrifying of past state notions of justice, popular justice, with current circumstances to develop a range of sovereign forms where borders with the formal apparatus of the postcolonial state are constantly and often violently negotiated. Thus, and in keeping with the book’s argument, the rise of the multiple sovereignties is thereby one of the latest actualizations of the frictions and tensions between
Puzzlingly, the state order does not, I have argued, succeed in attempts to co-opt (or eradicate) what it deemed *tradição*—despite many subsequent state formations’ multiple attempts of doing so. In the Mozambican context, this argument is contrary to the visions of those, for example Florêncio (2005), who see the recent decentralization moves largely as a successful extension of the Frelimo state into the rural settings that, more or less, manages to fully capture these within the state apparatus. Such an argument rests on a vision of the state where it has the capacity to successfully engage nonstate social orders. As I have shown in different chapters, this argument further rests on the state order’s decapitation—if you will—of the traditional field’s potentiality. In theoretical terms, Florêncio and other approaches similar to his represent, therefore, an overly systemic approach and, perhaps, an overestimation of the state’s capacity to strate the social field, thus making it penetrable, controllable, and surveillable for state organs or agents. In empirical and ethnographic terms, such a vision of the state in Mozambique shies away from the multiple ways in which consolidation of state control in political, territorial, national sovereign terms has never been fully accomplished—as the periods of the civil war or the externally controlled Companhia indicate also historically.

Contrarily, my argument of seeing the current and past identifiable state formations through the optic of statist dynamics confronted by the traditional field brings a novel perspective on these processes in studies on Mozambique and African state formation. Further, the insistence of these processes of state formation as always ongoing, perpetually challenged, and predominantly violent—the violent becomings—is at the same time a reflection of seeing the state from its nonelite subjects situated within their social and political circumstances in the rural-urban continuum of Honde and Chimoio, Manica Province, and, moreover, to emphasize the state as emergent and unfolding rather than confined to an institutional vision (see also Hoffman 2011). Such a noninstitutional argument—pertaining both to the traditional field as a domain of potentiality through its virtuality that is actualized at particular moments and to the ongoing, contested, and violent becomings of state—extends an analysis of the traditional field beyond a focus on decentralization policies or the institutions of *régulos*, community authorities, or community police in Mozambique. Further, by arguing for certain dimensions of the traditional field and state dynamics comprising assemblages, I have also underlined the interpenetration of processes of state formation and the potentialities of the traditional field. By seeing statist for-
mations as violent processes of becoming, one can proceed to analyze ruptures, transformations, and similarities in a range of settings wherein the order of the state is antagonistically or problematically related to forces of broader social formations—also to those not pertaining to the traditional field. Through an analysis of the particular case of Mozambique I hope to have contributed to an anthropology that approaches the state order in more tangible terms than the cold monster poised for attack—or levitating above its subjects.

In this book I have sought to understand the state as an incomplete and beleaguered mode of organization—an arborescent structure always in the state of becoming and always being contested, challenged, and evaded by forces, dynamics, and practices of the social in general—and the domain of the traditional in particular. In doing so—and in deliberately invoking some of the standard repertoire employed when analyzing the state, such as territory, body, economy, sovereignty, law, spirit, economy—the aim has been to shift the analysis of how we conceive the state away from state-centric discourses and institutions: by reconceiving conflicts over various forms of state formation—and sometimes the very possibility of state—in such disparate domains as sorcery, informal markets, gendered corporalities, spirit possession, and lynchings, the book has provided entry points into the state. And I hope also to have shown that an anthropological approach deploying a critical use of historical sources—in a sense mimicking how the past impinges on the present for my interlocutors—may have helpfully delineated the trajectory of violence that is the trace of state in Mozambique.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appiah, Kwame Anthony</td>
<td>My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture</td>
<td>Oxford University Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argenti, Nicolas</td>
<td>The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence, and Belated Histories</td>
<td>The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence, and Belated Histories in the Cameroon Grassfields. Chicago: University of Chicago Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnfred, Signe</td>
<td>Sexuality and Gender Politics in Mozambique: Rethinking Gender in Africa</td>
<td>Sexuality and Gender Politics in Mozambique: Rethinking Gender in Africa. London: James Currey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Claudio, Fernanda. 2006. “Cloth, Hoes, and Beads: Chikunda Domination, the Warlord Kanyemba and the Chapoto Chieftaincy in Dande, Zimbabwe.” In *Studies in


———. 2009. “Gêmeos, albinos e prisioneiros desapaarecidos: Uma teoria moçambicana do poder político.” Paper presented at Departamento de Arqueologia e Antropologia (DAA) da Faculdade de Letras e Ciências Sociais (FLCS) and Cen-


———. 1991. “The King Comes from Elsewhere.” In Body and Space: Symbolic Mod-


Bibliography


Kurokawa, Kisho. 2001 [1988]. “Toward a Rhizome World or ‘Chaosmos.”” In


Liesegang, Gerhard J. 1966 [1796]. “Resposta das questoes sobre os cafres” ou noticias etnográficas sobre Sofala do fim do século XVIII. Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Centro de Estudos de Antropologia Cultural.
Mafeje, Archie. 1996. Anthropology and Independent Africans: Suicide or End of an Era? Dakar: CODESRIA.


Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, João Carlos Trindade, and Maria Paula Gutierrez Meneses, eds. 2006a. Law and Justice in a Multicultural Society: The Case of Mozambique. Dakar: CODESRIA.


———. 2015. “The Uncertainty of Prosperity: Dependence and the Politics of


abduction, 39, 91–2. See also under
state formation; violence
and forced labor, 61, 65, 73
and killing of prisoners by police,
242
by FAM, 31, 37, 74–5
by Portuguese colonial army, 71
by Renamo, 30, 37–8, 40, 52n19,
54n37
by sorcerers, 104, 242–3
of the mhondoro, 108, 112–3
Abraham, D.P., 60, 103, 107, 113,
119n20–21
Agamben, Giorgio, 161, 182, 185–7,
194n28, 239, 251
agency, 199–200, 230, 238
analytical allocation of, 22, 59,
85n6, 129, 199–200, 217
and gender, 217
and power, 13
and violence, 180
executionary, 169
of intangibles, 142
agriculture
and large-scale farming, 5, 45,
64–8, 75–6, 79, 116n1, 200,
214, 241, 255
and machamba (plot of land), xx,
30–1, 33, 42, 44–5, 47, 76,
91–2, 97–8, 103–4, 122, 130,
135, 139, 170–3, 206, 212,
215, 221, 235, 245
and maize (see maize)
and matoro (plot of land), xxi, 44,
47, 91–2, 103, 170, 173, 245
and Operação Produção (see
Operação Produção)
and uroi (see uroi)
and war, 73, 91–2
collective work in, 170, 173
produce from, 44, 91 (see also
maize)
production cycles in, 44, 45, 47,
91–4, 185, 202, 214
aid. See development
alcohol. See under fluids
Alden, Chris, 51n7, 51n10, 51n14,
52n18, 194n26, 225n2
aldeia comunal. See under villagization
Alexander, Jocelyn, 52n22, 240
Allina, Eric, 64–5, 86n11, 87n18
Allina-Pisano, Eric, 65, 87n18, 225n1
allochthony, 61–3, 68, 95–7, 104,
113–4, 117n9, 144, 151, 182. See
also autochthony; territory
Alpers, Edward, 50n1, 59
Amazonia, 8, 112, 119n23, 220,
228n22
AMETRAMO. See under uroi
Anderson, Perry, 65, 86n11, 96n13
Angola, 12, 65, 77, 81, 86n13, 87n25, 128–9, 155n11
anonymization. See under methodology
and colonialism, 16–7, 24nn9–10
as critique, 263, 270
in Mozambique, 17, 24n9, 27, 51n8, 89n36, 155n11, 157n28
Argenti, Nicolas, 4, 192n17, 192n19
aridzi wo nhika (owners of the land), xiii, 47, 93–5, 100, 105–6, 153, 171, 203–4. See also territory
Arnfred, Signe, 78, 88n31, 117n11, 203
Artur, Domingos do Rosário, xvi, 35, 53n26, 54n39, 86n14, 119n22, 259n2
Aschwanden, Herbert, 193n19, 226n7
Ashforth, Adam, 191n8, 248, 261n13
authority. See also community authority; state; state formation; traditional authorities;
and gender, 133–4
and policing, 82, 128, 175–6, 193n21, 261n11
and power, 5, 56, 119n25, 181, 235, 238, 257
and sorcery, 173, 181–3, 194n28
chiefly, 90–120, 181, 200, 202, 231–2
community a. (see community authority)
non-state forms of, 4, 11, 74–5, 121, 126, 144, 235, 249, 254, 257
political, 11, 63–4, 82, 149, 181, 193n23, 229–62
ritual, 71–3, 233
spiritual, 102–3, 178 (see also healing; n’angas; profetes; spirit)
structures of, 11, 43, 234, 235–6, 241–2
traditional a. (see traditional authorities)
multiple, 65, 236, 241–2, 249, 253, 258, 266
tautochthony, 11–4, 34–5, 47, 61–3, 91–9, 104–6, 111–4, 117n9, 118n15, 122, 126. See also allochthony; territory
autoridades comunitárias, 10, 233–4. See also community; traditional authorities
Azevedo-Harman, Elisabete, 3, 51n15
Badiou, Alain, 14, 24n12
Bagnol, Brigitte, 17, 133, 226n10
bairro. See under Chimoio
bairro cimento. See under Chimoio
Baker, Bruce, 235, 259n3
Bakhtin, M.M.
and notion of epic, 77, 88n30, 194n28
and speech genres, 129–30, 173
Bannerman, James, xvi, 116n3
Bárue
chiefs, 110, 113
rebellion of 1917, 66–8, 71, 113 (see also Portuguese colonialism)
Bayart, Jean-François, 7, 13–4, 23n4, 190, 192n17, 194n28
Beach, David, 59, 85n5
becoming/s. See under Gilles Deleuze
beheadings. See violence
Behringer, Wolfgang, 119n23, 228n22
being, 10, 14, 22, 142, 152 (see also becoming/s under Gilles Deleuze)
Beira, 66, 226n4, 236, 244–5
corridor, 53n32, 99, 100
Bengo, 34–5, 37, 39, 49, 53n26, 104
Blanes, Ruy Llera, 128–9, 142, 155n11
blood. See under fluids
Bodin, Jean, 188–9, 252
body, 121–59. See also gender; healing; n’angas; profetes; uroi
and gender (see gender)
and human and animal bones, 78, 156n21, 175, 208–10, 220
and comportment, 141–3, 157n25
and healers (see healing; n’angas; profetes)
and tchikume (danger), xxiii, 130–9, 142, 147–50, 156n17, 205–6, 208, 210–1, 246
and transition to spirit, 100, 204, 210, 238
b. fat as power, 130, 219–20, 228n21
closure of, 130–9, 147, 243, 246–7, 258
illness of, 121–59, 156n19
nhora incisions in, 158n33
of the sovereign (see under sovereignty)
protection of, 121–59
orifices of, 85n8, 134, 156n17, 184–5, 195n31, 211, 220
as corpse, 31–2, 38, 54n33, 95, 99, 133, 164, 169, 174–5, 184, 193n22, 195n32, 198, 204, 207, 210, 217–21, 236–40, 227nn15–16, 228n20 (see also under uroi)
bones. See under body
Bourdillon, Michael, 95, 192n13, 192n15, 218, 227n16, 228n20
Bowen, Merle L., 82, 88n28, 214, 220–1
Bretton Woods institutions, 51n10, 179, 191n1, 260n8
bricolage, xv, 142, 158n36
Brito, Luis de, 23, 51n15, 225n2
Bullock, Charles, 116n3, 154n6, 156n21, 157n28, 227n19, 239
Burbridge, A., 116n3, 118n18, 119n20, 193n18, 228n22
bureaucracy. See under state
bush (mato), xxi
as externality related to sovereignty/chiefhood, 61, 67–8, 119n25
as site of animalization/non-sociality, 30–7, 40, 52n22, 139, 184, 240
as site for Renamo, 2, 30–7, 40, 52n24, 83, 240
Buur, Lars, 10, 24n5, 259n2
Cabeça do Velho. See Bengo
Cabo Delgado Province, 70, 88n26, 96–7, 162
Cahen, Michel, 4, 50n5, 51n8, 111
Cameroon, 12, 119n22, 166, 190
cannibalism. See body; uroi
Cape Verde, 74, 88n32
Capela, José, 88n32, 231
capital. See under economy
capitalism. See under economy
capture. See under state
Carsten, Janet, 197, 210
Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno, 224, 261n16
Castoradiis, Cornelius, 200–1,
Chanaïwa, David, 85n1, 85n3
Chapman, Rachel R., xvi, 117n11, 156n17, 199–200
chiefless society, 112–3
chiManyika, xv, 107, 116n8, 154n1
chiNdau, xv, 116n4. See also maNdau
Chimoio, xv–xvi, 1–4, 34, 42–8, 53n26, 53n32, 54n39, 61, 67, 95, 98, 104, 122–4
African Independent Churches
in, 127–9, 133, 150, 155n11, 157n24, 157n30, 171, 174, 186, 201, 219
and autochthony, 91–5, 116n4
(see also autochthony)
and civil war, 42, 80, 117n11, 117n13, 124
and territorialization/deterриториализация, 77–80, 91, 115
and Praça Gungunhana/Praça OMM, 78–9
bairros (sections) of, xviii, 42–5, 77, 80, 91–2, 126, 174, 182, 191n6, 204, 225, 230, 234–6, 239–48, 253–4, 256–7, 266
crime and insecurity in, 235–55, 259n5, 260n6
C. Massacre (1977), 99, 117n13
China, 201, 223, 225n2
Chingono, Mark, xvi, 54n39, 117n11, 212, 225n11
clan. See mitupo
class. See under state
Clausewitz, Carl von, 30, 53n31
Clément, Jean A.P., 23n2, 198
chiTewe, xv–xvii, 59, 166n4. See also maTewe
Clastres, Pierre, 7–8, 72–3, 112, 154, 183, 252
Coelho, João P.C.B., 50n2, 52n21, 69–71, 75, 87nn22–23
Cole, Jennifer, 151, 159n37
colonial capitalism. See under capitalism
colonial nostalgia, 43–4, 55n45, 76
colonial settler paradigm, 58, 129
colonialism. See Portuguese colonialism; state formation
Comaroff, Jean, 3, 13, 16, 155n11, 166–7, 191n9, 199, 252–3, 258
Comaroff, John, 3, 13, 16, 166–7, 191n9, 199, 252–3, 258
Companhia de Moçambique. See under state formation
community, 19, 42, 47–8, 52n23, 94–5, 107, 143, 151, 184, 192n17, 200, 202–3, 214, 222, 253, 257
community authority, 43, 46, 182, 233–6, 243, 246, 248–9, 253, 257, 261n11, 269 (see also autoridades comunitárias; règulos; traditional authorities)
community courts, 43, 181, 234, 243
community police. See under police
confusão (confusion), 103, 149
as antagonistic to state dynamics, 163–5, 176–7, 191n6, 193n23
Cooper, Fredrick, 12, 24n6
corpse. See under body
cosmology, 1, 8, 157n30, 199
and disorder, 168–9, 176, 209
and gender, 142, 152, 211
and healing, 122, 142
and sovereignty, 109, 114, 164, 187–9, 195n29, 254–5, 257
and state, 82, 177, 267, 201
and the traditional field, 8, 29, 72, 74–5, 90, 99–101, 105, 111, 113–4, 168, 201, 233–4, 254–5 (see also traditional field)
national c., 13, 117n9, 126, 183–4, 194n28
socialist c., 77
Cramer, Christopher, 179, 223, 261n16
curandeiros (healer-diviners), xix, 80, 122, 124. See also n’angas; profetes
decentralization. See under state
Deleuze-Guattarian cooperation, 25n13. See also Gilles Deleuze
Deleuze, Gilles, 23, 161, 23
anthropology, 7, 263 (see also Eduardo Viveiros de Castro
arborification, 21, 68, 81–5, 88n35, 143–4, 146–7, 152–4, 189, 196n36, 255–6, 265, 267, 270
becoming/s, 10, 14, 22–3, 32, 37, 49, 63, 81–82, 84, 85, 109–11, 115, 123, 125, 142, 146, 152, 161, 170, 189, 212, 227n15, 256, 259, 264, 267, 269–70 (see also under state formation)
lines of flight/destruction (see also under state formation)
Index

67, 69, 81–85, 129, 153, 160–1, 189–90, 225, 265, 268
rhizome, 21, 38–9, 68, 83–4, 88n35, 122–3, 144, 146, 152–3, 180, 190, 196n36, 215, 224, 255, 256, 265, 267–9
smooth/stratified space, 39, 81, 88n35, 124, 126–7, 189, 269
state/war machine, 21, 38–9, 41, 54nn34–35, 63, 69, 81, 107, 153, 189, 202, 256, 263, 267
development, 29, 45, 76, 113, 198–9, 225n2, 241
Portuguese colonial d. schemes, 58, 70, 80, 86n11
post-independence d., 4–5, 12, 75–76, 80, 113, 120n28, 224
discourse of, 10, 198–202, 252
Dhlakama, Afonso, xxvi, 1, 2, 96–7, 100, 109–11, 114, 129, 170, 183, 266. See also lycanthropy; Renamo.
Dinerman, Alice, 51n9, 73
djangano (work party). See collective work under agriculture
dzindza (kin group). See under kinship
duro (sorghum/maize beer). See under fluids
Earthly, E. Dora, 110, 116n3, 116n5, 156n20
economy. See also Bretton Woods institutions
and accumulation, 3, 6, 68, 92, 125, 170, 179, 187, 189, 197–228, 235, 242, 247, 257, 266
and capital 4, 5, 29, 58, 64, 166, 194n28, 198–203, 223–4, 225n3
and capitalism, 3, 58, 64, 87n20, 154n7, 166, 198–203, 214, 228n23
and commodification, 123, 126, 144, 166, 190, 197–8, 202, 211–7, 221–5, 226n11, 266
and development (see under development)
and economic growth in Mozambique, 248
and exchange, 4, 197, 202–3, 221–5, 266
and globalization, 166, 199, 262n19
and neoliberalism, 123, 126, 129, 160, 179, 190, 198–9, 260n8, 266
and production, 197, 253
and reproduction, 203–17
and state, 198–203, 221–25
and state elite accumulation, 3, 4, 6, 14, 179, 190, 198, 201–2, 223–5, 266 (see also Frelimo; state)
and substance, 192n17, 197–225
occult e., 199
postwar privatization of, 48–9, 179
Egerö, Bertil, 50n5, 75
elections. See under politics
Ellis, Stephen, 13, 191n9, 193n19
Emerson, Stephen, 41, 52n21
Engelke, Matthew, 155n11, 156n15, 226n5
Englebert, Pierre, 14, 15
Englund, Harri, 8, 12, 13, 16, 53n28, 55n45, 126, 155n11, 167, 194n25, 225n1, 261n15
Estado Novo. See under Portuguese colonialism
Ethiopia, 87n25, 88n29
ethnicity, xvi, 123
and ethnocide, 72–73
and ethnoscene, 35
and politics, 15, 78, 116n4 (see also politics)
and territory, 78, 99, 105, 227n16
Evans-Pritchard, E.E., 17, 24n10, 155, 190, 195n31, 195n33
and sorcery witchcraft distinction, 170–1 (see also under uroi)
event, 10, 22, 171, 227n15, 265–6
and state and traditional field, 22, 41, 49–50, 266–7
national, 1, 194n28
ritual, 140, 144, 218 (see also ritual)
violet, 3, 22, 41, 49–50, 53n29, 98, 230, 240, 246–7, 260n9
(see also violence)

FADM (Forças Armadas da Defesa de Moçambique), xxiv, 52n20
FAM (Forças Armadas de Moçambique), xxiv, 29–31, 35, 37–8, 40–1, 49–50, 52n20, 53n31, 83, 90, 94–5, 97, 100, 109, 259
and use of curandeiros and n’angas, 73–4, 90 (see also n’angas)

farming. See agriculture
fat. See under fluids
Fausto, Carlos, 119n23, 220
feiras (markets). See economy; trade
Feldman, Allen, 52n17, 54n33
fertility. See under rainmaking; sovereignty; territory
fieldwork, 4, 44–5, 36, 43, 78, 92.
See also methodology
and housing, 43–6
and language, xv–xvii
and long-term relations with interlocutors, 44–5, 135, 171–3, 203–11, 245–8
and whiteness, 45–6
rural-urban continuum of field sites, esp. 42–8
sites, 2–4, 11, 14–5, 26, 30, 42–8

Finnström, Sverker, 100, 262n19
Florêncio, Fernando, 24n5, 251, 259n2, 269

fluids. See also body; healing; n’angas; ritual; profetes; uroi
alcohol, 98, 139–41, 158n35, 170, 209

blood, 46–7, 96, 144–5, 147, 155n14, 207–10, 216, 220–3, 228n22
duro (sorghum/maize beer), xix, 47, 94–5, 101, 146, 170, 172
fat, 219–20, 228n21
from corpses, 193n22, 218–20, 198, 236–7 (see also body)
milk, 130, 133–5, 155n14, 217
nipa (liquor), xxii, 47, 94–5, 97–8, 124, 139–40, 143–5, 209
portugaro (red wine), xxii, 47, 94–5, 139–40, 143–5, 148, 209–10
semen, 134, 155n14 (see also body)
sweat, 47, 139, 144–5, 147, 209
(see also tchikume under body)
vaginal fluid, 133–4
water, 110, 130–3, 137–9, 156n15, 158n31, 193n22, 205–7, 210, 219, 222, 226n5, 245–6 (see also rainmaking)
white blood, 134

Fontein, Joost, 86n9, 110, 194n28
forced labor. See under labor
forced recruitment. See under abduction
Forquilha, Salvador C., 10, 24n5, 259n2
Foucault, Michel. See also power; sovereignty; state
and sovereignty, 90, 252–3
and state, 21, 90, 194n28, 252–3
and territory, 56–7
Frazer, Sir James, 195n31, 195n33
Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), xxiv, 10, 179. See also state; state formation; villagization
and alleged southern bias, 78–9, 182, 241
and antagonism toward the traditional field, 28, 34–5, 37, 75–84, 87n25, 88n27, 93, 96–7, 111, 114–5, 161–2, 233, 250 (see also AMETRAMO; obscurantism; tradition)
and civil war (see under war)
and corruption, 104, 179, 192n17, 202, 223–4
and elite formation, 4, 202, 241
(see also state elite accumulation under economy)
and grupos dinamizadores
(dynamizing groups), xix, 28, 72, 75, 83, 233
and history, 77–9 (see also history; memory under politics; memory under violence)
and liberation war (see under war)
and Operação Produção (see under Operação Produção)
and socialism, 5, 12, 75, 77, 80, 82, 88n27, 88n29, 114, 162, 233, 241, 256
as a guerrilla movement, 27, 69–75, 81
as a political party, 2, 4, 10
formation of, 50n1, 50n4, 27
killing of F. members, 27, 28 (see also under killing)
F. party secretaries, 6–7, 11, 40, 43, 47, 72–3, 96–7, 230, 233–4, 244, 246
F. party state, 9–11, 18, 27–8, 33–4, 39–41, 50n5, 53n32, 75–81, 104, 107–8, 111, 125, 161, 163–5, 183, 194n28, 233–5, 244, 264, 268–9 (see also state)
post-independence support for, 29, 51n10, 76
represented as allochthonous, 76
Freyre, Gilberto, 58, 82, 85n2, 231
Fry, Peter, 155n11, 156n20
Fuglsang, Martin, 20–1, 24n11
Fuller, Chris, 251, 161n18
Garbett, G. Kingsley, 105–7, 110–12, 118n15, 119n20–21
Gaza state. See under state formation
Gelfand, Michael, 105, 118n17, 154n1, 154n4, 154n6, 156nn20–21, 157n26, 157n28, 158n33, 192n13, 193n19, 227n17
General Peace Agreement, GPA (1992), xxiv, 29, 48, 51n14, 52n20, 229
gender. See also body; state
and arborescent hierarchies, 6, 144, 146–7, 151–4, 194n25, 211–2, 266
and economy, 117n11, 198, 211–7, 266
and Frelimo politics, 88n31, 117n11
and healing, 46, 133–4, 144–7, 151 (see also n’angas; profetes)
and informal economy, 54n39, 117n11
and land tenure, 97–99, 117n11, 212–4
and mukadzi wo adzimu (spirit wife), 146–8, 151, 153, 158n32
and patriarchy, 98, 139–48, 152, 157n23, 215
and reproduction, 116n5, 134, 144–7, 203–17, 223, 226n6, 226n9
and ritual, 46, 116n8, 142–4, 203–11
and sexuality, 17, 116n5, 116n8, 133–134, 157n23, 203, 206, 210, 217, 226nn6–7, 226n9
and social change, 97–99, 117n11, 144, 146–7, 151–4, 156n16, 226n4
and substance, 203–20
and spatial organization, 45, 117n12, 128, 144, 157n23, 203, 208
and zwidoma (dwar-sized sorcerous couple), 211–7 (see also uroi)
and uroi (sorcery), 193n20, 211–7
Germany, 103–4, 108, 111, 114, 241
farmers from G. in Manica, 64, 79, 214
German Democratic Republic, 29, 51n10
Geschiere, Peter, 12–3, 16, 166–7, 190, 192n17, 217
ghosts. See tchipoko under spirit
Gledhill, John, 15, 17
Gluckman, Max, 11, 52n22, 173, 183, 195n33, 261n18
Goldstein, Daniel M., 252, 260n8
Gonçalves, Euclides, 24n5, 77–8
Gondola, 104, 109, 136, 137, 156n17
Gorongosa, 60, 120n26. See also Renamo
  as Renamo area (see under Renamo)
  as important site for traditional field, 111, 113, 125–6, 144, 163, 169, 182, 192n12
gotokoto (spirit goat), xix, 53n27, 145–8, 153, 157n30, 218. See also ritual; spirit
Gramsci, Antonio, 24n12, 224
Granjo, Paulo, 156n21, 242
Green, Edward, 163, 191n2
grupos dinamizadores. See under Frelimo
Guattari, Felix. See under Gilles
Deleuze; Deleuze-Guattarian cooperation
Gudeman, Stephen, 200–2,
Guebuza, Armando, xxvi, 175–6, 221, 241–2
Gulbrandsen, Ørnulf, 7, 12, 14, 199, 262n19
Gungunhana. See Ngunungunyane
  gwanzas (paths). See under territory
Haar, Gerrie ter, 167, 193n19
Hall, Margaret, 16, 51n7, 52n21
Hanlon, Joseph, 4, 29, 48–9, 50n1, 50n5, 198, 224, 225n2,
Hansen, Thomas Blom, 188–9, 254
Harries, Patrick, 61, 88n32, 231
Harris, Marvin, 24n9, 65, 86n13, 232, 254, 259n1
Harrison, Graham, 24n5, 51n15, 251
healing. 122, 133–41 See also body; gender; n’angas; profetes; ritual
and becoming, 149–54
and commodification, 123, 125, 126, 141, 144, 148
and consumption, 133–41, 158n33
and deterriorialization, 121–59, 180
and memory, 151–4
and state, 144, 152–4
and urban impurity, 125–6
gendered dimensions of, 144–5
materialist understandings of, 141–2, 148–51, 265
Heusch, Luc de, 61, 68, 119n25, 133–4, 161, 176, 185, 195n31
See also healing; n’angas; profetes; ritual; state formation; violence
and counterhistoriography, 268
and healing, 123–9, 141–9, 152–4
and historical consciousness, 113
and Mozambican historiography, 50n4, 85n7, 51n12
Frelimo epic narrative of, 77–79, 88n30, 194n28
Hobsbawm, Eric, 16, 194n27
Hoffman, Danny, 7, 256, 269
Holbraad, Martin, 7, 22, 142
Holleman, J.F., 119n20, 154n6
Honde, 42–48
Honwana, Alcinda, 52n16, 80, 118n16, 130, 158n32, 179
household, 4, 32, 33. See also agriculture; gender; kinship; ritual
and ritual, 121, 127, 134, 139–41, 143, 197, 203–11
and rural layout of, 33, 42–8, 91, 126
and urban layout of, 45, 123–4, 126
rural-urban connections of, 43, 49, 80
hybridity, 55n46, 65, 194n25
identity. See politics
Igreja, Victor, 52n16, 118n16, 125, 155n8, 157n28, 179
impalement. See violence
Indian Ocean, 68, 87n19, 88n32
Inguane, Celso, 85n7, 194–5
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
   See Bretton Woods institutions
Isacman, Allen F., 51n7, 66, 82, 85n7, 86n17, 105, 119n20, 233
Isacman, Barbara, 51n7, 85n7, 233
Israel, Paolo, 17, 51n15, 119n20, 161, 177, 250
Jacobson-Widding, Anita, 154n4, 157n25. See also gender
   and body, 85n8, 133–134, 155n14, 155n14, 156n17, 211
   and fertility/sexuality, 116n5, 116n8, 133–134, 157n23, 217
   and sorcery, 85n8, 193n19, 211, 217, 226n7, 243 (see also uroi)
   and sovereignty, 119n25
Jenkins, Paul, 54n40, 79, 88n33
Jones, Branwen G., 49, 224
Junod, Henri Alexandre, 94, 118n17, 119n23, 192n11, 193n19, 226n8, 261n14
Junod, Henri Philippe, 94, 116n4, 158n34, 204, 209
Kaerezi, 40–1, 49, 254–5
Kantorowicz, Ernst, 185–6
Kapferer, Bruce, 8, 38, 48, 55n43, 177–8, 180, 187–8, 190, 253, 262n20
kidnapping. See abduction
killing. See also lynchings; uroi;
   violence; war;
   and tchikwanbo spirit, 145, 238, 247–8 (see also under spirit)
   and mhondoro (spirit lion), 103–4, 108–9 (see also mhondoro)
   and Nxaba, 60–1
   and sovereignty, 185–186, 248, 257
   and pfukwa spirit, 145 (see also under spirit)
   and uroi (sorcery), 85n8, 104, 109, 134, 149–50, 169, 174, 187, 193n18–19, 199, 200,
   226n8, 238, 242–3, 245, 257, 261n14 (see also uroi)
   and zwidoma, 216 (see also under uroi)
of civilians during war, 29, 30–4, 71
of own family members during civil war, 30, 32–3
of policemen during colonial era, 260n8
of rainmakers, 62, 114–5, 195n30–31 (see also regicide under sovereignty)
of returning labor migrants, 99–100, 145, 247
of sacred goats, 35, 157n30
of state agents by Renamo, 32, 39, 52n21
of thieves, 175, 236–9, 241, 245–6, 256
kinship, 33, 199, 203, 204, 209–10, 238. See also mitupo (totem clan);
   sociality; traditional field
   and dzindza (kin group), 52n23, 140
   and mobility, 42, 200
   and state attack on, 5, 153–4
   and traditional field, 153, 170
   and war dynamics, 5, 30, 40–2, 49, 84
   mobilization of, 256, 238, 245–8, 258
Korekore, 95, 105–7, 112–3
Kuper, Hilda, 167, 193n18
kuembera (ritual clapping). See under ritual
Kuti, Fela, 229, 238–9
Kyed, Helene M., xvi, 10, 14, 24n5, 163, 191n6, 193n23, 235, 251, 259n2, 261n11
labor, 7, 67, 70, 74, 89n36, 200, 222.
   See also migration; slavery; state formation
   and colonial obligation to work, 26–7, 64–5, 79, 86nn12–13, 203
and extraction of labor, 197–8, 201–3
and transformation from free action to work, 81–2
as disembodied, 81–2
forced, 5, 24n9, 28, 37, 60–8, 70–4, 79, 81–3, 86n12–13, 88n32, 147–8, 193n19, 201–2, 214, 230–1 (see also abduction)
recruitment, 65, 86n15
rural l. (see agriculture; villagization)
urban l. force, 79–81, 226n4
wage l., 43–4, 224, 245
Lalá, Aly, 224, 249
Lan, David, 86n9, 87n25, 112, 118n15, 119n20–21, 194n28, 202–3, 222–3
land. See under territory
language, xv–xvii. See also chiTewe; fieldwork
Latour, Bruno, 16, 49
law, 13, 72, 80, 163, 182–3, 187, 223, 225, 229–62. See also authority; legal pluralism; sovereignty
and indigenato regime, 231–3
and legal pluralism, 14, 19, 230, 248–53, 258
and lynchings (see lynchings) and ownership of land, 46, 67–8, 74–5, 79
and popular courts/tribunals, 72, 79–81, 233, 250
and popular justice, 79–81, 230, 236–42, 246, 248, 250, 251, 254–9, 268
and Portuguese colonialism, 230–3
and summary justice, 2, 22, 230, 236–42, 246–8
labor l, 64–5 (see also labor)
Leach, James, 8, 16, 126
legal pluralism. See under law
Legrand, Françoise, xvi, 37–38
Legrand, Jean-Claude, 51n8, 54n37
Liesegang, Gerhard, 50n4, 60–1, 85n7, 116n7, 154n6, 219–20
life. See also body; gender
and death, 203–11, 224, 235, 246, 251 (see also killing)
and agricultural growth (see ndimo under territory)
and reproductive growth (see ndimo under territory)
and sovereignty, 182, 185–6, 195n31, 203
bare life (see Giorgio Agamben
as substance, 203–11, 219–24
as suffering (see sufferings)
force experienced as extracted, 201–3
social l., 13, 19, 35, 44, 45, 90, 147–8, 150, 200, 203, 235, 251
lion. See mhondoro (spirit lion)
Lofving, Staffan, 53n29, 202
Lubkemann, Stephen, 52n18, 66, 83–4, 154n2
Luedke, Tracy J., xvi, 118n16, 122, 127, 142, 150, 154n5, 155nn11–12
Lundin, Iraë B., 17, 24n5, 194n26
Lusotropicalism, 58, 231 (see also Gilberto Freyre)
lycanthropy, 1, 109, 111. See also man-animality; uroibrand shape-shifting
lynchings, 2–3, 5, 8–9, 22, 23n1, 236, 240–1, 247, 256–7, 259n5, 260nn7–8, 270. See also killing; summary justice under law; violence
Macagno, Lorenzo, 85n2, 116n4
Macamo, Elísio S., 12, 23n1, 191n8, 260n6
MacGonagle, Elizabeth, 61, 62, 68, 78–9, 116n4, 227n16
machamba (plot of land). See under agriculture; maize
Machel, Samora, xxvi, 27, 50n4, 72–3, 78, 98, 114, 162, 177, 190, 192n17, 241–2, 250, 252, 254
magwere (maize). See maize
magic, 5, 39, 41, 92, 99–100, 155n8, 161, 173, 188, 199, 261n14. See also body; healing; uroi and mutombo
(medicine), xxi, 100, 102, 125, 130–9, 147, 149–50, 156n15, 156n17, 158n33, 169, 171–6, 193n19, 207–8, 211, 223, 236–7, 243 and state, 188–90, 196n35 maize, 32, 43–4, 98, 203–11. See also agriculture; gender beer (see duro under fluids) flour (ufu), xxiii, 32–3, 76, 205, 210–7, 222, 243–4 flour (konde), 209–11, 221–2 husks (bhutu), xviii, 205–6, 210–1 mills, 209, 215, 222 mortars (dhuli), xix, 32–3, 211 sadza made from, 96–7, 131, 134, 139, 206, 208–9, 211–14, 245 and fertility, 76, 93 (see also ndimo under territory) and ritual, 76, 203–11 and women, 203–17 makomerere. See under spirits; Zimbabwe Malawi, 51n9, 51n11, 51n13, 56, 112, 118n17, 144, 152, 155n11, 158n36, 225n1, 261n18 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 53n31, 261n18 Mamdani, Mahmood, 7, 231–2 man-animality, 32, 106–7, 109–15, 119n22. See also lycanthropy; shape-shifting under uroi manDau, 78–9, 110, 116n4, 152, 227n16. See also under Renamo Manica Province, xv–xvii, xxviii, 2, 5–6 and colonial farming, 86n17 and villagization, 88n26 archaeological work in, 156n16, 226n7 civil war in, 26–48 poverty in, 55n42 state formation in, 9, 18, 57–85, 114–5, 222–4 Maputo, 35–6, 54n40, 60, 77, 80–1, 88n26, 111, 158n32, 175–6, 186, 221, 226n4, 236, 241, 260n8–9 accumulation in, 4, 182, 202 elite formation in (see under Frelimo; see also state elite accumulation under economy) and perceived southern dominance, 65, 78–9, 111, 164, 182, 241 Mariano, Esmeralda C., 17, 133, 226n10 Marlin, Robert P., 52n16, 118n16, 157n28 Marwick, Max G., 118n19, 119n22, 167–8, 171, 192n11, 193n19 Marxism, 87n25, 154n7, 161, 203 matambudziko (sufferings). See under suffering Mateus, Dalila C., 50n1, 50n3, 87n24 maTewe, xvi, 6, 34, 78–79, 227n16 mato (bush). See under bush matoro (plot of land). See under agriculture; see also maize Mathei, Ugo, 13, 252 Maxwell, David, 122, 128, 156n20 Mbembe, Achille, 13, 24n4, 84, 195n34, 223, 254 Meillasoux, Claude, 51n8, 203 Medeiros, Eduardo, 88n32, 231 medicine, 121, 125, 142, 147, 149–51, 156n19, 157n26, 158n33, 158n36, 161–3, 177–9, 182, 191n2, 227n15, 259n2. See also healing; mutombo under magic Meneses, Maria P., 14, 23, 24n5, 158n36, 191n2, 259n2 Merry, Sally Engle, 248–9, 261n18 methodological camouflage, xiii–xiv methodology, 42–8. See also fieldwork and anonymization, xiii–xiv, 47, 191n4, 206 and narration, 156n18 mfecane, 5, 60, 85n6 mhamba ritual. See under ritual mhondoro (spirit lion), xxi, 102–20 and Afonso Dhlakama, 109–11, 114, 119n24 and lycanthropy, 109, 111, 119n23, 173
and Germany, 103–4, 108, 111, 114
and man-animality, 106–7, 109–15, 119n22, 173
and Renamo, 104, 107–14, 119n24, 265, 268
and territory, 102–15, 116n6, 120nn28–29, 122, 168
and the traditional field, 102–20, 151–53, 168, 173, 178, 265, 267
cults and ritual, 106, 110–3, 157n26, 192n12
mediums, 103–11, 113–4, 116n6, 118n15, 129, 202, 222
m. dwozutumua, xxi, 103–5, 108, 111, 113–4, 118n19
migration. See also under territory
as evasion from repressive state formation, 65–8, 83–4, 200, 231 (see also resistance; lines of flight under Gilles Deleuze)
labor m. between South Africa and Mozambique, 24n9, 45–6, 60, 83, 86n15, 89n36, 129, 145, 152, 175–6, 200 (see also South Africa)
milk. See under fluids
missions. See under religion
mitupo (totem clan), xxi, 94, 109–10, 116n3, 116n5, 170, 204, 234. See also kinship
modernity, 8, 15, 16, 80, 126, 154n7, 166–70, 191nn8–9, 199, 259n2
critique of term, 15–6, 20, 23, 24nn6–7, 47–9, 55n46, 167–70, 267–8
of witchcraft argument, 166–7, 191n8–9, 192n17 (see also uroi)
Mondlane, Eduardo, 27, 50n3. See also Frelimo
Moore, Donald, 40, 118n17, 225n1, 254–5
Moirier-Genoud, Éric, 155n11, 158n34
movement. See under migration; territory
Mtetwa, Andrew H., 55n44, 59
Munjakanja, 62, 117n19. See also rainmaking
Munslow, Barry, 50n1, 50n4
murder. See killing; violence
mussoco (head tax). See taxation under state formation
mutombo (traditional medicine). See under magic
Mwene Mutapa. See under state formation
Nader, Laura, 13, 252
n’angas (healer-diviners) xxi, 43, 100, 103, 117n10, 121–90, 193n24, 199, 204, 215, 218, 230, 235–7, 243, 246–50, 253, 257, 265–6 (see also healing; spirit; uroi)
and ritual, 133–9
and tchitumba tchonanga (house of n’anga), xxiii, 126–7
and uroi (see protection under uroi) as antagonistic to state order, 122–3, 160–90
discourses of, 178, 200
etymology of, 154n1
state recognition of, 178–80, 189
use in war of, 73–4, 83
Naparama. See Pamara
nduna (Nguni armed following), 60–3. See also Nguni under state formation
Neil-Tomlinson, Barry, xvi, 64–6
Neves, Joel M. das, xvi, 66–7, 69, 89n36, 202
Newitt, Malyn, 50n3, 60, 63
on origins of Renamo, 28, 51n7, 51n9, (see also under Renamo)
on Portuguse colonialism,
27, 58–9, 64, 70, 87n20, 87n23, 128–9 (see also under Portuguese colonialism)
Ngungunyane, xxvi, 61–5, 78, 79, 82, 85n7, 90, 114, 115, 117n9, 190, 231
Nguni migrations. See under mfecane; state formation
Nguni state. See under state formation

nharumbi (person leading funerary preparations), xxii, 204, 207, 209, 218, 222

nhika (territory). See under territory

Nicolini, Beatrice, 40, 100

Nicaragua, 29, 259n4

Nielson, Morten, 15, 79, 194n25

nipa (liquor). See under fluids

Nordstrom, Carolyn, 13, 30, 35–7, 40, 52n16, 52n18, 52n22, 53nn28–29

Nxaba, xxvi, 60–1, 81

Nyamnjoh, Francis, 12–3, 23, 194n25

Nyusi, Filipe Jacinto, xxvi, 2

Obarrio, Juan, 4, 10, 13, 24n5, 150, 177, 183, 250, 259n2

obscurantism, 5, 28, 72, 80, 82, 162, 176–7, 196n37, 233. See also Frelimo; tradition

Oestigaard, Terje, 195n29, 227n15

O’Laughlin, Bridget, 231–2, 233, 259n1

Oliveira, Pedro A., 27, 71

OMM (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana), xxiv, 27, 78–9, 88n31, 212. See also Frelimo

Ong, Aihwa, 199, 253, 262n19

ontology, 1, 7, 8, 25n11, 25n14, 36, 110, 255, 263

Operação Produção, xxv, 79–80, 88n33, 125, 162. See also Frelimo; territory

Orre, Aslak, 12, 88, 191n1, 234

Parama, xxv, 40–2, 49, 83

partridge, 1, 109, 111, 170, 266. See also lycanthropy; man-animality

peasantry, 12, 48. See also agriculture; villagization

and support for Renamo, 28, 75–6 as uncaptured, 40, 75–6, 88n27

Peiris, Shanaka J., 23n2, 198

Pedersen, Mogens, 51n8, 88n28

Pedersen, Morten Axel, 7, 8

Pélissier, René, xvi, 66, 232

Penvenne, Jeanne M., 226n4, 231–2, 260n8

Pfeiffer, James, 126–7, 129, 150, 154n5, 155n11, 156n20, 157n24, 157n30, 158n32, 193n24, 199

Pierre, Jemima, 24n10, 191n9

Pitcher, M. Anne, 48, 50n4, 80–1, 260n8, 261n16

police, xiii, 54, 164, 174–6, 181–2, 193n21, 216, 230, 236–9, 242, 249, 252, 258, 269

and criminal networks, 243–5, 256

attacks on p., 2, 240, 254, 260n8–9

colonial p., 63, 64–5, 68, 71, 82, 128, 232

community p., 43, 104, 175–6, 243–6, 261n11, 269

corruption in, 9, 235, 238, 240, 246, 253, 259n3

death squads, 242, 256–7

depolitics. See also power; state; state formation

aesthetics and, 77–9, 88n29

of belonging, 12–4

of identity, xvi, 12–4, 30, 37, 62–3, 116n4, 188, 194n25, 251–2

of memory, 76–9, 88n30

devolution of rights, 12–3, 87n20, 93–4, 252, 255

post-civil war elections, xiii, 2, 29–30, 51n15, 52n24, 109–10, 183–4, 234, 241–2

portugaro (red wine). See under fluids

Portuguese colonialism, 5, 58–71. See also state formation; trade; violence; war

and António de O. Salazar, 27, 85n2, 128–9, 155n11

and concession companies, 5, 58, 63–4, 66, 69, 87n20, 254, 259, 264–5 (see also under state formation)

and Estado Novo, 70, 85n2, 128–9, 156n11

and forced labor (see under labor)
and Mwene Mutapa, 58–60, 82
and non-Portuguese polities, 58–9
and search for gold, 59–60, 85n4, 113
and state formation, 58–71, 76, 86n11, 86n16, 87n19, 120n27
and tentative appropriation of traditional field, 70, 76–7, 82–3, 111, 161
Lusocentric approach to, 58–9, 84–5
maritime orientation of, 68, 87n19
memory of, 144–5
violence of, 57, 63–9, 71, 86n13, 87n24, 88n24, 114, 231–3 (see also violence)

Pospíšil, Leopold, 249, 255, 261n17
postcolonialism. See postcolonial state under state
poverty, 55n42, 200–1, 263–4 See also suffering
during civil war, 29, 218
urban, 29, 43, 135–6, 247–59
power, 90–1, 229, 251–9, 263–70. See also Gilles Deleuze; Michel Foucault and anthropology, 17, 263
and authority (see authority)
and body (see body)
and excess, 3, 148, 186–8, 195n34, 223
and Frelimo governance, 2, 10–2, 34, 52n21, 71–2, 81, 233–5 (see also Frelimo)
and healing, 121–59
and nature, 90ff, 110
and spirits (see spirit)
and Portuguese colonialism (see Portuguese colonialism)
and sovereignty (see sovereignty)
and state, 3, 7–8, 13, 21, 38, 41–2, 56, 57, 67, 180–90, 202, 266
and territory (see territory)
and u roi (see u roi)
and violence (see under violence)
conniving with, 13, 195n34 (see also Achille Mbembe)
global and foreign impacting Mozambique, 4, 16, 111, 201, 253–4
military, 27, 71–2
modalities of, 21, 38, 41–2, 68–70 (see also under Gilles Deleuze)
spiritual, 99, 111

Power, Marcus, 78, 88n34
Pratten, David, 13, 260n10
primordialism, 8, 19
profetes (healer-diviners), 121–90, 193n24, 199, 204, 207, 218, 230, 235, 238, 243, 250, 265–6 (see also healing; spirit; u roi)
and bishop, 127–8, 130
and healing, 129–35
and ritual, 129–35
and scripture, 122, 128, 133, 178, 226n5
and site of healing, 127–8
and u roi (see protection under u roi) as antagonistic to state order, 122–3, 160–90
discourses of, 178, 200
etymology of, 154n2
state recognition of, 178–80, 189
protection (see body; healing; n’angas; profetes; ritual)
race, 24n10, 45, 55n45, 82, 191n9, 231, 233. See also Portuguese colonialism
rainmakers. See killing; rainmaking; violence
rainmaking. See also killing; sovereignty; violence; water under fluids
and droughts/floods, 62, 110, 183–4
and fertility, 62, 94, 116n8, 158n31, 226n7
and fieldwork, 6–7, 37, 46, 49, 82, 94–5, 99, 145, 146
and sovereignty, 62, 82, 90, 110, 114–5, 117n9, 158n31, 183–8, 255, 267
and territory, 96, 99 (see also
territory)

killing of rainmakers (see under
killing)

Ranger, Terence, 13, 16, 23n4, 24n8,
50–51nn6–7, 194n27

Reis, Bruno C., 27, 71

recognition. See traditional authorities
reconstructive practices. See under
sociality

régulo (chief), 10–2, 28, 34–5, 39–42,
46, 49, 62, 70–3, 76, 82–3, 96, 105,
153, 154, 161, 162, 168–70, 172,
232–4, 250, 253, 257, 267, 269.
See also chiefs; traditional authority;
community authority

Reis e Gama, Carlos José, 116n7,
219–20

Reisman, Lainie, 224, 249

religion. See also healing; n’angas;
profetes; spirit

and African Independent
Churches, 97, 118n17, 122,
127–9, 153, 155n11, 156n15,
178, 193n24, 226n5 (see also
profetes)

and Catholic Church, 96–7,
155n11

and churches for eating/money,
97, 117n10, 122, 125

and missions, 27, 94, 105, 129,
155n11, 158n36

and Pentecostal churches, 96,
117n10, 128–9, 158n32, 178,
193n24

and proliferation of denominations,
96–7, 127–9, 153, 154n7,
155n11

and Tokoist Church, 128–9

and Zimbabwe Assemblies of God,
128

and Zione Jerusalem Kanaan
Jehova, 128

and Zionist churches, 96, 122,
127–30, 155n12, 156n15, 178
(see also profetes)

Renamo (Resistência Nacional
Moçambicana), xxv, 1–2, 16, 28. See
also state formation

and Afonso Dhlakama (see Afonso
Dhlakama)

and bush (mató), 2, 30–7, 40,
52n22, 52n24, 83, 240

gorongosa, 37–8, 39–40, 60,
108–9, 112–4, 125–6, 265 (see
also Gorongosa)

and relation to traditional field,
22, 28, 39–41, 49, 62, 73,
76, 83–4, 90, 93, 96, 100,
104, 107–15, 161–2, 183–4,
233, 240, 250, 264–8 (see also
traditional field)

and civil war violence, 30–42,
52n21, 53n32, 54n37, 61,
73–4, 95, 99–100 (see also
under war)

and ethno-regional politics, 78–9,
110

and war of the spirits (see under
war)

as anti-communists, 51n8

as postwar political opposition
party, 2, 43, 233–4, 235,
240–1, 244

as state, 83–4, 108, 254, 259

as war machine, 37–42, 73–4, 84,
108, 255–6

foreign support for, 28–9, 51n9,
51n11, 100

peasant support for, 28, 73, 76,
78, 233–4

Rennie, J.K., 55n43, 60–2, 68

resistance, 11, 16, 20, 62, 64–6, 84,
86n14, 160–1, 199–200, 258, 268.
See also migration; power; see lines of
flight under Gilles Deleuze

rights. See under politics

Rio, Knut M., 8, 221

riots, 2–3, 5, 8–9, 23n1, 157n30,
240–2, 254, 255, 260nn6–9. See also
violence

Rita-Ferreira, António, 24n9, 58
ritual, 46, 55n43, 62, 94, 98, 121–59, 208
addressing ancestral spirits, 121, 122–3
and funerals, 204–11
and gender (see gender)
and healing (see healing)
and kinship, 139–41
and memory, 143–54
and relation to or use of money, 125–6, 133, 135–40, 142–3, 145–7, 157n23, 171, 216–8
and n’angas (see n’angas)
and profetes (see profetes)
and rainmaking (see rainmaking)
and sociality, 121–2, 142
and state, 144–5, 149–54
colors used in, 40, 47, 95–6, 131, 138–40, 145–6, 155n14, 204
family, 121–3, 141, 157n23
mhamba r., 121, 46–8, 131, 135–2, 137–8, 145, 156n15, 156n21, 209
of kubatidzana, 198, 203–11, 217–8, 221, 223, 225, 240, 266
of kuembera, xx, 95, 101, 139–40, 143–4, 157n23, 158n34
of kupindamadzwadhe, 226n6
of kutenda adzimu edu, 139–41, 144
Roech, Otto, 51n7, 88n28
rural-urban continuum. See under fieldwork
Rwanda, 161, 184–6, 188
Sacaduro, Fernando de, 63–4, 116n4, 118n18
Sachs, Albie, 72, 241
Sætersdal, Tore, 107, 116n8, 158n31, 226n7
Sahlins, Marshall, 15, 16
Sanders, Todd, 86n9, 87n25, 125, 191n8, 199, 248
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, 14, 23, 72, 179, 230, 233, 239, 242, 250–3, 258, 266
Schafer, Jessica, 53n31, 194n26
Schnepel, Burkhard, 184, 195n31
Schoffeleers, J. Matthew, 105–6, 112, 114, 119n20–21
Scott, James, 12, 16, 75, 80, 161, 262n19
Schuetze, Christy, 23, 113, 118n16, 158n32
secretário do bairro (secretary of section), 10, 11, 43, 46, 192n6. See also Frelimo
Seibert, Gerhard, 127–8, 150
Seligman, Brenda Z., 184, 195nm30–31
Seligman, C.G., 184, 195nm30–31
semen. See under fluids
Sen, Atreyee, 13, 260n10
Serra, Carlos, 23, 254, 259n5, 260nn6–7
sexuality. See under gender
shapeshifting. See lycanthropy; man-animality; shapeshifting under uroi
Shapiro, Martin, 158n36, 179
Sheldon, Kathleen, 43, 117n11, 226n4, 226n11
Shropshire, Denys, 110, 119n23, 121, 154n6
Sidaway, James D., 51n12, 70, 75, 78, 88nn26–27, 88nn33–34
Simmons, David, 125, 150
Simonse, Simon, 184–5, 188, 195n32
slavery. See also under labor; state formation
and slave trade, 60–1, 85n6, 88n32, 193n19
and state formation, 5, 60–1, 78–9
during civil war, 37, 66
during Portuguese colonial rule, 66, 79, 86n13, 231
Socialism. See under Frelimo
sociality, 20–1, 30–2, 46, 90–1, 94–95, 142ff, 211–7, 238–40, 247–8, 255
and creativity, 9, 23, 84, 200–1, 268–9
and gender (see gender)
and healing (see healing)
Index

and patriarchy (see under gender) and ritual, 139–41
and (social) imaginaries, 161, 176, 184–7, 189, 196n35, 196n37, 198, 200–1, 212, 215, 220–1, 223–4, 265–6
and territory, 90–120 as problematic for Frelimo, 82–3
uroi (sorcery) as inversion of, 173–6 (see also uroi)

South Africa, 12, 57, 88n32, 156n11, 199, 225n1. See also mfecane
Apartheid era support for Renamo, 28–29, 53n32, 241 (see also Renamo)
migration to/from S.A. (see migration)

Southern Rhodesia, xxvi, 28–9, 32, 38, 41, 48, 53n32, 56, 66–7, 83, 86n15, 89n36, 99, 106–7, 129, 145, 157n28, 200, 241. See also migration; Zimbabwe
sorcery. See uroi
sovereignty. See also authority; power; state; state formation
and allochthony (see allochthony; rainmaking)
and autochthony, 109–10, 200 (see also autochthony; rainmaking)
and Portuguese colonialism, 64, 69, 87n19, 254
and body of sovereign, 161, 183–7, 195mn29–33, 219
and fertility, 61–2, 76, 184–6, 195n29, 196n33 (see also rainmaking)
and Homo Sacer, 185–7, 239
and Mozambican president, 160–96
and regicide, 184–5, 195n29, 195n33
and territory, 56–7, 70, 90, 242
and uroi (sorcery), 61, 166, 174, 180–90, 219–25
and violence, 36, 41, 194n28, 257
fractured, 16, 225, 253–4, 260n10
gradations of, 68–9
multiple, 225, 229–62, 266, 268–9
selective, 254–5
Soviet Union, 29, 51n10
Sørensen, Bent M., 20–1, 24n11
space. See territory
Spierenburg, Marja J., 105, 119n20
spirit, 90–123
and medium, 102–14, 116n6, 118n15, 129, 145, 148, 158n37, 202–3, 222, 265 (see also mhondoro; n’angas; profetes)

and memory, 139–41, 143–5
and territorialization/
gamba s., xix, 145–6, 150, 153, 157nn28–30
gombwa s., xix, 46, 94–5, 101, 116n6, 121
Holy Spirit, 122, 133, 178
makomerede s., xx, 94–6, 99, 134, 146, 148, 153–4
mashave s., 157n28
mhepo s., xxi, 118n17
mhondoro (see mhondoro)
non-autochthonous s., 95–6, 122 (see also allochthony; autochthony)
of/and war, 15, 30, 73, 76, 83–4, 95, 108
of the state, 180–3, 196n35
paternal, 139–41
province, 106, 118n15
possession by, 105, 122, 133–5, 138, 144–52, 154n3, 159n37, 193n20, 196n35, 270
pfukwa s., xxii, 39–40, 53n27, 91, 96, 99–102, 115, 118n17, 126, 131, 145–6, 153, 158n32, 265

spouse (see mukadzi wo adzimu under gender)

Tchawivi s., xxii, 91, 101–2, 115, 118n17, 265

Tchikwambos., xxiii, 138, 145, 148, 150, 153, 156n20, 157n30, 218, 220, 238, 247–8

Tchiphoko s., 101, xxii, 91, 99–102, 115, 265

Vadzimu s., xxiii, 101, 105, 115, 121, 139–41, 145, 147–48, 204

Zinhambuya s., xxiii, 157n23

State, and bureaucracy, 3, 13, 46, 48, 127, 144, 160–2, 177, 182, 183, 188–9, 191n5, 198, 235

and class, 4, 42, 203, 224 (see also state elite accumulation under economy)


as contested, 3–14, 84–5

as externality, 7, 61–2, 68, 117n9 as hierarchical order, 7–8, 63

as weak, 3, 64, 179, 254

Centralism, 11, 72, 77 (see also Frelimo party state)

Decentralization of s. power, 5, 10–1, 179, 191n1, 243, 248–51, 259n2, 269

Deleuzian concept of (see Gilles Deleuze)

Dynamics, 21, 91

Frelimo s. (see under Frelimo)

heterogeneous s., 230, 248–53, 258, 266

order, 9–10, 18, 112, 163, 183–90

Recognition (see under traditional authorities)

State formation, 20–3, 25n13, 48, 69, 97, 105–6, 112, 115–6, 117n9, 123, 129, 156n16, 183, 188, 223, 258–9, 263–5. See also state; war machine and concession companies, 5, 86, 63, 66, 69, 87n20, 254, 259, 264–5

and conquest, 59–63, 68, 106–15

and control of people (see state as apparatus of capture)

and criminal networks, 223, 235, 243, 245, 249

and elite formation (see under Frelimo; see also state elite accumulation under economy)

and forced labor (see under labor)

and raiding, 59–61, 67–8, 73, 74, 81

and rainmaking, 117n9 (see also rainmaking)

and sorcery, 183. See also AMETRAMO, sorcery

and territory, 56–89

and taxation, 5, 10, 18, 61–5, 67–8, 70–1, 73, 82, 84, 202, 212, 231–2

and the urban, 75–81

and traditional field, 48–50, 57, 96–7, 198–9, 214, 251, 255–6, 266–70 (see also Frelimo; traditional field)

and tribute, 5, 59–60, 63–4, 73, 81, 83–4, 212, 264–5

and wilderness, 67–8, 74, 86n17, 253–4

as ethnocidal, 72–3

as violence, 26, 29, 37, 39, 41, 54n36, 60–2, 64, 67–8, 80–1, 91, 125, 197–200, 202, 214, 222–3, 248–59, 267

becoming/s of, 10, 84, 125. See also becoming/s under Gilles Deleuze

Companhia de Moçambique s.f., 5, 63–70, 73–5, 79, 80, 83, 86n12, 86n15, 200, 231, 259, 264–5, 268–9
definitions of, 3–14, 20–1, 63, 72
Gaza s. f., 60–1, 65, 78, 120n27, 155n11
Mwene Mutapa s. f., 55n44, 59–60, 82, 219–21
Nguni s. f., 5, 59–68, 71, 73–4, 77–8, 84, 110, 120n27, 212, 264–5, 268 (see also nduna; Nzungunyane)
Portuguese colonial s. f. (see Portuguese colonialism)
Postcolonial s.f., 2–5, 9–10, 12–3, 16, 18, 21, 23, 57–8, 72, 74–82, 84, 111, 113, 115–6, 125, 154, 161, 163, 169, 177, 183, 188, 194n28, 195n34, 198, 212, 223–5, 254, 258–9, 264–8 (see also state under Frelimo)
Renamo s.f. (see under Renamo)
Shona s. f., 59, 85n5
Uteve s. f., 59–61, 63, 148, 195n33
Stepputat, Finn, 188–9, 254
structural adjustment, 4, 260n8
Suana, Eduardo, xvi, 45, 116n4, 118n17, 218
suffering. See also healing; poverty; ritual; violence; war
in civil war, 26, 36–7
in post-civil war period, 105, 122–3, 125, 129–31, 135, 153ff
matambudziko as a term for s., 135–9
of tradição, 96–7,
ritual addressing of, 76, 131, 141–9
threats of, 157n29
Sudan, 161, 184–6, 188, 192n15
Sumich, Jason, 4, 2234
sweat. See under fluids
Tanzania, 12, 27, 51n13, 69, 75, 77, 87n25, 95, 179, 260n10
Taussig, Michael, 86n17, 155n8, 189–90, 196n35, 228n21
taxation. See state formation
Taylor, Charles, 194n25, 200
Taylor, Christopher, 185
Taylor, Timothy, 119n23, 227n12
tchianhu wo atewe (our ways), 6–8, 17–8, 34–5, 40, 73, 83, 91, 96–7, 102, 108, 113–5, 121–2, 144, 264, 265, 268. See also tradition; traditional field
tchibalo (forced labor). See under labor; state formation and forced labor
tchikume (danger). See under body; fluids
Telle, Kari, 194n22, 262n20
Teixeira, José, 55n45, 220–1
territory, 56–89, 93–4. See also aridzi wo nhika (owners of the land)
and control of people (see state as apparatus of capture)
and fertility, 62, 91, 93
and gwanzas (paths), xx, 44, 101, 215
and movement as creative/evasive, 84, 200 (see also lines of flight under Gilles Deleuze)
and movement of people, 46–7, 80, 91–2, 101, 191n6 (see also migration)
and ndimo (growth), xxi, 39–40, 91–9, 115, 265
and nhika (territory), xxii, 91, 93–5, 98, 100–3, 106–8, 111, 115, 120n29, 204, 212, 215, 222
and rural space, 78–9, 91–9
and state power (see state; state formation)
and spirits (see under territory)
and ousting of parasitic and traditional elements, 79–81 (see also Operação Produção)
and urban space, 77–81
Tete Province, 70, 76, 87n22
Teve. See Uteve, chiTewe, maTewe
TextAfrica, 44, 48, 54n41, 67, 94, 203–4
Theal, George M., 85n3, 154n6, 195n33

theft, 168, 236–242. See also under
killing; lynchings

thermodynamics, 85n8, 116n8, 133–4, 146, 156n16, 158n31, 243. See also
gender; healing
tchirenge (rainmaker). See rainmaking
totem. See mitupo (totem clan)
trade, 5, 58–9, 68, 85n1, 85n6, 105, 193n19, 212, 225n1. See also
economy; Portuguese colonialism;
slavery; state formation

tradição, 6–8, 15, 17–20, 70, 71, 73, 102, 111, 114, 161, 162, 168–200, 205, 252, 264–5, 268–9
as weakened by war, 96–8,
tradition. See also traditional field;
tchiangwu atewe; tsika
discourse of invented t., 16, 194n27

traditional authority. See also under
authority; community authority;
state formation
and state recognition, 5, 10–14, 71, 233–5

traditional field, 6–11, 14–23, 26, 31, 35, 39, 48–50, 57, 70, 97, 126, 153, 198, 202–3. See also sociality; state
and rainmaking (see rainmaking)
and sociality, 8, 97
as antagonistic to state order, 70, 75–85, 105–8, 110–5, 121–2, 161–5, 190, 214, 233–5, 250, 254–8, 263–70 (see also state)
as dynamic, 14–8, 48–9, 250
as open, 18, 42, 94–6, 102, 212, 227n14
as potentiality, 8, 18, 41–2, 49, 91, 102, 212
tsika (tradition), 6, 17, 18, 264, 265, 268. See also tradition; traditional
field

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, 191n9, 262n19

Turner, Victor, 145, 155n14, 261n10, 261n14

United States of America, 24n9, 29
uroi (sorcery), xxiii, 6, 102, 149, 154, 160–96, 247–8
and accumulation, 125, 171–6, 211–25, 242–5
and agricultural production,
91–93, 170–4, 193nn18–19
and AMETRAMO, 160–83,
188–96, 215, 243, 265–7
and ash, 205, 210, 226n7
and cannibalism, 99–100, 104, 169–76, 198, 218–9, 222–3
and chupa-sangue (blood-sucker),
220–1, 222–3
and civil war, 97, 218–9
and corpses (see under body)
and cuchekera (blood sacrifice),
xix, 216–7
and death, 189, 204–11
and crossroads, 61, 85n8, 126–7, 133
and food, 208, 211–7, 226n8, 245
and hunting, 103–4, 247, 261n14
and hyena, 110, 119n22, 119n23
and leopards, 103, 110, 119nn22–23
and round shapes, 126–7
and salt, 130, 134, 206, 207–8
and sovereignty (see under
sovereignty)
and shape-shifting, 52n22, 107, 109, 110, 119n23, 170, 173
(see also lycanthrophy)

Berghahn Open Access Edition- Not for Resale
and state, 8–9, 160–96, 203, 221–5, 253, 255–7, 265–6, 268
and zombifi cation, 92, 193n19, 199, 216–7, 222–3, 261n15
and zwidoma, 198, 211, 215–7, 222, 224–5, 227n14
and violence, 97, 180
and sorcery/witchcraft distinction, 166–176, 191nn8–9, 192n17
from collective to individual organization of, 168–9, 172
historical reports of increase in, 167–8
in urban settings, 174–6
research into, 192n14
speech genre of, 170–1, 173
testing for, 180–3
Uteve state. See under state formation

vaginal fluid. See under fluids
Vila Pery (now Chimoio), 42, 77, 116n4. See also Chimoio
villagization, 70, 75–81, 126. See also territorialization under Gilles Deleuze
aldeia comunal (postindependence communal village), xviii, 5, 28, 33–4, 39, 52n25, 75–81, 88n26, 214, 255
colonial state controlled protected villages of the liberation war, 5, 27, 70–71
forced v., 28, 33–4, 75–81, 88n26, 126, 255
Frelimo-run liberated/protected villages, 27, 39, 69–70, 87n22
violence, 1–3, 26–55, 115, 236–59, 263–70. See also abductions; killing; lynchings; riots; sovereignty; state; suffering; war
and animalization, 32–3, 36, 170 (see also shapeshifting)
and attack on traditional field, 35, 37, 39, 41–2 (see also traditional field)
and bush (mato), 32–7, 40, 52n22
and display of body parts and corpses, 38, 54n33, 61, 66–7, 85nn8 (see also body)
and forced recruitment to war or labor, 31, 39, 61, 64–5, 67–8, 70–1, 74, 76, 86n15, 231
and illness, 122–30
and landscape, 99–102, 123
and meaning, 31–3, 36, 53nn29–30
and memory, 30–2, 35, 40, 41, 53n32, 99–102, 123, 125, 145–8, 152–4, 157n27, 159n37, 254–9
and Portuguese colonialism (see Portuguese colonialism)
and state formation, 2–3, 8, 13, 36–8, 54n34, 57, 63–75, 84, 123, 125, 144, 161, 180, 202, 214, 250–9
and terror, 30, 53n32, 66, 71
and torture, 71, 87n24, 88n24
and uroi (see uroi)
and war (see under war)
and war machine, 38–9, 41, 54n34
as encompassing, 32, 33
as multidimensional, 31, 35
as instrumental, 34, 66–7
attribution of, 31, 34
corporal, 232, 236–45
Mozambican concept of, 35–36
necrophageous, 13, 170, 186–7, 192n17 (see also Achille Mbembe, uroi)
symbolic, 34f
Western notions of, 35
Vigh, Henrik, 8, 43
Vijfhuizen, Carin, 86n9, 116n8, 117n11
Vines, Alex, 51n7, 53n32
Virtanen, Pekka, 14, 24n5, 65
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo, 7, 14, 119n23, 263
war
and representation, 30, 52nn17–18, 53n31
and ritual protection (see under
body; healing; n’angas; uroi)
civil w. (1976–1992), 2–4, 26–55,
73–4, 99 (see also Frelimo;
General Peace Agreement;
Renamo)
definitions of, 53n31
definition of Mozambican civil w.,
51n12, 53n31
First World War, 128
identities from w., 30, 35, 37,
38, 244–5 (see also Frelimo;
Renamo)
guerilla w., 2, 27–8, 39, 41,
53n32, 69–75, 81, 83–4, 95,
99–100, 108, 118n15,
196n35
Mozambican liberation w. (1964–
1975), 2, 50n2, 69–75
low-intensity Renamo-government
w. (2013–2016), 1–2, 109–10,
125–6
of the spirits, 73, 76, 83, 108
refugees from civil w., 51n13
Second World War II, 65, 66–7,
70, 71, 87n20
war machine. See under Gilles Deleuze
water. See under fluids
Weber, Max, 182, 249, 261n17
Welch, Gita H., 72, 241
Werbner, Richard, 13, 23n4, 24n7,
79, 117n13, 119n21, 151, 159n37,
194n28
West, Harry, 12, 24n5, 80, 88n31, 142,
149–50, 154n5, 158n33, 161–2,
182, 191n5, 192n11, 192n14,
192n16, 199, 250, 259n2
Whitehead, Neil, 100, 220, 262n19
Wiegink, Nikkie, 53n31, 120n26, 125,
194n26
Wilson, Ken, 36, 40, 52n19, 100
witchcraft. See uroi
World Bank. See Bretton Woods
institutions
Young, Crawford, 68, 87n19
Young, Tom, 16, 51n7
Zambezi River, 60, 203
Zambézia Province, 40–1, 66, 74, 76,
96–7, 105
ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army), xxv, 28, 32, 38,
41, 50n6, 53n32, 81, 87n25, 95,
99–100, 117n14. See also Zimbabwe
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National
Union), xxv, 50n6, 117n14
ZAPU, 50n6, 117n14
Zimba, Benigna de J. L.M. L., 88n32,
193n19
Zimbabwe, 45, 56, 59, 67, 83, 89, 91,
103, 117n13, 119n25, 120n28, 128,
159n37, 194n28, 200, 225n1, 240,
254–5. See also Southern Rhodesia
and African Independent
Churches, 128, 155n11,
156n15, 226n5
and civil war, 28, 31–1, 37, 40–2,
53n32, 95, 100
and spirits, 95, 99–100, 105–6,
110, 112, 116n8, 118n15,
118n17, 144–5, 152, 155n11,
156n20, 157n28, 192n13, 217,
222, 228n22 (see also spirit)
border areas with Mozambique,
42, 66, 103, 116n8, 200, 225n1
Mozambican civil war refugees in,
31, 51n13
makomerede from, xx, 94–6, 99,
118n15, 134, 146, 148, 153–4
(see also under spirit)
tchipoko (spirit goat) from, 100
(see also tchipoko under spirits)
tea from, 130, 134