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1968 and its other worlds: Global events and (anti-)state dynamics in France, Mozambique and Vanuatu

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ABSTRACT
This article de-centres the moment, event and impact of 1968 and expands it temporally and spatially. Taking a longue durée approach charting a trajectory from the 1960s into the 1980s, we analyse statist and anti-statist dynamics through a comparison of the May 1968 Paris riots with the Nagriamel movement in Vanuatu and the phenomenon of Naparama in Mozambique. Such a horizontal triangulation and spatio-temporal expansion is undertaken to contribute to a more global understanding of what we term ‘the 1968 event’ entails. However, this comparative analysis also underlines how its impact should be measured as, first, an experimentation with and attack on political reality, second, how the intricate connections between Euro-American and other worlds were integral to its articulation and, third, how paradoxically 1968 and its response spawned the rise of an authoritarian form of nation-state – eclipsing the openings in the firmament of the political, social and the real afforded by the original event.

KEYWORDS
1968; France; Vanuatu; Mozambique; politics; events; history; memory

Introduction: event, freedom, state

The semi-centennial of the year 1968 has come and gone – yet our present day discourses are still reverberating with its key issues such as inequality, citizenship, dependency, gender, race and wealth. For one, this passing of time implies that a part of heterogeneous forms of collective remembrance gradually becomes restructured as capitalized History in which linearity, formality and stasis replace plural and open-ended memory, a delimitation of pacifying and homogenizing 1968 into stale and stable History that Ross cautions against (2002; see also Nora 1989). In this article we take seriously the problem of homogenizing 1968 or, rather the domestification (in both senses of the term) that is the fall-out of many contemporary discourses reminiscing about the year 1968, often confining these to the North American and European contexts. Rather than privileging or naturalizing the Euro-American experiences, this article follows Chakrabarty’s (2000, 2008) call to provincialize Europe when approaching the 1968 event. This does not mean that we exclude or marginalize events animating socio-cultural and political dynamics in these regions of the world but that we refrain from instituting singular and unequivocal causal connections between, for instance, the May events in Paris in 1968 and the significant but largely unrecognized movements of Nagriamel and Naparama in Vanuatu and Mozambique respectively – which comprise our other two cases.
de-causalizing, de-centering and horizontalizing our comparison, we also take inspiration from an emerging global anthropological and historical debate where there have been calls for both a greater plurality in historiographic representation and epistemic freedom in a radical sense (see, e.g., Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018; Escobar 2018).

As we see it, two main currents run through the dominant narrative: First, 1968 is approached as an instance of existential experimentation with religion and awareness—a cosmological awakening drawing in and on everything from Jesus, Buddha and Confucius, to Nietzsche, Gandhi or the flourishing of figures like the Beatles-inspiring guru, Maharishi Mahesh. The second current emphasises 1968’s revolutionary political spirit with a resurrection of Marx and appreciation for Trotsky and Mao, Castro and Che Guevara, attention to Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, and a renewed interest in anarchist philosophers like Proudhon, Kropotkin and Thoreau, as well as upcoming philosophers like Noam Chomsky, Frantz Fanon and Herbert Marcuse. For both these currents, 1968 also provided a counter-cultural fashion and a life-style soundtrack through artists and bands such as The Grateful Dead, Janis Joplin, Bob Dylan, The Doors and Jimi Hendrix (see also Kutschke and Norton 2013; Sahlins 2009; Lewis 2009). These aesthetic and cultural expressions comprise potent modes of experimentation with subjectivity and iden-
titarian formations—in short, as Paul Gilroy (2010) argues, effectively constituting domains for utopian, boundary-challenging thought.

While the sixties was undoubtedly a lively period, a first point we would like to make here is that major aspects of what unfolded remain uncaptured by both the two main currents centring on North America and Europe, as well as in the sanitizing bracket terms of ‘religion’ or ‘politics’. Instead, the 1968 event must be considered in terms of radical doubt, profound uncertainty and experimentation with truth and reality. Probing the limits and constitution undertaken not only through shamanic attempts at altered consciousness, dabbling in hallucinations or experimenting with sensual and sexual awareness and its multiple constellations, but also in the sense of plural and mutating attacks on political reality and its institutions and powers, such as state, church and community. We hence perceive the 1968 event to be of great magnitude—existentially, politically and religiously—and one which needs to be rethought in a radical and global comparative manner. When we re-define 1968 as a global and long-term event, we thus wish to highlight certain characteristics— independent of the focus on sex&drugs&rock’n’roll in North American and European societies—and instead draw attention to a worldwide experimentation with the political as an emergent form of life.

Comparisons and 1968 as global event

In mainstream Western journalism, events in the colonial and post-colonial world are commonly portrayed as peripheral, incoherent and unintelligible for large-scale theories of politics and world history—or even represented as outside history (Wolf [1982] 1997) and, by extension, relegated to positions outside human linear and temporal progression. Yet, there is no particular reason why this should be the case. In the following we will therefore demonstrate that historical developments in two seemingly very ‘remote’ and ‘exotic’ locations could indeed be closely linked up to sentiments that we can place within the 1968 type of political framework and sentiment and the longue durée frame from the early 1960s to the 1980s—what we call, for short, the 1968 event. While they
unfolded at different dates and had other vocabularies and intentions, we will argue that they might even be cast as a different and broader understanding of 1968 as a world event. Here we also reflect what James Ferguson (2013, 120) notes in his contribution in a book on, precisely, the global reach of 1968, when he states: ‘There is not a single 1968 (with its epicentre in, for instance, Paris in May). The mood and moment of 1968 [...] was irredicibly plural and meant different things in different places’.

But how can we, and Ferguson, claim that events in other parts of the world should be paralleled with the year 1968 and its dynamics in Paris? As we will see, that event was related to youthful protest against authoritative structures embedded within culturally and historically specific situations of statehood, institutional structures, patriarchy, academic rationalism, Christian morality and bourgeois trust in reason and a positive reality – in addition to the dangerous situation of continuing war in Vietnam, the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union and the NATO Alliances. However, the 1968 event in Paris was perhaps first and foremost sensual and immediate, creating a space for experimenting not only with sexuality and play. This also, crucially, involved devising novel forms of collectivity, togetherness and intense notions of participation where the political transcended its erstwhile institutional and representational frameworks (see also Badiou 2018).

For our three cases, we are not claiming that identical notions of youth or togetherness were unfolding in these. What we point out is, however, that the movements in Mozambique and Vanuatu also created new, youthful and experimental horizons for their new utopian politics and nations, like in France, and that they, thereafter, became subject to similar forces of state reaction. Whereas the movements were outbursts of a multiplicity of social forms, the violent counter-reactions articulated a universality of state power. The 1968 event essentially articulated the intensity and multiplicity of political participation, in an era of adolescent state forms emerging out of the world wars and colonial insurgency.

The particular wedge of time from May to June in Paris or the US in 1968 (see, e.g., Halliwell and Witham 2018; Vinen 2018) is undoubtedly important. It is, also, integral to almost all hegemonic narratives of the era. However, rather than fetishizing that temporal and spatial wedge, we follow Blum’s (2018, 194) double argument about the need, first, for a longue durée approach to 1968 as a period lasting from the early sixties and into the eighties (see also Badiou 2018) and, second, about the necessity of outlining dynamic and plural connectivities between European and American movements and the (post-)colonial worlds.

From this comparative triangulation between the worlds of Europe, Africa and Melanesia, we draw out various lasting legacies for political trajectories, the nature of the political realities and dynamics of the state. Specifically, we argue that the movements in all three cases articulated multiplicity, freedom from authority and flourishing with ritual togetherness and anti-structure. However, they also – crucially – gave birth to new and authoritarian state forms. We wish to suggest that the world order we see emerging into the 1980s – with parliamentary democracy, global trade treaties, human rights discourses and the UN with its tools of World Bank and WHO and UNESCO collaboration – from our perspective heralded the triumph of such a novel state structure, eclipsing the reality-altering and revolutionary political imagination of movements from the sixties to the eighties in places like Melanesia and Mozambique. In our analysis we will, therefore, also relate to the question tangential to 1968 – notably how, and in what form, it is that the unitary
democratic nation-state managed to consolidate itself against all the kinds of revolts involving such a multiplicity of counter-forces on all kinds of levels; the political, the religious, the economic, or the academic. Through the comparison of such different examples we wish to convey not only the violent beginnings of the post-68 nation-state but also its smothering of radical possibility.

While we realize that juxtaposing such regions and such political events is highly unorthodox and may very well violate certain purists’ views of comparison, we sacrifice such concerns for the broader aim of conveying the complexity on a global scale of the spectacular emancipatory forms that the world saw in those decades, through ‘making the incomparable comparable’ (Detienne [2000] 2008).

The French case: ‘Under the cobble stones is the beach’

Creativity.
Spontaneity.
Life.


At the height of what has been labelled ‘May 1968’ in France, broad mass-mobilisation implied that more than one in five of France’s population participated in protests that expanded into all sectors of society. For many of the protesters, liaising and forging bonds with workers was a primary concern and, thus, leading ideologues, such as Alain Badiou (2012), who participated actively for the Maoist faction, deployed his energy at theorizing the factory as a locus for emancipation, protest and evental potentiality (see, e.g., Badiou [1986] 2006). Others, such as Félix Guattari, saw in the occupation of state institutions, like theatres, similar reality-challenging potential and participated, for instance, in the occupation of the Odeon theatre in Paris (see Dosse [2007] 2010, 173f) – using this as an opportunity to probe relations between politics, play and the real.

This form of experimentation with or, rather, attacks on the real – a creation of and delving into anti-structure – also inspired such leading protesters as Daniel Cohn-Bendit (‘Danny the Red’), a student leader from Nanterre who allegedly created such iconic slogans as ‘Under the cobblestones is the beach’, ‘It is forbidden to forbid’ and ‘Live without limits and enjoy without restraint!’2 The vast number of baby-boomers flooding French universities led by Cohn-Bendit had had enough of restraints on their lives and desired to explore sexuality, art, literature and science without the repressive gaze and rules of patriarchal authorities like their fathers or professors, as noted also by conservative scholar Raymond Aron (1969, 40). When Claude Lévi-Strauss commented on May 1968 he was, like Aron, also disillusioned with the French generational gap that had been allowed to widen:

These events appeared to me as a supplementary sign of the disintegration of a civilization which no longer even knows how to assure what non-literate societies know so well to obtain: the integration of new generations. (Lévi-Strauss, in Pace 1983, 190)

Regarded and treated as (semi-)children by the parental generation, the protest grew into a major and critical event in the first weeks of May 19683, denouncing dogmas, authorities and ideologues and instead acting ‘sensually’ – acting on their immediate desires, sympathies and gut reactions of what was right and wrong. This attack on and defiance of
repressive and violent structures was so widespread that when relatively few protesting students met with police violence on May 6th, vast numbers of students and university staff soon congregated, setting up barricades in the streets to fight equally swelling police forces. Eventually, over a million people took to the streets on May 13th – effectively taking over Paris and redefining the city and its lives (Turkle 1975).

As also indicated above, the movement lacked a clear-cut ideological or party-based foundation. As Cornelius Castoriadis noted in a commentary (1988, 127), its central rallying point was constituted by a general conflict between leaders and followers on all societal levels, what he calls dirigeants et exécutants, in a system that ‘turned people into objects’. Hence, it was a rebellion as much on the existential level as the political – against a sense of alienation, automation and authoritarian bureaucracy within work-place leaderships, family and university; a resistance against meaninglessness and life-defying forces. Differently put, it was a becoming-political of a part of society that had not previously been defined as political; children acting out their politics in the dormitories of the universities and in the streets. Consequently, the established institutions and political parties did not, at first, recognize it as relevant to their work or functions. The Communist Party, for instance, was uninterested in the riots and the major labour unions were hesitant to take part. Gradually, however, these joined in order to transform the broad protest into pragmatic ends, demanding higher salaries and better working conditions. Nonetheless, Castoriadis importantly points out that the unions were reactionary in relation to the protests through reproducing a ‘worker mythology’ and, thereby, also submitting to the capitalist regime of production, consumption, privatization and individualism. Because of the narrow labour union concern with economic progress, many workers actually rejected their own unions’ deals and instead joined the student uprisings in solidarity (Castoriadis 1988, 158–159).

On the 29th of May President de Gaulle vacated the Élysée Palace, as if the French Republic had been suspended leaving protesters in charge. De Gaulle’s absence and rumoured escape from France signalled a country now preparing itself for a veritable 1789-style revolution. This turned out to be untrue: As we know today, de Gaulle had merely spent 29th of May at a French military base in Germany consulting with his military apparatuses and supporters. In a short televised address to the nation the following day he stated that he was not abdicating, but ordered the dissolving of the national assembly, new elections, and that the strikes had to stop – if not he would call in the army he had encircling Paris. In a for de Gaulle fortuitous turn of events, a march of 800,000 supporters of the President reclaimed the Parisian streets the following day.

An ironic slogan in the streets of Paris in 1968 stated that it was now ‘back to normal’ and, indeed, the new national assembly had a strong Gaullist majority. This political turn to the right and, arguably, to a strengthened nation-state, paved the way for a series of conservative French presidents well into the 1970s. The following decades were also characterized by the economic policies of the European market, continuing issues related to the Algeria post-colony, unemployment and unrest in the banlieues. The sense of unresolved issues and missed opportunities is also reflected in the comments by Deleuze and Guattari in their essay ‘May 1968 never took place’ ([1984] 2006). In the year 1968, Deleuze was an early-career university teacher in Lyon while Guattari was working in a psychiatric clinic, La Borde, in Loire. Guattari, especially, got directly immersed in the unfolding of the protests and initially became elated by its prospects:
When 1968 broke out, I had the impression I was walking on air. It was a completely strange feeling. [...] I hadn’t seen it coming at all and hadn’t understood a thing. It took me a few days to realize what was happening. (Guattari, quoted in Dosse [2007] 2010, 171)

Moreover, as Guattari saw it, La Borde itself epitomised the spirit of 1968 through its radical and experimental confrontation with institutional psychotherapy – ‘a collective experiment [that] sought to reinvent the world while remaining remote from its turbulence’ (Dosse [2007] 2010, 40). Ceaselessly experimenting with organizational and therapeutic forms, La Borde also celebrated the festive and ludic by running thematic carnivals and large-scale theatre productions (Dosse [2007] 2010, 63). It was, therefore, unsurprising that when joining the protests, Guattari was instrumental in the occupation of the Parisian Odeon theatre adorning it with a banner emphasizing, in red, an import broader than parliamentary or institutional politics: ‘When the national assembly becomes a bourgeois theater, all the theaters should turn into national assemblies!’ (quoted in Dosse [2007] 2010, 173).

Deleuze and Guattari, however, first met in 1969 and Julian Bourg comments that ‘Deleuze, like Foucault, seems to have been jolted out of a rather bookish existence and drawn, if tentatively, toward the pragmatics of militancy’ (2007, 159). Prior to 1969, Deleuze was consumed by his PhD thesis Difference and Repetition (Deleuze [1968] 2004) throughout the spring and summer of 1968. When Guattari finally encountered Deleuze, a melding of concerns was set in motion that centred on temporality’s relation to normality, as well as the interconnected nature of stasis, state and motion – all concerns central to their experience of rupture in 1968 (Bourg 2007). Later, this encounter was to produce the ground-breaking book Anti-Oedipus ([1972] 2002) which was to open up the experimental world of 1968, Deleuze’s radical philosophy and ‘the laboratory of the real’, to a wider critical audience. Dovetailing both Guattari’s political and psychotherapeutic activism and Deleuze’s radical philosophical vision, their approach to May 1968 is of the order of pure event, free from all normal or normative causalities. They saw it as a ‘series of amplified instabilities and fluctuations’ and these sentiments were also shared by others, such as the then Nanterre philosopher Louis Marin who, looking back in 1972, stated (Marin [1972] 1984, 3):

May 1968 was not only a liberating explosion and an extratemporal moment of overthrow; it was also the seizure of every opportunity to speak. Subjects and objects were exchanged so that suddenly discourse seemed to conjure up its referent. It appeared to make manifest, through its verbal expression and by its images, desires. Both roaming in reality and fixated in words, these desires could not have been accomplished by discourse itself. Rather, it brought those who spoke to such a point of excess that they could do nothing but misjudge the discourse that animated them. They consequently found themselves beyond themselves, beyond what they thought or believed.

There were many agitations, gesticulations, slogans, idiocies, illusions in Paris in 1968, but as illustrated by Marin’s view, its totality amounted to a visionary phenomenon – as if a society in an ephemeral and enlightened moment of introspection gazed at its own intolerability and saw the possibility and necessity of change: ‘Give me the possible, or else I’ll suffocate’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1984] 2006, 210). Arguing for such intolerability being at the heart of 1968, they saw it not as reflecting linear causality or unfolding according to conventional temporal understandings, as the event did not arise as a reaction to crisis;
instead it became a crisis that France could not assimilate. The possibility of the event centred around a new collective spirit of youthfulness, but in the accommodation of 1968 every group returned to their means of production, the farmers to their conditions of their farms, the workers to the conditions of work and demands for higher salaries, the consumers to their products, the university professors to their disciplines and a universalist science – and the left to their leftism as much as the right to their conservatism. ‘Each time it appeared, the possible was closed off’ and this was the crisis of 1968.

An awkwardly similar argument can be detected in conservative Raymond Aron’s book *The Elusive Revolution* (1969) which comprises a devastating critique of the events. In his scathing remarks, Aron concluded that May 1968 cannot be labelled a revolution at all but must be seen as a delusional ‘psycho-drama’ around a ‘cult of youth’ that had taken place due to student loneliness and boredom, lack of real student community life and the build-up of an ‘illusion of fraternity’. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, Aron held that there was no political potential at all in the student events. Aron, belonging to the parent generation, claimed the students had merely dreamt of a libertarian revolution with direct democracy – but that they could not possibly fathom the tyranny and bureaucracy that their utopian strivings would unleash. Basically, he labelled it as a ‘verbal delirium’ in which nothing of consequence had really happened: no one had been killed or injured and there had merely been endless talk and symbolic acts (Aron 1969, 25). But that form of academic reaction, with Aron publishing his commentary in the conservative newspaper *Le Figaro*, and Lévi-Strauss withdrawing completely into his laboratory, also arose because of an emerging radical critique of their humanist disciplines: Structuralism and positivist modelling reigned and had replaced existentialism, and the younger generation perceived the humanistic sciences as detached from action and alienating them from political participation. For example, Marxist sociologist Lucien Goldman in 1966 supported that attack on the new fashionable ‘philosophy of society’ of Lévi-Strauss, Barthes and Althusser, as a

lifting off from men any responsibility, any worry about their own existence and meaning of their lives, [...] all reflection, all interest in the problem of history and transcendence, and all this for the simple idea of signification. This is the fundamental base for the development of a-humanist modern rationalism … an ultra-formalist rationalism. (Goldman 1966, 108, our translation)

Where Lévi-Strauss created a gap between science and ‘savage thought’, Althusser juxtaposed scientific theory and ideology. In many ways Goldman’s points here overlap with those of Deleuze and Guattari, in his insistence that Lévi-Strauss and the other structuralists did not fully grasp the possibility of May 1968 – as an appearance of a new subject, a breakdown of those types of divisions and dichotomies and as an attack on political reality. Goldman writes:

It seems to me that there is a tight connection between the birth of technocratic and corporate capitalism and the development of this philosophy that tends to look for in the human mind some universal and general structures, and to eliminate any problem of a moral order, or that concerns the contents of historical becoming or concrete issues in any social or historical or literary reality. (1966, 119, our translation)

In that sense, the academic establishment had been won over and separated from the grassroots – co-opted by and integral to the domains of corporate capitalism and political
elites and failing to grasp the possibilities of May 1968. The academic analyses of May 1968 in France, such as the ones by Raymond Aron, only took part in the political manoeuvring of the crisis, and managing to further disable the possibilities for participatory democracy and increasing the distance between the people and the state.

It is perhaps telling that when Foucault commented on 1968 he tried to de-centre it from Paris and instead focussed on his experiences from Tunisia where he was teaching at the time. As is well-known, the Tunisian student revolts unfolded in March 1968 and alliances were forged between Paris and Tunis – indicating the importance and interconnected nature of colonial and postcolonial political networks and sentiments of protest that comprise part of the global 1968 event (see also Hendrickson 2012). It is therefore unsurprising that Foucault understands the Paris event from the perspective of the Tunisian student revolts (Foucault 1991, 144):

What was the meaning of that outburst of radical revolt that the Tunisian students had attempted? What was it that was being questioned everywhere? I think my answer is that the dissatisfaction came from the way in which a kind of permanent oppression in daily life was being put into effect by the state and by other institutions and oppressive groups. […]
It was no longer acceptable to be ‘governed’ in a certain way.

What Foucault here describes as ‘government’ had become increasingly unbearable into the sixties and encompassed all social structures from factory life to university life to family life. As indicated by the March 1968 protests in Tunisia, this phenomenon of the unbearable could not be restricted to May 1968 in Paris, and was even to be found more clearly articulated elsewhere, in regimes where more was at stake, and where the formation of the political subject was more clear-cut due to a violent history of colonialism. We see this flowering formation of political subjectivities against ‘government’ even more clearly in our two following cases – also reflecting, as in Paris, the struggle against the repressiveness of the politically real.

**The Mozambique case: Naparama and the reconfiguration of the human**

At one level, the whole of the 20th century for Africa may be understood in the context of attempts at liberation, significant violent forces repressing such endeavours and, finally, from the fifties onwards, the gradual emergence of, at least formally, independent African countries. While space here inhibits detailing European imperial powers’ unwillingness to let go of their so-called possessions, suffice to underline here that rather than weakening the hold of their territories, the Portuguese colonial power strengthened their grip on their colonies through the implementation of the so-called New State (*Estado Novo*) implemented in 1926. To a large part inspired and fuelled by corporatist, authoritarian and fascist sentiments and orientations, the New State regime provided the military with extensive powers and militarized the Portuguese government – led by the powerful António de Oliveira Salazar who served as prime minister from 1932 to 1968.

For the Lusophone colonies, however, the New State also proved to be problematic as it implied an authoritarian tightening of the colonial state’s control over land, people and labour through novel forms of statecraft and violence (Newitt 1995). In places like Mozambique, this meant intensified forms of exploitation through forced labour, increased surveillance and worsening conditions for the vast black majority (Bertelsen 2016). Come the end of World War II, colonies such as Mozambique experienced a further
intensification of the Estado Novo dynamics where extensive powers were given to various secret police units operating in both Portugal and the African colonies – often engaging in torture, arbitrary detention and violent counter-terrorism tactics (Tiscar 2018).

Concurrently, the Portuguese colonial domains also saw the emergence of a Cold-War theatre where both the USA and the Soviet Union were heavily (if often clandestinely) involved. As elaborated by Rodrigues (2015, 244), Portuguese colonialism was, in a sense, condoned by the USA as its prime concern was to delimit the spread of Soviet Union-backed communism: ‘The new Cold War policy of containment was more important than any new initiative in Africa, and this set of assumptions clearly determined the position of the US regarding Portuguese colonialism’. As also illustrated by Foucault’s recognition of 1968 in Tunisia, the end of the 1960s was also a time when Western intellectuals, academics and activists more generally discovered and, sometimes, celebrated the revolutionary potential and capability in places like Africa – such as political scientist Ronald H. Chilcote’s (1968) homage to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde’s legendary revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral (Chilcote 1968). While quite a few, like the liberation movements Cabral led in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, were influenced by Soviet, Chinese, North Korean, Cuban or German Democratic Republic ideological thought, there was also a long trajectory of Black African protest related to the domain of religion, cosmology and non-colonial polities: As Rotberg and Mazrui’s classic tome (1970) shows, the rich and diverse forms of African dissent span from ‘… the highly instrumentally revolutionary to the exceedingly expressive and particularistic’ (Rotberg 1970, xvii).

Mozambique is no exception to this long-standing diversity and also here, from the 1950s and onward, there were a plethora of movements and networks related to various understandings of liberation operating both within and outside the colonial territory of Mozambique. Gradually, however, the multiplicity gave way to an increasingly hegemonic movement, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), Frelimo. Established in Tanzania in 1962 and initiating its armed struggle for liberation from 1964 onwards with its guerrillas being sent across the border into Northern Mozambique, Frelimo’s importance for the liberation of Mozambique is tremendous – also as it came to dominate liberated Mozambique after 1975 until the present day. However, Frelimo was also riveted by internal dissent – including directly the events in 1968. As Paolo Israel notes (2014, 151), commenting on the important so-called Frelimo school outside Dar es Salaam:

In May 1968, the students of the Frelimo school at Dar es Salaam, perhaps inspired by the global student revolts, protested against mismanagement and military drafting to the combat zones.

Such combat zones had already been opened up in Northern Mozambique from 1964 onwards. However, having for a long time been riveted by a division between what Derlugian has described as ‘… the ‘progressive’ cosmopolitan faction of [Frelimo leader] Eduardo Mondlane […] against the ‘obscurantist’ traditionalist faction of local ‘tribal chief” (2012, 80–81), the divisions and unrest within Frelimo ended with the former gaining the upper hand and the rise of Samora Machel, a classic Third World Marxist, as Frelimo’s leader in 1970 (see also Machel 1974). With Frelimo’s increasing presence in Mozambique from the 1970s onwards, establishing what Michael Panzer (2013) very aptly has called ‘proto-state’ formations there and in Tanzania, the non-cosmopolitan...
elements were muted, marginalized and repressed within its liberated domains and zones of influence.

So, not only was 1968 a watershed year at a global scale but it also directly influenced and intensified factionalization and political dynamics within revolutionary and insurrectionary liberation movements such as Frelimo. What one could call, after Rotberg and Mazrui, the ‘exceedingly expressive and particularistic’ forces of dissent that bubbled up in the 1960s culminating in 1968 has, however, haunted Mozambique – despite (or due to) Frelimo’s heavy-handed repression of what it saw as tribalism, obscurantism and superstition from the year of its independence in 1975 onwards. As Corinna Jentzsch writes (2014, 88), ‘Those with revolutionary visions consolidated their power within the movement after [Frelimo leader] Mondlane’s death [in 1969], but conflicts continued to be suppressed rather than resolved’. The clearest example of this is, of course, Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique, National Mozambican Resistance) which fought what it saw as a ‘War of the spirits’ against Frelimo’s Afro-Socialist experiments in forced collectivization of peasants, its dethroning of chiefs, its attacks on tradition etc. The war with Renamo, often labelled a civil war, lasted from 1977 to 1992 and claimed a million lives and unfathomable amounts of suffering and has been widely covered and analysed (see Morier-Genoud, Cahen, and do Rosário 2018 for an overview).

It is, perhaps counter-intuitively, also within this exceedingly violent context that we find an expression of the forces that were, in a sense, subdued since the 1968 schism within Frelimo and its international context: The phenomenon of the so-called Naparama movement that emerged in the late 1980s in the Northern Mozambican provinces of Nampula and Zambézia. It is here that we part ways with most observers of political subjectivity and ‘government’ in 1968. Whereas a straightforward comparison of political events in 1968 would simply analyse political parties, ideologies and battles – domains of formal politics – we would here like to delve deeper into the non-cosmopolitan domain of dissent that had haunted Mozambique from the 1968 Frelimo schism onwards: What is generally acknowledged is that Naparama, which has been categorized as a peasant militia, emerged and centred around the charismatic traditional healer Manuel António (Jentzsch 2018). Many analysts and observers have been drawn to Naparama – including the journalist William Finnegan who saw it as a ‘major millenarian movement […] completely transformed large sections of eastern Zambézia [Province]’ (Finnegan 1992, 255). In a brief mention, João M. Cabrita argues that Naparama had a working relationship with the Mozambican government (see, e.g., Harding 1993, 240ff) and that its leader Manuel António ‘… said he was immune to bullets thanks to a potion, or naparama, given to him by Jesus Christ’ (Cabrita 2000, 250). Kleibl (2017, 222) also comments that Naparama attracted youth and, even, children and that participants claimed that ‘members of the group were using ‘magic white arms’ during the civil war struggle and that Naparama members were vaccinated with drugs from a very influential traditional healer and sorcerer’.

The Naparama movement grew very rapidly from its start in the late 1980s and had at its height tens of thousands adherents. These abided by very strict rules reflecting taboos about what they deemed as modern weapons, sporting instead hunting spears, bow and arrows, machetes or clubs. Strongly influenced by the rich and long-standing tradition of anti-witchcraft movements in Mozambique, and southern Africa more broadly, adherents’ comportment was strongly regulated, for instance prohibiting sex or the consumption of
alcohol. In addition, Naparama combatants were, as described by a former fighter (cited in Jentzsch 2018, 83):

… not allowed to look back, only look ahead; no one was allowed to be in front of the other; no fighting in the shade, always in the sun; if the enemy was in the shade, we were not allowed to be in the shade as well […] we could not retreat when we heard shots, we had to go where they [Renamo] were.

Given their immortality by having been vaccinated and brimming with spiritual power, the Naparama were so dreaded by the Renamo guerrillas that these often fled when they heard them approaching, singing. Naparama activities often centred around what they saw as the recuperation of people that had been kidnapped or held by Renamo and it is alleged that by February 1990, around 100,000 people has been returned to their homes thanks to Naparama (Jentzsch 2018, 93).

In a sense, the Naparama comprised a spiritual movement doubly against the violence of war and against the anti-traditionalist stances of the Frelimo-dominated Mozambican government – a spiritual-cosmological insurrection that was hugely influential also beyond the provinces where it started. Further, as Nordstrom (1992) has asserted, the period of the civil war was awash with news made up of rumour, stories, scraps of information. Much of this, at least gauged from Honde and Chimoio where Bertelsen has worked, assumed the form of stories about where it was safe or unsafe for non-combatants, where soldiers (very often unspecified) had been seen to roam, when the next forced draft from government was rumoured to take place etc. None of this is unsurprising in war contexts. But there were also another and very strong tenor that emerged in narratives as well as in other contexts in the decades after the war – relating to Naparama and the world that the movement, in fact, generated. Here is one, told by a former government army soldier, ‘Paulo’, whom Bertelsen interviewed in 1999:

I know Manuel António and his gang. Epah! The Naparama were strong, strong, strong! These guys … they say they collaborated with us [the government army] but it is not true. They were really attacking the war, the state, the Frelimo idea of killing tradition. And they did it through becoming someone else – they were like animals that were invulnerable. It was if death did not exist for them. This was not just vaccination, we all did that [i.e., being ritually protected]. No, it was more: They really became different. And they looked different also.

[...]

I remember seeing them once in Zambézia. One of them was a woman who had only one breast. We called Maria de uma mama [Mary with one breast] and she was really powerful. It was like she had broke out of the human form.

Another person that Bertelsen worked with in 2000, a so-called profete – Christian charismatic healer – also commented in a conversation:

The Naparama? It was not just this guy Antonio. He was just the representative of tradition, of spirits. Naparama showed everyone – Frelimo and Renamo–the possibility of tradition. Yes, because tradition is the possibility to create: Create people, create culture, create everything anew. Restart everything. For this it is wrong when people say Naparama were Frelimo–no! Naparama were alone. They tried to transform the world alone. They were heroes, the guys!

From the above sketches of Naparama, several elements of importance to our discussion of the long and global 1968 emerge – beyond the hellish civil war context and the
particularities of Mozambican political and religious dynamics. For one, it is crucial that the Naparama as a movement or phenomenon is irreducible to strategic alliances or conventional forms of politics: It may rather be seen as an ontological or epistemological insurrection of sorts. Thus, it comes closer to what we referred to above as the 1968 event in the form of a life-centred insurrection – a celebration of vitality through forms of regimentation beyond the state and its hierarchical leanings and orders. This means it is also, then, similar to the contempt for the state and the general intolerability of political reality and society that was also commonly, expressed in Paris 1968.

Second, there is also a particular playfulness – and the term play is not chosen lightly – to Naparama in relation to its intense experimentation with the boundaries of the human. This is evident in the obviation of death at the heart of the Naparama practice and, also, clear in Manuel Antonio’s repeated and staged resurrections: He often had adherents digging a grave for him, was fully interred and then rose later on from the grave demonstrating his death-defying powers. Through engaging with the boundaries of human life and breaking the death-life cycles, Naparama lucidly and in a ludic fashion opened up the world by becoming more real human beings. In a sense, therefore, there are clear similarities between the ‘Demand the impossible’ slogans of Paris 1968 and what we could call the ontogenetic dynamics of the Naparama social and cosmological order and practice.

Third, as in other trajectories springing from the 1968 event and its shamanism – as epitomised by, for instance, Carlos Castaneda’s teachings for anthropology (Rio and Bertelsen 2018) – a path of human liberation went through the possibility of becoming an animal. Such a radical leap, deserting the human form altogether, as a possibility, was also sometimes used to deal with (too) inquisitive outsiders by Naparama. This is, therefore, how Manuel António responds to a question by the journalist Alan Harding (1993, 243): “You journalists” he said, “you mustn’t play with naparama; you must stop asking foolish questions. I can turn into an animal and deal with you if I have to’”. Becoming an animal other is becoming powerful – a more real being endowed with capacities to also take on (human and non-human) adversaries.

Manuel António died in 1991 but Naparama – as an orientation and an organizational form – continues to exist in certain Mozambican regions. As in other circumstances where the riot of 1968 was subdued, such as in Paris, the spirit remains a possibility – a fact that also the vivid and celebratory memories of Naparama in Chimoio and Honde testify to. Thus, even though the Naparama was, towards the end of the civil war, domesticated, disciplined and re-deployed as part of the war apparatus of the Mozambican state, there remains an incapturable element that reverberates: A breaking through and establishing of ‘the new’, a possibility of a life outside the confines of colonial and postcolonial strictures and the state.

The Melanesian case: Nagriamel and the violent creation of an indigenous nation

As we move our focus from Africa to Melanesia in the period of the sixties, we notice several similarities but also some significant differences. Whereas the African continent broke free from the European colonial powers but saw a continued presence of neo-colonial European involvement, the Melanesian nations during those decades also shifted their regional horizon to a larger degree. World War II played a vast role in this region and there
were American strongholds in many of the islands; with their impressive infrastructure and troops – and terrifying battles between U.S. forces and Japanese forces ensued (see White and Lindstrom 1989; Tabani 2010). On Santo Island in northern New Hebrides, the Americans constructed an airbase the size of a small city with three bomber airfields, two fighter airstrips, 50 kilometres of cemented roads, six wharves and a telephone system. At any time there were hundreds of ships in the canal and over 500,000 soldiers passed through during the war (MacClancy 2002, 116). Hence, USA and Japan began to figure in people’s imagination as impressive authoritarian state-formations, also Indonesia forcefully entered the region, and of course, Australia took over the British colonial administration. France continued to uphold its colonial presence, and throughout those years of rebellion they managed to keep in place New Caledonia as their colony (as it still exists today). In Melanesia, World War II hence left deep footprints, not least with regards to the terrors of authoritarian states and the concreteness of international politics. Hence, into the sixties, the recent war had made a massive appearance in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and the dark shadow of the state had also in other ways emerged on the horizon, through the cold war, communism and the Vietnam War, as well as news of all sorts of riots and liberation movements. The colonial presence also became more and more pointed into the 1970s. In Vanuatu, it culminated in the overwhelmingly violent year of transformation from the colonial regime and into independence in 1979–1980 (see also Abong 2008). It was during the seventies that we see unfolding a flourishing revolutionary movement, and a reactionary counter-movement, that is comparative to forms of reactionary reconciliations and new authoritarian state forms emerging following the global 1968 event across the world.

When we look concretely at the New Hebrides, or what during independence became Vanuatu, this was a joint French and British colony, officially back to 1906, but with trading companies, missions and plantations operating by backing from colonial navies at least back to the 1860ies. Independence was won in 1980 in Vanuatu, following Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975 and Solomon Islands following suit in 1978. We will here detail some of the drama that played out in those years in the sixties and seventies in the New Hebrides.

This brings us back to the so-called Nagriamel movement. It was a movement of very mixed influences – taking elements from local ritual systems, international socialism, American ultra-capitalism and French republican ideas, and putting that together in a bottom-up organization with ambitions for creating an independent nation. This is perhaps less well known than the John Frum movement of Tanna Island (see Lindstrom 1993), framed as a ‘cargo-cult’ and going back to the early 20th century, but Nagriamel should not be written off as a cult. We think it is of greater interest here as a type of manifestation of 1968 as a global wave of new political consciousness. It was rightly enough preceded by erratic local movements with fixations on all the cargo made visible by the American presence on Santo, and after WWII a lot of ceremonial activity had gone into that desire for a return of American wealth. Jeremy MacClancy notes that:

In 1946 Tsek, a Santo Islander, declared that disputes were the cause of the dreadful depopulation that all had witnessed. If the disputes […] were to stop, everyone had to cast off their clothes, destroy their goods and livestock, drop their taboos, speak a new common language, ‘Maman’, and have sex publicly and freely with everyone. ‘America’ was coming soon; everyone would be wealthy and never die (2002, 122).
But in the sixties there turned out to be more at stake than just changes of taboos and sexuality; as the movement crystallized around creating a real independent economy, government and nationality. Nagriamel as a movement was given more organizational structure, economic viability and ideological coherence and it grew into a strong political force in the sixties and seventies. Ideas of radical change continued to surface, but also merged with a break with old forms of Christianity and a sense of autonomy from dependence on colonial masters and their regime of labour and money. It became more concretely formulated around the question of land-alienation, triggered by colonial planters in the 1960s moving into cattle farming, for the growing market of meat internationally, and thereby clearing and fencing in new areas that the indigenous population considered to be their commons.

Again in the island of Santo, in vicinity of the area left behind by the US military base, a customary chief named Buluk Paul started a campaign to tear down the plantation fences, and in 1965 his movement joined with Jimmy Stevens, a Santo-born man of mixed Scottish and Tongan descent, and they wrote up a declaration called ‘Act of Dark Bush’, stating that settlers could no longer extend their plantations further into the bush (see Beasant 1984, 17; Tabani 2008, 335). But they also created an entirely new village as the headquarter for the growing movement and they started to claim the land in the vicinity of this village. The movement was set up as a plantation cooperative; where everyone worked the land for the benefit of the commune, and they were clearly inspired by socialist models. Members of the commune travelled to New Caledonia and Australia to learn about efficient farming and they purchased tractors and equipment for rationalized, modern agriculture. The movement grew quickly in membership and by 1970 there were Nagriamel villages in many of the New Hebrides islands.

There was highly formalized organization of the work and routines, and profit distribution was egalitarian. People were given their own plots of land and had to pay half of the produce as tax to the ‘Union Labour Board Office’. It was tightly organized, with a ‘Land Committee’ in charge of infrastructure, an ‘Upper Committee’ as a regional administrative structure, and at the top the ‘Ten Head Committee’ elected among people who had reached the top of the customary ritual society. This committee oversaw all social and reproductive issues pertaining to conflicts, marriage, death and rights. It also oversaw all sorts of social issues and regulation of life generally through sub-committees (Van Trease 1987, 162).

The Vanafo village became the ceremonial centre of the movement, and remained the centre even as the movement spread to other islands and multiplied into perhaps 30 000 members nationwide. It should be noted that Nagriamel made the Church of Christ their official church, having much to do with that church being a so-called ‘independence church’ in these islands for some decades already – opposing white missionaries and the teachings of the mainstream Presbyterian, Anglican and Catholic congregations. The Church of Christ was more of a charismatic church, it appeared as indigenous and as their own, more lively, less hierarchical, featuring crusades, healing and miracles and music, and stressing the presence of the Holy Spirit and individual liberation. However, it was also motivating people to take up their own independent labour and planting their own cash crops (see Allen 1968; Van Trease 1987, 158; Abong 2008:63).

This independence church, with its flavour of American Pentecostalism, combined very well with a sort of neo-traditional regime; and the movement was structured around a
ritual core that combined pig sacrifices and male careers in the ritual society with a reception of the Holy Spirit and the idea that the ritual centre of Vanafo received spiritual greatness from its ritual structure. In this sense, it was at its foundation modelled upon a parallel world of ancestor spirits and the mediation through pig sacrifices. We should also note that the leaders of the movement did not see it as a candidate to take up national leadership of the New Hebrides or as the future governing structure for the independent nation (Van Trease 1987, 163). It was never intended to be a governing body or a state structure as such; it emerged rather as a lively initiative for a community to thrive and be productive. It seems the focus was on the moment of autonomy, freedom and independence and not so much on the nation-state. Stevens explicitly expressed that this was not a movement on the same level as the emerging political parties like the National Party or the Moderate Party, and several movement members spoke directly against the idea that there should at all be a new government-based state. They instead wanted a custom-based nation, and hence, a nation against the state in many ways. These features led the movement to be compared with the Rastafarians of Dominica and Black Power in Trinidad (Gubb 1994, 43). Today we have very little documentation on the original character of this movement. Most people writing about it after 1980 placed it into the context of being a movement with ambitions for nation-state sovereignty and overturning the democratic independence movement. They were mostly looking at things either from the perspective of the new government (Beasant 1984; Van Trease 1987; Gubb 1994) or from Anglophone journalism generally (e.g., Shears 1980). If we instead place it into a 1968 context of liberation and alternative political subjectivity we could perhaps frame it differently. In interviews Rio conducted with men who figured prominently at the time on the island of Ambrym, they expressed clearly a search into a different form of independence from the nation-state type. They were not so keen on alienating the French and the British colonials but were interested in building a movement of indigenous liberty around local forms of ritual and hierarchy – which they thought could operate in tandem with ‘white man business’, since these things were of different orders. When they imagined independence they saw it as a form of ritual republic, wherein kinship, rank and inalienable land would be at the core. This is also why sometimes such reasoning articulated a form of utopian kingdom. Here Jimmy Stevens’ own words about his movement resonate well. This is what he said during the last days of his reign in Vanafo (see also Tabani 2008, 352):

… to ensure that the standard of Moli Stevens remains, I have killed one hundred pigs

plus another ten pigs to make the name of Stevens royal. In Bislama, the term for

royal is natamata. Once I am dead, my natamata will be guaranteed for future

generations to come. [ […] This plan is tied up very closely with my family (Stevens 1995, 233).

We need, however, to note here that this vision of a kingdom was a pluralistic vision, where each such leader imagined a separate kingdom in their land-based polity of kinship and ritual. In this type of thinking, a national parliament as an institution, bypassing all aspects of local essentialisms, seemed completely irrelevant and undermining of the crucial values of the customary republic – with its focus on customary pluralism, reproduction, agricultural growth, and land as a figure of personalization and vitality. But, in the end, the outcome of this newly formed communal and dynamic form of organization
ultimately brought people in touch with a field of national politics that they were not aware of.

Throughout the seventies the movement became subject to much international political intrigues. The big political player towards independence on the level of the nation was the National Party, largely a pro-commonwealth party with members from the Anglican and Presbyterian churches and featuring local leaders who had made a career within so-called ‘local councils’ set up by the administration or as advisors and police officers (see MacClancy 2002, 135); i.e., representing ‘the establishment’ in terms of continuing the state structures of the British colony and with strong links to the Australian government. The French therefore invested heavily in the Nagriamel as an alternative path towards independence; and the movement also became a cross-road for other political forces. The most well-known is the American ultra-conservative libertarian influence, involving for instance businessman and mafia-related Michael Oliver (Van Trease 1987, 149). In 1968 he had published a book titled *A new Constitution for a New Country* where he launched the idea of establishing a new free state under the policy of his Phoenix Foundation – in order to escape the totalitarian US. From 1975 onwards, he began to work with the leader of Nagriamel, Jimmy Stevens, for creating an independent republic and tax-haven in the northern New Hebrides. We can understand how the nation-against-the-state-idea of the Nagriamel could be compatible with their libertarian ideas, even though they were clearly on different planets. Oliver helped them set up a radio-station and they assisted Stevens in featuring the movement as specifically an indigenous independence movement, and working toward the UN to recognize their demands. They produced minted coins, passports and a flag for the new nation; and offered very liberal terms for land-leases for foreign developers.

Hence, it seems that the movement was throughout the seventies transformed from the flourishing, pluralistic indigenous experiment of creating a local way of life around ritual and traditional ceremonial life, the Holy Spirit, freedom and independence, and modern and rational plantation agriculture. It now took the shape of the predictable, ‘normal’ conflict between political interests – of the French, the British and the American capitalists. This transformation also implied a change in the political subjectivity of the Nagriamel people, now being groomed into the new reality of political parties, independence, elections and conflict of interest.

As the colony was moving towards independence in 1980, after two years of political preparations and elections, this was of course playing out on the level of state politics and not ceremonial nationalism. The new parliament that was elected in 1979 was composed of a majority of people within the movement of Presbyterian and Anglican churches; opposed to the colonial masters, and especially the French masters, but also opposed to customary ritual leadership. The many movements around the country were taken by surprise, since they had thought that independence would mean real local autonomy and sovereignty of local ways of life. But independence was instead a political platform for the polity of the Anglophone elite. Nagriamel therefore transformed into a new form of militant independence movement, declaring a rebellion from the new independent nation, as the free ‘Republic of Vemarana’, with Jimmy Stevens as Prime Minister. In May 1979, for a couple of days they managed to hold Santo Island as an independent nation around their ceremonial village of Vanafo. The new Anglican government in the capital reacted to the rebellion and isolated Santo Island and evacuated all of its party
members and officials. The British prepared their troops from Australia in order to secure the situation in the new nation, and the French military in secrecy conspired with Jimmy Stevens on Santo and was prepared to defend that against Australia (Van Trease 1987, 255). The conflict was at a standstill until the end of July, when all political parties, including the Australian and French governments, agreed not to interfere in the conflict and to declare the national independence day of July the 30th. By that date an agreement had been made between the independence government, Papua New Guinea and Australia to forcefully put down what was now called ‘the Santo rebellion’ of the Nagriamel. With the assistance of soldiers from Papua New Guinea, the Vanuatu Mobile Force in the first week after Independence Day led a violent campaign against all the various movements around the country that had opposed the new government (see Gubb 1994, 25). Close to a thousand French nationals fled to New Caledonia. People were beaten up and arrested in big numbers and when you talk to people today they still remember vividly the systematic and effective campaign against all other political forces in the country – and they will show you their injuries and limps dating to that attack (see also Shears 1980, 195–196; Abong 2008, 82). What had been a radical movement, experimenting with social formation, economy, ritual and religion, in an effort to become a form of nation of its own accord, was now pressed into being merely a political party under the new constitution of the new nation of Vanuatu.

Comparing the incomparable by temporal and spatial expansion

Jasmine Alinder et al. (2013, 1) describe ‘the long 1968’ around the world as characterized by a number of aspirations:

a pervasive search for new forms of social organization and political action, as well as new ways of thinking about them; an impatience, sometimes to the point of violence, with existing authority; an eagerness to find in other parts of the world, the more remote and exotic the better, the means of combating that authority and creating an alternative to it; disillusionment, but in some places the continued hope as alternatives were increasingly foreclosed.

From what we have seen above, the openings – or perhaps we could call them ontological rifts – provided by the long 1968 event, have constantly been tempered or eclipsed by the violence of state forces. Such eclipsing of the 1968 openings goes beyond the general argument that the state is integral to a form of violent possibility or, even further, character (see, e.g., Kapferer 2018; Clastres [1974] 1998). However, in all the three cases such a force of the state also emerged through the violent solidification of national unity by repressing (or appropriating – another form of neutralizing violence) the unsettling forces inherent to the 1968 event and its multiple and fundamental forms of protest. Let us be specific:

We point to a similar dynamic playing out in all three cases across a vast spatial and temporal plane, namely that the state form emerging in this context, what we have called the adolescent state, was one that could not simply encompass or assimilate other movements, since these were on other levels, guided by rationalities and orientations subversive and inimical to the state form. When the state found its normal ‘adult’ form it was exactly in the violent encounters with movements that were trying to break free from the state itself. And, so the political scene became restructured into the system that we know today, that is, the liberal-democratic nation-state that has the
parliament at its centre, with executive powers lifted out of that popular core and a bureaucratic organization around that again. It is a very specific political form that has to limit, cancel or re-codify all other manifestations of communal spirit – as it channels them into parliamentary party politics. There is multiplicity, yes, but only at the level of different parties and civil organizations. After this radical break or reaction to the 1968 event there could be no flourishing youth movement as we came to know it in Paris or California, no Nagriamel as we saw it in Santo Island and no traditionalist Naparama movement in Mozambique, since, in order to secure parliamentary power, all alternative forms of social mobilisation, like kinship, kingship, spirituality or youth solidarity had to be eradicated or controlled. To put it differently; a new political subjectivity had formed in these movements that paradoxically excluded them from flooding the new political scene.

Another facet here is what the movements in Paris, Vanuatu and Mozambique entailed in terms of generative ontogenetic or cosmogenetic dynamics. For Paris, one could argue, as Lewis (2009) has, that it was an early expression of ‘anarcho-surrealism’, that a wholesale interrogation of the real and the stability of normality integral to it, was what was at stake. As such, one could see it as a precursor also, therefore, to similar later intellectual and academic expressions, including Foucauldian approaches to genealogies of modernity (integral to critiques of the modern as a construction). To support such arguments, one could muster the famous slogans ‘under the cobblestones, the beach’ or ‘the walls have ears, your ears have walls’ – both indicating another and more benign or intensely real world within reach if the present circumstances are destroyed, dismantled and processes of re-booting the social and the individual is embarked upon.

For the Naparama, one could argue that the exceptional circumstances of multiple layers of oppression in a context of extreme and \textit{longue durée} violence also created a form of re-booting of the human – but a modality of the human absolved from colonial or postcolonial necropolitics (Mbembe 2003). Moreover, in the rise, spread and enactment of the followers of Naparama also lay a possibility of a defence of another, yes, more ben- evolent world: A world where death is abolished given the adherents’ immunity to bullets. This world also held the possibility to resurrect and was more in line with the ancestral forces, as well as the teachings of Jesus Christ. It was a domain where men were endowed with the capacity and possibility to defend their communities against the violence of the war – rising emancipated above repression, violence and authority – and recreating youthful and vital communities against or beyond the strictures of state and the intolerability of conventional, deadening society.

For the Vanuatu Nagriamel case, the youthful energy of the movement – its charismatic spirituality, its play with western forms of bureaucratic authority, its ritual sacrifices and thus the new generation’s reinvention of status initiation – was first and foremost a movement of radical experimentation. The question of what the independent nation should be like was not in any way fixed or bound to notions of democracy as we know them today. It was conceived as very much a participant immediacy where every man should play his part, perhaps in that sense akin to the notions of Parisian students, but also using ritual forms as a powerful technology for invigoration and for investing the movement with power.

The juxtaposition of these three examples suggest that – rather than simply reading Mozambique and Vanuatu in light of France (and more broadly, European and American counter cultures) – attending to radical and alternative political movements around the
globe suggests either (or both) that 1968 can be considered a postcolonial process or that radical politics are neither unique to Europe nor to the 1960s but are both global and ongoing.

**Conclusion**

Above we have described and substantiated how a long and global view of the 1968 event unfolding in Paris, Mozambique and Vanuatu, were all subjected to processes of post-hoc re-territorialization at the hands of maturing state forms. Through this solidification of the state, the openness and radicalness of the protests and the reaction were re-inscribed with both state-centered meaning (i.e., through peripheralization of the scope, range and aim of the protest) and were re-defined by capitalist logics where the protest and its popular icons were subjected to commodification, conservative forms of memorialization or relegated to oblivion. However, and this is a crucial point, such re-reterritorialization, memorialization and commodification is incomplete, underlining that the basic argument made by Bruce Kapferer (2010) – that power is always in excess of what the state, in its *aporia*, is able to contain and control – also points to two types of cracks brought about by the 1968 event. For one, and exemplified by the Paris case, such excess of power was, we argue, apparent in the sense of a state violence and brutality that opened up, in a fundamental way, for seeing state organs, logics and institutions and its wider society in a new and critical light (see also Castoriadis 1988, 125). Second, and connected to the first point is the fact that the ‘overwriting’ of 1968 was incomplete and, still, as a crack in the edifice of the society and of the state, provides fissures for alternative egalitarian projects to coalesce and to be voiced.

Fifty years after the Paris events, Badiou seems to propose a related approach, arguing that we commonly think of 1968 as comprising three different movements. As we have noted, it was a movement of youthful exploration of the human existence, it was a solidarity movement for the working classes and it became the grounds for a liberal, anarchic ideology of situationalism and vitalism (associated with new philosophy, new theatre, new cinema etc). But Badiou maintains that there was a fourth movement that was placed diagonally opposed to these first three. It was a movement breaking with the notion of politics itself: Whereas the red banner of socialist solidarity and the vocabulary of class struggle was already dying in 1968, as it was step by step absorbed and domesticated by the ideological apparatuses of leftists as well as the new philosophy (Badiou 2018, 35), there was the continuation of a more vague ‘blind’ and ‘unreadable’ movement – a movement of people in opposition to institutional, representative democracy and the parliamentary classes. He reminds us that in Paris in June 1968 the word on the streets was ‘*Élections, piège à cons!*’ (Elections, a trap for idiots!) – a kind of bitter realization after the democratic state had reinforced itself against that fourth force of the movement. The function of elections was no longer the representation but the repression of movements, their innovations and ruptures (2018, 40). This fourth aspect is also akin to what we have attempted to analyse through our horizontal comparison of three cases of the 1968 event. For us, the political reality in these three nation-states came into maturity with major question marks, and we have tried to pinpoint some of the radical bottom-up questioning that these have been subject to, as belonging to the continuing reverberation of 1968.
Notes

1. The concept of anti-structure arose in exactly this period through the writing of Victor Turner. Through that concept he was not only exploring and embracing Ndembu ritual, but also the whole counterculture atmosphere of the 1960s, including hippies, the Woodstock festival, experimental writing and theatre (Turner 1969, 138; see also Rio and Bertelsen 2018, 13).


3. Our argument here could also be expanded as one might approach the whole realm of ‘wait- hood’ and the category of ‘precariat’ coming into being with the rise of the post-industrial society – integral to the 1968 protests and beyond.

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