The Empire Strikes Back
Historical Legacies and Democratic Political Culture in Ukraine

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Abstract
This study investigates how Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic political culture are shaped by historical legacies from long defunct empires and states. The thesis’ focus is on what has been called a “natural experiment”, whereby the lands of present-day Ukraine were divided, first between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire (1772-1917), and later between Poland and the Soviet Union (1921-1939). The aim is to find out if the empires and states which ruled over Ukraine in these time periods have left legacies that can explain Ukraine’s regional variations in democratic political culture.

The thesis employs theory about how political culture is shaped by societal developments, and how national identity can be a carrier of political values across time. Arguments for why it may be thought that the foreign powers that ruled over Ukraine caused the emergence of distinct democratic political cultures are thoroughly investigated, and a set of expectations are developed. Since historical borders from different time periods nearly overlap, a high level of geographical precision is needed when testing for differences in support for democratic values between historical regions. Two surveys from Kiev International Institute of Sociology allow for a sufficiently high level of precision.

It is found a clear threshold in level of support for democratic values along the former border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire, but no such threshold is found along the former border between Poland and the Soviet Union. It can thus be inferred that a legacy of the Habsburg Empire is a higher level of democratic political culture than that of the Russian Empire, and that a particularly strong support for democratic values in Western Ukraine can be explained by imperial legacies. The thesis contributes with a more precise analysis than what is found in the existing literature, and other possible causes can largely be ruled out.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Topic and research question

Ever since open political competition became possible with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has been characterized by strong regional divisions, which in many cases have concurred with historical divisions between former empires and states. In popular debate and media reports there have often been talks about the spread of “democratic” and “authoritarian” values in “western” and “eastern” Ukraine respectively. While this dichotomy has been rightfully criticized as an over-simplification of the real situation (Riabchuk 2009, Katchanovski 2018), there are clear signs that different views on the desirability of liberal democracy is an aspect of what makes up Ukraine’s regional divisions. Election results have shown clear geographical patterns, and parties and candidates most strongly backing democratic reform have consistently received most support in western parts of the country (Kuzio 2015).

That the population of a country is supportive of democratic values, is seen as necessary for democracy to take root (Eckstein 1998a; Fuchs & Roller 1994). In the Ukrainian case the democratization process has been problematic, and it has proved very difficult to reach a consensus in society on key issues related to regime type, nation building and foreign policy orientation. This has been very evident the last few years, evidenced by the 2014 revolution and the subsequent outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine. Polls show that while the protests leading up to the 2014 revolution were supported by more than 90% of the population in the westernmost part of Ukraine, less than 25% in the easternmost part supported the protests (IRI1 2014, 101). The root causes behind Ukraine’s current divisions have often been attributed to certain historical events and developments that have created long-lasting regional differences in political values, identities and attitudes. Through an analysis of two nationwide surveys this thesis investigates these claims.

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1 International Republican Institute.
Claims about differences between West and East are backed by scholars who point to historical legacies as an explanation for a lower level of commitment to democratic values in the easternmost part of the former communist Eastern Europe. For a period beginning in the late 18th century and ending with World War 1, Eastern and Central Europe was divided between empires which had very different approaches to how to rule over their peoples and territories. And for the following period of around 20 years between World War 1 and World War 2, a new division ran through Eastern Europe between the areas that became part of the Soviet Union from its early establishment on the eastern side, and the areas that escaped communism until World War 2 on the western side. It has been suggested that the root causes of the lower level of commitment to democratic values in the easternmost part of Eastern Europe can be traced back to these territorial-political divisions (Fuchs & Klingemann 2006; Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017).

Both the imperial border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire (1772-1917), and the state border between Poland and the Soviet Union (1921-1939), ran right through areas that today belong to Ukraine. This is why Peisakhin (2015, 25-26) calls Ukraine a “natural experiment” that invites for investigation of how imperial legacies affect today’s political culture, and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017, 24-25) suggest Ukraine as a case for future research on how the length of time that an area has been subject to communism affects people’s commitment to democratic values. In this thesis we will follow both of these suggestions and investigate whether historical legacies can explain regional differences in peoples’ commitment to democratic values in Ukraine. Our research question thus becomes:

“Can geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine be explained by the historical legacies of former empires and states?”

Findings of stronger support for democratic values in western Ukraine have been explained by pointing to historical legacies (Person 2010, ICDT\textsuperscript{2} 2015), but due to Ukraine’s complex history and shifting borders it has not been completely clear which historical processes may have caused the emergence of these regional differences. Historical borders have been near overlapping, and Miller, White and Heywood (1998, 10) therefore went as far as saying that if any distinct values

\textsuperscript{2} The International Centre for Democratic Transition
were found in western Ukraine there would be “no way of knowing” which historical periods or regimes had caused their emergence. Our choice of surveys, however, and the development of our research design, is made so that we can as precise as possible make assessments about the geographical differences in support for democratic values among the population of Ukraine. This will enable us to say more about when, and therefore also why, these differences emerged. Our main geographical focus will be on the area around the historical borders, which crossed through the territories that today are situated in the western part of Ukraine.

1.2 Structure of thesis

Chapter 2 presents a map of Ukraine with place names, and can be used for reference throughout this thesis. Chapter 3 conceptualizes “democratic values” and “democratic political culture” and looks at the most relevant factors that are thought to play a role in the shaping of a society’s democratic political culture. We will then turn to the concept of “historical legacies” and explain how we can understand that term. Throughout the second chapter we will comment on findings which are relevant for our investigation, and we will place the Ukrainian case in the wider Eastern European context. Chapter 4 focuses on Ukraine and will present the arguments for why we may expect that certain geographical patterns of democratic culture in Ukraine can be explained by historical legacies. Our perspective will be comparative, as we will discuss how developments on different sides of historical borders may have caused the emergence of different levels of democratic political culture. We will here also consider the role of economy, demography, religion, ethnicity and language in the makeup of Ukraine’s democratic political culture, and present relevant findings in the literature. Chapter 4 will then continue with the development of a conceptual map of Ukraine which summarizes the main factors behind the country’s geographical pattern of democratic political culture and conclude with the formulation of three hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents our data and method. We will discuss the surveys we have chosen for our investigation, and we will see how questions about democratic values in these surveys concur with our concept. This chapter will include a section which explains why we create a composite measure of support for democratic values. We will further explain why and how we will conduct the hypothesis testing by use of OLS-regression with regional dummy variables. Chapter 6 presents descriptive results and results from the regression analyses.
7 discusses the results in light of the literature that have been considered. We will here discuss the implications of our results and how we are contributing to the literature. Chapter 8 will conclude and present suggestions for future research.

2. Map of Ukraine and note on the spelling of place names

Figure 2.1 Territorial administrative structure of Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of geographical unit</th>
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<th>Name of geographical unit (cont.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zakarpattia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Cherkasy</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
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<td>Volyn</td>
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<td>Mykolaiv</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kerson</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Khmelnytsky</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vinnitsia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kiev oblast</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Luhansk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>City of Kiev</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Donetsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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3 The border between the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol is marked with a dotted line.
Figure 2.1 shows the present-day territorial-administrative structure of Ukraine. When we later refer to individual oblasts this map can be used as reference. When maps which are used in future chapters include numbers for individual oblasts, these numbers will correspond with the numbers on Figure 2.1.

The geographical units shown on this map do not have the same administrative status, but for the sake of simplicity we will throughout this thesis refer to the administrative units as oblasts. Normally we will drop the word “oblast” and just refer to individual oblasts by their name. The spelling of Ukrainian place names in English differ widely in the literature. We will, with one exception, in this thesis be spelling the names of Ukrainian administrative units in English as it is done by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2010). The exception is Kyiv, where we will use the established English language spelling Kiev.

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4 Ukraine consists of 27 territorial administrative units, including 24 oblasts, two cities of republican subordination (Kyiv and Sevastopol), as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2010). The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol will be referred to colloquially as Crimea. We will thus consider only 26 territorial units of Ukraine.

5 The administrative status of Kiev oblast and the City of Kiev will normally be included when we refer to these administrative units in order to distinguish between them.
3. Theory

3.1 Democratic values and political culture

When we in this thesis talk about commitment to “democratic values” we will mean support for the “basic principles of liberal democratic government”, as is done by Fuchs & Roller (1994) and Norris (1999, 10-11, 16-17). The “basic principles of liberal democratic government” will here refer to Dahl’s (1971, 3; 1989, 233) concept of democracy. Our study of people’s commitment to democratic values in Ukraine can be placed inside the wider paradigm of studies of political culture. One of the founding books of the tradition of political culture defines this concept as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of [a] nation” (Almond & Verba [1963] 1965, 13). Political culture is thus defined as a macro-level phenomenon whose component parts are individuals’ value orientations. What we will be investigating in this thesis is how historical legacies affect the particular distribution of commitment to democratic values among the population of Ukraine.

The study of political culture has a long history and has been of interest to scholars especially due to its theorized connection with the endurance of political regimes. In Democracy in America Tocqueville ([1835] 2012) describes how the American population have certain habits and ways of thinking that are supportive of democracy. From the 1960s the topic of political culture caught the interest of political scientists, and authors like Eckstein (1961) and Almond & Verba ([1963] 1965) became interested in how certain cultural conditions must be in place for any political regime to be stable in the long term. Eckstein’s (1961, 1998b) view is that a political regime is stable if the patterns of authority found in society are congruent with the patterns of authority found at the state level, and Almond & Verba in The Civic Culture (1963), explain how a certain type political culture, the civic culture, is best suited for sustaining democracy. We will in this thesis, however, not try to explore every facet about Ukraine’s

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6 The basic principles of Dahl’s concept of democracy can be summarized, as is done by Fuchs & Roller (1994, 15), as freedom of expression, associational autonomy, alternative information, inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, elected officials, and the right to run for office.

7 Citizens in a civic culture are aware of their potential to influence politics but are not permanently politically mobilized. However, when an issue becomes salient in society they do mobilize politically, and this behavior of political involvement is seen by them as natural for a citizen. They are in other words strong supporters of
political culture or the exact relationship between the country’s political culture and regime stability. Our focus will be on how historical legacies are shaping commitment to democratic values, and we will in the following subchapters look into the literature on the long-term development and stability of this facet of political culture.

Two different approaches to the study of democratic values are 1) a broad approach that takes into account whole systems of value orientations that are collectively seen as supportive of democracy, and 2) an approach that focuses more exclusively on people’s support for a democratic political system and their commitment to values that are seen as founding blocks of this system.\(^8\) We will in this thesis employ the second of these approaches. The reasons for this are both theoretical and pragmatic. As we will see, historical legacies in Ukraine are theorized to have an impact precisely on people’s commitment to basic democratic values, while how these legacies are affecting extended systems of value orientations has not been much looked into. We have also been facing a choice regarding which surveys to use. As we will come back to, an analysis with a high level of geographical precision is what is needed in the literature, and the only surveys that allow for a precise geographical analysis are surveys that focus narrowly on basic democratic values.\(^9\) However, as findings from research done following the first approach are also of interest to us, we will briefly introduce that too here.

A central proponent of this first approach is Inglehart (1997), who introduces a two-dimensional values map which shows polarization on the one dimension in terms of survival values versus self-expression values, and the second dimension shows traditional values versus secular-rational values. These two dimensions are made on the basis of more specific questions about values and behavior, and the answer people give on a given question proves to be interrelated with the answers they give on other questions. Inglehart & Welzel (2005), using the World Values Survey, one of the world’s largest survey databases, show that there are strong correlations between certain questions both on an individual level and on a national aggregate

democracy - not only as an instrument for reaching economic or other goals, but as an important end-goal in itself (Almond & Verba 1965 [1963], 29-30).
\(^8\) When we talk about democratic values we could also have mentioned studies of social capital, as done by for example Putnam (1993, 2000). Studies of social capital focus more on people’s behavior, particularly in terms of participation in civil society, and a study of social capital in Ukraine is outside the scope of this thesis.
\(^9\) Issues regarding the surveys will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5.
level. There are thus empirical reasons for grouping together questions about values and behavior on the two above-mentioned value dimensions. One of Inglehart & Welzel’s main points is that self-expression values are supportive of democracy, and included in the self-expression values measure are specific questions about the importance of living in a democracy (2005, 56). According to this approach, in other words, people’s support for a democratic system *per se* is just a part of what makes up a democratic political culture.

An approach where the focus is on support for a democratic political system is used by authors such as Eckstein (1998a), Fuchs & Klingemann (2006), Fuchs & Roller (1994) and Norris (1999). They base their models of political culture on Easton’s (1965) concepts of *diffuse* and *specific* support for the political system. By diffuse support for a democratic system is meant commitment to the basic values that a liberal democracy is founded on. These value commitments are deep and slow-changing, and the long-term stability and survival of a democratic system can be dependent on that there is a historically and culturally rooted support for democratic values in society (Eckstein 1998a, 357). At the same time, people’s specific support for the democratic system - which is dependent on the actual performance of the system - can over time feed back into diffuse support, by strengthening or eroding people’s commitment to basic democratic values (Eckstein 1998a, 357; Fuchs & Roller 1994). The focus of this thesis, however, is long-term causes that are behind the geographical pattern of diffuse support for a democratic political system - meaning commitment to democratic values - among the population of Ukraine. The degree to which the members of a society are committed to democratic values is what we will here refer to as society’s level of *democratic political culture*, or just *democratic culture*.

### 3.2 Development of political cultures and mass attitudes toward democracy

We will in this subchapter look closer at factors that are shaping people’s commitment to democratic values. One of the steps we will take is to conceptualize “historical legacies” and see how historical processes - especially those connected with pre-communist and communist-regimes - can make an imprint in the political culture of certain geographical regions. Before we
do that, we will outline some basic theoretical understandings that are of relevance for us, namely how political cultures can persist in certain geographical areas or certain societal groups, and how political cultures can change over time.

3.2.1 Factors that shape people’s commitment to democratic values

The social and cultural context that individuals live in is seen as a major source of values and identities in political culture theory. Contextual effects, as explained by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1993), are effects on individual behavior and beliefs stemming from socialization in a specific milieu. The behaviors and beliefs prevailing in a certain geographical area or certain societal group according to this approach, affect the behaviors and beliefs of those growing up and living in the area or belonging to the social group in question. Huckfeldt and Sprague emphasize that an individual normally is affected by more than just one context, as (s)he may belong to several societal groups at the same time, and that the specific effect that a context has on an individual is dependent both on the characteristics of this individual and on the wider context. We will continue by looking closer at the connection between cultural groups, identity and political values, and then proceed with other approaches to development of democratic values.

3.2.1.1 Cultural identities and religion

Almond (1990, 150-151) made the case that values that are associated with ethnicity, nationality or religion are very resistant to change, and that this is the reason why the Soviet Union never managed to change the political cultures of the countries in Eastern Europe. The notion of a connection between cultural identities, worldviews and values is supported by Ross (2000, 42), who sees cultural identity as a key factor influencing people’s understanding of the world. Culture, as defined by Geertz’ (1973, 89) is "an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life". Ross sees these particular patterns of meaning and systems of conceptions as being transmitted inside groups consisting of individuals with a shared identity. Those sharing a cultural identity thus also share an understanding of social reality, and of themselves as belonging to a particular group with a particular history and way of life distinct from other groups. What kind of political behavior that is meaningful to a group member, and what kind of
political behavior a group member expects from other group members in particular situations depends on the group members’ shared worldview. The worldview embedded in a particular identity is thus shaping group members’ reasoning and political attitudes and behavior (Ross 2000, 42-44). People with a shared identity and common meanings and view of societal order can be said to make up a political community, and normally people will be a part of more than one community at the same time so that multiple loyalties develop (2000, 43). Laitin (1988, 591) takes up a similar point when he holds that there normally will be more than one cultural identity available to people. People can thus see themselves as primarily belonging either to for example a religious group, an ethnic group or a linguistic group. If a person primarily identifies as a member of a religious group, the worldview promoted by this religious group will probably be of high importance to him. Likewise, a strong identification with a certain ethnic group may increase the importance of a worldview and historiography shared by members of this group. A form of cultural identity in which common myths and worldviews have a particularly large emphasis is national identity.10

In Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, countries and areas where the population has a strong perception of their own national identity have been shown to vote for political parties supporting democratization. In the former Soviet Union this has been the case in the Baltic states and in Western Ukraine (Kuzio 2001, Way 2010, Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006). Where perceptions of a national identity have been weaker, as in Belarus and Eastern Ukraine, democratization has been less successful, and votes for pro-democratic parties have been fewer (Eke & Kuzio 2000, Way 2010, Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006). Shulman (2005, 59), who strongly emphasizes the role of national identity in a country’s political culture, explains this by pointing to how the members of a national group associate certain values and developmental models, like democracy or communism, with their own or other national groups. Those who see themselves as having a history of experience with democracy and see themselves as historically associated with other democratic nations, will be more supportive of democracy. This support will be strengthened if the main “Other” of their national group is perceived as non-democratic. Seeing one’s own national group as historically associated with Europe and opposed to Russia

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10 Much of the literature on nationalism is concerned with this, see for example Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983).
will therefore strengthen the commitment to democratic values among the members of this national group (Shulman 2005, 65-69).

Another factor that has received attention in the study of political culture in Eastern Europe is that of religion. In many cases the Catholic Church was a source of opposition against Communist rule, and Catholicism and national identity could be mutually supportive as in the cases of Poland and Lithuania (Grzymala-Busse 2014). Wittenberg (2006) shows how anti-communist attitudes in Hungary was supported by both the Catholic and Calvinist churches, and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017) find that Catholics in former communist countries in general are more committed to democratic values than adherents to other denominations and religions. Their explanation is that the message of resistance against communism that emanated from the Church, and the external support from the Pope, made Catholics less susceptible to indoctrination of communist values. We will soon come back to the legacies of communist and pre-communist regimes, but before that we will look closer at other factors that shape people’s commitment to democratic values.

3.2.1.2 Cultural modernization

An important strand of the literature is the one that stresses economic development as a driver for development of democratic values in a population. This view is rooted in the tradition of modernization theory, originally associated with Lerner (1958) and Lipset (1959), and sees economic modernization as a driving force for democratization. Inglehart (1990) and Inglehart & Welzel (2005) see a high level of life security (normally equaling a high income), a high level of education, and room for creativity and autonomy at the workplace as factors that increase an individual’s drive for self-expression. These processes take place on an individual level, but one of Inglehart & Welzel’s points is that also the context of living in an economically highly developed society has an effect on an individual’s value orientations. In a communist dictatorship, however, the effect of for example higher education is not necessarily a higher level of democratic values. Pop-Eleches (2014) holds that the lack of commitment to democratic values among the population of post-Communist countries is the main reason why these countries in general - and the countries which were a part of the Soviet Union from its beginning in particular - are less democratic than other countries at a comparable level of development. He argues that the high level of ideological indoctrination in communist education systems, and a
high reliance on technical sciences, meant that the highly educated middle class in communist countries did not acquire the same level of commitment to democratic values as the highly educated middle class in non-communist countries (2014, 41-44). He further suggests (2014, 45), on the line of Jowitt (1992), that as the urban population has been most subjected to communist indoctrination efforts, the higher standard of living in communist cities should not necessarily be enough for the urban population to acquire a higher level of democratic values than their rural counterparts. This suggestion, which is in contradiction with much of the general literature on political culture, is supported by findings of Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017), who find that overall in former communist countries, urban residence leads to lower support for democratic values.

3.2.1.3 Experiences with democracy

We have already in Chapter 3.1 touched upon specific support and feedback effects from evaluations of the performance of democracy on people’s commitment to democratic values. In this respect, Fuchs & Roller (1994, 36-38) see as most important how citizens evaluate the actions of decision-making politicians, the functioning of the institutional mechanisms of the democratic system, as well as their evaluations of the economic situation. As we are doing a case study of a single country with a unitary governmental system, the whole population must necessarily be subject to the same decision-making politicians and governmental institutions. We are interested in factors that are shaping Ukraine’s regional differences in democratic culture, and chances are greater that there are regional differences in citizens’ evaluation of the economic situation, as there might be great spatial variation in terms of the economic situation. Others who have stressed citizens’ evaluations of the economic situation in post-communist countries are Przeworski (1991) and Kitschelt (1992), who argued that the economic winners of the transition would support democracy, while the economic losers would favor a restoration of communism.

In every cross-regional or cross-national investigation of political culture it is implicitly assumed, if not explicitly said, that political culture is in one way or another a product of historical processes. If not, distinct regional or national political cultures would never appear. What makes political culture change, and how fast these changes appear, has been a central question in the political culture literature, and also a point of dispute. Almond & Verba ([1963] 1965, 5-6) saw the political culture of Great Britain as a result of century-long, slowly
developing processes, but Verba (1989, 399-401) concluded that what they had originally seen as very stable patterns could change fast under the right circumstances. Putnam (1993) traced the regional differences in political culture in Italy centuries back in time but has been criticized for overlooking more immediate causes for these divisions (Tarrow 1996). Huntington (1996) proposed that the world is divided into a number of cultural zones that largely correspond to areas of the world which traditionally have had the same majority religion. Inglehart & Welzel (2005) find strong evidence that there are indeed large and persisting differences in political culture between these cultural zones, but at the same time they show that societies’ political culture can change fast in periods of socioeconomic development. An analogy used by Larry Diamond (1993, 412) is that political culture must be understood as a “geological structure”, where different historical ages and events have all left “sedimentary deposits” of values and beliefs. Our task will be to try to single out which historical periods that have given rise to regional differences in political culture in Ukraine. We will now turn to the long-term developments of political culture and introduce a framework of *historical legacies*.

3.2.2 Historical legacies

Despite much literature on “historical legacies”, a common understanding of the concept of *legacies* has been missing in the post-communist context. Within this context, legacies have been conceptualized either as 1) causal factors influencing post-communist outcomes (Kitschelt 2003, Pop-Eleches 2007), or as 2) effects, in the form of beliefs and practices, of causal factors which operated in an earlier time period (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 7; Wittenberg 2015). The first of these approaches is used for example when the focus of a study is on how the structural, cultural and institutional starting points of ex-communist countries are shaping post-communist regime trajectories (Pop-Eleches 2007, 910), and will not be used by us here. We will follow the second approach, as our focus will be on causal relationships between processes that started in the pre-communist era and political-cultural outcomes today.

We will use Beissinger & Kotkin’s (2014, 7) definition of a *historical legacy*, which is “a durable causal relationship between past institutions and policies on subsequent practices or beliefs, long beyond the life of the regimes, institutions, and policies that gave birth to them”. Their focus is thus on how certain deep and formative historical experiences continue to be linked with present
practices and beliefs through causal relationships and mechanisms. This is different from Wittenberg’s (2015) approach to historical legacies, which is more focused on the persistence of phenomena across time, and less on the causal relationships and mechanism linking historical causes with present-day phenomena. Beissinger & Kotkin (2014, 12) argue that a focus on the sameness of a phenomenon across time means underplaying what they see as the most central point, namely how the origin of the present-day phenomenon can be found in certain formative historical experiences. “Legacies”, as seen by Beissinger & Kotkin (2014, 11), can be beliefs and practices that develop in ways so that the new beliefs and practices only vaguely resemble what they once were.

Beissinger & Kotkin see it as relevant to talk about legacies only where a societal rupture has put an end to an old order. Laporte & Lussier (2011) agree and suggest that a phenomenon is only interesting as a legacy if it has survived a critical juncture11 that destroyed the conditions that gave rise to it. This concept, as well as the concept of path dependency, are central in the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism,12 but are tools that Pierson (2004, 10) sees as useful for everyone who studies the temporal dimensions of social processes. Hacker (2002, 54), quoted by Pierson (2004, 21), sees path dependence as “developmental trajectories that are inherently difficult to reverse”. According to Pierson (2004, 21), path dependence is generated by developmental trajectories that are giving positive feedback, meaning that they are self-reinforcing. This process can be seen when, for example, an emerging worldview or ideology reaches a critical mass and generates culture-producing institutions, organizations and actors that contribute in spreading and reinforcing this worldview or ideology (Pierson 2004, 39). Another aspect that Pierson stresses is how the temporal ordering of events and processes can be a key to understanding how certain paths of development are followed and how certain social phenomena emerge. The impact of a historical event or process on long-term outcomes cannot be predicted if

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11 A critical juncture marks a period of significant change that is supposed to produce enduring legacies, whereby different countries (or other units of analysis) are sent on diverging trajectories (Collier & Collier 1991, 29; Mahoney 2001, 6-8).

12 Historical institutionalism is an approach to the study of social change where the focus is on how institutions structure and shape outcomes, often in a long-term perspective (Steinmo 2008). Even though this term itself dates back only to 1989 (2008, 136-137), some of the classics of comparative politics, like Moore (1966) and Skocpol (1979) are often associated with historical institutionalism. This approach is closely related to the legacy approach, but while the historical institutionalist approach sees a legacy as a trajectory which is followed as a consequence of choices taken during critical junctures, the legacy approach sees a legacy as a factor that survives a critical juncture. For a discussion about the relationship between these two approaches, see Laporte & Lussier (2011, 649-653).
the timing of this event or process relative to other events and processes is not taken into consideration. As the long-lasting causes of initial events and processes have implications for the outcomes of later events or processes, an event or a process may in one case occur too early or too late to produce the same outcome that it did in another case (2004, 67-71). These tools and insights offered by Pierson will be a part of our analytical arsenal when we shall discuss findings of historical legacies in Ukraine.

Beissinger & Kotkin (2014, 12) differentiate between five types of historical legacies - fragmentation\textsuperscript{13}, translation\textsuperscript{14}, bricolage\textsuperscript{15}, parameter setting\textsuperscript{16} and cultural schemata. What they mean by “cultural schemata” is “embedded ways of thinking and behaving that originate from socialization experiences under the prior political order but persist long beyond the macro political rupture” (2014, 15). Our study of regional differences of political culture in Ukraine will be a study of the persistence of such “embedded ways of thinking”. We will explain thoroughly what has caused the emergence of these regional differences, and how they may have survived.

By combining the political culture and historical legacies paradigms, we have developed a framework which will prove to be fruitful for analyzing how regional differences in political culture have emerged and persisted in Ukraine.

3.2.3 Historical legacies and political culture in Eastern Europe

Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe much research has been done on historical legacies in this region. As pointed out by Pop-Eleches (2015), two different approaches to the study of historical legacies in the post-communist world is 1) the approach that is rooted in Jowitt (1992), which focuses on the long-term effects of Communist rule, and 2) the approach that is rooted in Janos (1993), which focuses on the long-term effects of regimes, institutions and

\textsuperscript{13} When ““new” units are created out of an institutional rupture that are merely fragments or remnants of old institutions, and therefore closely resemble the parent unit” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 12).

\textsuperscript{14} When “an old practice finds new purpose and is redeployed in a different way than was true at the time in which the practice originated” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 13).

\textsuperscript{15} When “elements of the past become thoroughly intermixed and interpenetrated with the present, creating something completely new that only vaguely resembles the old, but that still profoundly bears its imprint” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 14).

\textsuperscript{16} “places limits on how individuals think and behave, so that the legacy relationship involves the existence of limits on what can occur rather than what actually does occur” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 14).
policies that existed before the onset of communism. The first of these approaches is primarily concerned with the homogenizing long-term impact of the communist mode of modernization. One then seeks to investigate the effects caused by totalitarian rule, ideological indoctrination, repression and heavy industrialization on later cultural and political developments. The second approach is primarily concerned with how societies that had been socially, culturally, politically and economically unequal before the onset of communism, but that had all been subjected to decades of communist rule, emerged from communism as still unequal societies and have had diverging developmental paths since the fall of communism.

Legacies of communist rule have been found to affect post-communist developments in domains such as post-communist regime trajectories (Bunce 1998; Linz & Stepan 1996; Pop-Eleches 2007), civil society (Howard 2003; Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2013) and societal and political cleavages (Evans & Whitefield 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999). However, Evans & Whitefield (2000) and Kitschelt et al. (1999) see the development of post-communist cleavages as being affected also by legacies from states and regimes that existed before the onset of communism. The same is found to be the case for post-communist regime trajectories (Bunce 2005; Pop-Eleches 2007), trust in institutions (Badescu & Sun 2005; Becker et al. 2016) and voting patterns (Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006, Wittenberg 2006). Especially in Poland the link between pre-communist legacies, political culture, and voting patterns has been widely researched. See for example Janczak (2015) or Jasiewicz (2009).

Communist regimes were special in that they made a formidable effort to transform people’s value orientations. In the Soviet Union, the goal was to create a Soviet culture, and to reach that goal alternative ways of thinking than the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine had to be eradicated. Severe suppression of opposing worldviews, a state propaganda apparatus working at schools and workplaces, as well as a total media monopoly was used for indoctrination of true Marxist-Leninist values (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). It has been shown repeatedly that support for democratic values is lower in former communist countries in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (Fuchs 1999; Inglehart & Welzel 2005, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). Similarly, the populations of the easternmost countries of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus are repeatedly measured
to have an even lower support for democratic values than other former communist countries (Fuchs & Klingemann 2006, Klicperova-Baker & Kostal 2018; Miller, White & Heywood 1998).

Fuchs & Klingemann (2006, 34-35, 58) hold several mutually non-exclusive possibilities open for why people in the easternmost countries are less committed to democratic values. As they see it is possible that this is caused by 1) the impact of additional years of communist rule in the areas that were a part of the Soviet Union from its establishment in 1921, it may be caused by 2) the different impact of the rule of the four empires that controlled much of Eastern Europe before World War 1, it may be caused by 3) the impact of the traditional religion of the countries in question, and it may be caused by 4) the easternmost countries being at a lower level of socio-economic development. All of these proposed lines of division are geographically close to each other, and as we will see, particularly the proposed causes number two and three are very closely connected and difficult to separate in the case of Ukraine. Due to this near-overlap of former borders, and since investigations of political culture in Eastern Europe are often done on the country-level, it is no easy task to provide evidence for any of Fuchs & Klingemann’s suggestions. However, that a higher number of years of communist rule in a country leaves a legacy of a lower level support for democratic values among the population is shown by Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017, 134-135) and Inglehart & Welzel (2005, 76), and that imperial rule by the Habsburg Empire has left a legacy of a higher level of commitment to democratic values than imperial rule by the Russian Empire is shown by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015), Drummond & Lubecki (2010) and Darden & Grzymala-Busse (2005). Inglehart & Welzel (2005) also investigate the impact of traditional religions on present day political culture and find that self-expression values are more widespread in societies where Catholicism has been the traditional majority religion than in societies which have traditionally been dominated by Orthodox Christianity.

We have now seen how historical legacies, different contexts and identities, membership in social groups, and individual experiences at the same time can affect an individual’s value orientations. For us this means that we will have to make precise assessments of which areas

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17 See Chapter 3.1
18 The Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire were associated with respectively Catholicism and Orthodoxy.
where we expect a historical legacy argument to be operating, and also that we should take into account the geographical distributions of certain ethnic, linguistic or religious groups and people with different levels of education and income. We will now turn to the case of Ukraine and explain how we will take all of these factors into consideration.

4. Development of political culture and commitment to democratic values in Ukraine

In survey-based studies of mass attitudes in Ukraine, region of residence is generally found to have a very strong effect as compared to effects of other demographic variables on attitudes toward Russia and Europe (Barrington & Faranda 2009, Katchanovski 2002; 2006, Kubicek 2000, Munro 2007, Peisakhin 2015), toward Ukrainian independence (Barrington 1997), toward the post-Soviet political and economic system (Barrington 2002, Barrington & Herron 2004, Hesli 1995), on support for democratic values (ICDT 2015; Person 2010), and on the degree of social capital (Drummond & Lubecki 2010, Katchanovski 2002). Likewise, regional cleavages have been very visible in elections ever since Ukraine’s independence in 1991 (Clem & Craumer 2005; Craumer & Clem 1999, 2008; Birch 2000; Holdar 1995; Kubiek 2000; Katchanovski 2006; Roper & Fesnic 2003). We will soon look closer at some of these findings, but before we do that we will discuss why and how historical legacies play a role in Ukraine’s regional divisions. We will start with a historical introduction, proceed with implications of different regions’ unequal historical developments, and then look at other possible reasons for regional differences in political culture, mainly the geographical distribution of ethnolinguistic and religious groups. In the end we will develop a conceptual map of Ukraine which summarizes the main factors that are shaping regional patterns of democratic culture, and which will serve as a basis for our formulation of three hypotheses. Central in our hypotheses will be three regions which are clustered around historical borders. These regions are very similar to each other with except for their historical experiences in certain time periods, and by comparing the level of democratic culture in these regions we can therefore make precise assessments about the legacies of these particular historical experiences.
4.1 Historical legacies

We will start by giving a broad overview of the historical geopolitical developments of Ukraine that are most central to our analysis. Important here is to show that historical borders were drawn in such a way that Ukraine is something akin to a “natural experiment”.\(^{19}\) We will also make clear the historical regional divisions of Ukraine, which will be important in our further analysis.

Central to our analysis are the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the period 1772-1795. In three phases during these years, the whole Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was partitioned between the Russian Empire, the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia.\(^{20}\) For several centuries before this, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had controlled much of present-day Ukraine, reaching its maximum in the 17th century. From the 17th century on, the Russian Empire gradually expanded into present-day Ukraine, partly to the expense of the westward-retreating Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and by the end of the 18th century the Russian Empire had incorporated as good as all of region D on Figure 4.1.\(^{21}\) At the dawn of the first partition in 1772, regions A, B, and C on Figure 4.1 belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. When the third partition was finished in 1795, region A had become a part of the Habsburg Empire, while regions B and C had become a part of the Russian Empire.

Important here is the way the new borders were drawn. According to Wandycz (1974) and Lukowski (1999), the border was decided completely without thought of conditions on the ground and did not follow any earlier state or regional border, nor any boundaries between ethnic or religious groups or areas with different economic profiles. The new border in other words cut right through an otherwise homogeneous area with a homogenous rural peasant population consisting of ethnic Ukrainians. Peisakhin (2015, 25-26) see the exact drawing of the border as fulfilling criteria to “randomness” and calls the process whereby otherwise very similar

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\(^{19}\) The term “natural experiment” is used about occurrences in history where different groups of subjects are as-if randomly assigned to different treatments, but where the manipulation of the treatments is not under the control of the researcher. Such occurrences can be used to study for example the effects of political regimes on populations. Of great importance is then that assignment has happened close to random, so that the populations do not differ on other variables (Dunning 2012, 15-17).

\(^{20}\) As the Kingdom of Prussia did not acquire any areas that are part of present-day Ukraine, it will not play any role in our further analysis.

\(^{21}\) This was also to the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which had controlled the coastline.
populations suddenly become subject to different political regimes a “natural experiment of history”.

**Figure 4.1 Historical map of Ukraine**

![Map of Ukraine with historical borders. Regions A, B and C were all part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the onset of its first partition in 1772. When the third partition was completed in 1795, the Russian Empire had acquired regions B and C, and the Habsburg Empire had acquired region A. Region A, which is called Galicia, belonged to the Galician province of the Habsburg Empire until World War 1, was a part of Poland between World War 1 and World War 2, and was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939. Region B, which is called Volhynia, belonged to the Russian Empire until World War 1, was a part of Poland between World War 1 and World War 2, and was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939. Region C belonged to the Russian Empire until World War 1, and then became a part of the Soviet Union from its establishment shortly after World War 1. Region D was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire during the 18th century, and also became a part of the Soviet Union from its establishment. As will be commented on later, the historical development of regions X and Y are strongly diverging from that of other regions and will not be central in our further analysis. Sources: Miller, White & Heywood (1998, 71), Magocsi (1993, 47), Magocsi (2007, 118, 133), Katchanovski (2006, 85) Peisakhin (2015, 26).]

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22 Region X on Figure 4.1, Zakarpattia, became a part of Czechoslovakia after World War 1, while region Y on became a part of Romania. Region 1 and region 2 are different from all other regions both in terms historical developments and in terms of demography. A study of political culture in these two regions would require high survey quality and large samples from these two particular regions. We will not discuss these regions more in this chapter, and in Chapter 5 we will further explain why these regions will not be considered in our analysis.
The borders between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire stayed the same until World War 1, when both empires collapsed. A settlement of a new border between the now independent Poland and the newly established Soviet Union was agreed in 1921, after the Polish-Soviet war. The new border was still not based on any ethnographic or other historical considerations, with an exception for the southernmost part of the border, which would follow the old imperial borders (Borzecki 2008, 59-60, 133). Regions A and B on Figure 4.1 now belonged to Poland, while regions C and D now belonged to the Soviet Union. On Figure 4.1 we can see how the southern part of the border between the Soviet Union and Poland is overlapping with the old imperial borders, and then how borders diverge as one moves from the South to the North.

A few comments on the historical divisions are in order before we continue. To summarize, region A on Figure 4.1 (Galicia) has experienced Habsburg imperial rule followed by Polish rule in the inter-war age, region B (Volhynia) has experienced Russian imperial rule followed by Polish rule in the inter-war age, and regions C and D have both experienced Russian imperial rule followed by rule by the Soviet Union in the inter-war age. As will be shown in this chapter, Regions A, B and C are very similar to each other with except for their distinct regime experiences, and they are thus suited for comparison when the aim is to assess the legacies of a particular historical regime. We will later explain in detail how we can conduct those comparisons. Now we will turn to the historical developments which are thought to have caused the emergence of different levels of democratic culture in the different regions.

4.1.1 Rule by the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire (1772-1917/18)

We will start with a discussion of the most relevant differences in the historical developments of the Ukrainian-populated areas of the Habsburg and Russian empires respectively. The key here

23 From 1804 until 1867 the formal notion of the Habsburg Empire is the Austrian Empire, and after the 1867 constitutional changes it is denoted as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For the sake of clarity we will throughout this thesis use the term “Habsburg Empire”.

24 Ethnographic considerations were taken into account only in the way that Polish factions disagreed on how large proportions of non-ethnic Poles could be tolerated in the new Polish state. The borderlands were still characterized by a peasant population of Ukrainians, land-owning Poles and urban population of Poles and Jews. No “natural” ethnographic border could therefore be drawn in this area. For a thorough discussion of the border question, see Borzecki (2008, 133-154).
are certain processes which happened in the Habsburg Empire and which did not happen in the Russian Empire, namely what Riabchuk (2015, 141) with reference to Eugen Weber’s classic book (1976) calls the process of turning “peasants into Ukrainians”. According to authors like Dardon & Grzymala-Busse (2006), Kuzio (1998, 2015), Person (2010) and Riabchuk (2015), a long-term legacy of this is a particularly high level of democratic political culture in the Habsburg province of Galicia (region A on Figure 4.1).

Before we start explaining the particularities of the historical developments in the Habsburg and Russian areas, we should make clear some points regarding the ethnographic and economic situation. The whole area that had belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 (regions A, B and C on Figure 4.1) was characterized by an ethnopolitical situation in the rural districts with Ukrainian-speaking peasants and Polish landlords, and where town-populations consisted almost exclusively of Poles and Jews (Snyder 2003, 119, 122-123). Religious questions were complicated in this area. The Brest Union in 1596 was an agreement whereby the Ruthenian Orthodox church inside the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth accepted to be underlaid the Pope and become a part of the Catholic Church, while at the same time retaining the Orthodox liturgy (Snyder 2003, 107-109). This specific organization became known as the Uniate Church or the Greek Catholic Church, and at the onset of the partitions in 1772, the formerly Orthodox Ukrainian-speaking peasant population in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had largely become adherents to this church. After the partition of the Commonwealth from 1772 to 1795, Greek Catholics ended up on both sides of the new border between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire. Greek Catholic parishes in the Russian Empire were soon converted back into the Orthodox Church, and at the end of the 1830s there were close to none Greek Catholic churches left in the Russian Empire (Werth 2014). On the Habsburg side of the border the situation was different. As opposed to the Russian Empire, where Orthodoxy was the official religion, the official religion of the Habsburg Empire was Catholicism. Here, the Greek-Catholic church was promoted as an institution unifying the East Slavic population with the Habsburg Empire, and as a bulwark against the Russian Empire (Snyder 2003, 124).
Many authors have described how a more liberal legal and political environment in the Austrian-rulled lands allowed for a much higher degree of organizational freedom, political participation and spreading of mass-literacy and Ukrainian nationalistic ideas than was the case in the Russian-rulled lands, and how this lead to the development of a Ukrainian national identity in the Austrian-rulled lands (Hrytsak 2005; Magoci 2010; Katchanovski 2006; Snyder 2003; Wandycz 1974). The central institution in the early days of Ukrainian nation building was the Greek Catholic Church (Snyder 2003 123-124). Members of the Greek Catholic Clergy had access to university education already from the late 18th century, were in close contact with enlightenment circles in Vienna (Stepien 2005, 66), and were encouraged by Habsburg authorities to write the first books on Ukrainian national history (Hrytsak 2005, 193-194). The Habsburg authorities were at this point keen on encouraging the development of a Ukrainian identity, as Ukrainians could be a counterweight to the independence claims of the Polish population. Ukrainian identity developed first in opposition to Polish identity, and later became incompatible also with any Russian identity or loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Greek Catholic Church made it their primary concern from the 1880s to reach out to the peasantry and spread the ideas of “national justice” for the Ukrainians and opened hundreds of schools with a national orientation and education in the Ukrainian vernacular (Snyder 2003, 124-125). The upper classes in Galicia could participate in elections from the 1860s, and voting rights were extended to larger parts of the population in the 1907 parliamentary election (Katchanovski 2006, 133). Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire thus participated in elections, and a dense network of civil society organizations helped mobilize masses in this regard. The electoral participation was a representational improvement, and it further increased the national consciousness of the Ukrainian population (Birch 2000, 1021). From the late 19th century a secular Ukrainian national elite took over from the clergy as the main force of nation-building. Central in the foundation of the Ukrainian national myth was historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who constructed a Ukrainian national narrative that laid claim to the heritage of Kievan Rus and refuted the claim of Russian historiography that Moscow inherited the traditions of Kievan Rus (Snyder 2003, 128-129). Russian and Ukrainian historiographies and national myths were thus highly incompatible with each other, with the political implication that Russia’s claim to Ukraine was challenged by the idea of a Ukrainian state with ethnic borders (Hrytsak 2005, 196; Snyder 2003, 128).
The legal and political environment in the Russian Empire did not allow for the same developments as in the Habsburg Empire. Russia was an autocratic Empire which did not allow for the spread of ideas which could undermine the legitimacy of Tsarist absolutist rule. Ukrainians were officially called “Little-Russians”, and were not seen as a separate ethnic group or nation. Rather, there was an emphasis on the very close historic affinity between the Eastern Slavic peoples of “Little Russians” (Ukrainians) and “Great Russians” (Russians) (Katchanovski 2006, 131-132; Magocsi 2007, 157). There were some articulations of Ukrainian patriotism in intellectual circles at the Kharkiv university in the 1820s and 1830s (Snyder 2003, 121), but from the 1840s the Imperial authorities became increasingly concerned with the possibility of Ukrainian separatism (Magocsi 2007, 158). Official repression against a beginning Ukrainian national movement in the 1860s made national agitators leave for the Habsburg Empire (Hrytsak 2005, 195). In the Russian Empire all publication and import of works in Ukrainian language was banned (Snyder 2003, 121-122), and Ukrainian political organizations and associations were not allowed (Katchanovski 2006, 131). The re-incorporation of the Greek Catholic Church into the Orthodox Church was a move that further denied the existence of an independent Ukrainian cultural institution. At the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire, the idea that Ukrainians might form a nationality of their own was spread only in small intellectual circles and was totally unknown among the vast majority of the population (Magocsi 2007, 158-159).

Ukrainian national identity was promoted in the Habsburg province of Galicia by a high number of educational, religious, cultural and political organizations, including the Prosvita society, which established three thousand reading rooms and libraries in the villages (Katchanovski 2006, 130). A result of this was that the Ukrainian national identity became widespread in Galicia, also in the peasant population (Katchanovski 2006, 132; Hrytsak 2005 197-198), and Riabchuk (2015, 141) sees the process of turning peasants into Ukrainians as basically completed in Galicia by the end of the 19th century. This Ukrainian national identity was exclusive in the way that it was not compatible with any kind of Russian or East Slavic identity. Meanwhile, the identities prevalent among the Ukrainian speaking peasant population in the Russian Empire
remained either pre-modern local identities or identification as Eastern Slavs or Little Russians (Kuzio 2015, 14; Magocsi 2007, 158-159).

As we discussed in Chapter 3.2.1.1, support for democracy has been much higher in political communities with a fully developed perception of themselves as a nation. This is also the claim of those who support the idea of a more democratic culture in the former Habsburg areas of Ukraine. The connection between Ukrainian identity and democratic values has been investigated by Stephen Shulman, and his scheme (2005) of two competing identity complexes in Ukraine has received support among scholars of Ukraine (Barrington & Faranda 2009; Kuzio 2015; Riabchuk 2015). He finds two separate concepts of Ukrainian identity which he calls the “ethnic Ukrainian identity complex” and the “East Slavic identity complex”. Those adhering to the ethnic Ukrainian identity consider exclusively Ukrainian ethnicity, language and culture as unifying features of the Ukrainian nation, see Ukrainians as historically and culturally associated with Europe, and see Russia as the main “Other”. Those adhering to the East Slavic identity, on the other hand, consider ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians as extremely close and brotherly, see Ukrainians as historically and culturally associated with Russia, and see Europe as the main “Other”. Through survey analysis Shulman (2005, 81-82) finds that while adherence to the ethnic Ukrainian identity is leading to support for democracy, adherence to the East Slavic identity is hindering support for democracy. Shulman treats the two identities as ideal types and sees it such that people to a smaller or larger degree will adhere to one of these ideal types.

We have now seen how differences in democratic political culture may have emerged between the Habsburg province of Galicia (Region A on Figure 4.1) on the one hand, and the areas that belonged to the Russian Empire (Regions B, C and D on Figure 4.1) on the other. We will now turn to the developments after World War 1, when new states had succeeded the old empires, and new borders were in place.

4.1.2 Rule by Poland and the Soviet Union (1921-1939)

After World War 1, when the empires had collapsed, and borders had been changed, the Habsburg province of Galicia (region A on Figure 4.1) became a part of Poland and was joined by Volhynia (region B on Figure 4.1), which had earlier belonged to the Russian Empire.
Regions B and C on Figure 4.1 went from Russian imperial rule to rule by the Soviet Union. In the inter-war period the populations of Poland and the Soviet Union lived in radically different political regimes, which are proposed to have left legacies in the form of different democratic political cultures.

Birch emphasizes the importance of the electoral participation of Ukrainians in Poland in the inter-war period (Birch 2000, 1022, 1025). She thinks that the experience of living under a democratic regime and taking part in elections may have left a lasting legacy in the form of a more democratic political culture in the areas of Ukraine that was a part of Poland in the inter-war years. This is also what Katchanovski (2018) holds as a possibility. Polish authorities placed some restrictions on Ukrainian cultural and political institutions, most notably by demanding that Ukrainian-language schools should become bilingual (Snyder 2003, 144). Still, Ukrainian civil society was by and large allowed to continue to function in Galicia, and there were now attempts to spread the Ukrainian organizations and national ideas also into Volhynia (Snyder 2003, 144-148). However, the territorial organization of the inter-war age lasted only for around 20 years, and the primary question with regards to legacy effects is perhaps not the impact of Polish rule in Galicia and Volhynia (regions A and B on Figure 4.1), but rather the impact of Stalinism on the Soviet side of the border (regions C and D on Figure 4.1).

The inter-war period was a period of particulary strong repression in the Soviet Union. The man-made famine of 1932-33, called Holodomor, resulted in 3,9 million excess deaths in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015). It is widely thought that this period of famine “broke the back” of the Ukrainian peasantry, meaning that they became obedient to the authorities and only developed a low level of political consciousness (Arel 2005, 45-46). A look at the regional pattern of population decline in this period (Figure 4.2) reveals some notable regional variations. Plokhy (2015) and Wolowyna et al. (2016) have investigated these regional patterns and hold that the (present day) oblasts of Khmelnytsk, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia (regions 25 This happened as a consequence of the implementation of Stalin’s plans of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization. The authorities ordered the collective farms to fullfill extremely high grain quota in order to feed the expanding labour force, and also in order to export grain. Resistance to collectivization, or failure to fullfill the grain quotas, resulted in harsh penalties in the form of confiscation of all grain and deportation of wealthier farmers. Among the nationalities of the Soviet Union Ukrainians were particularly targeted as famine victims in order to subdue them and destroy any Ukrainian national identity (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015, 54).
8-10) had lower excess losses due to their closeness to the Soviet Union’s western borders. They hold that the Soviet authorities tried to avoid showing the worst consequences of the famine along their borders with other countries, and Plokhy (2015, 404-405) points out that many in this area also may have survived by crossing the border into Poland. The areas with the highest losses are can be seen as a dark belt in the central and eastern areas in Figure 4.2.

**Figure 4.2** Population decline in percentage, 1929-1933

![Image of map showing population decline](image)

Figure 4.2: The impact of the famine was uneven across the Ukrainian territories. There is a belt of oblasts in the central and eastern part of the country with very high population decline. The areas closest to the Western border were comparatively less affected. *Source: Klid & Motyl (2012, xlvii)*

We have now seen how differences in democratic political culture may have emerged in the inter-war age between the areas that belonged to Poland on the one hand (Regions A and B on Figure 4.1), and the areas that belonged to the Soviet Union on the other (Regions C and D on Figure 4.1). We have also seen that the impact of the most repressive measures in the Soviet Union in this period, the Holodomor, was uneven across the territories of regions C and D on Figure 4.1. In the rest of this chapter we will look at other factors which may influence Ukraine’s political culture, and we will also make sure that there are not any later historical developments which to a substantial degree are working as confounding variables in the causal relationship between the historical developments we have discussed and present-day outcomes in terms of commitment to democratic values. We will also look at other cleavages in the Ukrainian society and see why these need to be eliminated as the causes behind Ukraine’s regional divisions. Before we do that, we will look at the research that has been done on historical legacies from the two time periods that we have discussed.
4.1.3 Research on historical legacies in Ukraine

Historical legacies have received much attention in Ukraine as an explanation for mass attitudes and value orientations. Many see the country’s election results as to a large degree reflecting historical legacies in the form of regional political cultures and identities. Together with survey analyses, analyses of election results have been most prominent in the research on historical legacies in Ukraine. As voting patterns can say less directly about people’s value orientations than can a survey, we will not make voting patterns the main topic here. Still, we will start here by looking at how election results have been interpreted as reflecting historical legacies.

The most divisive issue in Ukrainian society, which was structuring for the emerging party system, was the question of how relations between Ukraine and Russia should be (Hesli, Reisinger & Miller 1998). Connected with this question have also been questions about regime form and economic system as well as relations with the West. Ever since independence in 1991 Ukrainian elections have been characterized by very visible regional splits, and the battle for presidency has generally been between a candidate with a power base in the West of the country, and an opponent with a power base in the East, where the main lines of conflict have been a combination of the factors mentioned above, and where parties most strongly backing democratic reform and foreign policy orientations toward the West have been far more popular in the West than in the East (Holdar 1995, Kubicek 2000, Kuzio 2015). The areas that belonged to Poland in the interwar-age, and the former Habsburg province of Galicia in particular, have continued to be a stronghold for candidates backing democratic reform and cooperation with the West, and people in these areas have been shunning parties and candidates that are associated with the former Soviet regime or are backing cooperation with Russia. But even though there is a broad agreement that election results are to a large degree reflecting historical legacies, it is difficult to make precise assessments of people’s value commitments based on election results.

26 This is of course a very crude typology, and other issues have of course also been important. However, a general tendency is visible, and that is what is important here. For more detailed descriptions of issues, parties and candidates in Ukrainian elections, see for example D’Anieri (2007) or Kuzio (2015).

27 Parliamentary elections and first rounds of presidential elections have been less polarized, but also here regional splits are very visible.
Surveys, however, are better suited for studying values and beliefs. In the introduction to Chapter 4 we saw that survey evidence have shown strong regional divisions in Ukraine on a range of attitudes and values. However, a general problem with survey evidence from Ukraine is that sample sizes and degree of regional representativeness of surveys are not very high. This makes it difficult to make precise assessments about where eventual geographical boundaries in attitudes and value orientations can be found, which again makes it difficult to tell if eventual regional differences in political culture are resulting from legacies from the imperial period or the inter-war age. \(^2\) This is generally a problem also among the studies that have been done on the connection between historical legacies and Ukraine’s democratic political culture, and especially in the oldest of these studies. Miller, White & Heywood (1998) do not find a more democratic political culture in Western Ukraine than in Central or Eastern Ukraine, but what they called “Western Ukraine” do not correspond well with any of the regions that we have defined in this chapter. The same is the case for Shulman (2005), who did not find more support for democracy in Western Ukraine than in other regions of the country. Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger (2000), who are making a crude division of Ukraine into to equally big halves, also did not find any effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Western Ukraine. They suggest that regional differences can be explained by the ethnolinguistic or religious composition of the populations in different regions. We will look into the claim about ethnolinguistic and religious composition as being the real reason behind Ukraine’s regional divisions later, but we will first look at the findings from newer studies.

Person (2010) finds that residence in Galicia (region A on Figure 4.1) is leading to higher support for democratic values. Katchanovski (2018) is analyzing all the areas that did not belong to the Soviet Union before World War 2 (regions A, B, X and Y on Figure 4.1) as one single region, and do not find that residence in this region leads to more support for democratic values. ICDT (2015), however, who is analyzing the same region as Katchanovski, do find that residence in this region leads to more support for democratic values. However, there are methodological problems connected with these studies as well, as we will discuss closer in Chapter 4.5. Before we do that we will look at other factors which may be affecting Ukraine’s

\(^2\) As we have seen in this chapter, we will expect that regional differences in political culture which are caused by historical legacies should follow clearly defined borders.
regional pattern of democratic political culture. We will start by discussing other political developments, before we continue with economic factors and factors connected with ethnolinguistic and religious groups.

4.2 Other developments

In 1939, as a part of the fulfillment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and captured Galicia and Volhynia (regions A and B on Figure 4.1) (Magocsi 2007, 268-271). In 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and between 1941 and 1944 the front line moved twice through the entire areas of Ukraine, as the German army firstly advanced eastward, followed by the westward advancement and recapture of Ukraine by the Red Army (2007, 283-288). All of Ukraine was affected by this, and much of the country was devastated. Among the consequences was that almost the entire Jewish population of Ukraine was exterminated (2007, 282). Also, almost the entire Polish population was either driven out or killed, many as a part of a conflict between Ukrainian and Poles in Galicia and Volhynia (Snyder 2007). These murders were perpetrated by far-right militant groups that initially collaborated with the German occupational authorities before turning against them when it became clear that the Germans would not accept the creation of a Ukrainian state. These groups, motivated by resistance to the Soviet occupation by Galicia from 1939, continued to fight against the Soviet Union after World War 2 and into the 1950s. Snyder (2003) and Kuzio (2015) see this resistance as a step in the solidifying of a Ukrainian identity among the population.

Since the final incorporation of all of Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union in 1945, all of present-day Ukraine has been a part of the same country - from 1945 to 1991 as a part of the

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29 The growth of far-right groups in Western Ukraine must be seen on the background of the squeeze between the Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany after 1939. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was originally created in 1929 by young Ukrainians who were dissatisfied that no Ukrainian state was created after World War 1 and stood for an un-democratic nationalism with the goal to create a dictatorial state. The OUN was far from popular and needed the circumstances of war in order to grow (Snyder 2007, 152). The democratic party Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) was the largest Ukrainian party at the onset of the war, but as it became dissolved together with other Ukrainian political parties, OUN became the only political organization left on the stage in western Ukraine (Snyder 2007, 164). The strongest faction of OUN, OUN-Bandera, in 1942 created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which at the same time fought against Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Polish guerilla forces, and also conducted ethnic cleansing of Poles in areas that they considered as Ukrainian. For more about the special war-time circumstances that lead to the growth of far-right groups and the bloodshed between Poles and Ukrainians, see (Snyder 2007, Chapter 8).
Soviet Union, and since 1991 as a sovereign country. What has happened after this is thus of less direct interest to us, as the topic of this thesis is regime legacies from before World War 2. However, we explained in Chapter 4.1 how the historical divisions of Ukraine made parts of the country into something akin to a natural experiment, and we will now make sure that later developments are not working as confounding variables. In other words, we will now have a short look at other political and economic developments that may have had an impact on the regional outlook of Ukraine’s political culture.

4.2.1 Political developments after World War 2
In the course of the life of the Soviet Union, every citizen of Ukraine was subject to the same political regime. The most notable regional differences in political treatment in this period occurred during World War 2, when many thousand suspected political opponents were deported, and in the immediate post-War years, when collectivization was undertaken in Western Ukraine (this had already happened in the rest of Ukraine before World War 2), as well as the campaign against nationalist insurgents which continued until the 1950s. It is often thought that this harsh period in particular, and Soviet rule in general, did not weaken, but rather strengthened the national identity and self-perceptions of Ukrainians in the former Habsburg area (Kuzio 2015, 28). Person (2010) sees the period of Soviet occupation as a period when the pro-democratic elements of the Ukrainian identity were particularly strengthened, as hatred toward the communist regime lead to a strengthening of democratic sentiments. Changes of borders between the Soviet Republics made Crimea into a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1954, but no later changes happened in the West of Ukraine, which is our main area of interest. In 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, which is now totally outside of control of the Ukrainian authorities. The ongoing war in Donbass, which started in 2014, has also left much of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast outside of control of the Ukrainian state.

As there were no real elections and no relevant surveys being done in Soviet times, we do not know much about people's values and attitudes during these years. What we do know, however, is that there has been a continuing resistance against Soviet rule in Western parts of Ukraine from World War 2 and throughout the lifetime of the Soviet Union. Nationalistic guerilla groups that had been fighting against the Soviet Union in the World War 2 continued to fight in Western Ukraine well into the 1950s. There is further a very visible pattern of dissent. In the post-Stalin age and until a major crackdown on Ukrainian dissent in 1972, there emerged a high number of cultural and human rights activists from Western Ukraine. Of all political prisoners in the Soviet GULAG-system, 40% were Ukrainians, and the vast majority of these came from Western and Central Ukraine. Even though 20% of the country’s population and 30% of the urban population were Russians, there was close to none dissent among this group (Kuzio 2015 123-124).
There is no space here for a thorough explanation of the political developments in Ukraine from its independence and up until now.\footnote{Some of the developments and emerging cleavages have been commented on in Chapter 3.1.3.} We should, however, discuss the most dramatic events in this period, and the impact these may have had on patterns of political culture. This includes the Orange revolution in 2004, and the Euromaidan protests and revolution in 2014 and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in Donbass.\footnote{“Donbass” here refers to the easternmost oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk, region 24 on 25 on Figure 2.1 respectively.} Leading up to the Orange revolution in 2004 was a voter realignment in Central Ukraine. This could, if anything, indicate a diminishing of political-cultural differences between Western and Central Ukraine, as value orientations that had earlier largely been confined to Western Ukraine had now also spread to the youth population in Central Ukraine (Kuzio 2006, 64). Arel (2005, 45-46) notes that a realignment had also happened among the Ukrainian-speaking peasant population in Central Ukraine, meaning that in Central Ukraine rural residence and young age were now determinants for opposition support and support for integration into Europe. The revolutionary events of 2004 themselves are shown by Barrington (2012) and Katchanovski (2014) to not have had a lasting impact on the regional pattern of mass attitudes and voting patterns.\footnote{Important to us here is that there is no reason to believe that regional differences in democratic political culture between areas corresponding to former borders have appeared in this period. As we have seen, indications rather point in the opposite direction, as nationalistic, pro-western and pro-democratic ideas now seem to have gotten a foothold also in central Ukraine. Thus, a test of differences in democratic political culture across old imperial- and state borders after the Orange Revolution should amount to a tougher test of legacy effects.}

The Euromaidan protests and revolution in 2014 and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia and War in Donbass should also be commented on here. The sum of these events is even more serious for the population than the Orange Revolution in 2004. To begin with we should comment on the special historical developments of Crimea and Donbass and the goal of our study. The goal of our study is to explore how different empires and states have left legacies in the form of different levels of democratic political culture. Our focus is less on internal differences inside the areas that have been subject to the same historical regimes, and as will be explained in Chapter 5.4.3, our survey and method is not particularly well suited for identifying single historical factors that have given rise to historical legacies in other cases than where a historical border has divided an otherwise similar area and population. Crimea and Donbass stand out from the rest of the country in multiple ways. Donbass was subject to industrialization...
already in imperial times and experienced very rapid industrialization and urbanization in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 30s, when high numbers of people migrated to Donbass both from Russia and from other parts of Ukraine. This uprooted population never developed strong attachments to a Ukrainian identity, but instead identified with their industry, with the Soviet state and with their region (Osipian & Osipian 2006). In terms of values and culture Riabchuk (2009) considers Donbass as the region with the strongest Sovietophile and authoritarian attitudes in Ukraine, and therefore standing in stark contrast to the westernmost parts of Ukraine, were national consciousness and liberal-democratic values are most prevalent (2009, 77-79).

Crimea was transferred from the Russian Soviet republic to the Ukrainian Soviet republic only in 1954, has a long history of hosting Russian and Soviet fleet bases, and is geographically separated from the rest of Ukraine. It is the only region in Ukraine with an ethnic Russian majority, and also has a substantial minority of Crimean Tatars. These features make Crimea a special case that stand out from the rest of Ukraine in terms of historical legacies and identity (Sasse 2007). Resentments in these regions against the 2014 revolution has been exploited by Russia, who annexed Crimea in 2014, and who has supported separatists in Donbass since the outbreak of war in 2014.

It has been shown that there has indeed been a shift in mass attitudes and national identification in parts of Ukraine after these events (Kulyk 2016, 2017). A larger part of the population now self-identifies primarily as Ukrainian, while fewer primarily adhere to East-Slavic or local identities. Support for a close relationship between Ukraine and Russia has also gone down, while support for a closer relationship to the West has gone up. What has happened is that identities and sentiments that earlier were confined only to Western Ukraine now has spread also to larger parts of the population further East. This again, points toward a diminishing of differences in political culture between western Ukraine and the rest of the country.

Katchanovski (2014), however, finds that Ukraine remain regionally divided in terms of political attitudes, but the main point here is that there is no reason to believe that regional differences in democratic political culture between areas corresponding to former imperial- and state borders have appeared in this period. Still, in order to show that regional differences in democratic political culture between areas with different historical legacies have not appeared as a reaction

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35 This will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4.3.1.
to the above-mentioned events, we will utilize two surveys - one from before and one from after 2014.\footnote{We will discuss these surveys more closely in Chapter 5.}

4.2.2 Economic developments

Economic development is found to be an important factor which causes changes in political culture and should thus be taken into consideration in this analysis. The most important dividing line in Ukraine in economic terms is the one that divide the South-East from the North-West, as can be seen in Figure 4.3. While the areas to the Northwest of this line are less urbanized and dominated by agriculture and some light industry, the areas to the Southwest of this line are heavily urbanized and industrialized (Birch 2000, 1026-1027; Riabchuk 2009, 21). This characteristic geographical pattern of industrialization is connected with Ukraine’s topography and the Russian Empire’s colonization of Ukraine.

\textit{Figure 4.3 Main economical and topographical dividing line}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure4.3.png}
\caption{Main line of division between the heavily industrialized Southeast and less industrialized Northwest}
\end{figure}


The process leading up to this division began as the Russian Empire gained control over the steppe area (region B on Figure 4.3) in the course of the 18th century and realized this flat and open area’s potential for agriculture on an industrial scale. From this followed processing plants for agricultural products, and then textile industry and other industry on a vast scale. In the eastern part of the steppe area large-scale mining industry begun in the 19th century (Magocsi
A major colonization project was undertaken, and immigration was encouraged both from other parts of the Russian Empire and from other countries, as urban centers grew rapidly (Magocsi 2007, 159-165).

The forested plains to the Northwest were later incorporated into the Russian Empire, and were for topographical reasons less suited for the kind of large-scale agricultural industry which had started the industrialization of much of the Southeast. On the Habsburg side of the border the situation was similar. Galicia was an economically very backward part of the Habsburg Empire and stayed largely dependent on small-scale agriculture. The areas that were incorporated into the Soviet Union from Poland in 1939 thus were all economically backward, as were the adjacent areas that had been a part of the Soviet Union from 1921. While the industrialization of the Southeast continued through the Soviet times, the Northwest largely stayed economically underdeveloped (Birch 2000, 126-127).

Despite a general economic downturn in the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the regional economic outlook remained largely the same. The economically most successful areas in the transition period were the southeastern oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia and wages and living standards have generally been higher and unemployment lower in the southeastern areas (and Kiev) than in the northwestern areas (Birch 2000, 1028). Figure 4.4 illustrates the pattern of urbanization according to the latest census, while Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show the Regional Domestic Product (RDP) per capita for the year of our first survey (2007) and the closest we can get data to our second survey (the economic data are from 2015, while the second survey is from 2018). What we can see from these is that there is a very clear East-West dimension both in terms of urbanization and RDP, and that this division is persisting. Important for our further analysis here is also that the area to the west of Kiev is still a homogenous area which is clearly more rural and poorer than more eastern parts of the country.

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37 As we move from the poorer and more rural West to the richer and more urban East there is a more gradual rise in terms of urbanization and RDP than a crude North-West/South-East dichotomization implies, but a clear line can be seen in terms of urbanization. The most successful economic areas are in the East in addition to Kiev.
Figure 4.4. Percentage urban population in oblasts

Figure 4.4: A trend of rising proportion of urban population is visible as one moves from the West to the East, and also the line of division between the Southeast and Northwest is visible. Source: All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001.38 Retrieved from: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine’s webpage “Urban and rural population” (n. d.).

Figure 4.5, Regional Domestic Product per capita in UAH39, 2007

Figure 4.5: The heavily industrialized areas in the East are most economically successful. Also Kiev City and Kiev oblast have a high Regional Domestic Product. Western parts of the country are generally the poorest. Source: Osaulenko (2009, 14).

Figure 4.6, Regional Domestic Product per capita in UAH, 201540

Figure 4.6: The situation in 2015 was much the same as in 2007. The East plus the City of Kiev and Kiev oblast are richest, the West is poorest. Source: Verner (2017, 18).

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38 The All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 is the latest census of Ukraine.
39 Ukrainian Hryvnia.
40 Data cannot be obtained from Donetsk and Lugansk for this year due to the war, and not from Crimea, due to the annexation by Russia in 2014.
4.3 Societal Cleavages

The goal of this study is to investigate regional differences in political culture, and the main purpose of including ethnic and linguistic variables is thus to make sure that any regional effects found are not a result of certain ethnic or linguistic groups being concentrated in certain areas. Ethnicity and language are generally known as possible determinants of mass attitudes, also in Ukraine specifically. However, in order to understand why this is the case we will have to look into how ethnic and linguistic cleavages are to be understood in the Ukrainian case, and how the ethnic and linguistic boundaries have been changing.

4.3.1 Ethnolinguistic cleavages

Some authors have suggested that linguistic and ethnic divisions is the real reason behind Ukraine’s regional divisions (Arel 1998, Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger 2000). These cleavages must be understood on the background of the nation building policies of previous and present political regimes. As we have seen, a result of the different nationality policies of the Habsburg Empire as compared to the Russian Empire was that in the former case a mutually exclusive Ukrainian national identity had emerged, while this did not happen in the latter case. The existence of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic further increased the awareness of the Ukrainian nationality, but there was at the same time an official emphasis both on the closeness of the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian national groups, as well as on the overarching Soviet identity. In the East the situation persisted where people generally were not holders of any mutually exclusive identities, and in addition to Ukrainian, Soviet and East Slavic identities, they could at the same time identify by local or regional identities or as belonging to Eastern Orthodoxy (Kuzio 2015, 216). A high number of Russians migrated to industrial cities in the East, and these largely also adhered to the kind of multiple, blurred identities as eastern Ukrainians did.

In the Soviet Union Russian language was considered the language of prestige, and a command of Russian was a necessity for social mobility. This, in combination with periods of active suppression of Ukrainian language and culture, caused a significant proportion of the ethnic Ukrainian population to use Russian as their language of communication, especially those in
urban areas and higher positions (Kulyk 2011). Many Ukrainians started to declare as their native language not their language of daily communication (Russian), but the language of the ethnic group they felt closest to, the language that they thought should be privileged in society, or the language that their parents spoke (Ukrainian) (Kulyk 2011, Olzansky 2012).

We can thus find three main combinations of language use and ethnicity in Ukraine: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians. Russian-speaking Ukrainians are found to be less likely than Ukrainian-speakers to primarily identify as Ukrainians, and more likely to retain local or regional identities (Kulyk 2017). Barrington & Herron (2004) and Barrington & Faranda (2009) find that that language and ethnicity do have an impact on mass attitudes on regime support and foreign policy preferences, although less than region of residence. Khmelko & Wilson (1998) find Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians to be preferring the most nationalistic and pro-European candidates and policies, Russian-speaking Ukrainians less supportive of these, and Russians the least supportive. Regarding support for democracy there are somewhat opposing findings, as Dowley and Silver (2002, 517) find that there is less support for democracy among ethnic Russians than ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine, Barrington & Herron (2004, 67) find that Russian-speakers and mixed-speakers are less supportive of democracy than Ukrainian-speakers, while Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger (2000, 225) find that Russian-speakers are more supportive of democracy than Ukrainian-speakers. One reason for the contradicting findings may be the different ways of conceptualizing ethnic and linguistic groups.

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41 This language shift was facilitated by the closeness of the two languages, and it was thus a much smaller step for Ukrainians to shift to Russian than would be the case for natives of many other titular national groups of the Soviet Union.

42 According to a survey covering the population of Ukraine, a third of the respondents understand “native language” as the language in which they think and talk freely, another third understands it as the language of the nation they belong to, and the rest understand it as either the language of one’s parents or the language one speaks most often (Olzansky 2012).

43 In addition to this there are significant groups of ethnic Ukrainians who are constantly switching between the two languages, or who speak a mix of the two languages, called surzhyk. More about this phenomenon, and how this group is viewed in terms of ethnic group belonging can be found in Bernsand (2000) and Olzansky (2012). There are also several small ethnic and linguistic minorities in Ukraine that we will not focus on here. Notably, the two oblasts of Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi stand out as oblasts with sizable minorities.

44 According to the latest census (from 2001), 78 % of the population is ethnic Ukrainian, while ethnic Russians number 17 % of the population. 68 % of the population states Ukrainian as their native language, while 30 % states Russian (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2018). However, according to Kulyk (2011), probably less than half of the population in reality prefers Ukrainian in situations where they can choose between Ukrainian and Russian.
speak is a better indicator of identity, and thus also values and attitudes, than their stated native language. The map shown in Figure 4.9 is based on Khmelko (2004, 11, 13), who combines evidence from a high number of surveys in order to find out how many who actually do speak Ukrainian when given the choice between Ukrainian and Russian.\footnote{The vast majority of those who do not choose to speak Ukrainian choose Russian, while there is also a group (especially in region 3) who mix the languages.}

As we can see when we compare Figure 4.9 with Figure 4.8, the proportion of Ukrainian speakers falls off much faster as one move eastward than do the proportion of people who report Ukrainian as their native language. Only in the westernmost region, region 1, in Figure 4.9 is the proportion of active Ukrainian speakers at the same level as the proportion of people who report Ukrainian as their native language. In Figure 4.7 we see that proportion of Ukrainians by nationality falls of slower than language as one moves from the West to the East.

\textit{Figure 4.7} \hspace{1em} \textbf{Percentage ethnic Ukrainians by oblast}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.7.png}
\caption{Percentage ethnic Ukrainians by oblast.}
\end{figure}

A couple of findings about changes in national identification among the ethnolinguistic groups after Euromaidan and the War in Donbass should be commented on here. Kulyk (2017, 9) finds that while there are signs that Russian-speakers in the north-western part of Ukraine increasingly identify primarily as Ukrainians after Euromaidan and the War in Donbass, the opposite trend is visible in the Southeast. In sum the proportion of Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian is stable at around 40%. Among the rest of the population (primarily Ukrainian-speakers) the proportion who primarily identify as Ukrainian has risen from 60% to 75% between 2012 and 2014. There is in other words an increasing gap between Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers in terms of the proportion who primarily identifies as Ukrainian. Pop-Eleches & Robertson (2018) likewise find no signs of a weakening of ethnolinguistic group as a marker of political values, attitudes and identity in the same period, but rather see some signs of a strengthening of this cleavage (2018, 116).

46 Numbers are calculated on the basis of Kulyk (2017, 9). See Appendix for calculations.
4.3.2 Religious cleavages

We have in Chapter 4.1 commented on the history of the Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine, and as can be seen from Figure 4.10, the demographic situation with regards to Greek Catholics versus Orthodox believers is still quite similar to what it was a hundred years ago.

*Figure 4.10  Percentage Greek Catholics by oblast*

![Percentage Greek Catholics by oblast](image)

*Source: Polishchuk (2015).*

In 1946, when the westernmost parts of present-day Ukraine had recently been incorporated into the Soviet Union, a very rare example of forcible mass conversion ordered by the Central Committee of the Communist party in the Soviet Union found place, as Greek Catholic parishes were turned Russian Orthodox. This was probably a part of a plan to make the former inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire into loyal Soviet Ukrainians and make it easier to control their minds through a single religious body (Jepsen 2005) and have them accept the official historiography that saw Ukrainian history only as a part of a wider Russian history (David 2018). This made the Greek Catholic church to disappear from the surface of Ukrainian society and continue its activities as the world’s largest underground church (Kuzio 2015, 150). The Greek Catholic church became a center of resistance against Soviet rule and a promoter of democracy and Ukrainian national identity, especially after being supported by John Paul II, who was elected Pope in 1978 (Kuzio 2015, 150). In 1989 many of the parishes that had been converted to Russian Orthodoxy by force in 1946 started defecting to the Greek Catholic church. However, not everyone wanted such a return or did not want to be subjected to the Pope, and many of the parishes in Galicia that wanted to stay orthodox joined the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox

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47 As these oblast-wise data are collected in 2015, there are no data shown for Crimea. However, only two percent of the population in Crimea belongs to another denomination or religion than one of the Orthodox churches or Islam (IRI 2013).
Church (Jepsen 2005). The Greek Catholic Church thus does not have a full monopoly among the faithful in Galicia today, and the proportion of Greek Catholics is between 50% and 60% in all three oblasts of Galicia.

We have already mentioned Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017) who find strong evidence that Catholics in former communist countries have a stronger commitment to democratic values than others. Their proposed reason for this is that the Pope served as an external authority who spoke against the communist authorities, as well as the general anti-communist messages spread by the church. Both of these factors should also apply to the special denominational construction of the Greek Catholic Church. Katchanovski (2018) does find that Greek Catholics are more committed to democratic values than others, and Drummond & Lubecki (2010) find that churchgoers in Galicia have the highest level of turnout in Ukrainian elections and infer from this that the Greek Catholic Church serves as a transmitter of civic values.

4.4 A conceptual map of Ukraine

The conceptual map (Table 4.1) summarizes the geographical distribution of factors that are thought to shape democratic political culture. Oblasts in the same category are clustered according to their geographical clustering, and each of these clusters is given a name by which we will refer to them. The geographical clusters of oblasts are also similar on other variables are not mentioned on the conceptual map. Zhytomyr, Vinnitsya and Khmelnytsky, which are grouped together as “West Central”, in their entirety belonged to the Polish-Commonwealth at the onset of the first partition, while all the five oblasts which are grouped together as “Central” either partly or in their entirety belonged to the Russian Empire at the same point in time (this can be seen from Figure 4.1). Also, none of the oblasts grouped as “West Central” were among the worst affected by Holodomor, while several of those oblasts grouped as “Central” were strongly affected (this can be seen on Figure 4.2). “Donbass” is separated from “East Central” due to its particular history of heavy industrialization and strong identification with the Soviet Union. “Donbass” also experienced a stronger economic downturn than “East Central” around the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. “Crimea” is separated from “South” due to its special history and status as a very Russified region.
Table 4.1. A conceptual map of Ukraine with factors shaping democratic political culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional-level variables</th>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Individual-level variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial legacy</td>
<td>Inter-war legacy</td>
<td>Demographic and economic profile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habsburg Empire</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Agrarian, rural, low population density, poor</td>
<td>Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Empire</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Agrarian, rural, low population density, poor</td>
<td>Rivne, Volyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agrarian, rural, low population density, poor</td>
<td>Zhytomyr, Vinnitsya, Khmelnytck, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovograd, Sumy, Poltava, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialized, urbanized, high population density, rich</td>
<td>City of Kiev, Kiev oblast, Kharkov, Zaporozhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Lugansk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialized, medium to low urbanized, medium population density, medium rich to poor</td>
<td>Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48 Poltava is richer than the other oblasts in this category, but has the same low level of urbanization, and low proportion of Russians.
Table 4.1: This conceptual map of Ukraine summarises the geographical distribution of factors that are expected to play a role in the shaping of people’s commitment to democratic values. 49 Basically, oblasts are placed in groups that share the same attributes. These groups are sorted according to their geographic location, and as we move from the top to the bottom of the table we also move (crudely) from the West to the East and South. The first column from the left shows the two different imperial legacies that an oblast can have. The second column shows the two inter-war legacies that an oblast can have, and thus divides the oblasts with a Russian Imperial legacy into two groups, one with Polish inter-war legacy, and the other with Soviet inter-war legacy. The third column shows the demographic and economic profile of the oblasts (this is of course a crude approximation). The oblasts that end up in the same category after these three dichotomy-trichotomizations are now grouped into regions according to their geographical clustering, and each of these regions is labeled with a name. The two last columns show individual variables. The second last column shows which religious groups can be found inside each regional category. (Only in Galicia can there be found two substantial religious groups). The last column shows the ethnolinguistic groups that are found inside each regional category and religious group.

We can now draw a new map of Ukraine, Figure 4.11, with regions that correspond to the regional divisions that have been found through the conceptual map, Table 4.1.

Figure 4.11  Map of Ukraine with regions obtained from the conceptual map

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of region</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Galicia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>East Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Donbass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>South-West</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49 Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi are excluded from this conceptual map for the sake of clarity. We have already mentioned that these regions will not be analyzed in this thesis, and the reasons for that will be further outlined in Chapter 4.
The three western regions *Galicia (1), Volhynia (2) and West Central (3)* are clustered around the former borders and will be central in our hypothesis testing. *Table 4.2* summarizes the regime history for these regions and presents regime history also for the historical periods before the partitions of Poland-Lithuania and after the World War 2. This is done in order to point out that these three regions have the exact same regime history both before and after the imperial age and inter-war age. We have earlier shown that these three regions have had similar economic and demographic profiles (with except for religious and ethnolinguistic composition) since the time of the partitions of Poland, which make them well suited for comparison. We note that *Galicia (1)* and *Volhynia (2)* differ on only one historical variable – that of the imperial age - and that *Volhynia (2)* and *West Central (3)* also differ on only one historical variable – that of the inter-war age. *Galicia (1)* and *West Central (3)* differ on both of these historical variables simultaneously.

**Table 4.2 Summary of regime history for three western regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical period</th>
<th>Galicia (1)</th>
<th>Volhynia (2)</th>
<th>West Central (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1795-WW1</td>
<td>Habsburg Empire</td>
<td>Russian Empire</td>
<td>Russian Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW2-WW2</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW2-1991</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.5 Discussion of earlier findings**

As we have seen, there is much evidence of historical legacies leading to regional differences in political culture in Ukraine. However, poor survey quality is often hindering precise assessments of these legacies and regional differences. A low level of geographic precision can make it

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50 As can be seen from *Figure 4.1*, a small part of Ternopil oblast, which is one of the three oblasts in the region of Galicia, belonged to the Russian Empire. Still, as much as 89% of the present-day adult population of Ternopil lives on the territories of the former Habsburg Empire. This is calculated on the basis of information from Katchanovski (2006, 214, 237). See Appendix for calculations.
difficult to find regional differences, and in any case makes it impossible to say exactly where regional boundaries can be found, and thus also what has caused their appearance. We also note by comparing Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.1 that the area with the highest proportion of Ukrainian speakers corresponds with the areas to the west of the former outer borders of the Soviet Union. From Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.1 we can see that the areas where Greek Catholics are in a majority (and indeed are making up a significant proportion of the population at all) correspond to the former Habsburg province of Galicia. As both of these demographic groups (Ukrainian-speakers and Greek Catholics) have been theorized and found to be more committed to democratic values than others, we clearly have to consider if an eventual finding of a more democratic culture in Western Ukraine than in the rest of the country may have to do only with the overrepresentation of these particular demographic groups.

Analyses based on surveys with a very low level of geographical precision do not find a more democratic culture in Western Ukraine than in other parts of Ukraine. Miller, White & Heywood (1998, 71) use a survey with samples from only some oblasts, and they combine the region that we have defined as Volhynia with Lviv oblast in Galicia, and call this “Western Ukraine”. Their region of “Western Ukraine” thus includes oblasts which differ on a crucial legacy-variable, as can be seen in Table 4.1. Their definition of “Eastern Ukraine” equals our Donbass plus East Central, while “Central Ukraine” includes all remaining regions. As we can understand from Table 4.1, their three regions thus comprise oblasts which differ on several variables simultaneously, and by comparing these regions they thus do not manage to isolate any specific historical legacy variable (nor any other regional variables). We find basically the same problem in Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger’s (2000) analysis, where Ukraine is divided into two equally large halves, which thus also comprises oblasts that differ on several variables simultaneously.51 Shulman (2005), who uses a five-region framework, also has this problem.52

51 In their framework “Western Ukraine” consists of Galicia, Volhynia, West Central, Kiev and Southwest, while “Eastern Ukraine” basically consists of Central, East Central, Donbass, Crimea and South (Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger 2000, 216). From Table 4.1 we can see that inside their “Western Ukraine” are included oblasts with all possible regime histories and combinations. It would thus in reality be impossible to say anything about historical legacies based on the results of their analysis.

52 Shulman (2005, 73) uses a survey with samples from only some oblasts. Included in his “Western Ukraine” are oblasts from our Galicia, Volhynia and Southwest regions. “Central Ukraine” comprises Kiev oblast, Vinnytsia oblast and Poltava oblast in his framework, and “Southeast” includes Dontesk, Kharkiv, Dnipropestrovsk and Odesa. He also uses the City of Kiev and Crimea as individual regions.
The three newer studies are better, but there are problems attached also to these. Person (2010) is explicitly investigating historical legacies in the former Habsburg province of Galicia, but he merges all other oblasts than the three oblasts of Galicia into one macro region and compares Galicia with this (2010, 145-154, 158-160). Person does find that residence in Galicia leads to a higher level of commitment to democratic values as compared to residence in the rest of Ukraine, but as we understand from Table 4.1, he does not obtain any control at all for other regional variables as all non-Galician oblasts are merged together in one macro-region. We therefore cannot tell from Person’s findings if Galicia is actually different also from its nearest neighbors on the other sides of the former borders, or if the positive finding is driven only for example by some oblasts in the far East which are creating a big overall difference between Galicia and the non-Galician macro region. ICDT (2015) also finds that residence in Western Ukraine increase one’s commitment to democratic values. However, their “Western Ukraine” includes all the areas that did not belong to the Soviet Union before World War 2 (Belanenko 2018, personal communication in email), which corresponds to Galicia, Volhynia and Southwest in our framework. ICDT (2015, 41) uses Kiev as baseline comparison region, and as we can see from Table 4.1, Kiev is different from the western regions on several variables. When ICDT find an effect of residence in “Western Ukraine” we thus cannot know what causes this. Katchanovski (2018) is using the same definition of Western Ukraine as ICDT, but he does not find a particularly high level of democratic culture there as compared to other regions. It is unclear how “Central Ukraine”, “Eastern Ukraine” and “Southern Ukraine” are defined in his article, but since he informs that “Western Ukraine” is defined as Galica, Volhynia and Southwest it would anyway have been impossible to tell which historical legacies that had accounted for eventual differences in democratic culture between the regions. Katchanovski does, however, find a higher level of commitment to democratic values among the Greek-Catholic population, which is highly concentrated in Galica.

We now understand that in order to isolate the historical legacy-variables, we have to be very careful with which regions to compare. In Table 4.2 we have shown the three regions which are best suited for comparison, and two of our hypotheses will be based on these regions.
4.6 Hypotheses

We will now formulate three hypotheses. As we have outlined in this chapter, we have reasons to believe that there is a particularly high level of democratic political culture in certain areas due to historical legacies. We are in other words expecting that historical legacy relationships are operating in such a way that people who live in certain areas are more committed to democratic values than people who live in other areas. If we can confirm - when controlled for other effects - that there is an effect on people’s commitment to democratic values from living in an area that was ruled by a particular empire or state, we can therefore also infer that there is a historical legacy relationship operating. Further, if there is such a thing as an Eastern European threshold in democratic culture as was discussed in Chapter 3.2.2.1, we should expect that the regions to the east of this threshold have a lower level of democratic culture than the areas to the west of it.

Our first two hypotheses are therefore concerning the effect on commitment to democratic values from living in certain regions. The third hypothesis is concerning the level of democratic culture, which will be measured as the average level of commitment to democratic values within a population, and will serve as a point of departure for discussing the strength of other contextual effects that influence people’s commitment to democratic values in Ukraine.

Based on the theory and findings we have presented about historical legacies of imperial rule we can formulate the following hypothesis:

\[ H1: \text{To live in Galicia has a positive effect on commitment to democratic values as compared to living in Volhynia.} \]

The former border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian empire runs through an area that is otherwise very homogenous, where Galicia is located on the former Habsburg side of the border, and Volhynia is located on the former Russian side. Thus, if we can confirm that there is a positive effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Galicia as compared to Volhynia, then we will have reason to believe that the developments leading up to this effect originate in the period when different empires ruled on each side of the border. This will, according to Beissinger & Kotkin’s definition (2014, 7), amount to a legacy relationship between developments in imperial times and present-day commitment to democratic values. If we find
that H1 is supported, we will thus also establish that a legacy of Habsburg imperial rule is a more democratic political culture than that of Russian Imperial rule.

Based on the theory and findings we have presented about Greek Catholics, and since Greek Catholics are overrepresented in the former Habsburg province of Galicia, we can formulate the following rival hypothesis:

\[ H1a: \text{A higher average level of commitment to democratic values in Galicia than in Volhynia is explained by Galicia’s population of Greek Catholics, who are more committed to democratic values than others.} \]

The null hypothesis is:

\[ H1null: \text{There is no difference in people’s commitment to democratic values between Galicia and Volhynia.} \]

Based on the theory and findings we have presented about historical legacies from the inter-war period we can formulate the following hypothesis:

\[ H2: \text{To live in Volhynia has a positive effect on commitment to democratic values as compared to living in West Central.} \]

The former border between Poland and the Soviet Union runs through an area that is otherwise very homogenous, and where Volhynia is located on the former Polish side of the border, and where West Central is located on the former Soviet Union side. Thus, if we can confirm that there is a positive effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Volhynia as compared to West Central, then we will have reason to believe that the developments leading up to this effect originate in the period when different states ruled on each side of the border. This will, according to Beissinger & Kotkin’s definition (2014, 7), amount to a legacy relationship between developments in the inter-war age and present-day commitment to democratic values. If we find that H2 is supported, we will thus also establish that a legacy of inter-war rule by Poland is a more democratic political culture than that of inter-war rule by the Soviet Union.
Based on the theory and findings we have presented about Ukraine’s ethnolinguistic cleavages, and since Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians are overrepresented in Volhynia, we can formulate the following rival hypothesis:

\[ H2a: \text{A higher average level of commitment to democratic values in Volhynia than in West Central is explained by Volhynia’s population of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, who are more committed to democratic values than others.} \]

The null hypothesis is:

\[ H2\text{null}: \text{There is no difference in people’s commitment to democratic values between Volhynia and West Central.} \]

Based on theory, findings and suggestions about a particularly high level of democratic culture in the former Habsburg province of Galicia as compared to all other regions, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

\[ H3: \text{Galicia has a higher average level of commitment to democratic values than all regions that belonged to the Russian Empire.} \]

As we understand, H3 is not concerning the effect of living on the western side of the former border between the Habsburg province of Galicia and the Russian Empire. Galicia and the regions of the former Russian Empire are different on more than one variable simultaneously, and we can therefore not isolate specific effects in the way we that we can in the border area. H3 therefore concerns the average level of commitment to democratic culture in Galicia as compared to all other regions, when not controlling for other variables. Through H3 we will thus compare the strength of the historical legacy relationship with all other possible pathways to a democratic political culture that can be found in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Even if H1 is confirmed, it is possible that regions further east have an equally high or higher level of democratic political culture than Galicia. If so, we must conclude that there are other pathways to a high level of democratic political culture than that of historical legacies.\footnote{As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the available surveys put limits on what we can investigate. Better surveys would allow for methods that could shed more light on the effect of other factors than historical legacies.}

Based on theory about development of democratic political culture we would expect the economically most highly developed regions
to be most able to compete with Galicia in terms of level of democratic culture. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the economically most highly developed regions are Kiev, East Central and Donbass. Among these we will expect Kiev and East Central to have a high level of democratic culture, while Donbass (As discussed in Chapter 4.2.1) for other reasons is expected to have a low level of democratic culture.

The null hypothesis is:

\[ H_{3null}: \text{Galicia does not have a higher average level of commitment to democratic values than all regions that belonged to the Russian Empire.} \]

We will now go on with explaining how we will measure commitment to democratic values, and how we will conduct the statistical analysis.

5. Data and method

5.1 Introduction

Ukraine has been called a “natural experiment” (Peisakhin 2015, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017) due to the historical circumstances that made borders between empires and states divide an otherwise very homogenous population. Fuchs (1999, 123) comments that the German case, where a country was divided in two parts and underlaid different political regimes for around 50 years, almost perfectly conforms to Przeworski & Teune’s (1970) “most similar systems design”, where the basic idea is to compare systems that are as similar as possible except for on the dependent variable and on one independent variable. What Fuchs said was the case for Germany also seems to be the case for parts of Ukraine, and our research design will be constructed in order to exploit this. We have found two surveys that are suited for this purpose, one of which is conducted before, and the other conducted after the Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea, and almost four years into the war in Donbass. Two surveys will yield more validity than just one, and by employing both of these surveys for testing our hypotheses we will also be sure that the patterns of democratic political culture that we find are not created by, nor erased by, the events starting in 2014.
We will in the following subchapters explain why these surveys are suited for our purpose, and look at the possibilities they give and limitations they put on what we can study. Further, we will explain how we create an index of commitment to democratic values and explain how and why we will conduct an OLS-regression with regional dummy variables.

5.2 Surveys

A thorough review of available surveys of Ukraine has been done before concluding on which surveys are best suited for our purpose. The most fruitful search was done in the online database of Kyyivs'kyy Mizhnarodnyy Instytut Sotsiolohiyi [Kiev International Institute of Sociology] (KIIS). In their database Kyyivs'kyy arkhiv (“Kyivan archive”) more than 200 surveys conducted by Ukrainian survey institutes between 1991 and 2017 are stored (KIIS n. d.). Kyyivs'kyy arkhiv was where we eventually discovered one of the surveys that we ended up using, namely KIIS Omnibus 2007/10 (from now on: Omnibus 2007), conducted by KIIS in 2007 (KIIS 2007a). The other survey that we will use, KIIS Omnibus 2018/02 (from now on: Omnibus 2018) was conducted by KIIS in 2018. By request from this author, and with financial support from the University of Bergen, the questions that were most relevant to us in Omnibus 2007 were included again in Omnibus 2018.54

In the process of searching for surveys we have been looking specifically for surveys that fulfill certain criteria: They must be surveys of the population of Ukraine that include relevant questions for our investigation of democratic political culture, and they also need to include relevant background questions about the respondents, particularly questions related to language, ethnicity and religion. Further, and importantly, as our goal is to compare inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine, the surveys have to be representative also for relevant regions of the country, and as a consequence of this the number of respondents of the countrywide survey must be reasonably high.

54 Omnibus 2018 has of 30th May 2018 not been made public and was received by this author in email from Eugene Ilenko at KIIS together with survey methodology paper. All Omnibus surveys with methodology papers and questionnaires are at some point made public at online database Kyyivs'kyy arkhiv (KIIS n. d.).
It appears that we are facing a dilemma, since we will have to choose between datasets that give us a high level of conceptual precision (datasets that include many questions that are highly relevant when studying the spread of democratic values), or a dataset that gives us a high level of geographical precision (datasets that are representative for a low regional level. This will be better explained below.) As discussed earlier, what is lacking in the literature is a geographically highly precise analysis. In order to be able to conduct such a geographically precise analysis we have prioritized the geographical aspect of survey quality.

5.2.1 Representativeness at sub-national levels

The choice of survey method is often a question about high precision versus cost-efficiency. A compromise between these two considerations needs to be found, and in most Ukrainian surveys this means that the method which is used is a variant of stratified multistage cluster sampling. Forms of multistage sampling are widely used in surveys of large geographical areas (Daniel 2012, 153). We will now see how the different aspects of this sampling method affect the random sampling error, and what the consequences of this are for us.

One way to make sure that relevant subgroups of a population are represented in a sample is to divide the population into a number of strata that coincide with these subgroups, and then draw a sample from each of these strata. As compared to simple random sampling without stratification, this technique reduces the overall random sampling error, since we are guaranteed a number of respondents from all strata (2012, 138-139). Stratification is often used when the aim is to obtain nationally representative samples, but also - and more important to us - when the aim is to compare different strata of the same category with each other (2012, 131-133). Even though the surveys that we use have national representativeness as their primary aim, this latter point will be exploited by us.

In most surveys of Ukraine, the country is divided into a number of regional strata, which are again divided into “type of settlement”-strata. The Omnibus 2007 and Omnibus 2018 have samples that are stratified according to all oblasts, and also according to type of settlement inside each oblast and autonomous region. In 2007 this means that stratification is done according to 25
oblasts,\textsuperscript{55} while in 2018 stratification is done according to 24 oblasts.\textsuperscript{56,57} As will now be explained, this gives us an opportunity for a fine grained analysis with regards to regional effects.

Sampling is done inside each stratum - and in most cases this is done so that the final national sample includes correct proportions of respondents from each of the regional strata, as well as correct proportions of respondents from the different types of settlement inside each regional stratum. In most of the Ukrainian surveys “type of settlement” means urban versus rural residence, or in some cases also a further division of urban residence into small towns versus large cities. If commitment to democratic values is dependent on specific demographic characteristics we need to be sure that samples from the regions that we compare are made in such a way they reflect the true distribution of the relevant demographic groups in these regions. Urban or rural residence is found to be an important determinant of political culture in former communist countries (as well as globally). This makes type of settlement an important demographic characteristic in itself, and in addition to this we have already mentioned that several other demographic characteristics are unequally distributed between urban and rural types of settlements in Ukraine. This includes ethnic and linguistic groups specifically in the Ukrainian case, and generally also age, gender, education and income groups can be unequally distributed between urban and rural areas. Thus, by making sure that sampling is done both in urban and rural regions of each regional stratum, one will obtain samples that are closer to the real distribution of these demographic characteristics.\textsuperscript{58} We will now turn to the more problematic side of the multistage survey methods.

\textsuperscript{55} This is confirmed by Yulia Sakhno (2017, personal communication in email). Unfortunately, no detailed paper about survey methodology is available specifically for Omnibus 2007, but Sakhno (2017, personal communication in email) confirms that all Omnibus surveys are conducted using the same sampling methods, and that the paper about survey methodology which is available for Omnibus KIIS 2015/12 (KIIS 2015) is valid also for Omnibus 2007.

\textsuperscript{56} In Omnibus 2018 sampling is not done at all on Crimea, and in Donetsk oblast and Luhansk oblast only in the areas that are under control of the Ukrainian authorities.

\textsuperscript{57} Two surveys of Ukraine with good regional representation are the ones conducted by the project “Region Nation and Beyond”, available at University of St. Gallen’s webpage “Region nation and beyond” (2017) but these are lacking good questions about democratic values.

\textsuperscript{58} Minor to medium deviations from the real distribution of demographic groups may also be adjusted through the use of weights. We will in our analysis employ the weight which are included in the datasets.
All relevant surveys from Ukraine are done by an interviewer face-to-face. Interviewers need to visit households in person, and the time usage and cost of conducting a survey will therefore be reduced if respondents are geographically concentrated. As we will see, this comes at the cost of higher random sampling error.

In most of the relevant surveys a four-stage procedure is followed after a decision has been made on which geographical regions and types of settlement should be used as strata. The first step is to randomly draw a number of sampling points, for example a number of postal districts, inside each stratum. These sampling points are what we call primary sampling units (PSU) (Daniel 2012, 153-154). The second step is to draw a number of districts inside each PSU, which thus become secondary sampling units (SSU), and in some cases districts are also drawn inside the SSUs as tertiary sampling units (TSU). The third step is then to draw an address of the first household that is to be visited by the interviewer, and the fourth step is to draw a route to be followed to other households inside the SSU or TSU. This is the technique used by KIIS in the Omnibus surveys, which they call four stage random sampling (KIIS 2015). This sampling method can be placed in the category that Daniel (2012, 153) calls multistage cluster sampling. What is of relevance to us is to understand how multistage cluster sampling leads to larger random sampling errors than simple random sampling does, and what the consequences of this is with regards to regional representativeness of the surveys.

Ideally, in order to obtain representative samples from all strata, simple random sampling should be done inside each stratum. When this is done, the overall random sampling error of the survey becomes lower than what it would have been if simple random sampling was done without stratification (2012, 162). This would also be the ideal situation when the goal is to compare different strata of the same category (2012, 131-133). When simple random sampling is not an option, and sampling inside the strata is done by use of sampling units, one would want the within-sampling unit differences to be as large as possible in order to capture the whole range of

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59 None are done through telephone. Generally, face-to-face interviews are preferred because it gives higher response rates and a better possibility to control which member of a household who answers the questions (Daniel 2012 40, 48).

60 When KIIS uses the word “random” it is probably in order to point out that drawing is done randomly in every step, so that every respondent has the same probability of being drawn. Daniels’ emphasis is on the effects of the clustering of respondents in PSUs and SSUs.
values on the variables of interest which exist inside each stratum (2012, 162). The closer the sampling units resemble the stratum as a whole the less information is lost when sampling is done from the sampling units instead of simple random sampling inside the stratum.

In the Omnibus surveys a PSU is a whole city or town in the urban strata, and a rayon (municipality) in the rural strata. SSUs are districts inside cities and towns in the urban strata and villages in the rural strata. In the urban strata samples are drawn from these SSUs, while in rural strata one further step is taken as samples are drawn from TSUs in the form of village districts (KIIS 2015). This means that there is a problem attached to these surveys, as to all other surveys that use geographic clusters, namely that the smaller geographical areas the sampling units cover, the more homogenous the sampling units tend to become (Daniel 2012, 153-154). This form of multistage cluster sampling, in other words, are producing samples with lower strata-wise representativeness and higher random sampling errors than would be the case if simple random sampling was done inside the strata (2012, 160).

Calculation of sampling error is more complicated for multistage cluster samples than for simple random samples, and special methods should therefore ideally be used when analyzing multistage cluster samples. This is not always taken into consideration when regression analyses are conducted, with the result of biased standard errors and overestimated significance levels (2012, 160). In our case there are no variables in the datasets that indicate PSUs, SSUs or TSUs, and we are thus confined to conduct the regression analysis as if we are dealing with a simple random sample. This must be taken into consideration when assessing the results from our analysis, and as we will now see, it also has consequences for the way in which we can conduct our analysis.

If the sampling units are internally homogenous but not representative for the overall stratum, it follows that a way of increasing the representativeness and reducing the random sampling error of a multistage cluster sample is to increase the number of sampling units (2012, 160). In the Omnibus surveys there are in total 110 sampling points, which means that there are on average slightly more than two sampling points from the rural areas and two sampling points from the urban areas of each of the 24/25 oblasts. With such a low number of sampling units the samples from the individual oblasts have a low level of representativeness, and the surveys are not well suited for investigations and comparisons of individual oblasts. However, this is a problem that
can be dealt with elegantly. As we have seen in Table 1, there are groups of oblasts that are similar on both historical and other variables. By merging together oblasts that are known to be similar on variables of interest we obtain more or less homogenous macro-regions with a higher number of sampling points. The representativeness of these macro-regions thus becomes higher than for the individual oblasts. Other surveys than those conducted by KIIS are not stratified according to all oblasts but are instead stratified for groups of oblasts consisting of between four and 12 oblasts. If these regional strata had been equivalent to the regions that we want to compare, we could just as well have used one of these surveys as the Omnibus surveys. The problem is that regional strata in the surveys are not equivalent to the regions that we want to compare, and we would thus have had to divide regional strata in order to obtain samples from the regions that we want to compare. This would have been a problematic thing to do. If we create macro-regions completely independent of the regional strata, we do not know how representative these macro-regions are. For example, if we create a macro-region by merging half of one regional stratum with a third of another regional stratum, we may end up with a macro-region that has a very unbalanced sample in terms of type of settlement (and thus possibly also other demographic characteristics), that has a very uneven distribution of sampling points, that has few sampling points, or that has a very small sample. These problems will be particularly large if a sample has only a few, large regional strata from which a low number of sampling points are drawn. The surveys with a low number of stratified regions could be used only if detailed information about the geographical location of all sampling points were provided, and if these sampling points by chance happened to be placed in such a way that we ended up with macro-regions that are representative of the population. In the end the Omnibus surveys therefore give us the highest level of control of the representativeness of the regions that we are interested in comparing. Omnibus 2007 (N=2032) and Omnibus 2018 (N=2043) are also among the available surveys that have the highest number of respondents. Still, this means that the number of respondents from each oblast is relatively low,\(^{61}\) which is another reason why these surveys are not suited for studying individual oblasts.

\(^{61}\) Not more than 38 and 50 for the least inhabited oblast in Omnibus 2007 and Omnibus 2018 respectively.
5.2.2 Questions included in the survey

In Chapter 3 we discussed two different approaches for measuring democratic culture. The Omnibus surveys include questions that allow us to study democratic political culture according to a narrow approach that focuses on commitment to basic democratic values. The number of relevant questions for measuring political culture is lower here than in some of the other surveys, but if we want to conduct a geographically precise analysis, this is our best choice. The questions included in the Omnibus surveys are:

“There are different views on what social and political conditions are required for life in this country to be good. How important are the following conditions in this regard?

1. The right to speak freely about everything, even if it creates tension in society
2. The possibility to print newspapers of every political orientation
3. Freedom to join political parties that can compete in elections

1- Not at all important
2- Not very important
3- Difficult to say if it is important or not important
4- Important, but not obligatory
5- Obligatory

These are all questions that directly pertain to basic liberal democratic rights and liberties as understood from Dahl (1971, 1989), and are thus valid as measures of peoples’ commitment to democratic values.

Omnibus 2007 includes questionnaires and datasets in Russian and Ukrainian. Translations into English are done by this author on the basis of the Russian version. The same questions that were included in Omnibus 2007 were again included in Omnibus 2018 by request from this author, and with financial support from the University of Bergen. KIIS then asked this author to translate these questions from Russian into English in order for them to make a dataset in English. Thus, there exist an English version of the Omnibus 2018 dataset, and the wording of the questions in that dataset is a product of this author’s translation from Russian. This translation is not necessarily very accurate. In the present subchapter the questions are presented as written in the Omnibus 2018 dataset, but some notes on the translation should be made: The word “obligatory” is a translation of the Russian word обязательно, and a better translation in this context would probably have been “necessary” or “very important”. See Appendix for full questions in Russian.
In a situation like this, when we have several questions measuring different aspects of the same concept, a possible next step is to merge the questions together to a composite measure that can be seen as an overall measurement of the concept. Composite measures like this have been used for measurement of democratic political culture by, among others, Fuchs & Roller (1994), Fuchs & Klingemann (2006), Katchanovski (2018) and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017).

5.3 Constructing a composite measure

5.3.1 Concept and measurement

The answers to the questions on our surveys are given in terms of how important rights and freedoms are for the respondent, which is coded to a 5-point scale. This is in other words a 5-point ordinal variable and is what we can call a Likert-type item (Gliem & Gliem 2003). To analyze ordinal variables as if they were metric has often been criticized and should not be done if they have less than 6-7 values (Midtbø 2016, 35). However, when one has several 5-point items which are measuring the same concept, the most beneficial way of analyzing them is, according to Gliem & Gliem (2003), to add them together to a summated multi-item scale (what we will call a composite measure), which can then be treated as a continuous scale. If this is to be done, it must be shown, both theoretically and empirically, that the items are actually measuring the same concept. If this can be shown, it will be beneficial to make a composite measure. A single item has considerable random measurement error, and if several items that are measuring the same concept are added together, much of this random error will average out. Further, even though the items should measure the same concept, more than one item may be needed in order to represent various aspects of this concept (Gliem & Gliem 2003, 83; Hair et al. 2014, 122). Goertz (2006, 103) is stressing the need for the measure structure of a concept to comply with the theoretical structure of the concept. If the theoretical structure of a concept requires several elements to be present, then the measurement of the concept should not simply be the added sum of the elements which are actually present. In our case, “commitment to democratic values” refers to a general commitment to democratic values (and not just support for some of Dahls rights and liberties). Thus, a person’s degree of commitment to democratic values should, if the concept really exists, be reflected in a similar degree of commitment to various individual democratic values. In other words, we should investigate empirically if there is a high degree of consistency to the way
respondents are answering the three questions in the surveys. If we find that there is such a consistency, then we know that the three questions are actually measuring the same latent concept. And further, we will then also know that it is meaningful to speak about the concept of “commitment to democratic values” in the Ukrainian context. The way to go ahead to find out if the three questions are measuring the same latent concept is to investigate the composite measure’s dimensionality and internal consistency (Hair et al. 2014, 123; Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman 1991, 10-11).

5.3.2 Dimensionality
When we test the dimensionality of a set of variables we analyze the structure of the interrelatedness of the variables in order to find out if there are groups of variables which can be grouped together as measures of the same concept (Hair et al. 2014, 92). In the context of survey analysis this means that we will be analyzing how the answers people give to different questions are interrelated, and in this way try to find out if there are groups of questions which can be seen as measures of the same underlying concept. A group of variables that correlate with the same underlying concept can be said to be unidimensional. In our case we want to find out if the questions that we presented in Chapter 5.2.2 are unidimensional and thus measures of the same underlying concept. Assessment of the dimensionality of a set of variables can be done either through exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis (2014, 123). We will here proceed by conducting a form of exploratory factor analysis.63

The first step before starting with the factor analysis itself is to check that there is sufficient correlation between the variables so that it is possible to make a proper estimation of the underlying structure of the variables (Hair et al. 2014, 102-103).64 We then face a choice between common factor analysis and component analysis.65 We follow Costello & Osbourne’s (2005, 1-2) recommendation, and do not conduct a principal component analysis, which they regard as an

63 Confirmatory factor analysis is well suited for testing of hypotheses about relationships between groups of variables and underlying concepts but can not be conducted for a single group of less than four variables due to a lack of degrees of freedom (Hair et al. 2014, 670). In our case we have a single composite measure consisting of only three variables.
64 This was done in the form of a Bartlett test of sphericity as well as a measurement of sampling adequacy, as recommended by Hair et al. (2014, 102-103). These tests confirmed a sufficient correlation between the variables.
65 See Hair et al. (2014, 105-106) for a comparison of these forms of analysis.
outdated and “untrue” form of factor analysis which can yield inflated results. We rather follow their advice of conducting a form of common exploratory factor analysis, which analyses the underlying structure of the variables on the basis only of their shared variance (Hair et al. 2014, 105). We end up with doing an iterated principal-factor analysis, which gives better estimates than a simple factor analysis (Stata 2018a, 9). In this form of analysis, one should first run one analysis where one decides how many factors to retain, and then rerun the analysis. On the basis of the second analysis the factor loadings of the variables are assessed (Stata 2018a, 9-10).

We will start by noting that the LR-tests of independence versus the saturated models in Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 yield significant results, in effect confirming a high correlation between the variables. This is needed for a factor analysis to be meaningful (Stata 2018a, 11). The next step is to analyze the results in order to find out how many dimensions that are represented by the factors, or in other words find out how many factors should be retained in order to properly represent the shared variance of the three variables. Three common ways of deciding this on the basis of a factor analysis are the latent root criterion, the percentage of explained variance criterion and the scree test (Hair et al. 2014, 107-109). The most commonly used is the latent root criterion, which says that all factors that are retained should represent at least a whole variable, meaning that they should have eigenvalues above 1.66 From Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 we can see that in both cases only Factor 1 meets this criterion. This is in other words an indication that our three questions are indeed measurements of a single underlying concept. A strict criterion for the percentage of explained variance is that factors should be retained until 95 % of the common variance is extracted. In social science this cut-off value is sometimes set as low as 60 % (2014, 118). In Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 we can see that Factor 1 alone extracts more than 95 % of the variance. The scree test involves a visual inspection of the eigenvalues with the aim to find the point at which there ceases to be large gaps in the eigenvalues between subsequent factors, and the factors that appears before the last gap should be retained Costello & Osborne (2005, 3). In Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 we can see that there is a large difference in the eigenvalues between Factor 1 and Factor 2, and a comparably very small difference between Factor 2 and Factor 3. In sum these tests indicate that there are strong reasons for seeing the three variables as

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66 The latent root criterion is most reliable when the number of variables is above 20 (Hair et al. 2014, 107), which is a reason why we also consider other criteria.
being properly represented by one factor alone in both surveys, meaning that the groups of three variables seem to be unidimensional.

The factor loadings in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 show the correlations between the first factor and the individual variables. The proportion of the variance of a variable that is explained by the first factor equals the square of the factor loading (Hair et al. 2014, 114), and the proportion of variance of a variable that is not explained by the first factor is what we call uniqueness (Stata 2018a, 7). There is no benchmark value that definitely decides if a variable has a sufficiently high factor loading, but Hair et al. (2014, 115-116) holds that factor loadings should be above 0.50. Others consider a uniqueness above 0.6 as “high” (which is equivalent to regarding factor loadings below 0.63 as “low”) (Stata 2018a, 7). The uniqueness of a variable may be due to random sampling errors, and one of the benefits of adding together variables to form a composite measure is, as we have seen, precisely to equal out random sampling errors. But a high uniqueness can also indicate that the variable is measuring another concept than the one which is intended (Stata 2018a, 7). We can see from Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 that variable 1 and 3 in Omnibus 2007 and variable 1 in Omnibus 2018 have a uniqueness of more than 0.6. This indicates that especially in Omnibus 2007 there is a discrepancy between the concept that we want to measure and what we are really measuring when we add together the variables to a composite measure.\footnote{Because of this we have conducted separate ordinal logistic regressions for each of the variables individually in addition to the analysis that is presented here. These separate regressions generally show no large deviations from the overall pattern found in the analysis part of this thesis.} We should, however, also have in mind that one of the points of making a composite measure is that the concept that one wants to measure can not be measured directly, and that we have to measure different aspects of the concept separately. We are thus expecting a certain level of uniqueness also due to the fact that the different aspects of the concept are not equal and therefore should not be expected to vary completely equally. But this is not to explain away the fact that some of our variables have a higher level of uniqueness than we would have appreciated.\footnote{Since the latent concept found in a factor analysis is a linear combination of the variables, the variables can be weighed according to the proportion of variance they share with the latent concept. In this way the latent concept will be represented in the most precise way (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2008, 31-32). We have done this and found out that the difference in uniqueness between the different variables is so low that the results we get in the regression analyses when we weigh and when we do not weigh the variables hardly differ at all. The results printed in Chapter 5 are for unweighted variables.} When we come to the regression analyses in Chapter 6 we will utilize subsamples
from each of the surveys in addition to the full samples. We have therefore done factor analysis for the subsamples as well. These can be found in the Appendix (A1-A4), and generally show the same patterns as the full samples, although the subsample from Omnibus 2007 shows slightly weaker signs of unidimensionality, and the subsample from Omnibus 2018 shows slightly stronger signs of unidimensionality than the full samples.

Table 5.1. Omnibus 2007 Factor analysis part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>1.18619</td>
<td>0.9521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>0.05987</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3</td>
<td>-0.00016</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1863

LR test: independent vs. saturated: \( \chi^2(3) = 750.65 \) Prob>\( \chi^2 = 0.0000 \)

Table 5.2. Omnibus 2007 Factor analysis part 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5486</td>
<td>0.6990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7834</td>
<td>0.3862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5194</td>
<td>0.7302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3. Omnibus 2018 Factor analysis part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>1.62940</td>
<td>0.9691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>0.05208</td>
<td>0.0310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3</td>
<td>-0.00011</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1961

LR test: independent vs. saturated: \( \chi^2(3) = 1609.85 \) Prob>\( \chi^2 = 0.0000 \)

Table 5.4. Omnibus 2018 Factor analysis part 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5975</td>
<td>0.6430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8790</td>
<td>0.2274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7016</td>
<td>0.5078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before we proceed we should sum up what we can learn about Ukraine’s political culture and the quality of the surveys directly from the factor analysis. 95% of the common variance of the three
variables is explained by the same latent concept; the concept that we have decided to call democratic political culture. This indicates that there does exist such a phenomenon as democratic political culture in Ukraine, and that we are measuring it in a reasonable way. The somewhat low factor loadings on some of the variables may indicate that there are better ways to measure this concept, but it can also mean that the political culture in Ukraine has an element of fragmentation and inconsistency. We should therefore go back to the questions from the two surveys, and look at which questions that are least explained by the common factor. Question number 1, which can be seen as a question about the respondents’ view on freedom of expression, has a comparatively low factor loading in both surveys. What makes this question different from the other two questions is that it includes a contingency (“even if it creates tension in society”), which the other two questions do not include. We may speculate that this has made the responses to question number 1 diverge a bit more from the responses to the other two questions than would have been the case had this contingency not been included. Question number 2, which can be seen as a question about press freedom is strongly associated with the latent concept in both surveys, although stronger in the 2018 survey. Question number 3 about the right to join parties and that can participate in elections was the question that was weakest associated with the latent concept in 2007, but this association is much stronger in 2018. The general rise in factor loadings, which is visible for all variables, might be an indication of a rising consistency in the political culture of Ukraine. However, and even though the two surveys are conducted by the same bureau and the same survey methodology, the differences that are observed between the two surveys might be an indication that Omnibus 2018 is of higher quality than Omnibus 2007.

5.3.3 Internal consistency

In the last subchapter we tested the relationship between the variables and a common latent concept; what we will do now is to test the interrelationship between the variables themselves. If there is really such a phenomenon as democratic culture, and if we are measuring this phenomenon correctly, there should be a correlation between the different measures that we use for this phenomenon. This is what we call internal consistency (Howitt & Cramer 2011, 445).
As a first step we will have a look at the correlation matrices for the variables and the index consisting of the sum of the three other variables. Hair et al. (2014, 123) suggest 0.3 as benchmark for inter-item correlations (in the context of composite measures individual variables are commonly called *items*), and in addition to this, item-index correlations should be no less than 0.5. Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman (1991, 13) are less strict and see an average-inter item correlation of a survey of 0.3 as “exemplary”, while average values down to 0.1 would pass by a moderate criterion. At a minimum, all pairwise correlation of items included in a composite measure need to be significant at a 5 % level (1991, 7). As can be seen from Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, all individual inter-item correlations pass by the 0.3-criterion except for the correlation between variable number 1 and variable number 3 in Omnibus 2007, which is slightly in violation of this criterion (while still being strongly significant). Both surveys clearly pass the 0.3-criterion for average inter-item correlation, and all item-index correlations are above the benchmark value of 0.5. Again, the equivalent tables for the subsamples that we are going to use are included in the Appendix (A5-A6). These show very similar patterns as Table 5.5 and Table 5.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.5</th>
<th>Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4331***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2846***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>0.7494***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***=p-value less than 0.0001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.6</th>
<th>Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5231***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4199***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>0.7847***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***=p-value less than 0.0001

---

69 One of the involved variables is variable number 1, and a reason for why this variable might diverge from the other two variables has been commented on earlier. When it is only variable number 1’s correlation with variable number 3 that is below the benchmark, this might have to do with question 1 being less associated with question number 3 than question number 2.
A much used overall measure of the internal consistency of composite measures is Cronbach’s alpha. A high Cronbach’s alpha value indicates that there is a high degree of interrelatedness among its composite items, and thus that they have a low level of uniqueness (Cortina 1993, 100). Importantly, however, is that Cronbach’s alpha is not only a function of the interrelatedness of the composite items, but also of the number of items. If two different indexes have the same inter-item correlations, an index consisting of a higher number of items will yield a higher (in many cases much higher) Cronbach’s alpha than an index consisting of a lower number of items (1993, 101). A commonly accepted threshold value of Cronbach’s alpha is 0,7 (stemming originally from Nunnally (1978)), but according to Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman (1991, 13) Cronbach’s alpha values of 0,6 can pass by a moderate criterium of internal consistency. However, to choose a general threshold value like this regardless of the number of items in the composite measure would be meaningless, according to Cortina (1993) and Schmitt (1996). One should therefore take into account the number of composite items when deciding whether a given Cronbach’s alpha is acceptable or not. In our case we have an index consisting of only three variables, and we can thus expect to be in the lower end of acceptable Cronbach’s alpha values. As can be seen in Table 5.7, it is the case that we have somewhat low Cronbach’s alpha values for the Omnibus 2007 samples. However, the values of both surveys – full samples as well as subsamples - pass by the minimum alpha-value criterion of 0,6, and Omnibus 2018 is also well above the stricter criterion of 0,7 for both the full sample and the subsample.

Table 5.7  Cronbach’s alpha values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2007, full sample</td>
<td>0,6451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2007, Western subsample</td>
<td>0,6214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2018, full sample</td>
<td>0,7653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2018, Western subsample</td>
<td>0,8044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, our composite measure passes most criteria for unidimensionality and internal consistency, with a note of caution for some low factor loadings and a single low item-item correlation. Mostly these problems seem to be associated with question number 1 in the surveys. Most measures also indicate that the composite measure works best for the 2018 survey, and it is probably sound for our analysis that we do not have to rely on the 2007 survey alone. This is true both for the full samples and for the subsamples that we will use.
Importantly, we have now showed empirically that it is meaningful to talk about such a concept as “democratic political culture” in Ukraine.

5.3.4 Distributions of values on composite measures

By following the procedures for making of composite measures we have obtained a 12-step index of commitment to democratic values. From Table 5.8, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 we can see the distribution of values on this index. From both the figures it seems that the distributions are left-skewed. The same can be seen on the histograms for the subsamples, which are placed in the Appendix (A7-A8). We can also see a quite high concentration on the maximum value in both surveys. We will comment on consequences of the way the dependent variable is distributed in Chapter 6.3. The absolute scores on the indexes are not meaningful in themselves, and in the regression analysis we will standardize the indexes so that they get a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

Table 5.8  Distributions of values on index of commitment to democratic values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Total number of observations</th>
<th>Missing values</th>
<th>Valid observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2007, full sample</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>11,04</td>
<td>2,72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2007, subsample</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>11,38</td>
<td>2,25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2018, full sample</td>
<td>2043</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>10,90</td>
<td>2,91</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus 2018, subsample</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>10,98</td>
<td>2,80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1  Distribution of values on index, Omnibus 2007

Figure 5.2  Distribution of values on index, Omnibus 2018
5.4 How to conduct the regression analysis

We will in this subchapter explain why we will conduct an OLS-regression with dummy variables, look at how other authors have done this, and see how we are improving the methods that have been used earlier. Before we do that, we will have a short look at alternatives to OLS-regression and explain why we do not use these.

5.4.1 Multilevel modelling

Multilevel modelling is often seen as the best suited method in situations where the data have a multilevel structure, as when respondents are nested in groups with substantial between-group differences. If data with a multilevel structure are analyzed by OLS-regression it can lead to biased standard errors and thus biased significance tests. A multilevel model can be particularly very well suited in a situation where the researcher’s primary interest is how context effects affect individual level behavior (Hox 2010). All of this points to that multilevel analysis is a possible alternative for us. However, there are other reasons why a multilevel analysis is not an option in our case.

According to Hox (2010, 233-235) the number of level 2-units in a multilevel model should be around 30 with around 30 level 1-units (respondents) from each of the level 2-units. If we had a survey that was stratified according to all 26 oblasts, and where simple random sampling had been done in all of these oblasts, a multilevel analysis could probably have been conducted, even though we would then have been in the lower end of acceptable numbers of level 2-units. However, since only 23 oblasts were fully available for sampling to Omnibus 2018, we would stretch the benchmark criterion of 30 level 2-units even further. Still, in our case there are other aspects of the surveys that would cause even bigger trouble. We have already mentioned the problems of representativeness on the oblast-level, and it would be very problematic to investigate context effects on individual oblasts if the samples are not representative. Our surveys are stratified according to urban and rural areas of all oblasts, but respondents are ultimately nested in SSUs and TSUs, and it is normally on this lowest level of clustering that the largest

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70 Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are largely not accessible for interviewers due to the ongoing war, and Crimea is completely inaccessible after the annexation by Russia.

71 Some authors would recommend conducting a multilevel analysis even with a very low number of level 2-units, as long as there is substantial variation between the level 2-units. See Gellman & Hill (2007, 275-276).
context effects are visible (Asparouhov & Muthen 2006, 2718). A proper multilevel analysis of our data would thus have to use the SSUs and TSUs as level 2-units. However, we are not interested in such extremely local context effects, and we do not even have a variable in our datasets that identifies the clusters that respondents are drawn from. Instead of relying on non-representative individual oblasts and making a multilevel model, we will therefore conduct an OLS-regression with regional dummy variables, as is to our knowledge done by all authors who are investigating regional differences in political culture in Ukraine.

5.4.2 Other strategies
A version of the analytical strategy of dummy-regions, which is used by Becker et al. (2016, 41-42) and Peisakhin (2015), and which puts very high demands on the sampling of the surveys, is to use samples drawn only from a narrow belt along defunct borders. This gives a very high level of control for other variables, as regions normally will become more unequal - both with regards to the distribution of individual level characteristics and with regards to context-level characteristics - the further away from the border one moves in any direction. Using this strategy alone, however, will not reveal anything about the impact of historical legacies on the country’s overall patterns of political culture. Another analytical strategy, spatial regression discontinuity, is used by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015) in the case of Poland. This also puts much higher demands on the surveys than we can afford, as it requires a high number of sampling points as well as exact knowledge about the geographical location of the sampling points.

5.4.3 OLS-regression with dummy variables
When we use regional dummy variables for testing regional effects, we are in effect testing if there are still significant differences in the dependent variable between regions after controlling for the impact of individual level independent variables. Thus, respondents’ region of residence is a residual category which picks up all differences which are left after these controls have been done. Interpretations of what causes these differences thus need to be very well founded in theory, as we are only testing how region of residence impacts the dependent variable, and not, as

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72 This involves testing for discontinuities of the dependent variable exactly at some border and requires exact knowledge of the geographical position of the sampling units, as well as a high number of sampling units. In our case we do not know the exact position of the sampling units, and we also have few sampling units. See Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015, 63-64) for more on spatial regression discontinuity.
we are interested in in our case, the impact of historical legacies per se. The more we can assure ourselves that the regional differences that we observe are not caused by other factors, the stronger becomes our belief in historical legacies as the cause of this effect.

In Chapter 5.2.1 we explained why issues related to representativeness make it problematic to study individual oblasts. By grouping together similar oblasts we can obtain larger regions with a higher overall representativeness. We have already (in Chapter 4.4) shown how the oblasts of Ukraine can be grouped together according to their similarities. The ten groups of oblasts that were shown on Figure 4.11 will be used as dummy regions in our analysis, with distributions of respondents as shown in Table 5.9.

### Table 5.9: Dummy regions and distribution of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of region</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of respondents, Omnibus 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents, Omnibus 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West Central</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Donbass</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>South-West(^73)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of respondents</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>2043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9: The total number of respondents is approximately the same in the two surveys, but as Crimea and much of Donbass is not included in Omnibus 2018, there is a higher number of respondents distributed on other regions in Omnibus 2018 than in Omnibus 2007.

The point of constructing regional dummy variables that are suited for investigation of historical legacies needs emphasis, as it is not always followed up in studies of political culture in Ukraine. We have in earlier subchapters seen the role played by regional strata when assessing the representativeness of surveys on sub-national levels. What is done in surveys of political culture

\(^73\) As we have explained earlier, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi have experienced historical developments that differ strongly both from all other oblasts and from each other. These oblasts should therefore be investigated individually, but that is of course not possible with the limitations we have on regional representativeness. These oblasts are also among the ethnically, linguistically and religiously most heterogeneous oblasts in Ukraine, which makes the expected impact of the particular sampling points very high. It thus becomes meaningless to investigate these oblasts closer with the surveys we have at hand. We merge them together to the region Southwest, and we will not give them more attention in this thesis.
in Ukraine is to stick to regional strata as regional dummy variables (or eventually merging strata together in order to form larger regional dummy variables). In Chapter 4.5 we discussed the regional frameworks that have been used in the literature and found mismatches between historical regions and the regions that were used as dummy variables by the authors. Some of the reason for these mismatches is that surveys are generally not stratified according to the regions that are of highest interest when investigating historical legacies. One of the main reasons for our choice of surveys was that the Omnibus surveys are stratified according to all oblasts, which facilitates comparison with high precision.

Another feature of the Omnibus 2018 survey is that it includes a variable that tells the respondents’ religion. We have seen that control for Greek-Catholic religion is necessary in order to test H1 against H1a, but many surveys do give this possibility. Person (2010) and ICDT (2015), who find a positive effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Western Ukraine do not control for religion. Katchanovski (2018), who generally does not find such an effect, does control for religion, and finds that Greek Catholics are more committed to democratic values than others. In our case we obtain control for Greek Catholic religion, and we can also make tests with a higher geographical precision than was done by ICDT (2015), Katchanovski (2018) and Person (2010).

In order to test H1 and H2 we will make use of only the western subsample consisting of Galicia (1), Volhynia (2) and West Central (3), since no other regions are involved in these hypotheses. We will thus also make sure that values on individual level variables of respondents in other regions do not have an impact on the calculation of the regional effects. In order to test H3, and for some further exploration, we will use the full sample with all ten dummy regions. As a part of that exploration we will also conduct an interaction model with interactions between regions and ethnolinguistic groups, in order to look closer at regional differences and developments in the effect of belonging to a certain ethnolinguistic group.

In Chapter 4 we discussed how Ukraine’s regions differ in their historical experiences, demography and economic outlook, and we summarized the most important aspects of this in Table 4.1. OLS-regression with regional dummy variables is suited for analyzing the impact of a
specific regional-level independent variable only if the regions that are compared are similar on other variables. If regions differ on more than one variable, the independent impact of these variables cannot be distinguished from each other. As we move eastward from the former imperial borders, regions become increasingly different from Galicia. We must therefore recognize that the further away from the imperial borders we move, the less precise judgements we can make about the impact of any specific variable on a region’s democratic political culture as compared to Galicia. Still, as we test H3, we will do our best to discuss which other factors than historical legacies that we find to be important in the makeup of Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic culture.

In addition to controlling for religion and ethnolinguistic group, we will control for respondents’ level education, age, gender, urban versus rural residence and income. The operationalization of control variables which are not of direct relevance to our hypothesis testing - education, urban vs rural residence, age and gender - can be found in the Appendix (A9-A12). Except for this is the income-variable, which needs to be discussed here.

5.5 Operationalization of independent variables

Greek Catholic: Needed for testing of H1 is a dichotomous variable which distinguishes between those who are Greek Catholics and those who are not. Values 1-3 and 5-11 on variable D8 in Omnibus 2018 are here combined as Other.\(^7^4\) (0=Other, 1=Greek Catholic Church)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Galicia</th>
<th>Volhyna</th>
<th>West Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Other</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Greek Catholic Church</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74 The religion-variable (D8) only appears in Omnibus 2018, and not in Omnibus 2007. As no codebook nor any questionnaire from Omnibus 2018 has been published, we have declared all the values on this variable in the Appendix. All other variables appear in both Omnibus 2018 and Omnibus 2007, and we therefore refer to the questionnaire for Omnibus 2007 (KIIS 2007b) (in Russian language) for information about the other variables (no separate codebook has been published). As will be discussed in this subchapter, the income-variable is coded differently in Omnibus 2007 and Omnibus 2018, and we therefore also declare the values of the income-variable from Omnibus 2018 in the Appendix.
Ethnolinguistic group: We create a categorical variable that combines nationality and language and maintain as separate values the three theoretically interesting groups which were discussed in Chapter 4.3.1, Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, Russian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality and Russian. As there is also a significant group which are coded as mixed speakers, we keep that group as well. (1=Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 2=Mixed Ukrainian/Russian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 3=Russian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 4=Russian nationality, 5=Other).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mixed-speaking Ukrainians</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Russian-speaking Ukrainians</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Russians</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Others</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Total</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>2043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dichotomous ethnolinguistic group: The regional samples are too small for interaction between region and five ethnolinguistic groups to be meaningful, and we will thus have to simplify this variable for the interaction models. We make the ethnolinguistic group variable dichotomous by combining group 2, 3, 4 and 5: (0=Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 1=Non-Ukrainian speaker).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ukrainian speakers of Ukrainian nationality</th>
<th>Non-Ukrainian speakers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbass</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>2032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We here have a problem of potentially over-fitting of the model. When comparing the AIC for interaction models where the five-value ethnolinguistic group variable is used with the AIC for models where the simplified ethnolinguistic group variable is used, the latter value is around 20 lower than the former. The interaction model with a five-value ethnolinguistic group variable thus have essentially no support (Burnham & Anderson 2004, 271).
Table 5.13 Ethnolinguistic groups by region, Omnibus 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ukrainian speakers of Ukrainian nationality</th>
<th>Non-Ukrainian speakers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbass</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>2043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The income-variable is the only variable that is measured differently in the two surveys. In Omnibus 2007 respondents are asked what types of goods they can afford and what they cannot afford, whereas in Omnibus 2018 respondents are placed in nine income-categories. The measure in Omnibus 2007 can be divided into two roughly equally large groups that make up a dichotomous variable: Those who can cover their subsistence needs (those who can afford both food and clothes) and those who cannot. Regarding the income measure in Omnibus 2018 we have a problem, since as much as 26% of the total sample either has refused to answer or has answered that they do not know their income. This number gets as high as 44% in the Western subsample, which is already in the lower end of acceptable sample sizes. Our first solution here becomes to create a dichotomous variable of as close as we can get to the same distribution as the dichotomous variable from Omnibus 2007 by combining the five lowest income groups into one group, and all other values into a second group. In addition to this we have run a regression where the income variable in Omnibus 2018 is kept as a categorical variable. This brings only small changes to the effect and significance of other variables. This model can be found in the Appendix.

Table 5.14 Distribution of respondents on variable Low income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Other</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>1078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Low income</td>
<td>1059</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>2043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Results

We are now ready for trying to give an answer to the research question, “Can legacies from historical regimes explain the regional patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine?”

We will start by presenting some descriptive statistics and then proceed by presenting two regression tables, Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Table 6.1 will contain regression models where only the western subsample is used, and Table 6.2 will contain regression models where the whole Ukrainian sample is used. Based on the results from Table 6.1 we will either keep or reject H1, H1a, H2 and H2a. Based on the results from Table 6.2 we will either keep or reject H3, and the results from Table 6.2 will then serve as a basis for further investigation of the research question.

6.1 Descriptive results

To begin with we will look at the average values of the index of democratic culture for the ten Ukrainian regions, visualized in the form of two colored maps, one for each survey.

We will repeat that the main point of using two surveys from different points in time is to increase our confidence that the geographical patterns of democratic culture that we ascribe to historical legacies are actually stable patterns. This is especially important in light of the dramatic events in 2014, and by employing one survey conducted before and one survey conducted after these events we will be sure that what we take as stable patterns are neither caused by nor have been erased by these events. However, as the 2007 survey is lacking one important demographic variable (the variable of religion), only the 2018 survey can give us the control that we need in order to test H1 against H1a. Still, as Greek Catholic religion is expected only to increase people’s commitment to democratic values, a finding in the 2007 survey of no positive effect of living in Galicia when controlled for all other variables than religion would in effect mean a

76 We are here referring to the Euromaidan, War in Donbass and annexation of Crimea. The War in Donbass was still ongoing when the 2018 survey was conducted.
77 As we have seen, the lack of control for religion, or more specifically the lack of control for Greek Catholicism, is a recurring problem in research on democratic culture in Ukraine. Person (2010) and ICDT (2015), who find that residence in Western Ukraine increase people’s commitment to democratic values, are using surveys that do not give the possibility to control for religion. This is despite that other findings, as Drummond & Lubecki (2010) and Katchanovski (2018), who do find Greek Catholics to be more committed to democratic values than others.
rejection of both H1 and H1a. A second reason why it is desirable to use two surveys is that we are probably operating at the margins of what these surveys can be used for. In Chapter 5.2.1 we discussed how the methodology used in these surveys can lead to deflated calculated standard errors. By relying on two surveys instead of just one, we are decreasing the possibility that we are drawing conclusions based on false positives.

Figure 6.1  Regional average values of index of commitment to democratic values, Omnibus 2007

![Map showing regional average values of index of commitment to democratic values for Omnibus 2007.](image)

Figure 6.2  Regional average values of index of commitment to democratic values, Omnibus 2018

![Map showing regional average values of index of commitment to democratic values for Omnibus 2018.](image)

Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 reveal some recurring patterns in the 2007 and 2018 surveys. In both cases, Galicia has a higher average value on the index of democratic culture than both Volhynia and West Central. This is according to the expectations of H1, but we cannot based on these
results rule out H1a. We can further see that the difference between Volhynia and West Central is very small, which is not according to the expectations from H2 and H2a. When we move further to the east, we see that in both cases the Central region has a lower average value than Volhynia and West Central, while Kiev has a higher average than its surrounding regions. Still, Kiev in both surveys is having a lower average value than Galicia. When we pass the “line of industrialization” (discussed in Chapter 3.2.2) and enter the South and East Central regions, the average values are in both surveys higher here than in the Central, West Central and Volhynia regions. Further to the east and south the level of democratic culture goes down again, as Donbass and Crimea are among the regions with the lowest average values in 2007, and Donbass has by far the lowest value in 2018.78 Galicia has the second highest average value in both surveys. In the 2007 survey the Southwest region has the highest value,79 while in 2018 South has the highest average value. In other words, H3 seems not to be supported. We also note that there seems to have been a general fall in the level of commitment to democratic values between the surveys except for in Galicia and Kiev as well as in South, which looks like an outlier here.

In sum the descriptive results indicate that there is a particularly high level of democratic culture in the former Habsburg province of Galicia, but we can also see that there is not a uniform, low level of democratic culture in all of the regions that went directly from Russian imperial rule to rule by the Soviet Union. The areas that experienced Russian imperial rule, but that escaped rule by the Soviet Union until World War 2 (Volhynia), seem not to have a particularly high level of democratic culture. We will now go on with the regression analyses where the hypotheses will be tested.

6.2 Regression analyses

We will now proceed with the regression analyses, through which we will test our hypotheses. As outlined in Chapter 4.4, H1 and H2 will be tested by comparing the effect of living in regions that are as similar as possible, and that have gone through the same historical developments except for certain periods when they were underlaid different political regimes. If there is a significant

78 We should, however, not forget that the sample from Donbass in 2018 is taken only from the areas that are under control of the Ukrainian government and is thus not directly comparable to the Donbass sample from 2007.

79 Due to mentioned issues with the samples from the Southwest region we will in the following not give attention to this region.
regional effect when we have controlled also for individual-level variables, we will conclude that developments in the periods when the regions in question were underlaid different political regimes gave rise to historical legacies in the form of different levels of democratic political culture.

Table 6.1 Regression table, Western subsample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 1-West</th>
<th>Model 2-West</th>
<th>Model 3-West</th>
<th>Model 4-West</th>
<th>Model 5-West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>index2007</td>
<td>index2007</td>
<td>index2018</td>
<td>index2018</td>
<td>index2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Baseline:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia (2)</td>
<td>-0.244**</td>
<td>-0.348***</td>
<td>-0.383***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0975)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central (3)</td>
<td>-0.334***</td>
<td>-0.354***</td>
<td>-0.388***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0891)</td>
<td>(0.0971)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Baseline:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia (1)</td>
<td>0.263**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.347***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central (3)</td>
<td>-0.0484</td>
<td>-0.0209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0756</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-linguistic group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Baseline: Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speaking Ukrainian</td>
<td>-0.606</td>
<td>-0.979**</td>
<td>-0.981***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.581)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-speaking Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.485***</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.222</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>-0.0515</td>
<td>0.573**</td>
<td>0.593**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0739</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td>(0.311)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.340*</td>
<td>0.0737</td>
<td>0.392***</td>
<td>0.428***</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

80 Control variables are omitted from this table. Full regression table including control variables can be found in the Appendix.
In Table 6.1, Model 1-West 2007 and Model 2-West 2007 are analyses of the 2007 survey, while Model 3-West 2018, Model 4-West 2018 and Model 5-West 2018 are analyses of the 2018 survey. We will now explain how these models are constructed in order to test H1 and H2.

For H1 or H1a to be supported there needs to be a significant negative effect of Volhynia as compared to Galicia. If this negative effect does not disappear when controlling for the effect of Greek Catholic religion, then H1 is supported. If the negative effect does disappear when controlling for Greek Catholic religion, then H1a is supported. In Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 we saw that Galicia has a higher average value on the index than both Volhynia and West Central in both surveys. In Model 1-West 2007 and Model 3-West 2018 we can see that there is a significant negative effect of both Volhynia and West Central also when controlling for all individual-level variables except for Greek Catholic religion. These effects are significant at the 5 %-level in Model 1-West 2007, and at the 1 %-level in Model 3-2018. In the 2018 survey we have the possibility to also control for Greek Catholic religion. This is done in Model 4-West 2018, where we can see that there is no effect of Greek Catholic, and that the negative effects of both Volhynia and West Central thus stay significant at the 1 %-level. This means that we can reject H1a. Our findings are thus supportive of H1,

“To live in Galicia has a positive effect on commitment to democratic values as compared to living in Volhynia”.

We will now proceed with the testing of H2. For H2 or H2a to be supported there needs to be a significant, negative effect of West Central as compared to Volhynia. As we have already seen from Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the average score on the index is very close for these two regions in both surveys. In Model 2-West 2007 and Model 5-West 2018 we can see that there is no significant effect of West Central as compared to Volhynia in any of the surveys, when controlled for all individual-level variables except for ethnolinguistic group. A Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality dummy variable should have been introduced in order to test H2 against H2a, but as both H2 and H2a can be rejected on basis of the results from Model 2-West 2007 and Model 5-West 2018, we do not go further and include the Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality dummy variable here.\footnote{A model which includes a Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality dummy variable has also been run, without anything changing with regards to strengths or significance level of the West Central dummy variable.}
As we have now seen that there is no significant effect of *West Central* as compared to *Volhynia* in any of the surveys, which means that both H2 and H2a are rejected, and H2null is kept:

“There is no difference in people’s commitment to democratic values between Volhynia and West Central.”

We have now concluded that H1 should be kept, while both H2 and H2a are rejected, and we will now proceed with the testing of H3, and after that do some further exploration of patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine. In the following models we include the dummy variables of *Volhynia* and *West Central*, but as we have already tested the effects of these dummy regions under more controlled circumstances, we will not comment more on them here.

H3 is concerning the regional average level on the index when not controlling for any variables. The first thing we will do is to look at Model 6 2007-no control and Model 7 2018-no control in Table 6.2 to see the same patterns that we have already seen in Figure 14 and Figure 15, but now with significance tests of the difference between *Galicia* and each other region. As was already clear from Figure 14 and Figure 15, *Galicia* has a high level of democratic culture, and while other regions fluctuate more between the surveys, *Galicia* stays consistently at a high level. In the 2007 survey no eastern regions have a higher level than *Galicia*, but in 2018 *Galicia* is beaten by the *South* region, as can be seen in Model 7 2018-no control. And in Model 6 2007-no control we can see that *East Central*, even though it has a negative sign, is not significantly different from *Galicia*. *Kiev* is in this model only weakly negatively significant. In other words, although *Galicia* is clearly one of the regions with the highest average value of commitment to democratic values, H3 is rejected, and we keep H3null,

*H3null: Galicia does not have a higher average level of commitment to democratic values than all regions that belonged to the Russian Empire.*
Table 6.2  Regression table, full sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region (Baseline: Galicia)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia (2)</td>
<td>-0.235* (0.123)</td>
<td>-0.427*** (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.233* (0.121)</td>
<td>-0.386*** (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.236* (0.124)</td>
<td>-0.371*** (0.103)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central (3)</td>
<td>-0.296*** (0.0841)</td>
<td>-0.409*** (0.0974)</td>
<td>-0.326*** (0.0883)</td>
<td>-0.376*** (0.0977)</td>
<td>-0.301*** (0.0923)</td>
<td>-0.401*** (0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev (4)</td>
<td>-0.256*** (0.0899)</td>
<td>-0.173* (0.0979)</td>
<td>-0.385*** (0.105)</td>
<td>0.0364 (0.0994)</td>
<td>-0.239* (0.143)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.119)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central (5)</td>
<td>-0.603*** (0.0953)</td>
<td>-0.459*** (0.0839)</td>
<td>-0.719*** (0.107)</td>
<td>-0.206*** (0.0876)</td>
<td>-0.992*** (0.132)</td>
<td>-0.170* (0.0994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South (6)</td>
<td>-0.185* (0.0908)</td>
<td>0.251*** (0.0919)</td>
<td>-0.385*** (0.110)</td>
<td>0.606*** (0.100)</td>
<td>0.0559 (0.157)</td>
<td>1.108*** (0.0808)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central (7)</td>
<td>-0.130 (0.0812)</td>
<td>-0.392*** (0.0880)</td>
<td>-0.343*** (0.107)</td>
<td>-0.0549 (0.0955)</td>
<td>0.0548 (0.214)</td>
<td>-0.163 (0.125)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbass (8)</td>
<td>-0.513*** (0.0800)</td>
<td>-0.621*** (0.113)</td>
<td>-0.712*** (0.112)</td>
<td>-0.200 (0.133)</td>
<td>-0.870*** (0.257)</td>
<td>-0.848*** (0.289)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea (9)</td>
<td>-0.500*** (0.161)</td>
<td>-0.575*** (0.181)</td>
<td>-0.755*** (0.181)</td>
<td>-0.911*** (0.293)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest (10)</td>
<td>0.299** (0.120)</td>
<td>-0.261** (0.109)</td>
<td>0.238* (0.126)</td>
<td>-0.217* (0.112)</td>
<td>0.379*** (0.143)</td>
<td>-0.303*** (0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-linguistic group (Baseline: Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speaking Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.00903 (0.0664)</td>
<td>-0.175*** (0.0639)</td>
<td>0.254*** (0.0888)</td>
<td>-0.393*** (0.0749)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-speaking Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.144* (0.0775)</td>
<td>-0.263*** (0.0792)</td>
<td>0.327*** (0.0887)</td>
<td>-0.421*** (0.0839)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>-0.0494 (0.0808)</td>
<td>-0.0590 (0.124)</td>
<td>0.219** (0.0996)</td>
<td>-0.235* (0.138)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0969 (0.104)</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.128)</td>
<td>0.319*** (0.122)</td>
<td>-0.344** (0.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.290*** (0.0582)</td>
<td>0.274*** (0.0635)</td>
<td>0.0296 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.337*** (0.0791)</td>
<td>0.262** (0.117)</td>
<td>0.453*** (0.0937)</td>
<td>0.245** (0.117)</td>
<td>0.445*** (0.0946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>1,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We will, however, not just stop there, but continue exploring why H3 is rejected, and thus try to further answer the research question. Firstly, we note from Model 6 2007-no control and Model 7 2018-no control that most regions do concur with our expectations, as we have also seen from Figure 16 and Figure 17. Donbass and Central are strongly negative in both models, while Crimea is strongly negative in the model where it appears. Kiev is negative in both models, although only weakly significant in Model 7 2018-no control, East Central is significantly negative in Model 7 2018-no control, and South is significantly negative in Model 6 2007-no control.
control.

We will proceed with showing a model that includes all demographic variables, including an interaction term between region and ethnolinguistic group. This enables us to investigate how regional effects on ethnolinguistic groups vary between regions. As we will see, this can shed some more light on how Ukraine’s political culture has developed, and also how it continues to develop partly in response to actions made by foreign powers. We will now remind ourselves that our level of control for historical development and other regional-level variables is much lower for the Eastern regions than for our Western subsample. The Western subsample consisted of three regions that are very similar to each other, and where clearly defined historical borders between former states and empires coincide with present-day borders between oblasts. When we observed an effect on commitment to democratic values from living in one of the three regions in the Western subsample as compared to the others, we could therefore confidently point to different historical developments in certain clearly defined periods of time as the root causes of present-day differences in political culture. A similar situation as this does not exist in other parts of Ukraine, and when we observe regional effects further East, we can thus not confidently point to certain factors or periods in the past which have given rise to regional differences in political culture. An assessment of regional effects in the East could, however, tell us something about how important historical legacies are compared to other pathways to a high level of democratic political culture.

We will start by looking at the effects of the ethnolinguistic group variable. From Model 8 2007-ethnoling and Model 9 2018-ethnoling, where we have not included the region-variable, we can see the overall effect of ethnolinguistic group belonging when not taking into account different regional means on the index. While there is no effect of being Russian in any of these models, a negative effect of being Russian-speaking Ukrainian appears in Model 8 2018-ethnoling. When we proceed by including also the regional dummy variables, we can see that all values on the ethnolinguistic group variable that are compared to the baseline group Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality becomes positive and significant in Model 10 2007-control, while in Model

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82 We should now remember that the groups of Russians in the 2018 survey is very small, as this can make it harder to find significant results.
83 The smaller group of mixed-speaking Ukrainians is more unpredictable and of less theoretical interest.
all values become negative and significant. This has to do with the models that include regional dummies being in effect fixed-effects models, where calculations of effects of individual-level variables are done as group means are kept fixed for the various regions. In other words, there seems to be a tendency of polarization inside the regions between the baseline group Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality on the one hand and all other ethnolinguistic groups on the other hand.

At first glance it looks like there has been a fundamental shift in terms of regional patterns of commitment to democratic values in the time period between 2007 and 2018, and a comparison of the effects of the regional dummy variables in Model 10 2007-control and Model 11 2018-control show large differences for all regions to the East of the West Central region. What we see here has to do with a problem that arises because of multicollinearity. Because the ethnolinguistic group dummies have opposite signs in the 2007 and 2018 surveys, the calculated regional effects in Model 10 2007-control and Model 11 2018-control becomes very different from each other. For example, the effect of Donbass is strongly significant and negative when not controlled for ethnolinguistic group in both surveys (Model 6 2007-no control and Model 7 2018-no control), and then the regional effects become much stronger in Model 2007-control, but is explained away in the Model 11 2018-control. This happens even though (as we will see), nothing has substantially changed either in Donbass or in the baseline region of Galicia.

It thus makes more sense to look at regional effects on the ethnolinguistic groups separately. In the interaction model, ethnolinguistic group is made dichotomous with Ukrainian-speaking

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84 The effect Kiev goes from being negative and strongly significant to becoming positive and non-significant, Central is negative and significant in both models while the strength of the effect is falling between 2007 and 2018, South goes from being negative and significant into becoming strongly positive and significant, East Central goes from being negative and strongly significant into becoming non-significant, and Donbass goes from being negative and very strong and significant into becoming non-significant.

85 As we have seen in Figure 4.1 as well as from Table 5.12 and Table 5.13, in the westernmost regions (and especially Galicia and Volhynia) almost all of the population and almost the whole sample consist of Ukrainian-speakers of Ukrainian nationality. This situation is completely opposite in the eastern regions of Crimea, Donbass, where there are practically speaking no Ukrainian-speakers in the samples, and also in East Central and South, where Ukrainian-speakers are in a very small minority. If we pairwise compare samples from individual dummy regions with the Galician sample (Galicia is the baseline regional dummy), we will therefore see a very high correlation between ethnolinguistic group and some pairs of regional dummy variables. This will have an impact on the computed effects when both the Region variable and the ethnolinguistic groups variables are included in the same model.
Ukrainian as baseline and all others as the second category. Interaction terms are omitted from the table due to space constraints, but we will present the results graphically. The regional effects that are printed for the interaction models in Table 6.2 should be interpreted as regional effects on the regions’ population of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, as compared to the baseline group of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in Galicia. (For Donbass and Crimea, where there are no Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the regional effect in Table 6.2 means the effect on the “Other”-group, as compared to Galicia’s small “Other” group.)

Starting with East Central, we see that the situation is stable between 2007 and 2018 - there is no significant regional effect on Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in East Central either in Model 12 2007-interaction or in Model 13 2018-interaction. For South, there is no significant effect on Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in 2007, but a very strong positive and significant effect in 2018, for Central there is a strong negative and significant effect in 2007 and a weaker negative effect in 2018 which is significant only at the 10 % level. Kiev is negative but significant only at the 10 % level in 2007 and have no significant effect in 2018.

The last points of our analysis of the results from Table 6.2 are most easily seen when results are presented in the form of figures. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the predicted margins of the two ethnolinguistic groups in all regions. We should also be very careful about drawing conclusions about the Other-group, where the four ethnolinguistic groups that are not Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians are combined into a single group, but there is one tendency which is very clearly shown on Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 and which deserves to be mentioned here: In the Central region the relationship between the two groups has turned around, as Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians has gone from having a much lower point estimate in 2007 into having a higher point estimate in 2018. In Kiev and South, a difference between the ethnolinguistic groups has occurred that was not there before, as Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians now have higher point estimates.

86 See Appendix for full table with interaction terms.
87 We should start by emphasize that there is a difference between predicted margins and estimated differences between groups. Overlapping confidence intervals for the predicted margins do not necessarily mean that two groups are not significantly different from each other - differences between groups have to be calculated separately, as we have done for differences from Galicia in the regression tables.
88 The regional samples are too small for keeping all ethnolinguistic groups in the interaction model. The results from the fixed-effects models (Model 2007-control and Model 2018-control in Table 6.2), show that these four other groups tend to co-vary within the regions, and the kind of dichotomization we have chosen is thus supported empirically.
than Others. In other words, there seems to be a growing discrepancy between Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and Others in their level of commitment to democratic values in the regions where both of these groups are represented by a substantial amount of the sample.

Figure 6.3

Predicted margins of ethnolinguistic group, 2007

Figure 6.4

Predicted margins of ethnolinguistic group, 2018

Figure 16: The predicted marginal values of the dependent variable for ethnolinguistic groups in regions, Omnibus 2007.

Figure 17: The predicted marginal values of the dependent variable for ethnolinguistic groups, Omnibus 2018.

6.3 Assumptions of OLS regression and model diagnosis

The basic assumption of OLS regression is that relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable are linear (Midtbø 2012, 130). In our case, however, all independent variables are categorical, which means that all effects are calculated as differences between the baseline category and only one other category. We thus have already fulfilled the requirement of linear relationships (Geman & Hill 2007, 46-67), as a best-fitted line between two points can not be anything else than linear. The remaining most important assumptions of OLS regression are concerning the residuals, which should be independent, homoscedastic and normally distributed (Midtbø 2012, 106; Gelman & Hill 2007, 46). We have in Chapter 5.2.1 already touched upon the problem of dependence between respondents - and thus also residuals - that are drawn from the same sampling unit, and concluded that this might be a source of inflated significance levels as we do not have the possibility to cluster observations in sampling units.
Regarding the questions of homoscedasticity we will refer to figures in the Appendix (A13-A16). These figures show residuals plotted against fitted values, and the first thing we will note from these figures are the characteristic lines that appears as a consequence of our dependent variable being discrete. This makes it more difficult to look for pattern in the residuals, as the number of dots on a line is unclear. A Breusch-Pagan test indicates that there is a problem of heteroscedasticity for the full models where all dummy-regions are included, and no such problem for the western subsample. In order to correct for any problem of heteroscedasticity we have run models with robust (White-Huber) standard errors89 (Midtbø 2012, 109-110; Stata 2018b, 49-50). Regarding questions of normality of the residuals we will refer to figures in the Appendix (A17-A20). There can be seen signs of a curve, especially in the 2007 samples, indicating a skewness in the distribution of the dependent variable.90 However, non-normality of residuals is the least important assumption (Gelman & Hill 2007, 46).91 VIF-tests have been run and show that we do not have any problem of multicollinearity in our models, as we have no individual VIF-value above 4.92

7. Discussion

7.1 Main findings

We have in this thesis made an effort to answer the research question “Can geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine be explained by the historical legacies of former empires and states?”. This has been done by following the suggestions of Peisakhin (2015) and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017) about exploiting the special feature of Ukraine as a natural experiment of history. We have found that there is a major threshold in people’s commitment to democratic values at the long defunct border between the Habsburg Empire and

89 As is already commented on, we cannot use cluster robust standard errors.
90 On Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 we can see that distributions are skewed. A logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable was tried, but it did not have a large effect on the distribution of the residuals.
91 Even though it indicates that there are chances that the probabilities of under- or overestimate a value are not completely equal (Midtbø 2012, 114).
92 According to Midtbø (2012, 129), VIF-values above 10 indicate a problematically high level of multicollinearity.
the Russian Empire. Our investigation was done in such a way that we could further infer that the root causes of the emergence of this threshold are indeed to be found in the particular historical developments of the two empires. The Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire have in other words left legacies in the form of different levels of democratic political culture, and these legacies can explain some of the geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine. We did not find a similar threshold at the former border between the Soviet Union and Poland, except for where this border coincides with the older imperial borders.

Our approach has in this thesis been to conduct an analysis with as high geographical precision as possible. This has enabled us both to distinguish between legacies from the age of empires (1772-1918) and legacies from the inter-war age (1918-1939), and to conduct an analysis where we have obtained a high level of control for other historical and contextual variables. In the end our findings support authors like Birch (2000), Kuzio (2015) and Person (2010), who suggested that a legacy of the Habsburg Empire is a particularly democratic political culture in the former Habsburg province of Galicia. At the same time our findings do not support the suggestions made by Birch (2000) and Katchanovski (2018) that a present-day consequence of inter-war rule by Poland should have led to a more democratic political culture than inter-war rule by the Soviet Union.

By managing to control for other variables, we have shown that there really is a threshold in democratic culture on the former border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire. Person (2010) could not show that this was the case, and we have now shown that his finding of a higher level of commitment to democratic values in Galicia than in the rest of Ukraine was not driven only by anti-democratic attitudes in the far East of the country. We have also shown that it is not the population of Greek Catholics that is behind the high level of democratic culture in Galicia.

Our results can also explain why Katchanovski (2018), Miller, White & Heywood (1998), Shulman (2005) and Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger (2000) struggled to find a more democratic culture in “Western Ukraine” than in other parts of the country. In all of these cases “Western Ukraine” has been operationalized in other terms than as only including Galicia, and separate
tests have not been run in order to distinguish between imperial legacies and inter-war legacies. In these studies, measures have also largely not been taken in order to isolate the historical legacy variables from economic and demographic variables. “Western Ukraine” has in many cases been compared with large macro-regions that have a high degree of internal variation in terms of level of urbanization and socioeconomic development.

By employing a survey that includes all important individual-level demographic variables we have also ruled out Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger’s (2000) suggestion that regional differences in democratic political culture in Ukraine is due only to an unequal geographical distribution of ethnolinguistic and religious groups with different levels of commitment to democratic values. As for Katchanovski’s (2018) finding about Greek Catholics being more committed to democratic values than others, this can probably be explained by his operationalization of “Western Ukraine”: We have found that people in Galicia - regardless of their faith - are more committed to democratic values than people in neighbouring regions. Thus, as almost all Greek Catholics live in Galicia, when Galicia in Katchanovski’s analysis is merged together with neighbouring regions into a larger macro-region, Greek Catholics will be above average committed to democratic values among people inside this macro-region.

7.2 Implications of main findings

Our findings support a narrative that the legacies of policies pursued by the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Russian Empire in the late 19th and early 20th century left legacies that are still visible today in the form of different levels of democratic political culture in different parts of Ukraine. The liberalizing policies pursued by Austria-Hungary in this period made possible the spread of mass literacy, development of a civil society, participation in elections, and the spread of nationalistic ideas among the ethnic Ukrainian population, aided by members of the clerical establishment of the Greek Catholic Church. At the same time the population of the Russian empire were subject to an autocratic regime that did not allow for these same processes. The comparison of Galicia and Volhynia shows that regions that had exactly the same geopolitical development both before and after the period of imperial rule by Austria and Russia today have very visible differences in their levels of democratic political culture. Crucial here for enabling us to draw this conclusion is the rejection of the Greek Catholic religion as the source of people’s
commitment to democratic values in Galicia, as we have then ruled out that the higher level of
democratic culture in Galicia is resulting from the religious composition of its inhabitants. We
have thus also showed that the Greek Catholics do not follow the pattern of Latin rite (mainline)
Catholics, who are found to be more committed to democratic values than others in former
communist countries (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). Pop-Eleches & Tucker’s explanation (2017,
125) for the higher level of democratic values among Catholics is that the calls for resistance
against communism emanating from the Church and the Pope made Catholics less susceptible to
indoctrination of communist values. An explanation for the equally high level of commitment to
democratic values among people of different faiths in Galicia might be that the spread of a pro-
democratic national identity had already “vaccinated” people against communist indoctrination,
and that external support from the Pope and internal calls for resistance against communism from
the underground Greek Catholic Church did not add more to people’s pro-democratic and anti-
communist attitudes. However, even though personal belief in the doctrines of the Greek Catholic
church today does not increase a person’s commitment to democratic values, the Greek Catholic
church played a key role in the process where a Ukrainian national identity emerged among the
peasant population in Galicia.

The ultimate causes of the emergence of a democratic political culture in Galicia can be traced
back to policies and institutions in the Austro-Hungarian empire, and can thus be regarded as a
legacy in line with Beissinger & Kotkin’s (2014, 7) conceptualization of the term as a “a durable
causal relationship between past institutions and policies on subsequent practices or beliefs, long
beyond the life of the regimes, institutions, and policies that gave birth to them”. They emphasise
that a legacy argument should focus on the origin of the present-day phenomena and the
relationship between historical causes and present-day outcomes, and not on whether or not
certain beliefs and practices remain unchanged across time. We are not concluding that
geographical patterns of democratic political culture rose under imperial rule to stay exactly the
same ever since. No social phenomenon would stay unaffected by other phenomena through a
century of shifting historical developments. What we can say from our findings is that the
present-day effect of developments in the Austro-Hungarian empire is a higher level of
democratic political culture. The full, theorized causal chain about how the political culture in
Galicia evolved through history is difficult to investigate in detail as there do not exist surveys
from the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras. Shulman (2005) shows that embedded in the ethnic Ukrainian identity complex is a belief in democracy as the preferred political regime, and that those who adhere to an ethnic Ukrainian identity therefore are more committed to democratic values than others. Person (2010) sees the period of Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine after World War 2 as central in strengthening this democratic element of the national identity, as official suppression of Ukrainian identity by the Soviet authorities strengthened Galicians’ view on themselves as being “democratic Europeans”. Those focusing on the role played by Ukrainian national identity in the transition process in the 1990s are emphasizing the potential for anti-authoritarian protest that lie in a pro-European national identity, and which developed into pro-democratic actions in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Way 2010). The Omnibus surveys are not very well suited for investigation of this aspect of the theory, and our goal has neither been to find out how people understood the concept of “democracy” in earlier times or to find out exactly at what point people became committed to democratic values in the way we understand it today. We will, however, point to the embeddedness of democratic values in a specific “Western” version of Ukrainian national identity, and hold national myths and identity as the most plausible vehicles for transmission of democratic values. This is in keeping with Almond (1990), who saw value commitments associated with ethnicity, nationality and religion as very resistant to change, even among populations that were subject to the Soviet Union’s efforts to transform the political culture of Eastern Europe. Our line of reasoning thus rests on the notion that cultural identities can be embedded with certain worldviews and understandings, as articulated by authors like Ross (2000), Laitin (1988) and Shulman (2005). Through the national myth that sees Ukraine as a historically democratic nation that belongs to Europe a commitment to democratic values is transmitted from one generation to the next.

We could see our findings in the light of Pearson’s (2004) notion of sequencing. In the case where a liberal window of opportunity opened for the first time before the onset of communism, developments began that lead to the emergence of a national identity that was embedded with certain worldviews, and that proved to be resistant to communist indoctrination. Where communism arrived first, and a liberal regime was introduced only in 1991, communism made a much bigger impact, and the introduction of a liberal regime did (or has not until now) had the same impact as where it was introduced before communism. We have also seen that some of
those actors who were first to exploit the liberal window of opportunity in Galicia was the Greek Catholic Church.

The mere experience of living in the context of a democratic country and taking part in democratic processes in the interwar-age seems to have made a less lasting impact than the experiences related to imperial rule. The only historical period when people in Western Ukraine experienced something similar to a real democratic system was the interwar-period, and this experience was shared equally by the populations of Galicia and Volhynia, as these regions were a part of Poland between the wars. Birch (2000) was of the view that the population under these circumstances should develop a commitment to democratic values, and that this commitment should have survived through communism and be transmitted to future generations. Another way of framing this no-finding is that the impact of Stalinism in the inter-war age does not seem to have present-day consequences in the form of a lower level of democratic culture. But the most revealing approach is maybe that where a national identity was not developed, 50 years of communist rule was enough to level out eventual differences in democratic culture that existed in the inter-war age. That developments during a 20-year long period of division in the inter-war age created less lasting impacts on Ukraine’s political culture than the 140 years long division between different empires is maybe not so surprising after all. We should also remember the uneven impact of Holodomor in the inter-war age. We saw that the West Central region was comparatively less affected by Holodomor than other areas of Ukraine, and perhaps the legacies of inter-war Stalinism are therefore weaker in West Central than further east.

7.3 Other findings

Our research question asks if Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic political culture can be explained by the historical legacies of former empires and states. Our surveys and research design were chosen in order for us to isolate the historical legacy variables, and we found that historical legacies from former empires can explain some of the geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine. Galicia proved to have a consistently high level of democratic culture, and there were only one of the eight eastern regions that in one of the surveys had a higher level. Still, we should not ignore the importance of other factors than historical legacies. However, the further to the East we move, the more different from Galicia becomes the
regions of Ukraine in terms of historical development and economic and demographic outlook. Thus, we can by means of the chosen surveys and method say less about the Eastern regions. Some things seem clear, however. As we move eastwards the impact of ethnolinguistic groups becomes a more relevant factor. As practically speaking all of the population (and thus also almost the whole sample) in Galicia are Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, it is not a straightforward task to investigate the differences in regional effects between Galicia and the easternmost regions, where close to the whole population belongs to other ethnolinguistic groups. A closer investigation revealed that among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians there was no regional effect in East Central as compared to Galicia in both 2007 and 2018, and in Kiev there was also no effect in 2018 and only a weakly significant effect in 2007. This means that two of the economically most well developed and most urbanized regions, which are situated to the East of the former imperial borders, have a level of democratic culture among its Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians which is at the same level as that of the much poorer and more rural Galicia to the west of the old borders. This implies that we are in a situation of causal complexity, as there are more than just one factor impacting a society’s level of democratic culture. Another way of framing this finding is in terms of equifinality, as it shows that there is more than one historical pathway to a democratic culture. In other words, historical legacies are not the same as pre-determined historical pathways. Our finding points in the same direction as one of the main findings of Inglehart & Welzel (2005), namely that both the approach of societal modernization, as well as the approach of persistence of traditional cultures, are relevant for explaining the emergence of democratic cultures.

The Central region, which lies in the North-Western, less urbanized and less industrialized part of the country, and which thus is more comparable to Galicia, shows a pattern of having a lower level of democratic political culture than Galicia, as could be expected there. In both surveys the Central has either the lowest or the second lowest average value of commitment to democratic values, only beaten by Donbass in 2018. From Table 4.1 we can see that the Central region together with West Central are the poorest and most rural regions on the eastern side of the old imperial and state borders and should thus be expected to have a low level of democratic culture. The Central region fared worse than West Central during Holodomor, and if Holodomor really had an erasing effect on people’s political consciousness and national identity as suggested by
Arel (2005), then perhaps this can explain some of the differences between these regions. However, the pattern of a very low level of democratic culture is less visible in 2018 than in 2007. As has also happened in other regions, the average level of commitment to democratic values among the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian part of the population has risen relatively to the Russian- and mixed-speaking population. An increasing difference between Ukrainian-speakers and others is in line with what we are expecting from Kulyk’s (2017) results, but what we find is perhaps an even bigger difference than what we would expect. Most importantly, it shows that when the level of national awareness has risen more among a specific part of the population (Ukrainian-speakers) than among others, there also emerges a gap between these parts of the population in terms of commitment to democratic values. This finding strengthens the belief in a link between national identity and commitment to democratic values, and it strengthens the belief that national identity can serve as a vehicle for spreading of democratic values also outside Galicia.

We should also comment on the exceptionally high score that was measured on the dependent variable in the South region in 2018. From Figure 6.4 we can see that both ethnolinguistic groups are scoring high, but that it is the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian group that is the largest exception from the overall pattern. We propose that what we are seeing here is partly an effect of the sampling method, and possibly also a reaction by parts of the population on the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The reason why we come with these proposals is that a close investigation of the distribution of respondents in the South region shows that 27 out of the small sample of 31 Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians from this region are drawn from Kherson oblast. Among these 27, there are 26 who have the maximum possible score on the index, while the one remaining respondent have the second highest possible score. 20 of these 27 respondents are drawn from the urban stratum, and thus most likely from only one or two sampling units. As we know from Chapter 5.2.1, respondents tend to be more and more homogenous the smaller a sampling region gets, and inside a single sampling unit the level of homogeneity can be very high. The extremely high score for Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in the South might therefore be a result of a high level of commitment to democratic values among the inhabitants in one or two neighbourhoods in Kherson oblast. And when talking about Kherson oblast, we should have in mind that this is the only oblast that directly borders Crimea, and that a particularly strong reaction to the
annexation of Crimea by Russia might be expected by the inhabitants of Kherson oblast as they due to highly undemocratic processes have lost access to their neighbouring region. We also note that the Russian- and mixed-speaking population in the South has a comparably high score in 2018, which is harder to explain by reference to Kulyk. Since this is not the case in 2018 in any of the other regions where there are a substantial number of Russian- and mixed-speakers, and since the South has such exceptionally high scores only in 2018, we should also think about the possibility of survey errors. If not, the South region should be looked closer into in the future.

The comparison of Galicia with Crimea is interesting, even though they differ highly in their historical developments. Crimea is the historically and culturally most Russified region in Ukraine, and a comparison with the “purely” Ukrainian Galicia shows a very big difference in level of democratic culture. This finding is supportive of Shulman’s theory of more and less democratic values being embedded in pro-European and pro-Russian identities respectively. The same pattern is visible for Donbass, which is among the regions with the lowest average scores in both surveys. Donbass, however, is different from Crimea both in terms of its history and in terms of its extremely high level of urbanization and industrialization. A comparison of Donbass and Galicia is not well suited for isolating specific historical variables, and our method of using regional dummy variables is most efficient when regions that differ on one particular variable can be compared with each other. The clearly defined, old borders between now-defunct states and empires is a rare example of a case where this method can be very efficient. However, we observe that Donbass, as well as Crimea, follow the pattern that we expected.

7.4 Ukraine in the Eastern European context

A case study of Ukraine will of course reveal much about Ukraine itself, but it is also relevant in the wider Eastern European context. We have earlier in this thesis discussed two different approaches to the study of historical legacies in Eastern Europe - one focusing on how pre-communist legacies have persisted through communist rule, and another focusing on the homogenizing effect of communist rule. When we find that 50 years of communism could have the effect to erase any higher level of commitment to democratic values which might have been in Volhynia, we are supported by for example Badescu (2006), who concludes that 50 years of communist rule in Romania was enough to erase regional differences in democratic political
culture there. And when we find that national identity can survive communism and be a vehicle of democratic values we are supported by for example Kuzio (2001), who saw the same to be the case in the Baltic states, and Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015), who found the same in Poland. Our claim to external validity will be rooted in the fact that the same borders that we have been focusing on in this thesis also traversed other Eastern European territories. Fuchs & Klingemann (2006) asked what had caused the emergence of a threshold in democratic culture somewhere in the eastern part of Eastern Europe, and suggested that it could be that this was caused by 1) the impact of additional years of communist rule in the areas that were a part of the Soviet Union from it establishment in 1921, it could be caused by 2) the different impact of the rule of the four empires that controlled much of Eastern Europe before World War 1, it could be caused by 3) the impact of the traditional religion of the countries in question, and it could be caused by 4) a lower level of socio-economic development in the easternmost countries. Our findings support the second of these suggestions in combination with the third. (Regarding the fourth suggestion we have seen that the geographical pattern of economic development in Ukraine is opposite of that of Europe as a whole, since in Ukraine the easternmost regions are by far the richest. Still, we have found indications that socioeconomic development also plays a role in development of democratic political cultures.)

Can our findings in any way help us understand what has happened in Ukraine the latest years? Eckstein (1998a) and Fuchs & Roller (1994) stressed the need for congruence between a country’s political culture and political system in order for the system to be stable. In a country where there are substantial and lasting regional differences in support for democratic values such a congruence can, logically speaking, not take place. The consequence of this should thus be instability in terms of the political system, and instability has indeed been the case in Ukraine. We have also seen some signs of a rising gap between Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and other ethnolinguistic groups. If that finding is to be confirmed by future research, this will also be a hindrance for congruence between Ukraine’s political system and political culture.

7.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the analysis

The major strength of this analysis is that it has a higher level of geographical precision than most studies of political culture in Ukraine. This has enabled us to make precise assessments about
historical legacies, and we can also rule out the possibility that findings of historical legacy 
relationships are spurious and resulting from uneven distributions of demographic groups.

As we have explained thoroughly in Chapter 5.2.1, we have a problem of representativeness in 
these surveys, and we do also not have the possibility of taking into account the clustering of 
respondents in sampling units when conducting our analysis. A consequence of this may be that 
standard errors are estimated as too low, and thus that the levels of significance becomes too 
high. However, the recurrence of the same findings in both the 2007 and the 2018 survey is 
strengthening our case that the conclusions we have drawn are not based on patterns that have 
occurred just due to sampling errors.

A possible weakness is the questions we have based our investigation on. We have had access to 
only three questions about democratic values and based on this we are attempting to draw 
conclusions about people’s commitment to democratic values in general. Access to surveys that 
would include a higher number of questions related to democratic values, as well as questions 
pertaining directly to the link between identity, association with Western Europe or Russia and 
democratic values would have made us better equipped to make generalization about people’s 
commitment to democratic values, and also to investigate and the connections between identity 
and democratic values. However, as a survey that combines such questions with a survey 
methodology that allows for a high level of geographical precision has not been available, we 
have been confined to try to say as much as possible based on the Omnibus surveys.
Questions about alternatives to democratic rules could also have illuminated more about people’s 
view on democracy, and this was also suggested by Fuchs & Roller (1994). We would hold, 
however, that the formulation “How important in order to live a good life” will not encourage 
people to give a high score unless they really value the democratic rights that follow in the 
questions.
8. Conclusion and suggestions for further research

8.1 Conclusion

Ever since political competition became possible by the time of the end of communism, Ukraine has been characterized by very strong regional divisions. It has been difficult to reach a consensus in society on key issues related to regime type, nation building and foreign policy orientation, and there has often been a strong geographical polarization on opinions on these issues. An aspect of these divisions has been people’s support for liberal democracy, which is a central factor with regards to democratization and regime stability. Ukraine’s regional divisions have often been attributed to historical legacies, and Peisakhin (2015, 25-26) calls Ukraine a “natural experiment” which is perfectly suited for investigation of how imperial legacies affect today’s political culture. Likewise, Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017, 24-25) see Ukraine as a case which is very well suited for research on how the length of time under communist rule affects a population’s commitment to democratic values. This led us into formulating the following research question:

“Can geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine be explained by the historical legacies of former empires and states?”

Miller, White and Heywood (1998, 10) argued that it would be impossible to distinguish between different historical legacies in Ukraine due to the near overlapping historical borders, and we have shown that later authors have indeed had problems in this regard. We argue that we have overcome this problem by considering all the most important regime periods which may have made an imprint on Ukraine’s democratic culture and developed a framework for comparison of regions. This way we have obtained a high level of control for other variables and have thus been able to assess the legacies left by historical regimes.

We have in this thesis found that legacies from imperial regimes in the 19th and early 20th century are still very visible in Ukraine in the form of a sizeable threshold in commitment to democratic values at the long defunct border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian
Empire. Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic culture can therefore partly be explained by historical legacies from these empires. A similar threshold has not been found at the former outer border of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we have seen that other pathways to a democratic political culture are open, most notably is the one which goes through socio-economic development. Our investigation is more precise than those found in the existing literature, and one contribution to the literature is strong evidence about legacy relationships between imperial regimes before World War 1 and present-day outcomes in terms of democratic political culture.

Our focus has been on the legacies of actions made by foreign powers in the distant past. But we have also seen that the days when foreign powers were affecting Ukraine’s political culture may not be over yet. We found in several regions that a gap in commitment to democratic values has appeared between the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and members of other ethnolinguistic groups, and we saw that this rising gap may be linked to Russia’s involvement in the war in Donbass. Our surveys were not particularly well suited for further investigation of the ethnolinguistic aspect of Ukraine’s regional divisions, and we also could not go into detailed investigations of individual regions and oblasts. The southern region in particular showed a surprising pattern that invites for further investigation.

8.2 Implications of findings
Implications of these findings are that some of Ukraine’s problems with democratization perhaps can be contributed to the legacies from the Russian Empire, which are being felt in the largest part of the country. Some of the root causes of the political instability of Ukraine, or at least the current divisions, can also probably be found in the historical division between the Russian and Habsburg Empire, which have left legacies in terms of different levels of democratic political culture. In this situation it will be difficult to obtain congruence between the country’s political culture and its political system. We should not forget, however, that this study also confirms that there are other pathways to a high level of democratic culture than through regime legacies.

Ukraine is not the only country which has experienced shifting regimes. A similar pattern of imperial rule, short-lived experiences with democracy, and Soviet or Soviet-imposed communist rule is found in much of Eastern Europe. Our findings therefore also have validity for the wider
Eastern European context, and we thus add to the literature about historical legacies in Eastern Europe. Our findings are in line with the literature on pre-communist legacies, and also supportive of the connection between national identity and democratic values which has been found in other former communist countries.

8.3 Suggestions for future research

We have in this thesis repeatedly pointed out the necessity of high quality surveys for research on historical legacies and regional divisions in Ukraine. The more representative a survey is on low geographical levels, the more precise assessments can be made about geographical differences in political culture, and the more precise assessments can also be made about historical legacies. If surveys with larger samples and better regional representativity could be provided it would also be possible to conduct multilevel analyses of the Ukrainian case. That would enable us to take for example the regional socioeconomic conditions better into account, and we could investigate how effects of individual-level characteristics are dependent on the context. The regional variations in effect of ethnolinguistic group belonging could then have been further investigated, and perhaps one could also make closer investigations of individual regions and oblasts.

Future research should also focus more on other aspects of Ukraine’s regional political cultures, and the connection between national identity and political values. We have shown that commitment to democratic values do differ between regions, and we hold national identity as the most plausible vehicle for transmission of support for these values in the former Habsburg areas. We thus tapped into one aspect of the Ukrainian identity complexes which was relevant for our study. Also other values and attitudes have been found to be embedded in these identity complexes, most notably identification as belonging either to Europe or to the Russian sphere. Our thesis has been devoted to only one aspect of Ukraine’s political culture. A final recommendation for future research would therefore be an investigation of how historical legacies and identity complexes interacts and produces outcomes in terms of larger systems of value orientations.
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APPENDIX

A1

Omnibus 2007 Western subsample, Factor analysis part 1

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<thead>
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<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
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<td>0.8342</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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N=451
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(3) = 90.84 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

A2

Omnibus 2007, Western subsample Factor analysis part 2, Retained factors: 1

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<td>V3</td>
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A3  
Omnibus 2018, Western subsample Factor analysis part 1

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<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Difference</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.0199</td>
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LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(3) = 569.41 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

A4  
Omnibus 2018 Factor analysis part 2, Retained factors: 1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>0.6996</td>
<td>0.5106</td>
</tr>
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<td>V2</td>
<td>0.8801</td>
<td>0.2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3</td>
<td>0.7102</td>
<td>0.4956</td>
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A5  
Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2007, Western subsample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>item</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>index</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3432</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2880</td>
<td>0.4296</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>0.7314</td>
<td>0.7822</td>
<td>0.7492</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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A6  
Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2018, Western subsample

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6157</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4967</td>
<td>0.6251</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>0.8239</td>
<td>0.8828</td>
<td>0.8378</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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A7: Distributions of Dependent Variable, Omnibus 2007, Western Subsample  
A8: Distributions of Dependent Variable, Omnibus 2018, Western subsample
**A9-A12 Operationalization and distribution of control variables**

**A9: Education**

*Education*: We create a trichotomous variable. Different types of secondary education make up the category *Secondary education*, no education and primary education make up the category *Low education*, and higher education make up the category *higher education*. (1 = *Secondary education*, 2 = *Low education*, 3 = *Higher education*)

**Distribution of respondents on variable Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Secondary education</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>1386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Low education</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Higher education</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2042</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**A10: Urban**

*Urban*: We keep the dichotomous variable that tells if the interview is done in an urban or rural stratum. (0 = *rural*, 1 = *urban*)

**Distribution of respondents on variable Urban**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 Rural</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Urban</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>2043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A11: Male**

*Male*: (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*)

**Distribution of respondents on variable Male**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
0 Female 1266 1241
1 Male 766 802
Total 2032 2043

A12: Age
Age: We keep the original variable with six age groups. (1=18-29 years, 2=30-39 years, 3=40-49 years, 4=50-59 years, 5=60-69 years, 6= 70 years and above).

Distribution of respondents on variable Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2007</th>
<th>Number of respondents 2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 18-29 years</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 30-39 years</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>396</td>
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<td>3 40-49 years</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 50-59 years</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 60-69 years</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 70 years and above</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>2043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A13-16: Residual versus fitted plots

A13: Residual versus fitted plot, Omnibus 2007, full sample

A14: Residuals versus fitted plot, Omnibus 2007, western subsample

A15: Residual versus fitted plot, Omnibus 2018, full sample

A16: Residuals versus fitted plot, Omnibus 2018, western subsample

A17: Residuals versus inverse normal

A18: Residuals versus inverse normal
Calculations done on basis of Katchanovski (2006, 214, 237)

Katchanovski (2006, 214, 237) presents the number of years that an oblast has been under non-Russian and non-Soviet rule between 1793 and 1944. When the former borders did not follow present-day oblast-borders, he gives the number of years of non-Russian and non-Soviet rule multiplied with the proportion of registered voters that today lives on the western side of these borders. Numbers given for Lviv and Ivano-Frankovsk are 151, as the entire area of these oblasts were under non-Russian and non-Soviet rule between 1793 and 1944. For Ternopil he gives the number 134. 134/151 = 0.887.

Calculations done on basis of Kulyk (2017, 9)

Kulyk (2017, 9) presents the proportion of Russian-speakers and the proportion of the whole population who primarily identify as Ukrainian. On the basis of this we can calculate the numbers for non-Russian-speakers:

2012:

N=1920
Number of Russian-speakers (nR)=681
Number of non-Russian-speakers = N-nR=1239

Percentage of whole population who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 53.3 %
Percentage of Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 41.4 %
Percentage of non-Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian = (0.533*1920-0.414*681)/1239= 59.8 %
2014:
N=2035
Number of Russian-speakers (nR)=811
Number of non-Russian-speakers =N-nR=1224

Percentage of whole population who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 61.4 %
Percentage of Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 41.1 %
Percentage of non-Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian =\(\frac{0.614*2035-0.411*811}{1224}\) = 74.9 %

Regression analyses, Western subsample including control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 1-</th>
<th>Model 2-</th>
<th>Model 3-</th>
<th>Model 4-</th>
<th>Model 5-</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>index</td>
<td>index2007</td>
<td>index2018</td>
<td>index2018</td>
<td>index2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Region (Baseline: Galicia)

Volhynia (2) -0.244** -0.348*** -0.383***
(0.124) (0.0975) (0.111)

West Central (3) -0.334*** -0.354*** -0.388***
(0.0891) (0.0971) (0.111)

Region (Baseline: Volhynia)

Galicia (1) 0.263** 0.347***
(0.124) (0.0969)

West Central (3) -0.0484 -0.0209
(0.127) (0.106)

Greek Catholic -0.0756
(0.124)

Ethno-linguistic group (Baseline: Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality)

Russian-speaking Ukrainian -0.606 -0.979** -0.981***
(0.581) (0.379) (0.379)

Mixed-speaking Ukrainian 0.485*** 0.231 0.222
(0.130) (0.470) (0.471)

Russian -0.0515 0.573** 0.593**
(0.196) (0.246) (0.235)

Other 0.0739 0.205 0.196
(0.279) (0.311) (0.313)
### Regression analysis, western subsample with control variables and categorical income variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 4-West 2018 with categorical income variable index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region (Baseline: Galicia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia (2)</td>
<td>-0.276*** (0.0941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Central (3)</td>
<td>-0.281*** (0.0908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>-0.0513 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-linguistic group (Baseline: Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speaking Ukrainian</td>
<td>-0.872***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-speaking</td>
<td>0.254 (0.331)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ukrainian (0.372)
Russian 0.619***
(0.221)
Other 0.194
(0.255)
male 0.0707
(0.0712)
age (Baseline: 18-29)
30-39 -0.307***
(0.109)
40-49 -0.0916
(0.109)
50-59 -0.199*
(0.110)
60-69 0.00531
(0.109)
70 and above -0.262*
(0.136)
education (Baseline: Secondary education)
low education -0.205
(0.155)
high education 0.0666
(0.0861)
urban -0.0202
(0.0759)
Income groups
(Baseline: Less than 1001 UAH)
1001 - 2000 UAH 0.545
(0.383)
2001 - 3000 UAH 0.373
(0.372)
3001 - 4000 UAH 0.282
(0.386)
4001 - 5000 UAH 0.457
(0.369)
5001 - 6000 UAH 0.478
(0.383)
6001 - 8000 UAH 0.655*
(0.375)
8001 - 10000 UAH 1.017***
(0.377)
More than 10000 UAH 0.698*
(0.384)
DK/NA 0.333
(0.374)
REF 0.495
(0.368)
Constant -0.254
(0.385)
Observations 567
R-squared 0.145
Regression analyses, full sample including control variables and interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region (Baseline: Galicia)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia (2)</td>
<td>-0.235*</td>
<td>-0.427***</td>
<td>-0.233*</td>
<td>-0.386***</td>
<td>-0.236*</td>
<td>-0.371***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Central (3)</td>
<td>-0.296***</td>
<td>-0.409***</td>
<td>-0.326***</td>
<td>-0.376***</td>
<td>-0.301***</td>
<td>-0.401***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0841)</td>
<td>(0.0974)</td>
<td>(0.0883)</td>
<td>(0.0977)</td>
<td>(0.0923)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiev (4)</td>
<td>-0.256***</td>
<td>-0.173*</td>
<td>-0.385***</td>
<td>0.0364</td>
<td>-0.239*</td>
<td>0.140</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0899)</td>
<td>(0.1079)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.0994)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central (5)</td>
<td>-0.603***</td>
<td>-0.459***</td>
<td>-0.719***</td>
<td>-0.206***</td>
<td>-0.992***</td>
<td>-0.170*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0953)</td>
<td>(0.0839)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.0876)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.0994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South (6)</td>
<td>-0.185**</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>-0.385***</td>
<td>0.606***</td>
<td>0.0559</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0908)</td>
<td>(0.0919)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
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<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.0808)</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Central (7)</td>
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<td>-0.392***</td>
<td>-0.343***</td>
<td>-0.0549</td>
<td>0.0548</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.214)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donbass (8)</td>
<td>-0.513***</td>
<td>-0.621***</td>
<td>-0.712***</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>-0.870***</td>
<td>-0.848***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0800)</td>
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<td>(0.257)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crimea (9)</td>
<td>-0.500***</td>
<td>-0.755***</td>
<td>-0.911***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest (10)</td>
<td>0.299**</td>
<td>-0.261**</td>
<td>0.238*</td>
<td>-0.217*</td>
<td>0.379***</td>
<td>-0.303***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
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<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
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<td>Non-Ukrainian speaker (Nus)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Volhynia#Nus</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>West Central#Nus</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiev#Nus</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central#Nus</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South#Nus</td>
<td>-0.640**</td>
<td>-0.640**</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>East Central#Nus</td>
<td>-0.557*</td>
<td>-0.557*</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Donbass#Nus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crimea#Nus</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest#Nus</td>
<td>-0.701**</td>
<td>-0.701**</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>0.312</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-linguistic group (Baseline: Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speaking Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.00903</td>
<td>-0.175***</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>-0.393***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
### Mixed-speaking Ukrainian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.144*</th>
<th>-0.263***</th>
<th>0.327***</th>
<th>-0.421***</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td>(0.0792)</td>
<td>(0.0887)</td>
<td>(0.0839)</td>
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### Russian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-0.0494</th>
<th>-0.0590</th>
<th>0.219**</th>
<th>-0.235*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0808)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0996)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
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### Other

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.0969</th>
<th>-0.129</th>
<th>0.319***</th>
<th>-0.344**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
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### Male

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.0124</th>
<th>0.0245</th>
<th>0.0334</th>
<th>0.00514</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0502)</td>
<td>(0.0505)</td>
<td>(0.0489)</td>
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### Age (Baseline: 18-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>-0.117</th>
<th>0.0393</th>
<th>-0.0891</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0843)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>0.0955</th>
<th>0.000267</th>
<th>0.0991</th>
<th>0.0143</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0791)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-0.0263</th>
<th>-0.0252</th>
<th>-0.00294</th>
<th>-0.0145</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.0760)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<th>-0.0342</th>
<th>0.0957</th>
<th>-0.0342</th>
<th>0.106</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0868)</td>
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<td>(0.0845)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-0.0370</th>
<th>-0.0519</th>
<th>-0.0517</th>
<th>-0.0164</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0998)</td>
<td>(0.0997)</td>
<td>(0.0974)</td>
<td>(0.0943)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education (Baseline: Secondary education)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>0.0906</th>
<th>-0.0643</th>
<th>0.0565</th>
<th>-0.128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0851)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.0815)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.0507</th>
<th>-0.0244</th>
<th>0.100*</th>
<th>-0.0162</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0997)</td>
<td>(0.0561)</td>
<td>(0.0972)</td>
<td>(0.0555)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-0.105*</th>
<th>-0.185***</th>
<th>-0.0777</th>
<th>-0.157***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0568)</td>
<td>(0.0580)</td>
<td>(0.0562)</td>
<td>(0.0546)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-0.106**</th>
<th>-0.279***</th>
<th>-0.0323</th>
<th>-0.253***</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0527)</td>
<td>(0.0547)</td>
<td>(0.0522)</td>
<td>(0.0521)</td>
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</table>

### Low Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.290***</th>
<th>0.274***</th>
<th>0.0296</th>
<th>0.337***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0582)</td>
<td>(0.0635)</td>
<td>(0.0971)</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.262**</th>
<th>0.453***</th>
<th>0.245**</th>
<th>0.445***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
<td>(0.0946)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(0.054)</th>
<th>0.061</th>
<th>0.012</th>
<th>0.042</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.121</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1,863</th>
<th>1,961</th>
<th>1,836</th>
<th>1,960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

|          | 1,836 | 1,960 | 1,836 | 1,960 |

### R-squared

|          | 0.054 | 0.061 | 0.012 | 0.042 |

### Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

---

**Questions about commitment to democratic values in Russian original.**

Questions as written in the questionnaire of Omnibus 2007, and as ordered by this author for Omnibus 2018.

Есть разные взгляды на то, при каких социальных и политических условиях жизнь в стране может быть нормальной. О каждом из условий, которые я буду сейчас называть, скажите, пожалуйста, как Вы думаете, является ли оно обязательным; важным, но не обязательным; не очень важным; или совсем не важным, чтобы жизнь в стране могла быть нормальной.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>совсем неважно</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>не очень важно</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>трудно сказать</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>важно, но не обязательно</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>обязательно</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NO 9
1. Право свободно говорить обо всем, даже если это увеличивает напряжение в обществе
2. Возможность выпускать газеты любой политической ориентации
3. Свобода объединения в политические партии, конкурирующие на выборах

**Questionnaire, Omnibus 2018:**

Codebooks are not created for the Omnibus surveys. Dataset, questionnaire and survey methodology for Omnibus 2018 has as of 30th of May 2018 not yet been made public but will appear at the website “Kyivan Archive”: [http://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research](http://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research).

Included in the dataset that this author has received from Kiev International Institute of Sociology are only the above questions about commitment to democratic values, as well as demographic background variables. Since demographic background questions are the same for Omnibus 2007 and 2018, we refer to the questionnaire for Omnibus 2007 for these (see [http://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research@showResearch=113152](http://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research@showResearch=113152)). Since Omnibus 2018 is not made public yet we present these questions and answer categories here:

**D7 Religious Confession (religion)**
- 1 Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate)
- 2 Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)
- 3 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
- 4 Greek Catholic Church
- 5 Roman Catholic
- 6 Protestant
- 7 Muslim (Islam)
- 8 Religious but do not belong to a religion, church
- 9 Other answer
- 10 Unbeliever, atheist
- 11 DK/NA

**D11 Average monthly net household income**
- 1 Less than 1001 UAH
- 2 1001 - 2000 UAH
- 3 2001 - 3000 UAH
- 4 3001 - 4000 UAH
- 5 4001 - 5000 UAH
- 6 5001 - 6000 UAH.
- 7 6001 - 8000 UAH
- 8 8001 - 10000 UAH
- 9 More than 10000 UAH
- 97 DK/NA
- 99 REF