Oceans Apart:

Ideologies of Extraterritorial Foreign Policy in Northern Europe and the USA

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Dissertation for the Dr.polit.-degree, University of Bergen, Norway
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Abstract

In the study of international relations, domestic variables have rather seldom been used to explain phenomena on the international level. In comparative politics and historical sociology, explaining domestic outcomes have been based upon reductionist concepts of the international system, if this level has been addressed at all. In the latter discipline, analysis is often truly sociological, while in the former, economic models of action and systems are predominant.

In contrast, this thesis is a demonstration of the utility of comparing states by using explanatory variables from international relations, while at the same time presenting a sociological analysis of international institutions. The interplay between international and domestic politics is highlighted, as is the interplay between material and ideational incentives for action, since the state is embedded in a domestic as well as an international society. By combining the strategic and the habitual reservoir of action, interesting perspectives emerge through an empirical analysis of extraterritorial foreign policy. Extraterritorial foreign policy is maritime and naval state policies, and these policies were shaped by domestic and international factors, just as the policies in turn shaped international relations and institutions. It is argued here, that both the interplay between the domestic and international, and the combination of strategic and habitual state preferences can be studied by applying a typology of states based on ideological principles and degrees of overseas interests.

From the second half of the 17th century, the international system showed a higher degree of hierarchical properties than what often portrayed in neorealism. Therefore, the moulding of international institutions was highly dependent upon both preferences and ideational motives on behalf of the strongest powers in the international system. For smaller states, the alternatives were bandwagoning or sovereignty-seeking behaviour. However, the nature and content of the international institutions created structures that could be utilised by all states in the international society. It is demonstrated here that the post-war era therefore led to a major upheaval in the history of the international system, since it represented more formal equality for all states in a system where power was unevenly distributed. In spite of globalization and large-power rivalry, the autonomy of smaller states increased: sovereignty was transformed, not eroded. State autonomy increased for the majority of states as liberalism increasingly was institutionalised on the international level. Nevertheless, the thesis demonstrates that historically, other organizations than states have also waged war and used political power at, and from, the sea.
1 Introduction-theme and theory

“Ultimus limes cruce Christi signatus. Non licet ultra ire”. Translated into English, this should correspond to the phrase “The outer limit marked by Christ’s cross. Further journeys not allowed”.¹ 

This information is written on the territory portraying the northern fringe of Norway on an Italian map dated 1467. Borders, frontiers, cleavages and distinctions are essentials of politics and social life, including the community of social scientists. One can only hope to be forgiven for crossing the disciplinary borders of the ever more divided and specialised field labelled social science. And yet, crossing some bridges might also yield new and interesting perspectives to enduring themes in social science. I do so in the firm belief that the present analysis deals with a specific theme and with empirical data that have been neglected by political scientists and sociologists. The method and approach applied here makes the present thesis belong to the realm of comparative politics. While this field of study shares unclear boundaries with sociology, history and some approaches in international relations, comparative politics as conceived here lies in the borderline between history and sociology. It is a field literally defined by its method,² but its true distinctiveness lies in the fact that it both tries to study societies and institutions as entities through an ideographic approach, and on the basis of this empirical analysis seeks to contribute to attempts of creating "nomothetic" social theory. In other words, the view here is that “nomothetic theory can only be constructed as a pyramid of ideal-types on the basis of locally valid ideographic statements”.³ This requires a close analysis of the stated covered here. The essence of the following challenge is to carve out such ideal types and interpret them in a meaningful way for one field of world politics. I intend to combine those ideal types in an analytical model where state preferences and principles are combined⁴, where the international system is seen as constituted by both ideas and material factors, and where the principles of the states that occupy the highest positions in the international hierarchy especially shape international relations, and thus the enabling and restricting structures that all states must take into account in foreign policy decision-making. The first - and mainly ideographic- purpose of this thesis is to analyse how a group of states have used their agents at sea to define, consolidate,

¹ Ræstad, 1912: 152
² The case-oriented strategy, or the small-n approach, in comparative politics has sometimes been called The comparative method. See Smelser, 1973, Ragin, 1983, Skocpol, 1979. Such approaches seem to fall between two stools in some respect. On one side, historians and other specialists on one country or region (or city for that matter), often criticizes a study of more units as being too inaccurate. As Skocpol has argued, however, the demand that all sources in social science should be primary sources would render such comparative studies impossible. On the other hand, advocates of statistical analysis at times have argued that the potential for generalisations and contribution to nomothetic theory in small-n studies is too small. All in all, the continuum between detailed case studies and universalising social theory involves different conceptions of how social and human sciences can be carried out. We will repeatedly return to this later in chapter 1. See Gerring, 2004 for a useful overview.
³ Bakka, 1998: 5.
⁴ John M. Hobson has strongly argued in favour of such an approach (Hobson, 1997: chapter 1 and ibid: 221)
transcend and dispute borders and demarcations of areas beyond their territorial base or motherland, activities that have been produced from both ideational and material interests. Needless to say, this kind of activity raised both questions of international cooperation and conflict, as well as domestic debates on identity and interests. Thus, the ideographic part of the exercise is not so much aimed at describing the praxis of maritime policies, as it is to see this praxis as embedded in the habitus of foreign policy. In this way, the praxis of maritime politics is seen as a particular quality of foreign policy and an indicator of the level of institutionalization of world politics. This activity is here divided into two phenomena.

Firstly, extraterritorial sovereignty is the claims to de jure state annexation or occupation of new territories and oceans, often at the expense of other units. This represents a political ambition, often inspired by ideological arguments. I will argue that no single source of social power was predominant a priori in time and space as a source of motivation for extraterritorial ambitions. Thus, mono-causal theories of imperialism will be disputed throughout the thesis, as will approaches in which single sources of social power are given primacy.

Secondly, the actual exercise of extraterritorial sovereignty was carried out by various, but increasingly homogenous institutions. The state agent that I hold to be the chief instrument in this process is the navy. However, the dividing line between state agents and non-state actors has at times been blurred. I label all these types, governmental or not, of agents as means (or institutions) of extraterritorial violence. The means and praxis of extraterritorial violence constitute the

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5 Hobson, 1997 is one of the most promising recent attempts at combining historical sociology and IR in a way that offers new nomothetic findings for IR.

6 For a discussion of concepts of the state in competition with ideologies of Empire, see Armitage, 2000, Skinner, 1978, Tully, 1995. A principle reason why, with the exception of the dependencia-school and world-systems analysis, extraterritorial sovereignty has been less analysed, perhaps lies in the foundation of political thought itself. As Armitage (2000: 3-4), reminds us, political thought is ”…by definition the history of the polis, the self-contained, firmly bounded, sovereign and integrated community that preceded and sometimes shadowed the history of empire. For this reason, The British Empire has not been an actor in the history of political thought, any more than political thought has generally been hospitable to considering the ideologies of empire”.

7 In this respect the ideographic analysis of extraterritorial violence is a particularly interesting contribution to a nomothetic theory of the modern state. I will argue that the institutionalisation of violence at sea to a high degree parallels the strengthening of state apparatuses. The clashes between states in the industrial age to a considerable degree were fought as naval arms races and battles that in turn increased the perceived need to create international institutions that sought to regulate extraterritorial sovereignty.

8 The central motivation behing applying a praxis approach here lies in my assumption that the empirical analysis is the most important task of social science in the sense that empirical work both evaluates existing theories as well as produces the raw material on which to revise, expand and replace existing theory. Theory and methodology are both a group of tools to enhance the empirical analysis, not the other way around. Moreover, I find the use of this type of analysis as particularly intriguing when applied to comparative politics and international relations-themes in the longue duree. Praxes of war and diplomacy appear throughout the last millennium, in changing forms, in different contexts, but always observable. While some scholars probably will see praxis-analysis within social science as somewhat “radical” (mainly, one might suppose, because it is somewhat novel in CP and IR), I will argue to the contrary. My position here is one of rather extreme positivism. I see constructivism in CP and IR in much the same light; it is a positivist approach to empirical analysis that builds on scientific realism. In this view, a praxis or
secondary and institutional part of the ideographic analysis. Extraterritorial violence is the application of physical force at sea and in the littoral of overseas territories.9

This phenomenon is seldom addressed in political science. As Robert Jervis once remarked, among social scientists, “it is a common-place that navies are even more hide-bound than most bureaucracies”.10 At the time of writing, new exotic naval concepts as that of sea basing (whereby a huge mobile, fleet is used as the base for military strikes and thus renders territorial bases obsolete) are being investigated. According to the US Navy, the concept of sea basing “revolutionizes the projection, protection and sustainment of sovereign war fighting capabilities around the world”11, presumably by using ships as the base for both sailors, aviation crews and ground forces.

Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the states covered here all contained particular configurations of thought on how and why extraterritorial violence should be applied. This was their ideology of extraterritorial violence. Even among the major economies of the world, we have found eras where these states (The US 1866-1889) had restricted extraterritorial ambitions. In contrast, even continental states and relatively small island states at times sought to become world powers through building first-rank navies from scratch (Imperial Germany 1893-1914 illustrates the former, Imperial Japan 1880-1941 the latter). These empirical issues have important bearings on nomothetic macro theory in international relations and comparative politics alike. The empirical variation of this phenomenon cannot be explained by Marxist theories that treat states as part of superstructures, or by theories from international relations that treat states as synonymous to firms in a perfect market. Thus, a potential nomothetic contribution to IR from this thesis is analysing the international system through the model of an international hierarchy, rather than anarchy, of states, and how this

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9 One might question why the candidate has not chosen the term “Sea Power” for the present analysis. As will become evident in the empirical chapters, however, sea power is a more ideologically laden and normative term. The colonialist A. Mahan, who in practise founded sea power as a field of study, was an eminent theoretician on sea power at the tactical level, but probably failed to grasp the dynamics of an international political system in the 20th century.

10 Jervis, 1995: 47

11 ”Naval Transformation Roadmap”, Secretary of the Navy 2003: 24. At the time of writing, the costs of such a project are uncertain. The CVN/CVNX carriers alone, however, are estimated at a total of 120 Billion dollars, the DDX destroyers some 75 Billion dollars, while the costs of the new Maritime Prepositioning Force of cargo ships remain an unknown factor in the equation.
hierarchy allowed the strongest state influence the international system on the merits of their
national ideology through extraterritorial ambitions. In other words, principles as well as material
interests are seen as vital contributions to foreign policy and the making of international institutions.
As Peter Katzenstein has reminded us, "Collective expectations can have strong causal effects," and
collective expectations are not always based on purely material utility-maximizing. Neither
factor should be given primacy \emph{a priori}. If power is distributed by means of a hierarchy –or even
through hegemony- then the ideology and preferences of the stronger state will contribute to the
shaping of international institutions. On the question of state formation and nation-building, the
thesis will \emph{not} seek to turn the theories of IR and CP on the head. However, I will apply
contributions from both by attempting to analyse the following related questions;

- To what degree did was preparation for an execution of war at sea a peculiar praxis of
  foreign policy?
- In what ways were the states analysed here different actors in international maritime politics
  beyond varying material capabilities? Were these differences of such magnitude that they
  produced different foreign policy habitus or dispositions to act?

\footnote{Katzenstein, 1996:7. As John Lewis Gaddis (1992/93:55) justly claimed in opposition to mechanic theories of
international relations, international relations are created by “conscious entities capable of reacting to, and often
modifying, the variables and conditions they encounter. They can at times see the future taking shape; they can
device, within limits, measures to hasten, retard or even reverse trends. If molecules had minds of their own,
chemists would be much less successful in predicting their behaviour. It is no wonder that the effort to devise a
“molecular” approach to the study of politics did not work out…The simple persistence of \emph{values} in politics ought to
be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls".}

\footnote{The term state formation is used as synonymous to state building in the thesis. The term state-and nation-building
is referring to the formation of the nation-state or the state-nation. The theoretical position on these processes is the
same as in Rokkan, 1993, and Mann 1993.}

\footnote{The use of habitus in the social sciences has been an object of much debate. The point of departure here is the
importance of habit in social action. Charles Camic (1986:1044) defined habit as "a more or less self-actuating
disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action". In this thesis, habitus means a
broad disposition and character that guides the behaviour of a collective actor (Camic calls this a “stable inner core”
of the actor. In our terminology, it means a national equilibrium of identity within state borders that serves as a
source for guiding behaviour.) For our purposes here, the emphasis will be how state formation and nation building
in interplay with geopolitics created a basis for both reflective and less reflective behaviour. Once acquired, a habit
has a self-sustaining quality up to a certain point. In other words, the interplay between ideology and interests might
create a habitus that is enduring. At the same time, we will discuss how such dispositions to act change. In the same
way as introducing the concept of "praxis", the term "habitus" in contemporary sociology brings forth the
predominance of French social scientists (notably Bordieu), but one should keep in mind that "habit" as a kind of
action was central also to Max Weber, although the very term habit remained in the background of his theoretical
writings. However, he repeatedly returned to the term "Eingestellheit", understood as an inner disposition to act
according to a pattern. Indeed, it seems evident that this was central to the emphasis Weber laid on path dependency.
"The further we go back in history…social action, is determined in an ever more comprehensive sphere exclusively
by the \emph{disposition toward the purely habitual}" (Weber, Cited in Camic, 1986: 1059). In fact, Weber in the
introduction to \emph{Economy and Society} stated that "traditional action" (determined by ingrained habit) among the types
of social action formed the great bulk of everyday action. Now, in sum this led Weber to develop a}
Thirdly, and most importantly, to what degree was the ideological and naval power of states connected?\textsuperscript{15} Did policy changes at the state level change relations among states in the maritime dimension of foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a change of the international state system?\textsuperscript{16}

If states are to be considered “different actors”, then we shall require that states with comparable interests carry out different policies within the same issue. That is, there will be empirical variations that interest in the form of brute material factors alone cannot explain. A change of the international system means a pronounced higher degree of institutionalisation of a particular principle at the international level. We shall here require that a change takes place when formal treaties that visibly changed state praxis and the relations between states are created.

The main alternative to our hypotheses will be that ideas and ideology do not matter, in the sense that there is no need to complicate empirical analysis by introducing ideational variables. Thus, the alternative hypotheses will claim that there are no significant empirical variations in policies between states with similar interests. Material factors are not only necessary, but also sufficient variables that account for empirical observations. The major schools of thought with relevance to the subject will therefore be Marxism or neorealism. In the first, state autonomy hardly exists, in the latter states are “like units”, which makes a comparison of states theoretically irrelevant. In order to create a viable approach to address the hypotheses, we will have to look into some central concepts and theories of IR in the following part of the chapter. On the basis of this, chapter 2 will be an attempt at creating a new typology that combines ideational and material variables through different ideal types of extraterritorial policy. The empirical chapters will analyse historical trajectories through the use of these ideal types, and the last chapter will address the theoretical and empirical utility of the approach created.

The ideology of extraterritorial violence among states with overseas ambitions has often been

\textsuperscript{15} The power of states and their capacity to influence international institutions will be analysed by applying a framework similar to the IEMP – modell of Michael Mann, 1993

\textsuperscript{16} See especially Wendt, 1999; chapters 3 and 6.
dubbed imperialism, since the most spectacular use of extraterritorial violence has occurred in contests of power between peoples, and since these contests often reflected an asymmetrical relationship of power. I will argue that the process of “imperialism” has gone through changes that to some degree have altered world order through the mechanisms of international institutions. These norms and obligations regarding state praxis have been the result of state formation-processes, and at the same time they have changed and influenced states. By studying changes in the character of imperialism, and by seeing norms as significant, mono-causal explanations of imperialism or political development are by implication criticized throughout the thesis.

Furthermore, I propose that these phenomena have important contributions to mainstream theories of comparative politics (CP) as well as international relations (IR). If this indeed is the case, my scholarly navigation in distant fields of study may bring back to the nest a few exotic cases worth discussing in the age of “globalisation”. It may not be true to the letters of the founding fathers of comparative, political sociology, but I certainly find it to be true to their spirit. In sum, this thesis does hardly reveal new facts previously undiscovered by historians, but it certainly gives a new framework for interpreting macro history. Thereby this analysis contributes to causal theory.

The second –and mainly nomothetic- purpose of this thesis thus is to construct a new model for interpreting and explaining the interplay between states on the international arena. Through this discussion, I believe, will emerge an approach that might best serve the empirical study of extraterritorial politics. A central assumption is that ideology, understood as a source of social power to the degree that it creates a disposition to act in foreign policy, should be combined with
materialist modalities of power in such a model. In all modesty, much is at stake on exactly this point. IR scholars have often claimed that they do not study states, but relations among states, and what has been called the state system (or sometimes “the international system” or “the international society”). In doing so, they need nothing more than some simple assumptions of what states are. By the 1980s, the prevailing assumption was that states were "like units", not functionally differentiated, and since they were parts of an anarchic state system, could be treated as firms in a market.\(^{22}\) While such an approach certainly has some merits, such a theory seem ill equipped to address fundamental changes in the state system, witness the fall of the Soviet Union and the other communist states in Europe. This critique of some of the more celebrated theories in IR was elegantly summed up by Professor Ian Clarke already prior to the revolution of 1989:

"International relations may be practised in a constant framework of inter-state relations but the states themselves are changing, yielding a new substance to their contacts. Competing perspectives on the state- contractual, organic, liberal, Marxist, repressive, administrative and interventionist-reflect differences of theoretical interpretation, but also the heterogeneity of the world’s many states as well as the historical evolution of the state in recent centuries."\(^{23}\)

Interestingly, the contents and effects of extraterritorial sovereignty\(^{24}\) have gained more attention within the international relations literature than within mainstream comparative politics and macro sociology. The gap between the two traditions should not be unbridgeable, since political science is the study of power, where power is most clearly manifested in the distinctions between friend and foe. As several scholars within IR have recognised, the importance of extraterritorial sovereignty is

\(^{22}\) See Waltz, 1979 for the elegant and classical argument in favour of such a microeconomic assumption in IR. Thus, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are variations of the theory of the firm in a market, applied to states on the international arena.

\(^{23}\) Clark, 1987: 211. The same author in 1999, when commenting upon globalization and its challenge to IR theory, stated that “The “domestic” is as much a part of the fabric of the international system as any abstracted “structure” of the relations between states..It is precisely in the synergy between the two that the dynamic of change is to be located” (Clark, 1999: 5

\(^{24}\) See below. Extraterritorial sovereignty is a claim to hold sovereignty in a varying degree beyond the original, bounded and demarcated territory of the state. Today this can be applied to embassies and military bases placed on the territory of other states. It can also be applied to the personnel in these facilities in general. At the other end of the scale, we find extraterritorial sovereignty claims and practises in form of colonial rule, be it direct and indirect, and different forms of imperialism, be it formal or informal. This thesis will deal with such sea-borne “empires”, but particularly it will seek to analyse cases to state sovereignty at sea it self, including small islands and the seabed beyond the littoral. Imperialism is hardly a precise term in order to describe all instances of the latter phenomena. Thomson (1994) uses the term extraterritorial violence, without strictly defining what she means by extraterritorial. It is evident however, that she in practise means that extraterritorial is defined as activity at sea for the period she analyses.
vital to an understanding of world order(s), be it historical orders or our temporary one. On the other hand, IR literature, as opposed to CP and historical sociology, has paid little attention to state-building and its relationship with international institutions and imperialism (in the sense applied here, imperialism primarily is understood as formal, direct rule of “less developed countries”). The term “Paternalism” will be applied to post-colonial sentiments. States are all too often taken as given in mainstream IR, due to the concentration on international systems in the discipline. Thus, studies of extraterritorial sovereignty remain few. This is regrettable, since it is a highly substantial topic. The contestation and struggle for claims to maritime rights is a highly important aspect of Western European state formation and –consolidation, and the concept of the State presupposes the concept of the political.

Furthermore, Otto Hintze noted land “(as opposed to naval) warfare’s negative impact” on representative assemblies and democratisation in Europe. Did naval strategy influence political regimes and vice versa? While this thesis is only a small step (at best) towards addressing this Big question, my aim here is to conceptualise, set forth hypotheses on and analyse the ideological impact on this field of foreign policy in Northern Europe and the United States. Even a brief overview of these phenomena indicates the importance of the subject. The discourses and praxis on rights to extraterritorial sovereignty laid the foundations for the ideology and justification of overseas empires. Maritime and overseas activities made for diverse and intense interactions between states

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26 I will seek to define these concepts in chapter 2.
27 I cannot see that there is a very substantial difference, for example, in how neorealism (e.g. Waltz, 1979) and the so-called regime literature and “liberal institutionalist school” (Krasner, 1983, Keohane, 1986) view the states. These states vary in their resources/power, but they behave by the same logic. They can be seen as rational actors on the market, and thereby micro-economic theory can explain their functioning in international relations. I think it is important to point pout that this generalisation does not apply to classical realism, as defined by Wæver, 1992. Wæver, 1992: 47-52 shows that classical realists like Morgenthau and Kissinger did not treat states as rational actors in a narrow sense. On the contrary, these authors shared a pessimism that was to some degree ontological and also concerned the limits of knowledge, thus these scholars claimed that statesmen often relied more on visions and intuition than rationality and complete information.
28 This is particularly evident in the literature of this “American social Science” (Hoffman, 1977) from the late 1970s. Today, as in the 1960s, domestic theories of politics is applied in the IR literature, but has so far failed to make a substantial breakthrough. But then again, there will perhaps never be “a Theory” of international politics. Downing, 1992: 4. Although Downing’s contribution is impressive in many ways, it is characteristic that he in "The Military Revolution and Political Change" only briefly touches upon sea power and the entrepreneurship, financial problem-solving, technical innovations and organisation required to run a navy. The result of this, I propose, is a highly partial story. For example, England is interpreted in light of her land power; "Military organization in medieval England deviated somewhat from the classic medieval pattern in two regards: a higher proportion of infantry and a larger complement of mercenaries" (ibid: 159). Thus, the role sea power played in English power and wealth (greatly facilitating the strengthening of representative institutions) is ignored. Downing (ibid: 175) simply register that “Military expenditures peaked at 1.7 millions pounds in 1655, high by English standards, but per-capita taxation in England was only one-fourth that of Prussia in 1688, and England’s wealth greatly exceeded that of backward Prussia”. Could it be that the different political economies of sea power and land-power accounted for parts of this difference?
29 See for example Armitage, 2000 for this verdict in the case of the British Empire.
in Europe that helped shape both state formation processes and international institutions, including the institutions of state practices shared by sovereign states. The increasing number of issues of extraterritorial sovereignty and sharing of this sovereignty created highly dynamic, but always contested, international institutions. Ocean policy is by its very nature one of the most international topics that any coastal state is forced to deal with through its foreign policy. Thus it is an ideal topic to concentrate on when analysing the interplay between national/ideology and crafting of international institutions, since this cluster of political issues has a long history that affects the majority of states. Furthermore, the modern state, according to Max Weber, is an organised monopoly of the use of relatively legitimate violence. The lack of analysis of the organisations of violence, largely armies, navies and air forces, is profound in mainstream social science. This seems to indicate that not only theory, but also ideology among social scientists determines what are being defined as “proper” subjects of inquiry. In this thesis, navies will be seen as vital components of state formations. An organisation without naval forces is vulnerable to exogenous pressure if that organisation claims sovereign rights in oceans, simply because such a state will not be able to perform the “functions of state” as described in international law (to be discussed later in this chapter), and because it will have limited abilities to protect freedom of transport at sea. Furthermore, as the military theoretician Julian Corbett pointed out in 1911, extraterritorial violence gave modern states the opportunity to wage limited wars. By projecting power against weak polities overseas, in particular, the state could annex resources in a relatively cheap way, or so it seemed in the imperial age. As Modelski and Thompson stated in their seminal work on sea power, “seapower is an essential component of world order because of what navies, and navies alone, can do”. Naval praxis is a concrete indicator of the ideological character of foreign policy. How, where and when states used (or did not use) extraterritorial power gives us valuable information on the habitus of state policy.

Extraterritorial sovereignty seems to be of high relevance also from a contemporary view. A leading scholar in international law even claimed of the law of the sea that “No branch of international law has undergone more revolutionary changes during the past four decades.” The third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), lasting from 1974 till 1982 was by one observer coined “the biggest smash and grab since the European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885 carved up black Africa”. Today, even as the present texts of law give reasonably clear guidance on

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31 See Giddens, 1987 for a similar view.
32 See Neumann, 2002 and Ulriksen 2002 for similar conclusions.
33 Modelski & Thomson, 1988: 11
34 Shearer, 1994: 218
35 Lord Ritchie Calder, cited in Ulfstein, 1982: 26
demarcation of zones at sea, sea territory and continental shelves, it is obvious that the regulation of resources and conflict at sea are far from solved by technical or political solutions. To some degree, the UNCLOS “regime”\textsuperscript{36} has created new problems. Results from this failure can be seen in the global crisis in the fisheries, increasing pollution in the seas, and in the conflicts regarding the Sprat Islands, the tough negotiations between states and international organisations concerning the utilisation of marine resources, the increased occurrence of piracy and armed attacks by non-state actors at sea and perhaps even in global hydrographical and climatic changes which might be of huge importance for the human condition. The fear of large-scale use of extraterritorial violence by non-state actors in 2004 prompted the US to introduce a 200-mile "maritime security zone", and to seek to encourage its allies to carry out similar increases in the extent of their monopolies of violence.\textsuperscript{37} Simultaneously (and paradoxically), more and more tasks that traditionally have been carried out by military organizations in the western world are now being outsourced to private actors. Even in the UK -the archetype of a naval power- a private firm trains the Royal Navy “in operating and maintaining its newest nuclear-powered submarines”.\textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, the role of maritime resources has at times been able to arouse strong passions, signalising the symbolic value often attached to distant waters and isles. Twenty years after the Falklands war, Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde thus could claim that “Las Malvinas are ours, stained with the blood and tears of our heroes”.\textsuperscript{39} The fact is that the 1982 conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea led to an increase in national jurisdiction over oceans that gave incentives for claiming sovereignty over ever more marginal islands and islets. At the time of writing, a number of states have unsettled disputes over islands and ocean masses. These states include Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Iceland, the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Argentina, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Croatia, Spain, UK, Morocco, Haiti, Cuba, Greece, Turkey, France (in the Indian Ocean), Madagascar, India, Mauritius, Iran, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Botswana, Namibia, Bahrain, Qatar, Eritrea, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea.\textsuperscript{40} In fact, the extensions of (outer limits to) the national continental shelves are still disputed in many areas, with considerable economic significance. Below, for example, the UN has sought to map possible extensions to present continental shelves.

\textsuperscript{36} The so-called "international regimes" will be discussed below
\textsuperscript{37} See for example \url{http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1267205.htm}
\textsuperscript{38} Singer, 2003: 12. Singer gives an impressive overview of the process of privatization of military tasks. And the trend has been increased after this publication.
\textsuperscript{39} Aftenposten April 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2002.
\textsuperscript{40} See \url{http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/claims_2005.pdf}, for updates on such disputes.
Introduction-theme and theory

Figure 1.0: Possible extensions of present continental shelves under national jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles

The sea beds that could be extended as continental shelves under national jurisdiction are marked with light grey colour on the oceans in the map above. The potential for disputes in arctic waters is downplayed in this map.41

The political history of maritime sovereignty matters for international relations as well as for the domestic political and economic institutions in coastal states. Furthermore, I will claim that the questions of maritime policies should be seen as embedded in a larger field of world politics.42 Extraterritorial sovereignty, where maritime policy is a vital component, affects the relations between states and between state and citizens. In sum, extraterritorial sovereignty is indeed a facet of sovereignty. I therefore, at least partly, agree with the historians Cain and Hopkins who state that

41 Map taken from http://www.soc.soton.ac.uk/CHD/unclos
42 See Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 13-14 for an interesting suggestion in this respect.
the distinguishing feature of imperialism “is not that it takes a specific economic, cultural or political form, but that it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state”. As a matter of fact, extra-territorial sovereignty should be seen as embedded in world politics and in the foreign policy of every coastal state. But the present theories and concepts of maritime policies suffer from two main problems. Firstly, maritime policy is often studied as isolated phenomena where the political culture and general foreign policy is not taken sufficiently into consideration. Thus, scholars in international relations have too often made sweeping generalisations of such scope that empirical variations in time and space simply are ignored. Secondly, the traditional theoretical concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum, while still very valuable, are too wide to provide us with a thorough understanding of both state policy and international institutions regarding maritime world orders. In an attempt at addressing these two related challenges, chapter 2 proposes a comparative typology based upon materialist state interests (degrees of overseas interests) and ideational national maritime principles (mare liberum and –clausum). This results in a way of analysing international relations where states are seen as different types of actors on the international arena. At the same time, this difference is not explained solely in terms of preferences, power and interests. In this perspective, state interests, the struggle over principles in international institutions and the culture of national policies are seen as entangling clusters of variables that interact. The result is international as well as national institutions mediated by national, historically formed configurations of thought. I propose that institutional political economy and historical institutionalism add explanatory power to international relations. How can such a theory be coherent and testable? I suggest that comparative design and –methods should be applied in order to craft testable hypotheses of limited constructivism. In other words, theories from both international relations and comparative politics are used in order to produce an approach to the study of ocean policies and maritime world orders. This does not mean that I propose a novel Theory of Comparative politics and international relations. Rather, I will construct a typology of ideal types with analytical potential for this aspect of national and international politics. Thus, I claim that among hegemons, large powers and small states alike, there will be a substantial degree of empirical

43 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 54. I will present some major qualifications of this definition in chapter 2, where I will argue that the concept of empire and imperialism is applied too broadly by Cain and Hopkins. For an extensive discussion of empire as concept, see Armitage, 2000: 27-39. “Rulers could claim imperial status on the grounds that they possessed a number of distinct territories which were united only under their headship. This conception of imperium as a compound of territories could, like the other meanings of the term, be traced back to the Roman Empire” (ibid: 33)

44 “Constructivism” applied to IR is an old approach in this rather new discipline. I agree with Wendt (1999: 3) when he argues that “In the post-war period important constructivist approaches to international politics were advanced by Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas and Hedley Bull”. Furthermore, macro-sociological theories of the 1970s undoubtedly can be seen as social constructivism applied to an international level (Esp. Rokkan’s conceptual map of Europe.
variation on maritime preferences and principles.

What we have witnessed during the last five decades is a territorialisation of the seas. This has made ocean politics far more integrated into the process of territorial sovereignty than in previous epochs. I see no reason why this process should be reversed in a world of interdependence. Furthermore, the utilisation of marine resources have become more like territorial ones; witness the use of offshore oil- and gas-installations, the contestation of islands and the increasing importance of fish farming in the sea. And yet, the increase in the scope of formal national jurisdiction has not solved the international "tragedy of the commons" in maritime matters. On the contrary, globalizations seem to deepen some of the difficulties at reaching regional agreements of separating jurisdictions (see chapter 5).

This is one reason why scholars in IR continue to be so preoccupied with international co-operation, institutions and regimes concerning extraterritorial sovereignty. In particular, I will argue that the case of maritime sovereignty and -international institutions illustrates the importance of hegemons in shaping world orders.

The relative lack of corresponding interest for the phenomena within CP, I will argue, represents a drawback for theoretical innovation on the theory of the modern state within historical sociology. I will claim that the Baltic and North East Atlantic was a centre of gravity for the formation of the modern North European state, and that the modern coastal state is not only a monopoly of violence within its territorial borders, but also an exporter of extraterritorial violence. Most students of both comparative and international politics are probably unaware, for example, that the early modern navies of Denmark-Norway and Sweden were equal in strength to the English navy, and stronger than the Spanish and Dutch navies till the late 16th century. It was this ability to utilise the sea for transportation and violence that to a significant degree determined the configurations of states and international institutions in Western Europe, and indeed to the territories at one time or the other controlled from Western Europe. The empirical data and theoretical analysis in this thesis represent

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45 See Clark, 1999 and Sassen, 1996 for interesting analyses between "globalization" and IR theory, and globalization and sovereignty.

46 The latter term used in the same way as by Hedley Bull, 1977. State configurations and world orders, in my view, should particularly be studied in periods of transformation. Robert Cox wrote that “The notion of a framework for action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing historical structure they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a rival structure” (Cox, 1993, cited by Sinclair, 1996: 8).

47 As I will argue below, several sociologists actually have tried to link domestic and international levels of analysis. See for example Mann, 1993, and Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 2000. The latter’s ontological position more or less breaks down the dichotomy between international and domestic altogether.
challenges to established theories and hypotheses on state-building, political development and state autonomy in comparative politics, and views on macro-change in international relations. I have not been able to avoid an extensive theoretical discussion in the first part of the analysis. I have found this necessary, in agreement with the position of Arthur Stinchcombe that “Theory ought to create the capacity to invent explanations. During the course of research in a particular substantive area, a sociologist is ordinarily confronted with phenomena for which there are no theories”.

If we are to study extraterritorial sovereignty, our theory must allow us to see the interplay between states and international institutions. Both are effects as well as results. Especially demanding theoretically is the boundary-transcendent character inherent in the phenomena of extraterritorial sovereignty. Thus, concepts like “the state” and “sovereignty” gain a quality that is not covered in mainstream political science.

The phenomena dealt with in this thesis to a large degree have been neglected in comparative politics. On the other hand, I at least partly agree with Janice Thomson, John Gerard Ruggie, Barry Buzan and Richard Little that theories in International relations are ill equipped to explain the macro transformations of the international “system” and its units. However, these so-called “constructivists” have so far not developed alternative theories in the traditional social-scientific sense of the word. Another attempt at theoretical innovation in IR circles around the cognitive model, in which decision-making is seen as partly determined by ideas and perceptions that make up cognitive “maps” and knowledge-structures. The latter approach partly has influenced the micro-perspective in this thesis beyond the conception of the rational, calculating statesman, and I believe that it is compatible with a macro-perspective as well. The problem is how to build theories, or at least substantial, testable hypotheses, on such a micro-foundation. If this is not possible, then the

48 The comparative strength of navies are documented and analysed by the Swedish historian Jan Glete in two magnificent works. See Glete, 1993 and 2000
49 Stinchcombe, 1968: 3. See also Giddens, 1984 for a similar view.
50 See Martin & Simmons, 2001: 451-460.
51 Thomson, 1994
52 Ruggie, 1986 and 1993
53 Buzan & Little, 2000
54 Sinclair, 1996: 5 declared that “the demonstrated inadequacies of mainstream approaches to international relations place a premium on theoretical innovation in the study of international relations”
55 The exchange of views between Robert Keohane and constructivists to a large degree reflects differences about what criteria such theories should meet.
56 For a useful overview, see Matarese, 2001: 2-11. Matarese makes an original attempt at connecting these maps to historic experience and cultural variables. See also Holsti, 1970, 1962. Helen Milner (1997: 3) points out “In the 1960s and 1970s theories of international relations that focused domestic factors abounded”. When IR moved in more or less into two (rather similar) camps called neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism (more “scientific” theories according to their proponents) domestic factors were driven out.
cognitive model and constructivism remain broad approaches and methodological guiding lines, which I believe most social scientists would deem as unsatisfactory if we are to interpret or explain macro-phenomena. To account for the empirical structuration of this data, we actually are in need for a blending of several disciplines in order to construct a coherent argument. In particular, I will argue that we should merge contributions from CP with some conception of an international “system”.

Likewise, theoretical discussions later must be confronted with rather detailed narratives in a comparative and historical perspective, extending our habitual field of work in space and time.

Indeed, as the intensity and extent of European integration increases, the sharp academic and political division of internal and external politics is more blurred than it has been for centuries. Nowhere in the sciences is this more evident than in the field of IR, which I see as moving in a more sociological and historical direction now than during the Cold War. For CP, the interplay between domestic and international institutions is an ever more important field where it is necessary to build new theories.

Especially important when it comes to the understanding of “the state” itself, is a rather new trend in Northern European historiography, a trend which in turn seems to have been inspired by some of the scholars from the social sciences. This trend in historical science includes analysis the importance of merchant cities in the Nordic context, international trade, jurisdiction at sea, and navies and nations. As will be shown, some of these historians have provided us with material that not only challenges established views in historiography, but which should make social scientists look closer and more critically at some of the best theories of comparative politics as well. To simplify, IR’s systemic theories often lack dynamism. Macro-theories in CP often lack elaborated accounts of how exactly international institutions and processes affect domestic institutions.

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57 Academic specialisation might in fact become an obstacle to new insights. See Morgenthau, 1946.
58 As Douglas North (1990: vii) held, "History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution".
60 For attempts, see Evans et al, 1992, Tsebelis, 1992, and Milner, 1997 – the latter an IR scholar whose work should be seen as much as a work in CP as it is an example of Ir literature moving into the realm of CP.
61 The sea is the pivot of all great empires, according to Aron, 1966. All the instances of hegemony in Wallerstein’s history of the Modern World-system (The Netherlands, England and USA) were predominant sea-powers. As France was defeated in the Napoleon Wars, so was Germany defeated in WWI and WWII by alliances with overwhelming sea power.
62 In this thesis, I claim that international institutions have existed since the 15th Century. But as Eisenstadt (1985: 6) has reminded us, another question is ”to what degrees any pattern of social institution in general and the macro-sociological order in particular constitute ”systems””. This question has, and will continue to, arouse much debate. The central focus here is not on the character of the ”international system”, but rather the interaction between units on the international arena, and how this interaction produces international institutions, which in turn affect the states. A much more demanding overview is developed by Buzan & Little, 2000, who sees international systems as an enduring feature of politics throughout World History. Note also the debate in the World-systems analysis camp. Hereafter, the Modern world-system works by Wallerstein (I-III) will be referred to as TMWS I, II or III.
The empirical cases to be studied are those of a limited number of territories facing the Baltic and the North Sea, especially England, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland, all influenced to a large degree by the USA after WWII. The connection between international maritime institutions and the political processes within and between these territories has not been examined in comparative politics, and only partially in IR. Thus, the thesis partly aims at giving a “new” perspective of state formation in these territories. What I mean by “new” is that I bring together a historical narrative and theories of politics that hitherto have remained separated. In North European historiography, there is a growing body of literature on the connections between territories facing the Baltic and North Seas. I argue that the empirical data represent opportunities to expand theoretically from central themes to be found in Wallerstein, Tilly, and Mann. Likewise, mainstream IR theory is hardly equipped to account for the changes in the international state system in a lungue duree perspective. In this respect, the thesis aims at giving a theoretical contribution also to IR. In many ways, scholars within IR have already picked up important themes from their neighbours in CP. Attempts at making a more sociological approach to international politics are in fact strikingly central to the discipline today; witness the debate after the publication of works as Alexander Wendt’s book “A Social Theory of International Politics”. However, I will argue that the current scholarly discourse largely echoes the discussion between rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism, a lively debate in political science since the late 1970s at least. To Max Weber, at least, it was obvious that both social norms and economic utility shaped individual behaviour, and those individual considerations of utility did not preclude strong social orders.

63 See especially Hinkkanen and Kirby, 2000: 2 These authors of course point to the important works by Fernand Braudel on the Mediterranean, as well as to Archibald Lewis who claimed to detect the beginnings of an Atlantic-North European destiny around the time of the collapse of the Roman Empire. "And in the 1990s the Dutch historian Lex Heerma van Voss boldly advanced a notion of a "North sea World" in the early modern period, in which he discerns certain shared characteristics within an open and active system of exchanges around the coasts of this sea. " (ibid: 2). See also Glete, 1993, 2000. This historian is the first scholar, to my knowledge, that has produced an extensive analysis that integrates sea power and state formation in a way that is both theoretically interesting and empirically solid.

64 These prominent scholars represent three distinctive, substantial and different approaches to the study of state formation.

65 Arguments in favor of this postulate can be found in Spruyt, 1994 Thomson, 1994 Ruggie, 1986, 1993, Buzan & Little, 2000. Consider, for example, how restricted the influence from theories of international politics have been in other disciplines. Buzan and Little, 2000, use this argument in order to "remake" the study of international institutions.

66 Wendt, 1999

67 As Peter Katzenstein (Katzenstein, 1996: 1) elegantly put in a recent publication "changing political circumstances and intellectual fashions reopen controversies that appeared to some to have been already settled".

68 One argument made by Weber in "Economy and Society" (1978: 33) is especially worthy of reiteration in this context. In a comment on Stammler, Weber notes; "But economic action, for instance, is oriented to knowledge of the relative scarcity of certain available means to want satisfaction, in relation to the actor's state of needs and to the present and probable action of others, insofar as the latter affects the same resources. But at the same time, of course, the actor in his choice of economic procedures naturally orients himself in addition to the conventional and legal rules which he recognises as valid, that is, of
Despite the obvious strengths of rational choice theories, a central premise of this thesis is in fact that some of the most interesting elements constituting political institutions and processes might slip away more or less unnoticed from the perspective of game theory. At the same time, attempts at presenting credible theoretical alternatives to game theory seem more awkward and less parsimonious compared to the elegant models so widely applied in current political economy. This thesis will discuss some possible ways of combining insights from game theory with sociological macro theory. Furthermore, this approach is distinct from neorealism because it seeks to “open up the black box” of neorealism. The state and state-society relations, I will argue, is a key to understand political changes both at state level and international level. In short, realism can explain how protection costs vary with the balance of power at the international level. Neo-liberal institutionalism can give us valuable insights into the value of information at the international level. But in order to see the form and meaning of changes and enduring structures of international relations, we will need toanalyse the informal as well as formal constrains that shape how state leaders obtain and analyse information, and the differences among states in their ability to gain support for their policies. Looking into informal aspects influencing perception in decision-making, means that the thesis shares traits with social constructivism in IR. I would like to make myself very clear on the label constructivism, however. As we have seen above (and to which we will return), material and ideational motives lie behind social action. But this is nothing new in IR. Indeed, political realism, the theory often described as the most “systemic”, allegedly lending towards inspiration from the natural sciences, arose as criticism of too rationalistic an approach to the study of politics.

which he knows that a violation on his part would call forth a given reaction of other persons. Stammler succeeds in introducing a state of hopeless confusion into this very simple empirical situation, particularly in that he maintains that a causal relationship between an order and actual empirical action involves a contradiction in terms. It is true, of course, that there is no causal relationship between the normative validity of an order in the legal sense and any empirical process. In that context there is only the question whether the order as correctly interpreted in the legal sense "applies” to the empirical situation. The question is whether in a normative sense it should be treated as valid and, if so, what the content of its normative prescriptions for this situation should be. But for sociological purposes, as distinguished from legal, it is only the probability of an orientation to the subjective belief in the validity of an order which constitutes the valid order itself. It is undeniable that, in the ordinary sense of the word "causal", there is a causal relationship between this probability and the relevant course of economic action”. After all, much work within IR that is seen as constructivism is not that radical in sociology.


Rather than discussing the favourite themes of epistemology in the philosophy of science, I would rather assume that the nature of politics is, and the study of politics ought to be, much more like what Hans J. Morgenthau once envisaged it as (note the similarity with Weber);
I have structured the theoretical as well as the empirical analysis in the following way. My aim is *firstly* to discuss core concepts and comparative methodology that are central to this thesis, plus game theory and institutional theory applied to the study of state structures, and point out why the latter approaches have limits (for our purpose here) due to their lack of systematisation of endogenous factors of change. *Secondly*, I will propose an overall conceptual framework for an analysis of extraterritorial sovereignty that I see as an element of states as well as elements in international institutions. I will do this through elaborating the weberian ideal types\(^{71}\) of the phenomena to be studied, that of extraterritorial sovereignty, and argue for my selection of units, presenting hypotheses on the interplay between domestic and international maritime institutions for these units. *Thirdly*, I will embark on an empirical examination of the Baltic and North Sea “world-system”\(^ {72}\), studying the institutionalization of extraterritorial organisations on the domestic level, and how the interplay between these apparatuses created international institutions. I believe it possible to show how early variations in state formation and interaction between the fragile polities of Northern Europe gave a lasting contribution to ideology in maritime questions.\(^ {73}\) Indeed, the qualitative comparative method has its advantages in this kind of large scale analysis, although I do not necessarily agree with Hedley Bull’s verdict that scholars applying statistical analysis in the...
study of international relations will remain "as remote from the substance of international politics as the inmates of a Victorian nunnery were from the study of sex".  

*Fourthly*, I intend to analyse the interplay between state preferences in the form of enduring ideologies and international institutions of maritime questions during the last two centuries. Ultimately, the analysis will be summarized both in an empirical and theoretical sense. As is often the case when ideal types are used in macro analysis in novel ways, the original contribution to nomothetic models is built upon large amounts of data. This is the case here, and the most provocative models are thus presented in the last chapter.

One might easily point out the difficulties at attempting such a task. The relative lack of systematization of historical data and social scientific analysis of the empirical data on extraterritorial sovereignty addressed here is a puzzle in itself. Thus, Armitage notes that "the disjuncture between British history and the history of the British empire has been peculiarly abrupt and enduring".  

Let us take the Scandinavian countries (which will be central to our argument) as further examples. In Denmark, the historian Hans Christian Bjerg has noted that;

"Denmark commands a significant maritime geostrategic position. It is beyond dispute that this position has played a decisive role in the development of our country and has given it the essence of its historical identity. It’s curious, therefore, to observe that the maritime aspect of Danish history has been assigned a relatively humble position in historical literature, research, interpretation, and consciousness. Apparently, in the general consciousness of the Danish people, their country is more an agricultural nation than a maritime one".

Historians participated in nation-building, thus influencing the general population and later historians as well as social scientists. The same can be claimed for Norway, the naval historian Prytz-dahl noting how “Traditionally in Norway, however, there is a division between the study of

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74 Hedley Bull, 1966: 366. However, I acknowledge that in macro theory in CP, and in IR in general, the scholar faces “the basic dilemma of social science: whether to explain trivial matters with exactitude or to treat significant matters with imprecision” (Gilpin, 1981: xiii). In this thesis, the latter (and Gilpin’s) approach is consciously chosen.

75 Armitage, 2000: 15. "For all of its avowed intentions to supersede the national historiographies of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, the New British history has not encompassed the settlements, provinces and dependencies of Greater Britain” (ibid: 21). We shall return to the word "encompass" in our discussion of comparative research designs.

76 Bjerg, 1992: 103
The history of the Norwegian Fisheries, written by the Norwegian economic historian Trygve Solhaug points out that censuses have not reflected the mixed work involving both fishing and farming along the Norwegian Coast, thereby understating the role of maritime resources in Norwegian social history. Recently, Norwegian social scientist Ståle Ulriksen has argued strongly that the Norwegian historical tradition has suppressed the maritime dimension of history since the writing of history was part of nation-building. Norwegian historiography has dominantly seen Norway as a peasant society, a distinct and self-supported entity, which political development could be explained from endogenous models of social change. As has been shown elsewhere, exports of raw materials and import of commodities over the sea has always been a necessary condition for survival in Norway, Iceland and Sweden. These processes were lasting and vital interactions with other “units”, creating structures in systemic relations with each other. Seen from a leading Swedish scholar, this connection between nation-building, historiography and social science bias could perhaps be generalised. At least partly, I support the Swedish historian Jan Glete when he says that; “The attempts at generalisations presented by most historical sociologists from Max Weber on are solidly based on continental experience; agriculture, feudalism, princes, armies and fiscal-military bureaucracies”. To our concern at a practical and theoretical level; how did the case of extraterritorial sovereignty inform our present discourses and practise on international co-operation and conflict? It is upon these aims that I have tried to structure the presentation. Before these aims are pursued, however, I shall have more to say about the methodological choices and design.
1.1 How states made international institutions, and vice versa

In this dissertation I argue that state-building should be seen as a continual process. The same goes for the creation of international institutions. Thirdly, both processes are interwoven in a process of structuration. A central hypothesis thus is that states made international institutions and vice versa, a significant extension of both neorealism and the theory of state formation developed by Charles Tilly. If this is the case, one should not wonder why scholars within the tradition of international relations have started to re-examine the role of national institutions. Robert Keohane, for example, stated that “Some of us seek eventually to build an integrated theory of world politics, linking the domestic and international levels of analysis, rather than being content with unit-level and system-level theories that are inconsistent with one another.”

Bringing national institutions "back in" have taken two rather different forms within the discipline of IR.; one largely rationalistic, one largely built upon various strands of constructivism. Both forms will be examined here. Grand theories within IR are truly Grand theory. However, students of comparative politics certainly should pay attention to recent developments within IR. While rationalists like Helen Milner explicitly draws on comparative politics in order to study international institutions, constructivists actually builds arguments that closely parallels those of the historical institutionalists within comparative politics. Comparativists can learn from both of these attempts, as well as contribute to them. Empirically, there seems to be a certain sense of appreciation that “national” and “international” represent a dichotomy that makes less sense in some areas. While my aim is not to sum up the debate on globalisation here, I think that it is sufficient to say that the interplay between what I label domestic and international institutions should be at the forefront of the agenda of the social sciences.

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82 In other words, the "state" should be treated as a conceptual variable, as argued by Nettl, 1968
83 Waltz, 1979
84 Tilly, 1990, 1992
85 Keohane,: 1986 23-24
86 See Martin & Simmons, 2001, Ruggie, 1998
87 Scholars within IR have pointed out the same. See especially Wæver, 1992 and Janice Thomson, 1994
88 Rational choice and schools within institutionalism will be discussed in chapter 2.
89 Some work have been carried out in which the meaning of "international" is analysed, to be sure. Still, I find that this concept, initially coined by Jeremy Bentham in "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and legislation" in 1780, is intelligible, especially when we start to consider spheres of law, treaties and negotiations. See also Clark, 1999
90 One of the best theoretical arguments in favor of this view that I have been able to found is Martin & Simmons, 2001: 451-456. But see also Wallerstein, 2000 and Rokkan quoted in Tilly, 1984: 132
A rather challenging conceptual exercise is naturally to define what we mean by an international institution. Although we can cite hundreds of different sociological definitions of institution, translating the concept into international relations makes the concept even more contested, the latter problem is partly due to the strong theoretical disagreements whether, and how, institutions matter in international relations. Herein lies a tautological temptation; realists would probably prefer to define “International institution” so that it suits their conception of the nature of the international system, and likewise would institutionalists or idealists, although with a different outcome in terms of the central traits of international affairs. Most researchers of course prefer definitions that are in line with their more general hypotheses and theories.

If (as idealists and some institutionalists will hold), there is no unbridgeable gap between “national” and “international”, then established concepts of institutions would perhaps point the way. Arthur Stinchcombe, in an influential work, defined an institution as “a structure in which powerful people are committed to some value or interest”. One should note here, that Stinchcombe’s definition is wide. Institutions can “be about” anything social; they can be built around any perceivable kind of values. But these values must be of importance to “powerful people”. In order not to slip into a debate on power at this point in the thesis, it should be sufficient to say that in order for institutions to exist in a state and in the relations between states, the central actors (whoever that might be in a given time or place), must substantially support the values or interests in question. If the label institution is to be historically valid, the open and inclusive definition given by Stinchcombe is probably justifiable. I will argue that not only states, but also non-governmental actors, cities and pressure groups have shaped international institutions, while a whole host of different actors have shaped domestic institutions. But the struggles between states and actors with a wholly different organisational structure were to a large degree won by states during the 17th century. Thus, states are given prominence in the following analysis. I will propose, however, that the contest between the Hanseatic League and the consolidating states of northern Europe to a large degree influenced regional efforts at state building. And even up till the middle of the 19th Century, the suppressing of piracy became an important aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, at the time of writing, piracy and terrorism are seen as substantial threats (and with some reason) against the maritime sectors of the modern states (see chapter 5). But how “firm” or concrete, how observable, should the phenomenon be before we call it an institution? According to Stinchcombe, an institution is a structure. He argues

91 The following use of definitions represents a choice where the openness of the concepts is seen as desireable. The reason for this preference lies in the fact that this treatise will deal with a phenomena that changed its institutional content during a large span of time.
92 Stinchcombe, 1968: 107
that the capacity to conceptualise structural phenomena is one of the primary skills that a sociologist needs in order to generate theories. He sees structural phenomena as characteristics “of a system of social relations and groups which cause differences in the way interactions among people affect these people”.\textsuperscript{93} Stinchcombe then defines structural phenomena as “\textit{phenomena which determine the form and substance of such systems of interaction}”.\textsuperscript{94} I see no reason why this general definition of an institution should not be applicable to both domestic as well as international institutions. Power is a structural phenomenon in both settings. The actors and the system of relationship might differ, but so did the same variables differ in different epochs of \textit{time}. So do the systems of relationships differ between political systems in \textit{space} (otherwise comparative politics would be senseless). That Stinchcombe’s definition is valuable in its generality becomes apparent when one considers the theories of realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)\textsuperscript{95}. Hegemonies greatly shape the system of relationship in international relations.\textsuperscript{96} What must be remembered is that institutions at the international level should be defined “\textit{broadly as sets of practices and expectations rather than in terms of formal organizations with imposing headquarters buildings}”\textsuperscript{97}. Realists see the balance of power as a central institution. While also constructivists study institutions, it is, on the whole, quite common among realists to study the balance of power and hegemony based on material capabilities. Constructivists do not necessarily exclude such variables, to be sure, but they argue that the \textit{values} of the hegemon shape international relations through the diffusion of ideas and beliefs.\textsuperscript{98} Stinchcombe stresses that the key to institutionalising a value is to concentrate power in the hands of those who believe in the value.\textsuperscript{99} This is not at odds with the definition given by Douglas North, who sees institutions as “the rules of the game in a society”\textsuperscript{100}, whether formal or informal\textsuperscript{101} rules. Neither realists\textsuperscript{102} nor institutionalists\textsuperscript{103}, neither rationalists\textsuperscript{104} nor constructivists\textsuperscript{105} would argue on
this basic insight, as far as I can see. From political science and comparative politics, one might argue that the study of politics is the study of institutions. Thus, the traditional gap between international politics and domestic politics should not be so significant as to strangle a valuable crossing of the borders of CP and IR. In this thesis, we treat hegemonies as international institutions. Since hegemony always will have a centre (located within a state), it should be feasible to analyse the interplay between domestic and international politics. Hegemonies also by their very nature influence, and in turn are influenced by, regional powers and peripheral states. Therefore, the study of hegemonies as manifestations of political, military and ideological power is both empirically exciting and theoretically promising. When I argue that the interplay between international and domestic political institutions concerning maritime sovereignty is the dominant theme in the present treatise, I hope to have argued above for a wide concept of political institutions. Keeping the central concept open enables us to study changes over time and across space, or as Stinchcombe express it; “The definition of a concept is a hypothesis that a certain sort of thing causes other things of interest to us”. Surely, the easiest thing to do is to criticise concepts or definitions. I could find other (and more recent) definitions of “institutions”. Douglas North defines them as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanely devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Somewhat more narrowly, March and Olsen argue that “political institutions define the framework within which politics takes place”. Even more precise, perhaps, is Jack Knight who says that “First an institution is a set of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways. Second, for a set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of these rules must be shared by the members of the relevant community or society”. Although not all will agree with the last distinction drawn by Knight, the authors all share common ground. Institutions are broader patterns of human interactions, opposed to organisations that could also be seen as bodies of agency with the potential to act of their own. Secondly, these scholars all see institutions as rules, or even limitations, that

103 Compare Stinchcombe’s discussion of sunk costs (ibid: 120-121) with neo-liberal institutionalism on international co-operation and why institutions are stable, even in international politics
104 Scholars “firmly within the rationalist camp” have stated that “Researching the ways in which institutions do this—how do they enhance path dependence, and under what conditions?—would be intriguing” (Martin & Simmons, 2001: 454
105 Constructivists in IR would hold that “ideas and norms matter”. See Ruggie, 1993 and Alexander Wendt, 1999
106 Thelen & Steinmo, 1992
107 Stinchcombe, 1968: 38. His discussion in ibid; 38-41 parallels my own argument. Keeping concepts open to change in light of later observation of empirical data is not unnatural. Stinchcombe is also right in pointing out that it is useless to discuss concepts totally separated from theory. The theoretical approach here would probably be categorised as historicist explanations. I will return to the theories applied here that justifies the short discussion of the concept of international institutions.
108 North, 1990: 3
109 March & Olsen, 1989: 18
110 Knight, 1992: 2-3
regulate or constrain human behaviour.\textsuperscript{111} Or to quote Giddens, “Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life”.\textsuperscript{112} The latter scholar has also criticised structuralists for only seeing the constraining, and not the enabling, features of social structures. This view of structures is interesting for the present analysis, and might serve as a way of evaluating IR theories through the study of how or whether international structures changed the opportunities presented to different actors in this system. My point is that the real challenge lays not so much in defining institutions, structure and power. The challenge (of which this scholar is interested) is to try to tease out the mechanisms between the domestic and international levels at which political institutions might operate. One could indeed separate many different levels at both the international and national level. This is perhaps not as theoretically unattainable, as it is inconvenient, producing a framework too complex and unpractical in empirical work. I am not aiming at a theory that can explain everything. Rather, the approach lies in (a) separating a distinct set of international institutions within one policy area, (b) study the main ideological institutions at the domestic level that influence and are influenced by state policy in this area, and (c) try to grasp analytically the interplay between (a) and (b). This is easier said than done. Therefore, I intend to draw some lessons from comparative designs applied to macro-theory (in 1.2), and return to the question of international institutions in 1.3.

1.2 The issue of design in Comparative historical sociology; Some methodological considerations with bearing on this analysis

The sections below try to shed light on the problem of design through Charles Tilly’s\textsuperscript{113} categorisation of large-scale comparative work. In this passage, my aim is to clarify the purpose of the design chosen here, and to lie out the weakness and strength of this particular approach.

It might be argued that all social research is comparative in one way or the other. However, according to Charles Ragin\textsuperscript{114}, “in social science the term comparative method typically is used in a

\textsuperscript{111} See Milner, 1997: 18
\textsuperscript{112} I will return to Giddens on structuration later in this chapter. He has argued that ”The most deeply embedded structural properties, implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities, I call structural principles. Those practises which have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can be referred to as institutions”. In passing, one should also note that the concept of institutions is important for Jürgen Habermas’ (1996:23) concept of ”the lifeworld” ; ”The authority of powerful institutions encounters actors within their social lifeworld…The lifeworld, of which institutions form a part, comes into view as a complex of interpenetrating cultural traditions, social orders and personal identities”.
\textsuperscript{113} Tilly, 1984: 80-143
\textsuperscript{114} Ragin, 1987:1
narrow sense to refer to a specific kind of comparison – the comparison of large macrosocial units”. As in this thesis, comparative qualitative comparisons try to see cases as wholes, and are historically interpretive.115 Another highly interesting way to emphasise the distinctiveness of comparative social science is to underline its multilevel character116. This nature of comparative qualitative method is also reflected in this analysis. I basically agree with Ragin, writing on qualitative comparisons of macro-units in 1987 that “Over the last twenty years, some of the most celebrated works in the social sciences (from Barrington Moore’s *Social origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* to Wallerstein’s *Modern World System*) have come out of this tradition”.117 One of the legacies of Immanuel Wallerstein’s works is the way he approached the unit-of-analysis problem. To a large extent, this problematisation of ontological entities left a considerable imprint on comparative politics.118 But the comparative method is intimately connected to the choice of unit. Wallerstein’s point (or protest)119 was that social scientists too eagerly clung to the concept of “society” and state, treating these as ontologies that easily could be seen as distinct units in the (more or less implicit) *Parsonian* manner of viewing societies as social systems. Wallerstein, and even more so Andre Gunder Frank’s global history,120 runs into opposing problems of design. Social inquiry must be anchored in space.121 Holistic interpretations cannot be carried out without some limitations of scope; attempts at explaining it all might easily end up in explaining nothing.122 Before I proceed with any further elaboration of this theme, I will continue by discussing Charles Tilly’s types of comparative design.

Tilly123 proposes that such questions must start by classifying the different sorts of propositions at which one might aim a comparative analysis. He divides these propositions into two dimensions of comparison; *share of all instances* and *multiplicity of forms*. In the former, “the statement resulting from a comparison can range from a single instance (getting the characteristics of the case at hand right) to all instances of the phenomenon (getting the characteristics of all cases right)”.124 The latter include the dimension that statements emerging from a comparison “range from single (all instances

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115 This parallels Ragin’s (1987:3) argument, where the definition of interpretive work “Leans heavily on Weber” (ibid: 3)
117 Ragin, 1987: 2
118 Bakka, 1998: 3
119 For a compilation of methodological works by Wallerstein, see Wallerstein, 2000
120 Frank, 1998
121 See also Tilly, 1975 who sets up 4 “rules for better theory” of studies of European political development.
123 Tilly 1984: 81
124 Tilly, 1984: 81
of a phenomenon have common properties) to multiple (many forms of the phenomenon exist)”.\textsuperscript{125} This simplification of the two dimensions of variation can then naturally be cross-classified.

\textbf{Figure 1.2; types of comparisons based on two sets of propositions}\textsuperscript{126}

![Diagram of types of comparisons based on two sets of propositions]

This classification is basically a conceptualising of strategies of comparison. Furthermore, we must stress at this point that this typology actually \textit{classifies large-scale comparisons}.

(a) The pure \textit{individualising} comparison thus takes the form of the “uniqueness of history”. The case in question (in the purest form the single-N case study) is thoroughly studied as a case on its own. Its common properties with other instances are minimised. Rather, the depth of the unit is studied. That is not to say that the approach is not comparative in its nature. Tilly cites Bendix’ study of British and German workers as an example of this strategy, where Bendix tries to contrast the phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case.

(b) A \textit{universalising} comparison identifies common properties among all instances of a phenomenon. “It aims to establish that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same rule”.\textsuperscript{127} Political economy and econometrics might be fields of study in line with this level of ambitions. Typical cases are “the economic effects of elections and change of government”\textsuperscript{128} or the conditions for “economic take-off”.

(c) On the other side, moving from single to multiple on the propositions of multiplicity of forms, we then find the \textit{variation-finding} comparison. “It is supposed to establish a principle of variation

\textsuperscript{125} ibid: 81
\textsuperscript{126} Tilly, 1984: 81
\textsuperscript{127} Tilly, 1984: 82
\textsuperscript{128} Tilly, 1984: 82
in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances”. Tilly here uses Jeffrey Paige’s Agrarian Revolution as an example. I find that Theda Skocpol’s study of “Social Revolutions” as an example resembling this ideal-type of comparison. By the use of the methodological rules of John Stuart Mill, Skocpol explains the positive and negative cases of revolution.

(d) The fourth use of comparison essentially is none of the above mentioned, it is encompassing. “it places different instances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining the characteristics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole”. Not surprisingly, Tilly places Wallerstein’s world-system analysis into this form of comparison. Interestingly, Tilly also sees Rokkan’s work with the “conceptual map of Europe” as an example of the latter category.

I will make some more comments on the encompassing type of comparison, since it bears some resemblances to the design in this dissertation. Let me first make a critical remark on Tilly’s use of the encompassing-category. The concept is rather ill defined. Tilly does not elaborate what he means by “system” and “function of”. This is regrettable, since many forms of comparative work within this category do not necessarily employ functional explanations; not all modes of research deduces results from the system down to the unit level. In Rokkan, for example, it is from my point of view at least, rather obvious that his conceptual map is not an attempt at creating a functional explanation, and I can not see that the use of his model necessarily leads to functional explanations either. In Wallerstein’s case on the other hand, the term functional can probably be used with some justification. Connected to this point is the use of the word system. I find that one does not necessarily have to view the encompassing comparison as systemic theory. As in Rokkan’s case, the conceptual map is rather built on a limited number of geopolitical variables that, according to the author, partly explain variations in state building and the structuring of mass politics. This said, I nevertheless find the strategy of comparison that Tilly labels as encompassing, to be highly interesting. Let me make a few remarks why this is so.

Firstly, encompassing comparisons can be applied to different levels of explanation and analysis. This opens up for social inquiry that avoids mono-causal explanations. The usefulness of such a

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128 See for example Midtbø, 1995.
129 Tilly, 1984: 82, my emphasis
130 ibid: 83, my emphasis. Note that Tilly sees all the mentioned scholars as “mostly” applying the one or the other as these types of comparison. ”My aim is not to summarize or assess the complete work of any of these scholars, or even to offer full evaluations of the works I do discuss; it is to show strategies of comparison in action”, Ibid: 85
131 Encompassing comparisons also have much in common with contextualized comparisons, see Mahoney et al, 2003: 13
strategy is evident in studies where we see national phenomena as somewhat linked to international or transnational causes. In other words, our level of analysis might be domestic groups, institutions or whatever, while we look for explanations beyond the domestic society and polity.

Secondly, it follows from the above that encompassing comparisons might be more useful if we accept that diffusion is a typical, not untypical, phenomenon in the real world of politics and social change. In an age of “globalisation”, this should make us critical to the notion that internationalisation renders comparative analysis obsolete. Rather, encompassing comparisons actually can be applied as a fruitful way of accounting for national variations of phenomena that partly is derived from international trends, events and structures.133

Thirdly, encompassing comparisons is built on propositions that in themselves are theoretically interesting. If we accept that each “sub-unit” of the international or regional system contributes to, and is affected by the “system” of which it is part, then theoretical explanations must reach a corresponding level of sophistication. In other words, while it is easy to criticise the model building of Wallerstein and Rokkan (to mention a few, one could easily add most systemic theories in IR as well), their contributions are significant theoretically, more than what is recognised at times. If comparative politics and IR theory are to move beyond statist models, then encompassing comparisons might be a way of moving ahead, of merging theoretical explanations and use them as building blocks in concrete analysis. But doing this is not an easy task. This is evident in Tilly’s own treatment of the encompassing comparison. If I understand Tilly correctly, he sees these strategies of comparison as examples of the primacy of structures and external factors; “They select locations within the structure or process and explain similarities or differences among these locations as consequences of their relationships to the whole”.134 If encompassing comparisons simply means a mechanical deduction from system to unit, then this kind of inquiry is neither innovative nor very promising because it becomes deterministic. The way that Tilly defines encompassing comparisons is based on the practise of a few scholars, and the concept is actually arrived at from the study of these scholars. Tilly certainly is right in issuing the warning that “it leads effortlessly to functional explanations, in which a unit behaves in a certain way because of the consequences of its behaviour

132 See Rokkan, 1999
133 One might also criticise some, but not by any means all, of the literature on globalisation as teleological. Argueably, the territories of civilisation have been more or less globalised during the past 800 years. In some sense, aspects of these complex processes could be described as de-globalization. Think of the authority of the Holy Roman Church in the Middle Ages, the use of latin in international relations and in the church till the 18th century, the later use of French language in the 19th century, the Royal dependency upon rich bankers, the use of mercenaries to wage war, and the truly international commitments of commercial trading companies etc.
134 Tilly, 1984: 125
for the system as a whole”.135 Yes, indeed it does, once this type of comparison is defined in the way it has been above. As will be shown in the theoretical chapter, I will apply neither functional explanations nor pure systemic theories, but I still insist on the value of what Tilly classifies as encompassing comparisons. The reasons were listed above. Let me nevertheless be specific on the core presumption why I think this is a promising strategy. Neither polities, nations, national institutions, economies nor any other social or political phenomena worth studying in comparative politics exist in a milieu totally protected by the “state” boundaries or frontiers. If we assume that they do, we apply a systemic theory (and functional explanations) to a “national” society, which I find to be an incomplete view of politics, and perhaps more so than approaches where the national is combined with the international level of explanation. While I am not going to claim that encompassing comparisons are wonder-tools of political inquiry, it is nevertheless a good starting point for large-scale comparisons, since an encompassing comparison yields explanations that can be tested empirically at the local and regional level, while simultaneously allowing for a contribution to nomothetic theory. Guenther Roth once said of Max Weber that he "rejected the prevalent volutionary and mono-causal theories, whether idealist or materialist, mechanistic or organicist; he fought both the reductionism of social scientists and the surface approach of historians, both the persistent search for hidden "deeper" causes and the ingrained aversion against historically transcendent concepts.”136

As Tilly asserted of Rokkan “he made a decisive move from generalising comparison, in which the cases stood as logically independent instances of the same phenomenon, to the preparation of a complete map of a single interdependent system”.”137 Political “development” or transformations cannot be reduced to the expression of the population’s expression or political culture alone. Here, Tilly is in line with the argument I am proposing. He quotes an unpublished paper by Rokkan late in his career (1976), which is of interest to us at this point. Here, “Rokkan explained that he turned to the cartographic effort out of dissatisfaction with the sorts of models of cleavage structure and of democratisation he had presented in his “Citizens, elections, Parties”138 since it was;

“Too atomizing: it treated each case in isolation, without taking account of its connections with its surroundings, of the geopolitical position of the area in question. I began to study the links in space among the different cases, and became convinced of the decisive importance of interregional

135 ibid: 125-126
136 Roth, 1968: XXXV
137 Tilly, 1984: 129
138 Tilly, 1984. 131-132
relationships, both in the process of nation-building and in the further structuring of mass mobilization"\(^{139}\)

This statement is highly interesting, because it might be seen as meeting Wallerstein half-way, Rokkan accepting the critique mounted against modernisation theory, while still refusing global schemes of the study of political development. From an ideographic point of view, there hardly is any limit as to what "should" be added to such a typology: an account of crucial events, alliances, war-making and diffusion of ideas and ideology. On the way, however, the parsimonius character of Rokkan’s schemes is lost. Nonetheless, in order to produce better explanations (and not weaker) models and theories, these must be evaluated against empirical “facts”. The main problem with an encompassing comparison is “testing” it empirically. This is of course connected to the kind of theory involved together with the design of the analysis. In Wallerstein`s case, it is difficult to find criteria for a discussion of “systemicness”, that is; where and when did a “World-system” really come into reality? In Rokkan`s “Conceptual map”, which is a very interesting work of political geography, one could probably ask how much more one could possibly gain from the map other than a rather general starting point to create hypotheses.

While I certainly share some of the views in such criticisms as above, I will nevertheless argue that these encompassing comparisons have certain theoretical virtues that have often been ignored.

Encompassing strategies facilitate a theoretical merge of different (and divided) disciplines. One might propose, for example, that regime theory in IR might be highly compatible with a regional analysis of politics. For example, Robert Keohane (1984) and many of his followers in the camp of "neo-liberal institutionalism", have applied rational choice-theory to explain behaviour within international regimes. The units (states) all contribute to the project, but state behaviour is not simply deduced from the system (the regime). Is this account of international institutions based on a functional explanation? I believe not. This is of particular importance to the study of extraterritorial sovereignty. By international law, states are requested to resolve their disputes peacefully and this often result in intra-regional co-operation and conflict at the same time. The international law of the sea, as it is laid down in UNCLOS of 1982, specifically facilitates regional regimes for solving difficult processes of the sharing of sovereignty. Moreover, patterns of regional conflict and cooperation are often enduring, warranting a historical perspective. This link between encompassing comparisons and international institutions is interesting at a theoretical level. I think it makes a lot of

\(^{139}\) Rokkan, 1976: 9, quoted in Tilly, 1984: 132. Emphasis in original text
sense intuitively also. Encompassing comparisons makes it possible to study diffusion and cross-national movements and influences. The accusation that globalisation has rendered comparative methods obsolete when using macro-theory is less than obvious when it comes to encompassing comparisons. In this thesis, for example, I will argue that the territories facing the North- and Baltic Seas were influenced by, and themselves partly participated in creating, international institutions and –regimes. Or compared to Wallerstein; is it not so that replacing the exchange between “periphery, semi-periphery and core” with particular international institutions will make comparisons in space more feasible, adding nuance and historical sensitivity to large scale comparisons? Encompassing comparisons are also in line with the methodological approach advocated by King, Keohane and Verba\textsuperscript{140} that they have labelled the mixed-selection procedure. By adopting this research strategy, the analyst is forced to include maximum variations on both independent and dependent variables. In this way, one assures that cases with rare “values” are included. In other words, “peculiar”, or rare cases are included in the analysis.

Not only are encompassing comparisons ontologically, theoretically and methodologically promising (if demanding) but they also appear empirically sensible. The problem is of course the definition, the exact demarcation, of the “unit” or the “system” to be studied. As Wallerstein has reminded us, political or territorial entities are physically demarcated, while economic and social systems have a far less visible manifestation. Discerning these structures remains a vital undertaking for the social scientist, according to Stinchcombe. At this point, I will argue that analysis carried out within the framework of an encompassing framework actually is considered seriously also by scholars within IR. Neo-functionalism and studies of international regimes for example, can deal with policy within an international organisation composed by a group of states within a larger region (analysis of European integration is perhaps the most obvious example).\textsuperscript{141}

Therefore I will argue that macro-theories of comparative politics and historical sociology are closest to IR when an encompassing design is applied. Likewise, the study of international systems and – co-operation can be done in a comparative fashion. The beauty of the comparative design lies in the ability to isolate cause and effect, to become more historically and contextually sensitive, but more than anything for IR; to be able to study the interplay between the international and domestic levels of analysis. But my view obviously can be challenged. Is it not so that traditional theories of the international state-system and international regimes are far more straightforward, simpler and

\textsuperscript{140} King et al, 1994: 143-144

\textsuperscript{141} The Reguonal Security Complex Theory as developed by Buzan and Waever (2003) is also a very promising application of an encompassing comparison-type of analysis. Moreover, these scholars demonstrate that an empirical investigation of a region builds abridge between national and global levels of analysis.
powerful without bringing the domestic level back in the explanatory schemas? I will argue that they are not, and part of the explanation why is given by Robert Keohane in the quotation above. The empirical data in this dissertation indicates that theories of international politics will be insufficient without integrating a theoretically informed conception of the modern state in the analytical model. The failure to reach an agreement on the Law of the Sea in 1981 for example, cannot be explained without taking into account domestic politics in the participating states at the UNCLOS. Likewise, the international system actually has changed over the last 500 or 600 years, a finding that is inconvenient for some of the most known theories of international politics like neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, in the sense that it reduces the application of those theories. In this treatise, I will try to show that extraterritorial sovereignty is an excellent indicator of these changes, of the degree of order in the international system, and that this order is a vital component of world politics. On this latter point I am close to John Gerard Ruggie and above all Hedley Bull.

1.3 The challenge of explaining macro-change in international relations

The field of study labelled international relations (IR) or international politics, has often been divided into the neat categories of realism, idealism/liberalism, socialism and constructivism. Together, such a typology in reality simplifies a variety of divergent ontological and epistemological assumptions. If we are to reduce the variation into some common denominator, we have to cut through a maze of scholarship on IR theory. According to Ole Waever, the most important difference between liberalism and realism in IR is the dominant historical optimism of the former, and the corresponding pessimism in the latter. In the words of Professor Ian Clark, liberalism/idealism constitutes a “whig” interpretation of history, whereas realism is interpreted as a “tory” interpretation of history, which “even gives expression to a regressive view of the world”. Whereas liberalists see human rights, free trade and democracy as both ultimate and concrete goals of foreign policy, political realists are often portrayed as cool analysts of the national interest and the regional and international balance of power. However, this classical distinction between liberalists and realists should not be taken too literally as expressions of values and worldviews. In particular, it should be evident from the present treatise that liberalists might be just as –or even much more – prone to use brute force to achieve objectives in foreign policy as are realists. Ideals (liberalism) and necessity (realism) both can be potent sources for an activist foreign policy.

143 Ruggie, 1986
144 Bull, 1977
145 See Waever, 1992: chapters 1-4
As seen in the previous section, the development of IR made neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism into the two most dominant camps within IR from the end of the 1970s. I will postulate that neorealism hardly is an adequate tool of understanding changes in the international system. The point is not so much that the assumptions of Kenneth Waltz are implausible, but rather that his theory closes the study of international relations, thus excluding many highly substantial questions. Given its reliance on micro-economic theory and categorical divisions of levels of analysis, neorealism lays itself open to attack from several quarters. Firstly, state preferences are treated as given. This means that the particular content and meaning of state action can always be traced back to the same source of action; protection of given state interests (or national interests, to use the common term). Out of this, neorealism secondly points out that the anatomy of the international system basically is the same as an open market with free competition. In other words, international relations are anarchic. In connection with this point, neorealism is not well equipped to handle the possibility that the international system can in fact take on forms of hierarchy, or at least hierarchy within anarchy. Why explanations without reference to domestic politics will not do, should be laid out somewhat more detailed also theoretically. While neorealism is elegant and parsimonious, it is at the same time narrow in its analytical scope. Thus, one cannot resist the temptation to ask whether neorealism is a progressive step away from classical realism. The almost hermeneutical interest in the actual conduct of policy-makers, their praxis, which we find in some of the writings of Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger has been lost on the way. More specifically, the issues of domestic politics and identity are left un-examined by the big neo-theories of IR. This is unfortunate, since most sociologists today agree that social action to a large degree is culturally biased. Perhaps this is also the most essential reason why the theoretical debates in IR have become so intense during the last two decades. Neorealism and institutionalism, the latter in form of the so-called neoliberal institutionalism, in the 1980s converged around the same image of the state as a rational actor (or firm) that could be studied through a fitting of the theory of the market. This sharing of a crucial assumption left the entire field open to criticism from various stands of constructivism during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the sheer amount of work laid down within this tradition seemingly makes a closer analysis of (neo) institutionalism worthwhile.

146 Clark, 1998: 7
147 The latter being closer to what Martin Wight (1977) once called “suzereign systems”, as opposed to sovereign systems.
There is a rich tradition of studying international institutions, international organisations (IO) and international regimes within the field of IR. I will not be able to refer to the entire body of work in this field; that has been done elsewhere in voluminous publications.\(^{148}\)

One could reasonably argue that the mainstream theories on the so-called international regimes were most ready at hand for the present analysis. The social science-literature on international regimes is considerable in its scope and richness. It has also been applied to questions of the utilisation of marine resources. The Norwegian social scientist Arild Underdal, for example, in his study of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) defined a regime as “A set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which has been accepted by a group of states”.\(^{149}\) The focus is state-centric, which suits the modern era of nation-states and international law well. In the institutionalist, or neo-liberal institutionalist school in IR, there has been a whole literature devoted to the study of what makes international regimes possible, and what maintains an international regime once established, as well as studies of regime failure, of course. Typically, this literature uses micro-economic theory applied to the behaviour of states. Robert Keohane, a central scholar on regimes, has thus summed up the rational-choice programme for the study of international regimes;

> “International regimes help to make governments’ expectations consistent with one another. Regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain. In other words, regimes are valuable to governments where, in their absence, certain mutually beneficial agreements would be impossible to consummate. In such situations, ad hoc joint action would be inferior to results of negotiation within a regime context”.\(^{150}\)

Realists have typically criticised this programme on the grounds that it overlooks the relative gain-logic of states when it comes to co-operation. States hardly want to co-operate if other states gain more than themselves by the regime.\(^{151}\) This realist standpoint seems to have serious difficulties in explaining the extent of international co-operation in the post-WW2 era. While realism converges

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149 Underdal, 1980: 17. Different definitions abound, of course. One standars definition was introduced by Stephen Krasner in the book "International regimes", 1983:1 "International regimes are defined as principles, norms rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”.
150 Keohane, 1989: 108
151 For an overview, see Mearsheimer, 2000
with Wallerstein in seeing co-operation as fostered by a hegemon that benefits at a maximum rate by the co-operation, they can hardly explain cases where the hegemon sets up or maintains regimes at a particularly high cost benefiting other states more than the stronger state itself in the long run. Nor can realism explain why regimes set up on strategic grounds at a mature phase continue to thrive after the initial strategic *raison d’état* has vanished (e.g. NATO in the 1990s). Keohane has addressed this question with considerable vigour. As far as I understand him, the basic explanation rests on the value of important information;

“(realism) fails to take into account that states conceptions of their interests, and of how their objectives should be pursued, depend not merely on national interests and the distribution of world power, but on the quantity, quality, and distribution of information...Information, as well as power, is a significant systemic variable in world politics.”152

Against Keohane, one might argue that modern states in the era of high-tech intelligence, sophisticated bureaucracies and an international information network where non-state actors such as the media play important roles, have access to considerable information without intimate cooperation with other states in multilateral forums. Thus, apart from the fact that information matters and reduces costs, the general effectiveness of international regimes is contested.153 Realists would argue that international organisations and –regimes are just veils covering up power politics. In an effort to conceptualise what role international regimes played in international relations, Krasner and other suggested that regimes could be conceived of “as intervening variables standing between basic causal variables (most prominently, power and interests) and outcomes and behaviour”.154 Although this conception of regimes might correspond to reality as seen from observers in the western world, it leaves open the question if regime theory has given a significant contribution to IR when compared to realism, and if so, what that contribution actually represents. Keohane argued that regimes matter under certain conditions.155 Perhaps the most fundamental critique (in my view), against the literature on international regimes, was raised by Susan Strange in

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152 Keohane, 1984 : 245
153 See for example Gallarotti, 2001, Mearsheimer, 2000, and especially important, Strange, 1983. Wæver, 1992 also gives an accessible and elegant overview. My most central question is not whether information matters. Rather, I would argue that how this information is transformed into policymaking in the single states. How information is processed matters too.
154 Krasner, 1983: 5
155 Keohane, 1983
1983.\textsuperscript{156} Although I reject some of the harshest objections she raised, I nevertheless have come to accept two of the dragons she warns against. These are as follows: the use of regime theory is “value-biased”, and that it “distorts by overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in world politics”.\textsuperscript{157}

This is perhaps a minor criticism against empirical analysis of international regimes, in the sense that all macrotheory is biased one way or the other. More serious is the claim that to study regimes in international politics, which Strange views as an anarchical, is seeing world politics as far more patterned than it actually is. Strange continues to say that;

\textit{“Not only does using this word regime distort reality by implying an exaggerated measure of predictability and order in the system as it is, it is also value-loaded in that it takes for granted that what everyone wants is more and better regimes... is not political activity as often directed by the desire to achieve change, to get more justice and more freedom from a system, as it is by the desire to get more wealth or to assure security for the havees by reinforcing order?”.}\textsuperscript{158}

The last sentence in that quotation points to a major objection to the literature on international regimes. This scholarship, according to Strange, tends to exaggerate the static quality of arrangements for managing the “international system”. Combined with a state-centric view, the regime-scholars have tended to see states as equivalents to firms on a free market. Thus, international regimes are often portrayed as the pareto-effective or pareto-optimal outcomes of international negotiations. Regimes are stability, and regimes change little over time.\textsuperscript{159} At this point objections to Strange certainly could be raised. Of course there has been serious work on regime change, the role of science, technology, new knowledge, "epistemic communities" and linkage politics etc. in this literature. And Keohane has certainly reacted to this criticism from realism. He actually crafted a theory of international institutions that sought to cut off this critique;

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\textsuperscript{156} Susan Strange "Cave! Hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis”, in Krasner, Stephen (1983) "International Regimes”, Ithaca, Cornell University Press
\textsuperscript{157} Strange, 1983: 337
\textsuperscript{158} Strange, 1983: 346. But the use of the term equilibrium does not necessarily mean harmony or stability. In Thomas Schelling’s (1978: 26) apt prose; “the Body of a hanged man is in equilibrium when it finally stops swinging, but nobody is going to insist that the man is all right”. This quotation from strange indicates that she sees a substantial ideological reason to criticise regime theory also. Such a criticism is not my central concern.
\textsuperscript{159} Ruggie, 1998: chapter 3 broadens an ontological criticism into an epistemological one as well.
\end{flushright}
“International institutions help to realize common interests in world politics. An argument for this view has been made here not by smuggling in cosmopolitan preferences under the rubric of “world welfare” or “global interests”, but by relying on realist assumptions that states are egoistic, rational actors operating on the basis of their own conceptions of self-interest”\textsuperscript{160}

I think the point made by Strange still is valid in the sense that regime theory certainly has its limits. The wider the scope in time and space of an analysis, most scholars with empirical sensitivity will probably find that regime theory does not explain profound changes in the international system. Indeed, the elegant and strong theory developed by Keohane cannot explain how (states) own conceptions of self-interest vary. Keohane and Waltz actually share the same, reductionist theory of the state whereby states can be seen as rational actors on a market. The theories are thus not stronger than what applying micro-economic, neo-classical style, allows them to be.\textsuperscript{161} Now, in defence of the assumption that states for analytical purposes could be treated as rational unitary actors, one might claim that it makes for parsimonious models with much explanatory power. This is reflected in common language and international law, where the state is often equated as a person in the international community. In my view, however, the problem is not so much the logic of reductionism of neoliberal institutionalism or neorealism in itself. The real problem is the limited ideographic validity of the analysis possible with these theories. Indeed, the theory of games is being stretched too far, and in this criticism I am certainly not alone. One scholar on the application of game theory in political science (an approach often criticised for being too reductionist in itself), Alex Coram, has criticised the attempts at building grand theory on the model of the state as a utility-maximizing actor as being too simplifying: “This also tends to make too close an analogy with the firm and to treat the state as if it were attempting to maximize…in a competitive market”\textsuperscript{162}

In order to go further, and I believe this is a meaningful approach, we need to open up the same black box that is shared by neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism; that of the state. However, the perspective of foreign policy habitus can go well with a moderate stance of constructivism within the study of international institutions, since constructivists in IR will argue that what constitutes dominant states (e.g. domestic institutions, beliefs and culture that comparativists see as results of state-building), is utterly important for the nature of the institution or regime in question.

\textsuperscript{160} Keohane, 1984: 245
\textsuperscript{161} Ruggie, 1998 thus labels both neorealism and neoliberalism as neo-utilitarian theories.
\textsuperscript{162} Coram, 2001: 13
At best, regimes might be seen as situations of temporary equilibria within given issue-areas. In this context, the concept of international regimes is useful for analytical and comparative purposes. Krasner’s concept of institutions as following a punctuated equilibrium is probably quite sound (and certainly in line with institutional theories built on the metaphor of path-dependency). But regime theory itself can hardly explain the punctuation of this equilibrium.

It would nevertheless be folly to dismiss the entire body of literature on international regimes as worthless. I am in particular to build upon a point where the literature on international co-operation, realism and world-systems analysis shares common ground. The role of hegemonies in fostering international co-operation is vital to the understanding of international institutions in the maritime field. The maritime institutions, embedded in world-orders, cannot be adequately analysed without looking into the values and principles that hegemons (in particular the Netherlands, Britain and the US) tried to enhance through the influence upon international regimes and institutions. Robert Keohane has argued that “nonhegemonic cooperation is difficult, since it must take place among independent states that are motivated more by their own conceptions of self-interest than by devotion to the common good.” Accordingly, we should expect a more anarchic international system in the absence of hegemons, and more hierarchical structures in the presence of leadership by a strong state. This is a vital contribution from neoliberal institutionalism in the sense that it opens up for different orders than the anarchy explained by Waltz. As seen from what have been labelled the neo-liberal institutionalist school in IR then, hegemons can serve a benign function by helping other states to adjust their policies. Hegemons take the costs of fostering and supervising co-operation in order to enhance their own influence. Although HST perhaps is contradicting the theory of the balance of power, several realists have also pointed out that hegemons shape world politics, and whatever international institutions there might exist, the politics of the strongest states are what matter most to the foundations and content of international institutions. Thus, realists will assume that hegemons are likely to pull out of the institution if they do not see their national interests served by it at a given point (in neo-liberal institutionalism, a central hypothesis is that institutions are more durable than that. The virtues of shared information and reduced transaction costs make institutions persist).

To the central scholar in world-system analysis, the state-system is only a superstructure, no single state being strong enough to temper the basis of the world-economy. From this follows that

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163 Whether the Netherlands ever was a hegemon is contested. See Gilpin, 1987: p 73-74, footnote nr 8
164 Keohane, 1984: 244
165 Note still that Keohane hardly is a proponent for Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST).
166 See Strange, "The Retreat of the State"
international institutions by and large are devices of camouflage for the strongest powers. International institutions are the means for the hegemonic power to “impose its rules and its wishes in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas”, a less benign interpretation of international institutions, and one with some similarity to political realism.

Of the three schools so briefly commented upon here, I find the arguments on hegemony set forth by Robert Keohane to be the strongest. It is also compatible with Krasner’s concept of punctuated equilibria, and more generally speaking, with historical institutionalism. Only strong states (be it by unilateral or multilateral alliances) have been strong enough to break out of the dilemma of collective action, if we by this dilemma refer to the situations where many states are involved and where co-operation is not already institutionalised. The point is that we then need to focus on the critical historical junctures where institutions are created, as well as beliefs, values and principles which the strongest powers wanted to lay down in the particular institution. But neither neorealism nor neo-liberal institutionalism delivers strong explanatory mechanisms for the study of macro changes. From their common assumption that the state in IR theory can be treated as a rational unitary actor in a perfect market, both strands of thought run into serious problems, since the international institutions (the balance of power and various regimes) is more or less taken for granted at the outset; the units and the structures are there, and hardly require explanation. However, the scholarly as indeed the political debates between idealists/utopians and "realists" is sometimes obscuring the fact that both "realists" (implicit) and "liberals" (explicit) have one central assumption in common; beliefs matter in international relations. It is not, as sometimes argued, that realists deny the importance of ideas and beliefs in foreign policy. On the contrary, a theory of realism is impossible without such an assumption. As Ian Clark elegantly demonstrated, the validity of political realism depends on the degree to which its conception of the international order corresponds to the ideas and mentalities of the makers and executors of foreign policy.

Wendt was later to formulate this in the slogan that "anarchy is what states make of it". The realist scholar that seeks to explain an event, or the realist politician that seeks to analyse the actions of other statesman are both depending on the assumption that the actors in question will behave

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167 See Gilpin, 1987: 72-80
168 Wallerstein, 2000: 255
169 Note that this is different from world-systems analysis and theories of long-cycle hegemony in the international system. It is also very typical of neorealists an liberal institutionalists to claim that since they study international relations, they hardly need a theory of the state-. The fallacy lies in the fact that they thereby produce a double negative heuristics. They apply reductionism both to their analysis of the units as well as the relations between the units. Moreover, these theories do not produce explanations of what constitutes institutions.
170 Clark, 1998
171 This is not exactly the view adopted in this thesis. Ideas do not matter all the way down, but they matter along brute material factors.
according to "the objective" laws of realism. In other words, realism might serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy, perhaps imprisoning scholars and politicians in their own ideas, or worse, as historian Lewis Mumford once wrote: "This is utopianism with a vengeance; the nihilistic perfection of nothingness".\(^{172}\)

Recent publications in the research front concerning international political economy seem to signal a shift from the concept of regimes to the study of the phenomena categorised under the more inclusive concept of international institutions.\(^{173}\) Any student of comparative politics will be familiar with the terrain when IR scholars now assert that international institutions should be seen "as both the object of strategic choice and a constraint on actors' behaviour".\(^{174}\) Helen V. Milner even sees an "emerging synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics".\(^{175}\) In this framework, international institutions are seen as both causes and effects.\(^{176}\) And, in line with Krasner's\(^{177}\) important contribution, reaching one of several possible equilibria is only one challenge states face when they co-operate. Thus, institutions can perhaps be seen as increasing the path dependency of actors. In the words of Martin & Simmons; "once a particular equilibrium is chosen, institutions lock it in".\(^{178}\) But here one should be careful not to slip into the same fallacy as the static regime-framework. It is important to study the changes brought to institutions also from within. In this context, domestic politics within states that participate in the international institution might make that institution more dynamic than we usually perceive domestic institutions to be. Participating in international institutions can change the state. One might even conceive that international institutions might change state behaviour by substituting for domestic practices.\(^{179}\) States and international institutions can both be seen as dependent and independent variables.

\(^{172}\) Cited in Clark, 1989: 89. As Clark aptly shows, it seems that Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger were all too aware of this dilemma in realism. Clark therefore calls realism the tradition of despair; despair because classical realist scholars saw the problem of integrating the moral and political spheres as an impossible task. This naturally robbed political realism of the vision of ultimate ends, although all these scholars saw power as a mean, and not an end in itself. Furthermore, both Morgenthau, 1944 and Kissinger, 1957, seem to stress uncertainty more than certainty, intuition more than rationality. Famous realists have been much more prone to reflect this uncertainty than their self-conscious programmatic declarations often reflected. Perhaps it became that way because these were basically European scholars that sought influence in a quite different political culture: the USA.

\(^{173}\) See Katzenstein et al, 1999 Martin & Simmons, 2001

\(^{174}\) Martin & Simmons in Katzenstein et al, 1999: 89

\(^{175}\) Martin in Katzenstein et al, 1999: 119-146, See also, in the same volume, the articles by Garrett and by March & Olsen

\(^{176}\) Martin & Simmons, 2001: 451

\(^{177}\) Krasner, 1991

\(^{178}\) Martin & Simmons, 2001: 454

\(^{179}\) See Martin & Simmons, 2001: 455-456 and Milner, 1997
This line of reasoning closely resembles the architecture found in the theory of structuration as developed by Anthony Giddens. Giddens stated that an entire book primarily dealing with structuration could be seen as an “extended reflection” upon the phrase Marx made that “Men make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing”. Structuration theory is very “realistic”, in the sense that it’s main concept-structure, is seen as both “rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction”. Can this social theory be applied to macro-theory in CP or the study of international institutions?

A few words of caution could of course be appropriate. The sheer complexity of the theory creates problems, making one scholar comment that it is not “particularly enlightening”. Both Wendt and Dessler claim that structuration theory should be less abstract. At the same time, both these authors are concerned with how actors located in a structure “where he/she make decision and while doing so reproduce and/or change structures”. To our concern here, sovereignty seems to be the phenomenon most clearly linking the state and its groups with the “international society”. Nicholas Onuf once applied the concepts of structuration theory (of which he also had critical remarks) to the relationship between state and international institutions. He maintained that just as individuals and societies make, construct, or constitute each other, so do states and the international system. The level of abstraction is still quite high, though.

Perhaps the phenomenon and concept of sovereignty itself might prove to be a link at this point. I will focus on the concept as a tool for sociological analysis in the following, since the notion of sovereignty is pivotal for domestic and international politics alike. Let me clarify what I mean by the concept of sovereignty in this thesis, although extraterritorial sovereignty and not sovereignty at large constitutes what is to be explained in chapters 3-5.

Extraterritorial sovereignty is a continuation of the aspirations for national sovereignty. By extraterritorial sovereignty, I am referring to state claims to use the authority of a monopoly of violence that extends to cover overseas territories and sea areas. Sea areas include sea

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180 See Giddens, 1976, 1979 and 1984
181 Giddens, 1984: xxi
182 Giddens, 1984:xxxi
183 Bakka, 1998
185 Larsen, 2000: 473
186 Onuf, 1995
187 By overseas I mean territories which are divided from the mother country by salt water.
I will give some general remarks on territorial sovereignty, plus examples of state practice on extraterritorial sovereignty, in order to illustrate the nature of extra-territorial sovereignty as opposed to the traditional concept of sovereignty.

By focusing on the practice of sovereignty, it will seem that I am deliberately shying away from the discourses on sovereignty in philosophy and political theory. However, one should not draw the conclusion that there is an unbridgeable gap between law and state praxis on the one side, and political theory on the other. I hope the opposite will be evidenced below. Rather, I aim at avoiding the, at times incredibly archaic, theoretical debate on sovereignty. The reason for this is that there have been few extensive treaties on extra-territorial sovereignty in political theory, whereas we have numerous judicial statements demonstrating a philosophical way of arguing in law on the sea.

Furthermore, the purpose of my approach is to get closer to an understanding of how territorial and extraterritorial sovereignty have been empirically linked. Sovereignty, I claim, is an institution, a practice that has gone through numerous changes, due to material and ideational incentives of the most dominant actors on the international arena. At present, it is often specified in international regimes. In earlier epochs, this was not the case, thus weakening Ruggie’s claim that the state system after 1648 always included multi-lateralism. However, one of the main considerations will be to analyse the relation between international order and state autonomy. If neo-liberal institutionalism and hegemonic theory are to be empirically supported, we should find evidence that international regimes increasingly have helped to create order in the case of maritime management. This should also demonstrate that the modern state is embedded in institutional arrangements that serve as both rules and resources. That is, structures that are both restricting and enabling state activities, both decreasing and increasing state sovereignty and –autonomy. If the opposite is demonstrated, I must discuss whether this supports World-systems theory or traditional realist theory. Perhaps the research-field of extra-territorial sovereignty is particularly suitable for a critique
of orthodox concepts of sovereignty, as applied in realist theory. To what degree is there really a fixed border of inside and outside? And if not, how can sovereignty be seen as a residual variable?192

In spite of the criticism mounted against the concept of sovereignty, there is reason to question whether international law, constitutions and democracy might function without the institutions traditionally held to represent sovereignty. One of the most fundamental aspects of the existence of the state is its occupation of a territorial area, within which state laws operate. Within these demarcations (through borders, and to some extent frontiers) the supreme *de jure* authority is granted the state apparatus, either by popular consent or imposition. From this follows the general principle of territorial sovereignty, which implies that within a domain, jurisdiction is practised by the state over persons and property in a way that excludes other states.193 This judicial concept of sovereignty bears some resemblance to the patrimonial view of ownership in private law. Earlier theoreticians within the field of international law thus often used principles from private law in connection with private property on the territorial sovereignty of states. To some degree, such analogies are still used on the principle of sovereignty.194 In a certain sense, this still is useful.195

Max Huber, as judge in the The Island of Palmas Arbitration, thus stated that; “Sovereignty in the relation between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the Globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of the State” (ICJ, 1975, 12).

State, or state-sponsored, activity in an adequate scale, which definitely shows the execution of authority, is a fundamental hallmark of territorial sovereignty.

It is this Huber refers to as “functions of the state”, in a judicial meaning of the term. This does not mean that state sovereignty cannot be shared. As I will show, states and other organisations sharing sovereignty can be found in various constellations throughout the history of the Northeast Atlantic.

In practise, we find that states often take up commercial activities and support settlement by its population in areas over which it claims authority. One example is the case of Svalbard, where both Russia and Norway have supported local communities to preserve their influence at the island.

Territory can be leased or leant from one state to another, like UK leased its British bases in the West- Atlantic to the USA in 1940, in exchange for 50 American destroyers, badly needed in the easily lessons from classical realism. Although both Ruggie, 1993 and Wendt, 1999 have produced impressive arguments, I find that they both are more idealistic than they perhaps are willing to admit.

192 To Ian Clark (1999), the separation of domestic and international is the “Great Divide” in the study of politics.
193 Shearer, 1994:144
194 See for example Kratochwil, 1992
195 See for instance the Court’s verdict in the case for the international court in 1986 concerning the republic of Burkina Faso in Mali (ICJ 1986, 554, §§ 20-26
war against Germany. A more recent example is that of China leasing Hong Kong to UK for a period of 99 years from 1898. In other words, UK could execute territorial sovereignty over British Hong Kong for a limited period of time, while China according to the treaty could regain this sovereignty in 1997.  

From a judicial point of view, then, one can also conceptualise the ways states can establish sovereignty. These are occupation, annexation, accretion, prescription and cession. Effective control and authority is required either way a state might claim sovereignty over an area. In the case of occupation, it consists in establishing control and authority of an area not under the sovereignty of any other state, or an area abandoned by the state former in control. In the Eastern Greenland case (of interest to us here), The Permanent Court of International Justice laid it down that occupation, to be effective, requires on the part of the appropriating state, an intention or will to act as sovereign and the adequate exercise or display of sovereignty. In this particular case, Norway and Denmark disputed title to Eastern Greenland, and “Denmark was able to prove circumstances which established these two elements on its part”. Occupation does not make sense in traditional law of the sea, but as in the next case, an occupation of an island or a coastal state also typically will include sovereignty or sovereign rights of the sea around the state.

Annexation is “a method of acquiring territorial sovereignty which is resorted to in two sets of circumstances”. Where the territory has been conquered or subjugated by the annexing state, or where the territory is in a position of virtual subordination to the annexing state at the time the latter’s intention of annexation is declared”. In international law, the intention of the annexing state must be explicitly stated. The former example of annexation is the most typical, as in times of war, whilst the latter more seldom occurs. Annexing sea territory is hardly found in the 20th century, but from annexing land territory, an added sea territory or economic zone naturally might follow.

Gaining sovereignty through accretion of new areas occurs when new territory is added, mainly through natural cause (This might take place when new landscapes or islands appear because of volcanoes or wind blown sand extends the territory of a land state). In international law, no formal...
act or assertion of title is deemed necessary in these cases. One should note that claiming sovereignty over sea areas does not fall into this category.

Cession is a rather important way of acquiring territorial sovereignty. The state has the right to transfer its territory. This may be the result of a voluntary act, or it may be conducted as a result of war where territory is handed over to the successful opponent. The Russian sale of Alaska to the US in 1867, and the exchange of Heligoland for Zanzibar by Germany and Great Britain in 1890 might illustrate voluntary cession.201

To me it is pretty obvious that cession also could include sovereignty of the territorial sea, or sovereign rights in an ocean area, and this type of cession does not necessarily require simultaneous cession of land territory. Typically, these kinds of cessions of ocean areas might be negotiated voluntarily, as in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway in 1979-80.

Title by prescription, which is controversial among scholars of international law, is the result of peaceable exercise of de facto sovereignty for a very long period over territory subject to the sovereignty of another.202 There might be instances in negotiations on law of the sea, where this phenomenon occurs. One example is the bargaining on quotas in national economic zones. Typically, other states (as Poland and Western Germany) from the 1960s claim that since their vessels have been fishing in an area for decades or centuries, they have a right to extract resources from the same area, also when it (eg. Norway) has been included in the other coastal state’s zone of jurisdiction.

Apart from the definitions and concepts of international law, social scientists need some concept of the state as a residual variable.203 This can be connected to the degree of sovereignty on part of the state. Recently, Stephen Krasner (1999) has made such an attempt in conceptualising sovereignty. From a realist point of view, Krasner argues that degrees of sovereignty are determined by the outcomes of rational “rulers” in interaction; “Outcomes in the international system are determined by rulers whose violation of, or adherence to, international principles or rules is based on calculations of material and ideational interests...Organized hypocrisy is the normal state of affairs.”204

The weakness of Krasner’s theory of sovereignty is that it not adequately accounts for how different sources of intervention in states affairs matter in different eras of history (I can not see that he

201 Shearer, 1994: 153
202 Sheareer, 1994: 153-154
203 See Nettl, 1968
204 Krasner, 1999: 9
systematically explores the degree to which interdependence is the main reason for decreasing stateness after 1945, while low degrees of stateness in earlier times might have been the result of tense competitions between states. The way I interpret Krasner, his version of realism accounts for variations in sovereignty across time and space. Nonmaterial factors matter for states as well. This is simply due to the authoritative resources rulers must possess in order to uphold surveillance and control of the society/societies over which the state claims sovereignty. This affects the state’s ability to reflexive monitoring of the functioning of the organisation and societies within state boundaries or frontiers, as stressed by Giddens as vital aspects of the state. It is also important at an international level, since nonmaterial factors as ideology can change the way particular states perceive each other. As Alexander Wendt argues, ideas and ideology is constitutive for states as actors. In Giddens’ terms, ideas and ideology might threaten or strengthen the attempts on part of the Government to establish reflexive monitoring of the society within the state borders. Perhaps this is a useful start in order to conceptualise the state as a unit through different aspects of the term sovereignty. However, these external perspectives on stateness say little about how states will react to external impulses, or to what degree states and their institutions might impose reactions from other units. For example, different states will differ sharply in their reactions to the same ideological or cultural impulse. Different states will choose various strategies in order to cope with international economic and military competition. The Mongolia and US are both states, but it is hardly an exaggeration when I claim that they behave differently in international relations. In order to systematise the differences in beliefs, values and interests, we actually need to look into preference formation within states. Rational choice theorists will argue that this changes the subject; preferences become something to be explained, not something explaining. The debate on rationality is, as we have already mentioned, vast and rich. But one should note that even prominent scholars within rational choice, like Jon Elster, have warned against treating large institutions as rational actors. Even though, at an individual level, there are limits to what rational choice can

205 Giddens, 1987
206 Wendt, 1999
207 Methodological individualists would blame me here, since the processes to be studied here were carried out by individuals, and not collectives as the states mentioned. IR scholars that cling to the notion of the state as a unitary, rational actor might also note this sentence, and compare it with my later criticism of their own model. Truth is that although the metaphor of saying that states "want" or "wish", the use of the state as a subject in international law, are broad categories of language. The same broad categories might nevertheless say very little that is sociologically meaningful about what that state "IS", or how it "WORKS". In other words, my point is that the state as a unitary, rational actor might be heuristically useful in many respects, but that it is a theoretical position with clear limits. Nevertheless, the use of the names of individual states as a linguistic simplification to represent the sum of actions that result in foreign policy, have immense practical value in international law and politics.
208 Krasner, 1999
209 For a very interesting comment to the contrary, see John Searle, "The Social Construction of Reality", where the philosopher argue in favour of collective intentionally.
explain (I cannot will what I will), limitations are even more profound when dealing with such huge complexities as the state. A counter-argument will of course be that it does not matter, so long as the theory of strategic interaction produces good explanations and predictions. Perhaps a reasonable view of agency is to see all social actors as purposeful actors, acting on self-interest, but also out of social norms, a logic of expected consequences as well as out of the logic of appropriateness. The problem with the latter distinction of James March and Johan Olsen is to specify when the different logics of action apply. I will adopt a weak assumption of individual rationality. Agents do not appear in a vacuum, their preferences will not “drop from the sky”. As Weber commented in an earlier footnote in this chapter, an agent also operates within a social structure. The most important structures here are the various structures of the state. Acts and actors are parts of a state structure, which is itself part of the structures of international relations. To understand negotiators that represent given states at the conference table without taking into account the particular state they represent, simply will gain insufficient explanations of their behaviour.

My assumption here is that individuals acting on behalf of their state or their interest group acts upon the interests, beliefs, values and norms inherent in the institution they represent. What it means to act on behalf of UK, Iceland or IBM thus cannot be separated from what that institution is. And what that institution is cannot be explained without reference to what constitutes the institution in question. The central approach to this question here will be that of historical institutionalism as it has been applied in comparative politics and historical sociology. This approach has taken various forms within scholarship, to be sure. What these approaches have in common is that they confront “issues of both historical contingency and “path dependency” that other theoretical perspectives obscure”. This kind of approach is consistent with the definition of institutions borrowed from Stinchcombe that I have mentioned earlier. It includes both formal organisations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct. But in order to be more precise on how historical institutionalism might gain answers that rational choice cannot give, we shall have a closer look at a rationalist line of thought on the interplay between domestic institutions and international institutions that have developed within IR in the recent years.

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210 Wildavsky, 1990
211 See Pardo, 1983. It is so obvious, in my mind, that any theory entirely based upon a theory of the international system will be unable to explain state interactions and foreign policy.
212 Steinmo & Thelen, 1992: 2
1.4 Opening the "black box" of IR Theory: two competing groups of approaches on domestic actors and institutions in foreign policy

Several leading scholars today agree that the dichotomy “domestic/national” versus “international” is being eroded by increased “interdependence”, “internationalisation” and/or “globalisation”. These perceptions foster increased attention on theories and methods that seek to capture mechanisms operational in the interplay between domestic and international political institutions. As mentioned, these theories are largely divided between rationalistic analysis on the one hand, and more reflexive/constructivist/institutionalist modes of thought on the other hand, although there is a number of approaches (for example in institutionalist political economy), that do not fit neatly into either camp. Given the shortcomings of some of the grand theories in IR based on rational-choice analysis of the state as an actor, scholars within the rationalistic camp have been tempted to construct models that increase the ideographic validity of game theoretical analysis applied to foreign policy.

I am going to suggest some propositions below that are of interest to the phenomena to be studied here. A crucial point will be taken up below to sum up the limitations of the use of insights from the rationalistic models. As Milner suggests, “symbolic costs” might be of grave importance in domestic institutions in ways that severely affects international co-operation.

1.4.1 Rational actors

It is important to address game theory at this point, since it can be portrayed as a universal theory. Game Theory (or the theory of games) is the formal theory of strategic action between maximising agents. Game theory is indifferent to what the players wish to maximise (indeed, this might seem like a weakness in what game theory might offer for social scientists, but the fact is often overlooked by its critics). Applied to social interaction, a political process can be seen as a game when the players studied $i \in N$, they choose a strategy $s_i \in S_i$, their payoff for any strategy (given the others players strategies) $v_i \in V_i$ and the players have information. Thus, a game simply applies to any situation where;

213 Keohane, 1984 was one of the scholars who made this term known to a wider audience
214 Keohane & Milner, 1993 is probably one of the most systematic elaborations on this phenomenon
216 Milner, 1997: 46-47
217 Mahoney et al, 2003: 19-23 is a good discussion of the relationship between rational choice and comparative historical analysis.
One aspect of these assumptions is the possibility to see the best reply strategy in terms of evolutionary stability.\textsuperscript{218} Game theory might actually support an interpretation of state formation as an evolutionary process in which the most capable states survive in a self-help system of international “anarchy”.\textsuperscript{219} Evolutionary stable strategies occur from learning from repeated interactions, and the types of entities that do not survive the first interaction do not come to dominate the system. This opens up a possible link between micro and macro levels of explanation in the social sciences. Rationality in people and large organisations does not necessarily result from the strategic brilliance in a universe of Scrooges, but because entities that are good at adapting to their environment are more likely to survive in competition with others. Failure to adapt to the international competition or to international institutions can result in loss of sovereignty in various forms\textsuperscript{220}, dismantling of the state or in social revolutions that fundamentally alters the constitutive elements of that state as an actor.\textsuperscript{221}

The development of so-called two-level games seems to have been motivated by a certain sense of dissatisfaction with the “state-as-an-unitary-actor” model in IR. Two-level-games (or more generally, two-level models of international and domestic politics) seek to find better accounts of international negotiations and processes in IOs by taking domestic negotiations and institutions into account. The central challenge to any such attempt is of course to “model” the perspective.

Weighty arguments have been set up against such attempts, one scholar asking whether the study of International politics can do without the “Model of the State as a Rational, Unitary Actor” at all.\textsuperscript{222} The relevance of domestic politics in order to understand international negotiations have been dismissed, even by scholars often credited as being in the front of research on the subject.\textsuperscript{223} Robert Axelrod reached worldwide fame by his computer-tournaments, from which he constructed an argument explaining why international co-operation would occur as the results of reiterated games

\textsuperscript{218} I am indebted to Professor Alex Coram for his comments on this aspect of hawk-dove games.

\textsuperscript{219} The parallel to political realism and Charles Tilly’s work on state formation is clear

\textsuperscript{220} E.G. a neorealist assumption

\textsuperscript{221} As described by Skocpol, 1979.

\textsuperscript{222} Underdal, 1984 b. A central problem in trying to embrace both domestic and transnational politics lies in a complexity that easily leads scholarly analysis into rather chaotic or highly detailed narratives of political processes.

\textsuperscript{223} Axelrod, 1984 is a good example. Axelrod argues that the state preferences can be a result of endlessly complex domestic bargaining, different alliances and changing party or state coalitions, but this does not matter because the environment of the state sees the state as a unitary actor. The same assumption is more or less found in international law, where states are explicitly spoken of as being ”international persons” (Brown, 1994: 5-7). The latter fact is often used by IR-theoreticians to underpin their arguments in favour of the rational unitary state-model. However, there is also a growing body of international law that is dealing with non-state actors, while international law is also
between units. The question is whether these results can be applied to interaction between highly complex organisations like states.\footnote{Using game-theory to analyse each case of negotiation, then coding the negotiations from the concepts of game-theory I analysed the occurrence of tit-for-tat behaviour in seventeen international negotiations between states in matters concerning the law of the Sea. Although I controlled for various other variables, I could not find any support for Axelrod’s argument applied to state-level negotiations, even among close allies and culturally similar states interacting repeatedly in the same issue-area (Stensli, 1999). For a penetrating theoretical critique of Axelrod’s theory on co-operation, see Doyle, 1997.} Empirical analysis of international negotiations based on such a model leads to anomalies. Sometimes the crafting of international treaties and regimes hinge on some crucial states, and quite often it is simply impossible to interpret the behaviour of these states without taking into account domestic interests and political processes.\footnote{This is argued by for example Arvid Pardo, 1983 applied to UNCLOS III (the third conference on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Pardo was a central figure in the UNCLOS III negotiations.} Perhaps the main problem is not the conceptual apparatus of game theory (which actually can be coupled with a weak\footnote{Elster (1985: 2-3) gives a definition of a weak notion on rationality in this way; ”We must require, first, that the reasons are reasons for the action, secondly, that the reasons do in fact cause the action for which they are reasons, and thirdly, that the reasons cause the action ”in the right way”. Implicit in these requirements is also a consistency requirement for the desires and beliefs themselves”} or thin theory of individual rationality), but with the coupling of game-theoretic models with “state as an actor” ontology.\footnote{Skjærseth, 1994 points to this, albeit in a different language. He claims that it is a paradox that many game-theoreticians in political science seem to hold a position as methodological individualists; they actually apply game theory to collectives as states or other institutions as actors. Thus, I would argue that two-level models based on the assumption of individual rationality are far closer to the ideal of methodological individualism than its theoretical competitors. Another side of the question is of course how desirable such a proximity to the ideal of methodological individualism is. See Hovi, 1992} I find that the latter suggestion is a main feature in the theoretical debate within the field of IR today.\footnote{See Wendt, 1999, Ruggie, 1993 and 1986, Katzenstein et al, 1996, Katzenstein et al 1999, Martin and Simmons, 2001} However, one should note that Axelrod’s findings have been subject to intense debate also among game theorists. There are actually three weaknesses in the assumption that tit-for tat- strategies will be superior (in addition to the obvious fact that states and other large institutions are not computers, bees or ants).

**Firstly,** applying Tit-for tat strategies are complex when n>2. If one player defects amongst many other cooperative players, the collective good is no longer produced,\footnote{Think os pollution agreements for the Mediterranean or the Baltic Sea, in which a result depends upon the cooperation of all states at the sea-board.} the efforts of cooperation are in vain, strictly speaking.

**Secondly,** Playing Tit-for-tat is not feasible if punishment is costly. In this case, state x`s threat of defecting if state y does not co-operate, will not be credible. For small states, for example, its ability to inflict costs to large powers has been limited (of course there are exceptions, but seldom without enormous costs to the small nation).
Thirdly, it follows from the above that it **might pay to defect**, particularly in games that the player knows will be played a finite number of times.

The preferences of the state as an actor should not be treated as given, if one wishes to give precise explanations of empirical processes. A scholar that followed UNCLOS III closely, remarked on the US domestic debate at the time that “Some proponents of the treaty tend to speak more often of “interests”, while some opponents tend to speak more often of “principles””. Not only does Oxman’s statement point to the cleavage in US ocean policy. It also hints at the role of symbolic values that embed US administrations, in this instance the Republican administration in the 1980s. Several authors stress the same; for Congress and members of the Reagan administration, it was the **principles** of the deep Seabed regime that were impossible to accept. Nevertheless, the rigour, the concepts and the line of reasoning in rational models often provide clear standpoints from which theoretical debates can start and from which they can develop in a fruitful manner. Robert Putnam and his colleagues have been pioneers in this respect.

The central point for Putnam was to capture the interactive process in which the statesman or the official negotiating on behalf of his state took into consideration both his domestic interests, as well as the domestic situation of his “opponent” at the other side of the negotiation table. That this theoretical effort has been a victim of both criticism, as well as silence, is something of a surprise. According to Ole Wæver, IR (an “American social science”, Hoffman coined it), has lost its contextual and historical sensitivity. Indeed, one might easily argue that IR partly lost some of its earlier insights as rational models achieved hegemonic positions. In the 1960s and 1970s “theories of international relations that focused on domestic factors abounded”. After all, Henry Kissinger in 1957 wrote that

> “the acid test of a policy however, is its ability to obtain domestic support. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimizing a policy within the governmental apparatus, which is a problem of

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230 Oxman, 1983: 129
231 See also Nye, 1983 and Pardo, 1983
232 Putnam, 1988
233 Evans et al, 1993
234 Keohane, 1989: 173
235 Hoffman, 1977
236 Wæver, 1992, see also Buzan and Little, 2000, Thomson 1994 for similar verdicts
237 Milner, 1997: 3
bureaucratic rationality; and that of harmonizing it with the national experience, which is a problem of historical development”.238

Thus, academic attempts at linking domestic and international politics should not be seen exclusively as motivated by globalisation or increased interdependence. Political actors have had to analyse the interplay between domestic and international political institutions all the way. One of the best historical analyses that illuminate this fact that I have come across is Fritz Stern’s (1977) analysis of Bismarck’s policies, and the way that Bismarck mixed state security and economic policy. Stern concludes on Bismarck that

“Like other statesmen, he may on occasion have talked as if the domestic and foreign realms were separate or separable, but he knew that the world was not that simple, not for him and not for his foreign protagonists. Diplomacy was the art of obtaining possible ends abroad within the clear constraints at home”.239

The point is the same as in Evans, Jacobson and Putnam’s240 elaboration of Putnam’s model; international negotiations is a double-edged diplomacy, which is another way of stating that international negotiations, be it in an institutionalised setting or not, is where domestic and international politics meet.241 The model also seems to have intuitive appeal. Empirically, evidence in favour of the perspective abounds. Thus Schmidt wrote of the UNCLOS III negotiations and the American negotiating delegation that; “Interagency disputes in Washington rubbed off on United States negotiators, and their dilemma was compounded by the fact that they had to arrive both at a position that was negotiable with the G-77 and a result that would pass muster in the Senate”.242 Putnam and his collaborators have suggested some general, conceptual variables that might facilitate agreement on the international level and ratification on the domestic level. They call this the win-set;

238 Kissinger, 1957: 326
239 Stern, 1977: 309
240 Evans et al, 1993
241 But there is more than a nuance of difference between Kissinger’s statement on domestic politics and rationalistic models of two-level games. In the last statement contained in the quotation from Kissinger, he links the domestic acceptance or rejection of international agreements to national experience and “historical development”. The historical sensitivity of Kissinger’s ”A World Restored” makes it more akin to sociology than systemic theories and rational-choice models in IR.
242 Schmidt. 1989: 59
the agreement that will be agreed upon at the international level and simultaneously gain the required support domestically so that an effective agreement actually can come of real.\footnote{Evans et al discuss, for example the role of domestic demands. Some of their hypotheses are not entirely original. Thomas Schelling (1971: 28) for example wrote that “When national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they seem often to create a bargaining position by public statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permits no concessions to be made”. One might discuss to what extent Government can create such “public opinion”, but Evans et al, 1993 nevertheless sets forth the hypothesis that strong domestic demands is an advantage for the negotiator at the international level.}

Although Putnam’s model initially aroused attention and optimism, other scholars remained sceptical, and it proved hard to proceed further than what the team behind the concept of “Double – edged Diplomacy” did initially.\footnote{For attempts, see Mayer, 1992, Iida, 1993 a,b, Alt & Eichengreen 1989, Tsebelis, 1990, Lohmann, 1993, Pahre, 1994, Downs and Rocke, 1995, Mo, 1991, 1994, 1995} Professor Helen Milner’s “Interests, Institutions and Information” (1997) is an attempt at improvement and systematisation of the two-level game-metaphor. Her central aim is no less than to “explain the likelihood and terms of cooperation among nations”;\footnote{Milner, 1997: 7} International cooperation is often understood in ways similar to the definition by Keohane where cooperation is seen as occurring when “actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”.\footnote{Keohane, 1984: 51-52} Milner adds to this and similar definitions by pointing out that cooperation also can take other forms, as tacit communication, as opposed to explicit bargaining. There are a number of substantial points of domestic politics and international co-operation that she does not address, however.

Firstly, her conclusion that “polyarchy makes international co-operation less likely” should make us aware of one central limitation of the explanatory power of the model. It cannot say anything of the reasons for the differences between the countries in question, and why these differences are smaller or larger from case to case. It is not unreasonable to assume theoretically that the internal qualities of political institutions and interest groups, historical relationships between states etc, explains much of the international interaction. For example, it has been claimed in IR literature that democracies do not fight each other.\footnote{See for example, Doyle, 1993} Although the mechanisms resulting in this empirical fact are not clear-cut, it seems to have a lot to do with both internal qualities of the state, and how perceptions and reputations count.\footnote{In this thesis, I suspect that both perceptions of “the other” as well as symbolic aspects of the sovereignty of the polities vary due to different historical trajectories.} Secondly, that the influence of the legislative branch diminishes, as the legislature’s ideal-point is closer to the preferred outcome of the foreign country, is taken as a mathematical fact. It is important to point out, in my view that this to a large degree depends on the overall relationship and
powers of the executive versus the legislative. If the legislative, C, is strong, and less hawkish than
the executive, P, is it then not reasonable to believe that C is able to pull P in its own direction? If
we simultaneously take into account the relationship between C and F in the foreign country, Milner
treats the impact of anticipated reaction in a rather mechanical way. Most importantly, Milner has
probably not analysed fully how the influence of domestic politics varies with different structures of
the international game that is played. Her assertion that hawkish legislatures decrease the likelihood
of international co-operation does not apply to all international interaction. Schelling was right in
assuming that important cleavages in the polity might prove beneficial in international bargaining.
This can be proved by seeing the two-level game as a sequence of moves in a co-operative game.

1.4.2 What rational Choice cannot explain

The problems in Milner’s theory is firstly the lack of systematic treatment of the effects of different
political regimes and domestic institutional configurations in states, and secondly the tendency
towards tautological statements.

Regarding the first point, she just state that “domestic politics is rarely a pure hierarchy with a
unitary decision maker, even in non-democratic systems”249. But the implications are not elaborated.
The problem with this is the limitations it necessarily places on the validity of the model in both
time and space. Likewise one might argue that the model makes less sense in authoritarian regimes
in the third world than in the modern state (that is to say, the more centralised the state, the lesser the
significance of the two-level model). And finally, even among western democracies there can be
significant differences as to the relationshipo between the executive and legislative branches.

Perhaps a more fundamental critique could be raised against what I see as a tendency towards
tautological statements in the model (which is not the same as saying that the implications of the
model are wholly tautological). That “the degree of divided government and the preferences of the
executive”250 are critical when it comes to predicting state behaviour is not really a very original
thesis. She nevertheless interprets this in the opposite direction than Schelling251 and Putnam252;
Milner suggests that problems of international co-operation increase as the division between the
executive branch and the median legislator grows. She simply states that divisions at home seem to

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248 See for example, Owen, 2000
249 Milner, 1997: 12
250 ibid: 235
251 Schelling, 1960
252 Putnam, 1988
undermine the state’s bargaining leverage at the international level. Schelling early stated that divisions at home could be exploited internationally in all cases where the opponents had true incentives for reaching an agreement. A good example of this was the negotiations between Iceland and Norway on the 200-mile EEZ around Jan Mayen. The dominant view in Norway was that Iceland had outplayed its opponent;

“\textit{The Icelanders have played well. They have even managed to exploit their domestic split to their own foreign policy advantage. Norway, on the other hand, has totally blown its chances. If this case does not lead to consequences in the Parliament, it is simply unbelievable}”

Milner’s hypothesis that the preferences of political executives are important, is not particularly original. The more “hawkish” the Government, the less likely are initiatives for international cooperation in the given area.

It is of course important to bear in mind that Milner’s is a simplifying model. It is also true that “the test of the theory should be whether it provides valuable insights and helps produce testable hypotheses to explain real world phenomena”. Milner has produced such testable hypotheses. When I treat them sceptically, it is because I expect them to be negated to a considerable extent when confronted with empirical evidence, partly because the model is too limited. There are a number of questions (in my mind some of the most important ones) that are not – or to a very limited degree- touched upon by her two-level model.

Generally, the model to some degree says the obvious. In his conclusion on formal, game-theoretical models of negotiation, Jon Elster, for example, stated that “\textit{I will leave it, therefore, at this point. Fortunately, in a sense, not much is lost, since the theory has few robust results}”.

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253 Milner, 1997:236
254 Sunnmørsposten August 15 1979. On the whole, I am in fact uncertain if not Schelling conceptualised the strategic interaction of states in a clearer way than any other scholar has done ever after. For example, Schelling points to the role of credible threats. It is actually not hard to conceive that the executive in country X finds it easier to present an agreement to the legislative and pressure groups if it can point out that opposition to the agreement was even harsher in country Y.

An example is found in the negotiations between Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands on fishery regulation of 1996. In the Icelandic secretary of state’s statement to the Althingi (parliament) October 31 1996, he points to this aspect; ”This agreement was discussed in detail in the Althingi when it was concluded. It is clear that not everyone was satisfied with the outcome, but it is worth remembering that the agreement was heavily criticised by Norwegian interest groups as well” (INFO JAN 1997 Icelandic State Dept.)

255 Milner, 1997: 236
256 Milner, 1997: 248
257 Brams, (1995: 5), a proponent of rational choice in political science, stated that ”not only may elaborate models cloak the essential features of a problem in a fog, but they also may be almost as opaque as the real world we wish to understand”
In general, institutions are a lot harder to change than the preferences of the involved actors. At this point I find it appropriate to point out that the choices of important political institutions is not always “controlled” in any simple meaning of the word (some Marxists would certainly disagree at this point). The point is simply that the two-level models, in spite of their value in other respects, cannot explain why domestic institutions change. Helen Milner has made a fine contribution to the interplay between domestic and international politics. If we are to explain outcomes of political processes through the model elaborated by Helen Milner, we are destined to detailed case studies. It certainly is possible to compare these cases, but such an undertaking will be highly demanding. Firstly, the studies must be carried out case-by-case, where the case in question must be seen as an isolated event. Secondly, comparing these events means treating them as units. This is not per definition impossible, for example through Boolean techniques. While negotiations can be institutionalised, they are often not, which means that some negotiations have a high level of institutionalised environment, others not.\footnote{According to March \& Olsen, 1989, levels of institutionalisation influence the logic of action to a considerable degree. This remains an interesting theory (see below).} If we are to gain a better understanding of the interplay between states and international institutions, studying formal, isolated negotiations will be both particularistic and leave many untold stories of the enduring features of both domestic and international politics.

1.4.3 Historical institutionalism – an alternative framework

By historical institutionalism\footnote{Definitions of institutions are discussed in chapter 1.}, I refer to the body of work within comparative politics with the same theoretical core as Steinmo and Thelen refer to: “a theoretical project aimed at the middle range that confronts issues of both historical contingency and “path dependency” that other theoretical perspectives obscure”.\footnote{Thelen \& Steinmo, 1992: 1-2} This school defines institutions broadly, in a fashion similar to what I have done on previous pages. In the words of Thelen and Steinmo, “institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and structure their relations of power to other groups”.\footnote{ibid: 2}

When historical institutionalism is applied in research on public policy, it more or less corresponds to what some authors have coined the “institutional-political process perspective” in the study of public policy. In this approach, the state and state structures occupy centre stage. What makes this
line of work akin to historical institutionalism lies in its focus on the effects of state formation processes. Applying historical analysis, this comparative approach explains differences between political systems that can account for different results in policy processes. If we compare this line of thought with rational choice-perspectives on international relations (and systemic theories of the same subject that assume that the units are unitary and rational), a central difference between them is that the comparative perspective shows that states do differ in vital aspects. They are not “like units”, as assumed in neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism.

Historical institutionalism can be seen as a type of middle ground between grand theories and models that describe individual behaviour. Important questions in this perspective in comparative politics will be how different societal and political institutions in different territories help explain both changes and persisting cross-national differences in policy outcomes. This programme has been carried out in many policy areas by scholars from comparative politics/historical sociology, but surprisingly little has been done in order to explain the international effects of these “national” differences, and vice versa. Only with globalisation studies, it seems, is the latter becoming an expanding area of research. In my opinion, the effects of institution-building and different institutional configurations should enable us to study the difference between “states as actors” on the international arena. The point is that historical institutionalism argues that “institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics, and political history more generally, than that suggested by a narrow rational choice model”. If we for example share some of the same basic assumptions as Helen Milner of how domestic politics matters to international institutions, from a historical institutionalism- perspective, we would add that it is vital to study how institutions and individuals define their self-interest. Not only are strategies, but also the goals actors pursue, the principles they believe in and try to harmonise with interests, shaped by institutional context. In short, institutions matter even more than Milner and other rational-choice theorists argue. Rational choice treats preference formation as exogenous, while historical institutionalists treat it as endogenous.

In fact, one might plausibly argue that historical institutionalism means that we are able to get closer to the constitution of the subject we are studying than approaches from universal theories. The two latter theories actually derive at hypotheses from a very limited number of assumptions. By studying institutions, the scholar tries to link outcomes, behaviour and preferences with context.

263 Heidenheimer at al, 1990: 9
264 The "political culture"-literature in Comparative politics has occasionally been an exception in this respect. See for example Lipset, 1964 and Ellis, 1993. For a recent and refreshing attempt, see Matarese, 2001
265 ibid: 7
That economists, such as Barry Eichengreen, rejects this as fuzzy logic\textsuperscript{266}, perhaps has to do with the fact that economic models actually were created to study situations where utility ultimately could be measured in money-a calculable unit.\textsuperscript{267} Transferring these models to politics means that we could too mechanically apply them on situations where the main parameter is power, a variable much more different to conceptualise, to say measure.

What is lost compared to rational choice is the precision and elegancy of formal models based on simple assumptions. This loss surrounds the debate on the so-called New institutionalism, which in fact is a label applied to various approaches within “economic, organization theory, political science and public choice, history and sociology-united by little more than a common scepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes and a common conviction that institutional arrangements and social processes matter”.\textsuperscript{268}

A major controversy within this so-called new institutionalism hinges on the definition of institutions. For example, the question whether institutions reflect preferences of individuals or corporate actors, remains contested. This debate easily slips into the familiar struggle between methodological individualism and –collectivism within the social sciences. Dimaggio and Powell claim that the sociological approach within the new institutionalism is marked by its inclination to see action as structured by shared systems of rules that “both constrain the inclination and capacity of actors to optimise as well as privilege some groups”.\textsuperscript{269} Although there are similarities between neo-institutionalists and historical institutionalists, the latter group often study historical changes.

In turning to historical institutionalism, the scholar does not fall back on ad-hoc hypotheses or anecdotal evidence. On the contrary, in a historic study of institutions, the scholar is bound to face

\begin{footnotes}
\item[266] Eichengreen, 1999 well illustrates the rational choice paradigm in economics. In this article, it becomes apparent that economists go much further than for example Jon Elster in simplifying assumptions of human behaviour.
\item[267] Schelling’s (1967: 238) words that “For the social scientist, what is rudimentary and conceptual…about game theory…will be, for a long time, the most valuable” ring true even today. Consider how models of coalition formation and negotiations with a high degree of mathematical precision yield modest empirical value. Elster, (1989b: 52), a leading proponent of rational choice theory thus concluded that “Although there are many theories of coalition formation, I think it is fair to say that none of them is very satisfactory”
\item[268] Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 3. As these authors suggest, the study of international regimes has turned into the same mode of inquiry. What divides the study of regimes from pure rational-choice models is the emphasis on norms in the former line of work. However, one should be careful in overstating this difference, especially after the increasing use of constructivist ideas in IR.
\item[269] Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 11. Note that the notion of the rational actor is not completely tossed aboard here. Game-theorists within political science would hardly disagree on this point. Much more crucial is the study of changes in institutions. The use of cognitive “scripts” and “maps” as explaining institutional rearrangements does not seem totally convincing to this author. There is no doubt that such mental modes of thought and action exist, but in my view, this is a catchall theoretical position that hardly can be falsified. At the very least, such theoretical concepts seem to have limited potential for generalisation or comparison if they are not anchored in a theory of political culture or institutions that has elements of scientific realism. In other words, I will argue that the relativism of constructivism must be somewhat limited. A very ambitious form of such limited constructivism can be found in the grid-group analysis as elaborated by Ellis and Wildavsky. In chapter 4 I will argue that the use of ideal-types (in a weberian sense) might be fruitful at a macro-level if the ideal-types are based upon concrete historical experience.
\end{footnotes}
empirical evidence and the necessity of systematising huge amounts of textual information. As a matter of fact, he or she sees as problematic what rational choice takes as given or simply assumes. In the words of Wildavsky\textsuperscript{270}, preferences just don’t drop from the sky. On the other hand, social processes are also change. Milner and other rational choice theorists see institutions as rational units. Whether they study institutional rearrangements or wars, they assume it to result from the interplay between rational actors. The virtue of historical institutionalism is to explain how institutional structures help shape policy processes by defining principles and preferences. As claimed by March and Olsen;

“Understanding the transformation of political institutions requires recognizing that there are frequently multiple, not necessarily consistent, intentions, that intentions are often ambiguous, that intentions are part of a system of values, goals, and attitudes that embeds intention in a structure of other beliefs and aspirations”\textsuperscript{271}

This is not to say that historical institutionalism is without problems. Comparing historical institutionalism to rational choice also highlights the weakness of attempts to formulate a coherent Theory of institutions with anything resembling the clarity found in game models. Perhaps parsimonious designs to some degree must be sacrificed in order to explain preference formation. After all, as Powell and Dimaggio, have remarked, “Studies of organizational and political change routinely point to findings that are hard to square with either rational-actor or functionalist accounts”\textsuperscript{272}. Central challenges in institutional theory are the problems of explaining institutional change and linking micro/meso and macro levels of explanation.\textsuperscript{273} This, I assume, is a weakness in institutional theory.

Historical institutionalists, like Stephen Krasner in his model of punctuated equilibrium, will argue that functioning institutions shape politics, but in situations when institutions are created and suffer breakdown, will hold that politics shape institutions. The problem, As Thelen and Steinmo point out, is that these models “explain everything until they explain nothing”.\textsuperscript{274} Institutionalist perspectives can easily lead to static views of politics. In a model of path-dependency where critical junctures are highlighted, political leaders tend to become mere reflections of structures, rather than boundary-

\textsuperscript{270} Wildavsky, 1990
\textsuperscript{271} March and Olsen, 1989: 65-66. The controversy around the theoretical concepts elaborated by these authors, the "logic of expected consequences" and "logic of appropriateness", is substantial. See Krasner, 1999 for an application of them in a discussion of sovereignty as an institution.
\textsuperscript{272} Powell & Dimaggio, 1991: 3
\textsuperscript{273} See for example Di Maggio and Powell,
\textsuperscript{274} Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 15
transcending actors. They become “gardeners rather than engineers”, in the words of Johan P. Olsen. Thus, both actors and gradual change are pushed into the background. In order to remedy this, one can conceive of external changes as producing changes in institutions. If historical institutionalism cannot explain institutional dynamism through other ways than pointing to external influences, then “external change” naturally becomes paramount in order to explain changes in institutions. This, in my view, is the prime justification for macro-theory.

However, I will argue that elements from both game theory and the two-level metaphor inform our analysis of the interplay between states and international institutions. State leaders certainly can be seen as players in large games, both over their domestic as well as international resources. The Two-level metaphor is one attempt to grasp the interplay of domestic and international concerns that state leaders try to meet. However, it is not only formal institutions that mediate political decisions, but also institutions of a more informal character. One central assumption in comparative politics is that political culture also matters, thus making the international arena inhabited by different types of actors. This approach is not entirely incompatible with rationalistic analyses, since informal restraints can be seen as transaction costs in different polities as well as costs that affect behaviour among states. Douglas North, in one famous work, has sought to clarify the nature of how culture matters:

“Where do informal constraints come from? They come from socially transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture…the cultural filter provides continuity so that the informal solution to exchange problems in the past carries over into the present and makes those informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run societal change”

History should therefore be seen as path-dependent. I will use the most important tools from the theories above to investigate one particular aspect of what constitutes states; their maritime sovereignty. In this thesis, the theoretical concept of path dependency is of outmost importance. Both on the international and domestic levels of analysis, the philosophies of mare clausum and mare liberum served as principle justifications of state policies and as principles for international institutions regulating maritime policies.

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276 see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 18-20
277 North, 1990: 37
Is it possible to say that the international institutions regulating state behaviour at sea is an important aspect of world orders and to our understanding of world politics? In order to try to answer these questions, we firstly need to develop a general theoretical model of foreign policy where ideology and material national interests in the realm of maritime policies both are given the status they deserve. The next step will be to explore how empirical evidence can serve to construct a typology of states according to this general model. In other words, we will have to pursue the difficult task of ensuring that our ideal-types have the highest possible local and regional validity.

States are institutions. At the international level, states form institutions of a general as well as an issue-specific character. The efficiency and impact of institutions depend on the transaction costs inherent in interaction. I see transaction costs as consisting of two clusters of variables. One is the availability of, and costliness in processing information. How states collect and interpret information, and how this information is put to use, however, cannot be deduced from theories of firms on perfect markets. The formulation and pursuit of national interests will be seen as modified by ideology in this thesis. The second main source of transaction costs is the cost of protecting rights, including preferences, principles and property. For states, the costs of protection depend on the nature of the international system. The ability to protect is a result of international competition as well as the internal strength of the state, to a large degree determined by bureaucratic efficiency, legitimacy, and the strength of civil society and to what degree the state is embedded in society. The availability of information depends upon the degree of co-operation at the international level, but it also depends upon the same abilities of the state as mentioned in the previous. The latter to a large degree should be seen as a result of the political culture and political principles the state embodies, since I see these as mechanisms that influence the procession of information within the state. This is how domestic and international politics are seen as entwined in this thesis. In addition to the role played by war-making in determining state formation (Tilly), other international institutions have mattered. These institutions to a varying degree have been influenced by how strong powers have applied ideological, economic, military and political power (Mann). Game theory alone cannot explain preferences, only the interaction between units given a set of preferences (not a small contribution, to be sure). Historical institutionalism thus should be applied both at the national as well as international level in order to explain the principles that make institutions. What are lacking are concepts of political culture as influencing state information processing and decision-making.

The term political culture is ambiguous. Thus, I will restrict the analysis in the following chapter to

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278 This is a modified version of the argument by North, 1990: 27
279 Thus, I believe Martha Finnemore has exaggerated the role of international norms, and that almost all systemic theories of international relations have underplayed the role of domestic politics.
those aspects of political culture that have affected state policies over extraterritorial sovereignty and use of violence at sea. In other words, I am setting out to construct a relevant model with explanatory power where the material interests that were at the core of national interests in the foreign policy decision-making process are seen as constituted partly by ideational factors. In the sector of maritime foreign policy, the main ideational variable can be interpreted in the light of two old sets of principles: \textit{mare clausum} and \textit{mare liberum}.

2 Extraterritorial Sovereignty – Idealtypes and the Selection of Cases

“Historians, it has been said, spend the first third of their career attacking the errors of their elders, the second third putting forward their own, more convincing interpretations to replace them, and the last third defending historical truth against the misguided iconoclasm of their younger colleagues”

\textit{Richard J. Evans}\textsuperscript{280}

In this chapter, we face the intriguing question of what state principles mattered in state policies and international institutions of extraterritorial sovereignty. Thus, we will construct ideal-types (in the weberian sense) in order to analyse these. Particularly, the aim is to set forth hypothesis of how these principles were distributed among different types of states. Before we proceed to the hypotheses in the form of typologies, we must

- Clarify the structure of the explanation we seek to construct, which in turn is intimately connected to how to:

- Explain what the principles of mare liberum and mare clausum have meant historically.

The latter must be done in order to construct valid ideal types, and we are therefore at the juncture which is the only time where empirics serve theory and not the other way around, according to Weber.

In contrast to the brief elaboration on the view of sovereignty in section 1.3, Grotius argued in “\textit{Mare liberum}” that the sea couldn’t be seen as an extension of the land territory.\textsuperscript{281} The sea, he argued, cannot be territorialized; it should be seen as open to all, be it merchant companies or states. The sea cannot be inhabited, thus it cannot be parted among territorial sovereigns through borders or even frontiers. Grotius was one of the firsts to attack extensive claims to sovereignty. He based his

\textsuperscript{280} Evans, 1997: 12

\textsuperscript{281} Actually, the conflicting views on this point were well illustrated in the discourses of extraterritorial sovereignty in France and England in the aftermath of the Hundred Years’ War. See for example du Jourdin, 1993: 110
criticism on two grounds. Firstly it is impossible for any nation effectively to take it into possession by occupation. Secondly nature does not give a right to anybody to appropriate things that may be used by everybody. The open sea thus is a res gentium or res extra commercium. Being an ideology, mare liberum nevertheless suited Dutch economic interests. “As the greatest Seaborne carriers of the world for over a century”\textsuperscript{282}, the Dutch were moved by interests as well as ethical principles when they argued in favour of free trade and commerce. Still, mare liberum was an enduring principle in Dutch thinking, a genuine reflection of the wishes to be at peace. And peace clearly also was beneficial for the Republic.\textsuperscript{283} Thus, Pieter de la Court in 1662 wrote that “Above all things war, and chiefly by sea, is most prejudicial (and peace very beneficial) for Holland”\textsuperscript{284}

Empirically, the ideal-typical opposite in the form of mare clausum gained ground in the 20th Century, while mare clausum was established as state praxis in Britain long before this.\textsuperscript{285} Grotius actually foresaw John Selden on this point, since he insisted that “closed seas” was to be treated almost as lakes (Grotius undoubtedly had the Zuyder Sea in mind).\textsuperscript{286} Territory is based on the Latin terms terra, meaning, “land” or “earth”.\textsuperscript{287} But in modern law, the concept of territory has come to embrace spaces or areas, including the air, sea and outer space. The concept of extending functions of state sovereignty over sea territory thus emerged gradually. This is not to say that extra-territorial sovereignty is the same phenomenon as territorial sovereignty. If it were, the distinction between them would be empirically insignificant. The existence of an extensive body of the law of the sea as a particular field within international law points to the fact that state practise here has differed from that of territorial sovereignty. It is also evidence of the existence of what I call the evolving international institution on sovereignty at sea. The latter is important, and I argue that the ideological struggle on the contents of this institution has been the two main schools represented by mare liberum and mare clausum. The empirical relevance of these two ideal types will be demonstrated in 2.1

A much more difficult task is to show how state experience, ideas and beliefs helped shape individual states conceptions of the competing frameworks for the international institution for maritime sovereignty. This task should be seen as a simplifying step. When I claim that state X’s claim to extraterritorial sovereignty was dominated by the doctrine of mare liberum, that does not

\textsuperscript{282} Boxer, 1965: 90
\textsuperscript{283} Note the similarity, ideologically, with Adam Smith and his critique of restrictions on trade
\textsuperscript{284} Quoted in Boxer, 1965: 84
\textsuperscript{285} As I will return to, there actually is some degree of conceptual confusion on this point. What England did already prior to the 17th Century was to make unilateral demands to mare clausum, while often rejecting other states the same rights. This resembles what Stephen Krasner (1999) has named “organized hypocrisy”.
\textsuperscript{286} As Armitage, 2000, reminds us, these debates were pan-european. However, Selden and Grotius are the most dominant proponents for two distinctly different ideologies of the oceans.
mean that state X did not have interests in the direction of mare clausum. I will simply argue in 2.1 that historical experience up till 1950 made national institutions cling to one doctrine more than the other. The empirical deviations from the ideal types are interesting parts of the empirical explanation. I argue that modern states had a more or less coherent ideological claim to one or the other set of ideas on how to regulate the use of the oceans. How is it possible to separate these “ideological claims” from preferences on utility? I argue that the claims signify principles that often overrule more short-term sectoral interests. One example of this is the US withdrawal from the regime set up by UNCLOS. The proposed regime on the utilisation of deep seabed resources was simply incompatible with the ideology of the Reagan administration. Another example, that also signals the importance of overseas interests in general, is the British reluctance to join the European Community. The legacy of empire and the concern for the dominions within the Commonwealth was not simply economic interests that closed the window to “Europe”. What was at stake was the British view of itself and its role in the world; the very concept of sovereignty in a British setting. In the international system, the institutions of the Commonwealth could simply not be disregarded at this point in history, whereas the Commonwealth lost significance in British discourses leading up to membership in EEC in 1973. Critics will argue that other factors, presumably geopolitical ones, mattered more than some ideological framework that was “tailored to suit the national interest”. Conceptualising “historical experience” means that geopolitics and alliances are included as a vital part of the analysis, since power politics certainly influenced and were influenced by state preferences. But the central ontological assumption is that ideas were part of what constituted national or economic interests. Material incentives, I assume, seldom exist independently from perceptions. That is exactly why I try to single out the most defining historical experience in the categories in 2.2. At this stage I will set forth the central hypotheses of the thesis. I simply argue that no grand theories can explain the evolving international institution of maritime sovereignty, but that

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287 See Gottman, 1973: 5-7
288 See Lloyd, 1996, Lloyd, 1993, Cain and Hopkins, 2002. Lloyd, 1996: 353 states that “Britain had watched Continental efforts to bring countries in western Europe closer together after 1945 with a detachment that reflected her belief that the Commonwealth, and good relations with the United States were far more important than developments on the wrong side of the English Channel...After the six countries had worked out the 1957 Treaty of Rome, Macmillan proposed that Britain’s interests and and those of a number of other west European countries should be recognized by bringing them into the customs union for industrial products but allowing them unrestricted free trade in agricultural products. This proposal would give Britain a much larger tariff-free market for industrial products than the Commonwealth could provide, and at the same time would allow her to import the low-cost food which successful Commonwealth farmers produced”.(my italics) Clearly, this was unacceptable to de Gaulle. At the same time, the importance of the Commonwealth for the other members were illustrated by the rejection of Britain’s application. According to Lloyd (ibid: 354) “it had been a distinct shock to find that Britain wanted to join a west European community whose members were linked together more closely than members of the Commonwealth had been for some time”. After the dissolution of Empire, negotiations with EEC was much easier; “in the 1971-72 negotiations little attention was paid to the Commonwealth” (ibid: 374). See also Young, 1990: 226-228 on the relationship between France and Great Britain .
the history of the nation states themselves must be taken seriously. This history cannot possibly be explained by rational choice, unless we are to construct a narrative of a never-ending number of interactions. Historical experience conceptualised in the most parsimonious way possible, *shaped institutions and thus preferences*, influencing state ocean policy, which in turn shaped, and was shaped by, the international institution of maritime sovereignty. That is also why I use weberian ideal-types in order to take into account the *longue durée* process of preference formation that took place also before the remarkable territorialisation of the seas that began in 1945. Since elites *shaped national institutions as well as international ones, and these institutions in turn helped shape preferences*. The argument can be illustrated as in Figure 2.01.

**Figure 2.01; The structure of the causal argument - process between stateformation and international institutions**

I  
Continuous state formation  
In the form of institutions

II  
*State institutions of maritime sovereignty*

III  
Main State principles on issues of ocean policy

IV  
International inter-action

V  
Specific International institutions of the maritime part of world orders;

0-I  
*State apparatus shaped by international interaction*

Comments to figure 2.01: This model should not be seen as an assumption of linear development of distinct phases in an ordered chronology. The logic is as follows. State formation was conditioned by internal and external (0-I) interaction between various actors. Inherent in the argument is an assumption that in the initial phases of state building (before 1648), state-building efforts were affected by international interaction (0-I), that is, interaction with other states, monarchs, city-leagues, guilds, the Church etc. But the early states of Northern Europe, to generalise, were not formed in an environment of international institutions, if we by that term refer to enduring patterns. For coastal states, state formation meant that they formed state institutions that embodied principles and preferences for the exercise of maritime sovereignty (II). These institutions are operationalised (see below) as State principles (III). These principles were, through international interaction (IV), mediated and became contributions to Specific international institutions on maritime sovereignty (V). In turn, these outcomes (VI) shaped national institutions of maritime sovereignty (II). It might be argued that states that were late-comers faced an international environment where international institutions already were formed. This certainly is the case, which means that late state formations faced “outcomes” (VI) already in their phase I and II in their state building experiences.
In this thesis, I claim that state policies on oceans consisted of, and were based upon, mare liberum and –clausum principles. At the same time, mare liberum and mare clausum have been elements in all international institutions regulating transportation, the use of violence and resource extraction at sea. How pronounced state ideology was in foreign policy to a large degree depended upon the content of international institutions and –hegemony. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to build theoretical concepts and hypotheses by viewing maritime concepts and policies as embedded in foreign policy in different categories of states. The central theoretical assumption about foreign policy and international relations thus is that ideas and material interests both matter. This is a truly weberian approach to foreign policy analysis, of course, but it is also an approach that has gained increased attention within IR in recent years. Alexander Wendt has sought to address this at a highly theoretical level: "…the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas. The constitutive as opposed to causal nature of this claim bears emphasis". While Wendt from this premise tries to show that the international "anarchy" can take on different forms, my attempt here is more modest in that I seek to construct idealtypes of different foreign policy dispositions as well as a corresponding categorisation of polities. Mare liberum and -clausum are central categories also in describing and interpreting the international institution. When we see the state principles and preferences for these international institutions, I claim that we cannot solely deduce these policies from a simple cost-benefit analysis that state leaders carry out when it comes to assessing different designs of international institutions (although state leaders undoubtedly do make assessments of utility). Their choices were not always, or even dominantly, made under circumstances of their own choosing. The balance of power as well as the historical experiences and particular domestic institutions served as both geopolitical realities and structures that guided decision-behaviour. It was action guided by reason, which is much more than applying the standards of maximising utility or assessing relative gains. To put it simple, the states in this thesis are not seen as “like units”, their conduct not studied as they were converging on a single logic law of action. To illustrate the institutional “levels of analysis”, we can map our concepts as in figure 2.02.

289 Wendt, 1999: 135
2.1 Ideology; Two ideal types of views on sovereignty at sea and how the process of state building shaped institutions and preferences

This examination of the emerging customary practises and international law of the sea has one central aim; to establish two ideological ideal-types of extra-territorial sovereignty. These ideal-types are constructed from historical accounts of jurisdiction at sea, and when their formal meaning has been elaborated sufficiently, I will briefly sketch how these can be understood as state principles.  

Next, it will be pertinent to sum up the theoretical discussions and the different forms of extra-territorial sovereignty into a conceptual categorisation of the connection between the effects

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290 This historical overview is deliberately narrow compared to the later analysis. We should not be seduced into believing that the origins of the concepts and state or imperial practises of maritime principles "explain" the present. The great historian Marc Bloch indeed warned against such uses of history.” In popular usage, an origin is a beginning which explains…. Worse still, a beginning which is a complete explanation. There lies the ambiguity, there the danger! …A historical phenomenon can never be understood apart from its moment in time” (Bloch, 1953: 30-35). Armitage (2000: 5) sums up the reason why I do not depend heavily on the medieval or Roman uses of the concepts, while the same usages nevertheless represent a not insignificant background understanding; “the context within which a concept emerges does not determine its future usage, though the history of its usage across time will reveal a great deal about the history of the later contexts within which it was deployed. The origins of a concept, as any other object of historical inquiry, are not necessarily connected to any later outcome, causally or otherwise: aetiology is not simply teleology in reverse”. Nevertheless, instances of continuity certainly will be found here;
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of historically formed institutions and main principles of maritime sovereignty. This constellation of ideal-types should be seen as specified hypothesis on what we should expect to find in our analysis of the North East Atlantic.

The approach to conceptualise mare liberum and mare clausum taken here is Euro centric. It needs to be so, since the European experience shaped the classical terms themselves. A further vital prerequisite to the application of these ideal types lies in the requirement that they need to hold the highest possible regional validity. In an enquiry of Northern Europe, I can therefore see no reason how we can do without the historical emergence of these concepts within the very same region. This is certainly not to claim that there were not maritime laws outside of “Europe” at the time of the Roman Empire. For example, in India the oldest treaty of inter-State relations probably dates from early period of the Buddhist Mauryan Empire of the fourth century B.C. This treatise, Kautiya’s Artashastra, makes numerous references to maritime regulations. The sea route between China and India was in common use already in the 5th Century A.D, and the importance of this route made for a customary set of rules in order to fight maritime anarchy and piracy. However, it is not Eurocentric to claim that for the international institutions, these historic legacies would have less impact than those that originated in the Atlantic and in European waters.

Making a very broad historical overview, it seems clear that for the Romans, the basic principles of mare liberum were dominant, since the sea essentially was seen as a highway for transport and passage. In the Roman lawyer Celsus (ca. AD 200), we find this expressed with clarity. The lawyer Ulpinus explicitly states that fishing cannot, “not even outside the entrance of my house”, be denied any other man. Marcianus follows this up when he describes the sea as a *juris gentium* - a common property. But the Romans also made exceptions. Nobody should use the ocean in a way that could exclude others from the use of it. If this situation should occur, the government must interfere. These were considerations that Grotius, Selden and other lawyers took up to debate in the 17th century (indeed we might say that the same theoretical and political discourse exists today). And we should note that Selden’s interpretation of Roman law in some respects achieve a high degree of correspondence. Some Roman lawyers claimed that the beach (litus) and harbours were

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institutions were created in a certain time and space, and these dimensions shaped the particular content and workings of these institutions.

292 Ræstad, 1912: 4-6. The outline below is to a considerable degree based on Ræstad, 1912, Gottman, 1973 and Fulton, 1976.
293 Gottman, 1973
294 Ræstad, 1912: 7
populi Romani, the common property of the Roman people. The same controversy and conceptual disagreement arose in the questions regarding lakes and rivers. And at some points the Romans of course restricted the notion of the sea as a common property, enemies or peoples with hostile intentions could not be allowed to sail the ocean. From the same line of argument follows the Roman claim to have the right to cleanse the Mediterranean of pirates, since pirates interfered in the use of the highways of the ocean. But the basic philosophy was that the ocean was more of an international than a “national” area of law. In practise, the Romans actually followed this principle by refraining from imperialism at sea. The Roman principle of mare liberum partly survived the fall of the Empire, but mainly in the Italian societies. Only gradually, according to Ræstad, the concept of sea territory evolved. Where did this idea come from? In the Eastern Empire, Ræstad suggests, ocean fishing and the production of salt belonged to the state. Thus Emperor Leon VI (886-911) decided that every landowner should have the exclusive right to fish in the extension of his property (interestingly, this notion also is represented in the Old Icelandic law of the Gragasa). Although there was no agreed way to fix the extension of the territorial sea, a praxis evolved both in The Ottoman Empire and in Byzantium, where the right of coastal fishing was exclusively granted the inhabitants of the land, excluding strangers. The development of sea territory in the Italian cities seems to result from the need for laws to protect trade from piracy. Later on, the Pope banned all piracy within the dominion of the church, called Mare Ecclesia or Mare Pontificis Romani. Ræstad also suggests that fishing within this area were excluded all but the inhabitants of the church state and the citizens of Rome. Bartolus a Saxoferrato (d 1357), seen as founding father of Italian science of law, was the first to formulate in a comprehensive way the right granted to coastal states to uphold jurisdiction over the contiguous waters of a territorial polis. He also, on the basis of Roman law, sought to justify the extension of this sovereignty to 100 millarias. Bodin (1577/1992) quite correctly was to estimate 100 millarias to 30 lieues in his Les Six Livres de la Republique. The point is that the fall of Rome with its power in the entire Mediterranean created the parcelling up of the Mediterranean into sea territories of coastal proto-“states”, dominantly city-states. No single political community had the power to clean up an entire region of pirates “to the benefit of all”. The Holy Roman Empire did not employ any significant units of sea power during the middle Ages. And it was only when the message reached Europe that Columbus had "discovered" America, that the Pope tried to claim global authority concerning the oceans. In a bull from May 4, 1493, the Pope granted the King of Spain and his Crown the property right to all islands and territories that could
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later be found west of a meridian. This meridian was drawn from pole to pole 100 sea miles west of
the Azores and the islands of Cap Verde. In the bull, it was also prohibited to visit or trade in these
territories without permission from the Spanish king. The Portuguese King did not put up with this,
and through the treaty of Tordesilla in June 1494, the Bull was revised to benefit the Crown of
Portugal. This development of course aroused bitter opposing views on the role of jurisdiction over
the sea. Not only were the flood of bullion and other goods making the economic significance more
substantial, but in the eyes of other nations, the Iberian states seemed to behave as colonisers of the
sea themselves.298

At this point, it is worthwhile to pose the question of what, if any, rules on the sea existed beyond
Rome, or to be more specific; in the northeast Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, areas that only were
contiguous to areas under the influence of Roman law.

In the territories that now constitute France, England and Germany, the Roman principle of mare
liberum was *gemeines recht* throughout the middle Ages.299 Even along the coasts of Denmark, there
does not seem to have been restrictions on fishing by strangers. Ræstad300 suggests that this stems
from the fact that, except from the herring fisheries at Skåne where participation was granted
strangers from ancient times, Danish fishermen in the Middle Ages primarily harvested their catches
in waters further away from Danish territory. Now, moving further north and to the Northwest, we
arrive at an interesting finding. In Iceland, Norway, Scotland and (presumably) Sweden, the rules
were the opposite of those in England and continental Europe.301 In these areas, fishing was
exclusively for the local population. While Ræstad is unclear on the position in Sweden, he is
undoubtedly right that parts of Scotland, Iceland and Norway really had a population that depended
entirely on fishing along the coast.302 How important this was to be later in the Nordic-influenced
structuration of the International law of the sea will be demonstrated later in the thesis. The point is
that tradition and law existed very early in these North-Atlantic communities that excluded the rights
of foreigners (or even people from other counties) to fish outside the territory of the coastal

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297 Ræstad, 1912: 14-15. 100 millarias was seen as a distance covered in less than two days of navigation. It is
approximately 148 kilometres.
299 Not that there were not exceptions, for example concerning whaling, perhaps a remnant of Nordic law.
300 Ræstad, 1912: 22
301 According to Stein Rokkan, 1999, the geopolitical distance from Rome and the dorsal spine of Europe mattered
in the process of state building. He clearly saw all the Nordic countries as much less influenced by Roman law than
the other continental European states, claiming that this is one of the main dividing lines among European countries
when it comes to different trajectories of state formation. It is interesting to note that on the concept of sea territory,
Denmark among the Nordic countries “were closer to Rome” than the other Nordic countries. Ræstad argues that
this explains little in the case of the law of the sea. In his opinion, one could hardly claim that Denmark was more
influenced by Roman law than Scotland or the other Nordic countries.
302 See also Armitage, 2000: 107
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communities. How come Scotland took this position? It seems that mare clausum stood much stronger in parts of Northern Scotland and the Scottish islands. This suggests that Scottish law of the sea was influenced by Norwegian authorities, since the same territories at times were under the Norwegian crown in the Middle Ages, as will be shown in a later chapter. If this argument is to be valid, we must be able to show that there were created national laws under the Norwegian crown, and that these were actually enforced along the territory controlled by the King. As most students of Norwegian history know, this indeed was the case. In the old *Gulathingslov* (111), we find rules of inheritance of the King. The rule is based on a mid-line in the ocean, indicating that the Norwegian King had sovereign rights on the “Norwegian” side of the mid-line between Norway and other kingdoms.303 This law can be compared to the Old Icelandic set of laws gathered in the *Gragasa*. In this law (*Koningsbok*, ch 85), it is stated that Icelanders should not make statements in trials abroad or east of the mid-ocean. The same particular phrasing (“*fyrir austan(vestan) mitthaf*”) in the laws of both Iceland and Norway indicates diffusion or even a reciprocal treaty. And actually we find similar judicial propositions in English law. In an English book of law dating from the end of the 13th century, *Le Mirroir des Justices*, we find the same concept of the mid-ocean. The idea of the mid-ocean as a demarcation of some issues on extra-territorial sovereignty is even found in Grotius.304 But we should be careful in interpreting these texts of law. For the practise of relations between sovereigns, its importance was limited, and it was soon to disappear as law even in Northern Europe.305 However, we should note a central empirical point when it comes to applying mare clausum. *Mare clausum need not be only a “defensive” policy of protecting maritime resources along coasts of a state*. If a state with overseas possessions (colonies, sovereignty over smaller islands) claims mare clausum, it might actually take on an offensive attitude. Thus the “mother country” will lay down principles applied for its own coast also for its overseas possessions. This kind of policy is in line with an offensive sort of mare clausum-policy, because it will exclude other actors from the freedom to use the seas in question.

The interesting thing about the concept of the mid-ocean is of course the idea behind it. As opposed to the practise of navigating in the Mediterranean, the Nordic countries were used to navigation in the open seas.306 A result of this, in addition to the laws of fishing near the coast, was rules also for

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303 Ræstad, 1912: 24-25. That this mare clausum views survived long after the Norwegian influence had ceased to exist in Scotland, does not mean that the earlier Norwegian extraterritorial sovereignty explains the phenomenon. Clearly, the mare clausum principle applied to home waters suited Scottish fishing interests. The Kingdoms of England and Scotland prior to the regal union of 1603 had differing interests when it came to maritime rights and principles.

304 Ræstad, 1912: 26

305 Gottman, 1973

the distant waters between territorial kingdoms. Thus the *Gulathing* law (144) regulated the property right to the finder of wreckage in the sea, and the killing of whale at the open ocean (*a djupi*).

Otherwise, the law of the sea (or rather, the practise of sovereigns in Northern Europe in these matters), regulated the relations between Norway and other territories in part built on principles equal to these found in Grotius centuries later. What is of importance is to note the differences between the national laws in the 13th century and *Mare liberum*. Foreign vessels were to be taxed in Norwegian harbours, and navigating north of Bergen to the Northern county of Hålogaland was prohibited any foreigners. Fishing was for the native population exclusively. The King also had the right to levy fines in cases where Norwegians were molested or killed by foreigners at sea (*i kaupferdum*) and even in foreign harbours. It also seems to have been a common view among Scandinavians that the coastal kingdom had some right to provide protection for vessels navigating along the coast of the sovereign. Thus, King Haakon of Norway in the winter of 1247-48 complained to the Council of Lübeck on the grounds that they allowed Norwegian merchants to be plundered near the harbour of the town. Likewise, 40 years later the Lübeck council was accusing the Norwegian King of letting the same thing happen to German merchants near the Norwegian harbours. Ræstad also cites English and Russian 14th century sources indicating that state practise in the Northern waters conceptually had distinctions between the sea territory (*aqua*) and the open ocean (*in libero mari*). The Icelandic law seems to have been especially detailed on regulations concerning the extraction of resources along the coast, but the main point has hopefully been made clear. There actually were laws concerning extra-territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights in Northern Europe in the middle Ages. After the Law of King Magnus Lagabøtr (legislator), Norwegian efforts to jurisdiction at sea was aiming at protecting the trade of fish from Northern Norway, but the weakening of the Norwegian Monarch aborted any efficient jurisdiction.

The early use of sovereign prerogatives in England and France also was to damage *mare clausum*, since the French and English monarchs out of strategic reasons restricted the use of larger ships for use in exports. The result of this was that independent merchant cities gained a superior position in trade in Northern Europe, since they did not have to protect a population scattered over an extensive territory with poor internal communications. This was one of the reasons why Hanseatic cities were to interfere in the sovereignty of the Scandinavian monarchs from the 12th century, especially since Norway initially was dependent on trade with England. And it is evident, in the historical text of

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307 Ræstad, 1912: 29-30
308 Dipl. Norwegicum, IX: 1-2
309 Dipl. Norwegicum, XIX: 220
310 In a letter to King Haakon V dated april 16th 1313, King Edward II clearly states that; "Non enim possumus...tolerare, quod naves de regno nostro, quae semper promptae ad nostrum servitum esse debent, extra idem
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Kongespeilet, that the Norwegians increasingly saw the use of own ships for export and import as a very risky business, partly due to the extent of piracy. The Norwegian sovereign in his trade policy was trying to limit private control with imports, since this could result in imports of luxuries in a time of dearth. This might also be said to have created conflicts not only between the King and the German cities, but also between the native Bergen merchants and the Sovereign as well as the Hanseatic cities. A limited success for the Norwegian merchants was not achieved until 1545. In the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, the question of sovereignty was even more contested. The Norwegians were seen as upholders of the property right of the Nordic sea. Although the Karelians and the bjarmers, nomadic peoples partly living in the Arctic regions for parts of the year, never really came under Norwegian sovereignty, they were seen as Careli infideles, not included in international law as subjects thereof. Thus the Pope granted King Haakon Haakonsson the right to make war on his heathen neighbours. In reality this was interpreted as a right of Nordic sovereignty, and the practise should mean that the Crown had the right to refuse foreigners from gaining a foothold in the barren region of Finnmark and Troms. Sea faring in the area was an exclusive privilege of Norway and later Denmark-Norway. A reflection of this is found in various European sources. Foreign vessels travelled to Russia round North Cape for sure, but the Danish-Norwegian crown was, in accordance with the Haderslev agreement of 1583, to give permission to such voyages. This regulation more or less corresponded to the line Iceland-southern Hålogaland. The Norwegian, and later Danish, kings simply claimed that these Northern waters were something of a Norwegian lake (utrisque littoris quo continetur ratione, or fretum nostrum Norvagicum). Extra-territorial claims to the southern part of the Norwegian Sea and the North sea was considerably less ambitious. But England under Elisabeth was to challenge this claim, as she challenged Portugal and Spain on extra-territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the ambitions of Russia and Sweden strengthened the view of the Oldenburg monarchy that Danish-Norwegian sovereignty in these areas had to be underpinned and defended. The notion of this sea territory was named the “King’s streams” (Kongens strømme); the belt of water around the coast was a natural extension of the land territory, and thus it was under the jurisdiction of the Sovereign. Interestingly, we actually find the same term used in English sources referring to the territorial sea in the 16th century; King’s river and King’s streme. From 1544, we find in Danish and Norwegian sources

Regnum, ad partes remotas, se divertant sine nostra licentia speciali”. The Norwegian historian Arnold Ræstad mus be credited for the way he has used a large number of European sources to reconstruct this.

311 Ræstad, 1912: 97
312 Ræstad, 1912: 152. The most important map dates 1467
313 Ræstad, 1912: 170
that naval vessels were sent out patrolling to keep “The King’s streme clean”. In correspondence between the monarchs in Northern Europe, we increasingly trace the distinction between the territorial sea and the open sea, although the exact demarcation of the two zones was unclear. It seems, according to Ræstad, that by the territorial sea, the sovereigns of the north were referring to the sea in the very vicinity of the shore and the area around the harbours. However, in some letters of the Danish admiralty, claims extending to as much as 6 and 9 sea miles are also found. Certainly, the territorial sea or the King’s streme, did not extend further than the line of sight.

But the Nordic countries were not forming the centre of gravity of international “law” of the sea in the 16th and 17th centuries. Whereas the concept of mare liberum in practise was used in Northern Europe already in the 13th century, the same notion was not in use among Spanish or Italian lawyers. This is not surprising, given the commercial interests of their superiors. In many ways, it was a “pick-and choose”-politics, where different arguments were applied in law in order to suit the interests of the state or particular merchant companies more or less connected to the political sovereign. Thus England naturally contested the Iberian concept of the use of sea that was built on the Tordesillas treaty of 1494. Different “national” customs became increasingly important in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries. Especially the rising English and Dutch powers became the leading stars in conceptualising the law of the sea. Economic and military power was translated into scholarly works and disputes of extra-territorial sovereignty. And to some degree we must say that it was not surprising that exactly Dutch and English interests also were to clash on the concepts of the use of the sea. In England, according to Ræstad, the opinion gradually shifted in favour of the old Norwegian-Scottish system of jurisdiction. This obviously was a result of the ever more intensive Dutch fisheries along the English coast, and the poor results of English fishermen, as these faced an obstacle in coastal fishing at Scotland and Norway. Increased competition from other states made the English lean more towards mare clausum.

The claim to mare clausum by Christian IV of Denmark-Norway resulted in clashes between English and Danish-Norwegian interests. The Danish monarch actually sailed to the coast of Finnmark in the summer of 1599 and confiscated four vessels from Hull, followed by a series of diplomatic note-exchanges and negotiations. The Oldenburg monarchy followed up the claim to mare clausum by continued naval patrolling off Vardø in the following summers. The most

314 Dipl. Norwegicum, XVI: 783-4
315 Scotland actually seems to have been the only European country with exact lines of demarcation of the territorial sea, but the length of it seems to have varied between 14 and 80 miles during the 16th century
316 Gottman, 1973
317 Ræstad, 1912: 193-4
318 Armitage, 2000: 104-105
important outcome of the conflict was negotiations in Bremen in 1602, where the two powers presented their views on jurisdiction at sea.\(^\text{320}\) The significance of this meeting lies in the theoretical and judicial contributions to development of relations between states in the field of law of the sea. The English negotiators denied any extensive claim of sovereign parts on behalf of Denmark-Norway in the sea between Iceland and Norway,\(^\text{321}\) but nevertheless presented a modified version of *mare liberum*. This point of view can be found in the instructions to the English delegates;

> “Though propertie of Sea in some small distance from the coast, maie yeild some oversight and jurisdiction, yet use not Princes to forbid passage or fishing, as is well seen in our Seas of England and Ireland...neither is it to be allowed that propertie of the Sea in whatsoever distance is consequent to the banks, as it hapneth in small rivers”.

Thus, the English view was that the coastal state had some rights to jurisdiction and obligations to offer protection close to the coast. Free passage (later to be called free and innocent passage in international law), and the rights of fishing could not, however, be forbidden other states, not even within these narrow coastal waters.\(^\text{323}\) In a larger context, one should note the very intense activities of negotiations between the *Oldenburg* monarchy and England concerning fishing and trade at Iceland, Lapland and the Faroe islands around 1585 and 1602.\(^\text{324}\) These were conferences aiming at establishing treaties regulating relations between states. Although the practise of violating agreements was notorious, the Monarchs nevertheless laid down considerable efforts in order to solve conflicts peacefully. The relations between England and Denmark were much improved in this respect following the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603. This marks a turning point for the views on extra-territorial sovereignty in the Northeast Atlantic. The “new” English policy was built on the theories of John Dee\(^\text{325}\), converging with the Danish-Norwegian views in important aspects (but note

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319 Ræstad, 1912: 196-197
320 Fulton, 1976
321 Armitage, 2000: 108
322 Ræstad, 1912: 201
323 Arguments in favor of British extraterritorial sovereignty was especially elaborated by John Dee in his works from 1576 till 1597. He was concerned to establish “the legality of Elizabeth’s claims to the islands of the northern Atlantic (including Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Greenland and Friesland) on the basis of her descent from King Arthur, the last emperor of these isles” (Armitage, 2000: 106)
324 Detailed accounts of this is to be found in Ræstad, 1912, and in Bjørgo et al, 1995
325 “Soon after his accession to the English throne in 1603, James began to enforce Scottish policies of *mare clausum* in all of the “British” seas around the coasts of England and Scotland, and thus reversed the more liberal Elizebethan policies that had allowed foreign access to English waters for both fishing and navigation” (Armitage, 2000: 108-109). See also Fulton, 1976: 76-85, 105-7, 124-5. Fulton (ibid: 10) even claims that this reversal of policies was “the beginning of the English pretension to the sovereignty of the sea”
that Selden’s works were kept secret for a long time due to English fears that it would create harsh reactions from other sovereigns. Thus, it was possible for Christian IV to execute some jurisdiction and ban foreign fishing at Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Perhaps a more nuanced interpretation of the changes in English policy is to see the elements of mare liberum it contained as claims to English freedom to use the oceans and to exclude others from the same rights.\textsuperscript{326} In other words, \textit{I propose that elements of mare clausum (which we will analyse later in this thesis) had a long tradition in English views of extra-territorial sovereignty.}\textsuperscript{327} \textit{Mare Britannicum} had historical roots from the First Navigation Acts under Richard II in 1381, and was reiterated under Henry VII (1489) and Henry VIII (1540).\textsuperscript{328} Furthermore, in the case of England, overseas colonies later created a political economy that fostered very substantial exceptions from the mare-liberum principle. Perhaps this effect also could be generalised to European colonial states at large from the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. A comment concerning the Napoleonic Wars by the Danish Naval historian Ole Feldbæk is worth quoting in length here.\textsuperscript{329}

\begin{quote}
\textit{“European states in the eighteenth century were always concerned to tighten the economic bonds with their colonies: they attempted to do this, with varying success, by means of a closed “mercantilist” system. In wartime, states which were weak at sea therefore suffered severely if communications with their colonies could be cut effectively. They usually reacted by trying to liberalise their “mercantilist” systems so as to maintain communication with the aid of neutral shipping. Their adversaries on the other hand would have a vital interest in preventing this challenge to their command of the sea”}.\textsuperscript{330}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{326} Armitage (2000: 102) goes a long way to insist that the history of Britain’s maritime doctrines is a history of Britain itself; “Claims to jurisdiction over the foreshore, home waters, fishing and navigation around Britain were specifically British instances of wider European debates. The ideological history of the British Empire can, to a large extent, be reconstructed from the history of these maritime disputes”

\textsuperscript{327} Thus, I think it is historically inaccurate to claim, as many scholars do, that mare liberum was the dominant international “regime” until the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (for an example of this view held by a distinguished scholar, see Nye, 1983). Mare liberum, as it was sometimes claimed by the British Empire, was more rhetoric than real. Colonial powers in fact were applying mare clausum of their own coasts as well as overseas. Again, freedom for the Great power, at the expanse of all others. Perhaps the Dutch republic, manifested through the writings of Grotius, is the sole example of a European colonial power that actually worried about practising to some degree what they preached in European waters. However, this standard of action did not apply to the same degree outside Europe.\textsuperscript{328} du Jourdin, 1993: 113-114

\textsuperscript{329} I hold it justifiable because it sheds light on the use of the principles. Thus, I believe one should be very careful in interpreting the international institutions of extraterritorial rights as “regimes” of either mare liberum or –clausum prior to WWII (see chapter one on regimes, and footnote above).

\textsuperscript{330} Feldbæk, 1996: 265
The mechanism that Feldbæk points to can be generalised into the axiom that strong European sea powers actually practised mare clausum in times of tension and war, while colonial powers that at the same time were weaker sea powers, thus tried to counteract through mare liberum.\textsuperscript{331}

Improvements in navigational techniques, technological innovations, increased geographical knowledge and the increased resource-extraction from the seas made for incentives to mare clausum. In the first ten to fifteen years of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, whaling became an important industry in the waters of Northern Europe. It was actually the Basques in France and Spain that were the pioneers. This whaling activity spread from Newfoundland to the East off Iceland, where they encountered strong Dutch and English interests. Spitzbergen, discovered by Willem Barents in 1596, was reported to contain fjords and bays rich on whale. The entire part of the Northeast Atlantic soon experienced fierce competition in whaling, largely conducted by Dutch and English companies such as The English Muscovite Company. This immediately resulted in letters from Christian IV to England, France, Spain and the Netherlands, that whaling off Iceland, The Faroe Islands and Norway was prohibited to "strangers".\textsuperscript{332} Whaling off Spitzbergen would only be allowed so far as the parties accepted Norwegian sovereignty of the Islands. As a sign of the difference in the views on the law of the sea, this claim was accepted by the English King and refused by the Dutch (as always the latter were more liberalist in their views), seemingly also by the French Monarch. The outcome of the entire process was a sharing of sovereignty at Spitzbergen by 1637 between The Netherlands, England and Denmark-Norway. In claiming mare clausum, the Danish King was not alone. Karl IX of Sweden in 1608 gave the town of Göteborg the privilege to fish in the “North Sea”. The scene was set for numerous clashes between the Authorities of Denmark-Norway and Sweden off the Norwegian coasts. The Swedes also were of the opinion that they could grant privileges in the North Sea to fishers from other states, as they did to the benefit of the Dutch.\textsuperscript{333} Ræstad is very clear that this maritime conflict was the sole most important cause of the Kalmar war. The peace treaty of Copenhagen from 1613, where the English King had served as middleman, settled the case in favour of Norway. King Gustav Adolf of Sweden thus deprived himself and his successors of any claims to the coastal area that now comprises the coast of Northern Norway.

As the Swedish State rose to the dominant position in Scandinavia, the claim to mare clausum on behalf of Denmark-Norway was somewhat weakened. The de facto power of the Swedish monarch

\textsuperscript{331} Indeed, this inclination towards mare liberum will probably be found in all smaller states negatively affected by restrictions on sea-borne trade and transportation.

\textsuperscript{332} Ræstad, 1912: 220

\textsuperscript{333} Ræstad, 1912: 228-229
was reflected in dimensions of extra-territorial sovereignty, but most visibly in the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the Danish-Norwegian Navy (*fellesflåten*) remained a significant fleet in a European perspective up to the battles with the English fleet led by Adm. Nelson in 1807.

The above excursus is sufficient in order for us to understand the context in which our two ideal-types were systematically elaborated for the discourses of the early modern period. The two concepts are *Mare Liberum*, as worked out by Hugo Grotius, and *Mare Clausum*, as described and argued by especially John Selden and several other of his contemporary English lawyers. They were naturally drawing on various sources from Roman law as well as from medieval lawyers, but are usually credited as “the founding fathers” of these two schools of thought on the Law of the Sea. In their time, and the centuries to come, their concepts, ideas and lines of argumentation helped shape discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty in broad terms. There is little doubt that his treatise on *Mare Liberum* remained the dominant *conceptual* framework within *discourses* on the Law of the Sea. Selden’s contributions are much less celebrated, but his views have partly been fulfilled in the 20th century, a fact to which we will return later. Since Grotius’ thought is particularly influential up to the latter part of the 20th century, a closer investigation on his work on the law of the sea is justified.

Hugo Grotius’ (1583-1645) writings reflect the turbulent circumstances of the period in which he lived. The enlargement of Dutch Maritime power in the face of Iberian and English obstruction is most illustrating in our analysis, needless to say. His “*Mare Liberum*” was published in 1609. In Grotius we find a concept of an international society, primarily consisting of states. The “core” of this society is the Christian states, but somewhat unorthodoxically for his time, Grotius also meant that non-Christian communities belonged to the society, if not from positive volitional law, then through natural law. Indeed, the significance that Grotius ascribed to “just war”, *Mare Liberum* and  

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335 Fulfilled in the sense that both international law and state practise to an increasing degree is in line with some of Selden’s theoretical principles. The application of mare clausum was much more paternalistic in the colonial age than in the post – WWII era, I will claim.
337 Grotius also wrote a defence of chapter 5 in *Mare Liberum* against Wolwood’s criticism. This later treatise was only published in 1872. See Bull, et al, 1992
338 But here there were qualifications, to be sure “*love is not due to all in the same degree…a greater love is due to a father than to a stranger*”, Grotius quoted in Kingsbury and Roberts, 1992: 14. These double standards, these different dispostions to act in foreign policy, was a mark also of Dutch state policy. In effect, it meant that all powers with overseas interests could claim different principles in different regions. However, norms restricted the application of double standards. In the Dutch case, it seems that the Calvinists, heavily involved in the VOC, paid a not unconsiderable degree of attention on whether their actions could be justified.
free trade can be seen as fitting like a glove to the Dutch commercial interests, a view taken by Wallerstein, as well as by Röling, a professor of international law;

“(it)... could reasonably lead to a better world, while it did not in any way restrict the endeavour of subjugating the non-European nations to European authority. Grotius’ system could afford a pretext for every desired act of violence. Thus the phase was inaugurated in which the aggressive conduct of States could be dressed up in terms of the preservation of law and order and of the costly duty of upholding justice”\textsuperscript{339}

Furthermore, Rousseau later argued, not untruthfully, that Grotius favoured tyrants\textsuperscript{340} (and that to a larger degree than Hobbes. Indeed, there is little reason to doubt that “both Mare Liberum and De Jure Belli ac pacis owe much to their author’s political ambitions”.\textsuperscript{341} However, as Roelofsen\textsuperscript{342} suggests, there was more to Grotius’ claim to Mare Liberum than Dutch commercial interests. Although the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) had established monopolies in the East Indies\textsuperscript{343}, hardly in line with Grotius concepts of free trade, there is little doubt that the “arrogance” of Portuguese and especially Spanish fleets was the direct occasion leading to the juridical problem Grotius set out to solve.\textsuperscript{344} VOC was not only a commercial venture, like its English counterpart, but an instrument of warfare against the Iberian empires.\textsuperscript{345} Grotius had to tread warily in order to raise an indictment of Portugal without at the same time compromising the Dutch position. Mare Liberum suited both purposes.\textsuperscript{346} And from the general rules he sets out, the inevitable conclusions are naturally drawn in favour of the Dutch competition with Portugal in the East Indies.\textsuperscript{347}

If we leave aside these serious limitations of the applicability of Grotius thoughts, there is little doubt that Grotius works had an enormous influence on international relations as well as on deliberations of politics in sovereign, western states, as well as in Russia.\textsuperscript{348}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{339} Röling, quoted in Kingsbury and Roberts, 1992: 42. Compare this to Wallerstein’ s assertion that liberalism always benefits the Hegemon
\item \textsuperscript{340} Rousseau, The Social Contract,1993,200-201
\item \textsuperscript{341} Roelofsen, 1992: 97
\item \textsuperscript{342} Roelofsen, 1992
\item \textsuperscript{343} These monopolies were built upon treaties concluded with Indonesian chiefs and rulers.
\item \textsuperscript{344} See Alexandrowitz, 1998: 259 for a description of the circumstances in which grotius wrote the thesis
\item \textsuperscript{345} Roelofsen, 1992: 105
\item \textsuperscript{346} Roelofsen, 1992: 107
\item \textsuperscript{347} See also O’Connell, 1982: 9-10, Brown, 1994: 7
\item \textsuperscript{348} See in particular Bull, 1992, and Butler, 1992
\end{itemize}
so-called human voluntary law, or positive law, and in applying it on the international state of affairs of his time, he was able to draw upon the earlier described Roman idea of *jus gentium*.\(^{349}\)

The direct occasion turning Grotius to the phenomenon of extraterritorial sovereignty actually was a case against a group of shareholders in the VOC. These Shareholders supported the action of an Admiral of the Company who had captured a Portuguese ship in the straits of Malacca. This line of behaviour seemed objectionable in the eyes of the Mennonite shareholders, which regarded any kind of violence as contrary to Christ’s teachings. With this division among the shareholders, the directors of the company turned to Grotius for a legal opinion.\(^{350}\) His “solution” appeared in *De jure Praedae* in 1606, where he claimed that the prize was not a mere act of piracy “but a legitimate act of war, (since it) had occurred in the course of a just war”.\(^{351}\)

The actual publication of the text *Mare Liberum* seems to have been prompted by negotiations between Spain and Holland, which culminated in the truce of Antwerp (1609).\(^{352}\) In this work, he laid down what has become the so-called grotian principle on the law of the sea;

> “The vagrant waters of the ocean are thus necessarily free. The right of occupation, again, rests upon the fact that most things become exhausted by promiscuous use and that appropriation consequently is the condition of their utility to human beings. But this is not the case with the sea; it can be exhausted by neither navigation nor by fishing, that is to say, in neither of the two ways it can be used”\(^{353}\)

In the Northern European context, *Mare Liberum* proved important in Anglo-Dutch relations. Economic rivalry on issues like Arctic whaling and herring fisheries in waters that The English considered as English *dominium* led to serious incidents and direct clashes. The argumentation of Grotius on freedom of fishing provided the basis for Dutch negotiators for sixty years as far as the British claims to a *dominium maris* in the North Sea and the waters off Spitzbergen were concerned.\(^{354}\) The effects of *Mare Liberum* were significant from the outset. Shortly after its publication, King James I in May 1609 proclaimed that foreigners would be allowed to fish in the

\(^{349}\) Bull, 1992: 73  
\(^{350}\) Butler, 1992: 209-210  
\(^{351}\) Roelofsen, 1992: 142-143  
\(^{352}\) Butler, 1992: 210  
\(^{353}\) Colombos, 1968: 62-63  
\(^{354}\) Roelofsen, 1992
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seas of England, Scotland and Ireland only when authorised by England.355 Four years later, the English King granted the English Muscovite Company an exclusive monopoly over whaling in the seas around Spitzbergen.356 Clearly, the English had to put up an argumentation of Mare Clausum, before entering serious negotiations on these disputes with the Dutch. This was to be the position of Mare Clausum. A Scottish jurist and Professor of Civil Law, William Welwood, thus published a partial response to Grotius in 1613 entitled An Abridgement of all Sea-lawes, where he challenged Grotius’thesis that the sea could not be the subject of ownership by a single sovereign.357 Naturally, Welwood partly draw on the coastal communities’ dependency of coastal fishing in his claim for Mare clausum. “As God had divided the earth after the flood, so he had divided the sea, which therefore could be distinguished by boundaries, despite its fluidity”358, Welwood argued (in the only response to Mare liberum that Grotius ever replied to).

Grotius’reply to these English arguments was elaborated in Defensis capitis Quiunti Maris Liberi, which however remained unpublished until 1864.359 While Welwood returned to the dispute in 1615, the most famous response to Mare liberum came in 1617-1618 from John Selden. Mare Clausum (published first in 1635) defended the British standpoints. The sea, Selden claimed, under the law of nations is as capable of private dominion as is the land.

Selden argued that the king of Great Britain was lord of all the sea inseparably and “perpetually appendant to the British Empire”.360 One should be careful, however, to see Selden’s concept as signs of a lasting British policy.361 There is little doubt that Selden362 articulated a position that corresponded with England’s political and economic interests at the time. England was still inferior to Holland in naval terms at the time of King James I, the monarch that actually commissioned Selden to present a response to Holland, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, the philosophy underpinning extraterritorial maritime claims to sovereignty was introduced, making a conceptual and theoretical debate of claims to maritime sovereignty up to the present age. That the English view on extraterritorial sovereignty eventually would have a huge impact, is beyond doubt. The later English occasional embrace of mare liberum-principles was to include crucial elements of the

355 Gottman, 1973
356 Butler, 1992: 210-211
357 Butler, 1992: 210
358 Armitage, 2000: 110
359 Butler, 1992: 210-211
360 Butler, 1992: 211
361 Nevertheless, it also resonates rather well with theories of property right that also became highly influential in Britain. ”Locke’s may therefore have been the first, and perhaps only, theory of property in seventeenth-century England that was explicitly Protestant in its orientation..and applicable to colonial as well as municipal contexts” (Armitage, 2000: 98)
mare clausum doctrine set forth by the lawyer employed by King James I. In fact, one might argue that the question of *dominium* and *imperium* regarding the seas was so utterly important that in the words of a respected historian “Selden’s work provided the foundation for later claims to dominion over the seas in the name of a “British Empire”.”

Other lawyers entered the debate on both sides in the scholarly “battle of the books” regarding maritime jurisdiction, including the Portuguese Freitas. In his *De Justo Imperio Lusitanorum Asiatico* (1625), published the same year as *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* by Grotius. The latter contained his more mature views on the freedom of the seas as part of his analysis of the Law of Nations.

The core of Grotius view came gradually to be the foundation of the dominant *justification* on the use of the high seas. That is, states may, neither individually nor collectively, acquire the high seas by occupation (what was to be counted as the high seas and what belonged to colonial powers was another matter). This follows from the position that the seas are *res communis omnium* or *re extra commercium*. In his view, the principle of the freedom of the seas was nothing other than a “correct conclusion” drawn from “the principles of nature”, or “common consent”. The law of nations, according to Grotius, rests on the latter. He based his argument on the notion that by the Law of Nations, navigation is free to all persons whatsoever. “Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it”. W. Butler explains the core of the intricate, if not necessarily sophisticated by our standards, reasoning of Grotius thus;

“The axiom was laid down by God himself through nature, for since not every place is supplied with the necessities of life, some excel in some things and others in something else. By “divine justice” it was brought about that one people should supply needs of others. Those who deny this law and remove the opportunities for mutual service do violence to Nature herself”.

So maritime expansion and the trade system were institutions of God! There is a clear tendency in Grotius to see this freedom as facilitating utility to everyone concerned.

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362 Selden undoubtedly was indebted to Welwood for his arguments, but the impact of Selden’s work was more important.
363 Armitage, 2000: 119
364 See Alexandrowicz, 1998: 164-166
365 Selden did in fact not dispute this latter axiom.
366 Grotius, the freedom of the Seas, : 7
367 Butler, 1992: 213
But then Grotius concentrated on the physical properties of water, perhaps making his lasting contribution to discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty. Encompassing the entire planet, the seas (as the air) belonged to the *communia, an international society*. The sea cannot be divided and appropriated as other property can. Use of the sea by one country for navigation does not make the sea un-navigable for others. The opposite is often true of most movables. Furthermore, occupation of the seas followed by a situation of custody or ownership is physically impossible. The oceans and parts of it are part of a corporeal whole, and lines demarcating them express only a desire or intention to occupy rather than the capability to do so. The *functions* of sovereignty cannot be performed at sea, or at least at the high seas (thus, defining mare liberum in line with Grotius, it is difficult to see how England could be seen as a mare liberum-actor).

It is nevertheless important to note that Grotius also conceded that coastal appropriations for purposes of *use* could and should be allowed. This point is important because it is reflected in discourses of extraterritorial sovereignty, and because it is illuminating the concept of sovereignty *per se*. The point, according to the “Miracle of Holland”, was that no part of the seas could be in exclusive ownership. On the other hand, the sovereign of a maritime state has a duty to protect the right of all nations to free navigation in adjacent waters, from “which it follows that navigation is free not by command of the ruler but by command of the law of nations”.

While no state had the right to ownership to the sea (*dominium*), he recognised the coastal state’s right of *imperium*, or sovereignty, defined by Grotius as rights of protection and jurisdiction. This sovereignty must then be performed in accordance with the law of nations. While there is no sharp line (*dominium-imperium*) here, the point is highly interesting, since it notes a differentiation of sovereignty itself. These dimensions of sovereignty, in all aspects of interpretation, have followed negotiations on sovereignty at sea ever since. Grotius is especially relevant, since he treats the seabed and the seawaters as mediums with equal status. The right of *imperium* within the territorial sea was formulated and more or less accepted as extending to three nautical miles (more or less corresponding to the range of coastal artillery at the time) in juridical form by the Dutch lawyer Bynkershoek in 1737. This principle reached common international recognition in the 19th century.

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*368* Bull, 1977 saw Grotius as a central contributor to the institutionalist "Grotian" school in IR. I believe that this interpretation actually is solid. The idea of an international community based on freedom makes Grotius highly interesting for our later typology. One could reasonably claim that his ideas on norms of behaviour meant a less dogmatic view of state sovereignty than most of his opponents. But this is not incompatible with the view that states are the principal actors of international relations, and that the pursuit of freedom and wealth is a right to be granted states on the international arena as it is for individuals on a national one.

*369* Armitage, 2000: 109
Extraterritorial Sovereignty – Idealtypes and the Selection of Cases

while state praxis naturally continued to be diverse. More or less, however, the rule was that jurisdiction of the coastal state was within the 3-mile limit, including the right to fish.\footnote{Butler, 1992: 214} In reality, the vessels of other states had relatively free access to fishing and navigation within these territorial waters.\footnote{Fleischer, 1977} This principle was much debated and contested during the 17th century however. It remains a fact that later British philosophers took Selden’s classical treatise further in the direction of British rights to both \textit{dominium} and \textit{imperium} of European seas.\footnote{Andresen, 1987: 13} A conceptual ambiguity nevertheless prevailed. Just as earlier theorists were haunted by the wish to justify both \textit{dominium} and \textit{imperium}, later theorists and humanists in European powers were to be torn between two irreconcilable goals; liberty and empire. We have then arrived at the point where (a) the historically created maritime ideologies should be analytically combined with (b) the most crucial historical experiences and state preferences that in sum would shape national principles on ocean policy. Many words of warning should naturally be issued here, since we clearly are dealing with combinations of ideal-types. It is certainly the case that the concrete content of \textit{mare liberum} and \textit{mare clausum} have changed in time and space. For example, it has, as will be demonstrated in a later chapter, been possible to combine claims to territorial waters along the coast to protect fishing with strong defences of the freedom of the high seas. Any coastal state would prefer to have it both ways.\footnote{Armitage, 2000: 121-124 gives an overview of these. One of these was Sir William Petty, who found his “Hobbesian solution to the problem of competing sovereignties as a northern European \textit{mare clausum} centred on England” (ibid: 151)} But politics is often about prioritising between goals where it is simply not possible to have the best of both worlds. Therefore, I hold that the \textit{regulation of the uses of the seas for ocean faring}\footnote{The point is evidenced by the exclusive economic zone, an entirely new concept introduced at the UNCLOS III negotiations. More interesting is the effect of such a combination of \textit{mare clausum} and \textit{mare liberum}.} of all sorts is the most crucial issue in ocean politics through history at large. What distinguishes the present situation from earlier times is rather the territorialisation of the narrow sea adjacent to coasts. However, if we are to single out THE most important distinction between coastal states that have determined state principles and preferences on ocean politics, I suggest that we look into the distinction between \textit{states with various degrees of overseas interests}. Thus, I propose to combine the maritime principle (\textit{mare liberum} – \textit{mare clausum}) as ideology, with the variable of material interests (degrees of overseas interests) as in Figure 2.1.1, which produces four different ideal-typical categories of dominant foreign policy habituses (see below);
The utility of this simple typology as a first step rests in its openness. At this stage in our enquiry, we should be sensitive to different historical trajectories within our conceptual framework. And then again, one could easily split up this structural equation into a number of additional columns. However, there is no mechanical relationship from the “independent variables” to the dependent variable in the figure above. Thus, my main point so far is that the ideological doctrines of mare liberum and mare clausum are less “given” than what the figure indicates. I have simply chosen to see ideology as a binary variable, because mare clausum and mare liberum have been clear alternatives of justifying state policy at different times and under different circumstances. I suspect that both state interests (overseas-not overseas) and state principles in the form of more or less recognised references on the international arena (liberum-clusum), are results not only of the international position of the state in the state system, but that they to a large degree reflect the habitus in the foreign policy of the state. Habitus is an ambiguous concept. However, I wish to express that the different experiences of state building made states into different geopolitical entities, in the sense that different historical trajectories made for different dispositions to act in particular ways through foreign policy. Likewise, at critical historical junctures, states might change this habitus-often through the results of wars. These changes could affect regional security complexes. One needs only think of Scandinavia as an example, where Denmark and Denmark-

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376 Mare liberum and mare clausum thus are both state principles as well as contents of international institutions. The content of these international institutions thus partly reflect both international interaction as well as state preferences of the most influential powers mediated by the same international interaction (see figure 2.1.0). I find this way of placing the variables in a four-cell table containing textual data more illustrating than what orthodox methodology demands of presentations of descriptive data.
Norway fought numerous devastating wars with Sweden, and where both Sweden and Denmark were significant colonial powers until the 18th century. This stands in sharp contrast to the Nordic "zone of peace" of the 20th century. Likewise, the historical junctures in state formation at times influenced the content of international institutions. Here, the example of the US after 1941 is illustrative.

The argument in structuration logic is somewhat circular. However, the main point is that there is a huge amount of empirical variation in each of the cells in the four categories in the figure that are not explained by dichotomies as depicted in the figure.

I divide overseas interests into four simple categories on the main material variable; overseas interests. Of course this is a crude division of categories. Thus overseas interests should be seen primarily as the “aussen” side of the state policy, while the ideological position *mare clausum-mare liberum* also holds an “innen” side (of the political culture) of the units.

On the domestic side, the distinction can shed light on why different maritime principles came to dominate the foreign policy of individual states. Typically, this makes for a highly interesting comparative enquiry. For example, we should pose the question whether US maritime policy after WWII reflects the difference to the former European great powers with colonial experiences. The colonial legacy might very well be of significance. The ties to former colonies sometimes made it difficult for European states to disentangle them from a paternalist sentiment in their foreign policy. Both governments and pressure groups might have been inclined to state the principles of their homeland on an extraterritorial basis; they should be followed in the mother country as well as in the third world or in “white dominions”. While this might have been a predominantly paternalistic policy after WWII, it was certainly more aggressive and arrogant in the fierce competition of the 18th and 19th Centuries. That is not to say that norms did not modify the policies of these states as well. Britain is an illuminating case in this respect. When the Whigs came to office in 1806, they began to practise their anti-slavery policy. This actually resulted in payments to Portugal and Spain to stop their slave trading. A slave “squadron” was set up to control the Atlantic and free slaves, costing 2% of British Government peacetime spending for years.377

At the same time, I wish to hypothesise that also states with low degrees of overseas interests could hold principles that are lending *either* to *mare clausum* or *mare liberum*. Coastal states, be it

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377 See Lloyd, 1996: 129-130. It is nevertheless commonplace among theoreticians in the social sciences to project traits of the 19th century British Empire back to the 17th and 18th centuries. Needless to say, this produces a more benign interpretation of the English trajectory than that described here.
peripheries or semi-peripheries\textsuperscript{378} that depend on open sea-lanes of communication for security and exports and imports to a far larger degree than local fishing interests, will lean more to the doctrine of mare liberum than to that of mare clausum. Typically, this must have been the case, I suggest, for some of the dominions in the Commonwealth for many years after WWII. Likewise, it is not unreasonable to assume that also western states themselves did not contribute significantly to the maritime ion, but that nevertheless were dependent on an open international economy, band-wagoned behind powerful mare liberum states in the last half of the 20th century.

On the other hand, it would be entirely rational for Governments and pressure groups in small coastal states depending on their fishing industry to lean towards mare clausum if those fishing resources are extracted from the waters adjacent to the shoreline. Typically, one should expect that this nevertheless gave small coastal states a dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted to maximise their national jurisdiction over coastal resources, on the other hand, they depended on powerful states in order to secure such an outcome. Thus, a complex process of continuous and at times implicit bargaining took place between small states and large powers. Summing up these concepts, we end up with hypotheses on where to look for connections between the historical legacy of states and their dominant principles on maritime foreign policy.

Thus, I set forth the hypothesis that the claims to different natures of international institutions regulating the maritime world order has been fundamental to the foreign policies of maritime powers and coastal states alike. If we combine the maritime principles that we see as ideology, with material interests in the form of overseas interests, we still need to clarify interests in a way that is open to evaluation (i.e: ideas do not matter “all the way down”). If we are to compare polities in space and time, this demarcation must be robust enough to serve our analytical purposes. In other words, this categorization within the typology cannot be highly detailed and elaborate as to produce a tool unsuited for the empirical and larger theoretical aim. I therefore set forth the following categories for overseas interests and corresponding values for the categorization of units.

\textsuperscript{378} Again, the concepts from Wallerstein are used as signifying different degrees of influence on the world scene in line with Michael Mann’s IEMP-model. That is to say, while Wallerstein sees the core, semi-periphery and periphery as categories which powers are largely defined in economic terms, I see the categories as indicating both economic, military, political and ideologic power. In line with Mann, I hold that neither of these sources of social power should be given primacy.
Both “brute” material factors as well as more contingent ones are included in the criteria. But both classes of attributes are observable social facts. The criteria reflect the difficulty one inevitably encounters when considering how to operationalize degrees of interests. For example, is there an accurate AND exact dividing point between strong political overseas interests and overseas interests in the form of strong economic interest? Any attempt at creating such definite criteria could be criticised. On the other hand, I claim that the above rules are reasonable. A legacy of former overseas empire often had the effect that the territory had closer economic ties to its former colonies or dependencies. It is reasonable, furthermore, to claim that there is a difference between having a strong merchant fleet without overseas naval bases and a large power navy on the one side, and on the other side indeed maintaining several or many overseas bases and being one of the strongest naval powers. Now, combining these categories with the division between mare clausum and mare liberum, pure ideal types of maritime ideology, a typology of 8 ideal types is constructed.
Figure 2.1.2; Maritime principles, overseas interests and foreign policy dispositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Mare liberum</th>
<th>Mare clausum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong political overseas interests</td>
<td>International liberalism</td>
<td>Paternalism or imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas interests in the form of strong economic interest</td>
<td>Bandwagoning liberalism</td>
<td>Bandwagoning mare clausum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect overseas interests</td>
<td>Former small empires</td>
<td>Post-colonial territories clinging to dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax havens and flags of convenience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No dominant overseas interests</td>
<td>Bandwagoning peripheries</td>
<td>Sovereignty-seeking peripheries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 8 categories are pure ideal types of state foreign policy habitus. The alternative hypothesis to the ones we presented in chapter one was that ideologies do not matter to any significant degree. Now, the typology above will be used to demonstrate that ideas do matter; they explain differences among units with the same degree of overseas interests. In substitute for saying that there is one category of states according to each category of interests, we propose that there are two for each category of interests. The model should then be able to investigate whether the “principles” (ideology) are necessary variables to explain empirical variance. Let us see what the 8 idealtypes represent.

There are two idealtypes of states with strong political overseas interests. The first is international liberalism, which refers to the notion of a liberal international political economy. I think it is right to emphasis two main elements of this ideological structure. Both these elements stem from the classic writing of Adam Smith. The first is anti-mercantilism (at least in principle). The second is anti-colonialism, in the sense that trade between all territories should be free. Although there are
empirical variations among units in this class (and paradoxes\textsuperscript{379} abound in their internal efforts to reconcile principles), I claim that they all endorsed the free international market. Of course they all faced crisis in which they sought to defend their home industry through policies to some part marked by temporary mercantilism, but this has not been the dominant justification and self-understanding of their polis. Nevertheless, these tensions between political practise and political principles have often resulted in paradoxes, which perhaps is more evident in the Dutch Republic and the US than in most other sea powers. At times, principles had to yield to national interests, but this seldom occurred without a collective, national feeling of guilt. Ideas mattered for these units. Opposed to the other major powers, the international liberalists increasingly came to see colonies under direct rule and the yielding of own sovereignty to supranational organisations as a threat against the ideal principles of free trade, prosperity and peace. Attempts at restricting international commerce were thus something “unnatural”\textsuperscript{380}, since the freedom to barter and trade and to de-centralised decision-making was seen as embodied in natural law.

Historically, few powerful states have consistently claimed these principles. However, I find that the principles nicely illustrate difference in attitudes from the other category of states with important overseas interests, which is paternalism or imperialism.

**Imperialism – empire- hegemony- paternalism;** all are contested concepts. Conceptually, hegemons might thrive without formal empire. Informal empires might thrive without colonies. The main hypothesis in the table above is that states with strong overseas interests might have developed a mare-clausum justification of their policy. This position is probably found in states seeking empire. Furthermore, I expect that “paternalism” is a word that describes *mature forms of imperialism, or a post-imperial sentiment*. States with overseas colonies developed, more or less, sentiments where the colonial power had special responsibilities in their colonies or former colonies. Thus, a natural consequence was that the principles with support in the colonial power also should be extended to the colonies. At times the imperial powers included special restrictions, especially on the rights of other states to trade and interact with the colony in question. Imperialists more or less felt free to make incursions to a very substantial degree into the sovereignty of other states or potential states. They did so by justifying the rights of states, as “international persons”, to gain property. Thus, their actions could gain wealth and security, and not only for themselves. Colonies could gain as well, and be “modernized”. Especially when it came to religious conversion, imperialism then could even

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\textsuperscript{379} See for example, Ellis, 1993: 24-26 on US political culture

\textsuperscript{380} This does, again, not mean that they were free of the tendency towards ”Blue-water Lockeanism” (see below).
be interpreted as part of the “white man’s burden”. Accordingly, the “civilised” nations developed the colonies and more inferior states when these did not have the ability to do so themselves. That these enforced policies were not necessarily welcome or very advantageous for the dependency was of less interest, since they did not have the strength to realise their claims.

From a contemporary point of view, we nevertheless should be careful in interpreting the present foreign policies of the earlier imperialist states as results of their past in a determinist fashion. Colonialism in the classic sense belongs to the past, at least if we by imperialism refer to the direct rule or exploitation of weaker nations. However, we have not defined imperialism in this sense in the discussions above. The defining mark of imperialism is its incursion into the sovereignty of other states. What has changed is the form and content of incursions into sovereignty. Conceptually, then, the problem with the term “Empire” and “Imperialism” is indeed the various forms and contents attached to the concepts. Cain and Hopkins have simply not operationalised what types and forms of “incursions” into other states sovereignty that should count as imperialist incursions. In order not to end up in a thesis primarily discussing the theoretical concepts themselves, I choose to see imperialism and paternalism as two ideal-types that should be used to describe two different, but related, dispositions to act and two distinct but related bases for justifying these acts in foreign policy. In the empirical analysis in this thesis, I restrict imperialism to mean a direct or indirect rule of extraterritorial units, where this rule itself violates democracy in the dependency. Although this turn perhaps invites further conceptual discussions, I will claim that it is a reasonable ideal-type that is both historically sensitive and theoretically consistent. I believe it to be consistent, because imperialism only exists when the colonies, dominions or dependencies that form part of the empire remain in empire against their own will. In sum, colonialism in this meaning does not exist in

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381 In his Second Treatise of the two Treaties of Government (1690), John Locke developed a theory of property that had a lasting contribution in justifying Western colonialism. Firstly, Locke claimed that Aboriginal peoples were in a pre-political "state of nature". Opposed to the "civilized" nations (which had come to a higher stage in historical development), these pre-political societies had no established system of property and government. Secondly, these "primitive" peoples had property rights only in the products of their labour. Based on these assumptions, Locke drew the conclusion that Europeans were free to acquire property rights to vacant land. And then again, the aboriginal peoples would be better off with conversion to the European commercial system, sharing in the greater abundance of commodities and jobs. And fourthly, since the primitive societies had not institutionalised property and government, it followed that they were not political societies, making it justifiable for Europeans to deal with them not on a nation-to-nation-basis but as individuals under natural law! See Tully, 1998: 350-4

382 Often the justification was based on explicit or implicit racism, in the form of the survival of the fittest or the racial hierarchy of the nations. See Quinn, 2002: 7-9

383 On the "right and duty" to civilize in the case of France, for example, see Quinn, 2002: 5-6

384 Cain and Hopkins, 2002.

385 Inherent in this way of seeing imperialism is the built-in assumption that imperialism is non-democratic. This does not mean that a colonial power is an autocracy, but it means that an imperial power (in this sense) that claims to be democratic, conduct a foreign policy, indeed a policy in general, towards the colony that have undemocratic consequences for the latter.

386 In the words of John Adams, "An Empire is a despotism", cited in Kilian, 1998: 307
relationships where the colony is free to secede from the empire. It is also possible, through the above definition, to have democratic structures in the colony itself while it at the same time is part of the empire. The phenomenon of imperialism nevertheless exists in this situation if the imperial power does not grant the dependency the right to leave the empire (which in turn perhaps will be a threat towards the internal democracy of the colony). Such a polis should simply not be seen as a community ruled by the will of its people, it is to a large degree ruled by the colonial power. Simultaneously, the definition opens up for the possibility that the imperial power grants the dependency sovereignty, thus opening up a period of political transition for the former colony. In accordance with my definition above, I claim that imperialism nevertheless has ceased to exist in such a situation (the distinction might seem artificial, but it is not, neither judicially nor theoretically speaking). Although empire and imperialism are bound to remain contested concepts, I nevertheless believe it to be necessary to restrict their meanings. The arguments by Abernethy parallel this approach.

When scholars apply the terms empire and imperialism to include relationships that cannot be included in my more strict definition above, they probably do so from pragmatic reasons. Imperialism and empire are well-known concepts. They describe a historical phenomenon, and evoke interest and invite debate when applied to contemporary relationships between states and nations. However, I have chosen the term paternalism to describe the attitude and practices of post-imperial states. Paternalism signifies extraterritorial sovereignty de jure and de facto, but it is a weaker form of these claims than is imperialism. Paternalists, in an ideal-typical sense, are shaped by their past through their images of themselves as great powers. This image is still evident in their national pride, symbolic sentiments and in their special interest and involvement in the political, economic and social developments of their former colonies. I wish to give it a far more empirical and concrete content later in the thesis. At this point, the existence of the paternalist disposition to act and to shape international institutions remains a hypothesis. Still, I believe the colonial legacy has left significant imprints on the foreign policy-dispositions of former empires. As decolonisation and national independence became global, and as human rights became important elements of what constitutes the modern, democratic state, former empires in the Western world also were influenced by what Abernethy labels a guilt complex: “a desire to atone for past sins has probably played a

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387 The term “free” is naturally debatable here.  
388 Where this wish is expressed by the political leadership of the colony or by its people through elections or referendum.  
389 Abernethy, 2000: 19-22 is one of the best attempts I have yet seen at trying to introduce conceptual clarity in this line of work. As with my definitions here, Abernethy’s approach is distinctively political, focusing on the coercive elements and capabilities of regulation in the relationships between empire and colony.
role, however sublimated, in the foreign policy of former metropoles”. All the same, guilt may occur side by side with a sense of superiority. Thus, it is something of a historical paradox that Western commentators apply demanding moral standards when evaluating the foreign policy of their own countries and its allies, while “developing countries” not infrequently are assessed by lower standards.

It is useful to contrast liberalism and paternalism as ideal types, since the difference between the two theoretically should be of great significance to the nature of hegemonies, both categories by necessity including great powers. Schematically, some differing features of the two idealtypes are summed up in figure 2.1.3.

Figure 2.1.3: Defining characteristics of international liberalism and paternalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International liberalism</th>
<th>Paternalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ No significant, enduring history of overseas colonies with direct rule</td>
<td>➢ Imperial or former imperial power with overseas colonies for more than a decade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Tendency to support principles of formal equality between states and nations</td>
<td>➢ Tendency to see states and nations ordered on the basis of hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ High degree of free market policy colouring economic principles</td>
<td>➢ Higher degree of protectionism within the empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ More inclined to support mare liberum rather than mare clausum principles in international institutions</td>
<td>➢ Often choosing a pick and choose approach to international institutions that favour the national interest, or outright use of power to ensure dominance in markets or control of territories and sea lanes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

390 Abernethy, 2000: 383
391 ibid: 383-4. Abernethy does not extend his interesting remarks on these points into a discussion. In my view, this mixture of guilt and superiority is highly interesting and potentially substantial.
There are also two categories of states among the polities with strong economic overseas interests. The band-wagoning states depended upon stronger powers that more or less protected their interests to a larger degree than other major powers had the power or motivation to do. Band-wagoning states in this thesis have in common a rather pronounced overseas interest that had economic but not primarily political manifestations. This can to a large degree be seen in their significant merchant navies. Nevertheless, some bandwagoning states also had strong coastal interests (i.e: fishing, offshore activity), which made them into opportunists in the sense that they wanted both mare liberum and mare clausum – the challenge for these states was to find a middle ground. However, I propose that this last group of states ought to be labelled band wagoning mare clausum nations.

The third interest-category is the one of polities with only indirect overseas interests. Tax havens and flags of convenience territories were not necessarily directly dependent upon the protection of their maritime rights, but were territories that gained from liberal practises and institutions on the international arena. For example, these territories benefitted from their domestic ability as bankers and financers, which in turn depended on international liberalism. The former small empires had the same maritime ideology and same degree of overseas interests, but predominantly out of different reasons. In these territories, a bandwagoning logic appeared, coupled to indirect overseas interests that partly were legacies of former imperial traditions.

Lastly, there are also two categories of states with no dominant overseas interests. Post-colonioal territories clinging to dependency were territories that actually insisted upon remaining parts of the motherland (colonial power) or dominion in the post-colonial age. They did this either out of economic or security political interests. For example, threats from other powers could make these territories calculate that they were actually better off with remaining formally within the orbit of their colonial masters or protectors.

The peripheries are states that naturally also are heavily influenced by major powers in the international system and dependent upon the balance of power. However, they had very limited overseas interests. The peripheries that also had limited coastal resources became predominantly mare liberum, or bandwagoning peripheries. On the other hand, one group of peripheries was characterized by being som dependent upon their coastal maritime community that they sought to carve out as much sovereignty over these resources as possible, often by opposing major powers by peaceful means. The latter category is the sovereignty seeking peripheries.
These ideal types are hypotheses of what can be summed up as \textit{dispositions to act}\textsuperscript{392} on the policy area of maritime resources in a broad sense. The broad sense rests in the fact that for large powers and the states affected by large powers alike, extraterritorial sovereignty was represented not only by ocean politics. Rather, ocean policy is a trait of the principles of sovereignty claimed by any sovereign or sovereignty-seeking organisation. Particularly, extraterritorial sovereignty is connected to imperialism, since imperialism left an imprint on centre and periphery in the international system. Conceptually, Cain and Hopkins have grasped the essence of imperialism when they claimed that, “\textit{The distinguishing feature of imperialism is not that it takes a specific economic, cultural or political form, but that it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state}”.\textsuperscript{393} I choose the same standpoint as the authors just cited, but with some qualifications. The above is not a totally adequate \textit{definition} of imperialism, and it is hardly a \textit{distinguishing feature} that allows us to separate imperialism from \textit{other} related relationships between nations, in my view. Many state and non-state actions means incursions into the sovereignty of another state. In this thesis, I shall see \textit{imperialism} as \textit{intended} incursions by actors (primarily states) on the international arena, \textit{in the aim of} increasing the economic, military and political power of the mother country (which does not mean that imperialism always was a suited mean to reach such aims).\textsuperscript{394} However, I do have a major point of criticism against the definition by Cain and Hopkins that is not remedied by the above qualifications. If imperialism includes all these forms and levels of incursions into the sovereignty of other units, then imperialism is an incredibly broad concept. This is the reason why I introduce the concept paternalism to signify the post-imperial condition as a label for the European historical large powers and for polities whose foreign policy was marked by the colonial legacy.

As usual in a data-reducing typology, there will be unites at the borderlines between categories. This is inevitable in empirical analysis guided by ideal types. Particularly challenging, yet also valuable, are the cases of territories that have had historical trajectories that in some cases clearly have made them cross over from one type to another. For example, it is tempting to investigate how former colonies and dominions behaved in ocean politics after gaining independence. Furthermore, even large powers experiencing defeat in international competition were temporarily or permanently altered.

\textsuperscript{392} The term \textit{"dispositions to act"} is translated from Norwegian “\textit{handlingsdisposisjoner}”. I have borrowed it from professor Odd Bjørn Fure (Address Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, Bergen, February 25\textsuperscript{th} 2002)

\textsuperscript{393} Cain& Hopkins, 2002: 54

\textsuperscript{394} Seeing it the other way around makes little sense, in my view. But a central point must include that the territory occupied by the empire was inhabited by other peoples at the time of occupation. Thus, future claims to independence could take different forms by the nation in question.
Although I have pledged that this openness to historical development is a virtue inherent in the scheme, there is also reason to expect a closer connection to macro theories. I wish to point out the most crucial element concerning the international level in such a study. Both IR-scholars and world-system theoreticians converge around the importance of international hegemons. In turn, the ideological, institutional and economic composition of these hegemons always influences world order and international institutions. Hegemons have had the largest influence on the creation of international institutions for regulating the maritime world order. In the 17th Century, The Dutch Republic was successful in forging international relations in their own interests for a short period, although this hegemony was constantly under pressure, and perhaps never achieved a stable foothold.

The centre of gravity on this question came to rest on England. In 1587 Russia had claimed the principle of the freedom of the sea (“The Sea is God’s road”). As we already have noted, Queen Elizabeth I affirmed the same principle, but this was to a large degree due to Spanish protests against Drake’s expedition. The early inconsistenty of English claims to extra-territorial principles can be seen by how Stuart policies reversed the trend, until a formal standpoint of mare liberum was seemingly realised after the House of Orange succeeded to the English throne in 1689. That Dutch interpretations had rested on the same doctrine all along has been shown above. However, the praxis of England through wars and diplomacy was mare clausum, despite rhetoric of free trade. This will be demonstrated in our empirical analysis.

With the maritime revolution and overseas expansion reaching its maturity, naval power and shipping interests in the 19th century maintained European influence upon institutions of maritime extraterritorial institutions. What is more, the British Naval hegemony of the 19th Century ensured that at the entrance of the 20th Century, mare liberum as the dominant judicial principle was applied in a way that suited the British Empire. In other words, praxs was built on highly selective interpretations of international law. We should note, however, that mare liberum remained a principle, and to a lesser degree international law. State power dominated, not international law or

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395 Butler, 1992: 211  
396 Ræstad, 1912  
397 Butler, 1992: 211-212  
398 See Nye, 1983 for a comment upon the shift between world orders and the different meanings of naval hegemony at various times. I cannot but disagree with Nye on one central point. Scholars of international regimes project the present into the past when they interpret mare liberum as an international regime prior to the 20th Century. The critique of regime theory set forth by Susan Strange, 1983 certainly applies to this wide application of the term international regimes (see 1.3). I think it is more appropriate to see state practise and agreements as international institutions.
regimes. This also means that the big powers dominated the interpretation and praxis of extraterritorial sovereignty. Although there existed international institutions of maritime sovereignty prior to the 20th Century, there did not exist earlier international regimes in the same issue-area. For international regimes to exist, a formalisation of the existence of, and multilateral cooperation to uphold, the institution must be established and maintained.

Germany and the US were latecomers on the arena of maritime sovereignty; indeed they were late state formations compared to the early European states. The first ships of what generously could be labelled a German Navy were set afloat as late as 1848.399 The American Congress laid the modest ground of a US NAVY through the Rhode Island resolution in 1775, commissioning two ships in October the same year.400 One further macro-aspect of the history of the hegemonic USA separates it from the Netherlands and Britain. The US never had a colonial empire resembling that of the European overseas empire.401 Germany, although being a latecomer as state and as a competitor in the race for colonies, lost its colonies after WWI. Did these different national trajectories affect state policies on international maritime institutions? I suggest that they did, and that the American hegemony of present thus is crucially different than the British up till WWII. The dominance of mare liberum enforced by colonial powers, that perhaps suited core states more than peripheries, should be possible to evaluate against the background of weaker coastal states. This is the task set for chapters 4-5, but I hope the elaboration above is sufficient at this point to make probable the categorisation of units that follows in 2.2. Furthermore, if the territorialisation of the seas from 1945 on suited peripheries more than large powers, how could this be explained? Was the American hegemony so different from the hegemonic aspirations of the Netherlands, Britain and Germany that it altered world politics? If what matters is not the existence of hegemony, but what state is hegemon402, then it should be evidenced through the material presented here.403

399 Gildea, 1996
400 Howarth, 1991:7
401 The historian Geir Lundestad (1996) has called the US “an empire by invitation”, but uses empire in another sense than I. Surely the US has had global interests since WW2, but this “empire” does not resemble the sea-born empires of the Netherlands and Britain. Lundestad’s point is that US influence, partly through a strong military presence, largely came about through official negotiations with the host country. There could be substantial benefits for the host country for such co-operation. For discussions of formal versus informal empires, see Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 53-56
402 This is the hypothesis set forth by John Gerard Ruggie, 1993.
403 One should note that the position taken here is not as Gramscian as that taken by Cox, 1993.
2.2 Extraterritorial state interests – units and hypotheses

Moving from conceptual and theoretical framework to concrete hypotheses of the connections between maritime principles and state-building experiences demands that we arrive at a categorisation of units within the typology. This is the ultimate aim for this chapter, but the results are certainly not the last words on how these units developed their foreign policy habitus and how they participated in the crafting of international institutions. Rather, the ordering of units into idealtypes forms the hypotheses that the empirical analysis will be built upon.

2.2.1 State principles and preferences

From what has been elaborated on extra-territorial sovereignty above, it should be clear that the meaning of the term has varied in time, and that it still is a many-faceted concept. How could the phenomenon of extra-territorial sovereignty be married to the more general framework on state autonomy with its connection to the state- and world-system? My aim here is firstly (in 2.2.2) to discuss the utility of the framework and try to place different territories into the typological map. The states or countries that belong to the central cluster of units, the North East Atlantic, are England/Great Britain, Ireland, The Netherlands, Finland, Iceland, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden as well as the USA (the territories with the weakest polities at times had no influence on international institutions in this area). These countries in turn form nodes of communication and interaction with various other units.404

Nevertheless, in order to increase the validity of the theoretical framework itself, I include a discussion of the units that are to be studied in 2.2.2. In an analysis of the countries facing the North East Atlantic, it is thus time to construct an ideal-typical conceptual map that allows us to connect our overall theoretical framework to the phenomenon of extra-territorial sovereignty with reference to the particular countries in our study. Effective jurisdiction in the territorial sea, including the ability to regulate trade in harbours of the state, corresponds to materialist incentives that predominantly created a bias in favour of a policy of *mare clausum*. *Mare clausum*, it will be

404 Demarcation and definition of the unit is indeed a central methodological problem in this study as in area-studies and historical studies on coastal communities. See for example Braudel, 1996. There is no doubt that The Netherlands, France, and later the EEC/EU all have been important participants in the North East Atlantic. It is also impossible to exclude brief analysis of the Baltic Sea even in a study primarily dealing with the Atlantic, since the connections between these seas at times have been unavoidable. On the other hand, this line of reasoning ends up in the methodological rules of Andre Gunder Frank, 1998, who in a critique of Eurocentrist scholarship has argued that all history and social scientific work must deal with *the Globe* as a unit. Thus, Frank believes that one avoids constructing a history of Europe, where all other peoples become the people without history. In other words, all
remembered from 2.1, comes in two principally different configurations; the defensive and the offensive claim to territorial sovereignty. The ability *de facto* to use the sea lines of communication off the state, that is; to conduct sea-borne trade and exports and imports from other states and organisations, correspond to materialist incentives that predominantly creates a bias in favour of a policy of *mare liberum*. But then again, *mare liberum* does not mean that it only is the preferred principle for large economic powers. They are just as important for peripheries and bandwagoning states heavily dependent upon exports and imports, with large merchant fleets or strong economic overseas interests. These are variables that in turn are dependent upon both international factors of the state system and the world economy. But the states, in varying degrees to be sure, also affected the external arena in this field of international relations. They were not only affected by the structuration of the emerging international order, but they were, at times, important players on the arena, taking part in the crafting of international structures. State leaders, politicians, officers, guilds, cities, merchant companies, state companies, professions and unions were the rational actors that for practical reasons can be designated as a single unit under the name of their state or region.

But it follows that these units we call states were internally structured also in other respects than by some logic of being states in the “core”, “semi-periphery”, “periphery” or being more or less politically and militarily strong, measured by some index of realist theory. These internal structures in their turn affected how *other* state elites perceived the other unit. Indeed, structures also influence the cognition of policymakers, political parties, the media, pressure groups and the opinion in general.

This “national image” represents a knowledge structure that must be taken into account when studying international as well as domestic political institutions. But there is more to it than perceptions, ideas don’t matter “all the way down” as more radical constructivists seem to argue. The point is that the internal composition of states (economy, civil society and political regime to mention a few crude indicators) also constitutes the state as an actor. Although, on the external
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arena, the state must be recognised as such, it is not unlikely that the structure of the state and the peoples and territory that it tries to be sovereign over, create incentives for particular policies and particular action at the international level. Over time, a pattern -a structural component of foreign policy- emerges out of this complexity.

The question is how these structures affect state behaviour in the form of foreign policy. A typology trying to take into account so various sets of factors nevertheless is a conscious act of data-reduction. But this reductionism appears on the level of hypothesis, and must be confronted with, in a detailed historical narrative, the structuration of extra-territorial sovereignty on the part of the coastal state and of the international order or disorder regulating international regimes. I claim that the most interesting fault line lies on the frontier of transportation and other, more territorialized resources. In sum, whether the categorisation of each, single unit in the scheme is correct, is an empirical question. The utility of this preliminary ordering of units and variables lies in the possibility to extract the cases that make for the most fruitful comparisons, and to discuss deviations from the idealtypes.

Without pertaining to introduce a ready-made Theory of how maritime variables affected, and was affected by, state building and –consolidation in the North east Atlantic system, I propose to illustrate the typology by the following configurations of territories (section 2.2.2 of this chapter is a discussion of these hypotheses).
The grouping of states as units into the different categories represents hypotheses. By combining material interest in an idealtypical differentiation with the two ideological idealtypes, we propose that it is possible to find clear similarities between the countries within each category, and
differences between the different categories. However, we must refine the selection of units and discuss whether all categories are suitable for the empirical and theoretical purpose of this study.

2.2.2 Selection of the units based on hypotheses

We have borrowed from a rich menu of social science theory thus far. History has shaped what the states are, as it has changed the outlook of the international system. But there is a balance between the uniqueness of history and generalisations, to be sure. Models are tools to interpret history, without explicit models we will drown in empirical details. Nevertheless, I propose a modest level of abstraction. The structure of the argument was sketched in Figure 2.01. To link this structural argument with our empirical analysis, I suggest a simple model for a middle-range comparative inquiry into the extraterritorial policies and international institution of extraterritorial, maritime sovereignty. The model is constructed from ideal types in the weberian sense, but these ideal types are influenced by empirical data. That is the only way to ensure that their relevance is probable.

Even at this modest level of abstraction, however, categorisation means loss of data. But the virtues of models are NOT that we can read out the facts from them. They are not dense narratives of “wie es eigentlich gewesen ist”. However, there is ample reason to suggest that our enquiry should be reduced further in order to improve the quality of the analysis. This is a thesis on Northern Europe and the US. I think the typology in Figure 2.2.1 illustrates that we hardly need write a global story in order to analyse the historical significance that maritime interests had on state formation, and in turn, how these experiences affected the crafting of international institutions regulating maritime resources.

So far I have claimed that, for reasons of simplicity, coastal states can be divided into six main categories as geopolitical units. In the following, I will argue on empirical and methodological grounds which territories will be included in the empirical analysis in this analysis.

1. In order to produce a useful design for the study of Northern Europe, we should end up with units in each of the two categories of main principles, so that our enquiry might analyse how ideology influenced policymaking among states with similar degrees of overseas interests.407

2. Moreover, these units should be restricted to a total number of units that we are capable of analysing in a qualitative way. This is always a contested part of designing comparative

407 In other words, the simple typology makes us examine variation in outcomes
macro-research. The best we can do is to be conscious as to what cases are included and what cases are to be excluded from a comparison resembling the encompassing comparison described in chapter 1.

3. **The units chosen must be relevant to the empirical reach of the analysis.** This means that no relevant units concerning Northern Europe should be excluded, while all units of negligible relevance to Northern Europe can be left out without sacrificing the critical evaluation of the concepts and hypotheses. The territories excluded from the analysis thus cannot be said to limit the fruitfulness of the conceptual framework applied, or more importantly, to limit the critical evaluation of theory applied to Northern Europe.

With these principles of design in mind, I will move from each geopolitical type and argue for the selection of the units.

In the upper left column of the typology, portraying “International liberalism” we find geopolitical entities and political cultures whose internal norms and foreign policy-justifications were both heavily dependent upon notions of “negative liberty and freedom, and especially free markets. In this category we only find two traditional territorial units - that of USA from 1941 and the Dutch Republic 1579-1806, plus one non-territorial organisation, the Hanseatic League (1298-1587). The years 1579 and 1806 should of course be commented upon. One might reasonably argue that the Dutch republic was not consolidated until 1588 or 1590, but I have chosen the year of the Union of Utrecht as a meaningful starting point in which to treat the Dutch Republic as a unit.

Its name was actually changed to the Batavian Republic in 1795, but according to a prominent scholar on the Republic, this was “a renewal, certainly, but not yet a sweeping away of the Republic”. Thus it is sensible to speak of “The Dutch republic” till at least 1806, if not till 1808. More substantial at this point; the Dutch republic should be included in the analysis. It clearly belongs to a central part of the story of maritime Northern Europe. The Republic was an aspiring

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408 Russia/USSR is excluded, for example, and I claim that this is justifiable although this "unit" certainly has made extraterritorial claims and incursions into the sovereignty of other states. Nevertheless, I will argue that its principal influence from its overseas interests upon Northern Europe has not been dramatic. I agree with Curtin (2000: 41) that "Though Russia was geographically European, its earlier history and orientation often departed from the general pattern, and its empire building was overland, not overseas".

409 It is negative in the sense that it emphasises freedom of opportunities.

410 The first two units make an odd couple at first sight. However, I think it can be justified to mark out some highly interesting features of how the Dutch Republic and the US have been viewed by commentators outside of these territories. As Toqueville was impressed by North America, so were contemporaries of the Dutch Republic astonished by its degree of toleration and freedom. On the D. republic, see Israel, 1998: 1


412 Israel, 1998: 1121
hegemon up till the rise of England as a major sea power (see 3.2), and continued to influence maritime transportation and commerce till the end of the 18th Century. Indeed, the Dutch republic fostered the author of Mare Liberum, struggled with England and Spain over the economic hegemony of Europe, later on gave the English throne part of its ideological flavour and to a large degree influenced the early state-formation processes of the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, I argue that the Dutch colonial experience was different than that of Britain. The breadth, and particularly the intensity, of its colonial experience was less than those of the other European imperial powers. C.R. Boxer, for example, flatly stated that “Although the VOC’s sphere of activity extended from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan, only in certain regions were the Dutch able to exercise an effective monopoly for any length of time”. When it comes to industry, the Republic was highly advanced (for example in ship-building), but Jonathan Israel thinks that Wallerstein’s claim that the United Provinces became the leading producer of industrial products of the 17th Century is an exaggeration. In a comparative perspective, the Dutch republic also was a society that was tolerant and relatively free for its age. Although its states were oligarchic, Downing notes that “representative government and broad personal freedoms nonetheless existed, and served as a basis for liberal democracy in the following centuries”. As with the US later, the Dutch republic sought to reconcile different values and principles, which on occasions led to opportunistic policies. However, the ideological outlook of the Republic was different from France and Great Britain. In a certain sense, the Dutch republic as a federation, forged under unfavourable circumstances, resembled the USA in its creed. The puritans that sailed from the old world aboard Mayflower left an imprint on what the US would be. The political process that made the United Provinces into a federal republic also bears an uncanny resemblance to later US state building. Boxer, for example, notes how “the militant Calvinists claimed then-and have often since received- the credit for forging a nation under God’s blessing and with His active support”. A further similarity between the Dutch republic and the USA after 1898 lies in the will to enforce its principles through resort to arms when they deemed it necessary. In other words, international liberalism here in no way means that these

413 Bosscher, 1985: 97-122
414 Boxer, 1965: 92
415 Israel, 1989: 114-115
416 Downing, 1992: 215. Boxer (1965: 11) writes that ”each one of the seven provincial states were sovereign. In Holland the States were composed of delegations nominated by the regents of eighteen towns, and one further delegation nominated by the provincial nobility. Every town could send as large a delegation as it liked”, and ”Foreign policy was in the hands of the States-general at the Hague, since by the union of Utrecht in 1579 the rebellious provinces had agreed to present, in this sphere at least, a united front to the outside world”. As USA and the Hanseatic League, the Dutch republic was a federation.
417 Boxer, 1965: 121 noted this ideological distinctiveness; ”This vogue for biblical phraseology was not confined to Dutch Calvinists, but they seem to have carried it further and used it longer than elsewhere in Europe”
418 1965: 29
states were "pacifist" or even moderate in waging wars. It was just that they needed to see their wars as "just" wars; whenever large scale violence should be used, it had to suit the ideology of the polity that waged it.

But above all when it comes to international regulations; the Republic was a mare liberum nation. As early as 1608, the states of Holland formulated its claims to freedom of the seas.419 Especially for the conduct of Dutch policy in Northern waters, the Dutch never got the same flavour of paternalism as did Britain. Furthermore, this should also be seen as a result of its weakened sea power. On the 18th Century, Boxer writes “the sea-power of both the VOC and its fatherland declined noticeably during the struggle for Java”.420 On the Napoleonic Wars, Feldbæk thus concludes that; “When the Netherlands entered the Revolutionary wars on the French side against Great Britain the links between the Netherlands and its overseas possessions were cut”.421 Thus, the increased dependence upon neutral ships, weakened sea power (in the strict military sense) and claims to mare liberum on behalf of the republic were all entwined.

Although the Netherlands from 1806 is placed among the bandwagoning liberalist, reflecting its lesser importance in the 20th century, we should expect Netherlands to be influenced by its past as a former major power also in the post-WWII international arena. According to our criteria of overseas interests earlier in this chapter, the Netherlands nevertheless was such a minor maritime power during parts of the 19th century, that it does not meet the criteria for “strong overseas interests” from 1860 till 1925 (see appendix II).

The Hanseatic League (1298-1536)422 is the only non-state actor in our typology. In many ways, it should also be seen as a non-territorial and truly extra-territorial maritime unit.423 This league of

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419 Boxer, 1965: 90
420 Boxer, 1965: 105
421 Feldbæk, 1996: 266
422 Note that we will deal with the League in chapter 5.1. It is certainly worthwhile to discuss the duration of this city-league as an entity. The city of Lübeck was founded in 1159 (Dollinger, 1998), while the influence of the German cities was serious in Norway already from the 1180s. Indeed, the question of when the League actually should be seen as a rather coherent League is a subject of historiographic debates. However, there is little doubt that by 1298, German merchants in the Baltic did not longer operate as individual traders (see Spruyt, 1994: 122 for a similar argument, despite the fact that the term Hanse was used prior to 1298). Dollinger (1998:10-12) lets history of the League span from the formation of Lübeck in 1159 till the last Hansegag in 1669. But the duration of the Hanse as a unit in this analysis should be limited further. Dollinger (1998: 11) for example, emphasize that “Seit der Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts hatten die Hansen nahezu das handelsmonopol in beiden Meeren”, while “Seit dem Beginn des 16. Jahrhundert lag der Niedergang der Hanse offen zutage”
423 The historiography on the Hanse is rich. See for example, Nedkvitne, 1984, Helle, 1991, Postan, 1973, Christiansen, 1997, Karlsson, 2000, Bjørgo et al, 1995, Miskimin, 1975, Nash 1929, Lunden, 1967, Schreiner, 1941 and 1935, Ropp, 1961, Reynolds, 1974, Scammell, 1981 and above all else, Dollinger, 1998. To my knowledge, the only in-depth analysis (to be a bit generous) of the League by a political scientist is the study by Spruyt, 1994: 109-128. This lack of analysis of the role of the League in state formation in Europe, is probably due to the fact that the City-League was not recognized as a sovereign entity at Westphalia, 1648. Perhaps the League was incompatible
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maritime cities was a formidable power in Northern Europe for at least three centuries. This is evidenced by the volume and intensity of its trade, its incursions into the sovereignty of the weaker Nordic kingdoms, and by its role as an entrepreneur of naval warfare. The League practised trade to a degree that to its contemporaries, it seemed like a much more powerful actor on the international arena than the most powerful transnational corporation does for small states today. It waged war, largely through hired naval personnel, with England, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. At the peak of its power, it was able to play the leading role in choosing the Monarch in Denmark, to dominate trade in Sweden and Novgorod totally, and gain territorial concessions in Norway (see chapter 3.1). The League was an aggressive liberalist, but above all an international liberalist using the freedom of the seas for its commerce and transportation. The League might have said to make incursions into the “sovereignty” of its contemporary Nordic Monarchs, but these incursions were largely restricted to the economic sphere. And these incursions were without exception (as far as I can see) aimed at upholding its trade by resisting attempts by monarchs to gain control of commerce.

To our perspective today, the League at first sight is only a historically interesting case of extraterritorial struggles. But as I will argue later, this League of cities to a large degree was a catalyst in Nordic state building. It will simply not do to dismiss the League as a loose federation of cities that is not entitled to be treated as an actor or a unit in comparative analysis. The League was more than a loose federation. As Spruyt points out, the Hansa had the ability to “send emissaries, sign treaties, collect revenue and enforce Hansetag decisions”. The influence of the state-formation of England, Denmark, Norway and Sweden is incomplete without an analysis of the role played by the Hansa. I will claim that the mare clausum-policies often to be found in Northern Europe to a large degree were influenced by the historic lessons taught these countries by the German City-league. Furthermore, the Hanseatic League offers an interesting case when it comes to state-formation and sovereignty; why did this kind of organization disappear from the international arena? In accordance with Tilly’s theory on state formation, we should expect it to be ultimately inferior in waging war compared to sovereign states. Therefore, I shall include the Hanseatic League in my analysis.

with the logic of territorial sovereignty in the world order after Westphalia. Dollinger (1998: 9) certainly points to the ambiguity of a political and economic confederation that at the same time was not a “juristischen person”.

424 Glete, 2000
425 Bjørgo et al, 1995
426 Dollinger, 1998
428 Spruyt, 1994: 126-127 points out that the institutions of the Hansa was no more loose than those of contemporary states.
429 Spruyt, 1994: 126
430 Tilly, 1992
However, the League as a major player on the international scene only existed in pre-Grotian times, so to speak. Mare liberum and mare clausum as formal categories did not exist at the time of the League that makes us able to draw analogies to the later units. Therefore, I have chosen to include the League in the introduction of the first empirical chapter, but I do this in order to describe the context of the emerging modern states in the 17th century rather than to include the Hansa as a unit on which to draw definitive conclusions from.

The role of the USA is less controversial. There can be little doubt that the US played a major role in structuring international institutions after The Second World War. Thus, IR-scholars and world-system scholars alike would prefer to include USA in the analysis.431 Indeed, the US was a central component of the world polity after WWII, and thus any analysis not containing North America should be seen as incomplete. Moreover, the US did not play a major role in European crises until the 20th century. However, I propose that in the world after 1945, the importance and influence of the US is of such scale that a study of the interplay between state formation and international institutions simply must include USA. From the perspective of contemporary history, the US is too important to be left out of the thesis. Yet, as a central aspect of the theoretical contribution I try to give, the US makes for a highly interesting case to be compared to other historical major powers. Opposed to the European powers, a crucial distinction lies in the fact that “the United States was the first major colony successfully to revolt against colonial rule”.432 This also shows how ambiguous the concept of bandwagoning is when applied to the US in the 19th century. Nevertheless, for the major part of that century, relations between Britain and the US improved (after the Napoleonic Wars).

The US enjoined hegemonic power after WW2. However, this hegemony had no history of controlling a vast colonial empire as the European states. Although the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam were de facto colonized by the US in 1899433, an overseas empire never became as central an aspect in the history of US foreign policy as in the case of Britain. The intensity of American colonialism as well as its breadth was very limited.434 Even Theodore Roosevelt soon agreed that the

431 Wallerstein, 1974, Gilpin, 1987
432 Lipset, 1964: 2. The American historical journey was different from the European one from the outset. This shaped their identity and polity. Hoggenboom (2002: 43) thus writes that “Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, Americans were self-consciously republican. They created a republican empire of liberty”
433 Brogan, 1999: 440-441, Hildebrand, 1999: 224
434 The colonial experience was a disappointment. The missionary creed was weakened as the Americans discovered that the Spaniards already had converted the natives of the Philippines to Christianity. Next, American rule fostered armed resistance. Hugh Brogan (1999: 441) thus writes that “the shameful, though not unprecedented, sight of Uncle Sam behaving like George III roused widespread opposition within America”. Furthermore, the islands were valueless as markets and expensive to defend.
Philippines had been a mistake. In some ways, this can be seen as a confirmation of the earlier tradition of US foreign policy. Its early “neutralism” reduced its internal tensions. Lipset, for example, writes that “the subsequent heavy immigration from all parts of Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century reinforced these neutralist tendencies, since it gave rise to ethnic pressure groups that reacted sharply to American policies which affected their homelands.” Lipset compares this dynamique to a similar one in Switzerland. This multi-national entity could not participate in “European national and religious quarrels without running the risk of disintegration”. Moreover, the freedom of the seas was the second of Wilson’s fourteen points. It was a blatant statement against Great Britain. This is part of the explanation why the European race for empire and the balance of power politics seemed alien to American politicians, while at the same time US foreign policy was seen by its proponents as ethically superior compared to those of the old great powers. This makes the US a case worthwhile and essential to the present treatise. Indeed, the discussions on the freedom of the seas after WWI (the “Naval Battle of Paris”) are apt illustrations of the differences in the foreign policy-ideologies of the US and Britain. Asking what exactly Wilson meant by “freedom of the seas”, Lloyd George received a shockingly frank answer, “absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants” It was the US interpretation of freedom of the seas held since independence.

Indeed the defence of freedom, conceived in the North American fashion, has been paramount to US foreign policy. This does not necessarily mean that this missionary creed was seen as benign by other peoples. On the contrary, our typology points to the differences of political cultures between Europe and the US. In the Reagan Administration, James Watt, who once compared environmentalism to Nazism, was made Secretary of the Interior. His mission, he stated, was to

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435 Curtin, 2000: ”The annexation of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was an anomaly justified to the public mainly on strategic grounds”
436 Lipset, 1964: 66
437 ibid: 66
438 When US scholars and politicians did not hold this view, it often led to controversy, as in the case of Henry Kissinger serving as Secretary of State. On Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policy in WWII. Brogan (1999: 577) writes that he “could not teach the Americans the realpolitik he was practising: it would have shocked them too much”. Cited in Howarth, 1999: 323
439 Perhaps this belief in freedom is a characteristic trait of the national imagination itself; ”I have always believed that this anointed land was set apart in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent here between the oceans to be found by people from every corner of the earth who had a special love of faith and freedom”, Ronald Reagan, cited in Matarese, 2001: 61
440 Perhaps the US should be seen as liberal towards liberals, and not so liberal towards actors it did not see as liberal itself. Liberalism is of course an ambiguous concept, and perhaps especially so in the North American context. Huntington, 1981 thus stated that political practise invariably must fail to measure up to the values espoused in the
“mine more, drill more, cut more timber, to use our resources rather than keep them locked up”.442 Still, the American way of life was seen by Americans to be the only model worth emulating, and “perhaps this was the most characteristic trait: there was a missionary of some kind in almost every American breast”.443 Furthermore, I believe it is wrong, in the Marxian manner, to see this as mere hypocrisy and rhetoric camouflage of capitalist interests. This is not to deny that this missionary creed might be brutal. The US has been prone to fits of “moral crusading” and to support movements for the “elimination of evil”444. At its core, however, the ideals of freedom are central parts of what the US was and is; “At the bottom of all American patriotism lay, and lies to the present day, the commitment to freedom – the favourite word, the favourite idea, the favourite boast. This freedom was a very concrete thing, the essential stuff of the American historical experience”.445 Still, this liberalism could only be the stuff of a superpower when it was combined with a sense of communality; the federal state and foreign policy had to be embedded in civil society.446 These ideals have to be balanced against pragmatic assessments of national interests, a lasting paradox in US foreign policy to this day.447 And domestic ideology travelled around the world, through the structures of economic, military and political power.448 This makes both the Dutch Republic and the USA after 1941 into highly substantial cases to be studied. In sum, for their similarities and their differences, both the Dutch republic and USA after WWII were major powers claiming mare liberum. I will also argue that the Hanseatic League was a unit, and that although its importance might be disputed in creating international institutions, I will argue in 3.1 that it did so indirectly, through its huge impact upon the state-formation processes in Northern Europe. Above all, it is a mistake to see international studies and comparative politics through systemic models that do not take non-state actors into consideration. Both current and historical concerns seem to justify such a reminder. Historically, the rather introvert US foreign policy from 1776 till the 1890s makes it difficult to place the US within one category. It did not meet the criteria we have set for a state with strong political interests in this period. Nevertheless, it did have strong overseas economic interests, witness its large merchant navy (see appendix III). Thus, in spite of the war with Britain, we have

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442 Brogan, 1999: 689
443 Brogan, 1999: 437
444 Ellis, 1993: 24
445 Brogan, 1999: 319
446 Ellis, 1993: 13. According to Lipset, 1964, what makes the United States exceptional is that the “left” does not reject individual freedom and the right does not reject equality.
447 Writing on the debate about the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration, for example, Sokolsky, 1998: 77 state “the Clinton administration’s "pragmatic internationalism" represents the kind of approach which has always characterized US foreign policy, one of great ideals and uneasy compromises”.
448 Note the similarity with Michael Mann’s (1986. 1993) IEMP-concept of power.
placed it in the category of bandwagoning liberalism from 1776 till 1898. Thereafter, the US is labelled an international liberalist. An interesting question then arises; has US foreign policy habitus changed after “the war on terrorism” from 2001? We will address this difficult problem in chapter 5.

Moving to the upper right column, we find the geopolitical type of states that resembled a policy of Imperialism, and in an even more enduring perspective, Paternalism.

Apart from the critique that USA should be seen as an imperialist/paternalist (a view that is probably adopted by many on the left[^449]), I claim that this category includes territories that were aggressive actors of extraterritorial policies and territories that must be said to have such a past. The central question is why these states predominantly can be said to have claimed mare clausum more than the opposite principle. I propose that the historical trajectories of these units made them much more explicitly into conquering states on the international arena than the international liberalists. In the race for colonies, all these entities were aggressive actors at the international level, making them lay down mercantilist policies that in effect tried to encompass overseas territories as formal parts of their empire.

Later on, several of these imperialist nations restricted their praxis. Partly these changes were results of domestic changes, partly they were the outcome of competition from states with different principles, and partly, perhaps, imperialism itself was self-defeating in the long run. Generalising, I would claim that this history made colonial powers and former colonial empires turn into a disposition to act that nevertheless was somewhat paternalist in its nature.[^450] However, this theoretical trajectory does not necessarily apply to all major powers claiming mare clausum, as we will return to below.

[^449]: Probably one does not have to be "leftist" in order to hold such a view. Many would subscribe to the present informal "empire" of the US as an example of what Chalmers Johnson (2000: 65) has named "stealth imperialism". But my point is not to refute such vague notions of imperialism and extraterritorial claims to sovereignty. What I argue is that the “imperialism” of Russia and the US, for example, was of a different nature and character than the “imperialists” and “paternalists”. Curtin (2000: 41) claim that “In neither case was desire for territorial empire the main intent, though both Russia and the United States participated along with the others-Russia extensively in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Korea, and the United States equally dramatically in the 1840s by annexing most of northwestern Mexico and moving overseas in the 1890s by seizing the Philippines and Puerto Rico”. The expansion of the US, and, as Curtin (ibid: 42 rightly claims), of Russia, was much more strategically motivated than those of England and France.

[^450]: I believe it to be difficult to explain the policies of France and Britain otherwise. Consider for example the significance of Algeria and Indochina for French foreign (and domestic) policy after WWII, and the significance of the Suez crisis for both countries. In the entire period from 1948 till 1960, British forces were deployed in Malaya "in the Emergency" or "counter-insurgency" campaign in Malaya" (Curtis, 1995: 56). Although Britain was weakened, in a comparative perspective, after 1945, the Labour Government stressed the importance of keeping its status as a great power. Ernest Bevin, according to Curtis, 19995: 10, once explained to the Soviet Foreign minister that “just as a British Admiral, when he saw an island, instinctively wanted to grab it, so the Soviet government, if they saw a piece of land, wanted to acquire it".
Perhaps England and later Great Britain fits this ideal-type closely (in a weberian, not a normative meaning of the word). Britannia “Ruled the waves” in more than one sense, creating an overseas empire unparalleled in world history, since it both had the naval force and financial strength to create empire. Clearly, a study of Northern Europe must include Britain. In this respect, the historical legacy of the Empire is highly interesting in a comparison of Britain with the US and the Netherlands, since the imperial legacy somewhat continued through the Commonwealth well into the 20th century. Whereas both England/Britain and the Dutch Republic were maritime hegemons and both have histories of controlling a colonial empire overseas, I nevertheless claim that the Dutch republic and Britain were to be different geopolitical entities on ocean policy. This is perhaps the most controversial statement thus far, but I suspect this difference to be a result of the difference of the Dutch and English colonial experiences. That there was a manifest difference in the maritime policy between the two is beyond doubt. England was entirely dependent upon her strong Navy for survival. Thus, English policy at times was uncompromising. In the Napoleon wars, for example, “her Navy swept the French Navy from the seas but her insistence on her own interpretation of “maritime rights” offended her allies as much as the French” One historian interprets the the war of 1812 as a war fought because of differing interpretations of mare liberum, and with an ultimate result that “ended with both views unchanged”. While the Treaty of Paris in 1856 can be seen as a turning point when it comes to restricting prize taking, the most dominant claims of Britain were maritime ones. At the same time, the difference between UK and the US should be emphasized to a far larger degree than contemporary commentators are inclined to.

451 Indeed Great Britain (restricting it to include the British Isles) could be seen as an empire in itself. See Armitage, 2000: 24
452 For a discussion of the origins of the phrase ”Empire of Great Britain”, see Armitage, 2000: 41-47
453 "The myth was persistent not least because it enshrined an inescapable truth: the British Empire was an empire of the seas, and without the Royal Navy’s mastery of the oceans, it could never have become the global empire upon which the sun never set" (Armitage, 2000: 100) And it was a convenient way to see the empire, since "An empire of the seas would not be prey to the overextension and military dictatorship which had hastened the collapse of the Roman Empire, nor would it bring the tyranny, depopulation and impoverishment which had hastened the decline of Spain" (Ibid: 100-101
454 "The Navy dominated the seas of the whole world to an extent that had no parallel", Lloyd, 1996: 138
455 Brogan, 1999: 75
456 Indeed, the invasion of the Falklands in 1982 is an interesting act of extraterritorial state action that is perhaps not totally reducible to rationally calculated national interests. Likewise, the statements made by Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde in a memorial speech on April 2nd 2002 illustrate the symbolic value that can be attached to rather remote islands as objects of extraterritorial claims. (Aftenposten, April 3rd 2002).
457 Armitage, 2000: 187 termed Britain’s mare clausum policy "blue-water Lockeanism"
458 Boxer, 1965: 92, Cain and Hopkins, 2002
459 Chamberlain, 1988: 7. The treaty of "Armed Neutrality" between Prussia, Russia, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Portugal in 1780 was a direct response to the right claimed by Britain to seize enemy goods on neutral ships.
460 Howarth, 1999: 324
461 This included the insistence upon the neutralization of the Black sea, where Russia’s fleet was to cease to exist. See Chamberlain, 1988: 110.
462 Brogan, 1999: 484
Extraterritorial Sovereignty – Ideal types and the Selection of Cases

British Empire did not practise real liberalism in transnational affairs. Tomlinsson, for example, writes that; “Even the liberal international economy of the second half of the nineteenth century was underpinned...by a judicious use of formal and informal techniques of imperialism to provide appropriate public institutions”. Lloyd George told President Wilson`s representative that “Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power”. The reply was again frank; neither the US nor any other country would submit to Great Britain’s complete domination of the seas any more than to Germany’s domination of the land. The personal advisor of President Wilson, colonel House, described the US-British views of each other in the following way after WWI: “The relations of the two countries are beginning to assume the same character as that of England and Germany before the war”. One could criticize the view that Britain predominantly was a mare clausum large power by pointing out that Britain in a comparative perspective was rather liberal in the period from 1856 till the outbreak of WWI. As a society, Britain did have liberal traits, but if we take a look at its praxis as a naval and imperial power, and its preferences for international institutions regulating maritime matters, it cannot be labelled an international liberalist.

It was ill received in American opinion when Britain forced the abandonment of the freedom of the seas in 1919. An introduction of mare liberum simply would have negated Britain’s strategic position off continental Europe and threaten its imperial network. This shows the difference between UK and USA, a difference that was also evident after WWII. Britain owed her survival in WWI from her “success in using the Royal Navy to starve her enemy while preventing him from starving her”. Partly, she also survived WWII by means of a strong navy and the not insignificant support from her dominions.

Germany was a core state with claims to hegemony from ca 1880 till 1918, and indeed in the period of the Third Reich. However, the country lost its overseas colonial empire after WWI. Thus the Weimar republic certainly does not fit neatly into the category of paternalists, while I will argue that

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463 Tomlinsson, 2001: 358
464 Lloyd George, cited in Howarth, 1999: 324
466 See Louis, 2001: 343
467 Brogan, 1999: 484
468 This support was also evidence of the significance of the empire to the dominions. While the US pressed for changes in imperial matters after the Atlantic Charter in 1941, “partnership” with the dominions became the new creed of the empire. And the dominion subjects paid a price; “Of 30000 British merchant seamen who perished in the war an astounding 5000 were believed to have been of colonial origin. In explanation for such a high casualty rate, it was offered that colonial personnel were largely employed in the engine rooms of the old coal-burning ships”, Jeffrey, 2001: 312
Imperial Germany does. Moreover, the German colonial experience lasted only significantly from 1882-1883. Furthermore, the British hegemony ensured that German patronage often was abruptly, as in 1890 in the cases of Zanzibar, Uganda and Kenya, and in southern Africa in 1898. Thus, I have separated “Germany” into several different geopolitical types depending upon its political regime at different epochs. I find that Imperial Germany, from ca 1880 till 1918 clearly fits into the imperialist category, and should be included in order to make for a fruitful comparison. The short-lived nature of the German colonial experience suggests that it is a special case that should be examined. The Weimar republic certainly does not fit into the same category, and is consequently excluded.

Moreover, I believe that the opportunistic and highly curious ideological foreign policy of The Third Reich is not a typical case for comparison of foreign policy to illustrate the interplay between state formation and international institutions. While a unique case of a revolutionary foreign policy, Adolph Hitler and his staunchest followers simply wanted to make the Reich itself into the most significant international institution. Moreover, Hitler was less preoccupied with overseas empire than he was with creating “lebensraum” in the East, an idea that perhaps was the result of the blending of his racial ideology, selective interpretation of Teutonic history and his experience as an army corporal. Thus, I leave the Third Reich out of the comparison. But Imperial Germany certainly had overseas and colonial interests that make it comparable to the other units. It turned from a continental, landwards Empire into a truly overseas one. Klaus Hildebrand (1999: 233) has

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470 Stoecker, 1986: 21 states that ”It was only with the transition to protectionism and the promulgation of Bismarck’s anti-socialist law in 1878/79 that the colonial issue became a matter of interest to important sections of the German ruling classes”.


472 Under William II, the maritime ambitions of Imperial Germany were ready for take-off, especially with the launching of its huge Naval programme from 1898. Its aim signalled the warning to Britain. See du Jourdin, 1993: 125. Hildebrand, 1999: 232 states that “was die Erben Bismarcks im “Neuen Kurs” eingeleitet hatten, der anfangs noch im kontinentalen Rahmen geblieben war, das wurde nunmehr durch die Flottenpolitik des Wilhelminismus endgültig zu einem todernstern Spiel um Weltsmacht oder Untergang”

473 This does not mean that I claim that there were not significant incentives for colonial revisionism in the Weimar republic. That strong interests in Germany sought to re-establish Germany as a colonial power is nevertheless beyond doubt. Partly, German banks for example, proposed that Germany should co-operate with the other European colonial powers in administrating colonies. Germany was, in the words of German Foreign Minister Streßmann in 1926 a ”Volk ohne Raum” (see Stoecker, 1986: 315-316). The Western Powers seem to have hoped that they could divert Germany’s imperialism in an eastward direction, especially against USSR. In practise, however, Germany’s state practise under the Weimar republic was moderate in terms of colonial policy.

474 This is of course not to say that Hitler and his followers also planned for an overseas empire! On the contrary, Hitler wanted colonies for their natural resources, and thought that what could be done in Europe would be easier to achieve in Africa. See Stoecker, 1986: 402-414. I simply argue that this dream of Hitler was not as central as his drang nach osten.

475 du Jourdin, 1993: 126

476 See for example Kershaw, 2000
captured the German urge at the turn of the century to capture a “Platz in der Sonne”. The colonial adventures should therefore be seen as embedded in a distinct trait of Wilhelmine foreign policy. The Tirpitz fleet programme was a gigantic one, and “mit der Existenz diesen furchtgebietenden Waffe Deutschlands sollte seine wahre Autonomie als Grossmacht zur Geltung kommen”. Colonies could receive German emigrants, strengthen German capitalism and be a hindrance to socialism and domestic tension. The mare clausum incentives behind imperialism are well illustrated in the case of imperial Germany. The strongest domestic supporters of German imperialism were to be found among the people who were the most eager spokesmen for high tariffs on industrial goods, notably among representatives of the coal and steel industry and the largest German bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, and the financer Bleichröder. Although the colonial question was not in the forefront of the policies of Bismarck, he laid the ground for an elitist polity in the united Germany that later was to become a colonial power (witness the divide and rule in domestic politics by Bismarck. Critical voices were often co-opted. “He even thought of hiring Karl Marx”). This is the most important background for Bismarck’s decision in 1884 to embark of a policy of colonial annexations. Furthermore Stoecker emphasize the favourable international situation in 1884 that facilitated the decision by Bismarck. There were still territories to grab in Africa, Asia and Oceania, and the relationships between Britain and Russia and France were strained in the aftermath of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. This led to the German colonisation in South West Africa, Cameroon, Togo and German East Africa in the period between 1885 and 1906.

477 The historian Thomas Nipperday supports this in the following interpretation; "Weltpolitik was not just the policy of the Kaiser or of the "ruling cartel", it was the policy of the Germans, the fleet was the Kaiser’s fleet, to be sure, but it was also the fleet of the Germans. The German Middle classes became imperialistic voluntarily and of their own free will" (cited in Evans, 1997: 32).
478 Hildebrand, 1999: 236
479 See Stoecker, 1986: 22-23
480 See Stoecker, 1986 and Stern, 1977. Fritz Stern, 1977, convincingly demonstrates the close relationship between finance and Bismarck. This analysis also sheds light on the increasingly aggressive and anti-Semitic sentiment in Germany from 1871.
481 Stern, 1977: 277
482 Nationalist sentiments meant that laissez-faire doctrines were tossed over board. In contrast to the 1850s and 60s, Stern (1977: 208) states, "Interest groups clamoured for "national" protection, influential academics, organized in a League for social reform, demanded an end to manchesterism and a new activist state..Bismarck came to believe that a program of what he called state socialism would forestall revolutionary or democratic socialism. Bismarck had always been an interventionist and paternalist; economic necessity, political calculation and personal predilection combined to set his course in the late 1870s and throughout the 1880s”
483 Stoecker, 1986: 31-32
484 Stoecker, 1986; 39-113
Sweden played a major part in the struggle for dominance in the Baltic more or less from 1630 till 1809. This is (at least outside Scandinavia) easily forgotten, but Sweden was a strong regional power until the Great Nordic war. In effect, Sweden dominated the Baltic Sea in co-operation with the Dutch until the early 18th century. One might argue that the Swedish Navy did not play a direct role outside the Baltic, but without it, the Swedish armies “would not have achieved their conquests”. It was paramount to build a strong Navy; strong enough at least, to safeguard lines of communication between Stockholm and its armies in Germany. That the geographical distance between the motherland and the rest of the Swedish Empire was limited does not mean that it was not an empire. Under Gustavus Adolphus, its fleet increased from 50 till 90 powerful sea-going fighting ships. And the Swedish empire grew by deliberate acts of Royal policy, primarily motivated by national security and strategy. Those who would dismiss “small states” from comparative analysis might easily end up ignoring vital impulses and influences from these states on the international arena. This is especially true for Northern Europe. Glete, for example, makes this point.

For Sweden, mare clausum in the Baltic was the only mean to gain security (as it almost constantly was threatened by Russia to the east and Denmark from south-west. In fact, for two centuries, the two mare clausum kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark were locked into a near permanent hostility, a relationship that illustrates the clashes that occur among paternalist states with close geographical proximity). Sweden also participated in the colonial adventure through its own company, the Swedish East India Company, first established in 1731. This company existed up till 1813. Furthermore, Finland in effect was a Swedish province till 1809, and Sweden was the dominant part of the Swedish-Norwegian union from 1814 till 1905. What makes Sweden interesting in a comparative perspective is its role as a smaller, more regional power than the other units within the

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485 Swedish influence over regional affairs certainly diminished after the Great Nordic war, to be sure. The last Swedish soldiers participating in a war on the European continent fought under Bernadotte in the 1813-campaign against Napoleon.

486 Du jourdin, 1993: 122

487 Downing, 1992: 195

488 See Armitage, 2000: 15

489 Roberts, 1973: 1-3. To claim that economic considerations did not matter for the Swedes is probably an exaggeration, however. What is rather clear is that Swedish imperialism became a heavy burden on the Swedish and Finnish populations.

490 Glete, 1993: 110

491 Lundkvist, 1973: 31. A qualification should perhaps be in order when we deal with the relationship between Denmark and Sweden. Although these two kingdoms on several occasions were at war with each other, they also had common interests in controlling trade and transportation in the Baltic. Thus, “from the 1570s to the 1640s Sweden and Denmark-Norway lived with a shared dominium maris baltici, that is, a shared monopoly on violence and the right to enforce protection at sea”

same geopolitical category. Although the role of Sweden certainly was much less significant after 1800, it nevertheless makes it valuable as a case worth comparing. Thus Sweden up till 1905 is included in the analysis as belonging to the category of “paternalist and imperialist” foreign policy. Finland is treated as part of Sweden until 1809.

Although France till 1789 certainly participated in the colonial struggles, it actually seemed to lose interest in colonies to a significant degree after the revolution. The comment of one prominent historian of empires reflects this fact well; “The French had lost interest in colonies: Napoleon showed a few flickers of concern about the world outside of Europe, but they soon died away”. Its fate as a colonial power somewhat reappears in the Fourth republic from 1946 till 1958, but neither of these epochs determined state formation or the crafting of international maritime institutions in Northern Europe in a way comparable to the other great powers. France was consistently much more a landwards empire-nation, looking to the East for its most formidable foes and existential challenges. There were substantial periods when the struggle with England was the most important, for sure, but the overseas interests never shaped France in a way similar to Britain or the US. In the modern era, French monarchs never achieved command of the European seas. France, in fact, could have been the leading sea power or the greatest land power, but she could not be both. Another internal reason for the lack of imperial ambitions rests in the economy of France. As a large country with a huge agricultural sector, she did not have the same incentives for external expansion, as did states like Portugal or England.

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 stripped France of her colonies, with the exceptions of Martinique and Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Reunion near Madagascar and some minor stations. Although France gained increased influence later (notably in Northern Africa and Indochina), her impact as a maritime power in Northern Europe was not dominant after 1815. This makes it a less interesting example than England. France simply did not take a leading role in shaping the international maritime institutions. From 1870 till 1910, France accounted for only 5% of world shipping, compared to the British share of 45%, and “Long after iron ships were the norm, France still used

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493 Koninckx, 1996: 255
494 Lloyd, 1996: 112
495 Quinn, 2002: 5 writes that 2 I have euphemistically called France’s overseas presence the French Overseas Empire. In a strict sense, it was an empire only during the Napoleonic conquests…Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Togo and Cameroon were "protectorates" and the most complicated of all French North African holdings; Algeria was technically part of France for much of its recent history. Thus what began as a monarchy ended as a republic, and it was not an empire, except briefly in the 19th century”
496 Quinn, 2002: 67. Geopolitically, she was much easier overextended than England.
497 Quinn, 2002: 107
wooden frames to reduce its considerable stores of seasoned wood”. This is not to deny that France certainly had a considerable overseas empire. When we add that it definitely was a mercantilist one, it does seem reasonable to categorise France as a historically imperialist and later paternalistic power. The French 5th republic after 1958 sought to play a much more independent role in international affairs than Germany in the same period. I nevertheless think it is right to claim that its overseas interests have been moderate, although its commitments to Northern Africa (notably Algeria) at times have played a part in French identity and foreign policy. However, France after 1958 have been far less interested in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic. Geographically and culturally, it is not part of Northern Europe. On these grounds, I exclude France from the study of maritime interests and institutions in Northern Europe. The same logic essentially is behind the exclusion of Spain and Portugal from the empirical analysis. Clearly, they were paternalist powers in their imperial heydays, but they do not belong to the North European subcomplex.

Denmark certainly belongs to Northern Europe, but its historical role as a maritime state is perhaps more dubious to contemporary observers. This, however, is an understatement of Danish influence in the region. Denmark under King Hans (r. 1481-1513) “was one of the European pioneers in creating strong sailing navies”. The combined Danish-Norwegian Fleet up till the Napoleonic wars, for example, was one of the strongest in Europe. Denmark was a strong regional power up till the Napoleonic wars with a claim to Dominus maris Baltici. The struggle with the Hanseatic League was a formative experience for Denmark-Norway, and strengthened the mare-clausum-inclination of these territories. Denmark-Norway was weakened both by its struggle with the League, Sweden and its entanglements on the continent. However, it regained strength in the 17th century, where its maritime empire spread to the Antilles and the Indies. Its most extreme claims to mare clausum were in fact enduring till the middle of the 19th Century. It was only in 1857 that Denmark gave up its sound and Belt dues and promised in future not to hinder the passage of foreign

498 Quinn, 2002: 110
499 See Boulle, 1996: 233-236
500 Glete, 2000: 116
501 See chapter 5
502 Although Scandinavian politics at times were highly competitive, and at times violent, the Swedish and Danish monarchs also had shared interests. I believe it to be no exaggeration to claim that the earlier experience with the incursions of the Hansa on trade in these countries had an enduring impact. Glete (1993: 114) stated, “Early modern Danish and Swedish kings were of course no 19th century free traders. Their openness to foreign trade was based on combinations of old fears of being exploited by the north German trading cities, the weakness of their own commercial groups and the balance of power between them”
503 du Jourdin, 1993: 122
vessels on their passage through Øresund or the Belts. Although not extensively analysed by scholars, The Danish East India Company was active till the early 19th Century. The Danes also had a small “empire” in the West Indies that included St.Thomas (occupied in 1672), St.Jan (1718) and St.Croix (1733).

In effect, Denmark was also sovereign over Norway until 1814 and over Iceland till 1944. Its role as Crown over Greenland and the Faroe Islands also makes Denmark a highly interesting example of a formerly paternalist regional power claiming mare clausum. In short, Denmark is included in our thesis. Denmark belongs to the category of European states that at times dominated smaller states, and has remained a central actor in the North East Atlantic.

In the Northern European context from the 18th Century, England and Denmark were both able to sustain their economies on a varied basis. This basis enabled them to become sea powers, with colonial ambitions and overseas trade. Scotland, Norway, Ireland, the Faroe islands and Shetland did not have the power or economic basis to uphold their sovereignty during the turbulent centuries up to the 19th century of a more consolidated European state-system. A suitable, and definite, endpoint for Denmark as a paternalist in foreign policy was the handing over of its possessions in the West Indies in the second decade of the 20th century, although Danish foreign policy ambitions had been reduced 50 years prior to this event.

In the category where overseas interests in the form of strong economic (but not political) interest are combined with mare liberum, we find the “bandwagoning liberalists”.

What strikes one in this broad category is the diverse configuration of states that it contains. They all have in common low or non-existent political overseas interests. At the same time I have claimed that they more or less have stuck to the principle of mare liberum because of their economic interests through a significant merchant fleet, or simply as a result of a former imperial legacy that continued to uphold ties to overseas territories. Theoretically, this combination of economic overseas interests and mare liberum occurred in sovereign states that are depending on larger powers for their economic thriving or for security, if not for both. These relationships were of such importance for the band-wagoning states that they did not risk sacrifice their good relations because of differing interpretations of the maritime world order. Firstly, they benefited more from their

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504 See Killham, 1993: 21. The fact is that many maritime nations, included the US paid Denmark a fortune for this abandonment of this old tax-collecting system. The amount was not less than 30.476.000 rix-dollars. For details, see Olsen et al, 1958.
505 Koninckx, 1996: 255
506 Hernæs, 1995: 182. Hernæs, 1992: 85 estimates that the total export of Slaves carried on Danish ships between 1660 and 1806 amounted to approximately 100.000 persons.
relationship with the hegemon in this way. Secondly, it followed that the principles of extraterritorial sovereignty as laid down by the hegemon was not totally damaging the band-wagoning state, because it had a varied economic basis, or because its maritime economy in itself benefited from the existing order.

**The USA from 1776 till 1898** has been discussed above, and we concluded, with some doubt, that the US belonged to this category for that period, although the exact historical demarcation is difficult. The US in this period had a large merchant navy (see appendix III), but no legacy of being an imperial power.

**West Germany from 1949 till 1990** certainly depended upon the US for its security. Moreover, it also participated in the European integration process, however slow and painstaking that process actually was. This situation is not principally changed after the reunion of east and west in 1990. What has changed in German foreign Policy, apart from the general modifications of the geopolitical situation in Europe, is its very prominent role in the EU. My hypotheses on Germany at large after 1949 is that it has clung to relatively liberal concepts of international economic orders, including that of international institutions regulating maritime institutions. Both its relations with the US and the European Community have made this paramount for Germany. At the same time its maritime interests have been moderate compared to other industries. In military terms, the low interest overseas has been profoundly German through its very low naval profile. Moreover, Germany does not meet the criteria for strong economic overseas interest set earlier in this chapter (see appendix III). West Germany (1949-1990) and Germany (after 1990) are therefore not included in the analysis.

**The Netherlands after 1806** make for a highly interesting case, with its legacy of having aspired to a maritime hegemony. It certainly belongs to Northern Europe geographically and culturally, and it certainly has had maritime interests both overseas and certainly also at the regional level. The Netherlands also had a low degree of overseas interests after the war, although its historic legacy might have played a part in its maritime foreign policy. On the other hand, I claim at this point that it was a bandwagoning state after WWII. For its security, it was totally dependent upon the superpower, being a loyal member of NATO. Economically it also depended upon the US as well as its allies in the European Community. I propose that this made the Netherlands a state that dominantly stuck with the concept of mare liberum. This hypothesis makes for two related and

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507 The decline of Scottish influence is nevertheless an interesting case. The Scots actually did try to become a colonial power in the late 1690s through the establishment of a commercial centre at Darien on the Panama Isthmus. This effort led to financial disaster, thus contributing to the decline of Scotland. See Lloyd, 1996: 58.
interesting questions. Firstly, the Netherlands probably differed from the Nordic countries on maritime policies in the postwar era, since it remained an international liberalist. Secondly, the transition from a former liberalist with a high degree of overseas interests into a bandwagoning state should lead us into an enquiry as to how the Netherlands as a polity coped with the abandonment of empire. In sum, The Netherlands certainly is relevant and interesting as a case to be included in our analysis.

The existence of a combination of significant economic overseas interests and a predominant mare clausum ideology is rare, indeed. Only Norway in the periods 1880-1918 and after 1950 seems to meet the criteria we have set, indeed it seems to meet the criteria for the entire period after 1905. It is the only clear-cut bandwagoning mare clausum nation among the cases covered here, but it has been so for only a limited time. This makes Norway into an interesting case of comparison. Clearly, Norwegian authorities sought to carve out as much freedom for its merchant fleet as possible. As appendix III shows, Norway was almost equal to the US in terms of being a world carrier at the oceans. This made it strive for mare liberum, but not at the expense of mare clausum for the coastal ocean masses and eventually the seabed. Especially the fishery sector must have been instrumental in producing material incentives for mare clausum, but was there also a historical heritage that mattered in favour of mare clausum?

Among the states with only indirect overseas interests (significant merchant navy or tax havens, or flag of convenience-territory, or having close ties to an overseas territory as a result of having been a small empire-nation) are Panama (flag of convenience), Switzerland and Liechtenstein (tax havens), Sweden 1905-(former small empire and significant merchant navy on a European scale) and Denmark 1917-(former small empire with close ties to overseas territories). The first three units represent an overriding concern for an international order based on free trade. Liechtenstein is a clear case, and likewise Switzerland, both countries that have been deeply suspicious of being integrated in international organisations. In a maritime sense, Panama is also a case that falls into this category, through its interests in insurance, banking, and maintenance of transport facilities and registration of ships under the flag of Panama (thus, Panama is used as a flag of convenience). Measured by deadweight tons, Panama was the 6th largest shipping nation in 1975, while it actually was the largest in the world by 1997.\footnote{See Coulter and Goldman, 1998: 49. Panama thus serves as the best example of a (maritime) tax haven. But the relevance of the category is aptly illustrated by the fact that in 1997, Liberia is second, Cyprus fourth, Bahamas fifth, Malta seventh and Singapore ninth after Panama among the largest shipping countries categorised by flag.} As Liechtenstein and Switzerland have been rather passive...
towards international organisations, Panama has been reluctant in its relation with the US. But obviously, they only serve to illustrate the utility of the typology so far, and are not included in the analysis. Sweden has been a landward nation, but perhaps even more so after 1905 than in previous centuries.\textsuperscript{509} This does not mean that sea power and maritime interests have not been important for its political history, far from it. Sweden, however, did not principally acquire its status in the state system or the world system on the basis of maritime power. Expansion has traditionally been conducted on land territory, where Finland has been a buffer inbetween the two more powerful states of Sweden and Russia. This means that Swedish influence on the Northeast Atlantic have been less than the others in the typology. In the Baltic setting, on the other hand, Sweden cannot be left out of the story. I suspect that its ability to reach \textit{dominis mare baltici} was vital for the state-building processes of Northern Europe. The most interesting question is whether this actually mattered in Swedish maritime foreign policy after 1905. At that year the Union between Sweden and Ireland was dissolved peacefully, and neutrality and moderation has been the hallmark of Swedish foreign policy ever after.\textsuperscript{510} This is the reason why I have categorised Sweden as a former small empire after 1905. Sweden also had a significant merchant navy after 1905, when seen in a regional perspective. However, the distinctiveness of Swedish political history suggests that Sweden might be critical case for testing our hypotheses. Thus, I include Sweden as a case in the same category as its neighbour Denmark. Denmark also was a former small empire, and it did have a significant merchant navy but a small navy in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. What makes Denmark interesting in this study, is that it kept very close political ties to her former dependencies in the Atlantic throughout the century. Clearly, then, Denmark belongs in our further analysis.

The Post-colonial territories clinging to dependency is represented by Jersey and Gibraltar. Jersey is an example of a territory that has remained a formal dependency in the post-colonial age. Enjoying tax sovereignty and export-protection by British tariff barriers, this territory hardly is on the road to independence. The question of Gibraltar is not resolved either. In the population of some 280000 inhabitants, though, there is a clear majority in favour of staying under the British Crown (which Gibraltar has been since 1713, when the King of Spain ceded sovereignty “in perpetuity” to Great

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\textsuperscript{509} The term is borrowed from Rokkan, 1999. See also Flora, 1987.

\textsuperscript{510} One exception, perhaps, occurred in the case of the Åland islands. Sweden dispatched a military force to the islands in 1918. However, Sweden abided by the 1921 decision of the League of Nations that (since the population overwhelmingly wanted to become part of Sweden, the Swedes argued that the principle of self-determination should apply) the islands were awarded to Finland. The League required the Finns to guarantee the rights of the inhabitants to govern themselves and keep their Swedish language and culture. See Killham, 1993: 47 and
Neither the tax havens nor the Post-colonial dependencies can be said to be directly relevant to our present study, however, and is therefore excluded from further analysis.

Among the bandwagoning peripheries, we find Guyana, from 1966, and Mauritius from 1968. They belong to the geopolitical category of bandwagoning peripheries in the immediate years after they gained status as dominions in the Commonwealth. They more or less bandwagoned behind the remnants of British Empire in their first years of independence, and thus claimed mare liberum in the sense that they wanted to be free of restrictions on their transportation and commerce. However, their effect on the maritime institutions can at best be seen to have been indirect, through their membership in the British Commonwealth. They are not relevant to the present study, and we do not lose empirical material for a critical evaluation of the concepts by omitting them from the analysis.

The last category of states were sovereignty-seeking peripheries. They have in common a special emphasis on state sovereignty that was manifested in claims to mare clausum after WWII. With low or non-existent overseas interests and strong incentives for securing their coastal resources, these peripheries pressed as hard as they dared to territorialize their adjacent seas, also beyond the narrow confines of the territorial sea. But these claims nevertheless had to be based on a carefully monitored assessment of what was possible to gain at the international arena. Too stark demands could jeopardise their position, especially since several of these coastal peripheries were also dependent upon larger powers for their security and economic interaction. However, one critical aspect of the sovereignty-seeking peripheries as opposed to the bandwagoning states was the sheer importance of their coastal resources. These resources made their policy demands in the area of maritime resources more active and pronounced than with most bandwagoning states. Typically, the states in this category also became more self-conscious on the international arena in time. If the international situation thus changed in their favour, they acted more aggressively in a mare clausum-fashion than what one should expect from small states. Similarly, their incentives to do so increased in proportion with any increase in the importance of their coastal resources (typically in times of increased competition for the resources, or when technology or new information made further resource extraction possible). These claims to sovereignty of own maritime resources should be seen as embedded in a foreign-policy disposition that also combined the realpolitik of the weak with the moral claims of states that never have played dominant roles on the international arena. While their policies had to be attuned to the hegemons and to regional powers, the sovereignty-seeking

Petersson, 1991: 21. The islands were de-militarised and seen as neutral territory. The autonomy of the Åland islands was increased further in 1991.

511 TIME April 15, 2002: 46; ”We Pledge Allegiance”
peripheries with minor exceptions never have been in a position to dominate other nations. Thus, we might find a tendency among these peripheries to emphasise their distance from power politics. The self-image of the peripheries is that of a benign, peace-loving nation, and they often claim to have a special understanding of the rights of weaker nations. Inherent in such a disposition is also scepticism towards the stronger powers. Thus, a central theme in the policies of the peripheries is to emphasise international law and organisations. At the same time, these peripheries were sovereignty-seekers. This made them try to extend and strengthen their own political autonomy, which at times collided with other peripheries and less organised peoples. The sovereignty-seeking peripheries, in other words, certainly also could be nationalistic. When opportunity permitted, this nationalistic could find outlets in the form of claiming sovereignty of varying degrees in distant, barren regions of less interest to larger powers, but especially over their coastal areas. This means that our typology should not be interpreted as a categorisation of more or less ethical policies. On the contrary, there is reason to expect that also peripheries and bandwagoning states have imitated certain traits of power politics on a small scale, whenever opportunity permitted. Thus, small coastal states have been opportunists on the international arena, as have more powerful polities.

**Argentina from 1967, Peru from 1947, Brazil from 1966, Cameroon from 1962, Chile from 1948 and Uruguay from 1969** are all cases that I claim belong to this category of states. With the de-colonisation process, the strengthening of the UN system and the advantages that the Cold war could give them on occasions, all these states set forth extensive claims for increasing their territorial seas. However, the impact these states had on maritime institutions in Northern Europe is negligible. They are therefore not relevant for the present treatise, and are therefore excluded from further analysis.

**Norway -1905, Iceland and Ireland** are all small coastal states with a history of being provinces (or without national sovereignty as parts of a larger polity) in unions with stronger regional powers, respectively Denmark (Norway 1536-1814, Iceland 1380-1944), Sweden (Norway in a union with Sweden from 1814 till 1905) and Britain. Thus, Ireland was the only of these states with a history of being subdued not only to a regional, but a hegemonic maritime power. Ireland is thus treated as intimately connected to Britain at large. There actually are similarities in the state building experiences of all these three countries. In security policy, both Iceland and Norway have been

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512 Lloyd, 1996: 328-329 sums up the meaning of the term dominion, and how this meaning was altered.

513 See Fure, 1997 for an excellent empirical demonstration of these tendencies in Norway. Peripheries in 20th century Europe (i.e: Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark) were often keen supporters of the League of Nations and later UN.

514 According to Lloyd, 1996: 320 “The United Nations was not formally much more committed to the ending of imperial rule than the League of nations had been, but the belief was growing that it was hard to justify and also that rule over dependent territories separated from the imperial centre by salt water was particularly hard to justify”.
protected by NATO, and in practise by the US since the signing of The North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Up till 1940 Iceland depended upon Denmark for protection, while Norway in the period from its independence from Sweden in 1905 till the German attack in April 1940 based its security on neutrality coupled with an implicit faith that the Royal Navy would guard its freedom in the event of crisis. Ireland remained neutral, but geopolitically, none of the superpowers wanted to change this status.516

Economically, there are both similarities and dissimilarities between these peripheries. Iceland and Norway were both predominant coastal fishing-nations, but wanted to extend their zone of sovereign rights as the pressure on fishing resources increased, and as the opportunity to exploit oil and gas on the continental shelf was opened up in the 20th century. Economically, what makes Norway special is the size of its merchant fleet since the 18th century, and its strong interests in offshore oil and gas-production since the mid 1970s. Neither Ireland nor Iceland had a similar economic basis, but share the property of fishing industries. In Ireland, however, agriculture (and from the 1990s – electronic industry) mattered far more than in Iceland and Norway. When one adds that Ireland has not had a huge merchant fleet, one should be cautious to interpret Ireland as a dominantly maritime economy.

At this point, I exclude Ireland from the analysis, in the sense that Ireland will be commented upon under the question of overseas and foreign policy considerations of Britain. More interesting cases when it comes to international maritime institutions and state building are Iceland and Norway till 1905. Thus, both are included. Having chosen the cases that are relevant to our study of Northern Europe, we have ended up with cases that cover all the geopolitical types inferred from our central concepts. We thus end up with the Typology of cases as in figure 2.2.2.

515 See Prescott, 1975; p 72, table 3
516 Ireland remained a “neutral dominion” as a part of the British Empire after 1922, but in practise its line of neutrality can be seen as a secession from the Empire. This was an implication of the Statute of Westminster. Germany supported this neutrality, hoping this neutral line would have important effects on other dominions. See Jeffrey, 2001: 309
Figure 2.2.2; Typology of units for the study of Northern Europe and the USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mare liberum</th>
<th>Mare clausum</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>“International Liberalism”:</strong></td>
<td><strong>“Paternalism”:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA 1898-2001(^{517})</td>
<td>England/Great Britain from 1689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dutch Republic 1579-1806</td>
<td>Imperial Germany 1880-1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark from 1380-1917(^{518})</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 1630-1905</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>“Band-wagoning liberalism”:</strong></td>
<td><strong>“Bandwagoning mare clausum”:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands 1806-</td>
<td>Norway after 1905(^{519})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US 1815-1898</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>“Former small empires”</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden after 1905(^{520})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark 1917-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>“Sovereignty-seeking peripheries”:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland after 1944(^{521})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway until 1905</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Main Principles**

- **Mare liberum**
  - Strong political overseas interests
  - Overseas interests in the form of strong economic interest
  - Indirect overseas interests
  - No dominant overseas interests but significant coastal interests

- **Mare clausum**
  - “International Liberalism”:
    - USA 1898-2001\(^{517}\)
    - The Dutch Republic 1579-1806
  - “Paternalism”:
    - England/Great Britain from 1689
    - Imperial Germany 1880-1918
    - Denmark from 1380-1917\(^{518}\)
    - Sweden 1630-1905
  - “Band-wagoning liberalism”:
    - The Netherlands 1806-
    - The US 1815-1898
  - “Bandwagoning mare clausum”:
    - Norway after 1905\(^{519}\)
  - “Former small empires”
    - Sweden after 1905\(^{520}\)
    - Denmark 1917-
  - “Sovereignty-seeking peripheries”:
    - Iceland after 1944\(^{521}\)
    - Norway until 1905

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\(^{517}\) Year of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour

\(^{518}\) Iceland achieved home rule in 1918, but remained in union with Denmark until 1944. The question of the status of the Faroe Islands reached a compromise in 1948, keeping the islands as part of Denmark, but with substantial autonomy. The latter is also true of Greenland. The Faroe Islands thus chose to remain outside of EEC, while Greenland in a referendum in 1982 left the Community, thus making it a unique territory in the history of European integration.

\(^{519}\) Norway gained full independence after the Union with Sweden.

\(^{520}\) Union with Norway dissolved 1905.
I intend to explain why the typology above creates the hypothesis for our empirical material.

Strong powers (both militarily and economically speaking) could claim both mare clausum and mare liberum principles in their maritime foreign policy. This difference cannot be attributed to the degree of overseas interests alone, I propose. I assume that all large powers to be analysed here in fact had overseas interests.

But these interests were interpreted differently, thus making for the empirical variation among them; some became international liberalists, other imperialists, later gaining a pattern of paternalism. These variations cannot be explained by materialism alone.

Smaller powers have also held both mare liberum and –clausum principles, according to their relationships with larger powers. These relationships should be seen as consisting of security- and economic ties of dependency. The nature of these dependencies, largely attributable to the balance of power and the international hegemony, worked structurally in favour of either mare liberum or mare clausum.

But even among the more marginal polities, we do find significant empirical variations in extraterritorial strategies. Again, historical materialism is not sufficient as a mode of explanation.

If these hypotheses are correct, we should be able to infer some interesting conclusions. Thus, the case of extra-territorial sovereignty in Northern Europe would show that the content of sovereignty has undergone profound changes over time and that the structures of the international system have changed as well. The rules that constitute “international relations” have changed the relations themselves.

This would question realist theories of international Relations. It would also belie Immanuel Wallerstein’s notion of the modern world-system as a theory with sufficient explanatory power in this region for the 20th century, since we find that states in the periphery actually benefits vastly from the co-operation. A typical finding that will signify this change of the international system will be if we actually can prove that peripheries gained more (in relative terms) than did the core states.

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521 Year of full national independence from the personal union with Denmark.
Furthermore, we should also find examples where the dependency of the periphery is explicitly recognised by materially more powerful states to a degree that enables the weaker state to prosper.

Next, Charles Tilly’s thesis on Coercion and Capital in European state formation-processes should be somehow modified. The nature of both coercion and capital has changed so dramatically that “soft power” weakens the notion that “war made states and states made war” AD 990-1990.

In addition, the importance of naval power will perhaps add nuances to Tilly’s concept of warfare and its implications for the empirical variation of European state formations. I will therefore lay some emphasis on naval power and naval organisations in the sense that extraterritorial violence is seen as a state praxis that influenced state formation through ideology. In a very important sense, whether naval power became a central facet of national ideology or not was central to the identity that served as a basis for foreign policy decisionmakers. Above all, such a typology allows us to examine how national ideologies and material interests constituted national interests and how these influenced, and was influenced by, international institutions.
3 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology

The City-League lost to the sovereign nation-state as the dominant type of polity in North Western Europe, but the Hanseatic League influenced state formation in Northern Europe in the early modern period in an important manner through its contribution to a competitive environment. Thus we will begin this chapter by analysing what impact the League had upon the formation of maritime ideology in the emerging states of northern Europe.522 In order to control trade routes, the kingdoms of Northern Europe needed some kind of naval power, since all the vital international routes went by sea. In order to apply naval power effectively, however, kingdoms and cities would ultimately face the costs of purchasing or organising extraterritorial means of violence. The initial incentive to do so, was often spurred by incursions into the sovereignty the monarch perceived as his. The Dutch Republic was the only political organisation to survive with an inclination to develop a mare liberum principle. This is an interesting phenomenon, since the Hanseatic league at various times was at war with England (1470-1474), Spain, The Netherlands (predominantly with Holland of course, 1438-1441), Norway (1429), Denmark (1370, 1426-1435, 1616) and Sweden (1567-1570).523

As Norbert Elias and Jan Glete have emphasised, control of the means of violence in this period is perhaps better understood as a phenomenon partly outside of the realm of the state as an organisation.524 However, Slavic and Finnish raids on the coasts of Denmark and Sweden (Karelian Finns) seem to have been important incentives for the monarchs of Sweden and Denmark to strengthen their sea power, with Denmark gaining a foothold in Estonia.525 King Birger of Sweden concentrated on Finland and Karelen, in 1295 being able to announce to the traders in Lübeck and other Hanseatic towns that he had converted the Karelians to Christianity, and thus “protected the

522 Qoted in Spruyt, 1994: 128. One should absolutely be aware that the autonomy of Hansa cities and Kontors, and their relationships to sovereigns varied in space and time. We will try to focus on the position vis a vis "national" authorities in the territories covered here rather than giving an overall view of the Hanse itself.
523 These years indicate wars, but it is important to point out that there were thousands of armed clashes and plunderings between the early states and the League in the same period.
524 Elias, 1950: 295 "In the Middle Ages England had not a navy in the proper sense of the word". See also Glete, 2000. Furthermore, Postan, 1973: 113 notes that "most of the piratical acts in medieval records were committed not by professional pirates practising their occupation in all seasons, but by merchants who turned pirate and sometimes acted as privateers under official letters of mark. Thy either were pressed into service by their princes or turned to privateering while trade was at a standstill”
525 I must readily admit that comparative analysis of territories in the Middle Ages is a more demanding task than comparing modern states. As will become evident in the following pages, the very transnational character of the league, the use of private violence and the loose organisational structure of the dynastic states make borders and the limitations of state politics in space blurred. Treating these territories AS IF they were states would be historically incorrect. Thus, a comaparative analysis of states in Early Modern Northern Europe should analytically reflect this pre-modern pattern of politics.
Norway and Sweden were united in a *personal union* from 1319. At the same time Denmark entered a period of internal strife, the country being without undisputed sovereigns through most of the 1330s. This union faced different challenges as Denmark gradually regained its strength, and as the German sea-cities challenged the Swedish attempt to control the sea trade at Novgorod. In 1360 the Danish king Valdemar won back Skåne. The result of the struggle for power was the *Kalmarunion* from 1397, when Erik of Pommern became king of Denmark, Sweden and Norway. In many ways, this was an alliance of foreign policy, aimed at co-ordinating common Scandinavian interests in the Baltic, and to counter the pressure from the German *principalities* and merchant cities. Neither of the Scandinavian countries had state machinery or economic resources to resist this pressure on their own. The *Kalmarunion*, however, covered an area larger than any European state at the time. The Polish-Lithuanian union of 1386 was created in order to resist the challenge of the Germans. Why was the Hanseatic League, backed by powerful German interests, seen as so formidable a challenge that the Scandinavian kingdoms were united, and what were the effects on political centralization in these territories?

All early records point to the League having been originally formed as a “merchant league”. In Norway the first records mention “Hansa mercatorum Alemannie in 1343, in Novgorod in 1350; “theutonicorum Hansa mercatories”. The league was clearly established to protect German trade from the many bands of pirates in the Baltic Sea, for it was mainly round the Baltic that the first

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526 Christiansen, 1997: 120
527 Postan, 1973
528 Reynolds, 1974: 98
529 Bjørgo et al, 1995: 100
530 The reasons for the Polish-Lithuanian union are complex. I nevertheless support this view. Zamoyski, 1994: 43-45 states that on the question of electing the new Polish Monarch, ”they did not want the Habsburg, because he was an agent of the German hegemony”
531 Nash, 1929: 2
532 The lawless conditions in Medieval Northern Europe are evident in a number of sources. See Karlson, 2000 and Christiansen, 1997: 64, the latter stating that ”by 1158 a generation of coastal raids had brought Denmark low. Piracy was so unchecked that all the villages along the eastern coast, from Vendsyssel to the Eider, were empty of inhabitants, and the countryside lay untilled…the Wendish slave-markets were thronged with Danish captives at this time”. Although the Church played a role in creating order in Medieval Europe, this thesis, and a number of other works, testifies that this was a fragile order, even in relations between Christian peoples. The state of affairs in Northern Europe had traits of a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, as described by Alexander Wendt, 1999. The problem of creating order was not made easier by the fact that the demarcation of sovereignty was not yet clearly established or, far from it, recognised. This is not to indicate that the Church did not play a role in ordering relations between monarchs. The relatively peaceful 13th century might serve as a contrast between these relations and the relations between Christian monarchs and the lands of the heathen. Danish fleets attacked Finland in 1191 and 1202, Estonia in 1194 and 1197, Ösel in 1206 and Prussia in 1210. The crusading spirit of the Swedish archbishop also went well with the prospect of increasing revenue and patronage. For a detailed overview of the Northern crusades, see Christiansen, 1997
German merchants made their voyages. (Hanse means “fellowship” in Middle High German).  

There existed no common laws of navigation, testified in the huge Danish effort in building new stone and brick towers in the Great Belt, western Zealand and other places along the coast, as well as establishing coastal patrols. The concept Hanseatic City should be used referring to any city under the leadership of Lübeck (founded in 1143) in questions regarding policies of trade. Over the next two centuries, about 150 cities were connected to the Hansa. How important was this organisation and its trade? As Postan reminds us, the data available also makes it difficult to compare trade between different centuries prior to the 19th century:

“From this point of view, more relevant than any attempt at a measurement of foreign trade are the simple historical facts indicating the place of trade in medieval life – the existence of specialised economies, the number and relative wealth of towns, the attention paid by kings and parliaments to trade and navigation, the readiness to engage in political and military conflicts on behalf of trade”.

After the founding of the German League of cities, the heads of the Hansa turned their eyes towards the very flourishing trade round the Baltic coasts. Contrary to what claimed in Wallerstein’s research programme, long-distance trade in essentials existed prior to the 16th century.

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533 Kurlansky, 1997: 26
534 This is, as will be shown in the chapter on Law of the sea, a somewhat erroneous statement, since there existed some national laws. One example is the laws of Magnus Lagabòte in Norway at the end of the 13th century. The failure of these laws largely stemmed from the fact that there did not exist any lockean culture of anarchy, as described by Alexander Wendt, 1999
535 “After their defeat off Falster in 1172, Slav raiding fleets never ventured into Danish waters again”, Christiansen, 1997: 67
536 Postan, 1973: 159: "Of this first generation of new German towns none could rival Lübeck. It soon drew to itself the trade which had previously gone overland to Bardowick, replaced Schleswig as the chief starting point for sea journeying across the Eastern baltic, established itself in the fisheries of Southern Scandinavia and the island of Rügen, and in the rising trade with Bergen and the interior of Sweden. By degrees the old overland routes as well as the old Scandinavian sea routes fell into desuetude, and the bulk of the trade with the east was forced into the channel which ran along the south coast of the Baltic and across the foot of the Jutland peninsula – the channel which Lübeck served and dominated"
537 Reynolds, 1974: 67
538 Postan, 1973: 159: "These new towns had a double function…they connected the lands of the west with the sources of Slavonic goods..The second function was to serve as an outlet for the goods of the newly colonised lands. Bremen and, above all, Hamburg collected corn from the regions of Weser and the Elbe, and exported it to the west. Lübeck and Hamburg became the centres of the fishing industry of the Western Baltic, the salt trade of the Elbe, and the forste goods of Brandenburg", Postan, 1973: 159
540 At that time the herring spawned in the Baltic off the Pomeranian coast and the islands of Rügen, Bornholm and Gotland. So important was the herring trade in medieval Europe that changes in the spawning ground led to the rise of the Netherlands and the ruin of many of the Baltic towns in the early fifteenth century.
century. Novgorod, lying as it did on the direct trade route from the Black Sea and the Bosphorus to the Baltic, and near the junction of four great waterways, provided the Hansa with oriental merchandise as well as with all the varied products of the country itself. The great forests provided timber, furs, tar and pitch, honey and wax.

The Hansa in Norway and Iceland

Most scholars agree that a Norwegian state was established in the tenth to twelfth centuries. In some basic terms of sovereignty, it nevertheless was a very fragile polity. The fact is that The Hansa threatened the economic base of Norway, and remained in a strong position in Bergen up to 1600. According to Nedkvitne, German merchants began to trade in Norway with goods to and from the Baltic from ca 1200. In the latter part of the same century, Norway became a link in German trading between The Baltic and Western Europe. Prior to the middle of the tenth century, The Baltic Sea had been a Scandinavian-Slavic ocean. The rise of the Hanseatic League was due to the taking over of this trade route. Postan even claims that the cogs and the hulks could displace as much as 400 to 500 tons. It could also be used as a fighting ship. At the same time, tensions between

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541 This finding supports Frank, 1994: 3 in that "In our view, Amin and Wallerstein continue in the footsteps of Polanyi and Finley and under-estimate the importance of capital accumulation via trade and the market in the ancient world system. Therefore, they do not see participation in the system the same way we do and look for the "incorporation" of peoples and their societies and economies into the world-system long after we see them as having long since been part of the world economy... Abu-Lughod seems closer to the still dominant position, despite his reference to a "13th century world-system". Note also that Braudel "do not share Immanuel Wallerstein’s fascination with the sixteenth century. Braudel is inclined to see the European world-economy as having taken shape very early on". Miskimin states that "Even in the most dismal and bleak centuries of the Middle Ages, long-distance trade was undertaken. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, however, trade had become more a way of life than uncertain adventure, and regular institutions and trade routes had been devised by medieval merchants for their convenience and profit.Miskimen, 1975:116

542 Postan, 1973: 98-99. "From the middle of the fourteenth century onwards eastern timber shipped from the Baltic, and more especially from Danzig, all but ousted from the western markets the other types of "white" timber, ibid: 98

543 This section in the chapter is slightly biased towards interpreting the incursions of the League from a Norwegian historiography point of view. I must insist that this partly is justifiable because Norway, and particularly Bergen, was a vital node in cross-national trade in the middle Ages.


545 Nedkvitne, 1984: 197

546 Nedkvitne, 1984: 17

547 The Norwegian elite simply did not have the resources to equip sufficient numbers of larger ships to compete with the Germans on these longer trade routes. Constructing, equipping and manning a larger vessel demanded material resources and skill. For overseas expeditions, one needed crews of trained warriors for protection, and a complicated technique of building and maintenance of ships. The persons who controlled these ships “had to be landowners, lords of retinues, the masters of populous communities”, Christiansen, 1997: 15-17

548 Postan, 1973: 120

549 Christiansen, 1997: 90-91 discusses the comparative advantage of the Hansa Kogge. According to Postan, the ability to transport huge quantities of products and to wage war at sea was vital in this period. The salt industries of western France illustrates how sea power was indispensable in the many conflicts that could arise because of competition in trade; “ In the first half of the fifteenth century, we find it frequented by great
Denmark and Norway did much to put Norway on a comparatively bad footing compared to German and Dutch overseas merchants. The Baltic was an ideal place for take-off for a company gaining profits from fisheries. It also was a very navigable sea once ice melted.550

First opening up the market in eastern Norway, the Germans then seriously turned to Bergen, situated strategically on the Western Coast of Norway. This city had already become a node of trade between Norwegian cities, Skåne, Iceland and the other islands controlled by the Norwegian King. From Bergen the King then exported commodities to England and Continental Europe, giving Bergen a privileged position.\textsuperscript{551} Iceland had succumbed to the power of the Norwegian king in 1262. The Icelandic historian Gunnar Karlsson\textsuperscript{552} has recently shown that Norway exported 600 tons of goods annually to the small community at Iceland, which lacked wood for ship-building. There is little doubt that although the Norwegian crown was weakened by internal strife between contenders to the throne, the country benefited from its Atlantic islands. At times, it ruled over Orkney, Shetland and the Hebrides, the Isle of Man and even parts of the Scottish mainland.\textsuperscript{553} Iceland kept autonomy as a law district, however. It was usually defined as a tax-land (Skattland) or tributary to Norway or the Norwegian King, together with the other north Atlantic islands.\textsuperscript{554} The dependency on import of grain was to seriously undermine the position of the Norwegian Crown.\textsuperscript{555} The export of grain from Prussia and the eastern Baltic grew after the Black Death. We should also note that the worsening climate in itself not was the only reason why Norwegian cereal production ceased to be competitive.\textsuperscript{556} Of importance in deepening the dependency on the Germans is also the damage to the direct trade between English and Norwegian merchants.\textsuperscript{557} Thus, the

salt-fleets of all the northern nations. Hanseatic “bay fleets” sailed there several times a year, and Dutch and English ships and merchants also resorted there in large numbers. By that time Bay salt also entered northern politics as well as northern trade. The lawless and riotous life of this salt “Klondyke” generated international conflicts and quarrels, and the safety of the “Bay route” preoccupied the Hanseatics throughout the fifteenth century and gave rise to at least one war – that between England and the hanse in the middle of the fifteenth century” (Postan, 1973: 101)\textsuperscript{558} The economy of the sea lines of communication was of course also superior to overland journeys. Thus, in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century, the 200-mile overland journey from Hamburg to Wollin took a week, whereas the 1000 miles sea journey from Oldenburg to Novgorod only took twice as long. See Christiansen, 1997: 14-15

\textsuperscript{550} The economy of the sea lines of communication was of course also superior to overland journeys. Thus, in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century, the 200-mile overland journey from Hamburg to Wollin took a week, whereas the 1000 miles sea journey from Oldenburg to Novgorod only took twice as long. See Christiansen, 1997: 14-15

\textsuperscript{551} Helle, 1991: 46-47
\textsuperscript{552} Karlsson, 2000: 50-51
\textsuperscript{553} Karlsson, 2000: 79, Bjørgo et al, 1995
\textsuperscript{554} Karlsson, 2000: 95
\textsuperscript{555} Helle, 1991: 66, Nash, 1929, Miskimin, 1975
\textsuperscript{556} “In the long run, the German agrarian crisis, by reducing the price of grain, gave the Hanse towns an opportunity to extend their control of the Norwegians. Control of the grain trade enabled German merchants to regulate the prices paid by Norwegian hunters and fishermen: by extending credit on grain purchases, they could compound the bondage through the pressure of debt” (Miskinen, 1975: 59)
\textsuperscript{557} Earlier in the 13th century, relations between England and Norway had been favourable, and a regular pattern of economic cooperation existed. See especially Lorentzen, 1959: 58
Germans could fix prices of grain sold to Norway\textsuperscript{558}, and serve as middlemen selling the commodities bought in Norway to England.

The stagnating Norwegian seafaring also damaged Iceland, since it decreased the import of vital goods as well as the export of fish.\textsuperscript{559} Prior to the early modern period, the export of wool to Flanders via English ships had been the chief source of income at Iceland.\textsuperscript{560} The wool production continued to be of significant importance to the Icelandic economy, but during the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, the rich fishing fields off Iceland came to the forefront. English fishermen are first mentioned in Icelandic sources in 1412.\textsuperscript{561} In Icelandic historiography, the 15\textsuperscript{th} century has been named the “English century”, due to the fact that up to 100 English fishing boats went to Iceland annually, most often protected by armed forces. This resulted in numerous clashes, or small cod wars, between Icelanders and Englishmen. But it also led to outright punitive expeditions against officials and civilians.\textsuperscript{562} Indeed, English fishing off Iceland was the beginning of what many Icelanders came to see as "foreign exploitation" of fishing grounds around the country, which was to last uninterrupted until the late 1970s. Here, the English ambitions had become so strong that many Icelanders allied with the Hansa. King Christian III of Denmark (1534-59) changed the Crowns’s Icelandic policy such that Germans gradually retreated from Iceland, however. For Iceland, this gave peace, but economic decline, since the Crown in Copenhagen created a monopoly of the trade at Iceland. When the German trade at this island came to a final end in 1620, it was to be completely taken over by the newly established "Iceland, Faroe and Nordic Trade Company", administered from Copenhagen and running the trade with Iceland, Faroe and northern Norway.\textsuperscript{563}

The commercialisation of the entire Northern European trading system initially favoured the Hanseatic League. It was able to achieve a firm grip on the perhaps most important foundation for taxation in Norway.\textsuperscript{564} How important was this lack of an efficient monopoly of taxation? Estimates of the monetary significance are bound to be uncertain, but Nedkvitne argues that the export of stockfish from Bergen alone amounted to an average that must have been between 1000 to 2000 tons pr. year. The corresponding amount of silver to this amount of fish was 2.5- 5 tons.\textsuperscript{565} Knut Helle has suggested that the export from Norway to English and Baltic Sea board cities totalled around

\textsuperscript{558} Nedkvitne, 1984: 166-167 leaves no doubt that the import of grain covered a vital part of the Norwegian population’s need for grain and grainproducts in the later middle ages. Miskimin, 1975: 58-59 supports this strongly
\textsuperscript{559} Bjørgo et al, 1995: 124-125
\textsuperscript{560} Lorentzen, 1959: 66
\textsuperscript{561} Karlsson, 2000: 118
\textsuperscript{562} Karlsson, 2000: 121
\textsuperscript{563} Karlsson, 2000: 139-141
\textsuperscript{564} Miskimin, 1975: 59 "So successful was this policy that the Germans by the early fifteenth century could claim total hegemony over international shipping at Bergen".
\textsuperscript{565} Nedkvitne, 1984: 168
If one compares this to the total incomes of the King based on taxation as late as in 1520, Nedkvitne further estimates that the income of the administration amounted to only 130 tons of stockfish. The reason for the inconsistency of the Monarch’s trade policy largely stemmed from the earlier mentioned dependence upon imports of grain from the Hanseatic cities. According to the account by Schreider, threats of blocking the import of grain was the direct reason for the privileges given to the League in 1278, 1285, 1312, 1318, 1332, 1343 and 1350. Furthermore, The Hansa fought hard to keep all competitors out of the market. To keep English merchants out of the profitable trade in Bergen, the Hansa burnt down all the English merchandises in Bergen in 1393. The closure of English trade in Bergen was the start of a Northatlantic reorientation of the English trade. Iceland became the central focus of English fishery, resulting in a further incentive to build a modern fleet. This did not mean that the trade between Bergen and England ceased, but rather that it was dominated by the German merchants for long periods. The use of the Vitalian brothers as mercenaries proved to be a mixed blessing also for the Hansa. In 1429, however, the Hanseatic League established an effective blockade of the Norwegian ports. The Vitalinians, the pirates in service of the Hansa, totally crushed the Norwegian Leidang-fleet at Bergen, a further testimony of the loss of a Norwegian monopoly of violence.

The laws of the Hansa were in direct opposition to “national” laws. Both at the Lübeck Kontor in Bergen and the Rostock Kontors in the towns of Oslo and Tønsberg in eastern Norway (as in many other cities with hansa Kontors), the Germans established what we can call extraterritorial zones, isolated from the “native” territorial society. Of special importance were the Maritime laws, regulating exchanges, employment, force majeur and fixing of prices. An argument against the portrait of the powerful Hansa could be that the Church certainly was stronger than the state, anyway. Evidence shows this claim has limited value in the case of Norway (including the North East Atlantic islands Iceland and Greenland after 1260) since King Sverre from 1152/1153. Later, it was the Norwegian National council (riksrådet), in accordance with the Danish-Norwegian Union

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566 Helle, 1991: 46
567 Ibid: 167
568 Schreiner, 1935: 31, 91, 26, 30, 53, 54-59
569 Several Norwegian historians seem to support this conclusion. See Nedkvitne, 1984: 105, Bugge, 1923, Schreiner, 1941. This statement is also supported by Postan, 1973.: 218
570 Bjørgo et al, 1997:122-123
571 For a detailed analysis of the fluctuations of English trade with Bergen, see Nedkvitne, 1984: 124-130
572 Nash, 1929: 78-79
573 Prytz-Dahl, 1978, Ropp, 1961: 53-58. Helle, 1991, Christiansen, 1997: 181 finds that Sweden, Norway and Novgorod were dependent on the League by 1300 "to some extent". Postan, 1973: 154 is even clearer; "By that time the Germans had come to dominate the international economy of Northern Europe. The 13th century was indeed their century". Miskimin, 1975 is also clear on this point.
Treaty of 1450 that should have the last word in questions of waging war, and on privileges to foreigners within the borders of the Kingdom. To a large extent we must say that it was external events that made the hanseatic grip on Norway disappear.

The Hansa, Sweden and Finland

For many years, Skåne was the bone of contention in Scandinavia. In 1331, Magnus of Sweden repealed the ancient privileges of the German merchants in Skåne, and it took the League twelve years of diplomacy to win them back. It was only by playing off Sweden against Denmark, and Denmark against Sweden, that the League managed to maintain its footing on the peninsula.

Only after the struggles of power in Denmark 1534-36 was the Hansa sufficiently weakened in Scandinavia for national economic policy to become unrestrained by this non-governmental organisation. The last Hansa Diet was called in February 1630, at Lübeck, but was only attended by representatives from Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. By this time, the religious wars had damaged German territories significantly, also influencing German trade.

Wallerstein is right in the basic premise that Swedish political and economic development between 1599 and 1697 was remarkable. Even a rudimentary reading of historiography of European economic history shows that Sweden was a backward country in the later Middle Ages, one historian stating that Sweden “occupied the position almost of a German colony”. Wallerstein describes how the German (or rather hanseatic) monopoly was broken in the middle of the 16th century, and how trade (especially with the Dutch and Scots) increased Swedish exports and revenue. He then explains how Sweden, through a community of interests between the Swedish aristocracy and the Vasa dynasty, seized initiative when the window of opportunity opened around 1600. In this respect, Sweden was different than most areas in Eastern Europe, because “When the first signs of economic downturn began to hit Europe in the seventeenth century, a strong personality like Gustavus Adolphus (1611-1632) was able to use the crisis to strengthen the Swedish State still further and launch an economic transformation”.

576 Ibid: 111
577 Several scholars, as diverse as Eli Heckscher, 1968 and Perry Anderson, 1974, asserts the same. See also Miskimin, 1975, Postan, 1973, Christiansen, 1997, Reynolds, 1974
578 Roberts, 1958 II: 20
579 TMWS II: 203-221
580 TMWS II: 204
A change of control with international commodity chains, and demands for raw materials (especially copper and later iron, but also tar, naval stores, and partly wood and grain exports) made a leap forward possible for Sweden. Wallerstein’s description of how Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstierna successfully introduced improvements in taxation, administration and military reforms and thus built a stronger Swedish state is accurate (but has fairly little to do with his general theoretical model). Thus, the eventual decline of Sweden is explained only from international economic factors. Sweden had profited not merely from her strategic location but from the increased weakness of the peripheral zones of Eastern Europe in the 17th century. This created opportunities for a rather aggressive mare clausum foreign policy. Wallerstein here cites the Polish historian Marian Malowist, who has portrayed Sweden as a parasite living on the weakness of her neighbours. Wallerstein thus gives the lasting influence of Swedish development for European history less significance than Perry Anderson does. In Wallerstein’s words “Sweden was as strong a state as her economy would permit”. According to Wallerstein, real choices did not lie behind the game of what Perry Anderson calls “corrupt aristocratic parliamentarism” in Sweden. An economic basis certainly was important for political consolidation that could make expansion feasible. It is, in my opinion, clear that Heckscher has the same basic description of Swedish economic development as has Wallerstein. “The steady expansion of foreign trade tended to end Sweden’s economic isolation and to lead the country into the mainstream of general European development”. The difference lies in a more internal perspective applied by Heckscher. This presents some aspects of the story that are left out by Wallerstein. In particular, Heckscher stresses that agricultural output was vital for domestic consumption. Heckscher here points to the profound effects that bad harvests had in 1650-51 and in the 1690s. Export goods surely were vital, since it was the only source for foreign exchange, but the basis of the economy nevertheless was agriculture. Heckscher goes far in stressing the truly international impulses that made the Swedish development possible; “Almost every innovation in the Swedish economy had its origins in the initiative of the immigrants”. Quite clearly, this resource also had political as well as economic consequences. Göteborg, according to the Swedish historian, was planned almost as a Dutch colony. The first City Council

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581 Heckscher, 1968, gives the latter export industry little importance in his treatment of Swedish economy at this time.
582 TMWS II: 207-208
583 Anderson, 1974
584 TMWS II: 221
585 Anderson, 1974: 190
586 Heckscher, 1968: 80
587 ibid. 81
588 ibid: 84
589 Heckscher, 1968: 101-103
contained ten Dutchmen, one Scotsman and seven Swedes. To these impulses one can add the natural resources that Sweden had at her disposal, especially copper and iron. Particularly advantageous was the supply of wood for fuel in the iron- and steel-industry, while exports of timber played a much more limited role. In these respects, Heckscher’s analysis does not differ much from that of Wallerstein, but it is evident that also ideological factors are given prominence by Heckscher. Sweden and Holland were the two leading protestant powers on the European mainland, maintaining intimate political connections after ca. 1600. Nevertheless, the case of Sweden illustrates the limits in explanatory mechanisms in the world-system approach. In a comment on world-system analysis and geopolitical analysis, Tilly comments that they “lack convincing accounts of the actual mechanisms relating position within the world to the organization and practice of particular states”. The case of Sweden is easier to interpret in the light of Michael Mann’s IEMP-model, since Sweden’s ties with the protestant powers on the continent is important in order to account for the rise of Sweden to the status of a first-class European power. Of main concern to us is the legacy of the Hanseatic League; the rulers of Sweden knew that they would have to pay dearly if other powers reached dominis maris baltici. Thus, Sweden was to remain a mare clausum – state throughout its time as a major European power. The territory of Finland upto 1809 can only be seen as a province of Sweden. Finland was highly rural, with very few towns in the traditional meaning of the word until the foundation of the castle of Viborg in 1293. German merchants heavily influenced earlier small towns, like Åbo. Moreover, in the early modern period, the Swedish rulers treated Finland as a highly peripheral territory. A royal trading “policy” including Finland only took form with the first serious competition of the shores of the Gulf of Finland between the Monarch of Sweden and the League. The trade and barter along these shores were to be controlled from Stockholm, resulting in Royal decrees from 1347 onwards. In practise, Finland was no independent polity. The Swedish policy of mare clausum thus also applied for Finland. Therefore, I believe it to be appropriate to see Finland as a territory that was both directly, but most of all indirectly, influenced by the incursions of the Hanseatic League.

590 ibid; 107
591 Ibid: 94-101. Tar was the third most important export commodity, though it was a ”mer trifle next to iron and copper” (ibid: 100)
592 ibid: see esp. Pp104-105
593 For example, Wallerstein has relatively little to say theoretically about differences between semi-peripheries. His theory can hardly explain why some core states become hegemonic and others not. One interpretation of this is that state structures have minor significance. Although Wallerstein certainly is able to give credible empirical explanations in such cases, my criticism at this point rests on the lack of consistent theoretical explanations of the different trajectories of different states.
594 Tilly, 1992: 11
595 Jaakkola, 1932: 178. According to this author, Åbo should be seen as the equivalent to a Finnish „Capitol”, but given the comparative insignificance of this small town, this should perhaps be seen as a slight exaggeration.
The Hanseatic League, England, Ireland, and the Rise of Dutch power

The treaty between Barbarossa of Germany and Henry II of England marks the first real expansion of the league. From that date onwards it was to grow year by year till, with the Treaty of Stralsund in 1370, it was recognised as one of the greatest powers in Europe. English privileges granted to the German merchants were continually confirmed; repealed and reconfirmed by successive English kings up to the time of Elizabeth. In large part, the ultimate disintegration of the Hansa as an actor was fuelled by the rivalry between the Hansa and England. We find many examples of enduring strain in the relationship between the Hansa and the English sovereign.

One of the first successful attacks on the League was begun in 1488 in the reign of Henry VII by forbidding the export of wool from England except in English bottoms. As Clark Reynolds has argued, Henry VII marks a major change in English history, also in the sense that he made the Crown an instrument of English maritime expansion. Before Henry VII, independent shippers had had to provide what amounted to private navies to protect their vessels from rivals, pirates and the emerging navies of France and Spain. The Kings of England had to depend upon baronial aristocracy that owned these merchant navies fleets and thus were subject to their policies. Henry started building warships under direct control of the sovereign, and initiated the Navigation acts in 1486 and 1489, creating tariffs and other rules that he enforced. This was obviously a challenge to the League. It was also a very central aspect of English State building. For war at sea he built great battleships, supplemented and eventually replaced by the all-sail galleons. To support these in any fleet action, to scout and operate inshore, Henry also created a flotilla of smaller escorts and auxiliaries. The King constructed shipyards, iron foundries for cannon and fortifications along the

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596 Jaakkola, 1932: 178
597 Nash, 1929: 12
598 Hakluyt, 1995: 121-122. The Norwegian state was left utterly weakened to a degree that altered the political geography of Northern Europe. The Hebrides and the Isle of Man was given to the King of Scotland already in 1266. More vital to the economy was the later loss of Danish-Norwegian sovereignty over Shetland, The Orkney Islands (1468) and The Faroe Islands (1469) to Scotland. See Helle, 1991: 65. and Bjørgo et al, 1995: 116-121. A deal was struck in relation with the marriage between the King of Scotland and the Princess of Denmark, Denmark later gaining in negotiations with France, Scotland serving as mediator in these talks.
599 Prior to this, English resistance seems to have been somewhat fragmented and counter-productive. Writing on the English policy, Postan, 1973: 216 assures that "Not only were the merchants unable to rely on the latent power of English arms, but that power itself became a mer instrument of predating sea-war and piracy. There were easy and substantial gains to be derived from attacks on hanseatic shipping, and the Council not only did nothing to stop piracy on the high seas but itself directly and indirectly contributed to its extension. It was largely under the auspices of influential members of the Council that the first great attacks on Hanseatic shipping in the Bay took place in 1449. The outburst of piracy helped to consolidate Lübeck’s anti-English policy and to cement the unity of the hanseatic League and led to a naval war which threw the entire trade and navigation on the North sea into chaos”
600 Nash, 1929: 106.
601 Reynolds, 1974: 136
602 ibid: 137
English coast. The *Navy Royal* was the first line of defence for the sovereign state of England. Is there much truth in the often taken-for-granted assumption of social scientists that this was a cheap defence that made the burdens of military service comparatively light for the English society? I believe not, and I think it is wrong to see England as a territory that was safe from invasions and incursions ever since 1066. In the middle Ages, waterways were easy to utilise for transport on land. Thus, both England and Scotland were repeatedly invaded by sea. As the historian N.A.M. Rodger has pointed out, “English governments have been overthrown by seaborne invasions at least nine times since the Norman conquest: in 1139, 1153, 1326, 1399, 1460, 1470, 1471, 1485 and 1688”.603 But I believe that these occurrences made for a military build-up in England that profoundly shaped its political institutions. Comparatively speaking, seapower facilitated a path towards nationbuilding and ultimately democratisation. The main point is not that England was protected by the sea and thus could concentrate on commerce and industry. Essentially, producing seapower to protect the isles laid an important institutional foundation for both a modern state and overseas ambitions. A pure military regime can protect itself through the use or threat of force by means of armies. On the other hand, navies were much more demanding and once built, operated in a far more autonomous manner than did contemporary armies. This necessitated a greater degree of bureaucratic, political and social integration than armies (that were comparatively easy to organise), since the navy required leaders at the tactical level that had to be highly loyal.604 But there was no unilinear “development” in this institutional building in England or in any other European state. Thus, later British Monarchs to a highly varying degree were able to build coalitions of the necessary interest groups in order to reach consensus on what type of navy England ought to have. Although the Hanseatic League never was a military threat towards the English motherland, England early experienced fierce competition with the Germans in distant markets and fishing grounds. For example, the burning of English Merchant establishments in Bergen made the English voyage to Iceland, which in turn demanded improved vessels and navigational skills that ultimately resulted in a material and organisational basis for its Navy and its merchant fleet. It is a fact that prior to this development, the English "sea power" was very modest by contemporary European standards. Thus, the economic competition with other monarchs but above all with the Hanseatic league was instrumental, in the sense that it gave important inputs for later British views on sovereignty at sea. It also created a momentum that enhanced English maritime skills.

603 Rodger, 1997: 429
604 Rodger, 1997: 432 thus has a highly interesting suggestion of the effects of authoritarian rule, since “This we may suggest, is why Spain failed the naval test in the sixteenth Century, just as France failed in the eighteenth, Germany and Russia in the twentieth”
Ireland in the early modern period should be studied in light of its relationships with England and Scotland rather than from its sparse interaction with the Hanseatic League. Prior to the early 17th Century, when Ireland gradually came under English rule, hostilities between Irish/Celtic communities and English conquerers of land were numerous and often bitter. The polity of Ireland and the United Kingdom illustrates the essence of path-dependency. But Ireland’s weakness between 1642 and 1650 was political rather than naval. In 1647, the English parliamentary fleet was so weakened that Irish Sea power could have given the English fleet a serious blow. According to Lloyd, the “ships available to the confederation of Kilkenny were sufficient to control Irish waters and put such pressure on English trade as might have brought any English government to terms”. But the lack of unity and coordination of the Irish fleets presented England with the sufficient opportunity of eventually gaining control of the island. Thus, the limitations of putting efficient sea power at work sealed the political history of Ireland for centuries to come. Yet, England was a rather modest sea power early in the 17th century, a fact that is also mirrored in Irish-English relations.

Perhaps even more important was the rapid rise of the Dutch. Dutch penetration of the North European maritime economy was evident already at the end of the 14th century, when the Dutchman Benkelszohn brought new methods of salting to the Bothnian gulf, thus making Tornea (Torino) a great international fish-market, not controlled by the Hansa. About 1425, the herring left the Baltic waters off Skåne and Pomerania, and took to spawning in the North Sea, off the coast of Holland. This removed a great deal of trade from the Baltic, where the Hansa were masters, and led to a marked increase in the wealth and power of Holland. The first step of the Dutch was to endeavour to make themselves of use to the ruling powers, thus undermining the League. On the accession to the throne of Germany of Charles V, King of Spain and the Netherlands, their opportunity arrived.

The Dutch Republic was an economic power of such a scale that it prevented the Hanseatic League from penetrating the Dutch polity, however federalist it was by nature. But there is no mechanical economic relationship to explain this. Rather, Dutch entrepreneurship and abilities to use force whenever necessary consisted of deliberate actions that made the merchant machinery work, even in times of crises. More than anything else, this capital-intensive logic was to ensure the Dutch main

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605 As Lloyd, 1996: 15 states, the bitterness of these conflicts was deepened by the fact that Ireland had remained Roman Catholic, while England had become Protestant in the 16th Century
606 Rodger, 1997: 424
607 Christiansen, 1997: 178-180
608 Writing on the Dutch, Postan, 1973: 221 states that "It was largely because their economy grew so gradually that their appearance in the Baltic passed almost unnoticed by their contemporaries"
principle of mare liberum. However, there is a basic truth in Wallerstein’s assurance that a territory in the core needs a strong state. Thus, the Dutch Republic, and predominantly Holland, was able to project power overseas to ensure the smoothest possible functioning of its trade. In Tilly’s explanatory scheme, the Dutch Republic should be seen as a capitalised-coercion state. Although the Dutch republic was not a dominant land power, it clearly was a seapower of first rank from early in the 17th Century. We will return to the question why mare liberum ideology survived in the Dutch republic.

**Denmark and the Hanseatic League**

Emigration from the German towns was even greater to Denmark than to Sweden. The geographical proximity (particularly Lübeck) made for numerous clashes between the League and the Danish monarch. After the christening of the Danes in the tenth and eleventh centuries by the German Knights, the ruling powers in Germany had exercised a certain authority over the Danish king, so it had been easy for the German merchants to obtain special privileges in the trading-posts and towns round the Baltic. As the power of Germany declined, it only required a strong king in the person of Valdemar (1157-1182) to stir the Danish people into revolt against these German merchants. It was the trade between Lübeck and Skåne that provoked attack by Valdemar the Great, who, after seizing many of the German trading ships, invaded Holstein and captured Hamburg. Lübeck remained in the hands of Denmark from 1203 to 1215. Once rid of the Danes the League Cities banded themselves together and attacked the Danish forces, winning their first victory at the battle of Bornhöved, in 1227. Thereafter, Emperor Frederick II declared Lübeck as a free city forever, owing allegiance to none but the emperor. But the Danes, unsuccessfully, continued to challenge Lübeck. It was with the accession to the Danish throne, in 1326, of Valdemar III, that the Danes entered into a new and uneasy phase of their history. His aim was to rid Denmark of the German trade monopolists with their privileges, and to secure the Baltic trade for the Danes. As mentioned, he won back Skåne in 1360, and took Visby at Gotland. This was way too much for the League, which obtained the promise of alliance from Sweden and Norway. War was formally declared on Valdemar, and fleets from the Baltic and the North Sea attacked in 1362, the Norwegian and Swedish Kings backing out in the last moment, however, not sending any forces to help the Hansa towns. After the disastrous leadership of the Hansa fleet, the League was reduced to

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609 Dollinger, 1998: 58  
610 Nash, 1929: 69  
611 Reynolds, 1974: 98
make another treaty with Valdemar (this was an important lesson for the League; they were less apt at organising and leading their own fleet for war than for commerce). Valdemar then laid the foundation, by betrothing his daughter Margaret to Hakon, the next in succession to the thrones of Norway and Sweden, for a united Scandinavia. In the short run, the Danes lost, however. The League pillaged and burnt the towns on the Baltic. In 1369 Denmark sued for peace. The treaty of Stralsund that was drawn up by The Hansa and signed by Valdemar in 1370, and the terms were probably the most humiliating ever accepted by Royalty, especially when one realises that they were not dictated by another sovereign, but by the burghers of a League of Cities. The League claimed the freedom of the Peninsula of Skåne, and two-thirds of all its revenues. What is more; a free passage on all the Baltic Sea for a period of fifteen years, and lastly, that during the whole of that time the League of Cities should have a final say in any choices of a ruler for Denmark. The treaty established The Hansa as a great and powerful body in Europe. The daughter of Valdemar was proclaimed queen in Denmark in 1387, and allegedly, Margaret’s chief desire was to see a united Scandinavia. Quite clearly, the kingdoms of Scandinavia had clear motivations to reduce the German influence at Skåne. Postan, for example, claims that as late as in 1537, more than 90,000 tons of herring were still salted annually at Skåne.

With one enemy on the throne of Germany and the Netherlands, the League was faced with another bitter opponent when Christian II came to the throne of Denmark-Norway. As King of Norway, Christian had seen the Hansa tactics in Bergen, and like Charles V, he had no sympathy for the League. In seeking to counterbalance, The Hansa supported Gustav Vasa as King of Sweden. Norway, now united with Denmark under the Oldenburg monarchy, faced a more even struggle with the Hansa. In the autumn of 1519, the relationship between the Hansa Kontor in Bergen and Christian II worsened. The King demanded the “10th penning” (a tax) of the Kontor to finance his war in Sweden. Although this conflict ended in a settlement, it damaged the Hanseatic trade with Bergen critically from 1518-1522. Clearly, the League was uncomfortable with Christian II. In 1523, conveniently enough for the League, Frederick I of Holstein was placed on the throne of Denmark. Thus the League was instrumental in setting Gustav Vasa on the throne of Sweden (1523), and Frederick I on that of Denmark, and in return for their assistance they were given a

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612 The fleet was led by Johann Wittenborg, burgomaster of Lübeck, who was later beheaded by the Hansa.
613 The sovereignty of this enormously rich fishing district was indeed unclear, according to Christiansen, 1997: 12-13
614 Reynolds, 1974: 98
615 Postan, 1973: 95.
616 Gustav Vasa had been taken prison by the Danes in the war between Sweden and Denmark, escaped and was taken care of by the Hansa, which then assisted him in gaining the Crown in Sweden.
617 Hanserecesse: 3 Abt. VII nr 246, 14
renewal of their old privileges, and a fifty years lease of the island of Bornholm. When Gustav Vasa took over the Swedish throne, this was also accepted by the Danes as being the final dissolution of the Kalmar Union. But the success of the Hansa was short-lived. The arrogance of the English merchants was increasing, the Herring had left the Baltic, and the Dutch were seizing a larger and larger share of the carrying trade. The Scandinavian Kings then showed clear talents at realpolitik. King Frederick refused the League to continue its monopoly. In 1533, the Danes, encouraged by the example of Gustav Vasa, joined with Sweden in an anti-Hanseatic alliance (Gustav Vasa by now had openly challenged the Hansa). Through a series of expensive wars, the unity of the Hansa was destroyed. Gustav Vasa began to build a navy, including purchases of ships from the Dutch and later the French, all under Admiral Mans Svensson Some, but the major part of the Scandinavian fleet was provided by Denmark under Admiral Peter Skram. The alliance took back Copenhagen in 1536, and the next three decades both Sweden and Denmark-Norway kept naval squadrons active in the Baltic. During wars with the Dutch also, the League suffered the above-mentioned crucial blow to its trade in Russia. At this time, also Livonia had defied the Hansa and started independent trade with Russia. Then Ivan the Terrible took Livonia, and, by 1560, Livonia was divided up between Poland, Sweden and Denmark. The Hanseatic League was no longer a significant maritime power in Northern Europe. The military power triangle in the Baltic now clearly consisted of Russia, Sweden and Denmark, with the Dutch cities becoming much more influential in the economic sphere. The war between Russia and the Teutonic Order was an intensification of the more or less permanent state of war that had existed on the European Eastern front since the Establishment of the Order in the 13th Century. One might argue that the order was outmanoeuvred already in the 15th century, since Lithuania in union with Poland meant that “the Turk had replaced the Lithuanian as the leading non-Catholic power confronting Eastern Europe”.

The Scandinavian Seven years War (1563-1570) began with the Swedes under their new King Eric XIV, fighting the Danes, under Frederick II, and Lübeck for mastery of the Baltic. Gustav Vasas successor, Erik XIV, forbade the league to cross the Gulf of Finland. This incensed Lübeck, which formed an alliance with Frederick II of Denmark, and declared war on Sweden, but Lübeck had to give in, lacking funds and support of the rest of the League. The war aligned Denmark, Poland and Lübeck against Sweden, but

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618 Nedkvitne, 1984: 69 and 72
619 Bjørgo et al 1995: 100
620 Reynolds, 1974: 154
621 Reynolds, 1974: 154
622 Christiansen, 1997: 248-249
623 ibid: 497
624 Christiansen, 1997: 261
625 Nash, 1929: 200
Lübeck was by now a totally “subservient Danish ally”, according to one author. The result of the war between Sweden and Denmark was a stalemate in 1570. The more enduring aspect of this warfare was increased efforts to state building, both states hastening the production of new warships, the Danes turning to Dutch shipwrights to direct their work. The outcome of the war was thus twofold. It reinforced the Danish dominum maris baltici and Danish possession of Ösel. On the Swedish side, Erik XIV had no alternative “but to levy the peasants for military service and the first Swedish army ordinance was enacted in the 1560ies…in the absence of cash with which to pay for mercenaries the Swedish King had no alternative.” Even Poland tried to establish sea power. In 1620 Zygmunt III had 20 warships built and in 1627 the Polish Navy fought its only sea-battle when it defeated the Swedish off Oliwa.

The fall of the Hanseatic League as a major regional Power

With the loss of the privileges in Russia, Scandinavia and the Baltic, it was only natural that the prestige of the League should suffer throughout its jurisdiction. To this, one can add the heavy import duties put on all Hanseatic merchandise by both Philip of Spain and the Prince of Orange. With the incremental Dutch and English rise to masters of the sea, their merchants extended their activities. The League forbade participating in this trade. This is why Hamburg finally broke loose from the Hansa, taking several other cities with it. It is remarkable; however, that in a large period of medieval Northern Europe, a league of cities had been a central challenger to successful Scandinavian state building. In contrast, there seems to have been no special Hansa Kontor building in Bruges like the ones in Bergen, Novgorod and London, although the Hansa enjoyed prosperous trade in Bruges. There simply was no possibility for the Hansa to establish a monopoly here. But the decline and fall of the Hansa cannot be explained without reference to the growing power of the Dutch, English, Russian, Swedish and Danish states. The League had made war on all these states, and ultimately failed. The Hansa combined economic and military power, but could not fend off attacks in an area covering the larger part of Northern Europe, including the Baltic. Moreover, it was simply not accepted as a “proper” unit by contemporary monarchs that had highly mixed experiences with the intricate organisation of a city-league with extensive maritime interests. After

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626 Bakka, 1998: 497
627 Reynolds, 1974: 155
628 Bakka, 1998: 498
629 Zamoyski, 1994: 156. Dodge, 1998 assures that the "Polish fleet" was patched up by Gdansk, a free city owing nominal allegiance to Poland. The losses on the Polish side were considerable in this only Polish Naval victory.
630 Nash, 1929: 132
the fall of the Hansa, it was primarily states, and secondly Merchant companies connected to the states, that were the crucial actors. Mercantilism was to be dominant in strengthening the sovereigns. The League was of importance in undermining the efforts of Norwegian state-building. Thus, Norway remained in union with Denmark also after the dissolution of the Kalmar Union, and became a province of Denmark from 1536, totally losing its sovereignty. Denmark kept the *dominium maris Baltici*, and to break its grip on Swedish trade Karl IX founded Göteborg as the first port on the Swedish West Coast. In the following war Denmark captured the fortress of Älfsborg built to cover the approaches to Göteborg, thus closing the Swedish “window to the west”. In the following peace agreement, it was pledged to the Danes against a ransom of 1 million thaler. Thus, an almost permanent state of belligerency was created between the two Scandinavian *mare clausum* polities with their geographical proximity and conflicting interests in the Baltic Sea and the Sounds. The Baltic trade entered a period of regression (partly because of the flux in grain prices). A transnational market had existed in Northern Europe prior to the fifteenth century. The observations summed up by Postan are important clues here. He argues that the role of the trade in Northern Europe has been ignored because it “bear little resemblance to the conventional image of medieval economy…(it) evokes in the modern reader none of the romance which clings to trade in southern Europe”. The trade here was “cruder, bulkier, and altogether more indispensable than the luxuries and the fineries of the text book convention. This convention is not altogether true even of the south, for foodstuffs and raw materials also entered into the trade of the Mediterranean region…The trade of Northern Europe was almost exclusively devoted to the necessities of life”. Since the trade was so important, it is not difficult to see why maritime conflicts were given such priority and became such a chronic concern for the monarchs of Northern Europe. Moreover, the fight against the German Cities was a major incentive to build more powerful Navies in Denmark and Sweden, for the English to improve their vessels to be able to perform long-distance sea travels and the protection of sea lines of communication (opening up trade at Iceland and the route to Archangel), and for Russia to adopt knowledge of trade and warfare from western countries. We have mentioned that the German grip on Denmark was very firm at times, documented in the 1370

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631 Reynolds, 1974: 135
632 Of course Norway had been in unions, of different constellations, since 1319, but had kept its national council until 1536, when Christian III abolished it. Norway was to be a “ledemodth aff Danmarks riige och under Danmarks krone til ewiige tiidi”. See Bjørgo et al 1995: 98
633 Bakka, 1998: 498
634 ibid: 499
635 Davies, 1984: 300
636 For a similar conclusion largely based on other sources of evidence, see Abu-Lughod, 1989: 1-24
637 Postan, 1973: 92
638 Postan, 1973: 93
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treaty of Stralsund. Had the German influence in Sweden been less significant, thus making state building in this country easier than in the other? This seems to be negated by several scholars. Wallerstein asserts that “in the later Middle Ages Stockholm was listed as a Hanseatic town”639 Roberts states that up to the 16th century, Sweden “occupied the position almost of a German colony”.640 On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Swedish State experienced a growth and strengthening of its structures relative to the other Nordic countries once the German monopoly641 was broken in the 16th century.

Stein Rokkan has captured the starting point of these processes in broad terms. In his conceptual map of Europe, he labelled Iceland and Norway as “seaward peripheries”, Finland as a “landward buffer”, Sweden as a “landward nation-state” and Denmark as a “seaward nation-state”.642 And yet, the examination of the interplay between The Hanseatic League and the Nordic kingdoms in particular demonstrates how a non-state actor played an essential part in North European economy and coastal societies from the 12th to the 16th century. Moreover, we have claimed that the intense competition between these monarchies and the League in this period created a habitus in these territories where mare clausum was a central part. The port cities of what became the Dutch Republic was a notable exception to this pattern, since they lay in the northernmost part of what Rokkan called the “city-belt”, characterised by a certain resistance against centralized political authority. In all the other territories analysed here, the outcome was a maritime policy that leaned heavily towards mare clausum principles. Naturally, applying later notions of liberalism to the early modern period is risky in the sense that it involves conceptual stretching. On the other hand, in the anarchic period covered thus far, the League and the cities of the later Dutch republic were economic liberals by contemporary standards. Moreover, the fact is that the League in some vital aspects of maritime rules and praxis gradually contributed to temper lawlessness on the sea. The chief motivation was economic utility, to be sure, since a transnational city-league could not run overseas business without a minimalist degree of order. Thus, the City-League sought cooperation and reciprocal understandments with sovereigns in one field: to limit piracy and plunder.643 For the merchants, the most efficient way to secure their ships and crews was to encourage as much of a functioning monopoly of violence as possible where private violence threatened commerce. Ironically, then, the League also bargained with monarchs whenever possible and whenever a total absence of order threatened sea-faring and markets. The outcomes were national laws forbidding

639 TMWS II: 203
640 Roberts, 1958: 20, see also Postan, 1973, Miskimin, 1975
641 Roberts, 1958: 139-142
642 Rokkan, 1999: 355
643 Lorentzen, 1959: 82-84 exemplifies this
piracy unless sanctioned by the monarch and a gradual abandonment of the ancient right to plunder shipwrecks (the latter privilege had been very liberally interpreted until the 14th century and in some areas until the 16th. The Treaty of Westphalia from 1648 did not recognise the Hanseatic League as a sovereign body. The Hanseatic League, functionally but not territorially integrated for mutual defence, did not fit the territorial principles embodied in the treaty of Westphalia. Increasingly, sovereigns commanded organisations for violence that non-state actors could no longer beat in battles. With the exception of the soon declining Scotland, all the mentioned states belonged to the states of the world that had major navies of sailing-ships (see appendix I). The numbers show how England eventually gained the upper hand in naval power compared to the Dutch republic. But it is also important to note that this did not occur until the 1670s; before this decade, the extraterritorial power was distributed more evenly. In the Baltic, Denmark-Norway gained momentum compared to Sweden. Glete explains that this was not a result of Swedish sluggishness on ship construction, but that Denmark captured 21 ships of around 13000 tons between 1675 and 1679. At the same time Sweden lost another 9000 tons of warships in total in the same years. France had to apply pressure on Denmark-Norway in order to restore the provinces Sweden had lost.

But to explain the denial of the League as an entity at the conference of Wesphalia with the fact that the league was not a sovereign state, is a tautologic statement. The decline of the Hanseatic League begun much earlier, and from 1570, it was actually powerless at sea. How come the league was that much weakened compared to the early states from the latter part of the 16th century?

The comparative efficiency of early modern states is aptly illustrated by a comparison with the German League. Firstly, while states could afford to build, maintain and operate a standing army as well as a more or less permanent navy, this was much more difficult for the League, since it was much less territorial. This meant a diversified infrastructure, and an increasingly cumbersome decision-making process where it became impossible to handle unexpected crises for the League and such events were easy to exploit for its adversaries. The permanent state structures, however primitive, were ultimately superior at resource-extraction and warring compared to the multiple, diverse and spread actors of the Hanseatic League. Thus, Exit-opportunities were far easier within the League than within the state. Standardisation was much easier in the state than in the League (consider for example how the League never managed to standardise a system of measurements, a fact that contributed to comparatively high transaction costs. The institutionalism as elaborated by North, 1990, contributes to this kind of explanation). Thus, cheating (with) in the League also was an enduring feature of the Hansa. Naturally, the Diet tried to get rid of these problems by its issuing

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644 Glete, 1993: 153
of commandments, but enforcement of these decisions rested with municipal councils dominated by the merchants responsible for cheating. The League did not have the supreme and ultimate authority of the sovereign state to interpret and enforce regulations. I do not claim that the state structures of the states in Northern Europe in early modern time corresponded to the bureaucratic weberian ideal-typical creed of "sine ira et studio", but they nevertheless were superior to the decision-making and enforcement process of the Hanseatic League. However, a further explanation lies in the dual process of state formation and the establishment of a minimum level of international norms. The monarchs were political entrepreneurs that wanted to get rid of strong, independent cities. They truly wanted to monopolise both use of violence and taxation.

Secondly, the lack of military capacity on behalf of the League should also be seen as connected to the second problem of raising capital (on this point, Tilly’s model certainly has explanatory power). The league in the long run could not solve the free-riding problems that successful state formations eventually managed rather smoothly. Thus, the problems of the League were to a large extent institutional and political, not merely economic or military. Opposed to the League, with its cumbersome way of coordinating policy, the absolutist states had a final decision-making authority. These institutions were more able to “overcome the feudal remnants of economic and legal particularism”. A confederation of towns spread over Entire Northern Europe could not rely on a centralised government ruled by dynasties or monarchs.

Thirdly, the Hanseatic cities were quite diverse and stretched throughout Northern Europe. Over time, therefore, many local Hanse tradesmen became more and more assimilated in the social environment in which they lived. The League did simply not offer a sufficiently strong common identity to counter this incremental process. In a time where wars between sovereigns often made lines of communication precarious, this made any attempt at controlling the local offices more difficult. As a result of this and the gradual process of centralising power under monarchs, the position of many of the local Hanse kontors beyond Germany also made strong attempts at upholding a distinct Hanse society on foreign territory unattainable.

The fall of the Hanseatic League and early state formation in Northern Europe also sheds light on an argument in favour of the multi-dimensional concept of power. Military and political power was what made the early states of Northern Europe superior to the City League. In turn, the principle of the territorial, sovereign state created incentives for mutual empowerment of sovereigns. A principle, one might say an ideology, of the state was created with highly substantial significance for both states and the international system. Thus, the “Hansa was not acceptable as a player in
international politics”. Wallerstein’s general economic model, or the neorealist model of Waltz, are not readily applicable to Northern Europe in the 15th and 16th Centuries. Apart from the fact that long-distance trade in essentials existed prior to the 16th Century, the political history of Northern Europe seems to indicate that it was state-builders, not economic forces per se that shaped the political geography of the Baltic and North Sea seaboards. Against this, world-systems scholars would argue that this is only the superstructure of the development. But this argument does not seem very reasonable when one considers that the economic power of the League during the 14th and 15th Centuries was not sufficient to outsmart the early states in the long run. This enabled monarchs to enforce their laws and regulations in own territories and adjacent waters. Thus, the Hanseatic league simply had to adjust to national laws, a fact that made their transaction costs within the League rise even more. And yet, this chapter illustrates that the European international “system” was less “systemic” than the neorealist model allows. It also demonstrates that neorealism is not universal; units were indeed functionally differentiated in Northern Europe of the early modern period.

Paradoxically, this resistance to the League also helped foster mercantilism, including, strong incentives towards mare clausum. This is evidenced in the continued fight for dominium in Northern waters after the fall of the League. All states in this area that had experienced considerable incursions into their sovereignty by the League, developed into mare clausum polities. Thus, permanent navies became instruments to pursue sovereignty also at sea, in a logic that involved repeated clashes and the institution of the balance of power, with its secret diplomacy and temporary alliances. But at least this balance of power-logic contained rules of conduct; what was acceptable and unacceptable behaviour did not correspond to a truly “Hobbesian culture of anarchy”. Inherent in this institution of balance of power is a minimal claim to mutual respect among states in an international society. Not that struggles over territories and income from taxation did not occur, far from it, but in the case of extraterritorial sovereignty, a state praxis emerged in which states recognised each other’s right to sovereignty over narrow strips of coastal waters, although the exact demarcation of these waters remained contested. The ordering principle in the international community of sea-powers thus was built upon mare clausum, but also a mutual consent that piracy at sea should be somewhat regulated. Although prize-taking was to flourish in times of crisis, monarchs in Europe were increasingly prone to judge this praxis differently than piracy by “The other”; the Islamic communities of Northern Africa.

645 Spruyt, 1994: 155
646 ibid; 170
647 But the myth of the Hanse returned in German political history. Already in 1846, the German writer J.G. Kohl emphasised the “Germanness” of the coast of Seleswig-Holstein. Prussia should be seen as a successor of the
Compared to other regions of the 17th Century, at least according to traditional opinion, one defining feature of the political landscape of North-western Europe was the absence of “formal” empires that had direct rule in neighbouring territories. As we have seen, this verdict must be qualified. Firstly, England certainly was well on the way to establish an Empire of the British Isles from the late 17th century. Sweden created a maritime empire in the Baltic from the early 17th century, and Denmark was in firm control of Iceland and Norway from the 16th century. However, these were maritime empires where the motherland out of weakness established indirect rule in its colonies and dependencies. Northern Europe AD 1600 was a security complex where conduct between these fragile polities was institutionalised only to a small extent. Although the treaty of Westphalia should perhaps not be seen as The dividing juncture of the European state system, but rather a codification of evolving principles, it is quite clear that the most dominant international institution in Northern Europe was the principle of balance of power between sovereign monarchs by mid 17th Century.

This included a growing concern about alliances that included diplomacy and signing of bilateral treaties. Multilateralism only had a fragile take-off from 1648. But above all, the balance of power rested on the assumption that a state only existed when the monarch and his or hers state apparatus could execute sovereignty—that is, the functions of the state within a more or less defined territory, as well as the adjacent “territorial sea” in the case of coastal states. Although states certainly could compensate unilateral weakness by entering into alliances with each other, evident military weakness was dangerous, since any militarily weak state was a tempting target and an unattractive ally. Apart from the ideological power that could be mobilised along religious lines, economic power was an asset largely to the degree that it could be translated into military or political power.

One of the most efficient ways of producing political power in Northern Europe, I argue, was the Hanseatic League. A decade later, Anton von Etzel thus could claim that “the Baltic is essentially a Germanic Mediterranean”, and that the other powers of the region have “always been passive, it has always been their historic fate to be outstripped by others” Cited in Kirby & Hinkkanen, 2000: 56

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648 This opinion certainly contains substantial truths. The dominant states of Northern Europe in the 17th century were not strong enough to impose direct rule over longer periods in conquered territories in Europe. The Swedish maritime empire is thus judged by Peter Englund, 2000 as a type of indirect rule, where especially rich merchants in the cities along the Baltic Seaboard kept a very substantial degree of autonomy. Riste, 2001 shows how Denmark let Norway keep a national council. Lloyd, 1996: 3 sums up the nature of the English colonies by stating that “it was accepted by the 1630s that English colonies could take most decisions for themselves”

649 There is an enormous literature on the balance of power. Theoretically, I find, the major dividing line in the realist literature at this point is between scholars that see the institution as intentionally maintained by states, and those who see it as unintentionally maintained by states. Hobson, 2000: 27, in my view accurately, states that “while for Bull the system is intentionally maintained by states in part through the balance of power, for Waltz the system is unintentionally maintained as states balance, because its subversion into a hierarchy through the creation of a world empire is ultimately prevented”. On this question, I am prone to support Hedley Bull, not necessarily because it is a better assumption in macro theory, but because it closes the gap at least a bit, between micro and macro levels of analysis. Thus, interaction between units becomes might be better described than in waltzian neorealism. In the latter theory, analysis built on game theory or transaction costs analysis only belongs to the analysis of foreign policy of single states.
establishment, maintenance and use of permanent navies. Those organisations could, to simplify, be applied for three main purposes.

Firstly, navies could protect territorial waters, harbours and cities, thus ensuring that enemy forces were not able to penetrate the territorial state from the sea, and ensure that the extraction of coastal resources (e.g. fishing) could be used for the native inhabitants of the coastal state.

Secondly, navies could be used for the protection of sea lines of communications. This meant that sovereigns could sell protection to the merchants and merchant companies of his or her own states. Alternatively, the sovereign body could grant the merchant company the rights to provide this protection themselves. What is more, navies could be used to sell protection for vessels of other states. In the case of Denmark, for example, the Sound toll existed well into the 19th Century. Protecting sea lines of communications also could be a means to ensure that goods and personnel could travel safely between the motherland and its colonial processions or dependencies when the two were separated by salt water.

Thirdly, naval force could be applied for pressure of and outright conflict with opponents. But it could also be a means to suppress non-state actors as pirates and looters at sea. And finally, both military and merchant navies was by far the most efficient, and often only sensible, means of transporting armies to distant theatres of war or colonial possessions.

In sum, this indicates that a comparative analysis of the size and nature of navies and maritime power seems to be an interesting and potentially substantive aspect of state formation processes in Northern Europe. In short, the main questions that I will seek to address in this chapter are;

1. What kind of Navies did the states of Northern Europe create, and how were these state organisations influenced by their society?
2. What was the logic of this aspect of state formation compared to the institutionalisation of territorial armies?
3. In what way did states with maritime power influence international institutions regulating extraterritorial sovereignty and use of violence?

Each of these three questions is demanding. However, recent contributions by historians in these fields of study make it possible to draw an empirical map that makes comparison feasible.

Furthermore, if we once more stress that the aim here is to contribute to theorising and broad comparative perspectives, we will hopefully be able to avoid being swamped in historical details. The focus will especially be on navies, their organisation and extent, and how these were embedded in society. This may seem like a narrow approach, but when considering both the nature of the international anarchy and the percentage of state resources that were used to build navies in this
period, a different picture appears. Above all, we must grasp how navies gradually became practitioners of state policy, and expressions of the preferences and principles state leaders had.

3.1 Naval Technology, Personnel and Organisation

In order to understand the trajectories of state formation in the naval and maritime realms, we need some basic understanding of what nature naval organisations had from ca 1600 till the 1850s. The introduction of guns and gun-carrying ships, made for more complex naval technology, ship-designs and organisation. In turn, this demanded increased co-ordination and exchange of information.\textsuperscript{650} Seen in perspective, it is worth noting that in Europe at large, the Italian maritime cities of Genoa and Venice still were the leaders in maritime technology by the early 16\textsuperscript{th} century. Thus, it was not uncommon that both France and England bought or hired Mediterranean armed merchantmen. One century later, the balance had tilted in favour of Northern Europe. In the early 17\textsuperscript{th} century, Dutch and English shipbuilding were the best in Europe. Warship technology at this point developed fastest in the new economic centre around the North Sea. While few reliable sources exist on this early technological development, Jan Glete stress that “the development of technology for warfare at sea is often best analysed as an interaction process between the users..., the producers and the political rulers of the state or the private investors in maritime armed force”.\textsuperscript{651} In order to achieve this, different groups in state and society had to find compromises that were efficient and mutually profitable. Thus, maritime technological development fostered coalitions among actors within the polity.\textsuperscript{652} The fields of co-operation were vast, and can only be properly comprehended by the contemporary reader by briefly examining how different aspects of shipbuilding, operation of ships and maintenance demanded such efforts at collaboration among in other respects different actors in society.

The first aspect of maritime technology involved the technology of guns. The guns applied at sea in the early 15\textsuperscript{th} century were small and primarily used as infantry weapons against the crews of the adversaries. Stone shots were only replaced by iron during the 16\textsuperscript{th} century. The composition of the guns themselves underwent drastic improvements, from wrought-iron guns to copper guns, although the latter only gradually was deployed at sea.\textsuperscript{653} The next step was the introduction of the cast-iron

\textsuperscript{650} Glete, 2000: 19
\textsuperscript{651} Glete, 2000: 19-20
\textsuperscript{652} See Rodger, 2004: 581
\textsuperscript{653} When this was widely applied is uncertain. What seems clear is that Portuguese ships relied on gunpowder rather than boarding from the end of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Century.
gun; a weapon built with a cheaper material than the copper gun, but much more difficult to produce. Initially an English monopoly, the Dutch were able to produce cast-iron guns by 1600. Before 1650, however, the English navy generally preferred the copper guns to cast-iron ones, due to the technical problems experienced when firing cast-iron guns, while Sweden relied on copper guns primarily because of their rich domestic supply of copper. This definitely changed after 1650. The main reason mainly was that the increased demand for cheap guns stimulated technical progress in building iron guns. The variations in abilities in fostering and applying new technologies stand out as the most challenging question. In fact, realism and the other major schools of thought in international relations are silent on such questions of domestic factors. World systems theory gives economic factors a priori predominance. What these research programmes have in common is a minimalist theoretical assumption of the state. I believe that Michael Mann\textsuperscript{654}, belonging to what John M. Hobson\textsuperscript{655} has coined the “second state debate” in sociology and comparative politics where state power is seen as derived from the extent to which states are embedded in society, is a more interesting and fruitful approach to this question. The building of extraterritorial power demanded a material basis for sure, but the social constitution of the state and its society mattered as well. At the same time, half the story is missed if we do not pay due attention to international factors. Competition between states gave incentives as well as limitations in financing increased fire-power.

Even more demanding than the introduction of ever better cannons and artillery, was the competition in designing, building and manning gun-carrying warships. Indeed, it is hardly exaggerating to claim that it was one of the most demanding organisational tasks in European states prior to the industrial revolution. Several scholars, amongst them Immanuel Wallerstein, have seen 17\textsuperscript{th} century shipbuilding in Holland and England as the second (next to textile industries) industry of early modern times. Shipbuilding was highly mechanised, used many labour-saving devices and required an “industrial-commercial complex”.\textsuperscript{656} It is true that shipbuilding from the 17\textsuperscript{th} century involved the construction of wind-powered sawmills, great cranes, ropeyards, biscuit bakeries, ship chandlering, construction of nautical instruments and sea charts. One single medium-sized ship required perhaps as much as 2000 mature oak trees. Much of this wood for Western navies in the period came from the Baltic area. In order to achieve the necessary raw materials, the best prospects were in the hands of those states able to export other goods to the Baltic cities, and here the Dutch

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\textsuperscript{654} Mann, 1993  \\
\textsuperscript{655} Hobson, 2000  \\
\textsuperscript{656} Wallerstein, 1980: 43
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republic was in a favourable position throughout the 17th century. Again, the Baltic was very central in the balance of power.

By 1650, improvements in ship design had made battles with guns carried in sailing ships a more common form of warfare at sea. Fleeting platforms of artillery gradually replaced infantry fighting at sea. Not only was the firepower of these ships superior at open sea, and during sieges and bombardments; the ships were generally safer and had better sailing capabilities, making them much better instruments of power-projection. This also provided commercial shipping with far better protection against attacks by pirates. This provided state leaders and merchants in coastal states incentives for investing in sea-going navies. Thus, guns also made it possible to substitute manpower with capital to some degree. Moreover, guns, projectiles and gunpowder could be stored for long periods of time without losing quality. This meant that fighting efficiency could be maintained at sea for much longer intervals than earlier. In this way, warfare at sea became truly inter-regional, and in some respects gradually globalized. Time-space was reduced in an important sector that affected international relations. The ability to project power through extra-territorial means of violence meant that distant powers could operate in waters with great strategic and economic importance to a degree unparalleled in earlier epochs. The implications were drastic, and to a large degree in favour of the strongest maritime powers; the significance of power based on local resources was reduced while the potential for using sea power to defend national interests at long distances was increased. Furthermore, the coastal state with an inferior army could defend itself by meeting the enemy at sea and try to defeat his adversary before he could land his army. This meant that even a rather small navy could have a considerable deterrent effect, and that armies and navies had become functionally different organisations. Thus, a large army could not entirely compensate for a weak navy.

The development of the gun-armed ship also gave new opportunities for combinations of cargo carrying and firepower. This made the application of Naval vessels as well as long-distance transport of goods more cost-effective. In this way, fewer men-of-war were required for escort, thus making their use more flexible. At the same time, armed merchantmen could serve as a reserve fleet that could supplement the regular navy in time of war.657

If we compare the major maritime powers in Northern Europe by the size of their regular, sailing-ship navies, we achieve an impression the significance this “maritime revolution” had on the use of state resources and resource extraction from society at large.

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657 Glete, 2000: 31
Speaking from quantitative measures, the figures in appendix I show the enormous comparative strength of the Netherlands, but especially of England in the period. Furthermore, there is little evidence that those two states had navies that were of a poorer quality than their competitors. On the other hand, also several British naval historians (including Peter Padfield658) acknowledge that the Navy of the Dutch republic was perhaps even more efficient than the English. The overall impression is also a marked increase in the sailing-ship navies of Northern Europe combined, although the rising English proportion of the increase is most spectacular.

Building or supporting a regular navy became a dominant strategy to two main groups in the societies of 17th century Europe. Firstly, it benefited the state builders that wanted to increase centralized power. By building and maintaining a navy, state leaders sought to deny possible and actual opponents the ability to penetrate their sovereignty by ways of bombardments, landings of armies and blockade. In a weakly institutionalised international environment, the state not able or willing to set up this defence during the 16th and 17th century were the “suckers” in a prisoner’s dilemma with many players. Navies could also increase the legitimacy of the monarch, if the populace actually could witness that navies could protect fisheries and transport routes at sea that were vital for supplies of commodities. Thus, although regular navies imposed protection costs by their very existence, these costs were tolerable whenever transactions otherwise were threatened by unregulated use of violence. Therefore, naval protection of commerce can be seen as a transaction, or rather a series of transactions, between taxpayers and monarchs with their state officials.

The second group to benefit from a standing navy were the maritime groups (merchants, merchant companies, sea captains) that had interests in trade protection or plunder over long distances. Indeed, many of the same platforms could be applied to both protection of own ships, while praying on the vessels of the belligerent by prize-taking or even piracy. The exchange hypothesis on protection and tax is just as appropriate when used to this relationship between state and private maritime entrepreneurs as it is on the relationship between state and civil society in general. Naturally, the state had to protect property rights in the domestic realm. Without such secure rights, the economy would suffer, and thereby the state lost revenue. Simultaneously, of course, merchants would deem it rational to support such efforts of protection to maintain their business. This is a very obvious view today, but when we consider that enforcement of property rights and protection of transactions required efficient state bureaucracies and that the distinction between domestic and international realms was highly diffuse for coastal societies, it is also clear that building navies were paramount.

658 See especially Padfield, 1999
tasks for every sovereign coastal state with a vibrant maritime economy. Whereas a landlocked state in the critical phases of state formation in theory could do with a territorial army to protect its sovereignty, sovereignty for coastal states also included protecting what they saw as extraterritorial, sovereign rights. These rights included access to markets, and the use of sea lines of communication and important fishing grounds.

The losers in this process were, as Glete\(^{659}\) points out, those who had a vested interest in naval warfare “with easily convertible cargo carriers and in regional commercial supremacy based on control of trade routes where long-distance trade was kept out by armed force or geographical distance”.

Technological and tactical developments not only opened up new strategic opportunities, but affected sailors and their societies as well (this is a wide, and unfortunately neglected theme in scholarship, especially in the Scandinavian countries).\(^{660}\) Considering the quantitative increase in navies described in Appendix I, these effects must have been pronounced, and the fitting of professional expertise to political ends and technical opportunities certainly was one of trial and error.\(^{661}\) The major European export product from the 16\(^{th}\) to the 18\(^{th}\) centuries was violence - violence that had to be projected from the sea, since landwards communication predominantly was much more time-consuming than transport by sea. This ability, a result mainly of the fierce competition in the North Sea and the Baltic together with the competition between the Iberian monarchs over sea routes and colonies, was basically the only field in which Europeans were superior to peoples of other continents. The first encounter that the native peoples of the “new world” had with Europeans was heavily influenced by European firepower and the military organisation of soldiers, guns and warships. To the maritime states of Europe, the seagoing navies and merchant companies with firepower gave opportunities for increased social mobility, profit and spoils of plunder, whether “legally” sanctioned or not. Naval force in early modern Europe was increasingly applied to gain profit through overseas ventures, be it in trade, colonisation, piracy or

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\(^{659}\) Glete, 1993: 123

\(^{660}\) In my humble opinion, the best sociological analysis of the early naval profession in Europe, is the seminal 1950 article by Norbert Elias (Elias, 1950). There is no need to reinvent the wheel on the topic of the genesis of the naval profession, since Elias has covered this ground, and Rodger (2004) has gone in even greater detail on the topic. It is suffice to say that the article by Elias convincingly demonstrates how maritime know-how was a primary determinant of naval success, but that the merging of the professional mariner (a permanent position) and the gentlemanly military officer (appointed temporarily) was a cumbersome, incremental process. See esp. Elias, 1950: 296-299. As Elias (ibid: 299) notes "It was only in the early eighteenth century that a post and station in the career of young mariners, the post of a midshipman, developed finally into a regular training station reserved for young gentlemen". Prior to this institutionalisation, crisis always led the Crown to commission civilian captains as "naval officers", i.e. in the King’s service.
slave trade, in addition to protecting home waters. The state and private initiatives were not easily separable in this respect. State organisations had great difficulties, despite their increased degree of centralization, to control their coasts and maritime societies at the fringe of the territory they sought to penetrate. Thus, state authorities often supported private use of violence until the 1850s. We will have more to say on this matter in a later chapter, but it is sufficient to say that privateering and piracy were not fully separated in early modern Europe. Indeed, as Ferguson has pointed out, state-sanctioned piracy was the genesis of the process that founded the British Empire. To poorer sections of the populace, at least in coastal communities, the prospects for profit from such ventures could be much more attractive than what life ashore or in coastal fishing vessels could provide. Most importantly, the close connection between private entrepreneurship and state navies became institutionalised in the way personnel were recruited. As Christopher Dandeker has demonstrated, salaries for naval officers even in Britain well into the 19th century, were very modest so that "Prize was a vital element in officers’ material existence and was generally seen (particularly by the state) as a most important incentive for men to join the service". Needless to say, such a system gave incentives for captains to seek prizes and pray on civilian shipping. Even in dressing, the navies of the 17th and 18th centuries were very different from armies; sailors hardly wore uniforms. Furthermore, the “civilising process” that Norbert Elias has written so much about, did certainly not limit behaviour in distant waters, in foreign villages or against the crews with different outlooks and languages from other territories that could be pillaged, to the same degree as at “home”. The distance involved in the use of violence at sea thus involved praxis that would have been seen as illegal, upsetting and morally condemnable in the local communities of the seamen. Overseas was “another place”. In distant regions, other norms came to apply, since neither the populace nor the legal bodies of the state to which the European sailors belonged could, or necessarily were interested in, overlooking the everyday conduct of extraterritorial "business". Not until early 19th century did the slave trade become an issue in the British polity, and at large, it was only with the appalling horror of King Leopold’s Congo that the majority of nations in the western world for the first time seemed united in viewing the previous western “civilizing” of colonies as potentially barbaric.

If we look at the relationship between state authorities and state power on the one side, and the private sector or society at the other, what is quite clear up till the early 18th century is that a private maritime trade was a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing military power at sea.

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661 Elias, 1950: 292. Elias also reminds us that there was no sharp distinction between "armies" and "navies", in our sense of these concepts, in the early modern period
662 Ferguson, 2002, see chapter 1.
663 Dandeker, 1978: 307
664 See Ula, 1946 for a colourful but most entertaining portrait of life in the Danish-Norwegian Navy until 1807.
States that contained such societies seldom had great difficulties in expanding a minor navy at rather short notice. These societies already had the able sailor, the experienced captain, the navigator and the maritime entrepeneur that could man and supply ships. One interesting case is of course the Dutch republic, where the northern, coastal communities and cities were superiorly equipped for the task. A vibrant maritime community could thus be translated into the most efficient agent of state power in Europe – the Dutch Navy. Private ship owners had the networks necessary to find skilled masters, navigators, boatswains and quartermasters who in turn could pick an efficient crew of sailors. Even when recruiting captains for their warships, navies often preferred men from the coastal communities with already existing local and regional networks rather than noblemen. In turn, this segment of the populace was relatively easy to incorporate in state structures: unlike soldiers for standing armies, the sailors and the pilots already existed. Unlike more landlocked polities, coastal states already had an infrastructure to build upon. What were required were a mechanism and an apparatus to convert these sailors and specialists to man a state navy. Arguably, this was an organisational and bureaucratic requirement that also was a necessary condition in order to create sea power in its direct military meaning. But the interplay between a private, maritime trade also created incentives for converting navy personnel back to civil society once the state could not afford their services or did not need them. This created the paradox that the size of regular navies was relatively small in times of “peace”, but it also facilitated a rather smooth relationship between navies and maritime enterprises. Unlike the professional infantry soldier, the sailor’s special skills could very easily be re-incorporated and presumably made to good use in the civilian sector after wars (note that there were some variations in this respect. This nature of navies as organisations and their embeddedness in civil society should make for a qualification in the hypothesis that states made war, and war made states. Maritime communities made navies, and navies made states as well as commerce. Indeed, maritime violence could be seen as more cost-effective; small organisations of armed vessels could play one-shot games through plundering without being permanently tied up in costly operations in the army manner of occupying territory. Somewhat unlike the army officer corpses, sea officers employed by the state also became a highly distinct group. Unlike army officers, who dominantly came from the nobility, by 1650 the main principle that a sea officer should be a specialist generally had been established. Such officers to an increasing degree began their careers as young men and received basic training in ship handling, gunnery and navigation before they could obtain commission as sea officers. It will forever be denied by army officers and

665 See Padfield, 1999 for a discussion
666 Glete, 2000: 42-44
667 Glete, 2000: 49
historians of territorial armies, but the craft of leading naval forces simply was a much more solitaire task of leadership, and certainly more complex, technically speaking, than leading companies, battalions or even regiments on land. While the field commander to an increasing degree could rely on specialised officers of lower rank during and after the military revolution, the Navy captain had to have intimate knowledge and experience in a vast set of technical matters while simultaneously being able to act with great autonomy during battle.668

But how this institutionalisation of a permanent Naval officer corps actually took place is a complex process that actually only is partly understood even by the foremost of naval historians at the time of writing. According to Jan Glete669, this happened “gradually during the 16th Century” in Denmark-Norway, and in the “early seventeenth century” in Sweden. In England, the permanent corps of sea officers was actually not fully institutionalised until the late 17th century. The Dutch republic had a corps of captains with full-time employment from 1626, but the practise of hiring junior officers from the open market continued. The practise that social and political considerations played a large part in state employment continued longer when it came to the commander-in-chiefs of major fleets and the permanent heads of navies (Lord High Admiral in England, Riksamiral/Rigsadmiral in the Scandinavian countries, Amiral-Generaal and his deputies in the Dutch republic). The Dutch Republic was the first European state to employ a commander-in-chief of a major navy from humble social origin when Piet Hein was appointed in 1629. The situation was different in England, to be sure. But by the early 18th century, admirals usually were chosen among able captains with long experience at sea.

The political economy of recruiting the common sailor turned out to be more different among the maritime powers of Northern Europe. In both Denmark-Norway and Sweden, sailors were conscripts from coastal towns and maritime communities. It seems that discipline was not a problem in these navies, although the conscripts served for years under often harsh conditions. Only in Denmark do we know of a smaller cadre of professional sailors employed to supplement the conscript sailors. In England, impressments were used in periods for recruiting sailors.670 Mutinies among these men, however, seem primarily to have occurred in the first half of the seventeenth century. The Dutch example again is a case standing out from the others. This navy seems to have been the only one that was able to rely on the open market for mass recruitments of sailors. In its

668 After the industrial revolution, one might speculate, the difference between land power and sea power in this respect was actually sought reversed, especially in the Royal Navy. These efforts were fuelled by the mechanisation of fleets, communication and tactics underpinned by a belief in naval warfare as an exact science that perhaps have survived in many developed countries even today. I am grateful to Captain Inge Tjøstheim for his very clear suggestion that this indeed is the case (Sea Power seminar, Ulvik, Norway, August 30 2002)
669 Glete, 2000: 50-51
670 Rodger, 2004
merchant companies, merchant marine and navy, vast opportunities were opened for sailors, including many foreigners, especially Germans and Scandinavians.

The role of navies in state formation is much less understood than the role armies played in the same process. Considering the 17th century “hegemony” of the Dutch republic and the later English one, however, the notion often held by historians and sociologists that the Dutch and English states were “weak” and very limited, must be qualified. Both the Dutch Republic and England were able to project often-overwhelming power through their state navies. What is striking is that states like Sweden, the Netherlands and England during the 17th century were able to gain political influence in Europe that was out of proportion to their bases in population and economic resources. The answer to this is that organisation and resource utilisation mattered. *These medium-sized states were ultimately superior in projecting power by sea. Only efficient state machinery could be able to convert the scarce resources of these countries into military and thereby political power.* How this happened can only be understood by comparing findings of different specialists on naval administration and organisation and the processes of financing these organisations, a task that will be attempted in the following sections.

### 3.2 The Balance of Sea Power and extraterritorial Sovereignty

The principle embodied in the balance of power between polities was the dominant international institution of in Europe from AD 1600. Largely, these polities were states, understood as hierarchies where the ability to use large-scale violence and tax the people of the territory to a substantial degree had been monopolised, although this monopoly was frequently challenged. The principles embodied in the logic of balance of power included the institutionalisation of agents of violence; the institutionalisation of armies and navies under varying degrees of political control, intelligence aimed at reading the capabilities and intentions of adversaries by ways of intelligence, the military, political and ideological measures taken to counter the power of competitors, the exchange of information between states through the medium of diplomacy to be able to take such actions, signalling of policy intentions, war making and the negotiation and agreements over peace settlements and alliances. Navies both constituted a major element of the monopoly of violence *and* a possible means to increase incomes by protecting own trade, praying on trade of others, black mailing and selling protection.

At the international level, the navies played an important part in forming and changing the balance of power. Domestic factors (remembering that the demarcation between national and international
was almost as blurred as the distinction between private and state enterprise in naval matters up till the early 19th century), to a high degree meant that states had varying abilities to participate in the balance of power. Protection of territory and extraterritorial valuables, in this case through navies, should be seen as transaction costs.\textsuperscript{671} Douglas C. North\textsuperscript{672} defined the costs of transacting as “the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements”. More effective and/or cheaper naval protection meant that transaction costs were lowered. In turn, lower transaction costs consisted of lower insurance rates, decreased transportation costs (Increasing carrying capacity and decreasing the size of crews since merchant ships to a larger degree were freed from protecting themselves), lower prices, a widening of markets for goods and raw materials, and a smoother exchange of goods and information in commercial centres, especially those of a maritime character. This also meant that states were different when we compare their ability to resist penetration of their own sovereignty from the means of extraterritorial violence applied by adversaries in the international system. In the following sections, we will try to look into the main trends of the domestic factors that influenced state behaviour and to what degree these were manifested into sea power.

\textbf{The Dutch Republic - An International Liberalist?}

In chapter two, we depicted the Dutch Republic as one of the few cases that we can call an international liberalist. As we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, both the domestic sector and Dutch maritime policy in the realm of foreign policy were heavily influenced by the vast and highly international maritime sectors of the Republic. We have indicated that this dynamic maritime sector was the basis for the military and political power of the Netherlands in the 17th century.\textsuperscript{673} We have not looked into the decline of this power, but will do so in the last half of this section.

Profits from sea-borne trade and the financial means to wage war were intertwined phenomena in the Dutch Republic.\textsuperscript{674} It thus moulded its strategy to suit the interests of the maritime groups in the northern part of the republic. This was perhaps the key to the Dutch success for much of the 17th

\textsuperscript{671} A view also held by Glete, 2000
\textsuperscript{672} North, 1990: 27
\textsuperscript{673} See for example, Israel, 1995: 241-242
\textsuperscript{674} The international configuration of power struggle also gave the Dutch a favourable starting point; “it cannot be denied that the spectacular military achievement of the Republic between 1590 and 1597 were possible only because Spain was distracted by the struggle in France” (Israel, 1995: 253). The reopening of the waterways and rivers linking Holland and Germany, the influx of capital and skills from Antwerp after 1585 and the internal stabilisation of the Republic after 1588 all contributed to the “Dutch miracle” of the 1590s.
century. The commercial maritime interests then also certainly influenced foreign policy. *Mare liberum* as elaborated by Grotius certainly reflected the economic interests of both commerce and state. In this way, the civil society and market agents of the Republic, especially Holland, to a large degree influenced the international discourse on sovereignty at sea. The doctrine of *mare liberum* was a natural one to adopt in northern waters where Dutch ships were the universal carriers. Dutch policy was much more bent when it came to areas where Dutch companies tried to gain a foothold in trade and transport of goods. Thus, along the West African coast, in eastern seas and off Brazil, the Dutch companies protected their monopolies forcibly. In addition, as Anglo-Saxon historians remind us, they closed the river Schelde to trade for foreigners to secure the position of Amsterdam. However, I believe that it is an exaggeration to see the *mare liberum* position as mere hypocrisy. The Dutch society was liberal in a comparative perspective, which also meant that the Calvinist creed did not question Man’s role as master and lord of the universe. Thus, both meat, fish and whale meat was consumed in large quantities. Working in the comparatively speaking liberal atmosphere oh the Republic, René Descartes held that since animals lacked immortal souls. Man’s soul, on the other hand, was implanted by God; thus mankind was free to harvest and use natural resources in any way deemed necessary. Beyond this, there is no reason to doubt that Dutch citizens were proud of their success, consistent in their faith in the blessings of free trade and excited by the comparatively wide freedoms granted them by the Dutch republic.

In this respect, the contribution of Dutch society and enterprise was *ideologically* different from the corresponding ones in Denmark-Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, France and England, and *institutionally* different from the Hanseatic League. The Netherlands in fact replaced the Hanse as the dominant carrier of maritime trade. Lübeck and Antwerp were replaced by Amsterdam. But it is also interesting to note how the Dutch Republic *rose* without a national, seagoing navy. It could rise to a large part because of the strong merchant navies in northern Netherlands and the locally organised navies in the same regions. How did these interests affect international maritime institutions? In the first half of the 17th century, the Dutch republic was able to shape such institutions in Northern Europe. As a protest against the Danish king raising the sound tolls in 1611,}

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675 And Protestantism was not a barrier to local autonomy; ““Nowhere else...did Calvinism become so closely linked to civic autonomy and the defence of local privileges against princely authority as in East Friesland. Indeed, the political ideology, and church politics, of the Emden revolution of 1595 neatly complemented the larger ideological framework of the Dutch revolt itself” (Israel, 1995: 251
676 Padfield, 1999: 83
677 Padfield, 1999: 84-85. Note the similarity in implications with the views in the Reagan administrations on environmental politics. In other respects, needless to say, there are huge differences. Padfield (ibid: 85) shows how the view of animals as mechanical devices were reassuring for Descartes and his contemporaries.
678 Glete, 1993: 153
the republic forged an armed alliance with Sweden. Thus, with the treaties of 1613-1614, the principle was established in the Baltic that no state could be allowed to obstruct the trade or shipping by others. The states should all guarantee the freedom of the Sound. When the English Crown in 1614 sought to prevent that unfinished English cloth was exported for processing in the Republic, Holland’s retaliation (ban on imports of English finished cloth) forced the English monarch to abandon his initial regulation.679

At the same time, the Dutch Navy, divided into five admiralties, became a “local” undertaking as well. The five admiralties, or admiralty colleges as Jonathan Israel coins them, resided in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enkhuizen (collectively), Zeeland and Friesland. The admiralties had a wide range of responsibilities; “administering the navy, collecting customs, maintaining guard boats on rivers and estuaries, building warships, recruiting naval seamen, and enforcing (and advising on) the states general’s regulation of shipping and fisheries”.680

Seen from the point of the Dutch polity, this regional domestic organisation had obvious disadvantages (e.g. lack of unified military command, lower degree of standardisation and political convergence). But initially, it had advantages as well, perhaps being both an object of considerable local legitimacy since it suited the trade interests (and by implication employment possibilities) for people in those five units of the Dutch federation. Again, the Dutch republic as the later USA and the former City league, were relatively decentralised, federative polities, and they all belong to the main category of international liberals. While the Dutch navy (navies) can be seen as a means primarily created to protect trade and enforce liberal property rights, this was also visible in its financing. Again, the financing as well as the organisation, of the navy was a reflection of the composition and political economy of the state itself. “It has been estimated that four-fifths of total Dutch revenue was raised in the provinces by means of the separate provincial tax systems”.681 More than any other income, the revenues used for the navy came from customs paid by ships going in and out of ports. Each admiralty had a substantial administrative staff both for financing the navy and running it.682 But in addition to this income, the navy was also founded by the state in a direct manner, through stats subsidien. This was granted by the central authority (the Staten Generaal), and paid by the units of the federation as a whole. Thus, it would certainly be erroneous to see the Dutch Navy as merely a locally financed and organised institution. It was the Generality which fixed the tariffs and naval policy and supervised the work of the colleges.683 The navy also became a truly

679 Israel, 1995: 406
680 Israel, 1995: 295
681 Israel, 1995: 285
682 Details can be found in Israel, 1995
683 Israel, 1995: 296
state instrument, however decentralized. The navy was used as the vital mean in a grand strategy by power projection as well as protection from blockade and invasion. However, one should note the very peculiar (for the observer in the 21st century) dualism of state and market in the Dutch naval forces. Jan Glete684 thus speaks of two Dutch navies; one owned by the admiralties, financed by tax on shipping and used primarily for the protection of trade, the other a state navy in the (modern) sense, paid by the federal state and administered by the admiralties. However, this administrative and financial arrangement did not result in two different organisations altogether. Policy clearly was co-ordinated. Rather, the “two fleets” were used for sea control and as battle fleet respectively, where the battle fleets were composed of vessels from all admiralties. At the international level, the Dutch Republic further contributed significantly to the discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty by its foundation of two rather distinct bodies that were delegated authority of using organised violence. These were the United East India Company of 1602 and the West India Company of 1621. Again, power was deliberately granted in a decentralised manner that was thought to be an efficient institutional arrangement. In order to colonise the Indies, each company were given responsibilities to make war, trade and colonise in their respective areas. However, especially the East India Company acted in a manner that it would be inaccurate to see as just another example of the blue-water Lockeanism found amongst the more purely paternalist powers.685 Furthermore, as the existence of a maritime community with skilled organisers and labourers created an infrastructure on which to build sea power, the vastness and extension of Dutch maritime enterprise also created a structural problem for the state navy, and thereby for the Dutch polity. Thus, privately owned ships with their entire crews to a large degree were available for hire on an open, international market. This was liberalism with a vengeance. Indeed, some of the most famous Dutch admirals sailed in foreign and private service for long periods of their careers. The problem arose when the Dutch republic lost in the competition for personnel. The navy simply became very reliant on foreign sailors. Jonathan Israeal, for example, cites the English ambassador to Denmark-Norway, who in 1664 claimed that “all their Norway mariners are run in to the Hollanders’ service, for want of employment at home, and if (the Danish King) should command them back, the States would not be able to put their fleet to sea”.686 Unlike England, the Dutch admiralties could not apply press-gangs to man their ships. A liberal republic could not employ such means if its ideological creed should have any legitimacy. This meant that capital was even more important in order for the Dutch to man a fleet when deemed necessary.

684 Glete, 1993: 154-155
685 See ibid: chapter 4
686 Israel, 1995: 623
The maritime entrepreneurs also demonstrated a lack of interest for a Dutch Navy with ambitions outside of Europe. Such roles were only given the Companies, in which private capital and citizens at large mainly contributed as stock-buyers. Indeed, even in the Baltic, Dutch merchants were primarily protected by the efforts by Dutch authorities to keep friendly relations with the kingdoms of Scandinavia, rather than costly patrolling by the Dutch navy in the period till 1654. The very vastness of Dutch maritime activity meant that upholding a navy used both in local and distant waters would have been enormously expensive. Thus, it was a pareto-efficient strategy to concentrate on protection in more local waters. At least it seems to have suited the Dutch well in the final phase of the Thirty Years War. The transaction costs decreased for the Dutch in these years; Spanish embargoes were lifted in 1647, the Flemish privateering campaign against Dutch shipping ceased in 1646, Dutch-Spanish hostilities in the New World came to an end (1647) and the freight charges and marine insurance rates dropped. However, Dutch policy rested on the ability to keep the international institutions of maritime sovereignty as liberal as was possible for the Dutch to compete in. This meant that the political economy of the Dutch trade and foreign policy sooner or later would collide with the mare clausum politics of England. While England had been able to compensate their loss of commercial advantages in Northern Europe to the Dutch by gaining in the Levant, “by 1651 the slump in England, and disgruntlement of the merchants, shippers and clothiers, had brought Anglo-Dutch relations under severe strain”. In august 1651, the English parliament passed the Navigation Act. From now on, the struggle was intensified. The first Navigation acts of England banned the import and export of goods except on English ships or on ships of the place of origin or port of final shipment of the goods. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to see the English navigation act as an attempt to strengthen the English Merchant navy, and thereby creating both revenue and a maritime infrastructure that could be translated into sea power if necessary. The extension of the navigation acts to include the English colonies resulted in the arrest of Dutch ships, the direct cause of the war from 1652 till 1654 that was concluded by an empty English victory. The main battles were fought in the Channel, the choke point between the North Sea and the Atlantic and southern colonies, where both navies sought to control sea lines of communication. Since this war has been richly described elsewhere, it is sufficient to say that the balance of power was in the favour of England. The Dutch had never prepared for such direct confrontations with battle-fleets, while the English were superior in large warships. But the English “victory” was more than empty;

687 Of course there are exceptions to this rule; one famous example being the battle in the Sound between the Dutch and Swedish fleets in 1658. However, it was precisely the prospects of an utterly weakened Denmark that forced the Dutch navy to intervene.
688 Israel, 1995: 714
689 Glete, 1993, Israel, 1995: 715 believes that 30 Dutch vessels were brought in in January 1652 alone.
it demonstrated the comparative Dutch advantage in maritime power conceived as a broader set of capabilities than military power projected from the sea. Apart from fighting successfully in the Channel, the English forces were not sufficient to break the Dutch hold on the main sea-lanes further away from their homeland. Thus, England’s commercial shipping was damaged more than was the Dutch. The latter, allied to Denmark, and maintaining a significant force at the Sound, closed down the English trade with the Baltic completely. The Dutch were even successful in the Mediterranean.691

The war created a naval arms race between the two states of unprecedented proportions.692 It also meant that both English and Dutch fleets began to operate on a larger scale both in the Baltic, the western Mediterranean as well as in American waters. Thus, the English Navy projected power in the Mediterranean such that the North African corsair states were forced to sign treaties, the Tunisian fleet was destroyed and Portugal signed a treaty where the British undertook to protect its possessions in exchange for trade concessions. In order to protect its interests in the Baltic, the Dutch Navy clashed with Sweden’s remarkable and actually final serious effort to gain dominium maris Baltici in 1655-1660. The prospect that the balance of power in the Baltic would tilt in the favour of a strong Sweden could have such disastrous consequences (such as a Sweden-dominated naval alliance in order to control east-west trade in Northern Europe) that both England and the Dutch republic sent strong fleets to the Baltic in 1659 (actually, the Dutch Navy was sent to support the Danes, while the English fleet was deployed to support the Swedes). It was this effort by two strong, permanent navies of the great powers of Northern Europe that recreated the balance of power in the Baltic, and made Sweden bow and sign a peace treaty with Denmark in 1660.693 The Anglo-Dutch struggle for hegemony had definitely penetrated the Baltic Area and the North European security complex at large.

But the violent dispute between the Liberalist and the Paternalist was not settled. They clashed yet again in the second Anglo-Dutch war of 1664-67. Again, the issues on extraterritorial sovereignty and rights were the direct causes of a war that influenced the international configurations of power and influence. The more successful Dutch war efforts in this war were direct results of a more centralised Dutch naval policy including a programme for building of battleships never seen before in Europe. In 1652, the total displacement of the Dutch state navy had been ca. 30000 tons; by 1672 it had passed 100000 tons.694 This strength certainly was required when the kings of mercantile

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690 Described in Glete, 1993, Rodger, 2004
691 Israel, 1995: 721
692 See table earlier in this chapter
693 Glete, 1993, Israel, 1995: 738
694 Glete, 1993: 189-190
England and France allied and unsuccessfully sought to end the Dutch commercial superiority through a series of naval battles in 1672 and 1673. Indeed, our label of the Dutch republic as an international liberalist seems justifiable when we look at the contents of diplomacy carried out by the Dutch in the mid 17th century. The treaty of friendship that Amsterdam hoped that Charles would accept in 1651 contained the principles of unrestricted trade (thus abolishing the Navigation Act) and the principle of free ship, free goods whenever one of the two powers was engaged in hostilities with other powers.  Although the treaty was actually signed in 1662, the atmosphere - partly due to the mare clausum policy of England prohibiting foreign fishing vessels to fish nearer the British shore than ten miles –was so tense “that it failed to provide the stable basis of friendship which the Orangist camp needed.” The Republic also secured a treaty with France in 1662, guaranteeing the Dutch fisheries in the North Sea. However, warmaking continued. The series of battles fought between France and the Dutch Republic ultimately took its toll. From 1671 till 1680, the republic was not able to replace losses at sea. By 1680, the Dutch navy was only about half the size of the French and English. This certainly also was as much a result of the continued war on the continent as the costs of protecting trade and fighting battles at sea. As a matter of fact, the war between France and The republic was not a direct result of maritime questions, and even forced the more maritime conflict with England into the background. Indeed, the Dutch invasion of England led by William of Orange in 1688, had the immediate effect that the two maritime powers formed an anti-French coalition, the naval implications of which will be described further in the next section of this chapter. The strategic interests of both England and the Dutch Republic allowed for such an alliance to endure. These interests were primarily the specific counter-balancing of France and protection of sea lines of communication in general. In other words, the logic of balance-of-power between sovereign states had become the prime international institution that also penetrated national policies. Thus, the liberal and commercial idealism that we can find in Dutch attitudes concerning interstate relations among European states did not fully reach a breakthrough because the Dutch navy ultimately was not strong enough to impose these principles of mare liberum after 1670. Thus, I believe it is not feasible to see the Dutch republic as a hegemon after this decade. Furthermore, it seems to me to be quite wrong to label, as some scholars have done, international maritime institutions prior to the 20th century as reflections of mare liberum principles alone. The mare liberum predominance de facto disappeared with the demise of the short-lived Dutch naval predominance. Mercantilism and mare clausum were the dominant principles included in the

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695 Israel, 1995: 750
696 Israel, 1995: 757
institution of the maritime balance of power.

But did the title as an international liberalist fit the Dutch republic? This upon the ideological position of the reader and what standards of empirical comparison we apply: those of the late 17th century or the 20th? However, it seems that some defining features of Dutch state policy on maritime matters are clearly liberalist in a comparative, 17th century perspective. The maritime policy of the Republic was initially defined out of local needs and the demand for protection of fisheries and long-distance trade. While local entrepreneurs under the direction of the five admiralties gave the former protection to a large degree, the latter was only gradually sought through a permanent navy projecting power overseas. Before the Dutch-Anglo wars, the Republic primarily worked in favour of *mare liberum* and tried to protect overseas sea travel through good relations with other coastal states. This policy was gradually eroded through the strained relationships and wars with England and France. The logic of balance-of-power became the dominant international institution in Western Europe in the 18th Century. This logic forced the Dutch republic to enter an alliance with England in order to fend off France. In many ways, it is also tempting to interpret the naval battles in Northern Europe during the 18th century as a result of this equilibrium. From 1690 till 1815, the only clear-cut examples of battle between Battle fleets fought on the explicit orders of political leaders in this area occurred in the channel in 1690 and 1692. From 1692, naval deterrence seems to have worked. However, competing in the continuing naval armaments race was immensely expensive. Thus, the decline of Dutch sea power was pronounced by 1740. In the 1740s, as one leading historian has stated, “the Republic abstained from taking part in the new naval race over hegemony in the Atlantic hemisphere…the queen of the seas was of course now the British Navy.” During the 18th century, the European power struggle (if seen primarily as a balance of power between larger powers) can be interpreted as gradually being divided into one continental and one maritime sphere. From the traditional battlefields of Western Europe, the maritime sphere contained the struggles over colonies and sea lines of communication in America and Asia. The Dutch Republic did not have the financial resources or the motivation to outpace England in its trajectory towards becoming a global power. The two main protestant powers of Northern Europe during the 18th century thus were often allied or at least friendly neutrals whenever a conflict arose between one of them and another power. This relationship, however, became more and more asymmetric as the Dutch navy declined in a comparative perspective. By 1760, for example, the

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697 See Clark, 1989 for a very acute observation as to how statesmen prior to the 19th century and the Napoleonic wars saw the balance of power as a principle beyond dispute, and even almost beyond human control.
698 The battles of Beachy Head and Barfleur/La Hogue
Dutch only had a dozen vessels that could be called real battleships by European standards. The conventional view is that this development in the Dutch navy paralleled the general stagnation of Dutch society in general. However, it seems to be inaccurate to portray this decline as a dramatic weakening of the Dutch republic and its society. It is tempting to support Immanuel Wallerstein in that economic decline in the case of the Republic ultimately should be interpreted in a comparative perspective. However, it is also striking to note how the Dutch became technologically inferior in naval armaments and shipbuilding. The economic weakening cannot be ignored as the chief variable in explaining Dutch decline. The economic centralisation to Amsterdam meant loss of income to the admiralties of Zealand, Noorderqwartier and Friesland. Naturally these units of the federation had to cut down their peacetime navies, while the maritime infrastructure to man vessels for naval purposes in times of crisis also must have been weakened. The Dutch navy in practise became the Amsterdam Navy. The economic centralization did not harmonise with the principles of administrative and military decentralisation that the Dutch continued to rely on. The international competition had passed a threshold that made decentralisation in the monopoly of violence and taxation into a disadvantage rather than an advantage. How come the international incentives for change did not punctuate the institutional logic of the Republic? This is a highly demanding question, but one major reason seems to be the vested interests that embedded state structures and organisations. The admiralties were parts of the political structures. The declining provinces did not want to lose these bodies, since the admiralties were formal power positions. At the same time, the units of the federation did never really agree on federal founding for a permanent navy during the 18th century, not until Great Britain declared war in 1780, that is. Although the Dutch Republic managed to launch a large number of warships between 1781 and 1785, structural weaknesses in state structures and maritime infrastructure soon became evident. A main problem probably also was the lack of stores.

The vested interests that blocked reforms in state structures eventually resulted in their destruction following the French invasion of 1795. One result was that the “new” Batavian republic abolished the admiralties and created a unified, national navy. The Dutch navy in effect was recreated from 1813 after its earlier incorporation in Napoleon’s Empire. The new state (till 1830/31 including Belgium) returned to the traditional Dutch Naval policy where the avoidance of blockade of Dutch ports was given priority. What definitely had changed was the administration of the Navy. The French period from 1795 till 1813 gave as its lasting impact the existence of a centralised naval

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699 Glete, 1993: 227
700 See for example Glete, 1993: 411
701 Wallerstein, 1980.
administration and a permanent corps of naval officers. In many ways, Dutch state-building can accurately be described as being re-started during the French period. By this time, the republic had become a bandwagoning liberalist. What was beneficial to the Netherlands also certainly was the fact that after 1815, Great Britain saw good relations with the Low Countries as vital to its national interests. Thus, Great Britain actually restored most of the Dutch colonial possessions! Anglo-Dutch relations within the security complex of Northern Europe seemed to have changed for eternity. As the Dutch did not see Britain as a security threat, they had no reason to use scarce resources for building a battle fleet either. Anglo-Dutch relations to some degree had become embedded in a tit-for-tat strategy. The Netherlands thus concentrated on protecting their vast maritime empire, while simultaneously trying to keep a low profile in European power politics. The only exception to this pattern was the creation of Belgium in 1830-33, where France and Great Britain intervened with a naval blockade to force the Dutch to accept the new state. Armed conflict was avoided, and the new territory (the northern part of the earlier state) kept all its naval vessels, Belgium serving as a buffer state with only a token Navy of coastal gunboats and patrol boats. The Netherlands, however, modernised its fleet through the gradual converting to steam beginning already in the 1820s. Although the Netherlands have remained a maritime nation till this day, it never again came even close to being a core state, or to challenge other hegemonies. The extraterritorial dimension of Dutch politics nevertheless is an enduring trait in its foreign policy habitus, as will be seen later. However, the trajectory of Dutch sea power is a prime example of how the international competition in 18th century Europe quickly made older political and administrative arrangements obsolete. Although building, manning and maintaining navies could be cost-effective, it certainly was costly if it was a means to enforce its own national preferences on other powerful states. Above all, the consistent and long-term commitment required in order to produce a credible naval force from the 18th century was at odds with the highly decentralised way to organise the monopolies of extraterritorial violence and taxation in the Dutch republic.

**England as a naval hegemon**

If some of the empirical issues we try to cover in this thesis are hampered by lack of historical sources, this certainly does not apply to English maritime policies and sea power. More than in any other nation in Europe the Navy seems to be a true institution of the English. To recreate yet another narrative of the development and nature of English sea power thus seems entirely unnecessary. Ever
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since A.T. Mahan wrote his influential treatise on the Influence of Sea Power upon History in 1890, the dominant theme has been that of the rise of English and later British power by means of Naval force. Accounts of battles and detailed overviews of technological innovations will not be given in the following. Only during the past two decades, however, have historians analysed in detail how the limited state and societal structures of England could produce this expansion through force. To simplify, is not the dominant sociological explanations of the English “political development” somewhat narrow in focusing on the relationships between classes, agriculture, modes of production and the raising of armies? Without pertaining to argue that these variables have not been important in explaining English state building, I will claim here that what makes England special in a comparative perspective is the efficiency of extraterritorial violence created by this country that was rather insignificant by early 16th century standards. It was this capability that in time would ensure that British ideology coloured 19th century international maritime institutions to a very large degree.

Indeed, this growing ability has been underrated as a factor in studies of state formation in political science. The military revolution in land warfare supposedly created the absolutist state in Europe, where the representative institutions of the medieval period were abandoned. England only, so the traditional geopolitical explanation goes, escaped this path because it was “invasion-proof”, or because other powers were occupied in continental warfare. The weakness in this line of argument is obvious, according to N.A. M. Rodger. A navy of 20000 men was more expensive than an army of 100000 men by 1600. In 1588, it was proven that the resources of the greatest military and financial power in Europe, Spain, were not sufficient to supply a navy equal to the English. Realism cannot explain this, since the military resources of Spain were superior all in all. Materialists should also note that Spain had ten times more money than had the English state had at the time.

What mattered was skill, commitment but above all cooperation between state institutions and private interest groups. It was the ability of creating sea power that fostered an Empire and changed international institutions of maritime questions that was an important part of the 18th and 19th century world orders. The ability to raise an efficient navy was more dependent upon raising money

704 A reader of this thesis will perhaps question why not more emphasis has been laid on analysing Mahan. The answer is that Mahan’s work is deterministic. Moreover, his argument about the “national character” is both unclear and quasi-racialist (Kennedy, 1976: 7). Taken together, Mahan’s “principles” of Sea Power is not a theory that can be tested, but rather an all-embracing listing of main variables that can explain all successful as well as all failed attempts at creating sea power. The role model used by Mahan in his inductive research strategy clearly was England. According to Mahan, this state and its society clearly matched all principles that made up the successful recipe for sea power.

705 As we have seen from the previous chapter, this is an absurd argument.

706 Rodger, 1997: 430-432
than manpower. Thus, the absolutist state was not a viable option for the English monarchy, since compromises between interest groups and state bureaucracy was a necessary condition for creating naval power.

There is no denying that England had advantageous natural dispositions on which to build maritime power. But geography also was part of what constituted necessity in foreign policy. Separated from continental Europe by salt water, fending off possible invasions by naval force was the most obvious strategy chosen in times of crisis. Furthermore, England – especially in the south- had many good harbours, rich fishing grounds that also laid the basis for sea-faring and rich coastal communities, large sources of iron ore in the Weald, which gave good and comparatively speaking cheap guns. England’s position in the Northwest of Europe was an ideal position both on the east-west axis of trade in northern Europe, as well as in the later race for colonies and control of sea lines of communication. Economic development and an increasingly nationalist policy went hand in hand. Thus, the English state early sold protection to civilian commerce, instituted navigation acts and permitted private agents the use of extraterritorial violence for commercial purposes. In the latter respect, England’s de facto policy had far more a character of blue-water Lockeanism than that of the international liberalist of the Dutch Republic. The expansionist impulse in England gave rise to a series of chartered companies; the Turkey Company, the Venice Company, the Levant Company, the revived Eastland Company, the Muscovy Company, the Cathay Company and the East India Company. Thus, state-supported companies not only gave the state increased income, they also laid the infrastructure on which a stronger navy could be built upon later. Moreover, these early ventures and organisational innovations included alliances between the Monarchy, the Gentry as well as a new and dynamic middle class, all interested in the potential profit of extraterritorial commerce. The religious creed, be it conversion of Pagans or later the policy against Catholicism, naturally gave these adventures an ideological and idealistic dressing. However, it is important to note England as less ideologically constrained than for example Holland. There was a certain element of pragmatism included in the conduct of the Paternalist English polity that was not found in the Dutch republic of the 17th and 18th centuries. This pragmatism, a somewhat surprising feature in the eyes of the 20th century observer perhaps, had some important advantages that also were

707 Kennedy, 1976: 23-25
708 Kennedy, 1976: 25
709 It is not an exaggeration that the split between Protestantism and Catholicism had to be overcome in order for the “Three Kingdoms” to become a first class sea power. “Charles I was divided from many of his protestant subjects by his Arminian principles, widely perceived as no more than diluted or disguised popery. The hatred and fear which English and Scots Protestants felt for Catholics was beyond any other motive in guiding their political consciousness (and it is a motive which modern historians find especially difficult to understand). It not only made them suspicious
commented upon by contemporaries. The English maritime entrepreneurs and specialists were apt at picking up new methods, technology and organisational innovations. Pragmatism was also an advantage when encountering native peoples of distant colonies. Thus, English imperialism, although at times brutal and racist, was not as horrendous as the atrocities committed by some imperialists from other countries. But paternalist, it certainly was. Thus, the genesis of the British Empire was laid already in the late 16th century by the policy of blockading adversaries, protecting “English” fishing grounds and selling protection against pirates. However, we should be cautious against a tendency to picture this as a uni-linear development. Naval policy in England during the 17th century depended, like naval policies in the Dutch Republic, upon constellations of elites within the domestic realm, and in the English case, the parliamentary regime mattered indeed. Parliament gained control of the King’s Fleet in 1642. Parliament supported only a coastal naval fleet of smaller vessels in order to protect trade, ports and fisheries. This was a contrast to the foreign policy Navy of big ships earlier emphasised by Charles I. Thus, extraterritorial ambitions among private domestic elites reflected their more moderate ambitions at the time. The biggest ships of the navy (Sovereign and Prince) were laid up. In many ways, this policy in the latter period of the Civil war and in its aftermath in several ways was a return to an increased degree of private control over naval affairs. Rather than being controlled by pure state organs like the Lord Admiral and the Navy Board, the English Navy actually was controlled by a web of Parliamentary committees. Among these were the Navy and Customs Committee, established in 1641 to control and allocate revenues. Furthermore, the Navy Board in 1642 was replaced by a Navy Commission, combining professional members with parliamentary representatives in control of the Navy rather than the Lord Admiral.

Thus, the political system of the English polity already at this stage shows its distinctive influence on the Navy when compared to the administrative and political control of extraterritorial violence in Spain, France, Portugal and Denmark-Norway. The degree of “democratic” control of English naval matters should not be overstated, though. N.A.M Rodger thus shows how the “active members of the Navy and Customs Committee, the distinct Commission of 1643, the two Admiralty Commissions of 1642 and 1645, the Prize Commission of 1644, and the parliamentary representatives on the Navy Commission, were virtually the same”.

rodger, 1997: 422. See also appendix V in the same volume
However, this was a costly arrangement for the English society. The army occupied London in 1647 and ejected most of the Presbyterians from naval administration. The Navy itself was indeed purged of Presbyterian officers, and the “Army rule” of the fleet caused mutinies in much of England. Indeed, the Navy played a vital role in favour of the parliamentary side during the Civil war, and so “earned the gratitude of its new paymasters”. Thus, from the maritime point of view the outcome of interest here is that the war re-established English Sea Power as a major factor in the European balance of power. Domestically, this was facilitated by the fact that the Navy from this time on was regarded as a national force, or to be more sociologically precise, a part of the state monopoly of violence. Thus, the Rokkanian view of early state building in England should be complemented by this nuance: the English monopoly of violence was not secured until the 1650s. At this point in time, the English navy and naval administration thus had become more akin to Weber’s notion of the modern bureaucracy. Wages in the Navy were raised to attract personnel, pensions became more common, corruption in the administration was reduced drastically, capable officers replaced Royal favourites and logistical support improved drastically. And the revolution certainly brought into power and political position those groups in society who favoured an improved and stronger Navy that could be applied for both overseas colonisation and defence of sea-lines of communication that could provide for safe ocean-faring and trade. This melted together in a gospel of national interests that also converged around the religious and commercial well-being and profit of the upper and middle classes.

The most serious and immediate obstacle to maritime predominance nevertheless lay in Dutch maritime primacy. This struggle and the background for the first navigation Act of 1651 have already been mentioned in the previous section. Although trade wars, these wars were also were a matter of survival for the Dutch empire, and once concluded in favour of England, the Republic had to reduce its ambitions. The trajectory of the Republic was one from a state aspiring for hegemony to one subdued by another hegemon in an asymmetric, informal alliance. For English admirals and state leaders, the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century opened their eyes to the potential value of “command of the sea”, that is neutralisation of enemy fleets and control of maritime communications. Command of the sea did not only mean protection of the territorial polity, but also the ability to subdue colonies and to control and protect trade. Extraterritorial means of violence created extraterritorial sovereign “rights” as claimed by the power-projecting sea power. This introduced a new logic to the balance of power in Europe, and a dilemma for policy makers in ALL EUROPEAN states. They had to maintain a close surveillance of the continental balance of power,
to be sure. But the maritime sphere was global, and success in this vast field of competition in turn had the potential to finance both enterprises in the new world as well as defence of territorial national interests for protection and for contributions to the continental balance of power.

By 1660, The Royal Navy had become the power and the glory of a State that increasingly ruled the waves. The protestant myth of 1588 had produced a very concrete naval force. From now on, extraterritorial violence was used to keep the balance of military, political and economic power in equilibrium. Above all, the navy was an instrument for the protection of national interests, not primarily tied up to the defence of the territory of the motherland, but also of sea-lines of communication within the European security complex and a global network of sea-lanes. Thus, in the Scandinavian wars of 1658-1660, England was both eager to check the Danes and the Dutch in the Baltic, but simultaneously warned Sweden off from any attempt to achieve control of Norway, due to the possible monopolisation of Naval stores that this could imply. But this balance of power view of international relations should not be seen as unlimited cynicism and power politics for the sake of power itself. Rather, the international balance shifted since international relations always are in flux. The Triple Alliance of England, France and the republic in 1717 should be seen as an example of how national ideologies at times are penetrated by the balance of power as an international institution. But even here, the domestic ideological nature of England was not clear-cut. On the contrary, domestic interests resulted in a split during the 1670s, where the English were divided between a protestant, pro-parliament, pro-Dutch policy, and those favouring a pro-French policy led by a strengthened English Monarch. Indeed, the interplay between domestic and international politics is obvious in this case. The pro-French policy lost after a series of unsuccessful naval battles between England/France and the United Provinces, with the Treaty of Westminster of 1674 restoring the status quo ante. Although the domestic effects of the Anglo-Dutch wars were diverse, enhanced sea power and a higher volume and diversity in English commerce reinforced the mercantilist inclination in the English polity. To an increasing degree, therefore, violence and revenues from the sea were monopolised by the English state. After the Glorious revolution, all the older monopoly trading companies with the exception of the East India Company lost their privileges. In the diplomatic role, ambassadors and consuls took over the functions previously exercised by companies, and the navy took over the tasks of protection.

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715 See Moore, 1979: 16
716 Kennedy, 1976: 74-75
The war of 1689-1697 was the first major war between states where a maritime coalition (England and the Dutch republic) fought the large navy of a continental power (France).\(^{717}\) This war was to have important implications both for the increased willingness in the English parliament to support the Navy, as well as for tactical, technical and strategic concepts for modern navies. In addition to protection, the Royal Navy had to be used as an offensive weapon if the war was to be won. This meant disturbing and destroying French trade by controlling sea-lines of communication. Again the east-west axis of Northern Europe was of high importance. French supplies of grain and naval stores from the Baltic could be severed since they passed close to the Anglo-Dutch coasts.

The real wonder of the almost constant state of war between Britain and France in the period from 1689 till 1713, was that there was no significant decline in British sea power or financial strength. The creation of financial institutions such as the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange and the introduction of the National debt contributed to the latter and gave the necessary credit for overseas expansion. In addition, British shipping could carry on despite losses to privateers, traders could find alternatives to closed markets and the arms industry was stimulated by the demands of war. By 1714, for example, the Royal navy alone employed more workers than any other industry in the country\(^{718}\), in addition to a general rise of employed in all services required for building and maintaining a Navy that was in use constantly. Many of the new territories that came under British control were the direct results of this use of the Navy. At the 1713 Peace of Utrecht, for instance, Britain acquired Gibraltar, Minorca, Hudson’s Bay, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.\(^{719}\) After the Seven Years War, the empire was extended to include Canada, Cape Breton Island, Florida, St Vincent, Tobago, Dominica and Grenada, plus effective political control of India.\(^{720}\) Such gains of extraterritorial sovereignty naturally gave wind in the sails of the proponents of a British blue-water national strategy. There is no denying, though, that ever from the time of Elizabeth, the English polity at times was split between advocates of this blue-water lockeanism and the supporters of active English participation to support allies on the continent in times of war. The balance between the two groups has varied with the tides of the European balance of power, but the fact remains that this heritage also weaves a fabric between past and present in English politics. The colonies and the later Commonwealth were legacies of the Blue-water strategy that made the British Empire hard to reconcile with integration of England in Western Europe. In order not to run ahead of our narrative, we should note that the policy of pursuing extraterritorial maritime fortunes gained leverage after the

\(^{717}\) Glete, 1993: 212

\(^{718}\) Kennedy, 1976: 84

\(^{719}\) Kennedy, 1976: 85

\(^{720}\) For a complete overview of territories under the British Empire, see Lloyd, 1996 (The British Empire), table VII.
Glorious Revolution. The fruits of colonialism also meant that the chief 18th century opponent of Britain - France - sought to interrupt the sea-lines of communication, to a large degree by the use of privateering. In turn, this put increased demands upon the Royal Navy. Thus, a circular logic was involved in which the increased protection of merchant shipping demanded increased revenue to strengthen the Navy, which stimulated increased efficiency in transactions and protection and an increased volume of long-distance trade. An improved escort system was introduced, but simultaneously the overall use of the seelines of communication was increased to a degree that the Royal Navy could not provide protection to all. However, the National Naval strategy of Britain to some degree developed into a pincer strategy in which the Mediterranean Fleet diverted French Forces to its southern coast, thus relieving the commercial warfare in Northern waters.721 Thus, the seizing of Gibraltar in 1704 as well as the 1703 Methuen Treaty with Portugal, altered the strategic complexity facing France to a significant degree. Britain was the true victor of the War of the Spanish succession. We have already mentioned the extraterritorial gains outside of Europe for Britain. In addition, the Treaty meant that there would never again be a merging of Spanish and French power under the same crown, and thus that France could not gain hegemony in Western Europe. In addition,

“The allocation of the Spanish Netherlands, Naples and Sardinia to Austria, a non-maritime power, was a classic example of divide et impera on Britain’s part, since it tied the emperor to the defence of those key strategical points which London wished, in any case, to be kept out of Bourbon hands.”722

Although the configuration of military and political power on the continent itself was an important aim of Britain, there is no doubt that British sea power played a major role and that she ended up as the superior sea power on the globe after the Treaty of Utrecht. The fact is that Britain was to hold this position for a very long time. As historians have demonstrated in a reliable manner elsewhere, Britain in the 18th century was a status quo power in Western Europe, and a steady investor in colonies and trade on an almost global scale. Britain can thus be said to have found a stable equilibrium strategy in its foreign policy. This policy both consisted in keeping an eye on all aspects of European politics, as well as reinforcing the paternalist disposition in regard to less developed territories under British auspices in its various forms. In the words of Palmerston; Britain had no

721 Kennedy, 1976: 100
eternal allies, only eternal interests.\textsuperscript{723} As constellations of power and alliances in the realm of international relations were in flux, the extraterritorial interests of Britain were rather fixed. These two facts also ensured, however, that “Imperial Britain” was influenced and in turn influenced developments on a worldwide scale. Thus, the rise of Russian Sea Power meant that depots of naval stores were built in America to compensate for losses in trade from the Baltic, while British and Spanish vessels fought in the Caribbean, etc.

The British equilibrium strategy of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century was costly, as any strategy would be given the level of ambitions held by the British polity. But it was possible; at war with France, for example, the same Western Squadron of the Royal Navy that kept the French fleet in port and destroyed her merchant marine also blocked any reinforcements to America and Asia, while simultaneously allowing British trade to the same regions. The synergy of this was British dominance in all theatres of struggle for extraterritorial sovereignty and –rights. Thus, apart from her losses in the West Indies, Britain appeared as the victor again at the peace of Paris in 1763, “with the greatest collection of spoils in her history”\textsuperscript{724}. That Britain did not gain the desired results during the American War of Independence must partly be explained by a lack of national unity, many prominent flag officers being among the notables of the British society that opposed British attempts at suppressing the American revolt by force. Lacking a coherent national doctrine for this scenario, British naval and army forces were used in disperse operations where British efforts hardly were decisive in any one theatre. The peacetime administration of George III in effect had also resulted in a Royal Navy of poorer quality than the victorious force from the Seven years War.\textsuperscript{725} In addition, the balance of power in Europe had changed to the effect that France, for the first time in a war with Britain, did not have to run a continental campaign in parallel with the maritime one (thus, the “elephant” for the first time could try to compete seriously and on an “equal” footing with the “Whale”, to use Potter’s and Nimitz’s phrases). In addition, maintaining large and numerous garrisons in America was quite another enterprise than upholding the relatively cost-effective outposts in the outskirts of the traditional British Empire. I will suggest one further variable at the level of international institutions, however. The British paternalist policy of \textit{mare clausum} had reached a limit in North European and North Atlantic waters. Thus, the attempts by Britain to gain a monopoly of the effective use of maritime violence in 1778 provoked the “Armed Neutrality” of

\textsuperscript{722} ibid: 102
\textsuperscript{723} Often quoted differently, though. What Lord Palmerston said as British Foreign Secretary in 1848, was that “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are perpetual and eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow”
\textsuperscript{724} Kennedy, 1976: 124 “She had virtually total control of the valuable North American continent; Minorca was restored to preserve her dominance in the Mediterranean; Senegal taken to increase her position in West Africa...and French political influence was eradicated in India”
1780. There were limits to the intensity of *mare clausum* that the neutral states of Europe could bear. By 1783, Britain was isolated, since both Portugal and the two Sicilies had joined the Dutch republic, Russia, Sweden, Prussia, Austria and Denmark-Norway in the pact. Furthermore, the North American colonies could simply not be controlled by sea power as the bonds of loyalty to the British Isles were weakened, and as the populace in this particular colony became more or less self-sufficient. Thus, when a *mare clausum* policy had reached a point where it had to be followed up by large and lasting efforts at land warfare supported by logistics from distant sea lines of communications, it had to be adjusted. The alternative was overstretching. The peace treaty of 1784 meant in effect that Britain avoided such a situation, and instead entered a remarkable period of increase in productivity and in volume of sales. According to Paul Kennedy, the value of British exports thus rose from 12.5 to 40.8 million pounds from 1780 till 1800. Even in areas where Britain had lost her political control, as in North America, the losses in extraterritorial sovereignty in this case had no devastating negative economic consequences. And the vital economy in turn made the British able to develop their fleet further. Few historians will deny that in this respect, Britain was ideally equipped for the challenges during the struggle with France from 1793 till 1815, and that these years increased further the British power in Europe, also making it into a true maritime hegemon on a global scale. The period is perhaps best known for its famous sea battles (as Trafalgar, 1805) that proved to be decisive for the European balance of power. The British policy of blockade, in addition to lead to starvation in enemy and neutral countries, made it more difficult for its enemies to achieve the naval stores so crucial for warship building and reparations. Thus, the British *mare clausum* policy in the form of sea denial was strategically effective in times of war, although in no way without a price even for its executioner, which an overview of British losses as well as the incredible war expenditure figures amply testifies. Moreover, if one looks at the

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725 Moore, 1979: 23-25
726 Kennedy, 1976: 132
727 Moore, 1979: 26-27
728 Kennedy, 1976: 138
729 The exercise involved in the counter-factual speculation what the profit *would have been* in the same area had the British political control been upheld, is one I do not wish to engage in.
730 Such a statement is open to criticisms from all theorists in international relations that downplay the role of sea power as a factor in the balance of power. I cannot find any good reason for the latter practise. In the case of the Napoleonic wars and the European balance of power, British Sea Power played a large part in the outcomes in the decisive, Eastern Theatre. Kennedy (ibid: 160), for example, writes that “it can reasonably be argued that the British support for Russia, Austria and Prussia in the form of almost unlimited subsidies and munitions in the years 1812-14 had played a large part in the victories in eastern Europe; and that it was the Royal Navy’s protection of commerce which had permitted Britain to afford assistance of such dimensions to her continental allies”
731 The system of public borrowing found in England made Britain able to spend money on war far beyond the potential found in tax revenue. Thus, financial variables indeed should not be discredited in explaining the British success. However, if we compare the overall economic resources of Britain with the total resources of her adversaries, it seems rather clear that economy is not a *sufficient* explanation.
overall balance of power measured by numbers of warships, total tonnage etc.,\textsuperscript{732} it is pretty clear that Britain was quantitatively speaking outnumbered in naval forces. However, the century of rising and extending British maritime power had made The Royal Navy into a professional and coherent fighting machine unmatched by any of its adversaries. In this respect, the comparative advantage of the British captains and sailors around 1800\textsuperscript{733} bears similarities to the advantages in skills that favoured the Dutch Navy from around 1650 till 1680.\textsuperscript{734} In addition to contributing to victory in the European war, a lasting consequence (naturally not independent of the outcome of the war in Europe) of this superiority was that Britain in 1815 emerged as the totally dominant colonial power in Europe. In retrospect, however, we have due reason to pose the question as to how the British were able to gain these results. When we consider the official, contemporary lists showing that 11000 British merchant vessels were captured in the period 1793-1815,\textsuperscript{735} it is clear that the British achievement certainly was a result of more than tactical skills, leadership and “bravery”. Indeed, the tremendous British losses could easily have brought the Isles to its knees.\textsuperscript{736} In addition to the hardships suffered among ordinary people, marine insurance rates rose dramatically due to losses, and communication between the motherland and its overseas colonies were threatened.

Transaction costs within the empire rose. The answer to this dramatic development had to be found in increased protection and a lowering of information costs. The Admiralty held the key to both questions because Naval Power could provide protection, and protection in turn would lead to a lowering of information costs as well, since secure sea lines of communication provided both assets. The efforts to reach these results were formidable. Patrols were deployed to focal areas in European waters. Frigates were dispatched to watch enemy ports, thus disturbing enemy shipping and providing the Admiralty with crucial intelligence. In order to quell privateering, armed ships...
disguised as merchantmen ("Q-ships") patrolled along the English coasts, thus launching surprise attacks. Expeditionary forces were sent out to destroy the enemy naval bases and ports that were used to interfere with colonial trade. But the grandest and most successful design of them all was the institutionalisation of a worldwide convoy system. Worked out by the Admiralty and Lloyd’s; “by reference to the Convoy Acts of 1793, 1798 and 1803, imposed upon the mass of reluctant ship owners. In doing so, the navy and the insurers gave protection to the important overseas trade routes and undoubtedly reduced the rate of shipping losses”. Thus protection— as well as information costs, were kept as low as possible through a unique co-operation between state authorities, large insurance companies and ship owners. The sheer size and the organisational requirements of this enterprise seem impressing even at the time of writing. Indeed, when one adds that even the United States, the third international liberalist in our typology, united with France in declaring war on Paternalist Britain, the achievement of the latter is underlined. While this conflict again reflected the enormous difficulty any attempt at invading America would have, the peace terms in effect only postponed the questions over maritime rights. This was to become no insignificant source of future conflicts between the two otherwise similar Anglo-Saxon countries. This testifies to the effect that maritime principles in the ideal types of mare clausum and— liberum really do constitute a major cleavage in world politics as it does within many polities. I believe few, if any, can denounce the conclusion that the Napoleonic wars ended in a world order where British views of how the international maritime world order should look like, prevailed. In short, Britain had used its power to form the international institution into one predominantly resting on a mare clausum prerogative of Britain, and otherwise mare liberum to the degree that it did not threaten the empire. The sixty years following Napoleon’s final defeat was dubbed Pax Britannica. In retrospect, it is clear that the power of Britain also made their inhabitants overestimate the degree to which this international hierarchy was “natural” and “inevitable”. Yet, one can hardly be surprised that the Britons also came to see it that way; the largest colonial empire in world history was ruled “at a cost to the nation of one pound or less per annum per head of population in defence expenditure – equivalent to somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent of the national income”. Following the utter defeat of her enemies in 1815, Britain had a much more solid base of military power than any other potential challenger. This military power, which was repeatedly translated into political power, was also based on a strong financial sector, a maritime empire of trade and the fruits of the industrial

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737 Ibid: 155
738 As many as 500 merchantmen could assemble at Portsmouth, be escorted out of the danger zone by ships of the line and frigates. Escorting merchantmen going through the Belt from Danish attacks in 1808, ships of the line were placed in intervals along the sea-lane.
739 Kennedy, 1976: 176
revolution (that the surplus from this activity was indeed unevenly distributed within Britain is another matter). The industrial revolution was said to have changed the Britons from a nation of shopkeepers into a community that was the workshop of the world. Thus, the hegemony of Britain was only to be challenged by the USA and Germany from the late 1880s. But by then, British mare clausum traits in foreign policy had left an imprint on international institutions.

But what was the content of the international maritime institution she created during the 19th century? I believe, and at this point I differ somewhat from the most traditional pro-British historians, that this international institution was marked ideologically by Britain as a paternalist power. This did not mean that she preferred to settle disputes by violence, although she certainly did at times (“Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim Gun, and they have not”, a later slogan reflecting this sentiment). On the contrary, soft power, economic power and the political power backed up by the ever-present naval power were used in cost-effective ways to keep business running and hold the empire together. Neither does it mean that Britain created a maritime world order in which no other territories could thrive. Indeed, "semi-peripheries" and peripheries were not “exploited” by the core state in a crude sense. Neither does the paternalism inherent in Pax Britannica mean that Britons behaved in a more cruel fashion than other paternalist powers and imperialists. Britain was the driving force behind the abolishing of slavery, for example, establishing Freetown in today’s Sierra Leone for freed slaves and using large resources in order to stop shipping of slaves from West Africa after 1815.

What paternalism does mean in the case of Great Britain, is a shared sense of superiority in the hierarchy of states and nations. Thus, it was “natural” and “good” for humankind if the “reasonable” and generally able British civilisation could be exported elsewhere. In the 19th century, it was Britain that was “bound to lead”, and this to the better for the “common good of all”. Thus Cecil Rhodes could claim that “The British are the finest race in the world, and the more of the world they inhabit, the better it will be for mankind”. As Peter Marshall has observed, Empire strengthened a view of the world as a hierarchy, “in which the British occupied a pre-eminent place among the colonial

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740 Scholars disagree on when the decline of the British Hegemony set in. I believe Immanuel Wallerstein is right in stressing that decline is a very gradual process. Thus, if we give prominence to economic variables, he is right in stating that the late 1870s witnessed the start of this British decline. At this point, German and North American shares of world trade rise sharply. Politically and militarily, however, Britain remained a first-rate power until 1940. ideologically speaking, the ghost of empire survived until the 1980s, witness the Falklands war.

741 Quoted in Cannadine 2001: 5. Cannadine argues that social class actually was more important than the racial hierarchy within the British Empire. Thus, in his mind, indirect rule was fostered also by a particular political ideology that had its roots in the English and later British society even before the Enlightenment. This ideology maintained a very deep-felt sense of distance between social classes. Thus, local elites in the colonies were in some ways seen as the colonial equivalents to the British upper classes.
powers, while those subjected to colonial rule were ranged below them, in varying degrees of supposed inferiority”.742 The international institutions dominant for all states was not primarily an anarchical balance of power, it was a hierarchy of states and peoples, in which the hegemon, and then the other great powers, were the players forming international praxis. This hegemony in turn was of economic, political, military and ideological substance and impact. But British paternalism was also restrained by the very notion of “civilising” that the British creed maintained. Thus, the practises involved in the colonial adventures were, on the whole, less brutal than those of the other European colonial powers, although we certainly can find examples of British conduct that was both inhumane and counter-productive. On the whole, however, the British Empire also meant an export of Aristotelian ideals743 and political and administrative arrangements that we must admit bore special British traits. Of these, the political implications are the only ones deserving mentioning here.

Even from the time of the Tudors, those with the highest social prestige dominantly undertook English government at local levels. “This meant that it was in the hands of traditional authorities…that it was relatively inexpensive, and that it was amateur”.744 This tradition continued as Wales, Ireland and Scotland became parts of Britain; local elites were used to control their communities. Thus, indirect rule had traditions in Britain, and this tradition was to a large degree exported to the colonies, especially to the great dominions of settlement, but also to India and the crown colonies of conquest.745 One could perhaps portrait British imperialism as a benign form of imperialism, but imperialism and colonialism it was. Although present-day Marxists readily see the asymmetries of wealth between North and South too easily as a direct result of imperialism, there is no denying that Britain extracted huge resources from their colonies. To portray this as a policy of “free trade”, including a maritime regime of mare liberum, is thus utterly misleading (but nevertheless so common a mistake in political science, that it has almost become an axiom of thought). Adam Smith was quite right at this point; imperialism was a fundamental breach of the principles of free trade. Elements of free trade rhetoric and to some extent free trade principles nevertheless became parts of British policy during the 19th century. The idea among advocates of free trade in Britain was that Britain would gain more than any other community would if the

742 Marshall, 1995: 385
743 The ideal of the gentleman was fostered in British Universities and Military Academies. Although this will not be elaborated further here, I believe it to have had political consequences. Thus, in the latter part of the 20th centuries, numerous anecdotes exist on how British negotiators (all educated in Latin and Greek) appeared rather lax and perhaps not overly prepared in international negotiations concerning maritime boundaries in the North Sea.
744 Cannadine, 2001: 11
745 We should admit that the question of variances in British colonial rule is complex in time and space, and this certainly is reflected in scholarly debate. An overview can be found in the extensive five-volume edition of “The Oxford History of the British Empire”
principles of free trade were followed. With the large number of markets and sources of extracting resources and the largest merchant fleet in the world, Britain would only strengthen its position in a more cost-effective manner than mercantilist policies would. The abolition of the Corn Law and the repeal of the Navigation Acts could be seen as examples of such free trade principles. Although several of the other European powers followed suit, at least partly, as did France, most non-British contemporaries nevertheless saw it as a pick-and-choose-policy by the British, intended to kick away the ladder once the summit of greatness was achieved. Indeed, the relative gains were in favour of Britain, although the boom in overall world trade from the 1850s gave all states in Northern Europe absolute gains. Inherent in this British status-quo policy, was a belief in indirect rule of the peripheral territories of the Empire. The free-traders in particular criticised alternative modes of colonial administration as overly costly, as “millstones around the necks of the British taxpayers”, to use the words of Disraeli. Thus, a more “humanistic” spirit also seemed to fit the subtle changes in British policies towards their extra-territorial claims to sovereign rights; all would gain on free trade, and in the process, Britain would not break liberal principles. But if we are to study the actual policy carried out by Britain regarding their Empire – the significance of this rhetoric (that also has inspired much scholarship) - should be seriously questioned. It is a matter of undisputable fact that although formal, or colonial empire was not the favourite words for describing the British Empire, “there are remarkably few examples in the nineteenth century of the British government withdrawing from colonial territories”. Naturally, when it came to “white” colonies or “dominions”, to use the stick on a regular basis was senseless and unnecessary. But in the south, gunboat diplomacy was indeed frequently applied. Although the present thesis does not support Marxist theories of imperialism, the story of the 19th century British Empire demonstrates that to talk of international relations as always having contained elements of multilateralism, is seeing world politics as too benign. Likewise, to call the period up till 1914 a period where international institutions were characterised by free trade and mare liberum is inaccurate. For local rulers and ruled alike in West Africa, Latin America and in the Orient, the Royal Navy cruiser or gunboat was a highly concrete reminder with regards to the alleged content of “free” trade. Furthermore, Britain kept its chain of strategic bases on which its Sea Power also rested upon. These were truly extraterritorial units under direct British political control. They were the best strategic ports along the sea-lanes of the world, the “keys” that locked up the globe, to use Admiral Fisher’s words. Thus, the Royal Navy was the international institution asserting freedom of the seas for British vessels, and for the vessels of other nations.

746 Kennedy, 1976: 180-181
747 Ruggie, 1993, has made this claim
748 Nye, 1983
whenever it suited British interests. Considered that the political leaderships in all coastal states were aware of this fact, the evolutionary stable strategy was to bow to the British mastery of the Seas. But in order to make this commitment credible, Britain took in possession territory far away from the motherland. Apart, perhaps, from the Pacific, Britain thus ended up with bases in every ocean of the world. It is enough to mention just some examples of such bases acquired by deliberate political strategy in the “anti-imperial age”. Heligoland, Malta and the Ionian islands strengthened its grip on both the Mediterranean and the North Sea. Singapore, at the main entrance to the China Sea from the west was acquired in 1819, in 1833 the Falkland Islands (overlooking the route around Cape Horn), Aden in 1839 (entrance into the Red sea), in 1841 Hong Kong, and later bases as Lagos, Cyprus, Fiji, Mombasa, Alexandria and Zanzibar. To coastal states in the western world, this does not deny the argument that aspects of the Pax Britannica naval policy was for the benefit of “all”. In particular, the abandonment of protectionist tariffs and the suppression of piracy were positive developments for most European states. Indeed, the label world order might be an accurate label in describing the norms that governed international interaction in the post 1815-era. The existence of the Royal Navy gave the British principles of extraterritorial sovereignty a credible apparatus of applying sanctions to those units that broke the rules of the international game. Even the ideologically different US saw the profit in this world order, since the credibility of the Royal Navy made the Monroe doctrine a political reality. The latter is a major reason why the US chose to bandwagon behind Britain for decades following 1815. Although bowing to Britain was not without costs for the other European powers, it was cheaper than providing the protection themselves. Britain thus kept transaction costs at an acceptable level to its European neighbours. Moreover, internal processes of state- and nation-building were vital in order for several of these states to survive at all. The period from 1815 till 1856 witnessed many challenges to European states, the year of 1848 standing out as a particular manifestation of this.

There were elements of the freedom of the seas in British foreign policy after 1815, and increasingly so. Although we have argued that Britain remained a dominantly mare clausum-agent, let us look at the arguments of the supporters of the view that mare liberum was the dominant British doctrine in the 19th century. Firstly, Britain did abandon the claim to the channel salute in 1805. I believe this is not much to write home about. It largely was a symbolic gesture that was most important in British propaganda, but one that was duly noted by British historians. Another factor often used in favour of the view that Britain became a mare liberum-state is secondly, that Britain took upon itself the huge responsibility of charting the oceans after 1815. Again, the political scientist and sociologist must

749 Kennedy, 1976: 181
free himself of the ideologically coloured presentations by some Anglo-Saxon historians. Naturally, the British government proclaimed this as a benefit for all humankind. And to some extent, it did help for foreign companies or captains to which these charts were made available. It is true that this was a breach with the earlier policy of keeping cartographic information a national secret, but to interpret this as a result of a mare liberum doctrine is too strong a claim. Thirdly, suppressing piracy outside of Northern waters has also been taken in favour of the view that Britain had become a *mare liberum* agent. The theory of benign hegemony contains elements of truth here, in the sense that Britain actually did apply vast resources to curb piracy. But the intention of this activity was not to provide a common good to mankind, although rhetoric at times would include such claims. There can be no doubting who benefited most from this activity. Being the chief beneficiary of non-interference in overseas transports, Britain also was the actor most interested in lowering this aspect of transaction costs. This is not *a priori* a reason to dismiss the suppressing of piracy as a *mare liberum* policy, however. Unlike the two factors listed above, getting rid of piracy did not necessarily imply a relative gain for Britain, since she was the one sea power with the best protection apparatus amongst all Western states. Thus, weaker sea powers should share a disproportionate part of the common good produced by suppressing piracy. On the other hand, smaller sea powers in Northern Europe did not have much of a ocean transport outside of Europe when compared to Britain. However, I believe this is the best example of an international institution where the hegemon, *a la* Hegemonic stability Theory, provided a common good (more akin to the freedom of the seas-ideology than the opposite) to be enjoyed by all states. The campaign began soon after the Peace Treaty, with the bombardment “of that lair of the Barbary corsairs, Algiers”\(^\text{750}\) in 1816. Gradually, European waters were cleansed of piracy,\(^\text{751}\) but non-state extraterritorial plunder remained a problem in the Indies and in the China Sea,\(^\text{752}\) and has indeed remained a problem till this very day (as we will see in chapter 6). Although not a direct result of maritime policy, but rather a general turn in political values in Britain that was to affect the Navy, is the British suppression of the African slave trade. It is very hard, if not entirely futile, to find self-interest or hypocrisy in this British policy, that came of being with the forbidding of slave trade in 1807 and the ban on slavery as such in most British dominions in 1833. The evidence for this, generally accepted, conclusion rests in the formidable costs this enterprise had for the British state in general, and especially for the Royal Navy. Although the Congress of Vienna had decided to make

\(^{750}\) Kennedy, 1976: 194

\(^{751}\) See Rodger, 2004. Ibid: 21, the author stresses that the “Barbary corsairs” of North Africa did not practise piracy, but the *corso*, a traditional way of warfare to these peoples.
the trade illegal, there was no agreed-upon way of implementing the decision by the great powers. Partly due to the evangelical movement, the burden of implementing it fell upon the Royal Navy for a period of fifty years. Thus, aspirations for an "ethical foreign policy" can also be found among major powers of the 19th century. The burdens were heavy and long lasting; in the feared Bight of Benin, for example, disease led to the death of over one quarter of the West African squadron in 1829. It is remarkable that the British efforts continued, in spite of resistance from Spain, Portugal, Brazil and France, and in spite of growing reluctance in the Admiralty. Without the efforts of the Royal Navy, later international agreements would not have had any means of sanctioning the agreed-upon bans. It might even be suggested, though, that this anti-slavery policy increased the ideological power of Britain in the eyes of contemporaries.

However, the suppressing of piracy and the anti-slavery naval campaign, stand out as exceptions to the rule that Britain was a 19th century paternalist *mare clausum* power. Thus, the case of Britain in that century also reminds us of the fact that our idealtypes are theoretical constructs to guide our interpretation of historical evidence. There were traces of *mare liberum* in British foreign policy in the 19th century, but even the anti-slavery campaign added new bases to the British Empire, and raised the soft power of the hegemon among African coastal communities. Humanitarian interventions demand military power to a degree largely found among hegemons. There indeed was a Pax Britannica. A defining feature of the hegemon is its ability to give extraterritorial protection for its citizens and their property. Thus, Palmerston could compare he British empire with the Roman; “As the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus sum, so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong”.

Without the strongest navy in the world, such confidence will be built on false hopes. In the last years of the period analysed in this chapter, though, we see signs that testify that a hegemon always will be challenged, and will view it that way itself. From 1852 on, the growth in the French navy produced an invasion scare in Britain. The French decision to build warships with steam power seemed to make the British naval hegemony threatened by technological superiority, thus making the British government pour money into defence industry and fortifications. Furthermore, the French

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752 Indeed, the polymorphous mixture of private and “state” maritime violence lasted longer outside of Europe and North America. Thus, some of the really violent sea battles fought by fleets from the Royal Navy were fought against fleets of pirates, for example in the China sea in 1849.
753 Kennedy, 1976: 195
754 Kennedy, 1976: 198
The navy commissioned its first ironclad warship in 1858, producing the perception that France had taken the decisive lead in naval construction. The scare in Britain to these developments was rather unjustified, when viewed in retrospect. However, it stands as a reminder of how prophets of hegemonic decline can easily be supported by technological and organisational developments in other military organisations.

The Crimean war, not to say its conclusion in the Peace treaty of 1856, should perhaps be seen as more important in the development of the British Empire and international institutions regulating maritime affairs. In the Declaration of Paris in 1856, Britain more or less voluntarily gave away one of the keys to her undisputed naval hegemony: the right to prevent the carriage of contraband goods in neutral bottoms in times of war. Thus, the weapon of blockade in war was at least in theory abolished. How come Britain gave the game away? I believe that this is an important event in world history, and a clear sign that ideological factors matter in international relations as well as in the organisation of the use of the monopoly of violence. The British government seems to have claimed that the international opinion was in its disfavour. Not that this opinion, a phenomenon in flux to be sure, had the “force” to do something about it, but a normative consensus in disfavour of earlier British principles mattered. What mattered most in this international opinion was perhaps the growing concern over the rise of a new naval giant with a somewhat different ideological composition; the USA.

In this section of the chapter, we have tried to demonstrate that British sea power was decisive in creating a state practise that achieved the force and more or less informal status as positive international law. We have also shown that this policy, seen from a global perspective, is more similar to the ideology of mare clausum than mare liberum, although British Policy during the 19th century to an increasing degree abandoned earlier mercantilist practises. Thus, the British polity optimised its efficiency through lowering transaction costs. This had the benefit, especially by suppressing piracy after 1815, for all states in North Europe and North America, that protection costs were lowered.

However, we have not been able to give a thorough explanation of the domestic qualities and political trajectory and its interplay with international factors that gave the British polity this ability. In fact, I believe this question has only been partly answered in spite of a huge body of scholarship on the subject matter. The question naturally should be approached with a portion of humility, and I will claim that no mono-causal explanation holds. Rather, like neo-weberian historical sociologists, I would prefer to underline the complexity of the question (of a singular causal explanation). We have already mentioned several factors. England was geographically located in a convenient way (a
tautological fact, but a fact anyway). Once in possession of credible sea power, England controlled the Channel and the Irish Sea, the first being a strategic funnel in the east-west sea-line of communication both within Europe as well as between Europe and the Atlantic. The salt water dividing Britain and Europe also had the advantage that attempts at invasion could be stopped before foreign armies were landed on English soil, provided that the Royal Navy was effective as deterrent, another fact noted in scholarship on Britain. However, these geographical explanations are inadequate in themselves. Relying too heavily on these independent variables has brought scholars into teleological explanations of English state formation. One particularly flawed explanation is that the sea freed England from the burden of maintaining a standing military force, or to put it bluntly; Britain did not need a large standing army in order to protect its borders. Allegedly, this made British political development essentially different from the continental powers of Europe, since resources did not have to be extracted from society to the same degree, whereby England by and large avoided absolutism.\(^{755}\) Thus, the trajectory of England supposedly was set in the direction of liberal democracy at an early point. But this ignores the whole dimension of sea power, and this is what makes the explanation above incomplete and insufficient. The first we need to note is that building the Royal Navy was more demanding than raising large armies. This is particularly well proven by Brewer\(^ {756}\) and Glete\(^ {757}\). It is true, of course that the burdens of building navies as well as raising armies that faced the Dutch republic and France were enormously demanding. However, it is entirely wrong to see the military demands upon England as less incredible! Thus, geo-strategic explanations in themselves are not sufficient to explain the successful English state formation process and Empire-building.\(^ {758}\) To geographical factors should be added some of the assets of sea power that we dealt with at some length earlier in this chapter. Sea power was cost-effective in two ways. Firstly, when successfully integrating extraterritorial areas that largely could be maintained by Naval force into the empire, new areas of resource-extraction and even markets were provided. Secondly, shipbuilding industry involved an economic synergy that benefited the domestic economy. This is a necessary part of the explanation, but it is clearly not entirely sufficient, since it cannot answer why exactly Britain succeeded better at this from the 18th century than other European powers. Indeed, the balance of power often was in disfavour of Britain, a fact that should

\(^{755}\) According to Perry Anderson (1974b:18) “absolutism was…this; a redeployed and changed apparatus of feudal domination…in other words, the Absolutist state was never an arbiter between the Aristocracy and the bourgeois”. Nevertheless, I believe Anderson goes far in admitting that England was an anomaly in his overall theoretical scheme. Thus, in the case of England, “the strongest medieval monarchy in the West eventually produced the weakest and shortest absolutism...a particularly constructed variant of absolutist rule” (ibid: 113). If England was an absolutist state, its absolutism certainly was weak and short-lived.

\(^{756}\) Brewer, 1988

\(^{757}\) Glete, 1993

\(^{758}\) Rodger, 1997 and Brewer, 1988: 10 share my view at this point.
warn us of linear explanations of the Rise of British power and liberal democracy. Thus, we are forced into considering the central assumption in what Hobson\textsuperscript{759} dubs the second-wave theories of the modern state; how the embeddedness of the state in society itself can amount for state power, rather than viewing the power of the state over society. However, it is not easy to extract an explanation of the particular British trajectory directly from the meta-theory of Michael Mann nor the general guidelines found in historical institutionalism. But at the other hand, they provide us with the general approach that we can apply. Specifically, we argued in chapter 2 that ideational and material factors combined should be considered in addressing empirical complexity. In essence, domestic factors explain the ideational variable. I believe it useful to look particularly into the British case, since it influenced international institutions of maritime principles to such a degree. What was it with the British and English society that made its state strong? By strong, we do not refer to the sense of dominating and controlling society, but rather politically and militarily strong enough to shape international practise and norms? One general explanation is found in scholarship based on what James Coleman\textsuperscript{760} named social capital. The Norwegian political scientist Torbjørn Knutsen\textsuperscript{761} has used this as one variable in explaining hegemonic power. In his view, social capital fostered liberties and, in general, modernisation. The hegemonic powers thus were the chief modernisers of their contemporary world orders. I believe that in the British case, the existence of such social capital in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century might make some sense. The internal social cohesion of these polities, Knutsen holds, made them into effective fighting machines, thus enabling them to influence the international arena, and the very social cohesion of these polities made them look arrogant and paternalist to many contemporary observers. However, as Knutsen\textsuperscript{762} readily admits, social capital at best is only part of the explanation. Moreover, I find the concept ambiguous and in the case of Britain, not sufficiently tied to material factors as administration, finance and industry. Was post-1707 Britain really that much of a cohesive unit? As far as I can see, one could indeed make a case that the class cleavage in the British polity to be of such a character that “social capital” sounds odd as an explanation. On the other side of the ideational-material spectrum of analysis, Marxist explanations certainly do not fare better. I simply cannot see that World-systems theory can explain the rise of British power without introducing ad-hoc voluntarist explanations. I believe that strategic state policy is part of the answer, but John Brewer is close to the point when he explains that the peculiar British version of the fiscal-military state chiefly was the result of “the unintended consequence of the political crisis which racked the British state after the Glorious Revolution of

\textsuperscript{759} Hobson, 2000  
\textsuperscript{760} Coleman, 1990  
\textsuperscript{761} Knutsen, 1999
Under the later Stuarts and Hanoverians, the features of modern British politics began, that turned Britain into a strong state with low transaction costs compared to any other large unit in the world. The strong treasury, a centralised financial system, a standing parliament that largely supported the Navy, heavy taxation to found the organisations of violence, and government officials with a strong public ethos were all traits of an efficient state. The system of government deficits also contributed to a community with particular affinity and opportunities for profit making. The role of the City was controversial, but what mattered were the opportunities for wealthy individuals and companies to invest, and for self-made men to raise capital for new enterprise. That representatives of this state and its citizens at various times were conceived as arrogant and snobbish should not surprise us in a comparative perspective. The English had the power to enforce their will, and the financial means and techniques to uphold a strong naval force for centuries. Moreover, the synergies involved in naval warfare were elements of what I, somewhat awkwardly, will call a loop of positive reinforcement of incentives. This is no magic formula, but something I believe Britons in private ventures as well as state administration gradually came to recognize from the late 17th century.

Maritime commerce created the skills, the know-how, the infrastructure and financial basis to create a Navy. Building a navy also enhanced the maritime infrastructure and interests, since Naval yards became the largest industry in Britain. In turn, the instrument thus created produced two things: state deficits and a mean to lower transaction costs by providing protection for overseas commerce. Both created very concrete incentives for the twin process of market and state expansion through the acquisition of extraterritorial possessions. In turn, these gains paid the bills of the state, and gave British capital new possibilities of investments. This clearly was the thinking that informed the arguments of the Naval, or maritime, school in Parliament. But the key, the core in our explanation, must be that the nature and extension of the British state rested on a delicate balance between capital, Parliament, Monarch, state administrators and interest groups. Thus, it was not only the relative absence of invasions by foreign forces that made the fiscal burden of the state easier to bear than it would have been with a different geopolitical context, but just as much the interest in the coalition to keep the state apparatus efficient and lean; or in one word; small. This strikes me as typically British among the larger powers of Europe. Thus, it has been estimated that already in the Elizabethan England, there were only 1200 crown officers, or one officer per 4000 inhabitants. The corresponding numbers for France were 40000 officiers, or one for every 400 French inhabitant! The similar practise of selling public offices could also be found in Spain, thus fostering large, and

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762 See Knutsen, 1999: 142-145
763 Brewer, 1988: 250
764 See Brewer, 1988: 15
at times most unproductive administrations with vested interests. In Britain, on the other hand, titles and honours remained more separate forms of reward. In addition, although the Royal Navy was expensive, navies were also less personnel-intensive than were armies, and the skills of naval personnel were easier to reroute into productive enterprise in civilian life than the skills of infantry, cavalry and field artillery, the bulk of the traditional army. Add to this the cost-effectiveness of sea power as opposed to land power, and the lack of institutionalised regionalism in the English polity, and the most important explanations to the successful British state building is given. It was this success at internal reform that gave Britain its influence at the international stage. The point for the development of the maritime world order was not that it was formed by a British hegemony, but that the hegemony was British. Indeed, the extraterritorial sovereignty exercised by the British in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, to name some of the largest dominions, are examples of a lasting influence on other units in the international system that is unparalleled in international relations. Thus, apart from the large role played by Britain in forming international institutions as treaties, norms and state praxis, the Pax Britannica shaped many of the units that were to be parts of the international system. Thus, worldviews, political ideology and the British class system were exported overseas. The British hegemony can be said to have given a double impact on international relations; both in directly shaping units in the system, and by giving international institutions a content that was British in origin.

The USA-an emerging Naval Power

Although the US was not to influence international relations to the same degree as Britain had for yet another century, a closer look at the development of US maritime interests and the US Navy will give us valuable insights into the nature of the USA as a maritime world power and late 20th century hegemon. Moreover, the trajectory of US maritime policies is a very crucial test of our typology of idealtypes, and the entire theoretical ambition in this thesis. As we shall see, the United States would increasingly try to expand its trade in a world of mercantilist states, without jeopardising its predominant liberal maritime ideology, and without building a strong navy. Perhaps the genesis of the particular US extraterritorial ideology is to be found in this period. Rather than imitating the European paternalist, it seems, the US government chose the more costly route of furthering its claim to mare liberum without strong state-controlled extraterritorial means of violence. In other

765 I have borrowed the phrasing from the comment upon American hegemony by Ruggie, 1993
766 For examples, see Cannadine, 2001, Cain & Hopkins, 2002
767 See Bukovansky, 1997, particularly, ibid:216
words, neither Marxist nor rationalist theories seem to have much explanatory power when applied to US ideology and maritime foreign policy.

I believe the very peculiar history of the American federation shaped the formal and informal constrains affecting US transaction costs and its diverse ideological principles that at times would guide its foreign policy regarding the maritime world order. In other words, the line of argument should be consistent with the analytical model developed in chapter 2: state and nation-building created domestic institutions and a political culture that also came to shape the ideologies and dispositions to act in foreign policy.

In 1775, the thirteen colonies were still legally attached to Britain. The fear that Britain would use force to keep them in this position, made Congress pass the Rhode Island resolution on August 26 1775, urging each colony to fit out armed vessels for its individual defence.768 It is thus possible to date the first seed planted that was to become the US Navy accurately. In retrospect, the very humble and modest nature of the first North American steps to create sea power should not blur the fact that these efforts were deliberate attempts at gaining sovereignty. Herein lies a key to an understanding of the nature of how North Americans have viewed sea power as an ideology; an effort to curb imperialism and enhance “freedom”, conceived as the right to exercise national independence.

The first ship of the continental navy, a converted merchantman, was bought in November 1775, but the policy of building ships, finding the crews and capturing prizes was rather amateurish when compared to the administrative sophistication of contemporary European sea powers. Of course it had to be that way; hundreds, if not thousands, of practical problems had to be solved, testifying to the huge public effort required to create naval power when lacking a solid maritime infrastructure. North America certainly had the capacity to build ships, but to arm these ships was an enormous challenge. Since British law had banned the casting of cannon in the colonies, the skill of how to cast cannon was one of the worst obstacles that had to be overcome. Trial and error was expensive. The navy actually went to war “with only a very rough idea of how to make its main armament”.769 It is typical of the American spirit that when Congress’s efforts at centralised cannon manufacture was a failure; contracts were instead given many foundries. Although an improvement, the lack of usable cannons had the result that badly needed frigates could not go to sea. Most artillery pieces used on American vessels were thus either captured or brought over from France. Moreover, the strains of war made the Americans use unseasoned timber for many of their ships, giving the vessels

768 Howarth, 1991: 5-6
769 Howarth, 1991: 7
a short lifetime. The overall policy was to build many and small (relatively fast) ships, a reflection of the asymmetrical resources when one compares the Continental navy and the Royal navy. But the administrative challenges were not insignificant. In order to control the fleet during the War of Independence, no fewer than four separate bodies were set up. None of the earlier attempts at constructing Naval committees or a board of the admiralty were successful. Characteristically enough, the solution during the war was to give the sole responsibility to the wealthy entrepreneur Robert Morris. Thus, one single man became agent of marine, with “sole responsibility for and authority over the fleet’s organization”. This proved to be too late, anyway; the continental navy literally ceased to exist by 1781. In addition to the important French support, American sea power at this point more or less consisted of a guerrilla tactics including privateers. Issuing letters of marque was an apt strategy for the Americans, and since foreign vessels could be seized and sold, the policy was also popular with the shipowners and their crews. In fact, privateeering was so popular that it drained personnel from regular naval service (as in the case of the Dutch republic, a structural problem arose when the state had to compete with other organisations for crews). If controlling the navy was a challenge, controlling the privateers was even harder. Thus, seen as a public policy, privateering certainly was a mixed blessing. Although not optimal, privateering nevertheless brought home goods and did harass British shipping, thus disturbing the sea-lines of communication. American privateering in this way raised protection costs for the British. As we have seen from the previous section on Britain, this meant that the Royal Navy had to use considerable resources over the Atlantic under difficult logistical circumstances. The most important legacy from the privateering activity under the war proved to be the increased skills among American sailors. As the merchant marine in the Dutch republic and Britain had created a maritime infrastructure on which to build regular navies, so the trial and error naval enterprises of the federation did the same thing for North America. Moreover, although a minor adversary to the powerful Royal Navy, even the naval battle of Lake Champlain (navies certainly were used for territorial as well as extra-territorial violence), can with some justification be called a strategic victory. Although the fleet was defeated, it gave the country breathing space to endure the critical year of 1776 until help could arrive from allies from the other side of the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, the war of Independence became a global war, since an enemy of Britain became an ally of France. Together with the armed neutrality (mentioned above), Britain thus was on the defensive and forced to spread her naval resources. The international balance of power worked in favour of North America, enhancing the state building of the US. However, the monopoly of violence as conceived by Weber was very fragile in the US.

Howarth, 1991: 12
polity. When the Constitution went into effect in 1789, there was no US Navy or Navy Department for that matter. Naval matters, so far as naval matters were even considered, were the responsibilities of the War Department. A critical juncture was passed when the US Navy, in the proper sense of the word, was created in 1793. The opponents to the bill raised objections that to a peculiar degree can be found in later debates on the nature and course of American foreign policy. The objections were that a permanent state bureaucracy at the federal level would be created, the Navy involving America in wars, raising public debts and increasing the burdens of taxes. However, the law came into existence in March 1794, the authorisation for six frigates passed by two votes. The actual compromise reached, however, was the building of three of these frigates in 1795. The corsair state of Morocco, declaring war on America, was the direct reason why any of the frigates were built at all. Thus, the isolationist tendency in American politics can be traced from day one in the praxis of the US Navy. Although the US and Britain settled their disputes through treaty in 1794, the threats from pirates and the fact that France broke diplomatic relations with the US in 1796 made George Washington proclaim the need for a regular Navy in his last annual address to Congress; “Therefore, so that a future war of Europe may not find our commerce in the same unprotected state in which it was found by the present, America has to set about the gradual creation of a navy”.

Providing protection for US commerce was the chief motivation. A society like the American could not do without the lowest possible transaction costs. In this case, the hegemonic Britain supported this policy. Keeping transaction costs at the optimal level nevertheless also meant that the Navy should not be too costly; this theme was to reoccur in Congressional debates ever since. Still, a state administration controlling, planning and building a navy was created, a defining moment in American state formation. The independent Navy department was created in 1798, freed from its earlier control by the Army. Furthermore, the Marine Corps was formally established the same year. The modest bureaucratic improvements of institution building (until 1815, the Navy Department consisted of a civilian Secretary and some clerks. It is characteristic that the Anglo-Saxon countries almost exclusively had civilians as heads of the fighting services) were followed up by a far more rigorous building of warships than ever seen before in America, the building of 30 warships were authorised in the same year. The new strength of US sea power was demonstrated in the “quasi-war” with France 1798-1801; American strategy was by now more coherent, captains and

771 Albion, 1945: 294
772 Howarth, 1991: 57
773 Howarth, 1991: 59
774 Albion, 1945: 294
crews much more skilled than during the War of Independence.\textsuperscript{775} American protection was by now not only effective; it was cost-effective when viewed in the light of transaction costs for the society at large. Naval costs during the war with France totalled 6 million dollars. When we compare this to the total import tariffs for the same period, we see that it amounted to 22 millions. Simultaneously, it is probably no exaggeration to claim that without the navy, little of the exports totalling 200 million dollars would have come outside of the country.\textsuperscript{776} In 1799, for example, marine insurance rates were reduced at a scale that amounted to eight and a half million dollars. Economic profit coincided with a growing national pride, reflected both in the speeches of President Adams and the cheerful gatherings of people welcoming warships home after “glorious victories”. But the spirit supporting a strong navy was to compete with the very concrete and ever-present spirit of national debts and taxes on companies and citizens alike. Under the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state Gallatin found that the expenses on the Navy were among the posts most easily reducible. The contemporary Republican “Party” at the time was agrarian and anti-naval. However, Jefferson had to struggle between party loyalty and his role as President. The choice was acute simply because the pasha of Tripoli demanded a substantial increase in American tribute. In effect, the declaration of war on the US by Tripoli in May 1801 should be seen as a turning point of even higher importance than the bill of 1798. The decision made implied that the young American Navy should fight Tripoli and decline from paying tribute to the North African states. In effect, the decision also meant that the US intended to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean in order to secure the freedom of the seas and sea-lines of communications.\textsuperscript{777} A squadron of the US Navy was to cruise along the North African coasts as a force deterring “piracy”. This policy was openly, but softly (“to superintend the safety of our commerce there, and to exercise the seamen in nautical duties”), declared by President Jefferson in a letter to the pasha of Tripoli dated May 21, 1801.\textsuperscript{778}

Once the dice was tossed, a half-hearted attempt at blockade of Tripoli proved insufficient to safeguard merchantmen, thus threatening the credibility of Jefferson. In this situation Congress gave the President full discretion to apply the Navy for measures of offensive operations in February 1802. Precisely one year later, funds were given to build four vessels suited for inshore work and shore bombardment. In this way, the US Navy in effect had a blue-water as well as a brown-water capacity suited to protect overseas interests. The Americans had come to the same conclusion as had the British; money paid in tribute to Algeria would be to throw money out of the window since the

\textsuperscript{775} This did not mean that, of course, that the US Navy “defeated” the French. Rather, Napoleon did not prefer to waste any more resources on the armed quarrels with America.

\textsuperscript{776} Howarth, 1991: 66

\textsuperscript{777} Howarth, 1991: 71

\textsuperscript{778} Howarth, 1991: 72
other piratical states in the Magreb; Tripoli, Tunis and the emperor of Morocco, would demand equal or larger tributes. After all, there was a limit to British willingness to provide the common good of sea-lines of communication unfettered by piracy. The US had to contribute for the sake of their economic interests, and one dares perhaps say, their own international reputation. Furthermore, the USA risked no quarrels with the West European states if it were to crack down on the corsair states; the international norms among modern states were on their side. Thus it was that the US Navy showed force at Tangiers and instituted a blockade of Tripoli. However, losing one frigate and providing the pasha with 307 more American prisoners gave the campaign a less than ideal start. Indeed, although the Barbary wars were fairly popular back home (“From the shores of Tripoli...”), and commerce was restored, the peace treaty in practise ended by the US paying for the release of American prisoners. Furthermore, apart from a minimum protection cost in maintaining a small Navy for the protection of commerce after 1806, no American Naval strategy had emerged. Even as a large state with growing incomes from exports, the US could only afford a total of 1169 serving naval personnel from 1806. This testifies to the absence of *mare clausum*-incentives in the American political culture. The principles favouring low public debts, a minimal state bureaucracy and low taxes overruled any attempts at grand strategy that could involve active use of Naval force. The US in practise ended up with a gun-boat navy, a reflection of the isolationist tendency in the contemporary American polity, where local and agrarian interests dominated. While this small navy could, and should, be seen as a manifestation of exercising sovereignty in American waters, it also is proof that America in the beginning of the 19th century had no serious preferences for further expansion and claims to extraterritorial sovereignty. Republican representatives deemed even this minor naval force unnecessary. In this aspect of American beliefs we find the assumption that as long as the US stayed out of balance of power politics entirely, then the USA would be left entirely to itself, which was deemed as positive. As we claimed in chapter two, the real significance of these principles on foreign policy was the lack of imperial ambitions. In retrospect, the isolationist mood is striking, and can only be explained by the political ideology that prevailed. The central state should be small and inexpensive. Thus, there were few supporters of grander ambitions.

However, the growing US economy, and the nature of international relations made a policy of pure isolationism unfeasible in the long run. During the Napoleonic wars, as the Scandinavian supply of grain to Britain was cut off, its trade boycotted by European powers, Britain declared that direct trade between the United States and Europe simply was prohibited. All American vessels carrying cargo were to clear their goods through England, another example of classic British "mare clausum"
policies. Responding to this, Napoleon issued a statement that said that American vessels were free to do so, but that they by implication would lose their rights as neutral ships and thus would be regarded as lawful targets. The American answer was an Embargo act of 1807 forbidding the sailing of any American vessel carrying goods for foreign ports! Again, the US President sought to keep his country out of war. This hurt the US more than anyone else. The evidence that sea power is about upholding sea lines of communications, not about controlling territory, was proved on this occasion as well, but it was a lesson that Americans had seemed unwilling to learn. The result was that British vessels scooped the vacant sea lanes, and France seized all American merchantmen, after all, they violated the Embargo act! It all ended in exchange of fire between the US Navy and Royal Navy in 1811. The cleavage in the Federation regarding naval expansion and whether to enter in a war against Britain was peculiar, at first sight. With strong maritime traditions, New York and the New England states voted in favour of an expansion of the Navy and against war. The other states voted diametrically in favour of the opposite; against naval expansion and for war. The coastal states voted for expansion partly out of principle, partly out of the fact that if the war developed without a US Navy, then their trade as well as homes would suffer. The assumption of the other states also had some logic; a war with Britain could be waged without a Navy, since US war efforts should be channelled through an invasion of British-held Canada. In the hardships of the winter of 1812, pressure was growing in Britain in favour of lifting the sanctions on the US trade. This was done in June 1812, but due to lack of communications; the US was ignorant of this fact when it declared war on Britain two days later. Thus, the British had a war that it did not want, the US a war for which it was not prepared. However, a clash between the mare clausum sea power and the liberalist US does not seem entirely coincidental in retrospect. The war of 1812 was a war over maritime principles. In spite of the cultural similarities and common heritage of the British Isles and the US, the vital importance of maritime principles was important enough for them to drift into armed conflict. The effect of the 1812 war on the future of US foreign policy should not be underestimated. The result of the war was that the principle of non-entanglement was elevated “into a matter of principle”. The outcome was a disposition to act that we in chapter two labelled bandwagoning liberalism. That this label was not contradictory with US isolationism lies in the origins of the kind of liberalism to which the US polity subscribed. More than perhaps any other nation in the world, North Americans shared the belief Adam Smith had elaborated in the Wealth of Nations; that international trade more than international political relations created peace. Indeed, the two, state-politics and economy- were seen as separate realms of human activity. In this respect, mercantilist and paternalist policies of the

780 See Howarth, 1991: 95-96
781 Crockatt, 1995: 19
European major powers were different to those of the US. It meant that the US was anti-imperialist, but at the same time anti-interventionist. America “goes not in search of monsters to destroy”, as John Quincy Adams quipped when he turned down a request for help from Greek insurgents fighting for independence from Turkey in the 1820s. However, prior to the 1890s, the US did relatively little to actually shape the international institutions to its liking. It was not a hegemon, and after 1815, the US did not challenge Britain to any particular degree. Rather, it chose to bandwagon behind Britain as a bandwagoning liberalist under a paternalist, but increasingly liberal, paternalist hegemon. However, the 1812 war does much to demonstrate the difference in ideological terms between the US and Britain.

Against all odds, 1812 was a relatively successful year for the US navy through a single-ship strategy that gave some victories and prizes of high symbolic value. The esteem of the US Navy rose in public and in congress, and control of the big Lakes became paramount in order to subdue the British forces in Canada, a venture that were to turn out successfully for the US. But the balance of power in Europe affected the course of events; with Napoleon’s abdication in 1814, experienced British soldiers were available for action in Canada and on the East coast of the US. Thus, 1814 was to increase the American awareness of the importance of military power in general and naval force in particular. The British burning of Washington that year was a short-term tactical success, but would eventually become a central facet of the American identity, as were the US national anthem, written during the bombardment of Baltimore. These are apt illustrations that naval conflicts were part of the American nation-building process. The peace signed on Christmas Eve 1814 in fact was

782 The spirit of American exceptionalism and isolationism was perfectly illustrated by the 1796 Farewell address of George Washington (italics added): “Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other... The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course... when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world... I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them”. Quoted in http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/49.htm
the foundations of two realisations - on the part of the US that Canada would not be integrated as American territory - and for the British that the US was a sovereign polity. The US Navy came out of the war with increased prestige, which secured its institutions as permanent features of the federal state. The three decades of peace that followed for the US included reforms of the naval administration. With a Naval academy, a professional corps of regular officers, and with a Board of Navy Commissioners, also experienced Captains got a say in naval affairs. To call the slow-paced shipbuilding programme of the US Navy innovative would nevertheless be to exaggerate. Even consideration of steam engines was rejected. Thus, many of the new ships of the US Navy were actually outdated when they were commissioned for use. The somewhat insular position of the US when compared to the European powers in part explains this; the US admirals and policymakers did not fear the French innovations of steam warships that in turn accelerated British constructions. Rather, the nostalgia of 1812 was allowed to govern US naval policies.

At the principal level, however, the US navy became busy; the overseas trade of the bandwagoning liberalist boomed after 1815. This meant that the Navy to an increasing degree were used to provide protection from piracy for private merchantmen, not only along the coasts of the US. From 1817, ships from the US Navy patrolled the east coast of South America, ships headed for the seas of China, the first vessel reaching the Philippines in 1820. The concept applied to the Mediterranean squadron was applied to form more solid and robust lines of command within the navy. Thus, the ships off Chile and Peru in 1821 were organised into the Pacific Squadron. The following year, the West Indies squadron was established. This is not to deny that peacetime meant a downsizing of the Navy. The number of personnel was reduced by almost 20% from 1816 till 1822. The US actually spent more on its army than its Navy, the 1823 Monroe doctrine was more guarded by the Royal Navy than the by the bandwagoning US. From 1798 till 1947 when the Navy Department existed as a separate body, there were only 27 years when there was allocated more money to the Navy than to the Army. Moreover, while many US presidents have been generals, and some, like J.F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter and George Bush have served in the Navy, no American President have been career Naval officers. In retrospect, the officer corps of the US Navy seemed somewhat insulated from technological as well as political developments during the 19th century. When Congress in 1839 at last passed a bill authorising the building of two steam frigates, there were over 700 commercial steamships in America. The potential for American innovation was there, to be sure. The civilian

783 Albion, 1945: 294
784 Howarth, 1991: 130 stress that by squadron, contemporaries did not mean the fixed, regular forces as we see today. Rather, the squadron commander in the US Navy of the 19ty century was some sort of an area commander.
785 Howarth, 1991: 131
786 Howarth, 1991: 145
sector was technologically well developed, and occasionally this benefited the Navy, as in 1841, when the US was the first in the world to permit the construction of a warship with an underwater propeller instead of paddle wheels. However, the problem lay, in addition to the somewhat conservative officer corps, in the shifting support the Navy had in various administrations. Between 1841 and 1853, for example, there were seven different presidents and ten different secretaries of the Navy. With the Congress controlled by the Democrats, to large degree a party of the farming community at this time, the Navy was not given high priority. That the Navy board was a consensus institution without personal responsibility for any of the commissioners did not improve the state of affairs. The US simply did not have effective state machinery for running the Navy. A reflection perhaps of the distrust in federal bureaus inherent in the US, the US simply lagged far behind the European sea powers. This should also serve as a reminder that a vibrant civil society and a private overseas commercial sector are not sufficient factors to make a sea power. In the terms of second-wave weberian historical sociology, the state apparatus, and in particular the navy, was not sufficiently embedded in civil society for it to become a truly national instrument of considerable power. Perhaps this is not so strange when we consider the relationship between land and population in North America. When the war in California came to an end in 1848, the USA had gained its present-day extent (apart from the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867). This meant that “between one shining sea and the other there were an awful lot of land and not many people”.787 The potential for expansion was to be found on US territory itself. Given the ample opportunities this vast continent provided for a relatively small population, it was no wonder that the Americans turned their back to the sea. When one adds the facts that the US after 1815 faced no serious external threats from other sea powers, and the multi-ethnic composition of the US populace, the particular version of American exceptionalism is comprehensible. Up till the 1890s, however, the US was not internationalist on the political level, and bandwagoned behind Britain as far as its ideological foundation allowed and to the extent that power politics demanded.

Sweden

Early Swedish state building certainly was influenced by the Hanseatic League, but we should also stress the struggles of the 17th and 18th centuries with Denmark and Russia as an enduring feature of

the geopolitical context. Thus, already early in the 16th century, Sweden at times allied with the league in order to balance the Danish monarchy.\footnote{Kirby et al, 2000}

The formation of the Swedish state as an organised monopoly of violence under the Vasas started with the rebellion against the Danish occupation force in 1521. Gustav Vasa hired mercenaries in order to gain better control of Sweden. With the support of the League, Sweden began to assert control of the Baltic Sea.\footnote{Glete, 1999: 117} Vasa soon turned against the League, however, and by 1536, the city of Lübeck had lost its role as a serious competitor in terms of military power compared to the increasingly centralised states of Sweden and Denmark-Norway. From 1540, Sweden built a galley fleet, a fleet that was used in attempts at invasion in Russia in 1555. The main competitor in the Eastern Baltic nevertheless was Denmark-Norway, and from 1563 till 1566, the two sovereigns fought seven major battles.\footnote{Glete, 1999: 121} These wars had major significance on statebuilding through the organisational and logistical innovations they fostered. This more lasting sort of naval operations required planning and preparation of stores through the winters. Losses had to be continually replaced during battle, and ships damaged had to be repaired on short notice. The use of guns as the decisive element of naval warfare required more copper, more guns and more gunpowder. In order to break blockades, Sweden built special-purpose warships rather than relying on armed merchantmen. By the 1580s, the Baltic was pacified. The Dutch, as we have seen, used this opportunity to develop shipping and trade in the Baltic.

Nowhere in Europe was the influence of Dutch technology and know-how more felt than in Sweden. The lack of capital and native commercial organisation here gave the Dutch premium opportunities. The ambitions of the Swedish monarchy as well as the availability of extensive mineral resources as copper and iron brought many Dutchmen to Sweden as well, facilitating increased efficiency in industry as well as in business. The Calvinist Louis de Geer, for example, settled in Stockholm and built up the largest business empire in the country, “comprising iron mines and works, brass foundries, shipbuilding, rope-making...(and) also became the largest producer of cannon and cannon-balls not only in Scandinavia but possibly the whole of Europe”.\footnote{Israel, 1995: 274-5} All this was possible because the Baltic had been relatively secured from piracy, a rare quality in European waters at the end of the 16th century. Furthermore, the influence of the Dutch was not a hindrance for Swedish imperialist expeditions directed against other targets. Thus, under Gustav II Adolf, Sweden started to apply their efficient armed forces for ambitious offensives in the Eastern Baltic. Moreover, since a
Habsburg fleet in the Baltic threatened Dutch trade there, Swedish naval power was sold as protection to the Dutch. The Habsburg power, reaching the Baltic coast where the emperor aspired to create a navy, was in fact supported by Spain, hoping to break Dutch Trade in the Baltic Sea. Thus, the religious wars of Europe certainly affected Northern Europe. This was a major reason why the German Baltic coast was taken by Sweden, and this is part of the background for why Sweden got heavily involved in the thirty years war. The North European security complex involved shifting alliances, so that whenever the Swedes seemed to gain control in the eastern Baltic, the major powers intervened, as did the Dutch republic on behalf of Denmark-Norway in 1652-54. Sweden and Denmark-Norway in fact shifted in the roles of selling protection to Dutch shipping. The peace of Westphalia settled the balance of power in the region in favour of Sweden. However, this only meant that the Dutch republic again sought to check Swedish influence by supporting Denmark. From the 1650s, therefore, the Baltic Sea security complex was penetrated by the balance of power in Europe at large. However, these developments at the international arena should not blind us to the fact that Sweden to a high degree continued to shape security in the Baltic for decades to come. In order to do this, Sweden relied on a Navy that both could secure lines of communications, transport soldiers, artillery and munitions, land soldiers, and least, but certainly not last, to provide supply to extraterritorial bridgeheads and depots. In other words, a limited imperialist ideology was reflected in naval praxis. To manage such a task demanded vast resources. There were limits to what the, after all, small state and population of Swedish society could provide of these resources. Part of the answer was to let the armies feed themselves through confiscation, buying and plundering the regions in which they were deployed. However, the use of mercenaries and specialists in state bureaucracy also demanded money. This was partly raised by taxes the Swedes could extract from the ports they controlled on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea. Thus, controlling parts of the seaboard in the Baltic paid off. But the ambitious policies of Gustav Adolph and Karl X Gustav were also followed by periods of a modest foreign policy, which immediately were reflected in the (lack of) priorities for the Navy. As soon as the Navy was weakened, the Swedish Baltic Empire was immediately threatened as well. The crisis was acute since the military prestige of Sweden was shaken by the defeat in Brandenburg in 1675. The relationship between the Swedish Navy and army was utterly important because of two simple reasons. Unlike Empires that included weak political structures overseas, the Swedish Empire faced highly competent and efficient armies on continental Europe. Secondly, the fact that the Swedish possessions nevertheless were overseas meant that the empire would be lost if sea-lines of communications between the motherland (and particularly the

792 Hornborg, 1945: 212-214
possessions in Germany) were broken. Above all, this was true of Pommerania, Wismar, Bremen and Verden. Joint operations between naval and land forces was the rule, not the exception in the Baltic area at large, partly due to the limited resources and weak systems of land communications of the era. Glete thus states that in this area “any army which was to operate successfully had to be placed at one end of a maritime line of communication controlled by the navy...even defensive warfare had strong amphibious elements”. Especially after the rise of Russian sea power in the early 18th century, all parts of the Baltic Sea were probable theatres for acts of war. This made the Baltic an area where battle fleets, archipelago fleets and army forces had to be coordinated.

Surviving the wars in the 1670s, Karl XI thus took advantage of the peaceful years from 1679 till 1700 by a significant strengthening of the Swedish Navy. The monarch decided already in 1679 to found his new naval base in Karlskrona, much closer to the overseas possessions in the southern Baltic than Stockholm. Karlskrona was the main base in effect from 1689, at a time when a rise of Russian sea power seemed unlikely. Although the professionalisation of the Swedish officer corps came later than in the Dutch republic and in England (Swedish admirals were regularly chosen among army officers with scarce naval skills, and no Naval academy was instituted during the 17th century), the naval infrastructure built in this period was an important part of Swedish state building. Gothenburg became a permanent naval station in 1699. From 1680 till 1700, thirteen ships of the line were built, a formidable effort by a Nordic power. By 1700, the Swedish Navy thus included no less than 39 ships of the line and nine frigates. However, even the Swedish administrational skills did not suffice to create an efficient system of educating the sailors. The system of conscription worked poorly, and the efforts at employing professional sailors were costly and did not create the quantity required.

The Great Northern war from 1700 was to change the scope of the tasks for the Swedish Navy. In 1721, Sweden lost most of the eastern Baltic to Russia, the battle of Poltava raising the influence of Peter I in Europe, and similarly reducing the reputation of Karl XII. Sweden also lost parts of her possessions in Prussia to Germany. The land, population, revenues; all were lost (although Sweden was given the right to import grain from her former provinces in Livonia duty-free up to a maximum of 50000 rubles per year). The loss of the Swedish-controlled provinces in North Germany and in the eastern Baltic meant that the tasks of the Swedish navy became much more conventional for a small state. With no trans-

793 Hornborg, 1945: 214
794 Glete, 1993: 295
795 Hornborg, 1945: 228
796 Wallerstein, 1980: 219
Baltic empire to defend, ambitions were reduced in Stockholm. But it is too easily forgotten that many of the traditional extraterritorial tasks nevertheless had to be carried out in the much smaller empire. Communications between Finland and Sweden had to be kept intact, army operations along the coasts needed naval support and blockades had to be broken. Apart from Denmark-Norway, Sweden now also had a powerful Russian Navy to look out for in the east. The geopolitical position of Sweden dictated its policy for the century after the Great Northern war; a mix of fear, and simultaneously hopes of revenge for, Russia, and the desire to annex Norway. This does not deny the fact that the geopolitical ambitions of Sweden forever were reduced after the Great Nordic war. The war should, frankly speaking, be seen as a turning point in the social constitution of the Swedish state and Swedish society. After all, the wish to incorporate Norway was a smaller ambition than being the dominant power of the Baltic security complex. We should also note that Sweden’s role on the continent of Europe utterly diminished. Thus, Sweden’s extraterritorial aspirations were strikingly reduced. Although officers and monarchs could dream of restoring the lost empire, geopolitical alterations had made Sweden much more inward looking.

This did not mean, however, that Sweden was reduced to the negligible after 1721. The ambitions aimed at Norway and the sizable navy reminds us that Sweden still was a territory with paternalist traits, although the application of paternalism was limited. The ingenious system of militia sailors living along the coast in fact made rapid mobilisations of the Swedish Navy possible, a cost-effective arrangement on part of the Swedes, as so often has been the case. The system proved to function smoothly during the wars with Russia in 1741 and 1788. While a good system for defensive purposes, the personnel policy of the Swedish state nevertheless made the Navy unsuited for offensive operations. Swedish sailors were unskilled, by the standards of 18th and 19th century Europe. This was evidenced in the attempts at attacking Russian base areas in the Gulf of Finland in 1790. The Swedish state did not have the resources to pay for professional soldiers, and there was no political will to conscript or press sailors in the merchant navy into service in the state navy. In the end of the 17th century,

“the non-noble estates had been able to trade taxes for the support of a volunteer system in exchange for guarantees that conscription would be abolished. This was a reaction against the

797 Glete, 1993: 296
798 Glete, 1993: 296
Again, as Michael Mann and John Hobson point out, states are, in the long run, not stronger than their embeddedness in society permits. The Swedish attack against Russia ended as a total fiasco in 1742. It is tempting to judge the 18th century Swedish foreign policy in general, and especially naval policy, as overly ambitious compared to the abilities to actually achieve the results desired by the state leadership. The ambitious program of shipbuilding from 1781 till 1785 was part of Gustav III’s scheme for an operation against Copenhagen and Norway to annex and occupy Norway. But since Russia was involved in a Turkish war, the Swedish monarch instead decided to strike at Russia in 1788. The results were again disappointing, with severe Swedish losses of personnel and vessels. Indeed, the criticism of the Swedish Navy around 1800 was based on quite unrealistic beliefs in what Sweden could achieve given the European balance of power. It was not only the main Swedish Naval base that had moved to Karlskrona, but also the central naval administration, the Admiralitetskolklegium. Thus, the senior naval officers and planners were isolated from the politico-administrative center of the state, and senior politicians and bureaucrats grew increasingly ignorant of naval affairs. In this respect, the difference to Britain is striking. Distrust and lack of communication between officials and various interest groups severely hampered the always-important connection between political decisions and strategic and tactical possibilities as worked out by naval officers. In fact, the Kollegium was formally abolished in 1791. The admirals were not at all interested in galley warfare in the Eastern Baltic; to them, a battle fleet was what a Navy ought to be, and Denmark was the lasting enemy. Thus, there was a cleavage among the most powerful groups regulating the use of extraterritorial violence, a cleavage founded on different conceptions of Swedish strategic and national interests. In fact, it was Swedish politicians and army officers that created the archipelago tactic of warfare, since the Kollegium could not provide tactical guidelines for such manoeuvres. Thus, the admirals lost administrative control of the galley fleets in 1756. These fleets were organised as a separate organisation, a sort of forerunner for the 20th century mobile forces of the Swedish coastal artillery. It was only in 1788, when the same person was appointed commander-in–chief of both fleets that Gustav III had full control of his battle fleet. Although the naval administration had been a modern bureaucracy, this shows how naval institutions could be much more conservative than their political superiors and younger officers,

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799 Glete, 1993: 297
800 See Glete, 1993: 414-415
how slow Admirals could be at grasping the new realities of sea power as part of national strategy, and how a monarch in a strong state as Sweden had to manoeuvre and wrestle with the apparatus of his own state. The dynastic union with Norway from 1814 must have been something of a, militarily speaking at least, disappointment to the Swedish leadership. The rise of Germany (see below) made Sweden formulate a new naval policy in 1850-51 with support for the battle fleet. Improving materiel, training and building steam frigates made the rather poor state Norway build two steam frigates and three corvettes.\textsuperscript{801} Even this periphery and modest mare clausum state was influenced by the European-wide impulses of a more activist foreign policy. For some years during the 1850s and early 1860s, scandinavism, the aspirations for a new union of the Scandinavian states, had a hold on the elites in the three countries. These aspirations came to nothing.

But the Nordic countries were divided further in more than the ideological realm. On February 21 1808, Russia launched a surprise attack on Finland, which for centuries had been part of Sweden. Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I had made a secret agreement, where the latter was to make Sweden break with Britain and join the continental system by the use of military force. In compensation, Russia was to gain Finland.\textsuperscript{802} The position of the Swedes had been to avoid this, since Britain controlled the sea-lines of communications, thus denying France the ability to project power to the Scandinavian Peninsula. The attack was a strategic surprise in the most literal sense of the word, since the tsar was a cousin of the Swedish monarch and had been an ally of Sweden. Thus, the weakly defended territory of Finland was overrun by the Russian army in a campaign where naval forces played a secondary role at the tactical level (a winter campaign during the critical phase of the war), while the European contest for the blockade against Britain was the decisive struggle at the strategic level. The outcome was that Finland became a Grand Duchy under Russia from 1809. However, Sweden was not \textit{de facto} further subdued by Russia, thanks primarily by the true ruler of the Baltic in 1809; the Royal Navy. The fleet-in-being of Britain hindered the Russian Navy from entering deeper into the west. Thus, Britain also broke the sea-lines of communications that were so vital for the allies of Napoleon in Eastern Europe. The Swedes were forced to sign peace with France in 1810, thereby joining the continental system of blockade of Britain, but in reality, Sweden continued its trade with Britain. Neither Russia nor France could do much to prevent this, since there was one truly sovereign of the seas. Thus, the Royal Navy ensured that Anglo-Swedish trade could carry on.\textsuperscript{803} In sum Sweden remained a regional player, but the Swedish political territory had changed; she lost Finland and "won" Norway, even if the latter was a hollow victory when one

\textsuperscript{801} Glete, 1993: 435
\textsuperscript{802} Hornborg, 1945: 389
\textsuperscript{803} Hornborg, 1945: 405
considers the political autonomy of the Norwegians and the meagre economic outcome Norway was to yield to Sweden.

**Denmark-Norway and Germany**

The capital of Denmark remained the main naval base in Denmark until after WWII, with the incorporation of Nyhamn in the base in 1680s. Although the Baltic Sea had been thoroughly penetrated by the balance of power in Europe by the 1720s, Denmark-Norway continued to be a considerable naval power, the naval yards at Holmen building 15 ships of the line from 1680 till 1700.\(^\text{804}\) In 1700, the Danish-Norwegian combined Fleet consisted of 33 ships of the line and nine frigates. A further strength was the coastal fleet of smaller vessels. All in all, the combined fleet consisted of 2800 cannons and 17500 sailors by 1700. In one crucial aspect, Denmark-Norway went further in developing a modern Navy than its main competitor Sweden\(^\text{805}\). The union started regular training of midshipmen already in 1679. These midshipmen became the core of regular units in 1701 (A school educating navigators both for the Navy and Merchant Navy was instituted in 1685). As in Sweden, the recruitment of sailors nevertheless was a considerable problem. Thus, the Danish-Norwegian fleet relied heavily on conscription, but a substantial number of professional sailors were employed by the state in addition. The most important threat to Denmark-Norway was that Sweden could break the sea-lines of communications between Denmark and Norway. Norway was the chief aim of Swedish ambitions in the 18\(^{th}\) century, but Norwegian territory was difficult to operate in for any intruding force. Thus, the main threat to the union was a Swedish blockade of Copenhagen.\(^\text{806}\)

This made for a defensive security policy of the union, but it also meant that the combined fleet of Denmark-Norway had to be numerically superior to the Swedish. The fact that Swedish influence in the European balance of power diminished after the Great Northern war did not alter this basic fact of the Nordic security complex. Divided by salt water, Denmark and Norway were forced to uphold a vital Navy. The Atlantic islands under Danish rule and the colonies in the West Indies made this policy even more sensible. It is also worth stressing some similarities between Sweden and Denmark-Norway, particularly for the reader who will question to what degree extraterritorial rights and violence mattered for the total course of history in these countries. Both kingdoms were

\(\text{804}\) Hornborg, 1945: 231

\(\text{805}\) Sweden was the main challenger, to be sure. However, we should note that the conventional wisdom that the Hanseatic League was the last effort at creating German sea power until the age of Bismarck is somewhat erroneous. During the 1670s, Brandenburg-Prussia actually bought some vessels from the Dutch republic. With the death of Fredrich Wilhelm in 1688, “his fleet and his plans for a Brandenburg colonial empire died as well”, Hornborg, 1945: 233. The Brandenburg fleet ceased entirely to exist under Friedrich I of Prussia

\(\text{806}\) Glete, 1993: 295
maritime powers with very significant interests in trade carrying by ship in Europe. As the volume of overseas transport along the east-west axis in Europe represented by the Dutch republic fell, Denmark-Norway and Sweden in many respects occupied the roles previously held by Holland. The protection of merchantmen from the raids by vessels from the corsair states were important for both countries, but this task was a secondary one, mainly carried out by cruisers. Perhaps more important than anything else, although this might sound strange to a reader less inclined to see the value of a regular navy, was to keep fleets in being. This worked as a deterrent. First of all in the region of the Baltic Sea, but also in Europe at large; having a substantial sea-going navy meant that both countries could be important assets in an alliance as part of the European balance of power. This provided protection of overseas transport by itself, since hostilities could turn the relationship with the Nordic countries into an enmity that could be disadvantageous in a later conflict. Concerning the balance between Sweden and Denmark-Norway, none were really able to exploit the weaknesses of the other. While the Swedish Navy could be mobilised rapidly and with great security, its personnel were not very skilled. Thus, the Swedish navy was good at defensive undertakings, but poor on offensive operations. In Denmark, on the other hand, the core of professional soldiers and a rather well trained officer corps made her fleet comparatively better at offensive operations than the Swedish, but the Achilles heel of Denmark-Norway was geographical. The very distance between Denmark and Norway, not to say the Atlantic islands, increased transaction costs within the union. Besides, Copenhagen, the main naval base, was situated on an island. This meant that an enemy surprise attack, or surprise blockade (this actually was what the Swedes planned to do in case of hostilities with Denmark) actually could hinder the mobilisation of the fleet. The sailors, in a blockade, would simply not be able to get out to their ships.\textsuperscript{807} The Royal Navy took advantage of this weakness of the Danish mobilisation system on three crucial occasions; in 1800, 1801 and 1807. The combined fleet was never ready on either of these strikes. The Norwegian-made guns aboard the combined fleet were also inferior to the high-quality Swedish guns. Thus, the men-of-war in the Danish-Norwegian Navy were given larger dimensions in order to be able to carry the same firepower. However, Danish ship design could not keep pace with the progress in France and particularly Britain. There is some truth in the “myth” that the small gunboats applied for coastal operations in Norway were rather effective, however. Such smaller vessels in large numbers were efficient in archipelago operations, a fact that was also evidenced in the Swedish victory in sea battle with the Russian navy in 1790. The days of oared warfare continued into the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century. One should also note the obvious fact that such smaller vessels with crews of limited size also were

\textsuperscript{807} ibid: 296
beneficial to a weak state for defensive purposes. The central dilemma for small coastal states has always been that scarce resources make for a Navy with a small number of advanced, sea-going ships, or a Navy with a higher number of smaller, simpler ships. Both choices have their weaknesses, to be sure. During the Great Northern War, the combined Danish Norwegian fleet to a large degree was based on building smaller ships, with no ships of the line being commissioned after 1711.\textsuperscript{808} Norway got a particular profile for coastal combat, a naval monopoly of violence that suited the maritime policies of a sovereignty-seeking coastal state. In 1807, the combined Danish-Norwegian fleet suffered a catastrophe after Admiral Nelson’s successful raid at Copenhagen. Up till that day, the combined fleet had been one of the larger battle fleets in Europe. That was precisely the reason why Britain chose to seize it, of course. The Royal Navy had to ensure that the Danish-Norwegian fleet did not fall in the hands of Napoleon. To the British, that scenario would mean that the naval balance of power in the Baltic would be utterly changed, which could threaten the trade with states like Sweden. The destruction of the combined fleet was a purely strategic move to ensure British superiority in European waters. The losses suffered by the combined fleet in 1807, and the dynastic union with Sweden that Norway was forced into in 1814, meant that the economic and infrastructure investment that Norway had contributed to the battle fleet was lost. What Norway inherited was a naval force of gunboats and brigs. At this point, the difference between Denmark and Norway is illuminated. While Sweden, given the skills and huge maritime infrastructure of Norway, wanted Norway to build a new battle fleet, the Norwegian parliament consistently refused to do so. Given, furthermore, that Norwegian sailors had made up a large proportion of the personnel of the combined fleet, the almost total lack of enthusiasm for building a new fleet seems to suggest that the support for the combined fleet in reality had been modest in Norway. The defensive, restricted \textit{mare clausum} inclination in Norway was now fully revealed. A battle fleet seemed to have been viewed as entwined with a more offensive foreign policy and the use of extraterritorial violence in distant waters. There was little support for such a policy in Norway after 1814. Furthermore, while the Danish-Norwegian fleet had been a combined venture with the powerful Denmark, the Norwegian army had been a relative autonomous branch of the nation since the early 17\textsuperscript{th} century. In the increasing efforts at nation-building during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, therefore, the army had a much larger support among the elites. The army was increasingly embedded in society as a part of the nation, while the battle fleet Navy was seen as more Danish than Norwegian. While highly distorted, this view of history came to stick in the Norwegian identity.\textsuperscript{809} Another peculiar, but rational and totally transparent, view among Norwegians was that although the

\textsuperscript{808} Jungersen, 1945: 268-269

\textsuperscript{809} See the entire book by Ulriksen, 2002, for a line of argument in favour of this interpretation.
Norwegian sea-lines of communications clearly existed on the mercy of Britain, it would be beneficial to Britain to safeguard these sea lanes in the event of crisis. Upholding the commodity chains between Norway and Britain would be in the British self-interest. This belief was part of Norwegian foreign policy until the German attack on April 9th, 1940. Apart from the movement in favour of supporting Denmark against Prussia in 1848 and 1864, Norway was an utterly isolationist polity, a sovereignty-seeking periphery until 1905 that gradually tried to loosen its bands to its stronger neighbours. The use of the Norwegian army outside of Norway had to be given the support of the Parliament, an institutional barrier preventing the Swedish leadership in applying Norwegian units to create a stronger union with a more activist foreign policy. In fact, Russia repeatedly warned the Swedish monarch whenever he tempted to force the Norwegian parliament to abide his word in these matters.810 To Russia, it was paramount to counterbalance any attempt on the behalf of Sweden to create a strong military power in Northern Europe. This led to the ironic result that by 1836, Tsar Nicolas warned Sweden that they better stick to the constitution Sweden had granted the Norwegians. The sympathy for Denmark’s cause was not entirely a result of the close cultural ties that existed between Norway and Denmark; it was quite clear that both politicians in Sweden and Norway saw Denmark as an important buffer to the south against Prussian ambitions.

The post-1814 development in Denmark was very different than the Norwegian trajectory. It actually rebuilt a battle fleet. Although this fleet was small, and the men-of–war themselves not large or equipped with impressive fire-power compared to for example the Royal navy, the Danish battle fleet was suitable for exercising sovereignty in its empire of Atlantic and West Indies islands. Moreover, the German states had not had a Navy since the German mini-fleet abolished in 1701. This was an advantage to Denmark, but was perceived as a disadvantage in Sweden, since it meant that Russia after 1721 was the dominant naval power in the Baltic.811 When Prussia set out to create a navy from 1850, Denmark (which had moved from absolutism to constitutional rule in 1849), was convinced that naval force was essential in any confrontation with Germany. Thus, Denmark modernised its navy in the 1850s with seven screw frigates and corvettes and converting one battleship to steam.

It is striking to look at the well-known fact that in spite of the rise of Prussia to great power rank, despite its Baltic seaboard after 1814 and despite Germany’s large merchant fleet, German military naval forces consisted of a few gunboats.812 The revolutions of 1848 resulted in an attempt to recreate a German Navy. In fact, although the federal German state planned by the Frankfurter

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810 See Riste 2001: 56-58
811 Hornborg, 1945: 302
parliament did not materialise, a Federal German navy was instituted. Its main opponent was the Danish navy. At this time, the German Duchy Holstein was part of a dynastic union with the Danish monarchy. Holstein and the German population in Schleswig revolted in 1848. A local fleet and the German federal navy were both means in the support for the cause of Schleswig-Holstein and against Denmark. However, both forces were abolished with the peace of 1850. Prussia experienced a Danish blockade in the conflict of 1848-50. This led to the recognition that it was absurd for a great power to be at the mercy of a small Scandinavian state at sea. Even the small Danish fleet had been able to block the busiest ports in Germany, and thereby in effect produced a stalemate in the war for Schleswig-Holstein. It is indeed poignant to ask why the German states in effect had no navy at all. The main reason was historical; the peace of Westphalia had made much of the "German" coasts belong to the Kings of Denmark-Norway and particularly Sweden.

Prussia actually started building a navy, and as always when a largely continental state was to embark on such an effort, the relative lack of naval infrastructure was a drawback. However, the flexibility of naval forces made it possible to build the first frigates designed by a Swedish naval architect, and to man the first steam vessels of the German navy with Swedish officers. In 1864, this Prussian state, joined with Austria in a joint attack on Denmark. The Danes, without support from other powers, managed to fight the Germans at sea with some success, a testimony to the limited capacity of the German states to project power over sea. By 1870, however, the direction of German sea power had taken another route than the other Baltic powers. While Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Russia created coastal defence navies, Germany soon would create a navy where the core was a battle fleet of armoured battleships.

3.3 Monopolies of violence? The practises of piracy and Prize-taking and Northern Europe until 1856

We have already noted that the formation of states in Northern Europe was heavily influenced by competition with a strong non-state actor (or should we say set of actors) through the Hanseatic League. Thus, theories of international politics too narrowly focusing on an international system of states miss central facets of 16th and 17th century international affairs. Moreover, we have also seen that fighting the Corsair states was a formative phase for the emerging US Navy.

812 This was the Royal Prussian Navy, in existence since the Napoleonic wars. See Sondhaus, 1997: ch. 1 for an interesting overview.
813 Riste, 2001: 56-57
814 Sondhaus, 1997:1
815 According to Glete, 1993: 435, this was a result of Prussian conservatism. Rather than let the liberals who had run the federal navy of 1848 lead the building, they preferred to hire foreign competence.
Medieval jurists had echoed classical Roman law in labelling pirates *hostis humani generis*: "enemy to all mankind." The *piracy* these sea-robbers practiced was seen as different from selective maritime theft, conducted with the approval and support of a sovereign against merchant shipping flying the standard of that monarch or civic republic's rivals. This practice was alternately termed “*ire ad pirraticam*”; to sail or go as a pirate, and *ire in cursum* going "in cursum"; i.e. *corsairs*. Later distinctions were variations of the same division between piracy and state-sanctioned violence at sea. Janice Thomson has demonstrated the importance of the fight against piracy in international relations. However, her study does not analyse how and to what extent piracy influenced Northern Europe. This reflects the tendency to see piracy as the adventurous activities in southern waters conducted from exotic bases in distant islands. In the following, I will seek to construct another, often neglected, story of how piracy influenced states and their conceptions of maritime sovereignty in Northern Europe. So neglected is this part of European history, however, that we must use whatever scattered comments that actually exist in naval history in order to analyse the subject. Pirates were a large and diverse set of actors, and did thus not make for a coherent picture of “the other” in nation building. In this way, the phenomenon is often seen as unimportant in traditional contributions in historiography. If we are to evaluate whether piracy (the concept is ambiguous, but defined in international law. At present, the distinction between piracy and terrorism at sea should be seen as a distinction primarily in the goals of the two activities, see chapter 6), we should ask whether piracy affected the core of the modern state, conceived as a monopoly of violence. In more precise terms, to what degree did states in Northern Europe (apart from hegemons like the Dutch republic and the British Empire, which by its almost global reach inevitably came in contact with piracy) apply their navies to suppress piracy? Another side of the coin is to what degree the states themselves approved of methods that were similar to piracy? It was primarily “piracy” in the Mediterranean that affected modern states in Northern Europe. After the dissolution of the power of the Western Roman Empire, the corsairs, or “Berberians”, in the Magreb region to a large degree gained control of the Western Mediterranean. Around AD 935, the Arabian prince Zeiri founded Algeria on the foundations of the old Roman colony Icosiums. According to Danish historian Jungersen, this marks the beginning of the long period in which piracy, or the *corse* to be more precise, became an important source of income for the power-holders along the coast in Northern Africa. Such was the intensity of violence committed by these units that all major European states with seafaring in the region, including Britain, had to pay large sums of money in tribute to the

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816 Tai, 2003:1
817 Jungersen, 1945: 280
818 Jungeren, 1945: 280
regional rulers of the Magreb. It is tempting to use the analogy of blackmail. However, we should also note that the corsairs at times ventured as far away as to Iceland, where they set ashore in 1627. They pillaged local villages, slaughtering people and livestock, and captured over 300 persons as slaves, according to Icelandic historian Gunnar Karlsson.\footnote{Karlsson, 2000: 144} It is interesting to note that such practises seem to have been universally condemned as uncivilised by all North European states at the time.\footnote{Karlsson, 2000: 145} The indignation against the corsairs did nevertheless not produce a permanent weakening of piracy at sea, or rather the corso. When the cargo carrying of the Scandinavian countries rose significantly in the Mediterranean from the 1730s, for example, Sweden, Denmark and Norway were all forced into signing “Treaties of friendship” with the corsair “states”. It was a costly peace. Thus, states from Northern Europe occasionally sent naval forces to the Magreb in order to gain better terms. Already in 1746, Denmark sent 3 ships of the line and one frigate to Algeria in order to negotiate with the Pasha. Backed up by visible force, Denmark-Norway thus managed to reach agreements with Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli and Morocco through rather substantial gifts to the regional leadership.\footnote{Jungersen, 1945: 280} The biggest problem with establishing stable conditions with such non-state actors in an anarchic environment was the question of verifying and enforcing that the parties stuck to the agreements. Given the resources and time required to project power from Northern Europe to the Magreb, this was an opportunity the corsair leaders often took advantage of. Thus, the Algerian pasha set forth new demands in 1769, and when these were not met, he simply declared war on Denmark and started preying upon Danish-Norwegian traffic in the Western Mediterranean. In this situation, Denmark-Norway sent a force of 4 ships of the line, 2 frigates and 2 artillery ships to Algeria in 1770. The patrimonial traditions in these areas meant that the problem was never solved once and for all. When a new pasha came to power in Tripoli in 1796, he immediately made new demands and broke the treaty. The only way to seek effective (although temporary) settlements was through violent confrontations. Thus, a Danish fleet actually combated a fleet from Tripoli in May 1797. Still, one should note that until the war in 1801, Denmark-Norway maintained a fleet of 7-8 frigates in the Mediterranean continually. Thus, a not insignificant part of the armed forces of the Union was more or less permanently deployed to prevent piracy and prize-taking (the activities of the corsair states increasingly shifted from piracy to prize-taking, since the latter could mean both the capture of cargo and ransom money for imprisoned crews). The only means to stop this activity was occupation and complete pacification of the territories from which prize taking and piracy were conducted. Thus, France conquered Algeria in 1830. The paying of
tribute to Magreb territories does not seem to have stopped for the Nordic countries until France defeated Morocco in 1844. The latter operation in fact was a multinational endeavour. Swedish, Norwegian, Spanish and Danish war ships supported the French operation that more or less ended the tribute and prize-taking in the region for a long period. The significance of the fight against the corsair “states” is also a sign of the norms that came to be recognised by an increasing number of western states. After 1815, this was reflected in exactly multinational operations other than war that were meant to uphold these norms. In 1828, two Norwegian and three Swedish warships operated together for nine months. In 1844-45, apart from the mentioned states participating against Morocco, small states like Norway (1 frigate, 1 corvette) and Sweden (1 frigate and two corvettes) gave substantial contributions to international operations of this sort. Scandinavian navies co-operated in 1847-48 to support Norwegian, Danish and Swedish merchant ships in the Mediterranean (the Nordic co-operation also included combined operations during the Crimean War). There is no reason to lay the guilt of piracy solely on muslims. Many European outlaws participated alongside the pirates of the Magreb countries. In addition, the often-told stories of piracy in exotic waters more or less rest on the myths of actions by people of West-European origin. What is even more striking, however, is the state-approved policies of prize-taking with global reach, as they were practised by states in the “civilized” western world. Nowhere, perhaps, is the contrast between territorial and extra-territorial laws and modes of violence more striking than in the question of prize-taking. The property rights on the seas were strikingly different from those on land, and the use of violence was granted private entrepreneurs to a far larger degree than what was conceivable for territorial organisations other than the sovereign state itself. Captured vessels in the 18th and 19th centuries often (at least in western countries) were taken to “prize courts, whose decisions were avidly followed by the press and public. They played a vital role in the port cities that were the major population centres of maritime nations. The laws controlling prize taking were as familiar to the American populace as the rules of baseball are today”.

Thus, the historian cited above, with some justification, argues that prize-taking in practise was a sort of lawful booting on the seas. In contrast to piracy, prize-taking was considered as lawful acts. How come this anomaly in the constitution of states and international relations came into being? In fact, the practise that ALL ships were entitled to carry arms seems to be as old as seafaring itself. Ship crews did not need government authorisation to use their weapons for self-defence. Included in this principle was the right to seize prizes, that is, to capture and hold “enemy” ships that attacked, or might attack them. The captor’s sovereign in turn became the property-holder of the captured vessel, cargo and the ransom of

822 Petrie, 1999:1-2. This publication is the only comprehensive study of prize-taking that, to my knowledge, has been made public since 1861.
prisoners.\textsuperscript{823} However, the outcome of prize-taking was entirely different, financially speaking, if the Captain of the ship prior to the voyage received a written licence\textsuperscript{824} from his sovereign, authorising attack on enemy vessels on behalf of the nation. If the ship was a warship, such a Royal letter was a commission as a vessel of the national navy, a straightforward certificate that the ship and its crew were parts of the monopoly of violence. However, if the ship was privately owned, the letter was called a “\textit{letter of marque and reprisal}”, and de facto made the vessel a privateer. Privateers were ships with a state license to seize property belonging to owners from other countries. Thus, private use of violence became part of foreign policy, since the sovereign at least tried to regulate the practise of privateering against adversaries rather than allies. However, the word reprisal indicates a condition between sovereigns and private parties that lies between peace and war. In the first centuries after the renaissance, privateering was a form of debt collecting. In this period, letters of marque and reprisals authorised “a wronged private party to secure redress by seizing vessels of the offending nation” \textsuperscript{825}. As such, private vessels were not necessarily part of warfare, perceived as armed conflict between nations. By the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century, if not earlier, the practise was reversed. By the 1850s, letters of marque and reprisal were issued only in time of war. Thus, these private vessels were supplements to the state navies. The main reason why states ceased to apply privateering too generously was that it created a mess of unpredictable clashes with unintended consequences. In Britain, this realisation came gradually, as the extension of government control over extraterritorial forces grew.\textsuperscript{826} As the total volume and striking power of the world’s navies rose, and as the British Empire became so vast as to threaten overstretch of the Royal Navy if tensions were not controlled, admirals could not be allowed to behave like leaders of organized crime with private interests. Slowly then, a norm was consolidated on this issue, a norm that was respected by all western powers after the 1850s, with some minor and unintended exceptions. Thus, it is no surprise that these western powers eventually joined forces to root out the last uncontrollable non-state actors and rogue states that did not respect the sea lanes for peaceful transportation.

\textbf{3.4 States and Navies - A comparative overview}

Quantifying the extraterritorial power of the European states and North America in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century is not as straightforward as one might assume. The measurements and records by themselves are unreliable, and do not suggest much about the differences in efficiency among the states. However,

\textsuperscript{823} Petrie, 1999: 2
\textsuperscript{824} In French, “lettres de Marque”, in Norwegian and Danish often “kaperbrev”
\textsuperscript{825} Petrie, 1999: 3
they do suggest major variations and similarities of ambitions and foreign policy thinking in the state leaderships in the period (a more detailed view than found in Appendix I is warranted for this period).

Table 3.4 Combined size of sail- and steamship navies 1820-1860

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<th>1820</th>
<th>1825</th>
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<th>1850</th>
<th>1855</th>
<th>1860</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>825</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>German Fed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>150</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The table illustrates that all the “paternalists” in our typology maintained a substantial naval force during most of the 19th century. The regional differences are nevertheless profound. Thus, the Baltic states including Sweden, Denmark and Germany are numerically much weaker than the states that at one time or the other have been included as hegemons by Wallerstein. Of these states, the paternalist power of Britain had a far stronger base of power-projection than the international liberals the USA and the Netherlands. Germany is a special case, since the German ambitions to create sea power only gradually surfaced after 1850. The periphery Iceland never had a navy, and Norway was a minimalist naval power after the dissolution of Denmark-Norway (although the latter half of the 19th century saw a strengthening of the Navy). While the above numbers evidences British sea power in an apt manner, one should also note that any notion of Britain as a minimalist state is highly inaccurate. It is also clear that Britain was in a unique position to provide protection for its worldwide transactions through this naval strength. However, such a military protection in itself involved high costs. Thus, a drop in income could quickly make the cost-effectiveness of the Empire precarious. The rise and long-lasting vitality of the British Empire cannot be explained by theories of the international system alone. A unique ability to utilise naval skills and entrepreneurship was mixed with a strong civil society and stable political institutions to produce a lean but lethal ability

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826 See Bukovansky, 1997: 221 for a similar conclusion
to project power overseas. After 1815, the Concert of Europe was a deliberate attempt to regulate the balance of power in Europe, but the content and form of this peace was characteristically marked by British preferences. The domestic political and social development of Britain thus influenced the international system to an unprecedented degree. In this period, Britain also gradually became a chief engineer of instituting the navy under political control, even though the use of non-state violence on a large scale continued for much longer in the naval realm. The smaller states could no longer hope to compete with Britain in the maritime realm after the 18th century. Not even allying, for example with the aim of remaining neutral during crises, made these states into powerful actors on the international scene. Moreover, no European power seemed a significant threat against Britain in naval terms prior to the late 19th century, while the US remained isolationist throughout the period. The fact that the American Civil war produced new weapons and vessels for naval warfare did not make the US attempt major incursions into the sovereign European states. In the Western hemisphere, a different pattern was observed, as witnessed in this chapter and the following one. Nevertheless, with the single exception of the Civil war, the North American navies were insignificant when compared to the major navies of Britian and France. Nevertheless, all states covered in this chapter gained political control of arms at sea originating from their territory in this period, although this process was cumbersome. If we compare extraterritorial force with the territorial equivalent, it is clear that navies were institutionalized much later than were armies. Moreover, elements of private violence continued to exist side by side with state agencies at sea. All in all, the analysis so far lends support to the hypotheses of chapter 2: a relatively liberal Dutch Republic lost its naval hegemony to paternalist Britain, with the US joining as an uneasy bandwagoning liberal state after 1815. Interestingly, both Sweden and Denmark behaved according to the paternalist category throughout the period analysed above.

4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

“The supreme geopolitical fact of the modern era, Prince Bismarck is alleged to have remarked, is that the Americans speak English”

David M. Kennedy

This chapter will seek to analyse to what extent and in which ways extraterritorial violence and regulation of sovereignty at sea changed principally at the international level during the age of industrialisation, and how ideology influenced world order. In other words, the aim here is not

828 David Kennedy, 1999: 465
primarily to explain different modes of imperialism, but to highlight the purpose, organisation and use of naval force, itself an indicator of the scope and ambitions inherent in foreign policy for any coastal state. Secondly, the chapter seeks to compare the significance of naval factors on outcomes of state building in the major powers; how naval policies influenced domestic and foreign policies. I will lay particular emphasis on Britain, Imperial Germany and the US in this respect. While the extraterritorial policies of Britain were “locked” in a particular direction at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, the other two powers were latecomers as states and hence as naval powers. Fact is that navalism as a modern phenomenon in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy came only after A.T. Mahan’s "The Influence of Sea power upon History" (ISPUH), reached world-wide fame in 1890. Crucial matters that will be addressed cover new and more efficient means of extraterritorial violence. Without pertaining to analyse all facets of those changes, I will seek to shed light on how this maritime revolution changed time-space dimensions between and within states. In other words, we ask the question whether and in what way the praxis of power at sea changed the international system and the states covered in this thesis. Again, the approach is comparative in design and methodology, with emphasis on the major powers in Northern Europe and the USA. For reasons explained in chapter four, the Netherlands and Germany after WWI are not included in this chapter. Needless to say, in the age of industrialisation, these states were pioneering both organisational and technological innovations with important bearings for the society of states at large. Thus, a major proposition is that smaller polities had to adapt as best they could to the balance of power and new technology, and that these efforts influenced small states as major powers shaped international relations. Again, state principles as well as preferences are seen here as the main engines in international change, and simultaneously, international change affected the constitutions of domestic societies and state structures. A major challenge to the presentation is the degree of interconnected impulses between the major powers that affected their foreign policies. Thus, a comparative design that proceeds by covering one territory after the other might obscure the degree to which policies in one territory were affected by the policies of the other. Nevertheless, I have chosen to stick to a traditional comparative design in order not to complicate the empirical presentation unnecessarily. In order to show the interconnectedness between states in this era,

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829 The history of British seapower was path-dependent. After Trafalgar, the majority of Britons saw their empire as intimately linked to the Royal Navy. There is little doubt that the Navy had played a major role in creating the empire and protecting it against the challenge from France. However, historians recently have come to doubt the cost-efficiency of the Empire and such a strong navy during Pax Britannica (see Ferguson, 2002; introduction and chapter one for a discussion). The major proposition here is that British politicians and politicians came to see any threat to British naval predominance as a threat against the empire and even the Isles themselves.

830 As Rolf Hobson (2002: 12-13) reminds us, the rapid technological development of the 20th century not only imposed increased financial burdens on states. These burdens in themselves gave incentives for innovations that could produce “a bigger bang for the buck”.

4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

...
Moore stands out, have pointed out, which industrial, land-owning and state elites formed alliances, had profound effects on the political regimes of the 20th century. But so did the international political developments beyond full control of any single state. Industrialisation meant increased productivity, but it also meant that the means for organised violence were industrialised. This happened for all arms of land warfare, at sea, and –ultimately- in the air. At sea, ship construction alone in fifty years “turned the ship of the line which Nelson and even Blake would have recognised into something akin to the ironclad of modern times”. New designs, new propulsion and better guns made production costs immensely much higher than in the wooden world. This was a major alteration of the dynamics of international relations. Likewise, how (and to what degree) states adapted to these changes was to change their societies at large.

We will begin this chapter by analysing British Naval power, Britain still being a prime maritime state at the end of this epoch. Next, we will look into the particular course of German ambitions for maritime influence, before we examine the rise of the US into becoming the major global naval power. Finally, the smaller states in our typology from chapter 2 will be analysed.

4.1 From Pax Britannica to a weakened maritime Empire: Britain and the International Hierarchy 1856-1945

After Trafalgar, the majority of the British social and political elite saw the Royal Navy as the backbone of the Empire. This meant primarily two things.

Firstly, the means of extraterritorial power were prioritised beyond dispute. It was as if it were impossible to question the wisdom of allocating the Navy with the chief task of protecting the empire and the Isles, and this in effect meant that British naval policies was set on one single path after Nelson’s historic victory; the Royal navy had to be the strongest navy in the world. Thus, even well into the 20th century, naval priorities were of chief concern in nearly all matters of British foreign policy; in this respect, British nation building was path-dependent with a clear influence on British foreign policy. Whatever historians writing in the 21st century will have to say about the cost-efficiency of such a mental predisposition, the point is that to the politicians in the Empire, it

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831 Reynolds, 1974: 400-402
832 Kennedy, 1976: 228
833 Howard, 2001: 124-126 gives an elegant summary. Our ambition here is not to tell the history of these changes, but highlight both the reasons and consequences of the change in praxis of extraterritorial violence. However, such an explanation cannot be given without describing some details of what changes actually took place within state navies.
was evident that it rested on naval power. Winston Churchill, for example, in “The World Crisis” characteristically wrote;

“For consider these ships...All our long history built up century after century, all our great affairs in every part of the globe, all the means of livelihood and safety of our faithful, industrious, active population depended upon them...The British Empire would dissolve like a dream; each isolated community struggling forward by itself; the central power of the union broken; mighty provinces, whole empires in themselves, drifting hopelessly out of control, and falling a prey to strangers; and Europe after one sudden convulsion passing into the iron grip and rule of the Teuton”. 835

While pompous, such rhetoric indeed captured a central facet of that unshakable faith that leading politicians had in the role of the navy for the Empire at large.

Even entering WWI was largely a question put in naval terms for British politicians. While Britain had no formal treaty requiring the protection of France in the advent of a German attack, Belgium was different. Ever since the 17th Century, Britain would not permit a great power to seize control of the Low Countries. In order to keep the Channel coasts out of the hands of a potential opponent, Britain had fought Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte! Britain had guaranteed Belgian neutrality, and during the war in 1870, Gladstone sought to verify if Bismarck had understood British commitment to Belgium, which Bismarck indeed had. 836

Secondly, any -even modest- shortcomings of the Royal Navy were perceived as shocking; often provoking public outcry and even war scares. 837
This was evident already at the outset of the period covered here. Contrary to common views of Britain and the British Empire as the almighty sea power till WWII, the fact is that the Crimean war left the British somewhat surprised as of the limitations of the Royal Navy. Perhaps this should not be seen as a surprise given the long period of absence of major wars after the Napoleonic wars, but for a proud maritime power with glorious memories of naval supremacy, the Crimean war was a reminder to the British that there are no free lunches in international politics. John Moore reflects the same sentiment, claiming that "The Royal navy’s showing at the bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882 was woefully incompetent." While such operations undoubtedly gave some incentives for innovations, Kennedy interprets the course of British sea power until 1900 as one of slow but steady relative decline. However, this by now traditional account (notice the similarity to Wallerstein) should not make us project the present into the past. One might indeed question to what degree British military and political power diminished in the period. After all, up till the 1890s there seemed to be no probable challengers to British supremacy. Americans were occupied by civil war and the demands of the following reconstruction. The German Navy was still negligible, and the French navy unimpressive after the defeat to Germany in 1867. The perceptions in Britain changed in the 1880s, due to the ambitious Russian and French, but especially the latter’s, fleet programmes, and the prospect of a French-Russian entente. The perceived weakness of the Mediterranean fleet, in particular, led to the so-called naval defence Act in Parliament in 1889, with its ambitious goal of commissioning 10 new battleships and many smaller vessels. In retrospect, it seems rather clear that Britain overestimated their potential rivals, witness the outcome of the Russian-Japanese encounter in 1904-5, and the weak French performance at Fashoda in 1898. The Royal Navy enforced the global ambitions of the Empire. Yet, here also lay a problem. Was this a productive or self-defeating...
strategy in the long run? The sum of extraterritorial use of power was expensive and diverging the focus of both the army and the Royal Navy. However, the British seemed resolved in their ambitions of extending the Empire; “between 1871 and 1900 Britain added four and a quarter million square miles and sixty-six million people to her Empire”.\textsuperscript{842} Thus, even during the scramble for colonies, Britain came out on top.\textsuperscript{843} At the end of the century, Britain still was the “carrier of the world”, and London held a firm grip upon the global financial market through the insurance and banking firms in the City.\textsuperscript{844} Mahan’s work inspired navalists in Britain, as elsewhere in the major powers, and in Britain to the degree that the perceived connection between sea power and Empire was consolidated.

However, the geopolitical warnings on future competition sounded by Mackinder, did not produce the incentives for a modernisation of British home industry that could have delayed the decline of British hegemony. Thus, Wallerstein indicates that the end of British world hegemony should be dated to the 1870s.\textsuperscript{845} Britain partly compensated the German and American commercial competition by utilising the lead it had through its Empire, but in the long run, this was hardly a substitute for innovation and development. Furthermore, the limits of empire seemed to become more pronounced. The efforts at creating a federation out of the empire met with fierce resistance, particularly from Canada. In a short perspective, however, the Foreign Office, by giving way in the peripheries, managed to focus naval tasks to vital areas in order to best serve the national interest. This amounted to an enormous state activity, both in scope and resources, but it was not "war-making" in the sense that Tilly uses the term. Wallerstein perhaps goes too far in interpreting the decline of the British hegemony as an “inevitable” process to a large degree caused by a diminishing share of world industrial output. British shipbuilding industries were not hit by recession, and then again; sunk costs were immensely valuable to the position of both the Royal navy and the British merchant marine. As Paul Kennedy reminds us, “The Royal navy naturally still benefited from its control of the many overseas bases, of the superb cable communications system, of the near-monopoly of good steaming coals, and from the ultimate support which it and the giant merchant marine gave to each other”.\textsuperscript{846}

The decline of hegemony, according to both Kennedy and Wallerstein, was an incremental, gradual process. Not only the incremental nature of decline, but also the fact that it was a relative

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{842} Kennedy, 1976: 213. Note that the size of the populace seems uncertain. See also Ferguson, 2002: introduction
\item \textsuperscript{843} Lloyd, 1996: chapter 9 discusses the impulses, controversies and inconsistencies in the "Victorian Imperial Enthusiasm", which he dates from 1883 till 1899
\item \textsuperscript{844} Lloyd, 1996: 225-6
\item \textsuperscript{845} Wallerstein, 2000: 253-260
\end{itemize}
phenomenon, seemed to form the perception that British maritime power was as strong as ever by 1914. But the fact is that the period from 1890 till 1914 indeed was an era of “new navalism”; after publication of Mahan’s *Magnus opus* in 1889, ALL the major powers (including Russia and the US) built major navies in this period. What is more, efforts to remain a hegemon during a revolution in military affairs require that the hegemon spends money, enormous amounts of money, in order to keep its position. Building "Castles of Steel" became an organisational and economic challenge to the states at this stage with some equivalence to the building of fortresses that could stand more advanced artillery centuries earlier. The great revolutions in naval technology in the mid-nineteenth century must be said to have been the introductions of steam, the screw propeller, shell guns, rifled ordnance and armour. This development made for "races" in arms and technology, although the scientific studies of such an arms race have yielded divergent results. Steam and screw propellers, once introduced, rendered traditional ships obsolete. The shell gun of a potential enemy had to be met with similar weapons as well as protection of hulls and improved designs. The latter development had an especially profound effect upon the production and utilisation of naval vessels. By 1863, Britain had stopped using wood for ship building entirely. The building of ironclad ships had been a transitory phase, and the introduction of iron hulls changed ship construction to a very significant degree. From now on, naval engineering could produce designs of highly diverse types and functions that had previously been impossible. Considering the solid industrial base of England in the latter part of the 19th century, the industrialisation of extraterritorial violence strengthened British power in the short run, especially compared to France and most other second-rate naval powers. One should also note the advantage of Britain vs. France in the technological breakthrough. Britain was in the position to adopt French innovations in naval engineering (note the dissimilarity here between the British Empire and the US at present. The latter bears the immense costs of research and development on new weapons and –systems to a degree unparalleled in modern history). But one should also be cautious to interpret industrial strength as the sole basis for extraterritorial power. As we will see later in this chapter, the US would soon beat the industrial output of Britain and Germany without fostering the same degree of naval ambitions. In steel production, Germany had bypassed Britain by 1910.

The strategic consequences to a large degree rested upon the new logistical requirements. Extraterritorial bases became of vital interest not only as a means to safeguard imperial

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846 Kennedy, 1976: 226
847 See Hobson, 2002: 26-28
848 See Stoll, 1992: 263-267 for a discussion
849 See also Brodie, 1940 and van Creveld, 1991
850 Hobson, 2002: 28
administration and trade, but also in order to supply (fuel) and maintain the machined ships. In naval tactics, the steam ship had enormous advantages to the sail. Paradoxically, the need to supply fuel meant that the steamships gave further incentives for the major powers to possess overseas naval bases.\footnote{Hobson, 2002; 28-30} While expenditure on these bases was high, the introduction of an industrialised navy also meant that costs increased in replacement of materiel that all too rapidly became obsolete due to the technological race. This trend was obvious during the 1860s, although the developments in the two decades prior to WWI were to dwarf this level of expenses. The development of guns and shells was an especially important factor in this regard, and as a naval historian has pointed out, navies then had to live with “…one of the primary laws of the industrial age – that obsolescence begins at the time a design is made, not at the time the equipment is completed for use”\footnote{Ropp, 1987: 58}. This was a change that affected the state with the pretension of remaining the most powerful naval power in the world. At Trafalgar in 1805, for example, Nelson’s flagship had been 40 years old, without being inferior to the vessels of the opponent.\footnote{Lavery, 1983: 101} At the end of the 19th century, a 40-year old naval ship would be hopelessly outdated.

Rolf Hobson thus has called the British standing of the latter part of the 19th century as one of “relative disadvantage”.\footnote{Hobson, 2002: 32} As technology spread, Hobson argues, Britain repeatedly had to topple its competitors. Whether it was an advantage or the opposite to be the leader in the race of technological innovations is a controversial theme, more so since the cases of international “hegemony” are so few. Richard Stoll, for example, argues contrary to Rolf Hobson on this point, stressing that there was a clear advantage for Britain in “…preferring to let other navies innovate, and then to use its greatly superior resources (including the ability to build ships more quickly than other navies) when other experiments were shown to be successful”.\footnote{Stoll, 1988: 101} This corresponds to my tentative conclusion above. The fact is, that if we compare the ratio of resources spent on research and development to the ability to project sea power at the turn of the century and the following decades, Britain was unrivalled in producing efficient ships in a quantity that no one else could match. However, a brief look at the effects of the competition gives us a clear picture of what the arms- and technology race meant for the British state, in a narrow definition of the state as a monopoly of violence and taxation.

Even this vast empire faced severe challenges in order to finance its extraterritorial means of violence. In 1883, Naval expenditure of the British crown totalled 11 million pounds. Twenty-seven
years later, expenditure for the same purposes had risen to an astonishing 40.4 millions!\textsuperscript{856} To a hegemon, even such challenges might seem inevitable; the price for NOT keeping up is the loss of an old and familiar world, national pride as well as standards of living, material interests as much as the feeling of cultural and political supremacy.\textsuperscript{857} Technologic development fuelled the rise in expenditure, the Dreadnought introduced in 1906 rendering all other first-class battleships in the world obsolete.\textsuperscript{858}

However, the increasingly democratic state had barriers for unlimited militarism, including infinite levels of spending. In a modern mass democracy of a society with distinct class-cleavages, attempts at genuine domestic economic and social improvements were prerequisites for public support. Moreover, the informal empire that Britain had enjoyed in Africa and Asia more or less disappeared in the European scramble for colonies. Either the parts of the “informal empire” had to be abandoned, or made formal. The Empire “won” more territory than its competitors, but the point is that the price was high; forms of direct rule (in various modalities to be sure) became more dominant. Ultimately, the perceived need of outbuilding Germany thus made the British government seek alternative solutions in two previously vital theatres; A Japanese naval alliance and a Caribbean agreement with the United States.\textsuperscript{859} Clearly, such scaling down of ambitions was a reflection of rational calculus. But it also lends evidence to the decline-thesis of British hegemony; that it was a process reflecting the increased military and economic competition. One further attempt at maintaining British Naval hegemony was to engineer leaps in the technological developments. Thus, the \textit{Invincible} class of battle cruisers was meant to outsmart both cruisers and battleships through speed and gunnery. However, the development of effective torpedoes and submarines made deployments of large naval vessels increasingly more risky, especially in the littorals and in the narrow seas. Alas, the hegemon could not simply escape the geopolitical realities of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century by means of naval engineering alone. At the same time, Britain could not escape the logic of a competitive international arena where several paternalist states developed into first-class sea powers. Each new generation of naval vessels were far better than their predecessors. The result of future war to a larger degree than previously was determined by peacetime construction programmes.\textsuperscript{860}

The gap in naval construction speed between Britain and Germany seemed to be closing, or so was

\begin{footnotes}
\item Stoll, 1992: 268
\item Kennedy, 1976: 228
\item Stoll, 1992: 271
\item Modelski and Thompson, 1988: 76
\item Hobson, 2002: 35
\item See van Creveld, 1991
\end{footnotes}
the British perception. Neither should we be totally blinded by the democratic influence on Imperial policy. As always, geographical, but above all cultural, distance mattered a lot in determining the modes of control over the various parts of empire. According to British historians Cain and Hopkins, British paternalism was given new justification in the last decades of the 19th Century by notions of hierarchies of racial classes. Thus, India as a prominent example belonged to a type of country “…whose spiritual and material improvement were to be entrusted to the paternal direction of gentlemanly rulers”.

These sentiments, the propaganda in favour of colonialism (from for example A.T. Mahan) and the enormous resources devoted to the arms race in the period from 1880 till 1914 shows us that the international environment had not changed in the direction of a “democratic peace” or a “culture of Kantian anarchy”, as has been described by contemporary philosophers on the post-cold war world-system. On the contrary, although nationalism had had positive influence in abolishing old regimes and fostering a development towards democracy in many Western European countries, the international arena was filled with mutual suspicions, fear of preventive wars, a lack of international cooperation and information-sharing. Clark Reynolds has described this state of affairs in a way worth reiteration;

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861 Stoll, 1992: 271-272. There have been numerous attempts at quantifying the naval arms race prior to the Great War. Many of these have followed in the footsteps of Richardson, whose work was made famous by Antaol Rapoport some 50 years later.
862 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 285. The same authors (ibid: 293) also note that India attracted an increasing flow of investment from London, which lead them to conclude that India was vital for British investments. This is of course not the same as portraying British imperialism as wholly damaging to the colony. More substantial, perhaps, is that Cain and Hopkins (ibid: 402) sees the traditional explanation of declining British power at the international scene as a result of weakening British industrial vitality as unsatisfactory. The two historians see the other major powers ambitions as reactions to the dominant position held by the Empire, and notes that none of the competitors managed to topple British influence. This undoubtedly adds a nuance to Kennedy and Wallerstein, but it does not refute the central argument here; that British POLITICAL ambitions and windows of opportunities were reduced after the 1880s. Furthermore, and as a comment on the situation after 1914, while Cain and Hopkins (ibid: 405-406) certainly are right in warning against the tendency to read the present into the past, even they must admit that a) Britain had to compete in a much more hostile international environment after 1900, and b) that the US was a much stronger competitor after 1918. This is not to say that British imperialism died after 1914. However, I believe that Cain and Hopkins are perhaps a bit too willing to see British imperialism as TOO long-lasted and vital. What is of interest in a comparative perspective is the changing nature of the British Empire. Cain and Hopkins seem to agree with my central argument; that British paternalism survived well into the 20th century, but on an increasingly fragile material basis. Our assessments of British power nevertheless are different. I cannot but disagree when Cain and Hopkins (ibid: 407) asserts that “Britain was the only true world power of consequence in the 1930s”. The fragility of their assumption is evidenced in the changing balance of extraterritorial power. This is a result of their reliance on an almost exclusive emphasis on the economic aspects of power in international relations (“although there were tense moments of rivalry, the central battle was between economies” (ibid: 449))
“The days of Pax Britannica came to be numbered as rival powers –no longer content to adhere willingly to British rule upon the seas- imitated Britain with their own merchant fleets, colonies and navies. These powers made feeble attempts to perpetuate the old international legalism of the enlightenment with disarmament conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907 and with the Declaration of London in 1909, which aimed at protecting neutral shippers in time of war. But opposition within Britain itself and elsewhere left the Declaration unratified by any nation”.

In the Eurasian landmass, railway made territorial modes of violence more effective. By railway, commerce flourished in new nodes, and most importantly for war making; huge numbers of troops, artillery and logistical support could be transported fast and in relatively secure ways to the battlefields. To some degree, this changed the challenges to extraterritorial violence applied to the European continent. The much-applied British strategy of sending expeditionary forces by sea to project power from (often) peripheral positions at the continent was made a lot more risky. The continental power could counter such expeditions by rapidly transporting and deploying troops by trains. Furthermore, this development meant that it was not only Britain that could send 250000 soldiers 6000 miles from the motherland (over the ocean), as they did to fight the Boers in 1900. By 1904, Russia, by means of railway, could fight the Japanese with the same number of troops in Manchuria. Industrialisation also meant that mass armies could be equipped and sustained in a more efficient way. Thus, the earlier relevance of sea power in the international balance of power was by now modified through improved communications by land. However, this did not significantly reduce the perceived value of sea power and overseas stations. The transition from sail to coal made overseas bases and stations to support fleets ever more important to the great powers. Overseas garrisons seemed to grow, due to the increased mobility of most of the major great powers (i.e. Russia, Germany, Japan, the US, France). Extraterritorial possessions became ever more costly in terms of numbers of troops. With a small professional army engaged largely overseas in the Empire, Britain now had few possibilities to influence continental politics by force.864 Moreover, some military historians have emphasised that the technological development of navies made them even more decisive in future wars. See Hobson, 2002: ch. I for a discussion.
Indeed, the historian T. Lloyd argues that the Boer War ended the era of territorial expansion of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{865} The fact that Britain had to send 250,000 troops, and was still not able to cash in an easy victory, gave second thoughts even to ardent imperialists. The early British setback in the war was something of a shock to a nation used to “splendid little wars” in the colonies. Besides, J.A Hobson wrote “Imperialism” based on his experiences in South Africa, from which he formed a general theory on imperialism that in the words of Lloyd “shaped all subsequent thinking about empire”.\textsuperscript{866} It is an understatement to claim that Hobson’s thesis has been debated, embraced and refuted respectively, but it did cause an increased level of uneasiness in Britain as to the logic of overseas possessions. It also inspired anti-imperialists in America and a certain character known to the world as Lenin. German perceptions were different; in the eyes of the Kaiser, the war demonstrated that Germany had to build a substantial ocean-going navy.\textsuperscript{867} In the short run, the Boer war led to some critical British self-examination, and indirectly to social reforms. The performances of British soldiers convinced some politicians that “an unhealthy and poverty-afflicted nation was a weak nation”.\textsuperscript{868} However, welfare had to be balanced with warfare. In Britain this meant that expenses on pensions and unemployment partly competed with the building and manning of naval ships. From 1909 onwards, when the Admiralty claimed that Britain required more battleships in order to be able to retain command of the sea, the Cabinets repeatedly found themselves in a difficult position. Increased taxation was inevitable when social reform at home and participation in a naval arms race at the international level were pursued simultaneously. To some degree, the Government found it self squeezed between labour and capital as well, witness the rather bitter strikes from 1912 till 1914.\textsuperscript{869} The two-level game was an increasingly complex one for British governments in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

Blockade, as a weapon in crises and war, became a somewhat less effective strategy due to the railway. For Britain, the prospect that her own sea-lines of communications could be vulnerable to an adversary with suitable naval capability, had seemed less credible during the Pax Britannica. Yet, the coming age of submarines and the development of airplanes armed with torpedoes would expose the inherent weakness of even the state with considerable sea power. These innovations, when added

\textsuperscript{865} Lloyd, 1996: 253-255
\textsuperscript{866} Lloyd, 1996: 257
\textsuperscript{867} Moore, 1979: 54
\textsuperscript{868} Lloyd, 1993: 15
\textsuperscript{869} Lloyd, 1993: 47-50
to the industrialisation of British society and its huge increase in population, made Britain much more vulnerable. One should nevertheless avoid the conclusion that British decline was inevitable; Britain and its Empire indeed was the most powerful military and political unit in the world. In some respects, it was also highly technologically advanced and held the lead in communications. An enormous reduction of time-space was made possible through her imperial cable communications network. By this asset, Britain was able to reduce transaction costs by exchanging information faster and more reliably than anyone else. This had obvious economic, strategic and military advantages. Nor was the quantitative strength of the Royal Navy an inaccurate measure of her strength; it was paralleled by quality of men and materiel, compared to her competitors. The French learned this in 1898, when Britain was willing to wage war over the Upper Nile, making Kaiser Wilhelm comment, “The poor French...They have not read their Mahan!” In retrospect, it may seem tempting to see a clear (relative) decline of British maritime strength from 1883 till 1900, as Paul Kennedy has argued strongly. However, the observation given above, that only an enemy alliance of major sea powers (thereby creating a possible equilibrium of forces) could threaten Britain, seems sound. The difference by 1900 was that Britain certainly could not fight alone against an alliance of major powers; while the number of British battleships in 1883 almost equalled the total of all the other sea powers; by 1897 the numbers were 62 (GBR) against 96 (others). This alteration of material extraterritorial power contributed to the end of the foreign policy of “splendid isolation”. Indeed, judged by political influence, it even ended Pax Britannica. Already in 1901, the First Lord, Selborne, in practise argued that Britain simply had to accept that it no longer could go alone in international relations. At this point, Germany, Russia and Japan, and an international liberalist, the US; all were major sea powers. The era of an international order (although weakly institutionalized) to a large degree upheld by a single maritime hegemon, was about to end. The end of Pax Britannica was a result, more than any of the other contributing forces, of an increase in maritime incentives and power on behalf of states that sought extraterritorial possessions, expanded markets and prestige.

The afterthought that the shifts in balance of power brought to British decision-makers, were vital for the coming pattern of alliances. A fascinating question, for example, is why the relationship...
between Britain and the USA (paternalism-liberalism) did not turn into open enmity, while Germany became the enemy of both. We will return to the German and US positions, but in the case of Britain, it seems clear that a number of considerations pointed towards the evolution of a relatively benign relationship with the US.

Strategically, Canada would be difficult, not to say impossible to defend. In addition, the US war against Spain created enthusiasm for naval power to a degree not paralleled in the previous history of the republic. By 1905, the US had twelve modern battleships and was building another twelve. For Britain, given her interests in its adjacent waters, in Europe and in parts of the Empire in the southern hemisphere, projecting power against North America by now seemed impossible and undesired.874

Financially, a major conflict between the US and Britain would be a disaster for both sides. British Admiral Philip Colomb indeed had argued this already in 1880. The trade competition had made Britain immensely dependent upon imports not only of raw materials, but on food supplies as well. Colomb concluded in 1881 that war with the USA had become a “practical impossibility”.875

Politically, British decision-makers increasingly began to see the USA as a potential ally once they acknowledged the limits of British global power. And finally, culturally (if not exactly ideologically), the two Anglo-Saxon powers had more in common than they had with any of the other major powers. Thus, for the differences at the ideological level, the potential for painting reciprocal pictures of the other Anglo-Saxon power as an enemy, was limited. The outcome was an effort at graceful withdrawal, avoidance of a (so it was thought) war it probably would not win, and in the process, hopefully, winning the lasting friendship of a new major power.876

This policy of "appeasement", evidenced over the canal question and the Alaskan boundary, faced with American expansion, was in fact not resented in Britain. Both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty were pro-American and eager to get rid of a political and strategic inheritance that to some degree was seen as somewhat embarrassing or improper applied to the northern hemisphere.

British perceptions of Germany were different. Increasingly, perceptions among the British elite of paternalist Germany changed for the worse. While the Admiralty did not produce war plans for a potential outbreak of hostilities with the US, such courses of action seemed more likely in the Far East, where the commercial interests of the Empire were perceived to be threatened by France,

873 Kennedy, 1976: 249
874 Reynolds, 1974: 426-428
875 See Hobson, 2002: 89
876 Reynolds, 1974: 427
Germany and Russia. To preserve the “independence” of China seemed futile faced with landwards expansion from Russia via Siberia, and from France via Indo-China. Even more disturbing to the British identity was that the balance of naval power in this region had swung decisively in favour of the Franco-Russian alliance. Again, the Admiralty actually contemplated alliance with a major sea power in the region, resulting in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, signed 30 January 1902. However, the British Government saw the applicability of the alliance as strictly limited to the East. In other words, it was not designed in order to counter Germany and be able to give support to the French in Europe, a development that came later. Also in contrast to later wars of propaganda, the scaling down of British ambitions was not made into major domestic issues. Nevertheless, it was evident to British decision-makers that German naval ambitions would accentuate the imperative to pay closer attention to European waters if Germany would become a "threat" to the national security of the isles.

In particular, as we will see later, the Tirpitz idea from 1897 that Germany only could achieve her genuine political freedom by creating a force of battleships stationed in the North Sea, was deemed with some anxiety in the British Admiralty. The Admiralty raised the first warning in the Cabinet of the possibility that German naval ambitions could be aimed at Britain, in 1902. To uphold global, imperial ambitions, to counter US and Franco-Russian influence and an arms-race with Germany simultaneously was too much; the time had come for prioritising, witness the British military transformation from 1907. The new naval base in the Firth of Forth and the increase of the Home Fleet were generally perceived as responses to the German naval build-up. Under Fisher, furthermore, the Royal Navy was drastically transformed. It was a naval revision based on one sole strategic imperative; strength in home waters. The Japanese 1905 victory only made the withdrawal of five battleships from the Far East to the Channel Fleet seem even more sensible. The general argument in favour of a new disposition was given already in the so-called Cawdor memorandum from 1905; “...The kaleidoscopic nature of international relations, as well as the variations or new developments in Sea power, not only forbids any permanent allocation of numbers, but in fact points the necessity for periodic redistribution of ships between our fleets to meet the political requirements of the moment”

The re-organisation simply reflected a new perception of the balance of power, much to the dissatisfaction of local naval officers and the dominions. This criticism eventually led to the

877 Kennedy, 1976: 253. See also Moore, 1979: 72-75 for the impact this alliance had in the US.
878 Kennedy, 1976: 255
879 Moore, 1979: 59-61
880 Cited in Kennedy, 1976: 260
Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, followed by “national” navies of territories like Australia. More spectacular still was that the abandonment of less useful ships made the new Dreadnought class possible. With its strength, firepower and speed, it more or less made all other battleships obsolete.\footnote{Reynolds, 1974: 411-413, Howard, 2001: 124-125. The most colourful account is given by Massie, 1991} In addition, the Anglo-French \textit{entente} was improved in the years following the first Moroccan crisis. Eventually, this (together with Tirpitz’s supplementary Naval Law of 1912) would allow for an even more concentrated naval defence of British “home waters”. Not only German, but also Italian naval ambitions and the creation of an Austro-Hungarian navy of \textit{Dreadnought} battleships were used to justify this policy. This also led to the naval agreement between Britain and France, which facilitated British interests in the Mediterranean. Thus, the Admiralty ultimately withdrew all but a few battleships stationed at Malta from the Mediterranean to the home fleet. Part of the agreement was that the Royal Navy should protect both sides of the Channel. Although British politicians later could claim that this was not a legal obligation to protect France, it nevertheless was seen as a moral duty to help protect her northern coastline by 1914. Indeed, Grey warned already in 1906 that British opinion could make it impossible for Britain to stay neutral in the case of a Franco-German war. Still, one should not underestimate the delicate balance facing British cabinets trying to make ends meet in budgetary terms, gain domestic support for policy, and simultaneously assessing and acting on the international scene. The Naval Arms race and the perceived costs due to technological improvements gravely influenced British politics. The belief that the Empire rested on the Royal Navy seemed ingrained in the British national character to a degree that made even slight naval improvements in other countries seem threatening. From 1909 and onwards, the Liberals saw no other alternatives than introducing higher taxation. The constitutional crisis of 1909-11 was a result of this.\footnote{Cain and Hopkins, 2001: 198} What naval priorities really mattered in British domestic politics by 1912, however, was the reduced presence in the Mediterranean. Yet the withdrawal of vessels from the Mediterranean was also facilitated by another move in the relationship between France and Britain. Although no formal treaty was signed, France in effect transferred its fleet to the Mediterranean the same year (see above). Had it not been for German ambitions, Britain could have prioritised differently. But, alas, this remains a counterfactual hypothesis. Facts were that the Royal Navy and the means to secure extraterritorial sovereignty ended up where they had emerged centuries earlier, as a result of German ambitions. Churchill stated it flatly to the English Parliament that Britain was building ships against one power alone; Germany.\footnote{Kennedy, 1976: 272} Thus, in spite of a Royal navy unprecedented in strength, all –or practically all- efforts
were centred on the, in Paul Kennedy’s words, expected Armageddon in the North Sea. The Nemesis of Tirpitz was that he had never expected that Britain would temporarily “abandon” her overseas interests in such a way. Thus, the British isolation from the continent was also abandoned. To see another European power threaten the maritime hegemony would ensure that Britain would live at the mercy of a not necessarily benign competitor. Being an open economy and an island territory, this could imply a threat to the survival of the isles, or so at least Britons perceived it. Perceptions both on international relations and individual states mattered. As we will see in 5.2, German leaders in no way wanted a war with Britain. What they underestimate was the way in which Britons evaluated extraterritorial power. Britain reacted decisively and perhaps in an exaggerated manner against any attempts by a major European power to create another formidable seapower in Europe, but she acted true to her foreign policy habitus.

In sum, the period from 1856 till 1914 did not only signal vast organisational and technological changes in extraterritorial violence. In this respect, the most significant changes of them all occurred between 1897/98 and 1914, but the main change at the international level was that Pax Britannica had ceased to exist by 1914. This was a result of the steady relative decline of the British maritime and economic hegemony at the international arena.

Indeed, the dominant picture of WW I is that of trench warfare, where new machines and modes of violence, increased strategic mobility and efficient munitions were the crucial factors in the destruction of millions of young lives. The conscription of a generation of men and the economic strain on the British state in order to wage war was a dramatic shift from the 19th century British foreign policy. Britain perceived a German domination of North-western Europe as unbearable. The Royal Navy made dispositions in order to fight an enormous “New Trafalgar”, presumably in the North Sea, where it was confident that it would defeat the German main fleet. In addition, the Navy was convinced that it would apply blockade and commercial warfare against Germany in order to cripple Germany’s will and ability to fight. Again, history was applied to conjure up how a future war should be fought. Except from some success at blockade, the other two calculations simply did not materialise. Geographical factors greatly contributed to the only partly successful blockade strategy. For Britain, the war could only be won at the battlefield, but it had to be secured on the oceans. Germany was never able to break British dominance in the crucial sea lines of

884 See also Massie, 2003
885 This basis for the casus belli on behalf of Britain was stated clearly by Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey in parliament on August 3 1914. In his speech Grey stressed explicitly the national interests of Britain, not on abstract ideas.
communications in Western Europe (although it was close in 1917, but ironically by means of the
U-boat, a weapon that traditionalist European naval officers a few years earlier had dismissed
entirely). Germany could never gain superiority neither numerically nor in firepower against the
strategy applied by the Admiralty. The balance tilted even more in favour of the Royal navy during
the war. Thus, Britain could apply a defensive position and apply the old weapon of (at this stage
distant) blockade against Germany while simultaneously protecting her trade with the dominions.
Germany would lose either she chose an offensive (which she by all calculations was likely to lose),
or a defensive (in which her fleet could be preserved, while her economy was badly damaged). Both
actors played according to the mini-max strategy envisaged in game theory; a stalemate was the
conclusion. For British naval officers and opinion, this defensive position was hard to swallow, but
the new technologies of submarines and improved mines made the calculations seem right (causing
indignation by conservative Britons, to whom this invention seemed a total breach with Nelsonian
tactics). On the u-boat, Admiral Wilson declared that it was “underhand, unfair, and damned
unEnglish”887. In fact, the perceived threat from German u-boats made the Royal navy even more
careful during the war. The Battle of Jutland thus was the only full-scale fleet encounter of the war,
which only outcome (in strategic terms) was to confirm the naval stalemate in northern waters.
The really significant change in the logic of extraterritorial means of violence during WW I was the
use of submarines aimed at the sea lines of communications, deeply threatening supplies from
overseas. One should note, however, that both the fear of making the US enter the war as well as
moral qualms made the German leadership hesitate for years before conducting “unrestricted”888
submarine warfare. The British response ultimately was the old defensive weapon of convoying. But
an astonishing eight millions tons of merchant shipping had been lost due to u-boats at the end of the
war.889 This primarily had two intimately interconnected consequences.

Firstly, the British merchant navy was dealt a severe blow, from which it would take immense
resources to recover, which in itself meant a weakening of British maritime power. Included in the
equation one should add the severe financial and industrial losses to the Empire. The modern war of
attrition did simply not produce a boost in the economy, as had the Napoleonic wars. Indeed, the

886 “…a regiment of field guns could in 1914 deliver on to a target area of a few hundred square yards more
destructive power in an hour than had been fired by all guns on both sides in the whole course of the Napoleonic
wars. All this could be done by conscripts after a few months’ training”, Howard, 2001: 120-121
887 Cited in Kennedy, 1976: 290. See also Massie, 2003 for an assessment of the somewhat conservative attitude
towards new weapons found in the officer corps of the Royal Navy, but above all; Gordon, 2000
888 The term “unrestricted” submarine warfare is, in a literal sense, somewhat misleading.
889 One should note that this is an amount almost impossible to comprehend. Compare for example with the TOTAL
losses of merchant tonnage among ALL the allies during the Battle of the Atlantic during WW II: they amounted to
loss of a young generation hurt Britain as it hurt the other major European powers. But in terms of assessing candidates for maritime hegemony, the most apt comparison is that between Britain and the US. The USA appeared in a much more healthy condition after the war than any of the European major states. In this respect, the difference between 1914 and 1918 is astonishing.

Secondly, it became clear that British naval mastery would NEVER regain strength similar to earlier times. Since the required number of merchant ships and convoys was so high, Britain would never again be able to protect overseas transports alone at a sufficient level; she could simply not produce the required number of destroyers. Only the new industrial giant, the US, could replace destroyers and merchantmen fast enough to do so. The industrial and financial strain on Britain resulting from the war effort was unprecedented. We have previously mentioned that even after the naval arms race had begun, allocations for the Royal Navy amounted to less than 40 million pounds per year by 1910. In the two last years of WWI, however, Britain spent the same sum of money continually in less than six days throughout the rest of the war. By 1917, the total British expenditure on the war was seven million pounds PER DAY! Naturally, an increase in taxes (and an increase there certainly was) could never sustain this effort alone. The result was that the British National Debt increased from 650 million pounds in 1914 to 7435 million pounds by 1920. Simultaneously, replacing lost u-boats was comparatively speaking much easier, as indeed demonstrated by Germany during the war. To some extent, then, both Germany and her main adversary had underestimated the role of the u-boats. On the other hand, the surrender of the German High Sea Fleet in November 1918 did not feel like a clear victory to the Royal Navy. For patriotic Britons, the naval war of 1914-1918 seemed something of an anticlimax. Sinking the German U-boats at Scapa Flow could not hinder that the Royal Navy had lost prestige (in particular the large battleships), and that prospects for a war in the future would have to include new modalities for protecting sea-lines of communication. On the other hand, the weapon of blockade against German supplies had proven less efficient than British staff officers had assumed prior to the war. Germany was not an island. Only 20 per cent of her exports were extra-European. The loss of 6-8 per cent of her national income was not a total disaster, especially when the central powers could take in possession vast resources in Central and

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890 See Kennedy, 1976: 308
891 Neither Britain nor France could enjoy a substantial naval spoil of war after WWI. All Allied powers agreed that the entire German submarine fleet should be surrendered (to the allies) after the war. The English and, in particular, French, governments also wanted to take over the majority of the German surface vessels. All the German surface ships were thus interned at Scapa Flow in 1918. On June 20 1919, the Allied Naval Council authorised seizure of the interned German ships at the moment the armistice was to expire (7:00 PM on June 23). The German Admiral Reuter, unaware of the deadline and without any written orders, ordered the entire fleet sunk peacefully in Scapa Flow. Unfortunately (for the Germans, and perhaps also for the future of Europe), this act nevertheless had an infuriating effect on British and French public opinion. As punishment, Germany was forced “to deliver practically everything still afloat in her silent harbours”, Potter, 1981: 231-2
Eastern Europe (For example Rumanian wheat and oil). Here, again, the vitality of railway transportation had changed the strategic environment somewhat since the Napoleonic wars. Furthermore, one German lesson was that the breakdown in Russia made Ukrainian goods available in Central Europe, thus relieving Austria and Germany. Controlling the “heartland”, as described by Mackinder, was just as vital as controlling the sea-lanes to the continental powers. Only in the Mediterranean did the Royal Navy apply the offensive with success. This strengthened the British hold on Egypt and the Suez Canal, but it also tied up as many as 750000 Empire troops.

Furthermore, it did not alter the gloomy psychological effects of the war, perhaps one of the main lasting effects of WW I, and one that would influence British foreign policy for decades. What is more, by 1918 the US had taken over several of the traditional British markets, and had replaced Britain as the most significant creditor nation on the globe. In addition, the strategic position of the Empire had been drastically altered in 20 years: Britain came out of the war much more dependent upon her allies, mainly the US, and for a period, Japan. Thus, Britain’s position partly rested on the attitudes of the political leadership in these allied countries. In the short run (to which we will return), there were definite limits as to the US sympathy for the Empire. Thus, the incredible US naval build-up came at the worst possible time for Britain; when her debt was enormous and her fleet had already come to be seen as technically outdated. In the words of Liddell Hart, victory in the true sense means that one emerges from the war in a better position than one held at the outset. By this definition, Britain had no true victory in 1918. In the longer run, this naturally had implications for the Empire; if Britain no longer was superior at extraterritorial power-projection, how could London assume the chief responsibility for Imperial foreign policy? Indeed, the very concept of the Empire was changed by the international equilibrium following WW I. While the victorious determined that Germany was to lose all her colonies after the war, it did not seem “proper” that these were to be annexed by the Allies. Thus followed the principle that these areas were to be held “under mandates from the League of Nations, and that countries administering them should be responsible to the League”. Formal imperialism was not compatible with the ideology of the liberalist US. While historians Cain and Hopkins argue that the mandates held by Britain were “colonies in camouflage”, thus circumventing US principles, this nevertheless does not refute the argument of a changing nature of imperialism. Indirect rule became the preferred mode of control, India serving as an experience. Furthermore, what remained of the British Empire (which was by

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892 Kennedy, 1976: 300-301
893 The point here is that the British naval “victory” should be interpreted in a somewhat more nuanced way than some historians have been prone to. See for example Reynolds, 1974: 471
894 Kennedy, 1976: 306
895 Lloyd, 1996: 279
now increasingly called the Commonwealth) also changed on the crucial centre-periphery dimension within the Empire. The Dominions gained increased leverage in their relationship to London. One example of this was the fact that mandates given the Empire were to be administered by dominions. Thus, Australia was given parts of New Guinea, New Zealand was handed Samoa, and South Africa German South-West Africa. Secondly, there had been an upsurge of nationalism in the dominions, accompanied by the lessened economic and industrial dependency on England. The international institution of the League of Nations, however fragile, gave legitimacy to the claim that dominions were entities - polities, on their own. Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India (though not a self-governed territorial state) all became members of the League of Nations. Ultimately, domestic changes in Britain itself accounted for the more wary approach to outright imperialism. Almost complete adult suffrage raised barriers to imperial policies. Democracy was not compatible with formal imperialism. The twin processes of domestic democratic development and attempts at civilising the relations between states at the international level made compromise a necessity in the British Empire; witness the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921. The paternalist sentiment in British foreign policy nevertheless survived through the notion of trusteeship. As Cain and Hopkins observe;

“...By claiming to promote both progress and conservation, Britain’s version of trusteeship offered a vision of an international system which could compete with the appeal of Bolshevism and fascism. Although the world order envisaged by the British was neither democratic nor populist, the script for the civilising mission emphasised the merits of a multi-ethnic enterprise united in its diversity by long chains of loyalty which led ultimately to the imperial monarch”.

In the immediate perspective, the Empire was extended; witness the mandates for Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan. With this extension, however, seeds of trouble were planted within the empire that was to become troublesome to cope with for London later in the century.

Nevertheless, the economic situation following the war, the defeat of Germany and the absence of enemies meant that the Royal Navy was scaled down in the 1920s. Furthermore, the economy was

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896 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 574
897 See also Lloyd, 1993: 94-96
898 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 591
899 By February 1947, Britain referred the mandate for Palestine to the UN. The British mandate came to an end in 1948, but the Arabs eventually blamed England and the US for the creation of Israel, while at the same time did not feel particularly grateful to England.
Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

not really recovering to pre-war standards in the interwar years. Britain’s share of world trade fell from 14.15 per cent in 1914 to 9.8 per cent in 1937. The downward trend was somewhat masked by increased domestic consumption and preference for trade within the still existing Empire, as well as exports to smaller countries dependent on British manufacture. Alas, this only postponed the industrial and financial re-structuring that Britain needed badly. The actual naval allocations shrunk from 356 million pounds in 1918-19 till 52 million pounds in 1923. This meant that the British version of a paternalist policy of mare clausum, often dressed in the rhetoric of free-trade liberalism, did not influence the world scene to anything resembling the degree Pax Britannica had. The US did little to conceal its demands for the freedom of the seas in the negotiations after the war. Thus, changes in the balance of power meant that the international institutions of maritime sovereignty were also altered since the dominant maritime nation simply had other principles and preferences. This was evidenced in the Washington Conference for naval disarmament, whose main architect was President Harding, under pressure from his domestic economy-minded circles. The outcome of the Conference initiated by the international liberalist was a 10-year stop in all naval building programs, and definite limits to the total size of state navies. The main target for the Americans (Germany’s Navy already having been crippled), was the alliance between paternalist Britons and Japan. In practise, the outcome was a Treaty between The US, Britain, France and Japan to respect the possessions of each state in the pacific and the Far East, plus some provisions on the forbidding of fortifications in these theatres. This treaty demonstrated the degree to which Britain was dethroned from the role of being the maritime hegemon. The US more or less imposed its will. In spite of fierce protests from the British Admiralty, the British government simply accepted the terms. Paul Kennedy ascribes this new British flexibility to several factors. Partly it was a matter of domestic reluctance to navalism, in part it resulted from the pressure on the economy, and partly the dominions (Canada and South Africa in particular) pressed for as smooth relations with the US as possible. Above all, Britain could no longer compete for Naval superiority. Neither materially nor ideologically did the US make for a suitable rival in an arms race. One thing, or so argued British politicians, had been to extract tremendous resources from the Isles and the Empire in order to defeat Germany. To extract even more resources from society in order to compete with the US would be quite another matter. In a period of relative tranquillity, the main naval disputes at the international scene were the disagreements between the international liberalist and the major

900 Kennedy, 1976: 317
901 Kennedy, 1976: 323
902 See Moore, 1979:92-93
903 Potter, 1981: 234
904 Kennedy, 1976: 326-327
paternalist. And US policy was consistent towards Britain; at the 1930 London Naval Conference, the British Labour Government accepted the American demand that Britain build no more than a total of fifty cruisers.905

In the field of military technology, the most spectacular novelty was perceived to be air power. How, and to what extent, the use of airplanes as platforms would affect strategy remained a controversial issue throughout the interwar period. For navalists, it also meant another service to compete with for resources in peacetime (The Royal Air Force came into being as an independent service by 1918), and a competing means in the pursuit of strategic ends. Firstly, the advent of airplanes armed with bombs and torpedoes could be seen as rendering battleships highly vulnerable, if not useless (an extreme stance, of course). Secondly, air power was advocated as a strategic deterrent. In this respect, air power came to be seen as the new extraterritorial means of violence. Instead of costly amphibious operations and expeditionary corpses to the continent, Britain through air power, or so it was thought, could strike at the heart of enemy motherlands. This would save British soldiers from dying in trench warfare, it would save money, and it had the potential of swift action – a characteristic that would also increase the value of it as a deterrent. At the very least, one must admit that the prospects for breakthroughs in military technology made politicians postpone decisions on modernisation out of fear that progress might render new platforms obsolete before they could be put to use. Only in 1932 was a process of reassessment under way. By then the Empire “had lost its muscle”.906 The Royal Navy was a latecomer when it came to one of the novel machines of extraterritorial power-projection; the aircraft carrier. The British policy of appeasement in foreign policy was thus not only a result of wishful thinking and horror at the prospect of war with Germany; it was also a bid for time. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria and the Italian war in Abyssinia only worsened Britain’s strategic position.907 The difference from the policies of 1902-7 was that the adversaries this time was even less prone at signing treaties or agreements acceptable to Britain. Besides, as Paul Kennedy has pointed out; “At the same time, Britain’s only potential allies remained a decaying France, together with New Zealand and possibly Australia; even Canada and South Africa were uncertain friends by the time of Munich”.908

The Royal Navy was overstretched even in European and Atlantic waters. Worse still, even the maritime threat posed by Germany and Italy in these regions seemed no graver than the threat posed by the enormous Japanese build-up. The entire Royal navy, if concentrated, would in fact have an

905 See Potter, 1981: 234-235
906 Ibid: 336
907 Moore, 1979: 102-108
enormous challenge in encountering the fleet of Japan in battle.909 Moreover, sea and air power at this point had become interconnected.

And the rest is history. So many libraries are crammed with books on WW II and the naval struggles involved, that an attempt at repeating or synthesising these dramatic processes seems unnecessary. Constitutionally, it was a fight over which regimes modern states ought to have. Materially, it weakened the states of Western Europe, and made the US comparatively much stronger. As for the former, Philip Bobbitt to some degree is right that the question remained unsettled till the break-up of the USSR in 1990.910 Concerning the latter, however, an unintended consequence of WWII undoubtedly was US hegemony in the non-communist world, laying the foundations for a post-1990 Pax Americana. We will return to this in the next chapter, but we should summarise quite briefly the main implications of WW II for Britain.

Firstly, although the extraterritorial power and pride of Britain emerged as, both quantitatively and qualitatively speaking, magnificent in 1945, the enormous machinery of the new western hegemon dwarfed the military power of Britain. By 1945, it was an understatement to conclude that the British Empire never again would become equal to the US, unless the latter in some mysterious way should disintegrate or be defeated in a total war. The fact is that British sea power helped the allied win the war by keeping the sea lines of communication open, yet this very contribution was a defensive one. The days were gone when the Royal Navy could claim command of the sea.911 Moreover, any use of fleets overseas in crisis and war now would require substantial aerial support, evidenced by the operations in Crete and Norway. During the invasion in 1944 -operation Overlord- air superiority was vital, tactical support to the ground was decisive, and the destruction of communication facilities by bombers much more significant than what the Navy could contribute. What is more, aircraft could, through the use of torpedoes and bombs, be a cost-effective weapon against both convoys and regular battleships. The aircraft carrier was a new platform, but it was a platform designed for air power. On the other hand, scholars of sea power will not hesitate in arguing that such platforms, and even any amphibious landing, are doomed unless one has sea control. It thus follows that the almost invisible role of sea power is as vital as ever. Thus, a kind of hybrid form of warfare had developed that changed the outlook of extraterritorial violence. Britain

908 Kennedy, 1976: 345
909 Kennedy, 1976: 347
910 Bobbitt, 2002. His insight that the Thirty years War only in retrospect seems like ONE war, is of course to the point. There is some inclination towards teleology and determinism in his general account, however insightful his tour de force of world history undoubtedly is.
was not the leader in this kind of warfare, and the costs associated with large carrier groups would ensure that even major powers would have limited possibilities to build and man such large platforms with all their required material and manpower.

Secondly, the material basis of the Empire as the dominant power in the world was shattered. Thus, according to Paul Kennedy; “In the second quarter of 1942 American military output caught up with the British; by the end of 1943, her production of aircraft was double, her launchings of merchant vessels six times, that of Britain; and by 1944 her overall armaments production was six times as large”

Only the US had the industrial and scientific capacity to develop the ultimate weapon that came out of WWII. Even more impressive; the US war efforts never strained her finances as was the case with Britain and Germany. By 1943, 63 per cent of the German GNP was military expenditure, the British figures corresponded to this, while US figures never rose above 43 per cent. It is true that the US had to fight a bitter war in the Pacific. But it is also true that the US motherland came out with an undamaged (in many ways improved) infrastructure, a superior economic position in the world-system, and the ability to utilise the “fire of the gods” to use Kissinger’s words; The Bomb. On the financial side, the war struck Britain decisively. Already by the end of 1940, munitions orders to the US totalled 10.000 million dollars. The terrible financial situation made the Congress pass the Lend-Lease act in 1941. This was seen as a grandiose act when it came, but some sixty years later it is open to a more critical assessment, to be sure. Firstly, the act was seen as an effort to secure America. Economically and strategically, the fall of Britain would have been a catastrophe for the US. Secondly, the USA set the conditions for the help. This primarily meant that Washington controlled the gold and dollar reserves of Britain. It also meant that the US practically did not import any British-made products. In the words of historian A.J.P Taylor, Britain sacrificed her post-war future for the sake of the world. This is a benign interpretation of the sacrifice of Britain. The governments of both states had few viable alternatives, given their position. There is no reason to doubt that the relative strength of both polities was highly affected by the agreement. But that a favourable outcome for the US was not the primary intended consequence of the Roosevelt administration. Rather, it was a compromise between the “internationalist” and “isolationist” camps in the US at the time. To contemporary critics of “imperial USA”, it might be useful to remind of the fierce resistance the Lend lease agreement met among isolationist Americans. David Kennedy has done much to illuminate this resistance; “Roosevelt’s onetime progressive ally Montana senator

[^911]: Reynolds, 1974: 542, 545-547 aptly illustrates this.
[^912]: Kennedy, 1976: 369
Burton Wheeler, now the implacable adversary in foreign policy, charged that the Lend-Lease legislation was the New Deals “Triple-A foreign policy: it will plough under every fourth American boy”.914

To counter the criticism from the isolationist camp, Roosevelt sought a design that would lead to the perceived conclusion that Britain had expanded all its dollar reserves before receiving American aid.915 Even so, the isolationists had the strength to attach a series of amendments to the Lend-Lease bill.

Thirdly, and intimately linked to the argument directly above, the US in effect undid the logic of the British Empire that had prevailed until WW II. In spite of all other portraits of F.D. Roosevelt and his administration, this is the brute fact. This was evidenced in the long-term policies that were being planned in Washington (see below). The US simply wished to break up the trading blocs that had hampered her exports. She wanted to gain access to raw materials around the globe; in one single phrase – she wanted international liberalism. And fundamentally, this sort of liberalism was American. But hegemony must be secured and codified through agreements. In practise, this meant terminating the Sterling Bloc and the systems of imperial preference established in 1932. Most significant of all to US policymakers, the entire system of European colonies should be demolished. This was in line, of course, with the ideology of international liberalism. It was also expedient for American economic hegemony. In the words of Paul Kennedy, this meant that the US demanded “a full freedom for their own firms to secure the oil of the Middle East, the rubber and tin of Malaya, and the markets of India and the colonies – at the same time ensuring that American raw materials, tariffs and spheres of influence (especially Latin America) would not be tampered with by the allies from whom she was demanding so much. Hence the constant insistence, in the Atlantic Charter, the 1942 Lend Lease agreement and elsewhere, upon “access to the trade and raw materials of the world”, the frequent collisions with London over control of the oilfields of the Gulf

913 Taylor, 1965: 513-514
914 David Kennedy, 1999: 472-473.
915 As David Kennedy (ibid: 466) notes, ”It was no easy thing for Americans accustomed to thinking of Britain as the saggering master of a global empire now to believe the assertions of British bankruptcy”. FDR in a meeting with American journalists on December 17 1940 applied a simplistic metaphor to convince the public opinion of the moral obligation to help Britain ”If a neighbor`s house was on fire and he needed your garden hose to put it out, you would`nt haggle about the prize; you would loan him the hose, and he would return it when the blaze was extinguished” (ibid: 468). At this point, FDR was also explicit in stating that the US expected a refund from britain after the war.
In turn, the weakened economic position of paternalist Britain would make her less able to resist the new rules of the game imposed by the new hegemon after the war. All these principles were to have specific bearings on ocean politics and international institutions concerning maritime matters. For Britain, these norms and the loosening of bonds between territories of the Empire as a result of the war, in effect meant that it was assumed to behave differently. By 1945, the traditional Imperial Idea was definitely dead. This was a remarkable alteration of international politics that to some degree has been downplayed in IR literature. Involved in the process of changing the relationship between big powers and small states in the world-system obviously were the ideas envisaged in the League of Nations and later, the United Nations (we will return to the latter). It is also quite clear that these ideas primarily came from, and was defended by the US. To claim that the USA had an interest in forging these institutions is not denying that American Idealism actually changed international relations and the constitution of polities. But this also had profound consequences for nearly all other polities. Indeed, new polities were created out of the dismantling of the empires in the wake of WWI. Although Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are not examined here, it is almost impossible to over-estimate the domestic and international effects of the altering of ideational principles in the western world. These changes have been described and explained in detail elsewhere, so that only a brief summary is sufficient to underline the argument above. The Balfour declaration of 1926 formally established the “equality of the members of the Commonwealth”. But this was not primarily a result of Britain wanting to tie the dominions as close as possible to the Commonwealth. On the contrary, it seems fair to claim, as historian T.O. Lloyd does, that it was a result of the desires of the dominions to define their positions in constitutional terms, to codify their new international status. This process was carried further by the revised Statue of Westminster in 1931 where, for all practical purposes, Dominion parliaments were given as much control “over

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917 This is not to claim that nationalism in the colonies and dominions was a novel feature in 1945. Lloyd, 1996: 230-236, for example, shows how Indian nationalism gained momentum from the 1880s.
918 Again, this might due to the way established IR theories have narrowed the empirical study of state relations. To neorealists, the system was and remains to be anarchic, to neoliberal institutionalists, international relations more or less continued to be seen as structured through international regimes. See Wæver, 1999: 47-88 and Wæver, 1992
919 Lloyd, 1996:293. The United Kingdom and the Dominions were ”autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations” (Quoted in Lloyd, 1996: 299
their own constitutions as they wanted to take”.920 Until 1945, however, large parts of the Empire, as India, were still under tight British control. By 1950, these territories too, were well on the path to national independence; exit extraterritorial possessions of a distant motherland. WW II had accelerated the tendencies already evident in the 1920s and 30 towards a loosening of imperial ties. We do not need to go into detail about the developments in India, the Pacific or the Far East. It is sufficient to point out that Britain emerged as a much more limited power after the establishment of the UN and the Bretton-Woods system. Furthermore, although the UN was not formally more committed to ending imperialism than had been the League, overseas empire as a predominantly western endeavour, was deemed as improper by 1945.921 This primarily applied to the relations between territories divided by salt water. Any wide-ranging claims to paternalism overseas from Northern Europe were to face severe resistance at the international level. In the final analysis, however, the paternalist and mare clausum inclination of Britain was to prevail for decades to come.

4.2 The rise and fall of a continental sea power; Germany

As covered in a previous chapter, “Germany” exhibited few naval ambitions until the 1850s.922 The crucial dimension to be studied in this section is the genesis of such ambitions, to what degree they were connected to German foreign policy habitus, and how the outcome in the form of a maritime policy influenced international relations; all deemed by most scholars to be highly significant923 for the history of the 20th Century. Emphasis will be put on the history of the German Empire until the defeat in 1918, since we in our typology have not included the Wimar Republic or the third Reich.

The fact that Germany was a young state, and in particular a young naval power, also necessitates a somewhat different approach to the German case than to that followed above on England. In chapters two and three, the ideological genesis and sinews of British sea power have already been highlighted. Thus, a rather materialist analysis might be deemed as sufficient to explain the dominant domestic impetus for sea power in England in the industrial age, since the culture of British national security changed little during the 19th century. The German case is different, and one might argue, more similar to the US, in some respects. Germany had no such naval traditions and –experiences, as did Britain. In terms of quantity, the German trajectory of sea power in the 19th and 20th century started near zero. This makes Germany all the more fascinating; what shaped the

920 Lloyd, 1996: 293
921 Colonies in 1918 were "out of fashion", in the words of Lloyd, 1993: 94
922 For an overview, see Sondhaus, 1997: ch.1
particular content and form of German imperialism, and particularly sea power? Was this a
development fostered by imitating the Empire, or did the German Sea Power take its own peculiar
direction? In order to address these questions, I believe it is imperative to look much deeper into the
ideological impetus in Germany that helped it develop into a considerable sea power. The question
is not so much that these ideas originated in Germany than how ideologies of extraterritorial power
were interpreted in this continental power. Therefore, I will seek to address the development of
naval thought in Germany from the latter half of the 19th century in a more detailed fashion than for
England during the same period, we will therefore look much more into the innen side of the
equation in the following.

4.2.1 Early developments in German naval thought

In structural terms, German and North American sea power shared some fascinating common
ground. While Britain had, and relied upon, long naval traditions, the newer large power had no such
reservoir of experience, and the war with Denmark in 1848 had all too clearly demonstrated this in
the case of Germany. In the case of Germany is illustrative, the historian Lawrence Sondhaus points
out that; "And because the Danish blockade became a symbol of the impotence of a divided
Germany the creation of a German navy went hand in hand with the Frankfurt Parliament’s quest
for national unity".924 Both Germany and the US developed a “scientific”, i.e. theoretical and rather
abstract, approach to what sea power was, and how it should serve national strategies. Thus, both
drew heavily on their military academies, indeed they were the first navies to found such
institutions. Compared to Britain, the study of sea power in Germany and, especially, the US was an
academic discipline. In Britain, it has been argued; strategic debate was very much a public affair.925
The Royal navy had no doctrine, although the “navy scares”926, the impossibility of war with the US
and the fear of Germany fostered debates in newspapers. The Germans proceeded much more
systematically through the Marine-Akademie from 1872, but at the same time, naval policies were
much more an insular process of developing and formulating concepts and strategies. The US
created the Naval War college and fostered Alfred T. Mahan, whose influence was to become the
point of departure for most attempts at formulating sea power doctrines as part of foreign policy. As
a matter of fact, the influence of exactly Mahan was to become a crucial conceptual and ideological
basis for the development of German sea power.

925 Hobson, 2002: 80
However, advents prior to the 1890s laid the seeds of German overseas imperialism. Historian Fritz Stern has argued that the ambitions of Belgium’s King Leopold II were the signal for the “partition of Sub-Saharan Africa.” Neutral Belgium, according to Leopold, was blessed by its access to the sea. One could argue that Germany ought to take advantage of this asset as well. By 1884, according to Stern, the prospect of a “German India” in Africa began to gain support. Although there was a certain degree of scepticism both among German merchants and in Bismarck, the latter in particular reasoned that a free-trade area in central Africa (ruled by Leopold) would be more favourable to Germany than French or Portuguese rule. When the US and Germany granted Leopold (virtual at least) sovereignty over Congo by 1885, the scramble for Africa in effect had begun. By March the same year, the German state created the subsidies needed for a regular German steamship line to the Far East. Bismarck created an empire five times the size of the Reich. The temporary conversion of Bismarck to imperialist, and his following loss of interest in the same project from 1886, has indeed puzzled historians (as it did the contemporaries of Bismarck) ever since. Stern concludes that domestic reasons by far were the most important, 1884 being an election year. Colonies made for pawns on the international chessboard. It also seemed to be an element in Bismarck’s efforts to create a German-French entente. German business interests perceived colonialism as beneficial. A German Colonial league was created in 1882, claiming that overseas colonies would produce new markets. Once Bismarck gave the starting signal, businessmen and adventurers in German society plunged into efforts at creating a German overseas empire. However, German imperialism never had the same significance to Germany under Bismarck than as it had to Britain under Gladstone or Disraeli. In some respects, Germany was the “reluctant colonialist” during the era of Bismarck. At the same time, Germany’s increased interest in sea power and her more solid self-esteem prior to WWI demands an explanation. Again, efforts at creating sea power were a state priority that changed foreign policy, and this change in the German case was to have profound effect on international relations. However sketchy as the portrait comparative scholars are able to construct, we nevertheless have to look deeper into the configurations of thoughts on strategy and foreign policy that developed in Germany after 1871.

926 Occasional fear among officers, politicians and the upper strata of the population that Britain was losing in the technological and quantitative competition in sea power
927 Stern, 1979: 402
928 Stern, 1979: 410. In addition, Bismarck became an “imperialist” out of short-time tactical considerations of the domestic political game. I have not found any serious scholar who has argued to the contrary.
929 Stern, 1979
Germany was a latecomer in the European state system, and in naval affairs it was a novice following the German unification. The Navy thus was an entirely new national institution with very modest experience by the standards of the 1870s. Earlier attempts at establishing a navy had been Prussian both in geneis and personnel. By 1861, however, Prussia was the only major power not in possession of at least one ironclad. The more ambitious plans for a fleet were introduced following the war with Denmark, and these proposals effectively were the basis for the Fleet that came into being in 1867. We are in a safe position, however, if we conclude that prior to 1888, the Navy was a rather negligible institution compared to the German army. In the words of Rolf Hobson; “...the navy was completely subordinated to the army – institutionally, strategically, and financially. It played only a minor role during the wars of unification”. In this period, the German Navy had no prominent role in national strategy. Furthermore, Germany prior to the 1890s was not crucially dependent upon overseas supplies. Another side of the same coin was that she had no significant colonial history compared to Britain. The result was a navy role of coastal defence. The interest in the navy was negligible compared to other institutions. It was this initial isolation from the public arena that gave German naval strategy its peculiar institutional outlook and content. As a matter of fact, German naval strategy and doctrine increasingly aimed at reducing its dependency on army doctrines. Herein lies a fundamental reason behind the particular German path towards imperialism and sea power ambitions. In the words of historian Hobson, the fact that the German navy wanted to transcend the bonds to the Army, “laid German naval thought wide open to the unlimited ambitions of the age of imperialism”. The aspirations and the eagerness of the German naval officers to enhance the influence of their own service made them into advocates of imperialist policies. In this picture Mahan became immensely important, since his theory allegedly linked naval strategy and the perceived benefits of overseas possessions. Moreover, the German merchant marine had grown to be the third largest in the world by 1869 (see appendix II), thus providing both an illustration and a rationale for the argument that Germany indeed had overseas interests. In the case of Germany, however, the Mahanian doctrine developed into naval expansion without clear, well-defined strategic objectives. Let us try to outline the anatomy of this development.

930 Sondhaus, 1997: 57-58
931 Sondhaus, 1997: 46-47
932 “When the Kaiser appointed Tirpitz state secretary in 1897, "the German navy", the admiral wrote later, "was a collection of experiments in shipbuilding surpassed in exoticism only by the Russian navy"", Massie, 2003: 9
933 Hobson, 2002: 111
934 Sondhaus, 1997: 78-80
935 Hobson, 2002: 112
936 Sondhaus, 1997: 56
The Prussian war minister tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 1865 Landtag to favour a long-term naval construction program. His main arguments for such a scheme were to “protect the overseas trade of Prussia and Germany and defend the Baltic and North Sea coasts, and second, in order to maintain for the future its European influence against such lands which may only be reached by sea”. In 1867, the first naval minister of the North German Confederation eventually managed to pass a 10-year naval armaments program for the North German Bundesmarine. Compared to the 1865 proposal, Admiral Jachmann had laid greater emphasis on a fleet of cruisers for overseas service. General (!) von Stosch served as chief of the Imperial Admiralty from 1872 till 1883 and he in effect laid the foundation for the Imperial Navy. Article 53 of the constitution of April 1871 made the Bundesmarine into the Kaiserliche Marine. The alleged ambition for the fleet also included possible service overseas to “protect German interests”. The latter is interesting. Stosch principally argued along the same lines as Tirpitz did some 25 years later. By being able to protect the German Merchant fleet, the Imperial navy in effect would foster overseas trade. Thus, a synergy similar to the one perceived in the British Empire was possible also for Germany. Rolf Hobson also notes that Stosch thus defended German annexation of overseas colonies, especially on the assumption that this would absorb “German emigration by providing land for agricultural settlement, but also to provide markets and sources of raw materials for industry”. But the influence of Stosch was marked by the trivial fact that he was in high office prior to Mahan. Thus, Stosch advocated cruisers and frigates for direct protection overseas. The actual result was that one major German warship was continually stationed in the Far East from 1869 till 1914, and German vessels made sporadic cruises in the Caribbean. The difference with the Mahanian age can be illustrated by comparing Stosch to Tirpitz. According to Tirpitz, political influence through sea power was best assured through the presence of a strong German fleet in European waters. This conformed with the view of the chief of the General Staff, Moltke. At the same time, always preoccupied with the balance of power, Bismarck added that Germany should be a respectable second-rate Navy. His reason clearly was that a German navy could be an asset in the balance of power. The result was that Germany had the third largest navy by 1883; only behind France and

937 Roon’s speech April 5th 1865, quoted in Hobson, 2002: 113 and Sondhaus, 1997: 81
938 Sondhaus, 1997: 85-86
939 It was typical of the first period of building the German navy that army officers, largely of Prussian origin, became naval officers, since there did not exist naval officers with any seniority in the first place. Von Stosch was promoted to both General and Admiral in 1875, but was most often referred to as General von Stosch. See Sondhaus, 1997: 102
940 Sondhaus, 1997. 101
941 Quoted in Hobson, 2002: 114
942 Sondhaus, 1997: 97
943 Sondhaus, 1997: 123
Britain. Thus Bismarck’s purpose with the Navy was fulfilled; it became a second-rate naval power that could serve as a potential ally of one of the western sea powers. After a brief reduction of ambitions from 1883 till 1890, the initial goal of the fleet set by Stosch in 1873 was reintroduced by admiral Hollmann, state secretary of the new Reichsmarineamt from 1890 till 1897. The rationale was that the German navy should have the potential of defeating either the Russian Baltic or the French North Sea fleets. Thus, the actual size of the Imperial fleet varied with the estimated strengths of the fleets of the potential adversaries (in effect between fifteen and twenty ships). It might be concluded that the German fleet from 1883 till 1898 to some degree was designed according to German grand strategy, since it enhanced Germany’s ability to participate in the conscious efforts at balancing power at the international arena (efforts were also made to make the German maritime power visible for this purpose. From 1872, both the German navy and merchant marine became more active in the Mediterranean, Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific). In the internal realm, the naval strategy also necessitated institutional reforms. Symbioses between naval doctrine, shipbuilding and naval weapons also started to materialise. Gradually, the navy also indeed freed itself from its subordination to the army. Furthermore, the balance of power diplomacy of the Bismarckian era seemed more and more constraining the German range of action in foreign policy, the new Chancellor became sceptical as to the possibility that Germany might avoid a two-front war with both Russia and France. The nightmare of such a war seemed even worse if a naval blockade could be imposed upon Germany: Caprivi was the first in high office in Germany to demand a study of the consequences if such a scenario was to materialise. His main defence for liberal trade policies was his conviction that “in a future war the feeding of the army and the country may come to play a decisive role”. Traditional German strategists could perhaps point out that the navy would not be able to decide the outcome of the war, but this nevertheless bordered to the irrelevant, since a naval blockade of Germany in a major European war would cripple its industry and starve its population. In the mind of Caprivi, Germany had to adjust its naval strategy so that it became compatible with German vulnerabilities, and to Caprivi, the main vulnerability was being the victim of naval blockades. This ran contrary to the organisation and tasks of the fleet that Tirpitz had in mind. Although France, and not the UK, figured as the main antagonist in German

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944 The decline in major German warships in the latter part of the 1880s in part was a result of the influence of the Jeune Ecole in France. This school of thought was popular in the years before "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" was published in 1889. Commerce raiding and coastal defence were central ingredients in the Jeune Ecole camp. This led to an emphasis on smaller torpedo boats, also in Germany.
945 Sondhaus, 1997: 144-158
946 In this respect, he shared the gloomy view of von Moltke the elder.
948 Speech in the Reichstag December 10th 1891, quoted in Hobson, 2002: 123
949 Sondhaus, 1997: 168
strategic thought, the weapon of blockade naturally would be even more crippling to Germany in the
case of war with the British Empire. In that case, the Royal Navy in effect could close the Atlantic
sea-lanes to Germany (The Channel and the Gap between the Shetlands and Norway). The
difference in strategic thought in Germany also reflected different ideas about the role that Germany
should play in international politics and economy. Caprivi thought that Germany as a continental
power was more or less bound to dominate Europe without expansion; he even envisaged that
Germany would be the leader of a united Europe. Tirpitz, on the other hand, argued that it was
“necessary” for Germany to develop overseas colonies and become a prime European overseas
“empire”. The logic of Tirpitz implied that a strong German battle fleet would serve as a fleet-in-
being that in peacetime would ensure the functioning of this overseas trade and protect German
colonies.\textsuperscript{950} To Tirpitz, the mere existence of a potent German fleet would deter even the British
Empire from waging war with her.\textsuperscript{951} To Caprivi, as to Bismarck, the prime assumption was that it
was the general balance of power –not a strong fleet per se- that would ensure German
extraterritorial sovereignty, especially through the possibility of an alliance with England.
Furthermore, in the event that no alliance with Britain was to materialise, the window of opportunity
open to France would be restricted if England were to choose a strict policy of neutrality as the one
she had chosen in 1870. By the early 1890s, such an outcome, in addition to the assumption that the
US would remain neutral in the case of a German-French war did not seem wholly dubious. If
events were to point to the contrary, there was not really much Germany could do about it.\textsuperscript{952}

The Tirpitz notion of a German Naval strategy prevailed. As the new state secretary at the
Reichsmarineamt in 1897, Tirpitz “convinced the Kaiser and Foreign Secretary Bülow that his
projected first navy Law would improve Germany’s position vis-à-vis Britain and lay the foundation
for its rise to world power”.\textsuperscript{953} The real jump in ambitions came two years later with the second
Navy Law, doubling the size of the German fleet. This can with authority be said to have marked a
real turning point, from a continental to a world grand strategy. \textit{Militarism was no longer confined to
the national defence, but included imperialism}. In other words, domestic changes, chiefly the
abandonment of the navy as an institution subordinated to the army in the name of national defence,
was tossed aboard in the German polity. How sharp a demarcation was this turn? Rolf Hobson

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{950} As Hobson, 2002: 126, notes, Tirpitz had recognised enemy blockade as a possibility, but only as a worst-case
scenario. Sondhaus, 1997: 176-177 argues that Tirpitz was instrumental in convincing the Kaiser, since the latter
wavered between the French jeune Ecole and Mahan for some time early in the 1890s.
\item \textsuperscript{951} As noted in the previous section, there was some tactical sense in this configuration of thought, since the enemies
were careful in not risking their fleets in an all-out naval battle. This was a meagre comfort however, since in
strategic terms, the German navy in itself could not deter a total European war.
\item \textsuperscript{952} Hobson, 2002: 127
\item \textsuperscript{953} Hobson, 2002: 130
\end{itemize}
interprets it as profound. He points to the fact that for the years 1875 to 1890 the *Marine-Verordnungsblatt* only published “two or three articles that are even remotely connected with a theoretical discussion of strategy, or even tactics. Surprisingly, not even the more important contemporary British or French debates were referred to at any length”.955

The German case is similar to the USA in this respect, witness the US Naval Institute’s *Proceedings* until 1886. And as in the US, the German navy until the 1890’s figured only marginally compared to the army in national security. In both countries, there must have been both personal and institutional motivations to develop theories of sea power that could enhance the prestige and resources of a modern blue-water navy.956

The seeds to German navalism (the US is to be elaborated below) can be found in the *Marine-Akademie* at Kiel. A pattern of professional and prestigious education of officers for the army had already been established in Prussia. In particular, the Berlin war Academy proved an exemplary role model. The German naval academy was, contrary to popular belief, the first of its kind in the world. The academy (established 1872) focused on strategy, not on techniques and seamanship as at the *Marine-schule*. The *Marine-Akademie* was to foster a “German Mahan” in one of its first teachers (assigned to the Academy in the periods 1875-1881 and 1894-96), Alfred Stenzel, who wrote (published posthumous) two volumes on the history of naval warfare.957 In his books, however (based on his notes for his weekly lectures), we find the same problem that Mahan faced some years later; how to articulate a theory of naval warfare in a service lacking experience and traditions of naval service and in particular -warfare. Stenzel partly built on Clausewitz, whom he believed had grasped the nature of war better than any other military theoretician.958 Thus, Stenzel lacked the subtle analysis of the late Clausewitz applied to war at sea, so skilfully developed at a later time by Corbett. A central assumption of Stenzel, and the main reason why he borrowed freely from Clausewitz, was that for all their peculiarities, land and naval warfare essentially had something in common. The conclusion Stenzel could draw from this was that also naval forces were to be concentrated, particularly at decisive points in time and space. However, Stenzel was firm in his belief that the Declaration of Paris would be followed, since this would be in the interest of all

954 See Hobson, 2002: 133  
955 Hobson, 2002: 132  
956 See Sondhaus, 1997: 186-190  
957 Hobson, 2002: 137  
958 In the words of Hobson, 2002: 139:”Stenzel in Kriegführung zur See” was trying to baptize Clausewitz with salt water”. One should note however, that the main influence of Clausewitz upon Stenzel was the military application of principles rather than the general, philosophical parts of Clausewitz’s works. It has been debated however, whether the “philosophical” Clausewitz ever existed, or whether he has been invented in the 20th century by military historians.
neutral sea-faring states (including the US). Thus, Germany would not be totally dependent on its own merchant fleet if the German Navy could manage to break a naval blockade. Implicit in this argument, however, was the belief that the neutral powers actually would have the capacity and the will to defend their own interests.

But a far more self-conscious ambition of German naval strength was to develop with Tirpitz. The incentive for increased ambitions took a course that is interesting also in a theoretical perspective. The Tirpitz school of thought in part is an example of diffusion of strategic thought (From Mahan in the US), but also to a significant degree an example of defining the national interest "from below", Tirpitz always promoting "the interests of whatever department he happened to be serving".

The role of Tirpitz initially (and instrumental for his further career) primarily was as leader of the Torpedo section, where the tactical focus prevailed. This work culminated in a long memorandum by Tirpitz in 1889, containing not only conclusions on the use of torpedoes and platforms for this weapon, but also far more general observations on naval tactics. Indeed, one military historian has argued that “the 1889 document strongly suggests that the torpedo department was the original workshop for future German naval development as guided by Tirpitz, first as Chief of Staff in the Naval High Command and later as Secretary of State at the Imperial Office”.

As Chief of Staff at the High Command, he elaborated his doctrine of the strategic offensive, formulated in the famous Dienstschrift IX from 1894. Other scholars have analysed the intellectual development of Tirpitz. Suffice to say in this work is that Tirpitz was influenced by Clausewitz and probably also to a large degree by Stenzel. Already in 1877 he claimed that “It is characteristic of war on the open seas that its sole goal is the destruction of the enemy…At sea success lies only in destruction”. It was this firm (and I dare say single-minded) conception of war at sea, that made Tirpitz, the foremost developer of the practical use of torpedoes, resist the temptation of devising a torpedo-boat, littoral German Navy. The operational conviction of Tirpitz, together with his ambitions for a significant German battle fleet, made him less prone to support the Jeune Ecole after the publication of ISPUH.

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959 Sondhaus, 1997: 193
960 Sondhaus, 1997: 199
961 Hobson, 2002: 147
962 Lambi, 1984: 109
964 Tirpitz spent the years 1892-1894 developing the Linearteknik, in practise revising the traditional battle formations of the days of sail for a modern era of naval warfare.
965 Quoted in Hobson, 2002: 150
966 See Sondhaus, 1997: 192-194 for a discussion
Dienstschrift IX in practise was the work of Tirpitz, and gave the German Navy an operational doctrine. More than anyone else, Alfred Mahan of the US Navy was the source of inspiration. But how come Imperial Germany turned out a paternalist naval power, in sharp contrast to the US?

4.2.2 The Influence of Mahan upon German History

One might question why American naval officer Alfred Mahan fits into the section on German navalism. Yet, such was the influence of Mahan’s teachings and publications that any study of extraterritorial violence and sovereignty in Northern Europe without due reference to the imprint his works had is incomplete. Nowhere in Europe did he gain more attention than in Germany, the young state, the young naval power, with its desire for a “platz in der sonne”. Is this the main source for the paternalism of maritime politics in Imperial Germany at the ideational level? Inherent in Mahan’s project was the desire to build a theory of sea power on a “scientific“ basis and to publish his results extensively. Concerning the former, he applied the French Baron Jomini’s principles of war on sea power. Regarding the second objective, Mahan was wildly successful in “The Influence of Sea Power upon History“ (ISPUH), published and read literally all over the globe. Social scientists have in general not been very eager to analyse or apply his theory. Firstly, the “theory“ as developed by Mahan is not particularly “scientific“, although it contains concepts for the study of sea power. Secondly, the normative appeal towards expansionism and imperialism in his writings does to a large degree overshadow significant insights. However, this cannot preclude a proper understanding of the extent and content of Mahan’s influence on naval thinking from 1890 till 1914. Whether he was “correctly“ interpreted by political and naval leaders, is irrelevant in this respect. In ISPUH, Mahan stands out (and this was his desired appearance) as an interpreter of the workings of Sea Power in history, primarily applied to the period 1660-1783. But he is also the clear advocate of rebuilding US strength at sea and expansion. It is no exaggeration to claim that this motivation coloured his empirical and theoretical analysis. In particular, Mahan sought to link naval strategy with imperialism, making him the chief theorist of extraterritorial policies at the turn of the century. First and foremost, it was his famous six "principles“ of sea power that introduces ISPUH (“the book of the age“ in Gladstone’s words), that made him famous. What is important concerning strategy in these principles for his influence on Germany (and world history in general, it

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967 Hobson, 2002: 153, Sondhaus, 1997: 198. Note that the Kiel Canal was completed in 1895. The same year, the larger fleet exercises almost entirely were high seas operations rather than coastal, a trend that would last.
968 Mahan, 1897/1894: 29-81
is fair to say), was his connecting of colonies and economic interests with a strong navy.\textsuperscript{969} In short, Mahan concluded that sea power (a term he never defined precisely) had two positive objectives and two corresponding negative ones. In ISPUH he writes that sea power gives the state both the ability to transport troops overseas and to control commerce through overseas transportation. Correspondingly, these positive objectives correlate to the ability to deny a competitor these assets.\textsuperscript{970} But his six principles of sea power also made up a body of a very much broader definition of sea power; a truly navalist stand where sea power for the state depended upon three factors; production, shipping and colonies. Shipping and commerce made for overseas stations that turned into colonies. Colonies, in turn, provided security for business in general and shipping particularly. But without a navy strong enough to project power overseas to these stations and to protect the sea lanes, no empire could be had. Furthermore, since wars according to Mahan sprang from economic competition, and since the US was fast becoming a prime industrial and economic power, the USA had to build a strong navy in order to protect her national interests. That this interpretation was ideologically coloured and one-sided is rather clear,\textsuperscript{971} but it is also more important that Mahan’s argument gained attention. For navalists, in particular, the celebrated six principles as elaborated by Mahan made for a checklist with which to assess the naval policy of their respective countries (needless to say, the use of the principles more often than not produced arguments in favour of stronger navies). What is more, Mahan does not draw a sharp distinction between sea power in war and in peace. In peace, rivalry between sea powers was a test of financial strength and “willpower”, with sea power the ultimate mean to gain credibility. Extraterritorial means of power is more or less synonymous with what Mahan labelled sea power; the total maritime resources of a society. In war, contests were determined by the rival’s capacity to gain command of the sea. Again, the close connection between economic strength and naval capacities is stressed.

The most important argument in naval propaganda became the axiom that "The size of the battle fleet had to be "commensurate“ with the size of the Reich’s overseas economic and colonial interests."\textsuperscript{972} The one, according to this logic, could not be had without the other.\textsuperscript{973} A strong

\textsuperscript{969} Hobson, 2002: 157
\textsuperscript{970} Mahan, 1987: 8, 26
\textsuperscript{971} His six principles of sea power are easy to criticize as necessary but not sufficient conditions for any one coastal state to be a sea power in Mahan’s sense. To a large degree, the different principles seem to have been construed from historical cases that are particularly apt in illustrating the points Mahan seeks to make, rather than principles that can be deduced from a general axiom on power. It is quite intriguing, for example, to follow Mahan’s argument that a strong merchant fleet gives the basis for a strong navy. The Dutch republic seems to be the prime model here, where Britain serves as the main ideal of a colonial empire. According to Mahan, the US and France did not produce strong navies and a vast overseas empire due to their rich soils, making the populations more motivated to turn inwards for resource extraction rather than become expansionist. The historical evidence for these propositions is rather scarce in Mahan’s works.
\textsuperscript{972} Hobson, 2002: 163
German navy was a requisite not only in case of war, but also as an instrument in the required expansion of German economic activity. Inherent in this position was a central tenet of navalism; that the international scene was an arena for the survival of the fittest. Moreover, such arguments could thrive without particular objectives of contest; the belief in international competition was so strong as to form the perceptions of the entire field of international relations, and in the case of Mahan, social Darwinism was an all too obvious assumption.\textsuperscript{974} In particular, this view was turned into arguments in favor of strong navies. There was a domestic side of the coin also. Mahan was not particularly fond of socialism, to put it mildly, and he believed that a great navy also would arouse national pride and cohesion. This theme also seems quite visible in the ideological justification of Tirpitz in fostering a strong German navy. But for the purpose of our analysis, the foreign policy direction from 1895 is the most remarkable one. More than anything, German naval thought helped develop, and merged with, ambitions of a German Weltpolitik. Announced by Wilhelm II, these sea power ambitions found a potent fertilizer in Mahan’s ISPUH. The domestic source of German navalism did not only come from the Navy, but it is beyond debate that it was instrumental in navalist propaganda. From 1894, the High command increasingly supplied the press with articles stressing the need for a stronger German Navy. Appointed state secretary of the Reichsmarineamt (RMA) in 1897, Tirpitz helped intensify this tendency. One might be wise to stress that Mahan was but one of the ingredients in the broader nationalist German sentiment that turned it into a competitor for the core in the hierarchy of states. Historians indeed have been divided on the issue of to what extent and in what form Mahan influenced German naval priorities and, in a broader sense, extraterritorial ambitions. 

One school of historians has argued that Mahan did not influence German navalism to a significant degree.\textsuperscript{975} The central argument among these scholars is that Mahan was misunderstood in a profound way in Germany, both by the Kaiser, Tirpitz and in the public opinion. Thus, Germans picked and chose among Mahan’s publications, missing his real insights. In other words, German navalis would have followed the same path if Mahan had never gained attention in Germany. This explanation has some virtue, stressing as it does that German ambitions existed without ISPUH, for sure. Indeed, there was a certain sense of urgency in the German naval service itself; it was a young navy of young officers eager to justify the institution itself: "More than 60 per cent of the sea officers of 1888 had entered the corps since the Franco-Prussian war, and thus never served under a

\textsuperscript{973} Sondhaus, 1997: 202-207  
\textsuperscript{974} Hobson, 2002: 168. This, in my view, does not remove the value of Mahan’s work as interesting contributions to the study of sea power or geopolitics. It does, however, explain the limited normative appeal today and the limitations of his theoretical publications.  
\textsuperscript{975} See Baecker, 1976:10-19, Herwig, 1988: 68-105
chief of the admiralty who was not a Prussian general.\footnote{Sondhaus, 1997: 209} It should not surprise us that the sea power gospel of Mahan thus was used for what it was worth by German naval officers. Much in the same vein, German navalists could very well support the claim that increased defence spendings in Germany should primarily benefit the navy because a broader recruitment to the army could pollute the aristocratic purity of the army officer corps.

The popularity of Mahan’s thinking influenced German development in a particular direction. Partly, ISPUH and interpretations of it influenced the German public directly. But above all, Mahan influenced the German polity indirectly through the navy itself. Mahan produced a scholarly justification for extra-territorial aspirations. One school of historians agrees with this interpretation, Volker Berghahn\footnote{Berghahn, 1971} being a prominent scholar in this group. He argues that ISPUH served to intensify tendencies that existed in Germany.\footnote{See also Hobson, 2002: 180-181} Mahan and the chief navalist spokesmen in Germany converged in three areas; a social Darwinist interpretation of sea power, a common understanding of strategy and notion of "the rise and fall" of maritime powers. In particular, it was the broader political implications of sea power as imperialist policy that proved to be especially influential on Tirpitz. There is no doubt that Mahan was read by the senior officers, and that most of them deemed Mahan as an essential contributor to plans for naval power. More than anything, Mahan gave German navalists an increased belief in a naval purpose beyond coastal warfare.\footnote{See Massie, 2003:9-10 for a vivid description} It was the imperialist, rather than the tactical, message that received attention. Admirals Maltzahn and Tirpitz both conceptualised the role of the navy in a European great power conflict prior to 1894, while both ,,at some point during early 1894...expanded their horizons to take in the rest of the world".\footnote{Hobson, 2002: 189, and further (ibid same page) "The most likely cause of the change of emphasis was that sometime in 1893 or 1894 both Tirpitz and Maltzahn had been convinced by Mahan’s theories about the role navies had to play in overseas expansion and altered their justifications accordingly".} Now, the way Mahan was interpreted in the leading naval circles in Germany by 1895 invites a crucial question of its implications for the larger course of extraterritorial violence. If, as Tirpitz believed, great power conflicts almost inevitably rose out of maritime competition; if, furthermore, Germany needed a strong battle fleet in order to take part in the economic competition including colonies, was it not so that a future war with Britain also was inevitable?\footnote{See Sondhaus, 1997: 213-214 on the roles of the heads of the naval agencies in the debacle of the Kruger telegramme.} Historians now seem to suggest that in the eyes of Tirpitz, at least, some sort of conflict with Britain would occur to determine who would have command of the sea. How Germany eventually could turn itself
into a great sea power, however, was a far more complicated matter than to be decided by theoretical debates alone.

4.2.3 German navalism 1895-1918

Intra-service rivalry and limited state budgets served to modify German naval ambitions until the late 1890s. The absence of a clear operational doctrine and bureaucratic infighting meant that the plan for the fleet was inconsistent until 1899. By 1899, Tirpitz managed to pass the second Navy Law with its stated goal to double the German fleet. His presentation of views on German naval armaments to Kaiser Wilhelm in 1891 had not damaged his career, to say the least. In his memoranda during the early 1890s, the political significance of sea power was the central argument in favour of a large fleet, and at the strategic level Tirpitz remained confident that the status of Germany as an extraterritorial power would be determined in a future battle in European waters. His appointment to higher office, faced with the material realities of the German navy, did much to mature his strategic analysis. The chief problem for the navy was to define its exact purpose. Tirpitz also fully realised the chief operational difference between land and naval warfare in the industrialised world; the room for manoeuvre for the inferior fleet would be very limited. These insights were incorporated in Dienstschrift IX in 1894 with its emphasis on line-of-battle tactics and the squadron organisation. The doctrine of this work was the need for superiority as a precondition for the strategic offensive. A superior fleet could bring the war through extraterritorial means to the coast of the enemy, forcing the inferior fleet to do battle. In the advent that the inferior fleet was not used for this purpose, the offensive part would exercise command of the sea through blockade, trade interdiction and bombardments. The purpose of the German fleet was clear: to fight for command of the sea (a term much applied by Mahan). This was conceived of as a zero-sum game; the outcome would be that the future battle at sea would be fought by the coast of the inferior naval state. Thus, Tirpitz concluded that at sea, the strategic offensive was a superior naval strategy, with all its requirements of ships, technology and training of crews. If the inferior fleet did not engage the enemy, but rather stayed “at home” in order to avoid wholesale destruction, then the stronger power would exercise command of the sea. The vital thing therefore was numerical superiority (given similar levels of quality) at the outset of war. This thinking in naval affairs was not only remarkably similar to Mahan, but also seems to us in retrospect as something of a self-fulfilling prophesy. In peacetime, the state had to prioritise its navy so that it was stronger than its potential enemy. If it failed to do so, the war would be lost. In this way, the Tirpitz doctrine also blurred the line between...
peace and war, since an arms race was the assured outcome between states if they shared the ambition to fight for command of the sea. And to ensure that Germany really would be superior, Tirpitz in the 1890s determined that the German fleet should be superior to a potential enemy fleet with the ratio of five to three.982 At the time Tirpitz wrote the Dienstschrift, such a size was not inconceivable when the Dual Alliance was the potential main adversary. The principal, ideological point of departure delivered by Tirpitz was at the political level. His German readers did not see Mahan as theoretical; he was seen as describing the realities of great-power politics. Thus, when the operational doctrine of Tirpitz was widened to be applied beyond the threat of the Dual alliance, the Rubicon was crossed. The Dienstschrift plainly stated that Germany’s position as a great power depended on developing overseas interests. And a strong fleet in European waters, Tirpitz claimed, could protect these interests. This fleet was not only there to protect established trade that had already developed, it would be the precondition for further overseas trade to develop. We should also note that Tirpitz, in buttressing his arguments, used the history of northern Europe to show this. The trade of the Hansa and the Dutch republic were undermined when they did not provide sea power to back it up. Like Mahan, Tirpitz now believed that sea power would foster the ability of the state to compete in economic terms in peacetime. To Germany, sea power ensured the Lebensraum of its economy.983 Tirpitz did not favour a German naval armaments program as some sort of Keynesianism by rising domestic spending; his prime (public) argument was that the vital benefits of extra-European trade mattered most. Appointed state secretary of the Reichsmarineamt in 1897, Tirpitz focused German naval priorities from the perceived threats of the Dual alliance "to the need for sea power as a means of exerting political pressure on Britain".984 Few historians will argue anything to the contrary. In the aftermath of WWI, Tirpitz and other leading German officials pointed to the Transvaal crisis of 1896 as the first occasion where Germany saw Britain as a possible antagonist in a future war, and that from this moment on, Germany had to prepare for the worst-case scenario. The arguments of leading German naval officers, in favour of more battle ships prior to 1895, were primarily that France and Russia were building faster than Germany. As a matter of fact, it is not wholly unreasonable to conclude that Tirpitz picked and chose between whatever arguments would serve his goal of strengthening the navy. In a much-quoted letter to Stosch dated December 21st 1895, for example, Tirpitz argued that there were both international and domestic benefits to create a sea power out of Germany;

982 Hobson, 2002: 207. This was exactly the recommendation of Mahan in his first ISPUH book. Tirpitz studied this publication with great energy at the time.
983 It is perhaps needless to say that the difference between Wilhelmine Germany’s strategy and ideology to that of the Third Reich is obvious. As mentioned in chapter four, this is also the chief reason why the Third Reich is not part of the analysis.
"I believe that Germany will rapidly decline from its position as a great power in the next century unless the growth of these general sea interests is taken in hand energetically, immediately and systematically. Not least because in the great national task and the economic benefits it will engender there lies a strong palliative against educated and uneducated Social Democrats."

In January 1896, Tirpitz in writing for the first time identified Britain as the chief adversary in the sea power race. By this time, opinion was growing throughout Germany that the nation ought to make itself increasingly heard at the international scene. By tailoring his arguments for these ends, he managed to gain broader sympathy for his strategic plans than purely military claims could do at that moment. In the thinking of Tirpitz, it was not so much that he at this point saw war with England as inevitable or desirable, far from it. To the contrary, he based his judgements on a risk theory. What would be the case if Germany became a major sea power? In that case, the dual alliance could hardly threaten German naval interests in an existential way. Furthermore, England would do its utmost to avoid war with the future German fleet. In order to actually prepare for war with Germany at sea, England in such a case would have to seriously weaken its Mediterranean fleet. But even if it did so, the destruction of the German fleet would require an effort that would inflict grave losses to the extraterritorial means of violence of the Empire. These would be losses that England simply could not afford. This, in effect, was the core of what has been labelled Tirpitz’s risk theory. In hindsight, its logical consistency was not impeccable, however. If, at the tactical level, a 30 per cent superiority was needed against the navies of the dual alliance, why would a German fleet that was bound to be, numerically at least, an underdog compared to the Royal Navy, mean that Britain would not enter a war against Germany? In retrospect, it seems all too clear that Tirpitz promised more than even his strong German fleet could possibly be able to keep. However, he seemed convinced that his planned navy would ensure that Germany be treated with more respect in both peace and war. Partly, this would result from the reluctance to engage a strong German fleet out of economic reasons, factors that he believed would be paramount to “the City on the Thames”. As with Tirpitz, or perhaps even more, the Kaiser had no intention of seeking war with Britain, but rather to enhance German foreign policy. In any event, a German effort at strengthening the navy also seemed to make perfect sense in less horrifying scenarios than those involving total war. Neither do I see in German naval policy a particular “Germanic” misreading of Mahan. The tragedy rather rested in the fact that Mahan did not formulate, and the German leadership did not

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984 Hobson, 2002: 214
985 Quoted in Hobson, 2002: 222
986 It has become famous in scholarship on Imperial Germany. That various scholars have interpreted his hypothesis differently is not so curious given the fact that its author applied somewhat different justifications and arguments for it during and after his professional career.
fully exploit, the vital importance of connecting sea power to *diplomacy and the nature of the international system*. In fact, even a German navy inferior to the Royal Navy in the North Sea seemed consistent with the risk theory. With sufficient firepower and armour, a modern, fast and well-trained German fleet -or so it was argued by Tirpitz- could deter England from risking its grand fleet in one single stroke, since the navy was the backbone not only of the Empire, but the entire defence of The Isles themselves. In such an interpretation, it becomes clear that the German navy had no offensive purpose aimed at Britain whatsoever. The deterrent effect was the ability the German navy would have to make Britain avoid war with Imperial Germany out of a rational calculus that seemed obvious to Tirpitz, Bülow and the Kaiser. To my mind, scholarship that has focused on what the German leadership actually said and wrote on naval matters overwhelmingly seem to support such a conclusion.\(^987\) German policymakers did not seem to comprehend that by building an outstanding navy in addition to the strongest army in the world, they helped create a doomsday machine. Furthermore, both the foreign policy and statements made by Germany often stirred consternation in England. It seems obvious however, that without the sea power arguments, the more consistent and systematic planning of fleet-programs from 1897 could hardly have gained the required support within the German polity. The command of the Sea in the Baltic and the North Sea would be of outmost importance to Germany whatever coalition of forces would materialise in a war in the industrialised age. Without command of the sea in home waters, it was believed, both the army and the civilian population would starve in the advent of war. It would also cripple German industry and even strangle the German economy permanently. The German fleet programme was built on the assumption that the Anglo-Saxon powers would remain neutral in such a conflict, *and that the same powers would follow the dominant international treaty regulating transport at sea.*

But as an extra assurance of such an outcome, a strong German fleet was a prerequisite. In his memorandum to the Kaiser of July 1897, “a defining moment in the history of the Wilhelmine empire”\(^988\), the long-term objective was redirected by Tirpitz to deter England through naval policy. It is significant that Tirpitz was not at all precise on how an eventual naval war between Britain and Germany should be directed or conducted. He merely stated that the German fleet should be concentrated in the waters between Helgoland and the Thames, and that this required as many ships

\(^987\) Bernhard von Bülow, chancellor of Germany for nine years under the reign of William, and with intimate knowledge of both the Kaiser and Tirpitz, once wrote, ”*It never even occurred to William II to go to war against England. What William II most desired and imagined for the future was to see himself, at the head of a glorious German fleet, starting out on a peaceful visit to England. The English sovereign, with his fleet, would meet the German Kaiser in Portsmouth. The two fleets would file past each other; the two monarchs, each wearing the naval uniform of the other’s country, would then stand on the bridges of their flagship. Then, after they had embraced in the prescribed manner, a gala dinner with lovely speeches would be held in Cowes*” (Cited in Massie, 2003: 10) William was the grandson of Queen Victoria of England.
as possible. The central puzzle was to convince interest groups and the Reichstag of this necessity. In fact, Tirpitz not only devised a political doctrine of German sea power, but he was also instrumental in hiring an imminent spin-doctor to spread its message. He set up an Information Bureau at the Reichsmarineamt in June 1887. The office immediately set out to influence the press and the political parties as to the need of a consistent fleet policy, without exposing the Tirpitz doctrine that overseas interests should be served by a strong fleet concentrated in the Baltic or the North Sea. Instead, Mahan’s arguments on the connections between economic vitality and sea power were used for all they were worth. Next, merchants and shipowners also were convinced of their need for protection. Thus, the campaign for the Navy law of 1898 culminated in a grand conference in Berlin with approximately 1000 dignitaries from commerce, academia and industry proclaiming the need for a stronger navy. As Rolf Hobson has stated

“The spread of the idea that a navy must be “commensurate with our sea interests” was without doubt the most important distinguishing trait of German navalism. It was a stroke of genius on Tirpitz’s part to recognize early on the enormous propaganda value of this linkage. It could be used to justify any form of fleet expansion without tying the navy down to explaining how the military instrument was supposed to function”989

It is my modest conclusion that the development of German naval thought in the years from 1897 till 1900 led to an alteration of the geostrategic thinking in Germany, and that it in time turned Germany into a different player at the international arena. How was this possible? It should be all too clear that the gifts of Tirpitz, the systematic workings of the Reichsmarineamt and a Kaiser with naval ambitions all are important parts of the story. Yet, the change could not have taken place without the economic interests of the merchant class, industrialists and shipowners that all became convinced that the 20th century would be an era of intense competition between states and national economies. The perceived benefits of overseas markets and colonies applied to the maritime sector, and the industry that would have immense benefits from an ambitious naval programme, it proved instrumental in setting up and financing the Flottenverein (Deutscher Flottenverein, est. 1898), a strong institution in the public debate. The british Empire had been the chief ideal-type of a sea power in Mahan’s analysis, and Britain also became the chief society for German navalists to compare themselves with. Next, the British empire was turned into the most dangerous potential

988 Hobson, 2002: 236
enemy at sea, since—according to the social darwinian worldview—growing British predominance through its empire and navy, necessarily had to come at the expense of Germany. In this context of national euphoria, incidents in Europe as well as overseas were easily interpreted as confirming Mahan’s theory and Tirpitz’s arguments. Thus, disagreement over Samoa in 1899 and British seizure of two ships just as the second navy law was on its way in the Reichstag, were incidents that were perceived as typical results of the lack of German sea power.990

The domestic climate also made it possible to plan for an even stronger German fleet than what had been thought conceivable before 1897. Even at the time of writing (AD 2005), the proposal for the new German navy that Tirpitz suggested for the Kaiser in September 1899 seem incredible. The planned fleet should include 42 battlehips, 12 large cruisers, 100 torpedo boats and a number of cruisers and gunboats for overseas service.

How was it possible for such ambitions to pass muster in the Reichstag, and to be accepted by the old Prussian generation of aristocrat army officers? Fact is that, as shown by modern historical analysis, the Reich leadership favored naval expansion at the expense of the army from 1900. Part of the reason for this was that increasing the annual intake to the army was seen as dangerous, since it implied that too many socialist recruits and younger officers lacking the "proper“ background would become part of the army.991 The Reichsmarineamt in fact gained the support of the Catholic center, the largest party in the Reichstag, in its aims for a greater fleet. When the new Reich Chancellor Bülow also joined the chorus of German navalism by famously declaring in 1899 that Germany in the coming century would be either the "hammer or the anvil“, in effect the entire political elite in the polity was in favour of a stronger German fleet. We have no evidence so far that the German elite sought a showdown with Britain on the high seas in the form of war. Thus, we should avoid the too simplistic analysis that the Great War was inevitable, and a result of German armament.

However, as we have pointed out above and in chapter two, Wilhelmine Germany was led by a political and economic elite and an admiral that truly believed that German sea power would give the nation a "platz in der Sonne“. In fact, the Reichsmarineamt sought equilibrium with Britain as a long-term goal, seeking to achieve this by a steady construction program of three larger ships each year. Historians now believe that the goal of Tirpitz was that Germany should possess between 75

997 Hobson, 2002: 241
998 Writing on WWI, Robert Massie also noted that "Antagonism between the American and German navies went back to June 1898, when an American naval squadron commanded by Commodore George Dewey had a potentially dangerous confrontation with a German force…in Manila Bay…In the months preceding this episode, the Kaiser had announced, "I am determined, when the opportunity arises, to purchase or simply to take the Philippines from Spain”“The US preempted this possibility (Massie, 2003: 754)
999 See Hobson, 2002: 245
Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

and 80 battleships by 1930. In retrospect it might seem that German navalism had been fuelled by overly ambitious goals and pure sectional interests in the German navy, but this does not deny the fact that Tirpitz and his followers indeed were serious about reaching the same level of extraterritorial power as Britain in European waters. What they failed to see was the potential British answer to such German efforts at reaching naval equilibrium or even superiority in the waters that Englishmen since the 17th century had perceived as “Mare Britannicum”. Arguments to the contrary were answered with the objection that since England had no universal military service, she would not be able to man the sufficient number of battleships required to reach parity with the projected German fleet. Germans believed that the costs of the British voluntary system would force it to reduce its construction rate. Besides, the mere extent of the British Empire would force it to disperse its fleet in different oceans, as a matter of fact of political geography. In this, German policymakers failed to anticipate two British adjustments. Firstly, the fleet was more concentrated in Home waters in spite of imperial duties, partly facilitated by improved relations with Japan, France and Russia. Secondly, First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher constructed the Navy Reserve, a system of nucleus crews strengthened by reservists in times of tension. Whereas Tirpitz and other German navalists thought they had found the ideal solution in the navy laws, because these stated that the older ships would automatically be replaced after a fixed amount of years. As Volker Berghahn has pointed out; "A future more left-wing assembly was, constitutionally, no longer in a position to reduce the naval establishment by refuting to approve the naval estimates", since the navy laws would restrict the freedom of political manoeuvr in naval policy; the Doomsday machine was thus created as an unintended consequence of an eager, young service and its supporters.

When British construction became more ambitious (as evidenced earlier in the chapter), German ambitions became -comparatively speaking- more modest, markedly so from 1906. From the goal of parity, the aim was reduced to a two-thirds fleet, by Tirpitz believed as sufficient to deter an English attack. When the Great War eventually began, one possible strategy was to await the all-out effort that German naval officers firmly expected the Royal Navy would carry out to engage the German fleet. Thus, a defensive application of German naval force in the Heligoland Bight could be hoped to decimate the Royal Navy somewhat, so that parity was achievable. But before the war, indeed up to the very outset of WWI, Tirpitz’s risk theory suggested that the German battle fleet would deter Britain from entering a war against Germany in the first place. In strictly military terms, even German naval officers questioned whether the Tirpitz plan had any value at all. Even if Germany

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993 This argument was used by Kaiser Wilhelm, Tirpitz and other German navalists. See Hobson, 2002: 253
994 Berghahn, 1976:66
produced a 2/3 fleet, the English could cripple overseas supplies to Germany by applying a wide, rather than a close, blockade. Tirpitz and his followers simply hoped that a 2/3 fleet would deter England from entering the war, since thirty-three per cent superiority was deemed as necessary for the strategic offensive. In other words, if you could not be strong enough to go to the offensive, you could at least be strong enough to deter your opponent from going to the strategic offensive. It represented a shift in the thinking of Tirpitz. Theoretically, he was convinced that only the strategic offensive with numerical superiority could give a state command of the sea in war. The risk theory simply was a way to give a military rationale for the new German navy besides “enhancing” German power and economy. After WWI, Tirpitz claimed that he had firmly believed that most maritime powers would oppose any efforts by paternalist Britain to limit the freedom of the seas, understood as international waters. In contrast to these claims, he did nothing to influence German foreign policy in these directions, rather to the contrary. However, Tirpitz -like most politicians in Germany- felt assured that enmity between Britain and the dual alliance would continue. The agreements between England and France in 1904 and between Britain and Russia in 1907 undermined this assumption, to say the least, but risk theory survived even these blows. When one adds that it was evident that Britain could entertain a wide blockade rather than risk an all-out effort in the Heligoland Bight to cripple German sea power, one is led to the conclusion that what made Tirpitz cling to his risk theory was that he wanted to strengthen his service. It is beyond dispute that the weapon of the wide blockade was recognised by Tirpitz, since he initially had argued that a strategic offensive would be required in order to undo French attempts at applying such a strategy. Underlying the strategic thinking lay the belief found in Mahan that war would occur as a result of economic competition. To strangle the rise of Germany, the German admirals argued in their war planning, England might risk a pre-emptive naval war against Germany. By closing off German supplies by the sea, and possibly striking at the heart of the German fleet with superior forces, Britain could deal a deadly blow against its enemy struggling for its place as a first-rank European paternalist power. In the words of Robert Massie; “German naval officers had never forgotten that a sudden peacetime attack on the German fleet to destroy it before it was fully developed had been publicly advocated in England by no less a figure than Admiral Sir John Fisher, the builder of the modern British Navy.”

It is also interesting to note that the wish to build a strong German fleet of ships—of the line strongly motivated German policy towards international law of the sea. When US President Theodore

996 Hobson, 2002: 268
997 Massie, 2003: 12
Roosevelt suggested that the peace conference of 1904 also deal with the law of the sea, politicians in the Reichstag quickly pointed out that it was in Germany’s interest to abolish all forms of prize-taking. Thus, the navy eventually would be free of the need to protect merchant ships in the case of war. In 1899, Tirpitz had realised that Germany was too weak both to defend its own commerce and attack that of an enemy. By 1904, however, Tirpitz with great haste and energy reversed the policy of the Navy; it was paramount to keep international law open to capture of enemy ships, in order to make the war felt in Britain. Again, one is struck with how Tirpitz manoeuvred with one sole objective in aim; to preserve his risk fleet. For if international law had banned all forms of prize taking, one could with some justification claim that a strong battle fleet was not required to protect German sea interests! On the contrary, Tirpitz argued, to Britain it would be risking too much to have her sea-lanes interrupted in the case that German sea power prevailed in war. Thus, he could claim that it was in the interest of Germany not to abolish the weapon against civilian shipping in war. It was a military rationalisation of the political ideology of sea power. One cannot escape the conclusion that this circular logic primarily was applied for institutional and personal reasons; that the means justified the ends. Prior to the Second Hague Conference, the procedure was repeated, with the German navy opposing the abolition of the right of capture. At this juncture, Tirpitz met resistance at the highest political level and from virtually all significant economic interest groups notable in the German society. In case of war, Germany at least could secure some overseas supplies if international law banned prize taking. Tirpitz, on the other side, was convinced that the prospect of economic loss through German interruption of merchant ships would be a potent deterrent against England. He argued that if it came to war, commerce raiding would be the only means for Germany to make Britain seek peace. This was wishful thinking, since Britain received most of its imports from its Atlantic ports, not in the ports on its eastern coast (Tirpitz was not in favour of developing a German u-boat fleet). The discourses in the international negotiations were eventually to concentrate on the definition of private property and contraband, concluded in the Declaration of London in 1909. The tragedy herein, for Germany at least, is the fact that it never took the opportunity to work in favour of an international institution of maritime law that was in the interest of the weaker sea powers. International law has always limited the room for action for the strongest sea power; now Germany sought to reduce the scope of the law of the sea. Instead of going for the abolition of trade warfare, it supported it. Instead of settling for international rules that would limit the policies of the strongest sea power, it worked to enhance it. And finally, instead of seeking a policy that could defend exposed interests, it sought a policy that favoured a paternalist extraterritorial strategy;
“As a result, it never took the shared interests of the secondary maritime powers into consideration. Even when the prospect of American support was considered, Washington’s motivation was believed to derive solely from the weighing-up of its commercial ties to Britain and Germany”

It was the German application of Mahan that made it seek military rationalisations for an expansionist ideology. So fateful for the destiny of Europe in the 20th Century, the axiom in the thought of Tirpitz was an act of hubris; yet it was also a reflection of the fact that imperial Germany was a paternalist power.

The fact is that most thinkers on German foreign policy in the Wilhelmine era favoured German expansion and an increased standing for Germany in world affairs. In this period, Tirpitz was as much a tool—an expression—as he was an independent actor. Tirpitz was part of a social structure at the core of Imperial Germany. Was this a structure entirely different from those found in other sea powers at the turn of the century? Much has been said above on how the ideological foundation of sea power influenced Germany, and much more can be said about its implications for the international system. But it is also a fact that a maritime revolution took place at the international scene from the 1890s till WWI. Again, domestic and international levels of explanation must be addressed simultaneously. It is true that the international development was perceived in a particular way in Germany, and it is true that Germany in turn influenced the international development in its particular way. But the outcomes at this level to a large degree were unintended consequences of a multitude of decisions. The study of German sea power is interesting precisely because of this particular interaction between the domestic level in Germany and the international level. This case also belies economic reductionism as a way of explaining the development in Europe. German navalists seem to have vastly overrated the economic significance of colonies, it is safe to say. To be somewhat cynical, the prospect of being able to supply the navy in times of war was perhaps their best use, but then again; what should the navy be there for? What mattered however, were perceptions; perceptions shaped by the ideology of sea power. Explanations of the German-British arms race and the rise of German navalism has primarily been addressed by two different approaches; one that stresses the particular domestic institutions and motivations of the domestic realm, the other belonging in the camp of IR macro theory that apply quantitative analysis of arms races (often so-called peace studies). I believe neither is sufficient to understand the increase in German extraterritorial power, while elements from both are necessary to comprehend the German trajectory. My main argument is that this particular trajectory cannot be explained solely with reference to the international system. Clearly, the ideology as articulated by Mahan merged with

998 Hobson, 2002: 284
social power in a different way in Germany than in the US. On the other hand, there is good reason to question whether the German ambitions for sea power really made it different than other major powers in the period from 1897 till 1914. Nevertheless, most observers will agree that it was an astonishing industrial enterprise for a new-comer among the sea-powers to build such a strong fleet. It was a feat made possible due to Tirpitz, to a Kaiser determined to build a fleet, and adherents to domestic explanations have also stressed the nature of the German political institutions as a supposedly vital factor. The Reichstag had limited control over the executive, and the Kaiser kept a decisive say over strategy and armaments. On the domestic side, there have been scholars who have advocated the argument that the reactionary “elements” of the German society through a forward foreign policy would seek to uphold the status quo of the classes of the German society. However, one might pose the question whether the domestic preconditions for building sea power was principally the same conditions for building sea power in Russia or Austria-Hungary. In other words, the German empire was not as different from other, primarily territorial, empires that sought sea power that Germany should be labelled as a special case; it belonged to the class of European paternalists. Bismarck had argued strongly that Germany did not need one of the largest fleets in the world to keep paternalist Britain from abusing its power at sea. As a continental power, the security of Germany was primarily enhanced through its strong army. In maritime matters, the most conceivable factor to balance British power was the joint interest of the neutral powers in a European war to keep international waters open for transportation and security for neutral rights. The deterrent to England was exactly the will of the signatory states of the Paris declaration from 1856 to uphold their rights. This made for a potential coalition of forces in the advent of English participation in a major European war. As the economic and indeed military vitality of the US rose in the period prior to WWI, Germany might very well have pursued this potential for a coalition restricting British power. Moreover, Bismarck in 1885 argued that a search for absolute security for Germany’s commercial interests was bound to be futile. Furthermore, Caprivi in effect was an advocate for only a blockade-breaking fleet in European waters, plus keeping good relations with Britain. Bismarck surely was not a naïve idealist, he simply (and as late as in 1897) dismissed the Tirpitz argument that a strong German battle fleet in home waters was a prerequisite to become “alliance-worthy”. What separated the continental from the maritime schools in Germany was the difference in what means were the most suitable to enhance Germany’s position. The navalists were, as we have seen, heavily influenced by Mahan, whose ideology came to be seen as both empirically “proven” and as providing conceptual tools in debates to strengthen the German navy. But this does

999 Hobson, 2002: 297
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not make German naval officers or the German Kaiser more “imperialist” than their colleagues in Britain that already had acquired an overseas empire backed up by the strongest fleet in the world. It was Germany that imitated the paternalist Britain. In fact, German naval developments should be seen as part of the maritime revolution that occurred in the international system in the decades prior to WWI. Ironically, as Mahan built his “theory” of sea power on the model of the British Empire, other second-rate powers gradually came around to the view that strong navies and preferably overseas colonies was something that any great power ought to have. It was not that Kaiser Wilhelm or admiral Tirpitz with their fleet plan sought to revolutionise the international system, but that the unintended consequence, partly as a result of their efforts, was a contribution to exactly such an outcome. As late as July 1914, for example, the Kaiser energetically denounced the idea that England would intervene in the European crisis. One should contrast this to the thinking of British strategists like Kitchener and Fisher. The latter already in 1911 wrote “Jellicoe to be Admiralissimo on October 21, 1914, when the battle of Armageddon comes along”. Of course, Germany was not alone in bringing these unhappiest of all consequences about, but it was a major contributor in the Mahanian era. Those who believed in Mahan thought that the German navy would deter a conflict on such a scale, and in peacetime make the German economy blossom in a larger empire. Similar institutions, similar thoughts and similar efforts at building large navies also occurred in Russia and Austria-Hungary in the same period. Moreover, the British Empire did all it possibly could do to secure its empire through strengthening and modernising its extraterritorial weapons.

Yet, domestic reasons also were necessary to alter the form of international competition. The main impetus came from state- and nation building. For Germany, as a young state in an old system of states, the military in particular proved instrumental. In this respect, Germany was not unique, but the repercussions of its extraterritorial policies were. This makes the particular configuration of German institutions into a significant field of study. Democratic institutions had limited influence on military strategy, with foreign policy being the prerogative of the Chancellor, and military matters the same for the Kaiser. In many respects, this suited Bismarck, the principal architect behind the German constitution. Notwithstanding the democratic weakness of the constitution, such a scheme functioned under the Iron Chancellor, since he was able to coordinate foreign policies. The deficit in this arrangement was that outcomes of policies to a very significant degree depended upon personalities. In this sense, the Prussian heritage in Germany was a double-edged sword. Kaiser William II indeed used the power given to the emperor by appointing the chancellors, secretaries of state and military commanders to his taste. The obstacle to building a large navy was to make navy

1000 Massie, 2003: 56
bills pass muster in the Reichstag. Nationalist groups in favour of naval expansion eased this process. Thus, nation-building in this continental state had the puzzling effect of raising German sea-power. But the interest in sea power as perceived by German industrialists also contributed, often financing agitation for a stronger navy.

However, there is no doubt that the Reichstag, a democratic national assembly by the standards of its age, increasingly supported an accelerated naval expenditure. Without support from liberals and conservatives in parliament, the colossal naval build-up could simply not have taken place. Even the largest moderate party, the Catholic Center, increasingly accepted strengthening the navy to unprecedented heights as a “national responsibility”. The ideology of sea power was not restricted to an inner circle at the very top of German society; it became an axiom in itself in German foreign policy. Nevertheless, to see in this a particularly aggressive or more nationalist political mindset than in other European great powers at the turn of the century, is probably distorting history. Both Russia and Austria-Hungary sought naval expansion. Japan and the US developed great navies prior to WWI, while in Britain; the domestic consensus on a strong Royal navy was at the very heart of English national identity. Although it remains a controversial issue, one might argue the case that Germany was more democratic than Japan, Russia and Austria-Hungary. What stands out as remarkable, perhaps the only truly remarkable, aspect of German navalism was that a country with such a strong army devoted the resources it did on building so strong a navy. The only explanation for this is the ideology of sea power that travelled around the international system from the early 1890s. It is beyond doubt that the grandson of Queen Victoria was utterly fascinated by all things British. It was the political power given to the German emperor combined with the particular naval interests of this Kaiser that made it possible for a Tirpitz to serve as the unchallenged naval expert in Germany for twenty years.

Radical historians, following Eckart Kehr, have interpreted the navalism and militarism of the German empire as an attempt by the elite to slow down processes of democratisation. This line of thought has also had Marxist undertones, emphasising that the German approach to foreign policy was a way for the ruling class to suppress the political ambitions of the labour class. It has even been a way to explain a German Sonderweg from Bismarck to Hitler. It was an attempt prior to WWI, allegedly, to preserve the status quo by an alliance between conservatives and liberals. It is not possible for me to find hard evidence in favour of such a view. Although men like Tirpitz, Bülow and William II did not have much positive to say about socialism, their naval policy was not

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1001 See Mann, 1993: 740-748 for a discussion
1002 Hobson, 2002: 305-6
systematically linked with a desire to curb domestic upheavals. Rolf Hobson has argued the opposite of the Marxist explanations.\footnote{Hobson, 2002: 316}

Miquel’s attempt at \textit{Sammlung} and Tirpitz’s naval policy were contradictory, rather than complementary parts of a common political scheme. It is true that Max Weber published commentaries in the \textit{Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung} in 1897 and 1898 where he spoke in favor of \textit{Weltpolitik} and a strong German navy, where one of his arguments was that an expansionist policy would improve the “political climate” in the German society. However, we should note that the purpose of Weber’s recommendations were to “educate” the bourgeoisie, limit the power of the Junkers and channel the energy of a democratised society into overseas policy. His commentaries were not arguments in favour of upholding the prerogatives of the Kaiser or the \textit{Reichsmarineamt}! Rather, it seems, these rather short public expressions by Weber were eagerly used to interpret German history by Kehr and other radical historians. Indeed, one of the foremost of historians who has contributed a major study of the genesis of the Tirpitz plan concludes as follows on the \textit{sammlung}-theory and German navalism:

"\textit{In this appraisal of Tirpitz’s motives, many historians have argued that the domestic, anti-socialist, anti-parliamentary goals of William II’s Weltpolitik were Tirppitz’s own primary goals. This thesis fails to take into account the admiral’s opportunism and attributes to him a depth of ideological conviction that simply did not exist, at least in the mid-1890s...he remained, first and formesost, a navy man with naval interests. His primary goals was to gain more ships, more money and a secure, central place for the navy in the overall strategy of his country}”\footnote{Sondhaus, 1997: 230}

It was the combination of German sea \textit{and} land power that made it into a competitor for hegemony in Europe at large. If Germany controlled continental Europe and threatened the Royal Navy, then England’s position would be highly vulnerable. The US would face a volatile constellation of powers if Britain were to suffer a severe blow (as seemed not totally unlikely by 1917). The worst case was a hegemonic Germany with the Royal Navy defeated. The tragedy behind the extraterritorial ambitions of Tirpitz and William II was the extent to which Germany’s search for security and recognition lined up the one opponent after the other. However, the gains to the other major European powers by the defeat of Germany were limited, indeed. Neither Britain nor France
could enjoy a substantial naval spoil after WWI. All allied powers agreed that the entire German submarine fleet should be surrendered (to the allies) after the war. The English and, in particular, French governments also wanted to take over the majority of the German surface vessels. All the German surface ships were thus interned at Scapa Flow in 1918. On June 20 1919, the Allied Naval Council authorised seizure of the interned German ships at the moment the armistice was to expire. The German Admiral Reuter, unaware of the deadline and without any written or oral orders from Germany, nevertheless was determined to pre-empt such an outcome. He therefore ordered the entire fleet sunk peacefully in Scapa Flow. Furthermore, the loss of the German colonial empire, although covering 1.000.000 square miles, was not as hard a blow as one might perhaps imagine, since the German overseas empire never became an example of a successful imitation of the British Empire. By 1914, these extraterritorial possessions had housed less than 21000 Germans, and contributed to only 0.5 per cent of Germany’s foreign trade.1005

Illustrating the relatively weak strategic German interests in its colonies is the fact that the German navy never really prioritised defending them during WW I. Furthermore, the foreign policy of the Third Reich followed Mackinder rather than Mahan in one crucial sense; to Hitler it was paramount to expand eastwards rather than seeking colonies overseas. The pre-war German building program illustrated this thinking. Naval construction came out as third priority, behind the army and the Luftwaffe. A substantial build-up of the German fleet did not occur until 1938. The ultimate victory, according to Haushofer, would come as a result of the occupation of the Soviet Union, which would mean that Germany was in full control of the “Heartland”. Ironically, then, Imperial Germany became a major sea power in the first years of the 20th century based on a rhetoric partly constructed by an American naval officer. To see Germany as more imperialist than the other European paternalist powers prior to WWI is nevertheless misleading. In contrast, the case of the US certainly displays a different trajectory.

1005 Kennedy, 1976: 299
4.3 The ascent of a Maritime hegemon; The US

“It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs”
Woodrow Wilson, 1912

In the previous section, we also stressed some –at least seeming- similarities between North America and Germany in naval terms. Both were relatively young independent states with very modest naval institutions and –experience, and somewhat theoretical and abstract approaches to sea power developed in both countries. Partly, this allegedly resulted in a curious tendency to separate naval planning from politics. A historian of the US Navy thus has written on the service in 1913 that;

“Naval planning was detached from the political world. Sea-power theorists gave little thought to the possibility that governments may try to avoid war, may have allies –or other enemies- that constrain them, or may pursue commercial ends by means other than command of the sea”

Such a postulate might at least form the basis of an interesting analytical question; to what degree did naval policies in the US reflect imperial or liberal tenets of US foreign policy? If naval policies were really “detached from the political world”, then we should expect to find evidence that naval policies shaped US foreign policy preferences through a “bottom-up” mechanism somewhat similar to the case of Imperial Germany. Furthermore, if history is path-dependent, we might also suggest an additional approach in line with our hypothesis (chapter two) that the US predominantly has been an uneasy liberal bandwagoning state from 1815 until the 1890s, and then to turn into an international liberalist; what were the central motives of policymakers to create and maintain a sea-going navy at all? Inherent in such a question is the central task of showing how naval priorities illuminate the paternalism-liberalism dichotomy applied to US foreign policy.

At the same time, the differences between Germany and the United States are obvious. Whereas Imperial Germany quite openly embraced imperialism after 1890, the US perceived itself as an anti-imperialist polity, whatever other nations would claim to the contrary. In American public opinion and among US politicians, policies that contained too evident features of imperialism resembling European foreign policies were always highly contested. Several explanations have been given in

1006 Cited in Thompson, 2002: 78
1008 Baer, 1993: 50 This statement applies to both War Plan Orange –the contingency plan in case of war with Japan, as well as War Plan Black, the same plan for military dispositions in case of war with Germany.
previous chapters (esp. ch. two and four) to account for this self-image, and should perhaps be shortly repeated here.

Firstly, in terms of geography, the US was not physically located in the centre of European great power politics, a fact so obvious that it is often left unnoticed. In fact, the sheer distance in time and space between the two continents made the US equipped to primarily address internal and regional concerns in the latter part of the 19th century. The US also had immense natural resources on its own territory. Historians, among them Hugh Brogan and David Kennedy, have argued that this made overseas expansion seem unnecessary or counterproductive to wealthy citizens and governments alike.1009 Exploring and developing US soil was a vast undertaking, a long lasting process, and cost-effective.

Secondly, in sociological terms the constitution of the US as a state and society was different to that of the continental European great powers. US citizens to some degree considered North America as the first new nation, the first colony to break away from the colonial rule of a European great power. It was a state based on ideas, and one prominent US social scientist has gone so far as to claim that “The American political system of the twentieth century still bears a closer approximation to the Tudor polity of the sixteenth century than does the British political system of the twentieth century”.1010 Needless to say, North Americans conscious of their European origin had severe difficulties in seeing themselves as imperialists, indeed in embracing anything with a resemblance of expansionist foreign policies at all.1011 I believe this background helps explain our theoretical labelling of the US as a “liberalist” on the international arena.1012 In all questions on foreign trade and maritime matters, two views naturally intertwined in American politics, the US consistently

1009 Brogan, 1999, David Kennedy, 1999
1010 Huntington, 1966: 382
1011 Thompson, 2002: 98: “…the policy of non-involvement had an ideological as well as a pragmatic basis. From the classical republican and English country Whig traditions of political thought, Americans had inherited a belief that standing armies were a threat to domestic liberty as well as a burden on taxpayers; free societies should rely on a citizen militia for defence. This idea became incorporated into the broad distinction between the "New World" and the "Old" that was fundamental to the ideology of American nationalism as it developed after the Revolution. The whole business of power politics, including professional diplomacy and espionage as well as war, came to be associated with the European social order – the means by which an essentially feudal ruling class justified both its privileges and the whole oppressive apparatus of states and empires”. When Secretary of Defence Ronal Rumsfeld during the Bush Jr Administration quipped that France and Germany were part of "Old" Europe, his utterance was part of a long North American tradition.
1012 Thompson, 2002: 97 argues that the US was not a player on the world arena at all. I believe this is an exaggeration; witness the US naval possessions in the Pacific and the Far East, plus the Open Door Policy. However, the passive form of liberalism in US foreign policy was remarkable on the European arena dominated by European paternalists. The US polity followed the advice of Washington not to let commercial relations develop into political ones. But that the US economy was an integral part of the world-system is beyond doubt. By 1913, its proportion of world manufacturing output was 32 percent, more than double of Germany as the second largest. Furthermore, the US had an agricultural surplus and was more or less self-sufficient in all raw materials. Also, while
opposed policies of *mare clausum* in international affairs. Naturally, the United States itself took liberties on this principle from time to time (I.e. the Monroe Doctrine, especially 1890-1909), but the memories from the war of the Revolution and the British maritime policies during the Napoleon wars left a deep imprint on the ideology of US foreign policy. The British burning of Washington in 1814 was a short-term tactical success for Britain, but would eventually become a central facet of the American identity, as were the US national anthem, written during the bombardment of Baltimore. The word blockade, so prominent in British naval policy and strategy, was a condemned word in the US.

However, if we accept this ideal type of US foreign policy, we must also admit that there are anomalies, deviations from the ideal type, in the history of US foreign policy. Scholars have often pointed out that the US indeed did expand politically and geographically. Especially on the left we will face critical remarks to the very concept of the US as an “international liberalist” from the 1890s. From this camp of scholars, US policy towards Latin America, the Philippines and territories in Asia will be pointed out as examples that illustrate the alleged imperialist creed that has been found in US foreign policy.

We will have to discuss the latter part of the 20th century and first years of the 21st in the next chapter, but I will emphasize that the one hundred years from 1845 illustrates that the case of US extraterritorial power was qualitatively different than that of the paternalist European powers. The justifications and ideological basis for expansionist policies on behalf of the US were, in main, different than those of Britain and Imperial Germany. One particular difference to the European powers was that the latter to a much greater degree applied double standards in foreign policy, drawing a sharp distinction between the standards of domestic and foreign policies. This demarcation gradually became less sharp among US policymakers. The existence of such an ideological component in the constitution of the American society was well illustrated by the policies that were exceptions to liberalism. The works of A.T: Mahan and the policies of Theodore Roosevelt are particularly interesting to illuminate the battle between paternalism and liberalism in the US worldview and apprehensions of its own possibilities and limitations on the international arena. In other words, paternalist sentiments among US policymakers and ideologists at times have spilled into US foreign policy. However, the very controversy that US interventionist affairs always stirred within the USA tends to support the hypotheses that the US was a fundamentally distinct

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Germany by 1913 produced more steel than Britain, Russia and France combined, America’s production was nearly double that of Germany!

1013 See Brogan, 1999: 251-5

actor in the international system; it only reluctantly entered into “entangling alliances”, or let overseas commercial relations develop into explicit political ones. In this chapter, I will seek to illustrate the ideological ambiguity within the US that eventually determined US involvement in major wars and international cooperation until 1945. The particular historical trajectory of the US will be emphasised in order to be able to interpret how it structured international relations in a peculiar way in the first half of the 20th century. Secondly, this American “exceptionalism” will be illustrated through the development and use of the US navy. My attempt to show that the “US Navy” hardly existed as an integral part of a “monopoly of violence” at all before the 1890s, aptly illustrates the difference between the US and the European great power paternalists. Thirdly, I will discuss the imperialist element in US foreign policy in the era of Theodore Roosevelt, and show how this sentiment was replaced by isolationism, Wilsonian internationalism and ultimately the attempt by F.D. Roosevelt (FDR) to impose an international order after WWII that in some respects was similar to ideologies that can be traced back to the New Deal (for the impact of the latter, see ch. 5).

4.3.1 US state formation and a modest Naval Power: The US NAVY 1845-1890

State building is a continuous process, as described by the late Stein Rokkan, and a process that eventually is carried on to maintain or moderate structures that are results of earlier state formation efforts. In the case of the US however, the state formation process from 1845 till the end of the Civil war was a discontinuous process of particularly abrupt changes in terms of what the US actually should be. This also had an obvious territorial component. By 1845 Texas had enjoyed de facto autonomy from Mexico for nine years. In California, an armed uprising had driven out the representatives of the Mexican central authorities. On 1 March 1845, President Tyler signed a congressional resolution where Texas –“at the request of the Texans”- was annexed by the US. This led to the armed conflict between Mexico and the United States in 1846, where The US applied

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1015 See Crockatt 1995 chapter one for a discussion.
1016 Potter, 1981: 113. Throughout this section I will refer to Potter, 1981, a widely used textbook on sea power that has been curriculum on US Naval Academy and numerous other Academies in the services of Western nations since its publication. Needless to say, such a reference should be used with caution. One should not expect to find particularly critical views of US foreign Policy, for example, in such a book. Indeed, in the chapters on the Cold war, such a suspicion is confirmed, Potter being a rather traditionalist US scholar on the history of the Cold War. I have therefore been critical in interpreting, and rarely relied on Potter on political conditions in the Cold War era. Nevertheless, Potter is in fact far more balanced than expected on the trajectory of US naval policies. His critical remarks on US decisions in the period from 1890 till 1941, for example, has stood the test of time. He is also on safe grounds in descriptive passages on naval developments. Overall, Potter’s Sea power serves as a useful overview of naval developments to this day.
1017 Potter, 1981: 113
naval force to seize San Francisco and other Californian ports, and to transport troops and supplies to the campaign on land, a campaign that eventually also resulted in an invasion of New Mexico. The war was momentarily brought to a halt through the signing of the Treaty of Cahuenga of 1847, ceding California *de facto* to the US. It is interesting to note that this became a lesson that at least temporarily taught the US the value of naval power in North American waters. The land campaign inside Mexico proper in 1847 was also the first inland battle in the history of the US Marine Corps. The end result of this war of US “manifest destiny” was the fulfilment of the dream that the US should stretch from the Atlantic- to the Pacific Ocean. By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico lost 40% of its territory. It ceded California and New Mexico to the US and recognised US sovereignty in Texas all the way to the Rio Grande. This territory became the states of California, Nevada and Utah, most of Arizona, plus parts of New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. The United States paid Mexico some fifteen million dollars as compensation for her lost territories.

Apart from this, the question of what the US was to be had to be resolved through war. So much scholarship has been devoted to the American Civil war that it seems unnecessary to dwell on its origins or conduct. Traditionally, few historians have emphasised the maritime dimension of the conflict, a dimension that was to shape North American thinking on the freedom of the seas, *mare liberum*, for a century, perhaps especially in the southern states.

The Navy’s strategy of blockade, in addition to the capture of confederate ports, and riverine warfare in the West, was a precondition for the victories of the Union armies. The American Civil War in fact is an apt illustration of how naval warfare with all its requirements was an invaluable contributor, not only to strategy, but also to state formation.\(^{1018}\)

Prior to the Civil war, the Union navy was a small and unsophisticated institution. Through the requirements of the civil war, sealing off 3500 miles of enemy coastline, the navy grew spectacularly between 1861 and 1865; from 42 to 500 ships.\(^{1019}\) The –in the eyes of the Union-utterly successful efforts at strangling the commercial life of the south left two lasting impressions on the US. Firstly, naval power was a potent political instrument in American waters. If the US were to face an overwhelmingly stronger sea power, it would pay a high price. Secondly, it reinforced the general belief, especially in the south, that *mare clausum*-policies could be a mean form of warfare. Hence, the use of blockade by Great Britain during WWI could cause indignation among American

\(^{1018}\) See Howarth, 1999; chapters 17 and 18 for a good summary
\(^{1019}\) Potter, 1981: 124. The number of ships in 1865 naturally includes private ships that were commissioned for the use in the navy. Again, the very nature of the Union navy was not akin to our contemporary understanding of a navy. The entire organisation was heavily based on private enterprise, even when compared to the Royal Navy
politicians, journalists and laymen to a scale that surprised most Europeans. The ultimate success of the Union in turning the resources of its industry and maritime sector into a wartime navy was nevertheless astounding. The total number of ships in the Union navy rose from 42 to 264 during 1861.\textsuperscript{1020} The civil war was important also in another aspect; it was a catalyst in bringing about modernisation of arms at sea. The South with its predominantly agrarian economy could not compete with the North in producing large numbers of new ships. Thus, energetic efforts at technological breakthroughs were attempted in order to produce ships that would make the traditional Union ship types inferior. In other words, the Confederacy tried to beat quantity with quality. Perhaps the most spectacular effort to do so was the introduction of armoured warships.\textsuperscript{1021} The most cost-effective way to do this was to clothe existing ships in steel. By 1861, the South had converted its first ship into an ironclad – CSS Virginia. The prospect of such a vessel with increased protection was that it could be able to break the blockade of Chesapeake Bay, and cut off supplies at sea to the Union land forces. The most promising design was the one of \textit{Monitor}, a work of John Ericsson.\textsuperscript{1022} Engineers at the time argued that \textit{Monitor} contained more than 40 patentable inventions.\textsuperscript{1023} At the Battle of Hampton Roads, the efficiency of the ironclads was seemingly demonstrated not only to North Americans, but also to the naval world at large.\textsuperscript{1024} However, the Confederation did not manage to exploit their initial lead, and turned to other technological innovations. The most successful was the mine, or as it was dubbed by contemporaries, the “torpedo”; a stationary underwater charge fired by either contact or electrical impulse directed from shore.\textsuperscript{1025} These weapons by far sunk the largest number of Union ships.\textsuperscript{1026} The South also produced submarines, small vessels with a crew of nine. These had the unfortunate habit of sinking itself and its crew to the bottom, so it never became an institutionalised arm in the American navy after the Civil War. However, the introduction of ironclads, mines, torpedoes and submarines pointed out the technological direction of sea power for the rest of the century. In another respect, the Civil War marked a swan song of an old phenomenon. After the Paris Declaration of 1856, privateering had more or less vanished from the repertoire of the use of sea power by states, France

during the Napoleonic wars. Yet, the point is that the Union had the personnel, economy and industrial base that made it possible to mobilise the resources of the society into an effective arm of the state.

\textsuperscript{1020} Potter, 1881: 124-125
\textsuperscript{1021} Howarth, 1999: 183-4
\textsuperscript{1022} Howarth, 1999: 185-6
\textsuperscript{1023} Potter, 1981: 127
\textsuperscript{1024} See Howarth, 1999: 191
\textsuperscript{1025} It is a testimony to the lasting effect these devices had on naval warfare, that the Norwegian Navy as late as the 1990s still constructed such mine fields with advanced fire control from the shore. Mines that fire on contact is still in use in most navies, witness the Iraqi laying of mines during the war in 2003. During the cold war, both the US and USSR produced mines, torpedoes and depth charges with nuclear charges.
\textsuperscript{1026} See Howarth, 1999: 208-9
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and Great Britain forbidding such practises within their empires. The south nevertheless ventured a policy of privateering, and supplied this with commerce raiding by ordinary naval vessels. This was felt by the Union through losses of cargo, increased insurance rates and the necessity of dispersing naval force to find the needles in the haystack; Confederation vessels. However, such policies of extraterritorial violence added to the criticism of the Confederacy from most western powers, thereby also ironically resulting in the confiscation of two ironclads that had been ordered from England. The very trajectory of the naval developments of the Confederacy does not, however, conceal the fact that the naval power of the south was gradually reduced compared to the Union. Although new usages of technology were to leave an imprint on warfare at sea ever after, the strategy of the South was the strategy of the weak. With the American Civil War, the US had gained experience in blockading, naval diplomacy, distant patrols, the use of steam, armour mine warfare and submarines. According to Stephen Howarth, the infrastructures and institutional basis of the US Navy embedded in the North American society was established; “Gideon Wells, by adding three extra bureaus, had refined the Navy’s administration to a form which remained essentially unchanged until after the Second World War...It had dry docks, navy yards, foundries and rolling mills”

By the end of the Civil War, the US navy on paper (i.e. in quantitative terms) was one of the strongest naval powers on earth. It counted 700 ships, 5000 guns, 6700 officers and 51000 men on duty. This force could easily have been applied as a mean to protect overseas trade, or even to project political power regionally or globally. Had the US been a paternalist power, such a temptation could hardly have been resisted. But the United States was not a paternalist, and in effect scrapped its enormous extraterritorial state apparatus by 1870. By this time, all its ironclad monitors had been laid up, its converted merchantmen sold or scrapped and most of its riverine ships decommissioned. Thus, E.B Potter has noted that by 1870 “only 52 ships mounting 500 guns were in full commission”, and Robert Albion comments that "The naval officers faced wholesale

1027 Howarth, 1999: 195-6
1028 See Reynolds, 1974: 384-394
1029 “The American carrying trade fell very badly and did not return to its antebellum level for three generations. But northern imports and exports continued to be carried in other countries ships, whereas in the South, as the blockade grew ever tighter, overseas trade evaporated”, Howarth, 1999: 196
1030 Howarth, 1999: 215
1031 Potter, 1981: 155. The exact numbers seem to be hard to determine. Howarth, 1999: 218 claims that by 1865, the US navy had 671 ships in commission, 7000 officers and 51500 enlisted men.
1032 One might even be tempted to draw the analogy to Ming China, a seapower that eventually abandoned its navy and overseas objectives.In 1436, an imperial edict banned the construction of seagoing ships.
1033 Potter, 1981: 155
unemployment as the swollen Civil War Navy shrank to a meagre handful of cruisers”. The downscaling of this effective force following the Civil war indicates how modest roles imperial objectives could play in US foreign policy. In domestic politics, focus instead was on the reconstruction of the south, settlement of the west and industrialisation of the northeast. To a higher degree than in Germany, the US was a polity where citizens and politicians alike perceived its own territory as promising an abundance of opportunities for development; developments that also could lead to a positive trade balance with any other power. In addition, geopolitical factors were perceived as beneficial to the United States. By 1870, the 3000 miles of Atlantic that divided North America and Europe was seen as an assurance against any serious threats on the international arena. And as long as Britain was a status quo power, the international market would not hinder US economic growth. The US was a liberal bandwagoning state at this stage, but it had not become an international liberalist yet. It was a bandwagoning liberalist in the sense that its dominant conception of an international community was one based on the “freedom of nations”, where free trade and the freedom of the oceans was a precondition for the other. As long as relations between states could be based on such freedoms, the US would scarcely have any incentive for “entangling alliances”. In the words of Hugh Brogan; “The world was so large, the oceans so wide and their own continent so vast and empty it was impossible for the Americans to be much concerned with foreign affairs”. Such a worldview did not provide justification for a strong navy. Congress barely appropriated enough funds for the US Navy to keep its ships manned and afloat between 1868 and 1883. Thus, the small allocations devoted to the navy made it a very modest state institution with few ships and few officers;

“By 1881 Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt could report that all but thirty-one American vessels were unserviceable. Representative John D. Long termed the fleet “an alphabet of floating wash tubs”, regarded by the public as a “marine Falstaffian burlesque”.”

In other respects, US maritime power nevertheless was considerable. Throughout the 19th century, US overseas trade thrived and developed. This increased the merchant navy, a backbone of any maritime community. Furthermore, the modest US navy did preserve the skills needed to apply sea

1034 Albion, 1945: 299
1035 See Howarth, 1999: 225-6
1036 Brogan, 1999: 436
1037 See Howarth, 1999: 221-3
1038 O’Connell, 1993: 57
power as a mean to meet political goals. This is evidenced in the overseas operations of the fleet that were aimed at protecting US trade. In 1871, for example, US marines and sailors went ashore in Korea and killed some 350 Koreans. US sailors landed in Montevideo to protect American property, US marines were sent to Panama to keep open the trans-Isthmian railroad, and the US Navy worked closely with the Royal navy in Egyptian and Chinese waters to show force.\(^{1039}\) When one adds the “opening” of Japan, we must admit that there were traits of paternalism in US foreign policy. On behalf of the US, naval officers laid claim to the Midway Atoll, made Japan open more ports to American trade, and reached agreements on navigation and commerce with Korea, Tutuila in the Samoa Islands and Madagascar. US naval expeditions also surveyed possible canal routes in Panama, Nicaragua and Mexico.\(^{1040}\) Nevertheless, these expeditions did not cover the fact that the US Navy lagged behind in arms, propulsion and armour by the early 1880s when compared to paternalist Britain.

The USA started rebuilding its navy in the early 1880s. The timing was no coincidence. Following the reconstruction after the Civil war, the economy prospered, making allocations for the Navy easier to defend. Furthermore, the technological development at this stage had reached a plateau, making investments in the navy look less risky; a ship designed in the early 1880s was unlikely to be outdated by technological innovations in a near future. Thirdly, the consolidation of the US and the growing economy made for a surplus of attention that could be directed outwards from the North American territory to international relations. Closely related to this was the tremendous growth of American industry; the domestic market was bound to be saturated, making foreign trade an obvious solution for further growth. At this stage, domestic and international levels of explanation again meet; American businessmen saw clear hindrances to increased foreign trade in the new era of imperialism. Inherent in this age was the tendency towards British, German and French monopolies of commerce and production. It therefore seemed a logical conclusion to American policymakers to build a larger merchant marine and a stronger navy to protect the former. The Republican Party, gaining control of both houses of Congress in 1880, was determined to amend the state of the weak US Navy.\(^{1041}\) President Garfield appointed William Hunt secretary of the navy. Hunt soon set up an advisory board to draw up different alternatives for the future fleet. After heated debates in Congress, construction of three cruisers was finally authorised in 1883, a year historians are prone to see as the junction separating the old and the modern US navy. Although the size of the new fleet

\(^{1039}\) Potter, 1981: 155-156
\(^{1040}\) Potter, 1981: 156
was not particularly impressive by the standards of major powers, the vessels were nevertheless highly modern. What mattered in the longer term was that ever after 1885, Congress each year granted funds for naval construction, the fleet grew slowly but consistently in size and levels of sophistication. While initially inexperienced at shipbuilding, American dockyards steadily improved and had reached the elite division by the late 1880s. In the process, American steel industry also blossomed. Thus, the infant of the so-called military-industrial complex was born; the steel industry soon was an important ally in the struggle for congressional funding. In tandem with this development, US senators also began to question the doctrine of commerce raiding, and called for full-fledged battle fleets that could “break up a blockade and defeat any enemy fleet that attempted to support a coastal invasion of the United States”. In fact, by 1889 eleven states had larger navies than the United States. Congress authorised the building of three seagoing battleships in 1890. It is natural to remark, however, that this certainly was not the navy of an imperialist power. If the US had harboured paternalist ambitions on the international scene, it would have had to build a stronger extraterritorial arm. On the domestic side of the coin, though, there is little doubt that the US by 1890 had acquired the skill and the organisational capability to build outstanding naval vessels. Considering the industrial and economic capacity of the United States of America, most strategists at the time appreciated it as a potential enemy or alliance-partner. The Naval Academy was established at Annapolis Virginia, and in 1873, the United States naval Institute was added as an institution to educate the Navy officer corps. The Academy published the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, a magazine that became a vitalising factor for the Navy, while the next new navy institution was formed in 1885 as the Naval War College. Perhaps even more important both to US state formation and to the calibration of the USA as an actor in international relations, was the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882. This organisation stationed naval attachés at American ministries around the world. Thus, a network of agents

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1041 Potter, 1981: 159
1042 For example, the ships were fully electrified, a step further from the traditional ships of the US navy.
1043 O’Connell, 1993: chapter 3 sees this as important for the further development of the US Navy
1044 Potter, 1981: 160
1045 Baer, 1993:9
1046 Indeed, as Baer, 1993: 21-24 shows, even US naval officers were quite puzzled as to what tasks the ”new” Navy should have.
1047 Furthermore, ”Concentration of forces for defense of the homeland meant keeping the battleships close to home. Along the coasts were secure bases and reliable fuel supplies” Baer, 1993: 25. By the early 1890s, upholding the Monroe doctrine was the conceptual limit of most naval thinking in the US.
1048 Potter, 1981: 161 is, like most American scholars, mistaken in the assertion that “the Naval War College so proved its worth that the major navies of the world established similar colleges”. As we have seen, the German Navy had founded its Marine-Akademie earlier. The first “idologist” of sea power in Germany, Stenzel, worked at the German Academy already as early as 1875.
monitoring naval developments worldwide was created, making naval issues much more integrated with the foreign services in general. The series of reports became a central mean to assess and evaluate US war plans and contingency plans.

In sum, then, the US in the period from 1875 till 1890 acquired permanent state institutions of a modern navy. It had the organisational and technological skills to build, man and operate modern warships of the industrial age. Until the 1890s, however, this organisation primarily was a part of the consolidation of the state, and did not make itself particularly felt on the international scene. In fact, compared to ALL the other states analysed here, the differentiation of specialised military institutions took place in the US long after such institutions were established in Europe. In the words of Samuel P. Huntington;

“Not until the turn of the century [i.e. 1900] did the United States have many of the institutions of professional officership which the European states had acquired many decades earlier. The division of power among governmental institutions perpetuated the mixing of politics and military affairs, and enormously complicated the emergence of a modern system of objective civilian control”

The result, I dare say, was a too long distance between politics and strategy, plus a lack of comprehensive and consistent developments of national doctrines for the application of US military power

The international, and partly domestic, effects of American sea power were to become much more pronounced in the next decade. Embedded in this development was a public “love affair” with battleships. Increasingly, the battleships and the Great White Fleet came to be seen as symbols for the power and the glory of the US. After the 1902 crisis off Venezuela, for example, naval squadrons were frequently sent on displays to ports of friendly countries. By 1915, Bradley Fiske publicly mused what would happen if the battleship would run on land; “It could whip an army of a million men, knock down all the buildings in New York, smash all the cars, break all the bridges,

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1049 One should notice that all the institutions mentioned here are still thriving. The office of Naval Intelligence with its headquarters in Washington D.C., for example, is by far the most vigorous agent in naval intelligence in the world. At the time of writing, no other institution even comes close in resources and span of activity.
1050 Howarth, 1999: 226
1051 Huntington, 1966: 400
1052 Baer, 1993: 33, and especially O’Connell, 1993: chapters 3-5
1053 Baer, 1993: 42
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and sink all the shipping." While such a view was not representative of the US populace or US politicians, it is nevertheless tempting and not implausible to see the period from 1890 till 1903 as a juncture in US foreign policy. In this period, we have shown that the US Navy grew steadily. But this alone is not evidence of a change in US foreign policy. The number and nature of US interventions in international relations will be a much better indicator of the development of the foreign policies of the United States. Furthermore, the context of US naval war plans, War Plan Black and –Orange, must be considered in order to grasp the nuances of US policies, since these two plans shows the central dilemma in application of extraterritorial violence by the United States; the emphasis on the Atlantic versus the Pacific. But the context cannot be read out of the war plans themselves, being staff documents prepared for contingencies that most of the public opinion was unprepared for. Instead, we will seek to trace the dominant traits in US naval policies and the ideologies that shaped it.

4.3.2 The dog that never really barked; The USA as a regional Imperial power

Why did even the international liberalist USA for a short period become a state that acted as something resembling an imperial power around the turn of the century?

Scholars who are inclined to stress material factors will undoubtedly point to the expanding US economy as the answer. As we have seen, US industrialists and politicians did indeed see an increase in overseas trade as vital to continued economic growth. However, I have great difficulties in seeing any causal connection between increased trade and the impulse to exercise a more paternalist foreign policy through sea power and territorial annexations. To the contrary, the North American conception of international trade was precisely that mercantilist policies were incompatible with free trade, and that *mare clausum* of the British model was incompatible with the liberalism that Americans held so high. Besides, one should be aware that *Pax Britannica (1815-1890s)* served US interests well on the oceans, and –the ideological differences between the two powers not withstanding- the relationship between Britain and the US was relatively good. Materialist explanations alone will not suffice to explain the particular trajectory of US extraterritorial ambitions.

The most traditional explanations from mainstream IR literature will point out that the always competitive, not to say regressive, nature of international relations simply meant that an expanding

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1054 Cited in O’Connell, 1993: 85
US economy indicated an increase in the tasks of protecting national interests. Thus, the US is a straightforward example of a power that adapted to the realities of the international state system. There is clear evidence that US policymakers indeed feared tendencies towards monopolies and a modern variant of mercantilism that they perceived among the European Great powers. If the dominant perception of policymakers in the US was the one found in balance of power theory, or in a Darwinist perception of world affairs, then achieving and protecting overseas trade through extraterritorial violence was a logical way to enhance national interests. However, I believe it to be an incomplete explanation. The nature of the international system cannot alone adequately explain the changes in US thinking. I believe this is evidenced both in the fact that sea power as an ideology proper was born in the US, and in the writings of that particular character chiefly responsible for pronouncing it. In other words, I postulate that an ideological impulse different than the traditional liberal values of the US for a short period of time reached support in the political leadership of the United States. This impulse to a large degree stemmed from the writings and teachings of the American naval officer A.T. Mahan.

Captain A.T. Mahan was appointed president and chief instructor of the Naval War College in 1886, chiefly based on his merits as a naval historian of the American Civil War. It is a curious fact that initially, Mahan like most of his fellow countrymen was firm in his belief that the US should avoid acquiring overseas territories. In his mind, it would impose too much of a burden on the navy in addition to create a caste of military and imperial rulers too far away from the control of the democratically elected government. The fact is that Mahan prior to his assignment to the College simply accepted the limited role of the US Navy as an arm to protect an isolationist continent, but he allegedly was driven by the desire to raise “the profession in the eye of its members”.1055

The converting of Mahan, according to one popular account1056, largely took place as he started to study history on a large scale in preparation for his duties at the War College. In his own words, he “discovered” that “control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been appreciated and expounded”.1057 In reality, of course, Mahan drew heavily on the British Empire as the empirical case on which to build his theory.1058 This is not to say that “The Influence of Sea Power upon

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1055 O`Connell, 1993: 64
1056 Potter, 1981: 161-163. Hobson, 2002, on the other hand, claims that this process started on an official duty to Latin America. In a library there, or so Mahan claimed, the importance of sea power as a historical force suddenly appeared to him when studying Mommsen’s works on the Roman Empire. I find the latter claim highly dubious. If this vision appeared to Mahan long before his assignment to the war College, it seems very inconsistent with his strong adversion to overseas possessions immediately after this assignment, although opportunism might explain this.
1057 Quoted in Potter, 1981: 162
1058 While the ”checklist” of what makes a state into a sea power certainly was the part of the book that drew most attention in political circles, his generalisations seem somewhat shaky today.
History” (ISPUH) (1890) was not a pioneering work. It clearly illustrated the way a small island had utilised its resources at the maximum rate and became a truly hegemonic naval power. But out of this unique historical experience, Mahan generalised too much. To US readers, one of the most exciting and debated proposals in ISPUH and “The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future” (1897) was that the US possessed many of the factors that had made Britain a sea power of first rank. Thus, a strong seagoing navy would increase the wealth and influence of America, to put it crudely. But inherent, indeed explicit in his argument, was the assumption that imperialism was part of being a sea power; thus, colonies was something a great power ought to have; “In yet another way does the national genius affect the growth of sea power in its broadest sense; and that is in so far as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies”\(^ {1059}\) Furthermore, overseas trade necessitated sea control; the naval securing of communications at sea for the merchant marine. And in the industrial age, logistics demanded overseas bases and stations to support the naval vessels. How were these bases to be supported? Mahan’s answer was that they were best situated in colonies; then they would be more or less self-supplied, since the bases existed for the navy, and not the other way around!

It is a testimony to the strength of US liberalism that this message was less enthusiastically received by the public in the US than in paternalist nations as Britain, Germany and Japan. William II, for example,

“…Ordered translations placed in the wardroom of every ship in his new navy, and his admiralty distributed it to all schools, public libraries, and government departments. The Japanese government provided translated copies to its army and naval officers, political leaders and schools”.\(^ {1060}\)

Initially, in the US, it primarily influenced a limited number of senior officers and politicians, most notably the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. Above all, it influenced Theodore Roosevelt, first serving as assistant secretary of the navy.\(^ {1061}\) But overall,

\(^{1059}\) Mahan, 1890/1987: 55

\(^{1060}\) Potter, 1981: 163. The Japanese development is not covered in this thesis, but the influence of Mahan upon Japan is a fascinating historical case. To Japanese policymakers, the demonstration of how a small island nation could become a world power through naval force certainly was fascinating. The teachings and publications of Mahan were especially central to the 16 Japanese that attended the US Naval Academy in the years up to 1906.

\(^{1061}\) "Roosevelt’s interest in naval matters was lifelong. Whether reading naval stories, visiting warships or sitting at the feet of his uncles, James and Irvine Bullock, old Confederate naval officers, Roosevelt had much cause in his
the response to Mahan was lukewarm in the US. In fact, while Mahan was being read by senior politicians and populace in the industrial world, he was initially seen as an embarrassment within the US Navy. When Mahan asked to be excused from sea duty in order to continue writing and lecturing, he was told by his superior, Commodore Ramsay that “It is not the business of naval officers to write books”\textsuperscript{1062}, turning down Mahan’s request. But Mahan managed to get ISPUH published at a time when it struck a nerve; its timing was perfect; “His book appeared precisely when Darwinian nationalism, a growing sense of racial supremacy, and dreams of overseas markets were diverting Americans from the previous preoccupation with domestic affairs”\textsuperscript{1063}.

For those labelling the USA as an imperialist power, the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and the earlier Spanish-American War are cited as the best examples of the paternalist traits in American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{1064} Such claims, and especially when linked to the navalist imperialism of Mahan, certainly deserve attention, since they seem to suggest that the label of USA as an international liberalist is misleading. Thus, I will lay particular emphasis on the Spanish-American War in order to interpret the meaning and praxis of US behaviour; did North America become a paternalist “imperialist” at the turn of the century, and what was the particular content of the contest between liberalism and paternalism at this critical juncture? What is beyond doubt, is that after 1898, the US was no longer a bandwagoning state, but had assumed a role as a world power.

There is no denying that the Spanish-American war can be interpreted as a turning point in the history of US foreign policy, although the degree of internationalism in foreign policy would go through repeated changes in the decades that were to come. It was both a reflection of, and a reminder of, greater US participation in world affairs. The war both involved North America in the problems of the Far East as well as testifying to Europeans the increase in US capacities. In its genesis, however, the war arose out of conflict located far closer to North America, to cut a long story short. The Spanish ruled Cuba, but was not prepared to stop a fierce rebellion on the island.\textsuperscript{1065}

By 1896, the Spanish government sent General Valerio Weylor to the island, brutally curbing the youth to develop affection for the Navy. In 1879, while still an undergraduate at Harvard, he demonstrated this affection by launching a study of the naval war of 1812”, Karsten, 1971: 586

\textsuperscript{1062} Cited in Howarth, 1999: 237. O’Connell, 1993: 63 notes that Mahan “was never really liked” by his contemporary colleagues in US Navy.

\textsuperscript{1063} O’Connell, 1993: 69

\textsuperscript{1064} Following the war against Iraq and the split between European powers and the USA has fuelled the debate on US foreign policy at the time of writing. This debate will be analysed through the concepts of this thesis in chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{1065} Potter, 1981: 176. Note that “Because of its commercial and strategic interests, the US had already offered to buy Cuba from Spain on three occasions”, Howarth, 1999: 247
revolution, partly through the use of “concentration camps”\textsuperscript{1066}. It was on the background of this humanitarian crisis that Congress passed a resolution demanding recognition of Cuban belligerency. The reaction of the president was nonetheless typical; Cleveland would not have any imperialist US policy and ignored the resolution. Foreign policy, claimed Cleveland, was the domain of the presidency. The crisis seemed more or less resolved with the introduction of a more benign Spanish rule and increased political autonomy for Cuba. Then, in February 1898, two events eagerly and vividly employed by the media,\textsuperscript{1067} stirred American sentiments.

The first was the publication in the New York Journal of an indiscreet letter written by the Spanish minister in Washington. The letter more than hinted at Spanish duplicity in pending trade agreements. The second, and graver incident for the Spanish, was the tearing apart by an explosion of the US battleship Maine at Cuba. Again, the US press was a contributing factor, fuelling the popular belief that a mine planted and triggered by Spaniards caused the detonation.\textsuperscript{1068} The importance of the explosion was magnified by media, and brought pressure on the government to act. In order to be able to concentrate forces in the advent of conflict with Spain, the majority of the US Navy was already concentrated in the Atlantic. The American east Coast, however, broke into a state of hysteria as the Spanish admiral Cervera steamed from Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands in April 1898. Fearing bombardment and even invasion, investors and populace actually fled the coast for the inland. It was in this context that demands for US coastal guns and naval vessels all along the East Coast arose.\textsuperscript{1069}

\textit{We should also note this very specific background to understand US sentiments leaning towards “paternalism”; the East Coast populace and the media interpreted the situation as one of “clear and present danger” to the US mainland; “when the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands for the western hemisphere [US], citizens panicked in ports on the American east coast”.}\textsuperscript{1070} Even President McKinley, anti-imperialist and isolationist in his worldview, could no longer ignore the cry of the usually non-interventionist Democrats to “Free Cuba!”. Especially so, since he realised that he was certain to lose the next election if he dared to overlook the concerns of the political elite and populace alike. Thus, on April 11\textsuperscript{th} 1898, he sent a war message to Congress,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[1066]{It is safe to say that the US press made the most of this. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Spain applied harsh means, and that thousands of children and women died from disease mainly because of the appalling conditions of the camps.}
\footnotetext[1067]{An (somewhat sarcastic) interpretation is given in "Citizen Kane" by Orson Wells. In reality, media magnet Hearst told his reporter on Cuba; \textit{"You'll furnish the pictures, I'll furnish the war"}, cited in Brogan, 1999: 440}
\footnotetext[1068]{Experts examined all available evidence in 1975. This US investigation concluded,"The characteristics of the damage are consistent with a large internal explosion". Cited in Potter, 1981: 176. Spontaneous combustion of coal probably ignited gunpowder in an adjoining magazine.}
\footnotetext[1069]{See Howarth, 1999: 259-260 for a description.}
\end{footnotes}
requesting authority to use both the Army and the Navy. Yet, we should also note the specific content of the following resolution in Congress, a resolution stressing the humanitarian concerns underpinning the following US actions. It called for a free and independent Cuba following Spanish withdrawal. It also included the Teller amendment, pledging that whatever the outcome, the US would not annex Cuba. US “imperialism” stretched that far, no further.

However, it would be foolish to deny that there were persons in power that saw opportunities for scoring victories in such a setting. One of them certainly was the young assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. He had early seen the opportunities open at the Philippines, owned by Spain, and protected by coastal guns and a small fleet. Thus, on order from “Theodore Rex”, Commodore Dewey sailed from Hong Kong on April 27th to conquer the Philippines. Dewey managed to destroy the Spanish fleet off the Philippines. And under combined US army and naval bombardment in August 1898, Manila capitulated.

The entire US Naval conduct of the Spanish-American war in fact displayed something never witnessed previously; a global US strategy. It struck at the Philippines and Cuba almost simultaneously. The US Navy sought to “control the waters of the major Spanish island colonies to wring concessions from the Spanish government. US warships on offensive commissions won two decisive battles on opposite sides of the globe". In tactical and strategic terms, it was an astounding victory. But the most significant aspect in retrospect is the new impetus for interventions beyond the Monroe doctrine that was evident in the war. The seizure of the Philippines is undoubtedly an example of US imperialism, in that it was an incursion into the sovereignty of another people. The isles were taken by force and occupied by US troops. It took the army and the navy three years to control the insurrection among the Filipinos, who had hoped for independence. Eventually, it would take some fifty years before the US granted them this right. That parts of the

1070 Baer, 1993: 31
1071 Potter, 1981: 178
1072 The Teller amendment stated that the US: "hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." (Library of Congress, Hispanic Division)
The Senate passed the amendment on April 19. True to the letter of the Teller Amendment, after Spanish troops left the island in 1898, the United States occupied Cuba until 1902.
The Teller Amendment was succeeded by the Platt Amendment introduced by Senator Orville Platt (R-Connecticut) in February 1901. It allowed the United States "the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty...." The Platt Amendment was finally abrogated on May 29, 1934. Source; the Hispanic Division, Library of Congress:
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/teller.html
1073 See Potter, 1981: 180. It was this invasion that pre-empted a German invasion, and thus angered the Kaiser to an astonishing degree.
1074 Baer, 1993: 27
American society saw this occupation as a civilizing process does not undo the fact that it was a paternalist foreign policy on behalf of the US.\textsuperscript{1075} In this respect, it is an exception to our labelling of the USA as an international liberalist. But in fact, the Philippines were useless in the short run for North America; the Philippines were valueless as markets, and expensive to defend, 6000 miles from the American continent.\textsuperscript{1076} Moreover, the most damaging aspect for the US was the harm to its image of itself, fighting a colonial war for three years against a people who only pleaded for independence. Therefore, it is characteristic of American imperialism that it soon turned into US soul-searching, domestic criticism and embarrassment.\textsuperscript{1077} On April 11 1902, Henry Cabot Lodge published the so-called Gardener Report, which produced national outrage due to the descriptions of US atrocities on the Philippines.\textsuperscript{1078} The following confessions of US Army officers led President Roosevelt to head a full investigation of the conduct of the US Army on the archipelago. In the aftermath of this investigation, the Philippines civil-government bill passed Congress, “promising a legislative assembly, an independent judiciary, and an expanding array of civil rights”\textsuperscript{1079} It was also in this context that Roosevelt declared the American occupation of Cuba as terminated the same spring.

Indeed, ANY extraterritorial adventure fostered heated debates in Congress. Typically, the Democratic Party often opposed, at other times was split on, questions of active foreign policy. Andrew Jackson’s party, in which politicians from the South played leading roles, “was not likely to be insensitive to the demands of national honor, but in the early twentieth Century the antimilitarist tradition that could be traced back to the party’s other great hero, Thomas Jefferson, was more marked”\textsuperscript{1080}. The Democratic Party of this era was prone to be anti-British and anti-interventionist. It opposed the occupation of the Philippines and other territories in 1898 as violations of the principles underlying the Declaration of Independence, while being much more supportive for intervention on Cuba, partly on humanitarian grounds.

However, the occupation of the Philippines can also with some justification be interpreted as a turning point in US foreign policy. After 1898, The US was permanently involved in the affairs of

\textsuperscript{1075} Puerto Rico and Guam also became colonies within the new American empire. Part of the alleged civilizing process was to be the conversion of the Philippines to Christianity. The Philippines were catholic.

\textsuperscript{1076} Brogan, 1999: 442-443

\textsuperscript{1077} Indeed, direct intervention by force into the sovereignty of other powers seem to foster what Abernethy has labelled a guilt complex; an encompassing expression in public in favour of mending past sins. Perhaps this mechanism has been stronger in the US than among the European Great Powers? See for example Kissinger, 1982: introduction and chapter 1. On the other hand, those states that were defeated in major wars went through much more thorough self-examination, i.e. Germany

\textsuperscript{1078} Morris, 2002: 99

\textsuperscript{1079} Morris, 2002: 104

\textsuperscript{1080} Thompson, 2002: 79
the Far East. Thus, although US imperialism never took off, its security interests in the region became institutionalised. The Philippines became an important base for the US Navy, and was perceived vital after the ascendency of Japan as a naval power, so powerfully demonstrated after its victory over Russia in 1904-05. In addition, while the overseas ambitions of the US were modest, there was an increased awareness among US expansionists of the potential of the Caribbean. Indeed, one could also point out that the Treaty of Paris had given the US an official protectorate of Cuba.1081 The picture painted by American strategists was in this way much more complicated than previously; what if US interests were threatened on two oceans? This dilemma reinforced the arguments for a canal through Nicaragua or Panama.1082 The canal was indeed built between 1904 and 1914, and the same ten years marked a high point in US interventionism in Latin America and the Caribbean islands. As the scope of US naval action grew, it became paramount to set up some sort of centralised naval command to coordinate operations. This body was to become the Naval War Board, a central strategy board largely manned by a staff of senior naval officers and specialists.1083 US politicians and large portions of the populace were enthusiastic about their humanitarian intervention on Cuba. Although the distance and complexities of this operation made it an easier undertaking than, say, the British participation in the Boer War, it was beyond doubt perceived by many North Americans as a defining moment. An expeditionary force of 16000 soldiers was sent in June 1898. Although the cooperation behind the naval and land forces proved worse than desirable, the fleet of Cervera was beaten and gained the US undisputed command of Caribbean waters. An American force also landed on Puerto Rico, and the sum of defeats made Spain sue for peace. In a final treaty signed in Paris in December 1898, Spain relinquished all claim to Cuba and ceded Guam, the Philippines and Puerto Rico to the US.

All in all, then, the years from 1895 till 1898 witnessed a growing pressure within the US in favour of a more active US foreign policy, culminating in overseas invasions and occupation of foreign territories in 1898.1084 This year then, could easily be interpreted as a vast change in US foreign policy. There is little doubt, at least, that to contemporary Americans, Europeans and inhabitants of the occupied territories alike, the alteration indeed mattered. The US had *de facto* acquired an overseas empire. We should note, however, some of the less striking yet principally important

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1081 Brogan, 1999: 442
1082 Partly due to the research carried out on the experience from the Philippines campaign, America had found a way to defeat yellow fever. This made a canal in Latin America seem possible; the French workforce that tried to build a canal there in the 1880s was more or less wiped out by the fever.
1083 Albion, 1945: 300
1084 To mark off one exact year as a critical juncture is difficult. From 1890 till 1917, the US by my counts intervened in Latin America 33 times. However, the Spanish-American war stands out as the most complex and far-
characteristics of this empire. Firstly, the occupations were motivated more out of humanitarian concerns than as means to address an international balance of power. It is true that especially Guantanamo and Puerto Rico made defence of the US homeland easier, but the addressed humanitarian motives and the profit of all the other territories were frustrated in a matter of years. The former was best exemplified by the Philippines as we have mentioned above and in chapter two. Speaking of the benefits to the US, the Pacific possessions certainly yielded more burdens than profit. In economic terms, the Philippines were simply not a territory from which to extract resources. Simultaneously, just keeping it generated considerable costs. For the US navy, and indeed for the armed forces of the US in general, an overriding concern during decades to come was the problem of how to defend the Philippines. The archipelago was nearly 7000 miles from the US, but 1000 from Japan and only 300 miles from Japanese-held Formosa. To establish and maintain fleet superiority against Japan in Far eastern waters was deemed impossible. And once lost, the recapture of the Philippines would require nothing less than securing control over most of the Pacific. Neither choice would rule out the necessity of fortified base facilities. In effect, the overseas possession and the “open door” policy generated a domino effect upon the objectives of US foreign policy; these policies created fierce political debates within the US from the outset. The rift was opened swiftly after the defeat of the Spanish fleet off the Philippines in 1898. In the short run, the expansionists were victorious, managing to gain a majority in congress in favour of the annexation of Hawaii in 1898. Wake and the Samoa Islands followed in the following years. This, however, was to mark the high point of US imperialism. Congress did not allow further suggestions in direction of overseas expansion to turn into policies.

The most profound effect on the US, and the international scene, of these expansionist policies was the fact that the US to a degree unprecedented in its history became part of the international balance of power. One might easily point to the following policies of the US in Latin America, the Caribbean, Cuba and the Far East as an imperialist policy. However, I will claim that such a label on US policies fails to distinguish the limitations on imperialism in the US when compared to the paternalist policies of the European great powers. This is not denying the series of imperialist–type actions that the US in fact implemented. What must be noticed is that even at its most “imperialist”, US foreign policy did not turn paternalist to the degree that it replaced international liberalism as the dominant ideology in the prevailing US view of international political economy.
Political science has not been in the forefront of theorising leadership as a political variable.\textsuperscript{1085} As in the case of Germany, personalities did matter in fostering interest in US extraterritorial power. In the case of US, the dynamic Theodore Roosevelt had particular influence on the direction of foreign policy in general and in naval policy in particular. He addressed the Naval war College in 1888, where he met Mahan for the first time. Mahan, developing a friendship with Theodore Roosevelt, had also become a chief propagandist in favour of US expansion. The use of American sea power was both in the national interest, a civilising mission and a way to counter “The yellow peril”.\textsuperscript{1086} The civilising mission was applied at the Philippines according to Mahan, and he also argued that the US should occupy Hawaii to “erect a barrier against the spread of Chinese barbarism into the Pacific”.\textsuperscript{1087} But we must note that this kind of rhetoric belonged to A.T: Mahan, and not Theodore Roosevelt.

To claim that Mahan became his mentor in naval affairs is perhaps an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{1088} Nevertheless, a close symbiosis developed between the two. Roosevelt praised ISPUH in a review in the Atlantic Monthly, and his adaptation of the principles of a strong battle fleet and a fleet-in-being as a political tool was total.\textsuperscript{1089} His strong leadership as president and his influence through his handpicked successor William Howard Taft, to an unprecedented degree in a democracy made the naval policies of the state identical to that of one person.\textsuperscript{1090} He never tried to cover up his worldview and the role he thought the US should play in the society of states;

\textit{“Is America a weakling to shrink from the world work of the great world-powers? No. Young giant of the west stands on a continent and clasps the crest of an ocean in either hand. Our nation, glorious in youth and strength, looks in the future with eager eyes and rejoices as a strong man to run a race”}\textsuperscript{1091}

\textsuperscript{1085} Of course there are attempts at this. See Mann, 1993: chapter 8 for one example
\textsuperscript{1086} Hobson, 2002: 168. See also Mahan, 2003
\textsuperscript{1087} Hobson, 2002: 168
\textsuperscript{1088} A detailed account of the correspondence between Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt in office as president is given in Karsten, 1971: 589-597. Karsten also shows that it perhaps was Roosevelt that inspired Mahan just as much as Mahan inspired Roosevelt. This might be an answer to the question why Mahan became a more interventionist spokesman during his career.
\textsuperscript{1089} Potter, 1981: 187
\textsuperscript{1090} Morris, 2002: 44, and naturally, domestic and foreign policy are always interrelated in the field of naval construction. See also ibid; 22 and 24
\textsuperscript{1091} Morris, 2002: 8
This is not to say that “Theodore Rex” was not part of a structure in the US polity; we have seen the influence of Mahan, and we have also mentioned the first tracings of the alleged military-industrial complex in the form of a common interest between the navy and the American steel industry. Nevertheless, Theodore Roosevelt stands out as an anomaly among US presidents. One year after his inauguration, contemporaries dubbed him “the strangest creature the White House ever held”\textsuperscript{1092}

Faced with criticism of his perceived tacit support of the “revolution” in Panama, he simply “did not understand what Hoar and other moralists meant when they talked of “conscience” in foreign-policy making”\textsuperscript{1093}

The role of private industries increased with the vitality of the US economy. Shippers, exporters and shipbuilders all had common interests in expansionist policies. In this respect; the mechanism was similar to the one in Imperial Germany. As in Germany, navalists formed an organisation working in favour of an increase in naval spending, the Navy League of the United States, 1903. The sum of this pressure was a praxis where a larger US Navy was seen as appropriate for such a strong society. This was reflected in the material basis of the extraterritorial powers of the US. In the decades prior to WWI, the Navy increased by an average of two capital ships per year, even if the costs of each ship grew significantly in tandem with technological developments. This also made it self felt in the spending of the state, as can be seen in table 4.3.2 below.

\textbf{Table 4.3.2: Naval expenditures and Total federal expenditures in the US, 1890-1914}\textsuperscript{1094}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Total federal expenditures</th>
<th>Naval expenditures</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>318,040.711</td>
<td>22,006.206</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>520,860.847</td>
<td>55,953.078</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>524,616.925</td>
<td>60,506.978</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>567,278.914</td>
<td>117,550.308</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>693,743.885</td>
<td>115,546.011</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>735,081.431</td>
<td>139,682.186</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{1092} Morris, 2002: 108  
\textsuperscript{1093} Morris, 2002: 302  
\textsuperscript{1094} Expenditures in US dollars, not corrected for inflation. Source: Potter, 1981: 187. The size and the complexities were the major reasons for the increasing naval expenditures.
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

The role of naval officers cannot account for the increased emphasis on modernising and increasing the navy in any direct way; US politicians were highly conscious of the importance of political control of the military. Thus, the secretary of the navy opposed a general staff—a suggestion enthusiastically proposed by the services themselves. Instead, a general board of the navy was institutionalised in 1900, but with mere advisory duties. In order to improve coordination between the services, a Joint Army-Navy Board was set up three years later. All the members of the Navy general Board were disciples of Mahan. The hallmark of Mahan thus set its footprint in three vital aspects of US naval policy. Firstly, large battleships were advocated. Ideally, such a fleet should be used concentrated as a fleet in being. Secondly, the strategic doctrine of Mahan emphasising the possession of bases as repair facilities and coaling stations was implemented in a literal manner. Thirdly, the construction of a canal across Central America in order to move fleets between the oceans was given paramount priority. There is no doubt then, that as in Germany, the influence of Mahan made it self deeply felt in both the officer corps and the senior politicians of the country.

There was also a political will in the US to enhance its strategic possibilities, embodied in Theodore Roosevelt’s words that it should “speak softly and carry a big stick”. However, we must note that this policy was in fact seldom applied to global affairs, but primarily was meant to use within the “sphere” of American influence. We should also pay attention to the fact that the cleavage in the US polity between interventionists and isolationists was in place during the entire period. Moreover, there was often a certain distance between the Navy and the political leadership on naval policies. More often than not, politicians represented the definite limit to naval grandiose schemes, or in the words of Henry Stimson;

“The psychology of the Navy department frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church”^1095

It seemed that North Americans applied one standard of foreign policy in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Philippines, and a quite different one in its dealings with larger powers. This is exemplified in the question of the Panama Canal, which in effect represented a change of geopolitical realities. The first step towards the realisation of the project was negotiating a termination of the 1850 treaty with Britain that stated that any such canal should be built and owned

^1095 Cited in O’Connell, 1993: preface
by the two states in concert. The US Congress eventually ratified the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty that gave the US exclusive control of the canal and the right to fortify it. The French consortium was skilful at convincing US politicians of the merits of the Panama solution, on January 9 1903. An agreement was reached between the US and Colombia –of which Panama then was a province- to this effect. This so-called Hay-Herran Treaty secured the USA a 6-mile wide transit way for 10.000.000 US dollars and a 250.000 annuity. Unfortunately for the US and the French company, the Colombian senate refused to accept the agreement. It was at this stage the French company under the leadership of one Bunau-Varilla decided to engineer a revolution in Panama. Counting on the temper of T. Roosevelt, Varilla calculated that US would enter the turmoil under the cover of the Treaty of 1846 with Colombia, which pledged the US to maintain “free transit” on the Isthmus. The “synthetic revolution” consisted of some 500 individuals, allegedly equipped and paid 500 US dollars ahead, and did indeed trigger a US naval deployment to Panama. Thus, on November 4 1903, the Republic of Panama was officially born. In this situation, there was not much the Colombian government could do, since;

“There was no overland route from Bogotá, and Colombian troops sent by water were politely told they could not land, since America had treaty obligations to uphold, and for them to proceed would obviously create an unneutral disturbance. The guns of the Nashville were an eloquent unspoken argument. Presently the Dixie arrived with a force of marines for any necessary policing ashore. On 6 November, the United States recognized the revolutionary government of Panama”.

Already 15 days after the revolution, the US Senate promptly ratified the Treaty. With the completion of the canal in 1914, the USA had a valuable transit way between the widely separated coasts of its mainland. In fact, the US could exercise as much military, civil and judicial authority as it deemed prudential in the Zone, administered by a seven-man Isthmian Canal Commission. The

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1096 The termination of the former treaty meant that the UK accepted "granting the United States exclusive right to build an interoceanic waterway in Central America", Morris, 2002: 67
1097 Potter, 1981: 188
1098 "Panama’s political status as a provinicia of Colombia was…Tenous. It had spontaneously joined the New Grenadian Federation in 1821, and seceded with its disintegration in 1839. Bogotá had reasserted control twelve years later, and from then on Panama had alternated stormily between semi-autonomy and subjugation. Roosevelt counted no fewer than fifty-three isthmian insurrections, riots civil disturbances, and revolts since 1846” Morris, 2002: 273
1099 Morris, 2002: 88
1100 Potter, 1981: 189
1101 The quote is not from a leftist scholar, but that of Potter, 1981: 189. Confer with Morris, 2002: 294
1102 Not that there was no criticism of the US role from US newspapers and NGOs, though. See Morris, 2002: 295-7
whole Panama affair nevertheless became a burden to the moral consciousness of US politicians and central actors in civil society. Some liberal journals labelled it an act of international piracy, and the US government eventually paid 25 million dollars to Colombia as an apology in 1921.\footnote{Again, the cleavage on foreign policy between the Democratic and the Republican Party was marked. See Thompson, 2002: 81} To my knowledge, no European paternalist power paid such sums to earlier or contemporary colonies to redeem past sins.\footnote{Several countries in Africa by the beginning of the 21st Century claimed a right to an enormous compensation from the earlier colonial powers. This issue remains to be settled, if it ever will. In contrast, US efforts to smooth its past were a result of the internal guilt-complex.} By 1977, a US-Panama agreement was reached on the ultimate return of sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama.\footnote{President Carter made it a top issue in US relations with Central America. Already in 1948, US Supreme Court stated that while the US exercised control of the Canal, it had no sovereignty over it. Under President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on behalf of the US signed a memorandum of understanding with Panama, where US in principle agreed to hand over sovereignty of the canal to Panama. In accordance with the agreement from 1978, Panama formally took over control of the Panama Canal on January 1, 2000. Henry Kissinger, the chief US negotiator of the treaty, was later condemned as a "Soviet agent" by right-wing US commentators, partly due to the Panama Canal Treaty.}

If we examine the paternalist traits of US foreign policy under the two terms of Theodore Roosevelt, it is also clear that US intervention in Latin America were to assume a character and purpose that must be understood in geopolitical terms. Roosevelt was to regret his blunt statement from 1901 that “If any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it”.\footnote{Cited in Potter, 1981: 189} This was a dangerous utterance in the golden age of modern imperialism. Especially so, as in the long run, the eventual opening of the Panama canal would make the entire region as well as the Caribbean islands far more accessible in the international economy. By 1902, Britain had persuaded the paternalist powers Italy and Germany to join in her blockade of the coast of Venezuela (the latter had repudiated her international debts). Roosevelt soon had second thoughts, seeing the Monroe doctrine threatened; “The thought of the Kaiser acquiring land rights anywhere in the Americas was enough to freeze Roosevelt’s blood”.\footnote{One should note that although Roosevelt was an admirer of Germany and passionately interested in German history, he on some occasions took a tough position on German foreign policy. Especially in the Venezuelan crisis of 1912, where he explicitly told the German ambassador to Washington, von Holleben, that he would wage war on Germany if German troops landed in Venezuela. In order to give William the opportunity of saving face, he did of course not make this threat public, nor was the message recorded in any official archives. However, the threat was backed up by a huge Naval exercise in the theatre, led by no lesser figure than Dewey, Roosevelt’s hero from the 1898 taking of the Philippines. The situation is described in detail in Morris, 2002: 189-191, Roosevelt’s rationale for it in ibid: 177-179. One should also note that Germany had war plans covering America and a possible war with the US. The German navy adopted the so-called Büchsel plan formally in November 1903. It focused on the Caribbean and possibilities for German expansionism in South America. In the}
“Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. It affirmed nothing less than that the US would feel obliged “...in flagrant cases of...wrongdoing or impotence...to the exercise of an international police power” in Latin America.\textsuperscript{1108} In other words, the US set itself up as the dominant international institution within the region. And it was more to it than just rhetoric. Britain backed down in the Venezuelan crisis, the British Prime Minister assuring that Britain respected the Monroe Doctrine and withdrew its squadron after the blockade of Venezuela (by this move, Balfour also successfully isolated Germany. This, perhaps more than the threats secretly given by Roosevelt, was a main reason for the eventual German withdrawal).\textsuperscript{1109} The first actual use of the Roosevelt corollary was to take over the customs collection of the Dominican Republic. In its administration of the Dominican economy, US assured that 55 percent of the receipt went to settle her foreign debts. Was this an act of formal imperialism? It was, in the sense that it directly intervened in the politics of another sovereign state, but the purpose was not state or personalised aggrandisement on behalf of US authorities. Moreover, the policies of the US directed against its “colonies” were markedly less paternalist in its content than those of European great powers in the same era. While US intervention often was deemed prudent due to geopolitical factors, Americans were almost consistently moved by the desire to do “good” as well. Thus, naval and marine forces in Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were part of governmental administration, education and health care as well as campaigning for Uncle Sam. The range of activities from public health to road building was astounding. One hundred years after the occupation of Cuba, one might reasonably conclude that

“Wood’s two-and-a-half-year governorship had been a spectacular success. A trained surgeon, he had transformed Cuba from one of the world’s most pestilential countries into one of its healthiest...As a result, Cuba was free of yellow fever for the first time in almost two centuries...Havana was now a more sanitary city than Washington, D.C.”\textsuperscript{1110}

Furthermore, one should also note that US interventions by and large sought a basis in decisions in democratic institutions. When the outbreaks of anarchy on Cuba in 1906, 1912 and 1917 made the US send the marines, the authority for these interventions was not the Roosevelt Corollary, but the Platt amendment (see footnote above). This amendment permitted US armed forces to intervene if

\textsuperscript{1108} Quoted in Potter, 1981: 190
\textsuperscript{1109} Baer, 1993: 36
\textsuperscript{1110} Morris, 2002: 105
required to keep law and order or uphold Cuban “sovereignty”. The Platt amendment in fact was an international agreement between Cuba and the US, and had even become part of the Cuban Constitution.\footnote{By a provision of the amendment, the US also leased Guantanamo as a naval base, a practise that since the war in Afghanistan from 2002 has become widely known to the public worldwide. Although the Platt Amendment was abrogated by treaty in 1934, and even after the diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba was severed in 1961, the US Navy just continued to use the base.}

Moreover, the adventure at the Philippines became more of an embarrassment than an asset to the US. The continuation of US presence in the Philippines was motivated by strategic considerations, not out of the wish for economic surplus, and it was the perceived requirements for the protection of the Philippines that made the US annex Guam, Hawaii, American Samoa and Wake. But there is no doubt that the Philippines was perceived as a springboard for another interesting market for US politicians and business interests alike. American merchants believed they saw an enormous potential market for US goods in China, in particular. Although China was \textit{de jure} a sovereign state, it appeared as if it was about to be partitioned by the European paternalist powers. To get a share in this market, the US either had to scramble for a sphere of influence of her own, or somehow convince the other great powers not to divide up China.\footnote{Potter, 1981: 191} It is characteristic of the international liberalist that it sought the latter rather than the former approach. It went down in history as the “Open Door”. It consisted in the mutual assurances of each power that every part of China should be open to the trade of all “friendly nations”, and was sought implemented by Secretary of State Hay from 1899. Initially, the open door policy had the effect intended by Hay; reducing the threat to the sovereignty of China as well as lessening suspicions between the European great powers. But to the Chinese, the Open door policy did not really seem to matter much, since all major powers involved in the Chinese market kept considerable institutions on the Chinese mainland and navies in Chinese waters. The Chinese populace increasingly resented this presence. This was the pretext for the Boxer rebellion, as is well known. One facet of the international force sent to quell the uprising is nevertheless of particular importance to our discussion of US extraterritorial policies. Anxious not to become tainted by association with imperialist powers, the US announced that its troops acted independently, and were not an integral part of the joint force. Furthermore, when the Chinese government eventually had to accede to pay an indemnity of 333 million dollars to the allied powers, the US later returned most of her share to China to provide scholarships to Chinese men for study in the USA. Again, then, what on the surface seemed as a US foreign policy similar to the imperialist policies of the major European powers, in fact had a content marked by a major power somewhat ashamed of using power in unjust interventions. What is even more significant in
connection with the Boxer rebellion, was that the US partaking in stopping the rebellion gave her a say in the following deliberations on Chinese sovereignty, and that she used this influence in a different direction than other great powers. The US simply stated that it stood for the territorial integrity of all China. Thus, even amidst “the heyday of imperialism”, US foreign policy was principally different in its content than those of other major powers; it had not simply imitated other large powers, or adapted to the state system. The US was a state founded on ideas. This mattered for its foreign policy, and so it was to matter for the content of the international system at large four decades later. In contrast to this, Imperial Germany sent her soldiers with, in effect, blessings from the Kaiser to apply what both Chinese and US eyewitnesses saw as brute and indiscriminate force. Russia seized the opportunity given her by the Boxer rebellion to tighten her grip on Port Arthur, occupy Manchuria and dominate Korea. Japan prepared for war, and indeed Japan and Russia soon fought each other. The intensity of extraterritorial violence was demonstrated in the battle of Tsu Shima on 27 May 1905, in which “Russia’s Baltic Fleet was annihilated in a holocaust of two thousand shells per minute”.

What was the US response to this harsh climate in international affairs? It certainly was not entering entangling alliances, but it was not naïve idealism either. Especially after the Russo-Japanese war and Tsu Shima, Roosevelt intended to show the “big stick” of American power, successfully getting Congress to allocate money for more battleships and ordering a world cruise to be taken by the 16 first-line battleships of the US fleet. It started in December 1907, lasted fourteen months with a sailing distance of 46000 miles. There can be little doubt that US policymakers by this stage saw Japan as a potential enemy; especially the defence of the Philippines from a Japanese attack was laid out in one war plan after the other. During the Spanish-American war, Britain was the only great power that expressed approval of US goals. The permanent withdrawal of the British West Indies Squadron from Jamaica by 1905, due to increased German strength in the North Sea, was an unspoken acknowledgement of American dominance in the Caribbean. As we have seen in the section on British sea power, these were calculated moves by British cabinets, based on what admiral Colomb already in the 1880s had stated; a war with the US was impossible for the Empire.

1113 See Massie, 1991 for a vivid recollection
1114 Morris, 2002: 387
1115 "The Great White Fleet”. “If we have such a navy – if we keep on building it up – we may rest assured…that no foreign power will ever quarrel with us about the Monroe Doctrine”, Roosevelt cited in Morris, 2002: 207
1116 It was certainly not the intent of Roosevelt to challenge Japan, though. It is nevertheless fair to point out that Roosevelt grew more and more skeptical of Japan during the peace negotiations following the Russo-Japanese war. See Morris, 2002: 397, 485, 493-4. Already in the summer of 1904 Roosevelt remarked on Japan that ”if they win out, it may possibly mean a struggle between them and us in the future”, Howarth, 1991: 281
It is striking to notice the increasing difference in US-German relations compared to US-Britain. Germany repeatedly aroused suspicions among American policymakers. We have already mentioned the crisis in Venezuela, where the Kaiser went furthest of the involved powers, permitting his fleet to bombard the Venezuelan coast. The German conduct in quelling the Boxer rebellion also awoke strong American antipathy. The fact is that the German leadership, and especially William II, unintentionally fertilised traits of anti-American attitudes in Germany after the US occupation of the Philippines. The German Kaiser had hoped to occupy the archipelago for Germany, and when the US moved against it, he aspired to secure at least parts of it. Thus, Germany sent a fleet stronger than Dewey’s for this purpose. The following friction between the fleets of the two countries nurtured a legend in both countries as to the hostile intentions of the other. It is on the background of tenser relationships with both Germany and Japan that US naval priorities must be properly understood. By 1905, the US was determined to counter the eventuality of any future Japanese attempt to seize the Philippines and to compete with Germany in becoming the second largest naval power after Britain. The at times rude appearances of William II, Germany’s rather brute development of colonies in Africa, her leasehold of Tsingtao, her purchase from Spain of the Carolines, The Marshalls and the Marianas – islands that were all between the US and the Philippines, in sum contributed to a US image of Germany as a paternalist power of first rank. It was typical of the era of Mahan, however, that the US war plan (Warplan Black) against Germany was restricted to the notion of a naval war. Again, the war conceived possible in the future would be a battle between major warships fought on the extraterritorial arena, free of the complexities of occupation, refugees, prisoners of war, devastation of infrastructure; it would rather be a duel, not unlike the sea battles of the Victorian age. However, an openly aggressive policy against any

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1118 Morris, 2002: 201
1120 The other, and the plan given most consideration by US strategists, major US war plan was plan orange, directed at an attack on Japan in the advent of Japanese occupation of the Philippines. As in The Black Plan, the Orange plan was primarily a naval scenario, but with the addition of amphibious assaults to secure islands and atolls in the Pacific on the approach towards Japan. See below for a description of further implications.
1121 See Spector, 2002: chapter 2 of this very interesting view on war at sea. Wars were seen as symbols as well as arms of national pride and technology. Wars by navies could be decisively won by fleets of battleships that would fight in the good old gentlemanly manner that had “always” characterised war at sea. Paradoxically, navies, that by their very nature made for interaction with other states, were institutions which personnel often were rather isolated from their motherland. This made, and still makes the naval profession special in many countries. O’Connell, 1993: 13-14 thus has written on the US naval officers that “frequent socializing among the officers of the major maritime powers became an important and traditional aspect of naval life. Driven together by loneliness and mutual professional interests, officers were received by their counterparts with extreme courtesy, practically without regard for international affairs. Therefore, Admiral George Dewey’s men thought it natural to exchange social calls with the Spanish naval officials they were about to replace in the Philippines – behavior reminiscent of the European military aristocracy during the anci`en regime”
European power was unconceivable before WW I.\textsuperscript{1122} In spite of the isolationist elements of the US as a player on the world scene, the US Navy nevertheless was in the front of the technological development. Needless to say, her industrial base also made her potential as a naval power remarkable. When the shift from coal to oil in warships was a fact, the US was in the best of positions compared to other powers, given her ample source of domestic petroleum. The US Navy was also quick at converting into turbine ships, commissioning five destroyers with turbines as soon as 1907. Even submarines were taken into the service as early as 1900, with batteries and electric motor for underwater propulsion. In time, this weapon alone would make Mahan’s doctrine that a \textit{guerre de course} was ineffective against a naval power, obsolete. One of the most fascinating aspects of the extraterritorial arms development in this “first new nation” was the innovative and creative approach to new technologies. No single weapon was to become more American than the airplane. In this respect, the US military was far more daring than the military institutions of Europe, with the possible exception of the Zeppelin arm applied by Germany.\textsuperscript{1123} The military potential of the plane was seen in the US almost immediately after the successful pioneering work by the Wright brothers in 1903. Already by 1910, successful takeoffs from ships had been conducted by US personnel and with US equipment. By 1912, the US Navy devoted resources to the torpedo plane, with a torpedo release gear and a self-propelled torpedo that had the potential of transforming future naval battles. This activity was also given an institutional basis through the first naval aviation unit established in 1912 at Annapolis, Maryland.\textsuperscript{1124} The most useful potential of the plane in the short run, however, was the use of planes for scouting, a practise that became part of exercises from 1914. Control of the extraterritorial means of violence was also greatly improved in this phase through the introduction of radios on all naval vessels. Needless to say, this instrument in the field of tactics gave better possibilities for exchanging information and orders, but also in peacetime, the radio greatly facilitated coordination of ships, stations and bases.

In sum, there is little doubt that the US, in the years with Theodore Roosevelt as assistant secretary of the Navy, then as Vice-President and in his two terms as US president, built a strong arsenal of means capable of extraterritorial violence. During his first four years as President, annual appropriations for the US navy rose from 85 to 118 million dollars.\textsuperscript{1125} The use of this weapon was

\textsuperscript{1122} Unconceivable for all Americans except military staff officers, which task it is to make contingency plans. See Baer, 1993: 51
\textsuperscript{1123} The Zeppelins were applied for gathering intelligence on land and sea. In some instances, they spread terror among in the British populace by air bombardment of cities. Conversely, Britain sought to destroy Zeppelin hangars by planes. The most effective means to stop the zeppelins, however, were by machineguns from airplanes. Ultimately, therefore, the use of the large, slow zeppelins did not become a lasting weapon. See Massie, 2003.
\textsuperscript{1124} Potter, 1981: 196
\textsuperscript{1125} Howarth, 1999: 282
applied in both real-political and humanitarian terms, and it institutionalised a foreign policy that made the US into a power with overseas possessions. However, the legacy in foreign policy was of a much more limited scope.

Not until the Soviet Union was beaten and had ceased to exist and Secretary of state Madeleine Albright during the Clinton Administration stated that the US was the “indispensable nation”, would US self-esteem reach the same heights. In essence, according to the worldview of Theodore Roosevelt, it was necessary for the US to monitor and partly keep up with the arms race in Europe, a sentiment that was not shared by all US politicians. To Roosevelt, however, the introduction of the British Dreadnought class made him prioritise all-big-gun battleships for the US navy, and authorise the first full US dreadnought in 1907. It was the parade of the Great White Fleet, the sixteen best battleships of the US Navy literally painted in peaceful white, in Chesapeake Bay in December 1907 that visualised the US as a first class world power.

4.3.3 Isolationism, Internationalism and the attempt at establishing world order through international institutions

In this section, we will discuss the particular form of international liberalism as expressed by leading US politicians in the period from 1900 till 1945. The US administrations aptly demonstrate the different traits in the culture of national security and thinking on international relations in the US polity, since they reflected nuances of importance within this culture. In particular, it is interesting to scrutinise the alleged shift from isolationism to international interventionism on behalf of the US. This thesis has postulated that there exists a significant causal connection between the ideology and self-identity of a hegemon and attempts at regulating or imposing world order in the international system. To the degree that this hypothesis is correct, we should expect to see clear attempts from US administrations to mould the world order according to its preferred ideational and material preferences. Here, much emphasis is laid on the ideational part of the equation. I will also question the often-held view that US politics shifted between clearly defined phases of either isolationism or interventionism. One alternative to the pendulum-argument that US foreign policy shifted between international activism and isolationism is the notion of a more or less constant struggle between

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1126 Howarth, 1999: 283-5
1127 Ibid: 285
1128 Howarth, 1999: 286. To grand effect, Roosevelt used the spook of Japan and the possibility of a threat to the US mainland as PR-stunt to gain support for his fleet program. In this he was successful, by 1909, the US was the keeper of the second largest organisation for extraterritorial violence in the world.
these views in domestic politics. In order to achieve a fuller grasp of US naval policies, we probably cannot think in terms of binary values in these variables. It is entirely possible, for example, to be active on the international arena while at the same time favouring disarmament; i.e., to be an interventionist “pacifist” rather than navalist. At the same time, we will also look into whether these various facets of US ideology made its naval policy vary significantly through the era. In other words, did extraterritorial strategy closely follow ideology? If this is not the case, then US naval priorities had already been relatively fixed at an earlier junction, notably the Spanish-American war in 1898. Lastly, we will address the question whether the combination of technological development, US naval strategy and the US assessment of the international system reshaped the very nature of extraterritorial means of violence and their application through new doctrines and new modes of projecting power.

In the field of naval strategy, there is little evidence that US policies changed significantly between 1902 and 1917, in the sense that preparing the fleet followed a familiar US path. The fact that US naval war plans did not shift significantly between 1902 and 1914 supports this claim, as it supports the interpretation that US foreign policy fostered few incentives to get embroiled in European politics. Thus, the Spanish-American war and the following fleet policy of Theodore Roosevelt can rightfully be seen as a critical juncture that “froze” US naval policies until WWI. The USA had built a Navy that was ill suited for war in the Atlantic. For example, there was a dramatic absence in the Navy of smaller ships that could be applied in anti-submarine operations. Moreover, and even more telling on the political side, was US war planning. As late as 1915, US war gaming was almost entirely based on the assumptions in War Plan Black, which covered engagements with enemy fleets (most notably German) in the Caribbean. The Navy department at this stage was not able to shift its focus to war in Europe, or even to the North Atlantic. This fact belies easy speculating about any grand US scheme to enter the war and model the state system in its own vision once the Europeans had been bled to death. Thus, a historian of the US Navy has simply concluded “The Taft years (1909-1913) were filled with naval thought, much of it focused on the Far East and most of it ineffective”. Taft inherited a strong fleet, but national naval policy was rather undefined. The same year that Woodrow Wilson became President, Germany’s ambitious level of shipbuilding

1129 Potter, 1981: 225
1130 The US road to war and US naval operations will not be discussed here, for reasons stated at the outset of this chapter. However, US policies during WWI and up to 1945 will be addressed with emphasis on ideology and foreign policy connected to naval priorities.
1131 Howarth, 1999:291, Baer, 1993: 60-63 may more emphasis on the importance of the Caribbean in US naval thinking, but basically agrees that the US Navy was largely unprepared for a war with European countries.
passed that of the United States. Up till WWI, US naval planning was a process that was rather isolated from political control. War Plan Black and –orange were both examples of this; plans that seldomly were analysed or even questioned by senior US politicians. Thus, one could postulate that US naval planning was an example of a bottom-up shaping of US foreign policy preferences. It is important to note, however, that whatever the degree of bureaucratic power prior to the European war, the policy process was firmly guided by the President after 1914. Wilson repeatedly overruled his admirals (attempts at creating something similar to the General Staff known from Germany, were blatantly turned down by Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy in 1913).\textsuperscript{1132} In this respect, even the influence of Mahan did not make for anything remotely similar to the role Tirpitz played within the German polity. In the US, the requirements of a policy of neutrality made the President at times dictate detailed naval policies. Commenting on WWI, for example, Baer states that:

“The nature of the war, and Wilson’s political purpose however, gave the Navy missions of another kind for which it was not prepared: antisubmarine warfare, antisubmarine escort (convoy duty), coalition cooperation, and above all, the safe transport of American soldiers to France”\textsuperscript{1133}

The isolated character of US Naval planning was addressed through reform in 1915 by the establishing of the Office of Naval Operations. But on the political side, again, the fact remains that when the war broke out in 1914, the main worry in Washington was the British blockade measures rather than the later envisaged potential hegemony of Germany! US official reaction to the “European war” was strict neutrality. While US authorities consistently insisted on \textit{mare liberum}, US merchantmen were repeatedly stopped by British patrols, making long inspections delay transportation by sea. However, the vast demand for goods from Britain and France as the war continued, made exportation on American keels more and more profitable, making for increased shipping across the Atlantic. It was this commerce that was exposed to German U-boats during the war. This fact, German clumsiness (i.e. the Zimmermann Telegram) and skilful British propaganda did much to tilt American sympathies in the direction of Britain, a pattern also facilitated domestically by The Navy League. Yet, the US hesitated long before entering the war. This process vividly illustrates US traits of isolationism. Wilson’s second note of protest after the sinking of \textit{Lusitania}, for example, made the pacifist Secretary of State Bryan resign due to the wording of the

\textsuperscript{1132} Albion, 1945: 301. This line was followed by FDR in his service as assistant secretary of the Navy and as President, citing the requirement of civilian control of the military.

\textsuperscript{1133} Baer, 1993: 73
protest. Parallel to this almost pacifist stance, Wilson managed to create the Naval Act of 1916, with its explicit goal of a US Navy “second to none”. It was as if “peace through strength” should be taken literally by a President that by realist scholars has been erroneously labelled a naïve idealist. Included in the Naval Act was a huge increase in US surface ships, submarines and the establishing of a Naval Flying Corps and a Naval Reserve Force. The build-up did not amount to a clear purpose to enter the war, but rather as a long-term asset that could be applied for intervention on the post-war arena. Part of the explanation why the US was so reluctant to take a clear stand in the war, was that Wilson was acutely aware of the sentiment of the US public. Millions of Americans sided with the countries from which their forefathers had come. Unsurprisingly, this of course included the large German-American community. But one should also note that other groups also had a clear tendency to support the Central powers; Jewish-Americans (chiefly out of hostility to Russia), Swedish-Americans (also hatred of Russia and historic relations to Germany), and to some degree Irish-Americans (due to their feelings toward England). Various groups naturally supported the other side, the British-Americans being the largest single group. No wonder most Americans understood the meaning of the slogan that Wilson had used in order to be re-elected “He kept us out of the War”. In addition to this, it was reassuring to state that the values of the US were superior to those of the European countries; “This country does not intend to become entangled in this war. It would be a crime against civilization if we entered it”, as Wilson put it. The vision of the war as evil was echoed in the famous speech by Wilson in Congress that “The world must be made safe for democracy” on April 2 1917. But by this time, pressure for entering the war had become irresistible. Again, it was the very ideological foundation of the US as a polity that was evoked in favour of intervention. No other motivation could be applied. The new thing about this interventionism however, was a moral conviction that precisely this ideological state had a mission to lead on the world arena; the balance of power and the Europeans could not look after themselves, to put it crudely. Contrary to economic reductionism, not even the economic aspect of the U-boat

1134 See Thompson, 2002: 117-118 and Howarth, 1999: 303-4 notes that "Not even Theodore Roosevelt or Admiral Mahan had asked for that much". See also Baer, 1993: 59-61
1135 Potter, 1981: 226
1136 Baer, 1993: 60-61
1137 See Thompson, 2002: 100-101
1138 Massie, 2003: 700
1139 Potter, 1981; 226. "It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war. But the right is more precious than peace. The world must be made safe for democracy. The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth" Quoted in Massie, 2003: 713-14
1140 Thompson, 2002: 142-149 proposes the argument that neither national security nor economic motives played any significant parts in the reasoning or the feelings that made the Wilson Administration (i.e. Woodrow Wilson) decide to go to war. However (ibid: 155), he quotes Wilson saying "When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking, because they will, among other things, be financially in our hands". In other words, the most logic conclusion that Wilson did not want to restore a balance of power in Europe, but nothing short of a new world order.
threat against the increased US exports to Britain could explain the US entrance into WWI. To Wilson, in particular, what seems to have mattered most in favour of intervention was his perception that the torpedoing of merchant ships without warning was illegal. Upholding the rights of American citizens, Wilson believed, was a cornerstone of genuine neutrality. Thus, the development of war could be raised to no less an issue than the Rights of Humanity. One might say that the actual naval contribution to WWI was undramatic, but this ignores the US assistance to allied convoying and the escort of US troops and supplies to the European theatre of war. However, US naval losses during the final one and half years of WWI were insignificant. The moral and material effect of the US strengthening of the allied cause was primarily through supplies and in increasing allied strength on the continent. We should also note that the war effort had an effect upon the US state itself. During the nineteen months of participation in WWI, the US raised an army of four million men, transported more than half of them to Europe by sea and “increased the level of its spending by a factor of 25 (the cost of the war to the United States exceeded the previous total of all federal expenditures since the establishment of the constitution).”

To our argument in this thesis however, the naval priorities so telling of, and vital to, US foreign policy in the following decades are of more central concern. In the US, realist thinking and idealist foreign policy ideology merged to a greater extent following WWI than is often assumed. Clearly, the defeat of Germany made Japan the foremost opponent of the US, hence the strong emphasis on the Pacific fleet of the US. This was a continuation of US naval priorities since the occupation of the Philippines, and belies the notion that US foreign policy was almost solely based on Kantian or Wilsonian idealism in the wake of WWI. In US policies towards the European powers, the elements of idealism was of course evident in Wilson’s fourteen points, of which the second was a blatant demand for mare liberum suiting a truly international liberalist. The content of this principle as it was proposed by the US, as well as the seriousness of US policymakers in backing it up, is a telling

However, this idealism was not incompatible with realism. If Britain fell, a scenario predicted by no lesser figure than First sea Lord Jellicoe of the British Admiralty in April 1917, the US could face the possibility of a coalition of Germany, Austria and Japan. See Thompson, 2002: 107-109. The sinking of Lusitania, for example, caused a storm of protest in the US that might seem incomprehensible. The ferrying of US troops across the Atlantic was the biggest such enterprise ever undertaken. Not one single soldier was lost by enemy action at sea. Indeed, Baer, 1993: chapter four, suggests with good reason that the US participation in WWI was a way of warfare without Mahan. There were no US partaking in big clashes of battleship fleets. Policy ruled over tactics. Thompson, 2002: 142

The importance of increased US naval strength was also recommended by Mahan since 1900

“The absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants”. Cited in Potter, 1981: 232.

See also O’Connell, 1993: 233-4
demonstration of what we have claimed to constitute a difference between the US and the paternalist sentiment inherent in the major European powers. Even in Britain, linguistically and culturally so similar to the US, the *mare liberum* demands as laid down by the US were perceived as shocking. That Wilson also was serious on its implication went beyond what European diplomats could conceive.

Characteristically, the fact that the US had declared war on Germany to preserve neutral rights on the high seas was by most European politicians seen as a mere technicality. To Wilson and his supporters, on the other hand, the question of *mare liberum* was a crucial component of a liberal world order. This indeed was international idealism, but when the British succeeded in getting the second point removed from the peace conference agenda, Wilson demonstrated his ability to play by the rules of the realist game; *he not only requested Congress to revive the suspended capital-ship building program of 1916, but asked for a doubling of this very heavy schedule!* In other words, if a liberal world order could not be achieved through reasoned deliberations at international conferences, then a further tilting of the balance of power in favour of the US could perhaps do the trick to achieve the same purpose. Thus, the only theoretically possible way for the British Empire to remain the first-rank naval power would be to literally throw in all its resources in an arms race with the US. Although we do not have precise knowledge of Wilson’s motivations, it is fairly obvious that he anticipated that he meant his proposal for a grand US navy as a means to enhance US negotiation strength versus Japan and Britain. In the case of Britain, Wilson simply wanted to make the paternalist more inclined to support the League of Nations and adopt a more liberal foreign policy. Another factor that seems to have been very important for Wilson, and which could be an attribute of both Wilson the idealist and Wilson the realist, was the wish to keep European powers out of the Western hemisphere, i.e. to keep the central purpose of the Monroe doctrine alive. Also, it should be noted that an interpretation where we see Wilson’s decision for a massive naval build-up as a bargaining chip against Britain, seems to correspond well with the eventual outcome: “The messy situation worsened in April 1919, when Lloyd George stipulated that

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1147 Indeed, and to much consternation in Britain, Wilson already in 1916 pointed to the freedom of the seas as the cornerstone in his vision of the post-war world. In a speech delivered to the League to enforce Peace, “Remarkably, the first object of the "universal association of the nations", Wilson called for would be to maintain the freedom of the seas” Thompson, 2002: 125

1148 Wilson was not inclined to share his inner thoughts with Congressmen or members of his cabinet. See Thompson, 2002 for some striking descriptions. More than his visionary worldview, this introvert attitude coupled with a very weak institutionalised bureaucracy around the Presidency, is perhaps the chief reason why Wilson’s grand scheme failed.

1149 Howarth, 1999: 325 concludes plausibly that Wilson was bluffing when it came to his request for an enormous US naval build-up. O’Connell, 1993: 240-1 concludes in a similar fashion.

1150 See Potter, 1981: 232-3
an end to the naval rivalry was the condition for his agreement to include the Monroe Doctrine in the League’s covenant”.\textsuperscript{1151}

Woodrow Wilson has been described as a dreamer, a portrait largely due to the descriptions of contemporary European observers. This, often rude and cynical portrait, to a large degree obscured the fact that his arrival in Europe by many Europeans was treated as something resembling the Second Coming. Largely due to his vision of a “new world order”, the streets of Paris were crammed with people cheering him upon his arrival. Even J.M. Keynes observed that “When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world unequalled in history”.\textsuperscript{1152} And yet, Keynes, along other reporters from the Peace conferences, saw Wilson like most educated upper-class people of paternalist powers saw the American president; “he had not much even of that culture of the world which marks M. Clemenceau or Mr. Balfour as exquisitely cultivated gentlemen of their class and generation”.\textsuperscript{1153} Sigmund Freud publicly compared Wilson to Don Quixote, applying the Christian Science to politics, and E.H. Carr twenty years later did as much as possible to portray Wilson as the embodiment of idealism.

But the fact was that Wilson already in 1917 much feared a settlement after the war that would spoil the victories of war to the damage of Europe as well as the world at large; “…the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong”.\textsuperscript{1154} It was for the purpose of a lasting peace that Wilson became the first president of the USA ever to go overseas while in office.\textsuperscript{1155} The problem was that the Congress was far more isolationist than Woodrow

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1151} Baer, 1993: 87
\item \textsuperscript{1152} Cited in Thompson, 2002: 3
\item \textsuperscript{1153} IBID: 5. The Reception of other US presidents 70 or 85 years later shared some of the same European snobbish disdain.
\item \textsuperscript{1154} Cited in Thompson, 2002: 163, 119, 133: ”It must be a peace without victory…Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s term imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand” and ibid: 231: “and there ensues upon it, in the suitable darkness of the night, the nightmare of dread which lay upon the nations before this war came. And there will come some time, in the vengeful Providence of God, another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America will have to die, but as many as millions as are necessary to accomplish the final freedom of the peoples of the world”
\item \textsuperscript{1155} And to this day, no US president has ever stayed for so long outside of the US! The major weakness of Wilson was his remote leadership and failure to use his cabinet to gather support for his international vision at home.
\end{itemize}
Wilson.\textsuperscript{1156} Congress rejected the 1919 building program, and the senate rejected the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{1157}

The elected Republican president Harding explicitly favoured a return to "normaley", which for Americans meant disarmament, and for Harding to reject the Navy’s strategic assessment.\textsuperscript{1158} The US nevertheless sought to utilise its improved standing after WWI through orchestrating international peace conferences, the first one was the Washington Conference with Britain, France, Japan and Italy participating late in 1921. In this conference, North America had an undisputed role as a leader, and in effect her proposals on a ten-year “holiday” in construction of capital ships and the scrapping of ships equalling a final ratio of strength of 5:5:3 for the US, Great Britain and Japan was accepted.\textsuperscript{1159} The popular support for the US proposals was widespread, largely due to the reciprocity embodied in the treaty drafts. Technical committees by the participating countries soon produced the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty, which also contained mutual restrictions on fortifications in the Pacific. This in many respects must be seen as an American success in limiting extraterritorial state activity in the form of military power. The success continued through the Four-Power Pact and Nine-Power Treaty.\textsuperscript{1160} The first stated that the US, Japan, Britain and France would respect each other’s Far Eastern possessions, in the latter treaty, the signatory powers were joined by Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and China in reaffirming the territorial integrity of China and endorsing the Open Door Policy.\textsuperscript{1161} However, voices critical of the treaties were soon to be

\textsuperscript{1156} See Thompson, 2002: 240-1. Congress was determined not to yield sovereignty to an international organ. Especially article 10 in the covenant, regarding intervention in the advent of war, was highly problematic to the Congress.

\textsuperscript{1157} That the US increasingly returned to isolationism is well analysed by David Kennedy, 1999. In ibid: 386-7, for example; "The idea of isolation was as old as America itself. From John Winthrop's declaration that Americans dwelt in a "city upon a hill" through George Washington's admonition to beware "the insidious wiles of foreign influence", Thomas Jefferson's repudiation of "entangling alliances", Mark Twain's satirical anti-European diatribes in "The Innocents Abroad and A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court", and Henry James's sensitive "Transatlantic novels", down even to F. Scott Fitzgerald's poetic conclusion to his 1925 novel “The Great Gatsby", with its lyrical invocation of "the fresh green breast of the New World", Americans had thought of themselves as not simply distant from the Old World but different from it as well. That difference, indeed, defines for many the essence—and the superiority—of the American national identity. International involvement was therefore worse than useless. It risked contaminating the very character of the nation. "Rejection of Europe", the novelist John Dos Passos once wrote, "is what America is all about". In the Great war –what Americans often tellingly called "the European war"—the United States had haltingly abandoned that centuries—old cultural wisdom, only to reembrace it with deepened conviction in the war’s aftermath" To many US citizens, the war demonstrated that Europe yet had not become a modern society. See Thompson, 2002: 153. The conferences were also politically controlled tightly; military officers were excluded from all meetings, with the exception for the Japanese delegation. See Baer, 1993: 93.

\textsuperscript{1158} On the latter, see Baer, 1993: 93

\textsuperscript{1159} Potter, 1981: 233. One should note that this included the scrapping of 847 750 tons of US naval tonnage. But also Japan and Britain had to abandon a huge number of ships, thus the comment that US Secretary of State Hughes "sunk in 35 minutes more ships than all the admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of centuries", Potter, 1981: 233

\textsuperscript{1160} See Howarth, 1999: 338-342

\textsuperscript{1161} Potter, 1981: 234
heard, also within the US. The Naval Limitation Treaty ignored cruiser tonnage, an opportunity eagerly exploited by Japan and Britain. US officers saw the non-fortification agreement as an underwriting of Japanese supremacy in the Far East, while the Treaty undoubtedly also made the US scrap more tonnage than Britain.\(^\text{1162}\)

What is more, the US attempt at regulating the maritime world order continued, only to become less effective. The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 to impose the 5:5:3 ratio on cruiser tonnage, for example, was an American effort that failed completely. Again, it is striking to note that US-British disagreement was in the forefront of discussions.\(^\text{1163}\) Not until the London Conference of 1930, for example, did the two states settle the single item of the cruiser issue.\(^\text{1164}\) Otherwise, US influence on the international arena through the medium of negotiations was reduced, The general Disarmament Conference in 1932-3 and the Second London Naval disarmament Conference 1935-6 both succumbing under unilateral strategies.

It was a lesson that came with a high prize, but the rapidly shrinking power of the US on the international scene did not only come about out of international rivalries. The isolationist camp within the US was important in the sense that it does much to explain the limited role of the US in international politics between the Washington Conference and the outbreak of WWII. Congress was more or less consistently against ambitious naval programmes. It is true that Congress authorised building of eight cruisers in 1924. But when president Coolidge only built two, then regretted this after the failed Geneva conference, congress sharply cut back the plan. During the office of pacifist President Hoover, not one single naval ship was constructed. But the US reluctance to engage more intensely on the world scene must chiefly be understood as caused by the very constitution of the American polity. US administrations could play by the rules of political realism just as much as they could appeal to US idealism, but at the end of the day, the isolationist sentiment always present in North America before 1941 limited the scope of both. In the words of Minnesota Senator Thomas Schall: “To hell with Europe and the rest of those nations!”\(^\text{1165}\) The tendency towards isolationism was not wholly incompatible with the liberalist creed in the US either, rather to the contrary. The earlier active enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine eased considerably during the 1930s. At the Pan-American Conference in 1933, FDR instructed the State department to vote in favour of a resolution

\(^{1162}\) Howarth, 1999: 342. One should also note the criticism of the treaty by US Naval officers who clearly saw that the limitations on tonnage did not preclude a technological race, a race on speed and range, plus increased efforts at modernising submarine fleets. Furthermore, "There was no verification process for any of the naval arms-limitations treaties, which was one of their chief weaknesses, and the US government and the League of Nations preferred ignorance to onsite inspection”, Baer, 1993: 126. Ibid: 94-103 gives a detailed account

\(^{1163}\) See Baer, 1993: 109

\(^{1164}\) Potter, 1981: 234

\(^{1165}\) Quoted in David Kennedy, 1999: 381
with the wording that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”. In effect, FDR abandoned formally what already had been abandoned de facto during Hoover’s administration; the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. FDR consistently followed up on this by releasing Cuba from the Platt amendment in 1934.

Naturally, military decision makers felt uneasy about the effects of US isolationism. Again, the looming potential of Japan did most on the international scene to impress US naval personnel. In 1930, for example, the Japanese navy conducted an exercise to test the US defence of the Philippines. The US office of Naval Intelligence concluded that the US fleet would have been totally destroyed if it had been an operation of war and not an exercise. But such Japanese demonstrations, even its invasion of Manchuria in 1931, did not produce a US fleet build up; nine days after the Manchuria invasion, President Hoover “halved the Navy’s destroyer construction for 1932 and cancelled all naval building for 1933”. Moreover, this isolationist policy took place in a context where it was evident that the League of Nations was impotent at halting aggression. In spite of US isolationism however, the behaviour of Japan made the US Navy General Board revise its Plan Orange. But this was not a step towards interventional interventionism. The US naval policy under FDR can also be seen as paying the dues for earlier isolationism. Thus, “In 1932, at the end of Hoover’s presidency, Japan had a 4:1 advantage in modern cruisers”. Neither did the US impress other major powers through their other military services; in 1930, the US Army counted only 145000 men. The isolationist traits of the US polity that made for insignificant extraterritorial ambitions were partially circumscribed through increased naval spending by FDR in 1933. Like his cousin, FDR had served as assistant secretary of the navy and was acutely aware of the relationship between diplomacy and military power, although he often could make an impression to the contrary. There is little doubt, however, that the commissioning of US naval ships during the 1930s also served a domestic purpose. The first big naval authorisation of FDR was “a relief measure to assist the depressed steel and shipbuilding industries: The National Recovery Act of June 1933 authorized construction in cruisers and lesser types to full treaty strength” One year later, the Vinson-Trammel Bill called for an eight-year building program, replacing older ships and amounting to 102 new ships. Although isolationism was still holding its ground in Congress, FDR

1166 David Kennedy, 1999: 391
1167 By 1935, it had begun to worry FDR as well. See David Kennedy, 1999: 393.
1168 Howarth, 1999: 350
1169 Howarth, 1999: 351
1170 Baer, 1993: 123
1171 Baer, 1993: 125
1172 But FDR was also aware of the isolationist sentiments in the depressed US. See David Kennedy, 1999: 390
did nothing to halt naval allocations after Japan and Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations in 1933. In addition, by December 1934, Japan announced that it would no longer be bound to any treaty limiting naval construction.

In fact, from 1934 to 1940, implementing the Vinson-Trammel Bill made US naval appropriations grow every year, ultimately reaching one billion dollars a year.1174 Moreover, in 1938, the second Vinson act explicitly granted a twenty percent overall tonnage increase above the former treaty limits. This “military Keynesianism”1175 also gave room for experimentation and the crafting of new types of units. Along with Japan, the US was the major power that put most emphasis on naval aircraft and carriers.1176 This policy also resulted in new naval bases and air stations. Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to claim that FDR was seduced by air power theory. In 1938, he mused whether not “pounding away at Germany from the air”, would devastate the fighting moral of Germany. It was a tempting strategy for a President restricted by an isolationist polity; “This kind of war would cost less money, would mean comparatively few casualties, and would be more likely to succeed than a traditional war by land and sea”.1177 Few casualties in this context meant few American casualties.

In hindsight, it is easy to point out that the US could have done even more in these years to prepare for the gathering storm. In retrospect, it seems all too obvious that Anglo-American relations could have been developed further also in military policy. With the historian’s knowledge of what was to come, one could perhaps make the claim that the US should have built more and even better aircraft carriers.1178 But such reasoning fails to consider the very essence of the limits to North American extraterritorial policies; the isolationist elements in the US polity itself. It was only with the fall of France in 1940 that this limiting factor on defence expenditures was shattered. From this year on, the only limits to increasing extraterritorial means of violence were the industrial capacities of the American society. On the day of Pearl Harbour, the US thus had the following fleet in commission and building:

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1174 See Baer, 1993: 130-1, 134-5
1175 See Howarth, 1999: 351-358
1176 Potter, 1981: 235. Although the US Navy was not in the very forefront of Naval aviation, it had also earlier demonstrated willingness to utilise the potential of planes in naval war. From April 1917 till 1919, for example, the US Naval Air Service rose from 250 to 50000 personnel. Howarth, 1999: 331
1177 Cited in David Kennedy, 1999: 429
1178 Potter, 1981 claims both. However, Howarth 1999: 345 is certainly right in emphasising that comparing carrier tonnage gives an unfair picture of strength in Naval airpower. For example, in 1929, 250 planes took part in US fleet exercises, while the corresponding number for the Royal Navy was 150.
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

Table 4.3.3: US Fleet in December 1941\textsuperscript{1179}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>In Commission</th>
<th>Building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The attack on Pearl Harbour might be seen as the definite blow to US isolationism in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. However, table 4.3.3 also illustrates that the US under FDR was on its way to become the maritime hegemon of the world already prior to the Japanese attack. In my view, it is difficult not to conclude that FDR worked in favour of a stronger navy also to be better prepared for a great-power war, at least after 1935. By 1937, the Joint Board strongly pointed out that the Navy had to focus on the Atlantic, and that “Germany might once more penetrate the Western hemisphere”\textsuperscript{1180} In contrast to a largely isolationist Congress, both the armed services and FDR was aware of a “gathering storm” in international affairs.\textsuperscript{1181}

What “Pearl Harbour” meant for the US polity, however, was that the isolationism in American politics vanished for four years, and forever was given a more modest place in US foreign policy decision-making. When US Congress declared war on Japan December 8, there was only one dissenting vote. By contrast, fifty representatives and six senators had voted against the resolution taking the US into WW I in 1917.\textsuperscript{1182} The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was a tactical victory and a strategic blunder. Mussolini and Hitler were also foolish enough to declare war on the US, which then recognised a state of war with Italy and the Third Reich on December 11, 1941. Thus, FDR had the pretext he needed for supporting the allied cause in Europe in a more wholehearted way, which would have been difficult to achieve as he was faced with the priority of the Pacific by the Navy.\textsuperscript{1183}

The hatred against Japan, and the Navy’s wish to prioritise the Pacific were both a reflection of US strategic and foreign policy thinking during the interwar decades. Nationalist Japan was in the US perceived as a real threat to the Philippines and the Open Door policy in China. To Japanese

\textsuperscript{1179} Source, Potter, 1981: 235
\textsuperscript{1180} Baer, 1993: 127
\textsuperscript{1181} See David Kennedy, 1999: chapter 13 for a discussion of FDR’s growing antipathy for the isolationist mood and his thoughts of the public opinion on foreign issues in the US after 1935
\textsuperscript{1182} See David Kennedy, 1999: 523
\textsuperscript{1183} See D. Kennedy, 1999: 523-26 for a discussion
strategists, to be sure, the hostile reception especially directed against their naval policies came as something of a surprise. At least, their purpose with the fleet was not to invite great-power rivalry, but to become a dominant regional power; after all, their interest in large ships and sea power was only a reflection of the naval ambitions on grandiose display in Britain and partly even the United States before the war. The Japanese were simply following Mahan. Again, the role of perceptions in foreign policy making was crucial.

The perceived threat from Japan practically shaped all US naval planning, and thus also technological applications in the armed forces, force structures and doctrine. The Orange Plan assumed that Japan would conquer the archipelago. The US plan was to concentrate its fleet and then to take it across the Central pacific, threaten the Japanese home islands and force a decisive battle at sea.\footnote{Baer, 1993: 120 shows that prior to WWII, the Orange Plan was a staff construction. But as Potter, 1981 argues, the plan was backed up by new weapons, platforms and a tactics that eventually proved efficient in the Pacific war.} To a far larger degree than the Royal navy, the US Navy meant that the aircraft carrier would be important in such vast strikes. In order to build aircraft carriers, the US simply converted cruiser-hulls that otherwise would have been scrapped under the Naval limitation treaty. Thus, two aircraft carriers were commissioned in 1928, providing the platform for experimentation and practical experience that would become a cornerstone of US hegemonic power. From 1937 on, the sophistication of the new arm had reached a level that justified steady building of carriers. By this year, Britain had 204 carriers, Japan 461 and the US 709 Aircraft carriers.\footnote{Howarth, 1999: 361. 709 is an astounding number, and shows that although US isolationism still was a very strong factor limiting US foreign policy, the Administration of FDR carried on a slow but steady naval build up from 1933.} At this stage, it was apparent to even the most conservative European navalists that the US experience and the improvement of aircraft meant that in addition to being paramount for intelligence, carrier aircraft could deal severe blows to enemy fleets. The naval dive-bomber “became the hammerhead of the naval war”, in the words of naval historian E.B. Potter.\footnote{Potter, 1981: 237} For state power, it meant two things. Firstly, naval war became even more complex and expensive. Only an organisation with the economy and expertise of a great power would be able to build, man and utilise such an arm effectively. In other words, the military gap between a first-rank and a second-rank power widened considerably. Secondly, and this was paramount for US hegemony for the rest of the century, US aircraft carriers for decades seemed to be the most formidable conventional weapon of modern war as well as a political instrument to project power and manage crisis short of war. With the carrier fleet, the US in effect possessed a platform that could fight targets on land, in the air and at sea.
Furthermore, the Orange Plan to defeat Japan also harboured doctrinal assumptions that refined US specialties that would prove important in future war. It was assumed that Japanese bases would have to be taken by amphibious assaults.\textsuperscript{1187} Studying the series of mistakes made by Britain in the Gallipoli campaign, the US navy and the US Marine Corps developed a very detailed amphibious doctrine, first published for use in the services in 1934.\textsuperscript{1188} This also added to a change in modern warfare. From now on, the US Navy would have to coordinate ships, artillery planes and land forces during amphibious operations. Entirely new vessels were designed to land soldiers; the LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) that could discharge tracked vehicles directly onto the beach. In addition, the larger LST (Landing ships, tank), attack transports, command vessels and a whole series of new equipment were at least being designed when the US entered WW II. Moreover, the Orange Plan in effect made US attempt to become the most efficient builder of new military bases in the world. The stepwise advance on Japan through the island-studded Central pacific would also require the ability to convert conquered islands and atolls into operational bases with the greatest possible speed. Thus were the Navy’s Construction battalions born (“Seabees”). In addition to this came the entire range of logistical support required to create a viable basis for prolonged overseas warfare; “oilers, tenders, repair ships, floating drydocks, ammunition carriers, and more”.\textsuperscript{1189} In short, already in the 1930s, the technological and organisational know-how and equipment for a first-class naval power with the material sophistication unparalleled in world history was founded even in the then isolationist, liberal US.

Indeed, the 1930s perhaps stand out as something of a heyday (or low point) of isolationism coupled with conspiracy theories in the American public.\textsuperscript{1190} The fact is that many US citizens accepted the proposal that US entrance into WWI had been a mistake, and that such a mistake should never again be repeated. In 1934, for example, a public roar was created through the hearings of the Nye committee in the Senate, where it was claimed that US industries had made fortunes out of the war. The reports of the committee made a scandal, and did much to strengthen US isolationism at a

\textsuperscript{1187} One should note that although the US navy and USMC were strengthened from 1933, it had one fundamental drawback compared to the Japanese extraterritorial forces; experience. As the US naval attaché in Tokyo pointed out in 1938; “From August 12th 1937 her naval aircraft have been continuously employed in combat operations…She undoubtedly would not hesitate to undertake offensive operations”, cited in Howarth, 1999: 365

\textsuperscript{1188} One can only speculate on some of the more perverse side effects the doctrine had. It called for an immensely detailed and elaborate preparation of an operation. The details were so important because of the difficult logistical requirements of an amphibious operation carried out far from the motherland, and because of the need to synchronise all units and commanders in the theatre. The coordination of artillery, aircraft, vessels and landing crafts was an immensely organisational problem that had to be solved in order to have any hope of success. The side effects of such a doctrine were that it perhaps merged with the rigidities that already existed in a military system. Thus, initiative in lower ranks might become hampered through bureaucracy.

\textsuperscript{1189} Potter, 1981: 238

\textsuperscript{1190} See Thompson, 2002: 123 for a fuller description of various peace-organisations active in the US already prior to WWI.
critical stage in US naval build up.\textsuperscript{1191} Pacifist groups as the World Peaceways promoted the belief that industries that profited from the war actually were responsible for US involvement in WW I. The incredible effect such sentiments had on US policy are testified in the neutrality legislation of the 1930s “Which unilaterally surrendered those neutral rights the United States had four times gone to war to preserve”\textsuperscript{1192}. Through the 1935 Neutrality Act, the selling or transportation to belligerents were simply forbidden. This was slightly modified in 1937 when exceptions were permitted for other goods than munitions, provided the transactions were carried out on a cash-and-carry basis, and provided that the belligerent carried the goods on its own ships. The US would not react if such ships were sunk by other powers. This was a policy designed for keeping the US out of trouble, or in the words of Potter; “To avoid being challenged on the seas, Americans planned to retreat from the seas”.\textsuperscript{1193} As late as 1939, a new neutrality regulation came in effect that lifted the arms embargo, but on the other hand granted the President the right to forbid US merchantmen to enter “war zones”. In contrast to the majority of Europeans, most Americans took the Kellogg-Briand Pact seriously, at least judging from Legislation acts of the US Congress in the latter half of the 1930s. However, US war planners and the administration of FDR had fewer illusions about the threats to US interests.\textsuperscript{1194} With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, US naval planners immediately started working on contingency planning for naval operations in two oceans simultaneously, and this had occurred only one time earlier in the history of the US, in the Spanish-American war of 1898. The older war plans were remodelled through the application of five different scenarios. In three of these, US naval operations in the Atlantic were included.\textsuperscript{1195} Considering the extensive list of publications on WW II and the US participation in it, there is little need to dwell upon US warfare from 1941 till 1945.

What is interesting to our theoretical ambitions here, however, was the effort by FDR to claim US influence on the world stage through a new attempt at creating a world order through international organisations (see chapter 5 for further discussions). This time it was primarily to be the United

\textsuperscript{1191} Howarth, 1999: 359
\textsuperscript{1192} Potter, 1981: 239
\textsuperscript{1193} Potter, 1981: 239, or Howarth, 1999: 366 "Congress had passed a series of Neutrality Acts intended to keep America out of anyone else’s wars”.
\textsuperscript{1194} Only after Münich, however, did FDR publicly state intentions that could be interpreted as a break with the neutrality law. See his State of the Union address January 4th 1939 and David Kennedy, 1999: 419-21. As David Kennedy notes, Roosevelt soon had to back away from neutrality revision due to the isolationist mood in the US public opinion.
\textsuperscript{1195} The exact date of this change in naval thinking in the FDR administration should perhaps be set at March 15 1939, when German forces entered Prague and Japan annexed the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. But FDR had probably made up his mind on the need for a more active US foreign policy far earlier. On January 4 1939, for example, he publicly declared that “We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly – may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim”, cited in Howarth, 1999: 366
Nations. But the very concept of involving the US in world politics on a permanent, institutionalised basis was not new. Indeed, FDR was partly inspired by a former President he had greatly admired; Woodrow Wilson. His ideas were to be echoed by FDR, Jimmy Carter, George Bush Sr., and indeed also Ronald Reagan. “Wilson was ahead of his time, and did not live long enough to know what great and commanding relevance many of his ideas would acquire before this century was out”, George Kennan wrote in 1991.\textsuperscript{1196} The essence of Wilson’s most lasting contribution was his solution to override US isolationism. Indeed, this attempt was not naive idealism (but unrealistically ambitious in 1919), but coupled with realism. No less a realist figure then Henry Kissinger could therefore write in 1994 that in bringing the United States to play a more profiled role in world politics, Wilson was “an astonishing achievement”. Building on the assumption that the US “lacked both the theoretical and the practical basis for the European-style diplomacy of constant adjustment of the nuances of power from a posture of moral neutrality”, Kissinger writes, Wilson comprehended better than his contemporaries “that America’s instinctive isolationism could be overcome only by an appeal to its belief in the exceptional nature of its ideals”\textsuperscript{1197} Indeed, the sociological constitution of the state, or “Culture of national security”, in short; its ideational foundations, matter in international politics.

However, empirical reality tells us that US interventionism did not succeed until WW II. This has not only contributed to enmesh the legacy of Woodrow Wilson as a controversial figure, but also to raise a scholarly discussion of US motives in extraterritorial policy. Based on a materialist interpretation of history, which some realists and many on the left might be prone to endorse, one might indeed question the very notion of American idealism: either it was mere rhetoric, or just naivety, at times both.\textsuperscript{1198} This also raises the possibility that Woodrow Wilson and FDR were somewhat more Machiavellian than many observers believed. It has also been suggested that the idealism and the preferred world order advocated by Wilson and FDR indeed were designed to enhance US influence and position in the international system. In other words, these presidents were “realists” rather than “idealists”. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a “new” history was written in the US that challenged earlier views on Wilson, for example. Gordon Levin thus saw Wilson as an advocate of a sophisticated plan to shape international relations in the interests of the US, not only to make US involvement compatible with US values, but to contribute to a world order.

\textsuperscript{1196} Kennan, 1991: 330
\textsuperscript{1197} Kissinger, 1994: 44-45
\textsuperscript{1198} Carr, 1939 set the standard here, but he was also acutely aware of the limits to political realism as a normative foundation for politics. If one accepts his criticism, one should also accept that realism has limits in analysing and even describing political processes. Wallerstein, 1980, 2000, goes far in saying that liberalism was a result of
favourable to US national interests. In much the same fashion of explanation, Samuel Wells wrote that the peace “became for Wilson the means of global reform which would bring an automatic expansion of America’s political and economic influence”. Indeed, there is a similarity between Wilson’s program and that of the FDR Administration after the Japanese attack in 1941; “Solely from the standpoint of the interest of the American people themselves, who saw straight and who thought straight twenty years ago?”, asked Undersecretary of State Summer Wells on Armistice day 1941. Thus, one might claim that Wilson was way ahead of his time. The problem was exactly that; he was far too much ahead of his time. Thus, the US society and the US state apparatus were not ready for the US contribution that Wilson’s plan had relied on. Although the US navy grew rapidly during WWI, it was not a favourite pet of the North American society. There existed no joint US institution for analysing military or political intelligence that resembled those of say Britain or Germany. The US had no unified Defence Department, and the White House Staff consisted of “Wilson’s Political secretary Joseph P. Tumulty, his personal stenographer, and a few clerks”. This did not make a basis for North American hegemonic leadership. However, Wilson in some respects was an embodiment of a US trait that mattered in US foreign policy throughout the 20th Century; a secular evangelism that always saw its extraterritorial activities as serving more than narrow self-interest on behalf of the nation. Wilson sought to translate this directly into the naval service in a manner that to some degree has marked the monopoly of violence of this state throughout the century. This was epitomized in his address to a class of graduating naval officers; “Every time you let the Stars and Stripes free to the wind, it means that you are on an errand which other navies have sometimes forgotten; not an errand of conquest, but an errand of service”. The power and national pride represented by the US Navy came to be unparalleled by any state during the entire cold war, even the Soviet Union would never achieve parity with the US in terms of extraterritorial power.

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1199 Levin, 1968: VII: ”The ultimate Wilsonian goal may be defined as the attainment of a peaceful liberal capitalist world order under international law, safe both from traditional imperialism and revolutionary socialism, within whose stable liberal confines a missionary America could find moral and economic pre-eminence”
1200 Wells, 1972: 419. See also Thompson, 2002: 7
1201 Cited in Thompson, 2002: 7
1202 Thompson, 2002: 9. In essence, Wilson in person WAS the Wilson administration; ”One British official at Paris recorded his astonishment when, after a session of the conference, the President ”gave someone instructions to telephone for his typewriter. We conjured up visions of a beautiful American stenographer, but in a short time a messenger appeared, bringing with him a battered typewriter on a tray…The typewriter was placed in a corner of the Conference room and the President proceeded to tap out a long memorandum. It is a strange sight to see one of the greatest rulers in the world working away in this fashion””, Thompson, 2002: 10
1203 Quoted in Thompson, 2002: 78
The isolationist trait in US policy was so enduring that when FDR announced US neutrality the day after the British declaration of war in 1939, the US president received an overwhelming public support. And yet, FDR’s administration pursued a policy of naval build up in spite of the isolationist tendencies in the US polity. On June 14 1940, FDR signed an act that meant an 11 per cent expansion of the Navy. Even more telling of the US move away from isolationism is the fact that Congress approved a further 70 per cent naval expansion on July 20 1940! By this stage, it was also evident that US exported strategic goods to “friends” and embargoed “enemies”, i.e. Japan. In many ways, the policies of FDR can be interpreted as a series of acts to prepare the US public for war; in the winter of 1941, the number of men registered for the draft passed 16.4 million, the Atlantic Fleet was reactivated, Greenland came under US protection in April 1941, and on May 27 1941 the President announced that “The war is approaching the brink of the Western Hemisphere. It is coming very close to home”. By September 1941, the United States had voluntarily extended its protection to cover the whole western Atlantic. The USMC had occupied Iceland since early July, and US destroyers were actively assisting the Royal Navy in the hunt for submarines.

It was in these months from 1940 and 1941 that the traditional US isolationism as a factor of significant importance to foreign policy was buried for the rest of the century. Traditionally, US isolationism was founded on two pillars; non-intervention in European affairs, and a defence very closely attuned to protect the national interest in a narrow sense of the term. It had been one thing to seize the Philippines and meddle in the Caribbean and Latin America. Those were controversial issues in the US polity all the way. But a further involvement with or against major powers had not been an appropriate theme in US politics since 1919. Both these assumptions were broken by 1941, and I might dare say prior to Pearl Harbour. The increased involvement in international politics proper by the US was signalled in earnest through Lend-Lease assistance decided on March 27, 1941, and the Atlantic Conference in August 1941. It was a gesture of support towards Great Britain, but it was also a signal to US isolationists and the coming enemies of the US. Moreover, it was a demonstration of the vision FDR had for world politics after the war. While much controversy surrounds the importance FDR and Churchill attached to the Charter, it is quite frank in its echoes of old US principles in foreign policy; the abandonment of colonies and the freedom of the seas are embraced, implicitly for the former principle, explicitly for the latter. In one sense, the meeting that produced the Atlantic Charter created a momentum of its own; the agreement to aid the Soviet

1204 Howarth, 1999: 375
1205 Howarth, 1999: 377-9
1206 Howarth, 1941: 380
1207 Baer, 1993: 157
Union materially, the endorsement of principles that became parts of the United Nations Charter and in time, it became a focal point during the war and in the first months of peace in Europe. Again, the interplay between domestic and international politics was also peculiarly strong. Through the Atlantic Charter with its liberal rhetoric, Roosevelt was able to raise domestic support for a more active US involvement in the war;

“On the liberal principles of the Atlantic Charter, by which Churchill and Roosevelt had pledged to support self-government in Europe and free movement at sea, Roosevelt could base an anti-German policy in wartime, in peacetime, or in between. It is for good reasons that Roosevelts’ admirers and detractors, then and now, have been reminded of Woodrow Wilson and the sequence of declarations and events that led to war in 1917”

In this way, the US became a cobelligerent with Britain in the battle of the Atlantic, though not yet formally at war with Germany. Roosevelt, one should presume, must coolheaded have calculated that such participation only increased the possibilities of clashes between German and US vessels. The economic and industrial power of the US made for a gigantic extraterritorial arm. To claim that the combination of industrial capacity and US entrepreneurship in the “war of machines” produced lasting results is no exaggeration. By 1942 American armaments output passed that of Britain. In 1944, it was six times greater. The enormous governmental demand for weapons – over 100 billion dollars in the first six months of 1942 for a start- changed the US, both as an actor on the world stage and as a society. According to historian David Kennedy, the US in four years produced 5777 merchant ships, 1556 naval vessels, 299,293 aircraft, 634,569 jeeps, 88,410 tanks, 2,383,311 trucks, 6,500,000 rifles and some 40 billion bullets of various kinds. It terminated unemployment, improved the entire infrastructure to meet the demands of a war economy, raised domestic demands for products, increased family incomes, increased levels of taxation and changed the demographic pattern of society itself. These domestic alterations, while modified after the war, left a permanent imprint on the US society. The federal government ever after was a big spender, the costs of military expenditure not being the least of factors in this pretext (see chapter 5).

1208 See Crockatt, 1995: 40-41
1209 Baer, 1993: 161
1210 David Kennedy, 1999: 654
1211 David Kennedy, 1999: 655
While our aim in this thesis is not to give an account of warfare, it suffices to say that this enormous mobilisation of US resources is unprecedented in world history. Sea-lanes of communications were vital for the winning of the war. In the Atlantic, it was a battle to ensure that enough material arrived to the Isles and to Soviet Russia, in the Pacific; it was an inferno of fighting in the air, at sea, on beaches and small islands on the march towards Japan. It was the prospect of a long (the Plain of Tokyo was calculated not to be in allied control before April 1946) and bloody (the Joint Chiefs estimated 1.5 million allied soldiers) continuation of the struggle with Japan that made Truman authorise the use of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{1212} It is tempting to say that the \textit{PaxAmericana} allegedly started where \textit{Pax Britannica} ended, in 1945. One could find support for such a proposition in the words of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in 1947, for example, when he stated that the US navy had “more or less inherited from Britain the job of keeping the sea lanes open and stabilising areas from which exports come”.\textsuperscript{1213} I believe the notion of a changing of the guards in 1945 to be too simplistic, however. Firstly, as we have seen above, Britain was no longer the undisputed sea power by 1918.\textsuperscript{1214} Secondly, and much more open to scholarly debate, is the question of US foreign policy, the motives and ultimate aims of central US decision makers, the role of financial and industrial interests and the role of international structures and interactions. Each and every one of these subjects has been open to intense and voluminous debates among scholars and laymen in every thinkable fields of study. This debate will undoubtedly continue, and I would have little to add to this debate but one not totally irrelevant note; the development of US means of Extraterritorial violence. In addition to the monopoly of the atomic bomb, the US possessed 1194 major combatant vessels, 1256 amphibious transports and over 41000 aircraft in 1945. In total, it was more than double the size of the Royal Navy. It is striking to note then, that within the three years that followed, only 267 major combatant vessels remained active in the US Navy.\textsuperscript{1215} Again, the constitution of the US society did not make a transition into an imperial power possible. Thus, I believe it to be too strong a claim to write the history of US foreign policy as one of “manifest destiny”.\textsuperscript{1216} A lasting transformation of states occurred in Europe as well. This change also applied

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1212} Rhodes, 1986 seems to become the classic reference here
\item \textsuperscript{1213} Cited in Howarth, 1999: 476
\item \textsuperscript{1214} If it had not been evident earlier, it became painfully so in 1940; “The British Navy, long the shield of the western hemisphere, was after 1940 dedicated to national survival. In the Pacific, where until 1940 the United States had expected a measure of assistance from European naval powers, no serious aid was any longer possible”, Baer, 1993: 147. Confer with Modelski, 1978: 223: “By 1900 it had become clear to many that Pax Britannica was well past its prime and that the world system was swiftly losing its ordering capacities”
\item \textsuperscript{1215} See Howarth, 1999: 476
\item \textsuperscript{1216} See Stephanson, 1995. One should note that the very broad picture painted by Stephanson is primarily built on two decades of US history. "I have concentrated on two periods of strong territorial expansionism: the 1840s, when the United States seized half the territory of Mexico; and the time around the turn of the present century, when war
to overseas possessions. During the war, as European powers faced the Germans; the French, the Dutch and the British Empire started to lose control of their colonies. The Vichy government of France conceded Japanese occupation of the north of Indochina, the Dutch could not protect the East Indies and the British naval strategy for the Far East crumbled. Moreover, the vision in the Atlantic Charter became embodied in the United Nations and the international political framework (see ch. 5) to such a large degree envisioned by the superpower that perceived itself an anti-imperialist polity; the USA.

### 4.4 From Pax Britannica to WWII: Hegemonic stability vs instability and the peripheries of Northern Europe and the Netherlands

After 1856, the Nordic countries, and even the former paternalist Scandinavian states, became more peripheral in the international politicial system. This is especially striking in terms of military power. In sum, neither of these territories had a base of resources that could be turned into major political power on the international scene. Nevertheless, the transforming of Sweden and Denmark from paternalists to bandwagoning states with indirect overseas interests is as spectacular as the rise in formal sovereignty that all the Nordic states would experience after WWII (see ch. 5). With the exception of Denmark, none of these polities controlled overseas territories, while Norway did administer arctic Svalbard as a mandate from the League of Nations under the Svalbard treaty from 1920. Therefore, one can rightly conclude that the dominant foreign policies of the Nordic countries until 1945 was one of adaptation to the balance of power, often practised as formal neutrality. In terms of foreign policy habitus, the naval aspects of world politics influenced all the Nordic states, especially the Atlantic peripheries Iceland and Norway, and to some degree Denmark. It is this consolidation of territories in a dynamic international system that will be briefly addressed here; to what degree and in what form did these peripheral states develop a lasting security culture during this era. The case of the Netherlands also deserves some attention, since it clearly was an old, relatively liberal state with significant overseas possessions and a legacy of once having had hegemonic maritime ambitions. Indeed, the Netherlands stands somewhere in between the major powers and the peripheral states in the sense that it held on to large overseas territories well into the latter half of the 20th century. This makes for an interesting comparison with the Nordic countries. In sum then, our hypotheses from chapter 2 indicates that The Netherlands was a “bandwagoning liberalist”, Sweden and Denmark were “former small empires” with only indirect overseas interests against Spain and the ensuing suppression of the Philippine independence movement added colonial possessions overseas” (ibid: xiii)
and mare liberum ideology, that Iceland and Norway until 1905 were sovereignty-seeking peripheries, while Norway after 1905 was a bandwagoning mare clausum state.

### 4.4.1 The Nordic states

Finland remained under Russia until 1917, Iceland under Denmark until 1944, while Norway ceased to be a “province” under Denmark, only to enter a (“personal”)\(^{1217}\) union with Sweden in 1814. Norway achieved full independence in 1905, twelve years before Finland. Correspondingly, Denmark and Sweden “shrunk” by abandoning the union with Norway. Denmark nevertheless kept Greenland throughout the 20\(^{th}\) Century, and their colonies in the West Indies until the early 20\(^{th}\) century. Denmark-Norway had had a common foreign policy, naturally controlled by Copenhagen, while Iceland remained entirely peripheral in political, not to mention foreign policy, decision-making.

While IR theory has a certain tendency to describe the behaviour of small states as either allying with, or bandwagoning behind, major powers,\(^{1218}\) the fact is that in the era covered here, the means of formal alliances was not used. Instead, I believe my initial concepts of sovereignty-maximising peripheries and bandwagoning were mixed in the Nordic states; more or less, all the states covered here with the exception of Finland sought protection under the umbrella of the Royal Navy. But at the same time, the political leaderships of the Nordic countries to a great extent sought to uphold their status of formal neutrality during conflicts until, and in the case of Sweden even during, WWII. On the other hand, none of the states sought an alliance with Britain. Also interesting is the fact that the Nordic countries did not themselves form an alliance, although this at times was publicly debated, and in spite of the formalisation of Danish and Swedish paternalist policies towards Iceland (until 1944) and Norway (until 1905). Moreover, the peaceful resolution to the questions of sovereignty for Iceland, and in particular Norway makes the Nordic picture even more complicated. Were the sinews for the Nordic Area as a “security community” or a “Zone of peace”\(^{1219}\) built during this period?

That the Nordic countries all should become sovereign nationstates during the 20\(^{th}\) century was no inevitable outcome. Up to the 1860s, the popular movement of the so-called Scandinavianism even worked in favour of a political union of the three Scandinavian territories, and at least wanted a

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\(^{1217}\) Riste, 2001: 52. The term is contested. See also Terjesen, 2001:chapter 2

\(^{1218}\) See Schweller, 1994: 72-107 for an overview of the theoretical question.
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

defence union. This social movement did not die until 1864, when Sweden and Denmark disagreed on the defence of the southern border of Schleswig. Thus, Denmark was left to fight alone against Prussia and Austria-Hungary, to great agony for the Danes and the supporters of Scandinavianism.1220

4.4.1.1 Two diverse small mare clausum states: Norway and Iceland1221

“No-one can suspect us of egoistic or narrow interests or motives. In our case, one knows that we speak from an entirely objective love of peace and on basis of the belief in the growth of feelings of justice between nations”
Norwegian PM Mowinckel, 19261222

In the personal union between Sweden and Norway, Foreign policy largely was a prerogative of the (Swedish) King, with some major amendments. The Norwegian constitution of 1814 demanded that the King consult an “Extraordinary Ministerial Council” in Norway in matters of declaring war and concluding peace.1223 The degree of influence granted Norwegian political institutions became a dominant issue of friction in the union. The 19th century history of the union is largely a story of increasing Norwegian autonomy, with some setbacks. However, although national historiography at times sought to argue to the contrary, this should not obscure the fact that in the international arena “Norway was very much a subsidiary of Sweden”.1224

On the other hand, Icelanders and Norwegians undoubtedly and increasingly saw themselves as nations with clear aspirations to full state sovereignty. It is also beyond debate that the international community saw Norway and Iceland as distinct entities, although peripheral in European politics (if not in all economic sectors, where both states continued to be considerable exporters, and Norway became a prime carrier through its merchant navy. In fact, the size of the Norwegian merchant navy was of such proportions that it was more of a mare clausum bandwagoning state than a sovereignty-seeking periphery after 1905). Correspondingly, their roles in influencing international institutions

1219 Karl Deutsch et al, 1957 saw the Nordic countries as security community, i.e. a set of territories with common values and a high degree of cooperation. For a discussion of the term ”Zone of Peace”, see also Archer, 1996: 451-467, and Bonnén et al, 2002
1220 See Bonnén et al, 2002: 4
1221 Although Iceland was under the sovereignty formally at least, of Denmark until 1944, Iceland is analysed together with Norway here. This is based on the assumption that they both were peripheral Atlantic territories, and with some similarities in their political history; especially their loss of sovereignty to Denmark, and in the case of Norway, to Sweden (1814-1905)
1222 Cited in Fure, 1996: 189
1223 Riste, 2001: 53. Also note that the King of Sweden had to consult a Swedish Ministerial Council in most areas of foreign policy.
1224 Riste, 2001: 55
were negligible. This is particularly true in the case of Iceland, where the predominant way of life lay in fishing and whaling. The export of these products was largely controlled by Danish companies, which made control over own resources an important aspect in the growing Icelandic national identity. This is a chief explanation of the Icelandic *mare clausum* policy throughout the 19th and 20th century. The true significance of these coastal states lay in their economic resources, i.e. as exporters of fish and in the case of Norway, timber, copper and sulphur.\(^{1225}\) Thus, these two Nordic peripheries adopted, as they always had, the twin principles of *mare clausum* for their coastal resources, and simultaneously *mare liberum* for “international” waters. In this, Norway and Iceland shared a common characteristic, true to our typologies in chapter two. However, there can be no doubt that Norway had moved from being a sovereignty-seeking periphery to a bandwagoning state by 1905, but the unique mixture of shipping and fishing interests made it paramount to Norwegian governments to balance these maritime principles. In the North European security complex, both nations sought to carve out the largest possible degree of sovereignty over their coastal resources (claiming *mare clausum* of their fisheries). This position was the dominant stand of policy. At the same time, they claimed that beyond the littoral of their states, transactions that involved ocean faring should be as free as possible. In other words, they both adopted a position of the weak, leaning towards a neutralist and low profile policy in crisis and war.

While we have argued that the role these peripheries played in international relations was negligible if we see them as actors in European politics, they nevertheless are apt illustrations of the conditions that made their survival possible. While it remained true that they were living at the mercy of larger powers, as long as the maritime hegemony of the UK prevailed, these peripheries seemed to gain an advantage from the codification of international maritime rules after the Crimean War. While the policies of the Maritime hegemon during the Napoleonic wars could be devastating (witness the British seizure of the Danish-Norwegian fleet at Copenhagen 1807), the challenge from Germany and to some degree the US made the Empire more careful in its dealings with small European coastal states out of primarily strategic reasons. The British recognition of the immunity of neutral flags was an advantage to all the Nordic states.\(^{1226}\) The Declaration of Paris did not endanger coastal maritime resource-extraction, but it codified the right to free passage at sea, thus helping to secure exports and imports in Northern Europe, which the Nordic countries in particular were dependent

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\(^{1225}\) See Riste, 2001: 95-98. Sulphur for example, was vital for the German production of ammunition. Both the exports of copper, fish and Sulphur made Norway an important pawn in the game of Germany and Britain in the 20th Century; together, of course, with the strategic position of Norway with ice-free harbours and direct access to the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea.

\(^{1226}\) Appendix III clearly illustrates this, with an extraordinary take-off for the shipping sector in all the three Scandinavian states between 1850 and 1880.
Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

The advantage lasted until 1914. The outbreak of both world wars naturally changed this logic, and damaged the merchant fleets. Until WWI, however, the before mentioned international framework (The US and modern, second-rate navies in the European powers constituting a potential alliance against an eventual British destruction of the international fabric), greatly facilitated the otherwise fragile and modest Nordic economies.

For Iceland, the full effect of this came from around 1900, due to the problems of over-population and a colder climate in the last half of the 19th century.1227 Thus, physical conditions made Iceland a special case in the latter half of the 19th Century.

Norway was probably the single state among the Nordic countries most favoured by the international institutional setting after the Crimean war. In particular, the maritime sector proved enormously rewarding for this coastal state with its many ice-free harbours. In addition to fishing and whaling, a huge resource of timber and waterfalls that made transportation from the inland to the sea was hugely beneficial for exports. The abundance of waterfalls leading to the ocean also made possible the construction of sawmills by the river routes where the timber was transported.1228

In tandem with this development, the small peripheral society of Norway turned itself into one of the largest transporters in the world. The size of the Norwegian Merchant fleet increased by 500% from 1850 till 1875!1229 Only a benign hegemony under *Pax Britannica* could enable a state like Norway to become the third largest merchant navy in the world, in sharp contrast to its tiny navy. In this respect, the pattern was set in the period 1815-1830, in which only ten per cent of the annual defence budgets were allocated to the Navy.1230 It is true that Norway was part of a union with the militarily speaking stronger Sweden, but nor was Sweden a maritime power of European significance by the 19th century. The fact remains that a weak periphery rich in maritime know-how1231 and some natural resources could prosper in Europe following the Crimean War. This fact cannot be accounted for without reference to the maritime regulations at the international arena, in which a predominant, if not hegemonic, Britain was careful not to upset the international equilibrium. Indeed, the unilateral yet peaceful Norwegian abandoning of the union with Sweden was a remarkable political event in the Nordic countries until 1917, when Finland achieved its independence from Russia. The formation of the Swedish-Norwegian union was part of the settlement after the Napoleonic wars, and the abolition of the Union could hardly have taken place

1227 Karlsson, 2000
1229 Bergh et al, 1983: 111
1230 See Ulriksen, 2002
had the major powers not consented to it. Apart from the economic significance of exports from the Nordic countries, the major European powers tacitly agreed that Scandinavia should not become a tempting bone of contention for any of the other powers, thereby threatening to complicate the European balance of power even further. Russia raised no significant arguments against the abolition of the union, since such an outcome could only weaken Sweden, its most traditional antagonist among the Scandinavian states. On the other hand, Britain was inclined to disencourage a strengthening of Swedish ties to Germany (and obviously, if Norway stayed in union with Sweden, the situation would be even more detrimental to British interests). However, Britain played carefully, and pressured Sweden to achieve a peaceful solution to the Union question, while at the same time allowing King Oscar II to save face publicly.\textsuperscript{1232} Russia was the first state to acknowledge Norwegian sovereignty, Britain the first to establish an embassy in Oslo.\textsuperscript{1233}

I believe it is fair to say at this point, that the traditional nationalist Norwegian argument that a strong national defence deterred Sweden from invading Norway is less credible. It is true, though, that the Norwegian defence allocations increased significantly from 1890 till 1905. In this setting, the very high priority of border fortifications and the building of four battleships after 1895 might seem evidence of the wish to create an effect of deterrence against Sweden, and to some degree they were.\textsuperscript{1234} Especially in the liberal party (\textit{Venstre}), most politicians saw Sweden as the most probable antagonist in a future war. However, the motivations underlying increased Norwegian defence expenditure were somewhat more complex. It is a fact that prior to 1890, the Norwegian armed forces were utterly un-modern. A vast program of modernisation was required even to be able to uphold the neutralist policy in Norwegian waters. In this respect, what was more appropriate in the Mahanian age than to acquire new battleships? But the international balance of power was also significant at the regional level. Prior to the defeat of Russia in 1905, Norwegian politicians and officers to a significant degree viewed Russia as a potential enemy, especially so, as the Northern territories increasingly became industrialised and the railway network made transportation of troops

\textsuperscript{1231} Allegedly, one owner of an American Fruit Company in the 1880s answered "We don`t charter your ships, we charter your captains", when asked why they preferred Norwegian freighters. See Bergh et al, 1983: 112. "Our honour and our power was brought to us by white sails", according to national poet Bjørnson in 1868.

\textsuperscript{1232} The outcome of the British policy process was of outmost important for the Norwegian effort to gain full independence. Lindberg, 1966:104-120 has demonstrated that kaiser William supported a further existence of the union, and the British cabinet was initially inclined to hold the same view. King Edward personally involved himself strongly in the question. However, the Norwegian government made a clever move through Wedel jarlsberg, who proposed that Prince Carl of Denmark, the brother-in-law of King edward, be the new Norwegian King. Through this move, the Norwegians managed to get King Edward as a frenetic supporter of the abolition of the union. See Lindberg, 1966: 159-168

\textsuperscript{1233} Needless to say, scholars in the Scandinavian countries, and especially Norwegian scholars in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, have been prone to stress domestic reasons for the peaceful dissolving of the Union.

\textsuperscript{1234} Riste, 2001: 66. See Ula, 1946: 215-218 for a colourful description of how battleships were celebrated symbols of national pride even in peripheral Norway in this period.
westwards more feasible.\textsuperscript{1235} An explanation must also consider the nature of the domestic ideologies and political institutions as exemplified by the Swedish-Norwegian union.\textsuperscript{1236}

Apart from the alleged role the Norwegian defence played in the dissolving of the union, it is also significant to note for this thesis that even a small mare clausum state as Norway did acquire modern battleships. Indeed, both Norway and Sweden allocated huge sums (in a Scandinavian context) for extraordinary defence after 1899. But again, a central Swedish motivation was to strengthen the defence against a possible Russian attack via Finland, whose status had become ever more precarious after 1899. It is nevertheless striking to note that the Norwegian extraterritorial means of violence reached something of an all-time high by 1905: it had acquired four battleships, one destroyer and 29 fast torpedo boats. It is striking to note that the golden age of navalism had a huge impact also in a peripheral European state.

It lies in the nature of small states with a mare clausum inclination to try to shield itself from large-power rivalry. Therefore, the path of neutrality that was to follow Norwegian foreign policy for 35 years was set immediately after the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union. As the first secretary of state told the Norwegian parliament in 1905, the aim of the Government was “to avoid involvement in combinations and alliances that could drag us into belligerent adventures with any of the European warrior states”\textsuperscript{1237}. Herein lies a core in the identity that underpinned Norwegian foreign policy; it saw itself as a state that could not significantly alter the international balance of power, had no wish to do so, and eventually saw itself as somewhat morally superior to states that practised power politics. The result until WWI was a curious blend of neutrality coupled with a very weak navy (Norwegian secretary of Defence Gunnar Knudsen expressed most clearly the assumption behind this policy; "We trust in the British Navy").

Although the attempts at upholding neutrality in Norwegian territorial waters during WWI largely were unsuccessful, the economic and security benefits of staying neutral during the Great War were such that this material factor only reinforced the ideology of the sovereignty-seeking periphery. It simply tried to hold on to, and expand, as much of its sovereignty in coastal territories as it could under the present circumstances. This made Norway a passive state in international affairs in general, but it simultaneously made her a rather clear mare clausum state in northern waters. Along

\textsuperscript{1235} This perception was strengthened under the Russian General governor Bobrikov. In effect, he tried to make Finland a full-fledged province of Russia. During 1899, for example, a series of constitutional rights for Finland were simply put aside. Lindberg, 1958:1099, Carlsson, 1985: 229
\textsuperscript{1236} Terjesen, 2001: especially chapter 10. This explanation, that the democratic maturity of the Swedish political institutions helped create a peaceful solution, was –as Terjesen, 2001: 186 also points out- given by Halvdan Koht already prior to WWII. However, the detailed analysis by Terjesen certainly lends substantive support for this hypothesis.
Its coast, for example, it claimed sovereignty over a 4-mile territorial water zone,1238 while the major powers were of the opinion that international law only permitted a 3-mile territorial zone. The claim to a 4-mile territorial sea was typical of Norway as a sovereignty-maximising periphery. Both the Norwegian and Swedish claims to the 4-mile rule existed even prior to the international recognition of the territorial seas measured as a 3-mile zone.1239 By and large, the Norwegian territorial limit was recognised by states that only had a 3-mile limit.1240 However, neither of the paternalists Germany and Britain respected or acknowledged the 4-mile territorial sea.1241

As exercise of sovereignty, however, Norway did not have the military means to do the job. Incredibly enough, as soon Norway had gained independence from Sweden, it continued to build fortifications on land along the border, but it almost totally neglected its navy. In 1910, for example, one single ship of the British lion Cruisers had a larger displacement than the entire Norwegian Navy.1242 Instead, the Navy was primarily a navy of small patrol boats and obsolete battleships (by this time, the 1905 effort had faded). In spite of the fact that Norway had the world’s third largest merchant navy (and lost 2000 sailors during WWI), the policy of neutrality that kept her out of WWI was seen as a success in retrospect. Thus, although Norway had a considerable stake in world overseas transportation, held Svalbard under a mandate from the League of Nations since 1920 and claimed a 4-mile territorial sea along its long and strategically important coast, her navy was only suited the task of guarding neutrality in home waters between 1914 and 1940. Most historians today agree that Norway’s policy between the world wars rested on the assumption that the Royal Navy would protect it in case another power sought to challenge her sovereignty.1243 After, all, being one of the leading maritime transporters in the world, Norway felt secure that its good relations with Britain made her willing to secure Norwegian interests if another major European power would seek to subdue her. Moreover, the framework set up through the League of Nations was seen as something of a new era in international relations by many Norwegians in high office.1244 This combination; the hope of a successful pacification of international relations, and the protection from the Royal Navy should the League fail, made Norway cling to neutrality far beyond what the international institutions could guarantee from the early 1930s. But to Norwegian politicians, this international framework seemed a promising one for maximising sovereignty outside of the spheres.

1237 Cited and translated in Killham, 1993: 39
1238 The basis for the claim was a unilateral declaration from 1812. See Holst, 1985:350 and Fleischer, 1977
1239 Fure, 1996: 12
1241 The annales of the Norwegian parliament, S.tid 1948: 1259
1242 Ulriksen, 2002: 124
1243 Riste, 2001, Fure, 1996 for a few examples
1244 Fure, 1996 gives a good portrait of these sentiments.
of interests of the major European powers. Such aspirations even turned into overseas interests beyond the merchant navy. Thus, the Norwegian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was instructed to seek to achieve sovereignty over Svalbard. In this it was successful, although the Peace conference added two reservations to Norwegian sovereignty; nationals “of the states signatory to the treaty would enjoy equal rights to exploit the economic resources of the area, and the islands were not to be used for “warlike purposes””. The formal treaty was signed by Norway in February 1920 and within 5 years also by 45 other states. One might also claim that Norway fostered further ambitions of territorial expansionism. In 1931, for example, a Norwegian expedition declared a private “occupation” of east Greenland (a territory disputed by Denmark and Norway). The ultimate outcome nevertheless was a condemnation of the occupation by the International Court, thereby reaffirming Denmark’s sovereignty over the entire island of Greenland. The most controversial issue in fact was the Norwegian claim to 4-mile territorial waters. This caused repeated clashes between Norwegian and English fishermen in the contested waters, but the Norwegian government largely settled disputes with Britain over such questions through diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the dispute with Britain over the territorial seas was the most important conflict in Norwegian foreign policy between 1918 and 1940. But much worse was to come.

The Norwegian position that the Royal navy would come to its rescue in the event that Germany threatened Norway (an unofficial policy that resulted in low defence spending and a lack of preparations for co-operation with Britain) proved disastrous. The attack on Norway naturally came by sea, but the Weserübung carried out on April 9th and following weeks in 1940 was a daring German operation that quite simply took the Norwegian cabinet by surprise. On the other hand, the nature of German expansionism and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, which changed the basis for Nordic neutrality, certainly should have warned the Norwegian Cabinet into stronger defensive measures earlier. To Hitler, the occupation of Norway was a means to forestall

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1245 Riste, 2001: 115
1246 Riste, 2001: 117, see also Fure, 1996: 117-118
1247 Fure, 1996: chapter 2 sees these attempts at possessions in the Arctic and the Antarctic as a very significant trait in Norwegian foreign policy in the interwar years. As far as I can see he judges it as kind of an imitation of larger powers already having acquired overseas possessions in the southern hemisphere.
1248 Fure, 1996: 247
1249 An enormous body of literature and debate, by Norwegian standards, exist on this event and the following five years of German occupation. See Fure, 1996, Sverdrup, 1996, Riste 2001 and Ulriksen 2002 for some recent overviews and assessments.
British intervention in Scandinavia and the Baltic, to secure the supplies of Swedish iron ore to Germany and a way to extend the sphere of operations for the German navy and air force.\(^{1250}\)

I believe it is sufficient to say that the ensuing occupation became a central facet of the national memory on the domestic side, and almost just as embedded in Norwegian foreign policy on the international side. During its exile in London, the Norwegian Cabinet soon entered private discussions with British, American and Soviet politicians on the future position of Norway in an Atlantic and an international community of states.

Compared to Norway, Iceland was less internationalised; it was a small country dependent upon local and regional fisheries, had no significant merchant navy, no organised military defence beyond a small coast guard, and was seen as a less vital territory by the great powers prior to WWII. Nonetheless, the case of Iceland well illustrates how the international balance of power made both paternalist and and the international liberalist increasingly occupied with the status of this Arctic island. The very development of Icelandic sovereignty in the 20\(^{th}\) century in fact demonstrates how the relationships between North European powers and the role of the US influenced nation building. Two parallel developments ensured this. First of all, Denmark (as we will see below) became both a weaker power and simultaneously a state with much less paternalist ambitions than in the 19\(^{th}\) century. The latter development primarily was a domestic alteration, in which earlier traits of foreign policy aspirations were incompatible with the national self-image and resources. Secondly, Danish grip on the North Atlantic islands (in addition to Iceland, the Faroese islands and Greenland) became generally more precarious due to the naval arms race between Germany and Britain, and weakened through the two world wars. Due to the battle for command of the North Sea, Britain watched Iceland much closer than it ever had done previously. It sent a consul to Reykjavik in 1914, and discreetly informed the Danish cabinet that if Denmark gave consessions to Germany on Iceland, future Danish rule over this island would not be supported by Great Britain.\(^{1251}\) Although such threats never became actualised, the more pronounced low-profile Danish praxis of foreign policy caused an upswing for the Icelandic independence movement during WWI, and to a degree that caused problems for the Danish Zahle cabinet. The first problems in Danish-Icelandic relations arose

\(^{1250}\) Haggløf, 1960: 159. Lidegaard, 2003: 95-98 has shown that German staff officers already in 1917 had been convinced that control of the North Atlantic was a prerequisite in a war with Britain. And the North Atlantic was better controlled if Germany could control the Western coasts of Denmark and Norway. Danish politician Eric Scavenius was introduced to this line of thought in his secret meetings with the German general staff in 1917. However, it appears that he never told anyone about the 1917 German strategic assessment and the German wish to control Denmark based on the reasons cited here. \(^{1251}\) Lidgaard, 2003: 113
in 1915 over the revision of the constitution. In contrast to Greenland and the Danish West Indies, Iceland and the Faroe Islands were not colonies but “bilande” with a degree of autonomy, foreign and defence policies being common. The strife between Copenhagen and Reykjavik particularly centred upon the degree of autonomy for the Icelandic parliament, Alltinget. This problem was solved pragmatically, but another contentious issue, the rights of Icelandic civilian ships to use the Icelandic flag, repeatedly caused political friction. The outcome of this and some related issues could hardly have materialised the way they did had it not been for the role of Britain, who consistently saw her interests best served in weaker ties between Denmark and Iceland. Thus, Britain signed a commercial treaty with Reykjavik in 1916, without seeking any form of blessing in Copenhagen. This asserted Icelandic feelings of increased autonomy, while being highly unpopular among Danish politicians. During the last year of WWI, Iceland and Denmark nevertheless settled the questions through the new union treaty of 1918. This treaty asserted that Iceland was a sovereign state, a considerable step towards independence for Iceland, although the two territories remained tied through common political institutions; the monarch and foreign policy, pluss a monetary union to expire by 1922. To Denmark, this was a successful policy of balancing the interest in keeping close ties to Iceland against the obvious fact that since Iceland was dependent upon the Royal Navy, Denmark could not provoke the British cabinet to force an abolition of the union.

Politically, the public opinion was strongly in favour of changing the terms of the 1918 Union treaty with Denmark. By 1928, all parliamentary groups in Iceland proclaimed their support for its abolishment. In The Allting a special committee overseeing foreign relations was established, and in 1934 a cabinet minister was appointed with the same function on behalf of the executive. The question of the relationship to Denmark in Iceland became an issue of whether to remain connected to Denmark through a personal union (not unlike the pre 1905 union between Norway and Sweden) or a total abandonment of special ties to Denmark. The context in which the question was addressed changed after 1940 and the German occupation of Denmark. The war did initially not alter the foreign policy habitus of Iceland, however. The political leadership was determined that Iceland should remain neutral. Even after the German invasion of Denmark proper, of which Iceland constitutionally was part, and a British proposal offering protection of Iceland, this policy did not

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1252 Which perhaps could be translated into dominion in English.
1253 Lidegaard, 2003: 114
1254 The union treaty of 1918 stated that the parties could claim the right to re-negotiating it in 19141, and if no result was achieved three years later than this, the union treaty could unilaterally be dissolved by either party.
1255 Karlsson, 2000: 319
1256 Only the Socialist Party worked in favour of the latter option
change. Indeed, the very occupation of Denmark immediately cut old political ties to Iceland. As for almost all overseas dependencies, colonies and dominions, WWII meant that European states in war with or attacked by Germany, lost some or all of their control of their overseas possessions. Already the day after the German invasion of Denmark, the Icelandic parliament, the Allting, declared the Danish King unable to uphold sovereignty over Iceland, and his powers were therefore assigned to the Icelandic parliament.\textsuperscript{1257} By implication, it meant that the political institutions of Iceland had to exercise sovereignty on Iceland and its territorial waters. That it was ill equipped to do so in a world war was quite another matter. It was evident to Churchill that as both Denmark and especially Norway had fallen by April 1940; the territory of Iceland could be of outmost importance to the future trajectory of the war. If Germany seized Iceland, it would establish naval bases both in Norway and Iceland, which would make the German navy much more able to control the North Sea and the North Atlantic transit to Northern Europe and the Murmansk area in northern Soviet Union. Thus, the British army occupied Iceland on May 10\textsuperscript{th} 1940, seized major public buildings in the capital Reykjavik, and installed a British minister for Iceland acting as liaison to the Icelandic cabinet. True to its role as a neutral, sovereignty-maximising periphery, the Icelandic government protested formally but had to comply with the British occupation. Britain faced overstretched as the German army reached the English Channel the same year, however. In order to have the majority of its troops back while avoiding a German seizure of Iceland, the idea came up in London to invite the US to take over the military presence in the north. This was a somewhat awkward arrangement for both Iceland and the US at the time, but they soon reached an agreement. On July 7\textsuperscript{th} 1941, the US took over the protection, on the assurance that US troops would leave Iceland as soon as the war was over. \textit{Thus, the first US dispatchement of troops to Europe in WWII became a reality with as much as 60000 soldiers to this island} in addition to a British unit that remained throughout the war. To a large degree this, in the view of most Icelanders vast, military presence was a benevolent “occupation”.\textsuperscript{1258} However, the US already in March 1945 suggested to the Icelandic PM that the US military stations should remain manned after the war. This was a delicate issue, and has remained so ever since, because the left parties in the Allting did not favour the US military presence. A compromise was reached in 1946, where an agreement was made to the extent that the Army troops leave Iceland, while a vast military airport at Keflavik remained with staff and equipment. In parliament, the Icelandic Independence Party voted for the treaty, the Socialist against, while both the Progressive Party and the Labour Party were split. The final outcome was 32
votes to 19 in favour of the US-Icelandic treaty. Thus was created a permanent American military base in the North European periphery and an enduring cleavage in the Icelandic polity as to the nature of its policies. In the advent, the political ties to Denmark were changed for eternity. An Icelandic referendum on the question of the union was held, in which only 0.5% voted against the dissolution of the union. Thus, the Republic of Iceland was established on June 17th 1944.

In sum, the foreign policies of both Norway and Iceland were restricted in this period through their unions with the former Nordic paternalists Sweden (union with Norway until 1905) and Denmark (de facto in union with Iceland until 1940, de jure until 1944). Their aspirations to maximise sovereignty thus was partly a result of their relationships to stronger Nordic countries. In addition, their dependence upon the maritime sectors made for repeated attempts to codify the extension of their territorial waters. Both countries sought to remain neutral, and in this they were successful in WWI, to a large degree because of the strength of the Royal navy. Being small states, but important in geopolitics, they both failed to remain neutral, as the relative power of Britain had declined by 1940. Both Norway and Iceland would continue to praise their independent standing as sovereign states after 1945, but in a context where only formalised ties to the new western hegemon would make such sovereignty possible. To Norway, this was a smaller step than it was for Iceland, the former having been a bandwagoning state under Britain from 1905 till 1940.

4.4.1.2 Denmark - from paternalist to a former small empire with indirect overseas interests

“A reliable defence is an impossibility, it cannot be produced in Denmark”

Danish secretary of Defence, P.Munch, 1913

This section will firstly address the trajectory of the foreign policy and its domestic sources in Denmark proper. Next, we will look into the Danish colonies and dominions, making a vast sweep in political geography from the Virgin Islands to the North Atlantic peripheries (Iceland was covered above). The pronounced decline of paternalist traits in the Danish polity, and the simultaneous intensified great power rivalries changed the logic of both Danish foreign policy and the sovereignty over its former and present overseas possessions, I will argue. In the war against Prussia and Austria-Hungary in 1864, Denmark lost the territories of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. This changed Danish foreign policy for the next 76 years. I will claim that the period is characterized by a

1259 Karlsson, 2000: 322
1260 Cited in Lidegaard, 2003: 20
stepping down from a paternalist foreign policy habitus. By WWI, Denmark held a low profile on
the international scene, although its overseas interests illustrate the legacy of a former small empire.
I choose 1917 as the last year of Danish paternalism, since the government at the Faroe Islands that
year requested London, not Copenhagen, to guarantee supplies to the population. Denmark was no
longer capable of managing its Atlantic territories.
It has been said of the 1864 defeat that Denmark lost whatever faith it had had in Scandinavianism
and a common Nordic security concept. Naturally, Denmark was much more preoccupied with
the threat it, rightly, perceived from Prussian military power and a unified Germany, whereas Russia
was the traditional large power antagonist most feared in Sweden. The sum of foreign policy
ideology and the Danish geopolitical considerations in this period makes it tempting to conclude that
Denmark was somewhere “between Scandinavia and Europe”. In addition to the aforementioned
fact that Denmark was closest to the continental powers among the Nordic countries, it also
remained a paternalist -in the sense that it kept overseas territories- longer than Sweden, to which we
will return below. However, the age of industrialisation left Denmark as a highly weakened power;
it could only theoretically play the paternalist role on issues and in geographical areas where the
major powers allowed her to do so. But even that opportunity dwindled away, partly out of
international reasons, partly as a result of the transformation of the Danish society itself. The war of
1864 marks a juncture in the history of Danish foreign policy, from this traumatic experience on,
paternalism was seen as less and less viable and desirable to the Danish opinion and to Danish
politicians. The Danish conduct of diplomacy leading up to the war was, according to Danish
historian Erling Bjøl, built on two erroneous assumptions; the hope of assistance from Britain and
Sweden, and the strength of its own army. In the following decades, these disappointments left a
distinct mark on Danish foreign and defence policy. The alternative position was formulated in
1878 and in effect meant rapprochement with Germany. By the turn of the century, the left had
adopted the doctrine to mean accommodation to any major power in Europe that could threaten
Denmark. After all, it was in a precarious position if a war were to break out between any of the
major powers in Northern Europe (Germany-Russia, Germany-France, Germany-Britain). But the
trajectory of Danish nation building also made the defence issue an ideological cleavage. When the
new Liberal Government in 1901 sought to reconcile the strong pacifist sentiments in its left wing

1261 Bonnén et al, 2002: 4
1262 Bjøl, 1986
1263 Bjøl, 1986: 603
1264 See in particular Lindegaard, 2003: 13- 21
1265 By the German victory over France in 1870, earlier plans for the Danish army to join France in a combined
attack against germany were abandoned for good. See Lidegaard, 2003: 16
with the necessities dictated by growing tensions in Europe, the party eventually split in 1905. The outcome was nevertheless a weak Danish Navy and army, even weaker than in the case of Sweden. Thus it was natural for Denmark, as it was for all the other Nordic countries, to remain neutral during WWI. Indeed, the calculation that Germany during WWI would see its interests best served through a neutral Scandinavia was basically correct; it ensured Germany of imports from Scandinavia and simultaneously made the northern states into a neutral flank for German forces. That neutrality succeeded, and that the Versailles settlement even brought home the Danish part of Schleswig (1920), also reinforced the low profile of Danish foreign policy towards major powers. Moreover, in the wake of WWI, both Russia and Germany had been reduced to a very humble status as players on the European scene. However, we should also note that the very policy of neutrality for a coastal state with overseas possessions, as Denmark was, required naval forces to uphold sovereignty. Thus, the Danish Navy remained a part of the Danish state structure even during the low-profile period *par excellence* in Danish history. As institutions always seek survival, the Danish Navy eagerly sought –and was successful at- adjusting to the new climate in domestic politics.

The “radicals” (*Det Radikale Venstre*), so dominant in the interwar years, were eager supporters of the League of Nations, and the alternative solution of bilateral “confidence-building” when the League deteriorated in the 1930s. Indeed, this policy had broad political support in Denmark. The 1932 defence reduction, for example, was an outcome of the simultaneous approval of Radikale

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1266 Einhorn, 1975: 494. The defence dilemma for the Danish cabinet was that strong fortifications at the coast could be sized by Germany in the advent of war, in order to stop British sailing into the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, Danish politicians were eager to reassure the Germans that their defence was not aimed at Germany. The final outcome, to put it crudely, was almost no Danish defence at all. After all, what could more clearly state a policy of neutrality?

1267 After the so-called Odense programme of 1905, the Radicals declared that the fortifications surrounding the capital should be abandoned altogether. The Social Democrats followed suit, declaring that no other country in Europe had a weaker defence. The latter was of course a gross exaggeration. Lidegaard, 2003: 19-20

1268 It seems that a Danish argument in favour of not interfering with Danish shipping made some impression in Berlin. Even though Denmark and Norway also exported large quantities of food and raw materials to Britain, the Danes argued, an attack on Scandinavian shipping would also cripple both imports and exports to Denmark and Norway. This would hurt the German economy even further. See Lidegaard, 2003: 56-58 for overview

1269 The reunion with Danish Schleswig is perhaps the most emotional moment in the history of Denmark after 1864.

1270 Nevertheless, an argument telling of the Danish foreign policy arose between the Admirals and the Cabinet as to the actual practise of neutrality. The former argued that an armed neutrality was the only de facto way to practise neutrality. The Cabinet was much more restrictive, emphasising that naval vessels should be unarmed or at least avoid all exchanges of fire! Such a policy directive from the cabinet is testimony to the degree that Danish foreign policy had changed after 1864.

1271 I use the term Radicals here as in Bjøl, 1986. One should not exaggerate the Radikale Venstre in this period as a very ideologically extreme party, however. Already when it formed its first minority cabinet in 1905, it carried on the defence commitments by the previous liberal cabinet. Nevertheless, Radikale Venstre was radical compared to contemporary European political parties that achieved cabinet posts.
Venstre, the Social democrats and economy-minded liberals. Even in the years from 1937 till 1940, it was not so much a cleavage between the parties on defence policy, as it was a cleavage within almost every other party; should Denmark have a military neutral guard or a defence that actually would be able to resist an (German) attack? The debate did not change the outcome: unpreparedness for war. The rapid capitulation in 1940 was the almost inevitable outcome of such a transformation of the earlier paternalist Danish national habitus. But as in Norway, the war left neutrality discredited in Danish politics, and even embarrassing to the national self-image (witness the Danish-German Non-Aggression Pact of May 1939, for example). Thus, Danish security policy was based on other assumptions by 1945.

On the other hand, and in clear contrast to the passive Danish foreign policy of the interwar years, Denmark partly was a former small empire through its overseas possessions. In this respect, Denmark is a case that illustrates how even a weakened power can keep intact paternalist sentiments towards weaker societies. However, it is typical of Danish politics in this period that its “decolonisation” was carried out in an ordered, peaceful way. In this respect, Denmark is also an example of how a former empire with diminishing power on an international scene where the rules of the game changed, could carry out a peaceful abolition of an empire. The Danish West Indies was sold to the US in 1917, to some degree in exchange for US support of Denmark concerning Greenland (see below). The orderly reduction in Danish rule over overseas territories also applies to its overseas possessions in Europe. Iceland was granted home rule in 1918, and Denmark was in no position to protest the unilateral Icelandic declaration of independence in 1944 (see above).

The Faroe islands also belonged to Denmark as a “biland”, as in the case with Iceland (see above). As a territory of interest to the major powers, the Faraoe Islands is also similar to Iceland, since the islands were seen as important in British naval strategy. On the domestic side, however, the question of independence was more controversial than on Iceland. At the international level, the British fear of German annexation of the islands were not sheer fantasy; the German navy in fact worked out a plan to this effect in 1916, but it was never put into effect. The continued British command of the sea ensured that a German attempt at seizing the Faraoe Islands never materialised. But this naval hegemony also made Britain into the only power that could secure the Faraoe Islands from outright

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1272 Einhorn, 1975: 495. One should also note that both the Radicals and the Social democrats by this stage had abandoned anti-military traits. The social democrats in particular, saw both the Navy and the Army as national institutions that should guard the Danish democracy against the twin threats of communism and fascism. Thus, every worker should serve in the military and see it as an institution to their own interest. The defence budgets did in fact increase in the 1930s. See Lidgaard, 2003: 262-266

1273 Lidgaard, 2003: 312

1274 Even more starkly than in Norway, the criticism against the cabinet and the senior Danish officers of 1940 has been harsh. At times, the debate has been based on counter-factual hypothesis that are impossible to verify or falsify.
occupation; in this respect, Copenhagen with its relatively weak navy was helpless. Thus, the government of the islands in 1917 requested London to guarantee future supplies to the Faroe islands, causing alarm in Copenhagen, since this could destroy the strict Danish policy of neutrality. The compromise nevertheless secured the population of the islands as well as avoidance of foreign occupation. The interest in the Faroe islands as a thinly populated but strategically important territory nevertheless continued among all Northern states with aspirations for sea power. Thus, the appeal for national independence was not disencouraged neither by London nor Washington, since strategists in both capitals saw these islands as important for naval strategy in the North Sea and the North Atlantic. The Faroe Islands, as well lay right in "the gap" between Iceland and Britain. Nevertheless, Britain in particular could not push its case too far unless it actually could compensate for a disruption between Denmark and the islands through a continuous naval protection of the islands. Thus, The Faroe Islands remained connected to Denmark. The population on the Danish Faroe Islands held a referendum that yielded a majority for independence from Denmark in 1946 and home rule in 1948, but it has remained tightly connected to Denmark throughout the 20th century. It remains a Danish External Territory with autonomy. Thus it is Part of The Danish Rigsfællesskab, the Commonwealth of the Realm. The same applies to Greenland, the largest island in the world, which achieved home rule in 1979, but has remained a part of Denmark. Both the Faroe Islands and Greenland elect two representatives to the Danish National Parliament (Folketinget).

Greenland deserves special attention, since it is the largest island in the world and still remains in a political union with a small European Nordic power. It also came in the focus of larger powers during the 20th century. Indeed, the very trajectory of the political history of Greenland in the 20th century to a large degree is a result of the interaction between the US and Denmark.

The possibility of using the vast Greenland territory for both military purposes and aviation bases became apparent during the interwar years, especially due to the improvements in aviation technology. This made Denmark, Norway, the US and Canada interested in Greenland. The question of sovereignty on Greenland nevertheless seemed a tricky question for all these states, since different polities claimed different principles for the division of Arctic and Antarctic territories. Nevertheless, states, industrial companies and NGOs all supported expeditions to these areas in order to analyse the possibilities for mining, air fields and military bases. It was apparent to all the major powers that Greenland and Iceland, situated in the middle of the northern airway between

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1275 Lidgaard, 2003: 116
Northern America and Northern Europe was strategically important. Historically, Denmark had traditions for establishments on Greenland. Thus, during the negotiations with the US in 1916 over the question of the Virgin Islands, Denmark sought to make the US relinquish all claims to Greenland territory. In this Denmark was successful, and the US even paid 25 million dollars for the three Virgin Islands known as the Danish West Indies (see below). This did nothing to dampen US interest in Greenland later, however, and in addition Britain, Norway and Canada were sensitive to the perceived Danish attempt to seize the sovereignty of this vast island. And indeed Denmark also sought formal recognition from Britain concerning Danish sovereignty over Greenland. The reason for this policy was the justifiable fear that Norway, with a history of settlements and expeditions to East Greenland before 1700, would annex a territory on eastern Greenland. Denmark argued that this claim was invalid because of the 1814 Treaty of Kiel. It was this treaty that had ceded Norway from Denmark to Sweden, but the Faroese Islands, Greenland and Iceland had not been part of the transfer. Thus, Denmark meant that it had an international agreement that codified its right to these Atlantic territories. At the international level, this was a question of principle that could have severe implications for many states in the developed world: should sovereignty claims be justified by historic claims regarding exploration, or on occupation and de facto administration of the territories concerned? The Permanent Court settled the dispute between Denmark and Norway over East Greenland in 1933. East Greenland became Danish. While this added a significant amount of territory to the Danish crown, the very notion of sovereignty in Arctic territories and –waters remained a contested subject. One group of states, predominantly Britain, Canada and Russia, based their claims on the so-called sector principle, which stated that the Polar Regions should be divided into wedges or sectors. According to these states, “the boundaries of a sector were established by extending longitudinal lines from points marking the eastern and western extremities of nations in the subarctic to the North Pole” If this theory gained international recognition, the Arctic and the Antarctic –as well as adjacent islands- in their entireties would be

1276 The same question arose fifty years later in questions on dividing up sea territory and economic zones between states. The different principles were largely the sector principle and that of a midline. See below
1277 Pendleton, 1917: 267. This amounted to ca 100 mill. Danish crowns, or the half of a Danish state budget. In addition, the US accepted not to interfere if “Denmark extended her political and economic interests to the entire Greenland territory”, Lidgaard, 2003: 81, see also ibid: 177-180 for an interesting analysis. The bilateral settlement in 1916 also sent a strong signal from Washington to the major European powers; it was not left for Europeans to settle questions of the status of territories in the Western hemisphere. The 1916 Treaty therefore became an excellent card for Denmark whenever questions arose over the status over her North Atlantic possessions. Thus, Denmark unilaterally issued a decree in 1921 that declared Danish sovereignty over the entire territory of Greenland.
1278 Fogelson, 1989: 54
1279 Fogelson, 1989: 56 and Fure, 1996
1280 Fogelson, 1989: 56
under the sovereignty of existing states. By such a principle, however, Norway and the US would hold very small sectors (compared especially to Canada and Russia/the Soviet Union).\footnote{The debate on these principles has remain heated to this day. Norway and Russia, for example have not reaced agreement on the sovereignty of the Barents Sea where Russia argues that the sector principle applies, Norway claiming the so-called midline principle. See Fure, 1996}

By 1933, aviation technology had reached a level where the US state department considered purchasing Greenland and Iceland from Danish sovereignty. This was a result of a consideration as to what implications enemy bases on these North Atlantic islands could have for the US. The bureaucratic interest in Greenland did not diminish in the years preceding WWII. By April 1939, the issue was clearly politicised when the Senate recommended a purchase of Greenland.\footnote{Fogelson, 1989: 61} To some US politicians, but most notably to the US Navy department, both Greenland and Iceland were now seen as possible bases for planes, submarines and light naval craft. More important perhaps, was the prospect that either of the two islands fell into enemy hands. After the 1940 German invasion of Denmark, FDR feared that the Third Reich also would claim sovereignty over the Danish “colonies”, i.e. its Atlantic islands. However, a direct annexing of Greenland territory was too drastic an incursion for the international liberalist. The solution to FDR was to construct airfields on the island. Thus, a secret US expedition examined the possible sites for building a base that could be used for ferrying bombers to Europe via Greenland. In 1941, when Germany extended its war zone to Greenland, Henrik Kauffmann, the Danish Minister to the US - who had already refused to recognise the German occupation of Denmark - signed a treaty with the US placing the island under American protection and allowing the US forces to establish stations there.\footnote{This was later dubbed the Greenland Treaty of 1941.}\footnote{Fogelson, 1989: 62} A major and more lasting airstrip was built at Thule in 1945.\footnote{Fogelson, 1989: 62} Thus, as in the case of Iceland, an Atlantic island inhabited with a native population with long historic traditions were heavily influenced by both Denmark, and after WWII, the US. US policies towards these territories were not imperialist, but they certainly reflected the increased power and role the US played in international relations, and how this affected Northern Europe.\footnote{While Iceland broke out of the union, Greenland has chosen to stay within the Danish realm.}

As we mentioned above the so-called Danish West Indies also ceased to be ruled from Copenhagen, but were simply sold to the US. The purchase, needless to say, was presented as a benevolent attempt to let the 27000 inhabitants on these three Virgin Islands (St.Thomas, St. John and St. Croix)
shape their own destinies, freed from European colonial rule. That these islands also were seen by the US as strategically important goes without saying. But in the context of Nordic politics, the Danish possession and 1917 selling of distant overseas possessions to a major power is unique. These small islands had a history of foreign rule under the Dutch and British prior to the first Danish settlement at St. Thomas in 1666.\textsuperscript{1286} The Danish colony primarily produced sugar and tobacco, applying slave labour from Africa under harsh conditions (St. John was in Danish possession from 1684, St. Croix was bought by Danes in 1733). Inspired by some of the same motives that led him to free the serfs of Denmark proper\textsuperscript{1287}, King Frederik VI prohibited the Danish slave trade in 1792. To the US, the value of the Danish West Indies became apparent during the Civil war, these islands being seen as useful for coaling in future naval operations. Thus began a series of negotiations in 1866 between Denmark and the US on the purchase of these Virgin Islands, only to be aborted due to disagreements between the Senate and the Administration\textsuperscript{1288} After 1896, Germany expanded commercially on the islands, trying to disencourage both Danes and Americans from the idea of purchase. It was partially successful at this; the offer from Theodore Roosevelt to purchase the Danish West Indies was turned down in Copenhagen as well as the Senate in 1902. This German meddling came to an end through WWI, and the US proposal to purchase the islands for 25 million dollars was ultimately accepted by 1916.\textsuperscript{1289} This outcome was just as much the outcome of internal Danish deliberations as it was a reflection of Denmark’s geopolitical situation. The two sets of factors were intimately interconnected. First of all, the islands in themselves were problematic for the Danish policy of strict neutrality in WWI. In order to exercise sovereignty, a neutral country at least needs to be able to credibly uphold neutrality in its territory including territorial waters. As we have seen, the neutralist and indeed almost pacifist inclination that marked the Danish polity after 1878 made such a policy impossible to implement for islands so far away from the motherland. Indeed, the North Atlantic positions were problematic enough. Secondly, as we also have seen directly above, the Danes tried repeatedly to sell the islands to an international liberalist. This was a policy compatible with the decreased paternalism of Denmark, and it was a necessity in order to avoid the European paternalists in getting too involved; this could upset the careful neutrality balancing during war. Thus, selling the island to a distant, neutral state was a fitting outcome for

\textsuperscript{1285} In the 21st century, the US plans for a national missile defence system has created new US enthusiasm for maintaining its base at Thule
\textsuperscript{1286} Pendleton, 1917: 269
\textsuperscript{1287} Denmark is an exception to the Nordic avoidance of absolutism, and had the strongest nobility among the Scandinavian countries. A system of strong and stable absolutism had been established in 1660.
\textsuperscript{1288} Pendleton, 1917: 285. Pendleton also cites evidence that after these negotiations failed, Germany exercised pressure against the Danes to stop US influence on the islands. See also Koht, 1945
\textsuperscript{1289} By 1915, the US had grown so uneasy about the possibility that Germany might use the islands as a base for U-boats that it urged a settlement with Denmark as soon as possible. See Lidgaard, 2003: 80-81
Danish foreign policy. Ideologically, there existed no strong ties between the Danish West Indies and Denmark proper anno 1916. When the West Indies political leader David Hamilton visited Copenhagen in 1915 to publicly express the local problems created by Danish colonialism, most Danes felt that their colonies on the Virgin Islands were something of an embarrassing relic of the past.\textsuperscript{1290} In the referendum held after the announcement of the sale, an overwhelming majority of the Danish electorate voted in favour of the sale.\textsuperscript{1291}

Regarding the theoretical categorisation of Denmark, it seems evident that Denmark was no longer a clearcut paternalist power after the Napoleonic wars. There is some sense in categorising Denmark during the 19th century as a bandwagoning state under Britain during much of the time. As one Danish scholar has remarked, "Economically speaking, Denmark must indeed be considered part of the British empire from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century."\textsuperscript{1292} But the presence of a unified Germany made too clear-cut political bandwagoning behind Britain impossible for the Danes. It therefore restricted a limited paternalist habitus within its overseas “empire”, but gradually created a more peripheral political role for itself. By WWI, Denmark was only a former small empire, and its mare clausum pretensions were limited indeed. This perhaps suited the “peasant ideology” that had been strengthened in Denmark during the 19th century. Noone expressed it better than the priest Nikolaj Grundtvig, who after the defeat in 1814 decided to re-establish what he perceived to be the original Danish habitus:

"Far whiter mountains shine splendidly forth  
Than the hills of our native islands,  
But, we Danish rejoice in the quiet North  
For our lowlands and rolling highlands,  
No peaks towered over our birth:  
It suits us best to remain on earth"\textsuperscript{1293}

\textbf{4.4.1.3 Sweden, Finland and the Åland islands}

It is also interesting to note that the small-state paternalist Sweden that was left so weakened as an actor in the European state system after the first half of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, experienced a crucial economic growth after the Crimean war. According to the respected Swedish economist Eli Heckscher, “\textit{In the case of Sweden, the fifty years between 1860 and 1910 witnessed an import of}\

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1290} Lidegaard, 2003: 80
\item \textsuperscript{1291} Only 37 per cent voted, 283.670 in favour, 158.157 against sale.
\item \textsuperscript{1292} Østergård, 1992: 5
\item \textsuperscript{1293} Cited in Østergård, 1992: 14
\end{itemize}
foreign capital which in all probability was a vital prerequisite for the country’s rapid economic upswing.”\textsuperscript{1294} The military power of Sweden was much more modest on a European scale, although it remained a regional power of significance. In fact, ever after 1815, Sweden has managed to stay out of war. As we noted in the section on Norway, the chief concern in the Swedish political elite was a Russian incursion into her sovereignty, especially since Finland remained a grand duchy under Russia until 1917. This, and not the wish to coerce Norway in the union up till 1905, was the main reason for the effort to keep a modern Swedish defence. It hardly had reasons for outbuilding Norway; by 1905, Sweden had 11 battleships to Norway’s four, 5 torpedo cruisers while Norway had none. Moreover, its army counted 170,000 against the 76,000-strong army of Norway.\textsuperscript{1295} A direct comparison of naval and total defence allocations in the two countries demonstrates this further, and shows that the Russian policy in Finland after 1899 did much to raise Swedish defence expenditure.

Table 4.4.1.3 Naval and total defence expenditure in Sweden and Norway 1892-1905, in millions Swedish kroner.\textsuperscript{1296}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Naval Norway</th>
<th>Naval Sweden</th>
<th>Total Norway</th>
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\textsuperscript{1294} Heckscher, 1968: 210  
\textsuperscript{1295} Terjesen, 2001: 130  
\textsuperscript{1296} Data from Terjesen, 2001: 122
As we see from the table above, both naval and general Swedish expenditure rose quickly after 1899, while the total defence expenditures of Norway did not show a steady increase in the same period. The Swedish Army reform of 1901 did much to increase Swedish defence expenditure, but neither army reform nor the decided building of three extra battleships in 1899 seem to be linked to a wish to deter Norway.

Moreover, it is striking to note that the Swedish state was much more active on the international arena than Denmark, not to say Norway, in the intensified arms race in the years before WWI. It was primarily the fear of the Russian empire that spurred Sweden into further modernisation of its Navy and Army until 1914. In fact, the perceived threat from an expansionist Russia made the Swedish government authorise secret conversations between the German and Swedish military staffs in 1910. Sweden wanted some sort of a German reassurance in the case that Russia threatened its sovereignty, while German authorities primarily sought to exploit the Swedish role to provoke Russia to place larger forces in northern Europe. If they were successful at this, the Russian threat to Germany from the east would be lessened. Needless to say, this was a risky foreign policy. The outcome was that the Swedish foreign minister privately assured Berlin of “benevolent neutrality”, while all other powers were promised only “strict neutrality”, i.e. according to the rules of international law. However, Sweden was surprisingly successful at staying out of war. In August 1914, for example, the Russian Baltic Fleet headed towards the island of Gotland, apparently to destroy Swedish naval forces there, but then only to return to Russia. Germany tried to get Sweden on its side again in 1915, but failed. Sweden, as well as Denmark and Norway, had to adapt as well as it could to the conflicting demands of the central powers and the Allies over the distinction between contraband and non-contraband goods (all three states were important exporters to the belligerents during WWI).

Moreover, the fact that Sweden stayed out of WWI made her international economic standing even better. In this respect, Sweden was similar to Norway. Sweden became a net exporter of capital after 1918. Although the per capita foreign trade was a bit lower than in Denmark and Norway, the Swedish volume of exports by 1914 was thirty times higher than in 1830. How beneficial Pax Britannica had been for Sweden was exemplified by the experience of the allied blockade during WWI. The very strict policy of neutrality adopted by Sweden made for conflicts with Britain. The

1297 Killham, 1993: 40, See also Lindberg, 1966: 182-199 for a fascinating account
1298 Åström, 1989: 15
1299 The ingenius ways to pass the contraband regulations make for good anecdotes. "The Swedes turned copper ingots into little statues of Marshal von Hindenburg, which were judged to be non-contraband as objets d’art. Denmark, not to be outdone, imported twelve times as much lard as it had before the war. This normally innocuous commodity was then sent to Germany to be turned into glycerine to produce explosives", Killham, 1993: 42
outcome of this was rather severe restriction on Swedish trade in general, and Swedish exports to continental Europe in particular. Considering that approximately one quarter of Swedish consumption of food cereals came from imports, this damaged Swedish society. In this respect, the more pragmatic Danish and Norwegian policies during the war were less costly. Like the two other Scandinavian states, Sweden was also a supporter of the League of Nations. Politically however, Sweden pursued just as strong –or even stronger- policies of neutrality as did Norway and Denmark. But it was typical of Sweden that it initially was sceptical towards the League, since it could at least theoretically get Sweden involved in military operations. Thus, Sweden 1924 explicitly ruled out any military operations as part of its membership.1300 In the economic sphere, too, the Swedish society managed to maintain strong ties to continental Europe without endangering its neutrality until the 1930s. Sweden experienced an economic boom in the 1920s and was not hit by the depression until the late 1930s. Partly, it has been argued, this was a result of anti-cyclic state intervention in the domestic economy.1301 However, the arms race prior to WWII also stimulated exports of Swedish steel, iron ore and machinery. The German steel industry was heavily based on imports of iron ore; half of the annually required 20 million tons came from Sweden.1302 This made the Swedish policy of neutrality especially vulnerable after 1939. Through the naval agreement of 1935, Britain had renounced her naval influence in the Baltic, and the Swedish ore could perfectly well be shipped from Baltic ports. In addition, the German-Russian pact of August 1939 upset the balance of power that in practise had been the basis of Nordic neutrality. With the German navy supporting Soviet submarines in the war against Finland, it was also a question whether Britain would intervene directly through Norway or in the Baltic proper. Churchill in fact proposed exactly such plans in September 1939, but received only lukewarm British support for the Norwegian scenario, and none for operations in the Baltic. Thus Sweden was able to remain neutral during the war. While Swedish military power never was to reach the heights experienced in earlier centuries, neutral Sweden was perhaps the one among all the states studied here that came through WWII with the least damaging effects on its economy, state institutions and infrastructure. In fact, out of the 20 European states that declared their neutrality in September 1939, Sweden was among the five societies that managed to remain neutral until 1945. Pre-war stockpiles of food and a policy of rationing dutifully followed by a disciplined population made the isolation of the war bearable. Yet this political isolation spared the Swedish society the burdens of war that befell its neighbours. Compared to them, Sweden was perceived as a strong state and a vibrant society by 1945. It is not, perhaps, entirely far-fetched to

1300 Logue, 1989: 47
1301 Heckscher, 1968: 273-275
1302 Hagglöf, 1960: 154
compare the small state of Sweden with the superpower US in this respect. Both avoided wartime destruction of its territory, and instead found themselves in an improved economic position following WWII. This never transformed into spectacular military ambitions in Sweden, although the Cold War made a large defensive capacity a necessity. However, while Sweden did maintain a significant merchant navy in a regional perspective, it only had indirect overseas interests after 1905, with very limited aspirations for far-reaching mare clausum demands. In sum, it was, like Denmark, turned into a former small empire with a low profile on the international scene.

The trajectory of Finland is a special case in the Nordic context, and its role as an extraterritorial power has not been significant. Some remarks on Finland are included here only to show how the international balance of power affected the relationship between Sweden and Finland. Its dramatic political history nevertheless sheds light on the destiny of the last Nordic territory we will mention in this chapter; that of the Åland islands, situated between Sweden and Finland at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia. When Finland gained sovereignty in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Sweden and Finland disputed the status of the Åland islands. The League of Nations and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 1918 eventually solved this. In other words, as in the case of Icelandic home rule and the abandoning of the Swedish-Norwegian home rule, it was a territorial disagreement solved through peaceful means. This particular outcome did not seem likely at the outset, however. When Petrograd recognised the former Romanov duchy as the sovereign state of Finland in December 1917, 40000 Russian troops still remained in Finland. In Finland, tension between socialists and conservatives/liberals was already high, so a struggle between Red and White guards soon broke out, the former supported by Russia, the latter by Germany. In this war, Germany intervened with naval forces on the Åland islands in March 1918, and eventually supported the White guards under Mannerheim to victory in May 1918. Thereafter, Sweden managed to send a force of 600 men to the predominantly Swedish-speaking inhabitants on the islands in May 1918, which seemed a bit too activist a policy for a neutral state. It probably was an ill-timed Swedish decision. In spite of the fact that the large majority of the islanders wanted to become part of Sweden, both the islanders and the Swedish government failed to persuade the League of Nations. Thus, the League awarded the islands to Finland, under the requirement that Finland guarantee the citizens rights to govern themselves and preserve their culture and Swedish language. In addition, the Ålands should be demilitarised. Finnish foreign policy was highly influenced by its relationship to its eastern neighbour; witness the war with the Soviet Union in 1939. In spite of formidable efforts on the ground by Finnish soldiers, the war ended in March 1940, costing Finland more than 10 per cent of its territory. After 1944, more than 400000 Karelian
refugees were resettled in other parts of Finland, and Finnish foreign policy was to be highly restricted by the presence of the Soviet Union till the latter ceased to exist.

In sum, if we compare the Scandinavian states (Finland and Iceland were negligible in naval terms), throughout the period 1856-1945, the naval policies of all were modest indeed. It is true, of course, that Denmark, Sweden and Norway all remained maritime states with some naval capacity. With the possible exception of the Norwegian fleet programme at the turn of the century, the diminishing naval power of all states nevertheless is the most striking feature of the Scandinavian states during the industrial revolution and the era of total war. The reasons for this development are complex. Two explanations nevertheless seem plausible. In material terms, the incredible rise in expenditure that modern warships required deemed Scandinavian efforts at building and maintaining navies modest. Secondly, in their evaluation of the international context, all these states prospered during Pax Britannica. Since the international balance of power and the law of the sea all in all favoured the Scandinavians, they were also less eager to spend huge sums on large-scale fleet programmes. Furthermore, one lesson from WWI seemed to be that they could stay out of the titanian military struggles between the larger powers. For Sweden, this analysis proved correct, for Norway and Denmark the result was the contrary. The reason why the Scandinavian states became more peripheral in the first place was their geopolitical history. For Norway, sovereignty-maximizing behaviour to a large degree represented continuity, since it had been the lesser nation in two political unions from the 16th century until 1905. However, the overseas interests through one of the largest merchant fleets in the world made Norway a bandwagoning mare clausum state that mixed coastal interests with the preference of the freedom of the seas for transportation. It was the significant coastal interests combined with an inward-looking habitus that made Norway into a mare clausum rather than a liberal, bandwagoning state. In the Swedish case, the defeat of 1721 and the rise of Russian sea power changed Sweden as an actor on the international arena. However, it was not until the abolition of the union with Norway in 1905 that it lost all pretensions of being a paternalist state. The same goes for Denmark, whereas the unified German state and the Danish defeat in 1864 were both the geopolitical fact and manifestation that changed Danish foreign policy forever. In sum then, the Scandinavian polities that once fought repeatedly over the control of the western Baltic Sea, turned into one sovereignty-seeking periphery (Iceland), one band-wagoning state with predominant mare clausum ideology (Norway) and two former small empires with only indirect overseas

1303 Hodgson, 1962; 84 and Killham, 1993: 80
interests (Denmark and Sweden). What they all shared was a support for attempts at regulating international affairs through international institutions.

4.4.2 The Netherlands—still liberal after all these years

“There is no profit at all in an empty sea, empty countries, and dead people”

(Allegedly from a Dutch critic of Jan Coen, Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies)\(^\text{1304}\)

From the end of the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century, the resemblance between the British and Dutch trajectories is small.\(^\text{1305}\) As historian Seymour Drescher succinctly stated “the Netherlands entered three decades of acute economic distress, overseas disasters, and political upheaval between the 1780s and the fall of Napoleon”.\(^\text{1306}\) It lost its great power status during the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century,\(^\text{1307}\) but kept large overseas territories in a Dutch empire well into the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. This makes the Netherlands an interesting contrasting case with the Nordic countries, as well as the major powers covered earlier in this chapter. Compared to the Nordic countries, it is a reasonable assumption that the Netherlands bears most resemblance to Denmark among the Scandinavian countries, since Denmark kept sovereignty over overseas possessions in the West Indies until 1917, and exercised de facto sovereignty over Iceland, the Faroe islands and Iceland during the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century (see above). What distinguishes the Netherlands from our discussion of the Nordic countries is that it most certainly does not belong to the category of the sovereignty-maximising peripheries. The question is which of the ideal-types of international liberalism, paternalism or bandwagoning state is most appropriate in the Dutch case. We have argued (chapter two) that the Dutch republic could be labelled an international liberalist during the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) century, but the chief analytical question here is to analyse the extent to which the Netherlands’ diminishing status on the international scene turned it into a bandwagoning state.

\(^\text{1304}\) Cited in Adams, 1996: 12
\(^\text{1305}\) Since we did not see it as crucial to the present analysis to include the Dutch Republic in chapter six, I will briefly pick up the que from chapter five here on the Dutch trajectory.
\(^\text{1306}\) Drescher, 1994: 47-48
\(^\text{1307}\) Indeed, the loss of power on the international scene to a very large degree must be understood as a result of the relative decline of Dutch extraterritorial power. In this respect I totally agree with Modelski, 1978: 221 “The great war against Louis XIV took the best part of a generation, were fought all over the world and finally came to an end in the Treaty of Utrecht 1713. The Dutch had held their own against the French, but the price was the effective transfer of global power to what had just become Great Britain. As the English navy took over the chief burden of fighting the French on the high seas and the Dutch concentrated on the land campaigns, the Dutch navy lost the impetus of its expansion and began to suffer neglect” (italics added by me)
After the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe. In the Dutch case, the result was that in order to create a buffer state between the continental powers, the southern provinces were again united with the north. Thus, two distinctive territories with different historic experiences were united in a common Monarchy. This soon resulted in opposition and the declaration of an independent Belgium in 1830. King William eventually accepted the terms of separation in 1839. Thus, The Netherlands was formed as a linguistically homogenous entity, but it was still divided into predominantly Protestant and Catholic areas and communities. The nature of the political control of Dutch overseas possessions changed significantly, but primarily only since the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies during WWII. We will return to the status of these territories in the next chapter, but at this point it is sufficient to say that resistance against Dutch rule in these territories existed prior to WWII, only to be reinforced during the war. What really sets the Netherlands apart from Denmark and Sweden in this context, is the fact that the former had a legacy of once having had hegemonic maritime aspirations. Did this make a departure from the imperial era more difficult?

On the side of economics, it is striking to note that the earlier dynamic of the old Dutch republic did not keep pace with Britain, Germany or even Belgium during the initial phase of the industrial revolution. As an example, scholars have estimated that in 1830, the largest Dutch machine factory only employed between eighty and one hundred workers, and that the total number of steam engines in the Dutch economy in 1837 was 73. Thus, the separation from Belgium was regrettable in economic terms from a Dutch point of view. One important explanation for this relative stagnation is the obvious fact that the Netherlands had no iron and practically no coal. This disadvantageous position was in many ways also a distinguishing trait of the Dutch overseas empire. In fact, the Dutch were the last to legislate slave emancipation in their colonies; “They perfunctorily abolished slavery in 1863, after their Swedish, Danish and French neighbours”. But by this time, the slave-worked colonies did not matter significantly to the economy of the Netherlands. Even among the sugar refiners of Amsterdam, there was no collective protest, since their imports came from a range of plantations others than the Dutch West Indies. In other words, the colonies had ceased, to a very large degree, to be perceived as economically beneficial to the Dutch economy by the 1860s.

However, the late Dutch response to anti-slavery movements might point in the direction of clear paternalist traits in the Dutch polity. We must therefore examine closer the nature and extent of the Dutch empire in the imperial age from the beginning of the 1880s. In a time when even small

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1308 Andeweg et al, 2002:8
1309 Mokyr, 1974: 370 and 371
countries like Portugal and Belgium developed colonies, the fact remains that The Netherlands took no share in the partition of Africa. It is true, of course, that the Dutch traded on the Congo estuary, had a presence on the Gold Coast and earlier had established a white colony in sub-Saharan Africa. But at the Berlin Conference in 1884, the Netherlands showed no interest in participating in the partitioning of sub-Saharan Africa. The fact is that the Dutch delegation at the Conference bandwagoned behind Britain. This was as evident in the Dutch support for the British appeals to the humanitarian tasks at the Conference as it was in Dutch lack of territorial ambitions.1311
Furthermore, on the question of the Free trade zone in the Congo, the principal aim of the Netherlands was to make such a zone as large as possible. The Netherlands supported ALL suggestions for free trade in Africa at the conference. In the end, the Dutch political leadership expressed utter satisfaction with the outcome of the Berlin Conference; “Dutch neutrality had not been damaged and free Dutch trade had been guaranteed”.1312 This was the position of a state of a predominant liberalist, mare liberum ideology. The loss of power on the international scene thus makes the Netherlands in the latter half of the 19th century neatly fit our ideal-type of a bandwagoning state. Yet, the age of imperialism and the international context from 1885, made the Dutch position an awkward one in international affairs. The imperialist policies of neighbouring states made the prospects for an informal empire in Dutch overseas possessions less probable, while at the same time, the very position of the Netherlands as a polity with such possessions and a political weaker power was even more precarious. Thus, Dutch foreign policy in this era can be interpreted as one of abstention and neutrality, carefully manoeuvring between Germany and Britain in order to uphold its interests. Thus, the Netherlands stayed out of the race for new colonies. It was not the lack of opportunities that caused this abstention. As Wesseling notes;

“*The small countries had enough opportunities – as was proved by Belgium and Portugal. It was the result of unwillingness. In the Netherlands...the political will to operate as an imperialist power was missing. Whenever it was necessary to act in such a manner, the Dutch did so hesitantly, with reluctance and often with dread***1313

The comparatively speaking liberal beliefs that constituted the assumptions inherent in Dutch thinking on overseas possessions also underlay, and were paralleled in, the particular background

1310 Drescher, 1994: 44
1311 See Wesseling, 1981: 504
1312 Wesseling, 1981: 506
Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945

and nature of Dutch neutrality, or independency, in foreign policy. This facet of the Dutch polity must be analysed a bit further, since it demonstrates the very essence of Dutch liberalism both in foreign and domestic policy (I will return to this below).

On the international scene, the position of Holland was precarious mainly out of two factors; the might of the German army and the British hegemony at sea. A too appeasing policy towards Germany could mean the loss of Dutch overseas possessions; alliance with Britain could lead to loss of sovereignty of the motherland. Neither did the Netherlands have sufficient resources to deter such adversaries in the industrialised age. The result was a foreign policy of neutrality, where the Netherlands sought smooth relationships with the major powers and in effect promised that it would not share forces with any major power. But at the same time, geography dictated that the Low Countries was just too central for the strategy of both Germany and Britain. For Britain it was paramount to prevent Germany from controlling the channel coast, to Germany the Netherlands was both a possible advance route in any invasion of France, and at the very least a critical flank during an invasion where Dutch territory was not infringed. The worst possible outcome was a German invasion and occupation of the Netherlands (more likely if the Netherlands allied with Britain), the next worse was an alliance with Germany that would lead Britain or other sea powers to cut off or even annex Dutch overseas possessions, and the best solution was a successful Dutch policy of independence. The political leadership of the Netherlands hoped and sought for the latter, and for British assistance in the case of a German invasion. This policy was a success until Hitler attacked on May 10 1940, but at this time it also had become a total failure. In what ways did the national trajectory and international relations interact to influence Dutch foreign policy?

In spite of the depression of the early 1930s, that particularly struck the economies of the Dutch overseas possessions, Dutch industry developed significantly between 1918 and 1940. It achieved remarkable results in domestic coal mining, almost reaching a level of self-sufficiency by 1940. It also was successful in a number of other industries, slowly but steadily changing Dutch society. On the level of politics, it seems pretty clear that the foreign policy of neutrality was compatible with the Dutch trajectory of state- and nation building. After the Congress of Vienna, the Netherlands was locked in a position of neutrality by necessity, surrounded by mighty neighbouring states. In particular, Britain was eager to support the Netherlands as a neutral zone between France and Prussia, later Germany. Thus, Britain restored Java and the other East Indian islands to the

1313 Wesseling, 1981: 508
1314 See Tuyll, 2000: 711
1315 Schokking, 1947: 345
1316 Tuyll, 2000: 711-12
Netherlands after the fall of Napoleon. The British and Dutch preferences for neutrality were only seen as ever more acute the more the military power of Germany grew. This policy was extended after WWI, when the Netherlands, in line with its membership in the League of Nations, called it independence rather than neutrality. And the peculiar thing is that this policy of “independence” by now rooted in the social constitution of the Netherlands, was highly compatible with the foreign policy ideals of another liberalist power, the US. The ideas and principles of Woodrow Wilson found huge support in the Netherlands. It is striking to note that perhaps only Sweden and Norway was as supportive of the League of Nations as the Netherlands among the European states. As one scholar has remarked; “organizing peace as the Dutch understood it meant initiating a universal juridical order, based on rational and generally recognized moral principles, and working without political bias”¹³¹⁸ Thus, it is no exaggeration to claim that in ideological terms, the Netherlands resembled the US more than any of the other European states analysed here. Moreover, in addition to the presence of Germany and Britain, this policy was in line with the Dutch view of the development of its overseas possessions. After all, the dominant view in the Netherlands was that it was a liberal kingdom developing the economies and societies in the overseas territories it controlled. It followed that neutrality, and an international order based on liberal principles suited the Dutch foreign policy habitus.

Did this foreign policy and worldview also interact clearly with Dutch domestic politics? Some evidence seems to support such a hypothesis. As a neutral power, the Netherlands could afford patient deliberations, carefully preparing decisions built upon detailed and intricate arrangements. Where politics ended and administration began was thus not always easy to tell (note the similarity to the US until WWII). This also made it possible to seek consensus in domestic politics, since endogenous pressures were not seen as acute during the interwar years. Proportional representation, for example, was worked out at the end of WWI in a manner that tried to accomplish mathematical precision. Neutrality only reinforced this view of internal politics; in much the same way as the polity itself increasingly saw the world in light of their own image. The twin images of neutrality and international free trade combined to produce “more than directives for their own conduct; they gradually acquired the value of general and unimpeachable norms”.¹³¹⁹ History indeed is path-

¹³¹⁷ Schokking, 1947: 344
¹³¹⁸ Schokking, 1947: 347
¹³¹⁹ Scokking, 1947: 348, moreover; “Cobden’s conception of free trade as being simultaneously a cause and a guarantee of peaceful relations between peoples was nowhere more wholeheartedly supported than in Holland’s commercial cities. Thus the Netherlands came to connect the demands of national interest with those of general peace and prosperity”
dependent, and the ideology of international liberalism was part of the Dutch domestic equilibrium, elegantly fitting with Dutch foreign policy from 1839 till 1940.

But the image of international liberalism easily becomes victim to the grim realities of realpolitik for a neutral power with scarce resources in an era of industrialised state warfare. Although a part of the Dutch Navy continuously was stationed in the Indies, it had a small navy compared to the major sea powers of the era. This navy did not contribute to the international balance of power. Neither was Dutch naval construction or –technology between 1856 and 1940 ever in the forefront. Therefore, it should not be seen as a vital component in an analysis of the international institutions of maritime power in this period. Nor did the Navy serve much of a purpose de facto other than as a national symbol in an era where Pax Britannica largely worked in favour of Dutch overseas transportation as part of British policy to keep the Netherlands neutral.

Moreover, army strength could not possibly compensate for this in strategic terms. In retrospect, the overseas territories of the Netherlands do not seem a cost-effective national business in the 20th century. Firstly, it required large and continued investments in infrastructure and social policies. Secondly, it drew a significant portion of the military forces of the Netherlands long away from the motherland, only to decrease the strength of defence in 1940, at the same time without hindering Japanese invasion of the East Indies in 1941. The result of WWII was dramatic in the short run for the Netherlands. Infrastructure was gravely damaged, and it took some time to have the 500.000 workers deported for forced labour in Germany repatriated into society. The power of the Dutch work ethic nevertheless set the country fast back on track. In the ideological realm, much became a return to normalcy in 1945, with the very notable exception that a neutral foreign policy had been literally crushed by the German invasion. However, the first Dutch government after the peace immediately saw forward to an international order based on the Atlantic charter and free trade.1320 Thus, our labelling of the Netherlands as a band-wagoning liberal state seems on safe ground for this period. It did not have the power to play a very significant role on the international arena, shaping the world order the way it did during the 17th century, but neither did its praise for free trade and a comparatively speaking liberal world order diminish in spite of its decline in world politics. In sum, the Netherlands remained a case of bandwagoning liberalism throughout this period, not so much a result of a merchant navy (see appendix II), but rather as a result of a very distinct ideologic heritage.

1320 Schokking, 1947: 350
4.5 Conclusion; arms races, globalisation and maritime politics in the industrial age

A naval arms race paralleled the industrial revolution. The naval race in technology and naval engineering was the first really sophisticated technological rivalry between truly modern states. Britain remained a hegemon until WW1, but could do so only by increasingly taking into account second-rate sea powers. The efforts of second-rate naval powers and weaker coastal states were to appeal to international law. Following the Crimean war, the 1856 Declaration of Paris could be interpreted as a juncture in this process.

British policymakers realised the limits of hegemony. These limits more than anything else consisted of striking deals, agreements and alliances with second-rate sea powers, thus achieving equilibrium of forces. Britain was a true paternalist when it came to regulations of the use of the sea. As of Britain, her main foreign policy preferences indeed seemed eternal. Upholding the empire also made the quest to remain the leading naval power seem axiomatic. The support for the Royal Navy became ingrained in the British national habitus, and in a characteristic British way ever after 1807. However, such dominant paternalism eventually was set under a pressure that not even the Empire could ignore. Britain gradually lost her ability to shape the international maritime order. Both France, Russia and last but not least, the US, saw their interests served by a higher degree of mare liberum in world politics. For the US at least, the interest melted together with ideology and political culture. At sea, in colonial questions and in the question of neutral rights at war, it was the combination of Russia, the US and France that checked the influence of the paternalist hegemon.

What material interests made states with relatively benign relations to the dominant paternalist nevertheless favour mare liberum? The prime reason for this rests in the fact that neutral powers had important interests to defend in rivalries where they were not directly involved. To put it simply, all coastal states other than the belligerents shared the wish to be able to continue using the oceans, ensuring “business as usual”. This made the efforts at upholding maritime law into a proper constraint on the policies of the Empire. By 1900, the new major European power, Germany, had taken over the role as a chief cause of worry in the British government. In other words, the historic inclination towards paternalism that we have traced in the British polity was checked by the balance of power. Simultaneously, as we have tried to point out, the Royal Navy as the predominant naval force was a credible instrument to ensure a certain degree of freedom of the seas for the smaller

1321 See Ferguson, 2002: 164-173 for one vivid interpretation. The Royal Navy literally knit the Empire together, or represented the “annihilation of distance” together with the telegraph.
1322 Semmel, 1986: 152-154
western powers. On the whole, this was beneficial for the smaller North European countries, and particularly for the coastal states Denmark and Norway (see appendix II).

British ideology of sea power was a phenomenon of path dependency. After the Napoleonic wars, Britons saw the Empire and the Royal Navy as even more interconnected; one could not be had without the other. Thus, Britain consistently tried to out build any potential competitor to her naval predominance. After the British-Japanese treaty, Germany and the US were the chief rivals that influenced British naval policies. Both Germany and the USA were latecomers in the society of states, and both had scarce naval experience. The US developed a foreign policy towards the Western world that was in line with its ideological foundations; bandwagoning liberalism, later a liberalism that swung between the extremes of interventionism and isolationism. Germany was a traditional European paternalist power, acquiring a colonial empire and soon building its navy in comparison to the Royal Navy, but with the aim to improve its position, not to enter a war in which Britain would be an opponent. The naval policies of Imperial Germany helped achieve the opposite of what intended. Faced with the strongest army in Europe and a strong German fleet, Britain lined up with the antagonists of Germany. The German efforts at becoming a sea power were parts of increased aspirations for exercising paternalism. With practically no naval experience prior to the 1870s, the German navy nevertheless was a very modest institution prior to the early 1890s. The army was seen as a much more important factor in protecting the Empire up to that point. The German constitution gave much room for manoeuvring in foreign policy for the Chancellor, and in military issues for the Kaiser. Thus, heavily influenced by the writings of Mahan, Kaiser William II and Admiral Tirpitz were successful at getting the Reichstag and the German opinion adopt a favourable opinion for increased naval spending. However, there was hardly anything peculiar about the ideology of German navalism. In many ways, it can be seen as an attempt to imitate Britain, and there is no evidence that German politicians or officers saw this naval policy as a preparation for a desired war with Britain. The nature of German imperialism nevertheless makes it a clear example of a paternalist power.

The US on the other hand, was marked by its political distance to the old, paternalist European powers, and only entered the wars in 1917 and 1941 at stages when participation in the war seemed the only feasible action. One should note, however, that the US hesitated in engaging as a major power through extraterritorial violence, in spite of her energetic industries and vital economy. It is only through taking into account domestic politics heavily shaped by the processes of state- and nation building we can understand these interactions of the three major powers covered here.

Material factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions to explain the outcome of WWI and
In this respect, the rise of the US as the major economic power compared to the other great powers is a major factor. Historian Bairoch, for example has estimated that it was in the years 1900-1913 that the US became the strongest economic power.\textsuperscript{1323} However, US economic power was not directly translated into political power. Materialist theories of international relations cannot explain this, while models that take domestic politics are at least capable of addressing this question. That Germany sought a much higher profile than the US in international affairs was a result of its ambitions to become a sea power. That these ambitions eventually contributed to the outbreak of WWI cannot be explained without taking into account the peculiar British preoccupation with countering any tendency in the international balance of sea power that it saw as threatening its naval predominance. It was the rise of another European paternalist power armed with a strong navy that fuelled the British naval build-up, while German politicians saw their strengthening of the Imperial navy as nothing more than an effort to achieve near parity with Britain. The outcome in both world wars was a German defeat, a weakening of the British economy and a strengthened US. Moreover, in the US, involvement in old, “pre-modern” Europe awoke little enthusiasm until 1941. Ideologically, the prevailing view in the much more liberalist US was that the whole international institution so dominant in Europe, the balance of power, had to be abandoned in favour of a different institution. In this respect, the policies of FDR echoed Woodrow Wilson, the latter being too far ahead of his time and his polity to succeed in administering and disciplining the European paternalists. Thus, the US continued to act like a liberalist in international relations, although paternalist traits surfaced between 1898 and 1909. In the latter period, largely due to the ideology of sea power as developed by Mahan and practised at least in part by Theodor Roosevelt, the US at times carried out a paternalist extraterritorial policy. However, these policies were controversial within the states, were geographically limited, and were consistently coupled to rhetoric of a civilising mission. Admittedly, the US also did give humanitarian relief in the territories it intervened in, but the distance between US idealism and the nature of occupation at the Philippines ultimately became too big. Thus, the US anti-imperialist ideology became incompatible with the practise of occupation. US foreign policy soon was brought back to equilibrium. After the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the USA swung between isolationism and precarious interventionism, the latter reaching its highest level only from 1941. It was significant of these major shifts however, that only direct aggression from other states in world wars could curb the isolationism that had prevailed in Congress. After WW II, no other nation could compete with the US for leadership within the western camp. While other former major powers were

\textsuperscript{1323} Source: Bairoch, 1982: table 8
severely weakened “As a thunder squall ionizes the sultry summer air, World war II left the American people energized, freshened, and invigorated”, to use the language of David Kennedy.\textsuperscript{1324} The US by now had transformed itself into the economic and industrial powerhouse of the free world.

The smaller states analysed here all were weak powers on the international scene in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The former liberal internationalist -the Dutch Republic- was transformed into a bandwagoning state after the Napoleonic wars. Although it kept overseas territories well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Netherlands combined liberalism with legalism in international affairs, and was a relatively weak naval power that was dependent upon the Royal navy for protecting its maritime sector. It nevertheless had to balance this with the fear of a German invasion, thus making it follow a neutralist foreign policy.

The same neutralist policy is clearly recognisable in all the Nordic countries, although the political status of Norway, Finland and the North Atlantic islands was changed in this period. Norway unilaterally abandoned the union with Sweden in 1905, Finland was independent from Russia in 1917, only to enter civil war and later Soviet invasion, forcing Finland to cede territories to the Soviet Union. Sweden consistently followed a neutralist policy during the entire period, protecting its trade with Germany while trying to avoid confrontation with Britain and Russia/USSR. In this it was remarkably successful, but this policy also implied adopting a very inward-looking definition of the national interest. Denmark’s position changed dramatically following its defeat by Germany in 1864. From being a paternalist power, it entered a path of neutrality defined in very strict terms, in the hope of avoiding further hostility with Germany. At the same time, neutrality had to imply a modest military, so that Denmark might not become too tempting for any of the major powers, making them wage pre-emptive wars against Denmark in the advent of a European crisis (the Danes did not forget that Britain did this in 1807, seizing almost the entire Danish-Norwegian navy). This made the position of her overseas territories very precarious. Thus, Denmark sold the Danish West Indies to the US in 1917, compensated with US support for Danish claims for sovereignty over Greenland. It also lost Iceland formally in 1944. A policy of neutrality was impossible to combine with sovereignty over overseas territories that had become strategically important for the major powers. Nevertheless, the combination of Danish rule in the North Atlantic islands of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the clear alteration of the ideology of the Danish policy and the decreased influence of Denmark on the international arena, made her more peripheral with reduced paternalist pretensions and only indirect overseas interests, characteristic of a former small empire. As we have

\textsuperscript{1324} Kennedy, 1999: 747
seen, Sweden belonged to the same category by 1905. Conversely, Norway and Iceland both tried to gain as much sovereignty as the international forces allowed them during this era. By definition, gaining independence from Sweden and Denmark respectively were the major aims of their policies in the early phase of their new sovereignty. WWII made both countries dependent upon US military and political support; while the British maritime hegemony had secured the sea-lanes prior to the war, WWII ensured that both peripheries had to adjust their foreign policy to the nature of the new hegemony. The difference between the two was that Norway had a significant merchant fleet. Although coastal interests made her stick to mare clausum throughout the 20th century, this was balanced with mare liberum in international waters, making Norways’s mare clausum ideology less pronounced than in the case of Iceland.

5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International Institutions, 1945-2001

On previous pages, I have argued that historically, two polities gained maritime hegemony and thus influenced the international institutions and the states affected by these. The predominance of the Dutch republic in the later 17th century came first. This was a weak and short-lived "hegemony" compared to later ones, but nevertheless a hegemony through sea power and economic strength that to a considerable degree made her capable of defining the rules of the international praxis of maritime activities. Britain was the second hegemonic power, and was much stronger than the Dutch republic had ever been. The Pax Britannica lasted until WWI, although its predominance was least threatened in the period from 1815 till the 1890s. The changing nature of the British Hegemony and the increased international economic and political competition after the 1880s made the British predominance ever more precarious, and it also restricted the paternalist traits of British foreign policies. In retrospect, it is also evident that the relative decline of Britain after 1880 made her attempts at establishing international institutions based solely on her own preferences impossible faced with other strong paternalist powers and a steadily empowered international liberalist -the US. At the time of writing, it has become commonplace to dub the post-war US predominance as an American “Empire”. In this chapter, I will argue that the states in this analysis voluntarily sought protection under common rules and resources, and that the specific design of the institutions that were created for this protection was a result of US ideology. Furthermore, the polities of Northern Europe actively sought US participation through international institutions. These policies were balanced against the military power of the Soviet Union, a balance that restricted the conduct of the,
comparatively speaking, liberal US hegemony just as much as USSR made most democratic states support the US. The fact that the domestic politics of the US also restricted the praxis of US foreign policy has often been ignored by European commentators. For these reasons, the ideology and nature of the US maritime hegemony will be addressed in the context of the Cold war. We will also analyse how this ideology gave weaker western powers opportunities to protect and even expand their degree and scope of sovereignty, and how the interaction between the US and North European ideologies made for cooperation as well as friction within the western camp. Empirically, the analysis is restricted to international institutions for maritime policies, chiefly the institutional framework set up under the United Nations (UN). Evidently, this framework was embedded in the entire post-war world order, and issue-linkages between policy-areas as well as interdependence complicate the presentation. Indeed, the structure of the following chapter will seek to illustrate the degree of this embeddedness. However, I will also argue that all the states covered here exercised a degree of sovereignty within the international institutions, and that these institutions in fact were instrumental for this purpose. This makes a comparative logic possible, in spite of the high degree of diffusion of ideas and ideology between territories within the international institutional matrix. In this period, the theoretical notions of globalisations and a world-system of interconnected units are reflected in empirical evidence to an even higher degree than in the preceding period. This makes the comparative approach challenging, and the test of locally valid ideal-types a cumbersome process. A justification in favour of a comparative perspective of this era is the degree to which such an approach indeed might question the political significance of “globalization” or “interdependence”. While it is easy to demonstrate that communications, media and common environmental problems made observers of world politics more aware of the necessity of international cooperation, this did not necessarily translate into successful institutionalisation of international relations or decreased sovereignty for each state. To be somewhat more specific, is it not feasible that whatever de jure reductions of state sovereignty membership in international organisations amounted to, it in fact increased the de facto autonomy of small states with limited political and military power on the international arena? The period also makes a close analytical connection between the domestic and international level of analysis a necessity, more so than for any previous period. Thus, I have chosen to lay much more emphasis on the interaction between states that took place within international institutions, simply because a much higher portion of such interactions did indeed occur in institutions after WWII. In other words, a major assumption here is that international relations among western powers became more institutionalised after WWII than in
previous epochs of history. Since the history and processes of the UN, NATO and the EEC/EU all have been covered by a substantial body of scholarly work elsewhere; I will not embark on a full analysis of these institutions. Rather, I will seek to isolate the maritime institutions and negotiations on maritime and naval matters that were seen as belonging to the realm of high politics by the states affected by the issues. This makes the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) of particular importance. Therefore, I will begin the analysis with the US and the role it played at the international level during the entire period covered here. In other words, I link the alteration, or lack thereof, of international law for sovereignty of the seas and international maritime disputes closely to the role of the US. Needless to say, such a position might lead to a distorted picture of international affairs in the post-war era in which the role of the US is exaggerated. On the other hand, I will try to show that the US indeed was vital to the particular content that the international institutions achieved, and the chapters addressing the other states will complement the analysis of the international institutions. The basis of the legitimacy of the post-war US hegemony must be highlighted, and we must ultimately discuss whether the foreign policies of the administration of Bush the younger changed US foreign policy beyond the ideal type of international liberalism.

5.1 Forward deployment and the translation of the New Deal to the international scene; the US and the Post-war international institutions

In this section of the chapter, I will seek to demonstrate that the American hegemony was substantially different than any of its predecessors, and how this difference changed the content of international law on maritime sovereignty. Materialist modes of explanations all too often fail to address this fact, as perceived by a scholar in 1993;

“The multilateralism that characterizes postwar international regimes is a fundamental characteristic of a liberal world order. In particular, it is characteristic of international institutions

1325 This hardly is an original position, but one that nevertheless is debated. It is in particular criticised by some, but not all, political realists. The so-called English school deviates from hard-core realists on this issue. In this chapter, I will seek to demonstrate that both political realists and world-systems theoreticians often exaggerate the degree that material power alone can shape international relations.

1326 The question of UN autonomy and whether the UN can be seen as an actor in world politics, was addressed by Oran Young in 1968. Young rejects both the realist interpretation of seeing the UN as merely a reflection of its component members, as well as an excessively idealist position that equates UN with the international system itself. Young (1968: 903) argues that the UN is “1) a device for regulating relationships of power in the international system; 2) an effector of agreements among the major powers in the system; 3) an instrument for the accomplishment of political change; 4) a tool of partisan interests in world politics; 5) a creator of norms and a source of collective legitimisation; and 6) a contributor to the development of long-term viability for the states and nation-states in the system”
designed by the United States – the liberal state most inclined and most able to project its domestic political and economic arrangements onto the world”\(^{1327}\)

As I have argued previously, it was not the point that the US did not apply covert operations, supported client groups and at times brute military force in interventions in other states to further its perceived interests. This did indeed happen during the cold war, but the US hegemony nevertheless was different than previous maritime hegemonies under European states. The chief difference was not the use of force –in this respect a powerful international liberalist can apply the same means as paternalist powers- but that the American idea of liberalism, for better or worse, came to matter so much for the entire Western world after WWII.\(^{1328}\) In other words, the purpose and content of US foreign policy was more ideologically coloured than those of the major European powers (with the exception of the Third Reich but with no comparison to the US otherwise). While even its main post-war antagonists in the USSR eventually came to doubt their own ideology; the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of history, US policymakers from Woodrow Wilson and FDR to Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, all continued to believe in what they saw as the fundamental truth and value of American political virtues, institutions and the sacred value of human rights and market democracy.\(^{1329}\) Needless to say, the US developed a strong geopolitical perspective during the cold war. Some will undoubtedly also argue that there were differences between US administrations. Yet, they all had shared common ground ideologically. As Henry Kissinger once said of the most despised American president of the post-war era, Richard Nixon: “*With all his tough-guy pretensions, what he really wanted to be remembered for was his idealism. On his first day as* 

\(^{1327}\) Burley, 1993: 124. I am indebted to Burley for the argument that serves as the heading of this section of the chapter. That is not to say that there are not some substantial differences in views among us.

\(^{1328}\) The ideology of the US, international liberalism, provided it with legitimacy on the international scene for much of the period covered here, in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that weakness also was an inevitable consequence of the liberal identity. As Henry Kissinger (1982: 12, 23) once wrote of the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam war: “*Like a surgeon wielding a scalpel, Hanoi dissected the American psyche and probed our weaknesses, our national sense of guilt, our quest for final answers, our idealism, and, yes, even the values of its sympathizers, whom it duped no less cold-bloodedly than its adversary...Hanoi had exploited America’s hesitations and self-doubt. Pilgrimages of antiwar Americans to this Mecca of revolutionary rectitude became a regular event*. The brute realities of the US intervention in Indochina proved a dramatic background for this venture. But this also made it tempting to see US conspiracies wherever political upheavals took place.

\(^{1329}\) In a commencement speech given at Notre Dame University in June 1977 for example, Carter reviewed what he believed should be the ideals and realities of American foreign policy: “*But I want to speak to you today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes*”.  

One might argue that this idealism primarily was paying lip service to Congress and the American opinion, but in this section I will demonstrate that American ideals did matter. They mattered for the entire institutional matrix of the post-war era, and after some general comments on this, I will continue to show how it mattered in questions of maritime resources and policies. Based on our ideal-type of the international liberalist, we should expect to find clear evidence of US insistence upon liberal principles in the formation, alteration and operation of these institutions. On the vision underlying the UN and its sub-organisations and legal framework, one should not overlook the fact that FDR and other US politicians that had direct experience with the US New Deal shaped the Bretton-Woods institutions and the Marshall plan to a considerable degree. In addition, FDR had committed the US to becoming “the great arsenal of democracy”. This was to materialise through clear US commitments and significant US contributions on the international arena, but within a multilateral framework. The US was well equipped to do so by 1945; it had the historically unique combination of ideological, economic, military and political power that gave it hegemony in the western world. There were obstacles to actually exercise this power on two analytically distinct levels; the domestic and the international. On the domestic level, the craft of the FDR and Truman administrations was to gain support for US foreign policy in a new international context with the historical experience of the US as a polity. Thus, US foreign policy could not appear imperialist, overly committed in material military terms, nor too unilateralist. At the international scene, the military power of the USSR restricted US foreign policy with many of the same effects as the domestic US factors. But in addition, there was genuine hope in Europe that the US would assume an active role in political reconstruction after 1945. The latter factor contributed significantly to especially US commitments to participate in what became NATO. The USA acted swiftly in setting up the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the USSR did not participate in neither. Both organisations were favourable to US interests, but were also seen as

1330 Kissinger, 1982: 1183
1331 David Kennedy, 1999: 476
1332 See Ruggie, 1993
1333 Confer with the IEMP-model of Michael Mann, 1993. Mann also states that in geopolitics, political leadership matters. Leadership is a relational function to be sure, and I believe it is fair to say that at least in Western Europe, one looked to Washington for assistance in the huge task of reconstruction after WWII.
1334 The USSR, in the words of Paul Dibb (1988) was an "incomplete superpower", but I would like to add that it nevertheless was a military superpower throughout the Cold war.
1335 Thus, the necessary conditions existed for the US to become an "Empire by Invitation", in the words of historian Geir Lundestad (1986)
1336 See Wade, 1993 for a recent and somewhat provocative exposure of this point
benign in most Western European countries. The Marshall Plan of economic aid is also an example of a US policy that was simultaneously endorsed by Western Europe and instrumental in increasing US influence on the international scene. The shift in US foreign policy in the years from 1940 till 1955 represented a merging of the Wilsonian internationalism and the more nationalist sentiment inherent in traditional isolationism. By 1945, the US had become so strong that it could influence the whole world with its liberalism; the old isolationist fear that involvement would contaminate the US was largely gone at this point. The US did no longer need to fear the evil forces of the world, now was the time for evil forces to fear the US. This shift in the praxis of US foreign policy fuelled by old traits in the US polity and new opportunities at the international level is evidenced by the extent of US military activity, in which the US Navy played an instrumental role. The Defence budget was one billion dollars in 1938. After the war, the US Defence budget was around 12 billion dollars each year; by 1953 it passed the 50 billion dollars mark. In 1938, the USA had no military alliances and no significant military units stationed overseas. By 1955, the United States had signed numerous alliances and treaties with states in Western Europe and Asia, and had some 450 bases in 36 countries. But there was no anonymous “historical forces” that dictated this outcome. Why did the US get so much more involved in general terms in international relations in this period compared to the interwar years, and why did the US seek a multilateral framework for this engagement? One source of understanding the American shift lie in the 1943 publication of “Prefaces to peace”, a compendium of four books written by prominent US politicians from different parties and loyalties. In this project, Wendell Wilkie (republican presidential candidate in 1940), Herbert Hoover, Henry Wallace and Sumner Wells all argued that the US had to plan for the construction of an international order that should follow immediately after the termination of the war. Even a former isolationist like Wilkie voiced concern that US not repeat the mistake of withdrawing from the international organisations that by necessity would have to be set up after the war was settled, and that a framework for international political economy had to be created anew. In particular, the United Nations organisation was conceived in the spirit created by the war; of allied cooperation in seek for peace, not for unilateral aggrandisement on behalf of the US, as some Marxist scholars have later argued. We have already pointed out in chapter seven that the 1941 Atlantic Charter, formulated by FDR and Churchill in 1941, was based on a liberal ideology. But one must also add that it was a document with a vision of an international order based on

1337 There were exceptions to this. But Lundestad, 1986: 268, and Hathaway, 1981 clearly demonstrate the point
1338 Crockatt, 1995: 13
1339 Schurman, 1974: 46
multilateralism. Needless to say, historians ever after have debated what FDR and Churchill really believed they were committing themselves to. Admittedly, Roosevelt was the most committed to what the Charter actually said; for Churchill the main hope was to achieve the support of the US at a time when Britain was in an extraordinarily precarious position. Yet, the document and the meeting set the tone of the allied cooperation, and above all became a source of inspiration for both the leaders of the wartime alliance as well as for national leaders throughout the Commonwealth. Thus, I will go so far as to say that the Atlantic Charter in earnest opened a Pandora Box. The Charter contained the phrase that Britain and the US “respected the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live” It did not take long before the British Cabinet sensed that this formulation might entail serious consequences to the British Empire. And indeed they were correct; US politicians as well as nationalists in European colonies took the phrase literally in the years to come. To the US, this also created a momentum of its own; once the Charter was seen as committing the USA to help abolish the very principle of imperialism as a part of the post-war settlement, it could hardly back down. Thus, when the United Nations Charter itself was hardly any more committed to a practical scheme for abandoning imperialism, the notion of foreign rule over territories separated by salt water was seen as harder and harder to defend. It had become incompatible with the aspirations inherent in the vision for the new world order, to a large degree as a result of the liberalism of the US, together with the fuelling of genuine desire to national independence in colonies that had experienced that ties to the imperial motherland were cut during the war. The geopolitical result of the US-British-Soviet wartime alliance was also a shift of foci. By the time of the Tehran Conference in 1943; “The United States

1341 The four last points in the charter read as follows; “Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments”. (source: http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm)

1342 See for example Wilcox, 1963: 683-703, Hughes, 1974: 177-190 and Crockatt, 1995: 40-42
1343 Hughes, 1974
1344 http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm
1345 Lloyd, 1996:316
1346 The defeat in South-East Asia, for example, also affected the relationship between UK and Australia and New Zealand.
turned its main attention within the alliance from Britain to the Soviet Union: western strategic policy changed from a Mediterranean focus, largely inspired by British ideas, to a Western European focus reflecting largely American concepts.\textsuperscript{1347} To the US, the balance of power in other parts of the world definitely mattered, but Europe was the prime concern in the years following immediately after WWII. In this respect, overseas colonies not only were incompatible with the ideologically coloured US vision of the post-war era. The possible continuation of European overseas sovereignty was seen as complicating both the defence of Europe and US relations with the USSR. The first major instrument through which the US would seek to discipline the former empires was the UN. WWII ensured widespread support for US participation in some sort of collective security organisation, in congress and public opinion alike. Already by 1942, three quarters of the American citizens favoured such US involvement.\textsuperscript{1348} But FDR was convinced that this time, the multilateral Wilsonian version of idealism should be coupled to a dose of realpolitik within the organisation itself. This was as much a result of, as a genuine hope in, that the cooperation among the allied powers could stand a chance of survival after the war. FDR’s inclination to demand Big power predominance was reflected in the Dumbarton Oaks Plan of 1944, in which representatives from the alliance states agreed in principle to a Security Council, while the universalist pretension was embodied in the notion of a General assembly of all member states. The quarrels over UN procedures nevertheless mirrored the differences in view among the major powers.\textsuperscript{1349} In practise, the oncoming cold war ensured that the UN thus not became the dominant arena to address security issues either by the US or USSR during this period. But the organisation was relevant on another level; all subsequent multilateral treaties to which the US participated was designed not to be a break with the UN Charter, and the UN did become a framework for solving whatever international policy issues that the bipolar balance of power permitted. Included in the latter development was a more institutionalised world polity, although East-west antagonism limited the scope of this institutionalisation. The significance of this framework is often overstated by idealists who came to see the UN as synonymous with the international community, but it was just as much ignored by scholars who saw the international scene during the cold war as one singularly determined by security and power solely based on military capabilities, and on the basis of this assumption concluded that the UN was irrelevant. We will demonstrate the importance of the UN framework below, but this is certainly not to deny the importance of power politics in traditional terms. The

\textsuperscript{1347} Sainsbury, 1985: 307
\textsuperscript{1348} Gaddis, 1972: 26
\textsuperscript{1349} One notable discussion was whether USSR should have 16 votes in the assembly, reflecting the sixteen “autonomous Republics” in the USSR, matching the separate votes accorded to the nations within the British Empire.
extraterritorial power apparatus of the US naturally grew from 1946 as the commitments and ambitions of the US increased. The German question, the Marshall Plan, the Truman doctrine, the nuclear arms race, the formation of NATO and SEATO, the US-Japanese security treaty, the creation of the CIA and the NSC 68 etc, were all manifestations of the increased US role in world politics as well as a reflection of East-west antagonism. This had important bearings on the US polity itself, and the prevailing view of how the US should behave as a unit in international affairs. At the domestic level, the significant shift in US politics was that a high-profile foreign policy gained increased support both within the political institutions and in the public. It is true that isolationist politicians still made up a percentage of the members of Congress, but these became less and less relevant to the formulation of US foreign policy after 1950. After the Korean War, in particular, the mood had swung from the earlier tradition of criticising administrations for being too interventionist, to the position that the US government was not doing enough to serve the interests of “the free world”. Confronted with what many Americans saw as a monolithic threat from a Communist world, this fertilised the perception that the US had “lost” China, and in the 1950s, even that the Government itself was corrupted – not primarily by big business interested in an arms industry, but by communist fifth-columnists! The international liberalism of the US had reached full maturity. Yet, this was also a product of the longue duree of US foreign policy. According to Henry Kissinger:

“The Foreign service’s approach to foreign policy nevertheless reflected much of American attitudes and historical experience. The Foreign Service had developed in the earlier years of our history when no direct physical threat to America’s security was apparent. America’s foreign involvement was considered to flow less from a concept of national interest – which was thought morally myopic – than from enlightened notions of freedom of trade and the implementation of moral, or at least legal, principles. We believed that the decision to be involved with matters beyond our shores was entirely ours to make...we would take no responsibility for the day-to-day management of the balance of power; indeed, we tended to deny its importance and even demonstrated our moral superiority by denouncing it as a contributory cause of international tensions”

\[1350\] Kissinger, 1982: 444. Of US ideology and foreign policy, the same author (ibid: 239) remarked that “Two schools of thought developed. The liberal approach treated foreign policy as a subdivision of psychiatry; the conservative approach considered it an aspect of theology. Liberals equated relations among states with human relations. They emphasized the virtues of trust and unilateral gestures of goodwill. Conservatives saw in foreign policy a version of the eternal struggle of good with evil, a conflict that recognized no middle ground and could end only with victory...American idealism drove both groups to challenge us from different directions”. As Kissinger,
While the support for US interventions abroad did suffer a setback after the Vietnam War and the Watergate debacle that weakened the executive branch, the dominant trend until the 1990s was one of strong domestic support of very considerable US overseas commitments, both in terms of the use of economic and military power. And this was seen as both in the national interest as well as compatible with the values of the US society. The very ideology that had been seen as bulwark against foreign contamination of the US had now been expanded to cover the entire “free world”.

Although this policy eventually has been called “imperialism” by the left, its ideological origins were far from the ideology of imperialism. Given the history of the US, international factors alone are not sufficient to explain how the US polity took such a vast step after WWII. The implication of such a position also means temporarily downplaying international factors, in order for us to grasp the genesis of the multilateral approach in US foreign policy after 1945. The development of international law and international organisations often has sources in changes of law and domestic politics. The US administrations during WWII and the immediate post-war years to a very considerable degree were influenced by the New Deal, and this coloured their vision of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions. This link is essential to grasp the following increase in institutionalisation of international maritime questions. To understand the shift properly, we need to address the worldview in the FDR and Truman administrations. This, or rather these, views both shaped US foreign policy and the international institutional order in the post-war era, and not solely in purely strategic terms. The great depression and the reconstruction added nuances to the dominant view of the relationship between the market and public policy among the most influential group of US politicians. Although it is perhaps an exaggeration to claim that this made for a precise doctrine, both politicians and bureaucrats in the FDR administrations clearly realised that a laissez-faire economic theory did not necessarily produce market recovery. In effect, this naturally meant that the Federal Government ought to "stimulate" the economy through various means, and that state regulation should be carefully applied to forestall market failure. The other side of the coin was that market failure, a wildly fluctuating currency, and resulting high unemployment could cause a threat to the very fabric of modern society. The latter was evident in the fall of the Weimar republic of course, but the severe difficulties on the American continent during the depression brought this fear very close to US policy-makers.\footnote{1999 has noted, the merging of liberalism and conservatism in the form of neoconservatism in the 1970s made for a particular amalgam of US idealism. I will return to this exotic configuration of thought in the next chapter.} \footnote{David Kennedy, 1999: chapter nine gives an impressive portrait of how this appeared to FDR and his closest associates. Crisis often seem much more manageable with the benefit of a retrospective perspective.} Intimately linked to such fears was the notion that the state ought to take responsibility where the market failed to do so; at least by a minimal standard, social
welfare was a question of public policy. This shift in US politics occurred prior to WWII. But after
1939, a consensus in the FDR administration was gradually reached where these principles were
seen as vital also for the post-war settlement and to the future world order. In retrospect, the
resulting vision might seem unrealistic, lofty—even hypocritical. But the context of this development
was so serious that it created a momentum for genuine aspirations for the improvement of both
domestic societies and the international society at large. For FDR and his planners during WWII, the
most dominant reservoir of thought on how to redraft the institutional set-up of the international
community was the legal and administrative reforms of the New Deal.1352 Thus, the US tried to
create relatively politicised regulatory organisations on the international level following WWII.
Quite clearly, this was a break with US detachment as well as a break with traditional balance-of-
power approaches to international affairs. Perhaps even more fundamental, this new approach also
resonated well with traditional US ideology in the respect that it envisioned an international law and
a set of institutions for persons in addition to states; it became a vision for nothing less than
mankind. Indeed, we might argue that both the League of Nations and the United Nations was based
on liberalism, and that a US-articulated idealism served as bases for both organisations. But the
point is that the UN was inspired by another form of liberalism than was the League of Nations.
Whereas the League had been inspired by a doctrine of laissez-faire economics and the night-
watchman state, the 20th century vision to a large degree was the result of liberal welfare-state
notions. In the words from the 1956 famous treatise “Swords into Plowshares” by Inis Claude, the
latter liberalism;

“Supported the assumption by governments of vastly expanded functional
responsibilities and a capacity for regulatory intervention in many areas formerly considered
outside the range of their appropriate concerns. Correspondingly, the Charter reflected a newly
enlarged conception of the necessary and proper role of international organisation in world affairs;
it envisaged for the United Nations and Specialised Agencies a functional”1353

Surely, one might argue that this was a trend in the entire western world after WWII, but the most
significant contribution to actually transcend increased state activity to the international scene came
from the US. In fact, if we look at the entire period after WWII and compare it to pre-war standards,
US liberalism in this respect was never to become the same again. A very substantial degree of state
expenditure and state intervention in the market became a hallmark of US liberalism, often in

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1352 Burley, 1993: 126
1353 Claude, 1956: 88
contrast to the rhetoric of US politicians. Thus, it was not so much that international institutions in
the post-war era had to accommodate to domestic interventionism, but almost the other way
around; the institutionalisation of the international community was to a large degree a result of
domestic changes in the thinking on state and market. The result was that the introduction of the UN
system, in an ideological and partly administrative sense, was a natural extension of the social
welfare state in the US and Western Europe. More precisely, it was the US effort at translating its
own vision of politics and market to the world at large, whatever disappointments and lost illusions
such a move would lead to, that produced the initial institutionalisation of world politics through
organisation. As Dean Acheson once remarked, there was the opportunity to “grab hold of history
and make it conform”. The Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations began the
first phase of post-war planning for this purpose already from 1939. As the war went on, the field of
addressed issues rose steadily. Following the attack on Pearl Harbour, FDR authorised a broader
committee, the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, with members from Congress and
a wide array of US federal institutions and chaired by the Secretary of State. The committee was
divided into subcommittees, and a number of special advisory groups, producing tentative policy
options in twenty-six policy fields in preparation for the Dumbarton Oaks discussions alone. That
the body of proposals eventually became so wide-ranging and voluminous reflected a dual
acknowledgement; that the New Deal philosophy could be a fruitful approach to world security after
a cataclysmic war, and that no other western power had the sum of ideological, economic, political
and military power to influence international affairs after WWII. And if the US did not do “the job”,
what would the results be? The US hope in the peaceful intentions of Josef Stalin declined
considerably during the war. Translating plans into responsibility also meant organising the
international community according to similar institutional designs as the US government. That this
preference at some junctures was modified through negotiations with the participating states does
not obscure the fact that the concrete institutional principles applied were American. To be more
specific, as Burley has demonstrated, the members of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign
Policy were almost exclusively “the actual planners and beneficiaries of these domestic solutions
[the New Deal]”. While the FDR Administration definitely wanted to construct a world order
through organisation with the ultimate aim of securing peace, the Committee also to a very large
degree focused on how to further US interests through this process of increased institutionalisation.

1354 See Ruggie, 1993 and 1998 for an analysis of so-called "embedded liberalism"
1355 Again, the analogy between domestic and international politics was much more conceivable for North
   Americans than it was for Europeans.
1356 Cited in Ryan, 2000: 15
1357 Burley, 1993: 131
This was to be ensured through the Security Council, but perhaps just as much through the organisations for specialised functions related to the UN. The liberalism inherent in this US attempt might seem naïve to European students and practitioners of power politics, but few in the FDR Administration and their planners had international power politics as their dominating experience; their main inspiration toward institutionalism was that of domestic problem-solving in the USA. The ideals of the New Deal as defined by Roosevelt in his speech on January 6 1941 (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of want and *freedom from fear*) were projected unto the world stage. Included in this projection was also the belief that legalism could solve problems on the international arena (in this respect, the parallel to Woodrow Wilson is clear). Thus, The International Court of Justice, at The Hague, should act as a “world court”. It should be empowered to the degree that it “decides in accordance with international law disputes of a legal nature submitted to it by States”. In addition, international organs and agencies are entitled to call upon it for advisory opinions. It was created in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations to be the principal judicial organ of the Organization, and its basic instrument, the Statute of the Court, forms an integral part of the Charter. Political realists predominantly have not found it difficult to illustrate the shortcomings of this institution. As we will see, however, the Court was to become a substantial contributor to the regulation of state sovereignty. While there is little purpose in elaborating the workings and processes of the UN in further detail for our purposes here, the implications of the American-inspired world order is outstandingly illustrated by the development it triggered regarding regulating maritime resources. The UN system and the evolution of international law became important for increased sovereignty for most former colonies and dominions of the earlier European-led empires. This was a very American-inspired approach from the outset; FDR wanted to combine the concepts of the “Four policemen” and a gradual and orderly implementation of self-determination for the colonial territories. The result was a careful balance between idealism and realism, one that produced a notion similar to the one described in a third school of thought in IR; institutionalism. Against such a US position, it is easy in retrospect to see how this would create an almost permanent dilemma in US foreign policy. On the one hand, the US in principle supported de-colonization, and would eventually end up defending “free peoples” for this purpose in overseas territories. On the other hand, such support more often than not had to be balanced against not pushing allies too far away. If the US did push the former European empires too far, the cohesion of the NATO alliance would be endangered. If aspirations for sovereignty in former colonies were too easily ignored,
Washington perceived that it would contribute to the spread of communism.\textsuperscript{1360} Thus, the legacy of FDR would become one in which the US repeatedly had to apply both carrot and stick.\textsuperscript{1361} That FDR already in mid-1942 began to express the belief that European empires should be replaced by independent nation-states linked to a new world organisation,\textsuperscript{1362} echoed Woodrow Wilson, but this time the principle was meant to include The World, not just the European territories embraced by the idealism of Wilson in 1919. To call this pure idealism obscures the fact that it was also seen by FDR and the Truman administrations as beneficial to US extraterritorial power. If the European overseas empires were abolished, would it not mean that it increased the window of opportunity for the US?\textsuperscript{1363} Of course it did, because the US was the strongest economic and extraterritorial power on earth, which included carving out a global strategy that it would embed in international liberalism. Thus, the “American Empire” would not appear as an empire to Americans, but would nevertheless ensure that the USA through bilateral and regional agreements with former colonies and weaker states could gain the overseas bases and military stations that a global reach required. Moreover, this remains much more than an \textit{a priori} assumption or creation of the fantasies of scholars within the world-system analysis camp. Historians have shown it through recent research.\textsuperscript{1364} FDR, through his earlier service as assistant secretary of the Navy, had a clear perception of what the post-war geopolitical context might require to ensure a \textit{Pax America}. This was evident in the Pacific, where FDR put several atolls in the Central pacific under the control of the US Navy already in 1934. In 1935 and 1936, three of the British-administered Line Islands were nothing less than taken over by US troops, however peacefully this happened. The same move was repeated with the Canton and Enderbury islands in British-controlled Phoenix group of territories. Moreover, the Administration of FDR was furious that the British and Australian governments refused to grant Pan American Airways landing rights in British Empire territories. On August 16 1939, the \textit{US claimed} –through official channels- title to 23 islands under British and New Zealand \textit{jurisdiction}. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the US desire for control of the Atlantic also made it establish permanent bases at Greenland and Iceland. But the liberalism inherent in the US self-perception required that the US in the post-war context formally based its overseas possessions on invitation and agreements with sovereign polities. This helped trigger a formalisation of the rights of the inhabitants of these territories. Thus, consolidating the “American Empire” had a huge impact on international affairs, and it also changed the strategy of US extraterritorial military power.

\textsuperscript{1360} Homan, 1990: 130
\textsuperscript{1361} See Ryan, 2000 for an interpretation in accordance with this line of argument
\textsuperscript{1362} Orders, 2000: 63
\textsuperscript{1363} This question is raised by Burley, 1993, but she leaves the question without theoretically or empirically analysing it in a thorough manner. In this respect, the following marks a contrast to Burley, 1993 and Ruggie, 1993
We have noted earlier in the chapter that the US Defence budget increased significantly during the early years of the cold war. Yet, the overwhelming US naval superiority in 1945-1946 (The USSR was not a major sea power at this stage), also seemed to justify a considerable down-scaling of the US Navy. With the introduction of the Bomb and long-range bombers, the dominant belief in the US indeed was that air power would be the chief instrument of extraterritorial violence. Thus, as Ronald Spector has noted for the period following WWII, “the navy was rapidly demobilized. Scores of ships under construction were cancelled, 2000 were put in mothballs, and 7000 were sold for scrap” 1365. While the US navy had almost 3.4 million men under arms in 1945, the number was reduced to 380,000 by 1950. The intra-service rivalry during these years are unparalleled in US history, witness the "revolt of the admirals" in 1949. Through the National Security Act of 1949, the navy, army and the new Air Force were established as equal services, under tight control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, itself under strict political control though the increased power of the Secretary of Defence as the leader of a unified department. Secretary Johnson so intensely disliked the navy arguments in favour of their service that he expressed the view that the navy be reduced to one single carrier “for the Old Admirals to ride around on”.1366 Prior to 1950, such sentiments were fostered by the belief that the Navy's plan to deal with the Soviet threat was unrealistic and unnecessarily expensive. The US Navy then came up with the concept of combining control of the seas with a new capability to project power from the sea. The main reason was the new Soviet strategy of utilising a strong submarine fleet. This fleet, the US admirals argued, would be so strong as to render the traditional tactics of convoy and anti-submarine warfare obsolete and inadequate. The only credible counter-measure would be to attack the very source of Soviet sea power, applying naval air to attack subs in their bases and destroying support facilities. Only power-projection from the sea could apply such tactics.1367 By and large, this was a logical doctrine in the sense that it was the only reliable strategy in case of an all-out war with the USSR. It also created a lasting imprint on US foreign policy. In peacetime, the new Navy doctrine called for permanent stationing of the most advanced parts of the fleet far from home. This became the strategy of “forward deployment”, in which the US sought to station its chief means of extraterritorial violence so near future theatres of war as possible. Although the critics of this naval thinking saw such a conventional war with the USSR as merely a theoretical possibility, the emerging pattern of US overseas deployments were heavily influenced by the forward deployment doctrine. In fact, it was evident already after 1946,

1364 See Orders, 2000 for a balanced overview
1365 Spector, 2001: 316
1366 Cited in Spector, 2001: 320
1367 A counter-argument was that Soviet planes would intercept such operations. To this, the navy responded that only carrier-based US aircraft could fight the Soviet planes, and that long-range bombers alone could not do the job.
when the US established a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean, what would later be designated the Sixth Fleet. But whether the US Navy would receive the required allocations of money to carry out such a strategy on a literally global basis was uncertain until 1950. The Korean War removed this uncertainty within months. The communist progress in the initial phase of the conflict showed that the US Seventh Fleet, with the Western Pacific as area of responsibility, had an inadequate level of fighting power with its single aircraft carrier, single cruiser and “handful of smaller ships”\(^{1368}\). Since North Korea had captured all US air bases in Korea in four weeks of fighting, this war demonstrated how aircraft carriers could be the perfect tool for the US. Since international waters were, and are, not submitted to the jurisdiction of any state, the US could reinforce its military strength in practically any theatre of war or crisis in the world by redirecting its carriers to the war zone. Moreover, faced with the strong conventional forces of the communists on the Korean peninsula, UN ground forces repeatedly pleaded for tactical support from US carrier-based aircraft. In addition to the carrier and its carrier-based planes, the landing of an amphibious force led by Macarthur off Inchon, reintroduced the potential of amphibious forces, with all its requirements of support from destroyers and battleships. Needless to say, the Korean War definitely altered the US defence policy in the direction of forward deployment and strengthened conventional naval platforms, ever more technologically advanced by the introduction of jet planes in large numbers. Interdiction by carrier-based aircraft; close air support and protection of sea-lanes of communication in a war where practically all Allied forces and material came by sea; naval gunfire; blockade and amphibious landings- and withdrawals; all were vital capacities also in the nuclear age. Faced with the perceived Soviet threat, this meant two things with bearing both on US naval strategy and international maritime affairs. Firstly, the US Navy became a global force with the capacity of conventional as well as nuclear strikes. This created a huge spin-off in forms of naval deployments and surveillance at sea. An incredibly huge project of a Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) with hydrophones on the ocean floor was instituted by the US in order to keep track on Soviet submarines. These hydrophones were anchored through the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea and to the Sea of Japan. In effect, it constituted an entirely novel logic of state intelligence on a global basis that monitored military activity in the oceans. In order to be prepared for war, it also logically followed that US submarines as well as surface hunter-killer groups had to be available in all major theatres of warfare at any given time. Since the submarine was increasingly seen as the most potent killer of other submarines, such submarines increasingly became autonomous units with the utmost endurance. Thus, the US commissioned its first submarine propelled by a nuclear power plant.

\(^{1368}\) Spector, 2001: 320
Nautilus, in 1955. The Soviets duplicated this feat by 1958, and by the mid 1970s, the USSR had a number of nuclear submarines able to cruise submerged at speeds exceeding 30 knots. Armed with powerful nuclear tactical and strategic missiles, such subs became the most lethal—and least visible—of all naval platforms, and made surface carriers ever more vulnerable, and submarines ever more important both at tactical and strategic levels. Although nuclear-propelled submarines and surface ships alike were able to operate on long patrols lasting for months, the scope of the US Naval strategy ensured that overseas bases were needed for the optimal functioning of these platforms. This created the second major alteration; the need for the US to extend and strengthen its overseas bases. Such ventures were only seen as possible by entering bilateral agreements with sovereign states. Needless to say, as the USSR increasingly became a major sea power, it too became a contestor for overseas influence. Thus, maritime questions became embedded in the cold war. The development of increased state sovereignty over coastal and maritime resources was part of this macro change in US military strategy that required a shift in US foreign policy, and in few policy areas did the strengthening of state sovereignty become more apparent in the post-war world.

Abandonment of the idea and notion of empire gained such momentum, that in ocean politics, it eventually came to threaten the dominant liberal and *mare liberum* preferences of the US. Paradoxically, then, the US would become the chief modifying state on these questions in the latter decades of the 20th century. After the successful US efforts to abolish Western-led overseas empires, the chief worry of US administrations became to control the forces set in motion. This dynamic would eventually lead to attempts at reaching equilibrium between state sovereignty over oceans and the freedom of oceans as an international waterway and a commons for resource-extraction by all.

To understand this highly complicated development, it is required that we look into the very process at the international level. While I do not propose that the international development determined the formation of national policies, it will become evident in the following that the structuration of international maritime issues deeply affected national trajectories in this period.

### 5.2 The evolution of international maritime cooperation

The changing nature of US liberalism became apparent on the international scene immediately after WWII. This also was a sign as to how the New Deal regulatory state was projected into foreign policy concerning maritime resources. Harry Truman declared on September 28th 1948 that “the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the

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1369 US submarine design followed suit. The US Sturgeon-class for example, was capable of similar speed. See
continental shelf beneath the seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States, as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control".\(^{1370}\) After the increased belief in state regulation within the US polity had been consolidated, and after the discovery of petroleum on the US continental shelf\(^{1371}\), this only seemed appropriate to the Truman administration. This US move set in motion an international trend in increased explicit state claims to extraterritorial sovereignty. Peru and Chile followed suit in 1947, claiming sovereignty of the resources 200 nautical miles from their shores.\(^{1372}\) The Santiago declaration of 1952 increased the momentum, since Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru all claimed jurisdiction within a 200-mile zone.\(^{1373}\) By and large, the claims to national jurisdiction of the continental seabed did not cause conflict among the American states, since the oceanic boundaries between them could be interpreted pragmatically through bilateral or regional consultations. However, the issue was much more delicate for smaller states that claimed large zones, or wherever states could be seen as geographically sharing the same seabed (in time, the Law of the Sea negotiations sought to define the special rights of such states under the label GDS – geographically disadvantaged states). Prior to 1958, no international framework existed to regulate these questions. Furthermore, an overriding concern for all states with a shipping industry was to avoid that national claim to oceans or maritime resources came to complicate international shipping.

Although the question of the sea bed was but one of the possibly complicating issues in the praxis of mare liberum, the western states early realised that a common institution dealing with traffic at sea could help reduce transaction costs. In 1948 an international conference in Geneva adopted a convention formally establishing IMO (the original name was the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, or IMCO, but the name was changed in 1982 to IMO, which will be used in the following).

The IMO Convention entered into force in 1958 and the new Organization met for the first time the following year. The purpose of the Organization, as summarized by Article 1(a) of the Convention, was "to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control

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\(^{1371}\) Fleischer, 1977: 35, Sinjela, 1983: 238-239. By a continental shelf, the 1958 UNCLOS conference settled for the following definition; "as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands (Original Treaty text).

\(^{1372}\) Confer Sinjela, 1983
of marine pollution from ships". IMO's first task was to adopt a new version of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the most important of all treaties dealing with maritime safety. This was achieved in 1960 and IMO then turned its attention to such matters as the facilitation of international maritime traffic, load lines and the carriage of dangerous goods, while the system of measuring the tonnage of ships was revised.

While the creation of IMO in itself was an instrument to protect the US preference for *mare liberum*, the question of national sovereignty at sea developed in an incremental manner. As we will show in greater detail in the section on Norway, the question of the drawing of the limit of the territorial sea became the first major international alteration of extraterritorial sovereignty in the 20th century. The importance of the dispute between Norway and Britain as to the demarcation of the Norwegian territorial sea lies in the fact that it was settled in the International Court in 1951, and that the Court concluded that the Norwegian claim was in accordance with international law. To simplify a complex jurisdictional procedure, this old dispute concerned which baselines the demarcation of the territorial sea should be based on. The Attlee cabinet claimed that the territorial sea should follow the actual coastline as demarcated at low water on officially proved maps. The Norwegian Gerhardsen government claimed that this was highly impractical due to the very high number of fjords, islands and archipelagos along the coast. Therefore, the territorial border in the oceans should follow a straight baseline established on the basis of islets along the coast. With ten votes to two, the Court settled in favour of this argument. In an international perspective, this seemingly trivial verdict was of outmost importance; it moved the international law of the sea in favour of the smaller coastal state for the first time in modern history. The court did not find that the Norwegian government had violated international law, and furthermore that “in these barren regions the inhabitants of the coastal zone derive their livelihood essentially from fishing. Such are the realities which must be borne in mind appraising the validity of the United Kingdom contention” When seen in a long perspective, such a conclusion is a testimony to the increased degree of institutionalisation of international affairs that took place after WWII. Great Britain, the paternalist former ruler of the seas and leader of a vast empire, had abided by the decision of an international court. Moreover, the court was also building its verdict on what appeared to the lawyers as a just cause on behalf of the weaker state; in the citation above, it is evident that the International Court takes the North Norwegian dependency on the fisheries into consideration. The result of the Court

1374 http://www.imo.org/home.asp
1377 International Court Journal, 1951: 133
decision was that states increasingly declared extensions of their territorial seas, as well as exclusive
fishery zones under national jurisdiction. International disputes over the width of territorial waters,
the width of base lines for demarcating territorial waters, and bilateral disagreement on the actual
process of demarcation soon ensued. From 1950 till 1972, more and more states converged around
the 12 nautical mile territorial limit, while a significant number of states laid down claims to even
wider zones of national jurisdiction, as seen in table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 Changing patterns of claims to territorial waters; Number of states
claiming different width of territorial waters. \(^{1378}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial waters</th>
<th>Year: 1950 Number of states</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 nm</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 nm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 nm</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 nm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 nm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 nm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 nm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 nm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 nm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 nm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130 nm</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 nm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The states with the most ambitious claims to wide territorial waters were South American, while the
most restrictive group that stuck to 3 nm in 1971 were former colonial powers in Western Europe
and their by now “independent” former colonies. But already after the 1951 International court
decision, it was evident that unilateral claims to wider territorial waters and fishery zones constituted
a problem of collective choice. Extending the territorial waters/fishery zone in one Western
European country, for example, meant that fishers from other countries were excluded from their
traditional activity in these waters, while the fishermen from the same state could enjoy more
restricted territorial waters off the other states. This was evident in Northern Europe as Iceland in
1956 announced that it would consider widening its fishery zone. The improved capabilities of modern trawlers made this problem acute, and several of the fishing stocks by this time showed symptoms of being depleted. On the other hand, the US in particular saw that a development of increased national jurisdiction over oceans (and not only the seabed) as a phenomenon that might evolve into an increased *mare clausum* institution that in the long run could threaten *mare liberum* and the traditional right to free and innocent passage through straits and territorial waters in general. In sum, these questions called for attempts at codifying international praxis. Thus, the United Nations initiated the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), in 1958. UNCLOS I lasted for seven weeks from February 1958, and was divided into five sub-committees based on issue-areas. A General committee, consisting of the Conference president, 13 vice-presidents and the chairmen of each sub-committee, led the conference. The most controversial issues during the conference were the questions of the territorial sea and the contiguous fishery zone, plus the question concerning the access to the seas of land-locked (LL) and geographically disadvantaged states (GDS). In the former question, the American proposal (a 6-mile territorial sea and access for fishing by other states in a 6-mile contiguous fishery zone), gained most support, but not the 2/3 majority required for a final decision. This, and in practice all other questions addressed at the conference, is a witness to the degree of change in the international system in the latter half of the 20th century. Small states, including many newly independent states in the “third world” had significant voting power. Especially African states claimed that their status as LL/GDS states in particular should reflect a new system of redistribution of maritime resources. This view, which was to dominate the legal discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty for the next two and a half decades, meant that poor societies should be paid a dividend of surplus from sea drilling, offshore oil and gas industries and fisheries in the world at large, or at least in their own region.

1380 Stortingsmelding 42/59
1381 The US proposal gained 45 votes, 33 voted against, while 7 states abstained. UNCLOS official records 1959.
1382 Needless to say, however such a system should be set up and work, would require a very complicated institutional framework.
redistribution at this point. Moreover, the US proposal for a 6-mile territorial sea and access to fishing for other states within the contiguous zone did not constitute a huge step towards increased mare clausum praxis in maritime policies. While the support this proposal achieved at UNCLOS I made wider territorial seas more likely and legitimate, the US initiative was moderate compared to the increasing pressures from smaller coastal states to expand extraterritorial sovereignty. To the US, increased international acceptance for wide zones of territorial seas could endanger both free trade as well as the movements of the US Navy. Since the US definitely had a stronger navy (at least in terms of surface ships) than its communist antagonist, mare clausum -or so it was perceived- would endanger the military hegemony of the US in the western world, and its defence commitments to Japan and South Korea. It would indeed damage the very effectiveness of the US naval system of overseas bases and stations that gave it practically global reach. Thus, the uni- and bilateral declarations from South American states were anathema to most US policymakers. If other states were to follow the claims of these states to 50 or even 200-mile territorial seas, the transaction-costs of the US economy and the room for manoeuvre for the US Navy both would be dealt a blow. Thus, a 6-mile territorial sea proposal was seen as a decent compromise between the sovereignty-maximising peripheries and the paternalist former imperial European states (i.e. Britain). That it was a useful compromise became evident during the conference, where eventually all western European states except Iceland voted in favour of the US proposal. But it is important to note the limits to US power on this and following occasions; it could not produce a majority decision for its preferred outcome. Equally significant is the fact that the US accepted such an outcome: it did not retreat from the multilateral forum, in spite of the lack of progress and direct opposition to US proposals from the Eastern Bloc, South America and some of the Asian states. In many ways, this constituted leadership of the western states; the US did not impose its will, but neither did it withdraw from responsibility. The result was that UNCLOS I, despite the substantial disagreements, in fact did produce four interventional conventions. These conventions were the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. All the final treaty texts received the required 2/3 majorities. Especially regarding the conventions for the continental shelf and the territorial sea, the smaller coastal states could leave the conference with net gains. But the Convention on the High Seas ensured that all states with a significant merchant navy also had been able to gain a precious price.

1383 Stortingsmelding 42/59.
1384 Stortingsmelding 42/59: 12.
mare liberum remained the dominant institution for international waters.\textsuperscript{1385} All in all, the extension of the territorial seas to six nautical miles constituted only a minor infringement of the oceans as a vast common. Although the six mile territorial waters principle increased the scope of extraterritorial sovereignty, the contiguous fishery zone in practice meant little; the 1958 treaty text gave in principle all states right to fish beyond the territorial seas. But whereas this can be seen as a victory of liberalism, it also ensured that pressure groups in the coastal states would seek to influence their governments to proceed unilaterally with declarations of extended fishery zones. By 1958, the numerical balance between mare clausum and mare liberum states were quite even, but in the longer run, decolonisation meant an increase in the number of states eager to gain increased sovereignty in coastal waters. Iceland led the way by unilaterally declaring a 12-mile fishery zone in September 1958.\textsuperscript{1386} This soon led to the first of what became a series of cod-wars with Britain (see below on Iceland). Moreover, the Faroe islands soon imitated Iceland. Naturally, the fishing industries of Norway and Denmark soon raised concerns that their own states should follow suit. With the above mentioned exceptions, however, the states analysed here acted in accordance with the 1958 treaties. This partly was a result of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which encouraged regional cooperation to forestall depleting fish stocks. The initiative for such a treaty came from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and the 1958 treaty led to the establishment of several commissions for different seas.\textsuperscript{1387} The Convention stated that each state, either alone or in cooperation with regional polities, had a duty inherent in its sovereignty to regulate fisheries in designated areas. Thus, increased cooperation at both administrative and political levels was an important effect of the 1958 convention. One of the most significant frameworks for regional cooperation was the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) from 1959, and at the same time, this attempt at solving a collective dilemma illustrates

\textsuperscript{1385} Article 2 of this convention read as follows; “The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:

(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.

These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas”. http://www.univie.ac.at/RI/KONTERM/intlaw/konterm/vrkon_en/html/doku/high-sea.htm

\textsuperscript{1386} Fleischer, 1977: 49
\textsuperscript{1387} Fløistad, 1987: 2
well the problem inherent in multilateralism. In fact, while the ratification of the UNCLOS treaties took time, the agreement on the NEAFC was ratified by Britain, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, the Netherlands, Denmark, the USSR, Spain, Poland, Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal and Western Germany even before the convention was meant to be effective (in 1963). The general idea was that the commission should, through negotiations by the parties, determine the quotas for fishing in international waters in the East Atlantic. But the number of participants and the lack of supranational authority in such commissions made for imperfect compromises (each state could veto a decision) and lack of enforcement of whatever regulations were actually agreed upon. Thus, this attempt at regional cooperation could not go longer than the least cooperative of the signatories would allow.

It was one thing for the coastal state to regulate fisheries through national jurisdiction in the narrow confines of territorial waters and the contiguous zone, but doing the same in international waters proved to become a prisoner's dilemma. In the NEAFC, for example, only 16 per cent of the agreements on total quotas were within the limits advised by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and more often than not, annual fishing amounted to a far larger catch than allowed even by the NEAFC-determined quotas. Inspection of fishing in these waters was carried out only sporadically. The EEC countries and Norway withdrew from the Commission in 1977-78.

The domestic pressure for increased fishery zones and symptoms of overfishing was repeatedly addressed through new attempts to create international conventions that sought to regulate maritime resource-extraction. Thus, the UN sought to move further through a second conference on the law of the sea in 1960, UNCLOS II. By and large, this conference produced fewer results than the 1958 process, no treaty texts reaching the necessary consensus. The US-Canadian compromise text lacked one single vote to pass. Nevertheless, such a balance between the states as reflected in this vote signified a strengthening of claims to extended fishery zones. Even prior to the conference, the sovereignty-seeking peripheries declared that they unilaterally would declare extensions of their

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1388 This institution has been studied in great detail by Lay et al, 1973 and especially Underdal, 1980
1389 Lay et al, 1973: 395
1390 Underdal, 1980: 36
1391 The convention of the ICES dated 12 September 1964. See Underdal, 1980
1392 The introduction of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone by this date seemed to make bodies such as NEAFC outdated. The institution was reinstalled in 1980, however. The states did not solve the problem of resource-extracting in international waters or at the ocean floor by extending their sovereignty over larger portions of the oceans.

Fishery zones if consensus was not reached through UNCLOS II. At this point the Faroe Islands, Iceland and the USSR all had 12-mile fishery zones contiguous to their territorial waters. Chile (1950) and Ecuador (1916) both had laid claim to a 200-mile zone, and combined with the widespread belief that several European states would introduce a wider fishery zone no matter what the outcome of the UNCLOS II; this produced a number of such unilateral moves through the 1960s. In addition to the states mentioned above, polities that extended their fishery zones to 12 nautical miles included Canada (1970), New Zealand (1965), Sudan (1960), Sweden (1968), France (1971), United Kingdom (1964), Spain (1967), Portugal (1966), Yugoslavia (1965), Mexico (1969), Turkey (1964) and Poland (1970).

While the discourses in UNCLOS II undoubtedly increased the legitimacy of such unilateral declarations, it only incrementally changed state behavior. In practice, the states that extended their fishery zones sought to regulate fishing in these waters through bilateral and regional agreements with other governments. Thus, states that had traditions of fishing in the contiguous zone of another state, often gained fishing quotas from the coastal state that claimed sovereignty in the contiguous zone. Moreover, the fact that international conferences carved out treaty texts and that states voted in favor of these, did not necessarily mean that the same states ratified the very treaties that they had supported on the international scene. The importance of domestic politics and pressure groups are nowhere more evident than exactly here. By February 1972, for example, only 32 states had ratified the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living resources of the High Seas from 1958. Even while rhetorically praising multilateralism, a state such as Norway in fact only had ratified one single convention, that of the Continental shelf, by 1972.1394

While a detailed narrative of the interpretations of the fishery zones might seem tedious, the increased state sovereignty-claims to the continental shelf in the short run proved to be more important. Various US administrations, ever from the first Truman government and onwards, reasoned that while national zones of the ocean masses could restrict the freedom of the oceans, the same fear was not raised over the issue of the ocean bed. Since state ownership of the seabed did not infringe on the rights and possibilities even for submarine transits, and since an oil-consuming society like the American could use all the oil it could have, increased sovereignty over the continental shelf was in line with US national interests. By and large, the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf at first seemed a clear-cut deal. It stated that the coastal state had sovereign rights (article 2) of the resources at the seabed out to a depth of 200 meters, and beyond that out to the

1394 Oda, 1976: 25
limits of resource extraction of seabed resources that the depth of the ocean permitted. Needless to say, the latter formulation made the convention subject of interpretation, since a coastal state reasonably could claim that deep-sea mining could make extraction of oil, gas and minerals from the seabed possible at ever greater depths as the technological development made such enterprises possible. While the potential for offshore oil and gas-industries clearly was realized by policymakers in most coastal states early in this period (with some ironic exceptions, as Norway), from the 1960s the potential of deep-sea mining for minerals made the issue highly contested. In the early 60's John Mero's thesis seemed to demonstrate the economic potential of manganese nodules. This was followed by "nodule fever" with industrial companies investing millions of dollars in the development of mining and processing technology. In the 1960's, the competition for copper, nickel, and cobalt drove prices upward and many nonferrous metals were in short supply. Ferromanganese nodules and ferromanganese crusts have a wide distribution and have in common a composition dominated by manganese and iron oxides.

Naturally, the sum of the perceived potential economic importance of the seabed now made even tiny adjustments of national boundaries at sea into high politics. Some states could claim that their continental shelves were enormously large, due to the shallow waters off their coasts. Other states faced the opposite problem. In addition, national claims to even seemingly ludicrously small atolls and islets made for bilateral quarrels. The most peripheral territories in the world now entered center stage in international relations, not only of military-strategic reasons, but for economic ones. One prominent example is the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. In addition to the strategic location of these tiny islets, both China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines now affirmed territorial claims to these islands (at the time of writing, this dispute is not settled, and have become a central part of the entire security complex of the region. The very distinct Chinese wish to establish a mare clausum regime in this ocean is not unlikely to cause tension with the US). As will be demonstrated in the sections on the individual states later in the chapter, this issue of extraterritorial sovereignty became deeply problematic for Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. But it mattered for the superpowers as well. High-tech industry, and particular military production, had a huge demand for some strategic minerals. This made the issue of minerals into a strategic question, especially for the US. The reason for this is evident if we consider the land-based mineral reserves in the major production countries in 1977;

1395 Fleischer, 1977: 35. This was stated in article 1 of the Convention; ”to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas” http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/contsh.htm
Table 5.2.2 Land based reserves of minerals in major production countries, in percent of world total land based reserves, 1977\textsuperscript{1396}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Copper</th>
<th>Cobalt</th>
<th>Manganese</th>
<th>Nickel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM %</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nr of states with significant reserves</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The oil crises had both increased the self-confidence of societies in the “periphery” of the international system as to their strategic value, as well as US awareness of the delicate position the industrial countries of its “empire” faced when pressured on strategic raw materials.\textsuperscript{1397} Japan, Western Germany and the UK, for example, were totally dependent upon all the minerals above. The same applied to the US regarding cobalt and manganese. The table above also illustrates well the special distribution of these resources. The refiners and exporters of manganese and cobalt, for instance, were for all practical purposes third world countries, the USSR and South Africa. Needless to say, this made all the US administrations after 1972 wary of the entire question of the CHM proposal. On this question, the US went further in breaking with its allies than in any other question regarding the law of the sea. Interest groups played a major part here, according to Schmidt:

“By 1977 the industrial lobby had generated such concern about mineral supplies and mining rights in a Congress worried about shortage of resources that the sea-bed issue assumed a prominence out of all proportions to its real place in long-term United States ocean interests”\textsuperscript{1398}

\textsuperscript{1396} Source: OECD Observer, nr 93, July 1978: 13-15
\textsuperscript{1397} See Schmidt, 1989: 204-206
\textsuperscript{1398} Schmidt, 1989: 86-87
Partly, the US wariness was a result of security concerns; partly it was an outcome of strong industrial interests. Mining consortia within the US carried out an intense series of lobbying on this question. The so-called Quaker-organisation of US drilling companies was particularly active in congress, and also had its own observers in the US UNCLOS delegation. In early 1974, only a few US companies were actively seeking to start extraction of the deep sea nodules. By 1976, four international consortia had been formed for the same purpose. With the Reagan administration, US resistance to the seabed-convention reached new heights.

In sum then, increased national sovereignty over the seabed unleashed a whole series of complicated policy-questions not anticipated by the Truman administration. In fact, the perception that deep-sea mining would almost completely alter the available quantity of minerals on the world market made the issue of the law of the sea even more complex than in previous decades. The increased tension created by deep-sea mining and the following grappling with the question of jurisdiction over the seabed firmly affected the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCOS III), lasting from 1973 till 1982.

While UNCLOS III were to address a whole array of concerns regarding the law of the sea, it is no exaggeration to claim that the question of the seabed in fact triggered the entire conference. Arvid Pardo, the UN-ambassador of Malta, in 1967 proposed that the values of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction should be reserved for peaceful purposes and utilized “in the interest of mankind”\textsuperscript{1399}. Since US President L.B. Johnson had uttered a similar view, although in a non-committed way, the idea soon gathered strong support in the third world. At the time, scholarly publications gave rise to an enormous optimism as to how deep-sea minerals could be extracted for commercial purposes. According to John Mero\textsuperscript{1400}, there was enough nickel in the Pacific to cover the world total consumption for the next 400,000 years, while the current land-based mines would only suffice for the next century. The increased efforts to address the question through a political process of international jurisdiction were to preclude an international race for these resources by states and transnational corporations. Therefore, the Pardo - inspired slogan that the deep sea resources were the “common heritage of mankind” soon appeared as an appealing idea.\textsuperscript{1401} By 1967, this entirely new idea\textsuperscript{1402} in international law had become a contested concept in international relations, and one that in particular brought the north-south dimension into the realm of international maritime issues.

\textsuperscript{1399} Andresen, 1987: 19-20, Schmidt, 1989: 24
\textsuperscript{1400} Mero, 1965: 274, see also Schmidt, 1989: 20-22. Optimism particularly centred upon the so-called mangan nodules at the bottom of the sea. These nodules were compounds of mangan, copper, nickel and cobolt.
\textsuperscript{1401} Ulfstein, 1982: 33
Thus, the law of the sea invoked interest also among politicians with little previous experience with maritime matters, and the entire issue complex became linked to the economic, political and judicial aspects of world order at large. Needless to say, the questions on maritime resources became ever more embedded in ideological beliefs and the clashes between such opposing beliefs. The newly independent states of former colonial territories in particular played important roles in this respect. The new International Economic Order (NIEO) was a third world manifesto first articulated by third world leaders at an Algiers summit in 1973. By May 1974, the UN General assembly adopted a Programme of Action for the establishment of NIEO, and reflected the voting power of the new states acting in accordance with states that had nothing to lose from committing themselves to such a venture (including all LL and most GDS states). In tandem with the development of the NIEO rhetoric, the law of the sea was soon seen as a part of the NIEO itself. If substantial resources could be extracted from the seabed beyond the jurisdiction of states, was it not a reasonable and noble thought that part of the income from such enterprises be redistributed to poorer countries? Based on the recommendation from Pardo of Malta, the UN in 1967 constructed an own committee for the ocean bed, a body that became permanent from 1968. On December 17th 1970, the UN General assembly through UN resolution nr 2749 reached the broadest possible consensus that the deep seabed should be regarded as the common heritage of mankind (CHM).1403

In principle, this was a step towards redistribution and democratization of world politics. It had no precedent in the history of international organizations. Furthermore, in the rather “progressive” era of the early 1970s, it did not seem infeasible that such a principle could be extended to include other policy areas as well. If all the states represented in the General assembly could reach agreement that the ocean bed belonged to mankind, could not the same be said to apply to migrating fish stocks?

As events unfolded, however, it was demonstrated that the step from ambiguous program declarations to practical policy is often endlessly long in international relations. As to the CHM principle, the UN resolution did not contain any definitions of the very essential terms like “the seabed” or the “ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction”. Moreover, as UNCLOS III convened in Caracas, the preparatory work of the sea-bed committee constituted six volumes of different and conflicting principles.1404 The predictable result was an avalanche of different proposals for such definitions, each tailored to suit the national interests of the individual states. To an international liberalist like the US, moreover, the whole idea seemed too much of a socialist scheme of imposing

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1402 One might argue that nothing is new, and that in the case of the UN, Immanuel Kant had urged an introduction of Weltbürgerrecht (Friedrich, 1947: 29), but as a subject of serious debate in world politics, the idea nonetheless was new to policymakers, in that the UN system was conceived as more far-ranging than the League of nations.

1403 UN OFF text LOS, 1983: 192
a bureaucratic regime for regulating resources that should be exploited by the actors who had the ability and will to do so. It was true that the US followed a multilateral approach during the cold war, but it was -after all- a multilateral approach based on liberalism, not social democracy.

Such was the background for the UNCLOS III negotiations, lasting for nine years, if we not include the preparatory work by the seabed committee from 1967, three sub-committees, and an extraordinary number of informal negotiations carried out on a bilateral and multilateral basis prior to and during the official conference. The negotiation delegations of the participating countries were convened for a total of 93 weeks of official negotiation. These deliberations involved a set of issues that were explicitly linked to one another: the hope was to reach a “package deal” of international law of the sea. The problem with this was twofold. Firstly, the cleavages on the various issues often split close allies, and even different domestic groups represented by one single state negotiation team. Considerable disagreement arose at the outset, as states disagreed whether the 1958 Law of the Sea should be seen as the basis for the future treaty, or whether the negotiations should start from scratch. Thus, the same teams both had problems in creating tacit alliances and coalitions with other states, as well as problems with domestic pressure. One widely applied approach to deal with the latter was that representatives of various political parties, lobbyists and representatives of interest groups participated in both formal and informal negotiations. Thus, the mare clausum versus mare liberum cleavage not only split groups of states into different sub-groups, but made even the behavior of the individual states at times seem exotic. Domestic constituencies of the coastal states wanted it both ways; to gain as much sovereignty over fisheries and continental shelves as possible, and at the same time eating the cake too, in the form of freedom of transport at sea. Secondly, to top it all, the issues addressed at the conference were linked to other issues. The conference itself was embedded in two macro-cleavages in the international system; the east-west conflict as well as the north-south dimensions ensured that each group of states carefully monitored the intentions of one another. In this manner, a proposal from one side became the subject of painstaking analysis and critical assessment by several other groups. Needless to say, the eastern bloc led by the USSR sought to utilize the opposition to the north that could be found in ample existence among the G-77 states. The western bloc, heralded by the US, sought to forestall this, and was seemingly pressured into accommodating to the wishes of third world countries. Interestingly enough, the smaller northern states thus had the opportunity of pretending to build bridges between north and south, and to some degree between east and west. The Norwegian cabinet member Jens Evensen, for example,

assured that the Norwegian position was identical to “the interests of the world society”. The result was an avalanche of proposals, counter-proposals, special committees, sub-committees, advisory groups, computer-simulations and a competition between scientific societies to provide data and interpretations that suited the national interest, and thus gave impetus for further research through state-sponsored research:

“Scientists...tend to testify that more research is required before there is basis for action. Successful politicians, because they got where they are by successfully manipulating the system – tend to put off making major changes in that system. Those leaders who do not want to rock their various boats join the scientists in demanding more data”

To make way through this maze, we divide the conference into two broad issues for the sake of simplicity; firstly the question of fishing zones and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and secondly the issue of the seabed.

The smaller North European states covered in this thesis were instrumental in setting the agenda for increased state sovereignty over the ocean masses. Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing zone to 50 nm in 1972. This immediately made the issue a hot topic in domestic politics in the other coastal states in Northern Europe, as well as producing a predictable rise in the already considerable tensions with paternalist Britain. But in fact, this Icelandic decision eventually gained increased support. Firstly, evidence at this stage accumulated to show the increased number of fish stocks that were becoming depleted. Secondly, fishery zones did not mean decreased freedom of navigation and transit through the fishery zone, it only regulated fishing. Thus, even in the US, the fishery sector increasingly supported the proposal to extend fishery zones. The Icelandic government pointedly drew attention to this US phenomenon; by 1971 six of the states desired a 200 nm national fishery jurisdiction. This even helped to modify sentiments in the UK. In Norway, Jens Evensen urged patience, realizing that the 200nm zone might capture the better of two worlds; national jurisdiction over the living resources within that zone, but a limited territorial water as defined in the 1958 treaty. Before the conference was about to convene in 1974, therefore, Norway proposed that an informal group of 40 international lawyers be set up prior to the conference to examine various legal

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1405 Dagbladet 7/3 1975
1406 L. Timberlake, in Andresen et al, 1989: 18
aspects of the issues. While the role of Evensen easily falls prey to exaggeration, this group became vital for the following negotiations; it represented all major regions of the 155 participating states, and most of its members became leaders of their respective delegations during UNCLOS III.

The whole idea of the EEZ as a concept was an Australian-Norwegian effort to combine mare liberum and mare clausum that served their national interests, and at the same time could be conceptualized in a manner that could gain support from the superpowers and the third world countries alike. Both Australia and Norway naturally wanted to extend their national jurisdiction at sea in order to protect their own fisheries. At the same time, both states had a strong merchant navy with a high degree of influence in domestic politics. Therefore, they wanted to restrict too strong mare clausum-proposals, such as those set forth by some African and South American states that wanted a 200-mile territorial sea. Against such claims, the adherents to the EEZ principle could argue that such a zone would grant all coastal states jurisdiction over the resources of the sea and the seabed, without challenging NATO and the USSR by restricting freedom of navigation. If the territorial sea were extended to 200 nautical miles, then the sea-lanes for merchant navies and regular navies would suffer a serious blowback. Problems in particular would arise over the right and procedures for passage through straits. In this manner, supporters of the EEZ-principle could claim, not without justification, that the poorer countries would achieve much more by supporting the EEZ rather than aiming at large extensions of the territorial seas. Next, Norway in particular sought to buttress the EEZ proposal by offering these states a deal. The bargain was that supporters of the EEZ also would support the CHM principle, with potential for huge benefits for all poor states, and for LL and GDS in particular. The crucial element was to gain the support for the EEZ among the NATO countries and above all the US. As we have mentioned above, the coastal regions of the US were beginning to see an increase in the scope of national jurisdiction in a more favorable light. Next, almost all Western European states with vital fisheries felt that the competition for scarce resources was becoming more intense. Due to the fact that European trawlers now were denied fishing from the banks off Latin-America and West Africa (due to an extension of the territorial waters in these regions), an intense competition took place in the Barents Sea and the northernmost part of the Norwegian Sea. Western Germany increased its catches from 2000 to 76000 tons per year in these waters from 1972 till 1974. Portuguese fishermen who had no previous record of fishing from this area increased their annual catches to 40000 tons. French companies equaled Portuguese in this respect. Then the Icelandic 50-mile fishery zone only made this problem more acute, making the British fishing industry voice grave concerns as to the future of their

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1408 The Icelandic government, information leaflet 1972: 22. See also Sunday times, March 14 1971 “Russia –
outcomes. Negotiations within the NEAFC only produced stalemates in the same period.\textsuperscript{1409} Quite clearly, all these states realized that an extension of the territorial seas in the Northern waters would have large consequences not only for fisheries and the seabed, but might also cause considerable friction between otherwise close allies within the West European security complex. If states in Northern Europe achieved increased national jurisdiction, this jurisdiction would also apply to islands as Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, Bjørnøya etc. In sum, national jurisdiction as understood in the treaty of the territorial sea extended to 200 nautical miles, would \textit{de jure} close the northern waters to third parties altogether and create numerous disputes as to where the ocean boundaries should be drawn between territories closer to one another than 400 nm. To the USSR, such increased national jurisdiction was not necessarily seen as a benign development. One could reasonably argue, for example, that Denmark, Norway and Iceland all would grant the US Navy considerable room for maneuver in these zones, while following a much more restricted policy for the USSR. This would, at least in Soviet perception, amount to a distortion in the balance of power in the region (we now know how intense the intelligence war in these waters were. At present, there are 8 officially acknowledged collisions between Soviet and US submarines in these waters during the cold war).

Such was the background for the complex UNCLOS III negotiations that started in earnest in Caracas in June 1974. 136 states participated in this first session, many of which had no coast at all. The goal, as articulated in accordance with the UN GA resolution from November 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1973, was to reach \textit{one convention for the entire complex of the law of the sea}. As mentioned, this would make it easier for each state to bargain on various issues. It nevertheless had the drawback that if the conference stalemated on one of the major topics, the entire conference would also be jeopardized. The first major issue therefore became how the conference was to reach decisions when faced with disagreements that made “gentlemen's agreements” impossible (the aforementioned UN resolution stated simply that decisions should be arrived at by such an assumption; there should be no vote before a “consensus” was reached on the topic subject for vote). On the session at Caracas, there was consensus on applying a 2/3 majority rule, i.e. when all other compromises had been emptied, a 2/3 majority produced an agreement.\textsuperscript{1410} Procedural questions were addressed by the same rules as applied in the UN GA. One might argue that the 2/3 requirement was a hindrance for reaching

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conclusions, but in retrospect it nevertheless seem logical; a decision with less than a 2/3 majority would not gain much legitimacy in the international system. In particular, one feared that the law of the sea would become a farce if third world countries by simple majority would be able to reach treaties that never would be ratified or followed by NATO countries or even the Warsaw Pact. Needless to say, the complexity of the issues addressed at Caracas was of such a nature that this conference session hardly was able to reach conclusions on any of the more than 100 topics on the agenda. The EEZ suffered this fate, and it was rather obvious that the question of the seabed would become a particularly difficult subject. In the committee on the seabed, 91 states had participated with much vigor for five years prior to the first session of the UNCLOS III. This tortuous work had not resulted in ANY unified proposals, but a six-volume catalogue filled with all the various suggestions. Since the whole idea was that the committee should have a unified proposal for the UNCLOS conference prior to the first session of the latter, the result was a predictable stalemate. As the number of participating states grew to 156, and the number of registered NGOs with status of observers grew to over 100, the whole conference became a test of patience.

This was not exactly the world governance as envisaged by FDR some thirty years previously. Yet, the novelty of such a truly global forum, set up in order to address questions of international law and global redistribution, was an important sign of a change in the process whereby international questions were addressed. For all the frustration frequently expressed during these years, this was the first forum in which practically all habitated territories of the world came together to find solutions to problems as old as the conception of polis, and as enduring as human conflict itself. In itself, the gathering of delegations from the US and Britain alongside African leaders can be interpreted as a practical step towards globalization of international policy decision-making. It is easy to ridicule the lack of efficiency at making decisions at UNCLOS III, but the very novelty of the conference itself was a sign of the degree of increased interdependence of world affairs.

Without the consensus-principle, the small coastal states had the numerical strength to reach majority on every single issue they submitted to voting. In this respect UNCLOS III set a precedent for later UN conferences with states as participators; consensus was a much more secure way of achieving legitimacy for the resolutions that in the end were produced. Yet, the inevitable drawback of such a procedure was the lack of decision-making efficiency. In some respects, the process adopted at UNCLOS III, with nearly 160 states and over 100 NGOs participating, was

1411 UN Off Text, 1983: 192, Ulftsein, 1982: 33, Stmeld 40/73-74. This was a warning of what was to come. The complete records of the UNCLOS conference makes for a lifetime study for entire departments of scholars.
1412 Schmidt, 1989: 109
beyond the competence of human beings to manage (at one point, computer engineers and mathematicians from MIT were hired to try to solve some of the problems through algebra).

Sticking to the consensus principle perhaps was the only way to hold the conference afloat, but the growing pressure from domestic fishery interests and mining consortia ensured that the two-level games that governments tried to play became increasingly difficult. In short, the pressure for unilateral extensions of jurisdiction over the oceans mounted ever higher.

This complexity at the domestic level was paralleled by increasing complexity at the international level of negotiations. A decisive difference between the 1958 and 1960 conferences and UNCLOS III was the number of participating states. Sinjela has documented that both the number of players and the ideological gaps between them was a result of decolonization. The ratio of strength between traditional mare liberum states and a large number of sovereignty-seeking peripheries made a compromise inevitable, if there ever were to be a treaty. Stephen Krasner (1985), for example, argues that the third world states in fact applied a rather coherent strategy based on mare clausum ideology; they wanted increased sovereignty over their coastal resources, simply because they saw the amounting pressure from the large trawler fleets of richer countries. Simultaneously, this was a historic opportunity to consolidate their regimes through increased zones of national jurisdiction that could give significant economic gains. Moreover, their ideologically laden rhetoric for this purpose was hard to refute for the former imperial powers; there was a certain amount of claims for justice in this ideology that was hard to resist publicly in a decent manner. Their aspiration was to gain sovereignty of resources out to 200nm, and to secure that the resources on the seabed beyond this zone was not exclusively utilized by huge companies with the know-how and resources for deep-sea mining solely based in the western world. For the smaller states of Northern Europe, it was easy to see how this made for the closest alliance with third world countries that opportunity permitted.

The LL and GDS countries also gained much attention during the conference, especially from the 1976 sessions and onwards. In fact, these states amounted to 52 votes, or practically one third of the states participating at UNCLOS III. Through their numbers, they were able to veto decisions. Being a set of highly diverse states, however, they had considerable difficulties in coordinating their initiatives. This could be utilized by other participants. Norway, for one, spoke warmly of the rights of LL/GDS states (not only should they have a portion of the profit from the CHM, Norway even argued that profit from the EEZ of richer countries should be given to these states. 25 of the poorest countries in the world were defined as LL/GDS states at UNCLOS III. Needless to say, this

redistribution has yet to materialize some 30 years later). Given the diversity of these states, Norway argued, their exact status should be addressed through bilateral and regional conferences, not a global one. The sum of complexity ensured that no significant progress was reached neither at the session in Caracas nor in Geneva in 1975. Faced with this stalemate, most coastal states unilaterally declared EEZs, a majority did so within 1978. It was seen as a necessity by most states, since “every other state” did the same, or was at the brink of doing it. Thus, this situation resembled that of the problem of collective choice modeled on the prisoners’ dilemma. A state without a 200nm EEZ seemed to be faced with a bonanza of trawling activities off its coast in the advent that most other states had extended their national jurisdiction at sea. Thus, unilateral modesty rather than unilateral extension appeared to be equivalent to political suicide for governments of coastal states. The predictable result was a race for increased sovereignty at sea, and in this race, the noble CHM principle was pushed aside. Not few delegation leaders from third world countries witnessed this with bitter emotions, as expressed by J. Logue;

“Unfortunately, the Law of the Sea Conference lost Pardo’s common heritage vision. The participating nations grabbed as much of the common heritage as they could. Inside the conference, they worked hard and successfully to insert “give-away” articles into each of the successive treaty drafts the conference was to consider. Outside the conference, in their capital cities, they passed unilateral legislation which claimed more and more of the common heritage as a national patrimony.”

While the global conference definitely had value, the primary vehicle for the development of the law of the sea was a gradual change in state praxis, indirectly facilitated by UNCLOS III as an arena for bilateral and regional contact and information-sharing. Step by step, governments in particular regions coordinated their policies, and timed the implementation of unilateral declarations for mare clausum. Thus, states used the international institution as an arena to change the law of the sea; it was the states that created the new body of law, not the UN in any direct meaning of the word. The result was that UNCLOS III continually had to adapt its agenda and framing of the issues according to changes that already had occurred in state praxis. Thus, the international conference ended up strengthening the formal sovereignty of the states, and not the

1414 The limits of altruism were rather clear. The Norwegian government must have calculated that this international redistribution was utopic. It is hard to avoid such a conclusion when one reads St.meld. 40/73-74: 20. Nevertheless, it was a rhetoric with appeal both in domestic politics and at the international scene from the mid 1970s, where radicalism, anti-imperialism and disillusionment of major powers seemed to reach a peak in much of the western world.
contrary. Moreover, this only legitimized the unilateral declarations by each single state. The gradual changes in state praxis are evidenced by historical data. As we have mentioned, Iceland introduced the 50nm fishery zone in 1972, while Chile, Ecuador and Peru already had introduced the so-called “off-shore zone”, which, for all practical purposes, meant state jurisdiction over the ocean and seabed out to 200nm.1416 This initiative spread to other countries; Argentine (1967), Brazil (1970), Benin (1976), Guinea (150 nm 1974), Sierra Leone (1971), Somalia (1972), El Salvador (1950), Panama (1967) and Uruguay (1969). These mare clausum policies on behalf of African and South American states naturally made it difficult for supporters of the CHM to claim that it was the industrialized, western nations that grabbed as much as possible of the oceans; it was the poorer countries that initially set the train in motion. It remains a fact that the strongest claims to mare clausum came from the coastal states of the south. Thus, the picture of a unified or monolithic “south” during the UNCLOS III proceedings is misleading. While the LL/GDS states undoubtedly raised deep-felt objections to the policies of the Western powers, it was not the latter that were instrumental in pushing for increased mare clausum. It would be more accurate to point out that the African and South American coastal states expanded the scope of state sovereignty, and that the western powers sought appropriate ways to modify this process. Not under any circumstances could the south have it both ways; it was impossible to demarcate the largest possible ocean areas as CHM and at the same time grant all coastal states national jurisdiction of the sea out to 200 nautical miles from the base line, and beyond that for the seabed. Indeed, it is not wholly inaccurate to argue that both the Warsaw-Pact countries as well as the NATO states in fact curbed the movement towards too large an increase in mare clausum: no country in neither of the two organizations claimed a territorial sea beyond 12 nm.

In this context, however, the 200 nm EEZ increasingly came to be seen as a viable middle ground between the freedom of the seas and increased national jurisdiction over maritime natural resources. While few states had proclaimed anything resembling the EEZ prior to the UNCLOS III Conference, a series of states did so during the conference, and several years prior to the conclusion of the negotiations. These states included Chile and Peru (1947), South Korea (1954), Costa Rica and Bahamas (1972), Bangladesh (1974), Iceland (1975), Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua (1976), the USSR (1976, implemented March 3 1977), France (1976, implemented February 1977), the USA (1976, implemented March 3 1977)1417, and Sri Lanka (1976, implemented January 15 1977).

1415 Logue, 1980: 24
1416 The introduction of the off-shore zones met with fierce criticism at the international level. For domestic reasons however, the South American states found it impossible to reverse its policy. See Buzan, 1980: 16-17
1417 In strict legal terms, the US only declared a 200 mile fishery zone in 1976. An American EEZ did not follow until 1983. In other words, the US was one of the very few states to withhold a unilateral declaration until after
In addition, all of the following states declared 200 nm EEZs in 1977; Denmark, Cuba, French Guyana, Canada, Norway, the UK and Western Germany.

The very substantial alteration of the international maritime institution and the corresponding increase in scope of national jurisdiction can be illustrated by figure 5.2.

**Figure 5.2: Zones of national jurisdiction 1958 versus 1982 Law of the Sea Convention**

Comments figure 5.2: The diagram above shows a very simplified, basic outline of the important distance markers for the international zones of jurisdiction over the adjacent sea and the seabed, and how UNCLOS III. However, the US had unilaterally declared the seabed out to 200 nm from the US coast as state property already during the Truman Administration. In addition to a fishery zone of 200 mile, this in effect accounted to an EEZ. See Fleischer, 1977, Tamnes, 1997, Giverholt, 1983.
these were changed from the 1958 till the 1982 conventions.\footnote{Illustration from http://2100.org/w_ocw1ill/zones.gif} In the 1958 convention, coastal states were given sovereign rights in the ocean over a 12 nautical mile territorial sea and a 12 mile contiguous zone, both drawn from a baseline. In addition, states had sovereign rights on the seabed 200 miles from the contiguous zone, but no jurisdiction beyond the contiguous zone in the ocean masses. With the 1982 convention, states achieved sovereign rights in the ocean masses in a 200 mile EEZ beyond the territorial sea which in effect meant a dramatic reduction of the high seas, or international waters. The sea bed beyond the continental shelves now was called the area, as a common heritage of mankind (CHM) now to be regulated by The Authority under the UN, while this sea bed earlier had been seen as open to commercial pursuit by any actor. The CHM aspect of the 1982 treaty has been seen as too radical by the US ever since 1982.

Somewhat paradoxically, the multilateral UN framework had opened up the gate to increased state sovereignty over the oceans through unilateral moves. By and large, the outcome through the EEZ principle was not incompatible with the international liberalism of the US, while it was also a satisfying concession to third world coastal states. However, the major reason for the rapid development towards acceptance for the EEZ must be found elsewhere than in the preferences of the hegemon. Regional fishery commissions under the existing international law of the sea had proven to be utterly unsatisfactory as regards efficient tackling of the problems of over-fishing. Coupled with the growing over-capacity of the world's trawler fleets and the cumbersome process of reaching anything resembling agreement on UNCLOS III, therefore, the principle that the coastal state itself should regulate the extraction of marine resources off its coast gained increased legitimacy in the international system. Inherent in this development was a \textit{de facto} suppressing of the CHM idea. The notion that LL/GDS states could negotiate for quotas from the EEZs of coastal states has yet to materialize at the time of writing, some 22 years after the conclusion of UNCLOS III. One of the chief inspirators of the CHM idea, Arvid Pardo thus reached the conclusion in 1989 that “The Common Heritage regime established for the international seabed is little short of disaster”.\footnote{Pardo, 1989: 499} The ultimate outcome was that states gained very substantial “continental shelves”, often beyond 200 nautical miles where the depth was not such that it rendered all arguments of "utilization of resources" as totally unfeasible. In sum, the seabed areas where it was feasible to extract resources
came under national control, while the much more difficult deep seabed was what remained as the “Common Heritage of Mankind”. ¹⁴²⁰

Moreover, the eventual treaty was too much to swallow for the US under the Reagan Administration. In the final session in 1982, the US demanded that it be voted over the treaty on the seabed. Although only four states voted against the convention, the fact that the US was among these states did much to weaken the status of the seabed convention. The US simply refused to accept conditions inherent in the convention. The very polity that had been so instrumental in setting up the UN system in the first place, and which had supported de-colonization against the wishes of its own allies, had become alienated from the multilateral process. Indeed, the US soon officially declared that it did not intend to sign the 1982 treaty on the Law of the Sea, but that it would follow the conventions and articles that did not regard the seabed treaty.¹⁴²¹ The US thus seemed to take a more unilateral approach to international maritime institutions. In 1994, the Clinton Administration submitted to the U.S. Senate a somewhat revised version of the Treaty. This treaty still failed to receive Senate ratification. Therefore, the United States' provisional participation thus expired in 1998. In addition, several states, such as the UK and Western Germany, did not sign the 1982 treaties. Nevertheless, 142 states did sign, thus making the long journey towards a legal framework for the use of, and conduct at, sea more than a farce. In reality, once the 1982 treaty had been created, it became a focal point, a point of reference, in most maritime disputes between states. The

¹⁴²⁰ One should note, however, that the legalistic outcome in form of treaties nevertheless constituted a serious attempt at establishing an international regime that gave LL/GDS states rights, and which harbourred institutions in order to regulate the extraction and redistribution of the CHM. Article 69, for example, stated that “land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned and in conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62.” GDS were granted rights in much the same maner through article 70.

Furthermore, Part XI of the convention sought to regulate the CHM. It was geographically simply called “The Area” (articles 133.135). This Area then was to be regulated by The Authority; (articles 157 and 158):

1. There is hereby established the International Sea-Bed Authority, which shall function in accordance with this Part.
2. All States Parties are ipso facto members of the Authority.
3. Observers at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea who have signed the Final Act and who are not referred to in article 305, paragraph 1 (c), (d), (e) or (f), shall have the right to participate in the Authority as observers, in accordance with its rules, regulations and procedures.
4. The seat of the Authority shall be in Jamaica.
5. The Authority may establish such regional centres or offices as it deems necessary for the exercise of its functions.

actual implementation of the treaty nevertheless is a testimony to the painstakingly difficult process that international cooperation is. Article 308 of the treaty stated that it would become effective 12 months after the 60th ratification of the treaty by any states. This number of states was not reached until 1993. Until then, states felt free to pick and choose according to their own preferences among the principles in the law of the sea.

In sum, then, the dominant political change in extraterritorial sovereignty in the latter part of the 20th century was not “globalization” or international institutionalization, but rather increased state sovereignty. One might strongly argue that the problem of depleted fish stocks, pollution at sea and the questions of the deep sea bed all were truly international issues that made states attempt international cooperation. This does not change the above conclusion. In order to deal with these problems, states replied with the weapon they knew best; state sovereignty. This was just as much the outcome of the preferences of consolidated states as it was the outcome of the creation of new states in the wake of decolonization. State leaders in the third world wanted what they perceived as the same fruits that western powers had enjoyed for centuries; sovereignty over their own natural resources. The result was a degree of formalized extraterritorial sovereignty unparalleled in world history. In addition, this outcome was partly a result of the fact that states did not manage to solve the tragedy of the commons regarding maritime resources. But at the same time, increasing state sovereignty over oceans did little to solve the collective dilemma at a later stage. Migrating fishing stocks do not move according to social constructs in the form of boundaries at sea. Nor does pollution at sea, or the intricate problems concerning the entire ecosystem of the oceans, easily lend itself to national control. On top of this, international terrorism and piracy are phenomena that now affect the use of the oceans for transport, and that cannot be addressed satisfactorily through the existing framework of the law of the sea (see more in last section of this chapter). One unanticipated effect of the convention, for example, is that piracy through the 1982 convention is defined as an activity that takes place in international waters (or in the words of article 101 “on the high seas”). In other words, similar acts in “national waters” are considered a criminal activity subject to national legislation. Since many coastal states in Africa and Asia are not capable of exercising sovereignty within their EEZ (or even in their territorial waters), this makes piracy (in the sociological meaning of the word) into a huge problem in sea-lanes within the EEZ of weak states (we will return to this later in the chapter. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation sought to address this problem).
The UN declared 1998 as the “year of the Sea”, in order to set focus on the pressing issues concerning maritime regulations. By this date, the FAO categorized 11 out of the 15 most vital fishing areas and 70% of the most significant fish stocks as maximally utilized or over-utilized. Moreover, the oceans store 1000 times more warmth than the atmosphere, and are the keys to regulate the amount of carbon dioxide at earth. A further destabilization of the ocean ecosystem might indeed change the world, and political geography, in the long run. Political realism and world-system analysis hold no clues as to how such problems might be solved.

Liberal institutionalism envisioned that the only way the problem might be tackled is through establishing stronger international regimes. There is little evidence of such a development at present, and indeed the mechanisms for change as described in this school of thought do not seem readily available. One major reason for this is that the hegemon at the turn of the millennium does not provide, and indeed does not have incentives for, such alterations of the international system. International liberalism does not seek supranational regulation more than necessary for upholding the status quo that is part of hegemony.

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1422 State of the world, Norwegian edition "Verdens tilstand", 1999: 103-104
5.3 After Empire; the UK 1945-2001

“Don’t Worry: Barbados is with you”\textsuperscript{1423}

During the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the British Empire reached its greatest geographical extent as well as its greatest power for a short period. After this feat, the history of the Empire in large is a story of (rather graceful) decline. A relative decline, that is, militarily as well as politically. The decolonization within the empire was strikingly rapid.\textsuperscript{1424} It left only a handful of dependent territories, such as Montserrat, Bermuda, Gibraltar and St. Helena.

Nevertheless, the imperial heritage was part and parcel of the British national identity, as witnessed in British popular culture and habitus. Paternalist traits die hard among former hegemonic powers. Without due reference to the history of Empire, British behavior in diplomacy and war is difficult to comprehend, even by the turn of the millennium. The afterglow of Empire is vital in order to interpret events such as the Suez crisis, British policies towards the EEC and EU, the 1982 Falklands War against Argentina, and the so-called “special relationship” with the US in foreign policy. Let us look into the foreign policy development of the UK after the war, and how this and the longer history of the empire came to color British policies with emphasis on international maritime issues. This development is perhaps the most illuminating in showing how imperialism changed as a phenomenon in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. This also necessitates a very broad approach to what Britain and the legacy of empire was in the latter half of the century.

In addition to the development towards a cold war, the question of imperial transition was the overriding concern of British foreign policy in the post-war years. Indeed, the entire notion of empire had very little legitimacy on the international arena after WWII. Thus, “Commonwealth”, which once begun as being synonymous to empire, became its antithesis. “The British Commonwealth of Nations” was the informal alliance between Britain and the old dominions during the two world wars. The 1961 “Commonwealth of Nations” was quite another structure, at least formally speaking, but also -in a very substantial way- a different organization. By the latter year, South Africa had left (for time being), and the original states had been joined by four Asian and two African members, plus Cyprus, whereas Eire had left.\textsuperscript{1425} If we go 36 years further on, it is easy to see that the “commonwealth” of 1997 was yet another organization; South Africa and Fiji had returned, to mention but few of the changes of members. And yet, it is striking to note that “the appellation “Commonwealth”, popularized by Imperial federalists eighty years earlier, now applied

\textsuperscript{1423} A cable from the West Indies to the British Cabinet on September 3, 1939
\textsuperscript{1424} McIntyre, 1998:11-44 discusses the question “When did the British Empire Fall?” in some depth
\textsuperscript{1425} See Lloyd, 1996: 362-378
to an international grouping larger than the United Nations in 1945”\textsuperscript{1426} Before 1965, the Commonwealth can best be described as a club within the empire, in which membership served as a badge of independence. Yet, this club was organized and led from Whitehall. After 1965, on the other hand, the Commonwealth was much more a multilateral organization.

This outcome was a result of a series of changes in the relationship between the metropolis and the imperial peripheries. In fact, each of the landmarks of imperial dissolution made for crises for the Commonwealth. Inherent in these crises was the question of legitimate rule. One response to these crises of legitimacy was to idealize the commonwealth as the resolution to the problems of \textit{imperium} and \textit{libertas}. The only solution possible was one of hugely increased flexibility. The Commonwealth to a large degree gave this opportunity. Eire for example, remained an external associate in spite of her neutrality during WWII. Needless to say, the conditions for cooperation became somewhat more strained after 1945, and the intimacy of this climate did not improve as the Asian Dominions, India, Pakistan and Ceylon joined from 1948. And yet, had not India become member, it probably would have been the end of the Commonwealth. To other former colonies, India’s abstention from Commonwealth membership probably would have had grave consequences. At least, this was how Mountbatten and the British Cabinet saw it. In reciprocity, “British” was omitted in front of “Commonwealth of Nations” in the 1948 communiqué\textsuperscript{1427} and the Monarchy faded into a mere symbol of the Commonwealth from 1949 onwards. By the mid 1960s, the popular phrase was coined that the “Empire strikes back”. A series of proposals for functional cooperation emerged from the former dominions and colonies, and these were suggestions in which British interest was not overwhelming. A body of organs was nevertheless created in order to fulfill the aspirations of poorer countries to take advantage of their membership. To some degree, this can be interpreted as a positive and lasting legacy of the empire. Through a network of territories where state officials spoke excellent English, and had been influenced by British administrative modes of thought and behavior, an international institution with a life of its own was created. The Commonwealth Foundation came into being in 1966, and biennial Commonwealth heads of Government Meetings were held around the Commonwealth, replacing the Prime Ministers Meeting held in Downing Street. As a matter of fact, when decolonization had taken place in the many Caribbean and Pacific islands, the Commonwealth by the end of the 1970s had turned into a small states forum. Needless to say, many Britons increasingly asked what was in it for Britain. The Commonwealth, it was argued, was built on two hypocrisies. “\textit{Equality was the founding doctrine, but Britain still paid the biggest bills. Non-racialism and democracy were trumpeted in declarations, but military}

\textsuperscript{1426} Mcintyre, 1999: 693
dictatorship, one-party rule, and racial strains were rife\textsuperscript{1428} within the Commonwealth countries. During the reign of Mrs. Thatcher, the climate reached a low-point, as Britain seldom supported Commonwealth communique\textquotesingle s, and the British premier scornfully remarked that “if it is forty-eight against one, then I’m sorry for the forty-eight”.

With the end of the cold war, the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the departure of Mrs. Thatcher, it is no exaggeration to say that the Commonwealth went through something of a renaissance in Britain. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 was largely a British construct, endorsing the values of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, good governance and market economy. In British eyes, the end of the cold war meant that the Commonwealth indeed could be useful, especially to raise trade and investment on the Asia-Pacific rim. Parallel to this development, the body of functional offices and non-governmental organizations loosely coupled to the Commonwealth also expanded. In fact, the post-colonial Commonwealth was a special case among the international organizations at the end of the millennium. It contained a vast number of micro-states, and was rather informal in its workings. Parallel to this development, a very curious phenomenon occurred in British popular culture; the idea and memories of the Commonwealth became central to identity, revived as part of the national historical heritage. Thus, Britain announced 1997 as the “Year of the Commonwealth”. As the post-cold war world order opened new opportunities and the efforts at creating a European political union deepened, Britons increasingly took pride in the Commonwealth.

The fact is that the transition from the British Empire to a Commonwealth as a community of free nations had taken place in a remarkably smooth manner. Given the sheer size of the earlier empire, and the vast potential for bloody conflicts that decolonization had, Britain could take some justifiable pride in the abolition of its empire. Moreover, the imprint of the historical empire on the current metropolis as well as its earlier dominions on the whole came to be viewed more favorably than was the case only two decades ago. The true significance of this legacy, so visible in popular entertainment and leisure, architecture, judicial systems, political and administrative institutions, education and language, is its potential of creating an identity as well as mobility. Needless to say, the common traits found in the organisation are merged with regional, national and local traditions to make up a rich and diverse family of national identities. The fact nevertheless remains that the common traits of identity facilitates cooperation among the territories of the Commonwealth.

\textsuperscript{1427} Mcintyre, 1999: 696
\textsuperscript{1428} Mcintyre, 1999: 699
Britain kept some of her paternalist traits of her imperial age. This was witnessed in the Suez crisis of 1956; the unilateral declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 1965, and one dare say the Falklands War of 1982. The Commonwealth nevertheless was part of this change of the paternalist power Britain. The Commonwealth, as a heritage of an empire with this particular characteristic, made possible a unique movement of people.\textsuperscript{1429} Since the educational system had made at least rudimentary knowledge of English a commonplace all around the Commonwealth, migration to Britain was eased both for the migrants and the British society. The result was that British citizens whose families had originated in the “New” Commonwealth alone became a significant minority in Britain. In 1991, for example, South Asians in Britain alone numbered 1.5 millions.\textsuperscript{1430} Especially the larger cities thus have become truly multicultural and truly multi-religious societies. To some degree, although not easily measurable, this also affects the identity of Britain in foreign policy: the perspective of international relations predominant in London remains global to a degree beyond what could be expected from objective measures of economy and military power.

But if we look a bit closer at the foreign policy of the UK in the post-war era, it is rather easy to point out that this factor has been central throughout the period. Thus, the British ambiguity regarding the project of “Europe” and its relations with the other North-European states in a very distinct way was marked by the peculiar imperial legacy. It was not so much that Britain wanted to cling to her role as a metropolis in a formal empire. To the contrary, Britain saw how the US and the USSR agreed to cut down the size and importance of the empire, and accepted it. That the aspirations to national independence had been raised in the dominions reinforced this choice; the alternative would have been bloody colonial wars that Britain was in no position to bear neither financially nor ideologically. By the summer of 1945, moreover, Churchill was voted out of office and replaced by a Labour cabinet much more preoccupied with domestic politics. In some respects, the departure of this leader symbolized a new age for Britain. While the skepticism of Churchill regarding the relationship between Britain and Europe (by which he meant continental Europe) persisted among large segments of the populace, the demise of the British paternalist role also made the period from 1950 till 1980 problematic in the sense that the UK found itself without a clear role in international relations. How much should the UK involve itself in the EEC, how fast should

\textsuperscript{1429} Indeed, as Lloyd, 1996: 345 notes, the Britons saw their empire as racially very tolerant. And the fact is that it perhaps was among one of the racially most tolerant of all western nations in the beginning of the 20th century. There were very few barriers to migration, and in the British army of WWII, peoples of different ethnicity fought together in many mixed units, in contrast to the US for example. This also can be seen as a positive inheritance from the imperial age, although the exceptions and shortcomings of tolerance certainly also are visible in the British case.

\textsuperscript{1430} See Brown, 1999: 708
decolonization take place, and what ties – if any- should be kept to these former possessions? These were questions of outmost importance to policymakers especially prior to the 1960s. The solution to the colonial question was speeded up with Macmillan's appointment of Macleod as Secretary of the Colonies in 1959. Both men were convinced that the residual decolonization should take place the sooner the better.1431

The question of British entry into the EEC was much more tortuous, and heavily marked by the ideology and interests of Britain as an informal leader of the Commonwealth. Indeed, for years following WWII, Britain saw the Commonwealth and a good relationship with the US as far, far more important than the incremental processes of cooperation on the wrong side of the channel. After the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Britain nevertheless argued that Britain and a number of other west European states should be brought into the customs unions for industrial products, while simultaneously allowing them unrestricted free trade in agricultural products. As the EEC countries clearly recognized, this in effect would be a highly advantageous outcome for Britain. If it were to materialize, Britain would enjoy a much wider tariff-free market for industrial products than the Commonwealth, while it at the same time would enable her to import low-cost agricultural products from some of the more successful commonwealth nations. Especially to France, it seemed a bad bargain indeed to let Britain in on this market without any British concessions on agricultural products. One might claim that this was narrowness on behalf of the French, but the British proposal was no less paternalistic. Furthermore, it is also a fact that none of the EEC members to any substantial degree felt anything but relief when de Gaulle rejected British membership in 1963. Clearly, most politicians within the EEC could easily conjure up images of Britain as a member that sought the better of two worlds; membership in the EEC to the degree that it suited British interests, while simultaneously taking full advantage of the trade within the Commonwealth. However, the options available to Britain became fewer with time. The weakness of the British economy during the 1960s, which in reality brought down the Sterling Area, is the chief explanation behind renewed British attempts at seeking closer cooperation with the EEC. After the third veto against British entry by de Gaulle in 1967, Prime Minister Heath was determined to bring Britain into the EEC from 1970.1432 This time, of course, it was the Commonwealth members turn to be concerned. As a matter of fact, Commonwealth exporters throughout the 1960s sought to widen and diversify their markets in order to be prepared in case British membership in the EEC would harm trade with Britain. At this, they were at least partly successful. Canada for example, increased its export to the

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1431 See Lloyd, 1996; chapter 13
1432 Kissinger, 1981 is a testimony to the fact that Heath even downplayed the special relationship with the US compared to the issue of British integration within the EEC framework.
US by some 65% from 1958 till 1962. When Britain eventually negotiated with the EEC for membership in 1971-72, Britain in fact did not pay much attention to these concerns of Commonwealth countries. The result was a British market far less open to Commonwealth export, and this affected Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India as well as more peripheral territories. At the same time, the tiny territories of the former empire, such as those (formally) British islands in the West Indies and in the South Pacific, were actually horrified by the development. While decolonization certainly was popular in the 1970s, it is an often-overlooked fact that these territories actually sought to remain British as long as they could. In the words of one historian of the Empire, Britain “set about making it clear to these tiny countries, as politely as possible, that they ought to become independent.” The Overseas Development Ministry, the last true remnant of an imperial bureaucracy, was closed down in 1970. The entry into Europe seemed more painful than the retirement from Empire.

The British extraterritorial ambitions, and the development of British extraterritorial means of violence, was a complex mix of a proud heritage and adjustments to the new role Britain eventually played in international relations. On the one hand, The Royal Navy and the Royal Marines to some degree remained the one and only truly national institution in the British society. To a very profound degree the Royal Navy continued to be a central part of the Kingdom, both as a symbol as well as a mean to further foreign policy goals. However, the tight relationship with the US, less ambitions in imperial policies and friendly, yet not all too intimate relations to other states in Northern Europe, did not necessitate a senseless prioritizing of the Royal Navy. It remained a strong navy in European terms, and a skilled Navy indeed. But the British economy as well as the changing degree of institutionalization of international relations did not make gunboat diplomacy feasible or desirable. Since the idea of imperialism had lost legitimacy on the international scene, since Britain could not cling to empire, and since the UK became part and parcel of the US-constructed international institutional matrix, the paternalist foreign policy of Britain was modified utterly. Only on some rare occasions, and in its policies towards Northern Ireland, was the old paternalist visible beyond its territorial base.

While the cold war restricted the level of conflict, there is no denying the fact that serious disputes indeed took place between the UK and its neighbors. In a sense, it represented a return to British concerns for the Mare Britannicum, those oceans that awoke the first conflicts between England and the Dutch republic in the 17th century. The reason was the declining interest in the direct extraction

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1433 James, 1994: 595
1434 Lloyd, 1996: 376
of resources from the weaker Commonwealth dominions. Thus, British maritime policies regarding ocean resources became much more centered upon the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. It was these waters that were most important to British fishing interests and eventually offshore activities. With the evolution of international maritime law and the ultimate competition for ocean resources, therefore, this particular area sheds light on the foreign policy dispositions of the old maritime paternalist.

Throughout the first half of the 20th Century, Britain refused to acknowledge the Norwegian and Swedish claims to a four-mile territorial sea. The conflict was rather dramatically illuminated throughout WWI, as Norway failed to uphold neutrality within the proclaimed 4-mile zone. The result was a series of “violations” of the territorial sea by both German and British vessels. The issue remained controversial until 1950, since neither Germany nor Britain acknowledged the Norwegian claim.\textsuperscript{1435} It is a sign of some degree of residual British paternalism that the Britons continued to neglect Norwegian claims to a 4 mile territorial sea also after 1948, and that this policy led to open confrontations between crews from both countries as well as sharp diplomatic protests. Nevertheless, Britain was more or less forced through the soft power of the US to play the game according to the rules of the new international institutional order. The perceived threat from communism reinforced these incentives after 1949. The result was that the policies, as well as the military praxis, of Britain were civilized in North European waters during the latter half of the 20th century. In short, the most valid generalization is that its paternalism was modified.

This was evident in the British decision to submit the case to the International Court.\textsuperscript{1436} The result was a verdict in favor of Norway, although the outcome was not as clear-cut and unambiguous a victory as Norway had hoped for. Moreover, the result was just as much a negative surprise for the British Labour Cabinet. However, it seems pretty clear from British as well as US sources that the security community being forged through NATO, with Norway as the only North-European state with a common border with the USSR, weighed more heavily for the British than fishing interests, and that this analysis was supported by the US administration.\textsuperscript{1437}

The British acceptance of the Court decision had a huge impact on the law of the sea, as figure 5.3 illustrates.

\textsuperscript{1435} Fure, 1996: 12, O’Connell, 1982: 200, Fleischer, 1977: 46
Comments figure 5.3\textsuperscript{1438}: In the dispute between the UK and Norway concerning the demarcations of the territorial seas along the Norwegian coast, The International Court decided that the territorial sea should be measured from a straight baseline following the outer islets in the archipelagoes along the coast. Thus, Norway achieved very wide territorial sea. Since later EEZs and midline demarcations on the seabed would also be drawn from the baseline, a state with such an archipelago had a remarkable advantage over the coastal state without such a topography (for example the UK).

To Britain, it nevertheless also gave results that were impossible to accept without resistance. This applied particularly to the situation that arose when Iceland extended its fishery zone. The first cod-war between Iceland and the UK was a direct result of this. The 12 mile Icelandic fishery jurisdiction of 1958 was a challenge not only to British fishing interests off Iceland, but should such mare clausum policies gain legitimacy in the North Atlantic, then considerable waters in practice would be nationalized. And indeed, the Faroe Islands did imitate the Icelandic decision the same year.\textsuperscript{1439} The increased Icelandic fishery zone in particular hit the “trawler-towns” of Hull, Grimsby and Fleetwood.\textsuperscript{1440} To the Britons, it appeared that the Icelanders utilized its domestic cleavage for all it was worth. The threat of an Icelandic demand that the Keflavik airbase had to be abandoned was deemed as a cynical game in London. But again, the fact remains that Britain certainly had to

\textsuperscript{1438} Illustration taken from http://www.claus-schive.com/grunnlinje.gif
\textsuperscript{1439} See Fleischer, 1977: 51, Woodhouse, 1961: 100-101
abide by US interests. To the US, the security concerns in the North Atlantic and the wish to uphold NATO cohesion, made it overrule too drastic British responses. Neither did British entry into the NEAFC mean that the UK increased its influence on the maritime policies of the North Atlantic. The time had come when British maritime interests increasingly was coordinated with the US. The Cod wars with Iceland did repeat themselves, particularly in 1973, but the US firmly tried to cool down the intense quarrels and confrontations that occurred during each and every such dispute (see next section for a comment on the 1973 confrontation). Britain nevertheless tried to gain as much as it could on questions of maritime resources. In 1963-1964, for example, Britain sought to coordinate the regulation of fishing in the North Sea with its members, apparently in the hope that it could present the EEC with the architecture of a common fishing policy. In fact, Britain managed to get a long way towards this aspiration, willing as it was to grant the Faroee Islands, Greenland and Iceland special rights. Norway was utterly dissatisfied with its outcome of the proposals, and protested the entire negotiation as this became obvious. Iceland, Greenland and the Faroee Islands also eventually withdrew; all the Atlantic peripheries in fact being utterly frustrated by the British conduct at the conference. Thus, the residual element of British paternalism made itself felt within the limits permitted by the security community under US supervision. Nevertheless, national interests were harmonized with the international institutional environment also in Britain. The British cabinet, for example, vetoed its own agricultural and fisheries department's proposal to use the import taxes on frozen fish to stop the Norwegian 12-mile zone. To a large degree, the cabinet refused to use such pressure because it knew that domestic pressure would then make Norway leave the EFTA.

The next question concerning sovereignty in the old Mare Britannicum was the question of the delimitations of the continental shelves in the North Sea. According to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 6 “where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be determined by agreement between them”. Furthermore, the same article stated that in the case there was no agreement, the boundary should be the median line, “every point of which is equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured” (on Norwegian and Danish tactics on this question, see below). Great Britain agreed on such a median line with Denmark and Norway in 1965. Again, Britain did follow the rules of the international game. By agreeing to follow the 1958 convention, Britain also was conscious that Norway with its very peculiar baseline, providing it with a territorial

1440 Davis, 1963
sea far from the habitated coast, was granted a very ample coastal shelf. At the time of negotiation, British diplomats did not seem to invest too much energy in the issue. There were no interest groups that pressured the British government on the topic in 1964-65. The fact is that also Denmark, and partly Norway, did not appear to be too anxious about the ultimate outcome; the seabed was not deemed to be of substantial economic value (see below on the Nordic countries for a qualification of this verdict in the case of Norway). The result was that Norway achieved an absolute gain. Five years later, as abundant oil and gas were discovered on the seabed in this ocean, the matter had already been settled in advance; to much despair to politicians in Britain and Denmark.

This process, and the fact that the Atlantic peripheries all sought to expand their sovereignty at sea during the 1970s, made also Britain join the club of countries that unilaterally declared a 200 mile EEZ in 1977. With this, the maritime demarcation in the North Sea was largely settled. For Britain, all that remained were bilateral negotiations with Ireland, the Netherlands and France on the precise delimitations in the Irish Sea, the Channel and the southern parts of the North Sea. All these issues were solved.

In sum, then, at the political level Britain followed the rules of the game as prescribed in the evolving law of the sea, a framework carved out under the US-inspired UN institutional matrix. The paternalism of Britain in foreign policy was heavily subdued, partly out of domestic priorities, but also partly because the international order was changed. Indeed, the domestic discourse itself was intimately linked to international norms. Gone were the times when Britain through sea power could pressure weaker states into submission to demands from Her Majesty's Government. Britain did try to apply pressure, as in the cod wars, but such pressure lacked international legitimacy. More than anyone else, the US played a dominant role in checking British pretensions in Northern Europe, by applying the soft power of the hegemon, but also through formalized channels in the Atlantic security community, chiefly NATO. “The special relationship” to the US made Britain accepts its limited political role, but this special relationship was also a reflection of necessity. Utterly weakened on the international arena, Britain did not have the military or economic power to reverse the forces of time. But most important of all, in the Atlantic community after WWII, such uses of power would not have been productive. Whatever authority Britain was to exercise in Northern Europe in the postwar era had to follow from other sources than economic and military power. Thus, British foreign policy is also an indicator of the changes in the international system after the two world wars.

1441 See The Parliamentary Records of Norway, S.Tid 1963-64: 2419-20, 2593
On the question of the *praxis* and organization of extraterritorial violence, the reduced political significance of the British Empire, the Commonwealth and Britain itself, also made for a relative reduction of the use and the size of the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, it is a testimony to the lasting habitus of Britain and her rich naval traditions that the Royal navy continued to be a truly national institution in which large sections of the British populace and political establishment took great pride. The most spectacular exposure of British extraterritorial violence in the postwar era so far has been the Falklands War of 1982, fought out over one of the most barren relics of Empire. It was the largest naval campaign of the 1980s, Britain alone deploying a task force of some 51 ships 8000 miles from the motherland to reclaim Las Malvinas, of which most Britons had never heard of.

Nevertheless, this most dramatic of British post-war extraterritorial expeditions was a testimony to the gradual diminution of the once global instrument of power into what had become chiefly an anti-submarine force in the NATO naval forces. For what should the Royal Navy be if not a supporter of the US navy? British naval enthusiasts increasingly found it difficult to defend notions of a stronger Royal Navy. Thus, the last true carrier had been scrapped in 1979, and the biggest ships of the Falklands Task force thus were the anti-submarine carriers HMS *Hermes* and *Invincible*. It is a telling contrast to the US navy that these two ships together could carry less than 25 Sea harrier fighter-bombers. This was a mere quarter of the number of aircraft carried by ONE single US carrier of the *Nimitz* and *Enterprise* classes! And at the time the Falklands campaign was fought, the USA had 6 Nimitz carriers operational.

Material factors notwithstanding, the political and military determination to fight the war lacked nothing in strength compared to that found in naval expeditions of an earlier time. This was coupled with the realities of a highly modern technological modus of operations, however. HMS *Conqueror* became the first nuclear submarine ever to sink a surface ship on May 2 1982, when the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was torpedoed with heavy loss of life. It only took two days to remind the Britons that modern naval vessels are vulnerable platforms, their high sophistication in electronics and weaponry notwithstanding. Argentine air attacks ensured that two frigates, two destroyers, a supply ship and one amphibious ship were sunk before the Falklands had been recaptured, while still more ships were damaged.

The Falklands war also demonstrated that *a change in the praxis of naval warfare was taking place*. In earlier exchanges of violence at sea, survival to a very large degree had depended upon gunners and fire directors, on the capabilities of the men in the engine rooms to maintain or increase speed, and on the seamanship and tactical cleverness of the captain.
In the computer age, comparable skills were still important, but another factor in actual combat was just as vital: the ability of a few technicians to get hold of, organize and present information massing in front of them on lighted screens. With the threat of jet aircraft and missiles, the time factor had become more important than ever before in naval combat. The time available from an observation of the enemy, own estimation of the observation, evaluating and ordering own conduct and to execution had been drastically reduced. While the 19th century naval officers had very few means of observation, the late 20th century naval vessel is crammed with sophisticated sensors for detecting platforms and weapons in the air, at the surface and submerged in the ocean mass itself. While naval gunfire was notoriously inaccurate in the Anglo-Saxon countries right up till the end of WWI (Germany during the war was a notable exception), today's vessels fire missiles that hardly can miss the target unless by malfunction or by very advanced countermeasures. The spiral of weapons and sensors and the corresponding counter-measures against them has reached a level of sophistication that made even Great Britain, arguably the proudest naval nation in the world, lag behind the US.

The curious fact arose for Britain, as for almost all the other states covered in this thesis, that the "new world order" seemed to demand an increase in the human and material investment to produce effective means for extraterritorial power. Throughout the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium, this was a striking characteristic of British security policy. Almost wherever western states intervened by military means in this period, the Britons were part of the coalition; in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Britain also carried out a unilateral intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000 under a UN mandate but with more far-ranging goals than prescribed by the world organization.

While Britain did take part in the project of European integration, it nevertheless held on to its "special relationship" with the US, spectacularly demonstrated in the attack and occupation of Iraq in 2003.
5.4 Enjoying and Criticizing Pax America? The Nordic countries and the Netherlands, 1945-2001

If we were to sum up the foreign policies of the Nordic countries in the post-war era in a few sentences, one of them should be that the Nordic countries all tried to shield themselves from what they deemed too close cooperation with the US, while they simultaneously enjoyed as many benefits of the Pax Americana as was possible. For the three Nordic countries facing the Atlantic (Denmark through her Atlantic possessions), this meant efforts at keeping as close military and economic ties to the US as the international balance of power and the national tradition allowed. In particular, this policy of integration applied to military matters. At the time of writing, Iceland and Norway still go to extremes in order to keep US bases and installations intact on their territories, while Denmark is one of the most eager among the West European states in its support for the US. For Finland, the overriding concern was shielding from Soviet pressure, for Sweden, a continued policy of neutrality, while this also led to top-secret cooperation in military intelligence with the US. And yet, the political history of these countries also show that their political trajectories, their dominant self-images and the populist sentiments ensured that they sought to construct a portrait of their relations with the US with an illusion of full national autonomy. What Immanuel Wallerstein with some justification dubbed the “revolution of 1968”, the student protests and the peace movement that gained momentum across the western world, added to the peace-loving sentiment in these countries in peculiar ways. The traditional legalist approach towards international relations that had existed long in these territories eventually came to merge with a normative condemnation of power politics in general, and of the US in particular. Therefore, Iceland continued to be a NATO member without its own armed forces (all the Icelanders could offer to the alliance was their territory), while Denmark and Norway often insisted on adding footnotes to NATO communiqués. Increasingly, however, a difference between Iceland and Norway on the one hand, and Denmark on the other hand, also became evident. While Denmark joined the EEC in 1973, the other Nordic NATO countries have yet to enter the organization at the time of writing. Naturally, it is not erroneous to point to the maritime interest groups that worked against EEC and later EU membership. In Norway, agrarian interests worked in tandem with coastal fisheries in this respect. Protecting such sectors against competition, and yet securing the access to markets in Europe, was perceived as a necessity, and the majority of the populaces in Iceland and Norway came to the conclusion that their interests were better served outside rather than inside of the EU. And at the same time, it was also a question of identity. While granting NATO a huge say in their security policy, giving the EEC and later the EU some supranational authority as regards natural resources was much more difficult to the mare clausum states of the North Atlantic.
Once the barriers of the cold war had been removed, Sweden and Finland entered the EU and became energetic members with an approach to the union fitting the protestant work ethic sometimes ascribed to the Nordic bureaucracies.

The second truism concerning the geopolitical status of the Nordic countries during the cold war is that the sovereignty-seeking periphery and bandwagoning small states were among the territories of the world which benefited the most from the changes of the institutions on the international arena. As we have stated earlier in the chapter, it was the tandem development of internationalising the issues and the solution of increasing the sovereignty of the coastal states that made the outcome so beneficial for Northern Europe. This combination of principles made states like Iceland and Norway ideally suited to take advantage of the international institutions to further their national interests. This was a novel political praxis, also in this part of the world. Henry Kissinger mused about this development after his 1973 visit to Iceland, when an Icelandic-British cod-war seemed a real danger:

“Here was an island with a population of 200,000 threatening to go to war with a world power of 50 million over codfish...Nixon and Rogers made soothing noises while the Icelandic ministers implacably insisted on what in any previous period would have seemed suicide...the tiny country threatening to make war against a nation 250 times its size and to leave NATO (without which it would be defenseless) – said volumes about the contemporary world”

In many respects the interstate relationships among polities with interests in the North Atlantic and the North Sea is a demonstration of changes of international institutionalisation. The UN Charter and the UN itself was a novel factor in world politics that appeared as useful for small states if they could simultaneously offer the hegemon a return in the bargain. The US as the leader of the western world, however much this leadership has been contested, could not openly embarrass itself by violating central principles of the world organisations it had been so instrumental in creating. Thus, small states often appealed to international law and the UN as an embodiment of this legalism. Needless to say, the presence of the USSR did little to restrict such expressions of justice. Neither did it encourage the North European states to break with the USA, with the understandable exception of Finland – a state that never had the chance to establish close ties to the US however much the population would have appreciated it. It was one thing for Denmark, Iceland and Norway

1442 Kissinger, 1982; 172-173
to impose restrictions on their integration in NATO, but at the practical level, the transatlantic relationship was seen as particularly important in these countries.

The third truism is evident in a comparative perspective; the internal stability and relative lack of immediate external threats to the vitality of the Nordic countries in this period made them all enjoy favorable conditions for security, economic growth and democratization. For our purposes, it is enough to notice the following facts. Neither of the Nordic countries experienced domestic terrorism or major political upheavals in this period. Their political systems were firmly established, their legitimacy in the population high, and the political consensus has struck observers from other parts of the world as rather extraordinary. Correspondingly, their minor role in the international system did not make them involved in foreign military expeditions beyond UN peacekeeping operations in this period. Indeed, their minor international roles and their protection under the pax America enabled them to stand on the sideline to evaluate by abstract moral criteria the policies of stronger nations. Neither did they have an imperial legacy that made the transition of decolonization in the international system problematic. While Sweden's history of empire had become distant history, Denmark was the only Nordic country with imperial possessions in a formal sense at the beginning of the 20th century. By 1950, even the status of the North Atlantic islands largely had been settled. Linguistically and culturally, the Nordic countries with some exceptions (the Swedish-speaking population of Finland, the Finns or the Sámi population in Northern Norway, Sweden and Finland) were remarkably homogenous. Nation-building as well as state building in these polities had, by these criteria, been “successful”, as demonstrated also by the late Stein Rokkan. The situation was more complicated from the outset for the Netherlands. This polity also carried its imperial past into the post-war era, making the Netherlands an interesting case of comparison. Thus, the Netherlands will be addressed towards the end of this section. Added to the largely common domestic traits of the Nordic countries, the world order from 1945 was kind to the Nordic countries. In foreign policy, this means that the principles and praxis of the Nordic countries should be seen as and treated as highly interconnected. Few aspects of world politics demonstrate this more clearly than the issues concerning maritime sovereignty.

As already mentioned, the first battle was fought over the criteria for demarcation of, the territorial sea. Here, Sweden and Norway both had declared a four mile territorial sea. The issue was largely settled by the decision in the International court, as demonstrated in the previous sections of this chapter. What should be noticed as a demonstration of the mare clausum preference was the fact that the issue awoke strong passions in Norway. It is remarkable, for example, that Norwegian politicians - with their intimate ties to Britain - in 1948 threatened with the use of brute force against
British vessels if they did not respect the 4-mile limit. The Court decision that the Norwegian policy did not violate international law, immediately led to an extension of the Norwegian fishery limit. Iceland followed suit in 1952, and increasingly came to see the Court decision as an affirmation of the rights of small coastal states heavily dependent upon maritime resources. This was not an entirely unreasonable interpretation, since the peculiar structure of the North Norwegian society explicitly was used in the verdict from the International Court. Hence, the development of the legal framework only reinforced the mare clausum instincts of the politicians of the smaller mare clausum states. The institutionalisation of international relations occurred in tandem with the increased scope of sovereignty for coastal states. Great Britain fought against this increase in coastal state maritime sovereignty, and after the verdict in the International Court, Iceland was the single Nordic state to bear the brunt of British resistance from 1952. The Icelandic announcements in 1956 and -57 that the Icelandic government was considering further extensions of their fishery zone aroused further disbelief in Britain. It were tensions like these that were among the problems addressed at the UNCLOS I conference (section above), but which were not “solved” once and for all through the 1958 conventions. But all the Nordic countries supported the main impetus of extending the fishery zone. None of these states had anything to lose from such a development, as long as increases in fishery zones did not infringe on the freedom of the seas in a way that mattered to the merchant navies. The latter mattered most to Norway, but even Finland, Sweden and Denmark were very dependent upon sea-borne transportation.

Iceland unilaterally declared a 12-mile national fishery jurisdiction immediately after UNCLOS I; and entered the first cod war of the modern era with Britain (see above). That the Faraoe Islands imitated Iceland was seen as a testimony to the fact that once the ball had started rolling, it would create a momentum that would make it hard to stop. As we have seen, UNCLOS II and the attempt to solve the debacle through a regional commission, the NEAFC, did nothing to sort out the problems of disputes over national jurisdiction in this region, although all the states with fishing interests in the North-East Atlantic signed the convention. This fact is a testimony to the degree of intricacy inherent in fishery policy in this region. No bilateral or multilateral agreements over these resources were easily settled even among otherwise close allies in this period. Even Norway and Sweden, two countries interdependent of each other to an unprecedented degree after WWII, clashed furiously over fishing rights in the Skagerrak. No doubt parts of the heated rhetoric of politicians and bureaucrats were attempts to signal determination against becoming the “chicken” in the negotiation game, but the presence of strong pressure groups in the fishery sector was an especially

distinct trait of Iceland, Norway and partly also Denmark. The two former states have yet to enter the EU, not to an inconsiderable degree a result of the fishery questions.\textsuperscript{1445}

The contrast to seabed politics is striking during the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{1446} The Nordic countries were, without exception, convinced that there was no surplus of significance to extract from their continental shelves. In retrospect, this seems remarkable, considering the enormous continental shelf countries like Iceland and Norway could gain via increased national jurisdiction over the seabed. At UNCLOS I, for example, the Norwegian delegation on the conference did not vote on the proposals for a Convention for the continental shelf. This abstention was based on a later notoriously famous telegramme from the Geological Institute of Norway that read “one can exclude the possibility that any quantities of coal, oil…on the continental shelf along the Norwegian coast”.\textsuperscript{1447} Only lack of information and the absence of strong pressure groups in the oil sector can explain this state behavior (in addition, the Norwegian merchant marine interests were anxious that the continental shelf convention entail consequences for the free passage of merchant ships).

The most spectacular result of this would be the agreement on the median lines in the North Sea between Britain, Denmark and Norway. I believe it is fair to say that in neither Britain nor the Nordic countries – perhaps with the exception of Norway - was there much interest in the matter at all. However, it was an incremental process within the Norwegian bureaucracy that led Norway to declare the sole and sovereign rights of the resources on its continental shelf, despite the 1958 resistance against the same convention that now was used, despite the fact that no one knew if any resources would be found on this shelf whatsoever, and despite the fact that the precise demarcation of this shelf had not been carried out. The growing attention soon spread from the bureaucracy, as a number of oil companies started to show interest for search for oil on the shelf from 1962 (one prominent Norwegian politician later admitted that he thought the representatives from the US oil companies had showed up at the wrong office).\textsuperscript{1448} The first discovery of an oilfield off Groningen on the Dutch continental shelf increased the interest to settle matters quickly (clearly, this would be more convenient before rather than after a potential breakthrough in the search for oil). In this context, all the states in Northern Europe were suddenly interested in claiming sovereign rights to

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\textsuperscript{1444}I have demonstrated this elsewhere, Stensli, 1999 \\
\textsuperscript{1445}See Silset, 1997. \\
\textsuperscript{1446}I intend to devote some space to the seabed question in Northern Europe. The reasons are straightforward. Firstly, the process and outcome on these questions exemplify both the increase in state sovereignty as well as the changing nature of relations between states in this part of the world. Secondly, it is a case that in a remarkable manner evidences the fact that extraterritorial policies would have dramatic consequences for the states and societies concerned. \\
\textsuperscript{1447}Quoted in Willoch, 1998, hanisch, 1992: 470. See also UN Off rec VI 1958:4, Stmeld 42/59:39 \\
\end{flushright}
their continental shelf, but the precise limits to these sea beds had to be demarcated. When several states border the same sea, as in the case of the North Sea, such a demarcation easily becomes a delicate issue. On the other hand, the North Sea was not particularly tricky compared to other oceans. It was not a closed sea, as the Baltic Sea, and in contrast to the case of the Barents Sea, all concerned states agreed to the median principle. The main problem was what to base the median on. It could be based on the distance from the territory of the three countries, of course, but what territory? Was it the mainland, islands, islets, or was it the territorial sea? In reality, the issue was partly settled the moment when the concerned states agreed to the median principle. At the very least, this was the standpoint of the Norwegian government, since the 1958 conventions clearly stated that the median line should be drawn on the basis of the territorial seas. In other words, Norway, through its “victory” in the International Court some ten years earlier, would then have a tremendous advantage over Britain and Denmark. With its fjords and archipelagoes, Norway had been granted a vast portion of coastal waters as a territorial sea, and compared to states without such archipelagoes (i.e. Denmark and Britain), would base its distance between the median line and the territorial boundary that was actually far out to sea from the major coastal cities and communities.

In order to "nationalize" as vast a continental shelf as possible through gaining support for the median principle, Norway tried to reach agreement with the Danish cabinet first. The Danish government had signed the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf on its genesis, and seemed a more convenient partner for the Norwegians to start negotiating with than the British. But interdependence is a double-edged sword. By 1963 Denmark refused to enter a bilateral agreement with Norway. The Danish perspective was a product of greater complexity than the Norwegian. The Danish Foreign Service argued that an agreement between the two Scandinavian countries would have neither legal nor de facto legitimacy. As the Danes pointed out, neither West Germany nor Britain had ratified the 1958 convention. The position of the former was particularly worrisome for the Danish cabinet, since the Germans refused to acknowledge the median line principle at all.

Surprisingly enough, the Britons ended the period of waiting and diplomatic probing through a Aide memoir to Norway from Her Majesty’s Government dated February 14th 1964, in which the median line principle based on the 1958 convention was accepted (this meant that the median line would be measured from the islets furthest out in the sea of each state, to put it simple). Through this move, complexity was utterly reduced. As Norway, Denmark and Britain accepted the median line as the main principle for the demarcation of the sea bed in the North Sea, West Germany faced a fait

1449 Hanisch et al, 1992: 44. This is the most authoritative account I have come across on these negotiations.
accompli. It was obvious that also London was in a hurry to straighten out the legal process in order to avoid conflicts between offshore activities by all concerned states.\textsuperscript{1450}

What from the contemporary perspective then seemed almost a trivial procedure nevertheless would develop into a national trauma for the Danes. The negotiations between Denmark and Norway lasted from September 1964 till December 1965. In the aftermath of this agreement, the Danish secretary of energy and oil stated that “the gravest error in the history of Danish offshore activity was committed in the negotiations on the demarcation of the North Sea with Norway.”\textsuperscript{1451} One might speculate on the conduct of the Danish negotiators. But the fact is that Norway through these negotiations achieved the sovereign rights to oil fields of outmost importance. When the British also made an agreement with Norway, the search for oil could start in earnest. One can only imagine how difficult it would have been to achieve an agreement had the locations of the oil fields been known in advance. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Norwegian government and society had been extremely lucky. It is true that some major officials in the Norwegian government played the negotiation game well, but it is equally true that none of the parties knew what resources actually were to be found on the bed of the North Sea. The Norwegian government also hastened to strike a deal with Sweden in July 1968, but this deal is an illustration of the point; it has practically yielded nothing in economic terms for neither of the states. Thus, in retrospect the Swedish-Norwegian boundary-setting of the seabed seems trivial, an act of bureaucratic wrestling, but nothing more. The British-Norwegian-Danish negotiations could easily have turned sour. The median-line principle had not become settled as a state praxis. A few years later, West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands found themselves in a deadlocked position, and decided to bring the issue of their continental shelf demarcation to the International Court. The verdict of the Court was that the median line principle not necessarily should be put to use, sine West Germany had not ratified the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.\textsuperscript{1452} The same argument could plausibly have been utilized against Norway, a country that had NOT ratified the same convention when it reached its agreements with Denmark and Britain. Given the change in the direction of the institutionalisation


\textsuperscript{1451} Cited in Hanisch et al, 1992: 47. Adding to the Danish anguish was the all too obvious fact that the Danish cabinet had not done its outmost. In the words of Danish historian Tage kaarstad: “during the course of negotiations, the Ekofisk field drifted into Norwegian hands. Hækkerup was not operational, and Krag was not oriented of the situation. Ekofisk would prove to be of outmost importance” (ibid: 47, 50).

Fact is that the Ekofisk field ended by the narrowest of margins on the Norwegian side of the median line. This field became the start of the Norwegian oil adventure. The conduct of the Danish secretary of state was seen as a disgrace by Danish commentators in retrospect.

\textsuperscript{1452} Andrsen, 1987: 118-119, Stprp nr 112/1970-71
of international relations in the western world, Britain and Denmark could do nothing to change the agreements they had made without jeopardizing their international and regional legitimacy.

Although depletion of fish stocks darkened the prospects for the fishing sectors of all north European states and North America during the 1970s and 1980s, the proceedings to create a new framework for the law of the Sea through the UNCLOS III negotiations was yet another milestone on the way towards increased sovereignty for the smaller coastal states. In fact, the smaller coastal states of Northern Europe, eager as always to widen the scope of their sovereignty and the status of their sovereign rights, increasingly declared their interest in the demands of the poorer third world countries. From this tactics, Iceland and Norway had little to lose and much to gain. The concessions given to the G 77 groups for example, were costless to the North European states. Conversely, it was of outmost importance to gain the support of the G 77 countries in order to secure increased coastal state jurisdiction. Still, their policies were adjusted to the realities of the Cold war and the Atlantic security community. Much the same can be said of Denmark, Greenland and the Faraoee islands. The former at this stage of history was reduced to a peripheral maritime power, but the political ties to the North Atlantic communities made Denmark a central actor on issues of maritime boundaries in northern waters. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see the development towards the EEZ principle as a victory for the scope of Danish sovereignty; it did not fare well in the median-line negotiations with Norway, and the population of Greenland and the Faraoe Islands received the most from the exclusive economic zone.

Sweden and Finland were much more reluctant. Finland had to adjust carefully according to the Soviet interests, while Sweden as a neutral, relatively small industrial country did not stand in the front line on these issues. Nevertheless, the low-profile Swedish policies on these questions were also reflections of the regional security complex, and thus, Sweden was not distant from the questions or absent from the debate. It was just that it did not play a role on the global scene on these matters at all, and that it hardly was a dominant regional player either. Surprisingly, then, the mare clausum nations Iceland and Norway, and to some extent even the Faraoee Islands and Greenland, played the most active roles of the Nordic countries when it came to the political and legal framework for international maritime resources. The tables certainly had been turned, when one compares the 1970s with the regional balance some five or ten decades earlier. This alteration of influence was a result of the changing degree and character of institutionalization of international relations. The Pax America in the western world was extremely beneficial for small, western states that cooperated with the predominant power within the institutional matrix at the international level.
It was not only that small states increasingly had gained formal sovereignty and independence that was remarkable, but the degree to which these polities were taken seriously as members of the international community. Could this have been possible with another international order than that following WWII? This remains a counter-factual question, but there is certainly little doubt that the American hegemony after the war was a liberal world order, and this benefited the smaller western states, however much criticism various groups in the same countries could raise against US “imperialism”.

By and large, the policies of the North European small states on these matters were a curious mix of small-state realism and idealism, since this was the best mix in order to widen the scope of their extraterritorial sovereignty. As one prominent member of the Norwegian parliament once expressed it: “For a small country such as Norway, behavior in strict accordance with international law is a necessity. This is not a question of doctrinarianism or national legalism. I rather see it as the cold facts of realpolitik.”

Thus, there seemed to be no contradiction in warmly supporting the idea of the CHM and simultaneously doing the utmost that diplomacy allowed in order maximizing the size of the continental shelf of one's own state. Iceland bore the brunt of international criticism for unilateral actions, but the fact that the coastal states of Latin America, and mainly independent states in Africa and the Pacific island states all wanted to increase the geographical scope of their national jurisdictions, and given the institutional workings of the UN and the UNCLOS conferences, the incremental struggle for increased national sovereignty eventually succeeded. When general de facto consensus on the 200-mile EEZ was reached in 1976, the implementation of the principle was relatively easy for the North European states, also in regards to the EEC member states, however time-consuming the negotiations on the exact demarcations and fishing rights within the zones were. The Nordic “zone of peace” ensured that these processes in a comparative perspective can only be characterized as smooth (with the major exception of the negotiations with the USSR). Most EEC members with significant coasts also introduced EEZs, Sweden, Finland and Norway reached agreements on demarcations and mutual rights in almost no time in December 1976. The Faraoee Islands, the EEC states and the Soviet Union all demanded agreements of reciprocity. The system of reciprocal quotas in the EEZs of each coastal state soon became an international bargain, carried out through bi- or tri-lateral negotiations. For many of the developing countries, however, the conduct of the Nordic countries was easy to see through. As John Logue once remarked; “if the CHF-Proposal

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1453 Tor Oftedal, Labour Party, S.tid 1973-74: 3423
1454 Tamnes, 1997: 289
is endorsed by the 77, the developed nations will probably go along with the proposal even though some, i.e. Norway, may be quite reluctant.\footnote{Logue, 1980: 24} Such was the game played; each nation utilized whatever coalitions were possible during the conferences in order to further own national interests. In this, the Nordic countries were remarkably successful. Only in the Barents Sea was the question of extraterritorial demarcation left unresolved, to the dismay of the Norwegian government. It has remained an issue of friction between Oslo and Moscow since the first high-level bilateral talks on the matter in 1974. 30 years later, the solution seems as distant as ever. There exists a large body of scholarship\footnote{For primary sources: Stmeld 93/1982-83: 6-7, Stmeld 57/1978-79, NOU 1978. For assessments and secondary sources: Frydenlund, 1982, Tannes, 1997, Østreng, 1990, Sonders et al, 1989, Sjaastad et al, 1975. The 1977-78 negotiations became something of a trauma for the Norwegian national psyche, partly due to the outcome and partly due to the later investigation and verdict of a central Norwegian official for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, at the time of writing, concrete plans for seabed drilling in the area are now materializing.} on the demarcation of the Barents Sea, so much that only a rudimentary assessment will be given here. This is worthwhile since the issue had some strategic relevance. The wish to compete with the US was made more difficult for the USSR after the opening to China, but the Soviet Union certainly responded to the forward deployment strategy of the US from the 1950s on. The USSR North Fleet had its base on the Kola Peninsula, south in the Barents Sea. The strategic submarines (SSBN) of the USSR used this base, and there is no doubt that the US Navy used its submarines and surveillance systems eagerly in these waters to monitor the development of and operational use of Soviet SSBNs.

Both states agreed that the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf should apply, but the two parties could not agree to the principle of demarcation. In short, this has remained the situation ever since; the Norwegian Government argued that the median line principle applied, the Russians that the sector principle had a longstanding history in these regions. From the introduction of the EEZ, however, the issue was further complicated, since the two states also had to agree on a boundary separating the ocean masses. Moreover, while none of the states had immediate plans to begin the search for resources on the seabed of the extremely harsh Barents Sea, both realized that an agreement on the precise borders of the EEZs was vital in order to control fishing in the area.\footnote{Interestingly, at the time of writing, concrete plans for seabed drilling in the area are now materializing.} By the mid-1970s, fishing stocks in much of the Atlantic were depleted, and the interest in the Barents Sea was tremendous also in this respect. The disputed area (between the median line and the sector line) was no less than 60700 square kilometers. The 1977 negotiations stalemated. The parties agreed to a temporary agreement for the practical division of zones of national jurisdiction and sovereign rights. A so-called grey zone was established. This solution created a zone of shared responsibility where 23000 out of the 60700 square kilometers undisputedly were on the western
side of the sector line, only 3000 square kilometers on the eastern side of the median line.\textsuperscript{1458} Drawn up on a map of the Barents Sea, the visual impression was one of a Norwegian loss and a Soviet victory. Needless to say, it sparked an intense debate in Norway, although many social democrats, the largest unions and a not insignificant part of the fishing sector supported the temporary solution. The agreement was meant to expire after one year, but has been prolonged each year until the time of writing. In practical terms, the solution was not so bad when it came to regulating fishing. The codfish largely migrated from the eastern to the western part of the Barents Sea as it matured, so that an intensive Soviet fishing in the eastern part of the area could have depleted the resources in a matter of years.

In the long perspective, the dispute between the USSR and Norway marks the limitations of, as well as the beginning of the end to the increased scope of sovereignty for smaller coastal states. There were limits to sovereignty-maximizing and opportunistic band-wagoning. In a game of “chicken”, smaller coastal states that relied heavily on their maritime resources was in no position to challenge a non-liberal superpower. Simultaneously, Norway was not eager to encourage direct support from the US or other NATO countries on the questions of the northern waters. This in effect could have terminated the so-called “Nordic balance”, and deprived Norway of its independent policies regarding Northern Norway and the contiguous seas. The latter challenge was primarily built on the assumption that if NATO or the US gained a too free position in the region, it would produce increased tension in the Barents Sea.

Between themselves, however, the smaller northern states fought many and prolonged battles at the negotiating tables. These battles were not peripheral, however. The outcomes decided the extent of national jurisdictions over vast oceans rich in resources, an ever more rare quality as fish stocks virtually everywhere became depleted. When the EEZ off the coast of the motherland had been consolidated, it was time to redirect the focus to the islands. The principle of coastal state jurisdiction also applied to islands separated from the mainland. The question was what qualified as an island.\textsuperscript{1459}

One of the first contested cases was over the island of Jan Mayen. Even to Norway, this barren place for decades had been marginal, due to the diminishing stocks of seal and herring in the nearby waters. With the introduction of the EEZ, the interest was increased manifold. The use and

\textsuperscript{1458} Stprp nr 70, 77/78: 3
\textsuperscript{1459} Even experts on international law agree that the definition of an “island” is vague in the 1982 Law of the Sea. See Brown, 1994: 149-157 for a discussion.
occasional habitation of the island had become so infrequent that Iceland and Greenland/Denmark now disputed the right Norway claimed to an EEZ and a continental shelf around the island. The problem was that the ocean was not big enough for all states to draw 200 mile-zones around their motherlands and their overseas possessions. Jan Mayen was situated between Greenland and Iceland, so that none of the three states of Iceland, Denmark and Norway could draw zones around these islands without agreeing to median lines—or some other principle of demarcation- of their zones in these waters. The question was suddenly dramatized after a surprisingly large catch of fish off Jan Mayen in 1978. After this, negotiations became hard, Iceland demanding a full 200-mile zone without any restrictions in spite of the proximity such a zone would have to Jan Mayen. The views in the Icelandic Allting were such as to negate compromise. Iceland is a small polity, whatever measurement one chooses to use. It was typical, as in this negotiation, that a coalition cabinet ensured that the parliament itself almost participated in the negotiations with other sovereign states. On the other hand, the Norwegian Labour government also clearly understood that Iceland would have a good case if the dispute was to be settled in the International Court. The outcome was a Norwegian fishery zone around Jan Mayen, granting Norway fewer sovereign rights in the ocean masses and practically speaking none on the seabed around Jan Mayen (not by this agreement anyhow). As always when the Icelanders were pressured on the vital access to fishing grounds, the rhetoric of closing down the US base at Keflavik was the ultimate threat Iceland could issue in an indirect manner. The primary sources that are available to us say nothing that can support the claim that this weighed heavily on the conduct of the Norwegian cabinet through US pressure, but most secondary sources imply-partly based on utterances from secretary of state Frydenlund- that Norway wanted to avoid a deeper conflict with Iceland at all costs. However, the Norwegian Nordli cabinet naturally also understood that giving up the median line between Jan Mayen and Iceland would make it difficult to claim that another principle should be used towards Greenland. An agreement was reached in May 1980. An apparent reason for Icelandic cooperation in the final phases of the talks was the fact that Denmark announced a 200 mile EEZ off Eastern Greenland to be effective from June 1st 1980. The Icelanders achieved their full, unrestricted 200 mile EEZ.

If the question of Jan Mayen was challenging, the case of Svalbard seemed even more complex, and involved a very considerable number of actors. The main reason was the fact that Svalbard had...
raised interest in many countries even before and during the imperial age. Thus, when the Norwegian government was given the role of administering Svalbard by the League of Nations, a large number of states signed the Svalbard Treaty that established the degree of sovereign Norwegian rights on the archipelago. However, the Svalbard Treaty – conceived and written in an age where even a 4-mile territorial sea was deemed radical- only applied to the land mass and the territorial sea of Svalbard. The exotic thought then was born within Norwegian departmental circles that the seas beyond the 4-mile zone could be seen as a Norwegian EEZ and continental shelf. This was announced by Norway in 1974, and largely received with silence in the western world.\textsuperscript{1463} The Soviet Union incuriously refused to accept the Norwegian demand. Was this a Norwegian tactic in order to have a horse to trade when it came to the demarcation in the Barents Sea? In retrospect, the Soviet claim that the continental shelf around Svalbard should be seen as regulated by the Svalbard Treaty, does not seem unjustifiable. Historians have later concluded that the US supported Norway quite vigorously on the Svalbard question. Seen from Washington, it was paramount that Norway continued to be the main exerciser of sovereignty on the archipelago. But the issue of fisheries beyond the territorial sea was difficult; the resources in these waters were indisputable. The problem from an ecological point of view was that the introduction of EEZs elsewhere had made trawlers from all major fishing nations in Europe catch more off Svalbard, and indeed in all waters that were beyond national jurisdiction. The Norwegian solution was to establish what was labelled a “non-discriminatory fishing zone” instead of a 200-mile EEZ.\textsuperscript{1464} In practice, the perceived need for regulating fishing in this zone was harmonized with the spirit of non-discrimination of signatory states embodied in the Svalbard Treaty. States that had a history of fishing in this ocean were thus granted quotas of catches in the specific area, to be distributed between the trawler companies within each state. This solution came into effect in April 1978. After some initial reservations, the western powers agreed to the zone. Moscow refused to accept it, and also denied the Norwegian claim to inspect fishing vessels within the zone. It was a suitable reflection of Norwegian prudence and the balance of power that made Norway avoid the introduction of quotas in the first years of the existence of the zone. But even within the western camp, the ever sharper competition over marine resources made the whole issue into a stone in the shoe for Norwegian cabinets. Spain, for example, had gained little by the development of the EEZ. Given the fact that most of the catches of Spanish fishers came from long-distance trawlers operating far from Spanish territory, Spanish fishers to a large degree had been excluded from some of the best fishing banks. In the Icelandic EEZ, resource

\textsuperscript{1463} See Stmeld 25, 73-74: 89, UD-info 26/78:2, Tamnes, 1997: 311
extraction had been so intense as to nearly deplete the most vital fish stocks. Increasingly then, the focus was directed at international waters, still beyond the national jurisdiction of states. Some states therefore came to see the fishing zone off Svalbard as an ecologically viable model for preventing a total collapse of fish stocks in the North Atlantic. Thus, even the USSR eventually instructed their fishing companies to abide by the Norwegian-imposed regulatory procedures in the non-discriminatory fishing zone off Svalbard. Spain became an enduring enemy of this zone, Spain and Norway were—in the words of Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes—"on the brink of a cod war" in 1986.\textsuperscript{1465} The use of the coast guard (a 20th century adaptation of home-water extraterritorial force) was required to stop a confrontation. Eventually, Spain accepted to follow the policies of the EEC, making the issue largely into a topic between this organization, Russia and Norway.\textsuperscript{1466}

At the level of foreign policies and international law, the UNCLOS III gave many new problems that had to be solved (we will briefly return to this on the phenomena of piracy and international terrorism in the next chapter). As states swallowed more and more of the oceans and the sea beds as national property, demarcations had to be made. Yet, it also increased the value of small islands and islets, over which the state had only exercised a symbolic degree of sovereignty. With the new international law of the sea, all such overseas possessions became immensely appreciated, since they became new departures from which to establish new zones and continental shelves.

In this respect, the increased scope of sovereignty for the small coastal states was not produced without friction, and in the longer run increased national jurisdiction did not solve some of the dilemmas inherent in the international institutions regulating maritime resources.

At the regional level, the political leadership and top bureaucrats invested much energy in carving out the most beneficial results in the form of EEZs and quotas, while from a global perspective, the overarching problem of depleted fish stocks did not diminish. The result was that coastal states with substantial EEZs and fishery zones experienced an increased pressure from less blessed states to open up their areas of sovereign rights to resource-extraction for the outside world. Nowhere was this more evident than in the northern waters, which during the last two decades were one of the few areas with sustainable fish stocks and a sound ecosystem in the world at large. Thus, the increased scope of national jurisdiction was bound to come under pressure, despite the framework of the law of the sea. For Iceland, Norway, Greenland and the Faroe islands, the EEC and later the EU...
became one of the chief challengers to full national jurisdiction within the 200 mile zones. On the other hand, the same peripheries were dependent upon the EU market for exports of their fish products. Thus, access to fishing in northern waters was increasingly traded for market access for products from the northern countries within the common market. In the negotiations leading up to the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership, for example, Norway tried in vain to keep the Svalbard area outside of the membership agreement.

Not only was the pressure on the national EEZs and fishery zones in themselves subject to pressure; the fishing activities in international waters beyond these zones became so intense as to threaten the entire ecosystem of the northern oceans. To Russia and Norway alike, this problem became acute in the early 1990s, regardless of the relative success these two states had in regulating their fishing industries. The limits to the word extraterritorial sovereignty for a small periphery is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Iceland. Having secured for its society a vast EEZ, the Icelandic government soon found the pressure from its fishing industry impossible to resist. After all, there were limits as to how much the Icelanders could fish in their EEZ. By the early 1990s, therefore, Iceland was seeking out every imaginable way to find new fishing fields, be it in international waters in the Barents Sea, or off Svalbard.

According to the 1982 LOS, fish stocks that do not wander across EEZs boundaries belong to the coastal state as a sovereign right. Migrating fish stocks, however, should be taxed through agreement between the states with EEZs within the migration pattern of the particular stock. Needless to say, this created a problem concerning regulating fisheries in international waters and quotas within the EEZs that made the victory of the coastal state seem a Pyrrhic one. None of the coastal states covered in this thesis had fought against *mare liberum* for international waters, a policy that would have been programmed to fiasco due to the preferences of the US, the new problems were clear indications that the relative lack of supranational regulation was a limit to small-state *mare clausum* pretensions. Apart from the very valuable asset of the seabed, coastal states had not found an ultimate solution to the tragedy of the commons.

Nevertheless, the various organizations and conferences under the framework of the liberal UN system proved instrumental in addressing these problems. When the so-called Rio-Conference for the Environment and Development failed to make progress in 1992, the FAO ultimately managed to reach consensus on a ban on the use of Flags of Convenience for fishing vessels in international waters.

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waters. However, many states ignored the use of flags of convenience by national companies, while other states simply did not have the capacity to do so. Moreover, the lack of will to regulate this activity was mirrored in the foreign policies of even the otherwise moderate states within the North European security complex. It was not rare for even the warmest supporter of international institutions to apply a pick- and choose policy determined by the national interest. Thus, the only western state that had ratified the 1982 LOS by 1990: "Iceland, which initially contested Jan Mayen’s status as an island, has required of Denmark that the much smaller island of Kolbeinsøy in the Denmark strait, is to receive full weight in the determination of the boundary line between Iceland and Greenland".

The pressure on fish stocks in international waters made coastal states ever more eager to claim national jurisdiction over oceans, but this clearly were temporary solutions. The final attempt to untangle this complexity was carried out through the treaty "Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks". It was opened for signing on 4 December 1995 and became legally binding after ratification by 30 countries. Again, the international level interacted with domestic concerns. Significantly enough, the outcome was one of international disputes and outright clashes between both fishing vessels and

1468 The use of Flags of Conveniences (FOC) was increasingly seen as a problem during the 1990s., both by unions, social democrats and environmental activists throughout the western world. A flag of convenience ship is one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership. Cheap registration fees, low or no taxes and freedom to employ cheap labour are the motivating factors behind a shipowner's decision to 'flag out'. By 2002, a very considerable part of the western-owned companies had flagged out. This development had many drawbacks, although some poor countries and tax havens undoubtedly profitted from it. Casualties are higher among FOC vessels. In 1997 46 per cent of all losses in absolute tonnage terms were accounted for by just 8 FOC registers. The top ten registers in terms of tonnage lost as a percentage of the fleet includes five FOC registers: Cambodia (1st), St Vincent (5th), Antigua (8th), Cyprus (9th) and Belize (10th). See [http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/flags/guide.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/flags/guide.htm).

Big companies specialized in helping clients setting up business or registering vessels in small states. As in [flagsofconvenience.com](http://www.flagsofconvenience.com): "Register your pleasure boat, merchant ship, commercial vessel or aircraft in any of our various flags worldwide (102 Countries)." After the US launch of the so-called war on terrorism, this practise seemed more precarious. As the Economist reported on March 16th 2002, "OSAMA BIN LADEN, intelligence sources would have us believe, is, among other things, a shipowner with a fleet of over 20 ships, probably flying flags of convenience (FOCs).... All this is rather ironic. It was America, after all, that helped Liberia to create its "open" register as an alternative to Panama, the first FOC, in the late 1940s. American oil companies, with Greek shipowners riding piggyback, switched their tanker fleets to Liberia to avoid high labour costs at home (American-registered ships are required by law to use expensive American crews). Liberia's success spawned many imitators: "free flags" are now flown by such unlikely places as Cambodia and landlocked Bolivia. China is a big user of FOCs, its main preference being Panama, the world's biggest FOC by tonnage." [http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1136592](http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1136592)
naval units. In many ways, this kind of extraterritorial praxis was a return to the past. Reports of violence between fishing vessels from coastal and distant-water states became increasingly frequent, especially during the "cod wars" of the 1970s. Several countries, including Britain and Norway, sent naval ships to protect fishing fleets on the high seas (ironically then, the Norwegian Coast Guard fired warning shots against Icelandic-owned trawlers off Svalbard in July 1994, the Icelanders returning fire with shotguns). Spanish fishers clashed with British and French drift netters in what came to be known as the "tuna wars". Before the UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was finalized in October 1995, several coastal States had fired shots at foreign fleets. In the northern Atlantic, Canada seized and confiscated a Spanish boat and crew fishing in international waters just beyond the Canadian 200-mile limit. The negotiations focused on the conflict between the coastal and distant-water fishing States. By mid-1993, Canada had declared a moratorium on cod fishing off its Atlantic coast until stocks were able to regenerate, putting between 20,000 and 30,000 fishers out of work. In the United States, fisheries for Atlantic haddock, cod and flounder and for Pacific salmon virtually collapsed. Iceland cut back its domestic fishing by 50 per cent because of depleted stocks. Meanwhile, unregulated foreign fleets continued to fish just off these countries' EEZs.

Coastal states argued that the high social and economic cost at home (of fishermen out of work in order to preserve fish stocks) could not be supported if foreign fleets continued to fish without restrictions on the high seas. Russia mounted military surveillance to keep Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Polish boats from over fishing pollack in the hotly contested Peanut-Hole, a small area of international water surrounded by Russian seas. In the South Pacific, island States tried to stop Taiwanese and Korean fishers poaching tuna. At the same time, distant-water states pointed to research that suggested coastal States were not sustainably managing stocks within their zones.

At first, many countries were reluctant to accept the need for a legally binding agreement. But as the negotiations evolved, "most coastal states realized the time had come for a meaningful international agreement and the distant-water fishing States understood very well that it was time to either play by a set of internationally agreed upon regulations or face anarchy on the high seas", according to Brian Tobin, Canada's Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.1470

The result was dramatic, at least in judicial terms, since the freedom to fish on the high seas ceased to exist as it did under the previous law of the sea. Governments would be required to cooperate to

1469 Østreng, 1990: 33
regulate high seas fishing or their vessels would not be allowed to fish. Again, this was a positive
development for coastal states with limited long-distance fishery activity, and a drawback for other
fishing nations.

The 50-article Agreement legally binds countries to conserve and "sustainably manage fish stocks"
and to "settle peacefully any disputes that arise over fishing on the high seas". The treaty also
addresses the problem of inadequate data on fish stocks, provides for the establishment of quotas,
calls for the setting up of regional fishing organizations where none exist, sets out procedures for
ensuring compliance with its provisions, including the right to board and inspect vessels belonging
to other states; and prescribes options for the compulsory and binding peaceful settlement of
disputes between states. Responsibility for regulating and enforcing sustainable fishing practices
falls to the regional fishing organizations, which must also collect, report, verify and exchange data
on catches. On the basis of a periodic review of the status of fish stocks, they will allocate quotas for
States fishing on the high seas.

The Agreement aims to make the fishing industry more transparent. Fishers are obliged to report,
through their Governments to the FAO and regional fishing organizations, the size of catches and
the amount of fish they discard. In areas where no regional organizations exist, states concerned
about declining fish stocks are expected to organize their establishment. *It gives any country that is
a member of a regional fishing organization the right to board and inspect vessels of any other
states fishing in the area in order to ensure that regional quotas and conservation measures are
being followed.*

Where there are "reasonable grounds" for suspecting that a fishing vessel is violating conservation
rules, the inspecting state can notify the flag state. If the flag state does not respond within three
working days--during which time the inspectors are permitted to stay on board -- the inspecting state
can require the vessel to go to the nearest appropriate port for further action. If the flag state feels
that enforcement measures have been taken unjustifiably, it can begin dispute-settlement procedures.

The North European coastal states ceased the initiative after the successful conference, and through
the NEAFC this instituted a regime for the international northern waters, where the Norwegian
armed forces were given a chief role in monitoring and inspecting fishing vessels in the Norwegian
Sea. *In many ways, this evidenced the ultimate success of the small coastal states in the Western
world; not only had large tracts of the oceans come under national jurisdiction, they also patrolled
the high seas in order to catch for example British, Dutch or Spanish fishing vessels or any violator*
of international law in the waters that once had been labelled "Mare Britannicum" by the premier sea power on the globe.

The questions of extraterritorial sovereignty distinguish The Netherlands from the Nordic countries, and make it into a case somewhere in between the UK and the Nordic countries in the postwar era. As with the Nordic countries, however, the trajectory of the Netherlands is closely connected to the international development, and in particular to relations with the US. The most characteristic trait of Dutch extraterritorial policies in this era was the overseas possessions, or in short, what was referred to as the Indonesian question. This complex problem is also the most controversial aspect of Dutch-American relations in the period, and a peculiarity that sheds light on a contrast to the Nordic countries. Therefore, the question of Indonesia will be addressed in particular below.

This is not to deny that the Netherlands had national interests in Northern Europe proper. Far from it, the Dutch polity was a substantial naval contributor to the NATO alliance (see below), and a participator in European integration. It also had its due share in the questions on demarcation of continental shelves and EEZs, although on a more modest scale than Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Britain. The Dutch government reached agreement with Denmark on a boundary between their continental shelves in the North Sea in March 1966. The problem with the agreement was that it imposed severe limits on the ocean area available to West Germany. The three states therefore requested the International Court to decide what principles should apply to the demarcation of the shelves of the three countries (the following legal discourse defies description in its complexity, but did not have any lasting impact on the international institution of maritime sovereignty). The Court, in the view of many experts on international law, failed to make a clear statement, but chose to instruct the three states to reach agreement based on "equitable principles". The ultimate result was that West Germany was able to gain a continental shelf stretching out into the North Sea, while the Netherlands nevertheless managed to secure a substantial shelf that would prove to be of huge economic value. While offshore industry was a novel field to the Netherlands, in other areas the Dutch continued a proud maritime tradition. At the outbreak of WWII, practically the entire vast Dutch merchant fleet of 2.7 million tons had been at sea. By 1945 it had shrunk to a fleet of some 1.5 millions. The reconstruction of the merchant fleet took place at amazing speed. By 1947, it passed 2.2 mill. Tons (yet, in a comparative perspective, the Dutch merchant fleet of the 20th century was not vast—see appendix II).

1471 Prescott, 1975: 166
1472 Schokking, 1947 : 353
As a political matter, the Indonesian question was the most dramatic foreign policy issue in the post-war era for The Netherlands, and a question that also had an impact on Dutch identity. In the latter respect, I will argue that the foreign policy of the Netherlands came to be more adjusted to what was appropriate for a bandwagoning state with a lost overseas empire. From postwar overseas intervention to uphold political relations with the empire, the Dutch polity silently drifted into what Arend Lijphard called "the trauma of decolonization", although this trauma should not be exaggerated in a comparative perspective. The Dutch had had political and economic functions in the Netherlands East Indies since 1595. As we have seen, the colonial ties were cut during WWII due to the Japanese occupation of the former Dutch-controlled islands. As the Japanese empire disintegrated, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia on August 17 1945, until British and eventually Dutch forces arrived to take control anew. Since nationalist groups on the islands, a force much ignored by the Dutch government during the 1930s, in the meantime had managed to seize Japanese weapons and munitions, the European effort at establishing a monopoly of violence proved difficult. By summer 1947, Dutch forces only controlled a few enclaves on Java and Sumatra, plus the politically much less important Outer Islands. The chief motivation of the Netherlands was not to re-establish a form of colonial rule, or so it was claimed, but to secure investments and economic interests in Indonesia. But as we shall see, economic interests are at best a secondary factor here, since the loss of Indonesia would not account to a severe blow to the Dutch economy. Although this claim was made by contemporaries (that the loss of the empire signaled an economic catastrophe), the more overarching concern was that without Indonesia, the Netherlands would be just another European periphery, devastated by war, and without influence in Asia. History indeed mattered, the Indonesian question soon developed into an issue of great symbolic value. Spurred on by the British government, Dutch authorities eventually settled for a negotiated deal with the provisional regime of the Republic, institutionalised with the so-called Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946. This settlement was only temporary and highly fragile, evidenced by the clashes of interests between the Republic and the agents of the Dutch government on the islands. The Netherlands thus chose a military intervention in 1947 (the first so-called Police Action).

The US position on this question was full of ambiguities. On the one hand, the Truman administration certainly had inherited the anti-imperialist belief of the FDR administrations. As an international liberalist, the US felt that it could not simply support openly the efforts of a European

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1473 Steiner, 1947: 625
1474 Homan, 1990: 123
1475 Homan, 1990: 124
power in re-establishing what seemed to be imperialism. However, by this date- July 1947- another concern also had found its way into the corridors of power in Washington; the spread of communism. While the abandonment of European empires certainly were still welcomed, the Truman administrations - and indeed later administrations- feared power vacuums in former colonial territories that could be easily exploited by communist parties. If this were the case, then one evil would be replaced by an even worse threat to liberalism and free trade. Thus, the initial US reactions to the first police action were very mild. It was only when the case was taken to the UN Security Council that Washington began to raise concern. In August 1947, the Truman administration thus supported the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire at the islands, and actually offered to mediate through the so-called Good Offices Committee (GOC). This commission finally produced the Renville Agreement of January 1948, calling for the establishment of a United States of Indonesia.\footnote{Vandenbosch, 1950: 3} This federation was to consist of the Republic of Indonesia plus the Netherlands.\footnote{Homan, 1990: 125} Without going into specifics, the deal was riddled with ambiguities that were bound to erupt eventually. Hostilities between the Dutch and supporters of the Republic continued. In a 1948 visit to the Republic, the US mood changed. The US GOC delegation was convinced that the leadership of the Republic was not an amalgam of Soviet and Japanese interests, as previously claimed by Dutch diplomats. From this visit on, the US perception was reversed: not granting substantial concessions to the Indonesian nationalists would produce the greatest danger of communist influence, not the opposite. The predominantly conservative Dutch coalition government strongly objected to this analysis, but lost much prestige as the the Republic of Indonesia crushed a communist coup at Java in September 1948. Thereafter, arguing that the government of the Republic was infiltrated by communists and that it was in no position to uphold a monopoly of violence, failed to make much of an impression in Washington or in the UN. The ultimate weapon of influence for the Truman administration was to issue an aide memoire dated December 8 1948 in which the US indirectly threatened to cease all appropriations to the Netherlands and Indonesia under the European Recovery Act if the parties went to war.\footnote{Homan, 1990: 133} However, the handing over of such a note was an action that risked backfire. The potential blowback of Uncle Sam threatening a weakened western European democracy in 1948 seemed so serious that the State department withdrew the aide memoire. As a result, the Dutch government ordered military action in December 1948, only to receive an international condemnation of which it was not prepared.\footnote{With this decision, the Dutch Empire was irretrievably lost. The Empire with a history of almost 400 years}
could not be saved either way the Dutch government could have tried to achieve some political influence over Indonesia. Like the other European powers, it had to adjust to the fact that the age of imperialism was long gone. The US hegemony ensured that there was no international legitimacy for overseas colonies.

Did this outcome change Dutch foreign policy, and even the predominant worldview and identity of Dutch politicians? This question is a substantial one, since the Netherlands clung to its empire longer than Denmark, the only Nordic country with at least formal sovereignty over inhabited overseas territories into the 20th century. At the same time, the Netherlands did not preserve a special status as a former empire through a commonwealth as did Britain, or through prolonged and strong political ties as did France. The Netherlands became much more of an "Atlantic" state than France in the political sense, and a much more "European one" than did Britain. It is of course true that the Netherlands continued to have links with Surinam and what once was the Dutch Antilles, but her status was not comparable to other major former imperial powers. Does this reveal a special trait of Dutch imperialism as well?

Firstly, one must state at the outset that abandonment of the overseas possessions in the Dutch case were complete and permanent. When the Dutch government completed the agreement where she renounced all claims to the sovereignty of West Guinea, it separated the Netherlands from its past for good. As we will see, history in one sense returned, but in the 1950s and 60s, the loss of the empire did not turn out to be the disaster some had predicted. Indeed, one is tempted to ask whether not the outcome was much more beneficial to the Dutch society than a continued empire would have been, although this remains a counterfactual hypothesis. One thing was the cost the empire would have constituted in the form of economic investments. Another matter was the cost in human tolls. The "Police actions" in Indonesia did not tempt the Dutch to pursue a policy of continued use of violence in order to keep the overseas possessions. Barely liberated from German occupation, the Netherlands plunged into one of the greatest battles in the history of the polity. In 1947 alone, 170,000 Dutch conscripts and officers saw service in Indonesia. Of the 2500 Dutch killed in Indonesia, only 250 died during the police operations themselves. 90% of the casualties stemmed from the results of the continued engagements by Indonesian guerilla forces. This was a testimony to the real costs of upholding extraterritorial sovereignty without local or international legitimacy. In

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1479 Vandenbosch, 1950: 7
1480 Baudet, 1969: 128
1481 This is a truth with one modification concerning the Dutch Antilles. It is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It was granted full autonomy in internal affairs in 1954, while the Dutch Government is responsible for defense and foreign affairs.
1482 Vandenbosch, 1950: 1-3
the end, the support of continued use of extraterritorial violence on a large scale dwindled also in the Netherlands proper. Advocates of the Dutch Empire argued that the Netherlands without an empire would fall down the ladder of the international hierarchy, and ultimately would come to resemble the weakened Danish polity.\footnote{1484} The hope of re-establishing the triangular commerce (the Netherlands-Indonesia-America) was perceived as vital to the Dutch economy, but not at any cost. The result was a dilemma that touched upon the very identity of what the Netherlands was. To many Dutch, the very idea of a Netherlands without special responsibilities and economic activities beyond the motherland seemed unconceivable.

Nevertheless, by economic parameters, the Dutch economy thrived without an empire. Several factors help explain this. The Marshall aid did much to supply the Netherlands with the hard cash the government needed. Secondly, efforts at modernization and industrialization became entirely focused on improvements in the motherland. Later on, the booming offshore activity created an additional stimulus to the economy. But even prior to the latter, the Dutch prosperity rose incredibly in the years unto 1960. In 1938, 30 percent of the Dutch national income came from industry, by 1957 the corresponding figure was 42 per cent (net factor cost).\footnote{1485} This was no small achievement for a country that entered the postwar era with quite significant damages to its infrastructure (especially some of the major ports, docks and ship-building industry). Neither did the loss of the overseas employment possibilities constitute much of a loss. Banks and financing companies quickly adjusted to the post-imperial condition, and manual labourers found employment in the booming industrial sector. Thus, the increase in national income per capita averaged about 3.5 per cent per year from 1950 till 1970. In sum, this increase was seven times as much as the growth in the first 40 years of the 20th Century.\footnote{1486} In sharp contrast to this development, the economic revival of the Dutch East Indies was painfully slow, to put it mildly. A challenged monopoly of violence, general political unrest and violent crime did not make the former Dutch colonies into attractive nodes of investment. To interpret the problems in the former colonies as a fault by the European powers is too much of a simplification. The main result of decolonization in economic terms in this case, was that the former colonist thrived, while the newly liberated overseas territories decayed or stagnated. In the political sphere, the Union was dissolved in 1954. The Republic of Indonesia made the situation even worse for its inhabitants by boycotting the Netherlands from 1957, thus striking a

\footnotesize\footnoterule
\footnote{1483} Wesseling, 1980: 125-126  
\footnote{1484} Wesseling, 1980: 126  
\footnote{1485} Baudet, 1969: 134  
\footnote{1486} Wesseling, 1980: 128

blow against its own people, not the Netherlands to any particular degree. The sum of these developments in the economy also influenced the Dutch perspective of its role in the international system. It prospered by band-wagoning behind liberal international institutions and the US. In terms of security, the Netherlands remained a faithful ally of the US within NATO, in terms of economic integration and lowering of transaction costs, the Dutch were eager supporters of the European common market. It is true that some last spasms from the imperial age were visible in 1957-1962, largely over the status of New Guinea, and as a result of the 1957 Indonesian decision to nationalize Dutch firms on the islands. Although Dutch troops were dispatched, the Netherlands abided by the 1962 Accord of Washington that turned New Guinea into a part of Indonesia. But the Dutch urge to protect Paouans on New Guinea cannot be explained by economic reductionism; there was no profit for the Netherlands in such an action. Rather, it was a genuine perception that communism endangered the freedom of the Far East. The Netherlands was perhaps not so much of an international liberalist anymore, but a bandwagoning liberalist it certainly was. In this respect, the Dutch marched with the US. Thus, the desire to protect New Guinea took place in parallel with the Dutch enthusiasm for the UN, NATO and European integration. What happened in the Dutch case was not so much a change of ultimate aims, as it was a change of the means by which to achieve these goals. The UN became the vehicle for favouring an international scene in which international law had a decisive role. NATO became the chief instrument of peace. European integration was the preferred alternative in order to achieve trade across borders. For all the changes in the international hierarchy as well as the alterations in Dutch domestic politics, a core of the national habitus stayed in place. In addition to these institutional solutions, Dutch liberalism was mirrored in very substantial programs of development aid. In fact, it is no exaggeration to claim that politicians and bureaucrats alike saw the development programs as a continuity of the Dutch liberalism that it perceived as an integral part of colonial policy during what Dutch historians have labeled the "ethical period". Overseas administrators in this period did not see themselves, or were perceived in the Dutch public, as colonisers, but rather as development experts. Thus, a huge support for development projects has remained above politics throughout the 20th century. It is true that aspects of the Dutch imperial conduct remained hidden to public attention for much of this century, and that criticism eventually arose on these matters. On the other hand, some Dutch ambiguity as to the multicultural legacies of the empire also has found political expressions that many observers find disturbing. Yet, the arguments on restricting immigration do not seem to make the Dutch polity adapt to a less liberal policy.

1487 See Wesseling, 1980: 130-132
5.5 Navies in a unipolar world Order; The US and North European Naval strength

As we saw in the section on Britain in this chapter, the modalities of extraterritorial violence was somewhat changed after WWII. In terms of technicalities, the modern naval force of the stronger sea power was a much more complicated organization, easier to direct from onshore headquarters, much more autonomous, much more strategic through range and striking capability, and in many ways more stealth and distant from the territories to which it belonged. The cold war gave major incentives for a technological effort to out beat potential adversaries for more than four decades. Not so much changed during this period in terms of naval thought, however. It was certainly the case that Soviet build-up of a fleet of strategic submarines with a vast nuclear striking capability spurred NATO to change some priorities, but as social praxis, the planning for and application of extraterritorial violence did not change principally. However, the period from 1990 is much more challenging and conceptually intriguing to the student of this particular aspect of the monopoly of violence that every state seeks to gain. I have therefore chosen to summarize and compare the naval strength of the units of analysis in this section. As of the distribution of power in the international system, military power still is of vital importance. Extraterritorial power, in particular, is a strong indicator of the capability a state has to project power and the reach this projection has. For the US Navy, the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium represented more of a continuity than change. At the level of security political assessment, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR-2001) of September 30th 2001 certainly did reflect an increased focus on what is labeled "new" threats, vulnerabilities and the tactics of terrorism and 4th generation warfare. However, in terms of platforms, weapon systems, personnel and tactics, not much has changed since the end of the cold war. In spite of the rhetoric of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the administration of Bush the younger, the alleged need for reform produced few innovations. What was new after the horrible terrorist attacks of 911 was an increased US sense of vulnerability. The oceans that for centuries had protected the "First New Nation" from the evil forces of Eurasia did no longer seem like the buffers they once represented. To an administration that initially showed traits of contempt

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for "Wilsonianism", the terrorist attacks suddenly presented in the starkest manner the realities of a world of interdependence. It is interesting, however, to note that the QDR-2001 showed an immense interest in the coastal zones of Eurasia in general, and that of the Middle East in particular. It remains a fact that a minimum of stability in this area was and is a vital interest to the US, due to the substantial energy resources in the region. Apart from this, the Pentagon documents were reflections of traditional national interests and the upholding of US values that have been described from chapter 2 and onwards. Through the policy for its Navy alone, the US signaled a global commitment to shape the international security environment. The ability to project power in order to stabilize conflicts, deter belligerents and reassure allies seemed a central tool for the policymakers who perceived the US as an "indispensable nation" in a Hobbesian world. Nevertheless, this did not transform the organization of the US Navy in terms of material, organization or personnel over night. As of 2001, the US Navy's and Marine Corps’ operational capabilities rested with the following types and numbers of platforms and with the following suggestions for the future force structure:

**Table 5.5.1: Force structure of the US Navy and US Marine Corps 2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Unit</th>
<th>Status 2001</th>
<th>Proposed Force Structure 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combat vessels (active/reserve)</td>
<td>108/8</td>
<td>99/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational amphibious groups</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN-attack submarines</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN-strategic submarines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of vessels</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>Ca 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers (CVS)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Wings (active/reserve)</td>
<td>10/1</td>
<td>7/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational airplanes</td>
<td>4000+</td>
<td>Uncertain at time of writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy personnel on active duty (officers/sailors)</td>
<td>53807/323288</td>
<td>Total estimated to ca. 300000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mef-Marine expeditionary Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions (active/reserve)</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>3/1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The total impression of these figures should be divided into two groups of comments. Firstly, the extraterritorial forces of the US AD 2001 were larger than the corresponding organizations and platforms of any other state in the world. The US had inherited a colossus consisting of units from the Cold war through the US Marine Corps and the US Navy. In CVS alone, for example, no other state or even potential coalition of states has any chance of matching those of the USA. In addition, one should note that the very substantial US Coast Guard (under the responsibility of “Homeland Security”) is not included in the above numbers.

Even more striking to the contemporary observer is the continuity represented by the force structure goals for the year 2015. The down-scaling of extraterritorial means of violence is on the whole microscopic in quantitative terms (the only exception is that of the use of battleships. The last battleship, USS Missouri, was decommissioned in 1992). By and large, moreover, it is the same type of platform, and the same organizations that form the basis for future estimates. Thus, the US did not significantly reduce its naval ambitions following the Cold War. Moreover, 911 gave new incentives for substantial allocations for new ships, better weapons systems and overseas deployment. Inherent in this mode of thought was also a fundamental continuity of beliefs, of ideology- in a broad sense. It is not that the US necessarily asks other polities whether it has a right to defend the freedoms it holds for sacred, US policymakers just assume that the world must be made safe for democracy; however naïve Eurasian commentators may view such a policy. Neither can material factors be said to be the only plausible explanation for such a policy. While one can argue that a military-industrial complex does indeed exist in the US, this is not a sufficient explanation as to why the US takes upon itself such grandiose tasks in order to uphold an international framework based on values just as much as following a narrow national interest. In sum, the extraterritorial dimension of the US was unique in both quantitative and ideological terms at the turn of the century. Moreover, it was a result of the peculiar US foreign policy trajectory of the US. In the words of Andrew Bacevich;

[The US navy also could demonstrate that even its CVS were not obsolete platforms in the war on terrorism: " As example, on 11 September 2001, USS Enterprise (CVN 65) had just been relieved from being on station in support of Operation Southern Watch. She was heading south in the Indian Ocean, beginning her trip back to homeport in Norfolk, Va., when, on television, they saw the live coverage of attack on the World Trade Center, then on the Pentagon. Enterprise, without an order from the chain of command, put the rudder over, executed a 180-degree course change and headed back to the waters off Southwest Asia. Enterprise then remained on station in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, launching air attacks against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban military installations in Afghanistan. For approximately the next three weeks, aircraft from Enterprise flew nearly 700 missions in Afghanistan, dropping hundreds of thousands of pounds of ordnance."
"The politicoeconomic concept to which the United States adheres today has not changed in a century: the familiar quest for an "open world", the overriding imperative of commercial integration, confidence that technology endows the United States with a privileged position in that order, and the expectation that American military might will preserve order and enforce the rules.\textsuperscript{1491}

For better or worse, this belief, one is tempted to say this particular and enduring ideological construction, made the US prone to force its will on international institutions in general, and questions of war and peace in particular, since ideologic as well as material interests influenced US judgements as to desired courses of action in international relations. In the next section, we will look into the potential weakness of such a worldview, but no one can deny the fact that the US won the cold war. For decades, world systems theorists have declared the fall or decline of the US within this system, and Paul Kennedy in 1987 famously argued in much the same manner, but the bottom line is that the US prevailed. At the time of writing, the US is comparatively stronger in conventional, military terms than on any other point in history. The data in this section shows this in naval terms, and to a striking degree. If the question of power is not so much the geopolitical position of the US, then the domestic and international ideologic power of the US will be more vulnerable than its military power.\textsuperscript{1492} We will analyse one highly interesting approach to this question in the next section, but if we compare the extraterritorial military power of the US with the North European states, then the position of the US in strict military terms is obvious.

The naval policies of Great Britain were based on similar threat assessments as in the US (although the security concept is somewhat broader than in the corresponding US documents). In all other respects, there are clear differences between the two.\textsuperscript{1493} A major similarity with the US exists in the sense that the Royal navy too has global assignments. These tasks are nevertheless described in much less ideological terms. The British Strategic Defense Review laid more emphasis on support

\textsuperscript{1491} Bacevich, 2002: 6
\textsuperscript{1492} See Nau, 2002: 237-253 for an interesting discussion. Both Bacevich and Nau share the emphasis on history and ideology in US foreign policy as chosen in this thesis, although their approaches otherwise are somewhat different. In his study of US attitudes towards imperialism, historian David Ryan in 2000:227 concludes that "by taking ideas seriously, by seeing them as inescapable and potent, and by following the ways in which they help leaders make sense of a diverse and fluid world, we get a better sens of the multiple currents of thought that combined in various ways to shape the evolvingUS approach to decolonization". In the next section, we turn the same approach on its head; what could predominant US reactions be to any attempt at making the US into an occupation force over great territories?
of overseas territories and management of humanitarian operations and peace support operations (PSO). Although 911 certainly influenced British thinking on security and naval priorities, there seems to have been even less of a juncture in British policies and doctrine than in the US with the beginning of the "war on terrorism". This is not surprising when one considers the ideological foundations of British foreign policy, so heavily influenced by the Imperial legacy. The troubles in Northern Ireland have been lasting, ensuring that both British politicians, military personnel and the general population have not been strangers to the effects of terrorism. The ability to carry out combined, joint operations is strongly emphasized, but as in the case of the US, there are few signs of radical rethinking of platforms and larger weapon systems, with the exception that strategic lifting capacity is increased through the lease of civilian merchantmen for use as roll-on, roll-off vessels (a capacity that the US has had for years). In quantitative terms, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines make up a much, much smaller organization and capability of extraterritorial violence than those of the US, as can be seen from table 5.5.2.

Table 5.5.2; Force structure Royal Navy and the Royal Marines\textsuperscript{1494}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/Unit</th>
<th>Status 2001</th>
<th>Proposed Force Structure 2015\textsuperscript{1495}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious vessels</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates and Destroyers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter carriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare vessels</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total nr. Fighting vessels</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol vessels</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30 (uncertain number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support vessels in Royal Fleet Auxiliaries (RFA)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply-vessels</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes and helicopters</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Current estimates indicate approximately the same number in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Marines</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel, total</td>
<td>43562</td>
<td>Estimated at 43500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{1494} Based on Royal Navy Strategy Plan 2001, The Next Fifteen Years, 2002
\textsuperscript{1495} Again, the numbers for proposed force structures for 2015 are very tentative.
These figures give us a crude portrait of British naval developments in three dimensions. Firstly - and not surprisingly - Britain is a naval dwarf compared to the US. Moreover, the crucial extraterritorial power-potential through US Marines, aircraft and the flexibility inherent in US CVS, is lacking any correspondence, quantitatively speaking, in the British case.

Secondly, as in the case of the US, there are no dramatic discontinuities in the British Naval organisation. The Royal Navy and Royal Marines certainly are to be modernised in arms, and command- and control-apparatus; but the ships, Marine units and airpower platforms remain as the same type of representatives for one kind of thinking in military means. In this respect, British policy on extraterritorial means of violence is similar to the dominant one in the US. A rethinking of security threats and -vulnerabilities has not led to a significant change at the conceptual or material solution to protection of national interests through naval means.

Thirdly, I find reason to point out that there nevertheless is a considerable ambition behind the British plan for its maritime force structure for the coming years. Considering the almost astounding rise in cost in military technology, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines remain as one integrated cornerstone of the UK as a state. In an era where globalization seemed to make some political scientists and historians predict the decline of the nation-state, the state apparatus in the monopoly of violence remained the most formidable to any other competing form of organisation. At the operational level, however, the British extraterritorial forces were used more extensively in distant waters than during the cold war. This is a main reason why the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines will remain more or less of the same size for some years to come. The intensive pattern of overseas deployment made British strategists and politicians alike prone to listen to Admiralty demands that there be no reduction in the number of personnel and capital ships. One step below in the international hierarchy, Germany, The Netherlands and all the Nordic states, even Iceland, kept naval forces intact throughout the 1990s (Germany is included here for the sake of comparison). As can be seen from table 6.5.3, these states were individually far less ambitious in their naval organisations than was Britain. However, several of the countries listed below cooperated in an institutionalised manner, and in naval terms even more intensely by 2001 than they did during much of the cold war. It is in fact striking to note that these states, including Norway that was not part of the EU, cooperated on development and purchase of technology, and exercised jointly and combined to an unprecedented degree, also with countries like France and Spain. Thus, the somewhat modest size of national navies should be seen in the light of increased genuine military cooperation within the EU framework (Iceland is not included here. Iceland does have a Coast Guard of 4 vessels and
128 personnel to man these vessels, largely occupied by the surveillance of fishing restrictions. Neither is Finland included, with its mainly littoral defense of Finnish territory).

Table 5.5.3 Force structure of Navies in Germany, The Netherlands and the Nordic countries 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type units</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional submarines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates and destroyers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7 (Thetis class included)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(classified as frigates by the Dutch Navy, and therefore included above)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>(Classified as frigates above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare vessels</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Numerous coast guard vessels</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast patrol boats or patrol vessels, large types</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Numerous coast guard vessels 16</td>
<td>Numerous coast guard vessels</td>
<td>(Plus 13 coast guard vessels various types)</td>
<td>Numerous smaller vessels in the coast guard and coastal artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply vessels</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 (support vessel)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes and helicopters</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(2001: all aircraft under the Command of the Royal Norwegian Air Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious vessels</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 (later decommissioned)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Numerous small vessels for littoral warfare the coastal artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>27200</td>
<td>Marines: Approximately 3000 in 3 Mariniersbataljen</td>
<td>4060</td>
<td>4950</td>
<td>9500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, the Netherlands and Germany are far closer to being naval powers of significance than any of the Nordic states. Moreover, apart from the littoral warfare units of Sweden and Norway that

clearly are mainly equipped for defense of motherland territory, the Netherlands is unique in this category of states in having a substantial Marine force consisting of three battalions.

Germany is a considerable naval power, especially if we take into consideration new naval vessels that are currently under construction. As in the case of the Netherlands, Germany does have a substantial number of aircraft designed to execute air to surface warfare at sea. Moreover, it has both the quantity and know-how of littoral warfare through its missile boats, mine warfare ships and amphibious vessels.

The two longstanding NATO members Denmark and Norway have small navies, both in number and displacements of platforms as well as in manpower. This is all the more striking considering the scope of their extraterritorial sovereignty. Clearly, the solid foundation of thought established during the cold war that their navies were designed for regional operations and that allies would come to their assistance in a crisis, has not been replaced by a strengthening of extraterritorial platforms in quantitative measures. It is only by the year 2006 that any substantial modernization will materialize through modern ocean-going surface vessels.

In quantitative terms, Sweden surprisingly is the strongest of the three Scandinavian states, although the gap is shrinking fast due to Swedish force reductions. The legacy of neutrality partly explains this, since Sweden focused on the defense of its littoral zones during the cold war to a degree that dwarfed similar efforts by Denmark and Norway. This largely resulted in very considerable Swedish coastal artillery, including mobile units, which partly has survived to this day. The sea-going navy was in a very different position during the cold war; "for the entire postwar era the Swedish navy has been a service in search of a mission".¹⁴⁹⁷ From 1945 till 1958, the Swedish navy was assigned the dual purposes of defending against enemy invasion and securing sea-lines of communications to the western powers, but Swedish authorities increasingly came to perceive surface vessels in the Baltic as too vulnerable. In fact, by 1970, Sweden had decommissioned the last of its destroyers and almost all its submarines. This became a legacy that also made Sweden remain an "introvert" extraterritorial power during the 1990s. By 2001, however, international deployments became more of a priority, and the Visby-class corvettes were seen as expedient tools for such purposes.

The incremental changes in doctrine, equipment and organisation of the extraterritorial means of violence was also distinct in the case of Norway, and to some degree also Denmark. One political scientist has identified the sources of this incremental change as a direct result of a peculiar Norwegian "defense tradition". In this tradition, history was interpreted in a manner that

¹⁴⁹⁷ Kruzel, 1989: 81
strengthened the army over the Navy. To a lesser degree, the same applied to Denmark, and the historic wars with Germany reinforced this Danish foreign policy culture throughout the 20th Century. In other words, Norway historically had had Sweden, while Denmark had both Sweden and Germany as neighboring states with which they had ambiguous historic relations. In popular expressions, the differences were emphasized rather than the similarities when the crucial period of nation-building occurred in the Nordic security complex. As we have seen earlier, nationalism suppressed Scandinavism. For both Denmark and Norway, one result of this was a navy of very modest ambitions and organisation, both compared to Sweden and when one considers the importance of extraterritorial sovereignty for these coastal states.

This historic legacy came under considerable pressure when forces were to be modernised for meeting "new" security challenges. The latter development, restructuring the extraterritorial means of violence for the purposes of being able to deploy naval forces in combined, joint frameworks in operations beyond local and regional waters, became a point of convergence in political rhetoric in all the above countries, especially after 2001. How extensive impact this rhetoric and these goals will have on the use of navies and marines, and whether it will change naval doctrines principally, is too early to tell.

5.6 The past as the future in the Atlantic empire? Overseas occupations, terrorism and piracy

However, it is quite clear from the above that the organisation and platforms of extraterritorial military power are not being changed principally. Whether this will actually be a limiting factor on attempts at creating a new doctrine for the navies of the western world is a reasonable question. If we are to take the threat assessment so dominating among NATO members during the "war on terrorism" seriously, one might indeed wonder whether submarines, destroyers, frigates and Marines are the most suitable means to fight terrorism, or more broadly speaking what historian William Lind has dubbed "4th Generation warfare" (see below). It is true that frigates, corvettes and perhaps destroyers are still important to control sea-lines of communication. Frigates, corvettes and fast patrol boats might be very well suited to stop piracy, if these vessels are produced and deployed in the sufficient number. The same vessels, but particularly the smaller ones, are also suited to the enormous task of inspecting transports at sea, so vital for non-state belligerents when operating on a

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1498 Ulriksen, 2002. Ulriksen demonstrates his thesis on the basis of the study of texts on Norwegian defence priorities. Although one might argue that the selection of these texts is somewhat biased, Ulriksen manages to demonstrate the striking fact that this particular maritime periphery gave the army a clear priority to the Navy.
larger scale. Neither should one lightly dismiss the argument of the US Navy that aircraft carriers are ideally suited in order to deliver air power and protection from the sea. It is nevertheless striking to note that the actual problem of fighting international "terrorism" by traditional military doctrines and -platforms remains unresolved, and perhaps especially so for sea- and air-power (although it might be argued that most regular western armies are hardly more conceptually developed in this respect).

If we take a 4th generation warfare perspective on the use of force at sea and from the sea, it appears that the western states have a problem. One major challenge naturally is that the immense rise in the cost of building, equipping and operating modern warships has made navies rather small in terms of number of vessels. This makes both ships and planes too few to react against the stealth tactics of 4th generation warfare. The other problem is much, much more complex. It must be seen in the perspective of ideology, the very peculiar character of asymmetric warfare and the limits of what can be achieved by modern navies.

Let us then look at what these challenges actually are, and how they relate to the current world order. In doing so, I will borrow from two historians and military theorists that from the perspective of political science might seem obscure or rather marginal. Martin van Creveld and William Lind nevertheless have important insights that are far from obscure for the sociologist or political scientist studying the modern state, globalisation and warfare. Both scholars share the conviction that the modern state is in trouble. Not because of the globalisation of national economies or information, but because the modern state will no longer be equipped to deliver its main task of protecting society from the globalisation of violence by non-state actors.

Let us begin with William Lind and his theory of 4th generation warfare (4GW).1500 In an article published in the Marine Corps gazette in 1989, with Lind as one of the co-authors, the essence of 4th generation warfare was described like this;

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1500 More recently, Lind has summed up the concept of different generations of warfare in the following way; "The First Generation ran from 1648 to about the time of the American Civil War, and it was characterized, on the whole, by a battlefield of order. The battlefield of order created a military culture of order, which endures to this day. And there's the rub. For around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Ever since, state militaries have had to grapple with a growing contradiction between their internal culture of order and the external reality of an increasingly disordered battlefield.

The Second and Third Generations represent two different approaches to that problem. Second Generation war was developed by the French Army during and after World War I. Also known as firepower/attrition warfare, Second Generation war maintained the First Generation culture of order. Decision-making was centralized and hierarchical; orders were detailed and controlling, to permit synchronization of all arms.

Third Generation war, also known as maneuver warfare, was developed by the German Army in World War I; by
"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. \[1501\]

The article produced debate within the then marginal camp of military theoreticians (the cold war did not produce major interest in military theory outside of military academies in the western world), but was otherwise ignored by academia, with one singular exception. Samuel P. Huntington based his 1993 article in Foreign Affairs "A Clash of Civilizations" on the conception of 4th generation warfare as elaborated by the authors of the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette. With the terrorist attacks in 2001, the concept of a clash of civilizations awoke new interest. But the true insights and questions raised by the 4th generation warfare literature seemed to remain either completely unnoticed or badly misinterpreted in the US. \[1502\] In other quarters, however, the normatively problematic (from a western point of view) notion of 4th generation warfare was being intensely studied. Exemplars of William Lind's "The Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook", written for the USMC, were found inside the command posts of Al Qaeda in the mountains of Afghanistan in 2002.

Correspondingly, the Iraq war was a tragic testimony of a western reluctance to address the new security threats within novel intellectual frameworks. Thus, Lind concludes that the decision of the Bush and Blair administrations to invade and occupy Iraq was a strategic blunder based on international liberalism on part of the US. Israeli Professor Martin van Creveld has noted that in a


1502 Why does the concept of 4th generation warfare, and an acceptance that 4th generation warfare seem so problematic for Western, but also for secular states in general? Conceptually, militarily and politically, it will probably be very hard for the modern state to adapt to the development if it entails a loss of the state monopoly of violence. The major problem is perhaps normative. To the extent that we accept 4th generation warfare as war, we also accept that the division between internal and external (domestic versus foreign policy) becomes much more blurred. Now, this will have a major impact on foreign policies for sure, but it will also threaten what constitutes the polity (see Buzan, 1991 for a conceptual discussion). One might indeed look at the case of Israel, to study how one particular security environment has entailed a state trying to combat non-state groups. But the problem will get even more serious, perhaps, if international terrorism becomes a dominant tactic of 4th generation warfare. The civil
world of interdependence, the conventionally stronger party always loses in an international armed conflict. In his paper, "Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did",\textsuperscript{1503} for example, he mused as to what the Iraq occupation will produce;

"In other words, he who fights against the weak - and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed - and loses, loses... As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force, however rich, however powerful, however advanced, however well motivated is immune to this dilemma. That is why the present adventure will almost certainly end as the previous one (Vietnam) did. Namely, with the last U.S. troops fleeing the country while hanging on to their helicopters' skids."

How come these historians deliver such a gloomy forecast? In order to understand them, we must simplify and address the problem through three analytically different, but highly overlapping, questions; political ideology, the very peculiar character of asymmetric warfare and the limits of what can be achieved by military means by modern, secular western states. Since this thesis is about the policies and ideology of extraterritorial power, we will emphasis the first group of factors. However, we will seek to demonstrate that these variables are related to the two other classes of questions in a way that often escapes proper attention.

Firstly, while the end of the cold war ended the appeal of Marxism, mankind had certainly not reached "The End of History". While political ideology did no longer seem important as a cleavage within the western world, the end of the struggle between liberalism and Marxism has in fact made international affairs more, not less, ideologically laden. This reaction started in earnest in 1981 with the Presidency of Ronald Reagan.\textsuperscript{1504} Gradually, and intensified from 1991, the western world seemed to converge around the notion of international liberalism. Powerful states and international institutions alike sought to export this ideology to Eastern Europe. But beyond this, radical Islamism was on the rise in North Africa, Indonesia, several Arab countries and in Afghanistan and the Caucasus. The terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 was conducted by the most violent off-spring of liberties and the open society, so important for western ideology throughout the postwar era, might come under pressure. Indeed, one does not need to belong to the left to warn against such a trend at the time of writing.\textsuperscript{1503} Paper delivered by van creveld, Bergen May 13 May 2004.

\textsuperscript{1504} This is a simplification, indeed. Ideology, we have argued, have always played an important role in shaping foreign policy. But the rise of the "neoconservative" movement in the US can be dated back to the war in the Middle East in 1973, where conservatives, friends of Israel and US idealists merged in condemnation of the Republican administration for not doing enough to support Israel. For a biased but highly interesting discussion of this particular process from one who became victim of this movement, see Vol II of Henry Kissinger's biography. For a
Islamism, and the first actions against the Taliban Regime of Afghanistan and Al-Qa"da therefore achieved solid international support. The initial actions also had some traits of success, but all that followed showed how the ideological component is vital to a proper understanding of the huge gap between international liberalism and other cultures. While the international community, led by the US, sought to stabilize the country in the aftermath of the major military operations, it struggled in Afghanistan in terms of creating a monopoly of violence or anything resembling such a construct. In fact, the western world had major problems in small Kosovo, in spite of a continued UN, NATO and EU presence. It seemed as if international liberalism was not able to gain even the tiniest lasting foothold in these areas by means acceptable to the ideology of the western nations themselves.

The weakening of NATO was accelerated within a few years after 911. The fact is that NATO no longer had the purpose that initially served as the building-blocks for the alliance (i.e. to keep the Germans down, the Russians out and the US in). Since established institutions die very slowly and reluctantly, the alliance throughout the 1990s sought to redefine its roles. However, the original interest in the alliance was gone, since the Soviet Union and communism was no longer deemed as a threat against Europe. This made the alliance vulnerable to disagreements on what constitutes the most important security concerns and in what way these should be addressed. To France and Germany in particular, there were also limits as to how long they would walk with the US. When the US combined international liberalism with what was perceived (however exaggerated or distorted such perceptions could be, this did not nullify the effect of perceptions as such) as something of a “unilateral gunfighter-nation attitude”, the cohesion among some of the western allies soon was weakened. This largely became manifest with the US initiative to invade Iraq (the cleavages that resulted in Europe to some degree consisted of Atlanticist versus non-Atlanticist states, "new" versus "old" European states, and between the elite and the majority of public opinion in the states that supported the US invasion). The invasion succeeded, but the occupation failed, at least in the short run. Once inside Iraq, a large number of different Islamic groups applied 4GW tactics in order to decrease the legitimacy of the occupation forces. Moreover, the actual conduct of the occupation forces combined with US tacit support of Israeli policies eventually managed to enrage the Arab world and raise already elevated European disbelief of US intentions in the Middle East. Indeed, the US citizens themselves came to doubt in the leadership of their country and the wisdom of US interventionism. In one single year, disapproval of how the President was handling the situation rose from 22 to 58 %. The international reaction was even less favourable. When asked whether they

discussion of the dangers of ideologic foreign policy, see the last chapter in Volume III of the biography by the same author.

http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm
believed the war in Iraq had helped the war on terrorism, respondents throughout the world responded largely in the negative. Surprisingly, the legitimacy of the US hegemony had plummeted only 2 years after the attacks on US soil in 2001.

The result of the Iraq-war fallout was an exposure of the political and ethical dilemmas that US policymakers and military units are bound to face in an age of 4th generation warfare. It seems almost incomprehensible how a democratic state can achieve victory without compromising the values for which it stands. In this respect, the dissimilarity to its opponents is astounding, since the non-state actors show no respect for the Geneva Convention or other international norms of behaviour in conflict. The resulting frustration and low morale in the armed forces of the state is inevitable. One consequence of this is a tactical conduct that undermines the legitimacy of the forces and the state leadership itself. As William Lind and his co-authors in the 1989 article concluded, it is not the case that the small groups using 4th generation tactics will engage its enemies on the "battlefield", understood in traditional western terms.

In sum, the US, or for that matter any other western state's, ambitions to transform distant regimes through intervention by force are limited by both international norms and their domestic institutions and level of public support. On both levels, legitimacy is a prerequisite for effective action and the endurance to carry out political reform and the desired social and legal improvements conceived in terms of human rights, market reform and the rule of law.

The chief problem, if one is to be cynical, was that the age of imperialism had passed. The high ideals of a western power AD 2003 could not be imposed through intervention in the same manner that the older European empires once sought to transform their overseas territories. It was not only that the ultimate aims of promoting human rights, the rule of law and relatively free markets were more far-ranging than the goals of the 19th century European colonial states. The international climate was much less inclined to support large-scale interventions that did not comply with the international institutional logic, and lack of such support mattered in the 21st century. Secondly, and perhaps even more important, the US as a polity and society was not inclined to see itself as an empire either. Thus, as US policies (however undeservedly as seen from Washington DC) came to be compared to imperialism based on the actual conduct of US foreign policy, it lost support in a dramatic way by 2004. This is all the more striking when one considers the huge support the Bush administration had both in domestic and international realms in 2001/2002. While the US intervention in Iraq and its conduct in Afghanistan certainly was less of an imperialist policy than the praxis in overseas possessions of the British Empire, the US came to be criticized for what was

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\[1506\] The Washington Post, March 2004. Note that the survey was carried out prior to the publication of photos of US
labelled imperialism. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US president George W. Bush set out to create a new order in international affairs in general, and in the Middle East and Western Central Asia in particular, partly through the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this respect, the invasion of Iraq was something much more ambitious than ending the efforts of the Saddam Hussein regime from building or using weapons of mass destruction. The pendulum between isolationism and international interventionism had swung in the direction of interventionism after the 911 attacks. This made stark measures against terrorists and potential enemies of the US politically possible to a surprising degree. In September 2002, for example, Head of the CIA Counterterrorist Centre, Cofer Black, said openly that the agency applied new forms of "operational flexibility" against suspected terrorists in US captivity. He stated that these novel US ways of dealing with prisoners were highly classified, but that "I have to say that all you need to know: There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11". But it did not take so long before pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq made the US public and the world “know”. Needless to say, the US public was as disgusted as many international commentators. The treatment of these and other prisoners was a breach with US values as well with international treaties that the US signed in 1949, and therefore backfired both domestically and internationally.

The strategic problem in a world of international institutions based on, exactly, order as conceived as relations between states, combined with the operations by 4GW organisations such as Al Quaida, is that western extraterritorial military organisations are not ideally suited to the task they are assigned. The occupation of Iraq is a good example of this peculiar mechanism when a high-tech western power combats 4th generation opponents applying guerrilla warfare, or "terrorism" as a tactic; the US is condemned throughout much of the world, while the 4th generation warriors that live off the land and mingle with the civilian population can continue their appalling, indiscriminate killing.

Therefore, it is possible to comprehend why it does not really solve the problem that the US Defence Budget for 2003 comprises over 40 per cent of the world's total spending on military material and operations. While US defence spending with the current growth rate is starting to approach half of the globe's spending on the military, the US has only 5 percent of the world's soldiers. This
becomes an acute problem for the US (and we have demonstrated above that numerically, the US is much larger than the other western powers in military terms) after their sophisticated units and platforms have gained a tactical victory on overseas territory. After such a victory, of course, the territory in question must be pacified through a long-term occupation. While the 19th century European empires could do this in a brutal fashion, the US is restricted from doing so by her own, as well as international, norms of the postwar era. This is clear evidence of profound change in the international system, and illustrates the differences between the British and US “Empires”.

While the 19th century British Empire could rule over vast territories with limited forces by recruiting local and regional manpower, the US forces are literally protected in fortresses when they are not on patrol in hostile territory.

While the 19th century representatives of the British Empire went on duty to an overseas colony, they expected to stay for a very long period indeed. As a result, they merged with the local population where they served. This had several long-lasting implications. In British India, for example, while the officers remained Europeans, the non-commissioned officers soon had a majority of children of marriages between a British soldier and an Indian mother. In contrast, by spring 2004, morale among US servicemen crumbled as their contracts with the Army and the Marine Corps were extended for longer duties. While Civil-Military cooperation certainly had own units, US servicemen and -women had very little contact with the local population neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan. While the British imperialists relied heavily on local rulers and built order with armies consisting of natives, the US solution early in the 2003 occupation of Iraq was to dissolve existing military units and police, practically making the servicemen of the earlier monopoly of violence into unemployed men with an uncertain future. While the old European states like France and Britain to this day have elite units of foreign mercenaries (The French Foreign Legion and the British "Ghurkhas"), the US has no such corresponding unit. While the European states learned about 4th generation warfare in places like North Africa and Northern Ireland over extended periods of time, the US was not prepared for the tactics they faced in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. The US, with the single exception of the early occupation years in the Philippines, was not an imperialist power. To the contrary, a dominant trait in US society was defined by being the opposite of the old European states. This international liberalism and US idealism has been instrumental in determining where US military power is applied, and how the US public opinion receives media coverage of a
not so liberal treatment of prisoners or civilian population in areas they seek to pacify. Moreover, it is perhaps not so surprising that a US administration, that believes in the power of civil society, individual liberty and which saw a corrupt state as the hindrance to Iraqi prosperity, did not plan for an intense restructuring of the Iraqi society through the means of rebuilding infrastructure. To a liberalist, society heals it own wounds. After all, all US citizens -and US soldiers are US citizens- have been taught from their first years in school that US values have been triumphant. And as Elihu Root wrote over one hundred years ago;

"The American soldier is different from all other soldiers of all other countries since the world began... he is the advance guard of liberty and justice, of law and order, and of peace and happiness".

All these, in many ways praiseworthy, beliefs proved to be overly optimistic in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. The historical background for the US when it comes to occupation was Japan and Western Germany, but those territories were different than Afghanistan and Iraq in a number of aspects. The neo-conservatives were aware of this, but in fact some of them seemed to have been inspired by the cost-effectiveness of the historic British Empire. It was just that the British had done things so differently. Where the British imperialists ruled indirectly through native elites with one British commissioner and two or three political officers with an area of responsibility of one thousand square miles in West Africa, US military personnel at the time of writing rely on heavy armour and air support to ride through the streets of Baghdad on their swift patrols. And yet, the US does not apply the more Byzantine practises of dividing and ruling to control the areas of occupation.

One might reasonably set forth the hypothesis that when faced with 4th generation opponents, second and third generation warfare fails. This has important bearings on the relevance of naval forces. While we should be very, very cautious to proclaim that war between modern states has vanished, it seems to me that the traditional thinking on naval strategy (largely a product of the cold war and Alfred Mahan) is almost irrelevant in fighting 4GW. Current doctrine relies heavily on high-tech weapons systems and platforms for extraterritorial use of violence. Naval platforms therefore have become incredibly expensive, and thus navies have shrunk in size. All the navies

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1510 See Mann, 2003: 25-26: "By the early 1800s over 80 percent of the 291,000 imperial troops in India were Indian". He also notes that even after the rebellions (successfully pacificated by the British, in the late 1850s, two-thirds of the Imperial army in India remained Indian.

1511 The legitimacy of US administrations, both in domestic society as well as the international society, is of utmost importance to the US predominance in world politics in a particular manner (see Melby, 2004: 228-236 for a good discussion). If US extraterritorial praxis moves too far away from US ideals, then a crisis of legitimacy might occur.

1512 Cited in Bacevich, 2002: 167
covered in this thesis have converged on this point; they contain very advanced but very few ships with a limited number of servicemen. In fact, this trend has been consistent for the last 60 years. In a war between states, this will make a western alliance, or even the US alone, impossible to defeat in a conventional war at sea, and in defeating military power projected from the sea.

We should be careful, as social scientists, to make the claim that such a war will not occur in the distant future. But based on the evidence from the study of large-scale violence during the last fifty years, it is clear that such wars -where western states are part of the conflict in a direct manner- occurs more and more seldom.\textsuperscript{1513} This opens up the question as to whether the current doctrine and current organisations are as relevant as their price tags would indicate. According to the thinkers behind the theory of 4th generation warfare, new developments must result in a renewal. Fifteen years ago, Lind et al wrote that:

"For about the last 500 years, the West has defined warfare. For a military to be effective it generally had to follow Western models. Because the West's strength is technology, it may tend to conceive of a fourth generation in technological terms. The fact that some non-Western areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to develop a fourth generation through ideas rather than technology."\textsuperscript{1514}

Since this was written in 1989, the ultimate conclusion must be that the hypothesis of 4th generation warfare as a way to combat western influence in general, and the US in particular, is strengthened rather than weakened. The big question on the side of naval praxis will then be whether our present platforms and weapon systems are optimally adjusted to the present and future threats. However, the required adjustment must start at the intellectual level, and must be conceptualized at the political level before a significant change in the praxis of extraterritorial praxis will occur in western states. Based on historical experience, such adjustments seldom come rapidly, and rarely unless the initiator of change has experienced defeat.

It is quite conceivable, in fact has already happened against some units (USS Cole and French tankers), that the enemies of the US and its allies might strike against naval ships, civilian cruise ships, oil tankers, cargo ships, offshore oil- and gas-installations, pipelines and harbors. In a world-system where some 80% of the long-range total transport is carried across seas, spectacular and large-scale disruption of this sector will have profound economic, political and military consequences. In the economic realm, transaction costs will with all probability increase sharply

\textsuperscript{1513} The best argument with empirical proof of this development is in my view van Creveld, 1991
after such attacks. It is not only the lost value of ships and commodities that will count, but also insurance rates and the entire logistical system of industries where producers are interdependent on each other and do not use resources to store raw materials and parts of their products locally. In such an economy, a steady inflow of the material needed for production and a steady outflow of the final product is a necessity for maintaining production. In the political and military realms, consequences are much more difficult to predict. The only certain effect will be a demand for de-centralised extraterritorial forces to protect the sinews of the modern world-system that stretch from continent to continent over the seas. The US or NATO will not have the capacity to protect all sea-lines of communication with existing plans for future force structures and with current doctrines. It will require far more ships and effective command and control of these ships, something that few African, Asian or Middle East countries are capable of supporting. The true maritime dilemma of the 21st century is therefore how to avoid such terrorism at sea.

In this respect, another maritime development in the "new world order" with its "new" security challenges- piracy- might prove illustrative. While piracy is not necessarily an activity of 4th generation warfare -piracy is defined as a criminal act separate from terrorism- there nevertheless is a link between piracy and 4th generation warfare at sea. Firstly, acts of piracy are carried out by non-state actors that do not seek any kind of military-technological symmetry with the western powers. This leads to a second parallel; pirates seek weak and largely unprotected targets, a kind of indirect approach. Thirdly, pirates clearly thrive in areas of disorder, understood as weak states. While weak states may have problems in controlling their territory, they more often have even bigger problems in controlling the waters under their de jure national jurisdiction. All these parallels, I argue, make a look into the anti-piracy efforts of international institutions worthwhile.

The 1982 UN Treaty on the Law of the Sea defined piracy in the following way in article 101

"Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts

1514 Lind et al, 1989: 25
In retrospect, it is easy to see that part a) ii would cause problems in addressing piracy from the standpoint of international law. The problem was that some states saw the 200nm. EEZ as "within national jurisdiction" for all practical purposes, whereas “failed states” did not even have the capacity to provide a minimum of law and order within their territorial waters. Therefore, the coastal state had the responsibility to exercise control within this zone, also with the purpose of stopping and prosecuting pirates. Needless to say, such tasks were beyond the capacity of many poor states. In many ways, it is not improper to say that the 1982 UNCLOS was unprepared for the fact that "failed states" might facilitate considerable problems for maritime safety. Like almost all other international treaties, the Law of the Sea institutions were based on the State as the "international person" responsible for its domain and its acts. Thus, the increase of the scope of coastal state jurisdiction also increased the scope of the problems of failed states. It is no exaggeration to claim that the problems in some states increasingly became internationalised in the process. From around 1980, piracy emerged as a global security challenge; between 1984 and 1999, the IMO has compiled 1587 attacks by pirates worldwide, presumably the actual number is much higher. Through international pressure and support, some weak states nevertheless managed to control piracy within their national jurisdiction better. This was the case for some years in the waters off West Africa, where piracy constituted a big problem in the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1986, this region -and especially the Nigerian EEZ- had the highest reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea. In average, 25 cases were reported each year. The frequency of these assaults decreased significantly after efforts by Nigerian authorities to curb piracy within their national jurisdiction had been implemented. Needless to say, such a result was only possible though extensive operations by Nigerian navy and police forces, a level of state alertness that proved not to be sustainable. By 1998, the annual attacks off West Africa had risen to 22 again.

Another problem area was the Malacca Strait, one of the busiest waterways in the world that during the last decade has also become one of the most dangerous. During the 1980s, piracy was not

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1515 UNCLOS Official text. Resources on Piracy from 1990 are scarce. Some books on the theme have been published by journalists and popular writers. I have therefore restricted the use of sources to the Oficial statistics and papers presented by the IMO and MSC.
One should also note that literally NO scholars have addressed the question of 4th generation warfare and naval forces. Indeed, scholars on military theory struggle with the same conceptual limitations as the author of this thesis does in this respect. As we will see, these problems at the intellectual level is perhaps even more striking in military circles.

1516 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:1

1517 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:2
common here, with an average of 7 assaults per year, again according to the IMO report. With the
dismantling of the bipolar world order, piracy in the Malacca Strait exploded. There were 28 acts of
piracy in 1989, and 50 in 1991 alone.\textsuperscript{1518} What made the Malacca Strait particularly important was
the fact that it is one of the busiest waterways in the world, with more than 200 large ships passing
each and every day. This makes the Malacca Strait interesting, beyond the question of piracy. Like
Gibraltar, Bosporus, The Channel, and the Panama and Suez channels, the Malacca Strait belongs to
a group of straits that can be characterised as the arteries of the integrated world economy. With
energy and safe transportation being of outmost concern for the advanced economies, it is easy to
see how failed states and 4th generation warfare makes for a rather dubious amalgam. NATO
officials realized this in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, and used NATO naval forces to
escort civilian shipping through the Eastern Mediterranean. But what body should take
responsibility for the Malacca Strait (Indonesia certainly displayed little enthusiasm for the US
proposals for increased US naval presence in these waters)?

The question of suppressing piracy here in the 1990s offer some insights as to the potential and the
limits to use an institution like the IMO and the states in the region to reduce irregular armed forces
in such vital waterways.

The Malacca Strait is shallow and narrow in some stretches, making boarding by pirates at night
easier. Surveillance systems aboard commercial ships therefore would make the transit much safer.
But merchantmen have sparse weapons to protect themselves from more heavily armed pirates or
terrorists. Neither was arming of merchantmen seen as especially desirable by the international
institutions (a revival of this old yet abandoned praxis is not entirely unfeasible, though).\textsuperscript{1519} On this
background, the IMO therefore set out to work out regional arrangements for this particular strait,
and simultaneously to give recommendations for ship-owners and -operators. This should be seen as
the start of a development which outcome we do not know, but one which clearly are raising the
protection costs of transport at sea. An IMO working group with experts from ten countries started
to cooperate with the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore)
in 1992 in order to produce a comprehensive report with recommendations for crews, ship-owners,
flag states, all coastal states and port states. Clearly, these recommendations could apply to other
regions as well, so that there could have been a substantial learning effect from the Malacca case.

The findings of the expert group resulted in two circulars from the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) in 1993. The first one was MSC/Circ. 622-"Recommenations to Governments for preventing

\textsuperscript{1518} Ibid: 3
and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships", while MSC/Circ 623 contained
"Guidance to ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing
acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships". These suggestions (and suggestions they were),
made the more political IMO Assembly adopt a new resolution- A.738 (18), recommending
measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships. These suggestions are
significant in a historic perspective, since they signalled the rise in protection of civilian shipping
and transport at sea that has continued until the time of writing. On the other hand, the IMO
resolution did not contain measures beyond the sharing of information through channels of
communication already established. The real improvement was simply a system of reporting acts of
piracy and attempts to armed robbery or similar incidents. This undoubtedly made reporting and
localising this security challenge easier. To a large degree, the measures aimed at utilising existing
international institutions in creating a system of early warning of piracy. As a result, IMO in
collaboration with the International Mobile Satellite Organization (Immarsat) and the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) included "Piracy/armed robbery attack" "as a category of distress
message which ships can now transmit through either the DSC (Digital Selective Calling) or
Immarsat equipment by simply pressing a button"1520 on the bridge of the ship. Such a message will
automatically be received by shore stations and ships in the vicinity of the attacked ship. Together
with the regional cooperation on naval patrolling by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the
frequency of pirate attacks shrunk to 6 in 1998. But it was the littoral states adjacent to the strait that
had to carry out these regional measures, and in the long run such measures are taxing on the
contributors.

The recommendations from the IMO did little to curb piracy in the South China Sea even in the
short run. In these vast and contested waters, piracy and armed robbery reached a level only
surpassed by the golden days of piracy some centuries ago. In many ways, this example is a stark
reminder of how complex a task it is to establish order in waters with unclear and disputed
jurisdictional sectors. Just as the IMO facilitated better warning and information systems for civilian
shipping, 42 incidents of piracy in the East and South China Sea were reported during a 7-month
period in 1993.1521 The significant difference from the Malacca Strait was that the large majority of
the China Sea attacks took place in international waters and were carried through with outright use

1519 Non-lethal weapons and passive protection is much more acceptable, and are being used at the time of writing
(2005).
1520 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:3
1521 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:4
of weapons. Clearly, stopping such activities could not be achieved through appealing to nearby coastal states or simply by information sharing. In many ways, the South China Sea was the ideal area of operations for organized piracy enterprises and perhaps terrorists alike, being more than 200 miles wide and literally dotted with uninhibited islands that served as hiding places after an operation. At this stage, I believe it is fair to say that the problems in this area is only getting worse, judged by the number of cases of piracy, that to some degree seem to be embedded in organized crime. The annual number of attacks in these waters had risen to 98 in 1998, and does not seem to fall, although the statistical material obviously is inaccurate because many cases of piracy are not reported to the IMO.

The US did not seem particularly interested in the problem during the 1990s. By and large, the political leadership during the Clinton administrations were far more occupied by the relationships to Russia and other East European Countries, China and addressing the mounting problems in the Balkans. At the military level, praxis was still focused on grand strategy and founded on the so-called Powell Doctrine. The two were interrelated, since the Powell doctrine stated that if the US use military force, then this force should be applied with maximum force to ensure swift victories with as little risk to own soldiers as possible. Otherwise, the US Coast Guard had more than enough to do in waters nearer the homeland, especially regarding the smuggling of drugs and people to the US. Piracy in South American waters and in the Caribbean in fact was a problem, 38 attacks being reported by the IMO in 1998, but this was not a US priority.

The ultimate result was that piracy remained, and to some degree increased, as a threat to shipping. From 1995 till 2000, for example, 244 incidents have been recorded in the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Although the IMO certainly tried to install mechanisms for curbing piracy, the western states and organisations like NATO and the EU did not prioritise anti-piracy policies particularly high. Without support from these organisations and their strongest member states, all the IMO could achieve were incremental steps through appeals to states to comply with IMO recommendations (as in IMO recommendations from the MSC, such as MSC/Circ. 622/rev.1 from 1999). However, the IMO through the MSC warned against measures to arm merchant ships, believing that aggressive responses to piracy from the crews of civilian ships would only lead to more casualties. Moreover, any ship has limited judicial freedom to counter-act by physical means in port or at anchor, or in transit for that matter. A civilian ship, or a naval vessel within the sphere of jurisdiction of another state in peacetime, does simply not have any police authority. In these

1522 “Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea”, Paper, IMO, 2000:4
circumstances, it must rely on the protection of the state that has, or is supposed to have, jurisdiction within the territorial sea or EEZ. Thus, port facilities and jurisdiction within national zones are the responsibility of the coastal state, while the merchant ship in practise is restricted to seek protection through passive means (navigation, use of lights etc). Furthermore, the international community at large did not emphasise supporting IMO with the financial and material means to improve the anti-piracy efforts. It is true that the International Maritime Bureau established a Piracy reporting centre in October 1992. But it is illustrating of the lack of state support that this centre was located in Kuala Lumpur and financed wholly by voluntary contributions from shipping and insurance companies. More or less, the Centre simply assists the same companies. This body could nevertheless not stop an increase of piracy at the turn of the century, according to IMO; "The number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to the IMO during 2000 was up by more than 50 per cent over the equivalent figure for 1999". Although we only have reliable data from the late 1990s and onwards, the IMO reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships show that the problem of securing traffic at sea is substantial. For the last 6 years of available data, the IMO reports the following frequency of piracy and armed robbery.

**Table 5.6 IMO Reports on acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships 1997-2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What really could reduce piracy would be one or all of the following precautions:

1. The establishment of and active maintenance of an international regime that made states responsible for increased protection for ships in port or at anchor. Needless to say, such a regime would require the leadership of powerful states that could apply sanctions against free-riders;

2. The arming of merchant ships with lethal or non-lethal weapons in order to aggressively deter and defeat acts of piracy;

3. The establishment and operation of standing naval forces in waters where acts of piracy have occurred with high frequency.

Of those, point 2 is problematic both in judicial and operational terms, although non-lethal weapons currently used do have effect up to a certain point. However, the US-led war on terrorism ensured that 1 and 3 in fact materialised to a degree unprecedented after WWII. Thus, the protective measures in order to reduce the likelihood of terrorism at sea also helped to increase the protection of merchant ships against piracy in some waters. In fact, the measures decided upon in 2002/2003 that sought to reduce the probability and consequences of terrorism at sea were of such magnitude that it deserves attention here. In sum, they constituted a change of the protection costs and thereby the transaction costs, in the world economy. To a large degree, states were again responsible for carrying out this protection from the acts of non-state actors.

One of the initial concerns regarding terrorism at or from the sea was the possibility that the enormous traffic of containers on ships could facilitate an attack with weapons of mass destruction. A weapon of mass destruction, it was feared, could be secreted aboard a ship and carried into a port, and then be detonated by a terror group. The practical problems of physically searching the hundreds of thousands of containers that arrive in large ports would be formidable. Furthermore, maritime transports itself could be used by a 4th generation group of warriors in numerous ways. The terrorists could capture a large merchant ship, such as a laden tanker or gas carrier, and use the ship as a weapon itself, to cause a huge explosion or vast pollution in a port or populated area. This itself is a frightening prospect and has led, especially in the United States, to strict ship movement controls being implemented by the US Coast Guard.

Secondly there is concern about the potential for an attack upon a ferry or large passenger ship, either caused by a bomb being secreted aboard, or an attack by an explosive-laden craft such as caused devastating damage to the USS Cole in Yemeni waters.
Thirdly, it is not totally unfeasible that 4th generation groups, or "terrorists", could attack offshore installations and pipelines. While this would require some equipment and trained personnel, the economic and environmental effects of such attacks could have significant political implications.

All these scenarios and the countermeasures that were central, and partly implemented in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, nevertheless illustrate a dilemma in how to deal with 4th generation "warfare". Precautions against all eventualities of terrorist attacks must be proportional, and if world trade is brought to slow crawl because of the level of precautions, then the terrorists have probably achieved one of their objectives. In sum then, the terrorist threat is constituted by a "terrorist-in-being", to apply a Corbettian phrase to the 21st century.\footnote{The term "terrorist-in-being" was, to my knowledge, first used by two midshipmen at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy in 2003. In a project thesis, midshipmen Rakvåg and Johnsen elegantly argued that the rise in protection costs was the major effect of the terrorist threat, and that the terrorists thereby achieved one of their chief purposes.} In the past, a major concern has been the wide variation in levels of port security. It is hoped that the security concerns will be sufficient to persuade all port managements that they need to greatly enhance security on the land and ship side of ports to prevent unauthorised entry. Luggage screening measures are being implemented in the passenger trades, while more sophisticated security checks are being employed.

With the container trades, it is obviously impossible to check every container, but it is hoped that risk can be managed by dividing cargo into that which comes from high risk areas, or from sources where security is less strict from that cargo which is well checked, emanates from secure sources and has a clear documentary trail. Efforts are also being made to develop x-ray and other equipment that will enable whole containers to be scanned rapidly. While at the time of writing it is too early to tell whether these measures will be successful, the attempts to deal with the risk from terrorism towards or through maritime units constitute an enormous rise in transaction costs throughout the world. Moreover, it well illustrates the difficulty the modern state has in countering 4th generation warfare in an open world economy.

In addition to the IMO regulations, heavily supported by the US, NATO responded to "credible evidence" that terrorist groups planned attacks on civilian shipping in the Western Mediterranean (it goes almost without saying that at present, it is very hard to evaluate the accuracy of the classified intelligence reports that justified these precautions). Thus, "Operation Active Endeavour" has lasted from 2002 till the time of writing, consisting to a high degree of regular patrolling and escort of civilian merchantmen in the Gibraltar Strait. In fact, the more or less permanent increase of the use of NATO naval forces was extended to cover the entire Mediterranean in March 2004.\footnote{In these waters then, the contours of a new "regime" were visible by 2004. According to NATO officials,}
more and more coastal states showed interest in an increased presence from NATO naval forces to protect civilian shipping and ports (this is not solely bragging from NATO circles. Especially states without or with insignificant naval forces saw the benefits in an international presence around maritime choke points). Thus, it seemed that navies were more usable than a theoretical 4th generation warfare proposition might seem to indicate. It was not so much that the role of navies was new. Rather, it returned to something very old and once familiar to every state navy; protection of transport at sea from non-state actors, be it pirates or "terrorists". In the 21st century, moreover, offshore industry and coastal states to a large degree saw this increased naval presence as beneficial due to the increased surveillance it represented. Swift rescue operations and monitoring of pollution are but a few benefits to the civilian society of this "new" naval priority beyond the primary objective of curbing terrorism. The only problem, of course, is the immense cost of this activity. To the modern state, and especially the modern market-oriented western states, operating sophisticated naval platforms for these tasks comes at a high price. Although there does not exist any reliable estimation of the costs, there is no doubt that the annual price of naval patrolling alone amounts to many billion dollars. In sum, the war against, and the protection from, terrorism has a staggering price tag. In the words of the "9/11 Commission report" (authorized edition):

"Between fiscal year 2001, the last budget adopted before 9/11, and the present fiscal year 2004, total federal spending on defense (including expenditures on both Iraq and Afghanistan), homeland security, and international affairs rose more than 50 percent, from $354 billion to about $547 billion"\textsuperscript{1528}

The big question is how sustainable this level of effort is in the long run, and if it is not sustainable, how security can be achieved with fewer dollars spent. Presumably, then, it is only a matter of time before governments will start to question the wisdom of their current (2004) force structure goals. Could not the tasks of naval patrol and escort of merchant ships simply be done in a much cheaper way? One might reasonably argue that quantity would matter much, much more than the quality of ships required to curb terrorism at sea and piracy. Moreover, the costs of protecting civilian shipping cannot be carried by the states alone. Neither does a clear-cut military solution readily exist to the twin problems of terrorism and piracy (the two phenomena are linked in the security threats represented by 4th generation warfare). For example, The Economist in October 2003 argued that

\textsuperscript{1527} \textup{http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea-e.pdf}
\textsuperscript{1528} The 9/11 Commission report, 2004: 361
According to a new study by Aegis Defence Services, a London defence and security consultancy, these attacks represent something altogether more sinister. The temporary hijacking of the Dewi Madrim was by terrorists learning to drive a ship, and the kidnapping (without any attempt to ransom the officers) was aimed at acquiring expertise to help the terrorists mount a maritime attack. In other words, attacks like that on the Dewi Madrim are the equivalent of the al-Qaeda hijackers who perpetrated the September 11th attacks going to flying school in Florida.\(^\text{1529}\)

An OECD report on maritime security, published in 2003,\(^\text{1530}\) pointed out that the shipping industry had to invest $1.3 billion that year on improved security and would face running costs of $730m a year to maintain better security systems. After all, there are some 46,000 merchant ships and 4,000 ports around the world.

With 232 million container movements through the world's ports each year, it is possible to look inside only about 2% of them at the time of writing. Adapting to the IMO requirements of increased port security, the owners of the world's biggest ports quickly co-operated, because they feared that, if they did not, they might have been cut off from trade with America. But the vast numbers of ports that are not able to achieve the ideal level of security will nevertheless represent a major problem.

However, it is not infeasible that international terrorists will single out oil supplies as one of their major areas of priority, since the western world is vulnerable on this point. Indeed, such attacks occurred during the US occupation of Iraq, with spectacular long-term consequences for the entire situation in the area. A coordinated suicide attack on oil terminals off the coast of Basra took place in 2004. During the first year of the US occupation, about 100 attacks on the 4000-mile oil pipeline system took place.\(^\text{1531}\) From the point of view of the terrorists that want to attack US interests, such targets are ideal. Ideal because they sabotage the reconstruction of Iraq, because they help slowly raising the price of oil on the world market, and because protecting refineries and especially pipelines and offshore installations is such a demanding task that it renders the likelihood of successful attacks relatively high (as the Al-Quaida training manual states; "We don't have to attack a tiger if we can attack a lamb"). Does this risk have wider implications? An answer in the

\(^{1529}\) http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2102424. See also the report "Energy Security" by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security for a similar conclusion; http://www.iags.org/n0524042.htm


\(^{1531}\) See "Terror's Big Prize" by Gal Luft, http://www.iags.org/n050904a.htm
affirmative seems reasonable. Tamil Tigers separatists carried out a suicide attack with five boats on an oil tanker off the northern Sri Lanka in 2001. The French supertanker Limburg was attacked by Al Quaida off the coast of Yemen in 2002. The same year, a group of Saudi citizens was arrested for planning to sabotage Ras Tanura, the largest offshore oil loading facility in the world. It has been estimated that if successful, such an attack alone could cut the export of Saudi oil by 50%, and thus send oil prices "through the ceiling". Likewise, the current level of piracy in the Malacca Strait make the following scenario likely; a terrorist group should easily be able to crash a smaller vessel into a supertanker in one of the busiest waterways in the world. When ignited, the supertanker would cause a vast area of burning oil that could shut down the choke point for several weeks, with grave implications for world markets, and possibly wounding the Achilles heel of the US.

For the merchant navies of the world, there is also the delicate issue of screening crew members. Half of the world's merchant fleet, with 1.2 million seafarers on board, sails under a flag of convenience. Paperwork and background checks are often minimal. After the September 11th attacks, the International Labour Organisation introduced identity cards for seafarers—but this has not solved the problem. Repeatedly, false papers are found on crew members, also in European waters. While reliable sources on this and related problems are classified and not open to regular scholarly analysis, it is not difficult to see the enormity of these challenges. The sheer complexity of global maritime traffic combined with the fact that extraterritorial surveillance is a lot more demanding than territorial intelligence, partly due to the different legal frameworks that apply to the two, makes looking for terrorists at sea analogous to finding the needle in the haystack. Obviously, the only feasible solution is to seek to avoid terrorists from being able to infiltrate civilian shipping. Since one never can be 100% sure to succeed in such an endeavour, naval escort and patrolling as witnessed in the Mediterranean during operation Active Endeavour indeed seem to be necessary precautions.

In sum then, the US through NATO and the IMO has sought to handle the risk of terrorism at and from the sea by;

- Increased control of cargo in merchantmen;
- Tightened security measures in all international ports with a minimum of container movements per year;

1532 Ibid:1
1533 For an assessment of Al-Quida and maritime terrorism, see the article by C. Dickey "High-Seas Terrorism", Newsweek, January 27, 2003: 4
Naval patrolling and escort in some straits.

Still, this security network is full of inadequacies. It seems to be an impossible task to protect a larger number of offshore installations, civilian passenger ships, and all major transportation in international waters. Not even all waters where the rate of piracy historically has been high, is surveyed by naval forces. Although protection costs have risen due to the measures taken by western powers after 911, most commentators seem to agree that an even higher level of security seeking will make transaction costs in the international economy too high. However, the idea that cheaper naval vessels could indeed perform protection of civilian shipping, ports and offshore installations in larger numbers does not seem totally unfeasible. After all, pirates and terrorists at sea do not constitute a technologically very sophisticated adversary. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the current NATO doctrine of "transformation", meaning to a large degree achieving a superior military-technological level compared to any other state in world history, is the wrong solution. This is an especially critical question for the smaller coastal states. While the US - the state that sets the standard for current and future NATO navies- can afford to combine fantastic quality with a large quantity of naval forces, the trend at the time of writing makes the navies of the smaller states ludicrously small. Norway, the coastal state with national jurisdiction over 1/3 of the total continental shelves of Western Europe, for example, is thus reducing its already small navy significantly. As the Norwegian General Inspector of the Navy declared in June 2004;

"The consequence is that the number of units is reduced. The Navy is becoming very small. The number of fighting vessels has been reduced to one quarter of what we had only a few years ago". The motivation to do so rests in the assumption that the Navy has to be "compatible with its allies". Needless to say, armies and Air forces will argue the same, using the comparison with the capabilities of the US as a measurement of technological parity. This in itself is a logic axiom, but the outcome is a navy that quite simply will be overstretched sooner than new platforms are commissioned. The entire idea behind the reduction is entirely at odds with current security threats as perceived from a 4th generation warfare perspective. In the latter, quantity is much more important than a small number of high-quality platforms and systems. Indeed, the very criteria for

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1534 Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington D.C., background brief for the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, June 5th 2003
1535 The parallel between other aspects of what can be interpreted as the retreat of the state is evident. Already in 1994, the private security industry in the US "had twice as many employees, and 1.5 times the budget, of all local, state, and federal police forces combined" (van Creveld, 2003: 15). In the US-led occupation of Iraq, mercenaries working for the US Army and civilian constructors became a regular feature of the entire security situation.
1536 Marinen, no 6 2004: 2
what constitutes quality in extraterritorial units of violence seem dubious from a 4th generation perspective.

Critics of the 4th generation warfare perspective will largely rely on the central assumptions of political realism in the study of international relations. To the classical political realist, international "terrorism" (many political scientists will discard the notion that terrorism and piracy and other crimes should be seen as a kind of warfare) remains a significant, but small problem compared to conflicts between states. In a Hobbesian world, scholars from the camp of structural realism will argue, wars between states remains a possibility. However, political realists increasingly face difficulty when they shall explain what states constitute a threat in military terms against the Atlantic empire. It is of course possible that China or Russia in the distant future may challenge the US, but otherwise the candidates for challenging the present hegemony by military means are few and relatively speaking weak. It is not totally unwarranted, therefore, to question the current development of the naval forces of the states covered in this thesis. The conclusion is that the western powers should have the capacity to adjust to the current security threats from non-state actors. It is, of course, impossible to predict such an outcome. However, some trends after the terrorist attacks in 2001 seem to indicate that an adaptation is taking place, but that this slow transformation in no way is the end of the nation-state or the international state system. In fact, one might be tempted to say that exactly states and a community of states will prove robust in dealing with the "new" threats; after all, the modern state emerged as the most powerful organiser of violence during the 16th and 17th centuries. The trends already emerging that seemingly reflect the viability of the modern state can be summarized as follows.

Firstly, as we have seen in the case of maritime security, strong states (The US) assumed leadership thorough international organisations (primarily the IMO) by trying to create a new international institution to safeguard international transportation at sea. We have described the immense challenges of port security that are currently being addressed, but in addition, a global satellite surveillance system that will cover over 80000 ships is scheduled to be operative by July 2006. Through this system, one should be able to detect the position, course, speed and identification of any vessel included in the system. Each coastal state will then, in principle, be able to follow all

1537 Indeed, war between modern states is an ever rarer occurrence. In the words of one of the foremost among military historians, Martin van Creveld: "As the twentieth century approached its end, major interstate wars appeared to be on the retreat. In terms of numbers, they were becoming quite rare; in terms of size, neither the armed forces that they involved, the magnitude of the military operations they witnessed, nor (in almost all cases) the threat that they posed to the belligerents existencies even approached pre-1945 dimensions" (Creveld, 2003: 10). The war in Iraq seems an anomaly here, but it must be remembered that the invasion itself was swift, and it was the occupation itself that soon turned into a conflict between modern states and non-state groups.
ships in own waters, and indeed all ships owned by companies registered in the state on a global scope. Yet, considerable disagreements have risen over the sharing of information on maritime traffic, since states like the US hardly is interested to share too much such information with "Rogue states" as for example North Korea. Nevertheless, the US has had success at making nearly all states in the world agree to the safety measures now being implemented in the maritime sectors throughout the world. Interestingly, this is both beginning to look like an increased scope of US extraterritorial commitments and like a source of increased friction between the US and other states. These tasks and these tensions are not restricted to the questions of which territories the US should invade. On May 2nd, 2003, the EU Commission warned that the security measures should not lead to an inflation of unreasonably costly precautions, and the stationing of US customs officers in European ports raised considerable resentment in EU governments. In order to control the containers being loaded into ships headed for American territory, the Bush administration now insisted that US officials should lead and conduct the screening in European ports! Now, this kind of policy does share some uncanny resemblance to imperialism, as defined in this thesis. The main reason European, and indeed African and Asian, governments conformed to these measures simply was the threat of being excluded from the US markets. Since over 80% of world transportation is carried at sea, and since 20% of these goods end up in the US, the threat is grave enough to be taken seriously. On the whole, the US precautions are also understandable, despite their costs. Secondly, states played the wholly dominant role in the "war on terrorism". Indeed, this so-called war would not have been possible without significant state military organisations, and the international framework for countering terrorism wholly depends on the states and the state system. Thirdly, state defense establishments clearly are trying to come to grips with the realities of 4GW opponents. The fact that it was the US that was attacked in September 2001 made the US strive for a new approach for security (needless to say, grave doubts as to the efficiency of this approach soon surfaced). This naturally started a chain reaction in most NATO countries and beyond. As we have seen in this and the previous sections, one should not exaggerate the speed and scope of the institutional change that has occurred. Nevertheless, US naval priorities clearly indicate that an incremental process of change is under way. By the winter of 2004, the Bush administration, faced with scepticism from Indonesia and Malaysia, seemed to make progress towards some sort of a surveillance regime for the Malacca Straits. Proposals for a stationing of US troops in the area, while supported by Singapore, nevertheless faced severe resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia in the initial negotiations in this process. Government officials in the two states argued that US
deployments would make Islamist agitation and recruitment even harder to deal with. The eventual outcome was that Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore agreed in August 2004 to patrol the Straits of Malacca in an effort to counter a rise in piracy and possible terrorist attacks. Refusing to allow US deployments, the states in the region assumed responsibilities themselves, an outcome that probably would not have materialised without pressure from the US. The United States nevertheless was welcomed to share relevant intelligence with the three states. One must hope that this regional cooperation will succeed, since there is no lack of non-state organisations capable of using violence on a large scale in this area, and since the Straits themselves are so important for the world-system. 10 million barrels of crude oil from the Persian Gulf toward Asian countries pass through these straits each and every day. 80% of Japan’s oil is carried through the Malacca Straits. Accounting for a third of the world’s trade and 50% of the global oil supply, a closure of this waterway will add 994 miles to travel for ships to and from China, South Korea or Japan, and the Middle East. The tremendous rise in freight rates would have global consequences.

In this chapter, we have sought to give an overview of the attempts to form viable international institutions that were given the responsibility to regulate questions of extraterritorial sovereignty, and to analyse to what degree this affected the conduct of sovereignty at sea for the states covered in this thesis. In the two last sections, we described how current trends in naval force structures and doctrine are developing in the US and Northern Europe, and we discussed how these trends ultimately are at odds with a development where threats from non-state actors are increasingly highlighted in the foreign policy rhetoric of western leaders.

It was clear from the outset that the US after WWII wanted to participate in the shaping of international affairs to a much larger degree than anytime previously. Our conclusion is that the US administrations from FDR’s wartime cabinet till Bill Clinton sought to do this primarily by setting up and supporting international institutions, the UN with all its sub-organisations, and later through regional security organisations. It gives a distorted representation of reality to call this an "empire". If any use of the word empire is justified, this US Empire was one based on invitation and integration. This was a result of the definitive US liberalism that provided the ideological building blocks of western cooperation in the postwar years. In this respect, our ideal-type of international liberalism is valid for US foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century.

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While it is true that the US at times intervened in other polities, in the maritime sector the dominant picture is that the US leadership and the international institutions that followed increased rather than decreased the formal as well as de facto sovereignty over waters and maritime resources. All coastal states gained the right to national control of their continental shelves, increased territorial limits and exclusive economic zones in this period. Indeed, the weaker coastal states utilised this international institutional matrix to press for ever increased national jurisdiction. The US accepted this development to a large extent, and even curbed the attempts of former paternalist powers like Britain to restrict the movement towards increased coastal state sovereignty over the oceans. Again, our ideal-types of the extraterritorial peripheries and the paternalist powers seem appropriate analytical categories. A central limiting ideological factor nevertheless was the tenet of international liberalism that international trade and the freedom of international waterways demanded free passage in international waters, and the right to "free and innocent passage" through straits and sea-lanes that were within EEZs and territorial waters. In this respect, the political geography of the oceans remains a large sphere where national sovereignty is limited.

The imperfections in any attempt to create a viable international "regime" for regulating transport, fishing and offshore activities are thus inevitable. This might make coastal states vulnerable to risks that are not necessarily results of inter-state rivalry. Ecologic concerns were thus highlighted in the 1980s and 1990s. From the 1990s and onwards, the direct threat against civilian shipping from non-state actors in the forms of pirates and "terrorists" became more central. Initially, the renewed interest in piracy did not lead to huge increases in transaction costs. The terrorist attacks on US targets in September 2001 changed the priorities somewhat. The US initiated measures for increased port security through the IMO, and escort of civilian shipping through some straits through NATO. Otherwise, the US under the Bush administration led the so-called war on terrorism through bilateral agreements with single states in "the coalition of the willing". In the maritime realm, at least, this was a success in the sense that no major terrorist or 4GW operation has succeeded at the time of writing. The fundamental shortcomings in the efforts that have been undertaken post-911 are twofold.

Firstly, any effort at regulating the threat from 4th generation warfare in the maritime sector by necessity must be based on international cooperation. If the international cooperation should collapse in this field, then the world economy as we know it cannot function simultaneous with overly strict security measures in the maritime sector. The US, for one, could be severely punished in the economic realm if this scenario became a reality. Thus, the scope of US unilateralism will be severely restricted: allies could not continually be alienated the way they were following the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
Secondly, it almost goes without saying that the current NATO "transformation" process has the result of making all navies of the countries covered here very sophisticated, very expensive and thus very small. The platforms thus being built at the time of writing will be highly able to wage war in a complex environment, but their small number will make the western states unable to adequately protect their offshore installations, ports, merchantmen and civilian cruisers. The fact is that quantity thus should be given much higher priority in the current planning of naval force structures. If we look at the combined figures for Britain, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the total number of destroyers and frigates in these states are 82. This is with all probability way too small a number of platforms to deal with future risks. If the latter judgement is accepted, there are two solutions; either to build a larger number of cheaper medium-sized ocean going naval vessels, or to provide the larger civilian ships with weapons on their own. Before any of those two solutions are even conceivable to western politicians, not to say naval officers, they must basically come to grips conceptually with what the weakening of the state monopoly of violence at sea will mean.

6 Conclusions

We have reached the point of presenting an overview of the most important findings in this thesis. Needless to say, a comparative historical analysis in itself invites debate once it includes more than a few cases in a longer time-perspective than some decades. One might plausible argue that the "how"s of the empirical chapters in this treatise with some exceptions are not valuable at all in a current perspective. While such an objection holds some, albeit limited, truth in a prescriptive perspective, it is flawed in a theoretical one. Unfortunately, in order for us to present a stringent and brief presentation of our conclusions, they are presented as either empirical (6.1) or theoretical (6.2) in the following, solely for the sake of simplicity since the two are not so easily separable.

6.1 Empirical conclusions

In the present study of the interplay between domestic political development and international institutions, we have found considerable degrees of variation; variation over time as well as variation in space. More or less, we should conclude that domestic dynamics to a large degree influenced international changes, although international alterations in turn produced an environment for domestic institutional change as well. To simplify, the general pattern is that the causal direction varies with power. Strong states with the ability to project power to the international scene also were
Conclusions

able to shape international institutions to a far larger degree than did small states. Needless to say, the states with the ability to do so, tried to shape the international institutions, independently of the degree of formality of the institution, to suit their own interests and principles. Conversely, smaller states predominantly had to adapt as best they could to the international environment. While this tautology is a trivial insight, it is also only half the truth. A major alteration at the international level - with huge implications also for small states- took place in the 20th century. With the institutionalization of international law, the UN, The International Court and all the functional international institutions, the autonomy of small states not only *de jure* but also *de facto* increased significantly, although the asymmetry of state power was more dramatic than ever in the thermonuclear age. Thus, the balance of power was modified by a set of rules for the international game that benefitted all small states that escaped the perils of authoritarian or totalitarian rule.

How could this be possible? The tautological answer to this question is that the international institutions endorsed sovereign equality and the "freedom of nations", and that the US was instrumental in setting up such an international institutional matrix. The more satisfactory reply is that state principles, results of the historical trajectory of the most powerful states, ultimately modified state interests in a manner that reduced the international anarchy. Since the US was a liberal internationalist and not a European paternalist, such was the outcome.

Locally valid ideal-types

The difference between the US and European states analysed here goes beyond recognizing different geographical, demographical and institutional mechanisms in explaining variation. The first and foremost analytical task in this thesis was to produce a typology of the foreign policy behaviour of the states according to the dominant interests and principles that determined maritime priorities. In order to evaluate these concepts we embarked on a lengthy empirical analysis in chapters 3 to 5.

Northern Europe

The formation of modern states and international treaties had its genesis in Europe, a multi-polar "system" of states and non-state actors characterized by fierce economic, military and political competition during the 16th and 17th centuries. Indeed, the level of conflict would occasionally rise to unprecedented levels in this strip of Eurasia until the 20th century. The formation and early consolidation of states in Northern Europe involved frequent wars at sea. Initially, these wars were fought with primitive means, and navies were very crude organizations until the middle of the 17th century. Predominantly, navies were semi-official, in the sense that private entreprenurship was
6 Conclusions

even more important in war at sea than in land campaigns even well into the 18th century. States with strong commercial and maritime societies, like England and the Dutch republic, were most effective at creating a high degree of cooperation between private entrepreneurs and state authorities to build and maintain strong navies.

Ideologically, the very intense struggles during the 15th and 16th centuries were important for the formation of maritime ideologies in the Scandinavian countries and Britain. I have argued on previous pages that this competition for markets and rights of taxation created an incentive towards mare clausum that reinforced the predisposition already created through intense rivalries between monarchs in the same field. More specifically, the city-league was an unwelcome intruder in the efforts of monarchs in Northern Europe to create centralized polities. The combination of international competition and competition with the Hansa made the Nordic states and England embrace mare clausum principles rather than mare liberum. This was again reinforced with the rise of Dutch maritime and commercial power, two aspects of Dutch development that were closely related. Indeed, the disputes between British and Dutch preferences on maritime rights constituted a conflict that refined the meaning of mare liberum and mare clausum, with scholars like Grotius and Selden articulating the philosophical underpinnings of two competing paradigms. To Dutch commercial interests, the Hansa was a competitor for sure, but the maritime industry in the Republic was a product of the coastal cities, and the Dutch therefore were much more familiar to some of the techniques of finance and sea-borne transportation that the German cities had pioneered. The Dutch maritime sector refined these techniques, and to a degree that made the Republic predominant in overseas trade and -transportation in Northern Europe for a short period. The federation was initially very cost-effective also at building and maintaining a strong navy, but ultimately proved to be the weaker part in the struggle against England. While the Republic maintained a predisposition tilting towards international liberalism, the Republic and later the Netherlands would never again seek predominance after the end of the 17th century. It is characteristic of this incremental Dutch turn towards bandwagoning that it did seek few privileges during the 19th century and did not take part in the partition of Africa to any noteworthy degree. In the crossfire between Germany and Britain in the 20th century, the Netherlands remained neutral until WWII, a war that changed both its foreign policy in general as well as Dutch overseas politics to a considerable degree. But the change was not bigger than the Netherlands remained internationalist through the process of European integration, the UN and NATO. Its transition from a polity with to a polity without overseas possessions was also fairly liberal, compared to similar transitions of other European powers.
Britain actively used its financial and naval strength to pursue a blue-water Lockeanism, laying out the rules for the overseas territories and -waters as suited English interests. The mare clausum principle of England were not limited to home waters, but to all areas within the Empire. This was extraterritorial paternalism. It is true, of course, that the 19th century Pax Britannica had liberal traits. Indeed, one might point out that the anti-slavery campaigns and the rights of neutral states are clear elements of a gradually liberalizing empire. Much in the same vein, historians as N. Ferguson certainly are right in pointing out that the British Empire did not carry out the worst imperialism there ever was. At least, there is a substantial degree of truth in this for the 19th and 20th centuries. But imperialism it was. While the principle of the freedom of the high seas remained in theory, England carefully monitored and defended whatever privileges it had as a result of overseas possessions. The Royal Navy increasingly came to be identified as a chief institution of the Empire. It was an institution that only incrementally became organized and controlled by the state after the chaotic 16th and 17th centuries, where privateering had been a dominant naval activity carried out by semi-official entrepreneurs. Britons perceived the Navy to be vital for controlling overseas territories and protecting the sea-lanes that knitted the Empire together. The genesis of a peculiar british mare clausum empire has been demonstrated in this thesis. The Navy ensured the shrinkage of distance that was a necessity of an overseas empire. After Trafalgar, the role of the Navy for British influence and security achieved mythical proportions. Indeed, one might plausibly argue that the myth that created a self-sustaining structure between civil society and the navy was created already in 1588. In the trajectory that Britain followed after the historical junction of the Napoleonic wars, both the maritime preferences and institutionalization of naval power in Britain were "frozen", in the sense that it is a clear example of path dependency. Even well into the 20th century, therefore, English cabinets repeatedly applied force to quell unrest in the empire. The paternalist predisposition occasionally popped up even after WWII, witness Suez 1956 and the Falklands war, both overseas operations heavily dependent upon naval force. Old habits die hard, and William Wallace has claimed of British foreign policy that "the whole ethos of this country’s foreign policy continues to be biased by ideological assumptions which date from the Edwardian era and before".

The relative decline of Britain in retrospect seems inevitable, given the economic and industrial rise of the US and Germany from 1880, and the rise of the USSR as a major military power during and

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1539 See Stinchcombe, 1968: 103 on what he labels "historicist explanations". The thesis presented here is both a historicist explanation as well as a demonstration of institutional equilibriua and punctuated equilibria found in the path dependency of macro institutions.

1540 Wallace, 1991: 70
after WWII. Correspondingly, at an analytically separate ideational level, England found itself in an ideologically bewildering position after the war, eclipsed totally by the US, and required to abandon the empire as the price to pay for US support during and after WWII. Nevertheless, in style and ideology, British foreign policy, one might argue, remained quintessentially British. The Commonwealth and the "special relationship" with the US prevailed after WWII, and made the Isles distinct from the continental European powers in their quest for European integration. While Britain undoubtedly have close political, not to mention economic, ties to the Continent, the geopolitical mindset of Britain goes beyond "Europe". This to a large degree is the result of British history, so heavily influenced by the Imperial legacy rather than mere material interests. This demonstrates the potent role that national identity played in British foreign policy. Or as William Wallace observed:

"When James the Sixth and First suggested that a written constitution might unite his two kingdoms, his English parliamentarians cited all these reasons for resisting. When Jacques Delores appears to threaten the imposition of a European written constitution, the reply, 395 years later, is in the same terms".  

Germany had no proud naval history on which to base an ambitious naval policy. Furthermore, Germany did not have a very considerable maritime institutional heritage either. The result was that Germany was a late-comer as a state, and in addition a society with a modest naval infrastructure indeed. As in the US, a theoretical approach to sea power therefore developed from the bottom to the top. The young Reichsmarine of Imperial Germany naturally and eagerly embraced the theories of A.T. Mahan, since these provided a rationale for Germany to become a naval power. The particular German political institutions and the personalities of Tirpitz and the Kaiser made this possible, but in retrospect the naval aspirations of Imperial Germany from 1894 till 1914 are striking in the sense that Britain served as a model, and that a war with Britain certainly were not the intended consequences of the political leadership in Germany. In fact, the sea power ideology of Mahan fitted the imperial enthusiasm in Europe as well as in Japan, witnessed by the highly ambitious naval construction programmes in a number of countries. The most peculiar feature of extraterritorial naval ambitions in Germany was quite simply that it was so utterly instrumental, and seemingly detached from diplomacy and a clear grand strategy to which the navy would fit (the fear of a “runaway” navy had made Britain and the US conclude that civilians as a rule should head the

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1541 Wallace, 1991: 70
navy as well as the other services\textsuperscript{1542}). The worst outcome of this was that leaders in Imperial Germany predominantly failed to fully comprehend that German sea power combined with the German army was quite simply perceived as a threat to British interests, whatever intentions the leadership in Berlin had with the navy. In the German perception, social Darwinist thought was present in the form that a strong navy was a requirement to ensure the nation "Der Platz in der Sonne" that it deserved. But in all fairness, such sentiments were in no way restricted to the Germans.

For the Scandinavian countries and Iceland, there are clear similarities as well as divergent patterns that can be observed. In a historical perspective, the differences are more striking than contemporary analysis often convey. As we have seen in chapter 3, all the Nordic territories, and particularly Norway and Sweden, were strongly influenced by the competition with the Hanseatic League. All the Nordic countries developed initial dispositions for mare clausum due to this rivalry as well as the competition between monarchs in the early modern period. Indeed, as we demonstrated in chapter 2, a not insignificant notion of territorializing coastal waters existed in the old Norwegian kingdom that covered much of the Norwegian as well as the North Seas already prior to the 14th century. After the demise of the City-league, the Nordic states increasingly were influenced by the European balance of power, and up till the Great Nordic War, by the repeated clashes between Denmark-Norway and Sweden. Both Iceland and Norway were too weak to survive as sovereign states, but the unions with Denmark and Sweden were peaceful. Moreover, Sweden ultimately was defeated by its nemesis-Russia, while Denmark eventually succumbed to the military power of Germany. In both instances, the result was that the defeated changed both important traits of its identity and its predisposition to act in a paternalist fashion on the international arena. It is often forgotten that both Denmark and Sweden had been truly imperial powers, and that the few adjacent states repeatedly waged war in the Baltic Sea. Denmark for centuries controlled the largest island on earth, several large Atlantic islands in addition, and had colonies in the West Indies. Sweden after the Thirty Years war possessed a large portion of the southern shores of the Baltic, and later laid Warsaw under siege and fought the Russian army in what today is Ukraine.

Their losses in wars changed such adventurous expeditions forever. Again, the domestic side moved in tandem with the international; for the small states, the balance of power became a constraint on state policy. It was not only that this balance restricted state interests, but the clashes of arms changed the national identities as well. Indeed, contrary to Barrington Moores \textit{a priori} assumption that the political problems of small states are not comparable to those of large countries, the

\textsuperscript{1542} See Albion, 1945:294-296 for a discussion.
trajectories of Sweden and Denmark are fascinating in the sense that it highlights the way national identity can be changed. Uffe Østergård, for example, has argued (convincingly, in my view) that the result of the Danish loss of Schleswig and Holstein to Germany under Bismarck was a "peasant" ideological hegemony in Denmark. 1543

By 1900, both Sweden and Denmark had become the neutral, peace-loving former imperialists par excellence (again; the exact date is not possible to pin down. Rather, the transition was a gradual and incremental process. Some outcomes at the international level had dramatic impacts though. In the case of Sweden, the defeat in the Great Nordic war seems of outmost importance. The colourful Norwegian historian Terje Ula in 1946 argued, not untruthfully, that the Danish-Prussian war of 1864 was the true turning point in modern Nordic history). An inner equilibrium seemed to have crystallized, where the national habitus reflected the possible room for maneuver on the international stage. Indeed, the process that led to this outcome was well under way during the 18th century (The Great Nordic war particularly for Sweden, The Napoleonic wars for Denmark where she lost Norway and the bulk of her fleet). Characteristically, WWII tilted Denmark in a somewhat different direction again, since it joined NATO, and later the EEC/EU as the first Nordic state to do so. Sweden managed to stay neutral during WWII, and stayed outside of NATO and joined the EU only in 1994. Nevertheless, both Denmark and Sweden turned from paternalist powers to mare liberum, low-profile former small empires with only indirect overseas interests in the 20th century.

Iceland remained under Copenhagen till 1944, while Norway broke loose from the union with Sweden in 1905. Both states played marginal roles on the European scene until 1940, with the important exception that both states were major exporters of fish, and while Norway had one of the largest merchant navies in the world. Both thus had important stakes in the international institutions regulating extraterritorial sovereignty. Indeed, conflicts with other states, notably Britain and Germany, arose again during the 20th century. These states nevertheless sought to carve out whatever national autonomy the international situation at any given time permitted. For Iceland, the political split with Denmark became a fact during the British-American occupation in WWII, a result facilitated by a rather smooth Danish attitude for sure, but above all a result of the fact that from a strategic perspective Iceland was too important to be lost to the Germans during the war, or to the Soviet Union after the war. Norway maneuvered skillfully through WWI, but was occupied in 1940. The occupation years produced much the same result as in Denmark, Norway joining NATO in 1949.

In the maritime realm, however, Iceland and Norway are prime examples of how the new

1543 See the entire article by Østergård, 1992 for a fascinating discussion.
international institutional matrix after WWII changed the opportunities of small states. The UN, and not to mention the International Court and the functional organizations under the UN umbrella, proved an opportunity to be utilized by the smaller coastal states in the north. The first, really significant landmark of this change in international relations was the verdict in the International court in 1951 (see chapter 5). The high mark of increased de jure sovereignty for the small coastal states was the 1973-1982 UNCLOS negotiations, during which the principle of the 200-mile EEZ achieved broad consensus. In this manner, the aspirations of the small mare clausum states came true. The fact that small states could gain, not only de jure sovereign rights, but in practice de facto sovereignty over so vast oceans, indicate that the international institutions themselves had changed. In an earlier epoch, the very notion that small states should exercise sovereignty over vast oceans with plentiful resources would have been dismissed as absurd. It is not inconceivable that one might raise objections to the choice of North European states for the present thesis. We have excluded France (through reasons expressed in chapter 2), for example. However, there are also similarities between the states covered here, both in a historic as well as contemporary perspective. As William Wallace once said of the sources of British foreign policy; "Until the end of the nineteenth century this essentially Protestant…sense of national identity divided Britain primarily from France and the Catholic and corporate states of southern Europe…Protestant northern Europe…was seen as sharing Britain`s values". In this perspective, it is also clear why Britain throughout the 18th and 19th centuries saw itself as the natural leader of Northern Europe; it constituted a benign hegemony in the eyes of most Britons. Even more fascinating is the fact that a very peculiar and enduring divide in the approach to foreign policy between Northern Europe and the US arose early.

The USA
The US was, and still remains, a state based on ideas. These ideas to a large degree constitute what the US is, and thereby dominant traits of its foreign policy. The US was the new world, Europe the old. Perhaps luckily for Europeans in the 20th century, the US was always a political rejection of things European, whatever transatlantic tensions this has created. While the US in some respects can be described as a premodern society, the very essential characteristic of US foreign policy compared to the corresponding policies of major European states is that the US represented a breach with "The Old World". To portrait this view of the European states crudely, they were at times seen as the class-based, backward, conspiratorial, balance-of-power endorsing, colonial states. So strong was the rejection of this culture that US foreign policy only resembled European modalities of how

1544 Wallace, 1991: 70
statesmen should behave for a short period: “while other states had interests, the United States had responsibilities”. Thus, détente never became embedded in the US society. Indeed, political realism, a result of the paternalistic historic tradition in Europe, did not succeed in the US. Despite the efforts of Carr, Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger "this exotic, European plant could find no roots in the native soil of the American political tradition", as Hedley Bull wrote in the aftermath of the Kissinger era in US foreign policy. The North Americans remained surprisingly faithful to the heritage of their political history. The US was forged as a reaction against European modes of rule, and indeed during an intense struggle over what the US should be. The outcome was a state that until the New Deal was minimalist; with a minimal federal bureaucracy, a minimalist conception of what the state should do to regulate society, a passive foreign policy outside the area that was seen as covered by the Monroe Doctrine, and during much of this time - a very small navy.

Indeed, it is striking to note that the US did not seek to enforce her consistent preferences for liberal commercial relations and mare liberum through even the threat from a navy in-being (the opening of Japan from the 1850s and the occupation of the Philippines are exceptions to this rule). Contrary to Marxist theory and political realism, the US did not create a "strong core state" or "balance" against other powers in this respect. Neither did the US exclusively bandwagon by supporting whatever - with some goodwill- can be called an international maritime regime during the 19th century, as liberal institutionalists could argue; the US rather chose the costly avenue of preaching mare liberum against Britain's paternalism. At the same time, the US on few occasions challenged the maritime hegemony of Britain until the 20th century.

Ideologically then, the US was close to one single European historic federation, the Dutch republic. Any scholar with empirical sensitivity should be able to see this structure in American policy. As Mlada Bukovansky has forcefully argued; "From its inception, the United States took its cue from the Dutch (early supporters of liberal neutrality) and staked its identity upon the contested liberal interpretation of neutral rights". With time, the liberal elements of US foreign policy nevertheless underwent some changes, and interestingly these changes to a large degree were results of domestic politics. The New Deal would for decades influence the liberal ideology of US policies because it raised the awareness of US politicians that state intervention in politics could yield results. The result was a new flavor in US liberalism, and a corresponding structure in US foreign policy; the belief that the US could and should seek to participate in the conscious creation of a world order based on international institutions.

1545 Lundestad, 1990: 11
1546 Cited in Clark, 1989: 79
While the New Deal did not end isolationism, FDR combined the pragmatism of political realism with the visions of Woodrow Wilson to forge a different US foreign policy in one respect; the US became permanently involved in, indeed saw itself as the leader of, the free world after 1941. What was needed to provoke such an alteration was an armed attack on the US government itself. As the Spanish-American war of 1898 and WWI both produced short-lived fits of US interventionism, WWII was the real catalyst. By this time the US had become strong enough not to fear foreign contamination of its ideological values, instead, the world should be made safe for democracy. This liberal ideology did not only fit into a liberal world economy that US planners rightly perceived as beneficial to the US economy, it was part and parcel of what the US ideological projection into foreign policy was all about. Yet this projection of US ideals did not take place in an international environment free of competition. Thus, US foreign policy quite rapidly conformed to the requirements of perceived necessity, and thus included the use of military force. To back up and strengthen US leadership then, the creation and maintenance of international organizations went in tandem with huge overseas US military activity. What was spectacular about the latter was the scope and strength of US sea power and air power combined. With exceptions during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the US Army was never especially large compared to the armies of the communist dictatorships. A major reason for this was that a strong US Navy and Air Force was not incompatible with the "empire by invitation", and neither was it incompatible with the unique, new-deal inspired liberal international institutions that the US was so instrumental in creating after WWII (considering the fact that the US has stationed troops in 120 countries at the time of writing, the number of personnel on overseas duty, 400,000 (including Iraq), is not staggering). Seemingly, the end of the cold war gave US unprecedented opportunities to carry on the liberal civilizing mission, and in some respects it did. During the Clinton administrations, this goal was largely pursued through US leaderships in multilateral organizations. With the Bush presidency of 2000-2004, unilateralism seemed more dominant. This was just as much a result of the gunfighter wilsonianism that blossomed in this particular administration as it was a reflection of the fact that the cold war was over. And yet, it is too early to tell whether the US activist foreign policy after the terrorist attacks of 2001 will be as short-lived as US interventionism was after the Spanish-American war. What can be assumed from our analytical model, however, is that the US will remain itself. National catastrophes in the form of lost wars or economic cracks might add new nuances to the US national habitus, but such crisis must be intense indeed for such alterations to occur. What cannot be predicted from the model is which of the ideological traits will come to dominate to produce either a very high level of

1547 Bukanovsky, 1997: 222
activism or a more isolationist foreign policy. The latter does however seem unlikely, the US being a status quo power at present. Moreover, little seems to alter the importance of American idealism on US foreign policy. "The War on Terrorism" and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq bore an uncanny imprint of liberal rhetoric and the aspirations for "promoting democracy" and creating "freedom from fear". Thus, the US has predominantly been -and still is- an international liberalist when compared to other powers in world politics.

If we are to sum up the comparisons in space and time in order to illustrate state trajectories, we can combine the ideational variable with a variable of state power in the international maritime balance of power as in figure 6.1 below. It shows that two trajectories were aborted (the Hanseatic League and Imperial Germany), while the trajectory of the US as a major power and later superpower influenced nearly all states in the direction of increased liberalism.

Figure 6.1.1: State trajectories
Comments figure 6.1.1:

The X-axis in the figure represents the continuum between marginal and great powers; here great powers refer to states with extraterritorial power. The Y-axis represents maritime ideology. For great powers, this continuum is that between paternalism and international liberalism. The figure illustrates how the US and the Netherlands have had a rather constant maritime ideology. In contrast, the other European states covered here to various degrees have moved towards increased mare liberum principles as the power of the US on the international scene increased.

International institutions

While theorizing about the international system can be hard, creating a synthesis of the history of the international institutions with special bearings on maritime matters during the last centuries is no small undertaking either. Indeed, however parsimonious our designs might proclaim to be, the complexities in describing, not to say explaining, its trajectory is painstaking.

To generalise however, there certainly are changes as well as some enduring traits in this system, and I believe it is feasible to analyse them. An enduring and obvious feature of the international system is that power matters, and that hence, the most powerful actors have the capacity to try to shape international institutions to suit their own interests as far as it goes. Apart from this trivial observation, however, there is no mechanical law that says to what extent the stronger powers will do so, or to what degree they will prove successful in their attempts. Moreover, one should avoid the fallacy to conclude that the international system only is a restricting set of structures for the weaker powers, forcing small states either to isolate or bandwagon (although such efforts have been carried out by several states). The history of international maritime institutions is full of insights in this important respect.

Prior to the middle of the 17th century states primarily tried to negotiate in bilateral forums, if they indeed did cooperate, but at this stage it was difficult to separate state extraterritorial policies from private enterprise. While ocean transportation and fisheries are sectors that always have been dominated by private entrepreneurs, the point here is that a state monopoly of violence at sea did not exist in the weberian sense. Firstly, the actors of extraterritorial violence were both state institutions and private, and at times the demarcation between them were blurred, as in the Companies that traded and waged war overseas with the blessings of their monarch, and the privateering vessels that preyed on civilian shipping. Moreover, the City league was also a major player of sea power. This
has been recognized in scholarship on the Mediterranean area, but fact is that the Hanseatic League played a major role in northern Europe as well during the 13th-16th centuries. Secondly, and related to the above, the "navies" of the monarchs were less institutionalised than the armies. The difference lies perhaps not so much in the lack of uniforms and the peculiar outlook of the arms at sea, as it lies in the very semi-official leadership and organisational endeavours to build and man sailing naval vessels. Coupled with the distance between the political leadership and the scattered fleets and single vessels that made autonomy a trademark of the navy captain’s profession, this created a very peculiar mix of private initiative and state activity in the arm of the state on the seas.

The result was a state of "super-anarchy" of international maritime affairs until the middle of the 17th century. Not only were the kingdoms of the north in war with each other repeatedly during this era, but city-leagues were powerful actors as well. Then came the not always closely coordinated activities of trading companies, naval vessels and privateers that made treaties fragile. In other words, a centralized decision-making process in "foreign policy" was no ensurance that national actors behaved accordingly. Thus, the verdict of international relations as a self-help system is of considerable value in this period.

But it is not a period where the international system can be exclusively seen as a system of balancing states. The very private and loose character of extraterritorial power made it a system where it was very hard to predict the intentions of foreign leaders, and where even acute analysis and "diplomatic" agreements did not ensure lack of armed clashes between representatives of states and companies. Monarchs clearly perceived that their domestic efforts at centralizing power was at odds with such a state of affairs, and the first step on the way to gain control of naval force was to get rid of the non-state actors capable of waging war at sea. Thus, the Hanseatic League was subdued gradually from the 16th century on. It quite simply was an inappropriate actor on the international scene, since it made incursions into the economic sovereignty of monarchs (taxation) and had the capacity to threaten the attempts at creating a monopoly of violence under the kingdom, and because it was increasingly difficult to strike deals with such a network of numerous small subunits as the League was.

The 17th century saw an incremental change in the political control of navies, but only to a significant degree after the first Anglo-Dutch naval wars in the middle of that century. And again, it is important to note that in Britain and particularly in the Dutch Republic, a close cooperation between private entrepreneurs and state institutions was the hallmark of raising and maintaining a navy. After the establishment of British sea power primacy during the 18th century, the struggle for international hegemony to a large degree stood between France and Britain until the end of the
Napoleonic wars. Numerous scholars have argued that the international maritime principles dominant during the British hegemony was one of the freedom of the seas. This is true only to a degree, since the English approach to sea power was to establish "command of the sea", thus denying opponents the ability to threaten or interfere with English interests. It is also simply false to claim that the largest overseas empire of the world was an empire of freedom, although the slave trade certainly became an issue in British politics during the 19th century, and even though Niall Ferguson to some degree is right in pointing out that the British Empire was not the worst of empires in a historical perspective. But the empire was not particularly liberal. Now, we might argue that with a minimalist concept of liberalism, Britain was liberal by contemporary standards. But the latter is whiggish history. If we apply the standards of Adam Smith, imperialism is not liberalism and never has been. The true hallmark of the international institutions regulating maritime policies during the Pax Britannica was marked by the origins of British hegemony, what Armitage (see chapters 1 and 2) has dubbed "blue-water Lockeanism". Clearly, such a conception of the relations between states and between peoples from the "civilized world" and "the barbarians" was part of what made 19th and early 20th century imperialism possible. The British handbook of military operations on land for Navy officers during the 19th century does much to indicate the different levels of norms that applied in the western world versus the colonies.

Thus, international maritime affairs in the "short" 19th century from 1815 were very marked by one European paternalist power: Britain. On the other hand, the simple metropole-satellite model of western exploitation is a simplification at best. While British foreign policy never produced an international liberalism based on equality between nations, the Pax Britannica did show some genuine traits of securing minimal rights. We have mentioned the increasing British opposition to the slave trade, but in addition, the Royal navy became an instrument in suppressing piracy. In this field, the British polity that originally had collected huge resources from privateering took the lead among several western nations. Even privateering and letters of marque had been restricted to wartime by the early 1850s. Through the treaties of 1856, the use of privateering in praxis was abolished as a common tactic of major states, and the rights of neutral states in war was codified. This was as much a British concession as it was a small but not insignificant victory for the smaller sea powers and coastal states with major merchant navies. This change in maritime rules was a major international upheaval, in the sense that maritime principles became a resource for the weaker power, and further in the sense that the hegemon actually recognised these rights of lesser powers. By 1858, 42 of the 46 states that had been "invited to accede to the declaration of Paris had done
6 Conclusions

so". While institutionalising rules in the maritime sector and even monopolizing the use of violence at sea in state formation had come late, it had now come for good. In the first major interstate war after Paris, the Spanish-American war of 1898, neither of the belligerents applied privateering. But alas, European paternalists in geographical proximity to each other produce a situation where tension is inevitable.

The series of decisions and consequences that made 1914-1918 into a World war to a significant degree entailed maritime priorities and actions. With Britain entering a war against Germany, the entire Empire was affected, and the entire international system. The means of extraterritorial violence in an industrialised age of sea power ultimately also made the US enter the titanic struggle over the European problem (i.e. the Lusitania affair as mentioned in the section above). To Woodrow Wilson, the chief reason was the threat to the freedom of the seas. Wilson’s protest after the sinking of Lusitania, and the Naval Act of 1916, with its explicit goal of a US Navy “second to none” was a product of US mare liberum principles! The later arrival of a president of a large-power liberal nation during the following "peace negotiations" in Paris, left European diplomats bewildered. The famous European portraits of Wilson in Paris make it all too clear that it was an exotic meeting, a clash between different principles and perceptions of international affairs in general, and maritime rules in particular. For the first time (since the Napoleonic wars, if one is to be generous), the US meddled in the internal affairs of "Old Europe", and now by trying to impose US principles in an international settlement. Again, true to its principles, the US prioritised mare liberum in literal terms as a chief point of the settlement. Had Wilson succeeded, the international institution of maritime policies might have been changed. Instead, the balance of power and power politics at sea remained a dominant trend, although the US clearly tried to participate in forging international negotiations on arms control at sea. In other words, paternalism continued to prevail in European maritime politics, and the US to a large degree remained formally detached from the European political scene in the sense that it did not pursue an active foreign policy to stop or modify the gathering storm. From 1941 and until the time of writing, the US remained permanently involved in the European problem, and increasingly in other corners on the Eurasian continent. The US involvement in Europe during WWII (that ironically started in earnest with the US occupation of Iceland), the Pacific war (as David Kennedy has remarked, "the penultimate chapter in the history of Western colonialism in Asia that had lasted since the fifteenth century") and the battle of the Atlantic were decisive factors in the outcome of WWII and the entire international system for the next 50 years. To a very considerable extent, this extraterritorial campaign also changed US foreign

\footnote{Thomson, 1994: 75. See Thomson, ibid: 75-78 for a further assessment}

\footnote{David Kenendy, 1999: 853}
policy permanently, in the sense that the US would be involved in managing the balance of power. It did so, however, based on characteristically US liberal creeds coupled with the belief in management that was a trait in many US politicians who had engineered the New Deal. Many have dubbed the world order from 1945 onwards as one of US imperialism, and it is also true of course, that US foreign policy served US interests, that the building of overseas bases and naval stations, airfields and intelligence facilities would not have taken place without concrete national interests. But if it were an empire, it was first and foremost an empire of invitation and integration if we see it in a comparative perspective. We have evaluated the postwar order through a maritime perspective, and we should therefore be cautious in evaluating all aspects of the entire postwar institutional matrix. But some general characteristics of the international maritime institutions seem evident based on chapter 5.

- A truly distinct feature of the postwar maritime order has been the simultaneous existences of a very inegalitarian distribution of power AND a very egalitarian distribution of de jure maritime rights among coastal states. As we saw in chapter 5, the US was by far the strongest naval power during the cold war, and is practically without competition in this respect today. This does have a parallel in the case of Britain in the middle of the 19th century, but never before has such primacy at the level of military power existed in tandem with a very broad international maritime law that granted all coastal states a large scope of jurisdiction over oceans as is the case since 1977. This development was a gradual process from the settlement in the dispute between UK and Norway in 1951 by the International Court, until the conclusion of the UNCLOS III negotiations in 1982. That small states successfully could use, and in fact develop by unilateral means, the existing body of international law, and that major powers accepted this, was a novel facet of the international maritime order.

- While many scholars have asserted that economic interdependence, transnational companies and technological developments have given governments less scope of action during the last 50 years, we have seen in chapter 6 that even politically weak states have gained increased leverage over maritime resources adjacent to its shores. Moreover, this increase in national sovereignty goes far beyond the territorial seas, and now covers a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Even more striking is the fact that such claims to national jurisdiction could be extended to cover ocean masses and seabeds around even the smallest islands. In sum, this has meant a territorialisation of the seas, and this has
occurred despite the fact that the US has been a mare liberum-inclined hegemon during the same era. When one considers the postwar era with the periods covered in chapters 3 and 4, this shows that the maritime dimensions of international politics have changed in a qualitative manner during the last 55 years.

While the territorialisation of the seas seems to vindicate a victory of the mare clausum doctrine as heralded by John Selden some 400 years ago, it does not change the fundamental dilemmas of managing the great commons the oceans are. In order for the world economy to function smoothly as viewed from the more prosperous states, mare liberum must still apply to the international waters, and the right to free and innocent passages through territorial waters remains a cornerstone in securing that ocean transportation (ca. 80% of world transportation of goods) is not hampered. Simultaneously, managing organic resources and controlling pollution is not secured through territorialisation alone. In this respect, maritime issues remain fundamentally international in nature.

Beyond these general trends with significant implications for world politics, there also lies a whole set of normative and prescriptive questions that remain to be settled in the current maritime world order. Some of these indeed seem to be of grave importance for the modern state. International waters remain an open commons, and the most formidable one on the globe. Likewise, in weak or "failed" states that do not have the capacity to monitor their EEZs or even territorial waters, the de facto distinction between the open sea and the jurisdiction zone of the coastal state is not always obvious. Taken together, these two facets of ocean politics merge into a central question of authority in maritime politics that appears solvable on paper, but much more difficult in practise. The shipping of refugees, often under the most appalling of conditions, across oceans have become a challenge in the sense that many of the refugees either die, are immediately returned to where they came from or camps for refugees, or simply disappear to live without citizenship abroad. In international waters, disputes between states often appear as to who are responsible for returning the refugees or otherwise taking care of them: is it the nearest coastal state with sufficient port facilities, the flag state of the vessel that finds the refugee boats, or is it the state from where these refugees originally departed? Moreover, the rise in piracy and the possibility of terrorist attacks at sea directed against civilian shipping, cruisers and off-shore installations poses a "new" challenge in the era of the modern nation-state. Not new in a literal sense, but novel in that state navies are not equipped to deal with such challenges, but are rather organized and equipped to fight other state navies. The
present threat, if we are to take politicians during G.W. Bush administrations I and II and NATO communiqués seriously, corresponds to what some military theoreticians have labelled 4th generation warfare. After the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, some international cooperation arose to face these risks, but with present plans for naval force structures, one is obliged to question whether the hardware fits the maritime challenges. Moreover, it is clear that the "terrorists-in-being" will impose huge costs to the prosperous societies if the maritime sectors are to be protected adequately. For the world economy and for the western nations in particular, increasing the transaction costs involving maritime transportation and energy supply might prove costly indeed.

Is it possible to see a discernable pattern in the development of international maritime institutions? We have claimed so far that the ideologic principles upheld by the states that at one time or the other were hegemons, have been rather stable. Simultaneously, the degree to which these hegemons managed to mould the international institutions can be seen as levels of institutionalizing the hegemony itself. Clearly, the evidence presented in this thesis indicates that this ability has increased over time, although it never has been perfect, or even reached a desirable level in the eyes of the hegemon. If we combine these variables, a general model is created where a central variable of hegemony on the internatonal level is illuminated, as in figure 6.1.2.

*Figure 6.1.2: institutionalization and ideological content of international hegemons*
How did this pattern matter?

We will return to the theoretical conclusion in the next section, but it is evident that in addition to promoting the interests and preferences of the hegemon, also smaller coastal states managed to gain increased national jurisdiction at sea. The main change during the post war era was the combination of institutionalized international liberalism, and the simultaneous territorialization of the seas, that in sum was a benefit to the coastal states. We can get a crude portrait of this through figure 6.1.3, where the present outcome of the territorialization of the seas in the Northeast Atlantic is shown on the map.\(^{1550}\) (The “banana hole” and the “loop hole”, are the international waters that remain in this area. The zones surrounding Svalbard and Jan Mayen are regulated by Norway. The “grey zone” in the Barents Sea is a contested area subject of negotiations between USSR, later Russia, and Norway (see inserted map and text in the figure). The demarcation of this zone is being negotiated at the time of writing (December 2005)).

\(^{1550}\) Illustration taken from http://www.sikkerhetspolitikk.no/kart/hav/3.htm
Figure 6.1.3: Oceans under national jurisdiction, The Northeast Atlantic 2003

**Legend:**
- I: Norwegian area
- II: Russian area
- III: Disputat area

The Median Line will make the area Norwegian, the sector-line will make it Russian (§2 east).

Area 1 is claimed by Norway as an economic zone. It is agreed upon to consider this as open use as long as the "Grey Zone" agreement lasts.

Area 2 and 3 are treated as Russian as long as the agreement lasts.
6 Conclusions

6.2 Theoretical conclusions

This thesis has been an empirical analysis facilitated by insights from historical institutionalism, in which the trajectory of the particular institution is seen as path-dependent. However, such an analysis must study the environment of the particular institution in order to grasp and explain changes in institutional behavior and -change. Since the state has been the main institution analyzed here, we have sought to embed the analysis of the state in its international environment. Clearly, the structures of the international system both constricted and enabled the actions and choices of state leadership. Conversely, state actions helped shape the content and form of the international system in the sense that it produced and altered the structural quality of subsystems on the international arena. Those actions were carried out based on material incentives, but incentives were often modified by the culture of security and foreign policy in each state. At times, all questions of state strategy were framed by this culture. The sum of material and ideational incentives created a foreign policy habitus. This habitus is not of character, but neither is it a mystery or a foggy theoretical construct. The foreign policy culture of a state is a product of the historical experience of the state; more precisely, the very history of state and nation-building. While our narrative of such processes is perhaps straightforward in one sense, modeling such processes in social science is painstakingly difficult. Still, theory is - as Einstein once said- what enables us to see what we see. The central challenge therefore was to model the state as a unit in the international system, the system as a product of the states, and to construct a typology that allows us to analyze the degree to which particular idiosyncrasies of individual states helped shape the content of the international system.

States

In chapter 1, we asked three questions with bearing both to empirical and theoretical questions on the state level. We need to sum up the theoretical contribution based on both our theoretical as well as ideographic discussions through the thesis. Rather than recapturing the comments from 6.1, I will proceed by stressing the theoretical implications at the state level. The initial questions on states were as follows:

- To what degree did was preparation for, and execution of, war at sea a peculiar praxis of foreign policy (1)?

- In what ways were the states analyzed here different actors in international maritime politics beyond varying material capabilities? Were these differences of such magnitude that they produced different foreign policy habitus or dispositions to act (2)?
• Thirdly, and most importantly, to what degree was the ideological and naval power of states connected? Did policy changes at the state level change relations among states in the maritime dimension of foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a change of the international state system? (3)

(1) In a substantial way, the eminent theory of Tilly lacks a more dynamic concept of "war". If we are to be pedantic, war in traditional terms is large scale violence between states, so war as such did not exist until the states were created in a way that made them capable of waging war. However, across the time dimension, war remains a static concept in Tilly. This does not necessarily weaken his typology of states according to the capital-coercion categories of European states, but it rather leaves some very important facets of state formation and war unaddressed. It is in fact striking to note that the states that in different epochs in western European history most successfully combined capital with coercion were sea powers. The Dutch republic and England seem to be prime examples of this, while the Republic became too weak on the coercive dimension. But what "made" the English state was not warmaking as such. Rather, it was the very peculiar mixture of private and royal extraterritorial violence at sea and overseas territories. Praying on the ocean transports of Spain and France was not war in a strict sense, but this piracy sanctioned by the Crown formed the material basis of the English state and the later British Empire. Moreover, even after the middle of the 17th century, the use of sea power was much less "militarized" than the army organisations of Europe, much more dependent upon private entrepreneurship and much more profitable for the state that had the society strong enough to dispatch fleets and privateers. Indeed, the bias is not unique for Tilly; sociologists and macro historians alike have been prone to leave the question of extraterritorial power out of the equation. Commenting upon a major comparative history on Britain and Germany, historian N. Rodger recently noted that “None of the distinguished contributors to the book seem to be aware that Britain’s contribution to warfare, and warfare’s contribution to British history, were rather unlike those of Prussia”. One could have wished that Tilly had devoted far more energy to the role of sea power, since it demanded fewer personnel to exercise a huge impact upon state revenues and the state system of Europe. Consider, for example, how the protection costs of a single state would rise due to the successful raids on one single valuable shipment carried out by one single enemy naval vessel. In addition, the lasting impact of sea power was that successful sea powers were much more prone to follow a geopolitical perspective on foreign policy based on high overseas

1551 Rodger, 2004: XIII
interests than smaller coastal states. While we should not criticize Tilly for the theory he did not set out to produce, it seems to me that his and Skocpol’s notion of the way international relations influences state formation is too reductionist. There was much more to the international system than "war", especially so in the 19th and 20th centuries, while I for one is not ready to dismiss the role of warfare. Furthermore, while the capital-coercion typology is an excellent basis for mapping a materialist history of Europe, it is far poorer in seeing the very substantial way ideology influenced state formation and -consolidation. Thus, very diverse societies are placed into the same analytical categories in Tilly’s scheme. Simultaneously, some national similarities are downplayed, since the typology is narrow. This is a classic problem of typologies in CP, but the major fault here is that the materialist factors dominate the entire model. The analysis in this thesis has demonstrated that naval policies were embedded in an ideologically coloured foreign policy. Mare clausum principles gave different incentives and justifications for extraterritorial policies than did mare liberum.

(2) Concerning the second question, of spatial variations of foreign policy due to different national trajectories, the answer is affirmative. Britain, and for long periods the US, display a very pronounced tendency of continuity in foreign policy, a continuity that is not entirely based on eternal interests, but also on an enduring national identity. Britain has remained true to the sea power axiom ever after Trafalgar. While the US has swung between isolationism and interventionism in the popular description, it has been an active player continually since 1941, and with an outlook that owes much to the myth of the fight against the evil European imperialists, the heritage of the Founding Fathers and the haven of freedom from sea to shining sea. That being said, we must not ignore the lessons to be found in the states that played lesser roles on the international scene in the post-war era. These show interesting cases of punctuated equilibria: of rather pronounced changes in foreign policy habitus due to international changes. But while the stronger sea powers demonstrated that domestic politics can determine foreign policy, and in the case of hegemons shape world politics, we must admit that the weaker states covered here are examples of the opposite, at least to a large degree. By and large, losses in war and international power politics where national boundaries were drawn anew were external factors that shaped the policies of the Scandinavian states and Germany. But there is more to the story than that, since the cases of Germany, Denmark and Sweden are all examples of states that turned from paternalism to either bandwagoning or neutralism in the form of assuming more peripheral roles in international politics. Thus, the first step in a conclusion is to state that domestic and international politics indeed were entwined in all the cases covered here. Next, it is not so difficult to see how the state formation
processes of England and the US influenced their foreign policy; to a very essential degree, the nationbuilding created a national identity that helped statesmen perceive national interests in a particular way. The problem with "national identity" is that it is such an elusive concept. This is the main reason why we on theoretical grounds have chosen to speak of foreign policy habitus in this thesis, and we have demonstrated that a typology of ideology coupled to national interests served to shape a predisposition in foreign policy decisionmaking on maritime issues. The real challenge is to see how this fits into a truly nomothetic theory. In this respect, this thesis holds no definite answer in the form of a "new theory" of CP or IR. However, it is pretty clear that there are important findings here that support a particular branch of theories of state- and nationbuilding. The dialectic process between domestic and international politics and between ideology and interests lends clear support to a path-dependency model, and more precisely to the concept of punctuated equilibria (see chapter 1). It is evident from the present exercise that the national ideology on maritime issues combined with national interests produced a high degree of continuity that has been broken only by major upheavals. Predominantly, losing a war means adaptation to new realities, and adjustment of national identity as well. But there was more to the international system that influenced foreign policy formation in maritime matters. It seems that the nature of hegemony, and particularly the dominant ideological trait of the hegemon, mattered to the system and its units at large. One should note that this is a huge step from both Marxist theories as well as realist theories of the international system. What mattered more than mere balance of power and economic strength were quite simply some deeply held values in the hegemonic power. It seems then, that the particular results of state- and nationbuilding shapes foreign policy, and that the outcome of this process in major powers will produce important results for the international system.\footnote{Note the similarity to Stinchcombe’s (1968) discussion of the relationship between power and institutions. This thesis demonstrates the utility of his concepts on institutions, power and path-dependency.} What then accounted for the variations in the domestic trajectories of the major powers covered here?

One central difference between the Anglosaxon countries and Germany was that the former to a substantial degree had the opportunity to create a maritime community over a long span of time. By a maritime community I refer to shipbuilding industries, the merchant navy and the naval skills required to operate a merchant navy. National maritime policies also developed on an early stage, even in the US this came at an earlier stage than in Germany. Central in the formulation of these policies was the cooperation between the maritime community and interests in the civil society and the state agencies and political institutions that created laws and executed foreign policies. Thus, even though the US did not get embroiled in the viles of European power politics until much later, military interests were closely coordinated with maritime interest groups in maritime questions.
History dictated that the policies in the US and Britain were different, to be sure, but the economic interests of the maritime companies and interest groups were practically always represented in the central discussions on national policies with bearings on the maritime sector. The contrast to Germany is clear. Although the old Hanseatic cities did have maritime communities until the German unification, the distance to the political institutions in Berlin were greater in both political and economic terms (and as we saw in chapter 4, even in cultural terms). The result was that the German Imperial Navy was built very fast, did not have a longstanding tradition, and came in a young state where the parliament seemingly had less control with naval policy than in the Anglosaxon societies. The argument I present here has no normative aim, and as we argued in chapter 4, the German political institutions simply wanted what Britain already had: a strong navy. The point, however, is that the building of this navy was less coordinated with the overall foreign policy of Imperial Germany than was the case with naval policies in Britain and the US. In the latter states, naval priorities and construction programmes were intensely debated in representative institutions, journals and newspapers, especially in Britain. The same can be said of the German case, but to a lesser degree, because the young naval service achieved much greater influence on naval policies than in the Anglosaxon countries. In other words, the Anglosaxon states seemed more firmly embedded in their civil society than was Imperial Germany. At the same time, international political and strategic developments also influenced the state. As we have seen, WWI "punctuated" German ambitions to become the dominant sea powers, just as defeats in war earlier had made Danish and Swedish predispositions to a paternalist foreign policy unbearable and unrealistic.

(3) To what degree was the ideological and naval power of states connected, or to be more precise; did ideology influence where, when and how naval force was used?

The question raises the issue of primacy yet again, was there a causal relationship between national ideology and power, and what direction did such a relation have?

The latter issue holds no answers in the form of a causal law, since the number of cases of international hegemony is too low. I would rather conclude that naval power was a dual structure of ideology and material power, and that different mixtures of these sources of social power in combination have produced sea power and extraterritorial power. In this respect, the IEMP model developed by Michael Mann is instructive in the sense that it opens up for the complexities of empirical variations analysed in this thesis. Some states mixed ideological and military power in a way that produced extraterritorial power, but among these states, the outcome varied on the continuum between paternalism and international liberalism. Concerning the former question, we
have demonstrated that the economic power of the US until the 1890s to a very limited degree was applied to seek extraterritorial possessions and domination at sea. Therefore, it is too simplistic to argue that economic interests dictated ideology and gave incentives for colonialism and strong navies. Even between the two main liberalists, the Dutch republic and the US, there is a not inconsiderable difference, since the Dutch did indeed create an empire before the 20th century. The variation among the three historic "hegemons" in this thesis is therefore instructive. Criticism could be raised against this verdict in the vein that there are clear similarities between the Dutch republic, Britain and the US. All three states developed democracy at an early stage, one might argue (this is an interesting topic in itself, witness the earlier segregation policies in the US), all these states were empires of trade and developed considerable navies, and the conventional view is that all were fairly liberal by contemporary standards. And yet, the difference in maritime principles between the US and Britain that we have demonstrated in the empirical chapters are so pronounced that they produced two different hegemonies, two different world orders. It is true that a world order is not shaped by the hegemon alone, but we have also seen that the British Empire and the US after 1945 indeed were instrumental in creating world orders that were both in their interest and compatible with their national ideology.

Did policy changes at the state level change relations among states in the maritime dimension of foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a change of the international state system?

I believe that chapters 3-5 leave us with firm empirical evidence that enable us to answer in the affirmative to these questions, although the question of systemic change will remain the most elusive and controversial. Again, the manifestations of US liberalism in various forms offer valuable insights. The pendulum between isolationism and interventionism produced different crystallizations in US foreign policy, and this changed transatlantic relations. Moreover, the different conception of liberalism, although not a dramatic change, in the US after the New Deal produced an altered approach to the management of US foreign policy and the world order. The case of Imperial Germany is instructive as well. Prior to the rise of German "navalism" in the late 1890s, there is some truth in the notion of British "splendid isolation" as regards continental affairs. As the result of Wilhelmine naval priorities became clear, this changed as well. In turn, the altered British naval priorities (Northern waters became much more important) and the world wars changed forever the relations between Paternalist European powers and their former colonies. The US did nothing to slow down the process of decolonization, although the cold war made the US tread warily in this regard in different regions. In Scandinavia, the balance of naval power in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea (primarily due to naval priorities in Germany, Russia and Britain) produced alterations in
foreign policy and extraterritorial policies in particular. And the changes were of such a scope as to influence national identity as well. The result was that the security complex of Scandinavia was changed, former paternalist powers like Sweden and Denmark becoming much more peripheral by adopting a preference of neutrality and legalism. In the postwar era, the principles and preferences of the US mattered for the entire complex of international organizations, including maritime matters, and maritime disputes were brought into the new institutions as issues to be solved in a multilateral context. No longer should principal cases in the maritime realm be solved by bilateral negotiations and determined by naval power alone. Extraterritorial conflicts are cases of international problems that were channelled through these mechanisms of discourse and settlement. It was not so much the matter if these mechanisms always were very efficient, but that they were there gave a *de jure* equality for all sovereigns. As we demonstrated in chapter 5, this was of outmost importance for the weaker coastal states. While the US had the seapower to establish "command of the sea" in many waters, it did not see this as the best way to secure interests and principles that served the US. Multilateralism was a viable solution to ensure the principles US leaders and opinion held so high, and in turn this also gave the US legitimacy. In the maritime sphere, the outcome was one of increased national jurisdiction over maritime resources, and in itself, this was a change of a structure of the international system. Prior to the UN, NATO, the International Court and the UNCLOS conferences, *there was no other structure* for a small power to turn to than the hegemon or an alliance of states if it were to secure some support for a particular national claim. Typically, a coastal state with very limited military power and an inclination to - or even a declared policy of - neutrality, seldom was in a position to gain such support unless two conditions existed. Firstly that the right the coastal state wanted was not disadvantageous for the hegemon. This was seldom the case during Pax Britannica. Secondly, the coastal state had to have some value in an important economic sector for the hegemon or alliance in which it sought support. This was the case with Denmark, Norway and Iceland from 1905 till 1940, when Britain simply no longer had the power to manage the northern waters by itself. By 1945, the institutional matrix were constructed that would evolve into a structure that also served as an enabling structure for weak and small states. As Kissinger (quoted in chapter 5) noted, the cod wars between Iceland and Great Britain said volumes of the changes of international affairs during the postwar era. Against this, one can naturally point out that the international system is anarchic in the sense that no supranational monopoly of violence, taxation and legislation exists. But this anarchy certainly were modified until it became more hierarchical than anarchic, this influenced small states according to the specific ideological content of the international institutions.
Likewise, international relations theory to a large degree has treated the state as given, as a unit which preferences are also given, and thus explanation of the logic and structure of international systems follow directly. This is a reductionist theory both on the levels of states and systems, since the state is seen as analogous to the firm, and the international system as analogous to the perfect market. In order to achieve an approach with more empirical sensitivity, some scholars in IR therefore divided into a rationalist camp, chiefly occupied with game theoretic analysis of foreign policy and regional security complexes, and one constructivist occupied with the notion of the culture of foreign policy and the ideational facets of what constitutes the state and the international system of states. The latter group is closer to historical sociology and studies of political culture in the field of comparative politics. In the wake of such cataclysmic events as the end of the cold war, constructivist approaches in IR have gained ground. The central challenge, as Robert Keohane has argued, for constructivists is to build "testable" hypotheses and theories. While radical constructivists will dismiss such a demand, we have attempted to construct a typology of ideal types in this thesis. Where Alexander Wendt made the same effort in conceptualizing "cultures of anarchy" in the international system, we have argued that the ideology of foreign policy is a central theoretical challenge, and that the particular identity of stronger states in turn helped shape the international system. Furthermore, the responses of these states to contemporary threats are colored by their ideologies. In an age where scholars from Martin van Creveld to Herfried Müller see the monopolies of violence as fundamentally challenged, we should then expect the major powers to find countermeasures appropriate of their foreign policy habitus, but adjusted to the nature of challenges.

The habitus of foreign policy and the International level
We have constructed a typology of states based on one main ideological factor: mare liberum and mare clausum as a continuum of principles, and one material factor; degree of overseas interests. The combination of such variables made us a tool to compare national policies, to examine the interplay between domestic and international politics and the historical trajectories of polities in an international system.

Now, a series of critique and objections could be raised against such a model. I believe it is necessary to address these questions, not in order to immunize the model, but in order to evaluate the insight with the highest potential of contributing to nomothetic theory. While the below does not amount to a summing up of this contribution, a meta-theoretical assessment is a requisite for summing up the theoretical contribution of the present exercise.
The main theoretical objections to the theoretical model here might be as follows.

1. One is that it quite simply is impossible to construct a model of politics where the ideational and material interests behind politics are combined, and that we should rather stick to one mode of explanation. In turn, this would produce more elegant models and make us avoid the multilevel analysis;

2. Another objection, and related to the first, is that material interests are more important than ideational ones, conceptualized as ideology in this thesis. Thus, material factors have primacy;

3. The third is that ideational motives at times have been far more important than material ones. It follows that ideational factors have primacy;

4. A fourth objection is that the multilevel model obscures the importance of the international level for the domestic one, and vice versa.

These objections can all be addressed in either a purely theoretical set of answers or a purely empirical one. Both will require ample space. While I hope that the empirical case has been given through chapters 2-5, I will seek to sum up the theoretical case for such an approach beyond that given in chapters 1-2, hopefully without having to envoke the canons of philosophy of science as I do so. On the other hand, I find it practically impossible to separate the theoretical from the empirical one at this point, given the very nature of comparative politics and this thesis, empirical validity seems to me to be the crucial test for theory. Still, I believe there are sound theoretical refutations of the objections listed above.

1. When one refuses models that are multidimensional in the sense of combining material and ideational interests, one is perhaps left with elegant models. Still, it seems to me that the last 50 years of social scientific work on macro processes to some degree have suffered from elegant models that are just too uni-dimensional. More or less, the history of the social sciences in the 20th century reflects the schisma between the old German historical school and Marxism. The most fundamental cleavage involves the role of ideational reasons for action versus material interests and the primacy of materialism versus "culture". In other words, this cleavage is very fundamental for social theory at large. However, I cannot but agree with the argument of Giddens that too rigid interpretations of material structures as restricting human behaviour often leads to determinist
theories. If one excludes one of Weber’s sources of social action entirely, then the researcher’s conception of social reality that are being used for analytical purposes also becomes too narrow. As I argued in chapters 1 and 2, materialist theories of history can be fascinating and certainly enlightening, but I believe fewer and fewer scientists will argue that they are satisfactory. Likewise, some postmodern "cultural" theories at times seem too removed from the realities to provide adequate understanding of large-scale political phenomena (see below). On an even more metatheoretical level, I think few social scientists will refute that game theoretic models of political processes are elegant. On the other hand, any serious game-theorist (and here I refer to scholars that are true specialists) will argue that there are not some very definite limits as to what game theory can explain in political science. At the most general level, the failure of producing analytical models that can take into account diversity sooner or later is bound to make political science, and perhaps especially IR, the object of even more severe criticism from other disciplines and new analytical approaches that by themselves do not necessarily produce progress in empirical social research.

In this sense, returning to historical institutionalism -a true Weberian programme- might yield new empirical insights through efforts at creating truly multidimensional models, because such models should have the potential of adding explanatory power to existing theory. Some of the theoreticians on whose shoulders I have been standing in this thesis clearly and explicitly recognized this long time ago, and subsequently produced outstanding scholarship. They include, but are not restricted to, otherwise diverse scholars like Michael Mann, Stein Rokkan, Douglas North, Peter Katzenstein and Hedley Bull.

In this thesis, we have tried to demonstrate that an analytical model where states are seen as constituted by ideas as well as very concrete physical reality makes more sense than a uni-dimensional theory. This has implications for state theory as well as theories of the international system and international relations proper. Naturally, this makes the present effort belong to the realm of constructivism in IR once one considers the thesis a work of IR. But in social theory at large, the theoretical assumptions in the model are not very different from established works in comparative politics. Involved in the study of political culture was a turn from the study of formal political institutions to more informal ones. It took some time for this approach to gain influence in other disciplines, but Douglas North eventually managed to demonstrate how culture in the form of informal constraints mattered also in the economic realm. One should not be surprised then, that IR scholarship recently has turned its attention to “social constructivism” of a more moderate character. The core problem in such attempts is to reconcile, so to speak, material and ideational factors. In this thesis, I have argued that there has been a certain dialectical process in states as to what was
appropriate action in extraterritorial issues in different epochs. I believe a theory of foreign policy and international relations should reflect such a process, since both purely material and purely "cultural" theories are bound to become too one-sided.

2. Both "structural" realists and Marxists, I assume, will argue that involving the variables of ideology and culture is an unnecessary step. In the Marxist reply, it will be emphasized that culture is just "superstructure", or a "result of" material factors. In the study of foreign policy as in this thesis then, one could claim that all hegemons preached liberalism because liberalism always best served the interests of the hegemon. I believe this is a teleological argument, and an argument with limited explanatory power, as chapters 2-5 have demonstrated. The arguments from some political realists will be more diverse, and partly more related to objection nr 4. On the ontological level, however, scholars of the neo-realist school will claim that material interests are far more important than cultural factors in explaining foreign policy, and the interplay between domestic politics and international relations. It is not that they will deny the existence of ideology in any way, but that whatever variations there are in national ideologies will not produce very different foreign policies and international institutions. In this image, states are "like units", not functionally differentiated, and the division of labour between them not very well defined. This to a large degree is a result of the systemic logic of the international arena; it is anarchic, and remains so, states therefore have conformed to a single institutional logic in a self-help system. While structural realism certainly has its virtues, this program (as Marxist theories of international relations”) is ill equipped to explain profound changes in the international system (indeed, some structural realists would argue that there are no significant changes in the international system after 1648. The problem then is a very restricted scope of the scholarship in question). How come? The fact remains that political realism relies too heavily on material variables, often quantitative studies of arms, sometimes of industry and economics, summing this up to constitute the balance of power, the only true international institution there is. Such modes of large scale analysis nevertheless had little to say as to how the cold war ended, and why its outcome turned out to be what it was. One might indeed point out that realist scholars in some instances proclaimed the demise of the US even until 1989. This failure is an outcome due to the fact that domestic politics, national ideology and international institutions matter, and that political realism after the 1960s failed to take these levels of analysis seriously. Huge changes take place in the international system due to domestic changes, the influence of ideologies that are less and less contained within state borders, and international institutions with rules and resources beyond mere power politics. Moreover, the application of
realist scholarship to foreign policy only explains parts of state policies. The national habitus, the role of tradition and identity, are all left out of the equation. While realist theory can help us lay out basic national interests, which is not a bad part of an explanation, realism fails to address the particular historic trajectories that have formed the formal as well as informal institutions that shape the predisposition to act in certain ways in different states, and realist theory in itself will in fact have absolutely nothing to say about non-material aspects of national decisionmaking at all, not to mention differences between states in this respect.\textsuperscript{1553}

3. The third objection to the thesis goes in the opposite direction of objection nr. 2, since it will claim that we have emphasized material factors too much in this thesis. This criticism will come from various positions that are not readily lumped together under one banner. Undoubtedly, various stands in the human and social science that lay particular emphasis on discourse theory and the formation of collective meaning in post-structural theory and radical constructivism will claim that "there is nothing outside the text". In this fashion, the various and voluminous references to strategic decisions in this thesis is unnecessary, we have therefore allegedly strayed away from the central task of social theory: to deconstruct the discourses that were most central to national identity as well as the "construction" of the world polity, largely a social product.

While I am in no position to decipher what seems to me to be various and diverse stands in radical social constructivism, I nevertheless have a gnawing feeling that this line of scholarship also ultimately becomes one-sided, and fundamentally so. That social reality is social constructs is true to some extent, but this does mean that social constructs are realities, and poses the question whether such constructions are not to a considerable degree also results of utility-seeking behaviour and thus material factors. For comparative politics, the question remains whether large scale comparisons are possible through discourse theory alone, and whether the tools of radical constructivism produce more plausible explanations through stronger tools than historical institutionalism as traditionally used in comparative politics.

4. The last theoretical objection to this thesis is the hardest one to address, and it certainly cuts deep into the very essence of the feasibility of multi-level, large scale comparisons. To put it crudely, some IR scholars will claim that introducing the state level makes the analysis of

\textsuperscript{1553} In the praxis of realist scholars, we often find empirical analyses that indeed include ideational factors, although they are not elaborated theoretically. Henry Kissinger (1957) for example, showed an almost heuristic interest in the praxis and worldviews of Great Statesmen.
international relations less elegant, while some comparative scholars would claim that far too much emphasis is put on the international level. Today, it is not exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that both these objections are dubious on empirical grounds, and that scholars with empirical sensitivity increasingly transcend the borders between IR and CP in macro studies (as we have seen both liberalists and moderate constructivists in IR use the domestic level to explain international relations, while macro theorists in CP from Stein Rokkan and Immanuel Wallerstein to Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly certainly have operated with concepts of the international system or international variables to explain national differences and similarities).

At a purely theoretical level, however, the objection has its merits. By presenting domestic political "development" as one process, by excluding variables exogenous to the state, the analysis becomes tidy, neat and causal mechanisms are restricted to the state level. This makes both qualitative and quantitative comparative research possible, and it most certainly has given important insights. On the other hand, we have seen that celebrated scholars in CP have found limitations in such approaches. Their answers have been to introduce the "international system" (Mann, Skocpol), the "world-system" (Wallerstein) or a "conceptual map of Europe" (Rokkan, Tilly) to account for regional and national differences. Through such efforts, they in my view produced better theories of macro phenomena. Moreover, Rokkan, Mann and North each have demonstrated that both material structures and cultural variables matter, and that it is not impossible to theorise on the interplay between international and domestic variables, whatever underlying structures they gave primacy.

The two-level metaphor applying game theory to the study of foreign policy ultimately was an attempt at producing a formal theory of this interplay. Again, introducing the international systemic variables in some form clearly opened up for new explanations of national trajectories. Therefore, I will claim that it is a viable approach even in comparative politics. Furthermore, our model developed in chapter 2 explained extraterritorial state policy better than a model that would exclude the international level of explanation. The assertive but defensive policies of the smaller states in the latter half of the 20th century could not be properly understood without due reference to international changes. Likewise, the specific US approach to the freedom of the seas could not possibly be fully grasped without taking into account its relationship to the British Empire.

While the multilevel approach is utterly challenging, it remains an attractive route to a better understanding of large-scale social scientific inquiry. Numerous scholars have sought to tackle those problems before. In comparative politics, scholars that have applied a research design of what Charles Tilly labeled encompassing comparisons is a particularly influential group of scholars when one considers the history of macro sociology. Stein Rokkan and Immanuel Wallerstein both were pioneers in this kind of large-scale social science, and gave valuable contributions to macro theory.
However, relatively few scholars today apply such theories, and later attempts (i.e. Skocpol, 1979, Mann, 1993)) have largely relied on highly reductionist notions of the international system, chiefly corresponding to neorealism (Tilly) or economic reductionism in the form of neomarxism (Wallerstein). Rokkan is an exception; his conceptual map of Europe, while not a fully developed Theory, is both geopolitical and geo-cultural. Likewise, International relations theory to a large degree has treated the state as given, as a unit which preferences are also given, and that thus does not need any further explanation or problematisation in order to explain the logic and structure of international systems. This is a reductionist theory both on the levels of states and systems, since the state is seen as analogous to the firm, and the system as analogous to the perfect market. In order to achieve an approach with more empirical sensitivity, scholars in IR therefore divided into a rationalist camp and one constructivist. The latter group is closer to historical sociology and studies of political culture in the field of comparative politics. This thesis is therefore an attempt to bring sociological macro theory in to study international systems, and simultaneously an attempt to bring theories from IR in to comparative, historical sociology. While a daunting task, it yields exciting results. Finally, there is the objection from some IR scholars (but certainly this group is shrinking in size judged from the last 15 years of IR scholarship) that domestic politics do not matter for international affairs to a degree that it makes any introduction of a two-level analysis worthwhile. The plausible assumption behind this argument is that if one is to analyse the international system or international relations, then one should have a theory of that system, and further that such a theory is possible without a theory of states. Indeed, the separation between internal and external (as in theories of CP that exclude the international variables) is then seen as a precondition for analyzing international affairs. The puzzle involved in this move is that in order to analyse an international community that are understood as consisting of states, these scholars ended up with a very crude a priori assumption not only of what states are, but how they behave according to the centuries-old international anarchy. The result, as scholars Buzan and Little have observed is that "IR theory is weaker than it should be because it is largely based on a narrow set of conditions". While there is much truth in the belief of an international system with a high degree of continuity, such a theory is closed to the most dynamic source for change. In the words of IR scholar Ian Clark;

"Continuity thus comes from the structure of the international system but change from the transformation of the individual units. Paradoxically, theories of international order have suffered both from too much concentration on the state and from too little elaboration of its evolving

1554 Interestingly, Immanuel Wallerstein in the recent years of his scholarship (1996-) has devoted considerable attention to what he labels the geoculture of the world-system.  
1555 Buzan & Little, 2000: 369
In this thesis, we have seen that international institutions were changed in tandem with state autonomy, largely depending upon what international institutions the major powers created. Is it possible to build a model useful for monothetic social science on the basis of our discussion above? I will claim that it is. What follows is not a universal model, since our empirical analysis in this thesis has been restricted to extraterritorial policies, and because the investigation has been territorially demarcated to the northern hemisphere. Nevertheless, we do have sufficient evidence to claim that the processes analysed here have had profound impact upon international institutions, and it is beyond dispute that these institutions have had a global influence. Our findings contradict the claim that the power of the state has been reduced during the 20th century. Indeed, we have demonstrated that the turning away from paternalist to liberalist principles has created a window of opportunity for smaller states. This opportunity was utilized by coastal states to increase the scope of national jurisdiction in a very concrete manner. We can illustrate this in a simple model as in figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Nature of hegemony and state autonomy in maritime politics for the majority of coastal states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Paternalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Institutionalization of liberalism in international politics
- Formal equality between states
- Non-institutionalized hierarchy of states/anarchy
- Limited autonomy for smaller states

1556 Clark, 1989: 212
Figure 6.2 illustrates a central finding in this thesis. There was no automatic shift from Pax Britannica to a US hegemony. The logic of the international institutions was changed due to the different principles that constituted US foreign policy. In turn, this set in motion a development where the majority of states gained increased autonomy. Naturally there were exceptions to this, since the Cold War set limits to the implementation of US principles, and since breaches with US principles in territories like Vietnam ensured US interventions whenever opportunity permitted such interventions. But on the whole, and particularly in maritime affairs, the dominant trend is one of increased state autonomy also for weaker states. One hypothesis that can be drawn from this, is that the absence of a major challenger to the US after the Cold War will increase this tendency. The dominant macro trend in the history of the polities covered here is increased convergence towards liberalism and formal equality between states. In figure 6.1.1, this convergence is easily visible.

Implications for the large-scale study of politics

A major proposition that has been strengthened in this thesis is that IR theory must build analytical models of international affairs that take the nature and identity of state into account. This is an affirmation of views voiced by several scholars for a long time, notably Ian Clark (1989). This thesis demonstrates that the most influential states shape international interaction, and that this shaping in turn can alter the foreign policy of separate states significantly. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that international relations have changed in the sense that different international institutions mediate international interaction, and that these institutions in turn are the results of the principles and preferences of single states. Thus, the empirical material presented here strengthens the conclusion drawn by Buzan and Little that "The really big changes that define transformations of era are caused by changes in the nature of the dominant units whose actions largely define the international system". Furthermore, I have argued that the changes in the international system due to the specific hierarchy of states are dependent upon the principles and preferences of the states highest in this hierarchy. That both ideology and material interests matter, is demonstrated in the field of extraterritorial policy. Beyond this, it is difficult to generalize.

However, a major argument at a general level from this thesis is that comparative, historical analysis seems to be as important as ever for the social sciences.

First, at the state level, the verdict that "historical depth is also necessary for the study of states because of another feature that they share with many of the societal structures with which they are
6 Conclusions

"intertwined" is certainly confirmed here. And yet, I believe that the thesis shows the degree to which states can change quite significantly as entities. While we find traits of continuity to be sure, it is striking to see how Germany, the Netherlands and all the Scandinavian states experienced defeats in war that seemed to produce an alteration of foreign policy habitus. We have demonstrated the content and consequences of these changes, but we have not addressed fully the mechanisms within these states that in more detail can analyze such changes. This requires further research, as the saying goes. What we have observed, is a close connection between international competition and the ideology of foreign policy. Imperial Germany perceived sea power as a requirement for survival in the international system, and pursued a navalist and imperialist overseas policy from the mid 1890s. The loss in WWI made Germany subdue the naval arm to the other services, while the Second World War made Germany a bandwagoning state. Likewise, the Dutch polity turned from an international liberalist to a liberal, bandwagoning state after the Napoleonic wars. Sweden and Denmark, once among the dominant sea powers in Europe with huge overseas possessions, both became peripheral after the 19th century, Sweden becoming a neutral, sovereignty-seeking periphery, Denmark more of a hybrid of sovereignty seeking periphery (prior to WWII) and bandwagoning state (after WWII). The US has been remarkably persistent in its liberalism, although the pendulum between isolationism and activism has swung in the latter direction. Typically, the periods 1895-1905, 1916-1919, 1941-1945 and 2001-2005 have been marked of an activist foreign policy with US forces waging war overseas, but each time justified on both universalistic and American values (indeed, it seems that Americans often see American values as universal).

Secondly, for theories of the international system, the implication of this exercise may seem less optimistic. We have, I believe, seen the limitations of neorealism and liberal institutionalism in this thesis. At least, when one studies extraterritorial state policies, international interaction seems far less patterned than these theories suggest. When one adds that non-state actors were very important until the 19th century, and that 4th generation warfare theorists have a point when they see non-state actors as ever more important at the time of writing, theorizing about the world-system or international system seems even more dubious and daunting a task. And yet, there is no bigger fallacy than proclaiming IR theory as dead because of this. On the contrary, classical realism or classical liberalism combined with moderate constructivism should provide the scholar with concepts and causal as well as constitutive theories for the study of international affairs. Moreover, all three should be studied by comparative scholars in macro sociology, CP and history that seek to

1558 Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 348
explain large scale changes. The reason for this relevance is that in the real world, there is a very substantial interplay between domestic politics and international interaction. The dividing line between the state and its surroundings at times has been blurred, as a thesis on extraterritorial policies demonstrates. It seems to me that the dominating trend in Western Europe at the time of writing is that the interplay between "domestic" and "foreign" policy is becoming even more intimate. In the European states covered here, even in Iceland and Norway which are not EU members, EU jurisdiction to a very substantial degree is national jurisdiction. In the US, for all its intentions of curbing terrorism, a too isolationist and nationalist policy is difficult in the light of economic interdependence. In the latter state, society has a distinct set of values -a cultural code- that is uniquely American. We have seen that the national ideology of US politics has helped shape US foreign policy, and it is very likely to do so in the following years. In the case of Western Europe, the corresponding issue of identity is not settled in any way; "Europe has been created: now we must create the Europeans". While EU states will perhaps have many common interests beyond economic policy in the years to come, the identity necessary for a more common foreign policy will not be easily forged. Once a political debate arises in western Europe over sovereignty of maritime resources, one can easily predict that the debates will be very intense, not only due to the fact that maritime resources are of highest concern for most of these countries, but because national ideology will be involved as well (in effect, the resistance against the EU reforms in 2005 are apt illustrations of the limitations that undoubtedly exist as to European integration).

In this thesis, we have argued that it was impossible to explain national preferences and principles in maritime policy without due reference to the international system, primarily but not exclusively consisting of states. At the same time, we have made clear that an account of international institutions without due reference to domestic policies will remain a sterile exercise. Therefore, we sought to construct a model of how domestic politics produced different extraterritorial policies. The model and the following empirical account have been structural to an extreme extent. And yet, the model also was an attempt to show that ideational motives for action modify material interests. In essence, as domestic politics is nearly inseparable from foreign policy, so is ideational incentives (or dispositions to act, habitus and mental "maps" of decision makers) inseparable from material interests. Both ideational and material factors constitute “the national interest”.

1559 See Shore, 2000
### APPENDIX I-quantitative estimate navies of the major powers

#### (a) Major European powers 1650-1815

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
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<td>1720</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>1740</td>
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<td>1750</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>1775</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>1780</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>137</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>1790</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>1795</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>160</td>
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<td>1805</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1810</td>
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<td>183</td>
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<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Data from Glete, 1993 volume II:522-675

\(^{1560}\) This fall is due to the fact that some ships of the Royal Navy over 100 tons were too small for the new Sixth Rte.
(b) Modelski and Thompsons “distribution of global power battleships”\textsuperscript{1561} -selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Modelski and Thompsons “distribution of global power pre-Dreadnoughts-selected years”\textsuperscript{1562}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gr.Brit.</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) Modelski and Thompsons “distribution of global power Dreadnoughts-selected years”\textsuperscript{1563}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GrBr</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{1561} Taken from Modelski & Thompson, 1988: table 3.4, 4.1, they here (ibid: 66) define a global power battleship after 1691 as a ship-of-the-line with more than 50 guns. Needless to say, this creates a somewhat crude estimate, and the definitions of the pre-dreadnoughts and dreadnoughts of the later age (see c) and d)) are also somewhat inaccurate in that other types of vessels are not included. However, as the authors also point out, such estimates are bound to be simplifications due to the existence of various designs of naval ships.

\textsuperscript{1562} Excerpt from Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 76, table 4.2

\textsuperscript{1563} Excerpt from Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 78, table 4.3
APPENDIX II: REGISTERED MERCHANT SHIPS IN 1000 TONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1699</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>2477</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>3565</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>3536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1519</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>6575</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>3578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>12466</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>3320</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>6861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>11984</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>16111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5681</td>
<td>1493</td>
<td>10738</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>2958</td>
<td>28409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>18846</td>
<td>4750</td>
<td>13574</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>7476</td>
<td>4089</td>
<td>19550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data gathered from Mitchell (1982) and (1993) tables under chapter G “Transportation”

APPENDIX III: Landings of fish in 1000 metric tons in European states 20th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
<th>The USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>1116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1468</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>2223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1543</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>2242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>2980</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>2230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1767</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>2550</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>2842</td>
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