Cooperation in the Heat of the Moment: The Effect of Leadership Behavior on Swift Trust

Written by: Philip van Heesch & Christian Søreide

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Supervised by: Olav Kjellevold Olsen

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Preface

This project has been conducted by students Christian Søreide and Philip van Heesch during the 3rd & 4th semester of the master program in psychology at the University of Bergen. The scope of work was proposed and guided by former commander of the Royal Norwegian Navy and associate professor at the University of Bergen Olav Kjellevold Olsen.

The project did not end up the way we planned in May last year, but then again, we didn’t know then what we know now. It has been meaningful for the both of us to work with a project that resonated within us. We would like to thank Olav for trusting us enough to go chasing after something novel and new, and giving us the confidence to see it through.

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Bergen, May 15, 2018

Christian Søreide & Philip Christopher Nordlie van Heesch
Abstract

Development of trust demands personal knowledge and is time consuming; at least so scholars have argued for several decades. Very little work has been done to investigate why in some cases people act as if there are high levels of trust with strangers. While there has been some studies related to the rapid formation of trust, the time perspective differs widely between studies. This is the first study to approach this paradox with an experimental research design; Looking at leadership behavior as a predictor of trust. We were able to identify a trusting intention within the initial sixty seconds of the first meeting between strangers. We propose this form of trust is based of schematic evaluations, and can be operationalized as Immediate Trust.

Key words: Swift Trust, temporary teams, leadership, operative, cognitive schemas.

Sammendrag

Tillit krever personlig kjennskap, og tar tid å bygge; dette har i hvert fall vært den ledende antakelsen i tillitslitteraturen. Veldig lite forskning har undersøkt hvorfor mennesker som er ukjente for hverandre allikevel kan samarbeide som om de skulle hatt høyt tillitsnivå mellom hverandre. Selv om noen studier har sett på tillit kan vokse frem hurtig, har tidperspektivet i disse studiene vært svært varierende. Dette er det første studiet som har sett på tillit med en eksperimentell tilnærming. Ved å se på ledelsesatferd og emosjonell stabilitet som prediktorer for tillit kunne vi identifisere en tillitsintensjon innen de første seksti sekundene av det første møtet mellom to ukjente. Vi mener en slik form for tillit er basert på kognitive skjemaevalueringer og kan operasjonaliseres som umiddelbar tillit.

Nøkkelord: Swift Trust, midlertidige grupper, ledelse, operativ, kognitive skjema.
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1 Introduction

Unexpected and dangerous situations arise across the globe on a daily basis. These situations are often complex in their nature and are hard, if not impossible to foresee (i.e. natural disasters, car-accidents). Additionally, when they arise there is often an imminent need to respond, meaning that there may be little time to wait for trained professionals to arrive. This means that the people that are in the situation have to respond and co-operate as an "ad-hoc" team. Consequently, the usual preconditions for effective team cooperation such as social cohesion, shared mental models and procedures are not present (Olsen, 2018). However, there seem to be evidence suggesting that despite the lack of shared history together, people may still be able to co-operate effectively (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Kolditz, 2007; Lester, 2007). That people who are strangers to each other cooperate as if they had operated together for a long period of time (Meyerson et al., 1996). In this study we will try to shed light on one processes behind such well functioning cooperation between strangers; namely swift trust.

In the literature, a commonly mentioned prerequisite of effective operational cooperation is trust (Costa et al., 2001; De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; Fahy, 2012; Mesmer-Magnus and DeChurch, 2009). In operative situations, trust affects the delegation of work, the individual willingness to wear risk, and to follow orders (Kolditz, 2007; Sweeney, 2007). Additionally, trust has been shown to be a key contributor to the effectiveness of organizations, by reducing stress, lowering turnover and increasing job-satisfaction (Dirks, 2006; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Lewicki et al., 2006; Mathieu et al., 2008). This suggests that trust is an important factor to consider for organizations in general, but maybe even more so for teams in operative situations; as the consequences of failure or ineffectiveness could lead to the loss of lives (Kolditz, 2007; Lester, 2007). As an example of this, from reviewing several incident reports after the infamous terrorist attack on 9/11 in New York, Fahy (2012) identified swift trust and swift distrust as factors that could explain the performance of the various emergency agencies that day. On one side, ad-hoc teams of firemen from New York and the surrounding areas worked effectively together both inside the towers and in the remaining rubble after the collapse. Conversely, the fire department and police department of New York had major issues collaborating and cooperating efforts during the same time (Fahy, 2012; Kolditz, 2007).

According to Fahy (2012) a long standing distrust between the agencies could explain much of this lack of cooperation. This led to lack of information sharing, impaired delegation and reactivity related to assisting each other in critical situations. Thus, the lack of trust led to a centralized command and control practice which both increased information overload in the central
command, and delayed initiative and swift responses “at the ground” (Fahy, 2012; Mishra, 1996). This case showcase one of the major strengths of trust within a group; it removes the need for controlling behavior (McKnight and Chervany, 2000). Unfortunately, not much is known about how to facilitate the rapid development of trust within a group.

Swift trust has gotten increased attention in the last years and is discussed in several theory reviews. In this literature, the relevance related to effective cooperation in complex and time critical situations is particularly stressed. However, the complexity of the construct as well as the difficulties involved in the development of trust is also emphasized (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Clark, 2016; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Lester, 2007; Meyerson et al., 1996). It is also noteworthy that very few (if any) have studied swift trust experimentally, as most studies are theoretic and anecdotal (Clark, 2016). This has led to a demand for experimental studies (Hyllengren et al., 2011; McKnight and Chervany, 2000). Here, according to Olsen (2018), factors that may facilitate or hinder the formation of swift trust is of particular relevance – in order to support both further research efforts and provide important insight for the emergency agencies in terms of educational aims and operational training interventions.

In the present study, we will conduct an experimental study, focusing on the impact of the leader and his or her behavior in a critical situation. This will take place within the first minute of an interaction with strangers that are potential followers. Thus, the question becomes whether a leaders’ behavior in this brief exposure can affect the formation of trust. The relevance of this approach is supported both by research showing that leadership in general have a large influence on (general) trust (de Jong et al., 2016). Furthermore, Hyllengren et al. (2011), identified leadership as the most significant predictor of swift trust in a military sample. Notably, this study also suggests that leadership can be a positive as well as negative influence on the formation of Swift Trust.

More so, the evaluations of leadership in Hyllengren et al. (2011) study was not rooted in a leadership theory. Instead it was focused on leadership behaviors, such as remaining calm and including the group in decision making. The experiment would therefore have to be rooted in behavioral manifestations of leadership styles. Additionally, a leadership style might have very different outcomes depending on the personality of the leader and the individual differences among the followers. Thus, in leadership research there has been an increase in focus on variables that may moderate the relationship between leadership and various outcomes (Lord et al., 1986). Pursuing this there should also be behavioral manifestations of personality traits included in the experiment. However, how these manifestations are perceived is also dependent on follower traits (De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2009).

Similar leadership behavior in similar situations have different effects on different peo-
ple (Hannah et al., 2009). In an operative situation, were emotional arousal tend to be high (Han-
nah et al., 2009) having a sense of control in the situation could affect preferred leadership style. Therefore, the study also aims, as illustrated in Figure 1, to see how individual differences in terms of hardiness could moderate the relationship between leadership behavior and Swift Trust.

![Figure 1. The research model for this thesis. Controlling for Generalized Trust](image)

Even though cooperation between strangers on both individual and department levels occurs frequently, the research literature on factors stimulating such cooperation is sparse (Clark, 2016). Hence, according to Olsen (2018), there is a gap between level of theoretical knowledge and operational practice that could cause severe life and death outcomes. Therefore, an aim of this study is to provide insights that can be implemented into practical leadership and team-development programs among emergency professions, hopefully increasing the quality of cooperation between strangers in critical situations.

Notably, the philosopher Onora O’neill (2002) emphasizes that trust is a response to trustworthiness. In her words; a person has to provide evidence that s/he is trustworthy. The question we propose in the present study is: can this evidence be provided within seconds, and if so how? We therefore want to define trust with emphasis on swift trust, and also describe relevant leader behavior that can affect the formation of trust, and whether different individual traits can moderate this effect. This is done to answer the repeated calls for quantitative experimental research on the topic of trust (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Clark, 2016; Curnin et al., 2015; Fahy, 2012; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Larsson, 2005; Lester, 2007; Olsen, 2018; Popa, 2005; Robert et al., 2009).
2 Theory

2.1 Trust

Most people have an idea surrounding trust and what trusting something or someone entails. While subjective definitions might differ, the underlying concept remains more or less the same. This is also apparent in academic literature; into the late 90’s, scholars applied different definitions of trust across disciplines such as; economics, psychology, political science, sociology, and philosophy. The definitions were often made in accordance with the respective research field and its line of interest (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; de Jong et al., 2016; Lewicki et al., 2006; McKnight and Chervany, 2000; Meyerson et al., 1996). In Mayer et al. (1995) paper they addressed this pluralism of definitions, and made an effort to reconcile them to establish clarity, and avoid further confusion of the concept. A common understanding would enable trust research and related topics to build a solid common base for what until then had been a vague concept.

According to Mayer et al. (1995, p.712) trust is "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other person will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party". This work has received over 17000 citations on Google Scholar (16.11.2017) and the definition is broadly accepted as the conceptualization of trust. Along with Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) similar definition of trust: "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another", these widely accepted and overarching definitions have four key dimensions in common, namely; willingness to be vulnerable, a positive expectation of the trustees intention, and the uncertainty and risk involved (Holtz, 2013; Lewicki et al., 2006; Vanneste et al., 2014). It is important to notice that these definitions not only apply between two people, but also between groups/organizations, from a person to a group/organization and vice versa (de Jong et al., 2017; Korsgaard et al., 2015; Lester, 2007).

Philosopher Onora O’neill (2002) points to an often overlooked but crucial part of trust; trust is a response to trustworthiness. Trust in itself is distinctive as something that is given, by the trustor in response to the trustee. Consequently from her view, one should not build trust, but rather trustworthiness. In a leader-follower relationship this suggests that the need to understand how the actions of a leader is perceived as trustworthy by the follower is of essence. Going one step further, what actions or behaviors can secure this trustworthiness? Using this angle, the study will investigate the mechanisms of initial trust development in a temporary system.
2.1.1 Function of Trust. The willingness to make oneself vulnerable to others is a critical behavior in any society, and a prerequisite for social interaction (Lester, 2007). While being all-knowing is impossible due to the complexity in our surroundings, trust is said to function as a glue that allow individuals to work and live together (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Luhmann (2018) similarly describe trust as the function that reduces complexity in order to maneuver society. Moreover, being unable to consider all possible outcomes involves an element of uncertainty due to the unpredictability of said future outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; Korsgaard et al., 2015). The willingness to be vulnerable part of trust is thus closely related to uncertainty. Meaning trust operates between the known and unknown in predicting future outcomes; If you know nothing, you cannot make a rational decision to trust or distrust. The more you know, the more you can make a reflected judgment based on your expectations and willingness to be vulnerable. Conversely, if you know everything, then trust serves no function. Hence, perceived uncertainty is connected to the unknown aspects surrounding the trustee and the incapability to fully surveil their actions or motives.

Nonetheless, the perceived uncertainty creates an unavoidable element of risk through potential doubt that emerges when making a decision to either trust or distrust. Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) explains the relationship between trust and risk like this; "Trust always involves an element of risk because of the inability to monitor others’ behavior or to have complete knowledge about their motivations or because of the very contingency of social life." (p. 73). Accordingly, trust implies taking risk by placing personal outcomes, both negative and positive, in the hands of another. The function of trust can therefore be said to manage issues of vulnerability, expectations, risk and uncertainty, which arise through the reduction of complexity in order to create predictability (Clark, 2016; Meyerson et al., 1996; Popa, 2005).

For Person A, experience with Person B increases Person A’s predictability of a Person B’s intention which in turn reduces Person A’s uncertainty. If the predictability results in a positive outcome expectancy, willingness to make oneself vulnerable could increase. Conversely, if Person A predict a negative outcome expectancy, then this willingness will decrease. These two different outcome expectancy’s are what differentiate trust and distrust. While some might argue that distrust is the opposite of trust, this is only half-true. While they might be semantically opposites, the same evaluations are part of both, and the opposite of both would therefore be naivety and gullibility (Jan O. Jacobsen, note on trust).

As a result, trust enables people to co-act more efficiently, both individually, within teams and organizations (Lester, 2007). Being able to rely on others, without monitoring their actions, is essential for how we cooperate (Costa et al., 2001). Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) exemplify
this within a military team, where; every single individual has tasks which are essential for the survival of the team. Without being able to control each others actions at all time, the members have no choice but to trust their teammates and thus making themselves vulnerable. Hence, trust enables individuals, teams and organizations to focus on the real task at hand, without being concerned with ones security nor psychological safety (Costa et al., 2001). On the other hand, in the case of distrust within the team; monitoring behavior could get in the way of other crucial tasks and therefore jeopardize the team’s safety (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005).

Delegation is defined as a prerequisite for effective operational leadership and cooperation (Olsen and Espevik, 2009). In order to hand over responsibility to others, the individual delegating needs to have a positive outcome expectancy. It may make little sense to delegate something if the delegator expects a negative outcome. This includes an evaluation of to what extent the individual at hand will safeguard the delegators own vulnerability. From this view, delegation can be seen as an act of trust and outcome of trustworthiness.

Trust therefore enables effective cooperation between stakeholders where uncertainty can be high (Lester, 2007). This is evident in time critical settings like in finance or the military, where in “a window of opportunity”, where there is still available alternatives to choose from, a decision has to be made. However, this window usually closes rapidly with little or no time to consult with, or wait for new orders, before acting. Trust enables them to act upon their own judgments of the situation based on a guiding intention. This decision making process is reliant on trust/trustworthiness for both the decision makers and their leaders. The boss is trusting the brokers ability to make good judgments, while the broker is trusting that the boss will approve of the decision based on judgment, not result.

This has proven to work efficiently for both stockbrokers and military leadership. The German Auftragstactic, dating back to the 19th century, was based on these principals by empowering lower rank officers to make tactical decisions as they advanced on the battle field. In comparison, a order based system focusing on compliance on operational levels and “do as you are told” attitude, the opponent was often paralyzed due to an extensive and slowly functioning chain of command (Schultze-Rhonhof, 2007). In an ever changing battlefield the highly decentralized Auftragstactic proved itself as an effective command and control system, providing a competitive advantage (Jacobsen, 1996). Consequently, this form of leadership philosophy is today the official doctrine in the Norwegian Armed Forces today, labeled manøver krigføring (Olsen and Espevik, 2009). Overall, without trust, the allocation of time and resources may be poorly executed in times of uncertainty, due to the necessity for monitoring others actions in order to perceive a positive/negative outcome expectancy (Clark, 2016; Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002).
2.1.2 Development of Trust. Trust development has received much attention from different streams of trust research. While scholars agree that several different mechanisms affect trust development, no unified mechanism has been identified. This roots back to the problem of various definitions of trust and how trust is measured (Clark, 2016; Lewicki et al., 2006). Whereas some scholars argue that trust initiates at a low level and needs time to develop, others argue that trust can initially be both high or low (distrust). Thus, the initial formation of trust and how time causes it to change, represents a discrepancy within different research streams (Lester, 2007; Lewicki et al., 2006).

For example, a calculative trusting stance argues that trust can occur initially through structures that rewards trustworthiness and deterrence for withdrawal (Clark, 2016). By not engaging in trusting behavior, consequences such as reputation loss could occur. However, as we will address later this is not an isolated encouragement for trust development. Moreover, other scholars argue that both trust or distrust starts at low levels and increases over time as individuals accumulate information about each other (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1997). However, McKnight et al. (1998) portray that initial high trust is possible through personality factors, institution-based structures and cognitive processes.

When managing issues of vulnerability, expectations, risk and uncertainty, the positive outcome expectancy the trustor has towards the trustee’s intention is central in the process of trust formation (Colquitt et al., 2007; Lewicki et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 1998). In a situation where the trustor has no positive outcome expectancy in the trustee’s intention, trust will most likely not occur due to the high perceived uncertainty and risk. On the other hand, if the perceived likelihood of a positive outcome exceeds the likelihood of a negative outcome, the trustor is more likely to engage in trusting behavior (Meyerson et al., 1996). Without positive outcome expectancy a trust relationship can not develop according to the definitions of trust by both Mayer et al. (1995) and Rousseau et al. (1998). Positive outcome expectancy will in any given situation be the essential factor to develop trusting intention (Rousseau et al., 1998). The antecedents to positive outcome expectancy will therefore be essential in order to understand the development of trust.

As mentioned, trust research has several different approaches, also within interpersonal trust. Lewicki et al. (2006) describes both a behavioral and psychological approach emerging from the trust development literature. The behavioral tradition to trust is based on the actions by the trustor, and is assumed to be founded upon a rational choice. The psychological approach "attempts to understand the complex intrapersonal states associated with trust, including expectations, intentions, affect, and disposition" (Lewicki et al., 2006, p. 992). Whereas the behavioral approach is strictly rational and base the emergence of trust from a *homo economicus* understanding of the
human (i.e., all choices are consistently rational), the psychological approach consider the affective and cognitive processes (Lester, 2007; Rousseau et al., 1998). Whilst the psychological approach may integrate a behavioral dimension, it considers the psychological dispositions and processes that outline and adjust those behaviors. This is aligned with scholars understanding that any psychological belief has a cognitive, affective and behavioral dimension (Cumming and Bromiley, 1996). Thus, the psychological approach emphasize the expectations, affect, beliefs and behavior in the interpretation of trust and its development (Lewicki et al., 2006).

Furthermore, the affective or relationship-based components of trust base trusting intention on the merits of a relationship and is linked to an emotional state between the subjects involved (Lester, 2007). Additionally, emotional states such as fear or uncertainty, will be added to the equation whether to perceive positive outcome expectancy and make oneself vulnerable. Hence, the values within a relationship, being personal or professional, could affect the cognitive ground on which trust is build (Lewicki et al., 2006).

The cognitive trust component makes trust judgments on a more rational ground compared to affective trust (Clark, 2016). Whereas affective trust is grounded in emotional states, cognitive trust "encompasses the beliefs and judgment about another’s trustworthiness" (Lewicki et al., 2006, p. 997). This reflects an evaluation of the circumstances at hand, and a consideration of evidence about the trustee’s trustworthiness to fulfill the positive expectations. According to Lewis and Weigert (1985, p. 970), "we cognitively choose whom we will trust in which respects and under which circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be “good reasons,” constituting evidence of trustworthiness”. Consequently, trustworthiness may be an attribute the trustor looks for in the trustee in order to trust. According to leading literature, trustworthiness is comprised by three main components; Benevolence, integrity and ability (Clark, 2016; Colquitt et al., 2007; Lapidot et al., 2007; Lester, 2007; McKnight et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007; Wildman et al., 2012).

Here, benevolence is understood as the extent to which the trustor believes the trustee wants to do him/her something good; ability describes to which extent the trustor recognize the trustee as competent in the situation and; integrity refers to the perception the trustor has of the trustees principles and values and to what extent trustor can identify with these (Rousseau et al., 1998). These three components are recognizable within both Meyerson et al. (1996) and Rousseau et al. (1998) definitions of trust.

For leadership this has a practical implication; followers will evaluate the leaders ability, benevolence and integrity, and based on this evaluation decide whether or not to trust the leader, thereby making themselves vulnerable (Hamby, 2002; Lapidot et al., 2007).
In summary, trust antecedents encompasses a cognitive and affective state; "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395); with a behavioral risk dimension representing "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other person will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). From a leadership perspective, this means that trusting a leader will either be based on the relationship between leader and follower (affective), a reasonable judgment of the trustworthiness (cognitive) by the follower of the leader, or a combination of both (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002; Lewicki et al., 2006). In a situation that requires a trust decision, the trustor could through a cognitive and/or affective evaluation create a positive or negative outcome expectancy based on the trustees intention or behavior. However, to what extent each component acts individually or in cooperation is still, as we will see, unsettled and exhibits the issues regarding the complexity surrounding trust (Lewicki et al., 2006). Also, empirically distinguishing affective and cognitive trust has proven difficult (Clark, 2016; Cumming and Bromiley, 1996; Lester, 2007).

2.1.3 General Trust Expectancy. It is evident that external antecedent affecting trust are important for trust development (e.g. relationship, familiarity, behavior). Nonetheless, every individual has "a generalized expectancy that the words and promises of others can be relied on" (Colquitt et al., 2007, 911). Meaning; a trustee could be perceived differently by different trustors (Delhey et al., 2011). McKnight et al. (1998) addressed this generalized expectancy of trustworthiness as "the extent which one believes that nonspecific others are trustworthy" (p.478). This means that every individual to some extent will be more or less prone to trust others. Rotter (1990) characterize trust propensity to be a stable personality trait that may strongly predict ones willingness to be vulnerable. For all trust research looking at the effect of external antecedents, it is crucial to take general trust expectancy into consideration, and controlling for this. Delhey et al. (2011) criticized contemporary trust research for its ignorance to this issue.

While this might be one of the biggest issues in trust research, the biggest issue in swift trust research could be the time dimension.

2.1.4 The time dimension and contemporary trust research. The majority on trust research consider trust formation as a time consuming activity, where first-hand knowledge is essential in order to achieve a high level of trust. The gradual development is explained by the repeated interaction between the subjects, giving both an affective-based and/or a cognitive-based platform of trust (Clark, 2016; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998). However, an
issue with this understanding of trust development, is that it comes short in explaining an often observed phenomenon where individuals or groups, that have never met, act as if trust was present (Meyerson et al., 1996). Although some conventional trust theories have responded to this issue, they come short in creating a fundamental understanding.

Meyerson et al. (1996) addressed this topic in temporary work groups, where individuals were called together to solve a task and later be dispatched without ever seeing each other again. They observed that the temporary work group initially acted as if they trusted each other, despite never having any time to establish a conventional trust relationship. This dilemma has received an increasing amount of attention, especially within the topic of ad-hoc and temporary emergency teams (Clark, 2016; Lester, 2007; Olsen, 2018; Popa, 2005). This *ex ante* form of trust enables teams to be more efficient and functional from their birth and has been demonstrated by recent research on military teams. Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) study shows how the need to develop trust rapidly has proven indispensable, especially for multi-national military teams. They often have little or no time to build a knowledge-based relation to evaluate each others trustworthiness, but are nonetheless expected to cooperate efficiently in combat situations. They experience situations where making the right choice and misuse of energy on mutual controlling could represent a matter of life and death (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Hyllengren et al., 2011). However there is also an increase in research on organizational temporary teams, and since Meyerson et al. (1996) introduced the concept of Swift Trust it now has over 2400 citations on Google Scholar (05.04.2018).

2.2 Swift vs. Immediate Trust

2.2.1 What is Swift Trust. With no clear definition of Swift Trust to distinguish it from other types of trust, Meyerson et al. (1996) argues that trust in temporary systems is a result of presumptions rather than gradually obtained experience. Lester (2007) imply that Swift Trust is highly cognitive compared to the other conventional cognitive based trust forms (calculus-, knowledge- and cognitive-based trust), which to a higher degree includes experienced based knowledge. In accordance with Lewicki and Bunker (1996) calculus-based trust, where trust is a result of deterrence (i.e. reputation damage) Swift Trust share similarities and can partially be explained by some of the same cognitive mechanisms, such as heuristics (Lewicki et al., 2006). However, the idea that trust does not necessarily have to build on experienced based knowledge of a party, but can be high already from early onset of a relationship, challenges the conventional understanding of trust. Accordingly, Swift Trust being somewhat related to conventional trust, it is not entirely the same (Olsen, 2018). Whereas conventional trust builds over time through
interaction, Swift Trust face a forced immediate evaluation of inputs available followed up by an instant judgment of trustworthiness due to time pressure and the situation at hand. As a result, trust development in temporary systems face other (dis)incentives compared to conventional trust (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Meyerson et al., 1996). For instance the expected time limitation of an initial interaction or the situation (e.g. a project) is said to generate a somewhat dissimilar cognitive and affective evaluations processes compared to the conventional belief (Lester, 2007; Meyerson et al., 1996).

Swift Trust is therefore said to be an ex ante form of trust, which "means that people have to wade in on trust rather than wait while experience gradually shows who can be trusted" (Meyerson et al., 1996, p. 170). Hence, the development of trust in temporary systems is described as "an unique form of collective perception and relating that is capable of managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expectations" (Meyerson et al., 1996, p.167). Accordingly an in line with Popa (2005, p.9), Swift Trust can be understood as "an individual’s willingness to take risks in a temporary group and it has a behavioral manifestation that involves the actual act of risk-taking". Hence, Swift Trust consist of a conscious decision to trust followed by action within a limited amount of time and due to the high level of uncertainty, it involves a high level of risk (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005).

However, the limited amount of time described in the Swift Trust literature is very vague and leave room for inconsistencies. Meyerson et al. (1996), Hyllengren et al. (2011) and Ben-S et al. (2005) all talk about Swift Trust as something that happens over a longer period of time. This concern was also raised in a recent dissertation by Clark (2016). According to her literature research, the closest any study has come to explicitly define the time frame of Swift Trust, was Wildman et al. (2012) study on cooperation within swift starting action teams. Their definition on the time frame conceptualizing Swift Trust was described as "short amount of time" Wildman et al. (2012, p. 1). While this might not be enough time to get as much first-hand knowledge as needed to build conventional trust, it does give them enough time to consciously evaluate the input to some degree; "The time periods during which the instant units were formed by the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) in the AL-Aqsa were much shorter and lasted weeks, days, and sometime, hours" Ben-Shalom et al. (2005, p.72). Hyllengren et al. (2011) used a questionnaire created by Larsson (2005) to measure Swift Trust. The scale included, among others, the following items: "How long did the group’s work go on? (...) less than a week; one to four week...". (p.359). Hence, both the measurement instruments and the situation fails, to some extent, to capture the immediate trust evaluation in an emergent situation.

As a response, our view on temporary systems represents a more immediate evaluation.
Setting a time frame limitation to sixty seconds answers the call for a warranted time definition of initial trust development. The justification lies firstly within our view that Swift Trust has embraced a too broad and inconsequential perspective of trust formation. Although the Swift Trust has addressed an often overlooked aspect of trust and enriched its comprehension, the magnitude of its scope comes short in having a united conception of a theoretical framework. Secondly, the initial interaction does not necessarily allow for a conscious evaluation and we argue in line with Elsbach (2004), that the cognitive categorization process play a much more significant part in the development of initial trust. As described, cognitive categorization often happens subconsciously and can be based on very little information (Kahneman, 2011; Myers et al., 2012). If this is also the case for trust, then very little exposure could prove sufficient for its development. This could also mean that initial trust can be reliant on situations that demand an instant trust judgment without time to lean on knowledge of the trustee. The immediate evaluation of the trustee by the trustor is thus expected to explain the formation of trust in such situations. Narrowing down the perspective of initial trust so rigidly compared to the existing Swift Trust literature, calls for further investigation. This refined view on initial trust development, focusing on the use of cognitive categories will be addressed as Immediate Trust.

The theoretical distinction between Swift and Immediate trust is; the cognitive categorization process and time frame. Whereas Swift Trust is partially driven by cognitive categorization, due to a longer time span; Immediate Trust consist only of cognitive categorization activated within the initial exposure to an individual (Elsbach, 2004). While they may both represent an ex ante form of trust, with Swift Trust the trustor can consciously attribute the trustworthiness of the trustee, e.g. he skillfully parked the tank. On the other hand, with Immediate Trust the trustor will not necessarily be able to consciously explain why he/she perceives the trustee as trustworthy, only that they did.

This again is linked to the time frame in which Immediate Trust takes place. Within the initial seconds of the exposure of an individual, there is simply no time to consciously evaluate trustworthiness. Thus, Immediate Trust will function as a predecessor to Swift Trust (Figure2). Aligned with the presented theory, this could mean that once exposed to an individual for the first time, people absorb the information given during the exposure and subconsciously compare these with existing cognitive categories (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Moskowitz, 2005). Just like Swift Trust, Immediate Trust will be followed by trusting behavior, only; this could happen without knowing why the trust is there. We do not propose Immediate Trust as a completely new construct, but merely a more nuanced addition to Swift Trust. This becomes evident when one look at the function of both Immediate and Swift Trust.
2.2.2 Function of Immediate Trust. Equal to conventional and Swift Trust, Immediate Trust serves the function of managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expectations Meyerson et al. (1996). Immediate Trust can therefore be seen as a mechanism to overcome the fear of ending up hurt by increasing the positive outcome expectancy in emergent situations. The use of categorization processing for decision making is said to occur when an individual is under time pressure and simultaneously in lack of personal knowledge of the person at hand (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005). Further, in situations where time is an issue, making a rapid decision could out-conquer the precision of a decision (Larsson, 2005; Moskowitz, 2005). This could mean that when under time pressure, people are more willing to trust i.e. making themselves vulnerable. Moreover, it could also suggest that people are less cautious of the foundation of trust in these situations. Hence, it reduces the reluctance to contribute in an ad-hoc situation by overcoming the sudden felt uncertainty these situations often represents (Olsen, 2018). The complexity reduction grant swift delegation and reduce the reluctance to be led - and take risk. Further it decrease the need for time consuming activities such as role clarification and control. In sum, Immediate Trust allow a quick establishment of efficient processes and coordinated cooperation between strangers in time critical situations. Considering today’s increased use of virtual teams, international cooperation and multinational military operations that are short-lived, Immediate Trust represents an attractive concept (Hyllengren et al., 2011).

Conversely, going against several fundamental research streams, observations clearly indicate that some temporary systems act as if they have high levels of trust by making themselves vulnerable to others (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Meyerson et al., 1996; Popa,
At this backdrop, it seems that other mechanisms affect the development of Immediate Trust compared to conventional trust.

**2.2.3 Development of Immediate Trust.** In contrast to conventional trust, where trust is said to be based on experience of an individual accumulated over time, and Swift Trust partially rely on a cognitive category-driven process to establish a stereotypical impression (Lester, 2007), will Immediate Trust rely solely on cognitive category-driven processing (Elsbach, 2004). This rapid trust evaluation could, as mentioned, reduce perceived uncertainty (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Meyerson et al., 1996) and enable the trustor to engage in risk-taking behavior. Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) study found that in short-lasting systems, where individuals have no pre-knowledge about each other, they tend to generalize the few inputs available. This is exemplified by an Israeli soldier: "When you don’t know, it worries you. You don’t know what his capabilities are, what he knows. You ask him: What can you do, what are your capabilities? You study him, learn to know him a bit, you must do that" (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005, p. 73). A better understanding what kind of inputs that form these generalizations in emergent and often short lasting situations could be essential.

Yet, inputs contributing to the initial evaluation are still the topic of future investigation (Clark, 2016; Hyllengren et al., 2011). Nonetheless, in line with current research, mechanisms such as reputation and personal characteristics has shown to influence the cognitive categorization process in emergent situations (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Curnin et al., 2015; Lester, 2007). For instance, Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) exemplifies how in the early stages of a relationship, mutual testing is used to increase predictability of a counterpart: "When a tank team joins an infantry platoon, even a small matter like placing tanks in the parking area may be seen as a test of a tank commander’s competence. Similarly, questioning a commander about his previous combat experiences may be a way to simulate his actions in the future" (p. 74). In the same manner, reputation function as a mechanism to get an impression of what one can expect of someone. The good reputation of a military squad could decrease the perceived uncertainty by increase of predictability (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005), which in turn could lead to trust. While in the case of reputation there might be no personal knowledge, the trust is still based in a form of knowledge about the counterpart. At a car crash, due to the reputation and knowledge most people have of firemen, they are likely to be trusted as first responders. However, if there is no reputation or knowledge to evaluate (e.g. no uniform), it is possible that there could still be trust? If so, the research on the Swift Trust might have come short in measuring the concept. Contemporary research has so far not excluded these mechanisms (Clark, 2016).

While not much is known about what stimulates the development of Immediate Trust,
there are other similar research fields to set as an onset. For instance, it’s expected that individuals will classify people they have no pre-knowledge of, by subconsciously evaluating the initially received inputs during the first 100-milli seconds of an interaction (Willis and Todorov, 2006). According to Rosch et al. (1976) the human mind will always try to segment nonidentical stimuli into classifications by which they can be treated as equivalent. Further, Fiske and Taylor (1991) argues that when confronted with challenging environmental stimuli, the human brain copes by simplifying the inputs and structuring them using cognitive shortcuts such as heuristics, schemas or labelling. In the same vain, Moskowitz (2005) found that when performing cognitive tasks, people are prone to the least effort principal. Thus, in order to process the comprehensive amount of information in a extreme setting, the brain will make use of cognitive routes requiring least effort (Lester, 2007).

Parallel to these principals stereotyping could help explain the rapid development of trust. With stereotyping one is able to make a prediction of future outcome of an individuals behaviour based on the group this individual is identified with (Moskowitz, 2005). Hence, trust is expected to develop if the individual is categorized within a group that is deemed trustworthy by the trustor (Lester, 2007). An important consideration, is that these categories are implicit and are different between individuals (Delhey et al., 2011). Although, some categories are more widely shared and unanimous in perceptions, such as firemen.

In other words, individuals interacting within temporary systems without any pre-knowledge could turn to a cognitive categorization process and make the trustee fit into a stereotypical character (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Myers et al., 2012). Hence, the implicit impression could work as a justification to make a decision to trust (Moskowitz, 2005). The perceived trustworthiness evoked by this impression could possibly create a positive outcome expectancy by giving a sense of predictability and thus increase the willingness to make oneself vulnerable (Clark, 2016; Lester, 2007).

Thus, conversely to several Swift Trust operationalizations that suggest a relatively long time span as basis for an evaluation of trustworthiness (from hours to several weeks), we suggest a more immediate and implicit evaluation processes of trust, that can occur after less than one minute of exposure. At this basis we suggest as follows:

H1: Trust can develop within the first sixty seconds of exposure to another person

Leaning on the cognitive categorization perspective (e.g. stereotyping, labelling, schemas etc.), visual ques such as rank or uniform, are said to stimulate and influence the acceleration of presumptive trust (Lester, 2007). Nonetheless, dynamic factors such as leadership
behaviors can also influence the acceleration of presumptive trust in the initial interaction. Hence, identifying what a leader should bring into the initial encounter with the follower to accelerate the presumptive trust development is essential. Hyllengren et al. (2011) findings indicate that in building a positive outcome expectancy and establishing high initial trust, leadership behavior play the most important part. If the leader is identified with trustworthy categories by the trustor, trust is expected to develop (Clark, 2016). A leader perceived as trustworthy and therefore able to form a positive outcome expectancy could thus be crucial to establish effective collaboration between strangers. Hence, assessing the impact of leadership behavior on trust development in the first meeting could be essential. Yet, little is known about what kind of leadership behavior would influence initial trust acceleration.

2.3 Leadership in an Operative Environment

Leadership resides in the situation; and every situation has specialized demands that call for certain leadership behaviors (Kolditz, 2007). In 1948 Peter Stogdill stated that “it becomes clear that an adequate analysis of leadership involves not only a study of leaders, but also of situations” (Stogdill, 1948, pp. 64-65). Since then contemporary leadership theories have implemented both leader and contingencies (Bass and Bass, 2009; Northouse, 2018; Vroom and Jago, 2007). However, it is hard to evolve a theory which encompass all situations, and it seems that many contemporary theories have a hard time explaining leadership in extreme or operative settings (Brandebo et al., 2013; Hannah et al., 2009; Olsen and Espevik, 2009).

Very little is known about what leadership styles or traits may stimulate development of trust in a complex and dangerous situation (Clark, 2016). However, Lapidot et al. (2007, p. 606) argues that "leaders behavior manifesting ability, integrity and benevolence play a central role in enhancing followers’ trust in the leader". The extreme nature of operative situations will likely also affect the people in the situation, e.g. making them overly aroused emotionally, hence distorting information processing and decision making (Sorokin et al., 1943). An operative context is often characterized by high complexity concerning unpredictability, restricted time windows and low information access. This makes the consequences of actions difficult to anticipate and a wrong decisions may lead to fatal outcomes. Thus, operative leadership diverge from contemporary organizational management theories, where contextual factors can be more predictable and less fatal (Olsen and Espevik, 2009).

According to Kolditz (2007) in extremis leaders have to give purpose, motivation, and direction to people when there is imminent physical danger and where followers believe that leader
behavior will influence their physical well-being. As such it is a follower perspective on leadership; In situations where followers perceive their lives are threatened, leadership can literally define the promise of future life, and those at risk desperately seek capable leaders (Kolditz, 2007, p. IX). However, this statement does not give insight into how a leader should behave to do so.

A large body of research shows how leader behavior can affect the function of a group, and one important mediator of this effect is trust in the leader (Zhu et al., 2013). Additionally, trust in leadership seem to have a trickle down effect on interpersonal trust within the group (Meyerson et al., 1996). However, many modern groups or teams often have no formal hierarchy, and in contrast to traditional teams therefore have no formal leader (Wolff et al., 2002). While such teams often exist in organizations as a modern empowered team, they also appear as ad-hoc teams in response to a specific operative situation e.g. natural disasters (Hannah et al., 2009). Research on leadership emergence can explain how leadership functions in such teams.

Bales and Hare (1965) found that those who emerged as informal leaders were those able to identify and address the most pressing problems. Additionally, there were often two distinct leaders who emerged from such teams, one being task-focused behaviors, while the other focused on the socioemotional needs of the group members (Slater, 1955). This finding was later supported by (Hollander, 1959) who concluded that the attainment of informal leadership required both being perceived as competent as well as able to alleviate social concerns. This is interesting when compared to trust research, because these two emergent leaders are representing two main dimensions of trustworthiness, namely ability and benevolence (McKnight and Chervany, 2000).

As Meyerson et al. (1996) described; trust in a leader can also affect interpersonal trust within a team when entrusting each other with sub-tasks. This is of major importance as evident in this testimony from a FBI SWAT team leader; "...the first guy goes left and the second guy is going right and he is driving his corner, he’s not worrying about the guy on his left, he knows that that guy is taking care of any threat in that corner" (Kolditz, 2007, p. 14). Evidently, trust within teams allows them to pursue different sub tasks without any concerns of each others responsibility. Thus, trust that is formed towards a leader and within teams prior to an extreme setting is crucial to how these teams perform, and a lack of it can lead to dire consequences (Hamby, 2002).

Operative situations are what Kolditz (2007) refers to as inherently motivating, meaning; the situation in itself motivates and emotionally arouse the people in it. Consequently, according to Kolditz (2007) an in extremis leader has to do three things; instill confidence of success, a promise for survival and a sense of resilience. It is hard to explain how any of these could be plausible goals for a leader if the team doesn’t trust him or her.

As addressed earlier, perceiving a positive outcome expectancy in the trustees behavior
or intention is crucial in order to trust (Meyerson et al., 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998). Furthermore, according to Ben-Shalom et al. (2005); Sweeney (2007), the leader-trust relationships might be even more important in operative settings in order to ensure efficiency.

For a leader to create a positive outcome expectancy, s/he has to be deemed trustworthy (Meyerson et al., 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998). In line with conventional trust, Competence or ability represents a fundamental building block for trustworthiness within operative leadership (Kolditz, 2007). This is supported by Sweeney (2007) finding that leader ability was rated the most important attribute for influencing trust in combat (Sweeney, 2007). Perceived leader ability gives an optimistic prediction of a future outcome and thus present people involved with a positive outcome expectancy (Kolditz, 2007). This become evident through a testimony of a US soldier in Iraq: "I don’t like the guy. I don’t know how to deal with him when we get off work, but as far as being professional and being out there in the trenches, he is a great leader. I admire him" Kolditz (2007, p. 12). This shows that when in a given situation, the perceived ability of the trustee to successfully handle the situation could nurture trust (Lapidot et al., 2007).

Further, while trust most often takes time to build, the literature suggest there are situations where the actions of a leader can inspire trust. A finding from Kolditz (2007) research suggest that experienced in extremis leaders will place themselves in the same or more risk than their followers. Such actions can be considered as a behavioral manifestation of integrity which is an antecedent of trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Olsen and Espevik, 2009). This makes sense when considering this testimony from a soldier "They are not going to throw you out into something that they wouldn’t put themselves in as well" (Kolditz, 2007, p. 6). However, such selfless acts could be pointless if the followers had no trust in their leaders competence or ability. That is to say if they thought their leader made a reckless decision that would put their life in danger, they would not necessarily follow him or her (Kolditz, 2007). Likewise, if followers believed that their leader did not want the best for them (benevolence), his or her competence wouldn’t necessarily be enough for them to trust him or her. This is a good example of how the three main components of trustworthiness are inherently interconnected and therefore hard to discern (McKnight and Chervany, 2000).

While the importance of trust seem to be evident from many studies, these studies are often anecdotal and there is a lack of research related to the antecedents of trust in leaders (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Brandebo et al., 2013; Lester, 2007). Few, if any studies have tested experimentally how different leadership behavior affect trust, let alone Swift and Immediate Trust (Clark, 2016).

Not knowing what effect leadership behavior has on predicting initial trust develop-
ment, approaching from a generic angle will be necessary. For now this means leaving out complex contemporary leadership theories, such as the full-range-model of leadership (Northouse, 2018). Instead, autocratic and democratic leadership are two contrasting ways of leading (Bass and Stogdill, 1990; Vroom and Jago, 2007; White and Lippitt, 1960), and offers a simplicity as an experimental research tool. Additionally, these two forms of leadership are very similar to the two kinds of informal leaders that often emerged in Hollander (1959); Slater (1955)’s research, namely a task-focus, and a social-focused.

Interestingly, there is research done on both autocratic and democratic leadership which suggest they may represent significant predictors of trust.

2.3.1 Democratic Leadership. Democratic leadership amounts to giving group members responsibility, improving the general abilities and leadership skills of other group members, and assisting the group in its decision-making process (Gastil, 1994). In a short exposure this means the leader has to divide responsibility within the group, and promote common decision making. Hyllengren et al. (2011) found that the most frequent mentioned leadership quality for promoting Swift Trust was to encourage involvement, as well as listening to followers. Meyerson et al. (1996) also suggest that leaders should demonstrate a willingness to change plans together with the group.

Such behavior is noticeable in many contemporary leadership theories, e.g. authentic leadership; where balanced processing involves actively involving followers in decision making (Avolio and Gardner, 2005). In turn this could lead to an increased sense of control, which subsequently might stimulate a positive outcome expectancy, and therefore also increase Swift Trust (Olsen, 2018). Also, aligned with once willingness to be vulnerable to others, participating in decision-making could decrease the feeling of uncertainty through a sense of control of the situations and thus risk-reduction and enhanced expectation of a positive outcome (Meyerson et al., 1996). Additionally, participating in the decision making process could increase a sense of internal locus of control (Rotter, 1990). It is possible that this in turn could increase the trustors willingness to be vulnerable.

However, research suggest that democratic leadership is more effective when the leader is elected (Gastil, 1994). Additionally, asking others for suggestion could be perceived as a manifestation of low competence. Meaning in an operative situation when there is no time to elect a leader, democratic might not be preferred leader. Supporting this, Mulder et al. (1986) found that leaders taking control and showed directive behavior in extreme situations where more effective. As a result, in line with Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) findings, individuals finding themselves in extreme situations may turn to pre-established categories and "accept more centralization of power
and direction from their leaders" Hannah et al. (2009, p. 904).

2.3.2 Autocratic Leadership. There are several key points to autocratic leadership which can be theorized to affect trust in such ad-hoc teams (Hannah et al., 2009). Unfortunately much research on autocratic research is indirectly through research on democratic leadership. This means that much research has focused on how democratic leadership is better than autocratic, and not on the positive outcomes of autocratic leadership (Gastil, 1994). However, there are several examples of the potential positive effects of autocratic leadership in an operative setting. According to Bass and Bass (2009) followers in a threatening situation, are more likely to accept centralized, autocratic and hasty decisions even if they are poorly determined. Hyllengren et al. (2011) found that specialist knowledge was one of the major contributors to trust in leadership. A leader who behaves as though s/he knows what is going on might be evaluated as more competent, and therefore also more trustworthy. It is however important to notice that this not necessarily reflect the actual ability of the leader, rather the followers perception of ability. Leaders who provide rapid and authoritative responses might be more likely to be followed, regardless of the accuracy of their decisions (Mulder et al., 1986). This might be due high perceived trustworthiness from followers through perceived ability as described in McKnight and Chervany (2000).

Hershey & Blanchards (1969) situational leadership model describe how workers in different part of their work life need different types of leader behavior. According to their model, a person in an unfamiliar and complex operative setting would rather have an autocratic leader (high direction, low support). Authoritative behavior might make the role of each individual clearer. Consequently, higher role clarity reduce feelings of uncertainty, and have been found to increase effectiveness in teams (Hannah et al., 2009) as well as trust in the leader (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005). Gal and Jones (1985) argue that leaders who are strong, confident and deliberate will attenuate levels of stress among followers, while also increasing their confidence to perform in extreme contexts. Supporting this is McKnight et al. (1998) structural assurance belief, which will increase the trustors willingness to make oneself vulnerable if common norms are in place. As extreme situations often induce high levels of stress and emotional activation (Hannah et al., 2009; Sorokin et al., 1943), a leader who is dominating and aggressive, acting to quickly reduce the ambiguity associated with events and redirecting followers to action (Fodor, 1978) might be preferred. Having a leader who takes away responsibility might be more comforting, and hence be judged as more trustworthy.

Examining both leadership styles it seems that both have several benefits and drawbacks when it comes to trust development. However, there is a difference between the two, namely their effect in an operative situation. Indeed, there seem to be more research leaning towards the
use of autocratic leadership in an operative setting to promote trust. When teams are under time constraints, some emergent leaders are better at perceiving situational requirements and selecting appropriate demands (Zaccaro et al., 1991). They will therefore focus on organizing the work and achieving goals, rather than building trust and regard for others (Taggar et al., 1999; Zaccaro et al., 2001). Indeed, in the 1974 Norwegian book of military leadership (Bang, 1974) it says that an authoritarian leadership might be preferred in extreme situations. This is also consistent with Hannah et al. (2009)’s notions of operative leadership.

At this basis we suggest as follows:

H2: Autocratic leadership will score significantly higher on immediate trust evaluations compared to democratic leadership after controlling for generalized trust

While leadership style can be chosen and trained, personality traits might affect how this is performed and therefore evaluated by others (Hyllengren et al., 2011; Taggar et al., 1999). Thus, even though autocratic leadership style may surpass democratic in an extreme situation, how it is performed could affect this preference. Furthermore, there are several arguments within the literature regarding the importance on emotional stability in the performance of operational leadership (e.g., Kolditz, 2007; Olsen & Eid, 2015). Furthermore, being emotionally stable could be important in extreme situations, regardless of leadership behavior (Olsen and Eid, 2015)

During the Alpha Piper blowout, one factor that seemed to affect leadership, or the total breakdown of leadership could have been emotional stability. The Offshore Installation Manager did not remain calm and self-assured, and instead responded with panic, and were not able to rely information to anyone else (Cullen, 1990). Hence, emotional stability may represent an important supplement to the actual leadership behavior, in order to stimulate followers, trust in the leader, and subsequently performance.

2.3.3 Emotional Stability. Several personality traits have been found to affect leadership effectiveness (Hyllengren et al., 2011; Lord et al., 1986; Taggar et al., 1999). Because of the scope of this thesis we are however more interested in the behavioral manifestations of such traits. Hyllengren et al. (2011) identified leaders emotional stability as the most relevant behavioral characteristics for affecting Swift Trust. Emotional stability can be described as the tendency an individual has to arouse quickly when stimulated and to inhibit slowly when aroused (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1985). While Eysenck and Eysenck (1985)”s definition is heavily cited, it is important to note that there is no unified definition of emotional stability in the literature (Ormel et al., 2012). Despite this, there is plenty of research on emotional stability as a predictor of leader effectiveness (Bass and Bass, 2009; Hogan et al., 1994; Stogdill, 1974). However, most of this research does not
look for reasons why emotional stability facilitates leadership effectiveness, rather that it does.

Moving forward, several behavioral characteristics are linked to neurotic vs. emotional stable individuals. Highly emotionally stable individuals are calmer, reliable and more self-assured compared to neurotics who are more anxious, self-conscious and vulnerable (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1985). This can manifest in action patterns and body language i.e low emotionally stable individuals will make fever hand gestures towards others (Argyle, 1988), and have more pauses in verbal communication (Furnham, 1990). Moreover, highly emotionally stable individuals are more likely to use their hands to reinforce their verbal communication, while low emotionally stable individuals will use their hands for non-signaling movements such as scratching their neck (Waxer, 1977). Such non-verbal communication is linked to perceptions on self-confidence (Waxer, 1977).

What is more, Kirkpatick and Locke (1991) suggest that perceived self-confidence is one of the most influential traits on leadership effectiveness. In the same vein, emotional stability in the face of danger may be perceived as coping ability and resilience, which in turn may stimulate a perception of competency and ability to perform under pressure. This perceived competence may stimulate trust in followers, thus increasing hope of a positive outcome. It is also noteworthy that self-confidence and calmness could instill calmness in followers (Grossman and Christensen, 2007). In his book The Warriors, philosopher J. Glenn Gray describes just how this happened to him during the landing of Normandy on D-Day, 1944.

"I crouched under my jeep on a landing craft that went on a few hours after the first waves of infantry. Shells were exploding in the water all around, and I felt assure the next one would land squarely on us. Then through the tangle of gear and machines, I saw an American officer, a captain, standing by the edge of our boat. He was smoking a cigarette, and I watched fascinated as he flicked ashes into the water. His hand trembled not at all. Then I felt unreasonably grateful to him. It was clear that he was exposing himself no more or less than I; but his reason was in control. I longed to ... clasp him around the knees, and look up to him worshipfully... The sight of him gradually calmed me, so that ... I was able to get into my jeep and drive it ... onto dry land.” (Gray, 1958, p. 13).

If a leader is able to instill calmness in follower, this could also increase self-efficacy and a positive outcome expectancy, thereby promoting trust. Conversely, an unstable and neurotic individual might be considered less trustworthy, simply due to negative outcome expectancy and not reducing emotional arousal in followers. At this basis we suggest:

**H3:** The emotional stable leader will score significantly higher on trust compared to
the neurotic leader after controlling for general trust

**H4: The autocratic and emotional stable leader will score significantly higher on trust compared to all other groups after controlling for general trust**

**Psychological Hardiness - Moderating the Leader vs. Trust effect.** As mentioned above, extreme situations are known to induce stress and emotional arousal (Hannah et al., 2009; Sorokin et al., 1943). There are however individual psychological traits that could moderate these responses, and psychological hardiness has proven valuable when dealing with stressful situations (Bartone et al., 2009). According to Bartone (1995) hardiness consist of three factors; Commitment, Control and Challenge. "Persons high in hardiness involve themselves in whatever they are doing (commitment), believe and act as if they can influence the events forming their lives (control), and consider change to be not only normal but also a stimulus to development (challenge)" (Kobasa et al., 1983, p. 42). In an operative setting a person with a high hardiness score (DNS-15) might therefore evaluate the situation as less threatening, feeling more secure. Additionally, Maddi (2008) research suggest individuals with high hardiness are more likely to look at stressful situations as an opportunity for development.

It has been suggested that in an extreme event followers are more willing to accept more centralization of power and direction from their leaders (Bass and Bass, 2009). Since this effect has been attributed to emotional arousal and stress (Bass and Bass, 2009; Hannah et al., 2009), this might differ between individuals high or low on hardiness. That is due to a generally lower emotional arousal in an extreme setting, high hardiness individuals are less prone to autocratic leadership compared to low hardiness individuals. Additionally, high hardiness scores could affect the evaluations of different type of leadership behavior. Because individuals with high control scores not only have a higher sense of control, but also higher need to influence their own life (Kobasa et al., 1983). Moreover, it can be argued that individuals high on hardiness are less willing to make themselves vulnerable to others actions, due to their subjectively perceived control (Meyerson et al., 1996). This is also in line with Kobasa et al. (1983)’s understanding, that control can be understood as the opposite of powerlessness and thus the wish to express an opinion on the matter at hand. Further, commitment, means to involve oneself in what they are engaging in. This could be argued to make the trustor more prone to a democratic leader, due to the possibility to participate. This can further be linked to the challenge component, where the situation is considered an opportunity to learn and not a threat. Turned around, individuals low on hardiness may perceive the situation as threatening and therefore be more prone to trust the autocratic leader to master the situation (Gambetta, 1988). In our experimental setting this
means that the evaluations of trustworthiness of autocratic/democratic leadership could very well differ between high/low hardiness individuals. However, this reasoning is based on a pluralism of literature and does not give a clear platform on what we can predict. Further it could be that it doesn’t have any moderator effect at all. On this basis we suggest that:

**H4**: Hardiness moderates the effect between leadership behavior and trust, so that individuals with high hardiness scores will have lower trust evaluations of autocratic leadership compared to those with low hardiness scores

**H5**: Hardiness moderates the effect between leadership behavior and trust, so that individuals with low hardiness scores will have higher trust evaluations of democratic leadership compared to those with high hardiness

### 2.4 Aim of the Thesis

In sum, this thesis will empirically try to unveil the concept of Immediate Trust, by focusing on the first encounter in an operative setting. In order to successfully measure Immediate Trust, an instrument is to be developed based on the existing trust instrument by Smith (2008, p. 116) and Larsson (2005). Further, based on the presented literature, we investigate the possibility of non-visual cues to activate cognitive categories and accordingly uncover the development of trust between strangers within their initial exposure. By doing so, we derail from what until now has been the leading way in activating cognitive categories, being visual cues. Hence, the visual-perception-input is put aside in favour of leadership behavior and emotional stability. We therefore want to identify a possible connection between the emergence of Immediate Trust and the perceived trustworthiness based on leadership behavior and emotional stability.

However, being the first to investigate Immediate Trust experimentally, the main challenge is creating a comprehensive research design covering all aspects. Hence, this thesis will present a research design capable to capture the essence. Although narrow in its application, the design is meant to lead way for future empirical research, such as other design and replication studies. As the first study to empirically investigate the emergence of immediate type of trust with an experimental design, we hope to create a foundation for future research.
3 Method

3.1 Sample

A total of 355 people participated and completed the experiment. None of the 355 respondents had incomplete data. The time period for data collection was between January 21st until March 19th 2018. The sample consists of random people willing to complete the experiment, most of which are current students at the University of Bergen. The mean age of the total sample was 25.7 years (SD = 8.3), with respondents ranging from 16-62 years. Of the 355 respondents 128 (36.1%) were male, and 227 (63.9%) were female, no respondents identified as anything else.

3.2 Procedure

To answer the need for experimental research on the subject of trust, we created an experiment with video vignettes and an in-between subject design. Four 40-50 second videos, representing a car accident, were recorded. Each of the videos varied in leadership behavior and emotional stability, while all other aspects were created as identical as possible. The 2-by-2 model (figure 3) enabled us to investigate possible differences in trust evaluations between the groups, based on expose to different leader behavior. The video was shot during dark in order to neutralize visual biases in the participants judgment of trust, such as attractiveness (Podsakoff, 2003). The in-between subject design gives the experiment a comparable data without the concerns of carryover-effects between the groups. Moreover, in order to measure Immediate Trust we had to develop an Immediate Trust-scale for the purpose of this study.

The people recruited for the experiment were given a link to one of four online surveys (using SurveyXact). The videos were uploaded to YouTube and were coded in order to make it impossible for the participant to identify which group they belonged to (link to all videos can be found in Appendix D). Informed consent was conducted and all participants were given written information and a briefing about the main purpose of the study. They were informed that the participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. The participants first had to answer a scale measuring hardiness (NDRS-15) and Generalized Trust (GT), before being exposed to one 40-50 second video vignette, and subsequently asked to rate the trustworthiness of the leader figure they met in the video. After completing they were told what the intent of the experiment was, and given contact information should they have any questions.
3.3 The Experiment

Vignettes are a valid experimental technique and are especially useful in studies focusing on perceptions and beliefs (Gould, 1996). Vignettes are described as "stories about individuals, situations and structures which can make reference to important points in the study of perceptions, beliefs and attitudes" (Hughes, 1998, p. 381). For this study the perceptions of trustworthiness is the key element, and as such, the use of vignettes were a suitable experimental technique. Furthermore, vignettes have shown high validity and has been used in numeral studies of trust (Robert et al., 2009).

According to Gould (1996) video vignettes have three major strengths as a research method. Firstly they tend to reduce the response bias on topics that elicit socially desirable responses. In our study, that meant that respondents might judge the trustworthiness of the person in the video more honestly than they would if they met the person face-to-face. It also allowed us to control both the situation and the focus of the participant. In a real life situation the chaotic nature of the situation could have overshadowed the independent variables we wanted to portray. Secondly, this also meant that we could ensure that all participants saw the exact same situation, and that no confounding variables could intervene (Gould, 1996; Robert et al., 2009). Thirdly, using a video vignette could increase the ecological validity compared to a written vignette (Sleed et al., 2002). Not only is there less room for interpretation, there is also a one time exposure limit. This was of utmost importance in this study, as we were looking for an immediate evaluation of trustworthiness and trust intention.

The four video vignettes combined constitute the independent variable for this study.
To ensure the effectiveness of the video vignettes we had to make sure they were portraying "the phenomenon of interest" (Gould, 1996). There are three key factors that can help establish external validity in vignettes (Robert et al., 2009). Firstly, the scenario should be founded in existing literature or case studies. Unfortunately, for this thesis there were no other examples in the literature that could serve as a basis. Instead we turned this key factor around, and started with the question "in what plausible situation would immediate trust occur?". This led us to create a situation of untrained first responders to a crash-site. While few people will ever experience this, there is always a chance that they could, which is why it is mandatory in Norway to have four hours of first respondent training in order to get a drivers license (Trafikkopplæringsforskriften, 2004, § 8-1). This made it a realistic and relevant situation for all participants. However, we also had to create a believable character that met the respondents in the video.

While we had theorized what kind of leader behavior that would be suitable for experimental manipulation; we also had to make sure that the actor portrayed the emotional stability/neurotic behavioral manifestations proposed by Furnham (1990) and Argyle (1988). The neurotic character would make few hand gestures towards others, and instead use hands for non-signaling movements (scratching the neck). Additionally he would have more pauses in his verbal communication and sound more afraid. The emotional stable character would be calmer, use hand gestures towards others and to reinforce his verbal communication.

After securing that our vignettes were founded in theory, to ensure content validity (Robert et al., 2009) the videos were first assessed by three expert reviewers, in order to evaluate to what degree our actor portrayed the different leadership behavior and modes of emotional stability we needed for the study. Their judgments were based on whether or not they observed the leadership behavior and mode of emotional stability that the four vignettes were designed to portray. The first videos were all judged correctly by the experts, however; the videos portraying democratic leadership were found to not be clear enough on democratic leadership behavior. Because of this both democratic video vignettes were re-shot and edited to elucidate democratic behavior. All the surroundings factors were set up according to the first shot, and only the script changed to increase the democratic impression. The new videos were taken back for re-evaluation by the experts. They all agreed on the validity of these changes.

Lastly, the vignettes were pretested and refined in four focus groups before they were utilized in the actual study (Robert et al., 2009). These groups were made up of fellow master-students who all have knowledge related to leadership and experimental research. The participants in the groups were first individually presented the videos followed by control questions (see Appendix A). They were asked to place the video in one of the four experimental setting, which all
but two participants did correctly 3. The two mistakes were due to the reviewer comparing two or more videos. This would not pose a problem for the experiment as respondents would only be shown one of the videos. After they individually commented the video, the focus group assembled for a group discussion. Here the participants expressed their view and discussed issues with regards to the variables of the videos. Simultaneously, we took notes in order to catch the essence of the discussed issues. Most feedback was related to the behavior of the character in the video, and how they interpreted this. The feedback where then implemented and adjusted accordingly in the survey. These evaluations showed that the videos had high inter-rater reliability, and the videos were therefore implemented in the survey, and sent out for pilot-testing.

During pilot-testing it became apparent that it was possible to watch the videos several times, which would undermine the immediate evaluation. There was therefore an explicit statement asking the respondent to watch the video just once. Additionally the respondent had to move forward before answering the questions related to Immediate Trust, meaning they could not return to the video when evaluating the leader’s trustworthiness.

3.4 Ethical Concerns

Several of the participants were students at the University of Bergen, and did the experiment in a class room setting. While they were offered not to participate, the setting in which they were asked might have contributed to them agreeing against their will. Moreover, the experiment puts participants in a high demanding situation, where it was portrayed that lives were at stake. While it is possible that some participants might feel uncomfortable in such a setting, the visual and auditory cues were not vivid or scary, as the focus was on the person and less so on the situation. However, the participants had the opportunity to abort the experiment at any time. Further, no personal information was gathered that could identify the participants, including IP-addresses. In addition, the data was password protected. The experiment and survey was approved by Data Protection Authority (Personvernombudet for Forskning, NSD) prior to the data collection.

3.5 Measurements

3.5.1 Immediate Trust Scale - Appendix C. Immediate Trust was the dependent variable for the analysis in this study and the scope of our thesis. In line with the concept, no established scale to measure Immediate Trust exists. However, a number of trust scales exists, including Swift Trust. It therefore seemed sound to adopt an existing scale and refine it to our
THE EFFECT OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR ON SWIFT TRUST

purpose. Essential was to identify a scale that addresses the three components of trustworthiness (McKnight and Chervany, 2000). Secondly, it had to measure a trust intention and thirdly, be able to identify these within an extreme situation with time restrictions. A trust scale used in a military experiment regarding communication under stress presented a relevant approach to our topic (Smith, 2008). This scale measured one trust dimension with eight items.

The questionnaire had a sufficient Cronbach’s $\alpha = .78$. However, this questionnaire was made to fit another experiment, and the questions were not general enough to be applied to our study. Additionally, there was little background information on how this scale was made and what considerations had been taken into account in its creation. The only information available showed that the scale had been handed down orally at a conference, and we did not succeed in making contact with the authors for further clarification. When adjusting the items to our purpose, developing the Immediate Trust Scale we followed the guidelines proposed by Hinkin et al. (1997) to make the scale as reliable and valid as possible.

Building on this we constructed a scale consisting of a total of 12 items, generated through a deductive approach (Schwab, 1980; Hinkin et al., 1997). The items were identified and developed at the basis of the three components of trustworthiness (ability, benevolence and integrity) identified in the literature (Colquitt et al., 2007; McKnight and Chervany, 2000). Some of these trust-dimensions were also apparent in the scale used by Smith (2008). From this scale, we identified three items as benevolence (e.g., "Jeg opplevde at vedkommende gjorde alt han kunne for at liv ikke skulle gå tapt), and three items concerning ability (e.g. "Jeg opplevde at vedkommende ikke visste hva han holdt på med). However, the integrity component of trustworthiness could not be identified in the Smith (2008) scale. Hence, we composed three items based on the theoretical construct of integrity (e.g., "Vedkommende ville ikke satt meg i unødvendig fare). Two items concerning trust intention where identified in the Smith (2008) scale: "Jeg opplevde at jeg stolte på vedkommende". However, we also wanted to know if the respondents would actually act on their trusting intention towards the person. We added the question: "Jeg ville gjort som vedkommende så". The questions taken from the Smith (2008) scale were translated from English to Norwegian by using a foreward-back translating method.

The scaling of the items would follow the 7 point Likert scale used in Smith (2008). A seven point scale have been shown to create enough variance among items and scales, and thereby creating adequate reliability estimates (Lissitz and Green, 1975 in Hinkin et al. (1997)). A seven point scale is also argued to be enough for an ordinal variable to be treated as a continuous, which strengthens the scale’s applicability in experimental studies. In total the new Immediate Trust Scale-12 (ITS-12) consists of 12 items measured on a 1-7 Likert scale, and initially indexed as
four distinct dimensions and one global (composite) index, encompassing perceived trustworthi-
ness (ability, benevolence, integrity), and trust intention.

The 12 items of the Immediate Trust Scale were subjected to a principal component analysis to assess whether the three proposed components of trustworthiness (benevolence, ability and integrity), as well as trust intention or other components could be identified within the scale. From the correlation matrix it revealed the presence of many coefficients above .3, and the Kaiser Meyer-Olkin value was .93, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser 1970, 1974) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Principal component analysis revealed the presence of two components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 53.5%, and 8.9% respectively. The Scree Plot (ref Figure 4) showed a clear break after the first component. The second component had an Eigenvalue of 1.09, and did not have a clear underlying theme related to its items. A multiple component solution was therefore renounced. Therefore, in the following analysis we utilize one global index representing immediate trust.

Figure 4. Scree Plot for principal component analysis on ITS-12

It is worth noting, that in the development of the scale we made sure that there were no double-barreled items, and tried to make the questions as simplistic as possible. Additionally, because the phenomenon at interest (immediate evaluation of trust) we could not have a long ques-
tionnaire, as the immediate evaluation would be compromised. This also decreased the chances that answers are biased due to boredom and fatigue (Hinkin et al., 1997). There were no experts on trust research available, so instead the proposed scale of 12 items were then administered to peer students during the pretesting of the video vignettes. Several of the students said they did not understand why these questions were asked when evaluating trustworthiness. When explained the theory behind the questions, all agreed the items were well composed.

3.5.2 Hardiness - Appendix B. Hardiness was measured using the Norwegian Dispositional Resilience Scale 15 (NDRS-15) (Hystad et al., 2010). It consists of 15 statements with which respondents are required to indicate agreement on a four-point scale (where 0 = not at all true, and 3 = completely true). The scale contains six items that are negatively keyed. After reversing these negatively keyed items, a total hardness score can be obtained by summing responses to all items. In addition, three subscale scores can be created by summing the relevant five items for each of the commitment, challenge, and control subscales. The scale has satisfactory internal consistency, with Cronbach’s $\alpha$ within the range of 0.60–0.70 (Hystad et al., 2010). For this study it had a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .721$, which is well within the margin.

3.5.3 Generalized Trust. Generalized trust is as described in the theory section merely a sense of whether or not people in general can be trusted and to what extent people have a general trust expectancy. This also includes the aspect of trust in strangers as addressed by (McKnight et al., 1998, p. 478), as "the extent which one believes that nonspecific others are trustworthy". This was therefore measured on a 1-5 Likert scale with the question "Would you agree that most people in general can be trusted?". By controlling for general trust, this study can take participants trust propensity into account and thus increase the homogeneity of the groups (Delhey et al., 2011).

3.6 Preliminary Analysis

Power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007). Power was set to .95, alpha set to .05 (two-tailed). The results showed that to detect between-subject effects we should recruit 400 respondents. For our study, 355 respondents were recruited, and this was regarded as an adequate sample size given the exploratory nature of the thesis.

Before the calculation of sum-scores of the scales, reversed items were transformed to fit. This applied for both ITS-12 and NDRS-15. To evaluate if the data was applicable, exploratory analysis were conducted to test for outliers and normality (Fields, 2013). Two outliers were iden-
tified for scores on the dependent variable (ITS-12). These respondents were removed from the sample (respondents 237 and 304). Test of normality using Shapiro-Wilk identified that the dataset broke the assumption of normality (sig. < .01). However, due to the sample size, Central Limit Theorem ensures that the distribution of disturbance term will approximate normality. Additionally regression analysis are not vulnerable to violation of the normality assumption (Fields, 2013).

3.7 Statistics

All statistical analysis were conducted through IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, version 25 (SPSS).

3.7.1 Reliability of the Immediate Trust Scale. In order to evaluate the new scale created for the measurement of Immediate Trust (ITS-12), the internal consistency will be measured using Cronbach $\alpha$. If $\alpha$ is above .70 it indicates a strong item covariance and suggest that immediate trust has been adequately captured by the scale (Hinkin et al., 1997). The scale will also be evaluated using a principal component analysis in order to identify whether or not the underlying factors of Immediate Trust (trustworthiness and trust intention) are distinguishable. Should ITS-12 prove to not reliably measure trust, it cannot be used to answer research question 2 and 3.

3.7.2 Identifying differences in trust scores between the experimental conditions after controlling for GT. In order to see whether there were significant differences between the four groups on trust evaluations. This difference had to exist after controlling for several confounding variables that theoretically could influence trust evaluations (GT and NFL). To do this we performed an ANCOVA were the four experimental conditions are the independent variable, trust the dependant variable, and GT and NFL as covariates. There are several assumptions that should be tested for when using parametric techniques. Firstly, our dependant variable (trust) was measured at a categorical ordinal level (7-point Likert scale). While some argue that only continuous variables are suited for parametric testing (Pallant, 2013), this analysis will be done with total mean score for trust, and will be treated as a continuous interval variable.

According to Pallant (2013) there are five additional assumptions that should be satisfied for ANCOVA to be valid. First, all covariates were measured prior to the experimental condition and dependant variable. All the scales that were used as covariates are well-validated scales, and showed satisfactory Cronbach alpha values in our sample. Preliminary correlation analyses showed no significant correlation between the two covariates. Linearity between the covariates
and trust evaluations, were done visually in a scatter plot. Here markers were set by experimental condition (video), and trust evaluations on the Y-axis. Both covariates violated the assumption of linearity. We therefore excluded the covariates from further analysis. Instead an one-way analysis of variance were performed with a conservative Post-Hoc test (Tukeys HSD).

3.7.3 The moderating effect of Hardiness. In order to look for a moderating effect of hardiness, we will make a dichotomous variable out of the four video groups, divided by autocratic/democratic leadership. This variable will then be multiplied with hardiness mean score to create an interaction variable. This will not discern between neurotic/emotionally stable, since the moderating effect was theorized to be on leadership style primarily and not leadership behavior.
4 Results

4.1 Correlations

The table shows descriptive statistics in form of mean scores, standard deviation, and correlations for all variables used in this study. There are few significant correlations between the different variables. There is a weak positive correlation between Hardiness and General Trust \((r = .220, p < .01)\), and a weak positive correlation between Immediate Trust and Generalized Trust \((r = .130, p < .05)\).

Table 1

\[\text{Correlation Matrix Variables}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Generalized Trust</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>1.181</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean Score Hardiness</td>
<td>1.7143</td>
<td>.29086</td>
<td>.220**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mean Score Immediate Trust</td>
<td>4.5340</td>
<td>1.18801</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. \( ^* p < .05. \quad ^{**} p < .01. \)

4.2 Development of the Immediate Trust Scale-12 (ITS-12)

In order to ensure that the scale developed for this experiment was a reliable tool for the measurement of Immediate Trust several statistical analysis were performed. Reliability analysis showed a high internal consistency with a Cronbach’s \(\alpha\) value of .91. Consistently, all items on the scale had significant correlations \((p = < .000)\) ranging between .280-.774 as shown in Table 3.

4.3 The existence of Immediate Trust

A one-way between groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore whether trust measurements were significantly different in-between the four different experimental conditions. The dependent variable was the total trust evaluation (ITS-12), and the independent variable was the experiment condition. There was a statistically significant difference at the \(p < .000\) level, in trust measurements between the four experimental settings: \(F (3, 349) = 36.76, p = < .000\). The effect size was calculated using eta squared and showed a large effect at .239 (Cohen’s, 1988, pp. 284–7). Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that only the mean score for AL/ES
(\(M = 5.26, SD = .96\)) was significantly different from AL/N (\(M = 4.05, SD = 1.16\)), DL/ES (\(M = 4.34, SD = 1.16\)), and DL/N (\(M = 3.90, SD = 0.91\)). All results are shown in the table below. None of the other groups were significantly different from each other.

Table 2  
Descriptives Immediate Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership behavior</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M(SD)</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>LL</th>
<th>UL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic emotional stable</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>5.26(0.96)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic neurotic</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4.05(1.16)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic emotional stable</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4.34(1.16)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic neurotic</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3.90(0.91)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CI = confidence interval; SE = Standard Error; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit

4.4 The moderating effect of hardiness

The interaction effect between leadership style and hardiness was not significant (\(p = > .05\)), and further analysis was abandoned.
Table 3
Correlation Matrix Immediate Trust Scale 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Jeg opplevde at jeg stolte på vedkommende</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende gjorde alt han kunne for at liv ikke skulle gå tapt</td>
<td>.674&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende ikke visste hva han holdt på med</td>
<td>.686&quot; .576&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jeg opplevde ikke at vedkommende forsto situasjonen</td>
<td>.554&quot; .431&quot; .541&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Jeg opplevde ikke at vedkommende brydde seg om hva som hendte meg</td>
<td>.444&quot; .403&quot; .338&quot; .433&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende var kompetent</td>
<td>.733&quot; .581&quot; .795&quot; .533&quot; .280&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Jeg ville gjort som vedkommende sa</td>
<td>.651&quot; .554&quot; .615&quot; .467&quot; .286&quot; .648&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Jeg opplevde ikke at jeg stolte på vedkommende</td>
<td>.774&quot; .553&quot; .625&quot; .556&quot; .432&quot; .630&quot; .542&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Vedkommende ville ikke satt meg i unødvendig fare</td>
<td>.556&quot; .422&quot; .411&quot; .388&quot; .380&quot; .414&quot; .449&quot; .527&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Vedkommende brukte meg for å beskytte seg selv</td>
<td>.569&quot; .513&quot; .464&quot; .452&quot; .367&quot; .443&quot; .404&quot; .510&quot; .433&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Atferden til vedkommende var styrt av et ønske om å gjøre godt</td>
<td>.516&quot; .525&quot; .345&quot; .372&quot; .380&quot; .351&quot; .376&quot; .442&quot; .374&quot; .479&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Vedkommende ville støttet meg hvis jeg trengte det</td>
<td>.559&quot; .481&quot; .388&quot; .349&quot; .406&quot; .434&quot; .377&quot; .531&quot; .366&quot; .423&quot; .508&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01.
5 Discussion

The theory for the existence of Immediate Trust was built mostly on the theoretical framework of Swift Trust (Meyerson et al., 1996). The literature on this theory had two major short-comings; a lack of experimental research (Olsen, 2018) and ambiguity around the time-aspect involved in Swift Trust. The main aim of this thesis was therefore to experimentally test the effect of leadership behavior and emotional states on Swift Trust within the first minute of the first encounter. Because there was a lack of the time frame encompassing swift trust, we propose that a first minute, first encounter effect on trust can be defined as Immediate Trust.

5.1 Development of the Immediate Trust Scale-12

A main issue for the study of immediate trust is the lack of measurement tools that catches the essence of this newly proposed nuance of trust. In order to measure trust within the initial 60 seconds of a first interaction between strangers, we developed a scale based on an existing trust scale by Smith (2008) representing a somewhat similar operative situation. Since Immediate Trust is theorized to be a predecessor of Swift Trust, reviewing a measurement scale for trust and adapt it to fit the immediate evaluation seemed plausible. This included the underlying factors encompassing trust intention and trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, integrity). These were of utmost importance in order to ensure construct validity surrounding antecedents of Immediate Trust as presented in the theory.

While the factor analysis was unable to uncover the underlying factors of trustworthiness, a clear trust dimension was identified. An explanation for the unsuccessful uncovering of the components concerning the perceived trustworthiness, could be attributed to their many similarities. Several studies have had difficulties differentiating the unique relationship between the three components of trustworthiness (Colquitt et al., 2007; McKnight et al., 1998).

Additionally, the theorized nature of Immediate Trust shouldn’t enable the trustor to consider the components individually due to the schematic evaluation (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). While in ordinary trust evaluations the trustor might be able to attribute the perceived trustworthiness to each components (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005). Through a schematic bottom-up processing it could be that by evaluating one of the dimensions (e.g. ability) as high was enough to evaluate someone as trustworthy. In turn, a top-down process starting from trustworthy could lead to evaluating the other dimensions (benevolence and integrity) as high (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Kahneman, 2011).
Further, the three items concerning trust intention could not be discerned from the three components encompassing trustworthiness. This could also be an indicator of the subconscious information process. However the evaluations of perceived trustworthiness are positively correlated to trust intention. This strengthens our belief that the measurement measures not only a theorized concept of trustworthiness, but that these components do predict trust as theorized by Mayer et al. (1995).

![IMMEDIATE TRUST](image)

**Figure 5.** Mean values for all four experimental conditions on all dimensions of trustworthiness

As such, the 12-item-scale identified one dimension which can be argued to measure Immediate Trust as whole. Firstly, in line with the complexity of measuring a subconscious categorization process as mentioned above. And secondly, that after 60 seconds of exposure to a stranger the participants reported willingness to engage in trusting behavior. The results showing a high internal consistency ($\alpha = .91$), indicates that it is reliable in its measure. While its high internal consistency could be an indication of redundancy within the items and them not uniquely contribute to the measurement. Relying on Fields (2013) a $\alpha$ smaller than .95 indicates that this is not necessarily the case. In sum, while we were unable to identify the underlying dimensions of trustworthiness within the scale, an overall trusting dimension enables us to apply the instrument for the purpose of this study, which is to measure if trust could develop immediately.
5.2 The immediate development of trust

There was a significant difference between at least one of the groups, meaning; within the initial 60 seconds the participants were able to express a level of trust towards someone they had never met or seen before and thus supporting Hypotheses 1. Although there is lack of literature supporting this finding, several scholars offer suggestions as to why this could be the case. Larsson (2005) argues that the need for a rapid decision could outperform the precision of the decision. Meaning, while its not a precise decision to trust or distrust after only 60 seconds, the situation demands that the individual makes a decision. Further, Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) argued that the use of cognitive categorization process will occur when a person is under time pressure and in lack of personal knowledge. The activation of a cognitive categorization process is also said to take place with only a tiny piece of information (Kahneman, 2011). Further supported by Fiske and Taylor (1991) who argued that humans apply cognitive shortcuts in order to successfully manage an overload of environmental cues.

Some trust scholars have also pointed out mechanisms that are somewhat related to an immediate development of trust (Clark, 2016; Lewicki et al., 2006). For instance, McKnight et al. (1998) model of initial trust formation addressed some of issues related to Immediate Trust. Mainly through institution-based trust; encompassing both situational normality and structural assurance belief. The model argues that when the trustor perceives the situation as normal and works according to well establish norms, they are more likely to develop a trusting intention. Also, that if a structural assurance is perceived, meaning that contextual conditions for a positive outcome are in place, leading to trust intention.

However, neither of these seems to be evident in an operative situation, which might instead be the exact opposite. Despite of this, immediate trust development still took place, going against the long held belief that trust has to have a base in personal knowledge (Olsen, 2018). While we could not discern the theorized underlying dimensions of Immediate Trust, it strengthens our suspicion of a more nuanced conception of trust development. Not as something new, but simply an addition to Swift Trust development (Clark, 2016; Lester, 2007). However, it could also be that this immediate evaluation is qualitatively different from general trust.

One of the most surprising findings was the fact that we could not discern a positive linear relationship between generalized trust and immediate trust scores. This goes against the expectation that high trust propensity, increases willingness to trust. The lack of a linear relationship could be interpreted in several ways. It could be that the single item "Er du enig i at folk flest kan bli stolt på? (Would you agree that most people can be trusted?)" is insufficient as a measurement
THE EFFECT OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR ON SWIFT TRUST

The results did not support H2, meaning autocratic leadership alone did not predict a higher trust score when compared to democratic leadership. While the theory suggested both types of leadership had strengths in promoting trust, neither was significantly different from the other. The autocratic leader was assumed to be perceived as more able (ability) by managing the highly complex situation, which in turn would increase the positive outcome expectancy for the trustor (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Kolditz, 2007).

Olsen and Espevik (2009) argues that when an individual is in a highly complex, time restricted and unpredictable situation, authoritative leadership could be more meaningful in order to manage the situation efficiently with quick decision-making processes. While this might be true, there seem to be more to it than just being authoritative. There could be several reasons why autocratic leadership alone couldn’t predict trustworthiness in this experiment. While the leader was decisive, the body language and communication might not have matched the autocratic style. Which in turn led to judgments of his ability to handle the situation was perceived as low.

While autocratic leadership might be preferred by followers in an operative situation (Bass and Bass, 2009), this does not mean followers will trust the leader. The result might be that followers will rely on monitoring behavior of leader as well as others within the team (Kolditz, 2007).
Just as described in the theory, the effect of a leadership style on followers might be very different depending on the leader's behavior (Taggar et al., 1999). One strength of autocratic leadership was that being decisive seems to reduce uncertainty in followers (Hannah et al., 2009). However, it is possible that the respondents felt that the autocratic behavior did not match the anxious behavior in the neurotic experimental condition. And as such there was a mismatch between leadership style and leadership behavior (Hannah et al., 2009).

5.4 Emotional stability

Emotional stability did not result in higher scores on trust as hypothesized by $H_3$. We theorized that emotional stability could be perceived as a sign of self-confidence, as well as a sign that he had the situation under control (Kirkpatick and Locke, 1991). This could further influence the trustor's positive outcome expectancy and hence increase the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the leader's actions.

Interestingly, a few participants in our study deemed the democratic emotional stable leader as less trustworthy due to him being too calm. This was also a point made by one of the expert commentators during the testing of the videos; namely that a person remaining so calm in an operative setting does not understand the severity of the situation. Hence, being perceived as too self-confident or too calm in an extreme situation, could lead to being perceived as reckless and thus promote a negative outcome expectancy. This could maybe be more prevalent for people who are experienced in operative situations, due to their schemes of leadership in such situations (Clark, 2016; Fiske and Taylor, 1991).

The trustor might recognize the leader as careless and without concern for the well-being of the people involved and thus lacking benevolence and personal values (integrity) (Kolditz, 2007). As a result, a too calm leader could be reckoned as less trustworthy due to a negative outcome expectancy of the trustor. Hence, while the ability to stay calm in hectic situations can be viewed as a positive attribute (Hannah et al., 2009; Kirkpatick and Locke, 1991), it might also have the opposite effect.

However, it is also entirely possible that the respondents just felt that democratic leadership, no matter how it is presented; is not suited to an operative situation. As one of the respondents commented "why is he wasting time talking and discussing when people could be dying?". It is worth noting that the democratic video is only marginally longer than the autocratic video.
5.5 The winning combination; autocratic and emotional stable leader

Neither emotional stability nor autocratic leadership could predict high initial trust development singled-handily. However, in combination they could predict a significant and large increase in trust. While this was in line with a considerable portion of the investigated literature, it also contradicted many other assumptions.

As this study was primarily influenced by Hyllengren et al. (2011) and their findings, we were especially interested in the effect of group involvement and participative decision making. Also Lester (2007) suggest this as a tool for accelerating trust in leadership in a military setting. Contrary to their findings our results suggest that this is not something that accelerates trust; at least not in an operative situation between strangers. However, this could simply be due to the differences between swift trust and immediate trust.

Most importantly the big fluctuations in the time frame used to address swift trust between from studies (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Lester, 2007); immediate trust on the other hand is bound to a very short amount of time (less than one minute). What is more, in Hyllengren et al. (2011) the time used to capture swift trust varies from "less than a week" to "more than three months". Interestingly, there are also a few responses in Hyllengren et al. (2011) study who values group involvement as a negative attribute for promoting swift trust (104 positive vs 20 negative). It could be that those attributing group involvement as something negative for promoting swift trust are also those who described more immediate situations. That as described by (Olsen and Espevik, 2009) a leader taking a directive approach from the start is warranted by followers in operative situations, even those who have a military background.

Hannah et al. (2009) asks for more research on leadership in operative situations, and at the same time makes a strong argument for the benefits of autocratic leadership. Some of the arguments relate to the fact that people might expect leaders to be autocratic in these situations. An autocratic leader might fit into followers expectations that leaders in such situation should act autocratically. It is possible that when this is paired with being calm and clear, this reinforces the "fit" of the person in the attributed scheme (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Lester, 2007). As discussed earlier, people tend to categorize other people by the tinyest piece of information. Through categorization the individual could be attributed several other qualities even if these qualities have not been witnessed (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).

Interestingly, it was only this experimental condition that could predict trust intention at all, while the three other experimental conditions gave mean trust scores close to neutral (4.0). It seems that just taking charge in the situation is not enough to induce trust. However, neither of
the groups were distrusted either, which could be due to the high propensity to trust in Norway (Delhey et al., 2011). While we could not find a linear relationship between trust development and immediate trust evaluations, the mechanism could still explain the neutral scoring.

5.6 The moderating effect of Hardiness

We proposed that individuals high on hardiness, would be more wanting to participate in decision-making processes and therefore perceive the democratic leader more trustworthy compared to the autocratic leader. Conversely it would be the opposite for those low on hardiness scores. The lack of a significant interaction effect is not necessarily unexpected, but it is nonetheless interesting.

While often reported in title sections, studies on the moderating effect of hardiness as a whole are not many. Instead, several findings that use hardiness as a moderator find significant relationships between the underlying dimensions of hardiness, and not the total score of the scale (Hystad et al., 2009). While it is clear from the results section of the articles, there might be a danger of creating a false sense of the effects of hardiness, and not the effect of control, commitment and challenge. This could also be the case for this study, that one of the components might have had an interaction effect, while others did not.

When looking at prior research on hardiness, most of these are interested in longitudinal moderating effects on health outcomes (Hystad et al., 2009). This is also true from prior research using NDRS-15, with only very few studies looking at effects other than health outcomes. Those who do look at other outcomes also look at longitudinal effects (Hystad et al., 2009). Very few studies are looking at Hardiness as a moderating in-situation moderator, which could be an indication of a limitation for the scale. An operative situation affect people in a different ways compared to daily situations in our private or work life (Olsen and Espevik, 2009). Although critical situations can occur in these arenas, they aren’t comprised by the same direct life threatening framework as an avalanche or car accident. Hence, even though one can be high on hardiness, the ability to cope with such extreme situations are not within the scope of hardiness as stated above (Bartone, 1995; Hystad et al., 2009). As it relates to longitudinal outcomes; the scale captures coping strategies over time, but might not capture stress moderating in-situ.

For instance assisting with first aid at an crash scene may not be seen as a challenge when one knows that lives are at stake. Moreover, it seems strange that someone would do first aid in order to "retain own health and avoid high level of stress" (Bartone et al., 2008). Also, in line with Hannah et al. (2009) it could be that in an operative situation, people expect or even
desire a directive approach in order to reduce the perceived uncertainty (Olsen and Espevik, 2009) regardless of individual hardiness. The might be other variables and traits that better capture in-situ stress coping, and that there might be form of state hardiness that is not captured by NDRS-15 (Olsen, 2018, oral communication).

However, while all of these explanations could be plausible, there is also a much simpler explanation. It is possible that the use of video vignettes cannot induce the sense of emotional arousal that a real operative setting can (Hannah et al., 2009). If there is no emotional arousal or stress, then hardiness might serve no function. If that is the case, then NDRS-15 might still be more of use in a similar experiment where the respondents are actually in the situation.

5.7 Limitations

The experiment had 355 participants, with only two being removed due to severe outlier values on several scales. Most of our sample consisted of students at the University of Bergen. Our power analysis suggested a sample of 400 respondents (with covariates and 335 without covariates) in order to ensure generalizability of the results. The amount of respondents are therefore sufficient. However, there are several limitations to the findings.

The scale that was used to measure hardiness (NDRS-15) is well established and have been shown to repeatedly have high internal consistency (Hystad et al., 2009). This was also the case for this study with sufficient $\alpha < .70$ (Pallant, 2013). However, the entire study is based on a scale that has never been tested or used before (ITS-12), providing a major limitation to this study. In the creation of the scale a lot of research and work were put into ensuring the validity of the scale. By leaning on a process proposed by Hinkin et al. (1997) for building a valid scale, we could feel pretty secure before the experiments started. Because of this thorough work, the scale also seemed to measure immediate trust as we had hoped ($\alpha .91$). We believe that the scale measures trustworthiness and trust intention. However, the scale is not proved a valid and reliable tool without retesting on different samples, and additional studies (Hinkin et al., 1997).

Depending on the amount of prior research, a limitation or strength to any study is its theoretical background (Brutus et al., 2013). There was little to no research that had tried to explain the same questions that we were looking to answer. This meant we had to look at similar literature, drawing primarily from research on trust and operative leadership. Additionally, a substantial body of research on cognitive categorization presented an possible approach to the cognitive domain of trust. However, since there also seem to be an affective dimension to trust (Lewicki et al., 2006) that that affect how people experience trust (Hannah et al., 2009), our approach does not fully
encompass this and thus our results might be limited to the cognitive dimension. The reason we did not encompass both dimensions was simply the time limitations for researching and creating an experiment and scale for both dimensions.

When conducting experiments there are always severe limitations to their ecological validity. While there are several benefits of using video vignettes (as discussed in the method), there is no the less a difference between real life processes and the vignette scenario used in this experiment (Hughes and Huby, 2002). The video vignette could not induce the heat from the fire, nor the cold winter weather that surrounded us when filming the videos. The vignette does not allow participants to engage in the situation, and are forced to take a passive role. This also implicates that we were not able to see if they would really engage in the situation, and that the measurement is strictly trust intention, and not trust behavior.

As far as the behavior shown in the experiment, it could be argued that the behavior is unnatural. When designing an experiment, there is always a fine line between natural behavior and experimental manipulation (Hughes and Huby, 2002). The manipulation has to be strong enough to give an effect (should it exist), and at the same time be natural enough to have any ecological validity. There were several comments from the respondents regarding the character in the video, and some of these were related to the authenticity of his behavior (e.g. "Nobody would be this calm during a crisis"). It was also pointed out during the expert reviews on the videos, that "being so calm during a crisis shows that this person does not understand the severity of the situation". Likewise, some respondents thought it was strange to ask for suggestions (democratic leadership style) when people were in danger. This could have made them evaluate the trustworthiness of the leader lower, simply because they felt the act was unnatural.

Our experiment took place in an operative situation, and as such our findings could be limited to an operative setting. Such situations could possibly activate a different evaluation compared to a daily work setting (Lester, 2007). Nonetheless, while lives might not be at stake, critical situations are ever present in business, financial, and political life. These could represent a similar sub-conscious evaluation, being situations where people are forced to collaborate and make rapid decisions. In sum, the research design for this study, focusing on an operative situation where lives are at stake, some spill-over-effects could be present.

During the literature research it became clear that the theoretical foundation of Swift Trust created an obstacle for experimental research due to its somewhat inconsistent framework. The reduction of its complexity was therefore unavoidable in order to grasp the essence. Hence, the introduction Immediate Trust was meant to contribute to a more comprehensive and refined framework of Swift Trust. With emphasis on the initial 60 seconds of the first interaction set for
Immediate Trust, we clearly narrowed down the inputs factors and thus the complexity for trust development. Compared to Ben-Shalom et al. (2005) & Hyllengren et al. (2011) time perspective of up to several months, we rigidly aimed our scope. On the other hand, the 60-second time window could exclude other facets important for immediate trust development or be too inclusive and unnuanced Olsen (2018). Hence, this study alone is not enough to define the time frame for Immediate Trust. It is entirely possible that trust development could take place within the first second or even a shorter period of time (Willis and Todorov, 2006). We do however argue that there is an inference based form of trust, that can help a team function effectively already within the first sixty seconds of formation.

There are major cultural differences in trust, especially there are major differences in the amount of general trust (Delhey et al., 2011). This experiments was done in Norway, which is at the very top of general trust in the world. While this does not negate the found differences between the groups, it could affect the high trust mean scores. None of the experimental conditions evoked distrust, but this might be due to the fact that our respondents are generally prone to trust other people, or less prone to distrust.

5.8 Theoretical Implication

It has been a long held belief that trust depends on some sort of knowledge to serve as a basis for trust evaluation (McKnight and Chervany, 2000). Our findings do not necessarily go against this belief, but it does break the assumption that you need to know each other to trust each other. Instead we propose some sort of knowledge trough inferences can also form a basis of trust.

In order to distinguish Immediate Trust from Swift Trust we have set a rigid line to pre-knowledge of the trustee. While Swift Trust can rely on some sort of pre-knowledge of the counterpart (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005), Immediate Trust cannot. Meaning in Immediate Trust the affective dimension of trust is put aside, and is bound to a cognitive sub-conscious evaluation process. Nonetheless, as McKnight et al. (1998) argues in the initial trust development model, reputation could affect the cognitive evaluation. Also Hannah et al. (2009) & Lewicki et al. (2006) argues that cognitive processes could be influenced by the affective dimension. Thus, having some pre-knowledge of the scheme the trustee fits into (e.g. uniform or profession), could lead to an immediate trust evaluation.

The introduction of Immediate Trust as an addition to Swift Trust will hopefully enable a more accurate understanding of initial trust evaluation and lead way for future research. Paired with this we have created a tool to measure the immediate development of trust, and this tool
should be general enough to fit other experiments.

While autocratic and democratic leadership theory might not be contemporary leadership theories, they are ever present within it (Northouse, 2018). As far as our findings suggest, autocratic leadership might be a branch worth pursuing in research on operative leadership. While this has been mentioned by several other researchers (Hannah et al., 2009; Olsen and Espevik, 2009, e.g.), our findings only further strengthens this view. Additionally, leadership style is not the same as leadership behavior, and the consequences of not distinguishing might be notable. As shown in our experiment, only the combination of autocratic leadership and emotional stable induced trust. As such, these could be indications of how the effectiveness of a leadership style is dependent on other factors. This was evident in democratic leadership research, were a democratic leader was only more effective when s/he had been elected (Gastil, 1994). It is possible that the leadership research field is littered with factors such as this, hidden in plain sight.

Bartone et al. (2008) suggest that hardiness is a trait that could be used in the selection of special forces, due to its effect on stress coping over time. However, there seem to be little research suggesting hardiness as a moderator of stress in-situ. That might mean when conducting experiments on stress in-situ or similar research, other moderators than hardiness should be implemented.

**5.9 Practical Implication**

This study showed that trust can develop during the initial 60 seconds of a first meeting. Understanding the mechanisms behind this could be of great importance for both military and civilian parties. It could indicate that just as proposed by Hannah et al. (2009); Olsen and Espevik (2009), people are more prone to autocratic leaders if they appear emotionally stable in operative settings. Supporting the statement that leaders in operative situations should engage a situation as autocratic and stable (Hannah et al., 2009), whilst it is still unknown at what point the leader should switch towards including the group in decision making. For any type of leaders that are likely to operate in such environments, it could be reassuring to have this finding to lean on.

In order to get a drivers license in Norway, you have to take part in a course on first-aid in a traffic crash. Our study could be used as an argument that this course should also encompass how to act as the first reponder. With focus on the need for someone to take leadership, and that being assertive and autocratic, could be the preferred behavior. While this will probably not make all participants act this way, those who do could help save lives that otherwise might be lost.

While the positive outcomes of emotional stability in leaders has been known for long,
our study suggest that one of the mechanisms behind this could be trust. Especially, since trust in leader has a trickle-down effect of trust within a team.

5.10 Future research

Due to very little research on trust formation, this study had a restricted research scope. The findings of this study will be irrelevant if the scale used (ITS-12) cannot be validated. It is therefore our utmost wish that more researchers use and validate the scale. While we simply looked at differences between the groups, we cannot say whether or not the individual character in the different conditions were more or less trustworthy than can be expected of anyone. This could shed light on the idea that just taking charge in a situation could predict trust.

While hardiness did not have a moderating effect on leadership style and trust evaluations, other similar concepts could. Emotional stability in followers could moderate trust by the same mechanisms we proposed for hardiness. Additionally, combat experience was the strongest predictor for effectiveness and lower physiological stress reactions in an experimental combat condition (Sagstuen and Balke, 2017). This is the reason we think the scale should be used on different samples with more or less experience in operative settings. Experienced individuals might look for different factors when evaluating trustworthiness in an operative setting, than those without prior experience.

It would also be beneficial if future research could look into mediating roles between leadership and Immediate Trust. That is why does emotional stability predict immediate trust? We had hoped that the different components of trustworthiness would be visible within the scale, and that this could shed light on through which mechanisms

While this study focused on emotional stability and leadership, there is probably several other behaviors that also function as accelerators (or decelerators) of immediate trust, and knowledge of this could be of great importance.
6 Conclusion

After meeting a person for the first time and being asked whether or not you like that person, you might answer that you couldn’t say, because you "don’t really know him". We think the same could be said for trust, you cannot say because you don’t know him. However, in both of these cases we would argue that you have made some evaluations about the person, including his or her trustworthiness. Meaning if you absolutely had to make a judgment, you could, even if your judgment was not precise.

Since this research paper is one of the first to address Immediate Trust evaluations, very few conclusions can be drawn from this study alone. However, it seems possible that trust can exist between two individuals after very short exposure. In an operative situation it could seem to be advantageous to have a leader that can remain calm, clear and focused while relying on an autocratic leadership style; as this might foster trust and accelerate trust development.

Vladimir Lenin supposedly said "Trust is good, but control is better". By doing so he may not only have overestimated the capability of a totalitarian society, but also undermined the importance of trust in societies. As we have argued throughout the course of this thesis, trust is an enabler; it enables groups, teams and organizations to function. In fact, in the modern economy just as on a battlefield, control might be the opposite of success. When opportunities arise and disappear in an instant, there has to be trust in those present to make decisions.
References


The effect of leadership behavior on swift trust

Appendices

Appendices A - Diskusjonsgruppe

Diskusjonsgruppe


Tildel filmen hvilken rute du mener den kvalifiserer seg for:

- Demokratisk (inkluderende), Trygg
- Autokratisk (styrende), Trygg
- Demokratisk (inkluderende), Nervøs
- Autokratisk (styrende), Nervøs

Hva gjorde at du tildelte personen denne klassen?

1. Jeg opplevde at jeg stolte på vedkommende

   Svært uenig  Litt uenig  Nøytral  Enig  Svært enig

2. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende gjorde alt han kunne for at liv ikke skulle gå tapt

   Svært uenig  Litt uenig  Nøytral  Enig  Svært enig

3. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende ikke visste hva han holdt på med

   Svært uenig  Litt uenig  Nøytral  Enig  Svært enig

4. Jeg opplevde ikke at vedkommende forsto situasjonen
5. Jeg opplevde ikke at vedkommende brydde seg om hva som hendte meg

6. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende var kompetent

7. Jeg ville gjort som vedkommende sa

8. Jeg opplevde ikke at jeg stolte på vedkommende

9. Vedkommende ville ikke satt meg i unødvendig fare

10. Vedkommende brukte meg for å beskytte seg selv

11. Atferden til vedkommende var styrt av et ønske om å gjøre godt

12. Vedkommende ville støttet meg hvis jeg trengte det

Har du noen kommentarer om personen i videoen eller eksperimentet i seg selv?
Appendices B - Hardiness NDRS-15

**Hardiness:** Revised DRS-15 (Hystad, S. W., Eid, J., Johnsen, B. H., Laberg, J. C. and Thomas Bartone, P. 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mesteparten av mitt liv blir brukt til å gjøre ting som er meningsfulle (CM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ved å arbeide hardt kan du nesten alltid nå dine mål (CO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>*Jeg liker ikke å gjøre endringer i mine vanlige aktiviteter (CH).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>*Jeg føler at livet mitt er ganske innholdsløst (CM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Endringer i rutinene er interessante for meg (CH).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hvordan det går med meg i livet, avhenger av mine egne handlinger (CO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jeg ser virkelig frem til arbeidet mitt (CM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>*Jeg tror ikke det er mye jeg kan gjøre for å påvirke fremtiden min (CO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Jeg trives med utfordringen når jeg må gjøre mer enn en ting om gangen (CH).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>De fleste dager er livet virkelig interessant og givende for meg (CM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>*Det plager meg når jeg blir forstyrt i mine daglige gjøremål (CH).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Det er opp til meg å avgjøre hvordan resten av mitt liv skal bli (CO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>*Livet er generelt kjedelig for meg (CO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>*Jeg liker å ha en daglig rutine som ikke endrer seg for mye (CH).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mine valg spiller en stor rolle for hvordan ting ender opp (CO).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stjerne (*) indikerer items som er negativt ladet og er reversert før skåring (0=3; 1=2; 2=1; 3=0),
CM, commitment; CO, control; CH, challenge.
## Appendices C - Immediate Trust Scale ITS-12

**Immediate Trust**: Skala basert på P. Svenmark (2005), svar indikeres på en 1-7 Likert skala for enighet med utsagnet.

| 1. Jeg opplevde at jeg stolte på vedkommende (GT) |
| 2. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende gjorde alt han kunne for at liv ikke skulle gå tapt (B) |
| 3. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende ikke visste hva han holdt på med (A*) |
| 4. Jeg opplevde ikke at vedkommende forsto situasjonen (A*) |
| 5. Jeg opplevde ikke at vedkommende brydde seg om hva som hendte meg (B*) |
| 6. Jeg opplevde at vedkommende var kompetent (A) |
| 7. Jeg ville gjort som vedkommende sa (GT) |
| 8. Jeg opplevde ikke at jeg stolte på vedkommende (GT*) |
| 9. Vedkommende ville ikke satt meg i unødvendig fare (I) |
| 10. Vedkommende brukte meg for å beskytte seg selv (I*) |
| 11. Aftarden til vedkommende var styrt av et ønske om å gjøre godt! (I*) |
| 12. Vedkommende ville støttet meg hvis jeg trengte det (B) |

GT = Generell tillit, B = Benevolence, I = Integrity, A = Ability, * = negativt ladet spørsmål
Appendices D - Survey link

The videos were uploaded to Youtube and were coded in order to make it impossible for the participant to identify which group they belonged to. The letter prior to the link is the key (name of the video).

- Autocratic stable: (A) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olPDl714DNw
- Democratic stable: (B) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=giR9sSAiW2E
- Autocratic unstable: (C) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl41SYTYkMo
- Democratic unstable: (D) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66uEMr_O3F4