Understanding the Different Outcomes of the Arab Uprisings

A Comparison of Egypt and Tunisia

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to analyse and explain the reason why Egypt and Tunisia experienced different transitional outcomes following the Arab uprisings in 2011. Although both countries appear to have similar authoritarian regimes, Tunisia experienced a democratic transition while Egypt reverted back to an authoritarian regime. The thesis applies the framework of new institutionalism and rational choice theory in an attempt to explain both structural, and actor-oriented factors that might have contributed to Egypt and Tunisia’s different outcomes. In order to investigate this puzzle, the thesis is based upon the following research question:

“Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while Egypt did not, when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?”

From the theoretical framework thesis has developed three distinct hypotheses. The first two hypotheses are developed from the new institutional approach, and focuses on structural explanations. The third hypothesis is developed from the rational choice approach, and focuses on actor-oriented explanations. In order to explore the hypotheses, the thesis utilizes the strategy of comparative historical analysis and process tracing.

The findings indicate that the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia mainly lie in influence of the military in relation to the state apparatus. In Egypt, the military and the state apparatus were not autonomous from each other, and instead fused together. As a result of the lack of autonomy between these institutions, a democratic transition has become impossible. By contrast, in Tunisia, the military and state apparatus were autonomous from each other, which in return encouraged a democratic transition. Hence, the autonomy between the state apparatus and the military appears to have been a crucial factor that promotes democratic transitions, whereas a lack of autonomy between these institutions appears to disrupt democratic transitions.
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**Abbreviations**

CPO – Causal Process Observation

CPR – Congress for the Republic Party

FJP – Freedom and Justice Party

FMF – Foreign Military Financing

IMET – International Military Education and Training

MB – Muslim Brotherhood

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

NDP – National Democratic Party

NI – New Institutionalism

PA – Populist authoritarian regimes

PPA – Post-populist authoritarian regimes

SCC – Supreme Constitutional Court

SCAF – Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

PSD – Socialist Destourian Party

RCT – Rational Choice Theory

RCD – Democratic Constitutional Rally
Chapter 1: Introduction

For much of the past four decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been characterized by an astonishing persistence of authoritarianism. In fact, no other place in the world has turned out to be so immune to democratization as the MENA countries. In 2010 the advocacy organization, Freedom House released their annual report on the state of political and civil rights around the world, and reported that the MENA remained the region with the lowest level of freedom (Freedom House, 2011). The failure of democratization to take root in the region and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world has puzzled scholars. The authoritarian persistence that characterized MENA changed in the course of a few weeks in late 2010 and early 2011.

On the 17th of December 2010 a Tunisian street vendor, named Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in front of his local government building in Sidi Bouzid, a rural town in Tunisia. Earlier that day, a policewoman seized his vegetable cart and publicly humiliated him. He attempted to lodge a complaint at the local municipality but this was of no use (Gelvin, 2012:27). Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest against the injust social and political conditions dominating the country. Mohamed Bouazizi died of his injuries on the 4th of January 2011. However, his death, set off an increasing series of protests against the government that spread across Tunisia. The 14th of January 2011, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia unchallenged for the previous twenty-three years, fled the country. Ben Ali’s overthrow set off a wave of anti-authoritarian mobilization in the region known as the Arab uprisings (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar, 2012:17).

The uprisings in Tunisia was the first in a series of events that made a powerful impression on ordinary people in the region, and as a result it spread like wild fire to its neighboring countries. The events that took place in Tunisia demonstrated that broad based movements such as the one that overthrew the Tunisian government was both powerful and effective. Subsequently, activists in Egypt began to occupy Tahir square in Cairo on the 25th of January 2011. (Brynen et al., 2012:24). The demonstrations in Cairo grew much larger than anticipated, and spread across the country. Tahir square became the gathering place for the opposition despite the regime’s efforts to intimidate them. The security forces in Egypt failed to unravel the protesters and the military refused to open fire on them. On the 11th of February the military removed President Hosni Mubarak who had ruled the country for thirty years (Gelvin, 2012:27).
Whereas Ben Ali and Mubarak’s regime eventually gave in to the revolution, the next wave of challenged leaders fought back. On the one hand, in some countries like Morocco, the leaders offered limited preventive political concessions, while on the other, wealthy countries such as Saudi Arabia combined repression as well as extensive public spending. Other countries responded to peaceful demonstrations with brutal force. Muammar Quaddafi, the authoritarian leader in Libya, unleashed the full force of his army on peaceful protesters. The al-Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain started an efficient elimination of their political opponents. The president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, refused to let go of his power when nearly every sector in society as well as the military turned against him. Finally, the protestors in Syria were brutally repressed (Lynch, 2014:1-2).

1.1 The Puzzle

The political landscape of the Arab world experienced its most dramatic transformation in half a century following the Arab uprisings (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011:647). The aftermath of the Arab uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia consisted of political change, and a renewal of party politics. In January 2014, after two interim governments as well as over two years of debate, Tunisia finally approved a new constitution. Egypt, on the other hand, experienced a military coup in July 2013, which ultimately removed the democratically elected Islamic opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood from power (Battera, 2014:545). What can explain these different outcomes? Why did Tunisia successfully transition to a democracy while Egypt reverted back to an authoritarian regime?

At first glance, Egypt and Tunisia share common traits that make their variations following the uprising puzzling. Firstly, Egypt and Tunisia are for instance two religiously homogenous countries. Roughly ninety-eight percent of the population in Tunisia and ninety percent of the population in Egypt are Sunni Arab (Gelvin, 2012:35). Secondly, Egypt and Tunisia both share a history of state-building that stretches back to the nineteenth century and both countries are republics (Gelvin, 2012:36; Battera, 2014:545). Thirdly, neither Egypt nor Tunisia were rentier states (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987:61). Finally, and most importantly, both countries have shown to various degrees, an interrelationship between the pillars of power, namely, the state, the party in power and the military (Battera, 2014:545). Accordingly, Egypt and Tunisia’s shared similarities makes their different paths following the
Arab uprisings even more puzzling. What can explain their different outcome, given their similar outset?

Subsequently, the research question I intend to answer is the following:

Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while Egypt did not, when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?

As will become clear in chapter 2, I believe that the key to understanding the different outcomes between Tunisia and Egypt, following the Arab uprisings lies in the relationship between the state apparatus and the military. The state apparatus includes the state and the party, and is considered the pillars of power together with the military within an authoritarian regime. Thus, by describing differences in Egypt and Tunisia from when the authoritarian regimes were founded, until a new regime was established after the revolutions, this thesis attempts to explain their different outcomes. The authoritarian regime in Egypt was established in 1952 whereas in Tunisia it was established in 1957. The research question in this study is addressed through three hypotheses, which have been developed from the theoretical framework in chapter 2, and consists of the new institutional approach and rational choice theory. The hypotheses that will be explored throughout this thesis are the following:

First, the more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other in an authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization. Second, the more the state apparatus and the military are willing to compromise with each other after a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization. Third, the more divided the state apparatus and the military are during a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization. The method used to carry out the research at hand is qualitatively oriented, and the research strategy utilized is comparative historical analysis, and process tracing.

1.2 Why is this Research Important?

The research at hand is important for several reasons. First and foremost, the study of democratization is important. Many scholars have attempted to explain the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Scholars have viewed the region as exceptionally and culturally resistant to democratization (Hinnebusch, 2006:374). However, following the Arab uprisings, the topic of democratization has never been as relevant to the Middle East as it is
today. The Arab uprisings not only destabilized robust authoritarian regimes but also the findings of a sophisticated literature that developed over the previous decade to explain resilience of authoritarian arab states (Lynch, 2014:5). As such, it is important to continue to develop research on democratization and the Middle East. The Arab uprisings, and particularly the internal variation within the region suggests the importance of developing new research aimed at democratization prospects in the Middle East (Bellin, 2012:127). New theoretical insights as well as new empirical realities are needed to mirror the dynamics of current authoritarian regimes.

Second, studies on transition from authoritarian rule have demonstrated that militaries play a critical role in authoritarian breakdowns (Lee, 2009:640). Subsequently, how the Arab militaries responded to the uprisings is an important aspect to investigate as it is crucial to understanding the regimes different outcomes. Moreover, the political science literature is ill-equipped solve this particular puzzle (Springborg, 2014:142). Ever since Gamal Abdel and the Free Officers came to power in Egypt in 1952 following a military coup, the MENA region became an important avenue of research for civil-military relations. However, as military rule persisted, researchers on the Arab region increasingly ignored the military institution as a subject of study (Springborg, 2014:142). This was partly because research access became progressively more difficult to obtain and the militaries role in politics were hidden from view (Norton, 2013:338). Therefore, I consider this study to be an important component into understanding the variations between the Arab militaries, which will shed light on their particular role in the different outcomes of the uprisings.

1.3 The Structural Outline of the Thesis

Following this introduction, chapter 2 consist of a brief presentation of core concepts related to the thesis, which are: authoritarian regimes, revolutions, transitions, democratization and liberalization. Moreover, this chapter also presents the theoretical framework outlined for the thesis. The theoretical framework consists of two theoretical approaches, namely, new institutionalism and rational choice theory. The final section of this chapter presents the hypotheses developed from the theoretical framework, which is intended to answer the research question.

Chapter 3 presents and elaborates upon the research design that has been selected for this thesis. The research strategy consists of comparative historical analysis, and process
tracing. This chapter also touches upon methodological challenges, case selection, data source material, and justifies methodological choices.

Chapter 4 consists of a brief historical overview of Egypt and Tunisia. It will serve as both an introduction, and provide the reader with the context and background relevant for the research at hand.

Chapter 5 consists of the empirical analysis. In this chapter, each of the hypotheses presented in chapter 2 is systematically analysed through causal process observations (CPOs), which are diagnostic pieces of evidence that are examined through process tracing.

Chapter 6 discusses the main findings from the empirical analysis, which are summed up and presented in a table. This chapter also discusses the findings in relation to the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2.

Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings. This chapter also provides suggestions for future research on this topic, and discuss the limitations and implications of the conducted research.
Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework

The first section of this chapter defines essential concepts that are relevant for the research at hand and for the theories applied in this study. Furthermore, this thesis concentrates on two theoretical approaches, namely, the new institutional approach and the rational choice approach. Subsequently, the second section of the theoretical chapter discusses the new institutional approach and the third section discusses the rational choice theory. The new institutional approach focuses on how institutions interact and affect society while rational choice theory focuses on understanding the behaviour of actors. Moreover, together these two approaches will constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis. The new institutional approach will provide insight into institutions in authoritarian regimes while the rational choice approach will highlight the interactions between the ruling elite in authoritarian regimes. The latter approach also helps to demonstrate why democratic transitions are either avoided or accepted at critical points when it results from elite calculations (Battera, 2014:547). Given that the theoretical framework consists of the new institutional approach and rational choice theory, the focus of this thesis is primary on internal factors within authoritarian regimes that can explain Egypt and Tunisia’s different outcomes. Previous research has emphasised the importance of external factors, which serve as an important tool for authoritarian resilience in the Arab world, however, for the purposes of this thesis I have deemed it more fruitful to focus on internal factors alone, as these have proved strong enough to resist change (Battera, 2014:546-47).

2.1 Definitions

In this section I will present concepts that are central to the research question, and that will be mentioned considerably throughout this thesis. The following concepts will be clarified and further elaborated upon: authoritarian regimes, social revolution, transition, democratization and liberalization. Authoritarian regimes are an important concept to consider here, as the cases that are investigated were both authoritarian in nature prior to the uprisings in 2011. Social revolutions are equally as important to consider since this is the main phenomenon under investigation, more specifically I am investigating the different outcomes of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. This is also the case for the concept of transitions as I am interested in exploring why Tunisia transitioned into a democracy while Egypt
transitioned back to an authoritarian regime. Finally, the concepts of democratization and liberalization are important to consider as this research attempts to understand the factors that leads to democratization following a revolution. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between the two concepts, as liberalization does not automatically lead to democratization.

2.1.1 Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarianism is often defined as a regime type in terms personnel, rules of the game, and the structure of the state (Pratt, 2007:5). Juan Linz defines authoritarian regimes as:

“Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.” (1996:38)

This definition was developed by Linz to contrast this regime type from democracies and totalitarian regimes. Hence, the definition suggests clear conceptual boundaries between democratic regimes and totalitarian regimes. Although authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are both non-democratic political systems, Linz argues that the former is distinguishable from the latter with regards to four key dimensions, which are limited pluralism, ideology, weak mobilization, and a partially constrained leadership (Linz, 1996:38-9).

In order to study authoritarian regimes it is important to identify and classify various types of authoritarian regimes as they differ from each other as much as they differ from democratic ones (Geddes, 1999:121). Geddes classifies regimes as authoritarian if they are personalist, military, single-party or a combination of these. According to Geddes, single-party regimes are characterized by one dominant party that controls the access to political office and the implementation of policy, other parties may, however, legally compete in elections. Military regimes on the other hand, consist of a group of officers that decides who will rule and have influence over policy. Personalist regimes are different from single-party regimes and military regimes, in that access to office, depend to a much higher degree on the discretion of an individual leader (1999:121). In this paper I will adopt Geddes classification of authoritarian regimes. Linz’s definition of authoritarian regimes and Geddes classification illustrates the differences between various authoritarian regimes, which is important as it can
help us understand why similar authoritarian regimes such as Tunisia and Egypt had different outcomes following the Arab uprisings.

2.1.2 Social Revolution

Theda Skocpol, a pioneer within the field of revolutions, defines social revolutions (1979:4) as: “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below”. Furthermore, she argues that social revolutions differ from rebellions and political revolutions. Rebellions can involve the revolt of subordinate classes, however, they do not lead to structural change.

In contrast political revolutions, change state structures but not social structures, and are not automatically accomplished through class conflict (Skocpol, 1979:4). Skocpol (1979:5) argues that social revolutions differ from rebellions and political revolutions in “that basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion. And these changes occur through intense socio-political conflicts in which class struggles play a key role.”

As the Arab uprisings are the focal point of this thesis, I will use Theda Skocpol’s definition of social revolutions when referring to the Arab uprisings. As will be shown later throughout the thesis, the uprisings were essentially changes in both the social structure as well as the political structure, which occurred at the same time in a reinforcing way. In addition the Arab uprisings occurred through class-based protests from below.

2.1.3 Transition

A transition refers to “the interval between one political regime and another” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:6). Transitions are delimited in that it launches a dissolution process of an authoritarian regime, by either establishing some form of democracy, or returning to authoritarian rule. A typical indication that a transition has started is when authoritarian incumbents start to change their own rules by providing more rights for individuals and groups. Thus, during a transition authoritarian incumbents tend to have control over the rules and procedures to the extent that they exist (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:6).

The concept of transition is central to the research question, as both Egypt and Tunisia have experienced a transition following the Arab uprisings. However, Tunisia established a
democracy whereas Egypt returned to an authoritarian regime. It is important to get a clear understanding of what is actually meant by a transition because as O’Donnell and Schmitter have demonstrated, transitions are not necessarily equivalent to democratization. Hence, a transition within an authoritarian regime does not automatically mean that the regime will become democratic as it can revert back to an authoritarian regime.

2.1.4 Democratization versus Liberalization

Democratization essentially refers to a shift or a transition from a non-democratic regime towards a democracy. In democracies, citizenship is at the centre, which involves the right to be treated as equals by others with respect to making collective choices and the obligation of those implementing these choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the community (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7). Democratization can be defined as:

“[ …] the processes whereby the rulers and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgment, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontax payers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, ect.) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:8).

Democratization is thus a process with a clear end result (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004:375), more specifically that of a democracy.

It is important to distinguish between democratization and liberalization, as these concepts are not the same. Liberalization refers to the process of redefining and extending rights (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7). In contrast to democratization, liberalization is not a process with a clear end result. Rulers in authoritarian regimes can accept or encourage liberalization through the assumption that by opening up some areas in society for individual and group action, this will diminish various pressures and give them access to required information and support without changing the authority structure (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:9). In other words, liberalization in authoritarian regimes does not automatically lead to
democratization, as the regimes are able to target different areas in society that they want to liberalize. Therefore, whereas liberalization is targeted at specific areas within the state, democratization is a change towards the establishment of a democracy.

As a reminder, the research question that this thesis attempts to answer is the following: “Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while Egypt did not, when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?” Subsequently, the section above has focused on key concepts utilized throughout this thesis. The concepts considered here are authoritarian regimes, social revolutions, transition, democratization and liberalization. In addition to having defined and clarified these concepts, they further relate to the theoretical framework. The institutions and actors examined are studied within the context of authoritarian regimes that has experienced social revolutions, and as a result either transitioned to democracy, thus experienced democratization, or transitioned back to authoritarian rule.

2.2 The New Institutional Approach

This section examines the new institutional approach by mainly focusing on sociological and historical institutionalism, which are two different strands within new institutionalism. Accordingly, this section is divided into five separate subsections. The first subsection looks at what an institution is, by defining and clarifying the concept. The second subsection discusses the differences between traditional institutionalism and new institutionalism. The third subsection presents the sociological approach to new institutionalism, whereas fourth subsection presents historical institutionalism. The fifth and final subsection will briefly discuss how the new institutional framework apply to authoritarian regimes, their durability, and democratization prospects in the Middle East, as is the main focus of this thesis.

2.2.1. Institution and Institutionalization

In political science, the new institutional approach can be distinguished from other leading approaches in the field such as behaviouralism, rational choice and structuralism in its focus on the concept of an institution. However, new institutionalism is characterized by a
lack of a clear conception of what institutions are, and how they can be defined (Keman, 1997:1). Correspondingly, the literature on new institutionalism illustrates that there are opposing views on what an institution is and how to understand them. Lane and Ersson uses an analogy of a chess game as a model of human interaction to give a better understanding of what institutions are and their place in social and political life:

“In chess, people interact under a clearly given and transparent set of institutions about how to move the pieces. These are the rules of the game. The behavior of each actor is orientated in terms of these rules, acknowledging him or her in every move. Yet, the actual moves are determined by the strategies of each player, which aim at maximizing their advantages” (2000:27).

In other words, the rules in chess restrain the choice of alternative strategies so that actors abide by the idea of chess, and the same can be said about institutions and political actors. Hence, chess as well as institutions are both institutionalized practice and rules (Lane and Ersson, 2000:27).

Although most scholars within the field of institutionalism disagree on how to conceptualize institutions, they do agree that institutions should be seen as rules that influence the behavior of political and social actors (Keman, 1997:2). However, this thesis will adopt Scott’s definition of an institution (1995:33): “Institutions consists of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior”. This definition is very broad, however, it does clearly specify what shapes, an institution. The term institution is used in many ways, both scientifically and in everyday language and a broad definition like this is preferable for this reason, as well as other reasons that will become apparent further on. Like most definitions on institutions it also has an underlying conception of what rules do or how they affect human behavior, thereby affecting social and political action.

**2.2.2. The Schools of New Institutionalism**

New institutionalism can be traced back to the traditional institutionalist approach, but these are however, very different from each other (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:13). According to March and Olsen (1984:738), new institutionalism differs from traditional institutionalism in that it can be characterized as a combination of aspects from old institutionalism together with non-institutionalist approaches of recent theories of politics.
The traditional and new institutional approaches both view institutionalizations as a state-dependent process that constrains organizational rationality through the limitation of options that they can pursue. However, they differ from each other in that they identify different sources of constraint. The traditional institutionalist approach emphasizes the entrustment of interests within organizations as a result of political trade offs and alliances, whereas the new institutionalist approach underlines the relationship between stability and legitimacy (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:12).

New Institutionalism is thus a relatively new theoretical paradigm that has received growing interest and acceptance in the social sciences. This new revival of interest in institutions is a consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions as social, political and economic institutions have become bigger, more complex and resourceful, and hence more important to collective life. Almost all crucial actors in modern economic and political systems are formal organizations, where the institutions of law and bureaucracy occupy a central role today (March and Olsen, 1984: 734).

New institutionalism is not composed of a unified body of thought, and consists of various analytical approaches within the field that has risen over the past fifteen years (Hall and Taylor, 1996:936). These analytical approaches to institutions originate from different fields namely, in economics, organization theory, political science and sociology to name a few. The only commonality between these analytical approaches is that they only are linked to each other through a common scepticism to atomistic accounts of social processes and a common belief that institutional arrangements and social processes matter (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:3). However, each of these analytical approaches within new institutionalism paint very different pictures of the political world.

Although there are different strands within new institutionalism, there are particularly two approaches, which are relevant to this study, which are sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. These two approaches can be distinguished from each other, in that sociological institutionalism places a great emphasis on the norms of institutions as a way of understanding how they operate and how they shape individual behavior (Peters, 1999: 19). Historical institutionalism on the other hand, can be characterized by its focus on “real-world empirical questions, its historical orientation and its attention to the ways in which institutions structure and shape behaviour” (Steinmo, 2012:118). Sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism are two particularly relevant approaches for this study, as previous
research has shown that institutions do count in surviving political crises such as social revolutions because they are instrumental in deciding if a transition occurs and whether or not the transition will take a democratic direction. Hence, the institutional structure of authoritarian regimes ultimately makes a difference for outcomes following a transition (Battera, 2014:546; Hinnebusch, 2006:380).

2.2.3. Sociological Institutionalism

The sociological perspective within new institutionalism is part of an emerging paradigm in the social sciences, which emerged primarily within the subfield of organization theory as a way of bringing back a sociological perspective on institutions into political science (Nee, 1998:1; Hall and Taylor: 1996:946). Since its founding, the discipline of sociology has been firmly associated with the study of social institutions and the comparative analysis of institutional change. This new institutionalism in sociology attempts to explain institutions instead of just assuming their existence (Nee, 1998:1). Scholars within this field have developed a set of theories that are of increasing interest to political scientists (Hall and Taylor, 1996:946).

Sociological institutionalism can be traced back to the 1970s when some sociologists started to dispute the traditional division drawn between the parts of the social world that followed formal means of rationality, which are associated with modern forms of organizations and bureaucracies, and the parts of the social world that exhibited a varied set of practices associated with culture (Hall and Taylor, 1996:946). This traditional distinction may be traced back to one of the leading theorists within the discipline of sociology, namely Max Weber. His theoretical work from 1976 is clearly concerned with institutions and the development of rational institutions to meet the demands of modern society (Peters, 1999:98).

According to Hall and Taylor:

“Since Weber, many sociologists had seen the bureaucratic structures that dominate the modern landscape, in government departments, firms, schools, interest organizations and the like, as the product of an intensive effort to devise ever-more efficient structures for performing the tasks associated with modern society. The striking similarities in form taken by these otherwise rather-diverse organizations were said to be the result of the inherent rationality or efficiency of such forms for
performing these tasks. Culture was seen as something altogether different” (1996:946).

As a reaction to this, the new institutionalists in sociology argued that many of the institutional forms and procedures adopted by modern organizations were not just implemented on the account of them being most effective for the job. Instead they argued that that these institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations, should be viewed as a consequence of the processes identified with the transmission of cultural practices (Hall and Taylor, 1996:946-7). Hence, the sociological institutionalists argued that bureaucratic practices have to be explained in cultural terms.

Sociological institutionalists typically focus on why organizations take on specific institutional forms, procedures or symbols, and try to explain how such practices vary throughout organizations or across nations (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947). As mentioned earlier, culture is an integral part of this, as well as the sociological institutionalist paradigm in general. However, the notion of actors and interests is also an essential part of this paradigm. In the sociological institutionalist perspective, institutions are viewed as something more than constraints on choices. The identities and conceptions of actors are shaped by institutional structures. For this reason, interests and institutions become obscured, and accordingly institutions assume the role of actors. This is because individuals or actors are formed in the institutional context in which they live. Parliaments, governments and courts for example, promote interest that reflects their images of themselves and what they can contribute to society. Hence, in sociological institutionalism, the interests of institutions as organizations mirror historical legacies, national interests, and community needs (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 7-8, 31).

According to Hall and Taylor there are three aspects to sociological institutionalism that distinguishes it from other new institutional approaches. First, it tends to define institutions much more broadly, meaning that they do not just include formal rules, procedures, or norms, but also symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947). A definition of institutions from a sociological institutionalist perspective clears up the conceptual divide between institutions and culture. This has two important consequences. Firstly, it disputes the division that political scientists like to draw between institutional explanations built on organizational structures and cultural explanations built on an understanding of culture as shared attitudes or values. Secondly, the approach
redefine culture itself as an institution, thus, associating culture with a network of routines, symbols or scripts that provides patterns of behavior (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947-8).

The second aspect to sociological institutionalism is the unique understanding of the relationship between institutions and individual action. Hence, sociological institutionalism follows a cultural approach (Hall and Taylor, 1996:948). The cultural approach emphasizes the extent to which an individual’s behavior is not fully strategic but is instead bounded by an individual’s worldview. It thus stresses the degree to which individuals turns to established routines or family patterns of behavior to achieve their purposes (Hall and Taylor, 1996:939). Many institutionalists focus on the cognitive dimension of institutional impact, thereby emphasising the way in which institutions influence behavior by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models that are crucial for action, because without them the behavior of others cannot be interpreted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:9-10; Hall and Taylor, 1996:948). As DiMaggio and Powell puts it: “one cannot decide to get a divorce in a new manner, or play chess by different rules or opt out of paying tax” (1991:10). Hence, in the sociological institutionalist view, institutions influence individual’s behavior not just through specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context.

The third and last aspect that distinguishes sociological institutionalism is its unique approach to explaining where institutional practices come from and change. Sociological institutionalists assert that organizations often adopt a new institutional practice because it improves the social legitimacy of its organization or its participants. Hence, organizations take on specific institutional forms or practices because they are widely valued within a broader cultural environment (Hall and Taylor, 1996:949). Soysal exemplifies this by arguing that the policies implemented by many states on immigrants, were adopted because of the evolving interpretation of human rights, which made some policies seem appropriate, while others were deemed illegitimate by the national authorities (Soysal, 1994:35).

In light of the research question that this thesis is based upon, the sociological inspired view of new institutionalism in political science is both important and useful. First, it focuses on institutions and the way they interact and affect society. Second, this approach explains why and how institutions emerge in a given context and why they persist (Peters, 1999:110). In other words, this body of theory provides us with ways of understanding and explaining the structure, persistence and fragility of institutions. The sociological approach to
new institutionalism can specify ways in which institutions can affect the underlying preferences or identities in actors, and takes the institutional environment into consideration as this can affect strategies that actors choose to pursue (Hall and Taylor, 1996:951).

2.2.4. Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is another approach within new institutionalism, which as stated by Steinmo (2012:126) view “human beings are both norm-abiding rule followers and self-interested rational actors.” Subsequently, how actors behave is dependent upon individuals, on the context, and on the rulers. Historical institutionalists are therefore primarily concerned with understanding why a particular decision was made or why a particular outcome happened, which is exactly what this thesis is investigating. For the scholars from this particular strand of new institutionalism, political outcomes are a product of both rules and interest maximising (Steinmo, 2012:126). Historical Institutionalists places a great emphasis on history, and Steinmo (2012, 127-128) argues that there are three important reasons for this. Firstly, political events occur within a historical context, which in return, has direct repercussions for the decisions or events that take place. Second, actors can learn from experience. Behaviour, attitudes, and strategic decisions emerge as a result of particular social, political, economic and cultural context. Third, actors’ beliefs are shaped by the past, and this in return will affect the actors’ decisions in the future.

A fundamental aspect of historical institutionalism is that policy choices made when an institution is established, will have lasting effects and clear influence over policies far into the future (Peters, 1999:63). For this reason, historical institutionalists focus on the effects of institutions over time (Peters, 1999:63). As stated by Pollack (2005:139): “historical institutionalists argue that institutional choices taken in the past can persist, or become “locked in,” thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time.” Therefore, from a historical institutionalist perspective, institutions can be viewed as sticky and resistant to change due to the uncertainty related to institutional design (Pollack, 2005:127).

One way of describing this argument is path dependency, which is mostly affiliated with historical institutionalism. Path dependence is an important aspect to consider here when studying regime transitions and democratization, as it may be a factor that influences the decisions of the ruling bloc within the authoritarian regime during political crises. Margaret Levi defines path dependence as:
“Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other—and essential if the chosen branch dies—the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow” (Levi, 1997: 28).

Levi’s definition of path dependence, which is adopted here, refers to the concept as dynamic processes that involve positive feedback, which creates numerous possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence that events unfold (Pierson, 2004:20). Hence, an important aspect to historical processes that creates path dependence is positive feedback or self-reinforcement (Pierson, 2004:21). Therefore, positive feedback refers to a process from which each step reinforces the probability of future change towards the same direction, because the cost of switching rises, which makes it more difficult to reverse the course (Pierson, 2004:21). Hence, when a government program or an organization starts on a path there is a tendency for those initial policy decisions to persist (Peters, 1999:63).

According to Hall and Taylor, there are four aspects to historical institutionalism that renders it distinctive from other forms of new institutionalism. Firstly, the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour is often conceptualized in broad terms. Secondly, historical institutionalists emphasise asymmetries of power associated with the procedure and development of institutions. Historical institutionalists have especially been interested in the ways in which institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups and tend to stress how some groups loose while others win. Thirdly, their view on institutional change or development stresses path dependence and unintended consequences. Finally, historical institutionalist are interested in integrating institutional analysis with other various factors can explain political outcomes. Hence, historical institutionalists seldom assert that institutions are the only causal force in politics (Hall and Taylor, 1996:938; 941-942).

As I am concerned with exploring a specific historical event, namely the Arab uprisings, and attempt to understand the different transitional outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia, the historical institutionalist approach is a very useful approach to adopt. Historical institutionalism’s emphasis on state-society interactions, tracing processes over time, and
institutional change, makes it an important and fruitful approach for the research at hand. Historical institutionalism also makes it possible to look at institutions across time, which is very useful aspect for what this thesis is investigating as it can highlight which particular institutional choices caused Tunisia to democratize, and which ones caused Egypt to revert back to an authoritarian regime.

2.2.5. How does New Institutionalism Relate to the Middle East?

How does new institutionalism fit with studies on the durability of authoritarian regimes and democratization? The new institutionalist approach essentially argues that the institutional structure of political regimes makes an important difference in their outcomes and durability (Hinnebusch, 2006:380). This institutionalist paradigm also demonstrates that institutions do count, especially with regards to the outcome once an authoritarian regime has been toppled (Battera, 2014:547). As mentioned, Geddes claims that authoritarian regimes vary from each other as much as they do from democracies (1999:121). Similarly, institutionalism argues that authoritarian regimes are not identical, and vary in their level of institutionalization, which in return is formed by and forms the social forces that are included and excluded in society (Hinnebusch, 2006:380).

According to Hinnebusch (2006:380), it is both necessary and important to distinguish between primitive forms of authoritarian regimes and more institutionalized authoritarian regimes, as this says a lot about authoritarian regime’s durability. Primitive forms of authoritarian regimes mainly consist of personalist dictatorships and military juntas, which lack institutions that are able to support social forces and implement policy. Thus, they are only likely to be viable at lower levels of development. Institutionalized authoritarian regimes on the other hand, are in a sense more modern than the former, which makes them more likely to be inclusive and developmentally capable, and thus more durable at higher levels of development. Institutionalized authoritarian regimes usually consist of authoritarian regimes with single party or corporatist systems with bureaucratic or technocratic institutions.

Furthermore, most of the institutions in the Middle East can be characterized by intra-elite coercion or in other words a fusion between the ruling coalition, which consists of the state, the hegemonic party and the security apparatus. This fusion between the ruling coalitions highlights a lack of autonomy between the institutions in the region (Battera, 2014:545). In this respect, how far institutions are institutionalized that is to say autonomy is
important, as weak institutions are ineffective (Hinnebusch, 2006:380). This fits well with the new institutionalist approach, which firmly believes that structures and organizations do count in surviving a crisis because they manage to maintain their own position and are influential in deciding if a transition occurs as well as which direction the transition will take (Battera, 2014:546).

2.3 The Rational Choice Theory

This section focuses on rational choice theory (RCT), which is essentially a framework for understanding behaviour and interaction between actors. The interactions between key actors involved in a transition process are important to political outcomes. This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first subsection discusses the concept of rationality, which is the basic assumption within RCT. The second subsection presents the origin of RCT and its core assumptions. The third subsection presents and discusses two main actors within the authoritarian ruling bloc that are involved in the transition process.

2.3.1 The Concept of Rationality

The fundamental premise within the RCT is the rationality assumption, namely, that actors are deemed rational (Dowding and King, 1995:1). In other words, this theoretical approach assumes that all actors act in a rational manner, meaning that they would not intentionally make choices that would ultimately leave them worse off. In relation to the concept of rationality, Jon Elster has developed two forms of rationality. The first one is the thin theory of rationality, where actions are deemed rational if they emerge from consistent beliefs and desires on behalf of the actor. Subsequently, a rational action in any given circumstance is one that the actor believes will ultimately end in the desired result. Elster’s thin theory of rationality only requires consistency, namely consistency within the belief system; consistency within the system of desires; and consistency between beliefs and desires on the one hand and the reason for the action on the other hand (1983:1).

Elster’s second form of rationality is his broad theory of rationality, which goes beyond the requirements of the thin theory of rationality in that it that the requirements are more rigorous. The broad theory of rationality includes more than acting consistently on
beliefs and desires. It requires that beliefs and desires should be rational in a more substantive sense. This entails that beliefs are based on available evidence, which is closely related to judgment. Desires, on the other hand, are based on autonomous preferences (Elster, 1983:1-2). Whereas Elster’s thin theory of rationality only requires consistency, the broad theory of rationality requires consistency, judgment and autonomy. I believe that Elster’s thin theory of rationality is sufficient for this thesis, as such, an action is deemed rational when an actor believes it will lead to the desired result.

Furthermore, the idea of a rational action within RCT is generally understood as a conscious social actor who engages in intentional calculative strategies (Scott, 2000:128). Homans (1961:21-3) holds that human behaviour is similar to animal behaviour in that it is determined. This essentially means that humans behave in a specific manner that would reward them, and stay away from what might punish them. Subsequently, reinforcement through rewards and punishments is the determining factor in human behaviour. Therefore, according to Homans’ argument, human behaviour can be studied in external and objective forms.

Not all RCT theorists have relied upon behavioural psychology as Homans. In fact, many scholars affiliated with the filed of RCT are sceptical about the determinants of human action. Instead, they argue that individuals act as if they were rational and, therefore, rationality can be taken as an unproblematic starting point. As a result, many rational choice theorists simply construct understandable and predictive theories of human action. In their view, then, there is no need to deeply understand individual psychology (Scott, 2000:129).

The rationality assumption is important to consider here, as it is the cornerstone of the RCT. This is an excellent basis for what this study seeks investigate, as I am interested in actors behaviour during a political crisis. Previous research has shown that what the elites within the ruling coalition do, during a political crisis is critical for the outcomes of a transition (Hinnebusch, 2006:387). Accordingly, this study wants to explore whether or not the actors within institutions acted in a rational manner by making decisions that would be to their advantage during the Arab uprisings.

2.3.2 Rational Choice Theory: Origins and Central Assumptions

RCT was originally developed in the field of economics to construct formal and often predictive, models of human behaviour (Scott, 2000:126). According to Monroe (2001:152):
“In its purest form, it (rational choice, rem.) refers to behaviour by an individual actor – a person, a form, or a political entity – designed to further the actor’s perceived self-interest, subject to information and opportunity costs.” In economic theories the interest lies primarily in the ways in which production, distribution and consumption of goods and services are arranged through money and market mechanisms. However, scholars have argued that the same general principles of RCT can be used to understand interactions between political actors (Scott, 2000:127). Subsequently, the concept of rational and social behaviour has increasingly become more popular within the social sciences, and political scientists have attempted to form theories on the premise that all actions are rational, and that actors consider the probable costs and benefits of any action before determining what to do (Scott, 2000:126).

RCT has three main branches, which is a classification first developed by Harsanyi. These three branches consist of: the unity theory, game theory and ethics. Unity theory deals with individual rational behaviour under certainty, under risk, and under uncertainty. The basic idea is that in all these three instances of certainty, risk and uncertainty, rational behaviour exists in utility maximization or expected-utility maximization of an actor’s utility (Harsanyi, 1986:89). Game theory describes rational behaviour in game situations through determining solutions for different classes of games (Harsanyi, 1986:89). Ethics is the theory of rational moral value judgement, in other words it is a theory based on the rational actors preferences, which are based on their moral value judgements that can be based on impartial and impersonal criteria (Harsanyi, 1986:89).

Although RCT consists of various strands, this thesis will focus on the general aspects of the rational choice approach. This is because I am interested in the theory as a whole, and its explanations concerning how actors make rational decisions during the events of the Arab uprisings. As Boudon (2009:180) argues, “As RCT is a family of theories with many versions, it is advisable to present the postulates in a general way in order to transcend the variants of the theory.” Therefore, as RCT emphasises the rationality of actors, in which actors behave in a manner that will lead to their own advantage, this theoretical approach is useful when investigating the transitional outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia.

A fundamental premise within all forms of RCT is the belief that complex social phenomena can be explained in terms of the elementary individual actions of which they are composed (Scott, 2000:127). For this reason, RCT maintain a methodological individualist position, which believes that “The elementary unit of social life is the individual human
action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals” (Elster, 1989:13). In other words, the actor is at the centre of this theory and it is individuals who ultimately take actions. In order to explain a social phenomenon one must therefore look at the interaction between actors.

RCT assumes that individuals are driven by desires and goals, which in return, mirror their preferences. As Scott (2000:127-8) explains, individuals: “[…] act within specific, given constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the conditions under which they are acting”. Hence, Individuals must make choices in relation to both their goals as well as the ways to achieve these goals because it is not possible for them to achieve all that they desire (Scott, 2000:128). RCT maintain that individuals predict the outcome of alternative courses of action and determine the alternative that is most favourable to them (Heath: 1976:3).

Monroe (2001:153) identifies seven core assumptions that characterize RCT. First, actors pursue goals. Second, their goals mirror the actors perceived self-interests. Third, individuals’ behaviour is a result of a process that involves a conscious choice. Fourth, the individual is the main actor in society. Fifth, the preferences of actors are ordered in a consistent and stable manner. Sixth, If possible, actors will choose the alternative with the highest expected advantage. Seventh, actors retain considerable information on the available alternatives as well as the probable consequences of their choices. Thus, according to RCT, a rational actor is an individual who behaves according to his or hers own individual self-interests and conscious choice. The individual possesses extensive information, and knowledge of the environment. He or she has an organized and stable system of preferences, and has the ability to carefully consider the best available alternative in relation to his or her preference. Hinnebusch illustrates how RCT relates to transition and democratization, and maintains that:

“Many democratic transitions have been elite-initiated but it seems reasonable to expect that political elites, as rational actors, will only democratize if they think their vital interests will survive or even be enhanced by the transition from authoritarianism or that the costs and risks of democratization would be lower than those of continued repression” (2006:387).

Although RCT has a tendency to assume that individuals have selfish goals, there is nothing in RCT that prevents rational choice theorists from specifying individuals’
selflessness or self-destruction. If a man, for example, decides to hang himself, then rationality simply asserts that the man does what he believes is rational (Green and Fox, 2007:270). As Green and Fox (2007:270) argues: “The defining characteristic of rational choice theory is not what it assumes about human objectives but rather the notion that individuals pursue their aims efficiently”. Subsequently, RCT does not have to assume that all individuals have selfish motives, however, many such theories believe that individuals seek money, power and prestige (Green and Fox, 2007:270).

Overall, the RCT has produced successful and convincing explanations of many complex social phenomena (Boudon, 2009:181). Boudon illustrates this through the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, who used what would later be considered RCT in his explanation of the stagnation of French agriculture at the end of the eighteenth century while comparing it to the British agriculture. Tocqueville was successful in explaining the different path of agricultural modernization between France and England, which was effectively due to the rational actions of individuals (2009:181). Moreover, Chai (2001:9) argues that RCT’s generality is one of its main advantages. More specifically, a single set of assumptions relating to each type of actor in any given circumstance, is compatible with any set of structural assumptions about the environmental setting where the actor is present. The RCT is therefore a fruitful theory to base this study on, as I am primarily concerned with explaining the Arab uprisings, and understand if the ruling elite in Egypt and Tunisia made rational decisions during the revolution.

In summary, RCT adopts a methodological individualist position, and attempts to explain social phenomena by assuming that actors make rational choices based on their preferences that will ultimately bring them benefits. Hence, RCT assumes that an actor chooses an alternative that he or she believes will lead to an outcome that will expand the actor’s payoff. The theory places the individual at the centre, and assumes that social phenomena can be explained in terms of rational decisions made by individuals. RCT focuses on the actions of individuals and to see all other social phenomena as reducible to these individual actions. Hence, RCT is a useful theory when analysing democratic transitions, because of its focus on understanding social behaviour.
2.3.3 Political actors in a Transition Process

The interaction between central political actors in authoritarian regimes is central for a democratic transition to take place, and for this reason RCT is an attractive approach to employ for investigating the different transitions that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia. RCT basically assumes that individuals pursue their goals effectively. The actors at hand can either possess a great deal of information or none at all, however, based on their understanding of the available alternatives in front of them, they select the course of action that has the potential to give them the best advantage (Greene and Fox, 2007:269). This is particularly relevant with regards to how the authoritarian ruling bloc manage a political crisis such as the Arab uprisings.

One of the most influential contributors to the literature of democratic transitions is Adam Przeworski, who through his work seeks to explain the strategies of actors involved in the process of regime change. According to Przeworski (1992:117), the authoritarian ruling bloc can be separated into two main groups, namely hard-liners and soft-liners. The hard-liner/soft-liner typology was first developed by O’Donnell and is important to examine as it conceptualizes variations within a regime.

Hard-liners can be found among the repressive cores of the authoritarian ruling bloc, and consists of various factions within regimes that comply uncompromisingly with the regimes ideology or policies. Hard-liners can be found in the police, the legal bureaucracy, censors, and journalists, etc. Hard-liners believe that the authoritarian regimes continuance and survival is both possible and desirable either through rejecting any democratic forms or by building a façade from which they can maintain their power (Przeworski, 1992:117; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:16). Consequently, hard-liners are likely to remain stubborn in the wake of a political crisis and if a transition has started, or a democracy has been established, they are likely to be responsible for attempted coups and conspiracies.

Soft-liners can be difficult to distinguish from hard-liners in that they are just as likely as hard-liners to use repression and to tolerate arbitrary acts from the security apparatus. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:16) distinguish soft-liners by their: “increasing awareness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usually occupy important positions, will have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation”. Hence, contrary to hard-liners, soft-liners are aware that in order for them to
maintain their power in the future they will have to liberalize. Soft-liners consist of politicians from the regime and some groups outside the state apparatus (Przeworski, 1992:117).

According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:19): “There is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavages between hardliners and softliners”. Furthermore, transitions usually begin when there is a disagreement between hardliners and softliners over the management of a political crisis as for example big popular protests against the authoritarian rule (Lee, 2009:641-642). This is where the division between the authoritarian blocs occurs, because for hard-liners, the crisis will not be seen as severe enough to take the political risk that comes with liberalization. In fact, hard-liners believe that the existing political structure will be enough for the regime to survive the crisis (Lee: 2009: 642). However, soft-liners, believe that in order for the regime to remain legitimate, the authoritarian regime cannot wait to long before reintroducing various freedoms that are somewhat acceptable to moderate segments of the opposition and to the internal public opinion (O’Donnell and Schmitter: 1986:16).

Transitions are uncertain in the sense that their outcome is a function of actors’ own beliefs, preferences and decisions. Transitions are also uncertain in that the available information about opponents’ strength is often obscure, and as a result, mistakes or miscalculations can occur, which can lead to unintended consequences that will either advance or slow a transition (Brumberg, 2014:35). Transitions from authoritarian regimes are ultimately based upon an agreement between different political actors, which fits in nicely with RCT. As this thesis focuses on the transition from authoritarian rule in both Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings, it is essential to investigate the interaction between key actors involved in the transition process.

2.4 What can explain Egypt and Tunisia’s different trajectory?

The new institutional approach and rational choice theory are two theoretical approaches that I have presented and reviewed above, and are considered the theoretical framework from which this thesis is based upon. Subsequently, in this section I present three hypotheses that I am going to test and explore based on the two theories presented above. These three hypotheses may give some insight into why Tunisia experienced a democratic transition while Egypt did not. The first hypothesis follows sociological institutionalism
within the new institutional approach. The second hypothesis follows historical institutionalism within the new institutional approach. Finally, the last hypothesis follows rational choice theory.

**Hypothesis 1:** The more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other, in an authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization.

**Hypothesis 2:** The more the state apparatus and the military are willing to compromise after a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization.

**Hypothesis 3:** The more divided the state apparatus, and the military are during a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization.
Chapter 3: Method

There are two main approaches when designing a study, namely, qualitative and quantitative research designs. Qualitative researches focuses on in depth small samples, and are concerned with issues of the richness, texture and feeling of fresh data. Quantitative research on the other hand, focuses on large samples selected at random, and are concerned with issues of design, and measurement (Neuman, 2006:149). The qualitative and quantitative approaches are thus two different research approaches in political science, which uses different research techniques to investigate the world we live in. However, these two approaches are on two opposing sides where scholars from each side believe that their approach is the advantageous one (Neuman, 2006:151-2). This makes it difficult to assess which approach is the most suitable.

This thesis will be based on the qualitative approach, because a small-N study is more suitable and appropriate for my research question as I am investigating two cases in depth, namely, Tunisia and Egypt. The reason why these two particular cases were chosen is elaborated upon in section 3.3.3. Qualitative researches are likely to look at whole cases, and compare these whole cases with one another (Ragin, 1987:3). This is exactly what I wish to do when investigating my research question and two cases. A qualitative research strategy has several advantages and the reason why this thesis has been based on this approach will become more apparent later on.

This chapter presents and justifies methodological approaches applied throughout the thesis, and is structured in the following way. First, the research question and the research design, from which this thesis is based upon, will be presented. Second, I briefly present and discuss the comparative method, which defines the logic of case-oriented comparative research. Third, I present comparative historical analysis, which is one of two research strategies applied to this study. I also justify and present the cases applied to this study. Fourth, I present process tracing, which is the second research strategy applied to this study. In this section I additionally discuss the procedure from which I have collected my data.

3.1 Research Question and Research Design

As a reminder, the research question that I am attempting to answer is: “Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while Egypt did not, when they
**both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?**” Accordingly, in order to understand Egypt and Tunisia’s different paths following the Arab uprisings I have proposed three distinct hypotheses to answer the research question.

Therefore, the research centres around two specific cases, namely, Egypt and Tunisia. The main objective of this thesis is to find out why these two countries, which appear to have relatively similar authoritarian regimes, experienced different outcomes following the Arab uprisings. The research question centre around a why question, which according to Yin (2014:10): “are more explanatory and more likely to lead to the use of a case study, history or experiment as the preferred research method”. Subsequently, the research design for this thesis consists of comparative historical analysis and process tracing.

Case studies generally consist of in-depth research on phenomenons of scientific interest of an “instance of a class of events” (George and Bennett, 2005:17). George and Bennett holds that “class of events” can refer to revolutions, types of governmental regimes, economic systems. As this thesis focuses on the Arab uprisings, a revolution that occurred in the Arab world in 2011, a case study approach is appropriate. Yin (2014:16) defines case studies as: “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context”.

The aim of this study is to investigate factors that may have contributed to Egypt and Tunisia’s different paths after the Arab uprisings, and therefore a case study approach is a suitable one. Moreover, the research at hand focuses on two cases and according to Tarrow (2010:246) two cases: “[...] offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added.” Two cases permit the researcher to examine how common mechanisms are affected by the particular characteristics of each case. However, when the number of cases increases this advantage weakens as the number of unmeasured variables increases (Tarrow, 2010:246). Subsequently, I believe that comparing two cases will provide a stronger basis for the research, as it will allow me to get a deeper understanding of the cases being studied that will otherwise be difficult with large-N analysis.
3.2 The Comparative Method

The comparative method in social science is concerned with identifying the similarities and differences among social units (Ragin, 1987:1), which in return provides a blueprint to understand, explain and interpret various historical outcomes and processes (Ragin, 1987:6). Furthermore, Ragin (1987:17) claims that: “The comparative method is superior to the statistical method in several important respects”. First, he argues that the statistical method is not combinable because according to him, it is difficult to use this method to investigate situations as wholes. Second, the utilization of the comparative method provides explanations that account for every instance of a phenomenon. Third, the researcher sets the boundaries of a comparative examination and as such this method does not require researchers to pretend that they have samples of societies from a particular population. Ragin’s last argument for the superiority of the comparative method is that it forces the researcher to be closely acquainted with the cases relevant to the analysis (Ragin, 1987:16).

The comparative method is thus a case-oriented strategy of comparative research. It focuses on comparing cases and examining them as wholes, which is also what distinguishes it from statistical methods (Ragin, 1987:16). The comparative method is also the favoured research strategy for political and social scientists when studying a small number of cases, and investigating institutions or other macropolitical phenomena (della Porta, 2008:202). I believe that the comparative method is a useful approach for the purposes of my thesis as I am studying two cases in-depth and investigating a macro-structural phenomenon. According to della Porta (2008:202), the comparative method has the capacity to go beyond descriptive statistical measures towards an in-depth understanding of historical processes and individual motivations. This is exactly what this thesis is investigating, making the comparative method a useful approach for this thesis.

3.2.1 Comparative Historical Analysis as a Research Strategy

Historical comparative research is both a useful and effective method when the research addresses big societal processes. This research method is appropriate when researchers are examining combinations of social factors that generates a specific outcome and for comparing social systems to find out what societies have in common and what separates them. It is also suited when one studies societal change over time (Neuman, 2006:420).
Comparisons are an integral part of contemporary social sciences, without them social inquiry is not possible. Today, there is a strong tradition of social scientific research where comparative research is the dominant method of investigation. This is comparative historical analysis. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2009:6) describe comparative historical analysis as: “a long standing intellectual project oriented towards the explanation of substantively important outcomes”. According to them, comparative historical analysis is not unified by one theory or one method.

However, work within the field of comparative historical analysis all share three common characteristics, namely, causal analysis, an emphasis of processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:10). Furthermore, the combination of these three dimensions is what makes the comparative historical approach distinct from other methodological approaches. In addition, these three dimensions combined, provide a definition of comparative historical analysis. I will now look further into them.

The first aspect is the concern for causal analysis. This entails an interest in explaining and identifying causal arrangements that generates extensive outcomes of interest. In other words, the first aspect focuses on causal inference through the investigation of explanations of a specific political or social outcome. The causal argument is essential to comparative historical analysis and thus, causal propositions are cautiously selected and tested (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:10). Hence, comparative historical analysis is concerned with works that try to find causes of important outcomes.

The second aspect that comparative historical researchers are concerned with is analysing historical sequences and focusing on the unfolding of processes over time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:12). Therefore, the events that are of interests to comparative historical researchers, are not statistic instances that occur at a single fixed point in time, but are instead, processes that unfold over time and in time. Hence, comparative historical researchers include attention to the temporal structure of events in their explanations (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:12).

Finally, the last aspect is its use of systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar and contrasting cases, which is what, also renders comparative historical analysis distinctive from other methods (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:13). This distinction separates comparative historical analysis from other statistical tools in that it allows an
exchange between theory and evidence in a manner that is unlikely in quantitative methods (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:13). This is the strength of comparative historical analysis, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2009:13) argue: “By employing a small number of cases, comparative historical researchers can comfortably move back and forth between theory and history in many iterations of analysis as they formulate new concepts, discover novel explanations, and refine preexisting theoretical explanations in light of detailed case evidence”.

However, the most common criticism of this method is what Rueschemeyer refers to as the “small-N problem” which is a combination of many explanatory variables that are expected to be causally relevant with evidence from only a small number of cases (Rueschemeyer, 2009:305). The issue for critics is that the study of a single case or a few cases creates only one reasonable theoretical outcome, specifically, to produce hypotheses that can be tested in other various cases. Hence, according to critics of comparative historical analysis, the aim of this method is producing theoretical ideas. Yet, Rueschemeyer argues that case studies accord more than just theory that produces theoretical ideas. He argues that they can test theoretical proposition as well as offer compelling causal explanations (Rueschemeyer, 2009:318). Similarly, Ragin (1978) argues that a small-N case research is more valuable than cross case studies to explain particular outcomes.

In sum, comparative historical analysis is an effective analytic tool when investigating complex societal phenomenon. Through comparative historical analysis we can generate theories, test theoretical propositions and present causal explanations. I mentioned that I am going to test the hypotheses that I have developed to answer the research question and as such I believe that comparative historical analysis is the best-suited approach for this thesis.

3.2.2 Why does Comparative Historical Analysis Apply?

As mentioned, comparative historical analysis is an appropriate research strategy when researchers are investigating social factors that create specific outcomes and for comparing similarities and differences between various social systems. I argue that comparative historical analysis is an excellent research strategy for my thesis as my research question is interested in causal factors that may explain why Egypt and Tunisia experienced different outcomes following the Arab uprisings. The aim of this thesis is thus, to find and explain what these factors are. I also argue that my research fits with all the three aspects, which
characterize comparative historical analysis as mentioned by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer. My research question requires causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time as well as the use of systematic and contextual comparison.

First, I am interested in finding that casual arrangements that can explain why Tunisia resulted in democratization while Egypt returned to an authoritarian regime. Second, in order to find these causal arrangements I am going to analyse Tunisia and Egypt in historical sequences by focusing on the processes that unfolded over time and in time. Third, I am going to use systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar cases, in order to answer the research question. Accordingly, I argue that my research is best suited within the framework of comparative historical analysis.

3.2.3 Case-selection: Why Tunisia and Egypt?

Case selection is an important element for any research design. For that reason, it is important that suitable cases for comparison are carefully considered before being selected. Tunisia and Egypt are selected for this thesis mainly because of the similarities between the two countries. This includes, the geographical area, the homogeneity of the population, their shared state-building history, the fact that both countries are republics and were not rentier states, and finally that both countries presented a strong fusion between the pillars of coallition in power, namely, the state, the party in power and the military. However, Tunisia and Egypt were not only chosen because of the authoritarian regimes similarities, but also for the fact that their paths diverged following the Arab uprisings. This is also what makes this research so interesting. Why was Egypt able to withstand democratization? What factors lead Tunisia towards democracy?

As the research question states, the cases selected for the research have been selected in advance. Hence, I began this research knowing the two cases that I would apply before I found the theories that I wanted to test. George and Bennett argue that researchers can either begin their investigation with a theory, before looking for a test case or by starting with a case or cases before looking for theories that one can test. According to them, either case selection approach is applicable as long as one takes care of selection bias (George and Bennett: 2005:83). Selection bias is one of the most common critiques of case study methods and occurs according to Collier and Mahoney (1996:59) when “[...] Some form of selection process in either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation
results in interferences that suffers from systematic error”. In other words, this can happen when cases or subjects are self-selected (George and Bennett, 2005:23).

As I am interested in a particular phenomenon it requires that I select the cases in advance. The nature of the research requires two similar countries that experience a different outcome and thus, they cannot be chosen through random sampling. Researchers of case study methods have argued that the selection on the dependent variable should not be rejected out of hand as selection of cases on the basis of the value of their dependent variables is fitting for some purposes (George and Bennett, 2005:23). Case selection on the dependent variable is an effective way of uncovering potential causal paths and variables that ultimately leads to the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005:23).

### 3.3 Process Tracing and Data Collection

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, in addition to applying the research strategy of comparative historical analysis, I will also apply the strategy of process tracing, which is an analytic tool for causal inference. Process tracing consists of examining “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case, which in return can assist in either supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses (Bennett, 2010:208). Moreover, Collier, Brady and Seawright (2010:201) define process tracing as: “The examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence, commonly evaluated in specific temporal sequence, with the goal of supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses”. The main focus of a researcher that applies process tracing is then to learn if a specific factor can be traced and linked to another (Vennesson, 2008:233). The goal of this thesis is to establish if the events that took place in Egypt and Tunisia fit the hypotheses presented in chapter 2, making process tracing an attractive analytical tool.

Moreover, the diagnostic pieces of evidence that are examined through process tracing are called causal process observations (CPOs). Collier, Brady and Seawright (2010:201-202) assert that: “Process tracing consists of procedures for singling out specific CPOs and evaluating their contribution to causal inference in a given analytic setting. Collier et al. further expand on this by emphasising that qualitative researchers that analyses processes rely upon CPOs. Furthermore, they define CPO as: “an insight or piece of data that provides information about context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal inference” (2010:184). In other words, CPOs are proof regarding what happened during a process and why it happened the way it did. This is exactly what I want to find out in the
transition processes in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings. The strength of CPOs lies in its in-depth insight (Collier, et al., 2010:24). Researchers collect CPOs from an array of primary and secondary sources, which will be discussed shortly.

Hence, causal inference in qualitative research consists of two joint tools: process tracing and CPOs. Although process tracing has many advantages it has also been criticized. The step-by-step approach to process tracing has mainly been criticized as a form of story telling. Tilly for instance argues that stories are an instinctive human way of ordering experience, but they do not necessarily help in generating causal analysis (Tilly, 2002:9-10). However, according to Vennesson process tracing differs from stories in three ways. First, process tracing is focused in that it selectively handles only certain aspect of the phenomenon under study. Second, process tracing is structured in the manner where the researcher is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework. Third, the goal with process tracing is essentially to find a chronological explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome (2008:235).

The procedure for gathering data is an important part in any given scientific research. As Lange (2013:140) argues, “Science ultimately involves gathering and analyzing data in ways that offer insight into the phenomena under investigation. In this way, data are the most central component of the scientific enterprise.” Therefore, it is important that the researcher gathers information properly and carefully considers the data that is analysed.

The data for this study will be gathered through CPOs, which will provide insight into the mechanisms that caused the different transitional outcomes between Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings. Accordingly, the CPOs will be based on material from newspaper articles, scientific articles, YouTube clips, speeches of key actors, as well as books on the particular events that took place in Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab uprisings. Combined, this material provides insight into the causal mechanisms that contributed to the democratization of Tunisia, and the reestablishment of an authoritarian regime in Egypt.
Chapter 4: A Historical Overview of Egypt and Tunisia

This chapter will present a brief historical overview of Egypt and Tunisia. Accordingly, it will serve as an introduction, and provide the reader with necessary context and background for the analysis of this thesis. The first section of this chapter consists of the authoritarian legacy that has characterized both Egypt and Tunisia for over half a century. Furthermore, the next two sections provide an overview of Egypt and then Tunisia’s political history. The fourth section examines, and compares the state apparatus in Egypt and Tunisia prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011. The final section explores, the military in each country before 2011. Together, these sections will give a more holistic understanding of the political climate before 2011.

4.1 The Authoritarian Legacy in Egypt and Tunisia

Both Egypt and Tunisia have for well over half a century been characterized by authoritarian rule (Gelvin, 2012:37). The dominant institutional form that created the current authoritarian regimes in the Middle East was populist authoritarian regimes (PA). According to Hinnebusch (2006:380) Middle Eastern regimes took the form of PA, as a result of an alliance between the middle classes and peasants because of a revolt against old oligarchies. The rebellion against the old oligarchies were run by the military and/or a single party, which in return ended in the expansion of the military and the bureaucracy, which eventually became the largest organizations in society (Battera, 2014:548).

The Middle Eastern PA regimes eventually experienced international pressure and economic decline, which they inescapably had to adapt to. As a result of this, by the 1980s, all the PA regimes in the Middle East were transformed into post-populist authoritarian regimes (PPA), which involved economic liberalization (Hinnebusch, 2006:383-84). Hinnebusch (2006:384) holds that “Economic liberalization was seem as the key to regime survival as it was expected that it would make the private sector a new engine of growth to supplement the stagnating public sector and generate a new bourgeoisie class with a stake in the regime ”.

The transformation from PA regimes into PPA regimes in the Arab world is important to consider here as it has had profound effect on the current regimes in the region. This is especially the case for the triangular relationship that exists between the state, the hegemonic party and the military. Battera (2014:548) argues that: “Given that authoritarianism developed
in the Middle East at an early stage, common patterns of interplay between a powerful elite developed simultaneously to ensure their continuity in power”. In other words, the elites within society such as military troops, bureaucrats, party leaders and businessmen all gathered, in order to find ways to preserve and maintain each other’s interests. This occurred to the point that the organizations or institutions they governed fused together. (Battera, 2014:548). Consequently, the fusion of organizations/institutions in these regimes created a conflicting impact on organizational autonomy.

What renders Tunisia and Egypt distinct from all other Arab states is their shared history of state building, which dates all the way back to the nineteen century. As Henry (2014:130) explains: “Egypt’s Muhammad Ali and Tunisia’s Ahmed Bey engaged in modern state building in the nineteenth century and, unlike the other Arab republics, enjoyed previous legacies as political entities living off their respective tax bases”. Tunisia and Egypt were a part of the Ottoman Empire, however, both countries retained considerable autonomy. In order to protect this autonomy, rulers adopted the same style of governance and governing institutions that was similar to European states. The rulers in Egypt and Tunisia believed that by implementing a similar design, they could achieve the same level of strength as the European states. Consequently, the modernized their militaries, built up infrastructure and implemented new legislation that was based on those of Europe (Gelvin, 2012:36).

Moreover, in 1881 when France made Tunisia a protectorate, Tunisia did not attempt to change the processes of centralization or development. Similarly when Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, they established additional institutions and structures, which continued to develop in Egypt. The processes of centralization and development carried on in Tunisia after the country won its independence from France in 1956, and the same happened in Egypt after Gamal Abd al-Nasser seized control in 1952 (Gelvin, 2012:36).

Egypt and Tunisia’s common history of state building left a legacy in both countries of strong national identities and administrative stability. Prior to the uprisings in 2011 then, Egypt and Tunisia had strong centralized bureaucracies in place, as well as advanced health, education, and social services (Lesch, 2014:64). As Gelvin (2012:37) asserts “strong institutions, such as the army, did not splinter, while others, such as those dealing with the economy and administration, remained in place to pick up the pieces even after the rulers left the scene”.

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4.2 Egypt: The Context

Egypt developed into a constitutional monarchy following British colonial rule. In addition to having a king, from 1922 up until 1952, Egypt also had a parliament where seats were competed for, political parties that competed against each other, and a press that was somewhat free (Gelvin, 2012:38). This was hardly a “golden age” as Gelvin (2012:38) states; however, it was less authoritarian than the regime that would succeed it. This all came to an end in 1952 when the Free Officers, led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser dethroned King Farouk in a military coup. Nasser and the Free Officers were nationalists that criticized the monarchy for corruption and inequalities in Egypt (Brynen et al., 2012:22). Regardless of this, when acquiring power, Nasser and the Free Officers banned all other political parties and repressed the political opposition thereby establishing “a one-man, one party rule” (Gelvin, 2012:38).

Accordingly, ever since 1952, and prior to the uprisings in 2011, Egypt had only known three presidents. The first one was naturally Nasser, who ruled from 1952 to 1970. The second president was Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat was Nasser’s vice president and fellow army officer. He took over the presidency following Nasser’s death in 1970, and ruled from 1970 to 1981. Sadat had separate views to Nasser with regards to domestic and foreign policy, which made him establish a peace deal with Israel in 1979, reorganize Egypt’s foreign policy toward the US, and initiate economic liberalization to a certain extent (Brynen et al., 2012:22). In 1976, Sadat established a restricted multi-party system, and created the National Democratic Party (NDP), which became the hegemonic party and served as a pro-regime political force (Blaydes, 2008: 5-6) The Muslim brotherhood (MB) that were repressed under Nasser were also eventually permitted to re-emerge as a social movement (Brynen et al., 2012:22).

In 1981 Islamist radicals assassinated Sadat, and his vice-president Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency. Mubarak thus became Egypt’s third president, and ruled from 1981 up until 2011 when the Arab uprisings occurred (Gelvin, 2012:37). It is important to note that prior to the uprisings in 2011, which resulted in the election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012, all of Egypt’s presidents including Mubarak came up through the military (Norton, 2012:338). When Mubarak became president, he continued with most of Sadat’s policies, which included maintaining a close relationship with the US, as well as continued economic reform and privatization that mostly benefited business leaders close to the regime. He continued with multi-party elections, and like Sadat, Mubarak ensured that NDP always won elections with an overwhelming majority (Brynen et al., 2012:22).
The general discontent among citizens grew over the years, as a result of the social and economic injustices in Egypt. The unemployment rate was high even among people with middle and higher education levels. There was also a significant rise in food prices between 2010 and 2011, which added to people’s unhappiness. Additionally, years of crony capitalism had added to the widespread public perception that the benefits of economic development went directly in the pockets of the elite that were close to the regime (Brynen, et al., 2012:23). This was essentially the political context in Egypt when the uprisings flared up in Tunisia, and inspired the Egyptian opposition. On the 25th of January 2011, Egyptian activists started to protest police brutality through organized demonstrations in cities across Egypt. The protests grew larger, and eventually developed in thousands of protesters occupying Tahrir Square (Brynen, et al., 2012:24).

On the 1st of February, Mubarrak promised vague political reforms and offered not to run again for office once his term had come to an end. This in return did not stabilize the situation and instead, resulted in clashes between pro-government supporters and anti-government supporters. Subsequently, the Egyptian military had to step in to separate the two groups (Brynen, et al., 2012:24). Mubarak refused to step down, and the political elite increasingly started to see Mubarak as a liability to the regime. On 10th of February, he agreed to transfer some of his power to Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s intelligence chief, making him thus vice-president (Brynen et al., 2012:24). The very next day, Suleiman declared that Mubarak was leaving his presidential post and would be replaced the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), who would have the task of managing the state’s affairs until new elections could be arranged (Gelvin, 2012:47).

4.3 Tunisia: The Context

Prior to the uprisings in 2011, Tunisia had only known two political leaders since gaining its independence in 1956. The first president was Habib Bourguiba, who ruled for thirty years from 1957 until 1987. Bourguiba was the leader of the Tunisian independence movement, and a year after Tunisia gained its independence from France, Bourguiba removed the county’s ruling monarch, King Muhammad VIII al-Amin, and declared Tunisia a republic (Gelvin, 2012:37). Bourguiba founded the Socialist Destourian Party from which he also became the leader, and following elections, he became president. In 1974, Bourguiba had the National Assembly modify the constitution to make him president for life (Brynen, et al.:

Ben Ali took over the presidency at a time of increasing labour unrest, and under a period of an emerging Islamic opposition (Brynen et al., 2012:18). One of his first acts as president was to dissolve the presidency-for-life decree that was implemented by Bourguiba, and amended the constitution to limit the number of terms a president could serve into three. This gave Tunisians hope, however, Ben Ali soon destroyed this hope by supporting a referendum that would annul the previous amendments that would make it acceptable for him to serve more terms (Gelvin, 2012:37-38). Furthermore, Ben Ali reformed Bourguiba’s party the Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) into the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), which made Tunisian believe that Ben Ali opened for competitive party politics. However, Ben Ali did just the opposite by strengthening the state coercive apparatus, co-opting different societal groups and cracking down on the moderate Islamist party Ennahda (Brynen et al., 2012:18). Throughout his presidency, Ben Ali was re-elected five times and got anywhere between 89 and 98 percent of the vote with each election, which were far from being free and fair (Gelvin, 2012:38).

Gradually, Ben Ali´s regime became a political aberration to Tunisia´s growing middle class. His regime tortured critics, assaulted investigative journalists, imprisoned youth for bypassing Internet filters, and destroyed any pretence of judicial autonomy (Henry, 2014:133). By 2010 the regime´s abuse and unfair treatment was obvious to Tunisians all over the country. The catalyst for Tunisia´s revolution was when the police harassed a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi on the 17th of December 2010. He attempted to submit a complaint that was eventually rejected and as a result he set himself on fire in protest. His actions made him an icon and set off an escalating series of anti-government protests across all of Tunisia.

A week after Bouazizi set himself on fire, Ben Ali visited him in the hospital in an effort to display compassion for his situation. He also transferred Bouazizi to a better hospital, and briefly arrested the police officer involved (Brynen et al., 2012:20). However, the protesters continued to spread to different cities in Tunisia, including the Tunisian capital, Tunis. Eventually, the Tunisian security forces were not able to supress the protesters because
of their growing numbers. As a result, on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of January 2011 Ben Ali fled Tunisia (Henry, 2014:133; Brynen et al., 2012:17; 19).

In summary, the combination of single-party institutional legacies, the façade of multi-party systems as well as a patronage-based economic privatization has contributed to the persistence of the authoritarian regimes in both Egypt and Tunisia. On the other hand, the economic inequality, corruption, cronyism and the lack of a political voice, were all fundamental factors that contributed to the social discontent that initiated and drove forward the uprisings in 2011 (Brynen et al., 2012:19).

4.4 The State apparatus in Egypt and Tunisia before 2011

Egypt and Tunisia has had a relatively autonomous pre-colonial rule, which has resulted in them becoming the two most developed states in region (Henry, 2014:127). Prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011, The Egyptian and Tunisian states redistributed its power through relatively autonomous administrative structures (Henry, 2014:130). Furthermore, the two countries experienced considerable growth in the state bureaucracy during the 1960s and 70s. Overall the bureaucracy in Egypt grew from 18.3 percent in the 1955s to 37.9 percent in the 1970s. Similarly, in Tunisia the state bureaucracy grew from 20.7 percent in 1960 to 40.7 percent in 1970 thereby doubling during the same decade (Owen, 2004: 23-25).

Egypt and Tunisia also share a similarity with regard to the leading role assigned to the hegemonic party. During the early stage of state consolidation in each country, the dominant party were given a mobilizing role that eventually resulted in it becoming a patronage machine (Battera, 2014:550-551). In other words, the hegemonic party in both Egypt and Tunisia was utilized as an instrument to co-opt elites and obtain social control. The elections through multi-party systems introduced by the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes also lacked validity. The RCD in Tunisia for instance, retained control over the Tunisian parliament, which was similar to the NDP in Egypt (Battera, 2014:551).

RCD and NDP had in both cases completely infiltrated society by rewarding loyal residents through resource redistribution. Neither party served a representative purpose, or identified with a specific ideology (Gelvin, 2012:39). Additionally, the opposition in both Egypt and Tunisia were controlled through co-optation. In Tunisia, religious parties were restrained, and the Tunisian government controlled the religious establishment by having
certifying imams. The Egyptian government, on the other hand, coexisted with the religious establishment to a certain extent, and independent candidates affiliated with the MB were given restricted access to parliament (Battera, 2014:551).

In summary, prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011, Egypt and Tunisia had strong, centralized bureaucracies in place. In both instances the hegemonic parties became hollow shells with the exclusive function of distributing patronage. As Gelvin (2012:39) so eloquently puts it: “Each (party, rem.) was more like a club whose board was composed of political and economic elites who divided political and economic spoils among themselves”.

4.5 The Military in Egypt and Tunisia before 2011

Authoritarian regimes depend upon a variety of institutions to provide them with their security needs. This includes numerous branches of the military, intelligence agencies, the police and often a praetorian guard (Bellin, 2012:130). This was exactly the case for Egypt and Tunisia prior to the uprisings in 2011, as both states established an extensive security apparatus to monitor, scare and repress citizens (Gelvin, 2012:39). Despite Egypt and Tunisia’s shared similarities with regards to the roles ascribed to the state bureaucracy and the party, there is an important difference in the respective role of the military.

Since 1952, when Nasser and Free Officers abolished the monarchy and established a republic, the Egyptian military has maintained a privileged role in Egypt and remained a key part of the regime (Springborg, 2014:142; 146). As Richter (2007:83) states “Egyptian military forces are not only the guarantor of the country’s sovereignty but also the ultima ratio of its internal stability”. Moreover, the Egyptian military has a strong sense of corporatism and professionalism, which has been developed by the Egyptian regime, as a result of it providing the military with large military budgets, modernization programs, and other privileges (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). During his rule, Mubarak depended on the Egyptian military, and controlled them by generously giving his officers various economic rewards (Springborg, 2014:146).

Unlike its Egyptian counterpart, the Tunisian military has always been kept at a distance from the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). In fact, the percentage of police officers outnumbered the military, which was due to Ben Ali and Bourguiba’s fear of military coups (Grewal: 2016). The Tunisian military thus existed in the shadow of Tunisia’s security
services (Anderson, 2011:3). As a result of this, throughout Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s rule the Tunisian military remained small in terms of size, its resources were limited, and officers were banned from politics (Brooks, 2013:209). However, the Tunisian military remained a part of the political coalition until the uprisings in 2011. Although one important aspect of the Tunisian military’s marginalization is that it allowed the military to sustain a corporate ethos that prioritized mission and duty and regard for the military as an institution (Brooks, 2013:213).

In sum, the Egyptian military was entrenched in the Egyptian regime; by contrast, the Tunisian military has had a long history of being marginalized, both militarily and politically. Therefore, in Egypt “the military ruled but did not govern” (Cook, 2007:8), whereas in Tunisia the military “neither governed nor ruled” (Battera, 2014:551).
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis

The following chapter consist of an empirical analysis, and is based on the hypotheses presented in chapter 2. The chapter will therefore examine each of the hypotheses systematically through empirical information to determine whether they can be proven or not. The hypotheses will be analysed within the time frame of when the authoritarian regimes were established until a new regime was established following the Arab uprisings. The authoritarian regime in Egypt was established in 1952 and 1957 in Tunisia (Gelvin, 2012:37). Subsequently this chapter will be structured as follows: The first section presents empirical evidence on the institutional autonomy between the state apparatus and the military during the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia. In order to do so, this section focuses on the military’s involvement within the country’s economy, and the state apparatus. The second section presents empirical evidence of the state apparatus and the military’s willingness to compromise with each other after the revolution. The third section, presents empirical evidence of the state apparatus and the military’s division during the revolution. To investigate this, the section will use military defection as an indicator for internal division within the ruling bloc.

5.1 Institutional Autonomy

This section will look at the institutional autonomy of the state apparatus and the military prior to the Arab uprisings. The interaction between the state apparatus and the military in Tunisia and Egypt played a crucial role in determining the outcome after the Arab uprisings. Scholars have attempted to explain the different outcomes that occurred following the Arab uprisings, and their studies have all pointed to the importance of the military and their role in society. The military has among other things, the monopoly of the means of legitimate violence and has proved to be the strongest institution (Battera, 2014:549). As such, no institution matters more to a regime’s survival than it’s military and their support (Barany, 2011:24). Subsequently, the military’s influence and power in relation to the remaining pillars of power, namely, the state and the party are vital to understand the different trajectory between Tunisia and Egypt following the uprisings. Therefore, in order to answer H1 I will focus on the military and their strength in society by concentrating on their influence over the county’s economy, and the state apparatus, which includes the state bureaucracy and
the ruling party. These three aspects will indicate the weight of the army, which will in return, display whether or not the state apparatus and the military were autonomous prior to the uprisings in 2011.

5.1.1 The Egyptian Military and the Economy

Ever since 1952, when the Free Officers lead by lieutenant Gamal Abdel Nasser conducted a coup to overthrow the monarchy, the military has essentially been the backbone of the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). At the time when the Egyptian military seized power, they enjoyed broad popularity, and became the main instrument that steered the county into large-scale political, economic and social change (Droz-Vincent, 2007:196). Since the coup in 1952, the Egyptian military and its civilian allies established political systems that favoured them at the expense of the remaining Egyptian society. To secure the new political order, the Egyptian military managed the advancement of political institutions that gave the appearance of pluralism but also included important mechanisms for oversight and political control (Cook, 2007:15). The Egyptian military has thus, a long history of dominating state institutions in Egypt, and is still to this day a central source of power that is part of the regime.

The Egyptian military’s influence over politics and the economic sector is hidden from public view. Generally, during periods of political crisis such as the Arab uprisings, the military elite has a tendency to revealing itself and their power position (Cook, 2007:15). This is exactly the case for the Egyptian military as there is strong evidence that demonstrates its involvement within the political and economic arena. This is because the Egyptian military’s core interests lies in the economy as well as the state apparatus (Cook, 2007:18). In this section I will present empirical evidence relating to the military’s involvement in Egypt’s economic sector.

In the 1970s, when Anwar Sadat assumed power, a linkage between private economic interests and the military developed. Sadat’s policy of infitah, which was a policy of “opening the door” to private investment, permitted members of the military and the economic elite to jointly benefit from the spoils (Cook, 2007:19). Sadat’s infitah policy was not only a tactical effort to secure political support from the country’s private sector but also an effort to simulate national economic development. Although, Sadat’s infitah policy was originally
intended to promote structural economic change it was, however, quickly used to set in place large networks of domestic patronage (Cook, 2007:19).

Over the years, the Egyptian military has accumulated a profitable portion of Egypt’s commercial and industrial sectors, and diverse cooperative ventures with domestic and foreign manufactures. Hence, they started to invest in the civilian sector, thereby becoming business actors in their own right (Cook, 2007:19; Droz-Vincent, 2007:201). This was in fact an important factor that ensured the Egyptian military’s allegiance to Mubarak’s regime. Hence, Mubarak awarded the Egyptian military with direct and indirect economic privileges (Springborg: 2014:146). This was also a tactical move on Mubarak’s part as it would ensure that the military would remain in the barracks as well as reduce the possibility of a military coup (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18).

To this day, the military institution in Egypt owns a “vast military-run commercial enterprise that seeps into every corner of Egyptian society” (Stier, 2011). The military run businesses have a hold over a wide range of important industries in Egypt, and includes producing food, the manufacture of weapons, electronics, consumer goods, and infrastructure development. The profit from these ventures goes straight to the military’s coffers and is distributed without state oversight (Barany, 2011:28). Another important economic source for the Egyptian military was public land, which is valued commodity in Egypt, and is transformed into gated communities and tourist resorts (Stier, 2011).

In an article published by the New York Times, the former minister of trade, Rashid Muhammad Rashid who is now in exile estimates that the Egyptian’s military empire is less than 10 percent (Kirkpatrick, 2011). However, some economists estimate that the military controls anywhere from 5 to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy (Gelvin, 2012:62). Yet no one knows exactly how much of the portion of Egypt’s 210 billion dollar economy the Egyptian military controls as this is a state secret (Gelvin, 2012:62; Stier: 2011). One thing is for certain, the Egyptian military’s economy is among the largest in the Arab region, and as a result, has become Egypt’s most important economic entity (Springborg, 2014:146; Cook: 2007:19).

The Egyptian military officers are also privileged in several ways. First, officers can buy real estate at subsidized prices. Second, domestic and imported goods are accessible for military personnel at low prices. Third, the military has developed a private educational system (Weiss
and Wurzel, 1998:192). Fourth, health care, recreational, and retirement facilities were created and are more or less free for the officers (Springborg, 1989:4). Fifth, military personnel are offered profitable jobs in the public sector after retirement (Weiss and Wurzel: 1998:192). When retired, favoured generals could also become highly paid “consultants” to the government ministries, banks and businesses (Lesch, 2014:65). Finally, the Egyptian military does not pay taxes or need to deal with bureaucratic red tape that strangles the private sector (Stier, 2011).

As demonstrated above, the Egyptian military essentially maintained a reserved private domain in the Egyptian economy, which meant that they had a decisive influence on the economic policies that were determined by the government. At the time when the Arab uprisings occurred, the Egyptian military enjoyed autonomy from Mubarak’s regime, however, the same cannot be said for the Egyptian economy. At the beginning of the crisis, the Egyptian economy was fused together with the military apparatus. For this reason the Egyptian military was willing to protect its corporate interests against any attempts to dismantle it (Hashim, 2011:109).

5.1.2 The Egyptian Military and the State Apparatus

According to Perlmutter (1969:383) “a modern praetorian state is one in which the military tends to intervene and could potentially dominate the political system”. This type of state usually develops in countries where civilian institutions either lack legitimacy or are in a position to be dominated by the military. Moreover, Perlmutter holds that the political processes in praetorian states will favour the advancement of the military as a core group, and its political leadership will predominantly be recruited from the military institution (1969:383). Egypt fits nicely into Perlmutter’s definition of a praetorian state. Ever since the Egyptian military overthrew the monarchy in 1952, Egyptian presidents have based their rule on the institutional power of the military, and the Egyptian military has maintained a privileged role in society (Springborg, 2014:151). Additionally, before the election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012 following the uprisings, each of Egypt’s presidents have been selected from the officer corps (Norton, 2013:338).

When Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the Free Officers seized power in 1952 and up until his death in 1970, the military was both prominent in state institutions and political decisions
The reason for this was because the important role that the Egyptian military played in Egyptian society. The military brought Nasser to power and ultimately became a symbol of revolutionary change in the newly established Egyptian republic (Brooks, 2013:209). Nasser’s regime controlled the government, political processes, and banned all political parties soon after taking over. Under Nasser, the Egyptian military’s role was to protect the regime and participate in government. The cabinet, ministries, and state apparatus were all staffed with military personnel. Hence, ever since Egypt’s first president came to power, the Egyptian military and army officers formed the core of the ruling elite, and retained a privileged position in Egyptian society (Harb, 2003: 276; 278-79).

After Nasser’s death in 1970, Sadat succeeded the presidency, and brought about radical ideological and practical changes to the Egyptian regime (Harb, 2003:282). He implemented the infitah policy (political liberalization), thereby creating a democratic façade that became more institutionalized and sophisticated. Sadat also introduced multi-party elections in 1976 (Michalik, 2005:80). However, the regime’s decision to hold multi-party elections were not a threat to the Egyptian military’s interests. Cook (2007:16) argues that the Egyptian military has a clear hierarchy of interests where regime survival is at the top, and as a result, when Egypt moved from a single party to a multi-party system, the military did not object because Sadat’s institutional changes reinforced the overall stability of the regime.

A consequence of the implementation of a multi-party system was that Egypt’s parliament included an array of political parties in 1980. The ruling regime allowed limited access to parliament to independent candidates linked with the Muslim Brotherhood (Battera, 2014:551). However, the Egyptian military retained and refined the means of political control through restrictive electoral laws, poll rigging, suppression of the media (Cook, 2007:26). The opposition parties in Egypt only served as a front, giving an illusion of a multi-party system in order to conceal the reality of a dominant-party regime where the dominant party was the regime’s party, namely, the NDP (Albrecht: 2005:384). The hegemonic party, NDP for example, was not a threat to the military because the parliament had increasingly become an extension of the executive branch. According to Cook (2007:70):

“The presidency remains the crucial institutional mechanism of the military establishment’s political influence. As a result, engineering the dominance of the NDP was (and remains) a means through which the leadership of Egypt’s military-dominated state sought to ensure both the regime and its attendant benefits.”
Accordingly, a separation between the party and the army occurred under Sadat, however, the establishment of a dominant party structure through elections served the overall interests of the regime, and as a result the interests of the military as well (Blaydes, 2008:24). Therefore, although the Egyptian military’s role within the party was reduced, their interests remained intact, and still had great power through the executive branch, which provided them with benefits and opportunities that essentially served their interests.

When Sadat was assassinated in 1981, his vice-president, Hosni Mubarak succeeded the presidency. Mubarak was a former air force commander and drawn from the officer corps when he became vice-president to Sadat (Brynen et al., 2012:22). Under Mubarak, the majority of Egypt’s 26 governors were senior-ranking military and police officers, and although they were removed from their posts, they remained integrated within the Egyptian military. Their role consisted of protecting the local and regional level from opposition activists from engaging in activities that would threaten the incumbent regime’s political control and democratic façade (Cook, 2007: 26). Hence, the Egyptian regime was not just Mubarak’s regime; it was also a military regime where generals and retired generals controlled a lot of the government (Alterman, 2011).

Subsequently, at the beginning of the political crisis following the Arab uprisings in Egypt, the separation of the Egyptian military from the party and the state was, incomplete. Although the party was kept separate from the military, there was no clear separation between the military and the state with regards to political control. This is because members of the military were part of the government through official functions and local power. The military for instance, controlled the presidency as well as the Ministry of Defence (Battera, 2014:552). Although the liberalization that occurred under Sadat had reduced the army’s control over the party, it gained at the same time power to control the state indirectly. The Egyptian military also took responsibility over the redistributive capacities that were previously administered by the state (Battera, 2014:552). This was partly because of the military’s connection with external resources provided by the United States in military aid (Richter, 2007:184).

Since the Free Officer’s coup in 1952, the Egyptian presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have used the military as a base for legitimacy and power. The military has and still continues to be, the key to Egyptian politics because it provides the power base for the president and protection for the regime (Harb, 2003:282; 287). From Nasser to Mubarak, the Egyptian military has experienced a change in its role over time (Blaydes, 2011:24).
However, the Egyptian military has come to enjoy the democratic institutions as it has protected them from politics in that public dissatisfaction is directed at other institutions, which allowed the military to focus on their own core interests (Cook, 2003: 15; Blaydes, 2008:24). Mubarak and his presidential predecessors, Nasser and Sadat were not only presidents; they were also leading members of Egypt’s military. As such, they continuously protected the Egyptian military’s interests and ensured the dominance and advancement of the military institution in Egypt (Harb, 2003:287).

In sum, the relationship between the military and the Egyptian state apparatus prior to the uprisings was one of cooperation. The regime protected the Egyptian military’s corporate and individual interests and in exchange the military used its competence and power to support the regime. The Egyptian military and its allies, thus created a political system with full-fledged democratic facades, which in return allowed the military elite to rule, and leaving it to others to govern (Cook, 2007: 26). Subsequently, when the Arab uprisings reached Egypt in 2011, the military had considerable influence over the Egyptian economy and the state apparatus. As a result of this, the state apparatus and the military were not autonomous of each other. This made a democratic transition in Egypt difficult, as the military were invested in the regime status quo, since their interests were tied to the regime.

5.1.3 The Tunisian Military and the Economy

Unlike the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military did not have extensive economic businesses ventures, and the officers did not have the same type of access to the private sector when they retired (Brooks, 2013: 210). This goes back to Tunisia’s independence as the country’s separation from France was rather free of conflict, and as a result, there were no need for the military’s involvement (Sorenson, 2007:106). Tunisia’s first president, Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali essentially excluded the military from any political involvement. They were not allowed to vote, and were banned from joining any political parties (Sorenson, 2007:107; Barany, 2011:27).

As such, because of their diminished role form the outset, especially in politics; the Tunisian military had no power to dominate the domestic economy (Anderson, 2011:3). As Springborg states (2011:398): “Tunisia’s military was essentially placed on ice by former president Bin ’Ali – and was weak even under Bourguiba – so it had no access to significant resources even on a strictly military variety”. 

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Under Ben Ali, the military budget was small, which for 2006 only consisted of 1.4 percent of the national GDP (Sorenson, 2007:107). The Tunisian military’s equipment was also outdated, and mainly consists of old weapons: around 140 tanks, some patrol boats as well as a few helicopters (Brooks, 2013:210; Sorenson, 2007:107). In fact, during Ben Ali’s rule there have been very limited upgrades to the Tunisian military’s equipment in general (Sorenson, 2007:107). In other words, both under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, they did not rely upon the military, and as a result Ben Ali built what would in the following two decades become a security state.

According to WikiLeaks, in 2006 the former US ambassador in Tunisia, William Hudson reported on the disproportionate power and influence that was controlled by a few of Tunisia’s elites. These elites mainly consisted of Tunisia’s first family, namely, Ben Ali and people personally related to him through his wife, children and siblings (WikiLeaks, 2006). Hudson also claims that their power and influence is rumoured to include all the major sectors of the economy, but is however, difficult to accurately measure (WikiLeaks, 2006). In other words, it was Ben Ali and his family that effectively ruled Tunisia though personalist ties, therefore it was they that controlled the economy, and not the military, which is in stark contrast to Egypt.

Ben Ali had tight control over the Tunisian military, and after the retirement of General el-Kateb in 1991, he refused to choose a new chief of staff for the military. This denied the Tunisian military a general that could coordinate the military, the navy and the air force. Instead, Ben Ali took on this role himself and made decisions regarding the Tunisian military himself (Grewal, 2016). Hence, Ben Ali exercised personal rule over the Tunisian military. Unlike most the other military establishments in the Arab world, the Tunisian military has never attempted any military coups, neither has it enforced any political decisions, or been an instrument of nation building (Ware, 1985:37). Most importantly, it has never joined in any economic development schemes (Barany, 2011:27). The Tunisian military was intentionally kept small, underfunded and marginalized.

In sum, the Tunisian military did not have any influence over the Tunisian economy. It was not privileged nor did it have any advantages as it’s Egyptian counterparts. The Tunisian military did not own any businesses, and as a result no economic stakes in the Tunisian regime at the time when the uprisings occurred.
5.1.4 The Tunisian Military and the State Apparatus

A year after Tunisia gained its independence from France, Habib Bourguiba, who was the leader of Tunisia’s independence movement, removed its monarch and declared Tunisia a republic (Gelvin, 2012:37). Bourguiba thus assumed power in 1956 as head of the PSD that would later become the country’s dominant political party. However, unlike Egypt, the military did not play an important role in the state apparatus. This is because the Tunisian military did not bring Bourguiba or his regime to power. Second, it did not play a leading role as a symbol of revolutionary change in the newly established Tunisian republic (Brooks, 2013:209).

In fact, when Bourguiba assumed power, he had a specific idea of the military’s role in the state in that it would play a little to no role in politics (Brooks, 2013:209). During his three decades long rule from 1957 up until 1987, he banned the officer corps from joining the ruling party (Barany, 2011:27). This in return, thus prevented them from having access to institution of elite politics in Tunisia. The Tunisian military was also purposely kept small in size and in terms of resources (Brooks, 2013:209). Bourguiba also denied the military a role in eliminating rebels, thereby distancing them from coercive functions. Instead, he relied upon the Interior Ministry as well as the police and other security forces to take on that role. For that reason the Tunisian military never participated in the decision-making process as a political elite. Instead, the Tunisian military served as the defenders of national sovereignty, the status quo and as a symbol of unity (Ware, 1985:37).

The police and other forces that were controlled by the Interior Ministry mainly provided the security in Tunisia. As a result, the Tunisian military did not operate in Tunis, instead they played a policing role in the countryside and smaller cities (Brooks, 2013: 211). In 1978 and 1984 the military helped the government to restore order following civil disruptions. However, the generals disliked having to assume police functions (Barany, 2011:27). Consequently, ever since the late 1970s, the Tunisian military has started to recognize their disadvantage in relation to the civilian bureaucracy (Ware, 1985:39). The Tunisian military held the bureaucrats of the Interior Ministry responsible for the relinquishment of their duty. Therefore, mistrust between the military and the Interior Ministry developed, where the military believed that the civilian bureaucracy could not cope with occurring problems of social disorder (Ware, 1985:39).
In 1987, Prime Minister Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who had climbed the ranks of the military before starting his political career, had doctors declare Bourguiba mentally incompetent, as Bourguiba’s health and erratic behaviour became increasingly serious (Gelvin, 2012:37; Brooks, 2013:210). This was a coup, and in accordance with the constitution, Ben Ali then became president (Gelvin, 2012:37). Once in power, Ben Ali banned Islamist parties and secured the ruling party, the RCD control of almost all the seats in parliament (Lesch, 2014:64). He also continued with Bourguiba’s strategy with regards to the military, keeping it small and marginalized, while at the same time, financing security forces that grew increasingly (Brooks, 2010:210). The reason why both Ben Ali and Bourguiba before him, wanted the army to remain small in terms of size was because they feared a possible coup d’État. As a result, the proportion of police officers was much higher than that of the military personnel in Tunisia, which is in stark contrast to Egypt (Battera, 2014:550).

According to Brooks, one important after effect of the Tunisian military’s marginalization and its dismissal to the periphery, is that it allowed the military some degree of organizational autonomy. Subsequently, the military managed to maintain a “corporate ethnos” that promoted mission, duty as well as respect for the military as an institution (2010:213). In other words, the exclusion of the military from daily regime preservation, limited their vulnerability to the bias and varied incentives that could occur if they had participated in elite politics and patronage networks within the state, as had happened to the Egyptian military. In addition, as the military did not have any influence over the party or the state, this in return became an advantage for them. For example under the Arab uprisings in 2011, the military was not seen as being part of the coercive apparatus in the manner that the police and other security forces were (Brooks, 2010:214).

Under Ben Ali, Tunisia was essentially a police state where the military was obscured by larger, more generously funded and more politically influential security agencies that were run by the Interior Ministry (Barany, 2011:27). Ben Ali also sent many of his military officers for training in the US, which in return, introduced them to programs on the principles of civil-military relations under democracy. As a result of the ban on military officers to join politics as well as its low budget and equipment, the Tunisian military eventually ranked among the Arab world’s most professional forces (Barany, 2011:27). In addition, the Tunisian army had no stakes in the regimes survival as they were not involved in the state apparatus, nor did they own economic business ventures, which separates it from the Egyptian case.
In summary, Ben Ali’s strategy towards the Tunisian military was control through exclusion by keeping the military isolated from the regime, and balancing it with an extensive police and security apparatus (Brooks, 2010:211). Contrary to its Egyptian counterpart, who’s power base was the military, Ben Ali’s power base lay in the security apparatus that he founded and expanded. The small Tunisian military remained outside of politics and developed a reputation for integrity (Lesch, 2014:62). However, the professionalization of the Tunisian military implied that its role as one of the pillars of the coalitions was preserved, and had been an integral part of the regime up until the uprisings in 2011 (Battera, 2014:551). In 2011 when the Arab uprisings occurred in Tunisia, the Tunisian military did not have any considerable influence over the Tunisian economy and state apparatus. Subsequently, the state apparatus and the military were autonomous of each other, which facilitated a democratic transition in Tunisia. This was because of the military had no interest tied to the regime.

5.1.5 Does institutional autonomy increase the probability of democratization?

The first hypothesis is:

“The more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other, in an authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization”.

I argue that the empirical evidence presented above supports H₁. The analysis conducted on the institutional autonomy of the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia prior to the uprisings has demonstrated that the institutional structures in two cases were different. As demonstrated, the military in Egypt were very strong as they had considerable influence over the economy and the state apparatus. The military, essentially ruled but did not govern, and has had a long history of dominating state institutions. Thus, the state apparatus and the military in Egypt were essentially fused together when the Arab uprisings occurred, which basically made a democratic transition impossible. This was largely due to the fact that the Egyptian military had built its very own economic empire through various business ventures. Hence, the Egyptian military had the most to lose from a democratic transition, and as a result, they interfered in the transition to protect their interests. In Tunisia on the other hand, the military was very weak as it was largely marginalized by the regime. The military were excluded from the economic sector, and kept separate from the state apparatus. Subsequently, the state apparatus and the military were autonomous of each
other when the Arab uprisings occurred, which facilitated a democratic transition. This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

### 5.2 Institutions and their ability to compromise

This section will explore the state apparatus and the military’s willingness to compromise following the Arab uprisings. Compromise is an integral part of politics. This is particularly the case for countries that undergoing a transition process such as Egypt and Tunisia. As argued by Al Ramiah and Hewstone (2012:303): “Compromise is an important component in negotiating and settling differences in a range of social spheres, including those involving political actors”. Therefore, to answer H2 I will focus on whether or not the state apparatus, and the military were able to compromise with each other during the transition. However, there will be a greater emphasis on main Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia as these are at the centre of the transition process.

#### 5.2.1 Post-Revolutionary Egypt: Divide and Mistrust

The continued power of the old regime following the Arab uprisings is most apparent in Egypt. In response to the uprising in Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) formed a transitional government, and removed Mubarak from office. For the Egyptian military, this was essentially a means to resist civilian budgetary oversight, which was accomplished by maintaining the old regime with small adjustments (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996). Once the transitional government was in place, the Generals insisted that the Egyptian military’s economic and political privileges should stay unchallenged (Norton, 2013:339). During SCAF’s rule, no considerable institutional reforms occurred, and most of the political power remained within the remnants of the old regime (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996). In fact, not only did the military’s role continue unhindered following Mubarak’s removal, but also other key institutions power remained intact (Norton, 2013:338).

As a result, when SCAF took over as the interim government following Mubarak’s ouster, they reinforced the old system that was already in place during Mubarak’s rule (El Amrani, 2013:100). For example, the Ministry of Interior that controlled the police as well as the judiciary was unimpeded in its power and retained it even after Mubarak’s fall. Indeed,
many remnants of the old regime remained after the uprising that swept across Egypt. In fact, around five million Egyptians worked for the government, including a large group of security forces that were all committed to controlling the political arena, uncover rebels, and remove challenges to the state (Norton, 2013:338). Consequently, the internal security apparatus was mostly unaffected by the revolution. Similarly, patron-client networks that linked the regime to economic elites remained for the most part intact (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996).

When Mubarak was removed from office, opponents of the regime were split over the issue of who should take over as well as how the transition should occur (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996). It is important to note that under Mubarak’s rule there was a clear absence of non-Islamist political parties as any secular political parties that could pose a threat to Mubarak’s regime was repressed and intimidated (Norton, 2013:339). Some liberal, nationalist, leftist and issue-orientated parties were however, allowed to legally function under Mubarak. Nevertheless, as Norton (2013:339) puts it they often: “[…] seemed more like political boutiques than groups with a significant base in society”. Yet, Mubarak and his regime allowed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to participate in politics by allowing them to run as independent candidates, thereby giving them limited access to parliament (Battera, 2014:551). This was more of a tactic on Mubarak’s in that he divided the Islamist opposition in suppressing radicals but allowing the MB to participate (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996).

Although the MB and secular political parties had incentives to cooperate with each other following Mubarak’s fall, there were various factors that hindered this. Firstly, there was a presence of mutual suspicion between them. Secondly, the MB was willing to accommodate the remnants of the old regime. Finally, the MB had contradictory positions on political reform (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996). Consequently, they were not able to build a pro-democracy coalition. Subsequently, the MB, secular and liberal regime opponents competed to influence SCAF, which resulted in a complex trichotomous game between Islamists, SCAF and secularists that was advantageous to the interim government (El Amrani, 2013:101). The MB was the only political party that was powerful enough to obtain a degree of “normalization” in Egypt and fill the political vacuum (El Amrani, 2013:101; Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:997).

During the Mubarak era, the MB earned respect from the people for their distribution of essential services to poor and for their religiousness, which concurred with the religious beliefs of most Egyptians (Norton, 2013:340). As a result of the MB’s popularity in Egypt,
SCAF’s willingness to collaborate as well as the MB’s mistrust of secular and liberal regime opponents, the MB decided to work with SCAF, as they believed that this would increase their political power. For them this was the best alternative as working with the secular and liberal opponents was an uncertain path (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:997). Consequently, the MB obtained a transitional plan that favoured them instead of their secular and liberal opponents (El Amrani, 2013:101).

Evidence of collaboration between the MB and SCAF can be found when SCAF appointed a commission to draft transitional constitutional revisions, which included Subhi Salih, a former member of parliament and affiliated with the MB. However, the commission did not include any representatives from secular parties or revolutionary youth groups (El Amrani: 2013:101). The result of the Constitutional Declaration that was approved on March 19th 2011 was the new constitution, was to be written by a constitutional assembly selected by parliament after the elections. This was a clear advantage for the MB because their superior numbers and organization made them likely to succeed and as a result they expected to win. The MB was successful in advocating a “yes” for the referendum, and the “yes” side of the referendum got 79 percent of the vote (El Amrani: 2013:101).

Before the parliamentary elections, the MB assured SCAF as well as other regime opponents that they were not going to establish an Islamic government. In order to reassure them of this they promised not to seek parliamentary majority, dominate the constitutional assembly or have candidate run for president (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:997). However, when parliamentary elections were held in November 2011, the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) that represented the MB won the elections with 45 percent thereby obtaining nearly half of the seats. The Nour Party, which represented the ultra-conservative Salafis, took 22 percent of the vote, secular liberals and leftist parties won 16 percent. Finally, parties with ties to Mubarak managed to win 5 percent of the vote (Al Jazeera, 2012).

Parliamentary elections were held in November 2011, and the result illustrated the weakness of the non-Islamist political parties. In contrast to the MB, the secular and liberal political parties did not have social and economic networks, and were divided amid various new parties (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:997). After winning the parliamentary elections the MB went back on their word, and essentially increased their power with the caretaker government at the expense of a coalition with secular/ liberal regime opponents as well as a national consensus towards a democratic transition (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:997).
In January 2012, clashes occurred outside the parliamentary headquarters between MB supporters and anti-SCAF protesters. Supporters of the MB chanted, “the army and the people are in one hand” while establishing a human shield around parliament. Anti-SCAF protesters on the other hand chanted against the MB, and accused them of abandoning the revolution by cooperating with SCAF, and refusing the early handover of power to Parliament (Ibrahim: 2012). In reaction to this, the leader of the MB, Mohamed Badie published an editorial to assure democratic activists that their interests would not be disregarded in the constitutional assembly:

“We seek to build a modern, democratic state on the basis of co-citizenship, the rule of law, freedom, equality and pluralism in all forms, as well as the peaceful rotation of power through ballot box and respect for human rights. We seek a state based on freedom, justice and equality for all citizens, without discrimination based on creed, colour or faith. We seek to forge a new constitution that meets the demands of the people… with the understanding that national charters are written by consensus – not simply by majority” (Badie: 2012)

However, Badie’s statement was contradictory, in that the constitutional assembly elected by the MB dominating parliament did not represent divergent interests in Egyptian society. In fact, out of the 100 members in the constitutional assembly, 64 of had Islamist connections. As a result, 25 non-Islamists members resigned in protest (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:998). This also highlights the fact that the MB broke the second promise they made to SCAF and the secular/liberal regime opponents, namely, not to dominate the constitutional assembly.

After promising that the MB would not put forth presidential candidates, the leadership within the party did exactly the opposite. Mohamed Morsi who was well known outside of MB circles became the party’s presidential candidate. During this time, he was the chairman of the FJP, which was created by the MB in 2011 (Norton, 2013:340). Because of the lack of success in organizing a pro-democratic coalition before the first round of the presidential elections, secular and Islamist democracy advocates divided their votes between Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi, Islamist liberal Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and the human rights lawyer, Khaled Ali. Together these three candidates received 40 percent of the vote (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:998).
The final round of the presidential elections offered voters an unsavoury choice between Ahmed Shafik a former commanding general of the air force who was named prime minister under Mubarak, or Mohamed Morsi, who represented an organization which had previously been illegal (Norton, 2013:340). At the same time, SCAF still maintained executive power, and from behind the scenes they pushed for the election of Ahmed Shafik (Lesch, 2014:66). However, Morsi won the presidential elections with 51 percent of the vote, and subsequently, in June 2012, SCAF unwillingly let go of their power (Lesch, 2014:66).

The conflict between secular/liberal regime opposition and the MB over who should assume power and how the transition should take place was dragged to the court. The Supreme Constitutional Courts (SCC) was not dissolved by SCAF following the Uprisings, and it is noteworthy that all the judges were Mubarak appointees who were used to seeing the MB as an illegal group with motives that were contradictory to Egypt’s interests (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:998; Norton, 2013:341). In June 2012, the same month as Morsi’s inauguration, the SCC ruled in favour of the MB’s secular opponents, and stated that the parliamentary election law was unconstitutional. The SCC ruled that parliament should be dissolved and mandated new elections (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:998).

On the 22nd of November 2012, Morsi issued a presidential decree that essentially would give him extensive powers as well as judicial immunity. The argument for this was that it was necessary to protect the democratic transition (Norton, 2013:340; Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:999). Morsi also tried reconciliatory gestures towards the opposition by offering dialogue, however, this proved ineffective, as the majority of the opposition was not interested. It was during this time that the military started to involve itself in politics by undermining Morsi and openly support the opposition’s demands that he annulled the presidential decree, which Morsi did in early December 2012 (Norton, 2013:342).

Popular opposition to Morsi increased as many felt that the MB was not interested in sharing power but quite contrarily wanted to seize it. This intensified after the constitutional referendum in December 2012. The new constitution was approved where about two thirds of the voters approved the draft. However, this new constitution included articles to preserve the autonomy of the military, protect its budget from civilian overview as well as enable military courts to try civilians (Norton, 2013:342). On June 30th 2013 citizens turned up for anti-Morsi demonstrations across Egypt. Consequently, the defence minister and commander of the army, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi gave Morsi an ultimatum by giving him two days to
reach a compromise with the opposition. Morsi in return, remained stubborn insisted on his own legitimacy. Finally, on the 3rd of July 2013 the Egyptian military carried out a coup, putting the military in power once again (Norton, 2013:343).

In summary, the Egyptian case highlights that although the uprising that occurred in Egypt managed to remove Mubarak, many of the remnants of the old regime persisted, which included bureaucrats, judges and military officers. As the remnants of the old regime endured in Egypt, it made it difficult for the opposition to form a coalition as the remnants worked tirelessly to pit them against each other. This is seen in the trichotomous game between SCAF, Islamist and the secular opponents in Egypt. Mistrust between the MB and secular opponents made it difficult for them to work together for a successful democratic transition. In addition, the MB broke all the promises they made to their opponents with regards to not seeking parliamentary majority, not dominating the constitutional assembly or having a candidate run for presidency. None of their actions demonstrated willingness to compromise, instead the MB appeared to seek inclusion with the ruling caretaker government in order to advance their political power at the expense of secular and liberal groups.

The MB essentially isolated itself politically, and when they won the parliamentary elections as well as the presidential elections they had few incentives to undertake reforms to disperse and share power, which is an important factor if a democracy is to be established. Instead of opening a dialogue with the opposition, both the MB, and later on the seculars stuck to polarizing positions that prevented any meaningful consensus building (Lesch: 2014:68). Additionally, as Egypt was previously characterized by non-competitive elections the parties were unable to acquire a democratic track record. The MB, which was allowed to operate to some degree in Egyptian society under Mubarak, had experience as an opposition party and no experience to rule the country. All in all, as Landolt and Kubicek (2014:997) states: “The MB chose the devil it knew by working with the SCAF to augment political power rather than the more uncertain path of joining secular/liberal regime opponents to demand meaningful regime change”.

5.2.2 Post-Revolutionary Tunisia: Cooperation and Compromise

In contrast to Egypt, remnants of the old regime in Tunisia lost their power after the uprising. Following Ben Ali ouster in 2011, his allies attempted to exploit the weakness of opposition parties by establishing a transitional government that basically excluded some of
the previously banned opposition parties (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:991). This resulted in substantial protests by numerous groups that responded by forming a Council for the Protection of the Revolution, which included professional organizations, students, trade unions and Islamists. This council forced many of Ben Ali’s allies to resign from the initial interim government. In February 2011, lawyer and high-profiled Ben Ali critic, Beji Caid Essebsi, became the interim prime minister. During his time as prime minister, he founded a High Commission whose purpose was to realize the revolutionary goals. The High Commission consisted of 170 members, and was intended to be an inclusive forum to implement demands of the people (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:991-2).

In stark contrast to Egypt, the Tunisian interim government dissolved old institutions, and instead formed new ones. Institutions, which included members of the old regime such as the Chamber of Deputies and the Constitutional Court, were dissolved. Subsequently, in March 2011, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), which was Ben Ali’s former party, was banned. All its assets were seized and the party’s elite was banned from ever running for political office (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:994). Several of Ben Ali’s allies also faced legal charges that consisted of everything from corruption to murder. Both Ben Ali and his wife were also charged and convicted (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:994).

Tunisia’s transition process started by electing a constituent assembly on the 23rd of October 2011 that would be responsible for forming the government as well as writing a new constitution. Subsequently, over a 100 parties registered to participate, and most of them came from political parties that had previously been repressed by Ben Ali (Lesch, 2014: 67-8; Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:992). Most noteworthy, was the return of the leaders of Ennahda, which was a moderate Islamist party that was banned under Ben Ali. Ennahda was able to quickly build up a support networks, and won the country’s first free elections (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:992; Cavatorta and Merone, 2013: 857). Ennahda won the elections with far more votes than any other party, claiming 40 percent of the seats thereby taking 90 seats out of 217 for the constituent assembly. The remaining seats were divided between several large secular parties (Churchill, 2011).

After the election, Ennahda formed a three-party coalition government with the next two leading parties following the elections, which were both secular leftist parties: Congress for the Republic Party (CPR) and Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties Pary (Ettakatol) (Cavatorta and Merone: 2013: 857; Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:992). As a result, Ennahda’s
general secretary, Hamzadi Jebali became Prime Minister. Moncef Marzouki from CPR became president, and finally, Mustapha Ben Jaafar from Ettakatol became Speaker of the Assembly. Together these three parties constituted a democratic coalition, as all three promised to advance democratic reforms (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:992).

This coalition government were to rule for one year while the constitutional assembly would complete its work thereby new elections would be held. Through their power sharing agreement, the coalition accomplished early cooperation, especially in removing the remaining actors from the old regime. Yet, splits surfaced within the coalition government on February 2012, after the constitutional assembly started its work. These divisions included issues on the outline of political institutions, as well as the role of Islam. In order to reach a consensus, Ennahda’s position evolved over time. Among other things, Ennahda discussed, whether or not to include an explicit reference to sharia, how to define the status of women, and the institutional design of the political system (Marks, 2014:20; 26).

In the spring of 2012, Ennahda members discussed whether or not to include a direct reference to Sharia in the constitution (Marks, 2014:20). As a sign of good will, Ennahda compromised by removing the adoption of Sharia Law (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:993). As it turned out, leaving the word Sharia out of the Constitution was not a big issue for many Ennahda members. The party’s elite had for a long time supported a looser view of Sharia, which prioritized abstract principles over specific rules. This in return helped to create a broad based consensus for not including the word (Marks, 2014:21).

Ennahda’s stance on women’s rights came under scrutiny, this was particularly due to the wording of Article 28 in the first draft of the constitution. Article 28 said at the time “The state guarantees the protection of women and supports their achievements, considering them as men’s true partners in building the nation”. It further said: “Their roles complement one another within the family” (Marks, 2014:22-3). This reflected the view that men and women are equal under God, but that they have different biological roles and familial obligations, which in turn complement one another within the family (Marks, 2014:23). Article 28 was a critical failure for Ennahda as they failed in building trust at a time when they should do everything in their power to build confidence in handling women’s rights. As a result, Ennahda backtracked and reverted back to using the term equal instead of complementary. Ghannouchi also promised to uphold women’s rights (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:993).
The issue from which Ennahda was most resistant to compromise on was the institutional design of Tunisia’s political system. The conflict was on whether Tunisia’s new political system should follow a presidential model, a parliamentary model or a combination of the two. Ennahda supported the parliamentary model by citing the importance of hindering Tunisia’s tendency towards presidential authoritarianism. In an interview, Jamila Jouini a member of Ennahda stated: “We have a history of strong men… a parliament can help stop that” (Marks, 2014:26). Ennahda’s opponents viewed Ennahda’s position on the institutional design of the political system as self-serving. In their view, Ennahda’s strong electoral position meant that they would naturally support a parliamentary system as their large numbers could give them more political power. In the end, Ennahda gave in to its opponents, in favour of a stronger presidential model similar to France. Tunisia’s Constitution has as a result, set up a mixed presidential-parliamentary system (Marks, 2014:27).

One growing source of concern the opposition had with Ennahda was the fear that the latter would do anything in its power to obtain control over the government. This concern intensified when foreign minister Rafik Abdessalem stated with complete confidence that “the Ennahda Movement will continue to be in power for many years to come”. This fuelled public suspicion that the first elections since the revolution, which had already been delayed until June 2013, might be compromised (Al-Maliki, 2012). The head of the Ennahda movement, Rachid Ghannouchi, was quick to clarify Rafik Abdessalem’s statement the following day during a press conference. Ghannouchi stated, “the minister was trying to envisage a future and did not intend to impose control over Tunisians” (Al-Maliki, 2012).

The fear that Ennahda was planning to rig the elections in order to obtain power did not come out of the blue as many, questioned Ennahda’s motives. This was particularly due to the fact that some Ennahda officials had made negative comments with regards to secularism and democracy in the past. Rachid Ghannouchi, for example, was in favour of Sharia law as well as an Iranian style Islamic Council to approve laws. However, following the revolution, Ennahda tried to reduce the concern that the party is anti-democratic or wanted to weaken the secular order that had characterized Tunisia since its independence in 1956 (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:993).

In an Interview with Marc Lynch for the magazine, Foreign Policy, Ghannouchi stated that: “Everyone in al-Nahda\(^1\) believes that democracy is the only way to reach power and to

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\(^1\) Al-Nada and Ennhada are two different ways of translating the party’s name from Arabic to Latin letters.
stay in power”. Furthermore, when asked about Ennahda´s priorities, Ghannouchi stated: “We will guarantee that dictatorship will not come back to Tunis. We are for a parliamentary system, which no longer gives us a person with concentrated powers. Our utmost priority is to guarantee freedoms: personal freedoms, social freedoms, and women’s rights. We did not ask to add anything to the first article of the old Constitution, which says that Tunisia is an Arab and a Muslim country. And everyone seems to agree on this in Tunisia” (Lynch, 2011).

Ever since winning the majority in the Constituent Assembly, Ennahda has been pragmatic in the sense of being willing to work with other parties by forming a national unity coalition. In the same interview with Foreign Policy, when asked about the coalition, Ghannouchi stated: “We have declared since before the elections that we would opt for a coalition government, even if al-Nahda achieves an absolute majority, because we don’t want the people to perceive that they have moved from a single party dominant in the political life to another single party dominating the political life” (Lynch, 2011). In this sense one could argue that in contrast to the MB and Egypt, Ennahda kept its promise to the Tunisian people, which in return could promote more trust with the opposition as well as the Tunisian people. In addition, Ennahda has rejected the prohibition of alcohol and bikinis by arguing that this would be unfavourable to the tourist sector (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:993). Hence, Ennahda has demonstrated a willingness to compromise to ensure a smooth democratic transition.

Interestingly, throughout the revolution and the transition process, the Tunisian military remained outside of politics (Lesch, 2014:67). Under the Revolution it quickly became apparent that the police and security forces could not stop the street demonstrations that quickly spread throughout the country. As a result, Ben Ali ordered the army’s chief of staff, General Rachid Ammar, to supply troops in order to help the regime. General Ammar rejected his order, and instead placed the military between Ben Ali’s other security units and the protesters (Barany, 2011:27). This essentially saved the revolution and forced Ben Ali into exile. Accordingly, when Ben Ali fled, General Ammar became one of the most popular figures in Tunisia, and could have expected extensive support if he had taken on a political role (The Economist, 2011). However, in the end General Ammar decided to stand down, and let the civilian government assume power (Barany, 2011:33).

Two years after the Constitutional Assembly started its work Tunisia’s new constitution was complete. The Constitution was passed on the 26th of January 2014, and it was the first
Constitution created by a representative democratically elected assembly in the Arab world (Marks, 2014:3). Throughout the Constitution writing process, as well as the transition process, Ennahda’s leadership have demonstrated both long term planning and pragmatic restraint. As mentioned earlier, Ennahda compromised on the issues of Sharia, women’s rights, as well as the institutional design of the political system. In contrast to Egypt, all political forces in Tunisia were brought under one tent, which allowed them to debate, and work together to find a solution that most of the public could agree with and accept (Lesch, 2014:68).

5.2.3 Does compromises increase the probability of democratization?

As a reminder the second hypothesis is as follows:

“The more the state apparatus and the military are willing to compromise with each other after a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization”.

I argue that the empirical evidence presented above supports H2. The analysis conducted on the state apparatus and the military’s willingness to compromise in Egypt and Tunisia after a revolution has demonstrated that actors in Tunisia were more willing to compromise and accommodate each other than those in Egypt. Post-revolutionary Egypt has been characterized by divides and mistrust, which ultimately led to a lack of cooperation. The findings show that although the MB and secular political parties had incentives to cooperate with each other in the best interest of a democratic transition, they did not. The MB broke their promises vis-à-vis of the opposition, which only created more suspicion and mistrust between them. In addition, institutions with remnants of the old regime stayed intact making it difficult to achieve a democratic transition. The Egyptian military was also present in the political sphere in order to protect their interests. The MB did not form a pro-democratic coalition following the parliamentary elections, and instead cooperated with SCAF, the interim government, hoping to gain more power. The transition process in Egypt was not inclusive, and the MB did not disperse or share their power. In sum, the state apparatus and the military in Egypt show any willingness to compromise and cooperate with each other following the Arab uprisings. It seems like the institutions were more concerned with their own interests than achieving real democratic change.

The findings show that post-revolutionary Tunisia was characterized by both cooperation and compromise. Throughout the process Ennahda and their opponents have
expressed a willingness to collaborate with each other to achieve a successful democratic transition. As such, following the elections, Ennahda formed a pro-democratic coalition that would work together and share power. Ennahda kept their promises to the opposition, and although the process was not without conflict, the party did everything it could to show the public as well as its opponents that it was not anti-democratic. Ennahda also compromised on several core issues, such as Sharia, women’s rights and the institutional design of Tunisia’s political system, all to reach a consensus with their opponents. The old Institutions under Ben Ali were also dissolved to create new institutions, and remnants of the old regime were removed from power and prosecuted. In addition, even though the Tunisian military could get involved in politics, to promote their interests, they stepped aside to let a civilian government assume power. Although the transition process in Tunisia was slow, it was an inclusive one, which fostered power sharing, cooperation and compromise. In sum, the state apparatus and the military in Tunisia has shown a willingness to compromise with each other after the revolution, which has in return facilitated, a democratization process.

5.3 Internal Divides between the Ruling Coalition During the Uprisings

This section will investigate internal divides between the state apparatus and the military during the Arab uprisings. Transitional outcomes from authoritarian rule are affected by central actors’ belief, preferences, and decisions. As previously shown, transitions often start because of important divisions between the ruling elite within the authoritarian regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:19). Previous research on transitions from authoritarian rule claims that the military can play a critical role in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. This is because militaries enjoy coercive resources and when willing, can countermand all challenges to authoritarian rule (Lee, 2009:640-641). Hence, to answer H₃ I will focus on whether or not the military defected from the regime. This in return will indicate if an internal divide between the ruling coalition in Egypt and Tunisia occurred during the Arab uprisings.

5.3.1 The Egyptian Military: Loyalty or Defection?

Following the Arab Uprisings, tens of thousands of angry citizens assembled in Tahrir Square in Egypt to demand an end to the Mubarrak regime. During the uprising in Egypt, the Mubarak regime’s top priority was to maintain the loyalty of the military and prevent internal
divides between the ruling elite (Heydemann and Leenders, 648). In Egypt’s intricate ruling elite, the Egyptian military is one of the central pillars of power and legitimacy. In order to maintain the Egyptian military’s loyalty to his regime, Mubarak granted them privileges. This allowed them to establish and manage a lucrative military-industrial-business complex, which remained untouched (Demmelhuber, 2011). The fact that the Egyptian military’s economic interests were deeply tied to the Mubarak regime, meant that the military had strong reasons to be invested in the political status quo in Egypt.

As the revolution in Egypt unfolded, the regime found itself backed into a corner, and the police had difficulty in suppressing the masses (Hashim, 2011:116). Mubarak responded by sending out military troops, however, many soldiers defended the protesters from aggressive police and paramilitary groups (Schneider, 2011: 481). Furthermore, on the 29th of January 2011, soldiers refused to shoot at the protesters, in a public statement the military declared: “The presence of the army in the streets is for your sake and to ensure your safety and wellbeing. The armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people.” (Black, Shenker, and McGreal, 2011).

On the 11th of February 2011 it was clear that the military had defected from Mubarak as the military ultimately pushed Mubarak out of power, giving him no other alternative than to resign from office (Hashim, 2011:106; Schneider, 2011:481). Why did the Egyptian military, after decades of the defending the authoritarian regime, refuse to repress the protesters and instead force Mubarak to resign? It is difficult to know what exactly went through the minds of the military elite when deciding to side with civilian protesters, however, when examining the political situation in Egypt I would argue that their decision mainly due to the military’s financial interests.

This might seem like a strange statement to make, as the Egyptian military’s business ventures were blessed and protected by the Egyptian regime, and accounted for a significant proportion to its economic privilege (Bellin, 2012:134). However, it was precisely because of the military’s own financial interests that the military turned its back on the regime. The Egyptian military’s main goal was to protect its privileged role in Egypt (Demmelhuber, 2011). Moreover, if Mubarak stayed in power, the Egyptian military risked losing important assets for several reasons. One of them was related to Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak who was to succeed the presidency (Nepstad, 2013:342).
Gamal who was groomed for the presidency, was mistrusted and disapproved of by the military elite (Norton, 2013:338). The military’s mistrust and objection of Gamal Mubarak emanated from his connections to a younger generation of ruling party cadres who had prospered in the business world. The military on the other hand, was connected to the NDP’s old guard, a less wealthy elite that have made their careers as ministers, and officers, and as a result military officers were afraid that Gamal would dismantle the military’s institutional powers (Cambanis, 2010). Mohamed Kadry Said, a retired general from the Egyptian military stated in an interview: “Of course the military has become jealous they are not the only big bosses now, they feel threatened by the business community” (Cambanis, 2010).

From the military’s point of view then, as long as Mubarak stayed in power, the military would thrive, however, this would probably change if Gamal took over for Mubarak and possibly implement privatization policies, which would in return break up the Egyptian military’s business assets, thereby threatening the military’s economy (Nepstad, 2013:342). Thus, the Egyptian military had strong economic incentives to side with the protesters over the regime because their assets were in fact threatened if the regime collapsed.

The military also had incentives not to repress the demonstrations as this would have ended in a bloodbath, and hurt the military’s reputation, which in return would ruin their chances to be able to continue to affect the political system in Egypt (Droz-Vincent, 2011:19). If the public disapproves of the military and perceives it as an extension of the regime itself, this would be harmful for the Egyptian military’s vital interests. In addition, the military wanted to avoid any internal divides between the officer corps, and feared that the rank and file members who had some degree of sympathy for the protestors (Droz-Vincent, 2011:19). This also affected the military’s decision to defect as a whole and change their support to the protesters of Tahrir Square. The fact that the entire institution defected as a whole implied that there was no one left in the military to enforce sanctions on defectors (Nepstad, 2013:343).

Furthermore, another reason, which could possibly have influenced the military’s decision to defect from the Mubarak regime, was the US response to the uprisings in Egypt. Originally, the Obama administration supported the Mubarak regime but later changed its position by asking for Mubarak to resign (Nepstad, 2013:343). As the Egyptian military received roughly 1.3 million dollars annually in aid from the US, they did not want to jeopardize the relationship (Richter, 2007: 184). If the military were to side with Mubarak this essentially meant that the military would defy the Obama administration. Moreover, it was
important for the Egyptian military to protect its relationship with the US. As stated by Hashim (2011: 118) the US has “[…] provided the Egyptian armed forces with some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the world”. Additionally, the annual military aid from the US consisted of almost half of the military budget (Demmelhuber, 2011). Hence, if the Egyptian military had remained loyal to Mubarak, they could have become subject to further financial losses.

Prior to the uprisings, the power base in Egypt was centralized. Mubarak had centralized authority over state institutions under his rule, which made his executive position strong. Mubarak had extensive constitutional powers and became the mediator over the elite within the state governing organizations (Stacher, 2012:70). Stacher (2012:70) argues that “This makes the system highly adaptable, which means that even the chief executive becomes dispensable because of its adaptive qualities are so efficient”. The adaptable character of Egypt’s centralized executive turned out to be an important aspect of Mubarak’s fall. When the regime was threatened, which in return put the military’s interests at risk the Egyptian military took action. In order to salvage the regime SCAF forced Mubarak to resign, and changed the ruling coalition without jeopardizing the regime as a whole (Stacher, 2012:96). This allowed SCAF to assume the central executive position and take control over the transition process. The Egyptian military essentially sacrificed Mubarak to save the regime thereby securing their own interests. Most of Egypt’s institutions, including the state bureaucracy remained unaffected by Mubarak’s removal from office (Norton, 2013:338).

As the uprising in Egypt demonstrates, the Egyptian military had institutional interests separate from the president. Accordingly, the survival of the regime was essentially dependent upon the military and its willingness and capacity to contain the political crisis (Bellin, 2012:130-131). When Mubarak called for the army to act, the military elite weighed their own institutional interests against their mission before making any decisions. As it turned out, Mubarak became more of a liability to the military as their fundamental interests were threatened. As presented above, there were several issues that influenced the military to defect from Mubarak’s regime. This was particularly linked to the military’s fundamental corporate interests. First and foremost, their financial interests were threatened if Mubarak’s son Gamal Mubarak succeeded the presidency. Secondly, the military would not risk losing its financial aid from the US by going against the Obama administration. Thirdly, it was not in the Egyptian military’s interests to repress protesters as public dissatisfaction could ruin an opportunity to continue to affect the political system.
In sum, the Egyptian military assessed the consequences of their loyalty to the regime and eventually defected from the regime. The military behaved as a rational actor by calculating risks and advantages of supporting Mubarak’s regime or the protesters before deciding and acting in a manner, which would ultimately maximize their own interests. The Egyptian military was and still remains to this day a central source of power in Egypt. Due to the centralization of power in Egypt, it also allowed SCAF to easily remove Mubarak from power without endangering the whole regime thereby securing the military’s own interests as well as re-establish control over Egyptian society. Since the military defected from the regime, this demonstrates that a divide between the state apparatus and the military was present during the Arab uprisings.

5.3.2 The Tunisian Military: Loyalty or Defection?

On the 12th of January 2011, the protests in Tunisia peaked, and tens of thousands of Tunisians protested in the Tunisian capital, filling the streets of Habib Bourguiba Avenue (Brooks, 2013:205). The situation was getting out of control as Ben Ali’s police and security forces were incapable of repressing the protesters as well as protect the regime. Subsequently, Ben Ali deployed the military to the Tunisian capital, Tunis. This highlighted the severity of the situation, as the Tunisian military has historically not had any role affiliated with patrolling the capital or protecting national security. Moreover, Ben Ali had reportedly ordered the Tunisian military to use force against the protesters. However, similar to the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military refused to comply with the regimes’ wishes (Gelvin, 2012:60).

Contrary to Egypt, the Tunisian military’s decision to defect was less surprising. The Tunisian military is the smallest in the Arab world. It is widely recognized for having a professional, small and isolated from Tunisian politics (Bellin, 2012:133-134). Although the Tunisian military is small in size and did not partake in founding the new regime in Tunisia following their independence in 1956 as its Egyptian counterparts, it is still regarded as a symbol of the state (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). The Tunisian military has not fought in any major war, and for the most part remained in the barracks. Contrary to its Egyptian counterparts, the Tunisian military never established any deep corporate interests that would make them invested in Ben Ali’s regime and its survival (Grewal, 2016). Hence, the Tunisian military’s decision to defect from the regime was predictable.
At the centre of the decision to defect from Ben Ali’s regime was the Tunisian military’s chief of staff, General Rachid Ammar. General Ammar did not only reject Ben Ali’s order but also placed the military between Ben Ali’s other security forces and the protesters (Barany, 2011:27). The Tunisian military were observed withdrawing from the Tunisian capital on the 13th of January (Kirkpatrick, 2011). Many viewed the fact that the military pulled out of the capital as a sign of the military’s unwillingness to repress protesters. However, the Tunisian military troops returned to the streets the very next day following Ben Ali’s ouster. In a YouTube clip from the 24th of January 2011 General Ammar addressed the Tunisian people, and declared that, “The army is the guarantor of the revolution” (YouTube, 2011). Why did the Tunisian military decide to refrain from violently repressing protests, and defect from the Ben Ali regime?

When examining the political climate in Tunisia, the Tunisian military’s decision to defy Ben Ali’s orders, and abandon his regime was primarily because the army had little to lose by Ben Ali’s fall. In addition there would be significant costs if the military decided to protect him. In fact, the Tunisian military had potentially more to win by Ben Ali’s removal from office. For the Tunisian military there were not many advantages with maintaining Ben Ali or his regime in power. Ben Ali’s regime had increasingly become more personalist and corrupted, which was a liability for the Tunisian military as it undermined their core organizational interests (Brooks, 2013:207). As Brooks (2013:207) argues “The reasons for its lack of incentives to defend the regime originate in the nature of civil-military relations and the mechanisms through which Ben Ali maintained political control of his military, in combination with features of the uprisings itself ”.

As previously mentioned, Ben Ali distanced the military from the regime, limited its responsibility, resources and influence. Instead, Ben Ali invested in security forces that executed the coercive duties of the regime. This limited the stake the military and its leaders had in maintaining Ben Ali in power. Additionally, because Ben Ali excluded the military from security roles by allocating most of it to the police and other security forces, Tunisian citizens did not associate the Tunisian military with the oppressive security apparatus. This created an important opportunity for the military by taking advantage of the situation and improving its position and influence in Tunisia by refraining from using lethal force. This way, the military could avoid the distaste Tunisans felt towards the police and security forces (Brooks, 2013:214).
Another important aspect that could have influenced the Tunisian military´s decision to defect from the Ben Ali regime was its relationship with the US. Although it is more limited than it was in Egypt, Tunisia has a long tradition of military relations with the US. A joint US-Tunisian Military Commission meets on an annual basis where joint exercises are held regularly (Arieff, 2012:316). The Tunisian Military also received advantages in military assistance from the US from Foreign Military Financing (FMF) as well as International Military Education and Training (IMET). In 2011 this added up to approximately 17 million and 1.7 million dollars. This was beneficial to the Tunisian military as Ben Ali deprived them of resources, and hence they relied on limited funds to maintain its aging equipment (Brooks: 2013:214).

Moreover, the interaction between the Tunisian military´s and the US military helped sustain a corporate ideology where the Tunisian military viewed itself as professional experts that placed great value on preserving its organizational integrity (Brooks, 2013:208; 214-15). Hence, the decision made by the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime can be partly understood in light of the cost for the military by having to jeopardize its organizational integrity, and prestige by firing on Tunisian protesters. The Tunisian military viewed repression as a threat to its organizational integrity, which could result in losing its prestige and social esteem (Brooks, 2013:217). Hence, defection from the incumbent regime would be more advantageous to the military as their corporate interests would be accomplished by siding with the protesters.

Similar to the case of Egypt, the uprisings in Tunisia demonstrates that the Tunisian military were first and foremost primarily concerned with the organization´s own institutional interests. Moreover, when Ben Ali called upon the military to supressed the protesters through the use of lethal force, the Tunisian military acted by refusing to follow his orders and eventually siding with the protesters. Similar to the Egyptian military then, the Tunisian military weighed the potential advantages and disadvantages of sustaining Ben Ali and his regime. As it turned out, the Tunisian military had little to lose in Ben Ali´s removal from office, as Ben Ali marginalized the Tunisian military from roles in state institutions, and limited the organizations access to resources. This in returned, reduced the Tunisian military´s investment in the Ben Ali regime. In addition, the cost that the Tunisian military would be subjected to by following Ben Ali´s orders to supress forcefully the demonstrators would go against the military´s core institutional interests, thereby threatening them.
To summarize, the issues that influenced the Tunisian military’s decision to defect from Ben Ali’s regime was essentially because of the political climate under Ben Ali. The Tunisian military had been excluded from Ben Ali’s regime, which had also limited their resources. Hence, there was a lack of incentives to protect the regime, and the military would face significant costs if they were to engage in the form of mass repression necessary to defend the regime. The Tunisian military also had potentially more to gain by Ben Ali being ousted as it did not benefit from its positioning within the regime. Thus, because the Tunisian regime had little to gain by helping Ben Ali, and much more to lose, it decided instead to side with the protesters under the uprisings. The Tunisian military essentially acted as a rational actor by choosing the option that would maximize their interests. For the Tunisian military, this was siding with the protesters. As was the case in Egypt, the Tunisian military defected from the regime, which indicates an internal divide between the state apparatus and the military in Tunisia during the Arab uprisings.

5.3.5 Does divides among the ruling elite increase the probability of democratization?

The third hypothesis is the following:

“The more divided the state apparatus and the military are during a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization.”

I would argue that the evidence presented above does not support H₃. The analysis on divisions between the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia has demonstrated that in both cases the military defected from the state apparatus. This has highlighted that an internal divide within the ruling coalition occurred during the Arab uprisings. In both instances, the military facilitated the beginning of the transition by defecting from the regime. For this reason, I contend that this does not explain why Tunisia democratized while Egypt returned to an authoritarian regime following the Arab uprisings. Furthermore, the military defection in both Egypt and Tunisia also indicates that the internal divides between the state apparatus and the military was due to disagreements between hard-liners and soft-liners within the ruling bloc over how to handle the Arab uprisings. In Egypt and Tunisia, the military’s decision to defect suggests that they realized there was a need to grant some freedoms or some form of change. The state apparatus, which included Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, on the other hand believed that the regimes structures, and coercion was sufficient to save the regimes. The Egyptian and Tunisian military acted as rational actors by
carefully weighing their options before deciding on the alternative that would be of most advantage to them. Although the evidence does not account for the different outcomes between Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings, this analysis has demonstrated the decisive role that the military played during the Arab uprisings.
Chapter 6: Discussion of Results

This chapter discusses the main finding of the empirical analysis presented in chapter 5, and is divided into three sections, where the first section discusses the main findings of the hypotheses. Accordingly, a table has been developed to provide the reader with a brief summary of the main findings in Egypt and Tunisia. The second section discusses what the findings mean in relation to the democratization process. Finally, the last section consists of a discussion of the theoretical framework against the findings.

6.1 Why Egypt’s Revolution Failed, and Tunisia’s Revolution Succeeded

Table 1: A brief summary of the main findings in Egypt and Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Causal Process Observations in Egypt</th>
<th>Causal Process Observations in Tunisia</th>
<th>Support of hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_1$: The more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other, in an authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization.</td>
<td>- The military owns a vast portion of Egypt’s commercial and industrial sectors. - The military was part of the state apparatus. - The military and state apparatus were not autonomous of each other.</td>
<td>- The military did not own any businesses or dominate the domestic economy. - The military and the state apparatus were kept separate, and subsequently autonomous of each other.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_2$: The more the state apparatus and the military are willing to compromise with each other after a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization.</td>
<td>- Remnants from Mubarak’s regime were not removed. - No pro-democratic coalition formed. - The MB broke its promises to the political opposition, and was not willing to compromise with them. - The MB collaborated with SCAF</td>
<td>- Remnants of Ben Ali’s regime were removed. - Formed a three party coalition. - Ennahda compromised with the opposition on several issues, including sharia, women’s rights, and the institutional design of the political system. - The military remained outside of politics.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_3$: The more divided the state apparatus and the military are during a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization.</td>
<td>- The military did not follow Mubarak’s orders to shoot protesters. - The military defected from the Mubarak regime to protect their own interests. - The military’s interests were separate from Mubarak and his regime.</td>
<td>- The military did not follow Ben Ali’s orders to shoot protesters. - The military defected from the Ben Ali regime because of a lack of incentives to save the regime and to protect their interests.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the Egyptian and Tunisian cases having similar authoritarian regimes, they differed on one key aspect, namely the strength and influence of the military. As table 1 demonstrates, the processes leading up to the different transitional outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia were quite different as a result of this. When looking at H1, the results indicate that the relationship between the state apparatus and the military institution were very different. In Egypt, the military played a dominating role since Nasser and the Free Officers carried out a military coup against the ruling monarchy. The Egyptian military helped establish the authoritarian regime, and as a result, were able to influence and help found a political system that privileged them. By contrast, the Tunisian military did not help establish the authoritarian regime, or have any important role in the regime’s founding. When Bourguiba assumed power he ensured that the Tunisian military would play a limited role in politics, which was a strategy that Ben Ali continued with when he assumed power. Under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, military officers were banned from politics, and were kept small in terms of size and resources. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that in the Egyptian case, the relationship between the state apparatus and the military was one of mutual dependence, and accommodation. The Egyptian military was part of the authoritarian regime in Egypt since it’s founding, and had considerable influence over the state. As a result the state apparatus and the Egyptian military were not autonomous from each other. In the Tunisian case on the other hand, the findings of the analysis indicates a stark contrast. The relationship between the state apparatus and the military was independent. The Tunisian military was kept at a distance from the regime since its inception, and did not have any influence over the state.

The findings in H1 illustrate a difference in relation to the Egyptian and the Tunisian military’s influence over their respective countries economy. In Tunisia, the military did not own any businesses, and were essentially excluded from the economic sector by the regime. This is a significant contrast to the Egyptian case, where the military not only owned a big portion of Egypt’s commercial and industrial sectors, but also had decisive influence over the economic policies put forth by the Egyptian regime. The difference between the Egyptian and Tunisian case, lies in the different strategy pursued by the authoritarian regimes. In Egypt, Mubarak and his predecessors protected the military’s interests and gave them privileges, which consisted of awarding the military with direct and indirect economic privileges. This in return ensured the Egyptian military’s protection, loyalty and allegiance to the regime. The Tunisian regime’s strategy on the other hand was different in that it marginalized and weakened the Tunisian military. Instead, because of a lack of trust in the military institution,
Ben Ali and his predecessor, Bourguiba based the coercive power on security and intelligence organizations. Accordingly, in the Egyptian case, the military institution was integrated into the Egyptian economy whereas in the Tunisian case, the military institution was excluded from the economic sector.

The main findings for H₂ in table 1, indicates a stark contrast in the willingness to compromise between the state apparatus and the military following the Arab uprisings. After the revolution, which resulted in Ben Ali’s ouster, the remnants of his regime were removed. The old institutions were dissolved under the authoritarian regime, and replaced by new institution. This facilitated the transition process in Tunisia because there were no remnants of the old regime present to obstruct it. The exact opposite occurred in Egypt. Following Mubarak’s removal from office, SCAF took over as the interim government, and as a result, the old institutions remained intact, and no new institutional reforms occurred. In addition most of the political power still remained with the old remnants of the regime, which successfully managed to create mistrust and divide among the opposition.

Egypt and Tunisia opted for different paths during the transition process. Egypt started with the legislative election, followed by the presidential elections, and finally an assembly elected by the legislature drafted a new constitution. By contrast, Tunisia started by electing a constituent assembly that would form the government and write a new constitution. The legislative election came last (Lesch: 2014:68). Following Ennahda winning the majority in the election of the constituent assembly, the party formed a three party pro-democratic coalition with CPR and Ettakatol. Ennahda did everything in its power to reassure the opposition of its commitment to a democratic transition, and subsequently compromised on various issues with its opponents such sharia, women’s rights and the institutional design of the political system. The MB on the other hand, was not pragmatic nor was the party willing to compromise with the opposition. Consequently, the transition process in Egypt was characterized by extreme polarization and mistrust. At the beginning of the transition process, the MB promised the opposition not to seek parliamentary majority, not to dominate the constitutional assembly or have a candidate run for the presidency, but nevertheless, broke all these promises, which prevented any meaningful consensus building. In other words, the MB essentially dominated the political dialogue in Egypt, while the secular parties were marginalized and alienated. Instead of compromising and collaborating with the opposition then, the MB collaborated with SCAF, which ultimately turned out to be their downfall in the
end. This is very different for the transition process in Tunisia where all political forces were brought under one tent to reach a compromise, and find solutions that everyone could accept.

An important aspect of the state apparatus and the military’s willingness to compromise following the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia is related to their autonomy. As previously mentioned, the Tunisian military and the state apparatus were kept separate from each other, which have impacted the transition in a positive manner. In Egypt on the other hand, the military and the state apparatus were essentially fused together, which has had a negative impact on the transition in Egypt. The autonomy between institutions in Tunisia facilitated the ability to dissolve old institutions, and create new ones. In addition, the military had no economic or political interests that were threatened by a democratic transition, and played no political role in the transition process. This in return, made room for the political elite, which allowed them to take control over the transition process, and find solutions. Unlike Tunisia, the transition in Egypt did not only threaten Mubarak and his regime, but also the economic and political privileges of the Egyptian military. As a result, old institutions remained and the military played a political role in the transition. Moreover, the remnants of Mubarak’s regime and the Egyptian military used a “divide and rule” strategy on the MB and the secular opposition. This fostered suspicion and mistrust between them, and essentially made them unwilling to collaborate and compromise with each other.

The main findings for H3 in table 1 have revealed a close similarity between the two cases in relation to the internal divide between the state apparatus and the military. In both instances, a division between the state apparatus and the military occurred. When Mubarak and Ben Ali ordered the military to shoot the protesters the militaries refused to follow orders, and eventually defected from the regime. Before defecting from the regimes, both the Egyptian and the Tunisian military weighed their own institutional interests against the interest of the authoritarian regime. In the end, both the Egyptian and Tunisian military decided to defect from the Mubarak and Ben Ali regime in order to protect their own interests. The Tunisian military was excluded by the regime both politically and economically, which meant that they could potentially gain more by Ben Ali’s ouster. A democratic transition in Tunisia could improve its position and influence in Tunisian society. Hence, the Tunisian military lacked incentives to save the regime because it did not own any businesses, and was marginalized by the regime. The Egyptian military on the other hand, were invested in the status quo, as they were not only included in the regime, their businesses were tied to it. However, Mubarak became a liability for the Egyptian military and their
financial interests, as a result they sacrificed Mubarak to save the regime, and thus, securing their own financial interests.

Moreover, I would argue that because the division between the state apparatus and the military occurred in both cases, this does not explain Egypt and Tunisia’s different transitions. Accordingly, the findings indicate that explanatory power lies in \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \). Hence, the autonomy between the state apparatus, and the military, as well as these institutions willingness to compromise account for the variations between Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings in 2011.

6.2 What does the findings mean to the democratization process?

The research question that this thesis has attempted to answer is the following: “Why did Tunisia result in democratization while Egypt did not, when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?” Subsequently, the findings suggest that the difference in Egypt and Tunisia’s transitions lie in the influence of the military in relation to the state apparatus. The transition process in both cases was very different, in Tunisia the military kept out of the transition while in Egypt, the military kept the transition under control. In Egypt, the military were a part of the authoritarian regime, and had the most to lose from a democratic transition, whereas in Tunisia the military had been marginalized, and had more to gain by a democratic transition. Moreover, the Tunisian military returned to the barracks after the start of the transition whereas the Egyptian military remained behind the scenes, even after the FJP had secured the parliamentary and presidential elections.

I would argue that because Egypt’s state apparatus and military were not autonomous of each other, and instead merged together, the Egyptian institutions were weakened. This in return, made them ineffective in supporting reform when the transition was initiated. On the other hand, because the state apparatus and the military in Tunisia were autonomous the institutions were stronger, which made them effective in supporting reform once the transition process started. As a result, Tunisia was therefore able to take imperative steps towards altering political and administrative system, while in Egypt the necessary steps towards changing the political and administrative systems were hindered by SCAF. Furthermore, because Tunisia was so successful in ridding itself of the remnants of the old regime, and, this in return allowed political forces to create new institutions, as well as engage in dialogue, and
compromise in order to find long term solutions that everyone could accept. In Egypt, the exact opposite happened, as the remnants of the old regime remained, no institutional reforms occurred, and the institutions under the authoritarian regime remained intact. The consequence of this was that the MB and the secular/liberal parties did not trust one another, and instead competed to collaborate with SCAF.

In summary, the causal mechanisms that explain why Tunisia experienced a democratic transition following the Arab uprisings in 2011 are the following. First, the Tunisian military did not have any influence over the state apparatus. They were not a part of the regime, and were marginalized both politically and economically by Ben Ali prior to the uprisings. Subsequently, the state apparatus and the military were autonomous of each other, and as a result the institutions were robust enough to uphold reforms once the transition was initiated. Second, the Tunisian military quickly returned to the barracks after the start of the transition, which allowed a civilian government take over power. Third, because the state apparatus and the military were autonomous, the political forces in Tunisia could more effectively remove remnants as well as old institutions from the authoritarian regime and put in place new institutions, thereby changing the political and administrative system in Tunisia. Finally, the political forces in Tunisia were all forced together to debate face to face, which facilitated dialogue and compromise between them. This resulted in them working for solutions that everyone, including the public could accept.

The transition process in Egypt was more or less opposite than Tunisia. The causal mechanisms that explain why Egypt’s transition reverted back to an authoritarian regime following the Arab uprisings are the following. First, the Egyptian military was included in the regime, and had considerable influence over the state apparatus. The Egyptian military also owned extensive businesses, making them invested in the regime status quo. The state apparatus and the military were merged together and not autonomous, and as a result the institutions were incapable to uphold reforms once the transition was started. Second, the Egyptian military took control over the transition soon after it started. Third, as a result of SCAF taking over as the interim government, the institutions and the remnants of the old regime remained, and hence, no changes were made in the political and administrative system in Egypt. SCAF worked tirelessly behind the scenes with the remnants of the old regime to pit the other political forces against each other. Finally, the consequence of this was that the MB and the secular/liberal parties lacked trust in each other. The MB and Islamic politicians were increasingly dominating the political discourse, and instead of collaborating with the secular
opposition and compromising with them to find solutions, the latter collaborated with the Egyptian military instead, which eventually removed them from power in a military coup.

6.3 Theoretical discussion

This thesis has utilized two different theoretical approaches, which was the new institutionalist approach and rational choice theory. Furthermore, three hypotheses were developed from the basis of the theoretical framework, where the first two derived from the new institutional approach, and the last one was developed from rational choice theory. Subsequently, the following section discusses the main findings in relation to the theories.

6.3.1 New Institutionalism: Sociological institutionalist approach

As a reminder, the sociological approach within the new institutionalist framework essentially argues that institutions count the institutional structure of regimes constitutes a crucial difference for their outcomes. Accordingly, the theory holds that institutions do count in surviving crisis because they manage to retain their own positions and are essential in determining whether a transition occurs, and the route it will take (Battera: 2014:546). The new institutional approach also holds that actors are formed according to the institutional context from which they live, and the interests of institutions reflect historical legacies, as well as national interests.

My findings support the new institutional approach. The institutional configuration of the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia was very different. The state apparatus and the military in Egypt were not autonomous of each other, and as a result the institutions in Egypt were weaker than in Tunisia, and were thus ineffective during the transition. By contrast, in Tunisia, the state apparatus and the military were autonomous; the institutions were robust, and thus powerful enough to support new reforms during the transition. As the findings demonstrate, the structure and relationship between institutions are essential factors that influence the directions transitions will take. Moreover, as findings demonstrate, the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia have mirrored the historical legacies in the respective countries. In Tunisia, the military were marginalized and kept separate from the state apparatus from the outset, whereas in Egypt, the military has ever since gaining independence, been a part of the authoritarian regime, and has had a long
history of dominating state institutions. This in return has influenced their institutional interests, and position with Egypt and Tunisia.

6.3.2 New Institutionalism: Historical institutionalist approach

Historical Institutionalism essentially argues that institutional choices made in the past can endure, and consequently influence and constrain actors in the future. Subsequently, for this perspective institutions are considered to be difficult to change. Path dependency is related largely related to historical institutionalist perspective, which basically holds that once a country has started on one path, it will be very difficult change course. As Levi (1997:28) argues “(…) there will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice.” Hence, according to Levi, it is possible to change path, however it can be very difficult.

My findings also support the historical institutionalist approach, as the institutional choices made following Egypt and Tunisia’s independence has been considerably different. Ever since the Free Officers helped Nasser come to power in 1952, they have had a long history of being privileged in a way that the Tunisian military never were. The Egyptian military has had the seat at the table in the regime, and has had considerable influence over Egyptian politics. The Tunisian military on the other hand, had a diminished role in Tunisian society under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The Tunisian military were much weaker than its Egyptian counterparts, and had almost no access to resources. In addition, contrary to the Egyptian military it had never backed a coup or initiated a revolution against the state. Hence, from the outset, the institutional structure of the Egyptian military was set up in a manner where they had considerable power and influence whereas the Tunisian military’s was kept separate from the state from the outset. The composition of the military’s structure is thus reflected in the events following the uprisings where in Egypt for instance, the same structures endured and constrained the political forces ability to change them. As a result of this, SCAF took over as interim government to protect the regime following the uprisings, and the old institutions remained. However, because the Tunisian military had no history of being a part of the regime, it remained outside of the political aspect of the transition, which in return made it easier for the political forces involved in the transition process to dissolve old institutions and create new ones.
6.3.3 Rational Choice Theory

RCT holds that actors are rational, and behaves accordingly. Subsequently, the theory argues that individuals are driven by goals and desires, which is reflected in their preferences. The actor has information on available alternatives, and will chose the alternative with the highest expected advantage. The framework of RCT can be applied to the ruling elite within authoritarian regimes under political crises. The ruling elite can be separated into hard-liners and soft-liners. Moreover, transitions from authoritarian rule usually occur when these two groups disagree on how to handle a political crisis. Hard-liners believe that the authoritarian regime’s current political structures, and coercion will be sufficient for the regime to survive the crisis. Soft-liners on the other hand, believe that the regime needs to grant some freedoms or else it will be vulnerable to popular overthrow.

Although my findings support the RCT to a certain degree, they do not sufficiently support the last hypothesis. This is because a divide occurred between the state apparatus and the military during the Arab uprisings in both the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, and subsequently this does not account for their different outcomes. The findings have displayed that both the Egyptian and Tunisian military defected from the regime during the Arab uprisings because this proved to be the alternative with the most advantage. Thus, both the Egyptian and Tunisian military acted as rational actors that weighed the alternatives available to them carefully before choosing the alternative with the highest expected advantage to them. The cost of repressing protesters was higher, than the advantages with maintaining the status quo. The military defection suggests an internal divide was present between the hard-liners and soft-liners within the regime due to disagreement between them on how to handle the Arab uprisings. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia this was between the military and the state apparatus. In Egypt, Mubarak increasingly became a liability to the regime, and the military had the most to lose with the regime’s fall. Accordingly, they refused to follow his orders to use lethal force on protesters and forced him to step down to attempt to save the rest of the regime. By comparison, the Tunisian military also refused to follow Ben Ali’s orders to use lethal force on protesters, which ultimately forced Ben Ali to flee. The Tunisian military had more to gain by a democratic transition. Hence, in both cases the military realized that their interests would be better maintained with Mubarak and Ben Ali’s ouster.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Through the use of comparative historical analysis and process tracing, this thesis has attempted to explain why Egypt and Tunisia experienced different outcomes following the Arab uprisings in 2011. By applying the theoretical framework of new institutionalism and rational choice, three hypotheses have been developed to serve as possible explanations for Egypt and Tunisia’s different outcomes. The hypotheses were explored and analysed through primary and secondary source data material. I considered the following research question:

“Why did Tunisia result in democratization while Egypt did not, when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?”

The findings indicate that the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia can be explained in the weight of the military in relation to the state apparatus. The Egyptian military formed the core of the ruling elite in Egypt and maintained a privileged position, both politically and economically. Subsequently, the state apparatus and the military in Egypt were not autonomous, and instead merged into each other. By contrast, in Tunisia the state apparatus and the military were clearly kept separate, and the Tunisian military were marginalized both politically and economically by the regime. Hence, out of the Tunisian and the Egyptian military, the latter had the most to lose from a regime change. Furthermore, this was reflected in the transition process in the two cases. In Tunisia the military returned to the barracks after the transition was initiated whereas in Egypt, the military kept the transition under their control.

Moreover, because of the lack of autonomy between the state apparatus and the military in Egypt, the institutions were weakened, and as a result it became difficult to enforce real political change. SCAF took over as the interim government in order to save the regime to secure the military’s interests. Consequently, the remnants of the old regime remained, which worked against the opponents of the regime. This created divide and mistrust between the MB and the seculars, and instead of working together they attempted to cooperate with the SCAF and old regime. Hence, due to a lack of autonomy between the state apparatus and the military in Egypt, a democratic transition became impossible. The polar opposite occurred in Tunisia exactly because the state apparatus and the military were autonomous. Therefore, the institutions were much more robust, making them able to enforce political change. As a result, institutions from the old regime were dissolved and new ones were established. In addition, the political forces in Tunisia were willing to compromise with each other, and put their
differences aside to find long-term solutions. This not only facilitated the transition in Tunisia, but also enhanced the likelihood of a stable outcome. Furthermore, in both cases the state apparatus and the military were divided as the military in Egypt and Tunisia defected from the regime. This facilitated the start of the transition in both cases; however, as this was the case in both Egypt and Tunisia this is not a satisfactory explanation for their different outcomes.

7.1 Implications and Further Research

The research conducted has several implications. First and foremost it has shown the importance of institutional autonomy in relation to democratization through the new institutional approach. Institutions do count during the event of a crisis, and particularly in determining the direction a transition will take. As the cases of Egypt and Tunisia has illustrated, the weight and influence of the military in relation to state institutions is a crucial factor that determines the outcome of a transition. When institutions are merged together the probability of a democratic transition decreases. Hence, the new institutional approach is very useful framework useful and can be applied to other cases that are undergoing or have gone through a political transition.

Second, the research has highlighted that the success in removing remnants, and institutions of the old regime is a critical component for a democratic transition to take place. In Tunisia, institutions under the old regime were dissolved, and the remnants of the old regime were removed. Consequently, this facilitated political forces ability to compromise and cooperate with each other. However, in Egypt, the old institutions remained and so did the remnants, which created divide and mistrust between the MB and secular regime opponents. As a result, no compromises were reached. Hence, this affected the transition process in Egypt and Tunisia in different ways.

There are other areas that this study has not considered due to decisions made in the research process. This study has primarily focused on internal factors, which has affected the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings. However, external factors such as international climate or international politics could be just as important, and for this reason it would be interesting to investigate how external factors have influenced the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprising. Additionally, one could
base the study on other cases to see if the findings apply to these cases as well. As this study has focused the transitional outcomes of two Arab republics, another possible area to explore could be the Arab monarchies as these proved to be resilient in the wake of the Arab uprising (Yom and Gause, 2012:74). Furthermore, it would be very interesting to apply the new institutional framework to the Arab monarchies.

The research conducted has been limited in three ways. Firstly, the data material, which the analysis is based upon, consists primarily of secondary source material. However, primary source material is difficult to obtain as the military, particularly in Egypt are quite secretive. As such, there is not a lot of primary source material available on the military or state apparatus. Secondly, I was not allowed to travel to Egypt by the University to conduct interviews because of possible dangers. However, I could have travelled to Tunisia although I would argue that the research would then not be sufficiently representative. Thirdly, I could have included more cases to this study. Additional cases could possibly have strengthened the findings of this thesis, thereby making the findings more applicable and allow for a greater generalizability. As I have conducted a small-N study, the study is limited because of it only considers two cases, and thus the findings may not be representative of other cases.

Despite some limitations with the research conducted in this thesis, the study has provided important insights into democratization prospects in the MENA region. The study has demonstrated that both institutions and actors’ interests and interactions do count when a transition occurs. In particular, the study has highlighted that the military’s power and influence in authoritarian regimes is an important aspect that obstruct democratic transitions.
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