Explaining variation in indigenous mobilisation –
A comparative study of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian Andes

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the question of why ethnic identity has served as a basis for mobilisation among the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian highlands, but not among the indigenous peoples of highland Peru. Ecuador and Peru can be regarded as similar countries as they share a number of background characteristics. However, during the 1990s Ecuador had the strongest indigenous movement in Latin America, while no national indigenous movement appeared in Peru. In a Latin American context Peru can be seen as a deviant case, as indigenous movements have developed in all of the other countries with large indigenous populations.

While ethnic conflict constitutes a challenge to the “new” democracies in Latin America with large indigenous populations, ethnicity and ethnic cleavages in the region remain an understudied topic. My approach to the research question is therefore exploratory. On the basis of a discussion of ethnicity theory, theories of nation-building and modernisation, and social movement theory, I develop three main variables which are operationalised by four indicators each. The variables are: 1) ethnic boundaries and group differences; 2) state- and nation-building policies pursued by the state; and 3) the potential for mobilisation of highland indigenous peoples. The variables provide the headings for the three chapters of the analysis.

The analysis demonstrates that the first variable is not likely to account for the different outcomes in Ecuador and Peru with regard to highland indigenous mobilisation, as indigenous peoples seem to be equally disadvantaged in both countries. Rather, a combination of state-policies and organisational processes, the second and third variables, seem to better explain variation in highland indigenous mobilisation. In Ecuador, nation-building ideologies have been more exclusive of indigenous peoples than in Peru, and there has also been less land redistribution. This is likely to have provided stronger incentives for highland indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador. In addition, weak class-based organisations and a relatively open political system in Ecuador as contrasted to Peru, seem to have been conducive to the formation of indigenous organisations. In Peru, ethnicity has tended to be overshadowed by class.
1. Introduction

1.1 The research question

The aim of this thesis is to explain why ethnic identity has served as a basis for mobilisation among the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian highlands, but not among the indigenous peoples of highland Peru.

The indigenous uprising in Ecuador in June 1990 was a watershed event which clearly established the indigenous movement as an important actor on the political scene. Since then, Ecuador has arguably had the strongest indigenous movement in Latin America. The 1990 uprising was headed by CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), formed in 1986 when the highland indigenous organisation ECUARUNARI joined the organisation of Amazonian indigenous peoples, CONFENIAE. Throughout the 1990s, the indigenous movement headed by CONAIE has taken sustained political action, and it is now one of Ecuador’s strongest social movements. The Quichua-speaking indigenous peoples of the Andean highlands constitute the majority of indigenous people with 20-40 % of the total Ecuadorian population, various Amazonian groups constitute 1-2 %, while Afro-Ecuadorians (5-10 %) and mestizos make up the rest of the population. The 1990 indigenous uprising took place in the highlands, and the participation of Amazonian indigenous groups was marginal.

The ethnic composition of the Peruvian population is quite similar to the Ecuadorian one. The Quechua-speaking indigenous peoples of the Andean highlands are estimated to constitute 30-45 % of the total population, the Aymara-speaking indigenous people in the highlands make up about 2 %, and Amazonian groups represent approximately 1 %. Mestizos and Afro-Peruvians (about 1 %) make up the rest of the population. While Amazonian indigenous groups have formed organisations to represent their interests as indigenous peoples in Peru, no explicit indigenous organisation and mobilisation have taken place among the indigenous peoples of the Peruvian Andes. For this reason, it appears impossible to speak of an indigenous movement in Peru. In a regional context the Peruvian Andes represents an exception as indigenous movements have been formed among the highland indigenous
peoples of neighbouring Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico.

Ecuador and Peru present interesting cases for comparison not only because both countries have large Andean indigenous populations. These neighbouring countries are also very similar on socio-economic indicators, and both countries went from military to democratic rule at the end of the 1970s. I will thus attempt to answer the following question: “How can we understand that two societies which are very close geographically, historically, and culturally have such different trajectories?” (Sánchez 1994: 324, my translation). An understanding of the different developments in Ecuador and Peru requires both an explanation of the factors that led to highland indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador, and of the factors that can account for the lack of highland indigenous mobilisation in Peru.

Several scholars have noted the exclusionary nature of national politics in Ecuador and Peru, and this exclusion clearly has an ethnic dimension that is intertwined with class (Lynch 1997: 131, Selverston 1997: 170). The troubles of Peruvian politics in the 1980s and 90s have often been described in terms of a crisis of representation: a mostly white political class has discredited itself by not being accountable to a far more heterogeneous electorate (Lynch 1997: 133). While Ecuadorian politics present many of the same problems as Peruvian politics, the indigenous movement in Ecuador, headed by CONAIE, has achieved some success in demanding the participation of indigenous peoples in national democratic politics. An understanding of the causes behind the variation in indigenous mobilisation, may contribute to a better understanding of present day politics in Ecuador and Peru.

1.2 Further arguments for studying variation in indigenous mobilisation

1.2.1 Theoretical justification

It is only recently that some political scientists have started to investigate ethnic tension and its possible political implications in countries of Latin America. In Horowitz’ (1985) influential book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Latin America is not included as class conflict is seen to predominate over ethnic cleavages. According to Debora Yashar (1997: 88), only a
very limited number of works have analysed the intersection of ethnic and democratic politics in Latin American countries, despite indications that ethnic cleavages are likely to provide a major challenge for some of the new democracies. Much of the recent literature on democratisation in Latin America has focused on elite accommodation, pact making, institution building, agenda setting, and party systems, while there has been little attention to the countryside, local politics, channels of representation, and ethnic cleavages. Ethnic divisions, and the political implications of such divisions in the region thus remain understudied topics.

1.2.2 Ethical justification

Yashar (1997: 88) argues that “against the history of exclusion, denial and repression of Latin American indigenous peoples coupled with the knowledge that failure to address ethnic cleavages elsewhere has unleashed a politics of xenophobia and a xenophobia of violence, it is important to begin addressing the future of democracy in pluri-ethnic states in Latin America”. If being indigenous in Ecuador and Peru implies political exclusion, this poses a very real challenge for nominally democratic countries. Democracy obviously requires that indigenous peoples are seen as equal citizens and included in decision-making. Mobilisation on the basis of indigenous identity within Latin American states therefore relates to fundamental questions concerning the relationship between the state and the nation, and the nation and democracy. While ethnic conflict is perceived by Latin American governments as a threat to fragile democratic institutions and national unity, Van Cott (1994: 22) argues that: "from the vantage point of the indigenous movement, the threat to democracy in Latin America, and the source of instability in democratizing countries, is the excluding state itself, not those who demand inclusion in the process of governance and the definition of the nation-state".

1.2.3 Empirical justification

Modernisation theorists and Marxist-oriented theorists alike have expected ethnic differences to disappear in favour of a common national identity within Latin American states as a natural
process of modernisation. Eventually, the indigenous peoples would become "civilised". The conflict between groups that undeniably exists in Ecuador and Peru has traditionally been described in class terms, and sometimes as class conflict with an "ethnic tinge". The rise in political mobilisation on the basis of indigenous ethnic identity in a number of Latin American countries following transitions to democracy, however, has underscored the need to focus on the interplay between ethnicity and class. Today it is no longer believed that indigenous ethnic identities are destined to disappear, even if the content of a culture may change. In many ways ethnicity in Latin America is only beginning to be theorised.

1.3 The choice of cases: why compare Ecuador and Peru?

1.3.1 Structural similarities

While Peru is a larger country than Ecuador, both in terms of geography and population, the proportion of the indigenous population is quite similar. (It should be noted that estimates vary widely according to different sources, something which I will discuss further on). In both countries it is also common to distinguish between the indigenous peoples of the Amazon, who generally first made contact with the state at the end of the 19th century, and the indigenous peoples of the highlands, who have been part of the larger society since before colonisation: “In contrast to lowland Indians, highland Indians are numerically much larger populations, and they have been part of the definition of the state and intimately linked to everything associated with it (from language, to occupation to goods purchased) since the early colonial period. They are often landless and can be classified as peasants, urban working class, or migrants” (Urban and Sherzer 1991: 13). The indigenous peoples of the Andean highlands originally consisted of various ethnic groups, but incorporation first into the Inca empire and then into the Spanish colonial state has made them increasingly similar over the centuries. They generally speak the language of the Incas called Quechua in Peru and Quichua in Ecuador, while a small percentage in Peru speak Aymara which is a pre-Inca language. As the Amazonian and highland indigenous peoples represent different problematiques I have
decided to focus on the indigenous peoples of the highlands. The difference between Ecuador and Peru with regard to contemporary highland indigenous mobilisation, is especially interesting given that these peoples have similar histories.

1.3.2 Historical exclusion and transition to democracy

The history of political, economic and cultural exclusion of blacks and indigenous peoples in Peru and Ecuador is often explained in terms of the legacy of the colonial economy and the structural position of blacks and indigenous peoples in this system. However, exclusive national ideologies and property and literacy restrictions on political rights have in both cases perpetuated the inferior position of blacks and indigenous peoples in national society in the Republican era. With the transition to democracy at the end of the 1970s, blacks and indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru were for the first time granted full citizenship rights. Both countries rewrote their constitutions, removing all literacy requirements for voting and granting full citizenship rights to all persons above the age of 18. As the political systems of Ecuador and Peru traditionally have been dominated by a white upper class, one would expect that this political opening would provide an incentive for indigenous mobilisation in both Ecuador and Peru.

1.3.3 Different developments in Ecuador and Peru

The indigenous movement in Ecuador began to form in the 1980s, and the establishment of CONAIE in 1986 and the 1990 indigenous uprising are important events. In 1990, as well as in later demonstrations, indigenous demands have included return of land to indigenous communities, basic infrastructure in indigenous communities, funding for bilingual education, and amendment of the constitution to proclaim Ecuador a multi-national state (CONAIE 2000). According to Selverston (1997: 170), the indigenous people’s struggle challenges the lack of democratic political participation in Ecuador, as they demand recognition and

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1 It should be noted that highland indigenous peoples and indigenous peoples of the Amazon have managed to cooperate in the Ecuadorian case with regard to issues such as land rights, bilingual education rights, and political participation rights.
participation in political decision-making as indigenous peoples. In the indigenous uprisings of 1990, 1992, and 1994, the Ecuadorian government was forced to enter direct negotiations with CONAIE. In 1996 eight indigenous representatives from the newly formed indigenous party *Pachkutik-Nuevo País* were elected to parliament.

As strong indigenous movements have emerged to contest the idea of the singular nation-state in Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador, it is often mentioned as a paradox that a Peruvian indigenous movement barely exists: "This low level of organizing is ironic in light of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and Jose Carlos Mariategui’s early twentieth century arguments about Peru’s indigenous core" (Yashar 1998: 26). Similarly, Remy (1994: 108) argues:

While it is possible to identify state policies geared towards indigenous populations (which may favor or disfavor their interests) as well as differential treatment that tends to exclude those with darker skin and who speak Spanish with the accent and syntax of the native languages, most of the sectors to which such policies are directed do not identify, organize, or mobilize as indigenous peoples, nor do they raise ethnic grievances. Because of these circumstances it appears impossible to speak of indigenous movements in Peru, though one can discuss a set of ethnic problems not yet solved.

The organisation Shining Path (it calls itself the Communist Party of Peru), which started its guerrilla activities in the early 1980s, has sometimes been labelled an ethnic movement. Although Shining Path has organised most effectively in the Peruvian countryside where the poor indigenous peasants are most numerous, it uses a socialist discourse and rejects demands emanating from an indigenous identity. The leadership of the organisation is also mainly mestizo, and in most cases the presence of Shining Path has been detrimental to indigenous communities. The questions to be asked are why a leftist guerrilla organisation developed in Peru, and whether the presence of Shining Path may have blocked the development of a Peruvian indigenous movement.

**1.4 Specification of the dependent variable**

What I want to explain in my thesis, is why indigenous identity has served as a basis for mobilisation among the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian highlands, but not among the indigenous peoples of highland Peru. Mobilisation can be defined as “the process by which
people are recruited into movements” (Gurr 2000: 69). However, mobilisation is often equated with organisational processes (see Yashar 1998), as the formation of organisations is important to sustain a social movement (McAdam 1996: 3-4). My dependent variable “indigenous movement” is therefore operationalised as political organisations formed on the basis of indigenous identity, with the power to mobilise a significant part of the indigenous population. In other words, an indigenous movement politicises an ethnic cleavage. Since 1990 highland Ecuador has thus had a positive, or high value on the dependent variable, while highland Peru has had a negative (or low) value.

What conditions (independent variables) can account for this outcome? In the following chapter, I will discuss different theoretical perspectives that can contribute to an explanation of variation in indigenous mobilisation, most notably theories of ethnicity, theories of nation-building and modernisation, and theories of social movements. On the basis of this discussion a model of analysis will be developed. The different variables in this model will form the headings for the chapters of the analysis, which will follow after a discussion of methods and sources in chapter three.
2. Theories that can explain variation in indigenous mobilisation

As argued in the introduction, ethnic cleavages have often been ignored in studies of political development in Ecuador and Peru. Because relatively little is known about the causes behind the different development in these countries regarding indigenous mobilisation, my approach will be exploratory and include different theoretical perspectives. Ethnicity theory, theories of nation-building and modernisation, and social movement theory are all likely to provide valuable insights for my purposes. In what follows, I will therefore first discuss different perspectives on ethnicity which can shed light on the nature of ethnic identity and inter-ethnic relations. Secondly, I will discuss theories of nation-building and modernisation, and possible effects of such processes on indigenous peoples. Thirdly, I will discuss how social movement theory can contribute to identify factors which are conducive to social mobilisation. In the final section of the chapter, I will try to integrate the different possible explanatory factors to variation in highland indigenous mobilisation in an analytical framework of variables, to be used in the subsequent empirical analysis.

2.1 Ethnicity and ethnic identity

Ethnicity, ethnic identity, and ethnic group are elusive concepts and different understandings of the meaning of these concepts also imply different understandings of the driving forces behind ethnic mobilisation. In ethnicity theory primordialism and instrumentalism are often treated as the two main opposing theoretical viewpoints. Before analysing these schools of thought, I will shortly discuss some ideas of Barth (1969) that have been important for contemporary understanding of ethnicity and ethnic groups.

2.1.1 Ethnic groups

Barth’s work *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) represented a break with the essentialist view of ethnicity. According to Calhoun (1997: 18), “‘Essentialism’ refers to a reduction of the diversity in a population to some single criterion held to constitute its defining ‘essence’.
and most crucial character.” For a long time it had been common to equate “ethnic groups” with “cultural groups” based on a belief that ethnic groups could be identified with reference to objective and observable cultural characteristics. However, cultural traits such as language or religion can cross group boundaries, and there is seldom a set of cultural criteria which are shared by all members of a group. “In other words, cultural boundaries are not clear-cut, nor do they necessarily correspond with ethnic boundaries” (Eriksen 1993a: 34).

Barth argued that the focus of investigation should be on “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 1998: 15). Group consciousness is developed through social interaction, and according to Barth only the differences that are seen by group members to be socially relevant become defining characteristics, or criteria for separating the group from others: “The cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the group may change – yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content” (Barth 1998: 14).

In discussions on subjectivist versus objectivist views on ethnicity Barth’s position is usually regarded as subjectivist, as he stresses the importance of self-definition. However, no ethnic group is entirely free to choose it’s own defining characteristics, and Barth also emphasise that “ethnic identity is a matter of self-ascription and ascription by others in interaction” (Barth 1998: 6). While “indigenous” seems to be the preferred term when referring to the original inhabitants of Latin America, some indigenous movements also refer to themselves as Indian movements (Albó 1991: 301). It is clear that both the category of Indian and indigenous is a result of colonisation and Spanish dominance over the original inhabitants of the territory. “Indian” was a category constructed by the colonisers and referred to all the native inhabitants of the region. At the time of the invasion these inhabitants belonged to a number of different ethnic groups, that to varying extents were incorporated into a polity such as the Inca empire. “Since the early 16th century to be Indian in America has been a recurrent journey into the realm of ambiguity, an inquiry into a self whose limits and attributes are more the result of colonial interaction than the outcome of autonomous choices” (Varese 1996: 58). In Bolivia, a recurrent slogan has been “As Indians they exploited us, as Indians we will liberate ourselves” (Albó 1991: 301).
Criteria such as language, religion and common history become defining characteristics of an ethnic group as a result of social interaction, boundary-drawing and self-definition. Even though this process involves "construction" and "imagining", Lindblom (1993: 12) notes that: "Once ethnic identity has been established, it becomes absolute, essential and primordial to the ethnic group itself. Ethnic groups themselves reify and objectify culture and identity. This underlines the problem of using criteria which one calls 'objective'”. Instead of speaking of objective characteristics of ethnic groups, Lindblom proposes to discuss such defining criteria as analytical constructions (1993: 11).

The relationship between objective and subjective criteria represents only one of the tensions within ethnicity theory. Another important controversy is the one between instrumentalist and primordialist viewpoints (Gurr 1993: 124, Eriksen 1993a: 56, Lindblom 1993: 8). More recently however, it has become common to speak of three general schools of thought in ethnicity theory: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism, and to argue that these views should be treated as complementary rather than competing (Calhoun 1997:30, Tilley 1998: 499, Yashar 1998: 30). According to Tilley (1998: 499) the three approaches are complementary because each offers important insights into any given case of ethnic mobilisation. In the following I will try to define the main ideas in the three schools of thought, and to discuss how these approaches are related.

2.1.2 Ethnicity and ethnic movements: Primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism

The term “primordialism” is used in a confusing number of senses, and may refer to ethnic identities as “natural”, “ineffable” or primary (Tilley 1998: 501). The basic idea of primordialism seems to be that people feel a natural attachment to members of their own ethnic group, and that such ethnic sentiments are older than the nation-states. The power of ethnic bonds thus lies in their continuity with a distant past (Calhoun 1997: 31). According to Tilley (1998: 501-2), some of the most cited scholars within this paradigm are Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963), but it is questionable whether they really should be classified as primordialists according to the above definition: “Geertz observes that people’s perception of kin ties seem to them to reflect ‘natural’ rather than cultural or cognitively constructed relations, and that some people define such relations as sacred” (Tilley, ibid). This
corresponds to Lindblom’s (1998: 7) argument that “to peoples, ethnicity and nationality become primordial”.

Degregori (1991: 116) argues that the danger of primordialist approaches, including Geertz’ approach, is the essentialisation and exotification of the ethnic “Other” and a view of ethnic identity as static. While primordialist approaches recognise that ethnic ties can be very powerful, they have difficulties explaining variation in ethnic mobilisation. “Even if ethnic loyalties are given, unchanging, and deeply rooted (an extremely dubious position), primordialist arguments provide little insight into why, when, or how they translate into political organizing and action in some cases and not others” (Yashar 1998: 28).

According to the instrumentalist view, sometimes also labelled the interest group approach (Lindblom 1993: 9), or rational choice analyses (Yashar 1998: 28), ethnic identity is more the result of political mobilisation than a prerequisite. People mobilise as a result of manipulation by self-interested elites who use cultural symbols in order to attract mass support (Brass 1991). Elites are seen as relatively free to chose the cultural symbols that will be most efficient in mobilisation, and culture becomes a tool for the elites to achieve goals such as political power or economic gain. “The basic line is thus not identity, but the common interest of the group in mind, or the interests of an elite which manipulates group identity for political purposes. This implies that ethnic identity is fluid and may be changed according to particular interests” (Lindblom 1993: 9).

While there is no doubt that leadership and organisation are important for political mobilisation, instrumentalists have a general problem explaining why the masses should follow self-interested elites. For the rhetoric of the elites to have resonance, a certain group identity must already be in place. Furthermore, it is questionable whether elites in a sense can be outside culture and clearly calculate what symbols are most efficient in attracting mass support. According to Tilley (1998: 507), the instrumentalist interpretation can also be seen as a highly political orientation which seeks to reject ethnic demands by revealing that ethnic movements are elite-constructions.

However, it is possible to recognise that ethnic mobilisation involves the construction of identities, without arguing that ethnic identities are “false”. “In modern research there is by and large a consensus on the fact that both ethnicity and nationalism are socially and
culturally constructed and that they build on inventions and imaginings” (Lindblom 1998: 7). Constructivist, or poststructural approaches, do not take ethnic groups as given, natural entities, nor as the formation of political entrepreneurs (Yashar 1998: 29). Identities are seen as constantly evolving both as a response to intellectual ethnic discourse, lived social experience, and individual choice. “Using a constructionist approach to reconcile the apparent contradictions between primordial and instrumental factors, we can begin to consider how a given ethnic label may grow out of a deep history of cultural change as well as socio-economic and political relations, functioning to provide a useful intellectual tool to express and explain those relations” (Tilley 1998: 514).

Drawing on the constructivist approach, my first variable will be concerned with how ethnic boundaries have been constituted historically, and how structural conditions impact on identity. On the basis of his statistical study of 275 politically active ethnic groups worldwide, Gurr (2000: 86) argues that if people are disadvantaged and discriminated against because they belong to a minority, this is likely to increase the importance of ethnic identity and provide an incentive for mobilisation. It is therefore interesting to investigate whether differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the constitution of ethnic boundaries, disadvantage and discrimination, as this may help explain variation in indigenous mobilisation.

2.2 State- and nation-building policies

State- and nation-building policies pursued by the state can also be a crucial factor in the drawing of ethnic boundaries and individual self-definition. If nation-building policies seek to assimilate ethnic minorities into a dominant culture, or if state policies threaten the interests of ethnically defined groups, this is likely to provide incentives for ethnic mobilisation. It is therefore vital to understand how state policies affect indigenous peoples within a state’s territory in order to understand indigenous mobilisation.
2.2.1 From colonialism to nation-building

Colonialism ended in Latin America in the first half of the 19th century, when the former colonial administrative units became independent states. It is a premise of colonial societies that rulers and ruled have different rights and obligations, and there is normally a stress on stratification and cultural differentiation. In contrast, in the modern nation-state the basic idea is that all inhabitants should have the same rights and obligations, and preferably also the same culture. This implies that while colonialism is based on the construction of difference through stratification, modern states favour cultural homogenisation and equality. A driving force behind nationalist policies has been the idea that only nation-states can be strong and successful in a competitive world system. Accordingly, nationalist ideology commends active nation-building and integration or assimilation of minorities in those cases where the state and the nation are incongruent. In ethnically divided states nation-building thus poses a great challenge.

According to McGarry and O’Leary (1993: 18), the response of those subject to assimilation and integration is partly a function of how they perceive the motives lying behind such policies. There can be high-minded motives behind nation-building such as ending discrimination, securing equality, and avoiding social disintegration. According to Urban and Sherzer (1991: 14): “Homogenization is the attendant of powerful and captivating ideas about equality and rights, which emerged in the 17th and 18th century and served as shining ideals for generations of thinkers motivated to construct a just world.” However, in those cases where people do not want to trade an already existing ethnic identity for a new “national” identity, it is hard to perceive assimilation policies as just or democratic.

According to Connor (1994: 319), assimilationist policies should be referred to as “nation-destroying” rather than “nation-building” as it seeks to destroy the culture of ethnic groups. Similarly McGarry and O’Leary (1993: 19) argue that:

Assimilation in contested homelands, however high-minded, cannot work where it involves assimilation on one community’s terms: if one community’s language, culture, religion, and national myths are given precedence then we are not talking of assimilation or integration but of annexation; in such cases people complain of ethnocide, the destruction of a people’s culture as opposed to physical liquidation of its members. This complaint is the standard one raised by indigenous peoples of the world.
The success of nation-building is likely to depend on various factors among which the motives of nation-building elites, the attitudes within the minority group, and the content of nation-building policies seem to be important.

2.2.2 Nation-building and ethnic revitalisation

While numerous indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities have become assimilated or integrated into dominant cultures throughout history all over the world, there also seems to be an increasing number of indigenous peoples who are going through a process of ethnic revitalisation. In the period 1945-1989, Gurr (1993: 115) finds that of all the politically active ethnic minorities in the world “indigenous peoples experienced the greatest proportional increase in conflict magnitudes of all group types, including a sevenfold increase in nonviolent protest and a fivefold increase in violent protest” (ibid, 115). He also notes that state strategies of subordination and assimilation generally increase collective grievances of ethnic groups (Gurr 2000: 81).

According to Eriksen (1993b: 340), ethnic revitalisation is almost always a reaction to modernisation and increased cultural homogenisation. Important aspects of modernisation processes include the improvement of infrastructure, the expansion of the educational system, industrialisation, urbanisation, occupational diversification, and increased geographic and social mobility (ibid, 289). Indigenous peoples are generally characterised by being non-dominant groups with a non-industrial mode of production, and as such they are particularly vulnerable to a modernising state trying to assimilate them (ibid, 338). However, while modernisation and integration processes threaten the identity of indigenous peoples, these processes may also provide them with resources such as literacy and knowledge of dominant society. This can in turn make it easier for indigenous peoples to affirm their own identity and present demands in a way the dominant society can understand. It may also explain why ethnic revival can take place when integration and assimilation processes have already developed quite far. One might say that ethnic identity becomes most important when it is most threatened (Eriksen 1993b: 341). Such processes of ethnic revitalisation are described by Roosens (1989: 141) as ethnogenesis: “the development and public presentation of a self-conscious ethnic group”. Ethnic movements are also likely to be aided by the increased
international legitimacy of identity politics. While state policies of assimilation and integration were rarely questioned prior to the 1970s, it has become more legitimate to raise demands on behalf of ethnic minorities in the last couple of decades\(^2\) (Eriksen 1993a: 128).

### 2.2.3 Specific state policies as incentives for ethnic mobilisation

Some policy areas are particularly prone to disagreement between nation-building elites and ethnic minorities because they are related to control over vital resources. The rights to land, language, and education are such policy areas as the survival of minority groups may ultimately depend on the position of the state on these issues. On the symbolic level the state’s position in these policy areas also reveal ideas about the worth of minority cultures, and the status of minority groups within the state.

According to Gellner (1983: 34), education is the main tool of modern state power: “The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence” (ibid). In choosing an official language, in designing school curricula and in creating “national” symbols, the state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities and thereby disadvantages others. If minority cultures are denigrated or ignored, this is likely to provoke resistance among minorities, given that they have resources to mobilise against such attempts at cultural destruction. Individual well-being and self-respect is partly a function of the esteem of one’s cultural group (Horowitz 1985: 218). When indigenous peoples or other ethnic minorities demand official recognition of their language or other cultural symbols, this is therefore also a demand for greater respect, importance, and worth in society. According to Horowitz (ibid, 216) what might be seen as minor symbolic issues are very important in ethnic conflicts exactly because they involve deeper disputes over group status.

Land is normally a vital resource for indigenous peoples. As the colonisation of the Americas involved a massive dispossession of indigenous lands and consequently economic disempowerment of the indigenous population, the extent to which the modern state has met

\(^2\) There has also been an increased academic concern with minority rights. See Kymlicka (1995), Raz (1994), and Taylor (1994) for a theoretical discussion and defence of multiculturalism.
indigenous people’s need for land is likely to be an important factor in explaining variation in
indigenous mobilisation. The expectation is that the less access indigenous peoples have to
land, the stronger the incentive for indigenous mobilisation. Horowitz (1985: 201) argues that
the question of land is also a question of legitimacy of minorities: “Legitimacy goes to one’s
rightful place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory…
By far the most common claim to legitimacy is predicated on indigenousness” (ibid).

Have the Ecuadorian and the Peruvian states pursued different kinds of state- and nation-
building policies, and have these policies implied different incentives for highland indigenous
mobilisation? This will be the central question for the second variable of my analysis. The
proposition is that state- and nation-building policies which ignore indigenous peoples’
cultures and need for land increase the likeliness of highland indigenous mobilisation.

2.3 The potential for mobilisation: the contribution of social movement theory

An explanation of variation in indigenous mobilisation will also have to consider political and
organisational factors that can say something about conditions under which people are able or
likely to organise around ethnic identity. It is therefore necessary to combine theories of
ethnicity and theories of nation-building and modernisation, with social movement theory.
According to McAdam et al. (1996: 2), social movement theorists working within different
theoretical traditions generally agree on three broad sets of factors that influence social
movement emergence and development. These are political opportunity structures, mobilising
structures, and framing processes.

2.3.1 Political opportunity structure

According to McAdam (1996: 2), political process theorists such as Charles Tilley (1978),
Doug McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow (1983) first emphasised the importance of
political institutions and the broader political system in facilitating or inhibiting collective
action by social movements. Tarrow (1996: 54) argues that “mobilization into social
movements varies as opportunities for collective action open and close, allies appear and
disappear, political alignments shift, and elites divide and cohere”. The political opportunity structure refers to political factors that are external to groups that may attempt to mobilise, factors which will influence the form, content and possibility of mobilisation. Recognising these factors implies an understanding of how the broader political system structures opportunities and constraints for collective action (McAdam 1996: 3). While the political opportunity structure of each country is unique, factors commonly studied are the openness of the political system, the state’s tendency to use repression, and the movement’s ability to attract allies either within or outside the political elite (ibid, 27). However, the political opportunity structure is also likely to be influenced by social mobilisation and organisation, and can thus not be seen in isolation.

2.3.2 Mobilising structures

The importance of leadership and organisation in fostering social movements has already been briefly mentioned in relation to ethnicity theory. According to McAdam (1996: 3), it is first of all scholars such as McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) within the Resource Mobilisation perspective who have emphasised the importance of resources and formal organisations to social movements. However, McAdam (ibid, 4) also notes that political process theorists such as Tilley (1978) have stressed that not only formal organisations, but also informal associations such as neighbourhood networks, can increase organisational capacity. Accordingly, McAdam (ibid, 3) defines mobilising structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”.

Gurr’s statistical study of politically active ethnic groups also include a consideration of both formal organisations and informal networks: “The cohesion of an identity group is a function of high and sustained levels of interaction among its members. Speaking a common language and sharing home ground both promote interaction. So does preexisting social organization” (Gurr 2000: 76). In studying mobilising structures of highland indigenous peoples, I will therefore look at both territorial concentration and ability to draw on skills and experience acquired through participation in former organisations and networks. These factors can also be linked to the argument that people who are isolated will tend to explain their difficulties as individual deficiencies, while people who take part in organisations with others who suffer
from equal difficulties, will tend to see their situation as a feature of the system (McAdam 1996: 9).

2.3.3 Framing processes

The last set of factors expected to influence the emergence of social movements are framing processes, which refer to ideas and events that shape actors understanding of themselves: “Mediating between opportunity, organization and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation” (McAdam 1996: 5). An increased emphasis on framing processes in more recent studies of social movements can be seen as a reaction to works within the Resource Mobilisation perspective which have tended to disregard culture and ideas (ibid). However, McAdam (ibid, 6) warns against equating the concept with all cultural aspects of social movements, and favours a more narrow definition. He defines framing processes as: “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (ibid).

With regard to indigenous mobilisation, efficient “frames” of understanding might be borrowed from the international indigenous movement. According to Gurr (2000: 72), empowering ideas about national self-determination, indigenous rights and minority rights have given impetus to ethnopolitical movements. These ideas build on a modern conception of rights, and ethnic demands presented in an international human rights language are more likely to be successful. Increased international contact and globalisation also imply that such ideas spread rapidly. According to Horowitz (1985: 32), ethnic subordination is on a worldwide decline: “Eroded by the spread of universalistic, egalitarian, achievement-oriented values, by international contact, and by the diffusion of education, ethnic stratification is ideologically obsolete” (ibid). The ability to attract media attention and foreign support has also become an important resource in ethnic mobilisation. An increasing number of international NGOs, churches, and development bodies work to support disadvantaged minorities, and this may also have an impact on how groups think about themselves and their rights.
2.3.4 Integrating opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing

Political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes work together and will be treated together in the empirical analysis as they all relate to the potential for mobilisation. According to McAdam (1996: 8): “political opportunities are but a necessary prerequisite to action. In the absence of sufficient organization – whether formal or informal – such opportunities are not likely to be seized. Finally, mediating between the structural requirements of opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and definitions – or frames – shared by the adherents of the burgeoning movement”. Drawing on the foregoing arguments, I intend to look at the territorial concentration of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru, prior organisational experience, the presence or absence of allies with whom highland indigenous peoples can form coalitions, and the tendency of the state to exclude and use repression. In studying organisational networks and allies, I will also seek to analyse discourses in use. Together, these factors are likely to reveal differences in the potential for mobilisation among the highland indigenous peoples of Ecuador and Peru.

2.4 A framework for analysing variation in highland indigenous mobilisation

My purpose is to explain why an indigenous non-indigenous ethnic cleavage has manifested itself in a social movement in highland Ecuador, while it has found no organised expression in highland Peru. The foregoing discussion has identified three broad areas or dimensions which seem relevant to explain variation in indigenous mobilisation. These dimensions will serve as the three main variables of the analysis. First, one would expect that the way ethnic identities have been constructed, and the relationship between ethnicity and disadvantage will have an impact on the likeliness of indigenous mobilisation and organisation. This variable thus refers to the situation of indigenous peoples and inter-ethnic relations. Secondly, the state- and nation-building policies pursued by the state are important, as attempts at elimination of ethnic differences and increased state control over resources are likely to serve as incentives for indigenous mobilisation. Thirdly, organisational resources and political opportunities are important as they determine the potential for indigenous mobilisation. The second and third variables thus refer to the main agents; the state on the one hand and highland indigenous peoples on the other. As these variables are very broad, and also interrelated, it is important to
develop reliable indicators and hypotheses for each of these variables. It is important to note that the aim of this thesis is not to test a singular theory, but to investigate how different theoretical perspectives can contribute to the empirical explanation of differences in highland indigenous mobilisation between Ecuador and Peru.

2.4.1 Ethnic boundaries and group differences

Drawing on the constructivist approach, my first variable is concerned with how ethnic boundaries have been constituted historically, and how structural conditions impact on identity. Gurr (2000: 86) argues that if people are disadvantaged and discriminated against because they belong to a minority, this is likely to increase the importance of ethnic identity and provide an incentive for mobilisation.

I will first look at how the indigenous non-indigenous ethnic boundary has been constituted historically in the two countries: what has defined the boundary, or what characteristics have been seen to separate the highland indigenous peoples from non-indigenous groups? The second indicator relates to evidence of differences between highland indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups with regard to income and education, and for the third indicator I will examine differences with regard to political representation. If income, education and political representation follow ethnic lines, this is likely to increase the importance of the indigenous non-indigenous ethnic cleavage and provide incentives for indigenous mobilisation. If disadvantage is also coupled with continued discrimination, I believe this will further increase grievances. The fourth indicator will therefore be concerned with evidence of discrimination of highland indigenous peoples. To the extent that differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the constitution of ethnic boundaries, disadvantage, and discrimination, this may contribute to an explanation of variation in highland indigenous mobilisation. My indicators of the variable ethnic boundaries and group differences are thus:

1. The historical constitution of ethnic boundaries between highland indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups.
2. Income and education differences between highland indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups.
3. Political differences between highland indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups.

2.4.2 State- and nation-building policies pursued by the state.

The second variable in my analysis is related to state- and nation-building policies pursued by the state. The general proposition is that state- and nation-building policies which ignore indigenous peoples’ cultures and need for land increase the likeliness of highland indigenous mobilisation. As modernisation processes and deliberate policies of cultural assimilation together are likely to provide incentives for indigenous mobilisation, the first indicator of this variable will be concerned with whether there are any differences between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the timing of modernisation. Modernisation will be defined as processes related to industrialisation, urbanisation, expansion of health and education, and geographic and social mobility. The content of nation-building ideologies, and the extent to which the state has attempted to assimilate and/or integrate indigenous peoples will be the issue of the second indicator. The proposition is that nation-building ideologies which ignore the culture and identity of indigenous peoples are more likely to serve as incentives for mobilisation than more inclusive nation-building ideologies.

As noted in part 2.2.3, language, education, and land policies are likely to be especially conflictive issues when the contact between the state and indigenous peoples increases, as such policies relate to ideas about the worth of minority cultures and the status of minority groups within the state. The third indicator will be concerned with how nation-building ideologies are reflected in education. If indigenous identities and cultures are denigrated or ignored, this is likely to provide an incentive for mobilisation. The fourth indicator will focus on access to land, which is a vital resource for indigenous peoples. Land disputes can be especially conflictive because indigenous peoples’ demand for land can be interpreted as a challenge to state control over the national territory. The expectation is that the less access indigenous peoples have to land, the stronger the incentive for indigenous mobilisation. To sum up, the purpose here is to investigate whether state- and nation-building policies pursued by the state have affected highland indigenous peoples differently in Ecuador and Peru,
thereby providing different incentives for mobilisation. I will thus see if any differences can be found between the two countries with regard to the following indicators:

1. The timing of modernisation processes.
2. The content of nation-building ideologies, and attempts at assimilation/integration.
4. Highland indigenous peoples’ access to and control over land.

2.4.3 The potential for mobilisation of highland indigenous peoples

The third variable of my analysis will focus on highland indigenous peoples’ mobilising structures, framing processes, and political opportunities, as these factors are likely to determine the potential for mobilisation and organisation. The first indicator of this variable will be concerned with differences in the degree of territorial concentration and shared life-situation of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru. I expect that territorial concentration increases interaction, something which again can lead to the formation of networks and associations, thereby enhancing organisational capacity. The second indicator is also related to organisational capacity as it is concerned with highland indigenous peoples’ prior organisational experiences. The expectation is that participation in organisations give valuable experience, training, and leadership skills which are important resources in indigenous mobilisation. The issue of the third indicator is the possibility highland indigenous peoples have to attract allies and forge coalitions with other actors. While allies and coalitions enhance the organisational capacity of a social movement, it is also likely to increase the movement’s political opportunities, especially if allies are to be found within the political elite or among international actors. When examining prior organisational experience, and interaction between highland indigenous peoples and possible allies, I will also try to discuss the discourses in use as ideological frameworks can be important in legitimising collective action. The final indicator relates to the openness of the political system and the state’s tendency to use repression. The expectation is that a closed and repressive political system reduces the opportunities for indigenous mobilisation. The indicators are thus:

1. Territorial concentration of highland indigenous peoples.
2. Prior organisational experience of highland indigenous peoples.
3. Presence of allies and ability to form coalitions.
4. Openness of the political system and tendency of the state to use repression.

The proposition is that territorial concentration, organisational experience, presence of allies, and lack of state repression enhance the possibility for highland indigenous mobilisation and organisation. This implies that opposite conditions are likely to inhibit the politicisation of an indigenous non-indigenous ethnic cleavage.

The three main explanatory variables will provide the headings for the three chapters of the analysis. Before starting the analysis however, I will discuss the methodological issues involved in this project. This is the task of the next chapter.
3. Method and Sources

This thesis seeks to answer the question of why ethnic identity has served as a basis for mobilisation among the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorean highlands, but not among the indigenous peoples of highland Peru. The dependent variable “indigenous movement” has been operationalised as political organisations formed on the basis of indigenous identity, with the power to mobilise a significant part of the indigenous population. The two units of analysis, Ecuador and Peru, thus have different values on the dependent variable. At the same time the two countries share a number of background characteristics. In this chapter, I will first discuss how methodological considerations have contributed to my choice of variables and countries for analysis. Secondly, I will discuss the sources and literature which are used in the analysis, and finally, I will consider the sources’ validity and reliability.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Comparing similar countries

During the 1990s Ecuador had the strongest indigenous movement in Latin America (Montoya 1998: 133), while no national indigenous movement appeared in Peru. Peru can be seen as a deviant case as it is the only country with a large indigenous population in Latin America where a national indigenous movement has not developed (Remy 1994: 108, Yashar 1998: 26). While it would be interesting to do an in-depth analysis of the trajectories that led to the formation of national indigenous movements in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia and Ecuador, I have decided to limit myself to a paired comparison of the contrasting cases of Ecuador and Peru. This choice is not only due to limited time and resources, but also based on methodological considerations.

Among the five Latin American countries with large indigenous populations, Ecuador and Peru are the most similar with regard to a number of characteristics. First, the highland indigenous population is believed to approach 30-40% in both countries. Secondly, the two
countries have achieved strikingly similar levels of development measured by indicators such as GDP per capita, birth rate, life expectancy, literacy rate, education levels etc. (World Bank 1980, UNDP 1991 and 1999). Thirdly, both countries were headed by radical military governments in the 1970s. Finally, the transitions to democracy at the end of the 1970s increased the possibility of indigenous political influence as all literacy restrictions on voting were removed in both countries. According to Haber (1996: 187), there is too little focus on cases of nonmobilisation: “Rarer still are studies that explain regional variations among cases of mobilization and nonmobilization under seemingly similar environmental conditions. Comparative research in the future should pay more attention to why movements do not emerge, or if they do, why they so often fail to realize their stated goals more fully” (ibid).

Various authors have stressed the internal diversity of Latin America and the need for increased focus on subregions such as the Andes (Martz 1994, Menéndez-Carrión and Bustamente 1995). An important idea behind the comparison of similar countries is that variation in some of the variables can be held “constant” in an explanation of a given phenomenon. According to Smith (1995: 4) “Most-similar-systems designs lend themselves especially well to intraregional comparisons, such as among nations or communities within Latin America since location within a single region can operate as a ‘control’ for the effects of a substantial range of potential independent variables”. This is the logic behind John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference” (one of his two forms of comparative logic), which is analogous to a most-similar-systems design. The point of departure is two similar cases with differing values on the dependent variable. Mill then proposes pair-wise comparisons of possible independent variables, thereby eliminating variables with similar values. In the end one is hopefully left with one independent variable with different values in the two cases, and this variable will then serve as the explanation of the dependent variable. The aim of Mill’s comparative logic is to establish sufficient and necessary conditions for a given phenomenon.

In practice however, it is difficult to determine necessary, and even sufficient conditions in the social sciences. Social phenomena are complex and can seldom be explained by one causal factor. A given outcome may be the result of different factors (multiple causation) in different cases, or it can be the result of a combination of factors (conjunctural causation) (Ragin 1987: 42). Even if a researcher finds covariation between an independent variable and the phenomenon to be explained, this does not necessarily imply causality: “Although the number of differences among similar countries is limited, it will almost invariably be
sufficiently large to ‘overdetermine’ the dependent phenomenon. Although ‘most similar systems’ designs focus on concomitant variation, the experimental variables cannot be singled out” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 34). Accordingly, I do not expect to find necessary or sufficient conditions for indigenous mobilisation in my analysis, but rather to find out how the variables included in my analysis have influenced indigenous mobilisation.

According to Ragin (1987: 44) one should distinguish between formal characteristics of case-oriented methods, such as they are formulated by Mill, and how they are applied: “Formally they tend to be incapacitated by either multiple or conjunctural causation if used in a rigid manner; in practice, such apparent failures of case-oriented methods provide opportunities for the development of new theoretical and empirical distinctions and for the elaboration of historical models and types”(ibid). Case studies rarely proceed through the “mechanical identification of similarities and differences”, as there is rather a dialogue between the researcher’s ideas and the evidence (ibid, 46). First, the investigator uses theory to identify relevant differences, then she must demonstrate how the differences are causally relevant to the phenomenon under study, and on this basis, general explanations of the phenomenon can be formulated or refined (ibid, 47). The aim of my analysis is a most similar systems design in this sense. Thus, case-studies can serve as a necessary first step in the exploration of phenomena that are little studied.

According to Smith (1995: 4): “Most-similar-systems designs are especially helpful in the initial search for and elaboration of plausible hypotheses”. Similarly, Menéndes-Carrió and Bustamente (1995: 69) argue that studies of originally similar cases which have different outcomes may help social scientists in identifying new variables and intervening factors, and in detecting spurious relationships. Also, a most similar systems design reduces the danger of “conceptual stretching”: the application of concepts which have different meanings in different contexts (Sartori 1970). While case-oriented approaches provide limited possibility of generalisation, it can be seen as a strength of case-study approaches that the cases can be treated as “wholes”. A dialogue between theoretical ideas and evidence can, according to Ragin (1987: 52): “provide a basis for examining how conditions combine in different ways and in different contexts to produce different outcomes.”
3.1.2 The time factor

In addition to the difficulties involved in controlling for other independent variables than the ones under study in causal analysis, there is also the potential problem of the dependent variable influencing the independent variables. Once an indigenous movement is underway, it may have an influence on factors that I will treat as independent variables. As an example the existence of an indigenous movement can have an impact on governmental policies towards indigenous peoples. The variables should therefore be situated in time.

It was the uprising in 1990 which established the indigenous movement as an actor in Ecuadorian politics. After this date the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables is likely to become more unclear. In collecting data, I have therefore focused on the period 1960-1990, although I will also have to refer to historical processes which go further back. The reason why I see these thirty years as the most important for my study is that the 1960s marks the beginning of mass politics in Ecuador and Peru. While I will focus on the period prior to the formation of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, I will be conscious of the possible turning of causal arrows throughout my analysis.

3.2 Sources

3.2.1 Aims of the data collection

Relevant sources for the first variable, ethnic boundaries and group differences, would be secondary literature, statistics on inter-group differences, reports on discrimination, and other information which could say something about the situation of highland indigenous peoples in the respective countries. Important information for the second variable, the state- and nation-building polices pursued by the state, would be official statements concerning integration and nation-building, reports on education and land reforms, laws which refers to rights and obligations of indigenous peoples, and relevant secondary material. For the third variable, the potential for mobilisation of highland indigenous peoples, relevant information would be overviews of organisations working with indigenous peoples, interviews with representatives of indigenous organisations, human rights reports, and secondary material.
3.2.2 Literature search

While the literature on democratisation in Latin America is by now extensive, the literature in English which discusses ethnic cleavages in countries of Latin America, and the political implications of such cleavages, is relatively scarce. This is striking, as the lack of a common national identity is often cited as a hindrance to democratic consolidation in countries such as Ecuador and Peru (Lynch 1997: 124, Manrique 1999: 127). According to Manrique: “There exists a consensus that one of the fundamental hindrances for creating a viable development proposal in the country is the lack of national integration” (ibid, my translation).

One reason for the lack of attention to ethnic cleavages in Latin America could be the complex relationship between ethnicity and class. Furthermore, within political science literature there might have been a tendency to focus on political institutions and formal rights rather than on practices and interactions within political institutions. Also, larger and more homogenous countries such as the Southern Cone countries receive more attention than the small countries of the Andes. Ecuador is “still numbered among Latin America’s understudied nations” (Martz 1997: 171). “Lacking the economic, diplomatic, and strategic importance that is attributed to other Latin American countries, Ecuador has long received far less attention from scholars and activists than most other countries in the region” (Dash 1997: 3). While literature on Peruvian politics is easier to find, the Andean region as such is an understudied area. As mentioned, ethnicity as a political cleavage in this area is also an understudied topic. It was therefore of great importance to me to be able to collect data in Ecuador and Peru, as this provided me with a lot more information than what was available abroad.

3.2.3 Data collection in Ecuador and Peru

I was in Ecuador and Peru from October throughout December 1999, and spent about six weeks in each country. In Ecuador my main literature sources were the library of social science at the University of Cuenca, the Bibliotèca del Banco Central in Cuenca, and the Abya-Yala research institute in Quito which sent books to Cuenca. My initial plan was to start searching for literature in the university libraries and research institutes of Quito, but as a
volcano eruption was imminent close to the capital when I arrived, Cuenca became my main base. In Peru, the library of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP) in Lima became my main literature source. I also found interesting material in the Universidad Nacional de San Marcos, the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información. In addition to books and articles, I also found relevant newspaper articles, statistics and laws in the above-mentioned libraries and research institutes.

During my fieldwork I did three interviews. I had hoped to get interviews with the leaders of CONAIE and ECUARUNARI whose headquarters are in Quito, but because of volcano activity this was not possible. Instead I got to interview the director of ECUARUNARI and CONAIE in the department of Azuay. In Peru, I interviewed two general secretary colleagues of the Confederación Campesina del Perú, CCP (The Peruvian Peasant Confederation), and a professor in anthropology who have done research on indigenous identities and organisations. All interviews were conducted in Spanish, tape recorded, and transcribed. The interviews with relevant details are listed under “Sources and Literature”. I also had a number of informal conversations with academics and students who took an interest in my work. As I only have three formal interviews however, these should be seen as a supplement to the written material I have gathered, which will be the main basis for my thesis.

Two other sources should also be mentioned. First, the Internet has been a useful source, in particular the homepage of CONAIE and the Abya-Yala net which provides information on all the indigenous groups of Latin America and a number of interesting links. Second, I had the opportunity to participate in a conference in memory of the Peruvian author and ethnologist José Maria Arguedas titled Identidad e interculturalidad (Identity and Interculturality), in which several lectures related to my topic were held. Arguedas is one of Peru’s most famous authors, and his greatest concern was with improving the situation of the indigenous peoples. In his novels confrontations between whites and highland indigenous people is a central topic. The conference took place at the Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina (outside Lima) and several well known Peruvian academics participated. Topics discussed during the conference included the question of Peruvian national identity, national identity and education in Peru, tradition and modernity, and mestizaje and cultural heterogeneity.

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3 www.conaie.org/ and www.abyayala.nativeweb.org/
3.2.4 Review of the data gathered

I found relevant literature for all my variables. After the indigenous uprising in Ecuador in 1990, a number of works on the causes of the uprising as well as on the situation of indigenous peoples were published in Ecuador. The indigenous organisations have also published important works with titles like “Our organisational process” (CONAIE 1989), “The history of the Quichua peoples and nationality in Ecuador” (ECUARUNARI 1998), and “The 1990 uprising as seen by its protagonists” (Macas 1992) (my translations of the Spanish titles). In Peru, several sociologists and anthropologists have written on national integration problems and on racism and discrimination, but works on indigenous peoples and politics are more limited. According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999), very few Peruvian anthropologists write about these issues, and within political sociology and political science in general, there is a total ignorance: “They are not interested in political phenomena related to indigenous peoples. And I don’t know what they are waiting for, because what is happening in Ecuador is extremely important” (my translation). I found four different articles seeking to explain why there is no indigenous movement in Peru, all written by anthropologists (Degregori 1993, Montoya 1998, and Sánchez 1994 and 1996), and two of these articles explicitly compares Ecuador and Peru (Sánchez 1994 and 1996). There are generally very few works which compares these two countries, and almost all my secondary material deal with only one of the countries.

There are no official statistics on inter-group differences in either Ecuador or Peru, nor any official estimates of the percentage of the indigenous population. Researchers’ estimates of the indigenous population vary widely, in Ecuador from less than 10 % based on criteria such as language and collective farming (Sánchez-Parga 1996) to more than 40 % (CONAIE 2000). This relates to the problem of who is to define what constitutes an indigenous person, something which will be further discussed in chapter four. As being indigenous is related to stigma there are serious difficulties involved in carrying out a census which seeks to classify people according to ethnic criteria, and official ethnic categorisation of people would be regarded by many as racist. For the second and third indicator of the first variable, inter-group differences with regard to income, education, and political participation, I can therefore not base the comparison of Ecuador and Peru on statistical information but will have to use other evidence such as secondary material and statements from people I interviewed.
The human rights reports I have found also tend to discuss the national situation with little explicit reference to the human rights situation of the indigenous peoples. However, I got some interesting comments on human rights and discrimination during the interviews which can be used in combination with secondary material. Concerning laws, the persons I talked to were generally sceptical about using them as a source. Repeatedly it was stressed that the law is one thing, but practice is something different, and one should therefore investigate how the laws are practised. I was also told that laws are not for the poor – with reference to civil and political rights – or that laws are only for the poor – with reference to punishment for criminal acts.

In the three interviews I did, the same general questions were asked, but not necessarily in the same order. The interviews took the form of a conversation where I presented the purpose of my thesis and asked for comments on questions related to the three main topics corresponding to my variables. Follow-up questions were also asked, and the person interviewed was always given the opportunity to add whatever he regarded as important or interesting for my topic. Some of the most valuable information was given when the person interviewed would talk freely rather than answering my questions, as this provided me with new ideas and perspectives. This indicates that in an exploratory study it is important to ask open-ended questions. The four interviewees are all men. (I tried to get an interview with a female Quichua teacher working with bilingual education in the department of education in Cuenca, but she could not find time for an appointment.) Getting appointments would probably have been easier if I had established local contacts who could have recommended me before I arrived. Still, I believe that the different sources together cover my research question to a sufficient degree.

3.3 Validity and Reliability

Validity refers to how relevant the data are to the question under study. This is determined by definitional validity which refers to the correspondence between theoretical variables and their operationalisation, and reliability, which refers to accuracy in the collection and treatment of data (Hellevik 1991: 43).
I have specified my three main variables or dimensions by four indicators each. The intention with using different indicators for each variable is to capture different aspects of these broad variables. As argued before, the approach is qualitative and exploratory since relatively little is known about the topic and strict operationalisations could leave out valuable information. The selection of variables as well as indicators for these variables is based on theories of ethnicity, theories of nation-building and modernisation, and theories of social movements.

There is always the possibility that personal bias will colour both the selection of variables and the collection and interpretation of data. If evidence that is contradictory to the researcher’s expectations is disregarded, this presents a reliability problem. According to Tilley (1997: 115), there is a tendency for researchers to see ethnic movements as either inflationary, formed to intensify ethnic divisions, or reconstructive; “formed to redefine the political position of an already distinct cultural segment” (ibid, 509).

A bias towards an inflationary interpretation may reflect a predisposition to faith in the legitimacy of the state, a belief in the rationality of ‘national’ integration, an assumption that cultural assimilation is a prerequisite for liberal democracy, and/or from an antipathy to ethno-nationalism as a force for prejudice and dehumanization. A research bias towards a ‘reconstructive’ interpretation may stem from distrust of assimilationist agendas, a sensitivity to the ethnocidal history of European colonial expansion and state-building, and/or sympathy for cultural diversity, extending even to a romantic longing for ‘alternative’ worldviews. Evidentiary contradictions to any of these assumptions – for instance, on the one hand, the demonstrated human suffering resulting from coercive national integration programmes, or on the other hand, extensive cultural mixing which belies hard-line ethnic claims – may be ignored or glossed over in quite an unscholarly fashion (ibid, 515).

Similarly to most researchers interested in indigenous peoples in Latin America, my bias would rather be towards a “reconstructive” than towards an “inflationary” interpretation of indigenous movements. Part of my interest in the topic stems from experiences during earlier stays in the Andean countries when I witnessed situations in which indigenous people were discriminated against. Naturally, my personal views are coloured by these experiences. However, the task of this thesis is not to take a stance on whether ethnic cleavages should be institutionalised, nor to support or reject indigenous movements, but rather to try to explain why an indigenous movement developed in one context and not in another. In doing so, I will largely base my arguments on secondary sources which may be biased in one direction or the other. Some of those who write about indigenous issues in Latin America are political activists and present themselves as advocates of indigenous rights. Yet, this does not
necessarily imply that their research results are less reliable than the findings of researchers who are less explicit about their personal views. To reduce reliability problems, I will use as many different sources as possible and try to balance these against each other.

Another possible weakness of my work is that I am studying processes which take place in a foreign cultural context and have to use a language which is not my first language. The larger part of my sources are in Spanish. In reading as well as in conversations, nuances may be lost, and there is a possibility of misunderstandings. Furthermore, I do not speak Quichua / Quechua. Indigenous activists are generally bilingual, and Spanish is normally the language of publications, but familiarity with Quechua could have added to my existing sources. When it comes to cultural understanding, there is the possibility that I misread statements as well as events. According to an Ecuadorian professor of history, my research question would be difficult to answer for an Ecuadorian and almost impossible for a gringa. He believed that indigenous people follow their own logic which is difficult to grasp with Western rationality. While I do not discard problems of interpretation in a foreign cultural context, I could not have been doing this thesis if I agreed with him. My point of departure is that indigenous people are rational actors and therefore act differently in different contexts. By using a variety of sources to explain why ethnic identity has served as a basis for mobilisation among the indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian highlands and not among indigenous peoples in the highlands of Peru, I hope to avoid misunderstandings due to language- and cultural context problems.
4. Ethnic boundaries and group differences

In this chapter, I will consider the proposition that if highland indigenous peoples are disadvantaged and discriminated against, this is likely to increase the importance of ethnic identity and provide an incentive for mobilisation. The question then is whether highland indigenous peoples have suffered more from disadvantage and discrimination in either Ecuador or Peru. However, to say something about contemporary living conditions of highland indigenous peoples it is first necessary to say something about how people are identified, and how ethnic boundaries have been constituted historically. The historical constitution of ethnic boundaries is therefore the first indicator of this variable. Then, for the second indicator I will examine differences between highland indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups with regard to income and education, while the third indicator will be concerned with differences with regard to political representation. To the extent that income, education, and political representation follow ethnic lines, I expect that this will increase the importance of the indigenous non-indigenous cleavage and provide an incentive for mobilisation. If disadvantage is also coupled with discrimination, I believe this will further increase grievances. My fourth indicator is therefore evidence of discrimination of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru.

4.1 The historical constitution of the indigenous non-indigenous ethnic boundary

According to constructivist approaches, ethnic labels grow out of deep histories of cultural change, socio-economic conditions, and political relations (Tilley 1998: 514). Ethnic identification in contemporary Ecuador and Peru is in large part a result of colonial encounters. To understand contemporary ethnic divisions in Ecuador and Peru it is therefore necessary to discuss the historical formation of ethnic boundaries, starting with colonisation.
4.1.1 Colonialism and the constitution of the Indian category

“Indian” was the name given by the colonisers to all the original inhabitants of the Americas, in spite of the ethnic diversity of these peoples. Today the term *indio*, Indian, is often avoided in Latin America because of its link to colonial exploitation, and many people see it as a depreciating term with connotations of poverty, servility, inferiority and backwardness (Montoya 1989: 83). I will therefore use “indigenous”, hopefully a more neutral term, to refer to the descendants of the original inhabitants of the Andean territories. Also, *indígena* seems to be the preferred self-description by individuals participating in indigenous movements in Latin American countries, as in “Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador”. However, contemporary highland indigenous peoples of Ecuador and Peru, or at least their parents or grandparents, share the experience of being regarded and treated as Indians, an identity which to some extent became internalised. It is clear that this has had a profound impact on contemporary identification, and it would therefore be difficult to discuss contemporary highland indigenous identity and mobilisation without reference to colonial history and the creation of the Indian category.

“Indian” in Ecuador and Peru was in many ways a fiscal category, as the native Indians had to pay a special head tax, *tributo de indio*, to the Spanish Crown: “The typical indian was one who lived in an indian community and paid tribute, in labour or in goods” (Wade 1997: 28). The tribute was not abolished with independence, and continued in Peru until 1854 (Degregori 1993: 119) and in Ecuador until 1857 (Guerrero 1993: 87), only to be replaced by new forms of taxation in addition to taxes to the church. The abolition of the tribute did therefore not alter the living conditions of most Indians, nor did it lead to the abolition of the Indian category. According to Varese (1996: 58): the Indians “continuous search for an ethnic identity that would both satisfy the need for communal belonging and express affinity/solidarity with all those who shared the colonial experience has characterized the long history of ethnic resistance of indigenous people of Latin America”.

In the Americas, (as in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa), the colonisers declared their own independence, something which implied that the colonial system of domination to a large extent continued (Stavenhagen 1996: 149). Indians continued to be regarded as “backward” compared to those of Spanish descent and “mixed people” (mestizos), and such
ideas were reinforced by theories of human biology accepted in Western “scientific racism” by the late 19th century (Wade 1997: 31). Ideas of racial superiority and presumed differences in levels of “civilisation” continued to be the premise for political rule in Latin America also after independence. This situation has been described as internal colonialism (Wade 1997: 64), a situation in which the rulers exploit regions within a country in the same way as colonising countries exploit their oversea colonies. In this system of domination, class and ethnicity thus come to coincide.

4.1.2 Indigenous peoples and the concepts of race, class and ethnicity

Ecuador and Peru approach what Horowitz’ (1985: 22) describes as “ranked systems” or societies, at least until the middle of the 20th century. In ranked systems, social class coincides with ethnic origin so that stratification is synonymous with ethnic membership. Ethnic groups are ordered in a hierarchy, and opportunities for social mobility are restricted for the subordinate group. The stratification systems of the Andean countries have been dominated by people of European descent (criollos), occupying the top of the social pyramid, Indians and Blacks occupying the lowest positions, and people of mixed origin occupying the middle positions. These societies have therefore also been referred to as caste societies, sociedades de castas (Wade 1997: 29); or they have been compared to the South African apartheid system, though lacking the formal rules of apartheid (Twanama 1992: 226). One may therefore object that white/criollo, mestizo (mixed), and Indian are racial rather than ethnic categories. “Race” is a troublesome concept, however.

Most contemporary social scientists agree that races are best dealt with as social constructions. However, this does not mean that race is unimportant. Poole (1994: 6) argues that in many Latin American countries, the idea of race shapes personal identity, as well as understandings of culture and ethnicity: “While the biological category of race has been long since overturned by, among other things, the theories of socially constructed identities advocated by ethnicity theory, the concept and reality of race as a social and discursive category continues to mold individuals’ perceptions of self, other and society (ibid). However, Eriksen (1993: 4-5) chooses to see race as a possible dimension of ethnicity, as race has little
descriptive value in itself: “Ideas of race may or may not form part of ethnic ideologies, and their presence or absence does not seem to be a decisive factor in interethnic relations” (ibid).

It makes sense to see “race” as an aspect of ethnicity in Latin America as people can change their “racial identity” through social mobility or by changing culture, although this may be difficult. According to Salomon (1981: 423), *blanco* (white), is rather a cultural than a racial category, and “whiteness” is associated as much with wealth, occupation, culture and urbanity as it is with skin-colour. Also, somebody may be described as white in a rural context, but then be labelled mestizo or perhaps Indian in an urban environment. “Race” is therefore not necessarily more fixed than ethnicity. In the Andes, “the absence of reliable phenotypical markers places special emphasis upon clothing, hairstyles, speech and body language to determine who is an Indian and who is not” (Weismantel and Eisenmann 1998: 131).

There are people who argue that contemporary stratification in the Andes only should be attributed to class as the indigenous peoples now have become thoroughly assimilated. According to a study by Friedlander (1975 in Tilley 1997: 512), the Indian is a “modern fiction” constructed by non-Indian elites “in order to maintain a marginalized and therefore cheap labour force”. However, I agree with Tilley (1997: 513) who contends that Andean indigenous identity cannot be reduced to class, although the social experience of exploitation and discrimination informs indigenous identity: ”We might safely speculate that, even without the European construction of ‘Indian’ and the segregation and subordination which it entailed, indigenous American cultures would still have developed in ways quite distinct from European societies. Amalgamation is not necessarily the logical outcome of interaction, whatever Euro-American thought might maintain” (ibid, 514).

While ethnicity and class are interrelated in the Andes, they should be treated as analytically distinct. Various factors have made for a division between indigenous and non-indigenous groups in the Andes, and this division has clearly also an ethno-cultural dimension. First, highland indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Peru generally speak an indigenous language: Quechua or Aymara in Peru, and Quichua in Ecuador. (In the Peruvian Andes, it is estimated that about 7 million people speak Quechua, and about 400 000 speak Aymara (NPIP 1995: 25)). Quechua was the official language of the Inca empire, and while there was originally great linguistic variety, Quechua became the dominant language in the Inca-controlled territory. The exception was the Aymara people inhabiting the mountain plateau of
what is today Bolivia and the southern part of Peru, who were granted special rights within the Inca empire, including the right to use their own language. Highland indigenous peoples also tend to retain an Inca and pre-Inca vision of time and cosmos, although they are Christian (Estermann 1998). As an example, rituals are performed to maintain good relations with the earth, the sun and the mountain spirits. The majority of the indigenous peoples also live in rural areas where they may belong to an indigenous community which practices communal work, they may work in an agricultural enterprise, or they can work as artisans (Montoya 1989: 54).

More important than the cultural markers of language, religious beliefs and a rural way of life however, is the fact that the indigenous peoples tend to see themselves as different from whites and mestizos. Quechua-/Quichua-speaking indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Peru refer to themselves as Runa, (Qaqi in the case of Aymara), which means man or human being, while mestizos are referred to as Misti by both Quechua and Aymara-speaking peoples in Peru, and as Mishu by Quichua-speaking peoples of Ecuador (Montoya 1989: 50-53, Estermann 1998: 56, Stark 1981: 395). Misti or Mishu derives from the Spanish “mestizo”. White people can also be referred to as misti, but a number of other designations are also used. It is important to note however, that there is great regional variation within Ecuador and Peru concerning self- and other-identification, and categorisation may also depend on the context, and on the self-identification of the person speaking. According to van den Berghe (1974: 20), what seems like terminological chaos and inconsistency in ethnic designations in the anthropological literature on Peru, can to a large extent be explained by differences in local situations. Similarly, the importance of local identities should not be underestimated.

In the last decades however, an increasing number of indigenous persons have migrated to the cities, and for many of these migrants this has implied a process of “cholification”. “Cholo” is a pejorative term which is used to describe anyone who is seen to be somewhere in between Indian and mestizo. According to Bourricaud (1975: 354): “The term cholo comprises almost all the ambiguities that can surround individual status”. In Peru, people from the highlands who have migrated to Lima, or indigenous children who have completed basic education and learnt Spanish are often termed cholo. “Cholification” processes imply a blurring of ethnic boundaries and seems to be more pronounced in Peru than in Ecuador, something which will be discussed in relation to integration and nation-building policies in the next chapter.
First, I will discuss whether any differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to disadvantage and discrimination of highland indigenous peoples.

4.2 Differences with regard to income, education and political representation

The expectation is that the more disadvantaged indigenous peoples are in relation to other groups, the more likely is this to cause resentment, which in turn may strengthen ethnic divisions and provide an incentive for indigenous mobilisation. The question is then whether highland indigenous peoples have been more disadvantaged in either Ecuador or Peru, with main emphasis on latter half of this century. However, two caveats are in order. First, indigenous peoples who live in complete misery, have no education and have never participated politically, are not likely to be able to participate in an indigenous movement. In other words, a minimum of resources is necessary for indigenous mobilisation. Second, disadvantage is more likely to serve as an incentive for indigenous mobilisation if it is coupled with continuing discrimination and exclusion on the part of non-indigenous groups. In the following, I will first discuss the difficulties involved in enumerating highland indigenous peoples and in measuring their living conditions, and then discuss the material that is available for highland indigenous peoples with regard to income, education and political representation. In the next section, I will study the discrimination of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru.

4.2.1 Indigenous peoples and living conditions: the problem of lack of statistics

A precise comparison of living conditions for indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru would presuppose that statistics were available for the situation of indigenous peoples living within these countries. However, this is not the case. In the official censuses which have been carried out in Ecuador, the first taking place in 1950, there have been no attempts to enumerate the population by race or ethnic group (Stutzman 1981: 48). Accordingly, there are no official statistics on the situation of indigenous peoples. In Peru, the last census which used “race” as a criterion was carried out in 1940 (Manrique 1999: 17, note
1). According to this census 46 % of the population were Indian and 53 % where white and mestizo (ibid). In subsequent censuses, race or ethnicity have not been an issue.

In spite of the lack of official figures for the indigenous populations in Ecuador and Peru, estimates of their numbers and descriptions of their living conditions abound in the literature concerned with indigenous issues. In Ecuador, the indigenous population is estimated to constitute 45 % (CONAIE 2000), 43 % (Itturalde 1991: 117), about 30 % (Gray 1987: 15), 20-30 % (World Bank 2000), and 27 % (Gurr 1993: 338). The indigenous peoples of the Amazon are generally thought to constitute about 1 %, while highland indigenous peoples make up for the rest of the figure. In Peru, estimates of the highland indigenous population also vary: from 50 % (Gray 1987: 16), to 47 % (Itturalde 1991: 117), to 40 % (Gurr 1993: 339), while Sánchez (1996: 115) thinks it is futile to estimate the indigenous population given the profound changes and blurring of ethnic boundaries in recent years. The variation in these figures reflect the difficulties involved in defining who is an indigenous person.

Two recent analyses seek to measure the highland indigenous percentage of the total population in Ecuador by means of objective criteria; Knapp (1991) and Sánchez-Parga (1996). According to Sánchez-Parga (1996: 16), it is a problem that most academics and development agencies take the figures presented by Ecuadorian indigenous organisations at face value, and then refer to each other to support these figures. He argues that the analysis of Knapp has been the most serious attempt to calculate the highland indigenous population in Ecuador (Sánchez-Parga 1996: 18). Knapp uses the census of 1950 which asked about each person’s first and second language, but did not ask about race or ethnicity⁴ (Clark 1998: 198).

According to this census, 320,056 persons out of a total population of 3,150,000 spoke Quichua (Knapp 1991: 11). Adjusting for sources of error such as the percentage of the population that was not enumerated, the number of persons who did not respond to the question of language, and the possible concealment of Quichua in some areas, Knapp concludes that about 440,000, or 14 % of the total Ecuadorian population were Quichua-speaking or indigenous in 1950 (Knapp 1991: 13). Knapp uses “indigenous” and “Quichua-speaking” interchangeably as “language is the best, and the only identifier of the indigenous cultural status” (Knapp 1991: 20, my translation). On the basis of the number of Quichua-

⁴ People living in the Amazon were not counted in the census.
speaking persons in 1950, and adjusting for population growth and expected “rate of acculturation”, Knapp estimates that the highland indigenous population should be about 836,507 persons, or 9.2 % of the total population in 1987 (ibid, 28-29).

Sánchez-Parga regards the use of a native language as a sufficient criterion for being indigenous, but he does not believe it is a necessary criterion (1996: 28). He therefore adds another sufficient criterion which is living in a rural community in an area in which a native language is used, although it may not be the predominant language (ibid, 32). Thus persons who speak a native language and/or live in a rural community where a native language is used, are counted as indigenous (ibid, 35). Using these criteria, and employing as sources the census of 1950, Knapp (1991), and the census of 1990, Sánchez-Parga estimates the highland indigenous population in Ecuador in the beginning of the 1990s to be about 850,119 persons, or 9.12 % of the total population (ibid, 36). Although he recognises that there might be persons who see themselves as indigenous although they speak Spanish and do not live in a community, these are not possible to include as his concern is with objective and quantifiable criteria (ibid, 42). Furthermore, Sánchez-Parga seems to be reluctant to accept “acculturated”, self-identifying indigenous persons as truly indigenous as it is their “traditional” indigenous culture which distinguish them from others, and he believes this culture is best reproduced within the indigenous communities (ibid, 36).

The positions of Knapp and Sánchez-Parga are highly problematic. First, they represent an essentialist understanding of ethnicity as the definition of indigenous peoples are reduced to one or two criteria. They both seem to think that cultural change with regard to these criteria implies that indigenous identity is abandoned, while there are numerous examples which show that this is not the case (e.g. Salomon 1981). The weakness of their analyses is also revealed by a closer examination of the 1950 census, which is their main source. Even if it was accepted that speaking Quichua was a good measure of “indigenousness” in 1950, it is not possible to treat people’s affirmation or denial of speaking a native language as objective “hard facts”, as does Sánchez-Parga (1996: 12). Calculating margins of error as does Knapp (1991), is also very difficult.

As Knapp recognises, the 1950 census did not cover the entire population, and it is likely that a large number of non-respondents were to be found among the indigenous peoples. Resistance to registration was expected among the Andean indigenous peoples as it was well
known that families had hid from enumerators in earlier regional census efforts, fearing that the aim of the censuses was military conscription or increased taxation (Clark 1998: 195). The Director of the census thus declared that “we have used all means available to us to conquer the impermeability of the indigenous stratum” (Clark 1998: 196). In spite of educational campaigns stressing the benefits of the census for all sectors of society and cooperation with the Ecuadorian Indian Federation (FEI), census workers ran into difficulties in several Andean areas. It was reported in the press that pre-census workers were attacked, and in the highland province of Chimborazo thousands of indigenous people attacked the National Guard who then killed two indigenous men (Clark 1998: 196-197). According to a letter to the editor of El Comercio on December 10th, 1950: “The only ones who have put a black stain, resisting the census, are the Indians. The Indians of this province [Chimborazo] persist in the greatest ignorance, they have not taken a single step forward in terms of civilization” (in Clark 1998: 198).

Of the population who was enumerated in the census, about 20% did not answer the question of language (Knapp 1991: 12). Knapp includes the non-respondents in the highlands in the Quichua-speaking group, as he believes it was logical that people wanted to conceal their use of Quichua due to its low social status (ibid). Accordingly, it is also likely that enumerated persons who were bilingual in Quichua and Spanish, preferred to report that their language was Spanish. Although this is recognised by Knapp, he believes their number is counterbalanced by the number of mestizos who may have reported to speak Quichua as a second language. However, the latter number was probably low, while the number of bilingual persons reported to speak Spanish can potentially have been very high. As noted by Clarke (1998: 201), it was also the male head of each family who was legally responsible for providing information for all family members. By 1950, seasonal migration to the city was common among highland indigenous men, who as a consequence became fluent in Spanish (ibid). With all these sources of error, the number of Quichua-speaking people registered by the 1950 census does not seem to give a very accurate picture of the ethnic composition of the Ecuadorian population. It also clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of using “objective” criteria only in defining ethnic groups. In contemporary Ecuador, it is clearly not possible to regard the use of Quichua as a necessary condition for being indigenous.
4.2.2 Socio-economic differences: Income and education

As the above discussion makes clear, there are no reliable figures for the percentage of the highland indigenous population of Ecuador and Peru. Consequently it has not been possible to develop statistics on living conditions of indigenous peoples. What we do have however, are ecological data which say something about areas in which a large number of highland indigenous people live. When individual data are lacking, ecological data are likely to be the best substitute. However, it is important to note that the correlations that are found are only valid at the aggregate level. If we find that there is a higher incidence of poverty in predominantly indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas, it is not possible to say that it is the indigenous people who are poor, as this would be committing an ecological fallacy. It is only possible to conclude that the incidence of poverty is higher in predominantly indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas.

On the basis of Knapp’s (1991) study, Zamosc (1995) analyses social conditions in the rural areas in which Quichua speakers constitute a majority, and compares them to rural areas in which there are few Quichua speakers. Although he does not agree with Knapp that language is the most important characteristic of indigenous peoples, he chooses to see the speaking of Quichua as an indirect measure of being indigenous, which can be used for pragmatic reasons when other information is lacking: “As a consequence of this, we have to modify our pretensions of quantitative analysis, and recognise that our results only can be seen as rough estimates or generalisations” (Zamosc 1995: 14, my translation). Although part of the indigenous population probably reported to speak Spanish rather than Quichua in the census, we can be quite certain that those who reported to speak Quichua are indigenous in the Ecuadorian case. Knapp (1991: 11) also argues that areas in which either Spanish or Quichua is clearly predominant, are more representative as mestizo and indigenous areas respectively.

Knapp calculates the number of parishes in the highland that are predominantly indigenous (more than 33 % Quichua-speaking), and predominantly mestizo (less than 33 % Quichua-speaking). However, the number of Quichua speakers are on average 65 % in the predominantly indigenous parishes and more than 50 % in all predominantly indigenous parishes except for a few parishes close to Quito (Knapp 1991: 18). He also finds that about 25 % of the total number of parishes are predominantly indigenous, and that 35-40 % of the rural highland population live in these parishes. As information about socio-economic
characteristics does not exist on the parish level, but only at the municipal level, Zamosc (1995: 32) treats municipalities in which more than 50 % of the population live in predominantly indigenous parishes as predominantly indigenous municipalities, and municipalities in which more than 50 % of the population live in predominantly mestizo parishes as predominantly mestizo municipalities. He then finds that of the 73 municipalities in the highlands, excluding Quito (there are 193 municipalities in the whole country), 56 are predominantly mestizo and 17 are predominantly indigenous (ibid).

On the basis of national statistics from the first years of the 1990s, Zamosc (1995: 43-44) compares the following characteristics for predominantly indigenous municipalities and predominantly mestizo municipalities in the highlands (calculated on the basis of Knapp’s definition of the parishes in 1987): percentage living in poverty, percentage of children under two years old suffering from malnutrition, infant mortality rate, percentage of male illiteracy, percentage of female illiteracy, and the size of the municipal budget adjusted for population size. He finds that predominantly indigenous municipalities are disadvantaged with regard to all these characteristics compared to predominantly mestizo municipalities. In predominantly indigenous municipalities 74.3 % live in poverty compared to 49.1 % in predominantly mestizo municipalities. Infant mortality rates are about 50 % higher in predominantly indigenous municipalities, and malnutrition rates are also markedly higher. In predominantly indigenous municipalities about 22 % of the men and 38 % of the women are illiterate compared to 12 % of the men and 19 % of the women in predominantly mestizo municipalities. Finally, municipal budgets in predominantly indigenous municipalities are on average 2/3 of the budgets in predominantly mestizo municipalities. All correlations are statistically significant at .01, except for the correlation between ethnic predominance and size of municipal budgets which is statistically significant at .10 (ibid). The correlations should not be due to differences between urban and rural areas, as the correlations are only valid for the municipalities in the highlands (Quito excluded) which are all predominantly rural.

As discussed above, we cannot conclude from the above discussion that it is the indigenous peoples who are poorest, or most illiterate in Ecuador. Although this seems to be common knowledge, I have not been able to find statistical evidence. In official Ecuadorian documents, ethnic differences seem to be obscured and revealed at the same time. In a campaign for public support for a new education and literacy programme in 1977, there were only one vague reference to ethnicity in the eight-page document which was produced, but various
references to the poor and “marginalised” (Stutzman 1981: 72). Yet, the illustrations accompanying the text showed only indigenous people, *cholos* and blacks in the ”poor” and “marginalised” condition (ibid). However, the World Bank (2000a) clearly states that indigenous peoples are the poorest in Ecuador: “As social indicators of indigenous peoples fall significantly below the national average in terms of infant mortality, female illiteracy, child malnutrition, access to basic sanitation services and access to productive infrastructure, they could be classified as the most disadvantaged groups among the poor” (ibid). The method of calculation of the World Bank is not reported.

Official statistics on the social conditions of indigenous peoples are also lacking in the Peruvian case. However, statistical information on socio-economic characteristics is available for each of Peru’s 25 departments, and five of these departments are considered to be predominantly indigenous. The highland departments of Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica and Puno was earlier referred to as *la mancha india*, or “the Indian stain” (Webb 1975: 32). The term *mancha india*, has come to be considered racist and is therefore best avoided, while the ethnically neutral term *el Trapecio Andino*, the Andean Trapeze, is commonly used to refer to this region today. According to Degregori (1993: 124), The Andean Trapeze is where the highest percentage of the Quechua and Aymara-speaking population is concentrated. In the following discussion of the social characteristics of these departments, it should be noted that the statistical information which is employed represents a high level of aggregation, as we speak of departments rather than municipalities or parishes. The findings should therefore be considered with caution as they at best represent rough tendencies.

On the basis of the national census of 1961, Webb (1975: 38) finds that 80 % of the poorest families in Peru (income of less than 3200 Peruvian soles per year) depend on subsistence agriculture in the highlands, and of the people in this category 63 % live in “la mancha india”: “Many of the characteristics of these agriculturalists are well known. The majority of them are Indians, they speak Quechua or Aymara, and about 70 % of them were illiterate in 1961. Their main source of survival is, on average, 0.9 hectares of arable land, three domestic animals and some other small animal” (ibid, my translation).

Later censuses present a similar pattern. In 1993, the three departments in which most people lived in poverty were Huancavelica (92.2 % poor, 51 % in extreme poverty), Ayacucho (83.3
poor, 50.8 % in extreme poverty), and Apurímac (83.2 % poor, 47.9 % in extreme poverty) (INEI 1995a: 33), all belonging to the Andean Trapeze. As for the other two departments belonging to this region, Cusco was the ninth poorest department (75.9 % poor, 40.6 % in extreme poverty), and Puno the tenth poorest (73.5 % poor, 33.7 % in extreme poverty) (ibid). By contrast, 34.5 % were poor in Lima and 11.9 % extremely poor (ibid). The three departments with the highest incidence of poverty were also the departments with highest illiteracy rates in 1993: Apurímac: 36.9 % illiterates; Huancavelica: 34.1 % illiterates; and Ayacucho: 32.7 % illiterates (INEI 1995b: 23). Cusco had the fifth highest illiteracy rate in 1993 with 25.4 %, and Puno the seventh highest with 22.2 % (ibid). In all departments however, the illiteracy rates had been reduced by about 50 % since 1972 (ibid). The five departments constituting the Andean Trapeze were in 1993 also the five departments with the highest infant mortality rate in the country (INEI 1995a: 54).

According to the World Bank (2000b), there is in Peru “a persistent disparity between urban/rural and indigenous/non-indigenous poverty”. Although more than two-thirds lived in urban areas in 1997, 50 % of the poor, and 60 % of the extremely poor lived in rural areas (ibid). In the period 1994-1997, the World Bank (1999: 19-22) followed the development of 900 households, comparing indigenous households (measured by whether the head of the household spoke a native language\(^5\) and non-indigenous households. According to their measurements, native-speaking people were 40 % more likely to be poor than Spanish-speaking people in 1994, and 49 % more likely to be poor in 1997, indicating that indigenous people are falling behind in development: “Native language was also one of the most robust and important factors when we examined welfare changes of several hundred identical households between 1994 and 1997 – controlling for everything else (e.g. education, geographic location, experience, household size), the native-language speaking families had significantly lower consumption growth rates than the Spanish-speaking population” (ibid). The World Bank also found that school attendance was lower among indigenous children, and that they were twice as likely to be malnourished. Native language speakers also earned less income when factors such as education and experience were controlled for: “The above suggests that the Government of Peru needs to take a careful look at its attempts to reach one of the most deprived groups in the country, its indigenous population” (ibid, 21).

\(^5\)“We use language as a proxy for indigeneity because indigeneity cannot be defined – indigenous languages, traditional clothing, heritage, and observed traditions and beliefs can, but need not, be part of the life of indigenous people” (World Bank 1999: 20).
The findings of the World Bank are consistent with the findings of Gurr (1993: Table A12) who gives the highland indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Peru the highest possible value on the variable of economic difference in his world-wide study of ethnic minorities. Their value of 4 signifies “Extreme differentials: the group is disadvantaged on five or more dimensions” (out of a total of six dimensions measuring inequalities in income, education and occupation) (ibid, 41). What we may conclude from the above discussion is that predominantly indigenous areas in the highlands are the poorest areas and have the highest illiteracy rates in both Ecuador and Peru, and additional evidence indicates that it is the indigenous peoples who are poorest and most likely to be illiterate. Indigenous peoples are thus more disadvantaged than non-indigenous groups. If disadvantage serves to strengthen ethnic divisions and provides an incentive for indigenous mobilisation, this incentive should be very strong in both Ecuador and Peru. It should also be noted that it is not possible to tell from our data whether highland indigenous peoples are even more disadvantaged in one of the countries than in the other, as this question only could be answered by the use of individual data and similar methods of measurement in both countries.

4.2.3 The contribution of the Ecuadorian indigenous middle class

Despite the general disadvantage of highland indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Peru, there is a documented difference which is not visible in the aggregate data. In the last couple of decades Ecuador has witnessed the growth of an indigenous middle class, and this young, educated indigenous elite seems to have played a particularly important role in the growth of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. At the beginning of this section, I stated the expectation that the more disadvantaged indigenous peoples are in relation to other groups, the more likely is this to cause resentment which again may strengthen ethnic divisions and provide an incentive for indigenous mobilisation. However, it is also clear that mobilisation requires leadership and certain resources, and herein lies the possible contribution of a self-conscious indigenous middle class.

The achievements of the indigenous middle class in Ecuador seem to inspire pride in indigenous identity, and they provide a counterexample to the stereotype image of indigenous people as poor and “backward”. Although the appeal to redress the imbalances in welfare and
education suffered by indigenous peoples may provide one of the strongest incentives for indigenous mobilisation, it is also important to have educated indigenous leaders who know the workings of the political system. The main difference between Ecuador and Peru in this regard seems to be that while middle class indigenous people in Ecuador continue to identify with poorer indigenous people, highland indigenous people in Peru who become middle class “forget” about their background: “Since the 1970s, there are in Peru indigenous professionals (lawyers, engineers, professors, accountants, first of all men) properly integrated into the dominant culture of the country, who have no visible anxiety to affirm their indigenous identity” (Montoya 1998: 159, my translation). It thus seems like the general coincidence of class- and ethnic cleavages in Peru, rather than strengthening ethnic identity, makes ethnicity become overshadowed by class.

According to Montoya (1998: 158-159), the reason why no highland indigenous groups in Peru are proud of their background, is that Peruvian indigenous peoples were more suppressed and marginalised by the colonial power than Ecuadorian indigenous peoples. In contrast to Ecuador where certain indigenous groups remained privileged throughout the colonial period, the Peruvian indigenous nobility was completely destroyed. (ibid). In 1780 there was a great indigenous rebellion led by the Inca noble Túpac Amaru II in the densely populated highlands of Peru, and the aim was to restore indigenous Inca rule, or Tawantinsuyu (Montoya ibid, and Degregori 1993: 119). The defeat of Túpac Amaru had far-reaching consequences for the indigenous nobility who until then had enjoyed several privileges; Quechua was prohibited, the indigenous nobility would no longer learn to read and write, they would have to pay tribute as common Indians, they were no longer allowed to ride a horse, and all symbols which expressed identification with the Inca empire or former indigenous civilisations were prohibited (Montoya ibid). The result of this was the complete destruction of the indigenous elite in Peru by the 19th century, and according to Manrique (1999: 15), indio has been synonymous with “poor” ever since. When the Republic was established in 1821, there were no indigenous representatives at the negotiating table (Montoya 1998: 158). Degregori (1993: 118) argues that the destruction of the indigenous nobility should be emphasised because of “the importance of elites in creating ethnic and/or national identities, in (re)inventing traditions, and in imagining projects” (my translation).

Ecuador formed the periphery of the Inca empire, and had no proper indigenous nobility at the time of colonisation. However, there were clear differences in wealth and power between the
different indigenous groups, and the colonial power continued to favour some groups over others. The most prominent example is the indigenous people of the highland municipality of Otavalo who were known to be skilled weavers prior to colonisation: “Unlike the vast majority of ‘Indians’ working for typically brutal colonial élites, a handful of Otavalan communities (not all) were singled out as weavers of cloth directly for the Spanish crown, and were said to be the descendants of Inca royalty” (Kyle 1999: 426). By the 17th century, Otavalo was supplying a large part of the colonial world with textiles (Salomon 1981: 437). Although it is difficult to say that the Otavalo weavers were privileged, as they worked endless hours in miserable conditions, weaving became the basis for a prospering textile economy which after independence has been controlled by indigenous hands. The consequence has been that unlike most other indigenous groups in the highlands, the Otavalans have acquired an independent productive capacity which has provided them with a higher income than the Ecuadorian average (ibid). Throughout the 19th and 20th century, the Otavalo region has been “the home of a people whose prosperity and ethnic pride stand out handsomely amid the Andean spectacle of misery” (Salomon 1981: 420).

The growth of tourism since the 1960s, and the paving of the Pan American highway from Quito to Otavalo in 1973 have opened up new possibilities for the indigenous people of the area: “Otavalans began consciously to tailor production to the growing tourist market at home and the desire for native handicrafts abroad. By the 1960s it was clear that the Otavalans’ principal asset was not their ability to weave and supply a pre-existing demand, but rather their broader cultural identity as an exotic ‘Other’” (Kyle 1999: 431). By the 1980s, a transnational diaspora of indigenous merchants had developed, and Otavalan handicrafts are now sold on the streets of Oslo, Amsterdam and New York. In the 1990s, folkloric music production has become increasingly important as it is a means of making money for investment in the handicraft economy: “Making music abroad, and the whole adventure that goes with it, including North American and European girlfriends (whom some have married), has become a sort of rite of passage for Otavalan men” (ibid, 438).

However, while Otavalans have adopted a number of Western consumer goods, including cars and televisions, they have not adopted the package of Western culture and values (Salomon 1981: 430). According to Kyle (1999: 439), it is a question of cultural borrowing rather than ‘acculturation’, and urbanisation has not implied a loss of group identity. Otavalans who go abroad retain strong ties to the canton of Otavalo, and most of the surplus from weaving goes
into the buying of land in the Otavalo region. In fact, there has been a “flow of land from latifundists to Indians” (Salomon 1981: 426). There is an enormous contrast between the rich indigenous Otavalans, fluent in English, Spanish and Quichua, and the campesinos (peasants) commonly seen in the Peruvian highlands (as well as in other parts of Ecuador), who dressed in filthy western clothes try to sell their vegetables.

Together with the indigenous cattle ranchers from the southern highland region of Saraguro, the indigenous people of Otavalo have contributed disproportionately to the growth of the new, indigenous middle class in Ecuador (de la Torre 1999: 98). At the end of the 1970s the first generation of indigenous teachers, doctors and lawyers started to emerge from Ecuadorian universities (ibid). In contrast to the Otavalans, the fortune of the Saraguros is built on colonisation and expansion of agriculture and cattle-raising into the lowlands in the latter half of the 20th century (Casagrande 1981: 271). However, what the indigenous peoples of Saraguro and Otavalo have in common, is their pride in their indigenous background: “Like the weavers of Peguche [an Otavalan community], the Saraguros are an open and proud people who confront their white and mestizo compatriots without humility or fear” (ibid, 272). Indigenous peoples from Saraguro and Otavalo also seem to have played particularly important roles in the indigenous movement. According to Field (1991: 41), the Otavalans have “created a model of indigenous capitalism and exercised an important influence on the political platform of ECUARUNARI and CONAIE”. Similarly, the director of ECUARUNARI / CONAIE in the province of Azuay, Mario Cabrera (interview October 19th, 1999), described the Otavalans as one of the pillars of the indigenous movement. As for the Saraguros, two of the most profiled current indigenous representatives in parliament are from the region, sociologist and former president of CONAIE, Luis Macas, and lawyer and member of parliament, Nina Pacari.

Contrary to the expectations put forward in the beginning of this section, the examples above seem to demonstrate that a secure resource base make indigenous mobilisation and affirmation of identity more likely, while economic disadvantage can make people more willing to leave behind their indigenous identity in order to improve social status and economic advancement. The disadvantage of indigenous peoples may thus provide an incentive for mobilisation only when it is coupled with the leadership of an educated indigenous middle class who can articulate demands. However, Sánchez (1994: 339) argues that there are several Peruvian highland indigenous groups who are similar to the Otavalans in
that they have a solid resource base in the production of handicrafts. Examples are the weavers of San Pedro de Cajas, the painters of Sarhua, and the ceramists of Pucará. Yet, none of these groups seem to be interested in affirming an indigenous identity, and according to Sánchez (ibid), the explanation might be that Ecuador and Peru have followed different paths of national integration. This will be investigated in subsequent chapters. For the time being, it can be argued that while there is no doubt that the Otavalans have been important in the formation of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, it is possible that they have been important mainly because their leadership has combined with other factors conducive to indigenous mobilisation.

4.2.4 Political differences between highland indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups

Few sources reveal any evidence of participation of indigenous peoples in formal politics or in the public administration of Ecuador and Peru prior to 1990. In the literature, it is the emergence of political representatives with indigenous background in the 1990s which scholars attempt to explain, rather than the lack of political participation on the part of indigenous people before this date. Until the end of the 1980s, the national governments of Ecuador and Peru looked on the surface very similar to the government of Spain. In 1990 however, Fujimori (born in Peru by Japanese parents) was elected president of Peru, stressing his own “chino” identity as different from the traditional white upper class, and identifying also with the “cholo” (de la Cadena 1998: 158). His administration represented something new: “Drawn to a significant extent from provincial, nonelite, and nonwhite sectors, the original Fujimorista politicians were more socially, culturally, and racially representative of Peruvian society than the political class they replaced” (Levitsky 1999: 82). It was also in 1990 that the Ecuadorian indigenous movement entered the national political stage, but by means of an uprising and not through the formal political channels. Only with the election to parliament of eight indigenous representatives in 1996 did indigenous peoples become involved in formal politics at the national level. Mario Cabrera, director of CONAIE / ECUARUNARI in the province of Azuay (interview October 19th, 1999) estimates that 10-15% of all political posts at both national and local levels now are held by indigenous persons.
My expectation is that political disadvantage increases ethnic divisions and provides an incentive for indigenous mobilisation. I am therefore interested in investigating whether any differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the participation of highland indigenous people in formal political institutions. In what follows, I will discuss the material which is available concerning political conditions and participation of indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru prior to the 1990s.

Until 1978 in Ecuador and 1980 in Peru, illiterates were not allowed to vote, nor to stand for election. As a result, a large part of the indigenous population in Ecuador and Peru did not enjoy full citizenship rights before this date. The limited scope of prior democratic regimes in these countries can be illustrated by the fact that in 1960 voters represented only 17.4 % of the population in Ecuador (Quintero and Silva 1991, vol.2: 143). In Peru, the electorate represented 18 % of the total population in 1963, while the figure rose to 30 % in 1980 (Lynch 1997: 129).

According to Guerrero (1993: 89), Ecuadorian indigenous peoples have been subject to an ambiguous legal position for most of this century as they have been counted as “nationals” but not as citizens. After the abolition of the Indian tribute in 1857 the state withdrew from the countryside, leaving administration to the local powers which were the haciendas and the church. This implied that indigenous peoples’ rights were delegated to the private sphere, and this situation lasted until the agrarian reform of 1964 (ibid). The consequence of this was that conflicts between indigenous people and local powers did not reach the national political scene, but were suffocated locally by means of “patio de hacienda justice” (ibid, 94). The highland indigenous peoples in a sense belonged to the hacienda. With regard to the rights of indigenous people working for haciendas in Peru, the situation seems to have been similar to the Ecuadorian case. According to Poole (in Guerrero 1993: 94), the hacienda system of Peru served to retain conflicts locally. While the majority of highland indigenous people worked for haciendas, more people lived in independent indigenous communities in Peru than in the Ecuador, and in 1920 these communities were legally recognised and their land declared inalienable (Remy 1994: 112). However, this legislation was often disrespected and state institutions remained weak in the Peruvian countryside (Ossio 1994: 78, Nickson 1995: 238).

Increased state penetration and the organisation of peasant movements sponsored by political parties of the left in the latter half of the 20th century in both Ecuador and Peru served to curb
the power of the hacienda owners and to bring about agrarian reforms, a process which went further in the Peruvian case. However, neither the agrarian reforms of the 1960s and 70s, nor the transitions to democracy and the extensions of the suffrage to include all adults in Ecuador and Peru, translated into any immediate increase in indigenous political representation in official politics in any of the countries. Sánchez (1996: 110), argues that in Ecuador indigenous persons can not hold political leadership posts within the parishes or the municipalities. He does not believe this is the case in Peru, with the possible exceptions of Andean departments such as Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cusco, Puno and Cajamarca (ibid). With the exception of Cajamarca, these are the exact departments which constitute “The Andean Trapeze”, the area in which the highest percentage of the Quechua and Aymara-speaking population is concentrated, indicating that the situation may not be much better in Peru. According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999), a Quechua-speaking Peruvian woman participating in the “First Encounter of Quechua-speaking Peoples of the Americas” in Cusco in November 1999, presented her argument in the following way: “Until now, when somebody like us presents him- or herself as political candidate for parliament, nobody would vote for him because everybody would say that this person doesn’t even know how to speak Spanish, he is not prepared, he is an Indian, he doesn’t know how to dress, he doesn’t have a good appearance, and he is not like white people and mestizos who are tall know how to behave” (my translation). Her conclusion was that Quechua-speaking people should vote for persons like themselves.

There is some evidence however, of highland indigenous representation at the submunicipal level in Peru. Nickson (1995: 246) stresses the strong tradition of community organisation in the Peruvian Andes, and argues that it is common practice that submunicipal official posts in the highlands are filled by traditional leaders who then coordinate voluntary agricultural or public works. These officials are not elected, but appointed by the mayor. To my knowledge, this has not been the practice in Ecuador. However, the political influence of Peruvian highland municipalities is limited: “The vast majority of the rural poor still live in district municipalities that fulfill a purely ceremonial role, receiving little income, employing very

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6 This was the first time in modern history an official meeting between Quechua-speaking peoples from different countries was organised, with participants from Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina and Peru. Issues discussed included the need for organisation and self-representation (La República, November 28th, 1999).
few staff, and carrying out hardly any service delivery activities whatsoever” (Nickson 1995: 267).

Lynch (1997: 133) argues that one of the main reasons why the Peruvian democratic system lost legitimacy throughout the 1980s was that political representatives who could “cholify” the political elite, or make it more similar to most people, did not emerge: “The differences of class and ethnicity separating citizens from their representatives also led to the failure to establish an institutionalized system of political responsibility allowing citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Ethnic and class differences created a distance which permitted politicians to feel that they were above public scrutiny, and that no one had the right to control them” (ibid). According to Montoya (1998: 165), indigenous people generally regard “politics” as synonymous with power, corruption and abuse, something which may discourage indigenous people from political involvement.

From the above discussion, it should be clear that highland indigenous peoples are politically disadvantaged in both Ecuador and Peru. However, it is not possible to tell whether highland indigenous peoples have been even more disadvantaged in any one of the countries. If political disadvantage increases ethnic divisions and provides an incentive for mobilisation, one would expect this incentive to be strong in both countries.

4.3 Discrimination of highland indigenous peoples

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, I believe that economic and political disadvantages are more likely to serve as incentives for indigenous mobilisation if they are coupled with continuing discrimination and exclusion on the part of non-indigenous groups. While the economic and political disadvantages of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru can be attributed to a long history of conquest, colonisation and exploitation, I am interested in investigating whether contemporary practices of discrimination can be seen as responsible for maintaining inequalities between indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups, and whether there are differences between the two countries with regard to the extent of discrimination. In what follows, I will therefore discuss evidence of discrimination of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru, focusing on the last decades. My expectation is that if
indigenous peoples see their disadvantage as a result of continuing discrimination and exclusion on the part of non-indigenous groups, this is likely to strengthen ethnic divisions and provide an incentive for mobilisation.

4.3.1 Defining discrimination

There is no generally agreed upon definition of what constitutes discrimination. A commonly used definition however, is the one provided by Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965, which states that:

In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

“Racial discrimination”, in the way it is used in the above definition as well as in everyday language, needs not rely on a belief in natural or biological races. Similarly, “racism” can be seen as “a discourse and practice of inferiorizing ethnic groups” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 12). A distinction is sometimes made between the so-called “scientific racism” which had it’s apogee at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, and the “new” or “cultural racism” which depends less on ideas of biological inferiority and more on ideas about deep cultural differences (Wade 1997: 21). This new understanding of racism may explain why concepts such as racism, ethnic discrimination, racial discrimination, and ethnic exclusion seem to be used almost interchangeably in contemporary language. If we as Eriksen (1993: 4-5) choose to see race as having little descriptive value in itself, as it rather serves as a possible dimension or marker of ethnicity, the most appropriate concept to use would be ethnic discrimination. Yet, as long as people discriminate on the basis of ideas of racial categories, the concepts of racial discrimination and racism can be more appropriate. Furthermore, by ignoring the discourse of race and collapsing it into ethnicity, one risks to gloss over the history of colonialism, discrimination and resistance which is more linked to the concept of race than to ethnicity (Wade 1997: 20-21). I will therefore discuss discrimination which can be described as both ethnic and racial. The point is that
discrimination is a practice of excluding, or treating persons differently because they belong to groups which are supposedly racial or ethnic.

A definition of discrimination should not only include direct discrimination, but also practices which have the outcome, if not the intention, to work differently on different categories of people (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 16). This is also the stance taken by the Centre to Combat Ethnic Discrimination (2000) which states that: “Indirect discrimination occurs where the effect of an apparently neutral criterion puts individuals of a particular racial or ethnic origin at an unjustifiable disadvantage.” The restriction on illiterate people’s right to vote in Ecuador prior to 1978, and in Peru prior to 1980 may provide examples of indirect discrimination. While the state could claim that the restriction only disfavoured illiterate people, the fact that indigenous people were much more likely than non-indigenous people to be illiterate (partly because Spanish is not their first language and partly because they are more likely to be poor), served to exclude the majority of the indigenous population from political participation.

The example points to another important aspect of discrimination which is that discrimination can, but need not be the result of public policy. Discrimination may also be the result of social practice, and such forms of discrimination are likely to be much more widespread. When members of an ethnic group have special problems in acquiring a job, in renting an apartment, or in getting access to public places, this is seldom due to discriminatory policies sanctioned by law, but rather a result of social practice based on prejudiced views against the group. In what follows, I will therefore consider both whether laws can be regarded as discriminatory, and the extent to which exclusion and discrimination of indigenous peoples can be seen as a result of social practice. It should be emphasised that the topic of discrimination is huge, and it is therefore not possible to give a comprehensive picture of discrimination in Ecuador and Peru in these pages. The idea is rather to find out whether differences in discrimination of indigenous people in Ecuador and Peru constitute a factor which can explain variation in highland indigenous mobilisation.
4.3.2 Evidence of discrimination in Ecuador and Peru

Discrimination proved to be a difficult topic to research as it is a theme ridden with taboos. It is a sensitive issue because it is linked to the fear of hurting and being hurt (Manrique 1999: 126). Among the Peruvian middle class it is taken as a sign of bad taste to touch upon the topic of racism (Portocarrero 1993: 208). The issue of racism and discrimination has also received limited academic interest in both Ecuador and Peru (Manrique 1999: 126; de la Torre 1996: 72), and there is a tendency to deny its existence (ibid). What is at stake then, is to “denaturalise racial discrimination as a social phenomenon that acquires characteristics of normality because it is not discussed” (de la Torre 1996: 72, my translation).

It has been possible to deny the existence of racism in Ecuador and Peru partly because discriminatory practices have not been sanctioned by law (de la Cadena 1998: 143), and partly because ethnic identity can be changed through *mestizaje*. The dismantling of the traditional hacienda system in the 1960s, and the removal of literacy requirements for voting with the transitions to democracy also implied that the most obvious forms of institutional discrimination ended in both Ecuador and Peru (de la Torre 1999: 94). According to Twanama (1992: 325), it is difficult to identify formal discriminatory aspects of Peruvian state institutions, and the problem is rather the norms guiding practice than the laws: “It seems like laws are not regarded as ready to be fulfilled, but as expressions of ideal conditions; their phrasing take the aspirations of the legislators into account and not the real world” (ibid, my translation). Similarly Mario Cabrera, director of ECUARUNARI / CONAIE in the province of Azuay (interview October 19th, 1999) complained that indigenous peoples were discriminated against in the sense that they were at the margins of laws which looked good on paper but were not accomplished. As discussed in chapter three, people I talked to in both Ecuador and Peru were generally sceptical about using laws as sources which could reveal discrimination. It was repeatedly stressed that laws and practice are two different things. In addition I was told that laws are not for the poor with reference to civil and political rights, or that laws are only for the poor with reference to punishment for criminal acts.

Referring to Ecuador, de la Torre (1999: 100) argues that discriminatory laws are unnecessary as indigenous peoples are constantly reminded of their subordinate rank through established social customs which are inherited from colonialism. After studying ethnic relations in the Ecuadorian highlands in the late 1960s, North American anthropologist Joseph Casagrande
(1981: 261) concluded: “Racism in Ecuador is institutionalized to a degree that would shock many oppressed people elsewhere. (…) That there have been few racial confrontations in highland Ecuador in recent years eloquently bespeaks the fact that Sierra Indians and non-Indians have learned their respective roles of submission and dominance extremely well and almost unthinkingly put them into practice.” An illustrative example can be that while no legislation relegated indigenous persons in Ecuador to the back of buses, this habit has until recently continued as an unspoken rule. A community leader from Cotopaxi told in an interview in the beginning of the 1990s that: “When I used to take a bus, I always went to the rear because I felt safer. I sincerely believed that the front seats were for whites or the superiors. I always went to the back” (de la Torre 1999: 100). This may indicate that after years of domination, negative stereotypes become internalised and thereby difficult to change.

However, in a world with increased international contact, increased education and spread of universalistic ideas of human rights, ethnic stratification is difficult to uphold (Horowitz 1985: 32), and both Ecuador and Peru have witnessed a certain democratisation of ethnic relations. According to Mario Cabrera, director of CONAIE / ECUARUNARI in the province of Azuay (interview October, 19th, 1999), the situation concerning discrimination in Ecuador has been improved a little since the 1960s and 1970s when indigenous peoples were completely excluded, but indigenous people’s access to education, jobs and politics is still restricted. This argument can be supported by de la Torre’s (1999) study of Ecuador which is based on in-depth interviews with 38 middle class highland indigenous men and women aged 20 to 40, and their experiences with discrimination. Most of the persons interviewed could tell stories of discrimination related to renting apartments, acquiring jobs, and in getting into restaurants and shopping centres, and it is particularly interesting that in these cases discrimination cannot be explained by social class. One person interviewed, an Otavalan indigenous merchant, told that he had been threatened with being kicked out of a car-dealer shop until he showed his pile of cash and convinced the salesman that he actually wanted to buy a car (de la Torre 1999: 103). In another example, two female indigenous students reported that they had been approached in a street in Quito and offered work as live-in maids, with the explanation that “people like you only come in search of work” (ibid, 101). The examples of discrimination are endless, and together they demonstrate that exclusion continues to be based on ideas of indigenous peoples as poor, “backward”, and unfit for intellectual work.
In a survey carried out at the end of the 1980s among more than 300 adolescents in Lima, representing both private and public schools, 82% replied “no” to the question of whether different cultures and races are treated equally in Peru (Twanama 1992: 214). In a national survey from 1993 conducted among adolescents aged 11-17 living in the ten major cities of Peru, 65.3% replied that there is racism in Peru, while 28% believed the opposite (Rädda Barnen 1993 in Manrique 1999: 27). What is interesting though, is that only 12.9% replied that indigenous people are most discriminated against, while 38.7% replied that black people are most discriminated against, and as much as 45.1% replied that “cholos” are most discriminated against. In addition, 90.9% replied that white people are most racist (ibid).

According to Manrique (1997: 27), the reduction of the importance attributed to anti-indigenous discrimination and the rise in the importance attributed to anti-mestizo discrimination among adolescents constitute a revolutionary change of mentalities. Furthermore, the overwhelming agreement that white people are most racist indicates strong social polarisation (ibid).

It is striking that “cholos” emerge as the group which is most discriminated against in Peru. While I have not found any explicit reference to discrimination of cholos in Ecuador, the percentage who think cholos are most discriminated against in Peru is more than three times higher than the percentage who think indigenous people are most discriminated against. This also illustrates the reconstitution of ethnic boundaries in Peru: “Racism has not disappeared. While racism used to be predominantly anti-indigenous, it has developed into a racism which is first of all directed towards the mestizo sectores of the population” (Manrique 1999: 28, my translation). On one occasion during my fieldwork I observed this kind of discrimination when a family with indigenous features and western clothes were denied access to Larcomar, a centre of restaurants, cinemas, and luxury shops at seaside Lima, by an armed guard who to me looked very similar to the ones that were denied entrance. In the same year (1999), the Judicial Power also supported Lima discotheques which were accused of excluding people on the basis of their physical features, invoking “freedom of the market” (Manrique 1999: 28).

In Peru, persons who would probably prefer to identify as Peruvians with no further reference to ethnicity continue to be discriminated against on the basis of their appearance. While it might be easier to escape the indigenous category through social mobility and the learning of dominant culture in Peru than in Ecuador, popular ideas of race and culture continue to serve as a basis for discrimination against those who are considered “cholo”. Twanama (1992: 221)
defines this form of discrimination as *cholo*; “discrimination of somebody who is considered racially inferior due to his or her Indian ancestors, but who is also evaluated through consideration of socio-economic situation, educational-linguistic aspects, and migrant condition” (my translation).

According to de la Cadena (1998: 144) “race” was discarded as a valid scientific concept in Peru in the 1940s and replaced by “culture” among the official intelligentsia, and “class” among intellectuals of the opposition. In the period 1960-1980, class rhetoric came to dominate as the leftist opposition dismissed race and culture as “false consciousness”, and the state started to use economic definitions to classify the population (ibid). *Campesino* (peasant) replaced “indigenous” in official terminology as it was argued that the latter term could be considered racist (Ossio 1994: 39). However, while social conflict in Peru came to be explained in terms of class and culture, the old racial stereotypes continued to influence these very concepts: “Disavowing biologically defined race, while simultaneously considering that exclusions legitimately resulted from ‘natural’ cultural features or ‘inevitable’ class hierarchies, intellectuals are trapped in a discourse of silent racism” (de la Cadena 1998: 144). While most people avoid using the concept of race, the idea of “natural” differences thus remains strong in Peru.

Discrimination can be difficult to detect in Peru because it is denied. Manrique (1999: 126) has proposed that Peruvians who are discriminated against may have trouble admitting it to themselves (not to speak of to other people), as this would imply an acknowledgement of being “different”. The result can be that discrimination is turned into individual shame rather than confrontation with the racist aggressors. Discrimination also seems to be more multidirectional in Peru than in Ecuador. According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999), “cholo” is an insult used against people in Lima who come from the highlands, look indigenous and speak bad Spanish. However, when the children of these people grow up and speak perfect Spanish they will be mestizos, and in turn use the word “cholo” to insult new migrants from the highlands, even if this implies denying part of their background. The bottom line seems to be a set of ideas which are colonial in origin: “the belief that ‘the best’ comes from developed countries, that Indians and blacks are inferior to whites, and that the road to progress demands the adoption of the cultural universe of Western societies” (Panfichi 1997: 229).
Various authors have proposed that racism and exclusion represent crucial explanatory factors of the Shining Path which emerged in the Andean province of Ayacucho (Montoya 1991: 159, Manrique 1999: 25). While this dogmatic, Marxist guerrilla organisation has encountered little support among the indigenous peasants, the backbone of the organisation has been made up of young people from the Andean provinces who entered universities in the 1960s-70s, then dominated by Marxism. Their background as lower middle-class, provincial, and non-white worked against social mobility, and a social revolution may have appeared as the only solution to Peru’s problems. According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999), Shining Path transformed the hatred, the bitterness, and the anger into a violent reaction against racism, into a political element which mobilised people. In this sense, discrimination may have provided an incentive for class-based mobilisation in Peru, just as discrimination has provided an incentive for indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador. If this interpretation is correct, discrimination in itself does not explain why one would get an indigenous movement defined in ethnic terms in one case, and a class-based organisation in the other. The task would rather be to explain how different forms of integration, and different organisational processes produce different ethnic boundaries and accordingly different forms of discrimination. Integration and nation-building policies pursued by the state will be the issue of the next chapter, while organisational processes will be discussed in chapter six.

To summarise this section on discrimination, I would argue that contemporary discrimination can be seen as responsible for maintaining inequalities in both Ecuador and Peru, but because ethnic boundaries seem to be constituted somewhat differently in the two countries, discrimination takes different forms. It is thus not so much a question of differences with regard to the extent of discrimination, but rather a question of difference with regard to the form of discrimination. In Ecuador discrimination is first of all directed at the indigenous population, while “cholos” are most discriminated against in Peru. Discrimination has been cited as an incentive for indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador, and since discrimination in Peru seems to be interpreted just as much in terms of class as in terms of ethnicity, it may provide an incentive for class mobilisation. It is important to note however, that the concept of class seems to be informed by ideas of race and culture.
4.4 Main findings

In the beginning of this chapter I stated the proposition that if highland indigenous peoples are disadvantaged and discriminated against, this is likely to increase the importance of ethnic identity and provide an incentive for mobilisation. This proposition is not confirmed by my material. Ethnic identification in Ecuador and Peru can be seen as a result of colonial encounters, explaining the strong correlation between ethnicity and class. Indigenous peoples are clearly disadvantaged in both Ecuador and Peru with regard to income, education and political representation. However, while education and social mobility seem to lead to the abandonment of indigenous identity in Peru, Ecuador has since the end of the 1970s witnessed the growth of an indigenous middle class. To the extent that this Ecuadorian indigenous elite has been important for indigenous mobilisation, the expected relationship between ethnic divisions and disadvantage is turned on its head: it is when indigenous people acquire more resources that indigenous mobilisation becomes more likely. In Peru, ethnic divisions seem to be overshadowed by class cleavages.

There are serious problems of discrimination in both countries, but while indigenous peoples are the most discriminated against in Ecuador, “cholos” are the most discriminated against in Peru. To the extent that discrimination provides an incentive for mobilisation, this difference may explain why indigenous identity has served as a basis for mobilisation in Ecuador, while class has taken precedence over ethnicity in Peru. The different forms of discrimination seem in turn to be related to a difference in the constitution of ethnic boundaries, and different forms of national integration pursued by the Ecuadorian and Peruvian state. State- and nation-building policies pursued by the state is the subject of the next chapter.
5. State- and nation-building policies pursued by the state

This chapter will focus on the interaction between highland indigenous peoples and the state in Ecuador and Peru, and in particular on how state policies of national integration, education policies, and land policies have affected highland indigenous peoples. The general proposition is that state- and nation-building policies which ignore indigenous peoples’ cultures and need for land increase the likeliness of highland indigenous mobilisation.

As ethnic revitalisation is often a reaction to modernisation and increased cultural homogenisation (Eriksen 1993b: 340), I will first see if any differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the timing of processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, expansion of health and education, and geographic and social mobility. The expectation is that increased contact between indigenous peoples and non-indigenous groups as a result of such modernisation processes, increases the likeliness of highland indigenous mobilisation. Then, in the following section, I will study state attempts at assimilation and/or integration, and the content of nation-building ideologies. The proposition is that nation-building ideologies which ignore the cultures and identities of indigenous peoples are more likely to serve as incentives for mobilisation than more inclusive nation-building ideologies. The third indicator will be concerned with investigating how nation-building ideologies are reflected in education. If indigenous identities, languages, and cultures are denigrated or ignored in education, this is likely to provide an incentive for mobilisation. Finally, I will discuss state-indigenous relations with regard to land. Since land can be a vital resource for ethnic survival, the expectation is that the less access highland indigenous peoples have to land, the stronger the incentive for mobilisation.

5.1 Timing of modernisation processes

If ethnic revitalisation and mobilisation can be seen as a reaction to modernisation processes, one should expect that the timing of such processes are important to explain indigenous mobilisation. Increased contact between different groups is likely to increase the awareness of ethnic differences, and it may also sharpen conflicts of interests. I will therefore discuss whether differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the timing of
modernisation processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, the expansion of health and education, and geographic and social mobility. I will first look at political development and then discuss indicators of structural change.

5.1.1 Political developments

There seems to be general agreement that processes which are referred to as modernisation only started to accelerate in the middle of the 20th century in both Ecuador and Peru. A stratification system reminiscent of colonialism was to a large extent preserved in Peru until the beginning of the 1960s, when peasants movements started to invade land and press the democratic government of Belaúnde for agrarian reforms (Starn 1995: 255), and in Ecuador until the 1964 agrarian reform abolished forced labour at the haciendas (Zamosc 1994: 42). The latter half of the 20th century has been a period of great changes in both countries, and in Ecuador the years 1964-1979 has been called “the period of modernisation” (Chiriboga 1987: 87), while Starn et al. (1995: 255), refers to the 1956-1978 period in Peru as “the break-up of the old order”.

In the periods of modernisation referred to above, no governments have been more concerned with implementing structural changes than the military government of Velasco Alvarado in Peru (1968-75) and the military government of Rodriguez Lara in Ecuador (1972-76). Both regimes aimed at economic modernisation, social reform, and integration of the lower social classes, and they considered it necessary to curb the power of the oligarchy to achieve this end (Isaacs 1993: 59). Isaacs compares these regimes in Ecuador and Peru to the regimes of Ataturk in Turkey (1923-60) and Nasser in Egypt (1952-67) as examples of populist-authoritarian regimes aiming at modernisation: They “envisioned a critical role for the armed forces in facilitating a developmental process that emphasised agricultural modernisation, industrial development and attention to the welfare of the poorer sectors of society” (ibid). She thus believes that a comparison between the Ecuadorian and the Peruvian radical military regimes is “apposite” due to the geographical closeness, the timing of the reforms, and the conservative reaction which followed in both countries. Furthermore, Ecuadorian officials travelled to Peru to seek advice from their military colleagues on a number of policy matters.
“The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces” in Peru seized power from the democratically elected Fernando Belaúnde (1963-8) (Starn et al 1995: 256). However, the aim was not to restore the oligarchical order, but to carry out Belaúnde’s promised land reforms which were obstructed by the conservatives in parliament (ibid). The military wanted to create a new economic order which was neither capitalist nor communist, promoting justice and harmony between the different social classes, thereby attaining the characteristics of a corporate state (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 217). They used a radical discourse, nationalised foreign companies, created a system of popular organisations termed the National System for Support of Social Mobilisation (SINAMOS), granted property titles to shanty-town dwellers in Lima, and launched a radical agrarian reform (ibid, 217-19).

The Ecuadorian military regime took over from the conservative populist president Velasco Ibarra, just before elections were to be held in 1972. State revenues from oil sale were increasing as new oil fields had been discovered in the Amazon, and the military feared that the oil revenues would be squandered by a disorganised and corrupt civilian regime (Isaacs 1993: 25). In February, Velasco was sent into exile, and the military headed by General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara announced a “revolutionary and nationalist government of the armed forces” (Isaacs 1993: 11). The military saw itself as more fit to overcome group interests and achieve national development than a civilian regime, and regarded the increased revenues as a golden opportunity for modernisation (ibid). The former president of Velasco had done little to alter the status quo. When asked by a journalist how he could stay in power without promoting social reform, the reply was: “Sir, do you think that if I had introduced reform I would have lasted in power another five minutes?” (In Isaacs 1993: 19).

However, the Ecuadorian military regime did not go as far as the Peruvian regime in its reform efforts. The Ecuadorian military demonstrated a more conciliatory attitude to foreign capital and domestic elites (Isaacs 1993: 74), especially visible with regard to agrarian reform, which will be further discussed in section 5.4. It should be noted that in terms of policy outcomes there are important similarities between Ecuador and Peru: “Neither the Peruvian redistributive emphasis nor the equitable growth strategy adopted in Ecuador succeeded in significantly improving the welfare of the poorest sectors of society” (ibid, 60). It was the middle sectors who benefited most from reforms. With regard to structural change, it can be difficult to assess the effect of specific state policies. Bearing in mind the political
developments in Ecuador and Peru in the 1960s and 70s, I now turn to discuss statistical indicators of change related to modernisation during the same period.

5.1.2 Indications of structural change in the period of modernisation

In 1960 agriculture still employed the largest part of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian workforce with 53% in Peru and 58% in Ecuador (World Bank 1980: 146). In comparison, 19% of the workforce were employed by industry in both countries, and services employed 28% in Peru and 23% in Ecuador (ibid). The majority of the population lived in rural areas in both countries, but the urban population had already reached 46% in Peru compared to only 34% in Ecuador (ibid, 148).

By 1978 the situation had changed. That year more people in Peru were employed in services (40%) than in agriculture (39%), and industry was employing 21% (ibid, 146). In Ecuador agriculture was still the largest sector with 46% compared to only 29% in services, but more people were employed in industry than in Peru with 25% (ibid). The greatest differences between the two countries were thus the percentage of the workforce employed by services and the degree of urbanisation: In 1978 as much as 67% of the population were living in urban areas in Peru compared to 45% in Ecuador (ibid, 148). The Peruvian capital of Lima experienced a steady influx from the middle of this century, and in 1980, 39% of Peru’s population of 17 millions were living in Lima (ibid). This indicates that radical agrarian reform in Peru did not halt the migration from the rural highlands to the coast. In Ecuador, the largest urban concentrations were the capital of Quito in the highlands and coastal Guayaquil, which had about 1.2 and 1.5 million inhabitants respectively in the beginning of the 1990s (Murphy 1997a: 84, 233) While the above numbers demonstrate that Ecuador remained a more rural and less urbanised country than Peru throughout the 1970s, there are important similarities with regard to the timing of industrialisation.

Social conditions also improved in the 1960s and 70s. In 1960, life expectancy at birth was 48 years in Peru and 51 years in Ecuador (ibid, 150). By 1977, it had risen to 56 years in Peru and 60 years in Ecuador (ibid), and in 1990 life expectancy at birth was 63 years in Peru and 66 years in Ecuador (UNDP 1991: 126). There were also great improvements in education. In
1960, 83% of the children aged 6-11 were enrolled in primary school in both Ecuador and Peru, while 12% of the children aged 12-17 were enrolled in secondary school in Ecuador and 15% were enrolled in secondary school in Peru (World Bank 1980: 154). Furthermore, 4% were enrolled in higher education in Peru and 3% were enrolled in higher education in Ecuador in 1960 (ibid). A couple of decades later, the situation had changed dramatically. In 1978, 110% were enrolled in primary school in Peru and 101% in Ecuador, while 52% were enrolled in secondary school in Peru and 44% in Ecuador (ibid). (The percentages of 110 and 101 in primary schools are probably explained by the enrolment of adults and older children without prior education). By the years 1986-88, 25.5% were enrolled in higher education in Peru, and 29.3% were enrolled in higher education in Ecuador (UNDP 1991: 146). The educational systems of both Ecuador and Peru were thus greatly extended, and this is particularly visible in secondary and higher education. As with industrialisation, Ecuador and Peru demonstrate a parallel development with regard to education, and the increase in secondary and higher education should imply increased social mobility in both countries.

The crucial question is how political development and structural changes have affected the indigenous peoples of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Andes. As with the indicators of poverty and development discussed in chapter four, only national statistics exist and there is little information on the situation of the indigenous peoples. According to Eriksen (1993b: 340), modernisation processes increase the likeliness of ethnic mobilisation because increased contact threatens minorities’ identities, make people more aware of ethnic differences, and also because modernisation may give minorities resources to affirm their identity.

There is no doubt that contact and interaction have increased in Ecuador and Peru as a result of structural changes. Sánchez (1996: 111) argues that while most of the highland indigenous peoples in Peru used to work and live in haciendas, in indigenous communities, or in mining communities, they have gone through a process which involves demographic growth, expansion of the education system, appropriation of the Spanish language, migration to provincial cities and to Lima, and a massive diversification of occupations. Similar processes have taken place in Ecuador, and Sánchez (1994: 330) claims that Ecuadorian highland indigenous peoples are as integrated into the national market as Peruvian highland indigenous peoples because communications and infrastructure are better in the Ecuadorian highlands. As discussed in chapter four, Ecuador has also seen the emergence of an indigenous middle class.
since the end of the 1970s. A number of indigenous persons have acquired higher education and high status jobs in Peru as well, but they then seem to abandon their indigenous identity.

5.1.3 Modernisation processes and ethnic boundaries

Contrary to expectations, there seems to be an inverse relationship between modernisation processes and ethnic affirmation in Peru, while affirmation of indigenous identity has accompanied modernisation processes in Ecuador. Degregori (1993: 120) describes the effects of modernisation processes on ethnic identities in Peru in the following way: “While the interethnic boundaries became more porous and ethnic identities became more fluid, the lowest stairs of the Peruvian ethnic pyramid started to disappear in front of the observer’s eyes. To express it in brutal terms: Nobody wants to be Indian. I am not pretending to ‘naturalise’ a phenomenon behind which agonising pain and merciless oppression is easily hidden. I am stating a fact, and I ask myself why?” (my translation).

In a study of local government in the highland province of Ayacucho ten mayors were interviewed about self-identification in the mid 1990s (Degregori 1998: 29-30). They were all bilingual Quechua-Spanish, seven of them had Quechua as their mother tongue, six of them had Quechua family names, and six of them came from peasant communities. However, only two of them identified themselves in ethnic terms, and then only as cholo. The other eight identified themselves as Peruvians, or with reference to their district or job. This can support Degregori’s (1993: 121) argument that in Peru, the demand for “national integration” also comes from below and thus attains a democratising flavour. However, it seems like most Peruvian as well as foreign scholars, agree that indigenous identities have not disappeared in the Peruvian Andes. Rather, ethnic identities have become relegated to a second stage, or they have become “hidden and latent” (Sánchez 1996: 91).

In Ecuador social and economic integration processes have been accompanied by a reaffirmation of highland indigenous identities: “Far from de-indianising to become integrated as mestizos into the national project, they have revitalised enormously” (Ramón 1993: 231, my translation). To summarise Ramón’s argument, it seems like the more schooling indigenous peoples get, and the better they speak Spanish, the more self-conscious they
become. The more land they obtain, and the better off they get, the stronger become their family networks, authority systems, and elements of cultural communication. The more Christian they become, the more rebellious they get, and the more they use the electoral political system, the more they see the limits of the dominant groups’ national project (ibid). According to Guerrero (1998: 118), indigenous people who move to the urban areas on the coast, change their way of life, and stop using traditional clothes do not cease to be identified as indigenous. The ethnic boundary between white people and mestizos on the one hand and indigenous people on the other, is also imagined as a boundary between citizens and subjects who are to be civilised, and it is continually reproduced in the context of modernisation and rural-urban migration (ibid). The level of ethnic segmentation thus seems to be higher in Ecuador than in Peru.

The above account of political development and structural change in Ecuador and Peru indicates that differences in the timing of modernisation processes between these two countries are small, and thus unlikely to account for differences in highland indigenous mobilisation. The most notable difference is that Ecuador has remained a more rural country, and to the extent that connection to the land is important for the preservation of indigenous identities, this may have played a role in indigenous ethnic affirmation. However, also in urban areas in Ecuador do indigenous people seem to retain their indigenous identities. I now turn to the content of nation-building policies to see if differences can be found between Ecuador and Peru with regard to state policies of cultural homogenisation.

5.2 The content of nation-building ideologies

The proposition is that nation-building ideologies which ignore the cultures and identities of indigenous peoples are more likely to serve as incentives for mobilisation than more inclusive nation-building ideologies. In what follows, I will discuss whether state elites in Ecuador and Peru have promoted different kinds of national identities and national symbols, and whether this can contribute to an explanation of differences in highland indigenous mobilisation.

While state attempts at nation-building date back to independence in Ecuador and Peru, the need for unifying national ideologies was heightened by the modernisation processes of the
20th century. In the latter half of the 20th century, national ideologies which favoured homogenisation through mestizaje (mixture) became more pronounced in both Ecuador and Peru. Mestizaje may refer to biological as well as cultural mixture, and the expectation has been that mestizaje would lead to the disappearance of ethnic differences in favour of common national identities. The relative contribution of criollo (Spanish) and indigenous elements is generally contested in Latin American countries pursuing ideologies of mestizaje. According to Sánchez (1994: 344), mestizaje has taken different forms in Ecuador and Peru, and he believes this is due to a greater concern with the indigenous past through the influence of indigenismo in the Peruvian case. I will therefore first discuss the origins of indigenismo in Ecuador and Peru, and then discuss the national identities and symbols which have been promulgated by state elites, with emphasis on the latter half of last century.

5.2.1 Indigenismo in Ecuador and Peru

Following the Mexican revolution (1910-20) there was an increased interest in indigenous peoples, folk traditions, and national history all over Latin America, and this was reflected in art, literature and politics (Vargas Llosa 1996: 63). Indigenismo as a political ideology developed in the 1920s and covers various perspectives, but the general concern is with elaborating special policies to protect or integrate indigenous peoples: “The central notion was that indians needed special recognition and that special values attached to them. Very often, it was a question of exotic and romantic symbolism, based more on the glorification of the pre-Columbian indian ancestry of the nation than on respect for contemporary indian populations” (Wade 1997: 32). According to Degregori (1978: 37-39), indigenismo is characterised by a glorification of the past, exoticism, paternalism and populism that to varying degrees are present in the writings of indigenistas.

As early as 1888, the Peruvian poet and cultural critic Manuel Gonzalez Prada declared that Peru is a nation of Indians (Starn et al. 1995: 191), thereby foreshadowing the Peruvian indigenista movement of the 1920s. It was first of all an intellectual movement headed by people of Spanish descent and mestizos, and it was strongest in Cusco, the capital of the Inca empire. The indigenista movement in Peru was also inspired by socialism, and it thus took on a radical flavour. Three names stand out in this context, Luis Valcárcel, José Carlos
Mariátegui, and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, as their ideas and writings have had a lasting impact on how indigenous peoples are conceived of in Peru (see Vargas Llosa 1996: 66).

In 1927, Valcárcel published *Tempest in the Andes* in which he predicted that an “Indian Lenin” would lead a “tempest in the Andes” which would liberate the Indian majorities and restore Indian hegemony and Cusco as the true capital of Peru (in Starn 1995: 218-19). He claimed that a cardinal truth had been denied, namely that “Peru is a nation of Indians” (ibid, 222): “For ten thousand years, the Indian has been the only worker in Peru… The Indian did it all, while the mestizo idled and the white gave himself over to his pleasures” (ibid, 219). According to Valcárcel, the indigenous race is biologically and culturally superior to the Spanish, and he showed little respect for the coast and the capital of Lima as the Andean highlands represent the “real” Peru: “The modern virus of elegant parasitism penetrates Peru through the open door of its Europeanized capital”, he argued (ibid, 220). Valcárcel has been called “the father of ethnology” in Peru, as he in 1946 founded the Institute of Ethnology at the University of San Marcos in Lima, while serving as Minister of education (Vargas Llosa 1996: 167).

In contrast to Valcárcel, José Carlos Mariátegui was less concerned with race and culture than with the economic situation of the Indians (Vargas Llosa 1996: 67) Wedding *indigenismo* and socialism, he argued that only a socialist revolution and the replacement of a feudal/capitalist society with Marxist collectivism could bring justice to the descendants of the Incas (ibid). Mariátegui saw the Indians as the cement of the nation, and he believed the communal work system of the indigenous community called *ayllu* would provide the foundation for Peruvian socialism (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 210). Interpreting the complaints about the degeneracy of the indigenous race as a mask for feudal interests, Mariátegui argued that the problem of the Indian was fundamentally economic as it was a problem of land: “The Indian question derives from our economy. It has its roots in the system of land tenure. Every effort to solve it with administrative or protective measures, with educational methods and road building projects, represents a superficial labor as long as the feudalism of the great landowners exist” (in Skidmore and Smith, ibid). Mariátegui launched an influential journal called *Amauta* in 1926 which became the main exponent of *indigenista* discussions, he helped to found a Socialist Party in 1929, and in 1930, the year of his premature death, his most important writings were published in *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (ibid). Until the present day, Peruvian political parties of the left, from the United Left to the Shining Path,
claim legacy to Mariátegui who remains one of Latin America’s most influential socialist thinkers.

The final author who should be mentioned in this context is Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. As a student leader he was exiled to Mexico in 1924, where he founded the Popular Revolutionary Alliance of America (APRA) which has become the most enduring political party in Peru (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 210). The aprista ideology of anti-imperialism, Latin American unity, solidarity with the poor, and state-led capitalism earned the party widespread support from the middle sectors and the coastal plantation workers of Peru (ibid). While Haya de la Torre was more moderate than Mariátegui, he shared many of his views about the problems of the indigenous peoples. According to Vargas Llosa (1996: 70-71), Haya de la Torre’s denunciations against the exploitation of Indians and his use of indigenista symbolism made the middle sectors aware of indigenous peoples’ problems, and served to put indigenous issues on the political agenda. In a speech in his 1931 presidential election campaign (he lost to the conservative Sánchez Cerro) he stated: “Even after 110 years of independence, forgotten are the true inheritors and masters of this land, the three million indigenous people who know neither how to read nor how to write…we must fight for the ‘Peruvianization’ of the state and the economic incorporation of our majorities, the nation’s vital force and the ones who have a right to take part in the direction of our destiny because of their great number and ability” (in Starn et al. 1995: 242).

The radical indigenista movement of the 1920s in Peru has no parallel in Ecuador. Ecuador experienced a period of literary indigenismo, mainly in the years 1930-50 (Becker 1995: 7-8), but indigenismo as an ideology had very little political influence. Pío Jaramillo Alvarado who wrote El indio ecuatoriano (The Ecuadorian Indian) in 1922 has been considered the founder of indigenismo in Ecuador, and in the years 1941-60 he served as director of the Instituto Indigenista Ecuatoriano which worked to improve indigenous people’s living conditions (Becker 1995: 5). However, this institute received little funding, and as most indigenistas of this period Jaramillo believed that the solution to the problem of exploitation of indigenous peoples was assimilation and the adoption of “modern” ways of life (ibid).

According to Sánchez (1994: 344), Ecuadorian intellectuals have generally ignored the problems of indigenous peoples as they have been more concerned with defending either the Spanish/European foundation of the nation, or the Latin American mestizo who is culturally
“Westernised”. The explanation for this seems to be that in contrast to their Peruvian counterparts, Ecuadorian intellectuals have not identified with the great Inca empire (ibid, 345). A similar argument is presented by Becker (1995: 8): "In Ecuador, which lacked such a tradition of large indigenous civilizations, for the most part people saw the Indigenous past as something which needed to be overcome rather than affirmed. If the indigenistas in Ecuador could not identify elements of Indigenous society in their country that were worthy of defence, it is only logical that they would favour assimilation and acculturation in order to improve the situation”. In Ecuador, the Inca empire also has a more negative ring because it is associated with Peruvian imperialism. Ecuadorians fear Peruvian invasion, and in 1941, Ecuador lost more than half of its territory to Peru, namely the Amazon areas in the south (Isaacs 1993: 2). For Peruvian intellectuals however, it was impossible to disregard both the “golden age” of the Inca empire and the strong indigenous component of the population.

5.2.2 Indigenismo, mestizaje and nation-building by political elites

The indigenistas did come to have a certain political influence in Peru, although it can be claimed that they influenced political rhetoric more than practical policy (Vargas Llosa 1996: 165). Some indigenistas worked for the regime of Augusto Leguía (1919-30), and contributed to the legal recognition of indigenous communities and communal land rights in 1920 (Remy 1994: 111-112). The aim of the government was to bring the indigenous population into the market and to extend state control over the territory by curbing the power of hacienda owners, and the legalisation of indigenous communities was accompanied by a radical anti-landlord and pro-indigenous discourse (ibid). By 1930, 321 indigenous communities were legally recognised, and thousands of lawsuits were launched to recuperate land lost to hacienda-owners (ibid). However, the new legislation was often disregarded, and the hacienda system continued to expand (Ossio 1994: 78). Skidmore and Smith (1997: 208) argue that: “Despite public rhetoric, peasants and Indians had no genuine place in the Leguía coalition.” An Indian uprising was violently crushed by the army in 1923, and indigenous men suffered disproportionately from the “highway conscription” which forced them to build roads and railways without being paid (ibid). The main contribution of the Leguía government was thus the new legislation which at least made it formally possible for indigenous communities to defend their land rights.
While the dictatorial governments which held power in Peru in the 1930s and 40s were more conservative and “Hispanicist” than the Leguía government (Starn et al. 1995: 255), *indigenismo* had a new apogee with the election of the APRA-backed president Bustamente y Rivero in 1945 (Vargas Llosa 1996: 167). Luis Valcárcel became minister of education, and he founded both the Museum of Culture, and the Institute of Ethnology at the University of San Marcos which became a driving force for indigenous studies (ibid). Following these events, seminars were held, books and journals were published on indigenous history and culture, and *indigenismo* inspired school textbooks and political speeches. The 1940s-50s have also been called “the golden period of folklore” due to an increased interest in indigenous music and art, and the restoration of Inca festivals (ibid, 167-8). On June 24th, 1944 the Inca sun festival of *Inti Raymi* was celebrated in Cusco for the first time since 1535, recuperated by Cusco intellectuals on the basis of chroniclers and historical documents. However, Vargas Llosa (1996: 165) argues that the official doctrine of *indigenismo* with its’ celebration of Peru’s indigenous past never took hold outside academic and artistic circles, and regional centers promoting folklore: “In general, the white continued to feel white, taking pride in their European ancestry and deprecating the Indians, and these responded with bitterness and hatred accumulated through centuries of exploitation and abuse” (ibid, 166, my translation). Rather than serving as a unifying national ideology as in Mexico, Vargas Llosa argues that *indigenismo* remained a superficial decoration of Peruvian society and culture (ibid, 167).

National integration through cultural homogenisation never ceased to be the aim of Peruvian state elites, and despite the exaltation of indigenous cultural elements it was first of all the indigenous peoples who would have to assimilate to a “national culture”. This is clear with regard to the government of Belaúnde (1963-8). While urging Peruvians to be inspired by the greatness of the Incas (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 216), the “National plan for integration of the aboriginal population report” (the Department of work and indigenous affairs 1965: 4) reads: “To synthesise, we have the national society and culture and the indigenous society and culture. The latter is moving towards the first in a process of acculturation”. The report also stated that about 50 % of the Peruvian population was not yet part of national society and culture (ibid, 1). The expectation that indigenous peoples would become “acculturated” was shared by the political right and the political left of the time, and the latter stressed the solidarity of the working class and the irrelevance of ethnic differences.
The radical military government of Velasco (1968-75) has been termed *indigenista* (Ossio 1994: 78; Becker 1995: 3; Sánchez 1996: 91) or *neo-indigenista* (Degregori 1978: 247), and in no Peruvian government has the paradoxical combination of celebration of indigenous cultural elements and attempts at homogenisation been more clear. The radical agrarian reform of 1969 liquidated the hacienda system in the Peruvian highlands. Evoking the image of Túpac Amaru who led an indigenous rebellion at the end of the 16th century, Velasco declared in a famous television speech, launching the agrarian reform in June 1969: “To the men of the land, we can now say in the immortal and liberating voice of Túpac Amaru: Peasant: The Master will no longer feed of your poverty” (in Starn et al. 1995: 269).

According to Montoya (1998: 157), the reform implied that the indigenous peasants got access to “their first parcels of citizenship”. In 1975, the government also made Quechua and Aymara official languages of Peru, and Bourricaud (1975: 381) argues that these steps made “the Indian” a symbol of national unity. According to Lynch (1997: 129) the reforms “forced ‘official Peru’ to consider the peasants as Peruvians”.

While the agrarian reform evoked indigenous symbolism and met indigenous people’s demand for land, the paradox is that it also “officialized the disappearance of Indians as Indians, recognizing them instead only as peasants” (Barre 1985: 53). In the television speech referred to above, Velasco stated: “The Agrarian Reform gives its support to the great multitude of peasants who today belong to indigenous communities and from this day forward – abandoning unacceptable racist habits and prejudices – will be called Peasant Communities (*Comunidades Campesinas*)” (in Starn et al. 1995: 267-8). It should be noted that this change of name did not provoke any resistance, rather indigenous people were celebrating that they would no longer be Indians in the sense of being serfs (Montoya 1998: 157). It is possible that the motives of the Velasco regime were high-minded, and that the intention was to combine increased equality for all Peruvians with respect for cultural pluralism. Yet, Degregori (1978: 248) suggests that the main aim was to neutralise or control the indigenous peasantry, which had increased its political protest activities under the former government of Belaúnde.

While the fall of the Velasco regime implied a decline in state-supported cultural pluralism (Degregori 1993: 122), and a restoration of more conservative political forces, it is also clear that the democratically elected governments of the 1980s had to take the new *campesino* electorate into consideration. After the APRA-candidate Alán García won the presidential election in 1985, he travelled the Peruvian highlands to engage in dialogues with the leaders
of peasant communities. As can be read from the following excerpts, his speeches resonate with the ideas of the radical indigenistas of the 1920s.7

“This Assembly is the most genuine, it is the most authentic, is the best of what my government has done until today, because for the first time we reach the most profound, what is the historic base of our nationality; because before the community there was nothing in Peru, later comes the Municipality and the Republic, but first there was the community” (1987: 69). “The government sustains that in the Andes we find the destiny, the historic key of Peru” (ibid, 71). “We unite with the presidents of the comunidades campesinas…to root the Peruvian state and the new government in the most profound of Peruvian history, in the most authentic of national reality… Together with all of you  we will form a force of action that will help Peru to go forward again” (ibid, 205). “Vivan las comunidades campesinas, Viva el pueblo peruano! Viva el Perú!” (ibid, 83).

The speeches indicate that it is the indigenous peasants who are the most “authentic” Peruvians and that they are the future of the nation. A somewhat similar message seems to be expressed by the electoral slogan of Fujimori in 1990: “chinitos y cholitos en contra los blanquitos” (Asians and cholos against the whites) (Degregori 1993: 124, note 15). Ossio (1994: 53-5) argues that in the Andean highlands Peruvians who belong to the urban elites are often seen as gringos or Spanish, in opposition to “authentic Peruvians”. When indigenous peasants in the Peruvian highlands have preferred to call themselves campesinos rather than indígenas to the present day (interview with professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya November 30th, 1999), this may be because they see themselves as genuine Peruvians rather than as members of an ethnically different minority.

In contrast to the situation in Peru, I have not found any author who claims that Ecuador is a nation of Indians, nor have any indigenistas questioned the ideology of mestizaje as progressive “whitening”. According to Becker (1995: 8), Ecuador has never, in contrast to countries such as Mexico and Peru, had a national administration assuming an ideology of indigenismo. Stutzman (1981: 54) argues that in the 150 years following independence, the ethnic diversity of the Ecuadorian state did not evoke much concern from political elites. From the 1960s onwards however, the state became more active in promoting a unifying national identity: “In recent years, the national leadership, motivated by the belief that blanqueamiento [whitening] is both necessary and inevitable, has initiated programs designed to reduce the broad cultural, linguistic, and lifestyle differences that still exist” (ibid). The

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7 The dialogues were compiled and published in 1987 in Rimankuy ’86 – Hablan los campesinos del Perú by Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos “Bartolomé de las Casas”, Cusco. All translations are mine.
Ecuadorian national who would be the end product of this homogenisation does not retain any indigenous cultural elements. Rather, it is a question of making blacks and indigenous peoples “more urban, more Christian, more civilized; less rural, less black, less Indian” (Whitten 1981: 15). Similarly, Clark (1998: 206) argues that “to become full Ecuadorians, Indians would have to conform to the white-mestizo cultural, social, political and economic norms”.

While the Ecuadorian state promoted modernisation and cultural homogenisation, it did not refer to indigenous peoples and cultures directly. According to Ibarra (1992: 176-7), words such as “indigenous” and “indigenous culture” were virtually absent from political discourse in the period 1964-77, as indigenous issues were subsumed under campesino issues. Yet, the campesino discourse did in general not take hold among the highland indigenous peoples. Belote and Belote (1981: 451), argue that in the Saraguro region everybody classifies as either indigenous or white, and campesino is only used with reference to the latter. When Camilo Ponce, a presidential candidate in 1968, claimed that there were no Indian problems, only general campesino problems, this served to alienate the indigenous population in the area (ibid, 455). Another blatant example of Ecuadorian state elites’ disregard for indigenous cultures is the answer of President Rodriguez Lara in September 1972 when he was asked how the requirements of indigenous subsistence agriculture could be reconciled with state plans for export-oriented agriculture in the Puno region (in Stutzman 1981: 45). Instead of answering directly, he said that he believed all Ecuadorians, including himself, were part Indian; then he went on: “There is no more Indian problem…We all become white when we accept the goals of the national culture” (ibid). However, with incipient indigenous organisations and ethnic demands at the end of the 1970s, the state became obliged to use the term “indigenous” and to address indigenous people’s problems (Sánchez 1996: 99). The fact that Jaime Roldós who was elected president in 1979 held part of his acceptance speech in Quichua, has been interpreted as a shift towards recognising the indigenous population: “The words of the speech were little more than a general commitment to work for all Ecuadorians, not only the Hispanic population, but the symbolic significance of such an act was immense, and it gave legitimacy to the language” (Selverston 1994: 144). Since then it has been impossible for state elites to ignore Ecuador’s indigenous peoples.
5.2.3 National identity and indigenous mobilisation

While state elites in both Ecuador and Peru have promoted the image of the mestizo national, indigenous symbolism has shaped political discourse and the idea about the national to a much greater extent in Peru. While Peruvian nationalism thus seems to have been more inclusive of indigenous peoples than Ecuadorian nationalism, it is also clear that the indigenous component of Peruvian nationalism has been carefully selected and defined by non-indigenous state elites.

According to Sánchez (1994: 340), it is striking that Peru has witnessed a strong indigenista movement but no indigenous movement, while Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia have had weak indigenista movements and strong indigenous movements. Sánchez (ibid, 343), argues that the indigenistas paternalist defense limited the indigenous people’s possibility to express themselves and define their own situation: “What we see is a phenomenon of appropriation of Andean cultural symbols by the indigenista faction of the white/mestizo intellectuality … dispossessing indigenous peoples of their values and discourse, and making it impossible for them to use their most valuable cultural tools”(ibid, my translation). As such, indigenismo may have been more important in solving the identity problems of mestizos than in solving the real problems of the indigenous peoples (ibid). This argument is also supported by de la Cadena (in Degregori 1993: 120, note 8), who argues that the festival of Inti Raymi is an example of appropriation of the Inca-imperial tradition by urban mestizos in Cusco, which leave indigenous peoples with the tradition of Indian servility only.

While Indigenistas generally romanticise the indigenous past, they often demonstrate an ambiguous attitude with regard to the contemporary indigenous population. Degregori (1993: 116) argues that there has been a tendency in Peru to regard the Andean Indian as “frozen in time” and incompatible with modernity and progress. Similarly, Bourricaud (1975: 381) contends that throughout the 1960s, “the prestige of the Indian as such was becoming gradually reduced by the aura of archaism which clung to it.” This may explain why Quechua-speaking peoples in the Peruvian Andes tend to define themselves as peasants and Peruvians, while those who leave the Andean countryside tend to redefine themselves, and be redefined by others as cholo. However, as demonstrated in chapter four, cholos continue to be severely discriminated against.
In Ecuador, the state has been rather unconcerned with indigenous cultural symbols. Furthermore, mestizos in Ecuador have resolved their identity problems by adopting the lifestyle and the corresponding ideological orientation of those of Spanish descent, thereby serving as white people’s best ally (Sánchez 1994: 362). As a consequence, the space for indigenous self-definition has been wider. Not only did Ecuadorian indigenous peoples find the way open to construct their own cultural discourses as argued by Sánchez (1994: 347), but the general lack of state programs to improve indigenous people’s conditions led to fewer attempts at co-option of indigenous organisational initiatives. According to Becker (1995: 13): “A weak indigenista movement which by its very nature would be paternalistic also left more political space for Indigenous leaders to organize themselves and in the process gain critical organizing experience” (ibid). Indigenous peoples’ organisational processes will be discussed in the next chapter.

To conclude this section, it is clear that Ecuadorian nation-building ideologies have ignored indigenous peoples’ cultures and identities to a greater extent than Peruvian nation-building ideologies. This can explain why highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador claim their rights as ethnically “different” minorities, while highland indigenous peoples in Peru tend to regard themselves as “authentic” nationals who should have their equal rights enforced. However, campesinos, cholos and andinos continue to be discriminated against and excluded, but this has not served as an incentive for indigenous mobilisation. Yet, as discussed in chapter four, the discrimination of people from the highlands has been an element in the recruitment rhetoric of Shining Path. While exclusion has served as an incentive for indigenous mobilisation in the Ecuadorian case, the lack of state concern has also made it possible for indigenous peoples to develop their own cultural discourse. Due to the history of indigenismo, this would be difficult for highland indigenous peoples in Peru. I now turn to language and education policies to see if such policies give any further evidence of differences with regard to nation-building ideologies between the two countries.

5.3 Nation-building ideologies as reflected in education.

The official education system is a major tool of state power, and it unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities and disadvantages others. The state’s choice of official language(s),
school curricula, and national symbols also reveal ideas about the worth and status of minority cultures within the state. In the following, I will discuss to what extent the differences in nation-building ideologies identified in the last section are reflected in education. Again, the expectation is that the more indigenous identities, languages, and cultures are denigrated or ignored, the stronger the incentives for indigenous mobilisation.

5.3.1 Education during the period of modernisation

The period of modernisation and its increased focus on national homogenisation also implied an extension of the school system in Ecuador and Peru. In Peru, the school entered most Andean rural communities from the 1950s to the 1970s, as a result of expansion of the Peruvian state apparatus (Jung 1987: 74). Also in Ecuador the school system started to expand during this period, and from the 1960s onward the primary education of indigenous children in the Ecuadorian highlands greatly increased (Ramón 1993: 229). The lack of formal schooling for the marginalised groups was seen as a major impediment to the creation of national identity in Ecuador (Stutzman 1981: 58), and the logical consequence was to extend and improve the school system: “The assumption was that Indians (who had overwhelming levels of illiteracy) would automatically become real Ecuadorians and identify themselves with the national culture if they were educated. Indeed by definition, Indians were seen as ignorant, because it was assumed that Indians who were educated would automatically become mestizos” (Clark 1998: 203). I will first address education in Ecuador during the period of modernisation, and then discuss the situation in Peru.

The ideology of mestizaje, understood as cultural “whitening”, is clearly reflected in the Ecuadorian school system from the 1950s throughout the 1970s. The major goals of the Ministry of Education during this period were national unification and modernisation (Yánez 1995: 43), and this was supposed to occur through the assimilation of indigenous peoples. According to de la Torre (1997: 13), the school assumed a “civilising” mission in the indigenous communities, and the aim was to transform Indians into mestizos. Indigenous children were punished for speaking Quichua, in the same ways as they could be punished for showing other signs of “indigenousness” such as wearing sandals instead of shoes (ibid). The general expectation was that in this way indigenous cultural traits would gradually disappear.
While the school aspired to create equal citizens for the future, the treatment of indigenous and mestizo children was not equal. According to de la Torre’s study (ibid, 4-5), indigenous children were last in line when entering the classrooms, and corporal punishment was more commonly practised on indigenous children than mestizo children.

While Ecuadorian school children have learned that Ecuador is based on a harmonious mixture of cultures and races, the message has also been that the indigenous contribution is more biological than cultural. This argument is developed in Stutzman’s (1981: 59-72) study of history text books used in Ecuadorian secondary schools in the 1970s. It is taught in schools that Ecuador has a glorious pre-Colombian past, represented by the Cara kingdom situated in Quito (Stutzman 1981: 60-61). This kingdom was subjugated by the Incas, but Inca Huayna Cápac married the Cara princess, and their son Atahualpa became the first Quiteño Inca (ibid). Atahualpa is a heroic figure in Ecuadorian history. In school text-books he is portrayed as an indigenous mestizo, and his great abilities are contrasted to the weaknesses of his half-brother Huáscar who had a Peruvian mother (ibid). Atahualpa is the first and last Ecuadorian Inca, due to the arrival of the Spanish, but the result of this encounter is portrayed as a happy fusion. The eleventh-grade text-book of Ecuadorian history reads: “The men who arrived in the sixteenth century were mestizos; so also were those who had for millennia populated the New World. For this reason, the union of these two groups met no resistance” (Cevallos García 1974: 13, in Stutzman 1981: 59). According to school history books, the Spanish conquerors established their headquarter in Quito and began to marry indigenous Quiteña women, and this has provided the mestizo and urban foundation of the Ecuadorian nation: “The city was the context within which el mestizaje took place, and el mestizaje was the social fact that permitted urban life” (Cevallos García 1974: 197 in Stutzman 1981: 62).

When the mestizo character of the nation is established however, it is the European cultural traits which come to dominate, according to the school text-books. First, Catholicism takes over from the more “primitive” indigenous religions: “As a superior religion and proven as such in the Old World, it easily penetrated the Ecuadorian consciousness” (school-book from 1952 cited in Stutzman 1981: 65). The same thing happens with language as “the academic language of Castile” naturally replaces Quichua (ibid). While the message evoked is that European culture proved to be superior, it is also necessary to explain why not all Ecuadorians have adopted these cultural traits. A common explanation is that Indians lost the capacity for development as a result of being victims of greedy colonialists who crushed their souls and
took away their dignity (Stutzman 1981: 63). However, the lack of integration of contemporary indigenous peoples is also commonly explained by their lack of contact with dominant, “civilised” (read urban) society, and their lack of interest in improving their own condition. According to Cevallos Garcia (1974: 118, in Stutzman 1981: 62): “those who remained in the countryside … stagnated; and it is there, bound to the earth, that they vegetate still”. The lack of adaptability of indigenous peoples is also lamented in another schoolbook: “There to the countryside he went with his rancor, his sad music, and his Incaic customs” (Colección L.N.S. ca. 1974: 164 in Stutzman 1981: 64). Ecuadorian children have thus learnt that indigenous peoples came to occupy the margins, as towns and villages became populated by mestizos, and that it is the responsibility of the state and dominant society to integrate the marginalised. According to the 1977 state programme of literacy training: “The Ministry of Education invites all Ecuadorians to take aggressive action toward making of Ecuador one vast school to the end of integrating the illiterate into the life of the country” (in Stutzman 1981: 70). Indigenous cultures were thus clearly disregarded within the education system. It was not until the 1980s that programs of Quichua-Spanish bilingual education, combined with greater respect for cultural pluralism, were attempted in some Ecuadorian public schools, partly as a result of indigenous pressure (Yánez 1995: 47).

Perhaps surprisingly, the national ideology dominating Peruvian schools in the 1950s-60s does not seem to be much different from the Ecuadorian ideology of mestizaje understood as cultural “whitening”. Also in Peru during this period, the implicit message of the school system was that the European cultural heritage was superior: “The children of the Indians started to learn that Peru was a Western and Christian country and that criollo modernity represented the future, while the indigenous was synonymous to the obsolete and backward, of what should disappear due to evolution and progress. For them, the school was, and continues to be, a traumatic experience” (Portocarrero 1992: 16, my translation). Indigenous languages and customs should be abandoned and, and modern language (Spanish) and customs adopted. In 1943, a prominent Peruvian intellectual expressed his happiness, noting that “Indians with good sense are abandoning the archaic language, unfit for the necessities for modern life, and adopting the official language of the fatherland” (in ibid, 20, my translation). While the greatness of the Inca empire which should inspire pride in all Peruvians was emphasised in Peruvian schools, the respect did not extend to the contemporary indigenous population (ibid, 18-19). As in Ecuador, indigenous peoples were seen as helpless victims of the unjust colonial order, in need of redemption by the Republic
The stereotypical image of the Indian imposed in school text-books demonstrated “an oppressed and melancholic person, nostalgic of his great past, and waiting for his redemption” (ibid, my translation).

In contrast to the situation in Ecuador however, the text-book image of Peru as a harmonious, Westernised, mestizo nation was increasingly criticised in the 1960s and 70s by Peruvian academics and school teachers who adopted a perspective which has come to be called la idea crítica, the critical idea (ibid, 23). According to Portocarrero (ibid), the main factors contributing to the development of this perspective were the influence of Marxism in Peruvian universities from the 1960s onwards, the educational reform of 1972 under the radical military government of Velasco, and the economic crisis which started in 1975. In what follows, I will discuss the background and the ideological content of the critical idea, and its consequences for cultural pluralism in Peru. Finally, I will contrast this to developments in Ecuador.

5.3.2 The critical idea in Peru and indigenous pressure in Ecuador

The ideological nucleus of the critical idea developed in the National University of San Marcos in the 1960s (Portocarrero and Oliart 1989: 115). Inspired by the Cuban revolution, the Marxists replaced the aprista leadership of the student movement, at the same time as students from lower social classes started to enter the universities for the first time (ibid). Students with a lower-class and often provincial background tended to be attracted to the faculties of education, and these faculties spread Marxist, socialist, nationalist, and indigenista ideas (Portocarrero 1992: 23). According to Portocarrero and Oliart (1989: 107-8), there were two Marxist hypotheses which came to sustain the critical idea: first that people’s actions are motivated by material interests, implying that political elites seek to sustain exploitation, and second, that history can be explained as a class struggle. In 1972, the teachers’ syndicate SUTEP (sindicato único de trabajadores de la educación peruana) was formed, and became controlled by the Maoist political party Patria Roja (Red Fatherland) (Stokes 1995: 45). By the 1970s, it integrated the whole teaching profession (ibid).
The newly educated teachers came to see themselves as defenders of justice and common people, and disseminated their version of Peru and Peruvian history through their teaching. This implied that the teaching of history changed form and content, and the central notions were as follows (in Portocarrero and Oliart 1989: 108-14): Peru is a country rich in natural resources, but colonialists and imperialists have stolen what belongs to the Peruvian people with national elites as selfish intermediaries. Consequently, the nature of the state needs to be radically changed, and this is again related to a need for revaluation of “the Andean” and what is “authentically” Peruvian (ibid). The critical idea thus borrows from Marxism, indigenismo and nationalism, and although these are not new ideas, it was the first time that they were presented as a more or less coherent ideology, gaining widespread acceptance. Indigenous heroes such as Túpac Amaru replaced criollo independence heroes in school text-books (Portocarrero 1992: 22), and Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre were for the first time portrayed as fundamental interpreters of Peruvian history in the schools (Portocarrero and Oliart 1989: 132).

The dissemination of the critical idea got an important impetus from the radical military government of Velasco (1968-75) who turned anti-imperialism and criticism of the oligarchy into an official doctrine, and launched an educational reform in 1972 intended to bring about structural change (ibid). According to Montoya (1990: 53): “The educational reform proposed by Velasco considered for the first time – at least in its’ discourse – the multicultural and multilingual reality of Peru” (my translation). The general law of education of 1972 (law 19326) states in article 10: “Education will be adapted to local, regional, and national requirements, and will avoid all forms of cultural imposition”, and article 12 reads: “Education will in all its’ actions consider the existence of various languages, which are means of communication and expression of culture, and defend their preservation and development” (in Montoya 1990: 53, my translations). Furthermore, article 301 of this law made the learning of one vernacular language compulsory for all educators (ibid, 54). In 1975, Quechua was made an official language at par with Spanish (law 21156, article 1), and article 2 states that from the year 1976, the teaching of Quechua will be compulsory at all levels of education in Peru (ibid). A standard Quechua alphabet was also developed and approved of (ibid).

The laws of the educational reform demonstrate an intention to promote cultural pluralism by the Velasco government. However, they were only to a limited extent put into practice.
According to Portocarrero (1992: 24), the reform failed to meet most of its objectives because the tasks were too large to be absorbed by the current system. There were changes in the curriculum and new school books were printed, but bilingual education was never generalised throughout the country. In fact, only in the department of Puno, where 90% of the population speak either Quechua or Aymara, did about 3% of the indigenous children receive bilingual education after Peru and Germany signed an agreement about a joint bilingual education programme in 1975 (Montoya 1990: 79). There were also some private and religious initiatives in educating indigenous peoples in their own languages, and a program in Ayacucho run by the Institute of investigations in applied linguistics of the National University of San Marcos, but in general Peruvian indigenous children were not offered bilingual education (Montoya 1990: 66-67). It should also be noted that bilingual education was not demanded by indigenous peoples in the highlands. On the contrary, Quechua-speaking parents feared that bilingual education would imply that their children did not learn proper Spanish, so important for social mobility and ability to defend oneself in Peruvian society (ibid, 98). In the region known as the Andean Trapeze, 34-72% of the population were monolingual in Quechua in 1961, depending on the department (Montoya 1990, chapter two, table 2c), probably explaining why the most important demand was better education in Spanish (ibid).

Portocarrero (1992: 24) finds that despite its many failures, the educational reform had two important effects: First, the reform implied a break with traditional authority and the encouragement of critical thinking, and second, the teachers were given greater freedom in developing and adapting the curriculum. It also implied a revaluation of cultural variety, and a redefinition of Peru from “Western and Christian” to “Andean and multicultural” (ibid, 22). According to Flores Galindo (1988: 12), the emergence of the word “Andean” is very important as it is a racially neutral term which attains positive connotations. Yet, the revaluation of indigenous cultures and languages in Peru can also be seen as a form of co-option and appropriation of indigenous cultural symbols by the state (Degregori 1978: 248). The new school books produced for primary education as a result of the reform presented idyllic images of rural societies inhabited by “rich-merchant-cooperativist-peasants, Indian or mestizo” (ibid, 250). Degregori argues that the “indigenista and egalitarian message” of these books passed unnoticed by children in the highlands who did not recognise themselves in these pictures, and that many highland teachers rejected these books which they found “comical” and “little serious” (ibid).
The fall of Velasco, and the takeover by a more conservative military coalition implied that the impulse towards cultural pluralism on the part of the state was not continued (Montoya 1990: 53). The governments of Belaúnde, García, and Fujimori have also demonstrated less respect for cultural pluralism than the Velasco regime, something which is reflected in new legislation. While the Constitution of 1979 establish the right of indigenous children to bilingual education, the General law of education (law 23384) passed by Belaúnde in 1982 states in article 4: “In communities where Spanish is not the first language, education will be initiated in the indigenous language with a tendency towards progressive use of Spanish in order to consolidate in the student his socio-cultural characteristics together with characteristics appropriate for modern society” (in Montoya 1990: 55, my translation). As in the period before the Velasco regime, the aim of education again seems to be assimilation of indigenous peoples to a Western national culture. As argued in section 4.3.2, cultural pluralism has also received little support from the leftist opposition who has tended to dismiss cultural issues as “false consciousness”.

In Ecuador, the first signs of public recognition of the cultural diversity of the country came in 1980 when president Jaime Roldós held his inauguration speech in Quichua, and the government decided to support the bilingual education program initiated by the Center for the Investigation of Indigenous Education (CIEI) of the Catholic University (Selverston 1997: 180). The program developed didactic material for bilingual and bicultural education and trained literate indigenous adults to teach in indigenous communities, thus representing an important change in government policy (ibid.). More than 1000 CIEI educators went to teach in 300 new, rural, bilingual education schools in the period 1980-84, contributing to a reduction in illiteracy from 25.7 % in 1979 to 12.6 % in 1984 (ibid, 181). In 1983, the CIEI program also took the initiative to establish indigenous children’s right to bilingual education in the Constitution, a measure not formerly adopted in Ecuador (Yánez 1995: 78).

The state support of the CIEI program can be seen as a result of incipient indigenous organisation and pressure, but the program did in turn contribute to a strengthening of indigenous identity and leadership. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the first indigenous organisations in the highlands were formed in the 1970s in Ecuador. While class demands dominated in the highlands until the end of the 1970s, the fifth congress of ECUARUNARI in 1979 declared that the indigenous problem has a double dimension of class and ethnicity, and ECUARUNARI decided to demand bilingual education and greater
respect for indigenous cultural expressions (CONAIE 1989: 222-3). Greater indigenous support for bilingual education in Ecuador than in Peru is possibly explained by greater fluency in Spanish among the indigenous population and the greater threat of Quichua disappearance in Ecuador. According to Ramón (1993: 314), the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian highlands are generally bilingual, and on the basis of unpublished material of the 1990 census, Sánchez-Parga (1993: 22, in Zamosc 1995: 19) finds that in 1990, the Quichua-speaking population had been reduced to 3.7%. However, ECUARUNARI denounced the CIEI program as a co-optive measure by the state since no indigenous organisations were allowed to contribute in the elaboration of the program, and they also criticised indigenous persons who participated in the program for “selling out” to the government (Selverston 1994: 114).

In despite of these conflicts, there is no doubt that the CIEI program gave indigenous educators (such as Luis Macas who would later become president of CONAIE), valuable experience and training, and equally important, it taught indigenous children to value their language and culture: “In a country where, only a decade before, schoolchildren were forced to cut their braids and speak Spanish, this constituted a significant change” (Selverston 1997: 180). Degregori (1993: 123, note 13) comments that in contrast to Peru, massive literacy campaigns in Ecuador took place in a context of weakly organised leftist organisations and incipient indigenous organisations, and he believes this was important for the strengthening of indigenous identity in Ecuador.

Increased indigenous control over bilingual and intercultural education has been a recurrent demand of ECUARUNARI and later of CONAIE, and in 1988 CONAIE signed an agreement with the Ministry of Education and Culture which led to the establishment of DINEIB (National Directorate of Bilingual Intercultural Education), a directorate staffed by CONAIE members who have the right to appoint bilingual teachers (Selverston 1997: 181). While the directorate has been troubled by lack of funding and support, it has been considered a main victory of the indigenous movement (Yánez 1995: 84). Current aims of CONAIE are improved funding and training for bilingual teachers, and also extension of bilingual education to non-indigenous children.

Language and education policies in Ecuador and Peru reflect the differences in nation-building ideologies discussed in section 5.2. While indigenous languages and cultures have
been ignored in Ecuadorian education until the 1980s, indigenous symbolism has been important in Peru, especially during the government of Velasco. The ignoring of indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian education system prior to the 1980s seems to have provided an incentive for highland indigenous mobilisation, and the lack of state concern has probably made it easier for indigenous organisations to develop their own cultural discourse and demands, and to take advantage of the new situation after the transition to democracy. In Peru, the government of Velasco actually adopted the measures (at least on paper) demanded by indigenous peoples in Ecuador, thereby removing such incentives for mobilisation. While later Peruvian governments have demonstrated less respect for cultural pluralism, the archaism of the indigenous image promoted by the state, together with the influence of Marxism, seem to provide important clues as to why ethnicity does not form a basis for indigenous mobilisation in Peru.

5.4 Highland indigenous peoples’ access to and control over land

A central demand of most indigenous movements in Latin America and in the world at large is the demand for land: “Most past and current indigenous political mobilization – from massive marches to land seizures – has involved the struggle for possession, legal recognition, demarcation, and protection of title to traditional lands” (Van Cott 1994: 16). Land is a vital resource on which the survival of indigenous groups may ultimately depend. According to CONAIE (2000): “A people without land is a people without life. From the land we get food, medicines, materials for ceremony, clothes, tools, and crafts. Land is our sustenance.” How, and the extent to which the modern state has met peasants’ and/or indigenous peoples’ need for land is thus likely to be an important factor in explaining variation in indigenous mobilisation. In the following, I will discuss state-indigenous relations with regard to the development of the hacienda system in Ecuador and Peru, and with regard to land reforms in the latter half of this century. The expectation is that the less access highland indigenous peoples have to land, the stronger the incentive for mobilisation.
5.4.1 Violence and clientilism

Until 1854, most indigenous people in the Peruvian highlands lived in indigenous communities called *ayllus* which were collectively responsible for paying the Indian tribute (Remy 1994: 111). With the abolition of the tribute however, the lands of the *ayllus* were left legally unprotected, and this implied that they were increasingly attacked and invaded by estate owners (ibid). As a result, the hacienda system became dominant in the latter half of the 19th century in Peru by means of brutal repression. In many cases the usurpation of the land of the *ayllus* implied that whole communities were massacred by estate owners (Vargas Llosa 1996: 59). The behaviour of the estate owners sparked the concern of the *indigenistas*, and it was also the background of the legal recognition of indigenous communities and the declaration of communal lands as inalienable by the Leguía government in 1920 (Remy 1994: 111-12). While several indigenous communities were recognised, the new legislation was often disregarded, implying that the hacienda system continued to expand (Ossio 1994: 78). In the 1950s, hacienda owners made up 4 % of the rural population and controlled 56 % of cultivable lands in Peru, while peasants made up 96 % of the rural population and controlled 44 % of the lands (Manrique 1996: 40).

In Ecuador, the hegemony of the hacienda system was established earlier than in Peru, through asymmetric relationships which favoured hacienda owners and made indigenous people dependent (Ramón 1993: 274). Already in the beginning of the 19th century, more than 80 % of the Indians were either part of, or worked for a hacienda in Ecuador (ibid, 273). However, Ramón (ibid) argues that the hacienda system in Ecuador was less based on repression than on clientilist arrangements, making the system more endurable. The repression by Peruvian estate owners, as contrasted to the clientilism dominating in Ecuador, may be illustrated by the region of Otavalo: “Otavalo had and still has some sizeable latifundia, but these did not, as happened further south in the Andes, convert whole villages into captive colonies of landless debt peons…the latifundia of the Otavalo region have had to rely more on hired labor done part time by minifundistas and less on fixed colonies of indebted Indians than those elsewhere” (Salomon 1981: 439). Such arrangements seem to have made the hacienda system more supportable in Ecuador, although large haciendas controlled more than 75 % of the country’s cultivable lands by 1954 (Zamosc 1994: 43). There has been no recognition of indigenous communities in Ecuador, and thus no legal protection of indigenous lands. The 1937 Law of Communes established that communities
may organise its own local government (*cabildo*), and get limited control over natural resources and community affairs, but the law does not pertain especially to indigenous communities (Selverston 1994: 138). However, a number of indigenous communities have availed themselves of this law, but mainly after the agrarian reform of 1964 as the law did not apply to *huasipungeros* (indigenous people subject to service tenure, or compulsory unpaid labour on the haciendas).

While highland indigenous peoples’ access to land has been restricted or controlled by hacienda owners in both Ecuador and Peru until the middle of the 20th century, the different working of the hacienda system in the two countries may explain why open conflict over land has been much more common in Peru. During the period 1956-64, Peru witnessed the largest peasant movements in South America (Starn et al. 1995: 255). Using workers’ unions as a blueprint, the first rural unions were formed in Peru at the end of the 1950s, congregating in peasant federations (Remy 1994: 113). Unions were organised both among those who worked for haciendas and wanted better working conditions, and among indigenous communities trying to recover land taken by hacienda owners, and their main method was the strike (ibid). The peasants also staged a number of demonstrations: “Major peasant marches and rallies were held in the cities, all in Quechua, all militant, but none with any disturbance and acts of violence” (ibid, 115). While Quechua was the dominant language, the demand for land was presented in class terms rather than as a right of indigenous peoples. Workers’ solidarity was emphasised, and the slogan was “land for those who work it” (see CCP 1999: 2). In the period 1960-64, about 1500 peasant unions were recognised in Peru, some of whom managed to recuperate hacienda land (Remy 1994: 114).

The peasants’ expectations of increased access to land were raised by the election of Belaúnde in 1963, who had promised to carry out agrarian reform “village by village” (Remy 1994: 113). The lack of compliance with this promise angered the peasant unions which increasingly invaded (or recuperated, in their own terms), hacienda lands (ibid). While some hacienda owners abandoned their property, there were also intense struggles ending with union repression (Sánchez 1996: 108). In addition, the beginning of the 1960s saw the irruption of a Cuba-inspired guerrilla movement headed by mestizos, who wrongly assumed they would be supported by the indigenous peasants (Starn et al. 1995: 292). The army’s repression of the guerrillas in 1966 also hurt the peasant movement. According to one account 8000 peasants were killed (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 217), and the following years were
marked by a decline in peasant mobilisation (Montoya 1989: 59). Yet, the land question remained a contentious issue, and the events of the 1950s-60s provide the backdrop of the 1969 agrarian reform.

Rural protests in Ecuador in the 1950s and 60s were weak compared to the situation in Peru. The main protests which took place were organised by the *Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios* (FEI), founded in 1944 by the Ecuadorian Communist Party in a first attempt to organise the indigenous peasantry (Guerrero 1993: 83). FEI aimed at replacing the *huasipungo* (service tenure) with wage relation, something which happened with the Agrarian Reform Law of 1964. While this law has been attributed to FEI protests (Korovkin 1997: 28), it should also be seen as part of a broader strategy of modernisation pursued by the military regime of the period 1963-66 (Isaacs 1993: 3). Modernisation efforts were facilitated by increased income from export agriculture at the coast, and the emergence of an urban middle class which reduced the power of the hacienda owners (Zamosc 1994: 42, Guerrero 1993: 93).

The 1964 agrarian reform had a minimal distributive effect, and it actually worsened the situation of the indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian highlands. While indigenous peasants were freed from unpaid labour and granted property titles to small plots of land, they also lost access to the pastures and forests of the hacienda owners (Selverston 1994: 138). In Chimborazo, the province with the highest proportion of Quichua-speaking population, only 3% of the land was transferred to the peasants by IERAC (Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonisation) (Korovkin 1997: 28). However, it should also be noted that in contrast to the situation in Peru, land invasions by indigenous peasants have not been very common in Ecuador (Salomon 1981: 429). In the 1970s indigenous communities would rather try to buy land and to get recognised as *comunas* (Korovkin 1997: 29, Zamosc 1994: 43). While the regimes of both Velasco (1968-75) in Peru and Rodrigues (1972-76) in Ecuador would have to face rural grievances, land invasions by the organised peasantry in Peru thus appeared far more threatening.
5.4.2 The agrarian reforms of the military governments

The 1969 agrarian reform of the Velasco regime has been considered the most radical since the agrarian reform in Cuba (Scurrah 1986: 253, Skidmore and Smith 1997: 218), and as discussed in section 5.2.2, it was accompanied by a pro-indigenous and anti-landlord discourse. With the words: “Peasant: the Master will no longer feed of your poverty”, Velasco expropriated the haciendas and turned them into state-run cooperatives known as SAIS (Agricultural Societies of Social Property) which incorporated former hacienda peons and peasants from surrounding communities (Manrique 1996: 40). While each ex-hacienda worker (who participated directly in the SAIS production) became an associate, each surrounding community would also count as one associate, and the surplus of the SAIS was to be divided equally (Webb and Figueroa 1975: 136). Communities which were not associated to a SAIS were also restructured according to a cooperative model, and for the first time the state started to regulate the internal organisation of established indigenous communities (now called peasant communities) by creating community councils headed by a president who would be its legal representative (Remy 1994: 115). By the mid-1970s, 70-75% of the agricultural land was under some sort of cooperative management in Peru (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 218, Sánchez 1996: 100).

The agrarian reform liquidated the hacienda system in Peru, thereby absorbing peasant resistance to the state, but for the majority living conditions did not improve (Manrique 1996: 40). While the government stressed that the means of production should be transferred to the workers, this did not imply much redistribution in the arid Peruvian highlands where agriculture was first of all labour-intensive (Webb and Figueroa 1975: 153). According to Sánchez (1996: 108), the agrarian reform in Peru was actually made possible because highland hacienda owners had started to abandon their estates in the 1950s due to the low productivity of the soil. Similarly, Webb and Figueroa (1975: 142) argue that real redistribution in Peru would have to imply transference of resources from income-generating sectors such as mining and industry to highland agriculture. The state-controlled SAIS were generally unproductive and inefficient also because they served state functionaries with vested interests in maintaining the cooperative structure, rather than the peasants who favoured individual distribution, or “parcelisation” (Manrique 1996: 40). The SAIS generated little surplus for distribution, and for the indigenous and/or peasant communities it was like the old hacienda in new clothes (Albó 1991: 323). On this background, a number of SAIS were
invaded by peasant communities in the latter half of the 1970s and in the 1980s with support from CCP (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*), and sometimes from the Shining Path, leading to the dismantling of the SAIS and subsequent parcelisation (Albó 1991: 323, Manrique 1996: 40). By the end of the 1980s, the whole Andean region in Peru was dominated by small-scale farms which in most cases could not generate a sufficient family-income (Sánchez 1996: 103).

The 1972 agrarian reform of the military regime in Ecuador ended up being far less redistributive than intended. While there was a real commitment to agrarian reform within the military, the politically powerful Chambers of Agriculture accused the regime of harbouring *peruanista* tendencies and adopting enemy ideologies, and the most radical clauses were finally omitted (Isaacs 1993: 74). In fact, only 13 % of the agricultural land was distributed to the peasants from church- and hacienda properties (Sánchez 1996: 106). However, the risk of expropriation led many hacienda-owners to put part of their land out for sale (Zamosc 1994: 42). In the highly productive northern highlands, hacienda owners would sell portions of their land and define what remained as a modern agricultural production unit, thereby avoiding expropriation (ibid, 43). In the central and southern highlands where land is less productive, hacienda owners would sell land in small parcels, usually to indigenous peasants, encouraging competition to raise prices (ibid). Thus the combined effect of land reforms and land sales was considerable: hacienda land was reduced from 75 % in 1954 to 36.2 % in 1985, while medium-sized units made up 30.3 % and small units 33.5 % in 1985 (ibid, note 17).

However, the hacienda owners managed to secure the best and most profitable land for themselves and ascertain their traditional dominant position, especially in the northern highlands (Sánchez 1996: 104). While more peasants got access to land, much of this land was unproductive: “This situation is by no means idyllic for the peasants, whose third of the agricultural land is physically insufficient to sustain the majority of the rural population and invariably included the highest, driest, and least fertile tracts” (Zamosc 1994: 43). While Isaacs (1993: 60) argues that Ecuadorian agrarian reforms were more timid than reforms in Peru due to factors such as lower professionalism of the Ecuadorian military, the weakness of the political left, and the ability to rely on growth rather than distribution, it is also clear that the higher profitability of Ecuadorian agricultural land, and accordingly the hacienda owners efforts in keeping it, is a factor. According to Montoya (1998: 155), Ecuadorian elites have in contrast to their Peruvian counterparts managed to develop modern agricultural production
units in the highlands, partly because the Ecuadorian Andes are lower and more humid than the Peruvian Andes. In the southern Ecuadorian highlands where agricultural conditions are more similar to the highlands of Peru, more land was distributed by the reform, making the haciendas disappear in several areas (Chiriboga 1987: 88).

5.4.3 Land policies and incentives for highland indigenous mobilisation

As a result of different land policies, the highland indigenous peasants in Ecuador and Peru faced quite different situations by the end of the 1970s. In the Peruvian Andes, many peasants have insufficient land to make a living, but the problem is that there is hardly any more land to distribute. As a consequence, the migratory flow to the cities continues, while peasant demands centre on achieving credits, better prices for agricultural products, and improved fertilisers and technology (interview with General Secretary colleagues of the CCP, Washington Mendoza and Pablo Quispe, December 2nd, 1999). Such demands are likely to be less conducive to a focus on indigenous identity than demands for ancestral lands. The 1969 agrarian reform in Peru thus removed access to land as an incentive for highland indigenous mobilisation, but without improving the living conditions of the peasants.

This is not the situation in Ecuador. The traditional hacienda elite was not destroyed by the agrarian reforms, and they still occupy more than a third of the best agricultural land. Access to this land has been a major incentive for indigenous mobilisation. According to Mario Cabrera, director of ECUARUNARI / CONAIE in the province of Azuay (interview October 19th, 1999), the Ecuadorian indigenous movement emerged because the government denied indigenous peoples what belonged to them, namely access to their “mother earth” which is indigenous peoples’ most important resource. The continued presence of haciendas also imply a certain continuance of colonial relations, and the possibility for highland indigenous peoples to define themselves in opposition to a common enemy. While the Peruvian highlands are dominated by poor peasants, indigenous peasants in the northern Ecuadorian highlands live side by side with hacienda owners, reminding them of ethnic divisions. This may also explain why modernisation processes in Ecuador were accompanied by ethnic affirmation. The modernisation processes discussed in section 5.1 took place almost simultaneously in Ecuador and Peru, but the context was different. As an example, the educational level of indigenous
peoples rose significantly in the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Ecuador, while they were still subject to semi-colonial relations. That the continued presence of haciendas has been crucial for indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador is also illustrated by the fact that the Ecuadorian indigenous movement is strongest in the northern highlands, where hacienda dominance remains strongest (Sánchez 1994: 328-9).

The land question seems central to explain the differences in highland indigenous mobilisation between Ecuador and Peru. However, it is not likely to provide a sufficient explanation. When the indigenous communities in Peru who invaded the SAIS defined themselves as \textit{campesinos} rather than as indigenous people, this seems to be related both to differences in nation-building ideologies between Ecuador and Peru, and to differences in organisational processes. In Ecuador, the lack of access to hacienda land is not sufficient to explain the development of strong and influential indigenous organisations. Variations in organisational processes will be the topic of the next chapter.

5.5 Main findings

Differences between Ecuador and Peru with regard to state- and nation-building policies seem to far better explain variation in highland indigenous mobilisation than differences in history, disadvantage, and discrimination discussed in chapter four. While modernisation processes took place almost simultaneously in Ecuador and Peru, thereby increasing contact and the likelihood of ethnic affirmation, these processes were accompanied by quite different nation-building ideologies. In Peru, nation-building ideologies have been more inclusive, in particular the \textit{indigenista} version, as indigenous symbolism shaped the image of the true Peruvians. Indigenous peasants have been referred to as the most “authentic” Peruvians, rather than as ethnic minorities. By contrast, the national ideology of \textit{mesitzaje} understood as racial and cultural “whitening” has had a hegemonic position in Ecuador, excluding indigenous peoples from the image of Ecuadorian nationality.

These differences in nation-building ideologies between the two countries seem to have had implications for highland indigenous peoples’ self-definition. It may explain why highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador claim their rights as ethnically “different” minorities, while
highland indigenous peoples in Peru tend to regard themselves as “authentic” nationals who should have their equal rights enforced. Paradoxically however, the exclusion of indigenous peoples in Ecuador may not only have served as an incentive for mobilisation, but also made it possible for indigenous peoples to develop their own cultural discourse and raise legitimate demands. In Peru, people from the highlands with indigenous features continue to be discriminated against and excluded, but so far this has not provided an incentive for ethnic mobilisation.

Differences in nation-building ideologies are also reflected in language and education policies, especially visible during the military regimes of the 1970s. The regime of Velasco in Peru has been termed indigenista, and both the 1972 educational reform with its revaluation of the Quechua language, and the 1969 agrarian reform which liquidated the hacienda system can be seen in this perspective. In Ecuador, bilingual education and redistribution of hacienda land have been major incentives for indigenous mobilisation. However, stronger incentives for highland indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador than in Peru is not sufficient to explain the development of strong Ecuadorian indigenous organisations. Furthermore, incentives for highland indigenous mobilisation in Peru do not seem to be completely absent. The next chapter will therefore discuss differences in the development of highland indigenous peoples’ mobilisational potential.
6. The potential for mobilisation of highland indigenous peoples

While the incentives for highland indigenous mobilisation seem to have been stronger in Ecuador than in Peru due to a more excluding national ideology and less land distribution in favour of the indigenous peasants, incentives alone cannot explain the emergence of a strong indigenous movement. Furthermore, exclusion and discrimination should constitute incentives for mobilisation also among the highland indigenous peoples of Peru. In this chapter I will therefore consider the extent to which differences in organisational resources and political opportunities can explain the differences between the two countries with regard to highland indigenous mobilisation. The proposition is that territorial concentration, organisational experience, presence of allies, and lack of state repression increase the potential for highland indigenous mobilisation.

The potential for mobilisation of highland indigenous peoples will be studied by means of four indicators. First, I will look at the territorial concentration of highland indigenous peoples, as concentration is likely to enhance interaction, cohesion, and informal networks which can be useful in mobilisation. Second, I will study organisational experiences of highland indigenous peoples in the latter half of the 20th century. The expectation is that former participation in organisations has promoted skills and knowledge which can serve as resources for indigenous mobilisation. Thirdly, I will study the ability highland indigenous peoples have to attract allies and form coalitions with other actors, as alliances are expected to increase organisational capacity and political opportunities, and thereby the potential for mobilisation. When discussing prior organisational experience and coalition-building, I will also relate this to the discourses used in the organisations, as shared “frames” of ideas can be important in legitimising collective action. Finally, I will discuss the openness of the political system and the tendency of the state to use repression, as an open political system is likely to be more conducive to indigenous mobilisation than a closed and repressive political system.

6.1 Territorial concentration of highland indigenous peoples

Quechuas in Peru and Quichuas in Ecuador are referred to as peoples in the plural rather than people since they despite many similarities can be subdivided into various ethnic groups. The
question is whether they are more geographically concentrated and less internally divided in any one of the countries as these factors are likely to enhance cohesion and organisational capacity.

6.1.1 Geographic and linguistic variation

Peru is more than four times larger than Ecuador and has twice its population (see appendix). The Andes cut across both countries, and are the traditional homelands of Quichua-, Quechua- and Aymara-speaking indigenous peoples. Although the Andes continue to be the area of residence for most of the indigenous population, many have also settled in other areas. The length of the Ecuadorean Andes is about 650 kilometres, and they are about 50-80 kilometres wide (CONAIE 1989: 125). By contrast, the Peruvian Andes cover a much larger area. According to Montoya (1998: 154, 160), thousands of kilometres separate the different Quechua groups, and the contact between different indigenous communities has traditionally been limited, and identity tied to the local community or village.

The larger distances in Peru as compared to Ecuador are reflected in greater linguistic variation in Quechua: “The Quechua world is a large world. Peru is an enormous country compared to Ecuador, and there are eight dialectical variations of Quechua in the country with such important variations that communication is difficult” (interview with professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya, November 30th, 1999, my translation). In addition, close to half a million speak Aymara, which is a completely different language. While there is also dialectical variation in Ecuadorian Quichua, differences are much smaller and the various groups do generally not have problems in understanding each other (ibid). Another linguistic difference between Ecuador and Peru is that Ecuador is the only Andean country where Quichua is spoken solely by indigenous peoples (Ramón 1993: 227). In the Peruvian highlands, by contrast, Quechua is commonly used also by mestizos (Sánchez 1994: 352, note 40), probably making language less important as a common denominator of highland indigenous peoples.

According to NPIP (1995: 25), a common Quechua identity does not exist in Peru: “Rather, each region sees itself as a separate part of Peru, and, in the few instances where written
Quechua is used, each prefers to follow its own dialect instead of yielding to the Cusco-based Peruvian Quechua norm”. This means that even if highland indigenous peoples in Peru tend to identify themselves as runa and different from white people and mestizos (Estermann 1998: 56, Montoya 1989: 50-53), this does not seem to have implied a common Quechua identity. According to Zamosc (1994: 56), the “new Indian identity” in Ecuador has been constructed around three factors: “the Quichua (or Quechua) language, the social and cultural characteristics of the peasantry, and the subordinate status to white landowners and mestizos in the village.” I now turn to look at the extent to which highland indigenous peoples are concentrated in rural areas.

6.1.2 Migration, urbanisation and life-situation of highland indigenous peoples

As discussed in section 5.1.2, Ecuador has remained a more rural country than Peru, and by the end of the 1990s, about 3 million of a total population of 12 million lived in Quito and Guayaquil (Murphy 1997a: 75, 89, 233), compared to 8 million in Lima out of a total Peruvian population of 24 million (Murphy 1997b: 70,78). Migration from the Peruvian highlands to coastal Lima has thus been much stronger than migration from the Ecuadorian highlands, and these migration processes also involve indigenous people. According to a study by Gray (1987: 10), 10 - 25 % of all indigenous people in South America lived in urban areas in the 1980s, and the bulk of this figure was Peruvian highland indigenous peoples living in Lima. Similarly, Degregori (1995: 460) argues that Lima has “the world’s single largest population of Quechua speakers”. In another article, he describes how thousands of people migrated from the Andean department of Ayacucho from the 1960s onwards in order to avoid misery and oppression (Degregori 1992: 34). From 1940 to 1981, Lima’s population grew from 645 000 to 4.6 million, a process which has been termed “the Andean ‘reconquest’ of the Spanish conquerors’ capital” (José María Arguedas in Starn et al. 1995: 278). Most of these new migrants have ended up in the squatter towns on the outskirts of Lima, called “young towns” or pueblos jóvenes, now home to the majority of Lima’s population (ibid).

While the migration to Lima implies a diversification of life-styles of highland indigenous peoples, one might also expect that concentration in a city would increase interaction and contact, and thereby cohesion of highland indigenous peoples. This does not seem to be the
case in Peru. According to most accounts, migration from the Peruvian highlands to Lima imply a loss, or at least a covering up of indigenous identity (Marzal 1995: 76, Montoya 1998: 156, NPIP 1995: 25). By contrast, migration to Quito and to a lesser extent Guayaquil, does not seem to lead to loss of indigenous identity in Ecuador. This can be related to the smaller distances in Ecuador and the location of the capital, but also to differences in nation-building ideologies discussed in 5.2.2.

It seems like more highland indigenous people who migrate to cities in Ecuador retain connections with their rural place of origin than is the case in Peru, and that this has implications for the preservation of indigenous identity and cohesion. According to Radcliffe (1999: 39), both permanent and short-term migrants to the cities in Ecuador remain in close contact with their former rural communities and often continue to regard themselves as peasants or Andeans. By contrast, professor in anthropology Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999) argues that many indigenous persons who migrate from the highlands to Lima discontinue contact with their place of origin. While he attributes this to people being ashamed of their Andean background, part of the explanation may also lie in difficulties of communication. As an example, Ayacucho and Lima are separated by a 15 hours bus-ride, while it takes 36-40 hours to travel from Lima to Cusco by road (Murphy 1997b: 323, 374). From the Ecuadorian capital of Quito one may travel about anywhere in the highlands in less than 10 hours, and to most destinations it takes far less. Moreover, permanent migration to the cities from rural areas has been limited in Ecuador compared to the situation in Peru. In the period 1962-1982 about 1 million migrated, but more than half of this migration was seasonal or daily migration (Whitaker and Colyer 1990 in Waters 1997: 54).

In addition to the greater facility of communication between cities and urban areas in Ecuador, the different locations of the capitals of Quito and Lima may also explain why migration to the Peruvian capital seems less compatible with indigenous cohesion and affirmation of identity. Professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999) argues that in contrast to Quito and La Paz (the capital of Bolivia), Lima is a colonial city organised and structured in opposition to the Andes and the indigenous peoples: “If the capital of Peru was Cusco, we would be like Ecuador and Quito. I believe this geographical factor is very important” (ibid). This argument is consistent with the tendency of Andean migrants to Lima to stress their rights as Peruvians when occupying unused land. It is common practice to occupy land on election days and national holidays and then place
Peruvian flags on the preliminary squatter shacks (Stokes 1995: 29). In contrast to Lima, Quito was an indigenous city from before the Spanish conquest in the same way as Cusco, and it is located in the heart of the Ecuadorian highlands. It is possible that this makes it easier for highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador to regard the capital as home territory, while Lima seems to be regarded as an alien city by highland indigenous peoples in Peru.

Distances and the location of the capital also have implications for the possibilities of collective action. One of the most visible methods of protest for peasant organisations and later ethnic organisations in Ecuador has been to stage marches on the capital. People walk for weeks and days from different parts of the country to gather in Quito and present their demands to the government (see ECUARUNARI 1998). This method of protest has also been used in Peru, as when more than hundred campesinos walked 500 kilometres from Huancavelica to Lima in 1999 to demand a plan for development of the region (La República, November 21st, 1999). However, it is obvious that such marches present less difficulties in Ecuador where distances are smaller and Quito is situated in the middle of the highlands. Moreover, greater similarities in the life-situation of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador, given that a large majority retain connections to rural areas, may also make it easier to gather around common demands, such as demands for land.

To sum up, highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador are less geographically dispersed and have less linguistic variation than highland indigenous peoples in Peru. In addition, they tend to retain stronger connections to rural communities, thus facing a more similar life-situation. These factors are likely to promote cohesion and interaction, and to provide a better basis for mobilisation than the great variation in geography, languages and life-styles of highland indigenous peoples in Peru.

6.2 Prior organisational experience of highland indigenous peoples

According to McAdam (1996: 3), organisations and informal networks are the building blocks of social movements, as mobilisation requires resources such as leadership, organisational skills, and networks between people with common interests. In addition, organisations promote ideas and shared “frames” of understanding which are likely to be important in
legitimising collective action. In this section, I will therefore study the development of organisations involving indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru in the latter half of the 20th century, and discuss how highland indigenous participation in these organisations has promoted skills, experience, and legitimising ideas which can serve as resources for indigenous mobilisation. The following discussion will focus on three periods: organisations involving highland indigenous peoples before agrarian reforms, during the period between agrarian reforms and the transitions to democracy, and during the period after the transitions to democracy.

6.2.1 The emergence of peasant federations

The Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP) formed in 1947 is considered the oldest organisation of the Peruvian peasantry, of which a majority is indigenous (Sánchez 1996: 96). CCP was formed by peasant leaders affiliated to APRA, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, and played an important role in the peasant mobilisations at the end of the 1950s and the 1960s, which were generally conducted in Quechua (Monge 1991: 327, Remy 1994: 115). The major demands were land distribution, better working conditions for the peasants, and the right to organisation (Monge 1991: 328). While CCP supported thousands of regional peasant unions which became affiliated to it, CCP did not achieve a national co-ordinating function, partly due to an internal struggle for political hegemony and leadership between APRA and the more radical socialists and communists (ibid, 329). However, the peasant movement was important in bringing about the 1969 agrarian reform which met many of its demands (ibid, 330).

According to Sánchez (1996: 96), CCP has throughout its history remained loyal to the leftist position that indigenous peoples’ liberation only can be achieved through socialism, thereby ignoring the ethnic aspect of those they represent. While CCP was the main organisation of the indigenous peasantry in the 1950s and 60s, its focus on class, and peasant – worker solidarity, did not increase the cohesion of highland indigenous peoples as such. Rather, these would begin to consider themselves primarily as peasants. According to Remy (1994: 116): “peasant communities, made up of indigenous and nonindigenous members (who no longer refer to themselves in such terms) are at the grassroots of the national agrarian federal
organizations”. The organisation of peasant federations was also the background of the Velasco government’s change of name from indigenous to peasant communities (Sánchez 1996: 96).

The Federation of Ecuadorian Indians (FEI) formed by the Ecuadorian Communist Party in 1944 is in many respects similar to CCP. It was the first attempt at forming a national organisation of indigenous rural workers, it was led by the Party rather than indigenous people, and it aimed at replacing service tenure with wage relations, thereby transforming the hacienda Indians into a militant agricultural proletariat (Selverston 1994: 138, Korovkin 1997: 28). Encouraged by the FEI, several hacienda unions were formed which worked for minimum wages and general application of labour legislation (Korovikin, ibid). In 1961, FEI managed to mobilise 10-15 000 indigenous peasants in a demonstration in Quito to demand agrarian reform and an end to the huasipungo system of service tenure (Guerrero 1993: 83), and with the agrarian reform law of 1964 service tenure was finally abolished. According to Guerrero (1993: 95), the main achievement of FEI was that it brought local conflicts between hacienda owners and indigenous peasants to the national political scene.

As CCP, FEI formulated its demands in class terms. Furthermore, Guerrero (1993: 95) argues that FEI was an indigenista rather than an indigenous organisation, as it served as a mediator between the indigenous peasants and the state, and tended to speak on behalf of Indians who where regarded as subjects rather than citizens. The focus on the economic problems of the indigenous peasants has also led CONAIE (1989: 32) to conclude that: “The FEI did not take into account the conjunction of our problems, that is class exploitation and ethnic discrimination to which we are subject. For this reason, the organisation did not obtain national representation of the indigenous peoples”. However, there are two characteristics which distinguish FEI from CCP, making the FEI experience more relevant for future indigenous mobilisation in the Ecuadorian highlands. First, it used the word “Indian” in the name of the organisation, and second, it included a few indigenous persons in the organisation’s leadership who thereby gained valuable political experience and became important for the formation of later indigenous organisations (Sánchez 1996: 93, ECUARUNARI 1998: 23). According to ECUARUNARI (1998: 24): “FEI was the example, the seed, for the birth of new organisations.”
The 1964 agrarian reform is considered a turning point in Ecuadorian indigenous politics, and the initiation of new forms of peasant and indigenous organisations (Albó 1991: 307, Selverston 1994: 138, Korovkin 1997: 29). The 1964 agrarian reform in Ecuador ended service tenure and introduced wage relations, but the reform was little distributive and implied that the indigenous peasants lost access to hacienda pastures, thus worsening their situation (see 5.4.1). However, Korovkin (1997: 29) argues that while the reform was a defeat in economic terms, it was a victory with regard to organisation: “The collapse of the semifeudal hacienda order was followed by a rapid growth of indigenous community organization” (ibid).

The agrarian reform decreased the hacienda owners’ influence over the indigenous peasants, and left a power void which was soon filled by indigenous communities organising as comunas (Guerrero 1993: 98). The 1937 Law of Communes which established that communities may organise its own local government (called cabildo) and get limited control over natural resources and community affairs did not apply to huasipungeros, but the agrarian reform opened up this possibility for the former huasipungeros (Selverston 1994: 138). In the province of Chimborazo, which has the country’s highest proportion of Quichua-speaking population, more than hundred communities were recognised as comunas in the period 1964-70 (Korovkin 1997: 27-29). While former indigenous community leaders were generally appointed by hacienda owners, the organisation of comunas led to the rise of a new generation of young, educated, indigenous leaders with a good understanding of politics (ibid, 29).

The growth of comunas in Ecuador was accompanied by increased activity of the Catholic church in rural areas. Inspired by liberation theology and the meeting of Latin American bishops in Medellin, Colombia in 1968 who declared their “preferential option for the poor”, progressive members of the Ecuadorian clergy became increasingly involved in education and development projects in indigenous communities (CONAIE 1989: 214). In 1972, with support from the Church of Chimborazo, a group of young religious leaders organised a reunion of indigenous community leaders in order to create an organisation which could “halt the influence of the Communists in the peasant sectors” (ibid, my translations). More than 200 delegates participated, representing indigenous communities and peasant organisations from most of Ecuador’s highland provinces, and this led to the formation of Ecuador Runacunapac
Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI) which translates “Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indigenous People” (ibid, Korovkin 1997: 30). The meeting also decided to promote indigenous federations in each of the highland provinces, referred to as Huahua Riccharimui (Awakening of the sons, or offspring). Such federations were formed in most of the highland provinces in the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, some of them taking the name of peasant federation and others referring to themselves as indigenous federations (see CONAIE 1989 for developments in each province). The strength of these federations was that they were better than the FEI in drawing on local forms of indigenous organisation, as they assembled representatives of the indigenous communities’ cabildos (Zamosc 1994: 47, Korovkin 1997: 30).

The Catholic church in Ecuador played an important role in fostering indigenous organisations, and participation in these organisations led to the development of indigenous leaders who would later be at the forefront of a more autonomous indigenous movement (CONAIE 1989, ECUARUNARI 1998). From the foundation of ECUARUNARI in June of 1972, there were divergent opinions about the aims of the organisation and currents which went against the Catholic clergy. At the first meeting there were discussions about whether the organisation should be for indigenous people only (as proposed by the clergy), or whether it should be a proletarian organisation uniting poor people from both the countryside and the cities in the struggle for revolution (ECUARUNARI 1998: 35). The latter turned out to be the weakest position, and it was decided that the movement should be pacific and that each province should have a Catholic priest as an assessor (CONAIE 1989: 216). However, the differing positions with regard to the ethnic versus class character of the organisation remained a source of division throughout the 1970s.

In the years after its constitution, ECUARUNARI suffered from a political, organisational and ideological crisis (CONAIE 1989: 216). Following the adoption of the second agrarian reform law in October 1973 by the military government of Rodrigues (1972-76), ECUARUNARI, FEI, and FENOC (National Federation of Peasant Organisations)\(^8\) started to push for the application of the law (ECUARUNARI 1998: 44). There were several acts of protest and also a few land invasions, leading to government repression (ibid, 54). In 1974, the leader of ECUARUNARI in Cotopaxi was killed in a confrontation between indigenous organisations

\(^8\) FENOC was a wing of the Catholic worker organisation CEDOC founded in 1938. In 1975 Socialist Militants replaced the Christian Democrat leadership, turning it into a socialist organisation (Zamosc 1994: 46).
and hacienda owners (ibid). The repression of indigenous leaders led to a radicalisation of ECUARUNARI, and increased tension between the clergy and indigenous leaders (CONAIE 1989: 216). By the mid-1970s, the progressive segments had also been weakened within the Catholic church (ECUARUNARI 1998: 54). Participation in the second congress of ECUARUNARI in 1975 was lower than in the first, as several indigenous leaders decided to have their own reunion without the support of religious assessors (CONAIE 1989: 216-17). In the next couple of years, ECUARUNARI was divided, leading to infiltration by various political parties of the left (ECUARUNARI 1998: 55). Adding to divisions were also the increased competition between Catholic and Protestant religious groups working with development projects and bilingual education programs in indigenous communities (Korovkin 1997: 30-31, Radcliffe 1999: 46), and the increased penetration by state development agencies which sought to establish clientelist relations with indigenous communities (ECUARUNARI 1998: 47).

After a few failed attempts at re-unifying ECUARUNARI, a fourth congress was held in July, 1977 under the slogan “Unity and Consolidation of ECUARUNARI”, with the participation of 180 persons, of which about 100 were official delegates from local and provincial peasant and indigenous organisations (CONAIE 1989: 218). Religious assessors did not participate (ibid). In this congress, a class-based ideology was emphasised, implying an approach between ECUARUNARI and the workers’ movement (ibid, 219). However, the organisation managed to live with both a class-based and an ethnic based ideological current in the following years, defining itself as an “indigenous, peasant, class-based organisation”, aiming at “the formation a socialist state” (ECUARUNARI 1998: 56, Ramón 1993: 215). In April 1978 the leadership of ECUARUNARI also met with the leaders of FEI and FENOC to form FULCI (the United Front for Indigenous and Peasant Struggle) (ibid, 220). In the first truly democratic elections in Ecuadorian history in 1978 and 79 (two rounds of balloting), peasant and indigenous sectors generally supported the centre-left presidential team of Jaime Roldós and Osvaldo Hurtado (ECUARUNARI 1998: 104) who won a landslide victory in April 1979 (Isaacs 1993: 119). I will return to the further development of indigenous organisations in the democratic period in Ecuador after a discussion of developments in Peru.

In Peru, the policies of the radical military government (1969-75) implied a dramatic change in the relationship between the state and the peasant, indigenous and worker sectors, something which had implications for organisational developments. The aim of the military
government was to curb the power of the traditional oligarchy and to integrate the urban and rural masses into national society by means of state-controlled corporatist organisations (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 219). In 1971, the government created SINAMOS (the National System for Support of Social Mobilisation) which may also be read *sin amos*, “without masters”, which was supposed to include peasants, urban workers, and inhabitants of the squatter towns surrounding Lima (ibid). In addition, the government recognised the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP) affiliated with the weak Communist Party, in order to curb the power of the APRA-controlled Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP), and it created CNA (the National Agrarian Confederation) in order to weaken the bases of CCP (Stokes 1995: 35, Albó 1991: 322). The creation of these organisations was followed by radical rhetoric and slogans such as “full participation”, “social mobilisation”, and “revolution of full participation” (Stokes 1995: 11, 72).

While the Velasco government intended to eliminate class struggle (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 219), it unintentionally contributed to a strengthening of leftist organisations (Stokes 1995: 11): “If a general leftward realignment of Peruvian society was already under way, this was not clear to military government strategists in the opening years of the 1970s. But such a process was under way, and the Velasco regime’s support of the CGTP unintentionally encouraged the process” (Stokes 1995: 35). According to Lynch (1997: 127), the development of a strong, rights-oriented civil society can be explained both in terms of an “impetus from above”, namely the military government, and the social movements themselves. As discussed in 5.3.2, class rhetoric came to dominate in the universities in this period, and a number of Marxist political parties were formed. Together with trade unions, peasant unions and other forms of popular organisations, these would stage general strikes and mass protests during the more conservative military government of Morales (1975-78) which would eventually open the way for transition to democracy.

The radicalisation of Peruvian society also had implications for peasant organisations, and the self-definition of the indigenous peasantry. While CCP was weakened in the immediate years after the agrarian reform and the creation of CNA and SINAMOS (Monge 1991: 331), it re-emerged as a result of increased activity of revolutionary leftist organisations in the highlands in the first years of the 1970s (Montoya 1989: 59). Leftist organisations and political parties openly competed to control the CCP and its local and regional federations, and the *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* eventually became most important in CCP’s reconstruction.
From its fourth congress in 1974 throughout the 1970s, CCP’s main aims were recuperation of land for the peasants, political and organisational autonomy in relation to the state, and a revolutionary solution to Peru’s problems (Monge 1991: 330). In the 1970s and 80s, CCP supported peasant communities who invaded SAIS-controlled land and then distributed it to community members as family parcels (Albó 1991: 323).

While class rhetoric dominated CCP and the regional federations affiliated to it, questions of ethnicity were not totally absent, as can be illustrated by proceedings from a meeting held by the peasant federation of the department of Puno in 1978, which was in opposition to the national leadership of CCP (proceedings cited in Montoya 1989: 60-65). Following the fifth congress of CCP in August 1978, the federation of Puno named Tupak Katari (an Aymara leader who fought with Tupak Amaru in the 1780 rebellion against the Spanish), held a meeting in which they denounced the CCP executive committee as too little revolutionary (ibid, 61). 35 representatives from Aymara communities participated in the meeting, and with reference to the writings of Mariategui, the Tupak Katari federation claimed that the leadership of CCP did not recognise the Quechua and Aymara nationalities as the basis for the Peruvian nation, and the principal actors of the popular struggle which would have to start in the countryside (ibid, 62): “We hold that the class-peasant factor and the nationality-Aymara factor are not mutually exclusive… The unity of Quechuas and Aymaras resides fundamentally in their condition as peasants with shared aims in the struggle for land and a revolutionary government of the people” (ibid, my translation). While Tupak Katari referred to Quechua and Aymara nationalities, it still saw a socialist revolution based on peasant-worker solidarity as the main method of improving the living conditions of indigenous peasants. At the same time, the statements illustrates how class discourse in Peru borrows from a discourse of identity.

The Tupak Katari federation would also stress the role of the Quechua and Aymara nationalities in later meetings. In 1979 it organised the “First Encounter of the Quechua and Aymara nationalities and the minorities of the Forest” together with the Peasant Federation of the Department of Cusco (Montoya 1989: 65). 75 delegates from 30 peasant communities and three Amazonian communities participated, together with 20 local and regional peasant organisations (ibid). They agreed on a common platform which included land distribution and better living conditions for the peasants, defence of language and culture of the Quechua and Aymara nationalities and natives of the forest, and “the revolutionary unity of the whole
The following year a congress of nationalities was held, but it gathered even fewer representatives than the first encounter, and the results of the congress have never been published (ibid, 67). In 1981, The Tupak Katari federation was characterised as “divisionist” by the CCP executive committee who would stick to a discourse of class throughout the 1980s and 90s (ibid, 68). According to Sánchez (1996: 92): “An immediate explanation of the campesino character of the movements in Peru is the filling of the political space by the Marxist left which has closed the possibility for any other form of political expression” (my translation).

When the more conservative military government of Morales took over in 1975, the 1968-75 experiment became virtually dismantled and SINAMOS was permitted to wither away (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 221). However, the military government of Morales had to face a radicalised civil society which was further angered by the effects of economic crisis and austerity measures which led to a 40 % drop in real wages in the period 1973-78 (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 221). In 1977, -78 and -79, the first national strikes in Peruvian history were held, bringing about the transition to democracy (Stokes 1995: 44-45). Worker-, student-, peasant-, and shantytown organisations participated, and “so intense was this mobilization that partisans of revolution saw the political moment as ‘pre-revolutionary’” (ibid, 44).

6.2.3 Organisations after the transitions to democracy

At the time of transition to democracy, Ecuador and Peru faced quite different political situations, and an important difference was the greater strength and radicalism of the Peruvian left. During the general strikes in the second half of the 1970s, the left became a powerful political force for the first time in Peruvian history (Degregori 1992: 36). In Ecuador, by contrast, entrepreneurial sectors still maintained a disproportionate strength compared to lower class sectors (Isaacs 1993: 121). According to Stokes (1995: xiii), the most extreme outcome of the radicalisation of Peruvian society in the 1970s was the violent irruption of The Communist Party of Peru – Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).
Sendero Luminoso was formed in the 1970s by a group of young university professors at the University of Huamanga in the highland province of Ayacucho (Degregori 1992: 35). Before the beginning of the 1980s it was unknown to most people as it did not take part in the general strikes, nor tried to influence peasant federations and labour unions, but rather concentrated on forming “generated organisms”; small groups of people with a rigid ideology depending on the party (ibid, 36). In 1980, when Peru held its first truly democratic election, Sendero Luminoso launched the “People’s War” by burning ballot boxes and voting lists in the small Andean town of Chuschi (ibid, 33-34). As the violence started in the middle of the Andean Trapeze, Sendero Luminoso was first interpreted as an indigenous movement: “Depending on the anthropological current, it was identified as ‘millenarian’ or ‘indigenous’; it was the ‘revenge of the centuries’, ‘the Andean utopia’, the pachakut’i” (Remy 1994: 124). However, the Sendero Luminoso leadership was generally mestizo, and the main followers have been students of Andean origin who entered the universities en masse in the 1970s and who had been disappointed by their lack of opportunities for social mobility (Degregori 1992: 37, 43).

When Sendero Luminoso gained some initial support in the peasant communities, it was mainly because they brought order and regulation by punishing cattle thieves and making schoolteachers show up for work, a regulating function the state apparatus had not managed to fill after the breakdown of the haciendas (Remy 1994: 125). However, Sendero Luminoso’s justice was costly for the peasants, as death penalty also struck merchants, village leaders, and leaders of peasant organisations (ibid). From the mid 1980s, peasants would generally side with the Army (ibid, 126).

According to Sánchez (1996: 91), indigenous organisations might have formed in Peru in the 1980s had it not been for the irruption of Sendero Luminoso and the grave economic crisis. However, it appears too simple to say that an indigenous movement would have emerged in Peru in the absence of Sendero Luminoso. According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999), there are too many factors in between; the radicalisation of Peruvian society in the Velasco years, and the growth of the left, most importantly, as these events made class interpretations of reality overshadow questions of ethnicity. In a study of political attitudes in the shantytown district of Independencia, Lima in the 1980s, Stokes (1995: 96-97) to her surprise found: “No significant differences in attitudes toward the state, strategy, and class appeared, for instance, between monolingual Spanish speakers and speakers of a native language...The survey findings do suggest, rather, that these
differences were swamped by the powerful forces of political-cultural transformation unleashed under military rule”.

It is clear however, that other organised actors suffered from the violence of Sendero Luminoso and that it was not a propitious moment for the emergence of new organisations: “A fundamental characteristic of Sendero’s activity is disregard for grass-roots organizations: peasant communities, labor unions, neighborhood associations. These are all replaced by generated organisms – that is, by the party that decides everything, just as before everything was decided by the *misti* lords and officials” (Degregori 1992: 39). Yet, a certain form of organisations proliferated in the 1980s, namely self-help groups and peasant patrols (*rondas campesinas*) (Starn et al. 1995: 419). By 1990, there were 2400 soup kitchens in Lima organised by volunteers serving 1 million people (ibid, 422), and in the southern highlands, peasant communities were copying the peasant night patrols of Cajamarca in the north (organised against cattle rustlers) to defend themselves against Sendero Luminoso attacks (ibid, 377). Such defence organisations among the highland peasantry have actually been important in halting the advancement of Sendero Luminoso and speaks to the organisational capacity of the peasants (Remy 1994: 127). CCP also survived the years of Sendero Luminoso violence, although its influence among the peasantry was reduced (CCP 1999: 3). However, this was not only because of Sendero Luminoso, but also due to a general crisis of the left in Peru, in particular after the end of socialism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (ibid).

In 1992, the leader of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán was captured, marking the beginning of the organisation’s decline (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 225). It has been speculated that this might give rise to indigenous organisations in the highlands (interview with professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya, November 30th, 1999), but so far this has not happened. General secretary colleagues of the CCP, Washington Mendoza and Pablo Quispe (interview December 2nd, 1999), expressed admiration for CONAIE and told me they were beginning to discuss multicultural issues within the organisation, and that this was likely to become more important in the future. However, they did not participate in the First Encounter of the Quechua Peoples in Cusco in November 1999, despite being invited (interview with Rodrigo Montoya, November 30th, 1999). Yet, questions of culture and identity continue to be important in Peru, and may also influence political outcomes. In his ongoing presidential election campaign (second round to be held in June 2001), the Harvard-
educated *cholo* Alejandro Toledo continually stresses his Andean background and his time as a poor shoeshine boy after his parents with 16 children migrated to Lima (CNN 2001). When the father of opposing candidate Lourdes Flores called him “a llama from Harvard”, half Peru took it personally (ibid). Toledo has also taken the nickname of *Pachacutec*, an ancient Inca emperor (ibid).

In contrast to the situation in Peru at the time of the transition to democracy, Ecuadorian leftist organisations were relatively weak (Isaacs 1993: 121). This seems to have had implications for the further development of ECUARUNARI and indigenous mobilisation. The government of Roldós-Hurtado was inaugurated in August 1979, and in October ECUARUNARI held its fifth congress with the participation of 350 indigenous delegates representing 10 provinces, including delegates from FEI and FENOC (CONAIE 1989: 221). According to congress papers: “It is increasingly clear to the movement that the indigenous problem has a double dimension: an ethnic dimension and a class dimension, and the solutions have to be sought in this perspective” (ibid, 222-23, my translation). The congress decided to raise demands which included land distribution in favour of the peasants, participation of peasant organisations in government development programs, administration of justice by indigenous authorities in the indigenous communities, bilingual education, and expulsion of foreign religious groups working in indigenous communities (ibid, 221-22).

The ECUARUNARI congress also decided to strengthen FULCI (The United Front for Peasant and Indigenous Struggle) and to establish links with indigenous organisations of the Ecuadorian Amazon such as the Shuar Federation (ibid, 222). In addition, the congress sought to establish relations of exchange with other indigenous organisations at the international level, and among the organisations cited is the CCP of Peru (ibid). In August 1980, various indigenous organisations of the Ecuadorian Amazon formed CONFENIAE (The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) (ibid, 99), and following an initiative from the leadership of CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI, the two organisations held The First Encounter of the Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador in October the same year (ibid, 261). The outcome of this encounter was CONACNIE (Co-ordinating Council of the Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) (ibid, 261-62). The existence of CONACNIE implied increased contact and exchange between highland indigenous organisations and organisations of the Amazonian groups, permitting the arrangement of
The First Congress of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador in November 1986, which led to the formation of CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) (ibid, 264-65).

The work of CONACNIE was mainly focused on strengthening indigenous organisations at all levels; locally, municipally, provincially, regionally and nationally (CONAIE 1989: 262). ECUARUNARI and CONFENIA also continued to hold their separate congresses. The strengthening of the organisation was also the main task of CONAIE in the first years after its formation; according to Zamosc (1994: 61): “most energy went into networking, bridging differences between Andean and Amazonian groups, contacting nongovernmental organizations in search of material support, and stabilizing the internal arrangements essential for effective functioning.” The main conflict within CONACNIE and CONAIE in the 1980s was the relative importance of class and ethnicity, a division which partly corresponded to the division between highland and Amazonian indigenous groups (Selverston 1997: 176).

According to an indigenous leader from Imbabura: “There were two visions: the indigenist cultural vision, focused on bilingual education, and the class vision, focused on land conflicts. The two merged when we realized that we could not have our culture without land” (in ibid).

Land and education have been important rallying points of the indigenous movement. The first major achievement of CONAIE was when the newly elected president Rodrigo Borja in 1988 recognised CONAIE as the representative of the indigenous peoples in Ecuador and gave the organisation administrative responsibility for bilingual education (Pitsch 1999: 3, Selverston 1997: 181, see also 5.3.2)

It was the indigenous uprising in June 1990 which clearly established the indigenous movement as an important actor on the Ecuadorian political scene. According to Zamosc (1994: 38), it was “the major popular mobilization in recent Ecuadorian history.” In early 1990, 73 land conflicts were pending in the four highland provinces of Chimborazo, Bolívar, Cotopaxi, and Imbabura only (ECUARUNARI 1998: 200), and an economic recession implying increased costs of living and reduced possibilities for temporary work in the cities, was clearly hurting the peasantry (Zamosc 1994: 52). On the 27th of May 1990, 160 indigenous activists occupied the Santo Domingo Cathedral in Quito, demanding an immediate resolution to land disputes (Pitsch 1999: 3). The following day, more than 1000 indigenous persons representing about 70 highland organisations marched to Quito to present the president with a list of 16 demands which included return of land to indigenous communities, basic infrastructure in indigenous communities, funding for bilingual education,
and amendment of the constitution to proclaim Ecuador a multi-national state (ibid, Field 1991: 41). In the following week demonstrations were held in most of Ecuador’s highland cities, roads were blocked, and indigenous peasants stopped selling their produce, causing food shortages in the cities (ibid, 39).

Initially, the Ecuadorian government did not recognise the demonstrations as an indigenous uprising, but rather saw it as a manipulation of indigenous people by a few subversives (León 1994: 34). According to the president Rodrigo Borja: “When national unity is most needed, irresponsible agitators are manipulating the highland indigenous peoples to make them commit acts of violence which conspire against the economic advancement of Ecuador” (in ibid). Both the army and the police were deployed to suppress the demonstrators, and an indigenous leader from Chimborazo was killed (Field 1991: 39). However, the uprising was the result of meticulous planning by indigenous organisations, especially by the regional organisations, and the work done at the local level is important to explains the massive participation (Zamosc 1994: 53). While the participation of Amazonian groups was marginal, there was a massive turnout of protestors in the highlands (ibid, 39). In Chimborazo alone, 150 000 – 200 000 persons participated according to local leaders (Korovkin 1997: 43). In a newspaper article (El Hoy, 8th of June 1990 in León 1994: 38) Felipe Burbano de Lara argues: “To say that the indigenous people are manipulated is as offensive as it is revealing of a culture where Indians are forced to occupy a subordinate position. It also denies the existence of a powerful organisation which has been built with time. Nobody can mobilise tens of thousands of persons overnight because it seems like a good idea” (my translation).

The indigenous protestors got sympathy both from other sectors of Ecuadorian civil society and from international actors, and after a week of demonstrations the government agreed to negotiate (Pitsch 1999: 3-4). Vice president of CONAIE, Luis Macas served as the spokesperson of the indigenous peoples and the Archbishop of Quito acted as mediator (ibid). The negotiations shattered the common image of indigenous people as passive and submissive and gave legitimacy to CONAIE which has since served as the interlocutor between indigenous peoples and the government (Selverston 1994: 140). In terms of indigenous politics in Ecuador it was thus a watershed event. The uprising also seems to have had an important effect at the individual level, increasing indigenous people’s self-esteem. The following citations are from indigenous persons participating in the uprising (in León 1994: 52-53, my translations):
The streets were ours.
-It was like a dream, all of us together, we were strong, everyone with ponchos and hats.
-First, I didn’t want to participate in the uprising; you’re crazy I said, you’ll see what happens. But the next day I went because everybody was going, and they said in the radio that indigenous people filled the stadium of Ambato and the governor had to come, all runas, so I wanted to go.
-Did you see what we indigenous people can do? Now everybody is ready to participate in another uprising.
-I had no idea that we were so many runas, and I discovered it at that very moment.

Since 1990, the indigenous movement led by CONAIE has taken sustained political action. In 1994, after another nation-wide indigenous uprising, the indigenous movement managed to stop a new agrarian law which could have implied the break-up of communal land (Pacari 1996: 29-30). The 1994 negotiations between the government and the CONAIE leadership were broadcast on the radio to secure the transparency of the process (ibid). In the election of 1996, indigenous candidates won 8 of 82 seats in the Parliament and 71 local offices, marking the beginning of indigenous participation in formal politics (Pitsch 1999: 6).

At the beginning of this section I stated the expectation that former organisational experiences of highland indigenous peoples are likely to serve as resources for indigenous mobilisation. While I have demonstrated that highland indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Peru have participated in organisations at least since the middle of the 20th century, organisational forms in Peru do not seem to have been conducive to explicitly indigenous mobilisation. In Peru, the peasant movements of the 1950s and 60s which included a large number of indigenous people were important in bringing about agrarian reform. While these processes are likely to have promoted skills and experience, they also made indigenous people begin to consider themselves primarily as peasants, a process which was further aided by state rhetoric in the 1970s. In Ecuador by contrast, the first indigenous organisations in the highlands were formed already in the beginning of the 1970s with support from the Catholic church. It is clear that this has been important for the development of organisational skills, indigenous leadership, and later autonomous capacity for indigenous mobilisation.
Throughout the 1970s ECUARUNARI and the local indigenous organisations in the Ecuadorian highlands became more independent from the church, and with the cooperation of Amazonian indigenous groups in the 1980s a strong indigenous movement developed. In a sense the highland indigenous peoples of Ecuador and Peru have become different peoples during the last 30 years as a result of different organisational processes. According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999): “Identity is organisation, identity is a sense of opposition, and identity is political proposals for the future. Ethnic groups acquire identity when they recognise a language, recognise a culture, and affirm themselves in front of those who denied their existence” (my translation). However, it is clear that the different development in Ecuador and Peru with regard to indigenous mobilisation and organisation is not only a question of highland indigenous peoples self-definition, but also of the role played by the state and other influential actors. I will now discuss the influence of the highland indigenous peoples’ allies.

6.3 Presence of allies and ability to form coalitions

The expectation is that the presence of allies with whom highland indigenous peoples may form coalitions, increases organisational capacity and political opportunities, and thereby the potential for mobilisation. In the following, I will look at the role played by the political left, the church, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and Amazonian indigenous groups, to see how their positions have served to weaken or strengthen highland indigenous peoples’ potential for mobilisation.

6.3.1 The political left in Ecuador and Peru

As the indigenous peasants in the highlands of Ecuador and Peru have belonged to the poorest and most exploited parts of the population, the political organisations of the left have tended to see them as natural allies. However, class-based organisation have mainly been concerned with the conditions of indigenous peasants as part of the rural proletariat, and not their condition as ethnically different: “Eager to promote a unitary peasant-based class consciousness, they have always viewed ethnicity as a divisive factor inimical to their projects
of social transformation” (Zamosc 1994: 54). While leftist organisations have played an important role in the struggle for land distribution in favour of the indigenous peasants, the mestizo leadership of these organisations has also been marked by a certain paternalism in relation to the indigenous peoples (Montoya 1989: 107). In Ayacucho, Peru in 1969, a peasant leader gave the following answer when asked about the situation of people in his region: “They need to be instructed, they need someone to give them orientation, they need courses… to see if in that way they can move forward, get out of slavery, free themselves from deception. Otherwise they will continue to be poor and exploited” (in Degregori 1992: 42). This paternalist attitude has been shared by political actors of both left and right in Ecuador and Peru (see León 1994: 32), but it is mainly leftist organisations which have involved indigenous people. To defend CONAIE’s focus on ethnicity, president Luís Macas stated in an interview in 1991: “A mestizo worker and an Indian are both exploited, but the worker has a higher social status, so he has the privilege of insulting the Indian (in Selverston 1997: 175).

Disregard for ethnicity and paternalist attitudes within leftist organisations are factors which seem to have worked against indigenous peoples’ autonomous organisational capacity.

According to Sánchez (1996: 92), the role played by the political left in Ecuador and Peru has been similar in that leftist organisations have generally tried to establish co-optive or clientilist relations with the rural indigenous bases. However, as argued in the last section, the political left has historically been much stronger in Peru (Sánchez 1996: 92, Montoya 1998: 157). Montoya (1998: 157-58), claims that the Marxist left in Peru has served to block the formation of autonomous indigenous organisations: “Paradoxically, where the left gained strength the indigenous peoples were weakened. The explanation seems to be simple: the hope of an alliance between the working class and the peasants as an axis for the revolution does not take the ethnic factor into account” (ibid, 158, my translation). According to Sánchez (1996: 96), Marxist interpretations of reality acquired intellectual hegemony in Peru by the end of the 1970s, reaching an extreme degree with the fundamentalism of Sendero Luminoso.

According to Selverston (1997: 175): “The story of the modern indigenous organizations in Ecuador can be told in terms of the theoretical and practical struggle between class-based and ethnic-based movements.” At the time of transition to democracy in Ecuador, leftist organisations were weak compared to the situation in Peru (Isaacs 1993: 121), but class rhetoric still dominated over ethnicity-based discourses (Zamosc 1994: 47). In the latter half of the 1970s, ECUARUNARI’s discourse hardly differed from that of FENOC (National
Federation of Peasant Organisations), as both focused on the struggle for land, the worker-peasant alliance, and socialist ideals (ibid). In the 1979 election, provincial indigenous organisations also affiliated with leftist political parties in order to launch indigenous candidates (Selverston 1997: 175). However, during the 1980s, two processes took place simultaneously: Worker and peasant organisations began to wane, and indigenous organisations became stronger and developed an indigenous ideology which successfully began to permeate Ecuadorian society (Selverston 1997: 176).

The crisis experienced by labour and peasant organisations in Ecuador in the 1980s can be explained both in terms of an ideological crisis and an inability to adapt to new circumstances. According to Zamosc (1994: 62), leftist organisations did not manage to redefine their projects of revolutionary transformation and to offer clear alternatives to neo-liberal economic policies after the transition to democracy. In the case of FENOC, the ideological crisis was coupled with bureaucratic entrenchment of the leadership and lack of attention to the need for services and credits in the regions where land had been redistributed as a result of agrarian reform (ibid, 48). By the 1990 uprising, CONAIE had become the most important organisation in the Ecuadorian countryside, and was also supported by non-indigenous peasants: “Without planning and foresight, CONAIE found itself as the only popular organization that could represent the distressed rural population of the Sierra” (Zamosc 1994: 62). CONAIE’s position as the most efficient organisation in expressing rural grievances is also illustrated by the fact that following the uprising, non-indigenous peasants would ask CONAIE to represent them in land disputes and negotiations with the government (ibid, 63).

The emergence of a strong indigenous movement in Ecuador seems to be explained not only by the development of indigenous organisations, but also by the default of other popular organisations. In that sense, the political space for indigenous organisations was larger in Ecuador than in Peru where class organisations dominated the 1970s and 80s. In addition, the creation of indigenous organisations in Ecuador were assisted by the church, which can be considered a pull-factor for indigenous mobilisation.
6.3.2 The Catholic church, religious groups and NGOs

Zamosc (1994: 54) identifies two main trends with regard to the allies of the indigenous peasantry in Ecuador: First, there has been a diminishing influence of leftist organisations, and second, there has been an increased influence of progressive sectors of the Catholic church. As discussed in 6.2.2, ECUARUNARI was formed after an initiative from sectors of the clergy inspired by liberation theology in the province of Chimborazo, among them Leonidas Proaño, who served as bishop in the province in the period 1954-84 (Espinosa 1992: 185). The aim of the clergy was not only to improve the conditions of the indigenous peoples, but also to halt the influence of the Communists among indigenous peasant sectors (CONAIE 1989: 214). With this aim, the church supported the formation of local and provincial indigenous organisations and also organised development projects and bilingual education (Korovkin 1997: 30). The Radiophonic Schools of Riobamba, Chimborazo run by Catholic priests in the 1960s and 70s are the most well known, as they were the first to run programs in both Spanish and Quichua (Yánez 1995: 29). In addition to teaching basic literacy, they would transmit local news, give information about practical matters such as agricultural techniques, and blend it all with evangelisation (ibid).

The message of the liberation theologians transmitted through radio programs and through their assistance in the formation of indigenous organisations seems to have had an empowering effect on the indigenous people involved. Highland indigenous peoples are generally very religious, and it is thus understandable that the idea that God’s word could serve to legitimate demands for better living conditions would have an impact. In an interview, an indigenous leader described how indigenous organisations used the bible to legitimate indigenous demands in the following way: “The gospel is not oppression, it is not the big fish eating the little fish, it is not slavery. We analysed that God’s word does not serve to suppress man, but to liberate him from slavery, from ignorance (in ECUARUNARI 1998: 37).

While ECUARUNARI became independent from the church in the mid-1970s (CONAIE 1989: 217), progressive sectors of the church continued to act as indigenous people’s ally. Espinosa (1992: 189) describes how indigenous organisations would seek advice with “the Bishop of the Indians”, Leonidas Proaño in Chimborazo in the beginning of the 1980s. The
indigenous uprising of 1990 was also supported by important segments of the Catholic church (ibid, 196), something which may explain why the 160 indigenous activists occupied the Santo Domingo Cathedral in Quito, using it as their base during the uprising. According to Espinosa (1992: 179), the activists were actually welcomed by a monk. When the government finally agreed to negotiate with CONAIE rather than to suppress the uprising, this can partly be attributed to pressure on the government from the Catholic church which criticised the methods of the army as excessively violent (ibid, 196). According to Ramón (1993: 250), the Catholic church has played an important role in avoiding the formation of a power block between the government, the army and the land owners which would have opted for repression rather than negotiations. In 1990, the Catholic church served as a mediator between the government and CONAIE, and when an agreement was reached it was celebrated with a “mass of triumph” in the Santo Domingo Cathedral, conducted in Quichua (Espinosa 1992: 181).

Sánchez (1996: 101) argues that without the support of the Catholic church inspired by liberation theology, the emergence of the indigenous movement in Ecuador would be difficult to explain. By contrast, the impact of liberation theology in the Peruvian countryside has been weak, due to two factors: First, a smaller part of the clergy in Peru adopted the ideas of liberation theology, and those who did would often be replaced by more conservative priests (ibid). Second, the strength of leftist organisations and their ideological hegemony worked against the influence of liberation theology. This difference between the two countries seems to have been important for the self-definition of the indigenous peasantry (ibid, 102).

However, the influence of the church has not only been positive for indigenous peoples in Ecuador. As in all Latin American countries, the church has historically been part of the dominant system, contributing to colonisation and exploitation, and demonstrating a paternalist attitude towards indigenous peoples. According to Mario Cabrera, director of CONAIE / ECUARUNARI in the province of Azuay, (interview October 19th, 1999), the influence of the church in recent years has been 50 % positive and 50 % negative. Cabrera argues that the positive contribution is the empowering ideas of liberation theology and the work of bishop Proaño (1954-84) and his clergy who promoted indigenous organisations and respected their autonomy, while the negative contribution lies in attempts by the church to control indigenous organisations, mainly after the death of Proaño.
Concerning the role played by other religious groups such as the numerous protestant missionary groups from the US, and the role played by NGOs, Cabrera’s evaluation is negative. He argues that these groups tend to have a paternalist attitude and prefer to work only with the leaders of the indigenous communities rather than with the common people who receive little benefit. Competition between the Catholic church and protestant groups has also provoked conflict within communities, especially when protestants have sought to ban communal religious festivals which they associate with alcohol and unproductive spending (Korovkin 1997: 31, Radcliffe 1999: 46). According to professor in anthropology, Rodrigo Montoya (interview November 30th, 1999) the impact of NGOs has been negative also in the Peruvian countryside. NGOs are involved in about 5% of the 5000 peasant communities in Peru, but each NGO tend to believe it represents a general solution to the peasants’ problems, causing rivalry and competition between NGOs and between communities (ibid). Such problems may explain why one of the first resolutions of CONACNIE in 1980 was: “To reject the manipulation of political parties, missionaries and other institutions who have always sought to establish paternalist relations of dependence with us, harming the authentic interests of the indigenous nationalities (CONAIE 1989: 262). However, CONAIE now receives funding from organisations such as OXFAM America, the Inter-American Foundation and the Rainforest Action Network, but CONAIE co-ordinate the funds and decides how the money will be spent (Selverston 1994: 140)

6.3.3 The alliance between highland- and Amazonian indigenous groups

The meeting between ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE in 1980, leading to the formation of CONACNIE and later CONAIE is an important event in the formation of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. According to CONAIE (1989: 260): “We know that the unity of all the indigenous peoples is indispensable for our movement to have the necessary strength to pursue our economic, social, cultural and political objectives” (my translation). The collaboration between highland- and Amazonian indigenous organisations in Ecuador has been important for defining the movement as an explicitly indigenous movement, and it has been important for international appeal and support. Developments in Ecuador thus contrast markedly to the situation in Peru, where it is as if the peasant organisations in the highlands
and the organisations of the Amazonian indigenous groups belong to two different worlds

While Amazonian indigenous groups are demographically weak,\(^9\) they are more ethnically
“different” from dominant sectors than the highland indigenous peoples, and they also occupy
vast territories rich in natural resources which are important to the Ecuadorian state (Zamosc
1994: 60). This has made the politicisation of their rights highly visible. When CONACNIE
and later CONAIE increased the focus on ethnicity and decreased the focus on class
(Selverston 1994: 139), this can in large part be attributed to the influence of the Amazonian
groups in the organisation. The Amazonian organisations brought the concepts of
“territoriality” and “nationality” into the discourse of the indigenous movement, concepts not
formerly employed by highland indigenous organisations (Ruiz 1992: 476). The resulting
dialogue between highland and Amazonian indigenous groups about the meaning of these
concepts has enriched the indigenous movement, and served to fill it with an ethnic
ideological content (ibid).

The participation of the Amazonian indigenous groups and the focus on ethnicity, have also
made the Ecuadorian indigenous movement more visible internationally. According to Brysk
(1996: 39): “The current debate within indigenous movements on class versus ethnicity must
be informed by a deeper examination of the international power of ethnicity as a form of
information that has empowered a movement rich in identity but poor in everything else.”
While dominant sectors in countries such as Ecuador and Peru tend to see indigenous people
as threatening and uncivilised, the Indian Other is rather seen as fascinating and exotic by
Europeans and North Americans, something which has increased the scope for organisational
and financial support for indigenous organisations at the international level (ibid, 46).\(^{10}\)
While this represents a challenge for indigenous organisations, the internationalisation of
indigenous rights has generally strengthened the organisations (ibid, 46). According to Mario
Cabrera, director of ECUARUNARI / CONAIE in the province of Azuay (interview October
19\(^{th}\), 1999), participation in international indigenous forums has led to the exchange of ideas
and proposals, and the indigenous movements of other countries have become important allies
of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. Cabrera also believes such participation has made

\(^9\) Together, the various Ecuadorian Amazonian groups number about 123 000 persons (Ruiz 1992: 451).
\(^{10}\) The political mobilisation of Afro-Ecuadorians has been less successful than indigenous mobilisation, possibly
because this group does not represent the same kind of “cultural otherness” as Indians. (See Wade 1997: 35-39
for an interesting discussion on the topic in relation to Colombia.)
the Ecuadorian government take the indigenous movement more seriously. In conflicts with oil companies, Amazonian indigenous organisations have found influential allies in both ecological organisations and human rights organisations (Selverston 1994: 136).

The argument presented indicates that strong leftist organisations have worked against identity-based mobilisation among highland indigenous peoples in Peru, while support from the Catholic church and the alliance with Amazonian indigenous groups have increased the potential for mobilisation of the highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador. The role played by the Catholic church and Amazonian indigenous groups in Ecuador seem to be important to explain both the predominance of an ethnic discourse and the strength of the movement, and these two factors also seem to be interrelated.

6.4 Openness of the political system and tendency of the state to use repression

In what follows, I will discuss how the broader political system in Ecuador and Peru has shaped the possibilities for highland indigenous mobilisation. A decision to mobilise will be influenced by a group’s strategic assessment of threats and opportunities, and an open political system is likely to be more conducive to indigenous mobilisation than a closed and repressive political system. The proposition is therefore that the more open and less repressive the political system, the more likely is highland indigenous mobilisation. In order to discuss the contemporary political opportunity structure in Ecuador and Peru, I will first look at how the political system in the two countries has evolved historically

6.4.1 The historical development of politics in Ecuador and Peru

Since the formation of the colonial state Peru has been characterised by a bipolar structure. While the centre of the colonial administration was established in coastal Lima, most of its resources where extracted from mining and agriculture in the highlands, which were densely populated by indigenous peoples (Mallon 1992: 43). The extraction of resources took place by the colonisers’ use of indigenous nobles as intermediaries, and in a sense the Spanish dominated the coast while indigenous peoples continued to dominate the highlands
In 1780, the Inca noble Túpac Amaru headed an uprising against the Spanish with the intention of restoring Inca rule, but Túpac Amaru was defeated, leading to a decline in the power of the indigenous nobility which lost all privileges (ibid, 118-19). Still, the dream of restoring indigenous rule has never been completely lost in Peru, and is expressed in the writings of the indigenistas (see 5.2.1).

Divisions between the indigenous peasants and the dominant sectors of Spanish descent in Peru were increased by the establishment of the hacienda system. As discussed in 5.4.1, the abolition of the Indian tribute in 1854 actually worsened the conditions of the indigenous peasants, as it was followed by estate owners’ invasion of indigenous communities. As a result, the hacienda system became dominant in Peru by the end of the 19th century, through a violent process which involved the massacre of whole communities (Vargas Llosa 1996: 59). The behaviour of the estate owners sparked the concern of the indigenistas in the beginning of the 20th century, among them Mariategúi who proposed a socialist revolution to solve the problems of the indigenous peasantry (ibid, 67). What this brief account of Peru’s political history should illustrate is that the contemporary division between the poor, indigenous/cholo highlands and the richer, white/mestizo coast (Mallon 1992: 37) has a long and conflict-ridden history.

The colonial and early republican history of Ecuador is rather different from that of Peru, something which seems to have had implications for a lower degree of political polarisation and a different functioning of politics in the 20th century. The colonial administration in Ecuador did not face a strong indigenous nobility, and the hacienda system was established much earlier through clientilist arrangements (Ramón 1993: 273-74, see also 5.4.1). According to Ramón (1993: 274), the relation between estate owners and indigenous peasants was characterised by a “shameful pact” based on asymmetric power relationships, which indigenous peasants had to make the best of, being unable to challenge the system. Ramón (ibid) argues that the differences between Ecuador and Peru with regard to the working of the hacienda system explains the greater radicalism of agrarian reforms in Peru, and why open conflict over land has been much more common. In Ecuador, the relationship between hacienda owners and the state on the one hand, and indigenous peoples on the other, has rather been characterised by negotiations (ibid).
León (1994: 162) stresses negotiation and consensus as important principles in Ecuadorian politics, but his explanation for the prevalence of these principles is not related to the hacienda system. He argues that the emphasis on consensus can be explained by the need for unification in a small country threatened by strong external powers, and by internal fractures between the coast and the highland region which are equally strong (ibid). In this situation, the role of the state becomes to “structure the regional equilibrium which is also an equilibrium of history and different social interests. Conflict loses presence and social legitimacy, something which together with the conditions of Ecuador as a predominantly agrarian country, inhibits the legitimacy of a discourse of class to articulate different social interests, as happens in the neighbouring countries to the south” (ibid). According to León (ibid, 163), this feature of the political system has made it relatively open to ethnic demands, and generally much more open than the political systems of Peru and Bolivia.

However, León does not take into account that highland indigenous peoples always have been perceived as a far greater threat in Peru than in Ecuador where the state established a white/mestizo political hegemony rather early, relegating indigenous peoples to the periphery (see 5.2.3). In Peru, three main forms of overlapping cleavages (class, ethnicity and geography) have divided the state since its formation, and this seems to have produced great fears among the dominant sectors and a stronger tendency of the state to use repression. An example can be the highland guerrilla movement of the early 1960s in Peru which was harshly repressed by the army during the government of Belaúnde (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 217). Guerrilla movements and insurrections have been far more common in Peru than in Ecuador in the 20th century, and in most of these movements all three divisions have been present, although the struggles generally have been focused through a socialist lens.

According to Mallon (1992: 47), the government of Velasco (1969-75) represents the most serious attempt to overcome class and ethnic divisions and to construct a mestizo hegemony. However, also this project failed, since the outcome was not reconciliation but radicalisation and further polarisation of which the most extreme outcome was Sendero Luminoso (see 6.2.3). According to Isaacs (1993: 91-92), the military governments of Velasco in Peru was more willing to use repression than the military government of Rodrigues in Ecuador, but at the same time the use of military power in Peru, as during the take-over of the haciendas, was often directed against the upper classes. The Velasco regime also (unintentionally) opened up space for the left to organise and grow, leading to high levels of social mobilisation in Peru in
the 1970s (Stokes 1995: 33). This indicates that when indigenous organisations were formed in the Ecuadorian highlands in the beginning of the 1970s but not in Peru, this is probably not due to more repression in Peru in the 1970s, but rather to the strength of leftist organisations and the predominance of a class discourse.

6.4.2 Politics after the transitions to democracy

At the time of the transition to democracy, Peruvian politics was characterised by a much higher degree of polarisation than Ecuadorian politics, and the beginning of Sendero Luminoso violence in Ayacucho revived old fears among people on the coast about the revolutionary potential of the Andean masses. In the beginning of the 1980s, some Lima intellectuals explained Sendero Luminoso’s activities as an Indian revolt with the intention of restoring the Inca empire (Starn et al. 1995: 305). The dominant sectors’ fear is also documented by Portocarrero’s (1993) survey taken among students in the three main private universities of Lima in 1984: 91% of the 221 students answered “yes” to the question of whether they had heard rumours that Lima would be invaded (ibid, 106), and 66% answered that these rumours produced fear, while 19% were indifferent (ibid, 108).

The initial interpretation of Sendero Luminoso as an indigenous movement led to a strategy of military repression in the highlands which hurt the indigenous population in particular: “Fear and distrust of the ‘other’ led any soldier seeing a puna Indian wearing a poncho to suspect that weapons might be hidden under the poncho, and would fire first and find out later. The army was an army of occupation” (Remy 1994: 124). In December 1982, nine provinces in the departments of Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica were declared emergency zones and handed over to military control, extended to 27 provinces in 1985 (Starn et al. 1995: 339-40). More than 5000 people were killed in the emergency zone, or more than 1% of the population (ibid, 340). A report from 1983 criticised the army for placing a lower value on the lives of indigenous people than on the lives of “professionals”, and for being prejudiced against indigenous people (in ibid, 339).

Indigenous peasants in the southern highlands not only suffered from attacks by the army, but also from attacks by Sendero Luminoso. Everything associated with the “old state” had to be
eliminated according to Sendero Luminoso’s ideology, including peasant communities and local administrations, explaining the killing of community leaders, teachers, and mayors identified as part of the state system (Remy 1994: 126, Starn et al. 1995: 339). According to the leader of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, the revolutionaries would have to cross “rivers of blood” to destroy “the old state”, and build a new society (in Starn et al 1995: 306). Gradually the army would learn that most indigenous peasants were actually trying to defend themselves against Sendero Luminoso, and the changed tactics by the army in the late 1980s which involved giving arms to indigenous communities have been important for Sendero Luminoso’s decline (Remy 1994: 127).

While Sendero Luminoso does not represent an indigenous movement, it draws on the division of class, ethnicity and geography that divide Peruvian society. According to Degregori (1992: 38): “The founders of Sendero form part of a long tradition of provincial elites who rose up against a system that concentrates everything in the capital, and who embraced indigenismo (glorification of Indian customs and traditions) as a reaction against the hispanismo (glorification of Hispanic customs and traditions) of the Lima upper class”. However, as discussed in 5.2.3, indigenismo (in the same way as class discourse) seems to have limited highland indigenous people’s ability to define their own situation, and to develop their own discourse. Both the state and Sendero Luminoso have purported to “redeem” the indigenous population, but trapped in between, indigenous peoples became the main victims of the war. According to Albó (1991: 228), the reason why the deaths of more than 20 000 persons have not caused a greater stir nationally and internationally, is that most of the victims were “Indians”. It is clear that the 1980s in Peru was not a propitious moment for highland indigenous mobilisation.

Obviously, Ecuador had a more open political system than Peru in the 1980s. Also, in the first years after the transition to democracy, indigenous organisations were actually encouraged by the government in Ecuador, as they appeared less threatening than class-based organisations (Selverston 1994: 131). However, this attitude of the Roldós-Hurtado government was interpreted by ECUARUNARI as an attempt to control indigenous organisations: “The expectations created by the election of Roldós-Hurtado, have quickly vanished. The government continues to follow an anti-popular policy…, they seek the demobilisation of peasant-indigenous organisations” (CONAIE 1989: 223). As an example, CONAIE criticises the program of bilingual education which did not consult indigenous organisations and which
“attempted to incorporate the most combative indigenous leaders as promoters, transforming them into government employees” (ibid).

Still, the years of the government of Roldós-Hurtado was a better period for indigenous organisations than the following years of the conservative government of Febres Cordero (1984-88) (Selverston 1994: 144-45). Cordero suspended agrarian reforms, and when indigenous communities took over land they had a right to according to former legislation, they were violently repressed: “There were a number of cases of landowners’ private guards burning homes and assassinating indigenous community leaders” (ibid, 145). According to Isaacs (1993: 136), there were more human rights violations during the government of Cordero than during previous military rule, sparking criticism from international human rights organisations. Indigenous organisations where particularly hard hit: “Indian activists associated with CONAIE, in particular, have suffered torture at the hands of the police force in recent years” (ibid). Yet, in spite of persecution, or perhaps because of it, CONAIE was consolidated in the latter half of the 1980s (Selverston 1994: 145). Expectations were raised with the election of Rodrigo Borja in 1988, who soon after his election recognised CONAIE as the representative of the indigenous peoples and gave the organisation administrative responsibility for bilingual education (Selverston 1994: 145-46). However, unmet expectations, in particular with regard to the resolution of land conflicts, provide the backdrop of the 1990 uprising (ibid).

According to Cleary (2000: 1141), the reason why the indigenous movement in Ecuador has never resorted to rebellion, not even in 1990, needs to be explained. His proposal is that Ecuador’s democratic regime is relatively responsive (ibid). To this should be added the role of the Catholic church in fostering dialogue discussed in 6.3.2, and a probable risk calculation by the indigenous movement, which is likely to have considered the high cost of repression. The willingness to negotiate, both on the part of the government and on the part of CONAIE, seems to have been important for the sustenance of the indigenous movement in the 1990s. According to director of CONAIE / ECUARUNARI in the province of Azuay, Mario Cabrera (interview October 19th, 1999): “We have told president Mahuad directly that we don’t want war, we don’t want confrontations, we want a conversation. We would even like to avoid the protest marches so that we could dedicate more time to work the soil. We told them, señores, don’t give us bullets, give us resources to work the land” (my translation).
Can a more open political system and less repression in Ecuador than in Peru explain variation in highland indigenous mobilisation? In spite of periods of persecution, the indigenous movement in Ecuador seems to have benefited from the democratic opening and the government’s willingness to negotiate with CONAIE. It is also clear that the 1980s in Peru was not a propitious moment for indigenous mobilisation. However, Sendero Luminoso did not emerge out of nothing to block indigenous mobilisation; rather, the different trajectories of Ecuador and Peru in the 1980s and 90s seem to be explained by differences in earlier political processes which have led to political polarisation in Peru and a predominance of class interpretations. Furthermore, political violence has declined in Peru in the 1990s, making other explanations for the lack of indigenous mobilisation more relevant. I now turn to a political factor proposed by Montoya (1998) as an explanation for lacking indigenous mobilisation in Peru, namely the deception with politics.

6.4.3 The deception with politics

According to Montoya (1998: 165), the word *politics* produce fear and a feeling of being deceived among popular sectors, it has an entirely negative significance, and it is something people do not want to relate to. He argues that most Peruvians suffer from a double deception with politics as neither elected politicians nor the revolutionary movements of Sendero Luminoso and MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru) have come close to fulfilling their promises. While people had high expectations at the transition to democracy in Peru, it brought violence and a disastrous economic crisis. Neither the government of Belaúnde (1980-85), nor the government of García (1985-90) managed to stop the escalating violence and spiralling inflation which by 1988 was 3000 percent, making Peru “the most bankrupt country on a bankrupt continent” (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 224). Poverty exploded, and the crisis was aggravated by government corruption and mismanagement (Starn et al. 1995: 419-20). In addition, people who initially supported a socialist revolution where frightened by Sendero’s brutality and their open “assassinations of peasants in the name of the peasantry and workers in the name of the workers” (Montoya 1998: 166, my translation). According to Montoya (ibid), indigenous people in particular adopted a cautious attitude to politics, enhanced by the Quechua principle of neutrality and non-involvement, developed during 500 years of domination. An interviewee told Montoya that “No indigenous political
movement emerge because it can’t and it shouldn’t. Revitalising Andean culture from below, little by little is sufficient” (ibid, 165, my translation).

While Ecuador also experienced economic decline in the 1980s (Isaacs 1993: 134-35), the crisis was not as serious as in Peru. Furthermore, the 1980s was the opposite of a “lost decade” in terms of indigenous organisation, and the 1990 uprising in particular created optimism among indigenous peoples (León 1994: 52-53, Radcliffe 1999: 47). Yet, as in Peru, politics and politicians receive a negative evaluation. According to ECUARUNARI (1998: 255): “For the gringos and the Ecuadorian oligarchs, one of the best methods of cheating the people, are the elections which are held every four years… In campaigns costing millions, they give away money, shirts, alcohol and food, and pay the wages of the leader of each community to make them organise the campaigns of these liars which confound the people” (my translation). Such attitudes probably explain the participation of the indigenous movement in the failed coup of January 2000 in Ecuador.

Given such perceptions of politics, it is understandable that political involvement remains a contentious issue within the indigenous movement. When the leadership of CONAIE works for the political recognition of indigenous cultures and enters negotiations with the government, they also contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of state institutions in their own communities (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1998: 200). Among the poorest sectors of the highland indigenous population such participation in politics is not universally supported, as they tend to interpret the divisions of Ecuadorian society as unbridgeable and based less on culture than on class and race: “In contrast to ethnic views, a polarised ‘racial’ view of Ecuadorian society works against involvement within the official political system and leads to a narrower politics of confrontation for land, water, and local needs” (ibid, 188). This view clearly resembles attitudes in Peru. It also hints at a challenge for the indigenous movement, constituted in the possibility of an increased disparity between an indigenous leadership who proudly defends indigenous cultures within the political system, and their poorer indigenous bases who have more immediate material needs.

To sum up, Peruvian politics have been characterised by a higher degree of polarisation than Ecuadorian politics, explained by historical divisions and a strengthening of the left in the latter half of this century. In Ecuador, different political actors have rather sought to negotiate, making the political system more open to ethnic demands. While a higher degree of
political polarisation in Peru is likely to account for higher levels of political repression, repression in itself does not seem to explain variation in highland indigenous mobilisation between the two countries. Political developments in Peru, in particular in the 1970s, have made organisation and mobilisation based on class predominate over mobilisation based on ethnic identity. Also, a greater deception with politics in Peru than in Ecuador may contribute to explain the lack of highland indigenous mobilisation in Peru in the 1990s.

6.5 Main findings

The arguments presented in this chapter confirm that differences in organisational resources and political opportunities contribute to explain differences in highland indigenous mobilisation between Ecuador and Peru. First, the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian highlands are more geographically concentrated and show less linguistic variation than the indigenous peoples of the Peruvian highlands, increasing cohesion and interaction, and thereby the potential for mobilisation. Yet, a more crucial difference between the two countries seems to be the different organisational experiences of highland indigenous peoples. In Ecuador, the first indigenous organisations were formed already in the beginning of the 1970s with support from the Catholic church, which contributed to the development of indigenous leadership. The weakness of the political left in Ecuador, and the collaboration between highland and Amazonian indigenous groups are also important factors in the growth of the indigenous movement. In Peru, class based organisations have dominated among the indigenous peoples of the highlands since the mid-20th century, and they were further strengthened during the regime of Velasco, achieving something close to political hegemony at the end of the 1970s. As a consequence, a class-based discourse has overshadowed questions of ethnicity in Peru, but the left also derives its strength from its ability to draw on the radical indigenista discourse.

The different organisational developments in the two countries also show the importance of external allies. In Peru, the predominance of leftist organisations seems to have made indigenous peasants consider themselves primarily as peasants, while collaboration with the Catholic church and Amazonian groups in Ecuador has promoted highland indigenous peoples emphasis on ethnic identity. Differences in organisational experiences and allies have
thus contributed to differences in self-definition among highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Peru. Finally, differences in the degree of political polarisation between the two countries seem to explain why repression has been more common in Peru than in Ecuador, where negotiations and consensus have been more predominant features of the political system. While the relative openness of the political system in Ecuadorian seems to be important for the sustenance of the indigenous movement, it is probably not political repression that explains why highland indigenous peoples in Peru do not mobilise on the basis of ethnic identity. As a result of nation-building ideologies and former organisational processes, highland indigenous peoples in Peru tend to define themselves in class terms.
7. Conclusion: studying indigenous mobilisation

7.1 Summary and main findings

The aim of this thesis has been to explain why ethnic identity has served as basis for mobilisation among the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian highlands but not among the indigenous peoples of highland Peru. Ecuador and Peru represent particularly interesting cases for comparison because they share a number of characteristics: the highland indigenous population is relatively similar, the two countries have achieved similar levels of development, and both countries made a transition from military rule to democracy at the end of the 1970s. In addition to this methodological argument, the research question is justified by the scant academic attention given to ethnic divisions in Latin America. Mobilisation among indigenous peoples is increasing in Latin America, but few works have been published which discuss the intersection of ethnic and democratic politics in the region. The argument of my thesis should therefore be of relevance to studies of indigenous mobilisation processes also in other Latin American states. Mobilisation on the basis of indigenous identity within Latin American states relates to fundamental questions concerning the relationship between the state and the nation, and the nation and democracy.

The dependent variable “indigenous movement” has been specified as political organisations formed on the basis of indigenous identity, with the power to mobilise a significant part of the indigenous population. Since 1990, highland Ecuador has had a high value on the dependent variable while highland Peru has had a low value. As relatively little is known about the causes behind the different outcomes, I decided to adopt a qualitative, exploratory approach. In chapter two, I discussed ethnicity theory, theories of nation-building and modernisation, and social movement theory, in order to identify factors which were likely to be important in explaining variation in indigenous mobilisation. On the basis of this discussion, I developed three main variables with four indicators each. The three independent variables are: ethnic boundaries and group differences; state- and nation-building policies pursued by the state; and the potential for mobilisation of highland indigenous peoples. The variables have served as headings for the three chapters of the analysis.
In chapter three, I argued that my choice of cases has been based on methodological considerations, and that my study approaches what Smith (1995: 4) defines as a “most-similar-systems design”. While such approaches rarely allow for the establishment of necessary and sufficient conditions in explaining a given phenomenon, most similar systems designs can be especially helpful in refining general explanations and elaborating new hypotheses.

In chapter four, I investigated the proposition that if highland indigenous peoples are disadvantaged and discriminated against, this is likely to increase the importance of ethnic identity and provide an incentive for mobilisation. This proposition was not confirmed. Highland indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Peru are disadvantaged with regard to income, education, and political representation, and they also suffer from discrimination. It should be noted, however, that cholos seem to be more discriminated against than indigenous people in Peru. The most striking finding of this chapter was that since the end of the 1970s, Ecuador has witnessed the growth of an indigenous middle class which has played an important role in the formation of the indigenous movement. This finding turns the expected relationship between ethnic divisions and disadvantage on its head: it is when indigenous people acquire more resources that indigenous mobilisation becomes more likely. By contrast, social mobility seems to result in the abandonment of indigenous identity and the adoption of a cholo or mestizo identity in Peru, indicating a different constitution of ethnic boundaries in the two countries.

The proposition investigated in chapter five was that state- and nation-building policies which ignore indigenous peoples’ cultures and need for land increase the likeliness of indigenous mobilisation. This proposition is confirmed by my material, and differences in state- and nation-building policies between Ecuador and Peru are clearly more important to explain variation in indigenous mobilisation than differences in disadvantage and discrimination. Mestizaje, defined as progressive cultural and racial “whitening”, has been the dominant nation-building ideology in Ecuador, relegating indigenous peoples to the margins of the image of “the national”. In Peru, by contrast, mestizaje defined as “whitening”, has been challenged by the indigenista version of nation-building since the beginning of the 20th century. According to radical indigenismo, Peru is a nation of Indians, and indigenous peasants are accordingly the most “authentic” Peruvians. While radical indigenismo never became a clear-cut state ideology, the indigenista discourse has coloured official rhetoric, and
in particular the rhetoric of the regime of Velasco (1968-75). The Velasco administration liquidated the hacienda system in one of the most radical agrarian reforms in Latin America, it promoted bilingual education, and it made Quechua an official language of Peru. This is important, as the redistribution of hacienda land and bilingual education have been major incentives for indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador. Paradoxically, however, exclusion and the absence of paternalist indigenistas in Ecuador are also factors which have made it possible for Ecuadorian indigenous peoples to develop their own cultural discourse and raise demands.

While the incentives for highland indigenous mobilisation have been stronger in Ecuador than in Peru, an explanation of variation in indigenous mobilisation also needs to consider organisational factors. In chapter six, I investigated the proposition that territorial concentration, organisational experience, presence of allies, and lack of state repression increase the potential for highland indigenous mobilisation. This proposition is to a large extent confirmed by my material. Geographic concentration and small linguistic differences seem to have promoted the cohesion of highland indigenous peoples in Ecuador, whereas highland indigenous peoples in Peru are more geographically and linguistically divided. More important however, are the differences in organisational experience. In Peru, class-based organisations have been stronger than in Ecuador, and the radicalisation of Peruvian society during the government of Velasco in the 1970s implied a predominance of a class discourse, which served to overshadow questions of ethnicity. In Ecuador, the first indigenous organisations were formed in the early 1970s with support from the Catholic church, and while these organisations initially suffered from internal disagreement concerning the relative importance of class and ethnicity, the increased collaboration with Amazonian groups in the 1980s led to a stronger focus on ethnicity. These developments point to the importance of allies and external actors in the formulation of highland indigenous peoples’ identities. While the relative openness of the political system in Ecuador in the 1980s and 90s seems to have been important for the sustenance of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, the higher level of political repression in Peru seems to be a consequence of greater political polarisation rather than a factor which has blocked indigenous mobilisation. At the time of transition to democracy in Peru, highland indigenous people tended to define themselves as peasants rather than indigenous. The main arguments of the three chapters of the analysis may now be put together in a more integrated conclusion.
7.2 An integrated conclusion

The historic differences between Ecuador and Peru with regard to state- and nation-building policies have been crucial for the differences in indigenous peoples’ self-definition, and for their different incentives for mobilisation in the two countries. In Ecuador, the ideology of *mestizaje* seems to have created a division between white people and mestizos on the one hand (true Ecuadorians), and indigenous peoples on the other. In Peru, by contrast, historical divisions and the influence of *indigenismo* seem to have created a division between Andean indigenous peoples, *cholos*, and mestizos on the one hand (true Peruvians), as opposed to white, “Europeanised” Peruvians. Differences in self-definition among Ecuadorian and Peruvian highland indigenous peoples, as a result of different national ideologies, can explain why they have favoured, or responded to different forms of organisation and mobilisation. It seems to be the success of *mestizaje* as a dominant national ideology over a long period of time in Ecuador, rather than its failure, which explains why highland indigenous peoples now demand rights as ethnic minorities. In Peru, neither the dominant white sectors in Lima, nor the Andean majorities in the provinces have managed to impose their image of Peruvian national identity. Accordingly, it is understandable if Peruvian highland indigenous peoples (who do not refer to themselves in such terms), *cholos* and mestizos stress class demands and work to obtain more respect and better living conditions as “true Peruvians”. It can be argued that while the Ecuadorian indigenous movement demands inclusion into the existing political system, Peruvian indigenous peoples, *cholos*, and mestizos from the Andes want nothing less than control of the state. Such arguments can contribute to explain the emergence of Sendero Luminoso.

The predominating forms of ethnic and class divisions in the two countries may also explain why social mobility leads to the abandonment of indigenous identity in Peru, but not in Ecuador, as discussed in chapter four. It is probably more difficult for an Ecuadorian indigenous person to become part of the white/mestizo national collective than it is for a Peruvian indigenous person to become *cholo* or mestizo, as he or she still will be in opposition to the coastal, “westernised” Peruvians. This can also explain why Peruvian *cholos* and mestizos from the Andes continue to be discriminated against by white and mestizo sectors on the coast. Paradoxically, *cholos* and mestizos might be even more discriminated against because they do not retain the more romanticised indigenous identity.
The aim of my thesis has been to discuss how different theoretical perspectives can contribute to empirical explanation, rather than to test a set of theories. However, the theoretical perspectives which have been used deserve a few comments. Contrary to the argument put forward by Gurr (2000: 86), disadvantage and discrimination do not seem to increase the importance of ethnic identities, nor to serve as incentives for mobilisation, as mobilisation rather requires resources. Consequently, the factors of disadvantage and discrimination seem to have little explanatory power for variation in indigenous mobilisation. Furthermore, the different constitution of ethnic boundaries in Ecuador and Peru, and the possibility of changing ethnic identity from indigenous to mestizo as commonly happens in Peru, support the position that ethnic identities are subjective and constructed rather than objective and primordial.

The importance of state- and nation-building policies in shaping ethnic identities in Ecuador and Peru gives weight to Barth’s (1998: 14) argument that ethnic identities develop as a result of social interaction. In addition, the emergence of an indigenous movement in Ecuador, but not in Peru, illustrate the argument that ethnic revitalisation can come as a reaction to increased homogenisation an attempts at cultural assimilation. Land policies and bilingual education were major incentives for indigenous mobilisation in Ecuador, underlining the importance of state policies with regard to these issues. Differences in state- and nation-building policies are clearly very important factors in explaining variation in indigenous mobilisation between Ecuador and Peru, suggesting that such factors should be considered also in studies of indigenous mobilisation in other countries.

Differences in organisational resources, political opportunities, and framing processes emphasised by social movement theory, have also been important to explain the different outcomes in Ecuador and Peru. Former organisational experience and the position of allies seem to be especially relevant factors, as existing organisations and outside actors both influence indigenous peoples self-definition and provide resources for mobilisation. My discussion of organisation, opportunities, and tension between class and ethnic discourses in Ecuador and Peru should also serve to support McAdam’s (1996: 8) recommendation of considering political opportunities, organisational capacity, and framing processes together rather than separately. My findings suggest that social movement theory provides valuable insights for studies of indigenous mobilisation in general.
7.3 Final reflections

When I started my study, I argued that Peru could be seen as a deviant case. However, while indigenous movements have formed in several Latin American countries, there is nothing inevitable about this happening. As this study should indicate, various factors account for the different outcomes in Ecuador and Peru. If the Ecuadorian outcome is seen as more “natural”, this can be because indigenous, ethnic affirmation confirms a Western picture of the “Indian other”. In concluding this study, I see a great dilemma involved in referring to highland indigenous peoples in Peru, if they themselves do not want to use such terms. In the worst case scenario, my thesis could be seen as a continuation of the *indigenista* paternalist tradition. This explains why I sometimes felt compelled to use words such as “Quechua-speaking” and *campesino* rather than “indigenous” when discussing my research topic with people in Peru. However, ethnic identities are far from unimportant in Peru, and I see a danger in ignoring questions of ethnicity and ethnic discrimination. At the same time, I also see a danger in an overly strong focus on the culture and identity of indigenous peoples in Ecuador, if it leads to a disregard for poverty as a political factor. I believe the argument of my thesis demonstrate the importance of both class and ethnicity when discussing the situation of indigenous peoples.

The main contribution of my thesis should be its identification of state- and nation-building policies and organisational processes as especially relevant factors to consider when studying indigenous mobilisation. My argument should also demonstrate that qualitatively-oriented comparative analysis can be well suited to the study of variation in indigenous mobilisation in Latin America, which is an understudied topic. While the approach does not allow for the establishment of necessary and sufficient conditions, comparative analysis can serve to refine general explanations of ethnic mobilisation. Further research into indigenous mobilisation in several Latin American countries would be fruitful for the improvement of our knowledge of causal factors for indigenous mobilisation.
Appendix: Map of Ecuador and Peru
Sources and literature:

Interviews:

19.10.99: Mario Cabrera, director of ECUARUNARI / CONAIE in the province of Azuay. Interview conducted in the organisation’s offices in Cuenca, Ecuador.

30.11.99: Rodrigo Montoya Rojas, professor in anthropology at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Interview conducted in professor Montoya’s home, Lima, Peru.

02.12.99: Washington Mendoza from Cusco and Pablo Quispe from Huancavelica, both General Secretary colleagues of the Confederación Campesina del Perú (CCP). Interview conducted in CCP’s office, Lima, Peru.

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