Love Taken for Granted

Relationships between Fathers and Adolescent Sons among Pakeha New Zealanders

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Foreword

There is a growing interest in relationships as a focus for understanding social and cultural phenomena, and this interest is also noticeable within anthropology. In a way this interest has always been with us, but it is now starting to take foreground, leaving actors and social systems to constitute the background. Or maybe our discipline is finally escaping the confines of binary oppositions defining the kind of image I just sketched? Maybe the emerging interest in relationships is part of move to obviate the epistemological prison of either/or? The relation is holographic. In every part one can see the whole; not only the whole of the relation, but the whole of the social context where it belongs. It is a good point and it is not mine. I have borrowed it from Marilyn Strathern [1995]. And what is more, the relation is fundamentally paradoxical; it defies ordinary rules of logic. This is my point, but I have borrowed the idea from Lévy-Bruhl [1985].

In this thesis I am trying to do two things. I try to build a general theory of interpersonal relationship and I try to use that theory in order to understand relationships between fathers and sons among Pakeha New Zealanders. Interpersonal dyadic relationships are the smallest building blocks of any society, and still they are not very well understood within social anthropology. One consequence of this lack of theory is that anthropological inquiries most often quickly move up to a relatively abstract level of analysis. Thus both the author and the reader may easily lose sight of the real people the text is supposed to be about. Another consequence is that certain areas of our discipline that rely on an understanding of interpersonal relationships suffer. I am thinking about kinship studies in particular. Schneider [1984] was right; we took way too much for granted about what kinship relationships are made of. When people around the world organise aspects of their society according to what we used to call kinship, it is not a matter of biological ties. It is a matter of notions, ideas, experiences and symbols; in short, a matter of meaning. Before we understand how this meaning is generated we cannot return to kinship studies.

The empirical subject of my thesis is relationships between fathers and sons. Anthropologically this relationship has been dealt with before, but among other peoples and in other places. These studies could have formed a basis for a greater emphasis on comparison in my own work. Particularly Sex and Repression in Savage Society in which Malinowski [1927b/2001] repeatedly compares father-son relationships among the Trobriands and in western society. I have not taken advantage of this opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis, however, because I did not find a basis for comparison. My study has a different purpose than other anthropological studies I have encountered. My focus is predominantly on dynamics internal to the relationship itself, whereas other studies are predominantly concerned with understanding the properties of larger social systems, where the father-son relationship is merely one of many elements making up the system.

As far as public debate is concerned relationships between fathers and sons is a hot topic, and has been so for quite some time. This relationship occupies a central position in western kinship, and considering the strong patriarchal tendencies still existing in Pakeha society, as in most other western societies, one might say it is the most important kinship relationship. At the same time boys and young men are becoming an increasingly greater problem. They die prematurely violent deaths from accidents and suicide, they use drugs and commit crimes and compared to girls they no longer do very well in school. It is, supposedly, a father’s job to turn a boy into a proper man. If the boy does not live up to those standards, the fault must lie with the father. So goes much of the common reasoning. I therefore raise the question: Do fathers really matter? And do they matter in particular to their sons? These two questions are the source of a massive body of beliefs, claims and counterclaims, some fairly well substantiated, most not, in contemporary western culture.

My answer is yes, fathers matter, not because of some natural connection, but because our cultural ideologies about kinship make them matter. Apart from these ideologies fathers matter in exactly the same way as all other people matter to each other. The meaning of the relationship emerges as a consequence of a complex interplay between cultural notions defining the relationship, and the experiences people have of actually being together.

The fathers, sons, mothers and sisters I describe in this text all live in New Zealand. Obviously that is important for how they live. But for me it is somewhat of a problem. It is actually quite difficult to identify how the New Zealand social and cultural context influences relationship between individual fathers as sons. In many important ways New Zealand is still very much part of a wide spread British Commonwealth. The similarities between New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, white English speaking South Africa, Canada and to some extent USA, is far more striking than the differences. Many Kiwis would dislike that statement. There are currently enormous efforts of national identity making going on, and most Kiwis are not too happy with being
told how small those differences seem to be to an outsider like me. The job of seeing how Pakeha father-son relationships relate to other aspects of Pakeha society and culture is made none the easier by the fact that the Pakeha kinship system is basically the same as in all the other societies just mentioned above.

Still, life in New Zealand is what takes place in New Zealand, no matter whether it is similar or different from life elsewhere. In order to say something about this life as I have observed it I present a range of small ethnographic impressions. I call them snippets. I have chosen this style of presentation primarily on the grounds of economy and topical focus. Mine is a study of relationships between fathers and adolescent sons, and not a general ethnography about New Zealand society and culture. If I were to describe in detail the connections between the snippets and my main topic, this text would have ballooned out of all proportions. I trust that the reader is able to interpret or imagine how these snippets constitute the context for relationships between fathers and sons. The snippets appear in separate boxes inserted into the main text, and are always somehow connected to the main text. The relevance of the connection varies, however. Some times there is a very clear connection between the ethnographic snippet and some aspect of my fieldwork or my study of father-son relationships. Other times it is a more general description with the aim of giving the reader of broader aspects of Kiwi society. Snippets like ‘Alternative lifestyle’, ‘Hospitality’, ‘The urban - rural ambivalence’, ‘The fifties’ etc. are mainly meant as description of the broader setting within which my fieldwork took place. When I devote relatively much space to snippets like ‘The Bach’, ‘The Bush’ and ‘The Beach’ it is on the one hand because these are important aspects of Kiwi culture and social life. On the other hand they are also important arenas for leisure life where many fathers and sons spend a lot of time together in ways that may be different from how they interact within the home. Because I have not observed fathers and sons together on these arenas I do not know. These descriptions are thus partly meant to make the reader aware that these arenas exist and that this study is not based on what goes on there. Because the snippets are connected to the main topic at the point where they occur I strongly advice that they be read when they appear, prior to returning to continuing with the main text.

This study was made possible by a grant from the Norwegian Research Council. I really appreciate the opportunity they gave me to have a lot of fun, to travel, and to explore a topic far more interesting than I had hoped. My deepest gratitude, however, is to the fathers and sons, the mothers, sisters and brothers who willingly opened their homes and let me participate in their daily activities. What amazing hospitality, what courage. I am lost for words. I would also like to thank all the men whom I interviewed and the wider communities where the fieldwork took place.

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The Institute of Social Anthropology at University of Bergen, Norway has taken responsibility for my well being over these years, have housed me and most of the time kept track of me. Thank you, both as an institution and mostly as a set of colleagues. I would also like to extend my gratitude to The Anthropology Institute at University of Otago, New Zealand for welcoming me as a visiting scholar. Thanks for taking me in, providing me with a space to work and feed-back on my work. A particular thanks to Professor Hugh Campbell and his honours class in rural sociology. Stord/Haugesund University College has accepted me as a member of their academic staff and has given me the space and the encouragement to finish this thesis. I truly appreciate their confidence and their generosity. Jill Reed helped with the proof-reading at a time when my energy was running out fast. Thank you for providing a lift at a time when it was much needed.

On the front cover is a photograph of a Kiwi father and son that I took at Cable Bay in the winter of 1998. Even though they did not take part in my study they gave my permission to use the photo. Thank you Phillip and Kenny Sellers.

My wife, Abbi, has always accompanied me to the field. At times she has taken part in my fieldwork, other times she has had her own projects parallel to mine. She has celebrated my joys and comforted my sorrows, and always supported me. She has listened to my rambles, commenting, critiquing and assisting the process whereby my thoughts have gone from confused to gradually clearing up. Without her company and help I cannot see how
I would have managed to do this job.

In the middle of my fieldwork one of the fathers asked how long the project was supposed to take to complete. “Four years in total”, I told him. “I could not do that” he said. “How can you stand only doing one thing for so long? I would have to do other things too, have more variety”. As it turned out, I could not do one thing for that long either. This work has taken seven years to complete, three years more than scheduled. But it has been worth it. I have enjoyed myself, learned things and expanded my understanding of my world. I have also got to know some very fine people along the way.

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Chapter 1 Fathers & sons, fieldwork and Pakeha New Zealand

With its vivid descriptions of unfamiliar human ways of life, combined with sharp and often totally unexpected interpretations and analysis, social anthropology has never stopped intriguing me. At the same time many anthropological descriptions and analysis also make me slightly uncomfortable because I lose sight of the real people and their lives that lay behind the analyses. As my knowledge of social and cultural anthropology has grown I have come to believe that my dissatisfaction is not just a personal whim, but reflects a deep theoretical gap within the discipline. Social and cultural anthropologists have, as I see it, always been preoccupied with making sense of relatively large and complex structures and systems. Even after the focus shifted, or widened, to include individuals as actors and agents, there is still a missing link. That link is the human dyad, the interpersonal relationship itself. In spite of the fact that the great majority of all social interactions are in the form of dyads, and the fact that dyads are the minimum building blocks, so to speak, of all social systems, I have never been able to find an anthropological theory of dyads. The first aim of this thesis is therefore to develop an anthropological theory of dyadic, interpersonal relationships. A rather ambitious goal, I admit. Let me therefore rephrase: the aim is to begin to develop a theory of dyadic relationships between people in the western world. In the next chapter I will outline my attempt at a theory of dyads, and the arguments upon which it rests.

This chapter has a different focus, however. My attempt at building a theory of dyads has grown out of an empirical study of relationships between fathers and adolescent sons among present day Pakeha New Zealanders. Pakeha being the Maori name for the Europeans, predominantly British, who arrived in New Zealand from the late eighteenth century and onwards. Today the term is generally used for New Zealand born citizens of European decent. In this chapter I will present of a number of aspects of the context for the empirical study. On the one hand contemporary Pakeha notions, ideas and beliefs about fathers and sons, on the other hand various factors concerning fieldwork and the collection of data in two local communities in a New Zealand that is a member of a late-modern and global society and also has strong Anglo-Germanic traits.

Notions about fathers and sons
Topics like fatherhood and relationships between fathers and sons receive much attention these days. Over the last ten to fifteen years there has been a huge increase in the number of publications, both popular and academic, that deal directly with these topics, or indirectly as part of larger debates about masculinity, gender equality, changing family constellations etc. Any search for literature on fathers is bound to come up with thousands of titles. The topic is also of great concern to many people in their everyday lives. If, during a casual conversation, I happen to mention that I am studying relationships between fathers and sons, the most common reactions are curiosity and a strong desire to share some of their own experiences as sons and as fathers or as mothers of sons and wives of husbands.

As Lupton and Barclay [1997] has pointed out,

“fatherhood at the end of the twentieth century, (…), is a rather amorphous phenomenon” [p. 3].

My study reveals that relationships between fathers and adolescent sons are no less so. There
is a large variation in how fathers and sons actually behave and relate to each other. Trying to make sense of the variations and to find commonalities has proven a more difficult task than I initially imagined. On of the more important obstacles to making sense of my observations is that the field is already riddled with ideas, beliefs and opinions about what this relationship is and what it means. Sorting through this mass of notions is an important and necessary part of understanding relationships between fathers and sons.

All popular opinions about fathers and sons are, of course, based on western kinship ideology and I will return to this ideology at a later stage. Before I can do so I believe it is necessary to clear away a whole set of popular ideas and opinions about fathers and sons that have become widely accepted among people in general, in the mass media and in certain kinds of popular scientific literature. As a result of my observations of how fathers and sons actually behave towards each other, and my attempts to understand what I have observed, I have come to believe that this set of opinions is unfounded. It is not based on how fathers and sons actually relate to each other, and neither can it help to understand these relationships. Epistemologically these popular opinions can at best be called myths, and in my opinion they are myths that block and blur our understanding rather than to enhance it.

One of the more important foundations of this popular myth is that the relationship between a father and his son is qualitatively different from all other human interpersonal relationships. Because the relationship is given by nature it is fundamentally different from all voluntary relationships like neighbours, friends, colleagues, business partners etc. It also differs from these latter relationships because it is held to be of unique, irreplaceable and utmost importance for the personal development and the emotional well being of both fathers and sons. In their more extreme versions these myths claim that a son’s relationship with his father is not only important, but also essential and crucial [see e.g. Biddulph 1994, 1997 and Lee 1991]. As an example, the relationship is supposed to be of fundamental importance for the son’s development of a healthy gender identity. The assumption is that ‘it takes a man to make a man’. Women (i.e. mothers) supposedly, just cannot do it. The boy must break away from the world of women and via a painful process of struggles and achievements (Hudson and Jacob [1991] calls this transition the ‘father wound’) enter the world of men. If the father is not present to do his part of the job of turning the boy into a man, the boy will either become a sissy (not a real man) or he will find other men (criminals, gang members etc.) upon whom he can model himself. Boys are, the myth claims, slaves to their increased production of testosterone. The increase in aggression, sexual drive and the sharpening of the competitive instinct which the testosterone necessarily produces can only be harnessed and put to a socially accepted use if the father guides the son into the community of older, wiser and socially responsible men. As a consequence adolescence is seen as a particularly critical and risky phase during which father’s input is crucial.

This myth has gained widespread popularity all over the western world particularly after the American poet Robert Bly published his ‘fairy tale’ about Iron John, titled *Iron John*, in 1990. Bly was not alone, however. At the same time that Bly wrote his book other authors [see e.g. Hudson and Jacob 1991, Lee1991, Yablonsky 1990] gave voice to similar views. Bly is of particular relevance for my thesis, however, because his myth-poetic interpretations of fathers and sons have become widespread in New Zealand through the works of Australian psychologist Stephen Biddulph. Biddulph is open about being influenced by Bly, and *Iron John* is a very obvious theoretical base for Biddulph’s books *Manhood from
1994 and *Raising boys* from 1997. Both books became bestseller in New Zealand and greatly influenced the popular opinions about fathers and sons among contemporary Pakehas. There are no signs to suggest that this myth about the unique, intrinsic and irreplaceable importance of fathers in relations to sons is about to weaken. When interviewed on national television as late as 2. October 2003 Celia Lashley of the New Zealand *The Good Man Project* gave voice to many of these opinions as if they were unquestionable truths.

When the father son relationship is held to be unique, and of irreplaceable importance for the sons, it is reasonable to assume that the absence of fathers will have detrimental consequences. It is thus not surprising that the concept of ‘father absence’ is one of the strongest and most pervasive themes in a huge part of the literature on this subject that has been produced since world war two. A literary review, in the form of a Cand. Psychol thesis at the University of Bergen [Arefjord, 1993], shows that the majority of studies on fathers during the nineteen fifties and sixties were motivated by concern for the effect ‘father absence’ (due to the huge loss of men during WWII) might have on sons. In spite of the massive effort these studies result in very few certain conclusions about the negative effects on sons of ‘father absence’. Slightly poorer academic achievement is the only statistically valid conclusion they manage to document.

The scientific lack of support has not been a deterrent, however, and the myth is still alive. The American right wing author David Blankenhorn [1995] goes as far as claiming that father absence is the greatest problem American society is facing today. ‘Father hunger’ has become a widely accepted term to describe the consequence a person (of both genders, but particularly sons) may or will suffer if he or she has not had sufficient contact with his/her father. The symptoms of ‘father hunger’ are, supposedly, grief and anger towards the father who failed, a general lack of direction and purpose in life, as well as a fundamental doubt about one’s own worth as a man or a woman. In adult life ‘father hunger’ will result in an ‘unhealthy’ relationship to authority, either in the form of opposition and lack of deference, or overt submissiveness towards authoritarian persons. This view is presently so widespread and so dominant that even the president on the USA can voice it without fear of being controversial. In a speech in 1995 President Bill Clinton announced:

“The single biggest social problem in our society may be the growing absence of fathers from their children’s homes because it contributes to so many other social problems”. [Lupton and Barclay, 1997:2]

The belief that fathers have an important impact on sons has been around for a long time. Recently the idea that children may have an important impact on fathers has also gained some popularity. The developmental psychologist John Snarey [1993] argues, from an Eriksonian perspective, that in order for an adult man to go through a healthy development throughout adult life it is necessary for him to be ‘generative’. By ‘generative’ Snarey means caring for and taking responsibility for younger people’s well-being and growth. According to Snarey the best way for a man to achieve this is to care for his own children. Snarey does not make a theoretical claim that it is more important for fathers to care for a son than a daughter. Most of his empirical examples are about father-son relationships, however, and thus he demonstrates an implicit conviction this relationship is special and of particularly valuable.

As already mentioned the popular myth about fathers and sons, as well as studies and
literature that entertain such notions as ‘father hunger’ and ‘father wound’, assume that the relationship between father and son is of particular importance during the son’s adolescence. Adolescence is seen as a transition from boyhood to manhood and boys need to learn to be men. What they can learn from their fathers is particularly important and something that they, somehow, cannot learn from other men. My impression is that his view is most commonly based on a rather antiquated role-model theory. Over the last thirty years the idea that roles, particularly sex roles, are learned through copying specific other people, has become common sense knowledge. Although all sorts of studies have demonstrated that the acquisition of knowledge about social identities and behaviour is far more complicated [see e.g. Lupton and Barclay 1997] the role model idea still thrives. Along with the myth, role theory also needs to be demoted from its present dominant position.

The myth about fathers and sons is strong, and taken for granted by the great majority of people in the western world. One might therefore be tempted to assume that it is a thoroughly documented fact, supported by numerous studies describing in detail why and how fathers are important for sons, and sons for fathers. This temptation should be resisted because such studies do not exist. As a matter of fact none of the literature I have found builds upon actual observations of interactions between fathers and sons in ordinary everyday situations. Studies based on observations between fathers and small children do exist, but these observations are made in laboratory situations [see e.g. Lamb, 1976]. There are numerous studies based on interviews with men as sons and fathers [too many to all be cited here, but as examples of these kinds of studies see Holter 1993, Lee 1991, Lupton and Barclay 1997]. There are also studies of public images and discourses on fatherhood and/or on being an adolescent son as presented in newspapers and magazines, films, novels, advertisements etc [again too many to all be cited, and again Lupton and Barclay 1997 is a very fine example]. There are historical studies [see e.g. Pleck, 1987], sociological ‘textbooks’ that do not reveal how the information was gathered [e.g. Benson, 1968] and of course there is a huge body of statistical studies trying to show correlations of various kinds, e.g. between absent fathers and academic achievement in sons [see Arefjord 1993 for a comprehensive overview of the studies on absent fathers]. What I find interesting is that almost all studies lack detailed information about the contents of these relationships, in other words studies of what fathers and sons actually do, both instrumentally and symbolically, to and with each other in ordinary life. Without detailed knowledge about what is actually going on between them it is, in my opinion, impossible to substantiate the popular myth as I have briefly sketched it above, including claims about ‘father hunger’, the effect of the relationship on their (father’s and son’s) personal development and the alleged social impact of ‘father absence’.

Fathers and sons in anthropology
There is a long tradition in anthropology, particularly in British social anthropology, of describing and understanding relationships between close kin. The extensive body of British kinship studies provide a large pool of information about relationships between fathers and sons among other peoples and in other places than Anglo-Germanic western societies. These studies could, potentially, be used as comparative material for understanding relationships between fathers and sons in western societies, and Malinowski even provides an example of what such a comparative analysis could look like. In Sex and Repression in Savage Society Malinowski [1927b/2001] compares father-son relationships among Trobriand islanders with father-son relationships in the west, particularly South-Eastern Europe. One of the arguments Malinowski develops as a result of this comparative analysis is that the element of aggression
and competition, which he claims to be characteristic of many father-son relationships among peasant Southern-European societies, is absent from Trobriand fathers-son relationships because of the different rules about discipline, inheritance of wealth and succession to social positions of high rank. From my perspective, however, the most interesting aspect of his comparison is that whereas his Trobriand material is the result of prolonged and systematic collection of information, his information about European fathers and sons is all hearsay. As a result his comparison works as an illustration of what characterises Trobriand kinship, but is barely more than a caricature of western relationships. It is easy to repeat Malinowski’s mistake and believe that the knowledge we have gained by being members of our own society is sufficient or understanding relationships like those obtaining between fathers and sons. In a scientific perspective the knowledge we gain as members of our own society is barely more than ‘heresay’ and not valid for the comparative exercise Malinowski performed. In order to perform such comparisons western father-son relationships must be as systematically investigated as those obtaining among people elsewhere.

The long tradition of anthropological kinship studies has, unfortunately, not been very helpful to me. The main reason is that my study has a different purpose than other anthropological studies I have encountered. My focus is on a particular relationship, and my purpose is to understand all the various elements and dynamics that make up and constitute this very relationship. Anthropological kinship systems, on the other hand, predominately seek to understand systems of relationships. When such studies investigate particular relationships the point is to understand how this relationship is an integral part of the large system. Admittedly Malinowski’s work does provide ample information about internal traits of father-son relationships, but even his work is first and foremost aimed at understanding systems.

For my purpose the most important insight concerning father-son relationships, provided by anthropological kinship studies, is of a negative nature; they are not given by nature. Studies of matrilineal societies demonstrates that the position we in the west call ‘father’ may or may not be recognized in all societies, and if it is recognized, can by invested with many kinds of meaning. This is a point I will return to in chapter five, but for now it reminds us that human beings have created all kinds of notions about what people are, and about the contents of the relationships between them. We should be careful and not take too much for granted, not only about relationships among people who are unfamiliar to us, but also about relationships we believe we know quite well.

Another body of anthropological knowledge which throws light on relationships between fathers and sons are household studies. One such study that has always remained vivid in my mind is Derrick J. Stenning’s study of the Fulani people of the Sahel in Africa. In the article “Household viability among the pastoral Fulani” [1958] Stenning describes how the viability of the household depends on a certain number of people doing specific tasks. The relationship between the older male owning the cattle and the younger boy guarding them, most commonly father and son, is not described in great detail, but the reader can still envisage how they are woven together around the task of tending the cattle. The growth and the decline of the relationship, leading to father eventually having given all his cattle to his son, himself having withdrawn to the outskirts of the compound and a position of social death, leaves the reader wondering how the contents of the relationship allows the son to see his father disintegrate as a social person. Anthropological household studies, like kinship studies
before them, aimed as understanding systems, and thus failed to provide detailed understanding of the specific relationships which the system consisted of. Household studies are still important for my study because they highlight how important it is to keep in mind that the relationship I focus upon is always part of a larger system of relationships.

As a consequence of their preoccupation with systems anthropologists rarely focus on specific relationship. Fredrik Barth’s article “Role dilemmas and father-son dominance in Middle Eastern kinship systems” [1971] is therefore quite unique. It has also considerably influenced my own research, first of all because it demonstrates that even within social anthropology it is possible to focus narrowly on father-son relationships. Even though Barth did not set out to study father-son relationships as such, he had noticed, while living in a number of different Middle Eastern societies, that it was common for adult, married men to avoid situations where their own wives and their own fathers were present at the same time. In spite of the fact that Barth’s analysis is only aimed at understanding this avoidance behaviour, the analysis also indicates how a more comprehensive and holistic understanding might be achieved. Barth’s study demonstrates the importance of looking for processes whereby patterns are generated. It shows how insight into cultural rules and ideology, and even into the formal distribution of power, is not sufficient for understanding the emergent phenomenon, i.e. the ways fathers and sons really behave. Last, but not least, unlike all other father-son studies within a wide range of disciplines, Barth’s work is the only one which describes how fathers and sons interact within the context of their own homes. As a consequence Barth manages to describe how contextual factors influence the ways fathers and sons interact.

Method
In spite of all the literature and the huge popular interest our knowledge of the contents of relationships between fathers and adolescent sons, gained from actual observations of interactions between fathers and sons, is meagre. This thesis will hopefully contribute to filling the gaps. It is based on two extensive fieldwork in two New Zealand communities, one urban and one rural. In addition to the extensive fieldworks I carried out intensive observations of interactions between fathers and sons in thirteen different families and within their homes, and also interviewed all the fathers, some of the sons, and an additional seventeen men who where not connected to these families. The first fieldwork formed the basis for my Cand. Polit thesis [Vandeskog, 1993]. It took place exclusively in the rural community and lasted from December 1990 to February 1992. I conducted my second fieldwork from November 1997 to January 1999, half of which was spent in the same rural community and the other half in a city with approximately forty thousand inhabitants.

The rural community in question has seen rapid and radical social changes over the last thirty years. There has been a huge influx of newcomers, from abroad as well as from other parts of New Zealand, generally with urban backgrounds who have settled in the country to realize ideals about a better and alternative world. During my first fieldwork I focussed exclusively on this sub-community of newcomers and I called them ‘alternative lifestylers’.

Alternative lifestyle
In all New Zealand towns of some size there will be a café with an ‘alternative’ touch. Health food is served, mainly vegetarian. Herb teas, good coffee, organic beer and wine are prominent on the
black board menu. One of the walls, or maybe the window by the entrance, is a notice board filled with adverts and announcements for new age therapies and workshops; reiki, magnetic pulsing, massage, re-birthing, home-birthing, African dance sessions, yoga and everything else that falls outside the domain of the ‘traditional’ health service. But that is not all; there are handwritten slips of paper advertising house-trucks for sale, a workshop for how to make tepee’s, advertisements for solar energy, a young woman going to Christchurch next week willing to take a passenger who can share petrol. There is a large poster about the solstice festival coming up, celebrating the turning of the sun. ‘Bring drums, some food (preferably vegan) and join the ritual at the organic gardens’. The Green Party announces their meeting on Tuesday, and the anti-genetic modification of food is having a rally. There is a call for support for ‘Stop the logging’ of native forest, and a notice that the local ‘Forest and Bird’ society is arranging a tramp next Sunday; everyone welcome.

All over New Zealand there are people with an interest in alternative practices of various kinds. Most people build these interests into what is seemingly an ordinary, middle class, suburban lifestyle. By that I mean they have a mortgage, live in a one-family house on a quarter-section, have a job nearby that they travel to by car every day, the children attend the public school nearby and after work it is time for tea, a bit of TV and then off to bed. The alternative attitudes and inclinations are still not difficult to spot, however. When ill they consult the homeopathist first, most likely they have an organic veggie-garden in a corner of the property, and during the holiday daddy spends a weekend at a Buddhist retreat up in the mountains. They try to eat as much vegetarian as possible, and regularly donate money to Greenpeace. At election time they vote for the Green Party.

If the above assumption is correct there is something like one hundred and forty thousand Kiwis with an interest in alternative ways of life. And even though most of them try to combine suburbia with alternative ways of living there are plenty of those who go much further. Over the last thirty years thousands of New Zealanders have broken with the ways of life they grew up with; the ways their parents lived and they were expected to follow. As part of an international western trend, which began in the late sixties, young Kiwis, raised or educated in the cities, started drifting. Many ended up in rather isolated rural areas, at the peripheries of mainstream society and the local community. They bought land that was useless for agriculture, built homes upon it, started growing vegetables and tried to meek out a living in any way possible. Some of these ‘new settlers’ began their life on the land as individuals, but most were families with a child or two. Larger communities with ten to thirty members owning the land communally were also established, but the dominant pattern was and is the core family on individually owned private land. The movement out of the cities even gained some support from the ‘establishment’. During the seventies the Labour government set up the so-called Ohu-scheme. Young enthusiasts where given the right to settle on and cultivate crown-land in a number of specified areas. Quite a few Ohus were set up, many in beautiful areas but on hopelessly infertile land. Every one has since been abandoned. The alternative movement has survived, though. Individual settlements, families and communities all over the country are still going strong. Particularly in Coromandel, in Nelson and Golden Bay and on the west coast of the South Island.

My first anthropological fieldwork took place in 1991 among people who had all left their place of origin in order to create a ‘better’ life based on green principles (environmentalism and social responsibility), and that gave them the opportunity to develop their creativity and become whole
and harmonious people. I found a community consisting of people from all over the western world where newcomers were welcomed and included. A community of all sorts, from successful self-employed alternative businesspeople, to dope-fiends on the dole. A community where people were judged on personal qualities rather than achievements, and where, as a consequence, poverty was more highly valued than conspicuous consumption. I have since come to call it 'a moral community'. A deep sense of right and wrong is prevalent among the majority of the people, and the community seem to depend upon this moral awareness for its sense of identity. Simultaneously, and for the same reason, it also depends upon people being tolerant of all kinds of ways of living, personal appearance (including body odour) and artistic expressions as long as they do not blatantly breach the basic principles of environmentalism and social responsibility.

Trying to understand this social phenomenon that I have called alternative lifestyle is not easy. In my opinion it is a deeply contradictory phenomenon that both challenge our traditional academic perspectives, and flies in the face of common sense. The standard interpretation, which I too adopted in the beginning, is to see it predominantly as an attempt at creating a real alternative to the dominant middle class way of life. That interpretation is not wrong. For many people the alternative lifestyle is a serious attempt at creating a way of life that is better, more just, more sustainable and of higher quality all around. But it is also something else. Over a period of ten years I have observed the community of alternative lifestylers in Golden Bay and I am convinced that it does not only constitute a protest and a romantic, but unrealistic opposition. As I see it alternative lifestyle is a paradoxical combination of two opposing trends. On the one hand a romantic rejection of modern society, on the other hand a fundamental embrace and exploitation of the most fundamental of all modern traits; i.e. individual choice.

Due to this paradoxical and amorphous combination of romantic rejection of modernity while simultaneously embracing the very fundament of modernity, alternative lifestyle may actually be pointing towards the future. In a late modern society where self-identity and a sense of purpose in life can no longer be borrowed from religion, from the government or from pop-stars, each individual has to create his or her identity for him or her self. Traditional middle class values and strategies are also becoming increasingly useless as far as the creation of individual self-identities is concerned. The middle class way of life offers little else than consumer based identities and a sense of belonging through allegiance to consumer object brands. To an increasing number of people such consumer-based identities are experienced as non-substantial and non-sustainable. In addition, middle class suburbia to a decreasing degree offers a sense of belonging to a place and a fling of community because of the gradual death of communities as places where people actually interact. Most importantly middle class lifestyle can no longer provide goals to strive for and an answer to the ‘meaning of life’. To me alternative lifestyle is a non-organized exploration, based on individual choice, of how to create sense, purpose, identity and meaning in a rather senseless late-modern world.

My first fieldwork, among the alternative lifestylers, was primarily about social life in public arenas. I did, however, also frequently visit people in their homes, and thus gathered information about domestic relationships. A phenomenon that I found particularly fascinating was that relationships between parents and children among the alternative lifestylers seemed different from what I observed among people who belonged to the ‘old’ community, and they were also different from what I had observed in middle class families in Norway. Most
alternative lifestyle parents behaved in ways that bore a close resemblance to descriptions of parents in non-industrialized and/or non-western societies. In a study of childhood in New Zealand Ritchie [1970] makes the following observations about the Maoris:

“So one finds Maori children everywhere in Maori life. They play about the house. They scamper around the cookhouse and the meeting house when Maoris gather for tribal or community affairs. They stand soberly or play about the fringe of activity at a mourning wake. They play on the floor while Mum gets the dinner. They drop off to sleep in their parents’ arms at the village weekly movie show....... They are not excluded, but neither are they included nor allowed to interfere. They are just there.” [:131].

This quote fits very well with observations from other parts of the world as well, e.g. Gaskins [1999] descriptions of interactions between Mayan parents and their children. Gaskin argues that among the rural Mayans adult work has primacy and that

“life in the compound as experienced by children is structured around adult work activities” [ibid: 33].

Adults do not entertain or overtly instruct their children, and children are mainly left to follow their own interests, primarily guided by their peers and their own understanding of cultural rules of conduct. From my perspective this also seemed to be the case with many of the children among the alternative lifestyle Pakehas in my study.

These kinds of observations made me curious about relationships between parents and children, and this curiosity was one of several reasons for choosing relationships between fathers and adolescent sons as the topic for my doctoral thesis. Seeing that my curiosity was born out of my fieldwork in this particular community in New Zealand, and the fact that I already had substantial knowledge about it, it made sense to make that community the locality for my second fieldwork as well.

The original plan for my second fieldwork was to conduct a comparative study and to make regular visits in the homes of alternative lifestylers as well as ‘locals’. By locals I mean families whose ancestors had lived in the area for several generations. I wanted to check out a hypothesis about ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ ways of being fathers and sons. My assumption was that fathers among the alternative lifestylers would be more modern, and fathers in the local families more traditional. This plan never materialized, however, because I did not manage to make enough contacts with local families who were willing to allow me into their home on a regular basis. In hindsight this was a fortunate turn of events because it forced me to abandon my assumption about the dichotomy between modern and traditional. The information I have today suggests that this dichotomy is too simplistic, and not useful in order to make sense of the huge observed variety in ways that fathers and sons behave towards each other.

As a consequence of the problems I had in finding families who were willing to allow me into their homes, I changed localities and moved to a city where I already knew some people and thus had gate-openers who could introduce me to fathers with adolescent sons. During the eleven months that I carried out family visits I gathered data about thirteen different
father-son relationships. From January to June 1998 I regularly visited seven families in the first locality and from June through November I regularly visited six families in the second locality.

Twelve of the thirteen families were either friends or acquaintances of mine from my first fieldwork, or they were friends or acquaintances of people I knew. Only one of the families was recruited by a chance meeting. This selection obviously does not meet any criteria for statistical validity, nor was it ever meant to do so. I never set out to gather statistical material and thirteen families is not enough for a statistical analysis anyway. My intention was always to conduct a qualitative study and look for patterns of interactions. To the extent that I make generalisations it is either as a result of comparison (between the families or between my data and empirical data found elsewhere) or theoretical inference.

My visits took the same form in all thirteen families. I visited each family once a week, on the same day and at the same time every week. As a rule my visits lasted for one to two hours. When I arrived I slipped into the activities that were going on prior to my arrival and that normally happened at that time of the day. In families where the fathers were engaged in paid work outside the home, my visits took place in the late afternoons and early evenings. In the few families where the fathers were not engaged in paid work outside the home my visits took place during the day. In some families I joined them for supper (in New Zealand called ‘tea’, and I will use that term from now on). In other families I watched TV with them, sat in the lounge and chatted, played games with the sons or had a drink with the father while we talked about politics, sports and the weather.

On an average I made between eight and ten visits, over a period of two to three months, in each family. Obviously I was always a visitor and never a ‘natural’ part of the family. Everyone present modified his or her behaviour, to some extent or another, in order to accommodate my presence. Of course I cannot know for sure, but I assume that the modification was in the direction of giving ‘better’ impressions of them selves than how they usually behaved when there was no ‘audience’ [ref. Goffman 1959]. It is thus reasonable to assume that the behaviour I observed was slightly closer to the ideals they hold about proper behaviour as fathers and sons, mothers and daughters, than how they behaved in my absence.

It is, of course, also possible that my presence had a different effect and that their behaviour was guided more by the rules of how to treat a visitor, than the rules of how to behave as a family. Most probably both sets of rules applied, but the latter set of rules may have contributed to why so many of the fathers assumed a dominant and central position during my visits. It is, after all, father’s job to face outsiders, and I was a male outsider.

In most families I was at first treated as a foreigner and a guest, and gradually less so. Still, in every family my visits took a certain form particular to each family, and these patterns were established from the very beginning. I n other words, there were no radical changes in behaviour as the family members became more used to me. The pattern of interactions between the various family members was observable from the very beginning and the only change over time was that people became slightly less formal and polite. After eight to ten visits in any family I was convinced that I was observing the same pattern being repeated. In order to learn anything more about the families, and the father-son relationships, I would have had to increase my presence dramatically. I would, more or less, have had to move in
with them. For my own sake, as well as the convenience of the families, I decided that what I had learned during eight to ten visits was sufficient.

In hindsight, when I think about the generosity and trust that these thirteen families demonstrated by letting me, a stranger, into the very heart of their homes, I am quite overwhelmed. I believe that this says a lot, not only about the thirteen families, but also about Pakeha New Zealanders in general. In the period since I conducted my last fieldwork many Norwegians, colleagues, friends as well as journalists, have asked me why I went to New Zealand, and why I did not to do this study in Norway instead. First time the question was put to me my instant reply was that I do not think I could have done it in Norway. I seriously doubt that I would have found families who would have let me into their homes the way they did in New Zealand. There is a degree of hospitality in New Zealand that has always astonished me, and warmed my heart. I seriously believe that the genuine Kiwi hospitality, their openness and basic trust in foreigners are some of the fundamental traits of Kiwi culture that made this study possible.

**Hospitality**

When my wife, Abbi, and I arrived in New Zealand in connection with my first fieldwork, we did not know where to go. We had two contacts, both in Nelson, but we did not know any of them personally. A few weeks before arriving in New Zealand we had written a postcard to one of our contacts, Helen, and asked if we could meet her when we got there. She wrote a card back saying “come and stay”. It was all rather vague and non-committed. We did not know when we might arrive, or if her invitation was genuine, or for how long we could stay. When we did arrive some weeks after the exchange of cards we showed up on Helens doorstep, quite out of the blue. Murray, her partner at the time, answered the door, and was obviously not pleased to see us. Years later he told us that Helen and he were in the middle of a domestic disagreement at the time and not in the mood for disturbances. He let us in anyway, and we stayed for two weeks.

Helen owned a small cottage. Open kitchen and lounge in the back, two small bedrooms occupied by Leif and Anne-Lise, her son and daughter, and a small closed in veranda at the front, which she and Murray used as a bedroom. Anne-Lise had to give up her room and move in with her brother. We intended to stay only for a few days, but things did not go as easily as we had planned as far as buying a car, a place to do my fieldwork, and finding a place to live. Then Abbi got ill and we had to have a doctor. That delayed moving out of Helens place even more.

I have always been amazed at the ease with which Helen, Murray and the kids coped with living with total strangers, and how well things worked. After a few discussions about domestic chores we got on really well, thanks to them and their hospitality. Only a month and a half after we moved out, they came to stay with us for a week-end. We had a ball. They were our first friends in New Zealand, and still are among the best.

Helen and Murray were not the only ones to open their arms and show us a remarkable hospitality. Shortly after settling in Golden Bay we stopped by at a potters place. He started talking and during the conversation he told him we had just settled in the bay, and I was doing fieldwork. He stopped working, invited us to his porch for a glass of home-brewed beer, and we
sat talking the rest of the afternoon. Abbi is interested in pottery and when she mentioned she was keen on learning the craft, Paul, the potter, offered her lessons. Abbi happily accepted and Paul stayed her teacher throughout the year we lived in Golden Bay, free of charge, on a sort of ‘exchange of favours’ basis. Not very long after meeting Paul we met a woman who had done some pottery earlier in her life and who had a potter’s wheel at home that she did not use any more. She lent it to us free of charge. Other potters, Gary and Tim, invited Abbi to use their glazes and fire her things in their kilns. All as favours.

Hospitality and a helping hand is one side of the story. The other is the way people responded when I told them about some new project I had started or some new idea I had. They were always encouraging and optimistic. “Good on you”, “Go for it”, “Good as gold”. Never any “Nah, won’t work”, “Why bother”, “Waste of time” or other ways to kill enthusiasm. Surely New Zealanders have their fair share of griping about the national politics, the economy and the madness of some international class fool like Saddam or Bush. When it comes to their own lives and interpersonal relationships, however, the prevailing attitude is “She’ll be all right, mate”. These attitudes of hospitality and easy-going optimism is so common that the only conclusion I can draw is that New Zealand culture greatly encourages these attitudes towards foreigners and life in general.

Finally, my narrow focus on the relationships between fathers and adolescent sons requires a few comments. I have chosen adolescence because I began my study believing in many of the opinions that make up the popular contemporary western myth about fathers and sons, including the assumption that adolescence is a critical phase. Having conducted this study I still hold that opinion, but I am now convinced it is critical for very different reasons than those proposed by the popular myth and by role-model theory. It is an important and critical phase, not because it is a time when boys learn to be men through a process of copying their fathers, but because it is the period in life when members of a late modern society begin to actively create and ‘discover’ their self-identity. It is a period during which people begin to seriously engage in the creation of their own, unique and authentic self-identity. The self-identity arrived at during this period tends to have a lasting influence upon peoples lives and is often considered the ‘true’ self. At an early stage in this project I also realized I needed to restrict my inquiry because I could not look at the entire life cycle of the relationship between fathers and sons. Having already decided to focus on adolescent sons I decided to keep that focus.

Having chosen such a narrow focus it is of utmost importance to always keep in mind that no relationship, and no living persons, exists in such splendid dyadic isolation. Even if it should happen that a single father lived together with an only son, they would not exist in a vacuum. There are always other relationships, other people and other agencies surrounding them. Most father-son relationships exist within a context defined by a wide range of kinship relationships; between father and mother, between brothers, brother and sister and so on. There will usually also be other relationships circumscribing it; friends of father and mother, friends of the son, the brother and the sister. There are colleagues, schoolmates, teacher, and the list can be expanded even more. These surrounding relationships always exist, and yet I have chosen not to include them on a general basis. On the other hand, when I believe that a particular contextual relationship seriously informs the meaning of the relationship between father and son, I deal with it specifically. As an example I devote large parts of chapter six to the relationship between husband and wife, and how the dynamics in that relationship
Aim
As indicated the substantial aim of this study is to describe and interpret the contents of relationships between fathers and adolescent sons through observations of interactions between them. My emphasis on contents is, of course, neither non-problematic nor innocent. It rests on a particular metaphor, i.e. the image of a container [Shore 1996]. I therefore underline that I do not necessarily suggest that relationships should or ought to be understood as containers. My purpose is primarily to avoid another tendency. When studying relationships anthropology has traditionally focussed either on the processes whereby systems of relationships are generated, or on the formal general rules and ideologies enabling and restricting the formation of interpersonal relationships. My focus is on the interpersonal relationship itself.

In western culture there are already several different notions about how to conceptualise the contents of interpersonal relationships. Most commonly a relationship is thought about as a kind of connection between independent and autonomous individuals. In everyday talk, as well as in the academic literature, one of the more frequent metaphors used is that the connection is a ribbon; people like fathers and sons are seen as tied to each other by a bond. As an undergraduate student I remember that social relationships were talked about as simple or complex, the former imagined as a ribbon made up of only one strand, the latter made up rope made up of many strands. The rope/bond/ribbon metaphor is not very good for analytical purposes, however, because it does not supply us with any detailed analytical clues about what to look for. Obviously there are no real ribbons between people and the ribbon metaphor does not provide any resources in order to imagine what actually makes up the connection.

Another western metaphor for interpersonal relationships is glue. It is not as common as ribbon, but I have encountered it. Again it alludes to a substance that somehow holds the persons together and again it is analytically useless. No such glue-like substance can be found and even if it could be found the metaphor does not indicate what the binding action of the glue might be. Magnetism too is used as a metaphor for whatever it is that connects people, particularly about erotic attraction. If we use this metaphor as an analytical tool it suggests looking for the forces or the energy that ‘draw’ people together. As an analytical procedure this too proves to be quite hopeless. Even though humans, like all other objects, actually are electro-magnetic objects, how do we make sense of this physical attraction? Should we look for electrons that jump from one individual to the other and bind them together by encircling both? And does the physical magnetism between material bodies have anything to do with what we ordinarily call relationships? How do we for example account for the fact that only some human ‘magnets’ are attracted to each other when their physical electrical charge should make them attracted to every other body of the same kind?

When it comes to relationship between agnates, the metaphor most commonly used within western culture to explain the connection is, of course, blood. [see Schneider 1968, 1984]. Our common sense understanding an explanation is that fathers and sons have the same blood, or in today’s terminology the same genes, and therefore they are ‘the same kind’ as each other. Being ‘the same kind’ also means belonging together. The blood metaphor builds on a totally different conceptual premise than those above. The metaphors of
ribbon/glue/magnetism assume that the entities originally are of different kinds and have an existence independent of each other. The forces or ties or magnetism then create a direct connection between these entities. The blood metaphor, on the other hand, builds upon a notion of ‘sameness’, i.e. the notion that in order for an entity to be a member of a category that entity must be of the same kind as the other members of the category, and the ‘sameness’ somehow establishes a connection between each individual member. The connection between individual members is, so to speak, a function or a consequence of membership to the category.

As far as providing analytic or hermeneutic resources for understanding how relationships between fathers and sons are established and maintained, the blood metaphor is, unfortunately, as useless as the metaphors of rope, bond and magnetism. Blood and genes are substances that somehow are supposed to be shared and thus to connect people. The problem is that these metaphors do not provide any clues as to how these substances create the connection. As an example, it is not even possible to specify what is meant by ‘same’ blood or genes. Obviously the ‘sameness’ does not refer to blood-type. Many fathers and sons have different types of blood and still remain father and son. As far as genes are concerned, today the technology exists to determine if a particular man is the genitor of a particular child, but that does not answer how common genes creates the connection between them. On the one hand father and son will not share all genes, only some. The metaphor says nothing about how many genes or which kinds need to be shared for a father-son connection to exist. On the other hand, as Strathern [1992a] has argued, having common genes does not in itself necessarily create a father-child relationship. There are many men who have perfectly good father-child relationships with their children without sharing any genes at all, either because they do not know that they are not the genitor or because of adoption. Also, the gene-metaphor does not indicate what else is needed in addition to shared genes for such a relationship to be established. My point is thus that shared substance in itself is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition in order for a father-child relationship to be established. It is obvious that for most people in the western world it is of great importance to believe that they share substance with their children. For the purpose of analysis, however, it is equally important to keep in mind that this conviction is not dictated by of nature and biology, but by western kinship ideology.

As it stands I believe that for the purpose of anthropological analysis all the above metaphors; from ribbon and magnetism to blood and genes, are not only analytically and hermeneutically useless, they are actually harmful. These metaphors insinuate that interpersonal relationships somehow can be conceptualised as having concrete and material contents. I am convinced that any search for concrete connections between people is doomed to fail. I therefore need another concept, or set of concepts, that can help me develop a detailed description.

In spite of the strong prejudices of western kinship ideology in favour of explaining kinship relationships as a consequence of shared substance, the ideology also contain another notion that has proven more valuable for my purpose. According to Schneider [1968, 1984] the content of western kinship relationships is both blood and “diffuse enduring solidarity”. The latter concept is promising because solidarity is neither a substance (like ribbon and blood), nor a physical energy (like magnetism). Solidarity is a notion, emotionally charged, and an abstraction that is both lodged in and a product of the human mind. The concept solidarity therefore invites a search for abstract meaning.
In my opinion the content of connections between humans is always a question of meaning and never a question of material substance. Different kinds of connections are different exactly because they have different meanings, not because they are based on or contain different kinds of substances. Thus, of course, I only beg the question; what is meaning? I will deal much more in depth with this question in chapter two. For now it is sufficient to say that this change of perspective allows for an investigation of both what the meaning of a relationship is (i.e. investigating the contents of the relationship) and for investigating the processes and elements involved in how the meaning is generated (created and maintained). In other words, it allows us to investigate both what the connection is, how it is made and what it contains.

In the next chapter I will enter into a more detailed discussion of meaning. However, already at this point I would like to say that I consider meaning to be a matter of cognition, but in the broad sense of the word. Meaning is a matter of abstract thinking and symbolic reasoning, as well as embodied knowledge growing out of bodily experiences. Cognition is, in other words, not only a matter of rational thought but rather an “orchestration of though, feeling and sensory experience”, to borrow a phrase from Bradd Shore [1996:6]. And because it involves both thinking and feeling, mind and body, the interpretation of meaning can never be a mechanical, analytical process. Making meaning, and understanding other peoples meaning, always require a degree of imagination. And because our imagination both needs resources and guidance, not in the least in order to arrive at communicable insights, interpretation can only take place on the basis of theory. For my purposes I have found that I needed an analytical theory of meaning and I rely heavily on a cognitive theory of meaning as presented by Bradd Shore in his book *Culture in Mind* [1996]. As Bradd Shore makes very clear, and demonstrates very well, any cognitive analysis of meaning also requires a phenomenological understanding of the lived experiences that the meaning grow out of and is a part of. I am particularly thinking of those aspects of human life that may be called ‘emotional tone’, ‘poetic nuance’ or ‘existential value’, expressed by words like awe, dread, ecstasy, boredom etc.

Cognitive theory and phenomenological descriptions are necessary for understanding the contents of relationships between fathers and their adolescent sons. Unfortunately these perspectives cannot throw light on the processes whereby meaning is maintained or changes over time. The social reproduction of meaning, in this case the social reproduction of the ways that men behave towards each other as fathers and sons, and the social reproduction of the ideologies, images and knowledge needed to be a certain kind of father also needs to be investigated. On the one hand I am therefore concerned with ‘external’ social processes (that fathers and sons themselves may or may not be aware of) whereby the settings for these experiences emerge. On the other hand I am concerned with mental processes (individual as well as cultural) whereby things that happen during a particular situation take on particular meaning as emotions, notions and/or ideas.

**Substance versus meaning**

My strong focus on the *contents* of relationships means that my study will differ from ‘traditional’ anthropological studies of kinship, as well as more recent studies of ‘relatedness’ [see Carsten 2000.] The difference is twofold, the first difference is a question of focus; whereas anthropological studies of kinship and relatedness are almost exclusively
preoccupied with larger systems of relationships, I focus sharply on the contents of one particular relationship. The second difference has to do with philosophical grounding, so to speak. In other words how we deal with the relationship between biology and kinship.

Prior to David Schneider’s book *A critique of the study of kinship* [1984] there was an implicit agreement among most anthropologists that the content of kinship relationships was the same for all human kinship systems. Though Schneider was not the only theoretician to question this assumption, after his critique no anthropologist could take it for granted any more. Schneider argued that anthropological studies of kinship were based on the conviction that the content of kinship relationships was shared biogenetic substance symbolizing diffuse enduring solidarity. This notion, Schneider argued, is in fact a western folk-notion and as such it does not hold for many of the non-western relationships anthropologists have described and analysed as ‘kinship’. With a single stroke Schneider changed anthropological kinship studies forever. Ten years later Marilyn Strathern showed that ‘shared biogenetic substance’ is not necessarily part of the contents of western kinship relationships either. In *After Nature* Strathern [1992a] convincingly argues that as a consequence of advanced reproductive technologies the ‘biological’ component of ‘western’ kinship can no longer be taken for granted as the unquestionable basis for how relatives are connected.

After Schneider and Strathern the foundations have been laid for asking a new set of questions about the contents of relationships between relatives. When nature can no longer be seen as holding a paramount position how are we to conceptualise such relationships? In the anthology *Cultures of Relatedness; New Approaches to the Study of Kinship* Carsten [2000] claims that:

“relatedness may be composed of various components - substance, feeding, living together, procreation, emotion - elements which are themselves not necessarily bounded entities but may overflow or contain parts of each other or take new forms.”

[34]

The arguments that Carsten et al. advance in their book are quite similar to those upon which I build this thesis. I too believe that interpersonal relationships, including kinship relationships, are made up of a number of different components that are generated by a number of different processes. I agree that affection and nurturance are vital for understanding interpersonal relationships, and particularly those between close family members. I, too, am of the opinion that interpersonal relationships are not established once and for all by some ‘natural fact’, but are continuously ‘under construction’ as part of everyday activities and interactions people engage in. And yet we differ at one very important point in the sense that we not share the same philosophical ground.

In the introduction to the abovementioned anthology Carsten writes:

"I have highlighted a single theme running through the chapters in this volume - the distinction between social and biological aspects of kinship, and the ‘articulation’ of these with each other.” [:25]

Carsten’s choice of focus reveals our fundamental differences, and in my opinion her choice is unfortunate. Rather than assisting our attempt at understanding interpersonal (including
kinship) relationships, it confuses the matter. The confusion is a consequence of what we mean by such concepts as substance, biology and nature. And what is more, the meaning attributed to these concepts will either make them (and their articulation with each other) of central importance to the study of interpersonal relationships, or it will dissolve their importance all together. Where Carsten et al. obviously arrive at the first conclusion, I arrive at the latter.

Carsten is aware that these concepts are ambiguous and a few pages earlier in the same article she writes that:

“The articulation of the ‘social’ and the ‘biological’ is central to the way both gender and kinship has been constructed as academic domains. While these terms may in themselves seem quite unproblematic, precisely what is meant by them is not always clear.” [:21]

Carsten’s discussion of these concepts is very good, but it would take too much space for me to give a thorough presentation of it here. On the other hand it is not necessary because her point can, as I see it, be summed up in this one statement:

“there is a combination of sentiment, substance, and nurturance as grounds for relatedness. Instead of attributing relatedness to a single indigenous, ‘substantialist’ model,..... affection, shared substance and nurturance underlie all forms of relatedness, whether genealogically based or not.” [:22].

At first glance this seems acceptable and a good point of departure for comparative studies of relatedness. However, a closer inspection reveals that a serious problem still remains. Carsten dethrones the substantialist model, and deprives biology of its primary importance, placing biology and substance on par with affection and nurturance. But, as she says in her conclusion, she is not willing to abandon biology altogether. This is, of course, a problematic standpoint, a fact that Carsten is fully aware of. Paraphrasing Yanagiasako and Delaney [1995] she hammers out this point very sharply:

“A recognition that the boundaries that separate off domains, such as ‘science’, ‘kinship’, ‘economics’, and ‘religion’, are cultural constructions offer the possibility of asking “how culturally-specific domains have been dialectically formed and transformed in relations with other cultural domains, how meaning migrate across domain boundaries, and how specific actions are multiply constituted” (ibid). These authors show that it is possible to abandon the foundational assumptions that have defined analytic domains, such as kinship, without abandoning “the study of the meaning and relations previously confined to those domains”. (:11)” [:13]

In my opinion Carsten et al. should have stayed with the position formulated by Yanagiasako and Delaney. They should have accepted that ‘society’ and ‘biology’ are “culturally-specific domains” that are what they are because of their meaning. They are not concepts that refer to ontological domains that somehow exist independent of the concept. But Carsten cannot give up her common sense ontological dualism. She seems to believe that doing so would be to abandon biology, and that she cannot, and will not do. She is wrong. To accept Yanagiasako and Delaney’s position does not imply abandoning ‘biology’ it only requires giving the
concept a new meaning.

My position is very close to Yanagiasako and Delaney. I believe our inquiries into ‘cultures of relatedness’ ought to build upon the ontological assumption that the world of meaning is the only world that is of any relevance to our inquiry. This is not a new argument in anthropology. Malinowski maintained that

“the nature of the bonds which unite men into social groups….. are one and all of an acquired character; in fact, it can be easily seen that there is no innate element in them at all.” [1927b: 151]

We should therefore not be asking questions about ‘nature’ and ‘shared substances’ because a ‘substance’, in its own right, does not, and cannot underlie human relatedness. Only the meaning of a substance and the meaning of the idea that it is ‘shared’ can underlie relatedness. Our inquiries should, in other words, build upon the belief that all aspects of relationships are ‘social’ and ‘cultural’, and that the so-called ‘natural’ aspects are only possible to investigate, and are only of interest, to the extent that they have been constituted as meaningful.

In a later article called Substantivism, Antisubstantivism and Anti-antisubstantivism [2001] Carsten tries to counter some of the problems her ideas about substance necessarily creates. By way of a conceptual analysis she concludes that ‘substance’ has many definitions that fit into four broad categories: Vital part or essence, Separate distinct thing, That which underlies phenomena, and Corporal matter. By investigating how the concept has been used, by anthropologists, in order to understanding kinship in the ‘west’, in India and in Melanesia she concludes that what the analysts refer to by the concept are radically different notions in the west and the rest. One might say that Carsten’s analysis is at the level of ethno-explanations, and when she compares different ethno-explanations she concludes that they do not have a common reference. The concept ‘substance’ is in other words deprived of its real material substance. To me this brings us back to Schneider’s point and it renders substance no more than an idea, on par with other ideas. And when substance turns out to be a concept with so many different meanings, and when it does not refer to anything else but meaning, it makes no sense to make “the distinction between social and biological aspects of kinship, and the ‘articulation’ of these with each other” [op.cit] the central theme of our new approach to the study of kinship.

In the end Carsten’s position is dualistic; reality still consists of two qualitatively different domains, one that is constituted by meaning (culture and society), and the other which is independent of meaning (biology and/or nature). And in spite of the long discussion that Carsten takes us through, it is still not, at the end of her article, clear what she means by the concept biology. I am however, left with a strong impression that she does not manage to rid her self of an old fashioned objectivist ontology whereby nature, biology and material objects (substances) are seen as having a real existence in their own right, independent of how they are conceptualised by humans. Substance is, in other words, something material that has the power to create connections between people regardless of whether people are aware of it or not. Epistemologically this assumption can only be classified as a faith. In itself that is not a problem. One of the uncomfortable consequences of dismissing objectivism and positivism as our intellectual platform is that it is no longer possible to arrive at any ‘objective’ facts from
where to start our inquiries. All inquiries must therefore be founded on some belief or another. Different beliefs may, however, have very different consequences and the merit of a belief can only be judged by the kinds of inquiries it makes possible. I am convinced that the ontological dualism that Carsten et al. build their inquiries upon will have very unfortunate consequences because it is doomed to lead to dead-end inquiries and logical breakdowns.

Her statement that

“affection, shared substance and nurturance underlie all forms of relatedness, whether genealogically based or not.” [op.cit]

is a good example of the kinds of untenable consequences her ontological belief are bound to result in. As a guide for inquiry on the one hand it leads us to look for meaningful acts that constitute different kinds of affections and different forms of nurture, and how these meaningful acts contribute to generating relationships between people. That is fine; it can be done and will bring some insight into how relationships are constituted. On the other hand it will also require that we look for ‘substance’ and how it contributes to creating interpersonal connections. This lands us in a position that is both practically and philosophically impossible. What are the concrete substances we should be looking for, and how do we find the specific mechanism whereby this substance creates connections between people? The philosophical problem is even worse. What do we look for in order to establish what a substance that has yet not been invested with meaning actually is? And what do we look for in order to find out how this ‘pure’ substance (i.e. matter without meaning) contributes to the creation of a meaningful connection between people? The answer is; it cannot be done. The only thing we can ever look for is ‘meaningful substance’. And not even then can we take for granted that some notion of substance actually underlie all forms of relatedness. Whether a specific relationship is founded upon a notion of substance, or upon affection or nurturance or anything else is an empirical matter and not something we can decide a priori. All we can know prior to investigating the contents of any particular relationship is that it is a matter of meaning.

The debate about substance is, of course, part of a larger debate about nature versus culture. I will not enter into that debate in any great detail, but because it is of central importance as a basis for this thesis it requires some attention. First of all I believe the debate is founded upon a philosophical mistake in the form of a confused use of categories. Nature and culture are concepts of radically different logical kinds and should not be compared. The concept culture refers to patterns/systems of meaning and as such culture is an immanent and inalienable aspect of every idea, belief, notion and meaningful emotion that humans can have, hold or produce. Nature, on the other hand, is a concept that refers to patterns of matter and energy (or in Yanagiasako and Delaney’s term ‘a domain’) that we, as a matter of faith, believe exists prior to and independent of our perception and knowledge about them. Culture refers to aspects of meaning and nature refers to a domain of things and processes that have an ‘objective’ existence. If we by mistake treat culture as a ‘thing’ or a domain then we can compare culture with nature and construe an opposition between them. But culture is neither a ‘thing’ nor a domain; it is an aspect of everything that has meaning for us, and as such also an aspect of our concept about nature. Thus there cannot be an opposition between nature and culture because as far as the meaning of both concepts are concerned, nature is a cultural concept and in our concept of culture there is an element of what we call nature.
When I say that it is only the world of meaning that is of any relevance to humans I am not trying to deny the influence of the material world, both the unknown and the known. What I am saying is that when the material world influences humans the only way we grasp it and understand it is by inscribing it with meaning, thus transforming the meaningless into something meaningful. It may of course be that an independent nature does exist, but if it does it is ‘unknowable’, because to know it is to transform it. The very act of getting to know it implies making it meaningful. This is an old insight, at least as old as Kant and his argument that ‘Ding an Sich’ in principle is not available to humans. It is only through categorization that the world becomes ‘Ding für Mich’ [see also Lakoff 1987].

I therefore maintain that the only world of any relevance to human beings is the world of meaning. This world is always both abstract (symbolic) and physical: *We live in a meaningful material world*. Meaning cannot be produced and sustained without being lodged in and carried by matter or energy [Bateson and Bateson 1988]. Matter and energy cannot be comprehended without being inscribed with meaning. I am not thereby suggesting that the meaningful world is a Latourian ‘nature-culture’ [Latour 1993], and that any particular phenomenon is a ‘hybrid’ of culture and nature. Quite on the contrary; to talk about hybrids necessitates the notion that the pure form is possible. In my opinion the pure form never existed and is, in principle, impossible. Thus any talk of hybrids is nothing more than an empty catch-word that catches nothing but some peoples fancy. ‘Pure’ nature has never directly influenced human society and culture and for as long as we have been cultural beings there has never been anything else than nature invested with meaning. Nature has always been a ‘hybrid’ and does not become more of a hybrid just because the meaning of some aspect of nature changes. Concept like ‘culture’, ‘society’ and ‘nature’ are used by people who try to make sense out of their experiences in the world. This attempt at making sense is always, and cannot be anything else than a bracketing off of some kinds of experiences and an inclusion of others. Some categorisations produce more and better meaning for some people in a certain situation. Other categories prove to be superior for other people at other times. But all concepts are ‘artefacts’ that are amalgams, un-separable wholes of meaning and matter/energy. But because the only thing we can know is ‘meaning’ categories such as ‘nature’ or ‘biology’ that pretends to refer to a ‘pure’ material world should only be given a place in our investigation as beliefs about pure matter, not as referring to the real existence of pure matter and how it really creates connections between people. Our task as anthropologists is to investigate social and cultural phenomena, i.e. patterns of meaning and how they are generated. If the people we try to understand employ concepts like ‘nature’ or ‘biology’ in order explain the meaning of their interpersonal relationships, then our job is to understand the meaning these concepts have for them. What we should not do is to maintain a belief in the existence of ‘pure’ nature (e.g. shared substance) and to try and explain how interpersonal relationships are made up of and created by natural matter and processes.

My final reason for rejecting the idea about ‘pure’ nature is that is actually unscientific and politically dubious. As Bateson and Bateson argues in *Angels fear: Towards en Epistemology of the Sacred* [1988] certain kinds of claims are not open to investigation, and as such they are in principle not falsifiable. According to Bateson and Bateson claims about metaphysical entities and processes (e.g. spirits) is one such set of un-falsifiable statements because it is not possible to devise criteria for judging whether they are true or false. In my opinion claims about ‘pure’ nature are of the same un-falsifiable kind and for the same reason. What could
possibly be the criteria for judging the truth of a claim about something that lies outside the realm of human knowledge? In general I am not a great supporter of Popper’s philosophy of science, but I do believe his principle of falsification is paramount for judging the scientific value of a claim. Because claims about ‘pure’ nature are not falsifiable they do not, according to the popperian principle have any scientific value. In addition, and as Bateson and Bateson points out, non-falsifiable claims are also potentially politically dangerous because they have to be accepted or rejected on faith. Faith and critical enquiry are rarely amicable bed-fellows, and because faith is so easily swayed by power the opinions of the most powerful may easily be accepted in stead of opinions that lead to greater insight or greater humanity.

**Methodological considerations**

As already mentioned my approach to the study of relatedness is different from both old and new anthropological studies of kinship, as well as the new study of ‘cultures of relatedness’ proposed by Carsten et al. [ibid], for a second reason. These studies are mainly interested in accounting for systems of relationships. Through describing, identifying and comparing a number of different kinds or types of relationships the aim is to find the general principles whereby the system is constructed. Though Carsten et al. assume that the contents of these different kinds of relationships is what makes them different, their main aim is not to gain a detailed and thorough understanding of the contents of every relationship as such. Their main aim is to show how people are engaged in a number of different kinds of relationships, and how some of these relationships may be more salient or important than others.

Even though I disagree with some of the ontological assumptions upon which Carsten et al. build their studies, I still think their approach is promising because they open up for describing and understanding the rich complexities of how people relate to each other. However, I also believe that in their eagerness to describe and understand the larger systems of relationships they take too much for granted about the content of each relationship. Saying that affection, shared substance and nurturance underlie a relationship, and that these elements contribute to making up the contents of the relationship, may be a better insight than the ‘old’ assumption that it was primarily a matter of shared biogenetic substance. However, I believe that there is far more to intimate relationships than that. It is not enough to add on the dimensions of affection and nurturance to gain an understanding of the full complexity and dynamic character of relationships as they actually unfold. Not only is it necessary to increase the number of dimensions, it is even more important to describe and interpret in some detail what the various dimensions actually are and how they actually manage to create connections between people. In order to do so it is necessary to spend considerable effort describing what actually happens, how people actually behave towards each other and how the behaviour invest these abstract concepts (affect, substance, nurturance as well as other ‘dimensions’) with specific, concrete meaning.

Methodologically I am greatly influenced by generative process analysis as developed by Fredric Barth. Considering the fact that I have received all of my anthropological training at the department he founded at the University of Bergen, Norway, that influence is perhaps to be expected. It is not, however, only a matter of habitus. I also greatly appreciate his perspective as a guide for developing insights into cultural and social phenomena, and I believe it is particularly valuable if the aim is to develop critical and non-dogmatic knowledge. As I understand Barth his basic project is to describe and understand the processes that generate observable behaviour and social forms. His approach is inquisitive
and non-prejudiced and the model does not make a priori assumptions about what the critical factors are that generate a specific type of behaviour or social form.

Not only do I find Barth’s theoretical approach valuable in a general sense. His article *Role dilemmas and father-son dominance in Middle Eastern kinship systems* [1971] is also the only anthropological work I have found with a narrow focus on father-son relationships. In addition, out of all the studies I have found of this relationship, Barth’s work is the only study that describes how fathers and sons interact in the context of their own homes. The article is primarily concerned with interactions between fathers, their adult sons, and the wives of the sons and gives detailed descriptions of how the married adult will go to great lengths to avoid situations where both their own wives and their own fathers are simultaneously present. According to Barth this avoidance behaviour is quite common in various Middle Eastern societies he has visited, and yet it does not offer itself to obvious interpretations. It is not a culturally prescribed behaviour, or a direct reflection of the structure of power between father and son. Barth argues that the avoidance behaviour is an unintended consequence generated by an underlying conflict between cultural rules governing behaviour towards a father and a wife. As husbands interacting with their wives these men are supposed to demonstrate autonomy and superiority. As sons interacting with their fathers they are supposed to demonstrate deference and inferiority. They cannot do both at the same time. A solution to the role dilemma experienced by sons in relationship to their fathers and their wives is to avoid such situations where both are present at the same time.

I am indebted to Barth’s analysis of fathers and sons in the Middle East because it is the only anthropological analysis I have found that actually says something about what really goes on between fathers and sons. In spite of resting on a theory that does not grant the complexity of these phenomena full justice (I will return to this critique in chapter two), it still provides valuable insight. As an example of a generative analytic approach I think it is very good, and it has been an important inspiration for my work. Barth clearly demonstrates that the behaviour is related to principles of social organisation, i.e. the relationships between fathers and sons, husbands and wives are expressed as rules of dominance and deference. The relationships as observed interaction, however, cannot be fully understood only with reference to the rules. The avoidance behaviour can only be understood as some kind of transactional process, in this case as a solution to a predicament concerning impression management. When a wife (or a father) is audience to interactions between a son and a father (or a husband and a wife), the man is caught in a no win situation. He is destined to give off an unfavourable impression towards one of them, and the lesser evil is to avoid such situations all together. In sum the relationship between father and son, including the occasional avoidance behaviour, can only be understood with reference to cultural rules on the one hand, and the logic of impression management on the other.

Barth makes it very clear that social phenomena can never be reduced to prescriptive social structure, cultural rules or the mindless enactment of social roles. Social phenomena are always outcomes of complex ongoing processes and society is, in other words, always ‘in the making’. I fully adopt this as my point of departure and I thus begin my study on the assumption that intimate relationships between people are also continuously ‘in the making’, i.e. that they are emergent phenomena. I also believe that they are complex phenomena and that it is impossible to grasp, describe and understand the totality of what is going on in any one relationship, not to speak of a larger number of relationships. It is thus necessary to begin
by focussing on some dimensions at the exclusion of others. Strict empiricists might argue that the important dimensions to focus upon ought to be discovered through observation. To some extent I am sympathetic towards that standpoint, but I am not convinced. We always start our observations based on some preconceived notions about something that might be worth looking for. Based on our experiences and empirical observations we then have to make critical judgement about whether to stay with or modify our preconceptions. In my case I will begin with a number of preconceptions inherent in western kinship ideology as well as anthropological ideas about that ideology. That means I will focus on those dimensions of father-son relationships that Carsten et al. suggests, i.e. affection, the meaning of shared substance, and nurturance. Because it is a relationship between men of different generations, in an Anglo-Germanic society it somehow seems appropriate to also focus on power.

My observations confirmed that these dimensions are of great importance for understanding the meaning of relationships between Pakeha fathers and their adolescent sons. In chapters four and six I deal extensively with nurturance in relationships between fathers and sons, chapter seven is devoted to the question of power and in chapter eight I try to understand how notions of blood and love contribute to the meaning of the relationship.

Problems of interpretations; interpreter and interpreted
This study is largely based on observations of interactions between fathers and their adolescent sons. Through observing what they do together and say to each other I have tried to understand the meaning that is their relationship. In common with the majority of anthropological studies this research strategy raises a number of serious questions concerning the interpretation of phenomena that the interpreter never has been part of and strictly speaking cannot be part of, and that he or she has only observed. In spite of the fact that this is a common anthropological problem there are no generally accepted solutions, and I therefore find it necessary to deal with it in some detail.

As I see it the problem of interpretation has two, equally important components; on the one hand the relationship between the interpreter and that which is interpreted (i.e. between the researcher and the phenomenon), on the other hand the relationship between the interpretation and ‘reality’ (i.e. between the description/analysis and the phenomenon). The first component has to do with the researcher as a person, his or her motivations, prejudices, abilities etc. The second component is an epistemological question about how ‘good’ the interpretations are, are they true or false, valid, reliable and can they be substantiated in any way? The problem of interpretation thus concerns the relationships between three different ‘entities’; the describing agent, that which is described and the description and can be formulated in one question: How does the describing agent change the representation of a phenomenon when he/she describes/interprets it?

My stand on this problem is not altogether controversial. I believe that in principle it is not possible to know what the phenomena was prior to being interpreted, and thus it is impossible to know if our descriptions match the phenomena that actually happened (by some people called ‘reality’, by other called ‘raw data’). This belief is based on the widely accepted idea that a description is not the thing described, and that between the two lays a gulf of interpretations by the person who made the description. A description is never a direct ‘transcription’ from a phenomenon to a representation of it. The transformation from phenomenon to representation always involves interpretation, and in principle humans can
never have direct access to ‘reality’ and we can never compare our interpretations with the 
‘pure’ phenomena we interpret. Humans can therefore never control how well their 
interpretations fit with ‘reality’. We are forever trapped in a hermeneutically sealed world and 
can never to anything but compare our various interpretations.

Because the interpreters are always individual human beings any interpretation will always 
contain some degree of observercentrism and ethnocentrism. In my opinion this is an 
unavoidable fact and we should therefore never aim for nor pretend that ‘objective’ 
interpretations are possible. What it does mean is that we should try to be as explicit as 
possible about how the observer influences the description and or analysis. Most 
contemporary anthropologists therefore accept that the interpreter should be visible in the 
descriptions so as to provide the reader with some means of ‘controlling’ for the 
‘subjectivity’ of the interpreter. There are many different ways to do this. The easiest and 
most common way is to give a sort of short biography of oneself in the introduction and then 
continue with an ‘objective’ text where ones own person is hidden. It might be argued that 
this is not an ideal solution because the ‘objective’ text may come to dominate and give a 
false impression that the interpreter is objective too. Protagonists of the latter view might 
argue that instead the interpreter ought to be continuously visible in the text so that it would 
be possible to judge, in detail and at any moment, how the interpreter informs the 
interpretation. There are pros and cons to both these positions, but I am not convinced that the 
latter is to be preferred.

Every style of presentation has its merits and drawbacks. The advantage of a highly visible 
interpreter is that it provides the reader with a lot of information (voluntarily given and/or 
involuntarily given off by the author) that the reader may use to gain an impression of how 
the author thinks. Descriptions of the interpreter provide resources for interpreting the 
interpretations. The drawback with a continuously visible interpreter is that the text may in 
the end be more about the author than that which he/she tries to say something about. It may 
also become a very self-conscious text, thus clumsy to read without gaining credibility. The 
important question, however, is to what extent a highly visible interpreter is a guarantee for a 
more ‘correct’, ‘accurate’, ‘objective’ or ‘true’ interpretation? I do not think the highly visible 
interpreter provides such a guarantee because in principle it is not possible to know for sure 
how exactly the interpreter has ‘distorted’ the phenomenon. Because ‘objective facts’ are not 
available in their unadulterated forms we cannot compare the description with the pure 
phenomenon that the description is supposed to be of. As a consequence we can neither 
decide how they deviate nor identify the factors that contributed to the deviation. As an 
example we can never know whether the information that the interpreter provides about him 
or her self is relevant, irrelevant, or even deceptive, as far as how he or she has coloured the 
description.

As I am not convinced about the inherent advantage of one style of presentation over the 
other, I choose the easy way. In the rest of the thesis I am not very visible, but the reader 
should know that I am always present. Obviously I do not have full overview of how my 
person has influenced my interpretations and all I can do is provide my own speculations. 
One factor that I believe to be quite important is the fact that I am not a father myself. My 
personal experiences of the father-son relationship is thus only from the perspective of a son. 
Though I am about thirty years older than the sons in my sample I observed a number of 
striking similarities between their relationships with their fathers and my own relationship

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with mine. A few words on my relationship with my father thus seem called for.

As I see him my father behaved in accordance with what I, in this thesis, call the breadwinner model of fatherhood. In nineteen fifty nine, when I was born, my father was thirty years old and the dominant ideology of how a man should behave in order to be a proper father was quite clear cut. My father rarely participated in any home-making activities, and hardly ever did any housework. He was never an ‘absent’ father, however. He always worked fairly close to home and from I was only three years old his workplace was just down the road. He also spent a lot of time in and around the home. But he was always engaged in his own activities, in the garden, reading, watching TV. I never experienced that he was involved in things I did, like boy scouts, soccer and swimming. From my childhood and adolescent years I remember him as a competitive and dominant person who did not frequently and explicitly communicate his love for his children. When I have chosen to focus on care, power and love as important dimensions of relationships between fathers-sons, obviously the choice is informed by my relationship with my own father.

I suspect that the fact that I am not a father has also influenced the focus of this study. As a consequence of the fact that I have a lot of personal experience as a son who observes his father, and none as a father observing his son, I have found it far easier to concentrate on the fathers. If there is one serious weakness in this study that I can point out myself, it is that I have not managed to grasp the life of the sons very well at all. It is quite ironic because emotionally I identified closer with them than the fathers, and yet I did not manage to understand them very well.

If we cannot compare the description with the pure phenomenon that the description is supposed to be of, does that mean there are no ways to discriminate between better or worse interpretations? I am of the conviction that such judgements can be made, but not with reference to an ‘objective’ truth. When it comes to descriptions and analysis I subscribe to a Wittgensteinian concept of truth. Truth is, in the final analysis, a convention about certain rules of reasoning and standards of honesty. Truth relies on critical examination and the capacity of the human intellect to identify and challenge claims that do not make sense. As a consequence I do not claim that my interpretations are true in the sense that other contrary interpretations are ‘objectively’ false. I offer my interpretations as some among many possible ways of seeing and understanding relationships between fathers and sons. At the same time I also claim that they are true in the sense that I have tried to abide by conventional academic standards of honesty. First of all that means I have not invented any of the fathers and sons I describe. My descriptions are true in the sense that I have written down things that I observed, and I have not deliberately fabricated anything. My descriptions are also true in the sense that I am confident that if other people were to visit the same families, and looked for the same things as I did, they would recognize my descriptions. But my descriptions are not true in the sense that they are the only possible descriptions. Other people might have chosen to highlight other aspects of what happened and ignore things that I found important. My interpretations are not true in the sense that these are the only relational patterns to be found, nor are they the patterns that all other people might find equally important in order to understand the contents of the relationships and how they are generated. My analysis and explicit interpretations (as opposed to the implicit interpretations that go into what I call descriptions) are even less certain than my descriptions. In line with Bateson [1972] I explore and probe, I do not prove or explain. Other people may disagree with my claims; perhaps
argue that I am reading too much into my observations. And perhaps there are other interpretations that are as good as or better than mine, that are more comprehensive and inclusive. As already indicated, my interpretations are only true in that I have not deliberately tried to fraud anybody, and I have tried to be critical of my own interpretations. To the extent that other people, after critical examination, find that they can accept my claims, that would strengthen their credibility as well.

I want to make it absolutely clear, however, that I take full responsibility for the observations and interpretations in this thesis. The people I studied did not provide any of the descriptions and analysis and I am solely and fully responsible for them. It may even be that they do not agree with me. I have not consulted them as I wrote me descriptions, and on only one occasion did one of the fathers listen to a presentation that I made at a conference organised by New Zealand College of Clinical Psychologists. In other words, the people I observed are not responsible for anything in this presentation, only I am.

**Ethnographic context**

As previously mentioned I conducted this study in New Zealand because I already had a lot of knowledge about, as well as contacts in the field. New Zealand culture and society is thus the context within which all my observations have taken place and it may therefore be useful to have a rough and general overview of New Zealand society and culture as I observed it at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Even though such general descriptions often are inaccurate and impressionistic I still believe they serve a valuable function. Our knowledge of the context for our actions is always more or less vague, and we never have a full and detailed overview of how all the elements of the context influences what we and others do and say. The context still provides the greater pool of interpretive resources, and the more we know about the context the better. Conventions draw our attention to some aspects of our environment and as such contribute to the constitution of the context for our actions. Having some information about this conventionally defined context will, at best, assist in understanding the relationships between fathers and sons that I describe. At worst it is only harmless, surplus information.

In a global and media dominated world New Zealand is a relatively small and peaceful country and is rarely mentioned on the international news. When I began my work in New Zealand fourteen years ago most people confused New Zealand with Australia. Considering the fact that the Tasman Sea represents a two thousand kilometre distance between the two countries, that mistake is equal to locating the British Isles in the Mediterranean Sea just off the coast of Greece. Even today, after *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy has, for a short period of time, brought New Zealand to the centre of media attention, many people in Europe and North-America would still have problems pinpointing it on the globe.

New Zealand consists of two main islands, approximately of equal size, plus some smaller islands out of which only Steward Island the very south and Chatham Islands to the far east are permanently inhabited. In geographical terms New Zealand is located between 166 and 179 degrees east, 34 and 48 degrees south. If one could drill a hole at the southern coast of Steward Island through the centre of the globe and out the other side it would penetrate the earth’s crust somewhere in Brittany in France, and if drilled at New Zealand’s North Cape it would erupt somewhere close to the northern coast of Morocco. If transported to the northern hemisphere New Zealand would stretch, in an east-west direction, from the Cote D’Argent in
France to quite a bit off the coast of Portugal. New Zealand is, in other words, a rather large country. Both main islands are long and rather narrow, stretching a total of almost two thousand kilometres from north to south, if the crow flies over land all the time. At the widest point the North Island is barely more than three hundred kilometres across. Topographically the two main islands are fairly similar, stretching from costal plains to interior mountains. There are some important differences, however, the South Island is more mountainous, they are higher and far more rugged and with less agricultural land.

**The Ocean**

New Zealand is all islands with huge stretches of ocean surrounding them. Compared to the rest of Polynesia the two main islands are quite large, but the overwhelming majority of Kiwis still live on or very close to the coast. The ocean is within eyesight or accessible reach of all New Zealanders. The Pakeha attitude to the ocean is therefore, in my opinion, rather odd. For most practical purposes the great majority of Pakehas turn their backs to the sea and seem to deny its existence. They are landlubbers, a people of farmers, loggers, gold-diggers and other land-bound activities. To a curious outsider like myself it seems that the general Pakeha attitude to the ocean is that it is an obstacle; a barrier to be crossed to get to some other land, but not of any real use in itself. Coming from a culture where economical exploits at sea, as sailors and fisherman, still provide a huge and important pool of resources for the constitution of national identity, I am puzzled by how unimportant the sea is in Pakeha culture.

Except as a playground of course. As a place to have fun the sea is almost as important as the beach and the bush. The moorings at Auckland harbour attests to that. They are filled to the brim with sailboats of all sizes, and on a fine day the whole harbour is littered with white sails. Those who are not into the wind pull a trailer with a motor powered boat of any size, from a huge seagoing vessel to a small aluminium dingy, ready to launch them down a boat-ramp or a hard packed sandy beach anywhere. Whether it is for deep-sea fishing, scallop-dredging or just a line and sinker, Kiwis love to fish, but it is only for fun. And there are lots of them, and they do it all the time. When the weather is good enough that is. No wonder New Zealand has some of the best yachtsmen in the world.

For all practical purposes, however, as well as national self-identity, Pakehas turn their backs to the sea. Most obviously this can be seen in how they have organized their cities. All major New Zealand cities are on the coast and for years these cities have treated the water-front as their back yards. Christchurch is perhaps the best, or worst, example. The city centre is located approximately ten kilometres from the beach. It is a perfectly flat city, and the layout and architecture is such that an accidental and uninformed visitor would never know that the sea is less then ten minutes away by car. To get to the beach one must travel through the poorer sections of town. To highlight the unpleasant aspects of the journey oxidation ponds, i.e. sewage treatment facilities, are located there too. On a good day it is a whiff, on a bad day it is more than enough to close the car window and turn on the A/C. New Brighton Beach, sounds lovely, but is not. Well, I have not been there since 1997, things may have changed. They were repairing the pier back then, and building a shopping mall. At the very northern edge, north of Waimairi Beach, a new up-market residential sub-division was under construction. Perhaps the whole area has been revamped? But in 1997 most of the buildings along the New Brighton seafront looked derelict, in dire need of TLC, or the opposite, demolition.
The beach itself, one long unbroken stretch of sand with heavy waves pounding in. Not one of the most beautiful beaches in New Zealand, too exposed and windy, and littered with rotting seaweed. Nothing was done to make it more attractive either. It was not kempt, and every few hundred metres concrete pipes, for storm-water or sewage, ran across the sand into the ocean. Having travelled through the stench from the sewage ponds to reach the beach it was impossible to resist the thought that the pipes too were carrying the same kind of fluid.

Most other cities see the same or similar phenomena. In Wellington, Dunedin, Nelson the waterfronts are industrial harbours, an inaccessible and unattractive mess of railway lines, packhouses, container yards, lumber storage, parking space for trucks and berth space for huge merchant vessels. Between the city centre and the harbour is a massive barrier in the form of heavy traffic or railway lines. The message is clear; the harbour is off limits. To the extent that there are beaches close to town, like St. Clair and St. Kilda in Dunedin and Tahunanui in Nelson, the residential areas close to the beach tend to be lower class. Considering the popularity of beach life one might think that living close to the beach would be attractive, but in many places it is not. Perhaps it is combination of poorly insulated houses, the wind and the salt mist from the sea? I am still puzzled.

Admittedly things are changing. I am not sure but I do believe Auckland too used to turn its back to the sea. Over the last fifteen years or so they have rebuilt and restored the harbour. Opened it up to the public, built luxury flats, restaurants and bars. When the various yachting contests, Whitbread Around the World (now called the “Volvo Ocean Race”) and The Americas Cup, are going on the harbour teems with life. Thousands upon thousands of visitors every day. Wellington too is changing. With the construction of Te Papa (the national contemporary museum) on the waterfront, the re-creation of Queens Wharf into shops, bars and restaurants, and footbridges across the heavy traffic in Jervois Quay, the waterfront has become an accessible promenade.

In my opinion the changes are not fundamental though. The beach and the oceans are already playgrounds, and now the city harbours are made into playgrounds too. Pakeha culture still largely ignores or denies the ocean as an integral part of Kiwi life and national identity. Fishing is a rather big industry in New Zealand. There are large numbers of people who harvest the ocean for their livelihood. And still, the sailor and the fisherman are not icons of Kiwi identity. In the various mass media, commercials for beer, novels about Kiwi life and the like, images of the sheep musters on horseback, loggers, bush rangers, farmers of all kinds and soldiers abound. There is no equivalent Kiwi man or woman of the sea. Maori myth is full of tales of canoes, and ocean travels. Pakeha myth seems to start with the colonisation of the land, and they have more or less forgotten how they made the journey there in the first place. In a snippet in chapter six I have described the Kiwi notion of remoteness, of being isolated in one of the most distant corners of the world. Maybe, just maybe, Pakehas turn their back to the ocean in an attempt to avoid dealing with their sense of isolation?

Climatically the country stretches from subtropical in the far north to temperate in the south. Being islands with huge stretches of ocean on all sides it has a coastal climate more or less all over, except for small pockets in the very interior of both islands. The predominant winds
bring humid air from the south and west, and the south and west coast thus receive far more rain than the north and east coasts. Relatively warm climate and high precipitation makes it a rather fertile country, even though the soil (I have been told) in general is not very rich.

Economically New Zealand relies heavily on export of agricultural produce; wool, meat and dairy products traditionally being the highest earners, fruit is also important, and the export of wine is rapidly growing. Even though relatively few New Zealanders today live in rural areas and are employed in agriculture, and the number is rapidly decreasing, rural images linked to ‘the farm’ and ‘the sheep station’ are still important symbols within contemporary ‘Kiwi’ identity. I will return to this point later.

Socially and culturally New Zealand is very much a Western, Anglo-Germanic country. The total population is approximately four million and close to three millions are Pakeha or first generation European immigrants. Maoris make up close to half a million and the rest of the non-Pakeha population are South-Sea Islanders (Cook Island, Tonga, Samoa, Fiji etc) and Asians of various nationalities. As far as human history is concerned it is one of the youngest territories on earth. Archaeologists disagree about the exact time that humans first arrived, but most agree that there are no signs of human settlement prior to the thirteenth century AD [King 2003]. Some scholars claim that Polynesian peoples arrived in several waves over several centuries and others are of the opinion that there was one large wave of initial immigration. In general most people seem to agree that by the thirteenth or fourteenth century the ancestors of the present day Maoris were firmly established.

The Maoris had the islands to themselves until the eighteenth century when European and North-American whalers and sealers started arriving. Abel Tasman had, of course, ‘discovered’ New Zealand in 1642 and Captain James Cook thoroughly mapped it in 1769. However, it was sailors, whalers, sealers and escaped convicts from Australia who first established permanent contact with the Maoris. It is, of course, not possible to say for sure what the consequences of this first contact have been for the consequent relationship between Maoris and Pakehas in later history. One may only speculate and I will leave that to others. It is beyond doubt, though, that the first Pakehas were a pretty rough crowd. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the settlement at Kororareka (later renamed Russell) in the Bay of Islands in the north of the North Island, was known as ‘the hell hole of the South Pacific’ [King 2003: 122]

Prior to Pakeha arrival Maori society was well organized and there can be no doubt that this level of organisation was of importance for how the relationship between Maoris and Pakehas have developed since then. The Maoris were quick to take up new practices like trade, new agricultural techniques and the cultivation of new crops. Most important, however, was the resources their own social organisation provided as far as political negotiation with the Pakehas was concerned. After approximately half a century of contact with Pakehas a group of Maori leaders initiated the process of reaching a formal agreement concerning the relationship between the two peoples. This process resulted in what is known as ‘The Treaty of Waitangi’, where a large group of Maori leaders, though not all, invited and accepted the British crown as sovereign. In return the Maoris were, among other things, guaranteed the ownership of their own land and the food from the sea around New Zealand, and they became “British Subjects” [King 2003:159]. This document is still seen as the basis for relationships between Maoris and Pakehas, and has become a powerful tool during what might be called a
Maori resurgence over the last thirty years.

New Zealand's history as a colony starts with the signing of the ‘Treaty of Waitangi’ in 1840 and organized settlement began soon after. The settlement took a rather different form than it had in other British colonies in the Americas, Australia and Africa. New Zealand was never a penal colony and there were no convicts (apart from the few who fled or moved from Australia) among the settlers. Neither were the settlers political or religious refugees. Most settlers in New Zealand did not aim at creating a totally new society, but to recreate the British society in a new and more benign place. Contrary to both the Americas and Australia, which received huge numbers of Irish immigrants, the settlers in New Zealand were mainly recruited from England and Scotland, and the settlement population was therefore relatively homogenous.

Similar to other colonizing processes at the time, the settlement period in New Zealand was rather violent. The first encounter between Europeans and Maoris had resulted in violence and there were many violent episodes to follow. The so-called ‘Musket wars’ between Maori tribes was a consequence of the introduction of muskets and as such a part of the settlement period. During two periods, in the 1840’s and the 1860’s, the level and frequency of violence between Maoris and Pakehas was so high it was considered a war. These periods were at first called the Maori Wars, but are now referred to as the New Zealand Wars. Still, in spite of these wars the settlement process in New Zealand was relatively less violent than in most other colonies.

The contemporary relationship between Maoris and Pakehas is far too rich and complicated for me to present a detailed and thorough account of it here. As social categories neither Maoris nor Pakehas are homogenous groups and there are important internal differences running along such lines of demarcation as tribe, region, class, age, gender etc. As far as practical, everyday social life is concerned there are no clear cut and unambiguous criteria for distinguishing between Maoris and Pakehas or to identify someone as one or the other. Even appearances are deceptive with many Maoris looking distinctly European, and many people who look like Maoris act and present themselves as if they are not. In spite of this muddle, and the fact that for many everyday practical purposes the distinction often dissolves, the distinction is still both statistically and culturally important. Statistics based on self-identification clearly show that Maoris are seriously disadvantaged with lower income, higher unemployment, higher crime-rates, poorer health, shorter life expectancy etc.

For the purpose of this study, however, it is as cultural categories that this distinction warrants my attention because Maori is absolutely the most important ‘significant other’ for Pakeha. The Maoris gave the Pakehas their name and it is only within a society and a culture defined as Aotearoa/New Zealand and in contrast to the Maori that the Pakeha can exist. As cultural identities it is the contrast between these two categories that constitute and define them. The awareness of this symbolic interdependence is fairly, albeit unevenly, widespread, to the extent that many Pakehas now talk about themselves as the second indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand. And yet the relationship is fraught with ambivalence, unease and unresolved conflicts between admiration and loathing of the other. Some Pakehas go as far as repudiating the name, preferring the more inclusive Kiwi or New Zealander, claiming that New Zealand is a multicultural rather than a bi-cultural society. Others embrace the dichotomy and make it a platform or building a new national identity.
Pakeha attitudes and behaviour towards Maoris

I have spent close to five years living in New Zealand. Four of my stays have been for a full year or more and I have also made several shorter visits. Almost all that time I have spent on the South Island. During my first longer stay, when living at the top of the South Island I never had to seriously relate to the fact that there are Maoris living in New Zealand. The local postmaster and two of the postal workers were and are Maoris, but apart from them I hardly ever saw any Maori people. The Pakehas and immigrants (from Europe and North-America mostly) I got to know behaved as if the Maoris did not exist. Not that there was any explicit denial or distancing from Maori people or culture. The people who lived there had nothing against the Maori, quite on the contrary. The few times I did get any information about this topic it was evident they were all pro-Maori, for their land-claims, in favour of Maori children being taught Maori language in school, and appalled at any sign of bigoted, redneck racism. But for some reason the ways and the lives of Maoris was not a regular topic of everyday conversations. To the extent that they did express ideas and beliefs, or displayed artefacts from a non western cultural origin it was more likely to be from Japan, South-East Asia or native American Indians, than from the Maoris. I may be doing my friends and informants a grave injustice here. Perhaps they did talk about Maoris, only I did not pick it up? However, the way they lived, and I lived like them, whatever they said about Maoris did not connect with my life living in top of the South Island.

There were two exceptions though. Des, a Pakeha whom I got to know quite well and who was the foreman at the building project for the new intertribal marae in Golden Bay. A marae is a Maori community hall. Des invited us to the building site and told us about the Maori situation in Golden Bay at the time. The other exception was a German immigrant who lived in a tepee. She had only lived in New Zealand for a few years and had taken a particular interest in the Maori situation. She tried to learn the language, and had decorated the insides of her tepee with pictures of Maoris and North American Indians, all mixed together.

Some years after my first fieldwork my wife and I returned to New Zealand for a short visit. My wife attended an alcohol and drug treatment conference in Rotorua, held at a large marae and I was invited to come along for the opening ceremony. Apart from having seen and met Maoris in the streets in Auckland and Nelson, this was my first real Maori experience. I had heard about Maori protocol, but was not prepared for what happened. The proceedings at a marae are very dramatic, i.e. there is a strict choreography that seems to be aimed at achieving maximum emotional effect. The emotions that this particular opening ceremony attempted to instil in the spectator was fear, awe, humility, and whatever emotions would lead the spectator to display subordination. There was no direct coercion, no violence involved. It was all by theatrical devices.

To begin with we, the visitors, were kept waiting in the courtyard. No one knew for how long, no information was given. Then a group of people, older women mainly, but a few men too, came walking out of the meeting-house itself, towards us. One of the women was singing or chanting something in Maori in a high pitch voice. Nobody interpreted what was said, no one attempted to explain what was going on. The approaching group then turned around and headed back towards the meeting house. The crowd of visitors started moving after them, were signalled to take their shoes off before entering the house and beckoned to sit down on the floor. Oral recitations and formal performances then began. One older Maori man after the other got up and made a speech, in Maori. Some of them carried canes or a wooden spear that they swung...
around as they spoke. The speeches seemed repetitious, with many phrases repeated over and over again. “Tena kotu, tena kotu, tena kotu, tena katoa”.

In the beginning of this performance my attention was on the performers, but gradually my eyes started wandering about the room. What I saw whenever my eyes spotted a Pakeha in the congregation was equally interest to what was going on at the stage. The Pakehas cringed. They had lowered their heads, looked to the floor, had a bewildered expression in their faces and looked profoundly uncomfortable. The Maoris sitting around me gave a totally different impression. They carried their heads high, followed what was going on and looked straight ahead, not in a challenging way, but not as if they had been walked all over and had accepted it. My intuition was that something was wrong. I got a hunch that as far as the Maori spectators were concerned the Maori drama worked well. In front of the Pakehas, however, it worked too well. It was as if the Maoris used such strong theatrical means because they expected some proud response, and then the Pakehas just rolled over on their back and whimpered. Personally I felt shame on behalf of the Pakehas who were present. They ought to have stood their ground proudly, I thought. Instead they lost all dignity. I must admit, the whole performance provoked a lot of aggression in me. I resented seeing the Pakehas humiliated and the Maori arrogance in that they did not try to accommodate or alleviate the humiliation felt by the Pakehas. It made me suspect that maybe the Maoris secretly enjoyed putting the white man down?

How many Pakehas have ever been to a marae? I do not know. Neither do I know if the loss of dignity I interpreted at Rotorua was real and if it is representative. My second visit at a marae was entirely different from what I had experienced the first time. It was a tangi, a burial ceremony for my friend Des, held at the marae in Golden Bay. Though a Pakeha he was a greatly respected friend of the Maori in the area and they showed him the great honour of giving him the tangi of an esteemed elder. The tangi lasted for three days, and took place at the marae he had taken part in building. All his friends, many of them Pakeha and immigrants, attended. This time I did not see any Pakehas cringe. But then again the Maori dramaturgical means at a tangi are not aimed at making anyone feel small. They are aimed at making people feel together. Which they achieve. Anyway, my point is that the Maoris have very strong symbolic means at hand for creating a sense of belonging and exclusion. Their means of creating a sense of inclusion makes a person feel very good, but when excluded one feels small, humiliated and angry. The Haka, the ritualised challenge performed prior to all international rugby matches is yet another example of a very effective means whereby the others are excluded.

Do Pakehas feel excluded from the Maori way of life today? In a sense I think they do. Not that most Pakehas have ever wanted to be included by the Maoris, but whereas earlier the Maoris were excluded by Pakeha society by implicit, structural means, today the most aggressive and explicit exclusion goes the other way. In many areas of life, particularly more poignant symbolic inter-ethnic situations, like Pakehas appearing at a Marae, Maoris are today able to define the situations to their advantage. In face-to-face institutionalised settings the Maoris have a large pool of cultural resources for challenging, humiliating and disempowering Pakehas, and Pakehas have no equivalent cultural means with which to counter the Maori challenges. The view that the Maoris have been seriously wronged, and that their grievances are legitimate, is widely accepted among Pakehas today. Up until the infamous Orewa speech by National Party leader Don Brash in January 2004 it was also the only possible view to express within the public debate.
One of the accepted Maori grievances is that their culture, i.e. Maori language, notions about health, cosmological beliefs, concepts of kinship, family and of the person etc., has not and does not receive its due and proper recognition by Pakeha society. Because this argument has become widely accepted by Pakehas, to the extent that it has become the dominant view, it has also deprived the Pakeha of most means of standing proud in the face of Maori institutionalised challenges. Prime Minister Helen Clark is a good example. Some years ago when she was leader of the opposition, she attended a Treaty of Waitangi ceremony at Waitangi. During the event she was heavily attacked by a radical Maori activist. The attack brought Helen Clark to strong emotional affect; some says she left in tears. She was obviously incapable of facing the attack and answering it in a way that was culturally acceptable by both Pakeha and Maori standards. My interpretation is that she simply did not have any cultural means available to her, and did not know what to do. For years she refused also in her capacity as Prime minister, to attend the Treaty ceremony at Waitangi and has participated in a ceremony taking place at a different location, and defined by Pakehas.

In situations like the one above Pakehas are left with only one option if they want to stand proud in the face of the challenge. That option is to learn the proper Maori response. This option, of course, means implicitly deferring to the Maoris and to accept that the Maoris have the right to define these kinds of situations and that Pakehas are obliged to conform. Even when Pakehas are ready to accept the Maori definition it is not altogether easy to live up to it. There are Pakehas who have the appropriate knowledge, and I have seen Pakehas who have performed well according to Maori Protocol. They are rare exceptions, however, because in contemporary New Zealand it takes extraordinary motivation and effort for a Pakeha to learn Maori language and protocol. For one, the state does very little to encourage and facilitate it. As an example, in spite of the fact that more than four hundred thousand New Zealanders are classified as Maori, Te Reo (Maori language) is not mandatory in school. Secondly many Maori, particularly the more militant, are opposed to Pakehas learning Maori ways. It is their culture, the argument goes, and they do not want the Pakehas to steal that as well.

The only other solution to the predicament is avoidance, like Helen Clark chose to do. Over time avoidance is not a good strategy, however, because the Maori and the Pakeha society are tied together in an increasingly tight knot. It is a particularly bad strategy for anyone who has accepted that the Maoris have been and still is a disenfranchised group.

It is my impression that many, probably most, Pakehas agree that the Maoris have been wronged, and in principle are sympathetic to the Maori cause. New Zealand Pakeha society has always prided itself with having the best inter-ethnic (formerly termed inter-racial) relations of all the European (former) colonies. There has never been a colour bar, Maoris are represented in Parliament, they have never been excluded by law from education and high positions in society, and as long as they have behaved 'properly' they have always been treated as if they were Pakehas. I truly believe that most Pakehas do not want the Maoris to be discriminated against. However, I have also picked up a growing dissatisfaction and resentment among Pakehas, even Pakehas who in principle agree with the Maori cause, against the way that many Maoris go about advocating their cause. I believe many Pakehas feel as if they are being unfairly treated. They have done their best not to discriminate against the Maoris, have created the best inter-racial relations in all the former colonies, have even paid huge compensations for the loss of land, and
the only appreciation shown by the Maoris are more demands, and to ridicule the Pakeha if he were to appear at a marae.

My impression is that the Maori struggle for land compensation and cultural recognition has led to an increased frustration among, and alienation of, many formerly sympathetic Pakehas. Up until the Orewa speech this frustration could not be publicly aired and thus become part of the public debate. And because of the reactionary contents of the Orewa speech a liberal critique of the ways Maoris pursue their interest is less likely then ever. Today it is virtually impossible to level any critique at Maoris without being branded a bigot. The only possible critique is when Maoris break the rules of the game. But the dissatisfaction many Pakehas feel is not about Maori crime. The problems are related to the legal, but by many Pakehas seen as extremist, demands and means employed by Maoris. For example in the mental health field when Maoris demand to be treated by Maoris because only another Maori is able to appreciate the symptoms, arrive at the culturally correct diagnosis, and perform the appropriate therapy.

Political and economical power in New Zealand is still securely in the hands of Pakehas. Pakehas (or western multinational corporations) still own most of the material capital and resources, and Pakehas define the rules and controls the political game. In many settings however, particularly institutionalised inter-ethnic ones, Maoris are gaining increasingly more of the symbolic power. To a large extent they have managed to seize this symbolic power by employing potent Maori symbols of exclusion and inclusion, and to make these symbols relevant and appropriate in many new situations as well. Using these symbols Maoris manage to put Pakehas in deferential and somewhat humiliated positions without Pakehas ever having managed to device symbols in order to counter or defy the Maori challenge. Obviously Pakehas do not enjoy this situation, and I have seen the discomfort in their faces when it happens. It would not surprise me, however, if many Maoris find it uncomfortable too. Obviously they must prefer to be in the superior position, but seeing someone being humiliated is always embarrassing. Maybe Maoris too would find greater satisfaction in challenging Pakehas if they stood proud and countered with a staunch Pakeha challenge?

Pakeha society and culture has without doubt greatly influenced the way all Maoris live today. That is outside the scope of this thesis, and I will leave that topic alone. I do believe, however, that the reverse is also true and that Maori ways have influenced the ways of the Pakeha. This influence is more difficult to identify and I can only speculate. In my opinion there are two features of Pakeha culture, features of importance for this thesis, where the Maori influence is noticeable. The first is a certain easy-going and relaxed attitude towards the protestant work ethic and the form of conspicuous consumption that tends to accompany it. In my opinion New Zealanders are less inclined to judge a person’s social position and social worth on the basis of conspicuous consumption than in other western countries where a fundamentalist protestant outlook on life is more prominent.

A second Maori influence, I suspect, is a particular exhibitionist public masculinity. The New Zealand national rugby team, ‘The All Blacks’ always start with a ‘haka’; a stylised Maori performance used as a challenge when initiating encounters where the parties want to assert themselves. It is a dramatic exhibition of one’s own staunchness that simultaneously mocks the opponent. It is closely related to a Maori warrior masculinity that, to my eye, is rather exhibitionist and prone to drama: It is important to look frightening and to display

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fearlessness. These two qualities are also important in contemporary public displays of masculinity in general in New Zealand. Rugby is a good example. There is no doubt that it is quite a violent game, with hard tackles, players constantly being knocked over and the occasional fight between players. And still the players, in general, do not wear any protection. I do suspect, however, that the game looks terribly much more violent than it is, and that the display of being hard and fearlessness men in the face of injury and pain is an important part of the image of the game. That, I believe, is one of the reason why the players do not wear any protection. And as far as Kiwi culture is concerned it is significant that Rugby is the favoured spectator sport among New Zealand men.

The dramatic and exhibitionist Kiwi masculinity may also be one of the reasons why New Zealand is the ‘home’ of many adrenalin inducing extreme sports like bungee jumping and white-water jet boating. As a consequence extreme sports have become an important part of the tourist industry and in areas like Queenstown the operators are busy inventing new extreme sport experiences all the time. Rugby and extreme sports are both public performances of fearlessness. Other examples of the same are motorcycle gangs and boy-races. Not that the two latter expressions of masculinity are particular to New Zealand, but they are very noticeable parts of New Zealand public life.

When in the privacy of their homes, on the other hand, the situation for Pakeha men is quite different. Whereas public life requires displays of toughness and fearlessness, home life is a potential haven where men hope for peace and a respite from having to assert themselves. A grossly over-simplified and a slightly malevolent caricature of the domestic Pakeha man is someone who wishes for little else than that his wife and children will respect (i.e. recognise and defer to) his ‘natural’ authority. He does not want to be challenged or to be the authoritarian head of the family. Just fed, looked after and left alone. Kiwi masculinity in public and in private are topics I will return to in chapters five, six and seven.

As mentioned, New Zealand is definitely a western country. It is also a former British colony, and the colonial history has had a huge impact. The British ancestry, and the fact that the emigrants chose (as opposed to being forced) to leave Britain, may account for a certain attitude of superior disregard combined with distrust towards government at both state and local level. In Norway, and most probably the rest of Scandinavia too, the vast majority of the population have a deep faith, so much taken for granted that it is not even a conscious thought, that the state government is fundamentally benign. It is not uncommon to hear the expression that ‘the state is us, the people’. The state is believed to be, and is definitely supposed to be, the servant of the people. Its job is to provide services like health care, social security, education, infrastructure etc. Most Norwegians seem to be of the opinion that the state is (or when functioning properly should be) ‘on the side of the people’ and a buttress against the ever increasing forces of ‘the market’ and ‘the economy’. In New Zealand, on the other hand, I find that most people do not trust the state. The state is ‘them’ and not ‘us’. People are still of the opinion that the state should provide the same services as in Norway, but if it fails it is almost to be expected; in principle politicians are not to be trusted, they only look out for themselves. I am on thin ice here, but it may also be that this attitude has been fuelled by recent developments. Since 1984 the New Zealand government have radically altered their economic policies, from strongly protectionist and very regulated, to extremely market oriented. Only a few years back it was rated by the OECD as the third most open and de-regulated economy in the world, only surpassed by Hong Kong and Taiwan. The New
Zealand state is, in fact, no longer the people’s buttress against economic forces, and the perceived ill effects of ‘big business’ and the global economy.

I would also argue that there is a deep anarchistic streak to most New Zealanders (see snippet in chapter eight), and this streak makes them suspicious of anybody with too much power and too much money. Of the two evils, ‘big business’ and the state, they tend to see the latter as greater. As anarchist, however, they also have a strong sense of social responsibility. Today many Kiwis seem to think that liberalism has gone too far. It is OK to give individuals freedom to better themselves economically, but individuals as well as the state has a responsibility to take care that this freedom does not have too adverse effects on others.

As a settler society individual self reliance and a high degree of social and geographical mobility were and still are important personal traits. In general New Zealanders are far more ready and willing to change jobs and move to a different locality than is the case in, for example, Norway. Not only change jobs, but often a complete change of profession. A friend of mine, only forty years old, has gone from being a labourer, to a tool maker, to a builder, and today he is a brewer and the owner/operator of a restaurant and pub. Their geographical mobility involves not only New Zealanders, but most of the world. New Zealanders have always been great international travellers and today the ‘OE’ (overseas experience) is an institution and almost an obligatory ‘rite of passage’ into adulthood. I have met adult New Zealanders who have not been overseas and who have displayed acute signs of embarrassment when admitting it. The OE usually starts in London where there are Kiwis (along with Australians) working in almost every second pub. From there they branch out. On their way home they may, in theory, cover half the globe. Huge numbers of Kiwis also leave for Australia, to settle for good or longer periods of time. The Sydney suburb of Bondi is known as a Kiwi enclave, and there are pubs not far from Bondi Beach where one is more likely to see a Maori face than that of an Aussie or an Aborigine.

New Zealand is also a mobile society in the sense that it is annually receives a large number of new settlers. Immigrants are granted residency on a point-system, aimed at attracting healthy, young, highly educated, fluent English speaking professionals with long work experience, and preferably with lots of money. There used to be a policy only to allow immigrants with a European cultural background, but it was abandoned during the seventies. The influx of Asians has therefore increased sharply over the last twenty years. New Zealand is thus part of a diaspora in several ways, as a global net-work of British, Kiwis and different Asian and European peoples.

Pakeha settlement only goes back approximately six generations. This short history obviously contributes to the flexibility and mobility that characterizes contemporary New Zealand. On the other hand one hundred and sixty years is also enough time for many social and cultural patterns to be firmly established. Many Kiwis have thus developed a strong sense of belonging to their local area and community. In the rural area where I did my first fieldwork there was a distinct difference between the ‘locals’ and the ‘new-comers’. Being a proper local meant being at least second generation and many of the local families had settled in the area in the eighteen forties.

Over the last forty to fifty years, as New Zealand has gradually become less dependent upon Great Britain, a Kiwi national identity has emerged. New Zealand nature, the bush and the
beach, feature very strongly in this identity. As an example New Zealanders have stronger opinions about their native forest than I have encountered anywhere else in the world. To a number of Kiwis the bush has become sacred, and the destruction of native bush is a sacrilege on par with offending God. In snippets in chapters three and four I describe the meaning of the bush in some greater detail.

Rural images are also very prominent features of the Kiwi identity; the farmer, the sheep musterer, the logger and the hunter. Interestingly enough images of rural women are not part of this contemporary Kiwi identity. Though there are quite a lot of women farmers, the image of the rural woman is, as I have noticed, exclusively as housewife and the rural housewife is not a Kiwi icon. As a matter of fact the Kiwi identity is almost exclusively masculine. Sport is a third strong element in the emerging Kiwi identity, with rugby, horseracing and sailing as the most important. Another point worth noticing is that in spite of the fact that most New Zealanders today live in cities the Kiwi identity does not contain any urban images.

There is a strong process of urbanisation going on in New Zealand today. Close to the entire population now live in urban centres. Approximately one million (out of a total population which, as mentioned, only number four million) live in or close to the city of Auckland, and there are less than one million living on the entire South Island. As a consequence there are huge areas that are completely un-populated, and yet other areas where the population density is very low. Contrary to popular belief the degree of urbanisation in New Zealand has always been quite high and in 1911 the urban population exceeded the rural for the first time [King 2003]. After world war two the move to the cities grew rapidly and as a result, over the last two generations a vast number of people have broken up from the community where they were born and have relocated in a new place where they may, or may not have had any social relations prior to moving in.

The gender situation among Pakeha New Zealanders closely resembles most other western (particularly North-European and North-American) societies. Officially and in public most Pakehas are definitely in favour of gender equality. Discrimination of any kind is illegal, regardless of whether it is based on gender, ethnicity, race or class, and there are a number of policies in place to safeguard equal opportunities for women. In some areas these policies have had a better effect than others, e.g. within education. New Zealand is presently experiencing the same phenomena as most other western countries, that girls are achieving better than boys in almost all subjects in school, and more women than men are now enrolled in tertiary education. In most other fields, however, women are still blatantly under-represented. Men fill an overwhelming majority of top positions in politics, government bureaucracy and the business sector. As in most Anglo-Germanic countries the division of labour by gender is still very traditional with women employed in health care and services like teaching and shop-keeping, while men are employed within technical and instrumental fields like farming, transport, factories. Men also fill most executive positions even in areas dominated by women.

In general the family situation is also quite similar to most western countries. The ‘nuclear family’, consisting of father, mother and their common children who reside together as a domestic unit, is the dominant ideal. Reality is somewhat different with a divorce rate hovering around fifty per cent, a lot of single parents (mainly single mothers) and ‘composite’ families where either one or both parents have children from a previous
relationship. Again the picture is approximately the same as in other western countries. In most families the division of labour is ‘old fashioned’ in the sense that women do the majority of the housework, including caring for the children and men do most of the technical work like building, doing repairs on the house, mowing lawns etc.

I have not made an in-depth study of government policies concerning the family, but my impression is that the government considers family life, including childcare, a private affair. The attitude seems to be that it is not the government’s job to provide assistance to the ‘normal’ nuclear family. Three months paid maternity leave was introduced as late as in 2002, but governmental policies still build on the assumption that in a heterosexual relationship one of the partners (meaning the wife/mother) should be and will be a full time caregiver and homemaker. This is reflected e.g. in the rules for unemployment benefit. If both husband and wife are unemployed, only one of them has the right to a benefit. If one of them is employed and the other is not, the unemployed person does not have the right to a benefit. The government assumes that only one of them is the breadwinner. If, on the other hand, a parent is alone in caring for his/her child the state guarantees the single parent a relatively generous income through what is called ‘the Domestic Purposes Benefit'(DPB).

Many visitors comment that New Zealand resembles how England used to be in the fifties. I touch upon this theme in a snippet in chapter five. Contrary to a somewhat ‘old fashioned’ appearance New Zealand is actually a highly modern society, showing many signs of what Giddens has labelled ‘late-modernity’. In the introduction to his book Modernity and Self-Identity Giddens write:

“Modern institutions differ from all preceding forms of social order in respect of their dynamism, the degree to which they undercut traditional habits and customs, and their global impact. However, these are not only extensional transformations: modernity radically alters the nature of day-to-day social life and affects the most personal aspects of our experience. Modernity must be understood at the institutional level; yet the transmutations introduced by modern institutions interlace in a direct way with individual life and therefore with the self. One of the distinctive features of modernity, in fact, is an increasing interconnection between two ‘extremes’ of extensionality and intentionality: globalising influences on the one hand and personal dispositions on the other.” [1991:1]

This quote by Giddens fits extraordinarily well with contemporary New Zealand society. In spite of its geographical remoteness (see snippet in chapter six) New Zealand is very much in the midst of a stream of globalizing influences. Because of its relatively small, but highly mobile population, an economy that is almost totally deregulated, and a public attention very much cast towards Australia, Great Britain and the USA, the globalizing influences may actually have a stronger impact than in many other western countries. I accept Giddens claim that late-modern institutions differ from all preceding forms of social order, and therefore believe it is necessary to spend some time Giddens point of view, and how late modernity relates to present day New Zealand society.

There are at least three features of late modernity that are particularly relevant for understanding relationships between fathers and sons, and that are quite noticeable in New
Zealand Pakeha society. These are what Giddens calls ‘disembedding mechanisms’, ‘the reflexive project of the self’, and ‘a transformation of intimacy’.

In Giddens own words disembedding mechanisms are

“mechanisms which prise social relations free from the hold of specific locals, recombining them across wide time-space distances.” [ibid: 2].

As mentioned above, New Zealanders move freely and frequently, both geographically and professionally. The possibility and the necessity to choose ones own life is therefore a prominent feature in New Zealand society. And with such choice comes, according to Giddens, ‘the reflexive project of the self’.

“In the post traditional order of modernity, and against the backdrop of new forms of mediated experience, self-identity becomes a reflexively organised endeavour. The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choices filtered through abstract systems.” [ibid: 5].

As Lynn Jamieson has made perfectly clear in her study *Intimacy; Personal Relations in Modern Society* [1998] Giddens arguments about the existence of disembedding mechanisms and pure relationships must not be misunderstood to mean that notions about kinship have lost all importance. Obviously commitment and obligations prescribed by kinship are obviously still important, but less so in late-modern societies and for different reasons than earlier. One of the important differences is that in a late-modern society where individual self-reliance is strongly emphasised it is not advantageous to leave the definition of ones self up to others. In a highly mobile society where people are not logged in social relationships that has lasted for generations, it is also frequently less possible to do so. To develop and maintain a particular self-image and a personal biography thus becomes an increasingly more ‘conscious’ (which in this context is but another word for reflexive) individual concern. In a relatively complex society, where different spheres of relationships (job, neighbours, relatives) do not overlap, it is even possible to have ‘multiple’ identities in the sense that one may develop and/or emphasise different aspects of ones self-identity in different situations. There is, however, at the same time a strong moral expectation and cultural demand that the self be ‘authentic’. The various aspects of self, developed in different spheres, must therefore be coherent. An inconsistent self-identity is, per definition, a false self. When self-identity has become a reflexive project it also becomes risky because one may fail. There is a risk of losing oneself, and of developing a false or negative self. And if ones reflexive project of self-identity should go bad, there shame and guilt sits squarely on ones own shoulders.

Along with the effects of disembedding mechanisms, and an increasingly reflexive self-identity, comes a particular transformation of intimate relationships, i.e. the development of the so-called ‘pure relationship’. In a stable society where every person’s identity is more or less prescribed by his/her position in a locally embedded social structure the content of social relationships is largely independent of personal likes and dislikes. Relationships to relatives and neighbours are predominantly a matter of rights and duties guaranteeing economic survival, political allegiance and security, religious worship etc. The quality of the experience of interacting with ones father, neighbour or fellow worshipper is relatively unimportant. The
relationship is maintained for other reasons than the pleasure (or lack of such) of spending time together. In a late modern society on the other hand the quality of the experience of interacting is essential. Or, to use Giddens terms, the ‘pure relationship’ is maintained

“on the basis of qualities intrinsic to the tie itself” [1992: 2]

and

“The pure relationship is one in which external criteria have become dissolved; the relationship exists solely for whatever rewards that relationship as such can deliver.” [1991: 6]

In a late-modern society it is seen as gradually less legitimate to have an ulterior motive for engaging in any kind of relationship. The notion that it is ‘wrong’ to choose sexual partner for position or money, instead of love, has been around for quite some time. It is now becoming increasingly ‘wrong’ to choose profession for reasons like position and money, and not out of ‘interest’ or because ‘it is an exciting job’.

It is reasonable to assume that the modern transformation or intimacy has also had an effect on relationships between parents and children and I believe that many such relationships have already taken on some of the characteristics of the ‘pure relationship’; a change that carry the potential for great rewards as well as serious problems. The good side of this change is that it makes parents more concerned with the quality of the relationship itself. This seems, to me, to be one of the major driving forces behind many men’s desire to develop a richer and closer relationship with their children. The down side is that the pure relationship has no other fundament but the intrinsic quality of the relationship itself. Other pure relationships, e.g. erotic relationships and friendships can be broken off when the intrinsic quality of the tie is no longer experienced as good. If parents feel free to terminate their relationships with their children when it no longer feels good, that may have detrimental consequences for their children, particularly so in a late modern society. As Giddens has already formulated this rather well I will quote him at length:

“In circumstances of uncertainty and multiple choice, the notions of trust and risk have particular application. Trust, I argue, is a crucial generic phenomenon of personality development as well as having distinctive and specific relevance to a world of disembedding mechanisms and abstract systems. In its generic manifestations, trust is directly linked to achieving an early sense of ontological security. Trust established between an infant and its caretaker provides ‘inoculation’ which screens off potential threats and dangers that even the most mundane activities of the day-to-day life contain. Trust in this sense is basic to a ‘protective cocoon’ which stands guard over the self in its dealings with everyday reality. It ‘brackets out’ potential occurrences that, were the individual seriously to contemplate them, would produce a paralysis of the will, or feelings of engulfment. (.....) Trust here generates that ‘leap into faith’ which practical engagement demands.” [1991: 3]

To have a caretaker in whom one has absolute trust is, according to Giddens, a precondition for developing into a well-functioning person in a late-modern society. A parent must thus be committed to his/her child in far greater sense than what the term ‘pure relationship’ implies.
A parent cannot divorce his child the way he/she can divorce his/her spouse without causing serious damage to the child’s ability to trust, and, depending upon the age of the child, damage to the child’s sense of ontological security. In a modern society, like New Zealand, the development and maintenance of parental commitment is thus a fundamental and precarious question.

As already stated a distinctive feature of late modernity is an increasing interconnections between globalising influences on the one hand and personal dispositions on the other. In New Zealand the globalising influences are many and quite noticeable. Disembedding mechanisms have been at work since the first Pakeha arrived, and the impact of such mechanisms have only increased, particularly with the radical economic restructuring going on over the last twenty years. More or less all the inhabitants in New Zealand today are involved in ‘reflexive projects of self’, to varying degrees. Whereas some people seem to find this continuous recreation of a personal biography a burden, others obviously delight in it. The transformation of intimacy has come a long way, and many ‘pure relationships’ are already a fact. New Zealanders are also, in my opinion, very good at establishing and maintaining pure relationships in the sense that they are they know how to enjoy relationships and what to do in order to keep them enjoyable. These late modern social characteristics are important aspects of the wider social context for my investigation into the contents of relationships between fathers and adolescent sons.
Chapter 2 Towards an understanding of the interpersonal dyad

Anthropology is a hermeneutic discipline. By means of interpretation we aim to understand both instrumental and communicative aspects of human behaviour, as well as the collective systems generated by such behaviour. We share this aim with many other disciplines, from astrology to psychology. What distinguishes our discipline, however, is our commitment to construct what I choose to call ‘relational interpretations’. Contrary to other disciplines we do not try to understand the acts of individual persons as determined or influenced by cosmic forces or innate psychological processes. We try to understand human behaviour as part of and influenced by relationships between and among persons. When I taught an introductory course in qualitative methods, some years ago, the textbooks went as far as claiming that all anthropological knowledge is ‘relational’ [Cato Wadel 1990, 1991]. Though that claim is somewhat bombastic it does express a basic anthropological principle supported by a number of other anthropologists as well. In her pamphlet The Relation Marilyn Strathern [1995] states:

Social anthropologists route connections through persons. They attend to the relations of logic, of cause and effect, of class and category, that people make between things; it also means that they attend to the relations of social life, to the roles and behaviour, through which people connect themselves to one another. [:11]

A few pages later in the same pamphlet she continues:

“British Social Anthropology remained closely tied to the conviction that at the heart of systems were persons’ dealings with one another, the system they created for themselves being second order manifestations of their primary human ability to make relationships. [:14]

I am of a similar persuasion, and this thesis rests on the conviction that when we try to understand such diverse phenomena as systems of symbolic meaning and the macro dynamics of a political system, we construct our interpretations by looking for how the artefact is given meaning as part of relationships and how the macro system is an aggregate of relationships between persons.

In spite of the central epistemological importance of ‘interpersonal relationship’ this concept occupies a blind spot in anthropological theorizing. Like the blind spot in the human eye ‘the interpersonal relationship’ is in the middle of our field of vision, and still we do not see it properly. Several factors contribute to this theoretical blindness. One such factor is a matter of scale. In her pamphlet The Relation Marilyn Strathern claims that

“Scale has been a headache for anthropology. If anthropology routes its knowledge through persons, the individual person appears to have its own scale, a ‘small’ entity by comparison with everything we know about society. Anthropological interest in interpersonal relationships seems side-tracked to dealing with ‘small-scale’ societies.” [:15-16]

Strathern’s observation is not revolutionary, but still to the point. In general anthropologists are mainly interested in systems of meaning and behaviour. And even though we “route our
knowledge through persons” anthropological theories tend to make a jump from the smaller of all social entities, i.e. the individual person, to small scale social systems, like households, kinship and neighbourhoods. The in between step, i.e. the dyadic relationship between two individual social persons, is usually overlooked. This is, of course, a matter of scale, in the sense that we tend to ignore a certain bracket of scale. On the other hand it is not a matter of scale in the sense that we have problems with smaller as opposed to larger. As a consequence scale only indicates where our problem lies, not what the problem is about. I am convinced that our problems with understanding interpersonal relationships are not only about a ‘blurred focus’, so to speak. These problems are far more fundamental and require an investigation of basic epistemological presuppositions upon which anthropological theories build. Taking a lead from Schneider [1984] and his classic critique of anthropological kinship theories, I suggest that our problems with understanding interpersonal relationships are a consequence of common sense Anglo-Germanic notions about individuals, persons and relationships.

Common sense notions
From an anthropological perspective investigating our own common sense notions is an inherently risky and somewhat dubious business. The data has not been systematically collected and the interpretations are fraught with the vested interests of the inside player. Bearing in mind, then, that this is a philosophical critique rather than an anthropological analysis, I still believe it is both a necessary and useful exercise in its own right as well as a prerequisite for my analysis of father-son relationships.

Applying common sense it seems obvious to me that interpersonal relationships can be conceptualised in two different ways. On the one hand they can be seen as by-products of individuals acting together and on the other hand as entities in their own right. Logically there is also a third possibility, i.e. that relationships may be a combination, i.e. both a by-product and entities in their own right at the same time. This third option does not loom large in contemporary Anglo-Germanic western culture, however. Our common sense seems to favour one or the other of the two first options, with a preference for the first. For a number of reasons the concept of the individual is granted primacy in most of our thinking and the individual is considered far more important than relationships. This preference is linked to a strong prejudice in western thinking towards granting concrete and bounded entities (i.e. things/objects) ontological primacy. Anything that can be conceptualised as having thing-like qualities like mass, shape and clear boundaries is somehow more easily understood than that which lacks the qualities of the concrete. Individuals are believed to be such concrete objects that exist in their own right as self-contained and autonomous entities with distinct boundaries between themselves and their surroundings. Relationships on the other hand are conceptualised as being not concrete.

One reason why it is easy for us to conceptualise the human individual as an object is because that individual is also a concrete body. Human bodies obviously have material qualities and somehow seem to exist in their own right. This idea is particularly fostered by the experience of observing or handling other people’s bodies, but also when a person experiences his or her own body. Analogies between mechanical instruments like motorcars or computer hardware and the body are not far fetched in western culture. Our dualistic, mind-body cosmology is both a prerequisite for such notions and contributes to their maintenance. But this dualism also indicates that a human individual is more than just a mechanical machine. Common sense holds that humans also have a mind, perhaps a soul or a spirit. To what extent these
words refer to different concepts is not important here. The important point here is that this mind is considered an entity in its own right. In spite of being entirely abstract it is thought about as if it is a ‘thing’. And this abstract thing is the seat of another abstract ‘thing’ called the personality that defines the human individual as an independent person.

Personality is generally considered to be an individual psychological trait, something that the individual carries with him ‘on the inside’ so to speak. At the same time personality is fundamentally related to cultural competence and social behaviour. As an example one of the most important things a human being must demonstrate in order to be recognised as a complete person is the ability to be autonomous. The ability to be, or not to be autonomous is most often interpreted as a personality trait. But the ability to be autonomous is directly linked to cultural competence, social position, access to power etc. As a consequence it is therefore, in general, only adults who are considered complete persons, and children are seen as still in the process of developing their personality. Still, personality is not the cultural competence and social position as such. Personality is an abstract entity, something the individual has, and it acts like a generator of expressions and behaviour reflecting cultural competence and social position.

In our common sense ontology the existence of individual persons is taken for granted. The individual human body harbours the individual personality, and as such they are one. Both are believed to exist as object-like entities. The existence of individual persons therefore requires no explanation. Our common sense notions about relationships, on the other hand, are far more problematic. Relationships, whether between and among animate or inanimate entities, do not exist in the same objective sense. Relationships lack all the characteristics of objects. They have no mass, no shape and no boundaries. They are entirely abstract and have no real existence the way stones and human bodies do. It may be possible to observe the people whom the relationship is between, but the relationship in itself cannot even be perceived; neither seen, heard, touched nor smelled. The relationship can only be conceived, in the double sense of the word. Whereas the concept of the individual is self-explanatory, the relationship needs to be explained.

One might say that according to our common sense notions relationships are secondary phenomena. They do not exist in their own right, but only as a consequence of other things that have happened. Relationships somehow exist outside of, and between entities existing prior to and independently of the relationships. Strathern [1992b] maintains that

“in western terms (...) relationships are (...) mapped as external connections among a plurality of individuals.” [:82].

According to this perspective an interpersonal relationship is, in other words, *that* which develops when two pre-existing autonomous persons somehow establish a connection. Obviously this begs the questions; what characterises such connections? First of all, common sense distinguishes between chance encounters and relationships. The latter lasts longer and is of greater importance than the former. Time and value are, in other words, distinguishing features of relationships. Beyond that common sense is not very helpful because it neither defines the time frame nor the values involved. Are two encounters sufficient or does it take ten? What are the values that constitute relationships? Is it love, power and money? And how much is needed? In my opinion common sense provides nothing but ad hoc definitions of the
nature and the contents of interpersonal relationships. Some times such relationships are seen as a matter of biology, other times they are seen as a matter of power, or wealth, or pleasure. The contents is sometimes thought to be a substance like blood and genes, other times it is believed to be emotions like love or hate, likes and dislikes.

In spite of being vaguely defined interpersonal dyads are still, in a common sense perspective, seen as the most basic of all human relationships. Interpersonal dyads are held to be qualitatively different from other kinds of relationships, e.g. relationships between a person and a corporate group, relationships among the persons who make up a corporate group, relationships between corporate dyads, and relationships among all the various entities that together make up a ‘society’. On the one hand interpersonal dyads are believed to be more ‘real’ than the others. Because interpersonal relationships are almost always face-to-face sensory data about the relationship are received through all or most of our perceptual organs. We can hear, see, smell, maybe even touch and on rare occasions taste the other person. Our experience of interpersonal relationships is, in other words, perceptually far richer than our experiences of other relationships. The experience of being a group, i.e. of relating to the group itself and not the separate dyads within it, is perceptually far less tangible than interpersonal dyads. A group as an integrated whole, as something else and more than the sum of its parts, does not have the characteristics of an object. It cannot be seen, heard nor touched. Relationships among group members are therefore commonly seen as less real and more imagined than interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal relationships are also thought about as ‘experience-near’ whereas relationships between groups are ‘experience-distant’. Interpersonal relationships happen right here and now and directly involve both persons, while the relationship between groups are rarely mass gatherings of two groups facing each other. Usually, particularly in western society, they are meetings between representatives of the groups. For the members who are not involved in the meeting the relationship is experiences as distant, happening somewhere else and involving others.

**Anthropology and common sense**

In my opinion anthropological beliefs about interpersonal dyads rest squarely on the kinds of western common sense notions I have described above. To my mind the individualist and objectivist prejudices are obvious, and I believe others support my conviction. One example is Marilyn Strathern’s argument concerning British social anthropology, as it developed during the first and middle parts of the last century. She claims that at the time

> “there was a double emphasis, then, on relations known to the observer as principles of social organisation and relations observed as interactions between persons.” [1995:12].

In my opinion this double emphasis to a large extent still holds and most contemporary mainstream anthropology is still built upon these two, or very similar notions about dyadic interpersonal relationships. The former emphasis is concerned with generalised positions (statuses) within a social structure and relationships between positions are conceptualised as ‘legal’ rules of rights and duties [Radcliffe-Brown 1952]. Though ‘statuses’ are not living people, they are still of the same logical type. They are merely generalised individual persons and as such they have all the same traits. Similar to the common sense notions about individual humans that I described above statuses are bounded entities with an objective existence. The statuses are taken for granted, and the relationship between them is hardly
conceptualised at all beyond some notion about complementarity. Even the rights and duties, which supposedly define the relationship, are lodged in the statuses. A father, for example, has certain rights and duties towards his son, and the son has complimentary duties and rights towards his father. These specific sets of rights and duties are what defines the as father and son respectively. How the rights and duties constitute the relationship while simultaneously defining the statuses is, however, not elaborated upon. When the emphasis is upon understanding larger scale systems of behaviour, for example as social organisation, the interpersonal relationship is not interesting in itself. It may harbour a principle of social organisation, and as such have a certain heuristic value, but it does not warrant any further investigation.

Though the other emphasis, what Strathern identifies as a focus on ‘relations observed as interactions between persons’ in one sense is the very opposite of structural functionalism it still builds on the very same common sense notions about individuals and relationships. This emphasis in anthropology is perhaps most clearly expressed by theoreticians such as Erving Goffman [1959] and Fredrik Barth [1966] and even though neither symbolic interactionism nor generative process analysis are built upon explicitly stated concepts about interpersonal dyads implicit assumptions are easy to identify. In perfect correspondence with western common sense interactionist theories are founded upon the notion that individual persons exist as objective entities in their own rights whereas interpersonal dyadic relationships and social systems are understood to be secondary phenomena, i.e. consequences of interactions between individual actors. According to (the early) Barth there are only two kinds of interactions, and thus interpersonal relationships: On the one hand transactions between two actors and on the other incorporations whereby several actors become a corporate group [Barth 1966]. Both kinds of relationships are analysed as outcomes of individual choices made by actors concerned with securing an optimal exchange of valuable, both material and symbolic. The concept ‘transaction’, i.e. two persons exchanging valuables, is as close as generative process analysis comes to the interpersonal dyad.

Barth aims at understanding how cultural and social systems are generated, and he does so by way of focussing on individual choice. Goffman’s main concern, on the other hand, is to understand the performative aspect of interactions. By use of a dramaturgical perspective Goffman maintains that interactions can be understood as performances where every actor is deeply concerned with ‘impression management’. According to Goffman no matter what instrumental objectives an actor may pursue during an interaction it is also always important to look good. The standards of judgement are culturally defined, and as such usually shared by performers and spectators. Actors are, however, never in full control of the impression they give off, and as such live with a constant possibility of being exposed and thus embarrassed or humiliated. Goffman gives no indication that interpersonal dyadic relationships are any different from other relationships. Again the individual actor is given ontological primacy, and the closest Goffman comes to a concept of ‘the relationship’ is a play of masks motivated by the risk of losing face.

In both of the above theories the existence of individual actors is taken for granted and it is interactions between individuals that ‘explain’ larger and systemic cultural and social phenomena. In line with common sense notions interpersonal relationships are merely ‘outcomes’ of transactions and impression management, and as such secondary phenomena. As a matter of fact these theories pay no attention whatsoever to interpersonal relationships as
such. Actors as well as systems are deemed worthy of attention, seen as real and as existing in their own right. Relationships do not. In addition, because interactionist theories do not differentiate between interpersonal relationships and other kinds of interactions, they also assume that the immanent logic all interactions are the same. Barth’s article about father-son relationships in the Middle East [1971] demonstrates this rather well. As I wrote in the previous chapter Barth describes how adult, married sons tend to avoid situations where their wives and their own fathers are present at the same time. Barth argues that this behaviour is the best strategy for reasons concerning impression management. Elsewhere Barth uses the same kind of analytical model to account for such different phenomena as relationships among fishing boats off the coast of Norway [1966], relationships between political foes and friends in the Swat valley in Pakistan [1959], and economic relationships within nomadic Basseri households in Iran [1961].

Obviously there is much more to anthropology today than structural functionalism and interactionist theories. My point here has not been to give a full overview of how common sense notions pervade all of anthropology. I have only tried to highlight how common sense notions are a basis for and inform some of the more important and founding theories of our subject. I am, however, also convinced that if we were to scrutinize many of the theories in vogue today, it would not be difficult to unearth common sense notions about the individual and relationships. As an example I am convinced that the propensity for conceptualising relationships as substance, as I wrote about in the previous chapter, is an example of such common sense reasoning.

At this stage I believe it is necessary to underline that my critique of common sense, and anthropology building on it, does not mean that I dismiss such notions and theories as fundamentally faulty understandings of interpersonal relationships. I believe they are valuable resources for understanding a range of social relationships. As an example, the concept reciprocity builds upon the one dimensional view of persons as bounded entities, and has still proven to be very valuable for understanding a range of economical systems and processes. To some extent common sense notions may thus be helpful for building a theory of dyads, but they are also insufficient and potentially misleading. One example of their insufficiency is that they cannot account for the qualitative contents of relationship. As an example the concept ‘reciprocity’ may assist us in understanding the rules guiding economic behaviour, but does not provide an insight into what it is that motivates people to follow the rules. On the one hand they fail to provide an insight into the difference in quality between different kinds of people. On the other hand they fail to provide an insight into the difference in quality in the same kind of relationship, between the same kinds of people, but involving different individuals. I can see that there are good reasons to avoid the question about contents, particularly because it may easily lead to essentialist answers. But as I have already argued in the previous chapter I firmly distance myself from essentialist notions in the direction that the contents of relationships might be some substance or another. I strongly believe that such contents can only be understood as a matter of meaning. Quality (as a question of good and bad) is also a matter of meaning and in order to understand interpersonal relationships it is of utmost importance to have some fairly well developed ideas about different kinds of interpersonal meaning and how it is generated. Neither cultural notions nor interactional processes (transaction as well as incorporation) can fully account for such dimensions as emotional tone, degree of anxiety and existential dread. The full meaning of such strong emotional experiences as love or anxiety, or deep existential questions cannot
be reduced to cultural rules, impression management and a fair exchange of valuables. Theoretical perspectives like those above cannot make sense of the fundamentally different quality between ‘near’ and ‘distant’ relationships. In order to shed light on why some relationships are considered so much more valuable and existentially important than others, and to account for the huge variety between relationships guided by the same rules, we need a more thorough theory of the meaning of interpersonal dyads.

Barth’s account highlights that shame and humiliation can be an important issue in dyadic interpersonal relationships, but leaves us no wiser about why saving face is a hot topic in one kind of intimate relationship and not another. Neither can the theory provide any understanding of the degree of severity involved. Arguing that these elements are culturally determined obviously does not hold because Barth himself describes how the degree of severity varies from one father-son dyad to the next among people holding the same cultural notions. So the question remains, why is showing deference required in one relationship, banned in another and failing to do what is required far more severe in one father-son relationship than the next?

The insufficiency of common sense and anthropology building on it is potentially misleading because it may lead us to think we understand more than we do. On the one hand their simplicity, and the taken for granted assumptions about the primacy of the individual, may easily generate a sensation that this is an adequate understanding. As a consequence these theories may easily foster a reductionist view and a conviction that interpersonal relationships are easy to grasp. In addition an important element in the common sense notions and the concomitant anthropology are certain notions about power. Late-modern political and economic ideologies rest on the conviction that power should be vested in the individual, and interactionist theory can easily be seen as both building on and supporting this ideology. Structural functionalism, with its emphasis on structure, less so, but even this theory provides no analytical tools for understanding how the power of structure is routed through relationships. These notions and theories may therefore easily contribute to the delusion that individuals are more in control over relationships than relationships are over individuals.

As I have been struggling with the material for this thesis I have gradually come to realize that the common sense ontology, and anthropology that builds upon it, is too limited as a basis for understanding interpersonal relationships. My observations of, and reflections upon, relationships between fathers and their adolescent sons have revealed to me how inadequate it is to conceptualise individuals only as fixed and bounded units, and relationships as a secondary phenomena. In order to understand my observations I have come to realize that we need to conceptualise individual bodies and persons as both bounded and permeable entities at the same time. We need a theory that can account for how persons are simultaneously creators and creations of relationships. My attempts at understanding relationships between caregivers and care-receivers, as laid out in chapter four, have made this point particularly cogent. Basically, I have come to believe that we cannot grant individuals, and particularly not persons (i.e. individuals with social identity and belonging), ontological primacy in our explanations. Individuals cannot be considered as existing independently of relationships, no more than relationships can be conceived as existing independently of individuals. I have arrived at the conviction that in order to make sense of interpersonal dyads we must temporarily suspend common sense and the anthropology that builds upon it. We need to develop a theory whereby individuals and relationships; actors and systems, are seen as
mutually constituting each other; a theory that does not reduce one to be a product of the other. The theory must provide a way to account for how these processes of constitution unfold, simultaneously going both ways, from individuals and individual acts to relationships, and from relationships to individuals. Or, to paraphrase my supervisor Professor Edvard Hviding: We must account for how relationships are moved by individuals, as well as how individuals are moved by relationships.

**Epistemological basis**

In my attempts at forming a theory of the interpersonal dyad I have come to realize that this task raises some fundamental epistemological challenges because the western concept ‘relationship’ harbours a fundamental tension that cannot be resolved. In a fundamental sense dyads seem to have a double and self-contradictory nature. They are both causes (e.g. as a cultural rule) and effects (observed behaviour), they both constitute persons and are constituted by the same persons, they both explain behaviour and are explained by behaviour.

In order to conceptualise this tension I have found it fruitful to begin by borrowing a perspective from Strathern. In the aforementioned pamphlet *The Relation* [1995] she argues that the concept is both holographic and incomplete.

“It is holographic in the sense of being an example of the field it occupies, every part containing information about the whole, and information about the whole being enfolded in each part” [ibid:17-18]

And further:

“The relation has a second property: it requires other elements to complete it - relations between what? This makes its connecting functions complex, for the relation always summons entities other than itself. Again this is true whether these entities are pre-existing (the relation is ‘between’ them) or are brought into existence by the relationship and thus exists ‘within’ it. - When one does not only see relations between things, but things as relations. [Ibid: 18-19]

Trying to make sense of this duality Strathern conceptualises it as a question of ‘parts and wholes’. Drawing upon ethnography from Melanesia she argues that the western way of understanding relationships is the not the only way. Whereas we westerners see individuals, as well as groups and categories, as something qualitatively different from relationships, certain Melanesian peoples would not make that distinction. About the Orokaiva people she writes:

“People make relationships specific to themselves. External relationships are centred on persons as at once subjects and objects of the multiple configurations of their acts, inclinations and judgements.” [Strathern 1992b:82]

Her point is basically that “what makes up the part also makes up the whole” [:82], and that “what makes the person, then, is no different from what makes up these relations” [:85]. Therefore, in the Melanesian understanding of relationships there is no need for the switch of perspective between individual and relationship which western thinking necessitates.
“In the way that Melanesians present social life to themselves, it would seem that there are no principles of organization that are not also found in the constitution of the person. External relations have the same effect as internal ones. In short, to imagine the person in this manner means that no switch of perspective between person and relations is required in order to ‘see’ social relations. Exchanging perspectives only differentiates one set of relations from another, as it does one kind of person from another.” [Ibid:86]

Strathern’s arguments are helpful first of all because she drives home the point that ‘the relationship’ is a paradoxical concept. In addition she also identifies some of the important elements making up the concept’s problematic duality. In order to build a history of interpersonal dyads it is important to keep in mind that relationships are simultaneously about internal and external connections, and that these connections carry both abstract and implicit notions which have to be expressed through explicit and concrete signs.

These lessons from Strathern are important, and yet her pamphlet The Relation provides me with an even more important clue for understanding how the meaning of relationships grow. The pamphlet is build up around an argument exploring

“the consistent parallel, the repeated echo, between intellectual propagation and procreative acts, between knowledge and kinship.” [1995: 8]

Fascinating as this argument is, I have not found it directly useful for building a theory of dyads. As part of her argument she does, however, reveal a very important point if we are to understand relationships. Strathern argues that when people find themselves in situations where kinship is of importance they will draw upon a pool of implicit connections in order to make explicit those that pertain to that particular situation. For my purpose the important point in what Strathern says is that relationships can exist as implicit connections, and that this existence does not depend upon the connections being explicitly stated.

Strathern and I disagree, however, when it comes to epistemological standpoints. Her view is that “knowledge consists in making explicit a field of connections that already exist” [op.cit: 20], and in my opinion knowledge is far more than that. As I see it knowledge consists in constituting connections in ways that humans can grasp. To know does not necessarily mean to create connections out of nothing, but there is a far more active component of knowledge than merely to make explicit connections that already exist. The concepts explicit and implicit do not refer to different ontological statuses, but to different kinds of knowledge. A theory of interpersonal dyads has to account for the qualitative difference between implicit and explicit knowledge, and how this difference influences the meaning of relationships.

In order to proceed in building such a theory I believe it is necessary to investigate in greater detail the ambiguity and contradictions inherent in our notions about relationships. In order to do so I believe it is also necessary to change epistemological perspective. The kind of analysis Strathern is involved in above is what I would call a logical and conceptual analysis. This analysis has proven helpful in identifying that the concept is self-contradictory, as well as some of the elements contradicting each other. In order to understand the process whereby this ambiguity emerges I believe it is necessary to turn to a phenomenological perspective and ask how relationships are experienced. This change of perspective was motivated by the
following quotation from Simmel in an article called ‘How is society possible’ in the *American Journal of Sociology*:

“... societary structures are composed of beings who are at the same time inside and outside of them (.......). Therewith society produces perhaps the most conscious, at least universal conformation of a basic type of life in general: that the individual soul can never have a position within a combination outside of which it does not at the same time have a position, that it cannot be inserted into an order without finding itself at the same time in opposition to that order. This applies throughout the whole range from the most transcendental and universal interdependencies to the most singular and accidental. The religious man feels himself completely encompassed by the divine being, as though he were merely a pulse-beat of the divine life; his own substance is unreservedly, and even in mystical identity, merged in that of the Absolute. And yet, in order to give this intermelting any meaning at all, the devotee must retain some sort of self existence, some sort of personal reaction, a detached ego, to which the resolution into the divine All-Being is an endless task, a process only, which would be neither metaphysically possible nor religiously feelable if it did not proceed from a self-being on the part of the person: the being one with God is conditional in its significance upon the being other than God.” [1910-11]

As I understand this quotation by Simmel his point is that as an experience the very nature of a social relationship is a contradiction and a tension between unity and separation. The experience of an interpersonal relationship is a contradiction through and through, and it is only as this contradiction that it can be experienced, and as such exist. This contradictory double nature cannot be thought about in terms of two different analytical aspects of, or perspectives on relationships. Neither can it be understood to the effect that a relationship is something that contains a tension. The point is that as an experience it is a tension. It cannot be understood to the effect that some aspects of the relationship carry a sense of unity while other aspects convey a sense of separation. Neither can the two different meanings be conceptualised as a consequence of a switch of perspective between individual (part) and relationship (whole).

According to Simmel a relationship is experienced as a simultaneous unity and separation that cannot be grasped by reducing it to a combination of two non-contradictory terms. The contradictory meaning of relationships is also of a different kind to how we ordinarily think about the individuality and unity of material objects.

“The things in nature are, on the one hand, more widely separated than souls. In the outward world, in which each entity occupies space which cannot be shared with another, there is no analogy for the unity of one man with another, which consists in understanding, in love, in common work. On the other hand, the fragments of spatial existence pass into a unity in the consciousness of the observer, which cannot be attained by community of individuals. For, on account of the fact that the objects of the societary synthesis are independent beings, psychic centers, personal unities, they resist that absolute merging in the soul of another person, to which the selflessness (Selbstlosigkeit) of soulless things must yield. Thus a collection of men is really a unity in a much higher, more ideal sense, yet in a much lower degree than tables, chairs, sofa, carpet and mirror constitute “the furniture of a room”, or river, meadow,
trees, house “a landscape” or in a painting “a picture.”” (Ibid)

If we accept Stratherns and Simmels arguments about the double and contradictory nature of social relationships we also open up for a serious epistemological challenge for the social sciences. At a fundamental level western scientific reasoning is not equipped to deal with such contradiction. Western science in general is founded upon a number of absolute logical rules, one of which is the law of non-contradiction, often called the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction. In simple terms the rule states that: “two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time” (Littleton 1985: ix). Strictly speaking this rule would only concern the relationships between material object and their positions in space, but the law is usually given a broader definition stating that something cannot be what it is and not be what it is at the same time. In formal terms it often expressed like this: \( a \neq -a \). Within western academia the law of non-contradiction is generally accepted as valid for all kinds of entities, including entities that are not objects.

Simmel and Stratherns arguments reveal that when the law of non-contradiction is applied to the investigation of social phenomena a number of rather intriguing epistemological challenges concerning the identity of the entities investigated are brought to the surface. With reference to the common sense boundaries of the human body an individual can, on the one hand be identified as a separate, bounded entity. As an object the body seems to obey the law of non-contradiction; it cannot be what it is, and not be what it is at the same time. Except, of course, during pregnancy and while breastfeeding. Is the fetus a body in its own right and does it have an existence as a separate entity that occupies a different space to its mother? When the question of identity is extended to the social persona the problem becomes even more complicated because there are no apparently physical boundaries that can identify the bounded entity. As an example, what exactly is it that defines a man as a particular person, or as a father for that matter? Is it not the case that many men both are and are not fathers at the same time and in the same context and maybe even for the same reasons? When I have tried to understand why fathers do not participate very much in care-giving (chapter four and six), or why so many men dominate while participating in situations with their sons (chapter seven), these phenomena can only be understood as outcomes of boundary management; i.e. precarious attempts at simultaneously managing their sense of self, their sense of fatherhood and their sense of being a husbands in situations where all three identities continuously blend into each other in an unbroken, undifferentiated and rather unmanageable flow.

This epistemological challenge becomes even more acute when the law of non-contradiction is applied to relationships between persons. Conceptually the relationship is a unity of two separate entities as well as an entity in its own right; it separates and constitutes two people as particular kinds of people while simultaneously connecting them as one inseparable amalgam at the same time. Or put a twist on Stratherns words, when it comes to relationships is it not the case that what makes up the parts is simultaneously both that which makes up the whole, and not that which makes up the whole. If Simmel has a point, which I think he does, that a collection of men is a unity in a higher sense, but in a lower degree than material things, then human beings have the capacity to experience interpersonal relationships as being more absorbing but of less strength and more easily broken than connections between material objects. To the extent that this is the case, we can only approach an understanding of interpersonal relationships if we accept, as a point of departure, the rather intriguing epistemological situation that the law of non-contradiction must both apply and not apply at
the same time. I believe that in order to understand interpersonal relationships we must be open to the possibility that the persons involved may experience it as a merger into one inseparable unit while simultaneously experiencing that they retain their individuality. In order to develop a thorough theory of dyadic relationships we must at times perform intellectual acrobatics that implies suspending the law of non-contradiction while simultaneously applying it. As I will elaborate upon in chapter four it is only within such a framework that it is possible to understand how some fathers and sons manage to develop what I call close parallel lives, while most other fathers and sons do not.

This does not mean anthropology must give up its pretense at being a rational discipline. To acknowledge that one of the rules of rationality can be an obstacle rather than a resource for understanding certain kinds of social phenomena does not imply abandoning all criteria of rationality. There are many kinds of rationality (according to Bradd Shore at least nine different kinds [1996:169-170]) and the only kind that is affected by what I have just written above is the one that Shore calls logical rationality.

“Logical rationality assumes that beliefs follow cannons of formal logic, such as consistency (defined in terms of the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction) and specific forms of syllogistic logic, such as modus ponens or modus tolens.” [ibid: 169].

It is only this kind of rationality that is affected by the above critique of the law of contradiction. The only implication of my argument is that as anthropologists we must be cautious and not take for granted that the phenomena we investigate always follow the law of non-contradiction. Other rules and criteria of rationality still apply. According to Shore contemplative and conscious rationality specify that only those beliefs and acts that are based on clearly thought out principles rather than emotion or desire, and that are subject to conscious awareness, should be judged to be rational. According to such criteria to be conscious about the limitations of our contemplative tools ought to be seen as an increase in rationality rather than a decrease. As rational anthropologists we need to be open to the possibility that many social phenomena are more complex and far larger than what can be grasped through a strict adherence to a logical rationality, and that in order to understand these phenomena it is necessary to devise concepts and theories that, though in themselves rational, try to fathom the extra-rational.\(^9\) In my opinion dyadic interpersonal relationship always harbour an uneasy mix of rational and extra rational meaning.

Mauss
The conviction that logical rationality is not sufficient for understanding interpersonal relationships does not in itself provide the detailed analytical tools needed in order to build a theory of such relationships. Fortunately anthropology provides a rich source of inspiration and not surprisingly I have found the works of Marcel Mauss quite helpful in my attempts at grasping some of the extra-rational dimension of social phenomena without resorting to reductionist, logical-rational interpretations. Though Mauss’ theory about gift exchange [1954] primarily is about relatively large systems of exchange the theory still contains valuable insights into the contradictory nature of interpersonal dyads. One of Mauss’ central contributions to anthropology is the insight that the exchange of a gift establishes a fundamentally different kind of relationship between two people than any other kinds of interactions, e.g. juridical contracts, barter or trade. According to Mauss commercial
relationships like trade or barter are in some ways the exact opposite of a gift relationship. The essential property of the commercial relationship is direct and immediate reciprocity. Buyer and seller exchange like for like, the relationship is established for that purpose and closed when the exchange has taken place. It is an activity that can be, and many people will say ought to be, kept apart as a separate domain distinctly different from other activities like religion, family life, politics etc. A gift, on the other hand, is what Mauss calls a ‘total prestation’. It cannot and should not be singled out and separated from other kinds of activities. Nor can the value of the object or service be separated from the gift itself. Because it cannot be singled out the value cannot be measured either, nor should it be. This is one of the reasons why it is not possible to completely repay the gift and thus terminate the relationship. Similar to other forms of exchange, however, the gift carries an obligation of return; something else must be given back at some later stage. Or, in more technical terms, a gift carries a moral obligation to be reciprocated, but contrary to in a commercial relationship the reciprocity of gift giving is not, nor can it be, equal and direct. The whole point of the gift is to establish a relationship that lasts beyond the situation when the interaction takes place and the obligation of return provides the mechanism for the long-term maintenance of the relationship. In other words; a gift establishes an obligation that can never be cancelled.

Another word for obligation is commitment. As I see it, the central question that Mauss is working on is how commitment is established and maintained in public relationships. The principle of delayed reciprocity provides a mechanism for the long-term maintenance of interpersonal relationship. This, of course, only begs the question how and why gifts are seen as containing this imperative? In my opinion it is in his speculations around this question that Mauss open up for an inquiry into the extra-rational dimensions of social phenomena. These speculations are also helpful in trying to understand the ‘double nature’ of human relationships that Simmel talks about. Gift exchange is, in other words, a particularly good example for investigating how humans come to stand both inside and outside of relationships at the same time, and for understanding how this double nature is a necessary prerequisite for human sociability.

In trying to understand the nature of commitment created by gift exchange Mauss relies heavily on an account given by Tamati Ranaipiri, a New Zealand Maori, about his notions of gift giving among his own people. Mauss’ presentation of Tamati Ranaipiri’s account draws a picture of a world where objects, as well as forest and animals, all contain spirits, in the Maori language called ‘hau’ [Mauss 1954]. Things given as gifts contain such spirits too and to receive a gift implies also receiving its spirit. In Mauss’ reading of Tamati Ranaipiri the spirit of the gift is an amalgam of the spirit of the thing in itself, and the spirit of the giver. Thus, as Mauss says, to give a gift is not only to give an object, it is also to give part of oneself. According to Tamati Ranaipiri the ‘hau’ of a gift is never satisfied with remaining indefinitely with the receiver. The spirit always wants to return to its birthplace and the gift must therefore be reciprocated. For reasons that Mauss does not go into, the thing that was gifted cannot just be returned. Some other object must be given back. To the Maori it is even forbidden to keep the original gift. It must be given to a third person and the gift that the second person receives from the third person must be given to the first person [Ibid: 9].

As I understand Mauss the exchange of gifts creates commitment in relationships because the people involved somehow “become parts of each other”. Unfortunately Mauss does not provide a detailed analysis of how people can become part of each other. Apart from telling
Tamati Ranaipiri’s story Mauss does not go into detail about how people are a part of each other or how the process of “becoming part of each other” is established. From Mauss’ writing it is obvious that it does not imply any loss of individuality, but he provides no further understanding of the nature of the resulting unity. To Tamati Ranaipiri it is a spiritual phenomenon and Mauss neither accepts nor refutes that idea. Mauss seems to be satisfied with saying that this is how the Maori understand it, and that the same or similar notions seem to obtain among all people who engage in gift giving throughout the world. In the final analysis all Mauss does is to demonstrate that gift giving is one mechanism whereby commitment can be established, and that the commitment has to do with notions of being part of each other. The questions that he leaves open are a more detailed understanding of what kind of unity this is, as well as how this notion of “being part of each other” is established. One might, of course, settle for Tamati Ranaipiri’s interpretations and say that it is a spiritual process. To me that is not an acceptable answer, for reasons already mentioned in the previous chapter.

**Merlau-Ponty**

In order to proceed with a further investigation into the questions above again I have found it helpful to turn my gaze at how humans experience the world. This time I will do so with the aid of Nick Crossley’s work *Intersubjectivity, The Fabric of Social Becoming* [1996]. Crossley’s work is an investigation into the so-called intersubjective turn in philosophy and social theory and he aims at integrating the works of theoreticians as diverse as Merlau-Ponty, Mead, Schutz and Habermas. It is particularly the theories of Merlau-Ponty that I have found valuable for this thesis, but as I am not well versed in his original works, I refer to it as presented by Crossley.

In order to understand human relationships Merlau-Ponty argues that humans interact in at least two fundamentally different ways. On the one hand people may engage in joint activity without consciously reflecting upon and contemplating their own nor the other person’s actions. Merlau-Ponty calls this kind of interaction ‘radical intersubjectivity’ and he claims it is characterized by a lack of self-awareness and an unconditional communicative openness towards the other. On the other hand humans may interact in ways that

> “involves an empathic intentionality which experiences otherness by way of an imaginary transposition of self into the position of the other.” [Crossley 1996:23]

Merlau-Ponty calls this ‘egological intersubjectivity’ and claims that this kind of interaction to a large extent relies on participants consciously thinking about themselves, their own actions, and those of the other participants. To Merlau-Ponty these two kinds of intersubjectivity, these two ways for humans to relate to each other, are so different that in a strict sense they are not compatible.

> “(radical) intersubjectivity consists (..) in a pre-reflective opening out onto and engagement with alterity, rather than in an experience or objectification of it.” [ibid: 24].

Radical intersubjectivity is pre-reflexive and depends on the absence of conscious reflection upon the interaction whereas egological intersubjectivity is based on reflexivity. Conscious reflection is, in other words, what distinguishes the two modes of intersubjectivity. Because
consciousness is always a matter of degrees rather than an either or; these two fundamentally different ways of interacting are not mutually exclusive even though they operate in mutually exclusive ways. There is a sliding scale as to the degree of radical versus egological intersubjectivity in any relationship at any time.

Merlau-Ponty argues in favour of this distinction between the two forms of intersubjectivity by way of a discussion of perception. Instead of assuming that the perceiver and the perceived are basically separate entities Merlau-Ponty maintains that perception

“is an ongoing process, rooted in the dialectical relationship of the organism with its environment, which gives birth to both the subject and the object of perception. To perceive is to constitute the object of perception as that particular object, but it also constitutes the perceiver as that particular perceiver.” [Ibid: 27].

According to Merlau-Ponty it is crucial to understand that perceptual consciousness is, in the first instance, pre-reflective and practical. An infant who perceives the face of its mother (or father) does not reflect upon what it sees, but still relates intensely with its parent. In a similar way a soccer player involved in a game or a bicyclist involved in heavy traffic must suspend reflection in order to carry out certain crucial acts, like receiving a ball from another player, kicking it at exactly the right moment in order to score a goal, or twisting ones body and bike instinctively to avoid colliding with a car. In order to continue with the activity these participants have to immerse themselves in the activity and slide between varying degrees of reflective consciousness. Both the soccer player and the bicyclist are, of course, capable of reflecting upon the game and the traffic. They do so during the activity and had to do so in order to learn it well enough to participate in the first place. But their activity at the moment of participation depends equally much on their ability to maintain, when called for, a non-reflective kind of perception-action involvement.

As I see it, one of Merlau-Ponty’s important points is that when people are involved in joint activity like soccer and traffic their perception of each other is not only, nor primarily, an experience of the other as objects, it is rather a form of enjoinment. Or, in Merlau-Ponty’s own words “a communion with otherness” [ibid: 28]. When performing activities like playing soccer or bicycling, the activity will break down if those involved continuously take time out in order to observe the actions of others, reflect upon it and make a conscious decision what to do next. The activity will only flow as long as all participants are capable of spontaneously acting together as one entity, and as long as there is no distinction between the perception of others and the action oriented towards others. This is at its most obvious when the participation takes the form of imitation, like the infant pointing its tongue in response to the pointed tongue of its mother [see e.g. Stern 1985].

This emphasis on joint participation necessitates a perspective that includes the human body because most forms of such participation involve bodies. Up until quite recently no mediums existed through which people could participate in joint activity without also being in bodily proximity. Even today most joint activity involves bodies interacting with each other. These bodies, participating in the same overall activities and situations, perceive, react, act, all in an unbroken flow of body movement that may involve reflection and language, but is not dependent upon it. It may even be that large parts of what participation is all about cannot be conceptualised, it may not be available or translatable into language. We can talk about a
beautiful move in a soccer game, but we cannot talk it. Merlau-Ponty calls this participating, embodied perceiver the ‘body-subject’. The concept of the body-subject must not be understood as equivalent with what we ordinarily talk of as a subject. The subject is usually understood as a unique, independent and autonomous individual who can move in and out of relationships, who can observe an objective world and who always remains the same, regardless of relationships and observations. The body-subject, however, always forms a system with its environment, i.e. other people or objects.

“(The body-subject) is in dialogue with its environment and this dialogue is irreducible. Its actions can no more be understood without reference to ‘its environment’ than ‘its environment’ can be understood independently of the perception-action which gives that environment its nature.” [Crossley 1996:32]

From Mauss and Merlau-Ponty I draw the conclusion that human perception as well as certain kinds of acts (like gift exchange) facilitates notions of oneness, of being part of each other and communion with otherness. Even though such notions of unity are easily though about as mystical and magical (e.g. Maori beliefs that it is a matter of spirits) the insights of Merlau-Ponty indicate that they may also be understood as properties of human perception and cognition. In order to gain a more detailed understanding of the cognitive processes whereby such notions of oneness are created I believe it is necessary, at this stage in my inquiry, to turn to cognitive anthropology.

**The new Cognitive Approach**

The fundamental question in cognitive science is ‘meaning’: How do humans transform the stimuli, emanating from the sense organs, from intrinsically meaningless signals and nothing but noise, into something recognizable and meaningful? It is a field that

“seeks detailed answers to such questions as: “What is reason? How do we make sense of our experience? .... exactly what is there that is common to the way all humans think?””[ Lakoff 1987: xi]

According to Lakoff the answer to these questions begins with the concept ‘category’.

“There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action and speech. Every time we see something as a kind of thing, for example as a tree, we are categorizing. Whenever we are reasoning about kinds of things - chairs, nations, illness, emotions, any kind of thing at all - we are employing categories.” [Ibid: 5, italics in origin]

This is, of course, a very old position, and until relatively recently scholars were convinced they had it all figured out.

“From the time of Aristotle to late Wittgenstein, categories were thought to be well understood and unproblematic. They were assumed to be abstract containers, with things either inside or outside the category. Things were assumed to be in the same category if and only if they had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in common were taken as defining the category.”[ibid: 6]
This position was not based on empirical study, however, but solely on philosophical speculation. As a consequence of a line of empirical work initiated by Eleanor Rosch a totally new understanding of what categories are, and how humans employ categories to create meaning, has been developed within cognitive science. The changes from the old view, Lakoff calls it objectivism, to the new view, which Lakoff labels experiental realism, are so radical that I believe it will be useful to present them side by side. The following is a direct quote from Lakoff [ibid: xii-xv]

Objectivism

- Thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols.
- The mind is an abstract machine, manipulating symbols essentially in the way a computer does, that is by algorithmic computation.
- Symbols (e.g. words and mental representations) get their meaning via correspondences to things in the external world. All meaning is of this character.
- Symbols that correspond to the external world are internal representations of external reality.
- Abstract symbols may stand in correspondence to things in the world independent of the peculiar properties of organisms. Since the human mind makes use of internal representations of external reality, the mind is a mirror of nature, and correct reason mirrors the logic of the external world.
- It is thus incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason that human beings have the bodies they have and function in their environment in the way they do. Human bodies may play a role in choosing which concepts and which modes of transcendentental reason human beings actually employ, but they play no essential role in characterizing what constitutes a concept and what constitutes reason.
- Thought is abstract and disembodied, since it is independent of any limitations of the human body, the human perceptual system and the human nervous system.
- Machines that do no more than mechanically manipulate symbols that

Experiental realism

- Thought is embodied, that is, the structures used to put together our conceptual systems grow out of bodily experience and make sense in terms of it: moreover, the core of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical and social character.
- Thought is imaginative, in that those concepts which are not directly grounded in experience employ metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery - all of which go beyond the literal mirroring, or representation, of external reality. It is this imaginary capacity that allows for ‘abstract’ though and takes the mind beyond what we can see and feel. The imaginative capacity is also embodied - indirectly - since the metaphors, metonymies, and mental images are based on experience, often bodily experience. Thought is also imaginative in a less obvious way: every time we categorize something in a way that does not mirror nature, we are using general human imaginative capacities.
- Thought has gestalt properties and is thus not atomistic; concepts have an overall structure that goes beyond merely putting together conceptual ‘building blocks’ by general rules.
- Thought has an ecological structure. The efficiency of cognitive processing, as in learning and memory, depends on the overall structure of the conceptual system and on what the concepts mean. Thought is thus more than just the mechanical manipulations of abstract symbols.
correspond to things in the world are capable of meaningful thought and reason. Thought is atomistic, in that it can be completely broken down into simple ‘building blocks’ - the symbols used in thought - which are combined into complexes and manipulated by rule. Though is logical in the narrow technical sense used by philosophical logicians; that is, it can be modelled accurately by systems of the sort used in mathematical logic. These are abstract symbol systems defined by general principles of symbol manipulation and mechanisms for interpreting such symbols in terms of ‘models of the world’.

As I see it experiential realism can be a helpful tool for building a theory of interpersonal dyads that can account for the double nature of such relationships. Cognitive anthropology can assist us in understanding how the meaning of categories such as ‘I’ and ‘you’, ‘father’ and ‘son’ emerges as consequence of both cultural and individual cognitive processes. Experiential realism can assist us in understanding how cognitive models and the kind of mental operation that we call ‘reasoning’ both contribute to the meaning of relationships. By ‘reasoning’ I here mean that kind of mental operation whereby connections are made, be it connections between ideas, people, objects, two stimuli of a sensory organ etc. In order to show how cognitive anthropology can be useful for these purposes I need to deal with both cognitive models and reasoning in some detail.

Cognitive models
To my knowledge the most thorough and informative presentation of cognitive anthropology available today is Bradd Shore’s work Culture in Mind [1996]. In his book Shore applies cognitive perspectives and knowledge to a range of fundamental anthropological problems, and in addition it is also a very good introduction to cognitive model theory. As I understand Shore the theory postulates that human being employ cognitive models both in order to form categories and to perform the mental operation we call reasoning. One of Shores central points is that without cognitive models the world is and remains meaningless to us. The stimuli emanating from our sense organs have no innate meaning and remain meaningless until they are organised and transformed into recognizable patterns. According to cognitive science stimuli are organised and transformed into particular kinds of sensations by way of a mental operation where the stimuli are compared with abstract images. These abstract images are what Shore calls cognitive models.

A cognitive model can be understood as a mental and/or embodied re-presentation of previous experiences. It is a slightly transformed version of those experiences in the sense that the model is simplified, generalized through elimination of detail and either reduced or enlarged in scale. It is this general character of the model that makes it configurable to many different situations and new experiences. Because of its general nature it is possible to identify a new experience as a particular kind of experience by way of a process where un-
interpreted stimulus is compared with generalized models. When a close enough match is found the stimuli has been ‘identified’ and as a result the situation and the experience become meaningful. Cognitive models are most frequently compounds that “consists of an interrelated set of elements which fit together to represent something” [D’Andrade 1995:126]. As such they not only help us to identify whole experiences and situations, but also supply us with what we need to identify the elements things consist of, how these elements are put together as well as the dynamics of the processes whereby these elements and connections are generated. For my purpose cognitive models can help me to identify the meaning of such concepts as ‘father’ and ‘son’, the elements that make up these concepts, the ways that these elements are combined, and the connections between the concept ‘father’ and ‘son’. I will return to this in chapter five in which I will describe the contemporary Pakeha models of father and son in great detail.

Before I continue with my presentation of experiental realism and how it can assist us in understanding how meaning is generated, there is an epistemological and an ontological problem that ought to be dealt with. The epistemological problem arises because the theory is supposed to be cross-culturally and universally valid. The theory claims that regardless of cultural background, regardless of the huge differences in the beliefs, ideas and notions people hold about their lives and their environment, basically all people create and store meaning by use of cognitive models. The second problem concerns the relationship between models and what they are about. According to cognitive theory the models are about ‘reality’. I will deal with the epistemological problem first.

Contrary to the old objectivist cognitive theory experiental realism greatly emphasises that the brain and the body are intimately connected in the creation of meaning. As far as most kinds of meaning is concerned the cognitive processes involved do not only take place in the brain, but involves the entire human body, and the bodily experiences are usually necessary ingredients in the meaning that is created. Today there is ample evidence to support the claim that in spite of cultural differences humans perceive and conceptualise their surroundings in fundamentally similar ways. The perception and conceptualisation of colours is a good example. All people do not have concepts for all the same colours. But when they do differentiate between colours, and have concepts for them, the way that they differentiate is not random. In other words, when people do identify a particular colour (particularly what cognitive scientists call basic and pure colours such as black, white, red, yellow, blue and green) they identify colours that are very similar to what everyone else does. According to Lakoff this is because

“colour categories are generative categories... They have generators plus something else. The generators are the neurophysiologically determined distribution functions, which have peaks where primary colors are pure: black, white, red, yellow, blue and green.” [1987: 30]

Colours are bodily experiences and the various colour categories exist, among other reasons, because humans are neurophysiologically predetermined to experience certain colours and not others. Lakoff goes as far as saying that

“Cognitive models are embodied, either directly or indirectly by way of systematic links to embodied concepts. A concept is embodied when its content or other
properties are motivated by bodily or social experience. This does not necessarily mean that the concept is predictable from the experience, but rather that it makes sense that it has the content (or other properties) that it has, given the nature of the corresponding experience. Embodiment thus provides a nonarbitrary link between cognition and experience.” [ibid: 154]

The point is that our perception and understanding of the world is strongly influenced by the make-up of the human body and as far as we know today the human body is made up in the same way everywhere on earth.

The problem which remains concerns the relationship between experience and that which the experience is about. That which the experience supposedly is about is usually called reality. According to Shore cognitive models are both products of and producers of experience. Human beings employ cognitive models to construct the objects of recognition in the sense that it is only by way of a model that the object is recognised and identified as what it is. On the other hand intrinsic qualities inherent in the object itself greatly influences the models that can be constructed. As the example above shows, if an object reflects red light humans will not construct a model of this object which defines the object as green. The human experience of the object thus greatly influences the maintenance of the model, or what a new model can contain if it were to be constructed.

This we are faced with the old chicken or egg problem; which came first, cognitive models or reality? Philosophically this is a very difficult problem because it necessitates asking the fundamental ontological question ‘what is reality?’ In principle this question is unanswerable because it is not possible to decide whether an independent reality, i.e. a reality totally independent of our perception and knowledge of it, actually exists or not. Even if such a reality should happen to exist it is impossible for humans to know its nature. We can only know the nature of our perceptions of reality. By implication it is not possible to know what the reality is that our cognitive models are models of and based upon. 10

Philosophically this is quite a bother but as far as this study is concerned it does not really matter. Regardless of what the experienced ‘reality’ (‘ding and sich’ so to speak) may be prior to being experienced we can confidently assume that at a fundamental level all humans have the same or very similar bodily capacities for experiencing this reality. The fact that the philosophical chicken-egg question cannot be answered does not pose a problem as far as our inquiry into human cognition is concerned.

**Kinds of Models**

In order to understand how cognitive models contribute to the creation of meaning we need to understand the large variety there is as far as kinds of models are concerned. The first distinction to be aware of is between individual and collective models. In spite of having a body that basically is the same as every other body, any individual can develop and hold knowledge, beliefs and convictions that are perfectly and completely private, held only by him or her self. Most commonly, however, knowledge, beliefs and convictions are shared to a greater or lesser degree among several individuals. According to cognitive theory it is only through sharing cognitive models that people are able to hold the same or similar ideas and beliefs. Some cognitive models may, in other words, be perfectly private whereas others are a mix of private and shared. To anthropologists this distinction is of utmost importance, and in
order to distinguish between these two kinds of cognitive models Shore [1996] employs the terms ‘idiosyncratic model’ and ‘cultural model’, respectively. An idiosyncratic model is the exclusively property of an individual mind. The moment an individual begins to share this model with someone it is transformed and takes on traits of a cultural model.

Cultural models are the very mainstay of anthropology and one of the older debates within our discipline is whether culture is located inside or outside of people’s minds. In Bradd Shore’s opinion neither position is adequate. It is not a question of either/or, but of both. He calls this the double phenomenon of culture. On the one hand cultural models are instituted, in the sense that they are lodged in public social institutions like national flags. Instituted models are culture ‘in the world’ so to speak, publicly available and publicly shared by a number of people. On the other hand cultural models are also conventional mental models that are lodged in people’s minds and as such never fully shared. Because conventional mental models are aspects of personal knowledge or meaning there is always an element of idiosyncrasy about them. All cultural models will therefore, by necessity, always have both instituted (i.e. collective) and mental (both idiosyncratic and conventional) properties.

In addition to the distinctions between private and collective, instituted and mental models Shore also identifies a vast range of different kinds of models that he divides into two major groups: linguistic and non-linguistic models. The former consists of: scripts; propositional models; sound symbolic models; lexical models; grammatical models; verbal formulas; trope models. The latter consists of: image schemas; action sets; olfactory models; sound image models; visual image models. This distinction is important because it highlights that humans perceive and understand their surroundings not only, and maybe not primarily, in terms of language. Smell (olfactory models) is, as an example, very important in how we conceptualise our environment without words. Smell is a sensation that almost exclusively is conceptualised as emotions. Human cognition is thus a matter of feelings and emotions as much as thinking and reasoning. This is an important point for understanding how bodily experiences of other people, for example acts of giving and receiving care, informs the meaning of the contents of interpersonal relationships. This is a point I will return to in greater detail in chapter four.

Another important point made by Shore is that cognitive models are organized at different levels of abstraction. He distinguishes between abstract, global models, which he calls foundational schemas, and more concrete and particular instantiations of those models. The difference between these is relative rather than intrinsic or absolute, but the distinction is useful, on the one hand when a set of specific models share the same foundation, but also to distinguish more general and specific aspects of a particular model. As an example models for mother and father have in common that they are models of parenthood and on of the foundational schemas upon which the model of parenthood rests is an idea about biological essence. Mother and father both belong to the category ‘parent’ because both have contributed equally much of their own biological essence into the makeup of the biological essence of their child. I will return to this idea of essence as a foundational schema in chapter eight.

The relationship between cultural models and concepts is not altogether clear-cut. Some concepts cannot be identified as a specific and separate model, or as an element in one model only. According to Shore such concepts may be distributed over a number of models [Shore
1999, personal communication], and therefore may carry different connotations of meaning depending on the models they are part of in the different situations when the concepts are used. A concept may therefore contain several different meanings that may go together harmoniously, or may contradict each other. Lakoff calls such concepts ‘cluster models’ and he uses the concept ‘mother’ as an example [Lakoff 1987: 74]. He argues that in western culture this concept is a cluster of five distinctly different models of what a mother is:

1. The birth mother,
2. The genetic mother,
3. The nurturance mother,
4. The marital mother (the wife of the father),
5. The genealogical mother (the closest female ancestor).

The possible contradiction between the ‘genitrix’ (in itself a cluster model containing the birth mother and the genetic mother) and the ‘mater’ (the nurturance mother) has been recognized by anthropologists for a long time. In today’s world, with fairly advanced medical technology for assisting reproduction, all five sub-models may turn out to be at odds with each other.

**Ways of reasoning**

It is obvious that the meaning of the concept mother is very different depending upon which model we use to define it. On the one hand this difference is a matter of what the concept refers to. If mother is defined by the marital model the reference is to husband, a legal and social institution called marriage, a ceremony called a wedding etc. If mother is defined according to the nurturance model the concept refers to a set of tasks that the woman is supposed to perform in relation to a child. On the other hand there are times when the difference in meaning is not only or primarily a function of what the concept refers to, but a matter of qualitatively different kinds of reference. A reference is a connection, but it is not a connection ‘in reality’. It is a connection in our minds, and the way that humans create (i.e. imagine) connections is of utmost importance for understanding the kind of meaning lodged in a model. As an example the meaning lodged in an olfactory model is very different from the meaning lodged in a lexical model. Both models may refer to the smell of a rose but the meaning inherent in the smelling of the smell is radically different from the meaning of a list of the chemicals that the rose emits.

The act of creating connections is of central importance in the creation of meaning. The referential process I have just mentioned is one form of connection making whereby a thing or experience is given meaning. In addition the construction of a model is also a connection making process in itself. As I wrote above cognitive models are usually compounds, i.e. “interrelated set of elements which fit together to represent something” [D’Andrade 1995:126]. Fit together is but another expression for connected. The point here is that the *kinds* of connections we make, and *how* we make them greatly influences the meaning of our models. In order to argue for this standpoint, and the consequences it has for our understanding of meaning, I need to deal with this topic in some detail.

Lakoff calls the process of connection-making ‘thinking’, a process that he claims is

>“imaginative, in that those concepts which are not directly grounded in experience
employ metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery - all of which go beyond the literal mirroring, or *representation*, of external reality. It is this imaginary capacity that allows for ‘abstract’ thought and takes the mind beyond what we can see and feel. The imaginative capacity is also embodied - indirectly - since the metaphors, metonymies, and mental images are based on experience, often bodily experience. Thought is also imaginative in a less obvious way: every time we categorize something in a way that does not mirror nature, we are using general human imaginative capacities”. [ibid: xiv]

The idea that human thinking is imaginative does not imply that there are no restrictions on human thinking, or that humans are free to construct any kind of connection they can imagine. There are a number of factors that influences the imaginary process that is called thinking (or connection-making in my vocabulary), both restricting and enhancing it. For the sake of clarity it is wise to divide them into factors internal and external to the imaginative process itself. By internal factors I mean such things as the restrictions provided by the *rules* of logic, of tropes, of narratives etc. By external factors I mean such things as social norms, the information-processing technology available etc. I will deal with the latter first.

The development, internalisation and application of cultural ways of reasoning are obviously closely guided by social norms; positive and negative social feedback. [Shore 1996: 47-48] Encouragements as well as discouragements from other people are important factors as far as what kinds of imagination will develop within a group. And because social relations are always a matter of power this raises such questions as who is in control of the institutions of education and art where the imaginative faculties are cultured and/or stifled. In cases where there are conflicting norms it is, of course, necessary to ask why some norms are hegemonic, who benefits from the dominance as well as what means of power operate to make and keep these norms dominant. Posing such questions opens up a huge field of inquiry, far too large for me to deal with it in any great detail in this thesis. There is however, one aspect of this topic that has greatly contributed to the dominance of a particular way of reasoning in western culture, i.e. the language technology that we call writing.

The fact that certain ideas and certain forms of imaginative connections making (i.e. thinking) dominates within a group of people is not necessarily an outcome of a deliberate strategy employed in order to establish that dominance. As history has shown an important factor involved in establishing the dominance of western scientific reasoning is the technology available for storing and communicating thoughts. According to Shore “every mental model is part memory, part invention.” [ibid: 47] and when it comes to cultural models, i.e. conventional public models, the relationship between memory and invention (the imaginative production of new meaning) is crucial.

In his book *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* [1977] Jack Goody argues that the mnemonic devices (memory techniques) available to a group of people is a decisive factor involved in determining the kinds of meaning favoured by that society. Language is the most obvious technique for storing and communicating meaning. Rhythm in the form of songs, dances and rituals are other, less obvious, mnemonic techniques. Then there is painting, text, audio and video recording. Not all meaning is equally easy to store by all kinds of memory techniques. By inventing alphabets, and thus the possibility to create texts, humans created an
enormously powerful mnemonic device which also had far-reaching consequences for the kinds of meaning that can be produced. Contrary to all other mnemonic tools texts also allow for the development of abstract, disembodied and atomistic thinking according to formal, conceptual rules of logic. In other words; the kind of thinking that Lakoff calls ‘objectivism’.

Of all the mnemonic devices humans have invented only texts facilitates the creation of definitions like this: “A bird is a warm-blooded, feathered, egg-laying vertebrate having the forelimbs modified as wings.” [Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary 1980]. A written language makes it possible to store this meaning (definition) of what a bird is so that at a later stage, when it has been forgotten, it is possible to turn back the pages and refresh ones memory. These kinds of definitions radically influence our thinking and our imagination. On the one hand definitions are products of, and inspire a kind of imaginative reasoning whereby the identity of any individual entity is determined by general essential traits immanent to the entity itself. This kind of reasoning is usually called essentialist and fosters the development of the kinds of rules of connection-making between immanent traits and outer appearance, rather than between the entity and the context within which it exists.

A written text also makes it possible to develop general rules of reasoning because, again, it is possible to turn back the pages and investigate what the rules of definition and the premises of the argument were, and to judge if they have been correctly followed. Once the general rules of reasoning have been established, as they were with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in the western tradition, literacy encourages the invention of new knowledge based on those rules. On the other hand such definitions also discourage imaginative reasoning that breaks with these kinds of formal rules.

In stark contrast to what is possible once text has been invented, in oral traditions there are no pages that can be turned back in order to refresh ones memory, and to investigate the premises of the argument. In societies without written language most meaning, and all meaning expressed by spoken language, is produced in one continuous stream of time. Because there is no turning back to re-examine exactly what was said, in order to remember what was said the words that were used and the meaning expressed must be stored in the same kind of activity as that in which it was produced. In oral traditions the only way to remember meaning is to store it in the form of analogies; primarily as rhyme, rhythm, ritual, narrative, image and performance. By evoking the analogies; singing the song, reciting the poem, performing the dance or the skill, and telling the story, the meaning is remembered. Oral traditions favour whole packages of meaning where each part stands in a metonymic relationship to the rest. By remembering the first strophe of a songs tune the whole song is recalled. By humming the tune, the words spring to mind. Or another direction of connections; by rhythmically moving ones body a dance is recalled, then the tune springs to mind etc. The first strophe is part of and also stands for the whole song, etc.

In the absence of text the capacity for storing is greatly limited and the creation of fundamentally new meaning is a threat to the body of knowledge and meaning already created and stored. Oral societies therefore cannot afford but to discourage the development of new knowledge, and have to be rather strict in selecting what will be remembered and what will not. When new meaning is similar to old meaning it is easier to store because it can be connected to meaning that is already remembered. ‘Similar’ new meaning therefore has a greater chance of survival than ‘unfamiliar’ new meaning that cannot be connected to
something that already exists.

At the same time and or the same reasons as above, in an oral society meaning and knowledge is never fixed and is always undergoing a subtle process of change. In a society where meaning is stored as text, remembering is ‘reading’. Thus it is held by most people to be a form of exact copying of what was written down. In an oral tradition, however, the mnemonic devises available do not facilitate a reproduction and an exact copy of the meaning that originally was produced and stored. Oral remembering is always in the form of evoking analogies and as such is always a creative process. Take the example of an event that is stored as a story. A story is a particular way of creating connections between a place, smells, the people and relationships involved etc. Any part of the story is a memory tag that may evoke the whole story. By telling the story at a later time something new is created because when told the story is always slightly changed. Some details are emphasised, others tuned down for the story to be relevant to the situation when it is re-told. The telling of the story is also an event in itself that may be remembered as a new story etc. The telling of the story thus re-creates the meaning of the story, but never copies it. Because it is continuously recreated it can stay alive, change with changing situations, and still be a form of remembering of meaning produced in the past.

A text, on the other hand, makes it possible to freeze the meaning, to make exact copies and to remove the meaning from the context in which it was produced. It also makes it possible to imagine that the stored meaning somehow can be independent of the context in which it was produced and is recalled. It facilitates the Platonic notion of the ideal form, the pure idea that exists prior to and independent of all its material manifestations. Oral traditions, on the other hand, cannot remember meaning that is not intrinsically a part of the context that it is part of every time it is recreated. Without all the connections, to analogies, to places, to people, to context, the meaning is lost. Thus it is highly unlikely that people with an oral tradition would ever imagine objectivist and essentialist notions akin to dictionary definitions.

My point here is that the old objectivist cognitive science rests on and employ the rules of meaning making fostered by the technology we call ‘written language’. So does western common sense about interpersonal relationships, as well as the anthropology that builds upon that common sense. In my view this is one of the main reasons why common sense and contemporary anthropology fails to grasp the more salient and experientially important aspects of interpersonal dyads. When engaging in intimate acts of relating to each other as lovers, parents and children, we are not reading texts, but are engaged as bodies in communal participation that fosters a radically different kind of imaginative connection-making. In order to understand this kind of connection-making and the meaning generated through such intimate acts we must look beyond the rules and reasoning fostered by texts.

**Lévy-Bruhl and the law of participation**

In order to understand the rational imagination, and the kinds of connection-making fostered by oral societies I suggest that we turn to Lévy-Bruhl and some of the ideas he presented almost a century ago. Lévy-Bruhl maintained that ‘natives’ tend to think in a different way to ‘civilized’ westerners. He contrasted the western, conceptual way of reasoning, based on formal rules of logic (similar to what Lakoff calls ‘objectivist’), with a ‘primitive’ way of reasoning, based on what he called the ‘law of participation’ [Littleton 1985, Shore 1996]. Lévi-Bruhl was heavily attacked for his assertion that ‘underdeveloped’ people look at the
world in ways that are fundamentally different from us in the west, and particularly for calling that way of looking at the world ‘prelogical’. As Shore has commented, it was an unfortunate choice of terms. [ibid: 27] because if we manage to ignore the unpleasant connotation of the term itself we may discover that Lévy-Bruhl actually had a good point. Littleton puts it this way:

“....This primitive ‘way’ involves the notion that all things, beings, or whatever are in some fashion linked together, that there is no distinction (not simply no clear distinction, but no distinction at all) between self and other, or between subject and object, past and present, animate and inanimate, etc. Interpretation - or better, perhaps functional integration in the modern mathematical sense - is the key descriptive concept here (though he does not explicitly use it), and the notions of time and space as we conventionally understand them have no meaning.” [Littleton 1985: xiii, italics in origin]

According to Lévy-Bruhl the ‘prelogical’ way of reasoning, (i.e. of making connections), governed by the ‘law of participation’, is inherently mystical. This quote by Lévy-Bruhl is taken from Littleton’s article:

“If I were to express in one word the general peculiarity of the collective representations which play so important a part in the mental activity of underdeveloped peoples, I should say that this mental activity was a mystic one (p. 38)” [Littleton 1985:xiii, italics in origin].

This mystical way of reasoning obviously violates many of the rules of western formal logic, including the rule of non-contradiction. At the same time Lévy-Bruhl never asserted that ‘underdeveloped people’ were incapable of what we in the west call logical thinking, and that they only reasoned in mystical ways. This quote by Lévy-Bruhl is taken from Littleton as well:

“By prelogical we do not mean to assert that such a mentality constitutes a kind of antecedent stage, in point in time, to the birth of logical thought. Have there ever existed groups of human or pre-human beings whose collective representations have not been subject to the laws of logic? We do not know, and in any case, it seems to be very improbable. At any rate, the mentality of these underdeveloped people which, for want of a better term, I call prelogical, does not partake of that nature. It is not antilogical; it is not alogical either. By designating it "prelogical" I merely wish to state that it does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding contradiction. It obeys laws of participation first and foremost. Thus oriented, it does not expressly delight in what is contradictory (which would make it merely absurd in our eyes), but neither does it take pains to avoid it. It is often wholly indifferent to it, and that makes it so hard to follow. (p. 78)” [Littleton 1985: xiii-xiv, italics in origin]

The important implications of Lévy-Bruhl’s work is the insight that humans are perfectly capable of non-logical forms of reasoning that does not restrict itself to avoid contradictions. By this form of reasoning it is perfectly possible for humans to create ‘mystical’ connections to the effect that at one level there is no distinction between self and other. In chapter four I will demonstrate how this form of reasoning, and the subsequent emergence of ‘magical
unions’ is an important and vital element in relationships between givers and receivers of care. In chapters six seven and eight I will show how an element of magical union in relationships between fathers and adolescent sons provides them with a vastly different set of resources for negotiating their place in the home in relation to other family members, for solving questions of power between them and for communicating the love between them, than if the magical union does not exist.

**Meaning for someone**
Having argued that it is possible for humans to reason in ways that establish ‘mystical’ connections only begs the questions: What is this mystical meaning? How is it established, and what is it that makes it different from ‘rational’ connections? In order to investigate these questions it is necessary with a slight change of perspective. So far I have talked about cultural meaning; i.e. conventional and instituted meaning and the social conditions that favour different kinds of conventional reasoning. In other words, the meaning of something. However, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter culture is a double phenomena and meaning is always twice born, once as public, instituted model, once as mental model. Meaning is, in other words, also always meaning for someone. At this level meaning is an experience rather than the kind of meaning we refer to when we, for example talk about the ‘abstract contents’ of a proposition. The meaning of ‘rain’ is ‘water falling from the sky’, but for a person living in drought stricken area ‘rain’ is likely to be experienced as ‘salvation and bliss’.

In order to understand how meaning is experienced it is necessary to understand how mental models are produced. Or to use Shore’s words:

“The ability of symbolic analysis to illuminate what things mean require that we understand how things come to have meaning. We need an adequate conception of the various ways in which the world takes on symbolic form for people.” [1996: 199, italics in origin]

This question is not a matter to be taken lightly. Regardless of philosophical orientation most anthropologists accept that what the world is for us, and the sense we make of it, all depends on the symbolic forms which the world takes on as a consequence of how we perceive it and reason about it. As anthropologists know, and the argument by Lévy-Bruhl is an example of, symbolic forms can be so different that the symbolic world of one people can, at the immediate level, be incomprehensible to another group.

The issue of how the world takes on symbolic form has, according to Shore, been approached in two different ways:

“The first way in which semiotic theories have tried to classify symbols is in terms of the different possible types of symbolic vehicle. These typologies have focussed on how signifier and signified are linked (...........) The second major way in which symbolic forms have been approached has been to focus on what people can do with signs - in other words how signs work in different contexts.

These theoretical approaches in semiotics vary in terms of whether they emphasise the logical characteristics of the sign or the psychological relation of a sign user to a sign. Thus, for instance, it is commonly (but wrongly) assumed that the iconic or indexical qualities of a sign can be determined without reference to the
intentions of any subject.” [Shore 1996:199, italics in origin]

In Shore’s opinion neither of these approaches is sufficient and maintains that there is

“a need to formulate a more coherent conception of signs that takes into account their degree and type of motivation. (Ullman 1957). The notion of symbolic motivation implies some kind of nonarbitrary relationship between a signifier and its referent” [op.cit: 199]

Shore’s point is that all signs are motivated to a greater or lesser degree, and the motivation is always a matter of both logic and psychology. In order to understand how both logic and psychology influences the ways which signifiers are related to their referent Shore distinguishes between empirical and psychogenic motivation.

“The first life of any sign lies in the empirical nature of the relation a signifier bears to a referent. Signs have different sorts of affordances for producing psychological meaning. The sign’s second life is in the establishment of a psychological relationship between signifier and referent in someone’s mind.” [op.cit: 200]

The important point here is that the meaning of a sign is, to a greater or lesser degree, determined both by the empirical nature of the relation a signifier bears to a referent, and the imaginative cognitive process whereby humans identify and/or create such connections. A sign, e.g. the word ‘rain’, partly derives its meaning by referring to the phenomena that water is falling from the sky. This is the empirical motivation of the sign. In addition it derives meaning from the connotations and emotions that the phenomena produces in the people using the sign. Some signs, e.g. onomatopoeticons like ‘cut’ and ‘hop’, are such that the use of the sign (in this case that would mean the pronunciation of the word) itself generates psychological meaning. Psychogenic motivation is thus the process whereby a psychological connection between signifier and referent is actively established in a persons mind.

According to Shore there are three different kinds of psychological connections that can be established between a signifier and its referent: Arbitrary (i.e. purely conventional), metaphorical and metonymical. As far as psychogenic motivation is concerned arbitrary conventional signs differ significantly and in fundamental ways from metaphors and metonyms. From a number of different perspectives a number of different theoreticians [see e.g. Werner and Kaplan 1963, Roman Jacobsen 1971, Bateson 1972, Tambiah 1990, Lakoff and Johnson 1987, Shore 1996] have suggested that metaphor and metonym are the elementary forms of symbolic meaning construction. Such theoreticians argue that the human ability to construct arbitrary signs, i.e. to build arbitrary connections between signifier and signified, has developed from and built upon our ability to create metaphoric and metonymic connections. And what is more, and of utmost importance, there are good reasons to believe that the kinds of connections we call metaphor and metonym rest upon bodily experiences, many of which are pre-linguistic.

One theoretical perspective supporting the above claim is Gregory Bateson’s [1979] investigation of the relationship between digital and analogue modes of creating and storing meaning. Bateson argues that language (predominantly a system of arbitrary signs) is fundamentally a digital mode of storing and conveying meaning. He points out that the
human capacity for language is usually located in the left hemispheres of the brain, whereas artistic capacities are usually located in the right hemisphere. The left hemisphere favours digital meaning whereas the right hemisphere favours analogue meaning. It may therefore be tempting to draw the conclusion that at the physiological level the brain is equally much both a digital and an analogue information processing organ. However, at the most basic level, i.e. the level of neuron transmitters, all brain activity is digital. This fact leads Bateson to ask if analogue meaning is always a product of digital brain activity, or if it somehow is produced directly as analogue meaning? To Bateson analogue meaning is so basic and of such great importance for how we make our world meaningful that he cannot accept that idea that analogue meaning is a secondary by-product of digital processing. Thus he speculates and proposes the hypothesis that whereas the brain is our digital thinking-machine, the entire body is our analogue-thinking machine. To Bateson the human mind is not located in the brain, and is not a function of brain activity alone. The human mind is the totality of brain and body (as well as any technology humans employ to extend their body), and as such the mind is equally much a producer of digital and analogue meaning.

There are good reasons to accept Bateson’s hypothesis. The case of Merlau-Ponty’s bicyclist is but one analogy that supports it. The knowledge of bicycling, both the know-how needed to keep ones balance, and the knowledge of the bike as an object, of moving on a bike at the speed of a bike, the knowledge of the traffic, of the how slippery the tarmac is etc is analogue knowledge. It is knowledge which certain muscles in the body have acquired, and which is stored in those muscles.

The hypothesis that metaphor and metonym are primary forms of meaning making can also be supported from a developmental perspective.

“Before early hominids had language (...) they had the capacity to create and communicate cultural forms, like tools, through mimic representations. ‘The mimetic level of representation’ says Donald, ‘underlies all modern cultures and forms the most basic medium of human communication.’ (1991:1679).”[Shore 1996: 320] 13

Language and arbitrary, conventionally motivated meaning is, in other words, not a developmental precondition for meaning-making. Neither is it the basis upon which the other two kinds of meaning-making (metaphors and metonyms) build. On the contrary, one of the central insights of contemporary cognitive science, as reflected in e.g. Bateson’s, Lakoff’s and Shore’s work, is that bodily experiences, and not abstract reasoning, are of central importance for how humans experience and create meaning in the world. According to Lakoff

“cognitive models are directly embodied with respect to their content, or else systematically linked to directly embodied models.” [Lakoff 1987:13]

Shore argues that

“mediation of sign-meaning by reference to ones own body is perhaps the most elementary way in which meaning construction works by a kind of integration of novel stimuli with prior experience.” [Shore 1996: 362].
My point is that there are good reasons to believe that the human capacity for meaning-making, i.e. for making connections between a signifier and a signified, is pre-linguistic and inborn. At this basic and immanent level meaning is constructed as concrete analogies between bodily experiences and something else. As an example, newborn infants, no more than half an hour old, are capable of making connections between their own faces and those of other people. An infant’s attention is automatically drawn to faces, and if the other face makes certain obvious gestures, the child is very likely to mime it [Stern 1985]. There is also evidence to suggest that infants are either born with or very quick to pick up on certain rhythms and are capable of identifying these rhythms in other people’s voices and movements [Trevarten 2002]

The Norwegian anthropologist Jorun Solheim [1998] expresses it this way:

“We may be faced with two absolutely basic and general ways of conceptualising connections - similarity and proximity - that at the deepest level is based on bodily/sensational experiences and images. (........) the human way of thinking, our way of establishing connections of meaning, is in a certain sense ‘magical’, and may say to derive from these two basic forms (metaphor and metonym) of ‘sensational’ associations” [ibid: 63, my translation].

Solheim’s point is that the meanings of symbols are, in their elementary form, bodily experiences of similarity and proximity, rather than an intellectual conceptualisation of the meaning of the symbols. As an example it is possible to understand the meaning of an emotion by miming the facial expression (making a similar face) of that emotion. Likewise, by copying the facial expression of someone else the meaning of what the other is experiencing can be understood. On the other hand proximity is experienced for example when a person touches two objects that lie close to each other, and the idea that these objects somehow naturally belong together can thus be established.

As I understand Solheim her point is that ‘connections of similarity’ is but another word for metaphor, and ‘connections of proximity’ another word for metonyms. Metonymic meaning, based on bodily experiences of proximity, is of particular relevance to this thesis, and I therefore need to elaborate on this theme. Metonyms are signs that belong to the category they refer to. When, as an example, a rose is used as a symbol for all flowers it is a metonym because the rose is also a flower and as such refers to itself plus all other flowers. Metonyms are, to use a term borrowed from Shore,

“‘participatory’ symbols, never achieving a full detachment of the signifier and the signified.” [Shore 1996: 200].

Metonyms are characterised by always being attached to their referent, but never absolutely so. Unlike icons (e.g. a statue of the Madonna), which are strictly tied to what they stand for (it is the Madonna and it stands for her), and arbitrary signs, which may stand for anything (there are no similarities or other empirical connections between the word ‘chair’ and the object which it stands for), metonyms are far more ambiguous. Metonyms can grasp and express radically different kinds of meaning from metaphors and arbitrary signs. Metonyms are good for expressing experiences of, as well as creating and imagining relations like part-to-whole, identification, incorporation, transformation and ‘participation’. [op.cit: 202].
Metonymic reasoning is, in other words, exactly the kinds of reasoning favoured by oral traditions. The kind of thinking which Lévy-Bruhl called ‘pre-logical’ and ‘magical’ is a kind of reasoning and a kind of meaning that can only be created, caught and carried by metonyms.

Metonyms are also particularly useful for making sense of contradictory and transformative experiences and phenomena. Through metonymic reasoning ‘something’ can be judged as having a separate identity, and it can retain this identity while simultaneously loosing it in the process of becoming an integral part of a larger entity. Metonyms work by transforming separate entities into integral members of a larger united entity while also keeping them apart. Proximity though participation in the same act or performance, within a shared context, is the mechanism whereby this transformative process of simultaneous separation and unification is achieved. And as I have indicated many times already in this chapter, these are exactly those aspects of interpersonal dyadic relationships that common sense western ways of thinking, as well as mainstream anthropology, does not manage to grasp.

The argument that signifier and signified may become metonymically linked if they are seen as participating in the same activity or the same category is a particularly important point in my thesis. My argument is that when persons participate together, particularly when they participate directly in the maintenance, feeding, cleaning, caressing of each others bodies, metonymic relationships are (or may) develop between them. Joint activity of any kind carry the potential for the development of metonymic relationships, particularly joint activity where bodies are seen as transgressing each others boundaries, as in sexual intercourse, pregnancy and birth, feeding another person, eating together etc. These kinds of joint activities are rich in affordances for producing what Shore calls “natural symbols - signs that draw directly from human encounters with the world”. [op. cit: 201]. Shore argues that natural symbols “tend to be grasped indexically by subjects because such signs participate in the larger context which they are a part. In the case of animal symbolism, however, this indexicality entails a more intimate form of metonymy, in which the relation moves between representation and actual assimilation.” [op.cit: 201]

The point that Shore here makes about animal symbolism also obtains for the symbolic contents of interpersonal dyads. Interpersonal relationships also move between representation and assimilation in the sense that the individual moves between representing him/herself and being assimilated with the other. The bodily participation in each others lives create affordances for certain kinds of metonymic meaning that cannot develop if this participation does not, or have not existed. This is a central point in my argument about why fathers and sons take love for granted, that I develop in chapter eight.

As I have indicated many times before in this chapter, the kind of meaning that can grow out of bodily participation in each other’s lives is radically different from the kind of meaning based on notions of separate identities and autonomy. In a discussion of totemism Shore makes a number of points that apply equally well to the meaning of interpersonal dyads.

“The mysteries of organic transformation and interdependence are fundamentally different from the question of classification and logic that have dominated anthropological discussions of totemism. And so the question of the “rationality” of
totemic beliefs and practices cannot be considered exclusively in terms of their adherence to principles of categorical logic. (...) concepts as embodied in human intentional worlds are living entities, not ossified museum pieces. They serve human ends - ends that may be practical, intellectual, or aesthetic or any combination of the three. It profits us little to simply assume that cultural forms as rich and complex as totemic symbols speak to all humans with a single voice and a unique function. The divergence between the classificatory (metaphorical) impulse, and the transformative (metonymic) impulse are matters of local emphasis and are distributed quite differently in different cultural traditions.” [op.cit: 207]

A theory of interpersonal dyads
Interpersonal relationships, even in their most basic form as dyads, are hard to fathom and interpretations that build upon western common sense and the formal logic of western academia are not adequate for catching the full contents of such relationships. In order to construct an anthropological theory of interpersonal dyads we therefore need to suspend a number of common sense ideas that we take for granted. As already elaborated upon in chapter one, the first common sense presupposition that must be eradicated is the belief that the contents of interpersonal relationships is a substance like blood, a rope, glue or similar. The fundamental premise of the theory I propose is that the contents of interpersonal dyads must be understood as a matter of meaning. This is important because it underlines the point that the contents of interpersonal relationships are never given, but are continuously maintained and re-created. The meaning of interpersonal relationships cannot be captured in a text and can therefore never attain the illusion of being fixed. As a consequence the meaning of an interpersonal relationship is an emergent phenomenon; always the outcome of a process of maintenance or change.

In order to begin to understand the meaning of interpersonal dyads it is necessary to realize that in a most profound sense they are double natured. Relationships simultaneously constitute the persons involved as separate individuals and as necessarily connected and thus interdependent. The relationship is simultaneously both the sum of the individuals and an entity greater than that sum. Different kinds of interpersonal dyads contain many different kinds of meaning, distributed over a continuum from unambiguous, one-dimensional, strictly and narrowly defined, finite and ‘impersonal’ transactions (e.g. between a supermarket cashier and a customer) to multi-dimensional, ambiguous, widely defined, infinitely intimate and intimately personal relationships (e.g. between parents and children). When trying to understand the meaning of any particular dyad it is important to be open to the possibility that the meaningful contents may rest further towards the ambiguous and ‘mystical’ side of the continuum than what immediate impression and common sense might lead on to believe.

In order to understand the full meaning of interpersonal dyads, i.e. both the rational and the extra-rational meaning, I suggest that they should be investigated from at least three different perspectives. First of all it is necessary to conduct a cognitive analysis establishing the models involved and the forms and processes of reasoning involved. Because meaning is always logged both in society and in individuals (see Shore’s point earlier in this chapter about the double nature of culture) it is necessary to investigate both the individual and social aspects of how meaning is established and maintained. Secondly my theory of dyads necessitates a phenomenologically inspired analysis establishing the meaning that the dyad has for the persons involved and how the persons involved experience the dyad. The third
perspective is upon social context. Obviously, as in all social life, social dynamics at a level of abstraction not necessarily experienced by individuals are at play. Relatively abstract or large scale social dynamics not only generate the context for individual experiences, they may also directly inform this experience by generating the meaning of the instituted and conventional cognitive models individuals employ as an integral and necessary part of experiencing their world. There are a number of contemporary anthropological theories available for understanding these kinds of social processes. However, due to the emergent qualities of the meaning of interpersonal dyads I believe a processual analysis, akin to Barth’s generative process analysis, will be fruitful in my case. This theoretical approach has the added advantage of a theoretical scope that encompasses not only actors but also social dynamics and social form.

These three different perspectives focus on different aspects of how the meaning of interpersonal dyads emerges, but it is important to keep in mind that they all impinge on each other and together generate the emergent phenomena. By treating these perspectives separately I run the risk of creating a false impression that they may be separable. I therefore underline that they are not, but for the sake of clarity of presentation it is still necessary to try

My theory of interpersonal dyads rests on the assumption that meaning is a matter of both cognitive models and ways of reasoning. In order to understand a particular kind of interpersonal dyad it is therefore necessary to discover both the cultural models informing the meaning of the relationship and the imaginative connection making generating the experiential meaning of the relationship. In western, Anglo-Germanic culture there are at least three different kinds of models involved in the formation of the meaning of dyads: the models for the individual, the models of the connection itself, and the model for the collective entity (the dyad). In the previous chapter I have already presented common sense western notions, and thus cultural models of the individual, the connections and the dyad. In chapter five I will provide a more thorough presentation of the cultural models of father and son that are held by Pakeha New Zealanders today.

Western cognitive models are obviously not generally valid among all people on earth and other people may have models that are very different from ours. Examples from Melanesia, where the foundational model for individual person and for collective is the same, are well documented. A number of Melanesian peoples hold cognitive models specifying that the connection between people is what makes them persons, and the model for the connection does not rest on nor promote the idea that the connection somehow has a material essence that is different from the relationship it forms and the people it unites. It is imperative to keep in mind that it is an empirical task to establish the relevant models among the people being studied. At this stage it is also important to underline that the models we look for when trying to understand the meaning of dyads are not necessarily of a kind that are easily described in words. The models involved in forming the individual person’s experience of the dyad may well, to a large extent, be the kind of model that Shore calls conventional kinesthetic schemas. These schemas

“model an individual’s relationship to the immediate environment through conventions affecting posture, interpersonal space, and muscle tone.” [Shore 1996:59].
Due to their non-linguistic nature such models and their meaning are necessarily difficult to describe. This does not make them any less important, though. Western culture, with its strong prejudice in favour of the written world and formal rules of logic, does not express much explicit recognition of non-linguistic and/or non-logical meaning. There are, however, traces to be found, and a basic notion about kinship relationships is a good example. To most people in Anglo-Germanic societies the statement ‘blood is thicker than water’ is a truism about the nature of kinship relationship. There is, however, nothing logical about the statement. On the contrary it expresses a mystical belief about some very unique quality inherent in and making up certain kinds of connections between certain kinds of people.

In this chapter I have argued that the question about rational versus extra-rational meaning is a matter of what kinds of connections people imagine to exist between and among humans, objects, happenings or between anything at all. Taking my lead from Solheim and Shore I argue that at a fundamental cognitive level notions about connections rest on bodily experiences of sameness and proximity. Such experiences are the foundations for the kinds of reasoning we call metaphor and metonym. Metaphors establish and express relations of similarity, whether analogical similarity of form and appearance, or homological similarities of underlying structure. Metonyms, on the other hand, establish and express relations of proximity based on how entities participate (in the same context and/or the same activity) in constructing each other. Metonyms are particularly important as far as the establishment of mystical connections, based on what Lévy-Bruhl called ‘the law of participation’, are concerned.

My theory of dyads proposes that there is a great potential for the growth of extra-rational meaning in dyads because almost all interpersonal relationships to a large extent build on face-to-face interactions, and thus bodily experiences of being together. Bodies favour reasoning by metaphors and metonyms based on experiences of similarity and proximity. Any interpersonal relationship may therefore contain meanings of both the logical and the mystical kind. By one process of reasoning the subjects involved in the relationship may work on establishing and maintaining themselves as separate entities. By the other process of meaning making they may be involved in the transformation of themselves into a greater unity. Any interpersonal relationship, whether dyad or larger, must be investigated along both of these axes. In chapter four I will explore how care-giving, particularly when it requires a lot of hands on, bodily involvement, can contribute to the growth of extra-rational meaning and what I have called magical unions between caregiver and care-receiver.

The establishment of metaphoric and metonymic connections are, of course, acts of imagination and thus always a form of ‘fantasy’. One kind of connection is no more ‘real’, in a material sense, than the other, but they can still be imagined as more or less so depending on how much the connection is experienced as a product of a deliberate and conscious mental operation (i.e. of conscious thinking), or as having sprung ‘directly’ out of a bodily experience. Metaphoric meaning is created through the establishment of an ‘as if’ connection based on some degree of imagined similarity. This ‘as if-ness’ carries the potential for the judgement that the connection somehow is construed. Metonyms, on the other hand, create ‘natural’ connections between the sign and that which it refers to. Part of the qualitative difference between metaphor and metonym is that they carry different affordances for being judged more or less ‘real’. One might say that metonyms create connections that are more real, but less objective, stronger and yet more elusive than metaphors. This point is of central
importance to the argument I develop in chapter eight.

The double nature of interpersonal relationships constitutes a serious methodological challenge because it is impossible to catch a phenomenon that is, by its very nature, the opposite of itself and continuously in the process of generating that opposite. But then again, we are all relational beings and as we have been producing insights into our own nature for eons, we have a large pool of resources available for our investigation. Even though I have attacked common sense for being too simplistic and potentially misleading, I still think it provides an opening into the maze. In common sense terms this duplicity is most easily understood as a continuous movement between individuation and unification. On way of grasping this continuous movement is to focus on how the boundaries between ‘one’ and ‘the other’ is continuously established, transgressed and re-established. Drawing inspiration from Barth’s work on ethnic boundaries [1969] I suggest that a possible methodological approach is to analyse interpersonal dyads as a process of ‘boundary management’. According to Barth ethnic groups, group identity and individual ethnic identity emerges as consequences of, on the one hand how individuals perceive boundaries as including or excluding themselves from ‘the other’ group, and on the other hand from how they interact within groups and across the boundaries. Similarly a focus on boundary management is a valuable heuristic tool for uncovering how the meaning of the connection and the quality of the dyadic unity emerges as a consequence of the activities two people engage in together, the acts they do towards each other, as well as how these activities are inclusive or exclusive, how they constitute, recognize and respect or ignore and violate boundaries.

A methodological perspective highlighting ‘personal boundaries’ and ‘boundary management’ can, in my opinion, be used for all the three analytical purposes I outlined above as necessary in order to achieve a fairly comprehensive understanding of interpersonal dyads. It can be used in cognitive inquiries into the meaning of dyads as well as for developing phenomenological understanding of how individuals experience them, and it is obviously useful for grasping how social and cultural forms are generated. From the perspective of cognitive theory the idea of boundaries is as basic as the idea about categories. In order for ‘something’, i.e. an incident, an object or a phenomenon, to be recognised as a particular kind of thing, and as such be brought into the domain of what is considered real and therefore memorable, it must be identified as belonging to a particular category. All processes of categorisation always involve both a process of differentiation and exclusion, and a process of inclusion. The first process outlines the boundaries of ‘things’ and separates and identifies them as different from other ‘thing’. This is, in other words, a process of exclusion by drawing a boundary between them. The second process involves comparison and matching and as an outcome the ‘thing’ is found to be adequately similar to a category of other things to which it therefore ‘belongs’. Such a process of inclusion implies the transgression of an already existing boundary of a category in order for the new entity to become part of the already existing larger entity.

Even though ideas and notions about boundaries obviously are mental constructs they are also strongly based on bodily experiences. As an example, in western culture the meaning, the boundaries and the contents of the concept ‘I’ very closely corresponds with the notion of the body. For most purposes the category ‘I’ and the category ‘my body’ are congruous and overlap. I will argue that in a phenomenological perspective ‘the body’ is a more primary entity than the abstraction ‘category’ and it is thus possible to speculate if perhaps ‘the body’
may be the cognitive model for ‘category’, rather than the other way around. All categories are entities that share most of the traits of human bodies: They have identities, they can be ignored, violated or honoured, they have certain powers (i.e. there are certain things they can do, or be used for), they can become obese or old and lose their powers, or with healthy and regular exercise remain in good shape and accomplish great things.

Cognitive processes can therefore be imagined as boundary management in the sense that categorisations and the mental acts of connection making (i.e. reasoning) can be conceptualised as different forms of boundaires, and transgressions of boundaries. As I have argued above, when interpreting interpersonal relationships it is particularly important to understand the kinds of meaning established through metaphors and metonyms. Metaphors and metonyms rest on very different kinds of boundary-management. Metaphoric meaning is created through an ‘as if’ connection, a similarity. New ‘things’ are included in an existing category if the new ‘things’ are similar enough to be identified ‘as if’ they are the same as the existing members. Because it is an ‘as if’ sameness, and thus a pretended belonging, the new ‘thing’ will always to a certain degree retain its separate identity and remain a bounded and separate entity within the category where it has been given residence. Because this ‘as if’ sameness can be quite far fetched, as for example when a rose is a metaphor for love, it is fairly easy to see that the boundary between the ‘thing’ and the other members of the category is always intact and require a shift of focus (e.g. between part in whole) in order to grasp the ‘thing’ or the category.

A metonymic sign, on the other hand, does not only ‘stand for’ the other members of the category, it both stands for them and is one of them at the same time. Metonymic meaning rests on a connection-making process whereby the new ‘thing’ is seen as a perfect member of a category to which both it and a number of other things ‘really’ belong. Categorization by metonymic reasoning thus rests on and creates an integrated connection between the new entity and the established members of the category. At the same time the new ‘thing’ is not dissolved through this process of incorporation. Metonymic reasoning can be understood as a form of boundary management where the boundaries between the new and the already existing members of a category are simultaneously maintained and dissolved. This kind of boundary management abides by the rule or participation, establishing mystical unions between entities that both retain their separate identity and merge into collective entities with a separate and different identity at the same time. The meaning that emerges as a consequence of metonymic process can only be grasped if we simultaneously both apply and do not apply the Aristotelian rule of contradiction. In terms of boundaries metonyms establish connections between entities so that the boundaries between them are both maintained and dissolved at the same time.

Metaphoric and metonymic reasoning, based on bodily experiences of similarity and proximity, are particularly important for understanding the meaning of interpersonal dyads, particularly when the relationships are of an intimate nature. The kind of bodily experience individuals have with and of each other can be understood as different forms of boundary management whereby different kinds and degrees of including the ‘other’ entity into the category of the ‘I’ are established. As Bateson [1979] has argued the human body can be ‘extended’ to include new ‘things’. To a blind man the stick is not a foreign object but the elongation of the sensory organs of the skin of his hand. In the same vein to a good bicyclist the bicycle is an elongation of his arms and legs. The inclusion of tools into the body can be
understood as either metaphoric or metonymic connections. First time a human tries to handle a tool it will be a foreign object, it will still be an independent entity and only an ‘as if’ extension of the body. Gradually the person will learn to use it so well that it ceases to be experienced as and ‘as if’ elongation of arms and legs. Gradually and with huge amounts of practice the person may come to experience that he or she is ‘one’ with the tool.

In principle there is no difference between a material object and a living organism; to a blind man the dog is his eyes. Meaning making and the manoeuvring of the material body within a material as well as a social world can both be understood as boundary management. By focussing on how people are continuously engaged in maintaining and transgressing their boundaries it is possible to understand how the meaning of their self-identity and their unions with others emerges. And because bodily and cognitive (as in abstract thinking and emotions) experiences are prerequisites for each other, a focus on bodily boundary management provides an avenue into understanding the meaning of more abstract entities like ‘self’ and ‘relationship’. In interpersonal relationships the kinds of happenings whereby boundaries are transgressed are potent means for establishing bodily sensations of ‘sameness’. Sexual intercourse is a prototypical symbolic act for including two people in one entity, and thus the establishment of metonymic ‘magical union’. Interestingly enough that is one of the very few means for establishing one-ness between parents and children that is absolutely banned. All sorts of other ways of transgressing bodily boundaries are, on the other hand, available to parents and children: washing, caressing, feeding, the child vomiting all over the parent who happens to carry it, being urinated or defecated upon when cleaning the baby, being cried upon when comforting etc. The dirt and pollution is a result of material bodily boundaries having opened up, and this transcendence and/or transgression carries a strong potential for the creation of a symbolic sense of ‘oneness’.

Boundary management also allows for the uncovering of some of the value attached to different kinds of dyads. As Douglas has pointed out the maintenance and transgression of boundaries is always risky; potentially both beneficial and harmful, clean or dirty [Douglas 1966]. In order to handle the cognitive awkwardness of ‘matter out of place’ it is commonly assigned either a very negative or a very positive value. It is, in other words, either pollution or sacred. This insight can account for why sexual intercourse carries sacred connotations and an act that properly only belongs in a relationship between husband and wife. Likewise it sheds light on why sexual behaviour between adults and children are seen as absolutely and totally wrong. The experience of maintaining and/or transgressing bodily and personal boundaries are important in establishing the meaning of self and other, as well as the meaning of a sense of being an integral union with the other. In addition a focus on boundary management assists us in understanding the value attached to these notions.

The idea that interpersonal relationships can be understood as boundary management and the consequences of how such management has guided many of the analysis in this study. Different meaning is created depending on how personal boundaries are managed, and in chapters four I try to describe what kinds of caring tasks fathers are involved in as well as how they perform them how differences in ways of caring also mean differences in how fathers manage their boundaries towards their sons. In chapter five I outline the cultural models available to fathers and sons in their attempts at creating their relationships and managing their interpersonal boundaries. In chapters six I explore how fathers struggle with administrating their boundaries in relationship to the social space called ‘home’ as well as to
their wives, and I suggest that their boundary management on these arenas are of central importance for the relationship between father and son. In chapter seven I present how fathers and sons deal with their boundaries towards each other and how this process leads to particular distributions of power in the relationship. In chapter eight I show how different father-son relationships, constituted by different ways of managing their interpersonal boundaries, create very different conditions for how to deal with the love in the relationship.
Chapter 3 Variety and patterns

I never thought it would be easy to understand the contents of relationships between fathers and adolescent sons. Not only are the contents of such relationships very rich and the dynamics of every relationship quite complex, but in addition no two relationships are the same. Even though I have, from the very beginning, focussed on those attributes/aspects/dimensions of relationships that I call care, love and power, the variety is still large. Even though my choice of focus simplifies my project it does not pave the way for a straight forward description and analysis. Having decided that I will look for care, love and power does not in itself determine what care, love and power is and how these topics are played out in real life relationships.

Due to the complexity of father-son relationships it is wise to begin with a simple and down to earth approach, and start with a relatively ‘naïve’ and superficial description of how the thirteen fathers and (more than thirteen) sons behaved in the everyday situations we all took part in. This approach allows me to begin in a relatively ‘naturalistic’ mode [ref. Barth, 1992]. In my everyday activities as a private person (as opposed to researcher) I place a lot of trust in naturalistic observations, and I take these observations for granted. Even though I do not believe that naturalistic observations are a guarantee of accuracy or truth, I still find such descriptions seductive. Considering that descriptions have to start from some point of view or another, and as long as no perspective can be granted privilege, I may as well start with my own habitual ways of looking at the world.

As mentioned in chapter one I observed fathers and sons in two different communities, one urban and one rural. In light of the urban-rural ambivalence in New Zealand culture it is worthwhile noticing that I found no clear cut similarities within these two categories, or any straight forward differences between them. If it is the case that the rural-urban dichotomy is a differentiating factor in New Zealand society I would have expected some differences to appear in my material. But the fact is that they did not and I can see two reasons why. First of all, the rural community where I have done my fieldworks have, as I mentioned in the introduction, a large population of new-comers. The new-comers are predominantly people with an urban background who have developed lifestyles that contain many urban traits. Thus there are many people in this rural community who live, think and express themselves in ways that are most commonly found in urban areas. Many of the fathers in my sample are such rural urbanites.

The urban - rural ambivalence

When travelling by car over long distances in New Zealand I have made it a habit to stop at regular intervals for a ‘cuppa’ tea or coffee and a bite to eat. It did not take me long to learn that there are two radically different kinds of places that serve such refreshments; tearooms and cafés. If I stop in a small rural town, or in the country it is most likely to be a tearoom. They almost always look as if they have been there for ages, at least since the early fifties. As a rule they are worn, not dirty, but a long time since they were redecorated. The walls are painted in light pastel, usually light greens, blues and pink, and the floor covered in linoleum or plastic tiles. The tables and counter have Formica tops, the chairs are made from steel pipes with seats and back covered in plastic padding. Decorations are sparse and to the extent that they do exist are likely to be a faded print, for example of a sentimental nature scene. Plastic flowers, dusty and having lost most
of their colours, are common decorations on the tables and in the windows.

On the counter is a class display exhibiting sandwiches, caramel slices and ginger squares for sale. Hot food is served too, mainly hot pies (kept hot in a separate glass display), fried chicken and chips. The tea is always good, generous amounts and as a rule standard black, often referred to as gumboot. Comes with milk and sugar. Coffee is served too. Some times only instant, but usually filter coffee prepared some time ago, stewing in a glass cone on a hot plate. Next to the counter is a large fridge stocked with soft-drinks.

Not all tearooms are old. Some have been built quite recently, but according to the same general model as the old ones. The newer tearooms are harder to describe. They serve the same food and beverage, but do not look exactly like their older counterparts. For one, new tearooms are often located in new buildings and the building materials are selected mainly on economic grounds; they therefore have a definite inexpensive look. Plywood walls and fibre-board floors are not unusual. The tables and counter still have Formica tops, but now imitate wood, and the tables and chairs may have wooden legs. Tearooms are created with efficiency in mind, for both owner and customer. The food is standard and easy to prepare, the premises easy to keep clean. They are no-frill down to earth filling stations where one can get a quick bite of familiar food and never expect to be surprised. They are not designed with even a side glance at aesthetics, and still have a certain charm.

On the other hand are modern cafés. Most often found in urban areas, but of recent they have started to pop up in the middle of nowhere. Elsewhere in this thesis I have described the new urban chic consumerism which is becoming increasingly more apparent all over New Zealand. These new cafés are part of that trend. The food and the drink is not only nourishment for the body, but also the soul and ones identity. Good coffee, prepared on an espresso machine is a necessity. So is tea, often several different kinds, including herbal infusions. Fancy food; imaginative salads, Italian breads like focaccia and ciabata, Asian and Italian pasta, sushi and green lipped mussels from Marlborough sounds. Unlike tearooms cafés often serve beer and wine. Soft drinks are always available, but the fridge is hidden in the kitchen. Cafés are always designed with style in mind. A multitude of different styles, from the rustic, anarchistic pioneer slash artistic to the strict modernistic steel and glass. The purpose of the café is the pleasant experience, the pleasant surprise.

I have described these tearooms and the cafés in such detail, not only because I find them fascinating in their own right, but also because they are symptomatic of a duality, an ambivalence that sometimes borderers on a schism within New Zealand society. In Golden Bay, the rural area where I have lived for longer periods of time, some people never visit the cafés, while another category of people is rarely seen at the tearooms. The newcomers, those who have only lived in the area for thirty years or less, who grew up in a city somewhere else, maybe even abroad, and after arriving in the area are involved in arts and crafts, as self-employed, in the service sector, or receive a state benefit, they are the patrons of the cafés. Those who are descendants of old families, who are involved in agriculture of some sort, or fishing, owners and operators of long established businesses, these people frequent the tearooms.

The distinction between the urban and the rural is very pronounced in Golden Bay. Over the last thirty years the influx of newcomers has been very large and by rough estimate I’d say that
today close to half the population have arrived since the late sixties. As categories neither newcomers nor locals are clear minorities and neither is made invisible by the dominance of the other. But these two different themes, or ways of life or whatever one wish to call them, is not an exclusive Golden Bay phenomena. As images of contemporary Kiwi ways of life they are presented in mass media as well as in small talk and conversations among regular people all over New Zealand all the time. To what degree these images fit with how people actually live their lives I am not in a position to judge. It cannot be doubted, however, that some people have a more urban style of life whereas others are closer to the rural pole.

As I have mentioned earlier almost all symbols of national Kiwi identity are from rural New Zealand, and all are male. And yet the vast majority of New Zealanders live in urban centres. Greater Auckland alone has more than a million inhabitants. According to Statistics New Zealand [www.stats.govt.nz] three quarters of all New Zealanders now live in urban areas. This imbalance obviously contributes to the ambivalence between the urban and the rural ways of life, outlooks on life etc. In general urban Kiwis regard their rural cousins with an uneasy mix of contempt and admiration. On the one hand they cannot help but to use rural images as part of their national self-image, and on the other hand slightly fear and despise them. One thing is the positive self-image; the rough, ingenious self-made good keen man who works hard, drinks hard and fights hard when necessary. Another thing is the down side of his roughness, reflected in general myths, in novels and films as well as media reports about child abuse, incest, drunkenness and a general conservative stubbornness keeping the countryside from developing and entering the twentieth century (The twenty-first century is so far ahead they have not got a chance). If Kiwi identity is rural, urban Kiwis also project their negative notions about New Zealand society onto rural life.

This contemptuous urban attitude was blatantly demonstrated by Prime Minister Helen Clark a few years ago during the debate about the logging of native forest on the West Coast of the South Island. The West Coast has an image as the last frontier. Quite lawless, and inhabited by pioneers, outlaws and fortune seekers. During the debate the West Coasters criticised the government vehemently. In a fit of irritation Helen Clark inadvertently called the West Coasters ferals. As mentioned above that term is also used about a category of young urban dread-locked students and beneficiaries. Helen Clark, on the other hand, used the term in its more conventional sense, referring to an animal that used to be domestic but has escaped and gone wild. As can be imagined her exclamation caused a bit of a stir.

Rural people are equally sceptical of urban dwellers. The New Zealand economy heavily depends on export of agricultural produce, produced in rural areas, by rural people. To the rural people city dwellers are seen as non-productive bludgers. They create no wealth, but make all the large scale decisions, govern the rural people from top to toe, are middle men who skim off the profits, and are generally condescending and out to fleece the hard working farmer/orchardist/logger. To rural people the urban life style is a symbol of all that has gone wrong with New Zealand since the happy fifties. With the obvious exception of many young rural people who cannot wait to leave for the excitement and fulfilment of life in the big city.
New Zealand are not greatly affected by such public images. Both instrumentally and symbolically the home is defined and organised in much the same way regardless of whether it is situated in a rural or an urban locality. Regardless of setting one or both parents are at work during the day while the children at school. (None of the families in my sample had members too young to attend school). When they arrive home in the afternoon it is time for relaxation, food, and leisure activities. In most families the latter means watching TV, computer games for the boys, and maybe some hobbies like sports or carpentry in the shed for fathers and sons. For my purposes, i.e. understanding relationships between fathers and sons, the only public images that significantly influence life in the family are public images of masculinity. I have already mentioned some of these images in the previous chapter, and I will return to this topic in chapters six and seven.

The accounts that follow are partly in the form of descriptions, partly interpretive commentary. I see no problem with this distinction. Neither description nor commentary are independent of each other, they are merely different conventional styles of presentation. They are also both my opinions. The descriptions are made in an everyday, naturalistic language. I write as if my observations are correct and comprehensive representations. Obviously that is not the case. There are many aspects and depths to all that happened that I do not describe, and even more aspects that I never saw. My descriptions are quite superficial, and yet I believe they serve their purposes. First, to indicate the huge variety in the ways that fathers and adolescent sons relate to each other. Second, to provide the reader with material to form their own impressions of the fathers and sons that this story is about. Third, it allows me to introduce, at this early stage, some of the themes that will be developed in further detail as the thesis unfolds. In the following each relationship is presented from a particular perspective in order to exemplify particular analytical topics. The descriptions are therefore slanted, highlighting certain features at the benefit of others. Obviously all names are fictional.

**Warren (approximately 45), Josh (19), Carl (16), Paul (12)**
Warren is a single father and the boys have lived with him for a couple of years. Josh has moved out now and attends university in another part of the country. Carl lives with relatives in another city as well, in order to attend school there. These boys spent the summer holiday at home and thus I got to know them. Paul lives full time with Warren. Even though Warren is a solo dad he works part time, and also runs his own small business close to home. He is an energetic and imaginative man. He is witty, continuously cracking jokes, and making funny comments about whatever is going on. During my visits he is usually busy with household tasks; cooking, tidying, making cups of tea or coffee for Paul and me, and other tasks around the house that I don’t see. Warren and I talk a lot during my visits and thus I receive a lot of his attention. At times I try to avoid that and sit quietly by the kitchen table hiding behind a magazine. I’m not good at it though, and Warren and I usually strike up a conversation again quite quickly.

Paul is a rather quiet boy, far more quite than both his father and his two older brothers. Often he’ll sit and read a novel all through my visit. When the TV program *The Simpsons* is on, he’ll watch it. Sometimes I watch it with him, other times I sit and talk with Warren in another room. On one occasion Warren joins us in watching *Simpsons*, but usually not. I spend time alone with Paul every now and again, Warren either in another room, or not home from work yet. Paul is quiet then too. He doesn’t object to my presence, but if I ask him too many questions he seems uncomfortable. He prefers to answer my questions with “Yep” and “Nope”.

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Warren and Paul come across as very different kinds of people as far as style of self-presentation is concerned. Both Josh and Carl seem to be able to play Warren's game to some extent, responding in kind to their fathers jokes and boisterous remarks. Paul doesn't play that game very well at all. At times Warren's jokes have a sharp ironic or sarcastic sting, mainly when he teases people like Josh or me who, supposedly, are his equals. There are times, however, when he also directs such comments at Carl and Paul. When directed at me I always find his comments challenging, but also friendly, never hostile. Maybe it is only a peculiarity of mine, but I interpret his comments as an invitation to competition, and I think perhaps Josh does too. I cannot remember how Carl responds to it, but know for sure that it usually makes Paul silent and he retreats. At other times Paul responds by assuming an air of confidence, as if he is cool and on top of the world. In general, however, Paul does not seem comfortable with Warren's extrovert behaviour, and usually responds by retreating into his own activity; reading or playing a game on his own in a corner of the room. The more quiet and calm Warren is, the more comfortable Paul seems to be interacting with him.

There are two points I find worth noticing about Warren and Paul. The first is the interplay between individual character traits (what is often called personality) and their relationship as father and son. Engaging in a chicken or egg speculations about what came first, idiosyncratic traits or the particular style of interaction, is obviously futile. Suffice to say that Warren most of the time comes across as a rather boisterous witty man with a sharp tongue whereas Paul generally comes across as a quiet person.

The second point is that Warren seems to have a self-identity project going which is larger than his role as a father. Warren comes across as a witty man regardless of whether he is at home or in public. It is my impression that it is important for him to be such a man. Being clever, witty, socially competitive and competent is a personal project he engages in most of the time. Even though this behaviour is not directly related to being a father it encompasses being a father, and strongly influences the way he is as a father. Warren is good at being who he is, and my interpretation is that Paul pulls away from his strong father in order to construct his own space where it is possible for him to explore and develop his ways of being, outside of the dominance of his father.

Daniel (approx. 45), Susan (Approx 40), Christine (13-14), Rick (11)
Rick does home schooling and Daniel is in charge of his education. According to Daniel the decision to do home schooling was made by Rick. On the other hand education and schooling is a very important topic to Daniel too. He has thought a lot about it, and he is very knowledgeable and articulate on the topic. We talk about it quite frequently. One of his main arguments against ordinary schools is that they are not tuned in to the imagination, desires, abilities and interests of the individual child. Daniel thus believes that rather than to stimulate learning schools stifles it. He is convinced that if children are left to themselves they will seek out the knowledge they want and need when the desire and need arises.

Because Rick doesn't go to school I usually visit them at midday, around lunch. Susan is at work and Christine at school, and usually only Daniel and Rick are at home. Daniel runs a small business, together with a handful of friends and neighbours. The work is irregular, with long spells of nothing to do, and then a period of intensive work and long hours. The workshop where the money-earning activities take place is in a shed on Daniels property, not far from the residence. During the first two months that I visited them Daniel did not work (i.e. to make money). He was therefore mainly involved in work in and around the home, and as such the primary caregiver for Rick.
Usually when I arrive Daniel is busy with some household task or another like preparing lunch or painting the ceiling. Rick is usually in the room next to the kitchen, playing on the computer. As a rule Daniel and I engage in conversations about some topic or another (frequently about education), while Rick continues to play on the computer. When the food is ready Rick leaves the computer and enters the kitchen to eat with us. On one occasion Rick was chef and baked a pizza. During lunch Rick doesn’t relate much to the two of us. He eats quietly and then leaves the room again to resume his computer game. He returns for some more food, but doesn’t engage in conversation with us. Once when I arrive Rick has a friend visiting and they play on the computer all the time I’m there. Usually Rick plays on his own, however. I get the impression he spends almost all his time at home, and that he does not spend much time with peers, neither in front of the computer, nor engaging in other activities. Sometimes I go and watch him play. Usually he doesn’t talk to me or acknowledge my presence, just keeps playing. On one of the few occasions when he does address me it is to ask for the meaning of a written text on the screen. Rick can’t read, but is still very skilled at finding ways to obviate his lack of literary skills in order to negotiate the games.

Once when I arrive Christine is home from school and together with her dad she is busy repairing and painting the ceiling in the lounge. Rick doesn’t participate, but watches. In the middle of the painting work, without any forewarning, Rick fetches a video and puts it on. Daniel is enthusiastic because it is his favourite movie: *Predator*. Christine stops working to watch the movie, and shortly Daniel stops as well. We all sit around watching, Rick and Daniel in the sofa, Rick sits more or less in Daniels lap.

Rick doesn’t interact very much with Daniel, nor with me. In general Daniel leaves him alone, waiting for him to initialize contact. At the same time Daniel is very quick to make favourable comments and praise Rick for things he does and says. Daniel provides Rick with a lot of freedom to explore his world and initialize contact, while also encouraging him by praising the discoveries and creations he does make. Sometimes, however, I get a feeling that Daniels praise is not entirely genuine. I am not sure, and it may be that I misinterpret Daniel, but on several occasions it seems as if Daniels praise is motivated by his own ideologies rather than because he finds that what Rick does is all that great. I am also of the impression that though Daniel gives Rick a lot of freedom Daniel also limits Rick’s life by frequently talking about how Rick is going to prosper by not going to school and by developing according to his own inner potentials. Sometimes I get a vague hunch that maybe one reason why Rick keeps so much to himself is that he avoids his fathers expectations of him.

Daniel is a man with high moral standards, and a strong ideological agenda concerning the education his children receive. These moral standards and his ideology can be interpreted as a strong personal project. Though the project is aimed at improving the lives of others, especially his children, I believe it can also have the effect of deflecting his attention away from the needs and desires of others and onto himself. I believe that Daniel resembles Warren in the above example in the sense that Daniel too is a man with a strong personal project. This project too is larger than and eclipses his role as a father. As with other strong fathers the son seems to withdraw and create his own space where he can maintain and develop his own ways of being in the world.

**Harry (late forties), Deb (17), Julian (15), Chris (6)**
Harry is a single father who has been full time caregiver for his three children for approximately two years. One time when I arrive Harry is in the front lounge, which has been converted into a jewellery workshop. He is tidying and cleaning up for the day while Julian is on the Playstation in the
kitchen/lounge. Deb is in her room and Chris is running all over the place. I sit down in the kitchen talking to Julian. He is busy with his game but answers me all the same. After a bit he stops, comes over to me and asks if I want a cup of tea. He prepares me a cup, and we talk about school and holidays when Harry enters. He acknowledges both of us, but does not interfere in our conversation. Chris is still racing all over the place, in and out of the room, preoccupied with his own activities. When there is a natural pause in the conversation between Julian and I, Harry joins in. He comments that this is an important school year for Julian, and emphasises how important it is for Julian that he does well this year. Harry is quite soft spoken about it, and takes great care not to push his opinion on Julian. Still, it is obvious that he speaks as a person of authority. Julian does not oppose this mild authority, but agrees wholeheartedly. Harry then asks me how my week has been and all three of us engage in small talk for a while. Chris comes running in and tries to interrupt our conversation. Harry, soft-spoken but firm, tells him to wait his turn. When whoever was speaking has finished, Harry turns to Chris asks him what it is. Chris wants to watch TV in Harry's bedroom, and Harry says "OK". Harry then leaves again to return with a handful of newly washed, but crumpled clothes. Starts sorting and folding, and waits for another natural opening in the conversation between Julian and I before he asks Julian what clothes are his. A small pile of clothes in need of repair is left over. Harry tells me that he is not a really good caregiver for his children because he does not know how to mend clothes. The worn and torn clothes will be sent to the children's mother who lives a few miles up the road.

Julian resumes his Playstation game, father is finished folding clothes and stands by Julian for a while watching him play. I ask if he has ever tried. He has, but not much. "I got my jewellery making", he says. Deb comes out of her room and fetches something from the fridge, then returns to her room. Julian sees her and follows her to say something, but she does not notice and closes the door. Julian quietly knocks and waits for a reply. When she appears he asks her, quietly, if they can do the dishes now (it is their turn) so that he can get into his homework afterwards.

Harry has been the primary caregiver for his three children for only two years. He does not feel competent as a caregiver, and believes a woman is naturally better at it than men. In spite of this he is the most gentle father and his relationship with Chris is marked by obvious signs of mutual respect. Julian is quite remarkable in his social skills. He takes great care not to invade other people’s space, and simultaneously will not let others invade his. His father and he seem to move in close circles around each other, taking great care to avoid overstepping each others boundaries. I decided to call their ways of being together ‘close parallel lives’

Matthew (approx. 45), Jane (approx. 45), Christie (16/17), Stan (13), Trish (12)
The entire family, except Matthew, is in the lounge when I arrive. The TV is on and Stan is watching The Simpsons. Matthew enters and sits down next to Stan. Immediately, without being asked or told to, Stan switches to the Six O'clock News. Matthew sits close to Stan, resting his arm over Stan's shoulders. Christie is sitting on the floor with her school books spread around, doing her homework. Trish is practising her flute in a corner of the room. Jane is moving back and forth between the lounge and kitchen, preparing tea (i.e. supper). We are all engaged in small talk, and the TV is mostly ignored. When the sports news come on Matthew and Stan focuses on the TV. When tea is ready we all serve ourselves and return to the lounge with our plates to watch TV while we eat. It is Stan's turn to do the dishes after we have eaten and he does so without being told.

Back in the lounge Jane has become engaged in Christie's homework, and Stan, when finished with the dishes, has fetched his as well. Jane engages herself in Stan's homework too. Matthew is sitting right next to them watching the rest of the news, exchanging a word now and again, but not involving
himself in the school work. Meanwhile Jane has run into a problem in Stan’s homework that she cannot figure out, and she hands it over to Matthew. He becomes quite engaged in assisting Stan, and they work on it for a while. It is getting cold and Matthew asks Stan if he can light the fire. Stan immediately goes to the job, fetches kindling etc, and obviously knows what to do. Matthew does not interfere, only stands in front of the fire, getting warm. He then excuses himself, saying he has a meeting at work and has to leave.

I am tempted to use the word ‘traditional’ to describe this family. It strongly reminds me of the sorts of families my friends and I all seemed to be part of back in the 1960’s. The roles of father, mother, son, daughter, brother and sister are all clearly defined. The main impression I am left with is that this is a ‘matter of fact’ kind of family where everyone agrees about how to behave. Father is the obvious head of the family, but in an inconspicuous manner. His authority and autonomy is taken for granted and he does not have to demonstrate it; it is just the way it is. Mother, of course, is the homemaker even though she works full time as well. Stan openly admires his father, does not challenge him in any way, and wants to be like him.

James (mid-forties), Barbra (mid-forties), Matt (15) and Henk (12)

James arrives from work at the same time I arrive for my visits. He goes to change clothes and clean up, and I play touch-rugby with Matt and Henk in the yard. James calls us in, time to eat, and when we arrive James is in the kitchen with Barbra, helping prepare tea. Barbra is in charge, however. We all sit down to eat, and James starts talking about sports. I do not know much about sports and James explains about rugby, cricket, and golf. He tells stories about himself as a sportsman, his injuries, his successes, but also about trips the boys and he have done together to various tournaments. The previous weekend they went to a golf tournament and James proudly tells me that Matt won his division. As James is talking Matt keeps a close look at him. Every now and again he tries to say something, but James is too busy talking to me to notice. Every now and again when Matt tries to seize the word I shift my attention away from James and fix my eyes on Matt. This obviously makes it easier for Matt to keep the word for a longer time then if my attention is directed at James. Henk on the other hand interrupts frequently, either by making some comment, more or less relevant to what James is saying, or by making some funny or indecent sound. Barbara is obviously embarrassed by his impoliteness and tries to correct him. James ignores Henk and keeps talking. Henk goes on like that until he has finished eating. He then leaves the table even though the rest of us are still eating and goes upstairs to his room.

Matt remains at the table o the duration of the meal and when it is finished he and I go into the lounge to watch TV, while James and Barbara remain in the kitchen to clean of the dining table. Matt turns on The Simpsons and we watch for a bit, not saying much until James enters. Matt immediately, without being told or asked, switches to Six O’clock News. James start talking to me about some news item when Barbara calls to Matt from the kitchen to come and do the dishes. Matt ignores her, and Barbara then tells James to tell Matt to do it. Matt then abides. As we watch the news James keeps on talking. After a while Matt and Henk have both returned to the lounge, and James has started telling me about his sons. In the presence of both the boys, and while they are listening he tells me that Matt is a very quiet boy, and that I will never get many words out of him, and that Henk is talkative and outgoing. “This is their nature”, he says, and as a father he neither has the power nor the right to change them.

As a father James is very accessible to his sons. He spends a lot of time with them, eating with them, sitting in the lounge watching TV, participating in touch rugby and on trips to various sporting events. He is not at all an authoritarian father and believes in letting his sons
develop according to their own inner scripts, so to speak. At the same time he is also a
dominant person, primarily because he talks so much and that way draws a lot of attention to
himself, and because he defines the topic of the conversation. In my opinion, when he defines
his sons as particular kinds of people, when they are present to hear it, that is also a form of
domination.

Jack (44), Pippa (approx. 40), Bob (12), Thor (6)
Jack runs his own, rather successful business from a workshop close to their residence. There are lots
of tasks that need to be done on the property as well, and Jack works a lot. He seems to enjoy it
though, and on a few of my visits he is so engrossed in his work that he forgets I'm coming. Jack
comes across as a quiet, slightly shy man. Bob and Thor are both quite outgoing, and Pippa is very
social and a big talker. Jack usually leaves the talking to Pippa or the boys. He does not initialize
interactions with his sons, but waits for them to make contact. When Pippa is not present he is quite
happy to let Bob or Thor define the topic, and the activity, and only intervenes when things are going
wrong, rules are broken etc. Bob uses such opportunities to make himself the centre of attention. He
talks a lot, cracks jokes, asks us quizzes and seems to enjoy himself. Though I am not sure, I get the
impression Jack is not perfectly comfortable interacting with Bob. Bob seems to be in opposition to Jack
a lot of the time. He does not take instructions or suggestions, and usually insists on doing things his
own way. Thor, at the age of six, is not in opposition. He has a way of invading his father with overt
signs of affection. He climbs on his lap, kisses him with big wet lips and will not leave him alone. Jack
tries to ignore it for quite a while and finally tells him, rather abruptly, to stop it.

Usually all four are at home when I arrive. Once it is only Jack and Bob. They arrive at the same time
as I. It is getting towards winter and the house is cold. Jack decides to light up the big wood burner
which combines as a range and a boiler for the central heating. Bob wants to build and start the fire and
at first Jack is reluctant because he doubts Bob's ability. Bob persists, nagging about it and Jack
resigns. Bob fetches some wood he thinks will work as kindling, but Jack disagrees. "It's too green", he
says. Bob insists, and Jack withdraws. Bob builds a fire, lights it and it does not catch. He fiddles with it,
but does not manage. All the time Jack watches, tells him it won't work, but Bob will not listen. Finally,
and obviously irritated Jack tells Bob to move away. He removes all the green wood, rebuilds the fire
with dry kindling and lights it. The fire catches. Jack and Bob then leave the situation to do a few things
about the house. After a while we all congregate around the dining table where Bob entertains us by
telling jokes, asking us quizzes about countries in the world etc. Jack does not say much for the rest of
my stay.

As I see him Jack is a somewhat withdrawn father. He is a quiet man, and obviously very
comfortable when engaged in practical tasks around the property and in his workshop. When
interacting with people he seems slightly uncomfortable, however, and I believe my presence
contributes to his reserve when interacting with his children. He is gentle and soft spoken
with them and they obviously feel very comfortable around him. But Jack does not interfere
much in their lives, he does not impose himself on them and give them a lot of room to roam.
I sense a degree of tension in Jacks behaviour, as if he is torn between taking more part in the
lives of his children, but does not know how to do it, and a desire to be more on his own. I
sense that my presence exaggerates this and that he is even less comfortable interacting
intimately with his family in my presence. When Jack hesitates Bob moves in and fills the
space that his father does not fill. Jack allows Bob to bask in that position, only interfering
when Bob goes too far. To my eyes Jack gives Bob so much free space one the one hand out
of deep love and because he enjoys seeing Bob blossom. On the other hand Jacks attempt at
curbing Bobs behaviour when it gets out of hand can be somewhat clumsy and I suspect Jack also refrains from interfering because he is often insecure about what to do.

**Peter (late forties), Gwen (mid forties), John (16), Dick (19)**

When I arrive John is lounging in the sofa, watching some American high-school show on TV. Peter is out on a bicycle run. Gwen arrives from work, and John turns off the TV. The three of us sit talking for a while and then Peter arrives. He sits down at the back of the sofa, slides down onto the armrest and then into the seat, where John is lying, spread out. John moves his legs, accommodating Peter. Peter then rests his arm, gently, on John's legs. All the while the conversation flows back and forth between all of us. Peter makes us all cups of tea and then sits down next to John again. A while later Dick, who boards with them, enters with a handful of photos. Peter gets up, joins Dick by the dining table where they spread out the photos. They are mainly from a rock climbing trip Peter and Dick had done together. Neither Gwen nor John joins in to have a look. I ask them if they climb too and Gwen says, mockingly: “No, John and I think climbing sucks, don't we John?” He agrees. Peter and Dick just shrug and laugh it off. Mock reply from Peter: “We wouldn't hang out with skaters and surfies anyway.”

Peter returns to the sofa and asks John about his school work. John can't be bothered to do it, and plays the fool, making faces and pulling stunts like putting a plastic container over his head to make Peter go away. Peter, jokingly, but still serious, looks at Gwen and says: “You are the decision maker, you make him do his homework.” Gwen laughs it off, but there is an undertone of seriousness to it. John then gets up and fetches his work and then sits down by the dining table to do it.

Peter and John move in and out of each others space with great ease. They can be physically very close, without showing any signs of discomfort. At the same time they both take great care to maintain their own areas of interest, as exemplified by Peters rock climbing and mountain biking, which John does not get involved in, and Johns skateboarding and surfing, which Peter stays out of. A point which I believe is relevant here is that Peter used to be the primary caregiver for John for the first two years of Johns life. They are both very comfortable in each others company, and I think those two years as primary caregiver might have something to do with it. Having observed Harry and Julian, and comparing their relationship with Peter and John, I decided to call this latter relationship too a case of ‘close parallel lives’

**Jonah (Mid forties), Sarah (Mid forties), Tom (15), Jesse (13)**

We usually sit around the dining table, talking, Sarah preparing tea, the rest of us engaged in conversation about whatever. Jonah is reading the paper while talking, Tom has got some school project in front of him while Jesse is leafing through a book from the library. Tom shows me his project, it is a mechanic devise of some sort, and I don't understand what it is. He starts explaining, using impressive mathematical terms. I'm no wiser, but Jonah interjects, refuting Toms claim. Tom does not give in, argues back. I'm lost, but the two of them really go at it, arguing back and forth. Tom is getting agitated. It ends with him saying something like: “Ah, I don't know, that's what I had in mind at least.” Meanwhile Jesse has found a photo of his favourite race car in the library book. Brings it over to show Jonah. Tom asks to have a look, and exclaims: “The x racing car has got a stronger motor”, whereupon Jesse says: “No it does not, I know it doesn't.”’ Tom frowns: “Sure you know, you know Jack shit, Jesse.” Jonah does not stop Tom from talking that way to his brother. Instead he says that though the engine in the x car may have a greater torque, Jesse's favourite has more horse power. Jonah and Tom then get into a discussion again, until I ask what torque is. Both try to explain, but fail. Jonah fetches a dictionary and reads to me what it says, but I still don't get it. He then pulls out all sorts of
books to try and find out how he can explain it to me. He remains focussed on the books until it is time for me to leave, and then only looks up to say goodbye, promising he will have it ready for me till next time.

Jonah and Tom have a very competitive relationship. Both of them are very knowledgeable and meticulous in finding out and learn about new things. They hardly miss an opportunity to engage in debates, over almost any topic. Usually it gets a bit heated, particularly on Tom’s side, but they rarely end up fighting. The aggression that Tom builds up he seems to take out on Jesse instead. Jesse and Jonah have a very different relationship. There is hardly any competition at all and he often sits very close to Jonah, seeking his attention. When Tom is not present, however, Jesse can be a bit more assertive.

Kenneth (late forties), Jasmine (late forties), Chrystal (17/18), Mike (14), Sophie (10)
Jasmine is in the kitchen, Sophie in a corner of the lounge watching TV, Mike is playing a game on the computer and Kenneth is walking back and forth engaged in something or another. I walk over to Mike, stand behind him and ask him about the game. He eagerly shows me a new game he has just acquired. He gets quite excited, and wants to show it to Kenneth as well. It is a rather violent game, and Kenneth does not like it much. Mike has a slight learning disability and does not know exactly how to operate the game. As he is demonstrating the game he is having some problems, and in addition Kenneth wants him to quit the game and do something educational instead. Mike doesn't figure out what to do and Kenneth becomes impatient and gradually takes over. After a little while Mike shifts out of the chair and Kenneth takes over the entire computer. He demonstrates and shows me all the marvellous things that the computer can do. Meanwhile Mike has moved away and sat down on a sofa at the other side of the room. He sits by himself for a while, arms folded around himself, not saying much. One of their dogs approaches him, and he lifts it up, caressing it and muttering to himself: “She is very special.” Kenneth keeps talking to me, demonstrating how the scanner works, showing me CDs with entire Encyclopaedias etc. After a while Mike gets up, leaves the lounge and goes to his own room. Kenneth keeps talking to me, but when he realizes Mike is not coming back he gets out of his chair, tells me he is not happy with Mike isolating himself in his own room, and goes to fetch him.

Kenneth is a very social person who likes to talk and interact with people. Mike is far more reserved, and seems to need quite a bit of encouragement in order to socialize. Kenneth is also rather impatient and with his learning disability Mike is a bit slow. Though Kenneth really wants to encourage and help Mike in learning things, it is as if Kenneth’s impatience and eagerness to finish the task at hand gets the better of him. The net result is that Kenneth comes to dominate the situation, Mike is sidelined and pulls out to sit by himself, or cuddle the dog.

Henry (mid to late fifties), Gina (mid forties), John (18), Karen (15-16) and Josh (12)
Gina is the homemaker. She cooks, cleans, looks after everyone, and takes great care to ensure that everybody is looked after, both materially and emotionally. She usually sits next to Josh when he is eating, gently resting her arm on his shoulders, listen to him talk about his day, and bring more food if he has not had enough. In the lounge she sits in one of the chairs, knitting, while John, Karen (Josh’s half siblings) and Josh all curl up in the sofa together, watching TV. Henry, on the other hand, is not particularly home-oriented. He is heavily engaged in politics and religious affairs, and the injustices and cruelties of the world concerns and disturbs him a lot. Often when I arrive he is not present in the kitchen or living room together with everybody else, but somewhere in another room in the house meditating or organizing some political event. He may also be out at an important meeting. Gina is not
happy about Henry spending so much energy outside the home. At regular intervals she lets him know that she wishes he would spend as much energy on his family as he is on trying to save the world. When Henry interacts with Josh it is often to inquire about his school work, to tell him to do the dishes, that he cannot have a Playstation, and similar commands.

After almost two months of visiting I arrive one evening to find that Gina has left to visit relatives up north. Henry behaves very differently now that Gina is absent. He has taken over her role, and now it is he who looks after everyone’s needs. He sits next to Josh while he is eating, with an arm resting over his shoulders, pays great attention to how much he eats, and if he wants more. Even Karen (his step-daughter) receives much more, and far more positive attention than usual.

It is my impression that Gina is so good at being home-maker that there is no room for Henry to be an involved caregiver. When I ask Henry about it he admits that he is ambivalent about this. One the one hand he enjoys the freedom it gives him to pursue other interests. On the other hand he regrets that it prevents him from developing a closer relationship with Karen and Josh.

**Bryan (late forties), Judy (mid forties), Trudy (15), Brett (14)**

Bryan is alone in the kitchen, preparing tea, when I arrive. I sit down in a sofa and we engage in small talk while Bryan cooks. Judy arrives from work and almost immediately notices that Bryan is searching for a kitchen tool in the wrong place. She enters the kitchen, finds the tool, but instead of giving it to him starts doing the job for which it was needed. This clearly annoys Bryan who gently takes the tool away from her, and says he can do it. Judy hesitates, and does not leave the kitchen. Obviously embarrassed in front of me, Bryan tells Judy that if he is to learn, she must leave him to find out on his own.

Bryan used to have a very high position in a multinational corporation. Quite recently he resigned in order to spend more time with his family, and on doing things he enjoys. As Judy is working full time Bryan is adamant he wants to do a lot of the housework, but there are still many things he needs to learn.

When tea is ready Trudy and Brett are called for, and we all sit around the dining table to eat. Bryan directs a lot of his attention to Trudy, asks her about school, and other things she has been up to. Brett does not say much. He is good natured, slightly heavy set and a bit sluggish. Rather different from his father who is tall, lean and with a quick wit. When Bryan shifts his attention to Brett, there is a slight change of tone as well. There is much more of a joking edge in his voice when talking to Brett than with Trudy. The jokes shift back and forth between good humoured and slightly sarcastic. Brett is a bit wary of the sting in Bryan’s jokes, but all in all he is confident enough to tease him back.

Bryan is a self-reformed father. He has chosen to quit a highly prestigious job in order to spend more time with his family. It seems as if Bryan is not yet perfectly comfortable with his new role. It also seems as if he is more comfortable in the company of Trudy than with Brett. Trudy seems to me to be more like her father than Brett, and my guess is that Bryan has not learned to understand his son very well yet.

**Nigel (mid forties), Daphne (early forties), Jason (15), Terry (13), Dave (10), Annie (7), Ted (3) and Granny (70?)**

First time I met Nigel was at a party. He asked me about my work and when I told him about my
research on relationships between fathers and sons, he said: “Come study me. I have four sons, and one daughter.” So I did. Nigel arranged it so that one evening a week Terry and he would cook tea together, and I could come and observe.

When I arrive Nigel, Daphne and Granny usually sit around the dining table, enjoying a glass of wine, talking and unwinding after the days work. There is classical music on the radio and a relaxing atmosphere. Jason has not arrived home yet, Terry and Dave are in the living room, playing on the computer, Annie and Ted are upstairs. Nigel pours me a glass of wine, and we engage in conversation. After a while Nigel goes to fetch Terry. Nigel has decided on a recipe, and both of them study the cook book together. Nigel instructs Terry and Terry, obviously familiar with both the kitchen and the cooking situation, quickly understands what to do. Nigel and I continue our conversation where we left off prior to Nigel fetching Terry. When the most active part of the preparations of the food is over, Nigel again directs most of his attention at me. When Terry is out of fathers gaze, he takes the opportunity to run off, back to his computer game. After a bit Nigel notices Terry has left, and fetches him back again. Terry remains for a while, but disappears back to the computer again when he gets a chance.

Nigel comes across to me as a fascinating mix of patriarch and exceptionally involved father. He moves about the world with an air of utmost authority, and though he is quite overwhelming, instils in me a sense of confidence and security. My impression is h has this effect on his children as well. I once ask him if he has considered he might overwhelm Terry. “I overwhelm most people” he says “so I guess I overwhelm him too.” Still, even though Terry seizes the opportunity to run off and play on the computer whenever he gets a chance, he also seems perfectly comfortable in his fathers company. He is also quite capable of standing up to his father. On one occasion a rather serious confrontation between them played out in front of me. Nigel had just learned that Terry had made up his mind, without consulting his father, about elective subjects to study the next year. Nigel was very upset about not having been consulted and scolded Terry for it. The scolding took the form of arguments for why he should have been consulted and through it all Terry stood firm. He argued back on a few of the points, but even when he had no arguments to counter his father’s points he did not give in. In the end he turned his head and towards Daphne and said over his shoulder: “Mum, make him go away.” Nigel was primarily upset because he had not been consulted, but he was also convinced that Terry had made some bad choices. Nigel was adamant that one of the subjects Terry had chosen was bound to be a disaster. When I met Nigel and Terry again one year later I asked Terry how his elective subjects had turned out. “Very well”, he said. “And what about the subject your father was convinced would be a disaster”, I asked. “Best subject I ever did”, Terry responded, with a smile.

Michael (38), Trudy (late thirties), David (14), Mark (13)
Michael is sitting in his favourite chair, watching the news on TV. Trudy is out, at evening class. David is sitting/lounging in a chair, while Mark is on the floor surrounded by school books. The three don’t say much, and Michael and I engage in small talk. Mostly we watch TV. After a while David gets up and goes to his room. He closes the door and turns on some music. I recognize it as the pop group Nirvana and say so to Michael. He shrugs and says that the music they listen to these days is absolutely terrible. I get up and knock on David’s door, then enter. He is playing a computer game, and I watch him for a while. I try to strike up a conversation, but he does not respond much. After a while I leave again. Michael has finished watching TV and has gone outside to do some work in the workshop in the garage. He is a competent carpenter, and makes furniture from old recycled wood that he picks up for free at the garbage tip. Mark and David come outside as well, with cricket bats and a ball. Start bowling
to each other. Michael does not pay attention to them, and when I try to engage them in talk about the game, they do not invite me to play with them. I sit and watch for a while.

Michael spends a lot of time in and around the home. The family also goes away together on trips during holidays and week ends. Trudy’s family has a bach on the beach about one hour drive away. They spend a lot of time there and Michael has shown me photos of the boys and him together out fishing. He is thus physically available a lot of the time. When he is in the presence of his sons, however, he does not interact very much with them, and to me it seems he does not initiate interaction. He is engaged in his own interests and projects, and if that involves his sons, like going fishing together, that is fine. If it does not include them, for instance when he builds furniture out in the shed, that is fine too.

The Bach
Few phenomena come as close to being a New Zealand icon as the Bach. The quintessential bach is a simple, one story, one or two rooms, self made hut built from inexpensive, readily available materials. Most baches are from the fifties, or older, with some going back one hundred years. Today they may have electricity and running water, but many do not. Most commonly they are lit by kerosene lamps, the cooking is done on a wood-range, water comes off the roof and is stored in a barrel, and there is a dunny or a long-drop out the back. Some may be accessed by car, many not, only reached by boat or on foot. Often they can be found in small bach communities, five or fifteen baches in a row along the beach front. Or they sit alone, hidden away in a little cove, in among the trees, or exposed - in the middle of nowhere, in a paddock, all on its own. From outside they often look like shacks, bordering on derelict; rusty corrugated iron, fibrolite boards that have never seen paint, flaking and moulded weather boards and old furniture spread all around the yard. As architecture go they are post-modern from an early modern age. Started off as a one room cottage with a front porch. Grew to two rooms when the porch was closed in. Then the closed in porch was extended all around the house with an aluminium framed panoramic window, picked up at a used building parts shop, covering the entire wall towards the view.

Basic is what the bach is all about. A basic structure, basic furnishing, basic amenities and a basically good life. It is all the best things life can offer; beach life and holiday, enough privacy to relax, crowded enough to sustain a sense of togetherness and belonging. Basic enough to be comfortable and to remind oneself that a true Kiwi does not need luxury. A true Kiwi can make do with what is available and has not been turned to sap from being cushioned by too many modern conveniences. A bach is basic enough to have been built by a do-it-yourself true Kiwi bloke, basic enough to be repaired, amended and maintained by him too, and basic enough to not need much cleaning. The bach is everything modern life is not. It is in touch with nature, the sea, with family and friends. It is overcoming instead of overwhelming; it is manual labour instead of stress. Bach life is unpretentious whereas city life is all gloss.

Variety and similarities
Thirteen different fathers, more than thirteen different sons. All of them behave in different ways and all the relationships are different from each other. Even in families with brothers of close age the two boys often behave very differently when interacting with their fathers. And yet, as my observations progressed certain patterns and similarities emerged. It became clear
to me that the large variety can be conceptualised as a function of permutation; a relatively limited number of elements put together in different ways. In other words, there are many common elements in the ways that fathers behave, and common elements in how sons behave, but no father and son combine these elements in exactly the same way as anybody else.

One of the more important elements in how fathers behave towards their sons is linked to the kinds of care they provide, i.e. the degree of involvement in the daily care-giving in the home, and the way the care is given. The care-giving activities that the fathers in my sample engage in can be seen as distributed over a continuum from relatively low to highly involved in a wide variety of caring work. At one pole of the axis are those fathers who predominantly are involved in distant care-giving as economical providers and providers of maintenance work in the garden and on the house. They are not much involved in the daily home-making and care-giving inside the home, like cooking, cleaning, nursing the sons if they are ill, listening to their sorrows and excitements etc. At the other end of the scale are the single fathers who provide all the daily care that their sons receive. And in between are fathers who share the daily care-giving equally with their partners, fathers who are involved in some daily care-giving tasks but not others, and fathers who are involved some days, but not others.

The power in the relationship can be seen as distributed and played out as a permutation of a smaller set of common themes. Most of the fathers in my sample assume a superior position in relationship to their sons, with a minority of fathers taking great care to make the relationship as egalitarian as possible. When I say that most fathers assume a superior position I do not mean that they are authoritarian. Quite on the contrary, almost all fathers shy away from being disciplinarians and rule-enforcers. They establish their superior position in other ways; first and foremost by dominating most situations when they participate together with their sons. They dominate by defining the situations they take part in, by defining the topics of conversation, by dictating the program to watch on TV, and by talking most of the time, controlling the word and who gets a chance to speak. Some fathers even go as far as publicly defining their sons as persons. In general fathers who dominate do so by making themselves and their activities the centre of attention.

The sons I observed reacted to their dominant fathers in three different ways; submission, opposition and withdrawal. As a general rule these sons chose one of these ways as their general attitude towards their dominant fathers, but most sons would at times also opt for one of the other behaviours. As an example a son who usually deferred to his father would at other times withdraw by leaving the situation or by not paying attention to his father. The sons I observed who assumed subordinate positions usually did so by displaying obedience and admiration for their fathers. Other sons seemed submissive by default; as if they had given up asserting themselves because they did not manage to challenge their fathers’ superiority anyway. Oppositional sons usually did so by openly rebelling or competing with their fathers, like Henk and Tom in the above descriptions. A third, but uncommon way for sons to oppose their fathers’ superiority was to accept it, but still stand their ground in a non-rebellious and non-competitive way. I only observed this behaviour once, in the relationship between Nigel and Terry as I have described above. In spite of being uncommon behaviour it is important to mention it because it shows the width of the repertoire of behaviour available to sons in general. It is also important because it highlights that a fathers dominance, and a hierarchical relationship can take many forms, some of which allow for a son to learn that it
is possible to go his own ways, even to stand in conflict with father, and that father will still recognize and respect his choice.

A minority of the fathers I observed did not dominate the social situations in the home, but for two different reasons. On category of non-dominant fathers behaved in what I have chosen to call a withdrawn fashion. These fathers did not participate very actively in communal activities in the home and they were often relatively absent-minded in the sense that a significant proportion of their intellectual and emotional attention was directed outwards and not towards the other members of the family. The sons I observed reacted to withdrawn fathers in two different ways; either withdrawing themselves, building relationships with other family members, or moving in to fill the vacuum left by the father, either in order to elicit some reaction from the father or to dominate the situation themselves.

Other non-dominant fathers participated wholeheartedly in home activities and their full attention was directed at those who were present. Fathers in this last category take turns with other family members at being the centre of attention. Their sons behave the same way and these relationships therefore appear to be egalitarian. Not thereby saying that the fathers do not have more power than the sons. Obviously they do, e.g. the control of money. The direct interactions between these fathers and sons gave the impression of equality because to a large extent their behaviour was symmetrical rather than complimentary.

Attention is an important aspect of power in interpersonal relationships and even though I have already briefly touched upon the topic I need to say a few more words. I observed that some of the fathers in my sample were heavily involved in the daily care-giving for their children and still their relationships with their sons did not bear many of the characteristics of what I have called ‘close, parallel lives’. Even though these were heavily involved and care-giving fathers they were also quite dominant and as a rule made themselves the centre of attention in situations when interacting with their sons. To me as an observer it seemed that these fathers ended up in dominant positions primarily as a consequence of how they directed their attention. In those relationships that appeared to be egalitarian the fathers directed most of their attention towards their sons, whereas in these latter, non-egalitarian relationships the fathers directed most of their attention at themselves. Their attention was focussed on projects of various kinds, from personal self-presentation via some intellectual or political ideology to practical tasks that they had to do. And because it was their projects their attention was in effect, directed at themselves. It thus seems that being a heavily involved care giver is a necessary but not sufficient component of the process whereby ‘close, parallel lives’ emerge. At least one other component, a father who pays a lot of attention to his son, is required too.

Last, but not least, I observed that love and affection was expressed in different ways in different relationships. The most obvious difference pertains to the display of love by use of conventional signs of love. The majority of the fathers and sons I observed were not explicitly affectionate towards each other in my presence. They rarely touched each other and I never heard them say things like I love you. When I interviewed them they told me that they rarely said things like that or to that effect. A minority of the fathers and sons were far more affectionate, even in my presence. They frequently touched each other, rested their hand on the other persons shoulder, fathers gently caressed their son’s backs etc. Though I never heard them verbally express their love, they told me that it frequently happened.
Based on my observations I believe that in general terms it is possible to describe relationships between Pakeha fathers and adolescent sons with reference to separate continua for each topic or dimension; from great to little involvement in the daily care, from egalitarian to hierarchical distribution of power and from explicit to implicit communication of love. Some fathers and sons have relationships that I have labelled ‘close, parallel lives’. They behave as equals, but take great care not to overstep each other’s personal boundaries. They under-communicate the hierarchy while not ignoring that the father is the authority and communicate their love for each other through explicit displays of conventional signs of love. These fathers either are, or have been, heavily involved in providing the daily care for their sons and they direct a greater proportion of their attention at their sons, rather than at themselves.

Other fathers and sons have relationships that are characterised by more formal or instrumental traits. These fathers usually care for their sons first and foremost as economical providers. Some of these fathers are rather distant in relations to their sons; whereas most of them tend to spend quite a lot of time with their sons but dominate the situations when interacting with their sons. These relationships are explicitly hierarchical and the sons only seem to have three options to choose between: subordination, opposition or withdrawal from dominant fathers. Though every son has a favourite strategy they usually also employ the other two in different situations or at different times. As a general rule these fathers and sons do not engage in explicit displays of affection towards each other, but they are still convinced that the love between them is strong.

A last, but important observation to highlight is that all the fathers and the sons I observed are convinced that they love each other, and that they are loved by the other. Whether the love is explicitly communicated or not does not seem to matter; love is taken for granted.
Chapter 4 Magical union and the logic of care

As the descriptions in the previous chapter indicate, there is a wide variety in the ways that fathers and sons behave towards each other. On the one hand there are single fathers like Warren and Harry who are main caregivers, and fathers, like Peter, in heterosexual dual parent families who are, or have been, primary caregivers and home-makers for long periods of time. On the other hand, there are fathers, like Matthew, James and Michael who predominantly care for their sons as breadwinners. There are fathers like Jack and Henry who are quite withdrawn, and others who are much more active when in the presence of their sons. There are families with a strict division of labour between the parents and where the fathers are the ultimate authorities, like Matthew, James and Michael. Then there are fathers like Bryan who strongly believe in equality between husband and wife, and therefore work hard at sharing all the housework and childcare evenly. There are also fathers like Nigel who are heavily involved in housework and childcare, but where the division of labour between husband and wife still is differentiated in the sense that Nigel performs some tasks and Daphne performs other tasks. Love is another area where there is much difference. Some fathers are emotionally quite expressive and communicate their love for their children openly and in obvious ways, others do not. Last, but not least, the distribution of power is also different from one relationship to the next; there are fathers who dominate their sons, fathers who compete with their sons, and then there are fathers and sons whose relationship seems to be egalitarian.

This summary of variations is merely an indication of the huge diversity I observed. The richness of real life is, of course, even greater. From an anthropological perspective this is both fascinating, and a challenge. How do I make sense of these variations? Are there any patterns, and is it possible to find common themes at all? Are the dissimilarities a product of one social process, or are there several, perhaps even conflicting processes that generate different aspects of the variety? Obviously a number of factors are involved in generating the observed variety. There are idiosyncratic traits inherent in every relationship as well as contextual factors such as the larger social structure. There are also other family relationships and other cultural notions (e.g. about gender) to influence the manner that fathers, mothers, sons and daughters feel, think and behave, which thus affect the quality of the relationship between father and son.

In this chapter I will explore, in greater detail, the quality of these father-son variations. My argument is that interactions between people is guided by differences of logic and that these differences of logic both rely on and foster different kinds of behaviour, and generate very different meanings. These variations of logic account for the different ways of dealing with the paradoxical, inconsistent and contradictory aspects of human life and relationships that I allude to in chapter two. In other words, the different logic relies upon, and prescribes, different rules and ways for dealing with the administration of interpersonal boundaries.

Relationships in public most commonly follow an instrumental logic. This is the kind of logic humans apply when manipulating their environment as if it consist of soulless objects. This logic rests on notions of distinction and individuation, of separate entities in opposition and competition with each other, and therefore carries a strong potential for the development of hierarchical relationships and power struggles. This logic has much in common with ways of reasoning founded upon an atomistic model of existence. And as far as negotiating the
challenges and hazards of public life, in a world where no one is in full control, instrumental logic has proven to be a superior tool.

Care and nurture on the other hand, does not work well if guided by an instrumental logic because instrumental logic prescribed a relatively high degree of caution and distrust. Proper care giving requires that care giver and receiver be far more open and trusting towards each other than what the instrumental logic allows. Instrumental logic does not permit the caregiver to be as sensitive to the needs of the cared for person as proper care giving requires. In addition a caregiver must be ready to give up his or her own interests in favour of what benefits the recipient, and must be willing to abandon ordinary ideas and emotions about taboos and pollution in order to comfort, clean and sooth the receiver of care. My main hypothesis in this chapter is that in order to provide competent care and nurture the interaction between giver and receiver must be guided by logic based upon the kind of cognitive connection making (i.e. reasoning) which Lévy-Bruhl calls ‘the law of participation’. When care and nurturance rest on this kind of logic, acts of care like feeding, cleaning, comforting, may carry the potential for the growth of what I call ‘a magical union’ between caregiver and receiver. As far as relationships between fathers and sons are concerned, one of my main arguments in this thesis is that when fathers are involved as qualified and confident caregivers this experience provides opportunities for both the fathers and sons to develop ‘magical unions’ based on the kind of intimate knowledge of each other that grow out of acts of nearness and involvement. When fathers lack such experience they also lack fundamentally important ingredients for the development of ‘magical unions’ based on the logic of ‘the law of participation’.

This hypothesis gradually grew as I began to see a certain pattern in my observations. I noticed that out of thirteen fathers nine tended to dominate situations when they interacted with theirs sons whereas two fathers assumed a withdrawn position. That left two fathers, Harry and Peter, who participated on an equal footing with their sons. Harry’s son Julian and Peter’s son John were respectful, but not deferential, calm and composed but not withdrawn, verbally expressive, but not dominant or competitive. I gradually came to realize that this first difference coincided with other differences. It became clear to me that the latter fathers and sons communicated their love and affection for each other in far more explicit ways than the former category of fathers. The latter category consists of the two father-son relationships that lead me to coin the phrase ‘close parallel lives’. These sons openly expressed affection towards their fathers, and allowed the same from their fathers, without signs of embarrassment. Last, but not least, I came to realize that both of the fathers in the latter category either were, or had been, primary care givers for their sons for several years. They were not the only primary care-giving fathers, a fact that suggest that being primary care giver is not a sufficient criteria for the development of a ‘close parallel life’. There is still ample reason to suggest that the more experience fathers have as caregivers, and particularly if they have been primary care givers for a considerable length of time, the greater chance that the quality I call ‘close parallel lives’ will emerge as part of their relationship with their sons. Before I continue I want to describe, once more, and in some detail how one of these ‘close parallel’ father and son pairs behaved together.

Peter and John
During one of my visits, Peter is busy in the workshop repairing his mountain bike when I arrive. He has just been out in the bush, on one of the many hiking trails in the area that laboriously penetrate the
The Bush
First time I lived in New Zealand we rented a property next to the Abel Tasman national park. The house literally sat at the edge of the bush. Every now and again I had to venture into that bush, e.g. every time our water pipe washed out of the creek. Quite frequently, and for a full year, I did that, and the bush always scared me. I knew there were no dangerous animals, no snakes and no lethal insects. I knew there were wild pigs, and pig hunters came by with their dogs every now and again. But wild pigs are generally not dangerous because they are scared of people and tend to stay hidden. And still the bush scared me. It was so thick, so dark, so impenetrable that I felt like it was about to swallow me any time. Gradually, however, I have come to know the New Zealand bush. Learned to recognize different plants, the bird song, and how to move through it without getting lost. Now it fascinates me no end. Now I love that dense, dark light, the lush, vigorous growth of plants growing upon plants everywhere, and the giant trees. I am not sure, but I think I have acquired some of the emotions, notions and ideology that Kiwis in general hold about their bush.

To someone not familiar with New Zealand the word bush is a bit misleading. There is nothing bushy about it. It is a forest, in many places close to a jungle, with huge trees, some stretching thirty metres and more towards the sky. Once, prior to human arrival, close to the entire land mass of all three islands was covered in bush. The Maoris started burning it off, supposedly to make it easier to hunt Moa. And yet, when the Pakehas arrived most of the original bush was still intact. To the first Pakehas the bush was a resource to be harvested and an obstacle to be removed. They chopped it down as fast as possible, used what they could for timber, and burned the rest. In less than one hundred years they had stripped eighty per cent of the land.

Not surprisingly, as the bush was gradually cleared people’s opinions about it also changed. The intrinsic value of the native bush and its wildlife has gradually increased, along with an increased appreciation of its vulnerability. Today many of the New Zealand birds, particularly flightless ones like the Takahe and the Kiwi, are threatened with extinction. Loss of habitat is one reason and in addition introduced animals like rats, ferrets, cats, dogs and the Australian possum kill the birds and/or eat their eggs. The bush itself is also threatened. There is still logging going on, but the greatest danger is seen as coming from the possums. They were introduced in the beginning of the twentieth century as a fur animal, but instead of farming them, possums were let loose to survive on their own in the bush, later to be trapped and skinned. The idea was that it would be a free resource for everyone to harvest. In a contemporary perspective it is ironic that it was actually difficult to establish possums in New Zealand. As far as I understand it took three or four serious attempts before they took hold. But when they did, they became a success and a disaster.

For long the possums were what they were intended to be; a free resource to be taxed by anyone. I have met several men, today forty years and older, who claim to have made a good living from possum fur. Then the anti-fur movement destroyed the marked. For two decades now there has been virtually no trapping of possums and the population has skyrocketed. Nobody knows for sure, but their numbers are estimated at somewhere between eighty and one hundred million. Today there are more than twice as many possums as there are sheep in New Zealand. Mainly
vegetarian they eat leaves off most plants but conifers. In rural areas the occasional possum will 
tray into a back yard and destroy a vegetable garden, or strip an apple tree in a night. But that 
is, after all, only an inconvenience. The large scale and serious problem is that somewhere 
between fifty and one hundred million possums are feasting on native trees every night. When 
flaying over certain areas it is actually possible to see how the bush is dying from being overeaten. 
And as if that was not bad enough, recently it has been documented that possums feed on the 
 eggs of native birds as well.

Today the remaining twenty per cent, and the original wildlife (i.e. bird-life) living there, has taken 
on a very special meaning. It has become a metonym for the ‘real’ New Zealand and a primary 
 source of national symbols. An obvious example is the fact that New Zealanders call themselves 
Kiwis. In chapter three I have written about the rural - urban dichotomy in New Zealand and the 
symbolic meaning of the bush is part of that divide. The bush carries strong, but very different 
 meaning for rural and urban people and in a sense the meaning of the bush can be seen as a 
 battle ground for the future of the New Zealand soul. To rural Pakehas, particularly men, the 
bush is a taken for granted part of the landscape, part enemy and part friend. It is there to be 
used, for hunting and fishing, and conquered if needs be. Keeping the bush at bay, or clearing 
new land, is a fundamental aspect of the farming attitude. Whether the invading bush is exotic 
gorse or native manuka, does not make a difference. It still needs to be kept under control. To 
the urban Pakeha, on the other hand, the bush has taken on a sacred status. It is a symbol of all 
that is good, pure and authentic about New Zealand. And like a cathedral, it is permissible for 
people to enter; to worship of just to enjoy it, but it must not be defiled, destroyed or disturbed. 
And the way to enjoy it is to go tramping. As already mentioned the bush is thick, often 
impenetrable. The landscape is frequently rugged, with dangerous bluffs and cliffs. To make 
tramping safer, and more accessible to the general public, the governmental Department of 
Conservation (DOC) has created a number of well-maintained tracks. In other words, in order 
to facilitate urban enjoyment of the virgin forest artificial pathways are cut through it with 
chainsaws. Ironic as it may seem, in many ways it is a necessity. Though many Kiwi trampers have 
a lot of experience in the bush, the fact that it is open to tourists means there are also many who 
have little or no understanding of how dangerous the bush may be. Every so often trampers just 
disappear. They step off the track to urinate and never find their way back. This dangerous 
aspect of the bush is of course also part of the urban image of the bush as the soul of New 
Zealand.

Along the tracks there are huts at regular intervals. These huts, like the baches and motor-
camps I have written about elsewhere, carry that same New Zealand message: basic. They are 
made for shelter, places to eat and sleep, not for luxury. Many are old hunter’s cabins, others are 
constructed by DOC. On the more popular tracks DOC does some maintenance, but being a 
government agency they are always on a tight budget. No hut I have visited was made or kept to 
provide anything but a minimum of comfort. That does not deter trampers though. From the way 
people talk, I get the impression that during week ends the entire New Zealand population is 
either on the beach, or out tramping. 

Most tracks, and all the popular ones have names, and these names have become part of Kiwi 
outdoor folklore. The Milford is the king of tracks. A decade or two ago the National 
Geographic Magazine had a long article solely devoted to it. Supposedly it is one of the most 
spectacular nature walks in the world. Immensely popular too, with tourists from all over the world.
Today access is restricted, booking required several months in advance and tramping is only allowed in groups with a DOC guide. Because they are now catering for the overseas tourist it has become rather up-marked: no need to carry one’s own supplies, except clothes because food and beverage is supplied at the huts. So even though it is still the king of tracks it is about to lose its soul, according to many avid Kiwi trampers.

Other tracks, not as spectacular as the Milford, also carry special meanings. The Heaphy is a must, a tramp that many trampers are convinced they have to do at least once in their life. It connects Golden Bay with the West Coast, along the same route that the Maoris used to transport Pounamu (green-stone/jade) from its source on the West Coast to Golden Bay, and onwards to all of the North Island. This track is still free for all. The Abel Tasman coastal track is one of the jewels of New Zealand tracks. A lot of it runs through re-growth, poor farming land left to revert to bush. As such it is not proper native bush, but still loved by Kiwis and tourists alike. The track meanders in and out of the bush, onto one beautiful, well defined and sheltered beach after the other. Lush green vegetation pouring onto golden sand gently sloping into azure blue sea. Breathtaking, actually. Only drawback is it is getting to be too popular. Advanced bookings for the huts are now necessary. And backpackers coming straight from South-East Asia have spilled their guts into the rivers and streams, infecting them with Giardia.

Urban Kiwis want to protect the bush and preserve the authentic New Zealand nature and soul for posterity. Obviously they want to ban all logging of native forests, and they won a major battle with the moratorium on logging in state forests on the West Coast of the South Island. The logging company had gone to great lengths to develop what they called ‘sustainable logging’. Clear felling was abandoned and they had started selecting individual mature trees, close to the end of their life, and removing them by helicopters. They even played the possum-card, setting up possum control schemes. To no avail. The puritan idea won. All tampering with the bush is a sin. It is no longer virgin if a bunch of rough loggers have raped it with their chainsaws. A few gentle DOC workers carefully shaving their way through the under growth is, of course, a different matter altogether.

The conservationist crusade at times takes on religious overtones. New Zealand has its fair share of New Age believers who hug trees on a regular basis and who perform elaborate rituals, begging the spirit of the tree for permission and forgiveness, if for some reason the tree must be cut down. But superstition sometimes also spill into mainstream society. Some years ago the highway between Nelson and Motueka was improved and a new stretch of road constructed. Unfortunately the new section ran close to a big and several hundred years old Totara tree. It was very likely the roots would be damaged and if left in its original position most probably the Totara would die. Under the Resource Management Act the road was allowed to be built under the condition that the Totara was moved. The moving operation cost, if I remember correctly, seventy thousand New Zealand dollars. In a marked oriented society like New Zealand, to spend that much money on saving a tree cannot be understood as anything but religious worship. For seventy thousand dollars approximately one thousand new trees could have been propagated, planted and tended for many years until they had taken hold. A whole forest could have been cultivated or the price of one tree. Certainly, the new trees would not have been as old as the old one and thus would not carry the value of time. Not yet, that is.

Another irony surrounding the bush is the widely held opinion that today Maori landowners are
some of the worst destroyers of native bush. Being private land, it is exempt from the government moratorium, and unless there are specific restrictions in place, the owners are allowed to do as they wish with it. To the extent that there is still native bush on private land that could be turned to pasture, the land is mainly owned by Maoris. Pakehas cleared theirs a long time ago. In a liberal, and somewhat puritan, urban perspective, it is ironic that Maoris destroy native bush. Ecologically minded urbanites would really like to see the Maoris as their allies. Maoris are after all, as indigenous people in general, supposed to be closer to nature than the white man. Maoris too are believed to be part of the authentic soul of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Ecological conservationist sentiments and understanding is supposed to be inbred in the Maori nature and culture. It just does not make sense when they too rape the bush.

Rural Kiwis have a radically different attitude toward the bush. They want to use it, not just look at it. Where the urbanites want to conserve it, leave it unspoiled, remove all human trace, rural people want to utilize it, harvest it and control it if possible. They do not want to destroy the bush, but see no harm in taking out some trees, maybe even clear-felling an area, as long as there is ample remaining bush somewhere else. Rural Kiwis also move about in the bush in a radically different way than trampers. Trampers, though very fond of the bush, keep a distance to it. At the beginning and end of all tracks are report books, kept by DOC, where trampers sign their name and date, intended route and when they finish. They are there to facilitate a search if/when a tramper disappears. And trampers keep to their schedule and their tracks, watching the bush from a safe distance. Rural Kiwis do not go tramping, they are not tied to the tracks and to schedules. Because they are out there for a reason like hunting and fresh water fishing, they bush-wack and follow the game and the river, not the track and a watch.

Trout fishing in New Zealand is free almost everywhere, and world famous. When hunting and fishing people do not bother about tracks. When the dogs are on to the scent of a boar, the hunters must follow, beat their way through ferns and supple-jack, wade through streams, climb up cliffs and not fall into crevices. When fishing one must stay in the river or on the bank. They leave notice, of course, of where they are going and for how long. But if they get lost, it is not dramatic. With proper clothing they know they can survive for days. Though there are not many edible plants in the New Zealand bush, there are some, and plenty of water. If lost, when night falls, they tuck their Swandris around them and curl up under a fern. Not comfortable, but good enough to survive till they manage to scramble back out. A good example is an incident that happened around Christmas a few years ago. A young rural lad had gone trout fishing, on his own, in the Kahurangi national park. He had gone on fishing trips on his own or years, and every Christmas holiday he took a whole week off. He was supposed to be back for the new years eve party, but did not show. When trampers are missing a search party and helicopters are sent out after twenty four hours, but because the trout-fisher was a keen bush-man his family and friends did not get really nervous until he had been missing four to five days. When a search party did go looking for him they did not find him. By this stage people started getting really nervous. Two weeks overdue the trout-fishing lad wandered out of the park, happy as a lark. When he learned about the search party he was genuinely puzzled. He was so comfortable in the bush he never suspected anybody could imagine he was missing. “The fishing was so good,” he said “I just decided to continue.

Many of the trails through the New Zealand bush are for hikers only, bicycles banned, but not all. Peter
had been out on one of the rougher tracks, and the bike needed maintenance. Dick, the boarder, is also there working on his car. We talk for a while and then Dick and I go inside. John is lying on one of the two couches in the lounge, watching some soap opera on TV. He is alone. He greets us and keeps watching. I ask him what he is on TV and he says: “Ah, just some silly soap.” We watch it together for a bit, none of us saying much.

Some fifteen minutes later Peter enters, having finished repairing his bicycle. He sits down on the floor in front of the couch, leaning his back against it, almost touching his son's legs. After a short while Peter gets up and goes to the kitchen to make a cuppa for me and himself. When he returns he sits down on the back of the couch, just behind and almost on top of John. John does not mind. Gradually father slips into the couch so that he sits in it instead of on top of it. This means he is now squeezed in very close to John. Gently he rests his arm on John's legs and leaves it there, gently stroking his calf. None of them seem to mind the physical closeness. After a while Dick leaves and returns with a set of photos from a rock climbing session he had been to; shows them to Peter whose interest is immediately aroused, then Peter gets up from the couch and goes over to the dining room table where he and Dick spread the photos out in front of them, admiring them and making comments about the various shots, the difficulty of climbing that particular spot etc.

Gwen, the mother, arrives and looks at the photos for a short while. She then walks across the room and sits down on the other couch. She and I start talking about something, and after a while I ask her if she too is into climbing. “No” she says, then jokingly says to John “we think climbing sucks, don't we John?” He agrees and the two laugh quietly. Rock climbing and mountain biking is nonsense, in John's opinion. He is into surfing and skateboarding, and jokingly says that climbing is just plain stupid. Father is too preoccupied with the photos to be stirred up by the slight, and ignores both his wife and son, but in a demonstrative way, to make us all know he heard what they said.

When finished with the photos father returns and once again sits down on the back of the couch where John is lying. Dick sits down on the floor some space away from them. John is bored and a bit restless. Mother asks if he is finished with all his homework and he says “Yes, almost”. “What about graphics,” father says, and John answers that he “just couldn't be bothered”. Neither Father nor mother will let him get away that easily and start to insist he should to go do his homework. John starts playing the fool, making faces and pulling a big plastic container over his head. Father then says, directed at us all: “Gwen, make your son do his graphics.” After a while John gets up to go and do his work. I get up too as it is time for me to leave. Peter, John and I all stand around in the middle of the floor for a bit talking about this and that. Suddenly Peter asks me about my project. He wonders if the things that have been happening in the family so far are what I am looking for. Jokingly I say that perhaps I ought to provoke them a bit to get some action. To create some action for my benefit Peter picks up a towel and jokingly strikes at John's thighs with it. John jumps out of the way, and pretending to feel offended gives his father 'the finger'. We all laugh at it and I leave.

Peter and John move in and out of each other’s space with great ease. They can be physically very close, without showing any signs of discomfort. Neither father nor son dominates situations when they are together, and both take care to foster and maintain a seemingly egalitarian relationship. At the same time, they both take great care to maintain their own areas of interest, for Peter, rock climbing and mountain biking, for John, skateboarding and surfing. The same quality of ease, comfort, equality and separate spheres of interests was present in the relationships between Harry and Julian.
The fact that these fathers and sons take such great care to define separate areas of interest, and clearly avoided invading each other’s areas, at first puzzled me. In the beginning I wondered if it was a form of withdrawal. That interpretation did not make sense, however, juxtaposed with the easy manner that they interacted, and the comfort with which they openly expressed their affection. Their relationships were obviously close, and simultaneously they worked hard at living in parallel with the other, not overstepping each other’s the other’s boundaries.

The pattern of behavior that I have called ‘close parallel lives’ is most obvious in the above two relationships, but it is also present, albeit not as clearly, in the relationships between Nigel and Terry, and to some extent between Daniel and Rick. Though both Nigel and Daniel are quite dominant fathers, they are also very involved in the daily lives of their sons. Both sons, Terry and Rick, give the impression of personal autonomy and being perfectly able to look after themselves. There is also a great deal of ease and comfort in these two relationships with neither son being submissive nor in opposition. With Rick, who is only eleven years old, I am sometimes in doubt about his apparent autonomy and self-confidence, and suspect that at times his confidence is a disguised withdrawal. But then he emerges from his solitary position and performs some active and independent move, for example baking us all a pizza for lunch on his own initiative. Both Terry and Rick seem to oscillate between withdrawal and an independent self-confident and calm stance. My interpretation is that these sons try to live parallel to their fathers, but the fathers are too strong, too overwhelming and thus invasive. To escape invasion the sons withdraw, usually into the virtual world of a computer-game. These latter two fathers and sons are also more explicit in their displays of affection than the remaining nine fathers and sons, but rather less explicit than Peter and John, and Harry and Julian.

In all the remaining nine father-son relationships the above qualities of ‘close parallel lives’ do not obtain, at least not to my eyes. None of these relationships have an air of equality. The fathers are all quite dominant e.g. in the sense that they are the obvious centres of attention, or if they are not dominant they are rather withdrawn. The sons are all either submissive or in opposition, or they have opted for a withdrawn position. Most of these relationships carry signs of a certain degree of tension and/or discomfort. On the one hand, this tension is linked to the distribution of power. This is most obvious when sons are in opposition to dominant fathers, but it can also be noticed when sons defer to their father’s dominance. In addition, the tension is also related to affection, and most of these fathers and sons are reluctant to display their affection for each other in my presence. The sons are easily embarrassed if their parents show them signs of affection in front of their friends. Most of these fathers and sons also told me that in general they are not very demonstrative in their displays of love for each other.

Again, the picture is not entirely clear-cut, because some of the remaining nine fathers and sons seemed quite comfortable in each other’s company. Matthew and Stan are a good example. Matthew is very clear about his conviction that it is important to ‘be there’ for his children, but apart from that he and his wife have settled for a clear, gender based, division of household and caring tasks. It is important to notice that both parents are very content with this. They are both employed in paid work outside the home, but he in an executive position while she is not. She does most of the cooking etc, and he often works after hours. He is the natural head of the family and the obvious centre of attention. When one of the children need help with school work they go to mum first, and then to dad if mum gets stuck.
The ways Matthew behaves as a father is obviously not only accepted but also greatly appreciated by all members of the family. The legitimacy of the way he is as a father and husband is, in other words, not contested. As far as his son is concerned it even goes beyond appreciation. Stan obviously admires his father a great deal. He obeys him immediately, sits closely beside him while watching the sports news and he chooses to the sports his father used to play. There are many explicit signs of affection, mainly solicited by Stan. Therefore, in spite of there being a dominant father and a subordinate son, there is an overall sense of comfort and harmony over all family situations where father and son participate. Stan admires his father so much that he happily defers to him and Matthew obviously enjoys his son’s company. Thus, Matthew is allowed to be the dominant figure and there is no conflict and no competition between them to disrupt the harmony.

The logic of care

Compared to other mammals, human infants and children need care and protection for relatively long periods of time in order to survive and become competent members of their communities. From an instrumental point of view providing food and protection against the elements, illnesses and predators is basically what care and nurturance is about. Nevertheless, humans are, in a very fundamental way, more than just material living organisms. From birth we have the ability, far greater than any other living organism, to manipulate and learn symbols. Human acts are quickly assigned a symbolic dimension, and will almost always have some symbolic effect or another. So too with the way care and nurture is carried out. As an example, if care is provided only to satisfy material needs the care will still mean something to the recipient. Warren, one of the fathers I observed, pointed this out to me when I interviewed him:

“All the men (in a particular group that he belonged to) believe in equally sharing the child care with our partners. We were all into changing nappies and all that. But changing nappies can be a very technical thing, you know. It can be just a ‘on your back, pants and nappy off, clean, new nappy on, pants up, on your feet’ sort of thing. Mothers tend to do so much more, you know. Massaging the baby’s bottom as they clean it, caressing its back. Pulling faces at them and all that.”

The tasks of care and nurture can be performed in different ways, with an emphasis on the practical goals, or with a combined emphasis on both instrumental and symbolic aspects. In both cases meaning will be communicated and attributed to the performed acts, but different meanings will be generated in the two instances. My argument in this chapter is that the meaning of care and nurture influences the meaning of the relationship between caregiver and -receiver in fundamental ways.

The four relationships that I mention above all differ from the remaining nine relationships in that the fathers have been heavily involved in the daily care over longer period of time. Relationships that resemble what I call ‘close, parallel lives’ have only developed between sons and fathers when the fathers have been the primary caregivers for several years. I believe that when fathers have a lot of direct, practical experience as caregivers there is a greater chance that they will also develop the ability to perform caring tasks in ways that also communicate trust, ease and pleasure. To borrow a phrase from Merlau-Ponty, experienced caregivers are like good football players in the middle of a game; they are engaged
“in a pre-reflective opening out onto and engagement with alterity, rather than in an experience or objectification of it.” [Crossley 1996:24].

As I see it, experienced care giving, providing both material and symbolic nurturance, is a case of the kind of interaction that Merlau-Ponty calls ‘radical intersubjectivity’ characterised by an unconditional communicative openness towards the other.

Care and nurturance is hands-on work with a strong technical and instrumental component, particularly during a child’s early years. It is manual labour, body work that requires a lot of technical know-how. It is physical labour, skin and flesh work that requires technical expertise. Care and nurture involves a number of skills, and like all other skills, they can only be learned by doing. The skilful practice of caring and the nurturing tasks cannot be properly learned by just watching or reading about them. To learn how to lift and hold a baby in a way that it is comfortable and safe for both child and adult takes a lot of practice. So too does knowing when and how to feed; how to clean a baby’s bottom; change diapers; soothe when distraught; comfort and cheer up when down and calm down when overly excited.

To learn to be a good caregiver and nurturer takes a lot of time and practice. Even the technical skills take quite some time to master. In addition one must learn to understand what the child needs at any given time. This is where the ability to communicate becomes a prerequisite for providing ‘good enough’ material care. In infancy the child can only signal its desires and needs by non-verbal signs and in order to provide what is needed the caregiver must be able to interpret these signs correctly. It requires that the caregiver pays a lot of attention to the child and tries to read the child on its own premises. Like all other acts of interpreting, reading non-verbal signs is a skill, one that many people, particularly men, have not learned, or forgotten by the time they become parents. On becoming parents, they need to learn or re-learn this skill. For most people it is a demanding learning process both because it can be very frustrating and it necessitates putting ones own frustrations, wishes and needs aside.

Many caring and nurturing tasks are also rather messy and unpleasant to the senses, particularly when caring for infants or children who are ill or distraught. Such tasks can provoke very fundamental cultural taboos, as well as cause strong physical sensations of disgust. People with little or no experience as caregivers frequently find even the thought of changing nappies unpleasant, and do not see much charm in being urinated in the face when changing nappies on a little boy. Being a caregiver means being vomited upon, requires cleaning up faeces and urine, necessitates dressing a serious wound and being covered in the child’s blood, and means being kept awake for hours by a child crying so badly it makes one’s head spin. This is all part of ordinary care, and the effect it has can be understood as a form of invasion; the caregiver is invaded by the child’s body, by its bodily substances and juices, its sounds and smells in a way that one would not tolerate being invaded by anyone other than a small child. As a child grows older, these invasions become less obvious, but not necessarily less frequent. Caring for a five year old means tolerating his noise, his racing around and creating a mess, his tantrums, and then when teaching him socially accepted behaviour and stopping him from being a ‘total pain’, caring means being able to contain his anger and his frustrations. The same may be said about caring for an adolescent.
To care for and nurture another person is an act of participation in the life of the other person in two very important ways. On the one hand the giver and the receiver participate in the same activity of giving and receiving care, and joint participation in the same act carries strong potentials for strong emotions, both pleasant and painful. Everyone who has played team sports, or cooperated intimately in joint problem-solving, knows that the joy of being an integral part in successful cooperation is hard to overrate. As an example, a larger group is more powerful than a single individual and the group can achieve more in less time. The sensation of power which comes with participating in the group when it is powerful can be very pleasant. Cooperating with some external goal in mind can also create a strong sense of belonging, of being ‘one’ group rather than merely a sum of individuals. Care and nurture carries the potential for an even greater degree of participation than business and sport. The acts of care are aimed, not at an external object, but at one of the people participating. The cooperation between caregiver and receiver is not a means directed at achieving some technical goal. On the contrary the cooperation and participation is both means and end in itself. If this joint participation is successful, it can lead to very strong pleasant emotions of power, belonging and self-worth.

In a fundamental sense a caregiver and receiver participate, not only in the same activity, but also in each other’s lives. Borrowing a perspective from Bateson [1972] one might say that they become extensions of each other’s bodies, or that they become incorporated into one ‘mind’. As I have already mentioned in chapter two, Bateson [1972] argues that as far as sensation is concerned for a blind man his stick is an extension of his body. The body and the stick are integral parts of the one mind that senses, perceives, discriminates and acts. To be a good caregiver and nurturer the giver must likewise be able to pick up the information generated at ‘at the end of the stick’, i.e. the signs that the child gives off. Metaphorically speaking one might say that to be a good care giver requires that the child becomes an extension of the care givers body. But of course, the child is not an inanimate stick, and it too has the ability to pick up information that the caregiver emits. When it comes to care, both receiver and giver become extensions of each other. From this perspective, pregnancy is of particular importance because a woman who has given birth to a child has obviously participated in the life of the child, and the child in her life, in a way that no man can ever experience. At the moment of birth the child already has a life-time of experience of being ‘one mind’ with its mother, and the mother has had ample opportunity to know the child as a part of her own body. There is no reason to believe, however, that another person cannot also achieve a strong degree of participation, and become ‘one mind’ with the child. It just means the other person must work quite hard at it, considerably stronger than the mother.

The point I am working towards is that care-giving and nurture provides an extensive pool of resources for making metonymic meaning. Giving and receiving care and nurture, if both the instrumental and the symbolic aspects are emphasised, implies a huge number of experiences that lend themselves to what Lévy-Bruhl called ‘magical thinking’ governed by the ‘law of participation’. Magical thinking is based on metonymic connection making (reasoning) whereby signifier and signified are seen as being of the same kind, belonging to the same category. Metonyms create a special kind of meaning because the distinction and thus boundary between the sign and its referent is both upheld and collapses at the same time. For the attuned caregiver, when the baby cries the cry is a sign about the baby, conveying information about kinds and levels of discomfort. If the cry carries metonymic meaning for the care giver it means that it is not only a sign about the baby, but the cry is the baby. To
paraphrase the title of a book by Roy Wagner [1986] the cry is a ‘symbol that stands for itself’. The cry is not any cry that stands for any baby. It is a particular cry, the cry of my baby which also is my baby. To the attuned caregiver there is no difference between the signifier and the signified; the sound of my baby crying is a sign of ‘my baby crying’, and nothing else. The cry and the baby participate in the same meaningful constellation and make up that constellation.

In caring and nurturing relationships the law of participation does not only govern the connection between sign and referent, but also between caregiver and care-receiver. One might say that the participation between sign and referent, i.e. the cry and the child, is analogue to the participation between caregiver and receiver. The cry is not only a sign about the child, it is also a sign about the parent, and the relationship between the two. For an attentive and sensitive caregiver the baby’s cry is as much a sign of the frustrations and discomfort of the caregiver as those of the child. The cry may as easily be interpreted as produced by frustrations and discomfort felt by the adult as those of the child. In some rather profound ways care giving and nurturance have the potential for establishing metonymic relationships between giver and receiver, whereby they become established as symbols that stand for each other as well as themselves and the relationship.

The performance of care and nurture to a large extent depends on embodied practical skills and the communication is very much by use of non-linguistic signs. During the child’s infancy it is exclusively by non-linguistic signs. This contributes to the ‘non-rational’ kinds of reasoning and cognitive connection making that Levy-Bruhl calls magical thinking. As argued in chapter two, embodied knowledge is based on experiences of proximity and similarity. Such bodily experiences greatly influence what Shore calls the psychogenic motivation of symbols. As I mentioned in chapter two Shore argues that

“signs have different sorts of affordances for producing psychological meaning. The sign’s second life is in the establishment of a psychological relationship between signifier and referent in someone’s mind.” [Shore 1996: 200]

From bodily experiences of closeness, metonymic connections are made, from experiences of similarity grow connections of metaphor. Handling a baby, and being handled by an adult is a strong experience of nearness. So is being fed, cleaned and caressed, not to mention being vomited and urinated upon. Experiences of similarity grow out of all the kinds of interactions when giver and receiver perform similar acts; like copying each other’s faces, singing or moving together in the same rhythm.

The meaning and knowledge that such experiences generate are both very real and magical. The magical qualities are, firstly, a consequence of the fact that this meaning is not accessible by rational, linguistic means. The meaning of kinds of nearness and similarities that constitute care and nurturance is a total mystery, and as such is magical, and cannot be properly understood by words, it can only be properly understood by the experience of it. Secondly, when the meaning of care is recognised in a new experience of being cared for, it is not possible to make sense of how that act of recognition came about. It is, in a sense, produced by magic. Most people can easily distinguish between merely technical care, and care that carries and produces this magic. Pinpointing and identifying what it is that makes
the difference is, however, beyond words. Not to say that the meaning of care and nurture
cannot be understood. All people, who have experienced being cared for, understand it well,
but it is an understanding in and of the body only. Trying to translate this understanding into
words, as I attempt to do right now, evaporates the meaning into thin air.

In chapter two I quoted Littelton [1985] who maintained that this magical thinking

“involves the notion that all things, beings, or whatever are in some fashion linked
together, that there is no distinction (not simply no clear distinction, but no distinction
at all) between self and other, or between subject and object, past and present, animate
and inanimate, etc.” [Littleton 1985: xiii]

This mystical way of reasoning obviously violates the traditional rules of western logic,
particularly the rule of non-contradiction. Lévy-Bruhl puts it this way:

“It does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding contradiction. It obeys
laws of participation first and foremost. Thus oriented, it does not expressly delight in
what is contradictory (which would make it merely absurd in our eyes), but neither
does it take pains to avoid it. It is often wholly indifferent to it... (p 78).” [Littleton
1985: xiii-xiv]

The lack of distinction between self and other established by magical thinking must not be
confused with the idea of symbiosis. Symbiosis is a concept based on formal logic.
According to Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary it is defined as:

“The living together in mutually advantageous partnership of dissimilar organisms.”
[1980].

The concept thus depends on the identification of separate entities that can fruitfully be
thought about as independent objects existing in their own right. These independent objects
obviously also exist in accordance with the law of non-contradiction. My point is that there
are certain kinds of connections between people which may resemble symbiosis but cannot
be conceptualised as such because the meaning of the connection does not follow the law of
non-contradiction. The concept symbiosis relies on and maintains the distinction between two
independent people who somehow enter into a mutual cooperation, but still remain
independent individuals. My point is that in certain situations and for certain purposes this
distinction is not relevant. Not to say that the distinction ‘really’ disappears. The point is
rather that when the relationship between caregiver and receiver has taken on the kind of
magical meaning I mention above, the law of non-contradiction is not useful for
understanding it.

To borrow words from Lévy-Bruhl, care can be given and received in such a way that
caregiver and receiver “in some fashion become linked together, that there is no distinction
(not simply no clear distinction, but no distinction at all) between self and other...” [Littleton
1985: xiii]. This lack of distinction is a consequence of a way of reasoning (i.e. making
connections) that “does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding contradiction.
It obeys laws of participation first and foremost... it does not delight in what is contradictory,
but neither does it take pains to avoid it. It is often totally indifferent to it, and that makes it so hard to follow.” [op.cit]. Concepts A concept like symbiosis may therefore actually confuse our understanding of such relationships because it attempts to grasp a dimension of interpersonal relationships that by its very nature cannot be understood by formal, logical reasoning.

Identity and personal boundaries
The violation, or obviation of formal logic is of particular importance for understanding how acts of care and nurture influence those qualities of interpersonal relationships that have to do with notions of identity (both self and other), and the management of the boundaries whereby such notions are established and transformed. According to the laws of traditional western logic the concepts ‘I’ and ‘you’ refer to distinct and clearly demarcated categories. According to the ‘old fashioned’ theory of categories that Lakoff [1987] calls ‘objectivism’

“categories were assumed to be abstract containers, with things either inside or outside the category. Things were assumed to be in the same category if and only if they had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in common were taken as defining the category.” (ibid: 6)

According to this objectivist theory the categories ‘I’ and ‘you’ can only contain one entity each (i.e. the person to whom the concept refers), the boundaries between I and you are absolute and one cannot become be part of the other. This theory postulates that I and you are conceptual opposites and contribute to defining each other. As the Aristotelian rule of non-contradiction specifies, an entity cannot be what it is and not be what it is at the same time. By applying this rule one way to define the ‘you’ is as the ‘not I’. When we apply formal logic, ‘I’ and ‘you’ are fundamentally and eternally separated. A third category ‘we’ does, of course, exist, but it is a sum and not a collapse of ‘I’ and ‘you’. If an adult member of a western society were to say that he had become ‘part of’ someone else and that his self-identity had amalgamated with the self-identity of someone else, his statement would be judged meaningless, superstitious or maybe even insane.

Out of objectivism and the law of non-contradiction, some fundamental and deeply felt problems and anxieties in western society and culture emerge. Here I will emphasise two sets of problems, on the one hand questions related to the properties that define the category I, on the other hand problems related to the management of boundaries and experiences of transgressions and transformations. The first question is a consequence of defining categories by referring to the properties of the member(s) making up the category. By implication this necessitates the identification and understanding of these properties in order to know what the category means. As far as self-identity is concerned this way of thinking leads to the question: What are the properties that define the ‘I’? The properties in question cannot be those that are common to all ‘I’, because that would define the ‘we’. It must be properties that are unique to each ‘I’ and they must be the real properties of the ‘I’. By implication they must be properties belonging to and have developed out of its own very essence, not properties that the ‘I’ have borrowed or taken on from someone else. This question thus immediately raises all the standard questions of self-identity, questions of authenticity and uniqueness, of ontological security and existential meaning.

When ‘I’ and ‘you’ are conceptualised as distinct and clearly defined entities the problem of
boundaries also becomes acute. The ‘I’ cannot exist alone, neither in an ontological, a
semiotic nor from an existential perspective. As a physical organism, the individual is totally
dependent upon others for its conception, birth and development into adulthood. Even as a
relatively autonomous adult, all individuals are fundamentally dependent upon others for
survival. In addition, the meaning of the concept ‘I’ is structurally dependent on ‘you’ to be
meaningful. In principle a solipsist ontology, i.e. that we inhabit a world inhabited only by
ourselves, and that all others are merely figments of our imagination, cannot be ruled out. For
most of us, however, that is a notion that is both practically and existentially non-sustainable.
For all practical purposes, we do not and cannot behave as if everyone else is nothing but
figments of our imagination. It is also such a depressingly and unbearably lonely idea that in
an existential perspective it cannot sustain life only death.

Yet, objectivism and the law on non-contradiction defines the ‘I’ as a clearly bounded,
separate and lonely entity. Thus all instances of transgressions of boundaries become deeply
problematic. On the one hand it is a conceptual problem, i.e. a relatively academic question
of who am I when I am involved in the other? On the other hand, it is a matter of ethics and a
question of dignity, a problem of autonomy and dependence with huge implications for
commitment. If I become involved in the other, is it invasion and thus wrong? By becoming
involved will I lose my autonomy, and is that right? If I were to become dependent upon the
other how would that influence the other person’s evaluation of me, my evaluation of myself
and thus my dignity? Last, but not least, how is commitment related to autonomy and
dependence? Is it a positive thing, or only a cover up for dependence and dominance?

The logic of care, based on magical thinking and the law of participation, obviates most of
the problems above. Not in the sense that it tries to avoid them, or solve them, it just does not
create these problems in the first place. That, however, does not absolve the anxieties and
existential issues that the above problems raise. In western culture, (perhaps in most cultures,
I do not know) we have developed the concept of the independent ‘I’, and the questions
generated by this idea do not vanish because we also have experiences of magical unions
with other people. Both ways of imagining the world and the social relations constituting it,
both ways of reasoning about the world, exists in our culture. The tension and contradiction
between them constitutes and/or informs many of our most salient and precarious notions
about ourselves, the interpersonal relationships we engage in and our society in general.
One way to exemplify this inherent tension in interpersonal relationships in western society is
to consider the difference between gift giving and payment. As I described in chapter two
Mauss [1924] argues that gifts establish a lasting connection between giver and receiver,
because the spirit of the gift contains part of the giver, which then becomes incorporated in
the receiver. To receive a gift carries the obligation of return, at some later stage. Not the
same object or favour originally gifted, but something else. With the returned gift a part of
the giver is transported to, and takes up residence in the receiver. Thus both have become part
of each other, and this connection can never be cancelled. It can be broken, and the
relationship can be discontinued, but the meaning of the relationship can never return to what
it was prior to the giving of the gift. The broken gift-relationship will always remain and
inform the meaning of the relationship in the future. A gift is a metonymic sign which
establishes a ‘participatory’ relationship between the gift itself, the giver and the receiver.

Payment, on the other hand, establishes the opposite kind of relationship. Or rather, the
function of payment is to terminate the relationship. The relationship exists for the duration
of the interaction, which lasts as long as it takes to negotiate the deal hand over the object or perform the service. When payment is received the relationship is terminated. The means of payment, usually money, is a metaphor for the thing or service received. As mentioned earlier metaphors are fundamentally different from metonyms in that they are not members of the category they refer to. A metaphor does not contain nor carry a part of that which it refers to and does not create any such relationships of participation. The money does not contain parts of the payer, nor of the commodity, and not of the receiver either. In between the reception of the commodity and the payment a relationship of dept obtains between the two parties. This relationship somewhat resembles a gift relationship because it means that the relationship continues beyond the situation when the objects/service originally was transferred, but it is radically different. A debt is an elongation by default. If and when the fault is corrected, and payment received, the relationship ends. A gift, however, creates a lasting relationship by intent and the reciprocal act of returning the gift secures the continuation rather than the termination of the relationship. Whereas a gift creates dependence, payment secures autonomy.

The phenomenology of Merlau-Ponty, which I referred to in chapter two, offers another perspective on the same set of contradictions and tensions concerning self-identity in western culture. The ‘magical’ logic of care and nurture facilitates and encourages the development of the kind of interaction that he calls ‘radical intersubjectivity’. As I wrote in chapter two this kind of interaction is characterized by a lack of self-awareness and an unconditional communicative openness towards the other. As already mentioned Merlau-Ponty distinguishes it from what he calls ‘egological intersubjectivity’ characterised by

“an empathic intentionality which experiences otherness by way of an imaginary transposition of self into the position of the other.” [Crossly 1996:23].

Whereas radical intersubjectivity is pre-reflexive and depends on the absence of conscious reflection upon the interaction, egological intersubjectivity depends on the participants consciously thinking about themselves, their own actions, and those of the other participants. The rules of formal logic are a consequence of conscious reflection upon, among other things, the identity of entities and as such they work relatively well in order to understand relationships developing out of interactions based on egological intersubjectivity. If these rules are applied for interpreting the meaning of self-identity and relationships that build on radical intersubjectivity, the interpretations are doomed to fail.

Human imagination, and our ability to create connections between ideas, objects, and people, is guided by at least two different principles of reasoning. On the one hand what we call rational thinking according to formal rules of logic, and on the other hand magical thinking according to the rule of participation. Contrary to computers, humans are able to employ both forms of imagination at the same time, constructing meaning that somehow has to be understood by applying both sets of rules at the same time. When Simmel wrote about the peculiar notions of separation and unity that characterises human relationships, I believe that is what he referred to. Even though I quoted Simmel at length in chapter two, I would like to repeat some of it here. Simmel claimed that:

“... societary structures are composed of beings who are at the same time inside and outside of them (........) Therewith society produces perhaps the most conscious, at
least universal conformation of a basic type of life in general: that the individual soul can never have a position within a combination outside of which it does not at the same time have a position, that it cannot be inserted into an order without finding itself at the same time in opposition to that order. This applies throughout the whole range from the most transcendental and universal interdependencies to the most singular and accidental.” [Simmel 1910-11]

By one kind of reasoning we constitute ourselves as independent beings outside of our relationships, by another we are part of and inside the same relationships. Alternatively, to avoid the dualism of Aristotelian logic, the latter way or reasoning, mystical thinking, does not constitute the relationship and the individual as opposing entities. By the latter way of reasoning the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ and the ‘relationship’ are of the same stuff. Whereas interactions in public, based on instrumental logic, predominantly foster notions about individuality and separateness, interactions in private, particularly acts of care and nurture, carry a great potential for the growth of notions about individuality and magical unity.

**Fathers as caregivers**
The contrast between these ways of reasoning is of particular relevance when it comes to fathers and the ways they care for their children. In general, fathers in Anglo-Germanic societies are not greatly involved in hands-on care-giving towards their children. That is also the case with the majority of the fathers in my sample. They are all good caregivers as providers of money, but only three of them have a lot of experience as primary daily caregivers performing tasks like cooking, cleaning, comforting, tending the children while they are ill, dressing wounds, calming their tantrums etc. In general, fathers who mainly care for their children as providers of money are not sufficiently involved in the daily care to develop any proficiency in the logic of care. In order to make money most fathers spend a great proportion of their time and energy, perhaps the major part of it, outside the home and separated from their children. The making of money is primarily a public affair in the sense that it involves relating to people outside of one’s home and in ‘open’ public arenas. Private and intimate relationships, on the other hand, primarily take place in the home, away from the public ‘eye’. To establish and maintain interpersonal relationships in private and in public are radically different affairs. Or to put it in different words; the administration of personal boundaries involve radically different challenges and problems to be solved in private and in public arenas.

A fundamentally important difference between money-making and care-giving is that they encourage, and rely on, different kinds of logic concerning the relationship between means and ends. Whereas money creates a fundamental distinction between means and end, acts of care makes it impossible to separate them. Money creates this distinction at several levels. As a symbol money is a metaphor that only has a conventional relationship to the value it stands for. There are no bodily experiences of money that somehow create notions of similarity between coins and notes, and whatever the money signifies. The acts of making and spending money further enhance this separation. On the one hand, there is a fundamental difference between work and money. As we all experience every working day there are no obvious connections between the acts we perform in order to make money and the money we make. To some people, lucky enough to greatly enjoy their work, or rich enough not to care, the money they earn is regarded as nothing but an incidental by-product of having fun. On the other hand, there is an equally fundamental difference between money and the objects and
services we obtain by spending money. As a consequence, when a father predominantly cares for his children as a provider of money there are no necessary and no direct links between the acts he performs and the care he provides.

With the daily and hands on care-giving the exact opposite relationship is obtained. The act of providing care is the care. The means and the ends of care giving cannot, analytically or practically, be separated. To feed, clean or comfort a child necessarily implies actually cooking and serving food, washing clothes or the body of the child, and stroking, wiping tears and whispering soothing words. These radically different relationships between means and ends are significant for at least three reasons. First, it means that care giving is a far more restricting task than paid work. There are, literally, thousands of ways to make money, but rather few ways to feed a child. Secondly, paid work necessitates and allows a person to engage in activities that are totally separated from the child. Providing care, on the other hand, implies that the giver and the receiver of care can hardly be separated by distance, and the care giver cannot commit his attention to any other activity. The money-maker can totally forget about the child while earning money and can make the job or career itself into a project that is valuable in itself. Third, and most importantly, money-earning in the public domain and care-giving within the home facilitates and encourages radically different kind of mental operations. Money making in public necessitates, and facilitates, a certain proficiency in formal, logical thinking. It requires the ability to imagine oneself as a bounded and independent entity. It requires vigilance and the use of power directed at external agents in order to secure one’s autonomy. It hinges on the ability to manipulate the world (including those people who are considered opponents and enemies) as if it consisted merely of soulless objects. As money makers and social actors on public arenas men and fathers have to cultivate knowledge and skills that are antagonistic to the imagination required to be good care givers. By the same token, the logic of care, whereby the other is constituted as the same as one-self, makes it impossible to manipulate the other as if he or she were a soulless thing.

In somewhat simplistic terms, one might say that the formal and technical logic of traditional western rationality is based on a clear conception of boundaries and the categories they constitute. Formal logic is a cognitive tool for the management of those boundaries with the aim of maintaining and defending the autonomy and integrity of the category. The logic of care and nurture, on the other hand, is based on the experience of ‘magical unity’ generated by acts of participation. As a cognitive tool, it is useful for the maintenance of notions of belonging, collective identity and togetherness. As with all kinds of tools both have their limitations. The predicament of formal logic is the inherent tendency towards atomism because all categories can always be divided and new autonomous entities be created. Formal logic has no other way to reunite entities into composite categories but by mechanistic mathematical means such as addition and multiplication. In many relationships, however, the totality is more than the sum of the parts; a phenomena where formal logic provides no tools to grasp the meaning. The predicament of the logic of care, on the other hand, is the danger of the collapse of internal boundaries, or rather the lack of recognition of internal lines of division. In an interpersonal dyad this may, as an example, lead to a transgression of boundaries that one of the persons involved could experience as a violation. A conclusion of the first part of this chapter is therefore that care-giving and nurture is a continuous balancing act. On the one hand, it involves the continuous transgression of the individual boundaries of both caregiver and care-receiver. On the other hand, it requires a constant re-constitution and re-cognition of these boundaries by way of continuous adjustment of the degrees and ways
that they are transgressed. As I will show in the chapters to come, all the father-son relationships I observed, from dominant fathers and submissive sons, to those who live close, parallel lives, can be understood in the light of this continuous transgression and establishment of personal boundaries.

As the descriptions in the previous chapter indicate there is a wide variety in ways that fathers and sons behave towards each other. There are single fathers like Warren and Harry who are main caregivers, and fathers like Peter, in heterosexual dual parent families who are, or have been, primary caregivers and home-makers for long periods of time. On the other hand there are fathers, like Matthew, James and Michael who predominantly care for their sons as breadwinners. There are fathers like Jack and Henry who are quite withdrawn, and others who are much more active when in the presence of their sons. There are families with a strict division of labour between the parents and where the fathers are the ultimate authorities, like Matthew, James and Michael. Then there are fathers like Bryan who strongly believe in equality between husband and wife, and therefore work hard at sharing all housework and childcare evenly. There are also fathers like Nigel who are heavily involved in housework and childcare, but where the division of labour between husband and wife still is differentiated in the sense that Nigel performs some tasks and Daphne performs other tasks. Love is another area where there is a lot of difference. Some fathers are emotionally quite expressive and communicate their love for their children openly and in obvious ways, others do not. Last, but not least, the distribution of power is different from on relationships to the next as well. There are fathers who dominate their sons, fathers who compete with their sons, and then there are fathers and sons whose relationships seem to be egalitarian.
Chapter 5 Cultural models, father and son

In the previous chapter I argue that the degree and the kind of care-giving that a father is involved in relationship to his son greatly influences the meaning of the relationship and determines whether a magical union will emerge or not. From my observations I have concluded that the majority of fathers do not spend very much time involved in the daily care for their sons, and that such fathers are usually quite dominant when interacting with their sons. On the other hand I also observed a smaller number of fathers and sons who have developed close parallel lives. This raises the question why some fathers are more involved in care-giving than others, why and how they manage to perform this caregiving in ways that foster magical unions?

In chapter two I argued that a possible strategy for understanding interpersonal dyads is to begin by looking for the cognitive cultural models involved. However, before commencing this investigation a note of precaution is necessary because looking for cognitive cultural models is not a perfectly non-problematic endeavour. As Keesing pointed out in his article Models “folk” and “cultural”; Paradigms regained? [1987] cognitive anthropology has been fraught with a number of weaknesses. Some of these have since been satisfactorily dealt with for example by theoreticians like Bradd Shore [1996]. Others remain, as far as I can see. For my purpose two of the pitfalls which Keesing identify are of particular relevance. The first problem has to do with the relationship between the observing analyst and the people observed. In simple terms it is a question of the degree to which the alleged models are held as models by the observed people, and how much the models are constructions made by the analyst? The second has to do with drawing the line between cognitive cultural model, and other factors that influence the processes whereby social and cultural patterns are generated. I will deal with the former first.

According to cognitive anthropological theory cognitive models have a dual nature in that they are both tools for interpreting the world and guidelines for behaviour. There is, however, not a one to one relationship between the two. When trying to understand what people say and do we cannot infer directly from their symbolic expressions and behaviour to cognitive models. As Keesing points out:

“Such models, then, are not presented to us in what everyday people say and do in their everyday lives, or in the stuff of metaphor talk; they are represented, in fragmentary surface facets. We must infer the mere coherent, if unarticulated, models that lie beneath....” [Ibid: 374, italics in origin]

As interpreters of other people’s expressions and behaviour we are always in danger of over-interpretation; of claiming the existence of coherent models in cases when the people themselves may not hold or believe that they hold such models. The problem of over-interpretation is, in principle, unavoidable. Not only is it impossible for the interpreter to know for sure what other individuals are really thinking. In addition it may be that some people are aware of the models they apply, whereas others are not. Thus, this problem cannot be solved. As an interpreter one can only be aware of it and try to be careful and not make claims that are too large. But then again, there are times when grand claims can be justified. And there are times when the interpreter is convinced that he/she is on to something without being able to justify the claim by referring in detail back to observed statements and actions.
Only honest, critical scrutiny can reveal whether the grand claims were sustainable or not. When I claim that Pakeha culture contains two main cultural models of fatherhood; the breadwinner and the involved model, this claim must, of course, be subject to the same kind of scrutiny. It is not a statement of fact but an analytical claim that I propose on the basis of my observations and reflections upon other literature. These models have not been given to me on a silver platter, I have distilled them myself, so to speak, from what I have seen, heard and read.

The second problem, i.e. the relationship between cultural models and other aspects of social life, is a question of how good the theory of cultural models is as a tool for interpretation. As Keesing observed this is a double question, on the one hand concerning:

“how we are to define folk or cultural knowledge so they usefully delimit some sectors, but not all, of the cultural knowledge of individuals? [Ibid: 374]

On the other hand it asks:

“What are such models? And what does human beings know that does not comprise these models?” [Ibid: 374, italics in origin].

The first question particularly pertains to the relationship between individual and collective knowledge. Bradd Shore [1996] has, in my opinion, dealt with this particular problem in a most satisfactory manner. He argues that culture is always twice born and cultural models always have both mental and instituted properties. This argument provides the analytical perspective needed to make sense of a lot of observed variety. In Bradd Shore’s own words:

“The reason for stressing the distinction between conventional mental models and instituted models is that there is no one-to-one correspondence between a social model and its cognitive analogue. It is conceivable, for example, that under certain conditions, members of a community will fail to fully internalize a cultural model because their personal experiences are incompatible with the conventional model. For these people the cultural models have become ‘dead models’. These individuals may well have alternative mental models, models that may be highly idiosyncratic or socially manifested as marginal cultural representations or as cultural innovations.” [Ibid: 52]

The latter question is more complicated, however, and leads to a philosophical discussion about whether knowledge can be independent of cognitive models or not. If we follow Lakoff’s claim [1987: 5] that knowledge is basically about categorisation, there is no need to assume that categories are always part of cognitive models. Not only can categories be distributed over a number of models, a category may also be a remnant of a ‘dead model’ (see below) or a fragment of a disintegrated model. The question about what humans know that “does not comprise these models” is thus, on the one hand, a matter of identifying the model that a particular category may belong to. On the other hand it may also be that the category does not belong to any model or that there is not enough coherence and structure to a particular set of notions to call it a model.

The most fundamental problem, in my opinion, is to recognise the limits of cognitive theory
as a tool for interpreting social and cultural phenomena. This problem is twofold. On the one hand it involves being aware of the fact that in spite of the fact that human cognition is an aspect of all social and cultural phenomena, there are social processes that unfold in ways that cannot be understood by use of cognitive theory. Knowing when it is appropriate and useful to apply cognitive theory and when it is not, is the first part of the problem. The second part is to try and understand how cognitive processes and other kinds of social processes are related, for example how they support or contradict each other.

Bearing in mind the above cautionary remarks my aim in this chapter is to describe the cognitive models involved in shaping the meanings of individual relationships between Pakeha fathers and adolescent sons, and to argue in favour of my claim that these are the relevant cognitive models involved. I will begin by sketching some cultural, contextual factors, e.g. notions about gender, that necessarily inform the contents of cultural models of father and son. Thereafter I will present three of the fathers and sons in my sample in somewhat greater detail than in chapter three. In combination with other analytic literature these descriptions make up the body of analytical resources I employ in order to support the proposition that there are two conflicting sets of models for father and for son in contemporary Pakeha society. On the one hand a model of fatherhood that rests on a strict gender division of labour, specifying different tasks of care and nurturance for fathers and mothers. According to this model father’s main job is to be economic provider and I therefore call it the *breadwinner* model. The fundamental duty inherent in the corresponding son-model is that the son behaves with respect and defers to his father. I call this the *obedient son* model. The other model of fatherhood is based on a principle of gender equality and specifies that mother and father take equal part in all parental tasks. I call this the *involved father* model. According to the corresponding son-model a son is supposed to be an autonomous individual who continuously strive to actualise all his inherent potentials. I call this the *self-actualising son* model.

In the second part of this chapter I will try to depict some of the structures and processes of Pakeha society that particularly influences the above cognitive and cultural models of father and son. I will argue that today the involved father model is ideologically hegemonic in Pakeha culture. I will present some of the factors that I believe contributes to the commonly held conviction that the involved father model is the best and the correct way for fathers to behave, as well as some of the factors that gradually undermines the foundations for the breadwinner model.

**Gender**

It is only as men that humans can be fathers and sons and the meanings of these terms are therefore necessarily strongly gendered. The way an individual behaves, thinks and feels as a father or a son is inseparably linked to how he behaves, thinks and feels as a male person. This is so obvious it is almost superfluous to state it. I still make this point explicit because in this thesis I will not use conventional gender theory (as presented e.g. by Michaela di Leonardo et al. in *Gender at the crossroads of knowledge* [1991]), as a perspective for understanding the meaning of relationships between Pakeha fathers and adolescent sons. I have two reasons for avoiding gender theory. On the one hand I do not find these theories very useful. On the other hand I believe that they are based on a very unfortunate presupposition. The reasons why I do not find them useful may of course be that I have not fully comprehended them. I am open to that possibility and admit that I find gender theory, as
well as gender analysis of ethnography, difficult to follow. My scepticism is based on the impression that gender theory carries a strong tendency either in the direction of the disintegration of the subject matter at hand, or towards essentialism. The former tendency is particularly found in gender studies within the social and cultural sciences, as well as within literary criticism. Today most such studies are based on social constructionist premises, and usually take the form of discourse analysis. As long as gender studies only focus on ideas and images discourse analysis is useful and valid. I am, however, fundamentally sceptical of text as a metaphor for understanding human behaviour and how humans experience their worlds, and do not believe discourse analysis is a good tool for understanding such phenomena. Both discourse analysis and social constructionism carry a strong inherent tendency towards the analytical disintegration of the social phenomena being investigated. In the former case social phenomena disintegrates to signs, in the latter to contingencies. In the end such analysis end up with nothing but signs referring to signs, contingencies refereeing o contingencies and all general statements melt into air (to paraphrase Marx and Berman). Thus we are left with nothing particularities; individual persons, individual histories, individual contingencies. Like all other forms of epistemological anarchy constructionist and deconstructionist critical theory may at times be good medicine against oppressive and/or outdated paradigms [Feyerabend, 1985]. However, when the medicinal effect is over they leave nothing in their wake. Medicine is not a sustainable diet, to put it that way. 

As di Leonardo points out social constructionism need not

“disintegrate into a nihilist stance holding that there is no truth or that, in Foucauldian logic, we are all trapped in the prisonhouse of logic” [1991:30].

Di Leonardo argues that in order to avoid such nihilism it is necessary to choose “an Archimedean point” as a foundation for ones study. In principle I agree with her, but I also believe that the point (or points) usually chosen by social constructionist gender theorists is most unfortunate. Looking for ‘contingencies’ most social constructionist theory tends to end up with history as one of its Archimedean legs. The problem, as far as I am concerned, is that history cannot serve that purpose. Few aspects of social life are as fleeting, as dubious and as far removed from the materiality of human life and human bodies as history. Not only does history bring us back to texts, and is thus removed from lived experience, but history is always also removed in time. History is always (at least) twice (in time and by text) removed, and thus, potentially, twice distorted. History is also epistemologically fundamentally dubious because it is never, and can never be, what it purports to be. History, supposedly, is a description of past events. In reality, however, history is a contemporary interpretation of texts about the past. History is thus not only twice removed it is also an un-separable mix of present and past, or in popular parlance a hybrid. History is thus far from solid enough to work as an Archimedean foundation for any study. The other leg that gender studies in general tend to rest their analysis on is nature. It seems to me that gender studies in general find it very difficult to free themselves from the presupposition that gender is a consequence of differences of sex and reproduction. This is particularly the case with gender studies inspired by biology or socio-biology, but also many psychologically inspired studies. Even in constructionist or discourse analysis, nature is often the only solid remain. I believe this is a most unfortunate presupposition because it draws our analytic attention towards biology and away from social processes. Just like kinship
relationships cannot be understood as ‘biological bonds’, gender and sex are not about biology either. I am not thereby implying that sexual and reproductive differences do not exist by nature. My point is that these differences are invested with meaning; or in other words they are made to make a difference. Gender is a question of what makes the natural differences into a difference that makes a difference. In my opinion the answer to this question is not immanent in the natural differences themselves, but is a matter of social organisation.

Social organisation is the Archimedean point I choose as a foundation for understanding gender. Ironically enough that brings me back to a social constructionist position, but it is not a position that defines gender primarily as a matter of notions, images and text that humans can construct or deconstruct more or less at will. Social organisation is basically a matter of practical tasks that people perform in order to maintain their material and symbolic world. The analysis of social organisation begins with identifying the tasks and asking who does what and when. I believe that very much of what we call gender is a matter of the different relational logics fostered by the social organisation of care and nurturance in private setting as opposed to the performance of most other kinds of tasks in public settings. I emphasise that I am not returning to Rosaldo’s argument that gender is a matter of ‘private’ versus ‘public’ spheres of social life. My argument is that gender is primarily a question of relational logic, and that tasks like caring for and nurturing young children within a social context characterized by a high degree of familiarity and trust rely on and favour a radically different relational logic than tasks performed in front of ‘strangers’ in public settings. I will argue this point more extensively in this and the following chapter.

Images of masculinity
Even though I will not employ conventional gender theory it is impossible to avoid talking about images and notions of masculinity and femininity as part of the context within which cultural models of father and son take shape. I take for granted that it makes sense to talk about cognitive models of father and son and that it also makes sense to talk about cognitive models of masculinity. By models of masculinity I mean paradigmatic examples of particular kinds of men, defined by certain stereotypical traits. Obviously it is models in the plural. Just as there are many kinds of women, there are many kinds of men [Connell 1995, Cornwall and Lindisfarne (Eds.) 1994].

In Masculinities in Aotearoa/New Zealand by Law, Campbell and Nolan (Eds.) [1999] a number of contemporary New Zealand masculine stereotypes are presented. As such it is a useful text, but what I find even more interesting about it is the conspicuous absence of men as fathers. According to Campbell [oral communication] articles about fathers were not deliberately excluded, but do not feature because of a lack of studies on fathers in New Zealand. To me this absence signals something very important about stereotypical notions and models of masculinity in New Zealand, i.e. the dichotomy between relations in public and in private/domestic settings. Several of the authors in the anthology touches upon this dichotomy, e.g. Schick and Dolan’s interview with Jock Phillips, who conducted the first thorough study of men and masculinity in New Zealand, published under the title A Man’s Country?: The Image of the Pakeha Male [1987]. In his study Phillips discusses the clash between the norms of masculinity for the ‘man alone’ and the norms for ‘the family man’. Campbell, Law and Honeyfield also deal with this dichotomy in their article ‘What it means to be a man’: Hegemonic masculinity and the Reinvention of Beer. They point out that one of
the pervasive themes for men’s interactions in pubs over the last seventy years is

“an almost ritualistic derogation of home/domesticity/wives/women before leaving the pub”. [p. 168].

The point I am driving at here is that Pakeha masculinity is predominantly related to public settings. The only set of models of masculinity that associates men with domestic relationships are models of fatherhood, and even such models have a hard time depicting men relating to women and children within the home.

There can be no doubt that all models of masculinity are not equally distributed or equally accepted within Pakeha culture and society. And yet it is problematic to claim that some ideas or images of masculinity are more dominant (what Connell [1995] calls hegemonic masculinity) than others. One problem is the danger of reification, and the problem of delimiting the group of people within which certain ideas dominate is another. A third problem is the fact that the model of masculinity that is most widely distributed and accepted may not be the masculinity of the men who dominate society in general. The stereotypical image of the men who rule Pakeha Society pictures them wearing suits and ties, drive slick sedans and drink red wine out of fine crystal. The dominant stereotypical image of the typical Pakeha man, however, sees him wearing a working mans outfit and gumboots, driving a pick-up and drinking beer straight out of the can. Bearing this in mind it is still possible to recognise certain traits that most Kiwis would say characterises the proper way for the common Pakeha man to behave.

During my interviews with various Pakeha men I asked them what they believe are the characteristics of Pakeha masculinity. One of the interviewees gave this short and poignant answer: “Beer, rugby and (horse) racing.” Another said something like this: “Being a man means being competent at whatever you try to do.” From my own observations these two statements express that core of the dominant model of masculinity in Pakeha culture. This model demands that a man exhibit mastery of his body, his relationships with other humans and with the material world. This is basically what the first statement says: Beer drinking implies exhibiting mastery over the intoxicating effects of alcohol as well as mastery over his own time in relationship to demands from his wife. Rugby means exhibiting mastery over the ball and the techniques of the game, not to mention the mastery of pain. Horse-racing (i.e. gambling) implies exhibiting mastery over ones own economy, and not becoming a slave to gambling. What the statements also indicate is that ‘latent’ competence is not sufficient. The competence must be proven, and the only way to do so is put it on trial and to demonstrate that ‘I can stand my ground’.

Heterosexuality and mateship are important ingredients in the dominant Pakeha masculinity as well. Pakeha displays of masculinity are mainly aimed at masculine audiences, in particular ones mates. The Kiwi myth about ‘man alone’ must not be misunderstood to the effect that the dominant Pakeha masculinity is antithetical to sociability. Nor does it prescribe asocial or antisocial attitudes and behaviour. The emphasis on exhibiting mastery does not even imply that dependency is unmanly behaviour. Being dependent is acceptable if it mastered in the proper way. As long as nobody assumes a subordinate position mates can depend upon each others as equals. This, obviously, closely ties in with mateship as strictly defined by heterosexuality. Proper men must be equals because the inferior position is
associated with femininity. Likewise sexual intimacy only belongs between man and women, and all signs of sexual intimacy is closely monitored and prohibited between men. Intimacy in itself is not banned but it must be carefully administered so as not to give off any erotic signs.

Gender stereotypes and Kiwi ways of life

As mentioned before stereotypical images of Kiwi identity are all male and all rural. As such these stereotype images are obviously also parts of the stereotypical Kiwi male. He is someone involved in agriculture, either working directly with tending animals and cultivating plants, or further down the production line; driving trucks, a labourer at a freezing work or a pack-house. He is unskilled or has a trade like being a butcher, and is involved in physically heavy manual labour most of the time. He wears a chequered shirt, shorts and gumboots all year round, and on a cold day dons a Swandri; a woollen, waterproof, hooded bush shirt which reaches down to his thighs. To guard against the burning sun he wears a cap or a wide brimmed hat. Most times he is clean shaven and frequently sports a hair cut called a mullet; short on top and sides, long at the back with a five to ten centimetres loose tail hanging over the collar.

The rural man most often drives a pick-up truck, but may also choose a Holden station wagon with a big motor. When needed he is capable of handling any kind of vehicle, from horse to four-wheel motorbike. He is a practical man and quite ingenious. There is no practical problem he will not attempt to solve, and most of them he will set right with a bit of number eight wire. After work he will meet his mates at the pub where they shout each other rounds of beer, watch rugby on the TV glaring in the corner, shoot pool, play on the poker machines, or just have a yarn. Once a week he plays rugby for a couple of hours in the early evening and afterwards the whole team congregates at the pub. Though he enjoys his beer he knows how to hold it. He has no time for other drugs, but if a mate smokes a joint, it does not bother him. When drinking the Kiwi bloke does not loose control and does not get violent. He will, obviously, defend himself, his mates and his family if necessary, but basically he sees violence as a stupid thing to engage in. If, on the other hand, he should loose his temper it is an unfortunate but excusable thing that can happen to the best of men.

At the week ends he goes hunting or fishing. Pig hunting is a favourite. Together with a mate or two he sets off into the bush. A pack of pig-hunting dogs are let loose; they soon pick up a scent and disappear. The New Zealand bush is thick and difficult to penetrate. In addition the landscape is folded, full of crevices and gorges. Following the dogs is quite an ordeal. The men run and crawl and beat their way through the undergrowth and in the distance hear that the dogs have caught up with a hog. A New Zealand wild pig is quite a sight. Most of them are descendants of domestic pigs that have gone feral. After generations in the wild they have turned big, black, with a heavy bristle, and two razor sharp tusks. When the men catch up the dogs have cornered the pig. The dogs are small, but fierce and attack the pig from all corners. Soon the pig has a dog hanging from each ear, a third has attached itself to a hind leg and the rest run around yapping and surging at the pig from all directions. It is often impossible to use the gun and shoot the pig without risking the life of a dog. In that case the only way to kill the pig is to jump on its back and slit its throat. And that is exactly what our rural Kiwi bloke does. Having killed it he and his mates then have to carry one hundred and fifty kilos of dead meat back out of the bush. With one hog's leg over each shouldar they are carried out as if they were backpacks.
The rural bloke described above is a cultural stereotype often portrayed in films, cartoons and books as a national character; the typical Kiwi. Whether he is representative of the majority of rural men I do not know, but I have seen and met lots of rural Kiwi guys who make no attempt to look any different. The rural Kiwi woman is a different story. As I have said elsewhere all symbols of Kiwiness are male. The image of rural women that I present below are thus stereotypes of my own creation, based on observations and opinions about women I have been told or have overheard, rather than a presentation of a cultural stereotype.

The rural Kiwi girl generally lives with her parents until she moves in with her boy friend. Often the move is motivated by her being pregnant. She may still be in school at this point, but more commonly she works at the check-out in the local store, as an unskilled clerk in a bank or at the garage pumping petrol. At school or work she wears a uniform, usually a rather un-flattering attire consisting of a blouse and a skirt just above the knees. After hours she will change into t-shirt, tight jeans and sand shoes, or a loose top, shorts and jandals on a hot day. When still in school, and prior to getting pregnant, she is quite active in sports. Plays netball, land hockey and enjoys swimming. She moves about with her friends, usually gender segregated, but sometimes made up of boys and girls. They hang out at the local small town centre, visit each other at home and during week-ends they party together, usually at someone's house when the parents are absent. Some time in her late teens she is likely to find a steady boy-friend, and it wont tak long before they move in together. On Friday evenings she may join him at the pub for a beer, but usually she will cook tea and wait or him at home. When he arrives she might have a glass a white wine before they eat, while he has another beer.

Her female rural friends and female relatives are all, like her, mothers or pregnant. Her single friends who do not have kids have left for the big city. Most of the mothers are full time home makers on or off a farm, or work part time as unskilled labourers in the service sector. Many are single mothers on the DPB, but just as many are living with the father of one or all of their children. The rural woman is a mother first and foremost. When her own children come of age and she becomes a grandmother, her life only to improve. As the centre of family attention, and with more spare time than earlier, she throws herself into community activities of various sorts. She enters produce in the A and P show competition, raises money for charities like Plunket society and starts playing bowls. Her children come for visits on a regular and frequent basis and if she has daughters they may look in several times a week. She is likely to outlive her husband, but with children, grandchildren and even the community based 'Meals on wheels' to service her, she continues to enjoy living in her own home for the rest of her life.

In spite of the facts that the entire stock of national Kiwi symbols is about rural life, and that there are no images of a typical Kiwi ways to live in the city, there are still many popular notions and images about urban life and urban people. As I have picked up these notions they run somewhat like this: First of all, it is a unisex lifestyle; there is no real difference between how men and women live in the city. The unisex urbanite is a professional, or on the way to become one. In the latter case he or she is at university. As a student the urbanite lives in a flat which is shared with other students. If the urbanite remains single after graduating, he or she may keep flating for a few years until having found a partner. As a single student time and energy is divided between studies, work and fun. The latter includes everything from week-ends at the beach to parties and all night clubbing. Student allowance is low, tuition and the cost of living (urbanites
have to have a car) so high that the urban student has to work between ten and twenty hours a week to make ends meet. They are also saving to go overseas, and though they have jobs lined up in London they still need the ticket and enough to get by or a month or two. So they all work, usually a low paid job in a café, at McDonalds or the local supermarket. When not working the young Kiwi urbanite favours casual clothing; shorts, t-shirts. There are some obvious sub-groups of style but the only one I am familiar with is the ferals. With dread locks, piercing and designer rags they are easy to recognise. If there are fashion conscious young Kiwi urbanites they must all follow a casual fashion because that is all I have spotted. On the other hand, I may of course be fashion blind.

Having teamed up as partners the young urbanite couple at first rents a flat on their own, and soon begin to save for the deposit on a mortgage. After a few years they buy their first home, a bungalow on a quarter acre section somewhere in the suburbs. They travel down-town every morning in their own car, a Toyota sedan, a second hand Japanese import. The traffic is bad but there is no public transport, at least none that they can rely on. Both work long hours and eat lunch at a fancy café in the city. After hours they sometimes meet up, only the two or a bunch of friends, at a bar for a drink. Particularly if it is Friday. Arrive home late, have a late supper and crash in front of the TV for a few hours before bed. On week ends they take off somewhere, go tramping, kayaking, white-water rafting, or to the beach. Maybe their parents have a batch not too far away where they join the rest of the family on special occasions like Christmas. Or they stay at home. She tends the garden while he is engaged in some technical job, like repairing the gutter. In the evening they invite some friends over for a barbeque and drinks. He and his mates enjoy some imported lagers, the girls sip a Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc. Or maybe they have decided to engage in some wine tasting; a new Pinot Noir from Central Otago has been all the rage in the glossy weeklies and the Sunday papers.

The urban couple plan their lives well, gradually paying off their student loans and the mortgage, buying a slightly better car and gaining better positions at work. In their late twenties or early thirties it is time to have a child, which they do. With a child things change, of course. Mother has to quit her job. After her first three months of state sponsored leave is up she asks her employer for a non-paid leave, but is not guaranteed to get it. Her employer is very apologetic, but he just cannot afford not to fill her position and training a temp for just some months is a waste. So she becomes a full time caregiver and home-maker and he compensates for the lost income by working even longer hours. They now rarely frequent fancy cafés and bars, but of course he still goes to a pub with his mates and colleagues after work. Week-ends and holidays are now spent almost exclusively at home, at the local beach and at the family batch.

A few years later they have another child. Mother stays home for a few more years, but when the oldest child starts school at age five, she sends the little one to day-care centre and gets a part time job. When both children have been in school for a few years she goes back to full time work. Things are looking good financially. They buy a bigger house and start taking off for week-ends again. This year they will go on holiday to Fiji, and next year they would like to go to Great Barrier Reef in Australia. Granny and Grandpa are getting too old to maintain the batch and the siblings have taken it over. Now they take turns using it.

The children grow up and the urban couple enjoy a second spring. With good jobs, high salaries and no more responsibilities the world is their apple. They pick up travelling again, all over New
Zealand and maybe a revisit of the OE they did thirty years ago. They sell their house in the
suburbs and move into an easy care flat down town. All the urban amenities at their fingertips,
they are now cruising and intend to do so forever.

Cultural Models of father and son

When searching for cultural models for father and son there are actually three different
concepts that need to be investigated; the concepts ‘father’, ‘son’ and ‘relationship’. In this
chapter I will only deal with models for father and son because models for relationship have
already been dealt with in chapter two. Though I never explicitly stated this point in that
chapter a theory is also a cognitive model. My speculations in the direction of a theory of
interpersonal dyads can also be read as an investigation into western cultural models of
interpersonal relationships. I will therefore leave that concept aside for now and concentrate
on contemporary cultural models for the concepts father and son in Pakeha society.

The cultural model for father is far easier to grasp than the model for son. Fatherhood is an
openly debated topic and a wide range of ideas about fatherhood are openly expressed and
publicly available. That is not the case with the concept son. The meaning of the latter
concept is taken to be self-evident: Sons are the male off-springs of parents, and that is all
there is to it. There is no public debate concerning this concept and it is even difficult to
identify different images of ‘sonhood’. To start with there is no such word as ‘sonhood’.
There are words like ‘manhood’ or ‘personality’, but no word that refers to different
culturally specified ways to be a son. As boys sons can behave in many different ways; there
are obedient sons, and rebellious sons and prodigal sons. Still, these differences are not
conceptualised as having anything to do with models of ‘sonhood’ as such. They are
conceptualised as having to do with personality, masculinity, politics etc. No matter how
boys and men behave, they are still sons for the same reasons; i.e. being male offspring. In
order to understand models of ‘sonhood’ it is therefore necessary to link this concept to
models of the ‘masculine person’.

Before I begin my search for western (i.e. Anglo-Germanic) cultural models of fatherhood a
few words on cross-cultural variation seems in place. Within anthropology it is common
knowledge that the kinship position and term ‘father’ is not equalled in all cultures and
societies. Particularly in so-called matrilineal societies the position and the meaning
attributed to it may be radically different from in our society. As an example the matrilineal
Mosco of the Yunnan province in China have a kinship system that does not identify a ‘father’
position and there is no term for ‘father’ [Håland 2003, personal communication]. Another
interesting variation on the topic of fatherhood is supplied by Malinowski. He claimed that
the Trobriands were

“quite ignorant of the man’s share in the begetting of children, the “father” has for the
Trobriander a purely social definition: he is the man married to the mother, who lives
in the same house with her and forms part of the household”. [Malinowski 1927/1966:
14].

Matrilineal societies is a good source for finding descriptions of fatherhood that are different
from our own. In addition the scope for variation is large also within such societies, a fact
thoroughly documented by Schneider and Gough et al. in Matrilineal Kinship [1961]. Even in
cultures where there is a term that translates to our father, the contents of the position, i.e. the rights, duties and variation of behaviour of fathers towards their children, may be radically different from that of fathers in Anglo-Germanic societies. The relatively large degree of intimacy between fathers and children among the Aka of Central Africa [Hewlett 1991] and the avoidance behaviour of sons in Middle-Eastern societies [Barth 1971] are examples of variations allowed within cultures that recognize a fatherhood position somewhat similar to our own.

Some of the variation in the meaning of fatherhood is due to the fact that in Anglo-Germanic cultures the concept ‘father’ is not one-dimensional. When searching for a model of fatherhood in Pakeha culture a primary point to be aware of is that in Anglo-Germanic cultures the concept father is not one model, but a cluster model. As I mentioned in chapter two George Lakoff presents a rather thorough analysis of the western concept ‘mother’ in his book *Women, Fire and Dangerous things* [1987: 74]. The concept father is very similar and Lakoff’s presentation of the mother cluster is, with minor adjustments, also a presentation of the father cluster model. The cluster contains these elements:

- The genetic father
- The nurturance father
- The marital model - the husband of the wife is the father
- The genealogical father

As I will show in this thesis all of these components are important for understanding the contents of relationships between fathers and sons. As far as making sense of the observed variety, however, the ‘nurturance father’ model is of greater interest. The contents of the other three models are relatively fixed, whereas ‘nurturance’ is open for a variety of definitions and practices. I have already mentioned that in this study I focus on care, love and power as three different dimensions of father-son relationships. Care and nurturance have very similar meanings and in this thesis I will treat them as synonyms.

In this chapter I will thus try and answer the questions: What are the relevant nurturance models of fatherhood in contemporary Pakeha society? How do the other models in the cluster relate to the nurturance model? Last but not least, how well do these models account for the observed behaviour of fathers and sons? I begin my inquiry with a relatively wide definition of care. Care consists of all those practical tasks a parent carries out in order to fulfil what he or she judges to be the wishes, desires or needs of their children. Even though the concepts wish, desire and need may refer to very different psychological phenomena that difference is not relevant here, and I will not enter into a debate about these differences. My use of the concept care relates to those tasks that fathers perform, or believe they ought to perform, in order to fulfil what they believe their sons desire or need. My focus at this stage is thus on fathers and the tasks that they perform, rather than on sons and why they want these services provided.

In everyday practical terms nurturance implies performing a number of small, mundane, practical tasks like cooking, feeding, cleaning, comforting, paying rent, maintaining house and home etc. My first question is if there are any such tasks that fathers are supposed to perform because they are fathers, and in order to be considered, by themselves as well as others, as proper fathers. To answer this question I need to know the ideas about fatherhood
that exists in Pakeha society. When I interviewed the fathers in my sample as well as seventeen other Pakeha men, I asked them to define what they believed to be the caring/nurturing tasks that define fatherhood. The answers varied and some interviewees maintained that there are specific tasks only fathers can perform whereas others answered that all parental tasks can equally well performed by both mothers and fathers. All interviewees agreed, however, that to provide economically, to teach and to protect are fundamental parental tasks that must be performed if the children are not to be neglected. The question about gender specificity was more a matter of degrees of responsibility and topics to be taught than an either/or situation. Those men who expressed a belief in gender specific tasks maintained that fathers have particular responsibility for tasks like providing economically, be a male role model, teach about male things, and to protect the children.

In addition to these three instrumental tasks, all the interviewed men also agreed that it is fundamentally important for fathers to ‘be there’ for their children, to ‘be available’ and to be ‘involved’. All the men I interviewed voiced this opinion, in clear and unambiguous terms. When pressed for answers many men said that when a minimum level of economic security has been reached, being there is more important than making more money. In spite of the clear conviction that it is important to be involved most of the men could only give vague answers to how the father is supposed to be involved. To some fathers it meant spending time in and around the home, whereas to others it meant talking an active interest in what the children do, their education and leisure time activities, and spending generous amounts of time engaging in such activities together with their children.

**Observed life**

Before continuing my analytic search for the models of fatherhood in Pakeha culture I think it will be useful to take a closer look at interactions between real life fathers and sons. The fathers and sons I describe below have already been presented in chapter three and what follows partly overlaps and repeats what has already been written, but also adds information.

**James, Barbara, Matt and Henk**

James is in his mid forties, so is Barbra, Matt is fifteen and Henk is twelve. They own and run a farm and the father therefore works close to home. Mother does the books for the farm, but apart from that she does not have a job outside the home. As far as the division of domestic labour between James and Barbara is concerned, he does the technical and physical work on house and property and she is the homemaker.

When I asked them if I could come and visit on a regular basis they were open and inviting. Both mother and father warned me though that Matt is quite reserved. “You won’t get much out of him” they told me. “Henk”, on the other hand, is very outgoing” they said, and actually a bit too much at time, they implied. Having thus warned me we decided I could come for tea (main evening meal) once a week.

A typical visit would run somewhat like this: As I arrive the boys are out in the yard playing cricket or rugby. I stand and watch for a bit, and then join in. Father arrives home from work while we are playing. He goes straight inside, changes out of his work gear, and cleans up. Meanwhile I have fully entered into playing rugby with the boys. They teach me what to do, Matt is far larger than his brother and keeps beating him, in a gentle sort of a way, but Henk does not give up and fights back time and again. Father then calls out the back door that it is time for tea. We are quite involved in the play and do not
respond. Father calls again, impatient this time, strict voice. We all abide immediately. The boys wash their hands, so do I, and afterwards we all hang around in the kitchen-dining room waiting for the food to be served.

Mother is by the stove, cooking. Father is helping with some minor task, or just stands by the sink, talking to mother. Matt sets the table, we all sit down and mother serves the food. Matt asks me what I would like to drink, I answer and he pours me a glass of juice. Father then strikes up a conversation about his favourite topic, sports. The winter 1998 Winter Olympics at Lillehammer are on at the moment, and seeing that I am from Norway he assumes I am well informed. I am not, so he fills me in. He keeps talking about sports, mainly addressed at me. I try to follow him, but my knowledge of sports is limited, so father explains. Matt makes an attempt to interject some comment about the subject at hand, but father does not pay attention. As the son makes this attempt he throws a stolen glance sideways and up at father to see if he gets any attention, maybe to check if what he is saying is going to be well received or not. I am not altogether sure what the stolen glance may mean.

Meanwhile mother has served us, and she inquires whether everything is OK. I respond, saying I enjoy it, nobody else responds. While we eat, and father is talking about sport, Henk is playing up a bit, making some indecent sounds, or remarks. Mother tries to stop him, but he continues. She tries to make him stop by making slightly fun of him, e.g. about how he talks so much without having anything sensible to say. Henk continues trying to get some attention by making indecent noises and other similar stunts, and intermittently succeeds and fails. Father mostly ignores him, but reacts if the stunts are too obnoxious. As father resumes a story about a particular game of rugby, Henk suddenly interjects: “Rugby is the only game for men. Soccer is for girls and softies. You got to be tough to play rugby”. I said that I had played soccer, as a goal keeper. He looked straight at me and said: “You’re a wimp, then”. Father looks sternly at him. Henk stops, finish eating, gets up and leaves the table, even though others are still eating. Nobody stops him or says anything about it. The rest of us keep eating, father keeps talking about sports and Matt keeps trying to make a comment every now and again, looking sideways up at father, but father does not pay much attention to him.

On the previous visit I was told that father was going to take the boys to a golf tournament over the weekend. It is obviously something they often do together. I ask how it went. Father responds before Matt has a chance, but I can see Matt’s face lighting up. Father says that it went really well; Matt won his class and received quite a nice price. We talk about Matt’s win for a while, and even Matt manages to get a few words in. I then ask how James did? Not too well. “So Matt did better than you, then?” I ask. Matt seems delighted with my question. Father hurries to deny that Matt is better than him. Matt was best in his own class, but father would beat him if they were to compete in the same class.

After tea mother and father remain in the kitchen, while Matt and I retreat to the living room/lounge. Henk went upstairs to his own room when he left the kitchen. As Matt and I enter the living room Henk comes downstairs again, carrying a golf club and starts practicing putting a golf ball all around the room. Matt has lied down on the couch and turned on the TV; watching The Simpsons. Mother calls from the kitchen, tells Matt to come back and stack the dishwasher. It is his job, he knows it, but he still tries to object, saying he will do it later. Mother then tells father to make Matt come and do his job, and father does. Matt still tries to protest, but to no avail. He gets up, does his job quickly and returns to the couch. When father enters the living room shortly after, Matt immediately switches over to the six o’clock news, without father having to say anything. I ask Matt why he switched over and he says: “Because he wants it like that” indicating his father. Father then says it is only because he wants to watch the weather forecast. (The following week the same episode repeats itself. But this time, when
father enters from the kitchen, Matt does not switch over to the news and leave it there. He switches back and forth between *Simpsons* and the news for a while, and end up watching *Simpsons*. Father does not object).

Meanwhile Henk has been putting a golf ball all over the living room. It irritates father, and he tells Henk to stop. Henk does not obey, puts the ball against the couch a few more times, and now father is clearly irritated. Tells him to stop it, rather stern voice. “Why don’t you take the tractor and take all the full garbage cans away?” father says. “I don’t know how to drive the tractor on my own”, Henk replies. “You have driven it, you know what to do”, father replies. But Henk does not want to, and father does not push. Henk goes upstairs again. Father, Matt and I remain seated for a while. I ask James if the boys help out on the farm a lot? “Sometimes”, he says, “Not much though, they have school and everything. When they come along it is for company. I enjoy having them with me, teaching them the ropes and things. The farm does not depend on their labour though.” We continue watching TV, father makes a few comments about some of the items on the news, Matt lies silently on the couch, not saying anything or trying to take part in the conversation between father and I. Before the news is over I get up and leave. Visit is over.

After three months of visiting this family once a week I interviewed James and Matt together. When I asked them if they regarded James to be strict father, both agreed he is not. Firm, strict if he has to, according to the father himself, but generally not strict. Father believes it is not possible to change the way people are, including the ways his sons are. It is his task, as a father to guide them, tell them what is right or wrong as he sees it, that they do not hurt anybody, but he cannot tell them how to be, they have to be the way they are. He sees Matt as quite similar to himself, a quiet guy who would “rather be on the fringe”, so to speak, than be the centre, as Henk tries to be. Certainly they may change, but father sees both himself and Matt as quiet people and Henk as someone trying to attract a lot of attention.

**Jonah, Sarah, Tom and Jesse**

Jonah is in his late forties, so is Sarah. They have three sons, Sam is eighteen and living abroad, Tom is fifteen and Jesse is twelve. Jonah is a professional and Sarah has been the homemaker up until quite recently but at present is enrolled at a part time course at the Polytechnical institute. The family lives in their privately owned house.

I arrive at the same time as Jonah arrives from work. We say hello and he holds the gate open for me as we enter the property. Inside the house we first enter a hall where we both take off our jackets, and then proceed to the kitchen/dining room. Sarah is cooking, and Jesse is there as well, quite restless, walking to and fro. Sarah wants him to do his homework, but he refuses. Jonah exchanges a few words with Sarah, then sits down by the dining table and picks up the newspaper. Jesse sits down next to him and starts talking about his day at school. He won a running race today and is very proud. Ran barefoot and won by several minutes. Father listens. Praises him, and Jesse is basking in the positive attention. I ask where Tom is and Sarah answers that he is at work but will be home any minute. Jesse and Jonah continue to small talk, and the tone between them is warm and accepting. Jesse is a bit provocative some times, more self-assertive than usual: Sarah had opened a letter for him from the library. It is only a formal letter to recall a book. Still, Jesse is quite upset, and tells her off for opening one of his letters. “Don’t ever, ever open my mail”, he says in a very brusque tone of voice. Jonah listens to the exchange between mother and son, but does not interfere. This slightly confrontational situation only lasts one minute or so, and the exchange between the three returns to being quite amicable.
Tom enters. It has started raining outside and Jonah tells him, rather brusquely, to hang his wet coat out in the hall. Tom does, re-enters and without first investigating what we are doing starts talking to all of us about his day, his work. Jesse goes silent. All of a sudden there is no more room for him. Jonah asks Tom about a physics assignment he is working on at school. Tom starts describing, in great detail, what he is doing. He is showing off, demonstrating how clever he has been in finding solutions. Jonah starts challenging him, questions whether the solutions are all that good or if Tom ought to have taken a different approach. Tom refutes Jonah’s arguments, defends his own and the competition between them escalates rapidly. For a while all they are saying to each other is: “Your said that....” “No, I did not”, “Yes, you did”, “No, I did not”. It does not end until Tom gets himself tangled up in a very complicated argument about how he could do a mathematical calculation to prove his point. Halfway through he gets lost, shrug his shoulders, and the dialogue ends. Throughout it has been impossible for me, as an observer, to determine if they are just play-fighting, or if it they are seriously cross with each other.

Throughout this debate Jesse has tried to engage the attention of both his father and brother, at no avail. He does not say much, but tries to sit very close to father, steals pens and paper from Tom that he fiddles with while Tom is talking, walks past Tom accidentally bumping into his chair etc. Jonah is not bothered by this, but Tom is getting increasingly irritated. He snatches his pen back, snarls at Jesse as he pumps into his chair etc. Eventually Jesse leaves the room and returns with an illustrated book on Ferraris. Jonah is also keen on fast cars, but even the book is not enough to engage his attention. Only after the competition between Jonah and Tom has ended, Jesse successfully manages to get his fathers attention. They admire the book together for a while. Sarah talks to Tom and asks about his job. She quickly turns the focus to his wages, and wants to know how much he earns. Her objective seems to be to encourage Tom to save at least half of what he makes. This irritates Tom a lot, and he gets up and leaves the room.

Tom returns shortly, and Jonah and Jesse are still admiring the Ferraris. Jonah reads one of the captions to one of the photos and the word ‘torque’ comes up. I do not know what it means and ask. Jonah and Tom both have a general idea, but have problems explaining it. As they try to formulate an explanation Jesse buts in with his own idea. Tom snaps back: “Yeah, you would know, you know Jack shit, Jesse!” Jesse goes silent. Jonah says nothing. Tom then gets himself tangled up in a long and convoluted explanation. Jonah interjects comments, disagreeing with Tom. Tom counterattacks and they compete like that for a while. Suddenly Tom stops himself short, exclaiming: “What am I saying? I don’t really know what I am talking about.” Meanwhile Jonah has fetched a dictionary and other books of reference in order to find a good explanation. He becomes totally engrossed in that task and ignores the rest of us. Jesse and Tom continue their small scale fighting. Sarah engages them in small talk. My stay is over before Jonah has found a good explanation of ‘torque’, and he barely looks up form his books when I say goodbye.

Both father in the above examples, James and Jonah, are not much involved in the daily home-making activities. As far as caring tasks are concerned they are primarily breadwinners. Economic provider still seems to be the most common task Pakeha men perform as husbands and fathers in relationship to their wives and children. As a matter of fact twelve of the thirteen fathers I observed are regularly involved in money making activities outside the home (from now on also referred to as paid work), and thus provide some or all of the income necessary to pay for food, shelter, clothing, etc. for their sons. Though some of the sons earn money on their own, the bulk of the money needed to pay for what they consume is acquired.
by their parents, with fathers usually being the main income earner. It is also important to notice, however, that in most of the dual parent families mothers contribute substantially to the total income of the family, and in a minority of families the mothers are the primary providers. In these families the fathers either spend fewer hours engaged in money making activities or provide less money than their spouses. In some of the families the fathers are primary income earners today but that has not always been the case. One father, Peter, had spent five years as primary caregiver and home-maker when they first became parents. During that period his wife provided all the money they needed. It is worth noticing, however, that none of these ‘secondary breadwinners’ see themselves as ‘poor’ fathers for that reason. As a single father and full time home-maker Harry is not a provider at all in the traditional sense of the word. That is, he does not engage in paid work at all but still provides for his children through receiving domestic purposes benefit (DPB). This too is an important point; not having a job does not disqualify him as a father, neither in his own eyes, not to most other people in the community. 14

The structure of working life, as well as school, means that the periods when fathers and sons have a chance to be together is classified as leisure time. James is quite engaged in the leisure time activities his sons engage in during weekends. He accompanies them to sport tournaments and encourages them to participate. The time that Jonah spends with the boys is leisure time activity as well. I know that they have a bach on the beach nearby where they spend considerable time during summer. That is also the case with other fathers, like Michael. I did not spend any time at the beach with the fathers and sons in my own sample and thus do not know for sure what they do together and how they interact under those circumstances. However, from other sources I have gained the impression that boating, fishing, swimming and playing games together on the beach makes up a substantial part of the interactions during such weekends and holidays. In other words, in these circumstances fathers frequently fill the role of playmates and/or organisers of play activities.

The beach

New Zealanders have a deep love affair with the beach. It is their favourite recreation ground. That is, at least, the inescapable impression one receives by listening to their conversations, watching TV shows and commercials, leafing through photographic picture books published in New Zealand [e.g. Male 2003], and a heap of other public representations. The beach is what the good life is all about. It is freedom and holiday. It is summer, sun and ocean. And not least, it is family and good friends. People head for the beach during holidays, week-ends or after work. Mostly in summer of course, when the sun is baking and the ocean warm, but not only. For many it is a standard after work ritual all year round. Walk the dog up and down a mile of sand is plenty exercise for man and beast. Not to speak of the kids in Dunedin (and plenty other places, for sure) who rush to the beach after school, all year round, close to freezing weather, to go surfing in their wet suits.

The beach is a playground. Friends and family gather for a picnic. An ice-box full of cold beer, white wine and soft drinks, fish and chips, some cellophane wrapped sandwiches. Up among the pine trees, away from the beach a bit, there are small fires going in most of the designated concrete barbeque pits. Lamb chops, sausages, sirloin steak, a recently caught snapper, mussels, cockles, pipi. Anything that can be cooked can be barbequed, and Kiwis do. Down on the beach the kids and the men play touch rugby, or beach cricket with driftwood for wickets, the women stretch out to relax or go for a swim. The surfers have gone straight for the waves, of course, and the amateurs play with boogie-boards or try body surfing. The dogs run back
and forth, unless it is that part of the beach where unleashed dogs are banned. A frisbee is flying, and someone throws a stick into the waves and the dogs go for it. A few wind-surfers have launched their boards and are a criss-crossing the bay ahead of a gentle breeze. Down the beach a bit, away from the swimmers and surfers, men with long fishing poles have taken up position. With huge swings of the poles they send their baited hooks way out, past the waves that break on the beach. Then they wait, check the line, and wait some more. Recently some new toys have appeared. Particularly the kites are impressive. Big things, big enough to carry the operators long distances through the air.

There are beaches all along the coast of New Zealand. It is a long coast and plenty of beaches to choose from. There are all sorts. Some beaches are stretches of sand and stone unbroken for miles upon miles. Ninety Mile Beach in Northland carries its name with justice. Other beaches are small coves of golden sand hedged by bush covered cliffs on all sides. There are beaches where the ocean rolls in, one huge violent wave after the other crushing on the sand, sending clouds of salty mist kilometres in land. Waves that have been building up over unbroken sea for thousands of miles, all the way from Australia, the Antarctic, South America or, if they have missed all the Pacific Islands, there are waves that started off as ripples in Alaska. Then there are shielded bays, some of them huge like Tasman Bay and Golden Bay where the waves rarely reach a metre high, and the four metres tidal difference create huge sand-flats.

Beach life in New Zealand is perceived and presented as almost harmless. Unlike in Australia there are very few dangerous animals, fish or other organisms in the seas around New Zealand. There are no poisonous box-jellyfish, no crocodiles, and very rarely shark attacks. In the last twelve years, as long as I have had a professional interest in New Zealand, I cannot remember any reports of shark attacks at all. The only New Zealand news item I can recall involving sharks and violence was about a Kiwi bloke who jumped in the water, attacked and killed a two metre long blue shark with his bare hands on a beach in the Tasman Bay.

Today the only real danger Kiwis face when enjoying life at the beach comes from above. With the depletion of the ozone layer the sun has, ironically, become an enemy of the beach lifestyle. Pakehas, along with non-aboriginal Australians, have one of the highest incidences of skin cancer in the world. Beach life carries a high responsibility for that problem. It is particularly bad in New Zealand though, because the ozone layer is thinner the further south one gets. The health authorities urge people to stay in the shade during mid day and to wear hats, sunglasses and heavy-duty sun block while out in the open. The nineteenth century style bathing suit, covering the whole torso, long sleeves and half way down the thighs, has become popular again. Or almost. A lot of children wear them for protection. They are made to look like wet suits and the children actually seem to like them. Most adults wear hats and sunglasses, and if not wearing a t-shirt regularly put on new layers of sun block lotion. In summertime the weather forecast on TV has warnings about ‘burn-time’, i.e. how many minutes one can be exposed to the sun before being burnt. (Just recently this was changed to a UV warning) It is usually only around fifteen minutes, but some days, and in certain areas it may be down to seven.

Though the beach is a strong carrier of nostalgia, things are changing. The economical changes over the last twenty years have had two mayor impacts on beach life; greater luxury and shorter holiday. The nostalgia depicts beach life as simple. A simple batch or a modest caravan. Maybe living in a tent for three weeks in a row. Now increasing numbers of Kiwis can afford flash holiday homes with all the mod cons. Obviously very comfortable, but to those with a more fundamentalist leaning, luxury and beach life just do not go together.
The other change that has taken place is a shortening of holidays. Many Kiwis can no longer afford, or are not given, longer summer holidays. For the lucky minority, those who have benefited from the changed economy, they can afford other kinds of holidays. So, in addition to a week on the beach, they take two weeks abroad.

But these changes are nothing compared to the perceived threat to beach life that looms on the political horizon. All of a sudden, for reasons I'm not entirely sure about, the question of ownership of the foreshore has become a hot topic. Given the central position of the beach in Pakeha national identity, most of them cannot conceive of any other situation but that all Kiwis own it together. Maoris, on the other hand, seem to have quite different notions about the sea and the foreshore that the Pakeha. They therefore want recognition of their special connection and do not accept that their separate and special interests are acknowledged in a “we all own it together” kind of rule. Thus many Pakehas panic, and imagine a future where Maoris exclude them from enjoying the beach, and Maoris rise in anger, conjuring forth a long tradition of Pakehas stealing their land.

Most fathers, including Jonah, takes a keen interest in what the boys have done at school as well as other ‘educational’ interests they have. For a number of fathers this is the most regular topic they talk about with their sons. Even fathers like Jack and Henry, who normally are rather withdrawn, take a keen interest in their sons’ education. For Daniel education is of fundamental importance and he has very firm, and quite radical ideas about the proper education for Rick. Some fathers also act as instructors themselves. Nigel instructs Terry about cooking and Kenneth tries to instruct Mike about the computer. When fathers try to directly instruct their adolescent sons it does not seem to work very well, however. The sons seem to resist it. I will get back to this issue later.

During my interviews all the fathers insisted that protecting ones family is also a fundamental paternal duty. From an outsiders point of view it is, however, quite difficult to grasp exactly what this means because as far as everyday interactions are concerned paternal protective actions are hard to identify. The homes where I observed fathers and sons together are all safe environments, and so is New Zealand society in general. The everyday level of danger, as well as perceived danger, is not high, and I only once saw a father acting in ways that I interpreted as having a protective intention. That was Harry and his six year old son Chris, and I will describe the incidence below. Other fathers told me about dangers that they tried to guard their sons against, but as mentioned I did not observe such actions.

Harry, Deb, Julian, Chris

Harry has been a single father and thus the primary caregiver for his three children for two years. As a primary caregiver he is involved in all caring and nurturing tasks, from shopping to cooking, from repairing the washing machine to sorting the clean clothes. The only task he does not perform, as I can observe, is mending socks. The care-giving is most obvious in relation to Chris who is only six years old. Chris is a very active child. Runs around, likes to play with dad’s jewellery tools, teases his big brother to get some attention.

Once, just as the sun was setting, he was in and out of the house, collecting crickets in the grass, showing them to us and putting them in a box. The house is next to a long stretch of road where cars drive past at high speeds. Suddenly Chris had slipped out of the yard to look for crickets in the grass along the road. Harry had told him several times, in a gentle way, not to go there, and quickly
discovered what had happened. He ran out, picked him up and carried him back inside without scolding or yelling. Just quietly told him not to do it because he could get run over by a car. Chris still wanted to and they argued about it. Chris eventually won and father followed him out to look after him.

Meanwhile Julian has been playing on the Playstation. While playing he has also been engaged in a conversation with me about his school day. When Harry eventually returns with Chris he picks up what the topic is about, but waits for a natural opening in the conversation before he joins in. Harry tells me that it is an important school year for Julian, and that Harry really wants Julian to work hard this year. Julian agrees and he too is adamant to work hard. Harry expresses his view as a concern, not a command, and Julian expresses his opinion as if it was his view, not a show of deference to Harry. There is no conflict or opposition between them that I can see. In my presence Harry never tries to command Julian, never tells him to do things; only expresses his view and Julian never opposes his father.

When we have talked for a while Deb enters the room and walks straight through, into her own bedroom and closes the door. Julian then turns off the Playstation, walks to her door and gently knocks. He does not burst in, does not yell through the door, but waits for her to open. When she does he asks if they can do the dishes now. It is their turn and he has been waiting for her. It is OK with her, they go to the kitchen and I go home.

As far as caring for Julian and Deb is concerned it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what tasks Harry performs. Or rather, what tasks he does not perform. As a single father he does everything a parent has to do. What is most striking about the way he cares for his children is how he makes the home run smoothly, but in such a way that it is not conspicuous that he is doing or has done it. Being the only daily caregiver Harry is involved in all the daily care that his children receive. He is obviously competent as a caregiver and his behaviour resembles many Pakeha mothers that I have observed. One of the characteristic traits of the competent caregiver is that there is no fuss around what he/she does. The tasks are performed in a non-conspicuous manner. Only three aspects of Harry’s behaviour are any different from how most mothers behave. The first is that he is more technically competent than most mothers. Akin to many Pakeha men and fathers he does the mechanical maintenance on the house and the car, and once he was repairing the washing machine when I arrived. Secondly he compares himself to how a mother would be and thus expresses his doubt about being a good enough parent. Many mothers also express such doubt but do not compare themselves with and find themselves inferior to fathers. The third aspect is that he has created a very different physical and aesthetic home to what most mothers would have done. The home is almost totally devoid of all decorations. Living on the DPB there is not much money for luxury, and Harry obviously takes care to provide the basic necessities. The house and the home is in good technical order, it is well kept and kempt, but there are no pictures on the walls, no bric-a-brac, the throw on the sofa is not chosen for the colours it adds to the room, and the walls have not been painted to give a nice, homey feeling. Nobody seems to care though and it is never mentioned.

Harry’s way of being a father is radically different from James and Jonah. Harry is an obvious and indispensable part of the everyday life of the family and the home. His input is crucial and the tasks he performs provide him with ample good reasons for being there. He moves about in the home with confidence and relates to his children in a self-confident way. He is a most gentle father and there is no tension or conflict in the air between him and Deb
or Julian during my visits. Nobody in the family, except Chris, behaves in ways that draw attention to themselves. They all take care not to interrupt each other and not to dominate situations. As I wrote in the previous chapter Julian and his father seem to move in close circles around each other, taking great care to avoid overstepping each others boundaries. When I interviewed Harry he said that when he agreed to be a full time single father he did so out of duty, but now the reward and the motivation to continue was the love and the positive emotions he experienced every day by being with them. As an outside observer I identify Harry’s behaviour as corresponding with the involved father model, and I am convinced that being a single father with sole responsibility as daily caregiver is one of the more important reasons why he behaves the way he does.

In contrast to most fathers Harry is the primary caregiver for his three children. So is Warren. Daniel too is primary caregiver in the sense that he spends a lot of time at home with his son while his wife, Susan, is at work. In most of the remaining families the mothers are primary caregivers and the degrees to which the fathers are involved varies. Nigel is quite heavily involved and there are certain household and home-making tasks that are defined as his territory. In a sense Nigel, Daphne and Grandma have divided the caring tasks between them. Bryan too is becoming more involved now that he has radically cut down on his working hours. In Paul’s case I am not sure what the distribution of housework and home-making tasks between him and Gwen might be. I never saw them cook, clean or performing other household tasks. Because their son John is quite mature for his age, sixteen, he does not require much care. As previously mentioned, however, Peter was primary caregiver and full time home-maker for the first five years after the birth of their first child.

Contents of the fatherhood models
I have already claimed that two cognitive, cultural models of fatherhood exist in contemporary Pakeha society, and I have labelled them breadwinner and involved father models. My observations as well as data gained from interviews support this hypothesis and so does the existing literature on fatherhood. In order to grasp the contents and the important differences between these models it is necessary to describe them in greater detail. Almost all the research on fatherhood emphasizes that the role of provider, i.e. money maker, is of utmost importance in defining fatherhood in western societies [see e.g. Benson 1968, Fein 1978, Julian 1999, Kimmel (Ed.) 1987, Lewis and O’Brien (Eds.) 1987, Lupton and Barclay 1997, Lewis and Salt (Eds.) 1986, McKee and O’Brien (Eds.) 1982, Parsons and Bales 1955, Parsons1964]. Drawing on my own observations as well as the existing literature the contents of the breadwinner model specifies that a father is supposed to be the main economic provider, ultimate authority figure, moral teacher and protector. He is not required to be much else. The model does not prevent him from loving, caring and being involved in the leisure time activities of his children, but the model does not specify it. Certain aspects of the provider model may actually limit the degree to which a father can be loving, caring and involved because this model usually goes together with models of masculinity specifying that a man must not be too ‘soft’ or weak. Basically a man and a breadwinner father must behave in ways that clearly signals that he is different from a woman and a mother. Too much openly expressed love and care, and too much interest in children can easily be interpreted as signs of femininity and weakness. Though this model of fatherhood does not prohibit a father from displaying tender love and care towards his children, the dominant models of masculinity, whether held by the father or not, may make it difficult for him to do so.
The involved father model is, in a certain sense, modelled on the ‘homemaker’ model of motherhood. As such it is a contradiction of the breadwinner father model. On the other hand the involved father model also contains elements from the breadwinner model. It may be a more apt to say that the homemaker mother model and the breadwinner father model have collapsed into one unisex parent model. To say that the involved father is supposed to act like a mother is therefore not altogether correct. Involved fathers, and the counterpart mothers, are both supposed to be caring, nurturing, homemaking, breadwinners, teachers and protectors. According to the involved father model a father is supposed to take equal part in all the activities necessary to create a family and a home and the care-giving should not be differentiated by gender.

What is it about the two, rather different, notions and images of fatherhood that I have presented here that legitimates calling them cognitive models, and not something else, e.g. what Keesing [1987] calls pragmatic strategies? In my opinion these two representations of fatherhood are cognitive and cultural models for a number of reasons. On the one hand they are simplified and generalised paradigmatic examples of stereotypical ways of being fathers. As simplified and generalised examples they can be used as templates for understanding a huge variety of ways that real fathers actually behave. Another reason why it is correct to call them cultural models is that they have both mental and instituted characteristics. Every individual who is a father, or relates to a man as a father, will carry in his mind certain mental representations of that father. Some aspects of these mental representations are idiosyncratic, based on individual experiences and reflections. Other aspects are gained from learning the meaning of instituted models of fatherhood. The large body of literature on fatherhood, some of which I refer to in this thesis, as well as the interviews I conducted, attest to the fact that these models are widely shared as instituted models. The breadwinner model is solidly instituted in almost every aspect of western culture, particularly kinship, religion and law. The involved father model is rapidly becoming instituted, particularly within certain fields of academia like social psychology, as well as some fields within the social services and psychologically inspired popular glossy magazines like women’s weeklies.

These two models of fatherhood are not exclusive to Pakeha New Zealand. They are the dominant nurturance models of fatherhood throughout the western (particularly the Anglo-Germanic) world. I am not alone in making this observation. Other researchers have reached the same or similar conclusions. Fein [1978] describes what he calls three historical conceptualizations of fatherhood: the traditional, the modern and the emerging perspectives. The ‘emerging perspective’ is more or less identical to what I call ‘the involved father model’. The historian Pleck [1987] distinguishes between four historical epochs and operates with four different images of fatherhood: Moral overseer, breadwinner, sex-role model, and ‘new’ father. Sommer [1999], working within developmental psychology, maintains that today there are many ways to be a father, and it is not possible to identify one prototype. Borrowing from Hyvönen [1993] Sommer still argues that a historical development has taken place, from the traditional father (the absolute authority figure) to the modern father, (i.e. a more egalitarian, interested, close and ‘psychological father’). Pleck’s ‘new father’ and Hyvönen’s ‘psychological father’ both correspond closely with the ‘involved father’.

Lupton and Barclay [1997] have produced a very thorough cultural analysis of contemporary notions about fatherhood and maintain that fatherhood is a phenomenon around which there currently exists many and often competing discourses. One of these discourses is the
“archetype of the ‘new’ father” [ibid: 1] who is heavily involved in the life of his child and who equally shares all parenting responsibilities with his partner. Other discourses define ‘strong’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘reckless’ fathers. Brandth and Kvande [1991, 1996] write from a feminist position and operate with a distinction between egalitarian and non-egalitarian fathers. Their focus is primarily on the relationship between husband and wife, however, rather than father and child. The sociologists Jump and Haas [1987] take a strong position and states, as if it is a fact, that:

“A new model of fatherhood has emerged that calls for fathers to join with mothers as equal partners in child care.” (ibid: 98).

Borrowing from Backett [1982:104] they maintain that:

“this means that both fathers and mothers cater to the child’s needs, are available to him or her where possible, and their care is viewed as equivalent - it means that both parents should have equal choices about their freedom to carry out their own individual pursuits with the overall feeling of responsibility for the organization of child care being shared between them.” (Italics in origin.)

Sue Kedgley uses these words about the involved father in New Zealand:

“By the mid-seventies the media were trumpeting a new breed of ‘active’ fathers - men who accepted that childcare tasks should be shared, were present at the birth of their children, bathed, changed and fed babies and even did the occasional ‘mother’ help at play centre and school. Helen Brown painted a caricature of the new superdad in a column on ‘Designer Dads’. ‘He breathes through every contraction, pants when the baby’s head crowns and buries the placenta under a bush in the garden’, she wrote. ‘He must laugh, cry and read with his children, wash their clothes, and whip up marvellous chicken casseroles in between times. In short he must be everything his own father wasn’t. He’s loving, caring and physically demonstrative towards his children.” [1996: 253]

All studies of fatherhood in contemporary western societies agree on one thing; new ways of being a father are emerging, or have already been established. Whether these new ways will replace the old ways or not is, however, a bone of contention.

Generally speaking one model is regarded to be older than the other. The common opinion is that traditionally fathers were patriarchs and providers who took care of the public concerns of the family. According to this view it is a recent development for fathers to be involved in daily family affairs. Many academics agree with this, but not all. Kimmel [1987] maintains that

“New role models for men have not replaced older ones, but have grown alongside them, creating a dynamic tension between ambitious breadwinner and compassionate father. (........) we live in an era of transition in the definition of masculinity, not, as some might fantasize, in which one mode comes to replace another mode, but in which two parallel traditions emerge and from the tension of opposition between them a new synthesis might, perhaps, emerge.” [ibid: 9]
Lewis, another historian, maintains that

“the emergent image of fatherhood - the view that men are starting to become involved in family life - is as old and perhaps as prominent as the notion of patriarchy.” [1986: 5]

In my opinion the actual age of these models is beside the point. I do not believe it is possible to accurately establish the objective historical development of an idea, and even if it could it is of no help in interpreting its contemporary meaning. What is important, however, is the belief that one model is old and traditional and the other model is new and modern. The breadwinner model, supposedly, has its roots in an unspecified past. On the other hand it also has a very strong connotation of a certain idealized image of the nineteen fifties; the ‘golden age’ of the nuclear family, when all fathers went to work and all mothers were happy housewives. It is a common observation by visitors that certain aspects of contemporary New Zealand resembles Great Britain as it used to be half a century ago. It has often struck me that the fifties seem to have a very strong hold on the imagination of many Kiwis, as if it was a particularly good time to live, and worth trying to get back to.

It may be that the breadwinner father model has a particularly strong hold in certain sections of Pakeha society for some of the same reasons why the fifties are romanticised. It is hard to say though, and I have not made a demographic investigation of the distribution of the model. I will therefore leave that speculation be. The point is that in general the model contains elements both from a time prior to the industrial revolutions, when fathers worked close to home and were ‘moral supervisors’, as well as when they worked away from home and thus became ‘distant providers’. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the provider model I am talking about does not belong in the past. It is a contemporary model, held today, by contemporary fathers and sons, influencing the way that fathers and sons relate to each other today. It is this contemporary meaning, and how it is employed today that concerns me. Part of the meaning and quality of the model is, however, derived from the idea that is old. The idea that it is old on the one helps to legitimise the model; it has stood the test of time. On the other hand it also undermines its credibility because it is old-fashioned and out of step with reality.

**The fifties**

Some years ago my wife and I travelled from Auckland to Wellington via the west coast. It was in October and early spring. Somewhere on the south Taranaki coast, along highway 45, by the tourist authorities called the ‘Surf Highway’, we stopped for the night at a motorcamp on the beach. Unfortunately I have forgotten the name of the place. Maybe it was Opunake, Pihama, Otakeho, Kaupokonui or Manaia. The campground had tent and caravan spots, mostly vacant, and some huts for rent. We checked into one of the latter. Absolutely basic. From the outside it looked like a portable working mans quarters at a construction site. Nothing but a box. Made from fibro board and with one large, aluminium framed glass ranch sliding door at the front, facing away from the sea view, and a tiny window towards the beach. In front of the sliding door a small wooden deck, made from pallets joined together. Inside; a double bed, a bunk bed and a small kitchen. And a TV, of course. Clean, always clean, but it had not seen a paintbrush for a decade, maybe two. Absolutely no frills. No attempts at making it into something it was not.
In the middle of the motorcamp was a solid, square building, made from concrete brick and painted a non-
distinct light yellow. It contained toilets and wash rooms, men’s to the left, women’s to the right, communal 
kitchen and laundry. Again, clean and basic. Only these walls had received a new coat of paint a few years 
ago. Steel sink tops, Formica benches and tables, steel pipe chairs. Functional, durable. It all looked like it 
was new in 1955 and had not been changed since. In fact, the whole motor-camp looked like it had not 
changed since 1955. Except for the ranch sliding doors, that is. They were from the seventies, definitely.

Down the beach a bit, outside the motor-camp, stood another brick building, facing the sea. It was painted 
bluish-green, turquoise I think it is called. The paint was fading and so were the letters on the wall: ‘Surf and 
lifesavers club’. Maybe it was just too early in the season, but the club looked dead. Across the road, 
twenty metres back and with lawns around it, stood a relatively large, one story house with verandas all 
around. Looking inside there was one big hall, and maybe something like a kitchen at the back. It looked like 
a communal hall, a place for parties. No party going on today though, it looked dead too. Or rather, it was 
hibernating. Everything about the place gave me feeling of late fifties-early sixties. Not only the way the 
motor-camp looked, and the surf-lifesavers club, and the dance hall. All the images and stories I had heard, 
seen and read of New Zealand beach life carry strong associations to that era. There, at the Taranaki 
coast, that feeling was accentuated by the fact that there were no people, and time seemed to have stood 
still. When I closed my eyes, and sat down on the veranda outside the dance hall I could hear the Beach 
Boys singing, see the girls in their knee length, floral patterned dresses, the boys with surfboards under 
their arms strolling up from the beach.

It is difficult to put my finger on all the little signs that carry the message, but they are everywhere. Buildings 
and architecture is a constant supply of reminders from that era. Most of the dairies, particularly the rural 
ones with petrol pumps outside look like they were built in the fifties. There must have been a building boom 
back then, because when we drive through small towns, like Paeroa south of Thames most of the suburban 
houses look like they were built back then too. The older tearooms I wrote about in chapter three still have 
their furniture from back then. The list could go on, but this will suffice. There is no doubt, New Zealand 
society and culture strongly suggests the late fifties and early sixties.

I cannot help the impression that that era must have been the hey-day of New Zealand Pakeha history. 
People, forty years and older, talk about a time when the sun always shone, when there was plenty of work, 
the welfare state at it’s apex, Universities free and students received an allowance. A time when all 
prospects were good, when a man could start as a share-milker and end up the owner of his own dairy farm, 
when politics was easy to understand, the Queen was young, and even the Maoris behaved like decent 
white people. That was the time when New Zealand was the ‘lucky country’. And then, sometimes in the 
seventies, things started going wrong. The reason, I have been told, was when the UK joined the 
European Market and more or less shut down all imports from New Zealand. If that is the case, I do not 
know, but it is a common Kiwi explanation. For twenty years, it seems, New Zealand stood still. When you 
look around in New Zealand there are not many races left of the seventies and he eighties. It is as if for two 
decades they closed themselves down to international cultural influences.

Oddly enough that was also a period when radical changes brewed and then happened. In 1984 the 
Labour Party began an economic liberalization process which has brought some of the most drastic changes 
any national economy has ever seen. Prior to these changes it had one of the most regulated economies in 
the world. Fifteen years later it was rated by the OECD as the third most deregulated, only topped by 
Hong Kong and Singapore. I will not go into all the consequences of these changes, e.g. the increased 
polarity between rich and poor. But it has contributed to an increased globalization and a greater openness
The cluster model of fatherhood

Above I have argued that in Anglo-Germanic culture the ‘father’ is a cluster model made up of our different elements. One of my main reasons for claiming that the breadwinner and the involved father constitute two different models is that we are dealing with two different clusters. The clusters are made up of the same elements (genetic, nurturance, marital and genealogical), but some of the elements have different contents, their relative importance is different, and they also fit together in different ways.

The genetic father model is fundamental in both the breadwinner and the involved cluster model. A father-son relationship is fundamentally and primarily a kinship relationship. Without western ideology of kinship there would be no such concepts as father and son, nor a relationship between them. In this respect one might say that within western culture the idea of a genitor is of fundamental importance in defining the concept father, and thus all social relationships involving a man as a father. In addition, the genetic father model is also a kind of generator of the other elements making up the total cluster; once it has been decided that the genetic father model applies to a relationship between a man and a child, all the other models and their contents become relevant, either as a reality or as a moral imperative. The fundamental importance of the genetic father model therefore necessitates a closer look at western kinship ideology and how it contributes to the make-up of the two father models I am dealing with in this thesis.

Schneider [1968, 1984] argues that in western kinship there is a fundamental distinction between relatives in nature (cognates) and relatives in law (affines). Husbands and wives are relatives in law, parents and children are relatives in nature. The former is a relationship created by human beings, the latter relationship is created by nature; a biological fact, so to speak. These notions about kinship are also generally held by Pakeha New Zealanders. Natural kinship relationships are usually expressed in terms like ‘common blood’, ‘common flesh’ or, today, ‘common genes’. According to western kinship ideology this biological connection creates a number of rights and duties between a father and a child, a man and a wife, the man and the state etc. In addition the biological connection is held to cause, more or less automatically and mechanically, a broad spectre of meaning, including love, or in Schneider’s words ‘enduring diffuse solidarity’, that the relationship between father and child is believed to ‘contain’.

Contrary to relationships in law, relationships forged by nature are unbreakable and cannot be fundamentally altered by humans. According to this ideology fatherhood is an ascribed status, given to the father on the birth of the child. It is up to him to decide if he wants to honour this status, by acting like a father, or not. In addition other people like the mother of the child, her kin and the state government have the right to demand that he honours a certain minimum. If it should be proved at some later stage that he is not the genitor after all his entire status as a father is in jeopardy. If he is not married to the mother, and regardless of how long he has acted as the father, he faces the possibility of losing the entire status of fatherhood. On the other hand as long as a man is recognised as the genitor the connections to his child can never
be broken. A father may dishonour his child, and he may start acting as if there no longer was a blood tie between them. But even such acts will carry a special significance because they will be understood as an attempt to break something that is unbreakable. To break a blood tie can never be anything else than an as if break. The father may behave as if the tie was broken. But the blood remains the same. In kinship terms the relationship between all fathers and all sons is the same. It is, in other words, defined by a general formal rule, and according to that rule the contents of the relationship is a matter of shared substance and enduring diffuse solidarity.

According to western kinship ideology blood and love are intimately linked, but the link is not symmetrical. Blood is the independent variable, so to speak. If there is common blood there is also a relationship which will, by necessity be filled with affections of love. The reverse situation does not hold; just because there is love does not mean that there is common substance. ‘Metaphoric blood’ relations, like adoptions, is an interesting example. From an ‘objective’ point of view adopted children do not share blood with the parents who have adopted them. Still the adopted children have all the rights and duties, and are loved as if they were of the same substance. The pretence of common blood results in love, and not the other way around. Adoption is an as if relationship, and the meaning of the relationship would not have been as strong (enduring) if that as if element did not exists. At the same time, because it is an as if relationship the pretence can never be totally erased and the relationship can never be the same as a ‘real’ blood relationship. Studies also reveal that identity is often a precarious question for many adopted children. At some stage in their development, usually during early adolescence, the question ‘Who am I?’ becomes paramount, because they know that by blood they are related to somebody else than their parents [Sætersdal & Dalen 1999]. Adoption is a relationship by law which is dressed up as a blood relationship and as a consequence adoption relationships take on elements of both and become fundamentally ambiguous. If our kinship ideology contained the idea that love could create relationships of equal strength to blood relationships, this ambiguity would not exist.

Western kinship ideology provides the necessary foundations for both the genetic and the genealogical father models. According to this ideology nature establishes not only particular blood-relationships, but also blood-lines, i.e. enduring connections through time. Blood relationship is the essence of the former father model, and blood-lines the essence of the latter. Because the relationship and the lineage are seen as given by nature, both have a formal character; their traits are general and similar for all fathers and sons and not a product of idiosyncratic processes within individual relationships and lineages. Fundamentally the relationship and the lineage are given and unchangeable. The breadwinner father model, as a particular version of the nurturance father model, rests heavily on these two other father models. Just as the blood-relationship and the blood-line are created by nature so are the rights and duties that a breadwinner father has towards his children. These rights and duties are formal in the sense that he does not need to pay any attention to the individuality of each and every one of his children. All he has to do is to behave in accordance with the rules and the relationships will be filled with the proper contents. There is no room, nor a need for father to do anything not specified by the model. And the model basically says that he should be economic provider, ultimate authority figure, educator and protector.

‘Nature’ is the great definier as far as the involved father model is concerned as well, but with a rather different outcome. As in the breadwinner model fatherhood is still primarily seen as a
function of being genitor. The relationship between father and child is still seen as a natural bond, and the rights and duties making up that bond are formal in the sense that they are given by nature. I do believe, however, that the term ‘nature’ refers to two rather different concepts when used as a basis for one or the other cluster of father models. In contemporary Pakeha culture the term nature can refer to (at least) two different realms. One realm is made up of objects that exist in nature, plus acts and happenings that take place in nature or for natural reasons. A stone, a river and a wild animal are examples of such natural objects, whereas an avalanche, a flood and animals copulating are examples of natural happenings. One may say that in this case nature is defined by its outward appearance, by the many phenomena that humans perceive and try to interpret. On the other hand the term nature refers to generalised principles; laws of nature. Mathematical, physical (geo- and astro-), chemical and biological principles that are believed to govern everything that exists and happens in nature.

In either case nature is, to some extent, defined in opposition to things and happenings that are human inventions. Phenomena that exist independently of human creative imagination are seen as belonging to nature, whereas phenomena that are believed to be products (or by-products) of human creative imagination are labelled artificial. As far as phenomena are concerned humans are believed to stand in a symmetrical or competitive relationship to nature. Some natural phenomena control or overwhelm humans, other natural phenomena humans manage to control, utilize and/or change. The relationship between natural laws and human being, on the other hand, is asymmetrical. Humans have no influence upon these principles. We can study and understand them, but we cannot create or change them. They control us, we do not control them. By continuously improving our understanding of natural principles we may, however, gain increasingly better control over natural phenomena.

The breadwinner father mainly builds upon a concept of nature as defined by phenomena. The ‘natural’ blood-relationship between a father and a child is established through such natural phenomena as copulation, his wife being pregnant and giving birth. These phenomena also establish the ‘natural’ blood-line, i.e. the lineage. The involved father model, on the other hand, to a far larger extent builds upon a concept of nature as principles. Fatherhood is still established through the kinds of phenomena just mentioned. But in addition, and of utmost importance, fatherhood is a consequence of being the provider of genetic material. Genes are not phenomena; they are principles for the creation of a human being.

One might say that whereas the natural and defining component in relationships between a breadwinner father and his child is conceptualised as common blood, the natural component in the relationship between the involved father and his child is common genes. This differences between ‘blood’ and ‘genes’ is a useful metaphor for understanding the differences between the two fatherhood models. On the one hand blood establishes blood-lines (lineages) whereas genes do not. The patrilineal blood of the father is not diluted when it passes to the son, and remains undiluted through the generations. Genes on the other hand are diluted. Children always carry genes that are a mix of genes from mother and father. If the father’s genes are not dominant, over some generations his genes may be totally wiped out. This difference, common blood versus common genes, is reflected in the fact that within the cluster of models that the involved father model is a part, the genealogical father model does not play an important part.
The difference in how the natural connection between father and child is conceptualised also has important ramifications for how fathers are supposed to behave. Blood establishes a formal relationship where all fathers are supposed to treat all sons alike. Genes, on the other hand establish individual and non-formal relationships. Not only are all fathers different and carry different genes. In addition genes, like all other laws of nature, do not totally determine phenomena. The biological laws define certain rules and boundaries that particular kinds of phenomena cannot violate, but following those rules and within those boundaries the particular phenomena may take many different forms. Genes are, in other words, principles for the potential development of a number of personal traits. It is the role of the involved father to contribute to the best possible actualisation of this potential. Contrary to the breadwinner model the involved model therefore places far greater emphasis on achievement. The content of the relationship is not seen as predetermined by the biological connection. Rather, nature provides a potential for a contents to develop. Depending upon how father (and child) behaves as persons different contents are generated. The fundamental duty of fatherhood, according to the involved model, is to be so much involved in the life of the child that he is able to do whatever is necessary in order to produce a relationship which provides the best possible conditions for the personal development of the child. However, even though the rights and duties as an involved father are different from those of the breadwinner, they are still seen as emanating from nature. It is as ‘natural’ for an involved father to be involved in the emotional development of his child as it is for the breadwinner to be concerned with providing enough money.

Though my focus is upon how these models create and influence relationships between fathers and sons, it is important to keep in mind that they also influence and concern relationships between the parents. As the cluster model, described by Lakoff, shows, fatherhood is partially defined by the relationship between husband and wife. According to the ‘marital father model’ the man who is married to the mother at the time that she conceives and/or gives birth is defined as the father of the child. It is this model of fatherhood that enables Malinowski to translate the Trobriand term tama to the English term father [Malinowski 1927]. The Trobriand tama, Malinowski claims, is neither a genetic nor a genealogical father, but consists only of the nurturance and the marital father model.

In Pakeha culture the marital father model is significantly more important within the cluster also containing the breadwinner model, than in the cluster containing the involved father model. There are several reasons for this, for example the fact that the breadwinner model developed at a time when there was no technology for precisely determining genetic fatherhood. The marital father model is a legal mechanism for eradicating the doubt immanent in the genetic father model. A more important reason, in my opinion, is that the breadwinner father model builds upon a complementarity between father and mother. The breadwinner father model is conditioned upon the mutual existence of the homemaking and care-giving mother. The involved father model, on the other hand, does not rest upon this gender difference. In fact it does not even depend upon the existence of a mother.

The breadwinner model is founded upon and implies a rather strict division of labour between parents, with father being main/sole breadwinner, and mother main home maker and primary/sole caregiver for the children. The involved father model, on the other hand, builds upon a fundamental equality between the parents. There are many reasons for the different division of domestic labour specified by the two father models. The idea that relationships
between humans are natural phenomena (created by blood), and that nature define us as particular kinds of persons does, however, have an important role in justifying it. According to western common sense nature has created men and women very differently, particularly when it comes to the reproductive tasks they are supposed to perform. In a common sense perspective these different reproductive roles also render men more powerful than women. The common sense justification for this unequal distribution of power often runs like this: Gestation and lactation is natural for women, not for men. It is therefore ‘natural’ for women to care for and nurture infants and to feed children. Because women are ‘naturally’ less mobile when pregnant and nursing, it is ‘natural’ that men do those tasks that require mobility, like hunting (bread winning) and warfare (protection). Men are also, by nature, physically more powerful than women. Because men are, by ‘nature’, more powerful than women they are also better equipped to carry out heavy and dangerous jobs like soldiering, fire fighting, mining etc. [see e.g. Gilmore 1990 for an anthropological support of this view]. Because of their relative lack of mobility women are (or should be) confined to the area close to home. A consequence of this common sense belief in naturally given gender differences it also makes sense that the relatively immobile women have less access to power resources like material wealth and social organisations. Nature, in the sense of observable phenomena, thus justifies not only a division of labour by gender, but also a hierarchical distribution of power between men and women, and men and children.

As argued above, the involved father model rests upon a slightly different notion about nature, and does not build upon, nor support, the above gender inequalities. According to this model equality is the central principle concerning the relationship between father and mother, and father is therefore supposed to do everything mother does, and equally much of it. Both are supposed to carry out the same tasks, and if they do different things then the tasks they do perform are supposed to be equally valuable. Equality is not a one dimensional term, however, and in practical life there are several ways to achieve it: Equal time spent on household tasks, equal enjoyment or lack of such, equal number of tasks, equally large areas of the house to maintain etc. [see e.g. Brandth and Kvande (Eds.) 1991, Engelstad 1990, McKee 1982].

In addition to being founded upon the principle of equality between the parents, the involved father model also builds upon a principle of voluntarism. In practical terms these two principles often have contradictory consequences. On the one hand father and mother are supposed to be equally involved in the lives of their children. On the other hand the parents are supposed to do the tasks they want to do, that they enjoy and are good at. Because the involved father model does not specify in detail what equality means, when it comes to actually doing the jobs efficiency usually wins and equality often suffers. Does equality mean that both parents should spend equal amounts of time doing the very same jobs, or does it mean that both contribute equally much, but by doing different tasks, i.e. those tasks they are good at or enjoy? Because individual abilities, desires and preferences are usually gender specific, the ‘principle of voluntarism’ may, for example easily contribute to a traditional distribution of labour between mothers and fathers. The idea that women are naturally (i.e. biologically) better suited to care for infants and small children than men still prevails among a large number of Pakeha men [Julian 1999]. Men’s lack of experience as caregivers perpetuates this idea, and the idea perpetuates their lack of experience.

The egalitarian principle is also challenged by another idea contained within the involved
father model. As I have mentioned earlier there is a strong tendency in contemporary Pakeha culture to assume that fathers are particularly important to sons as masculine role models because ‘it takes a man to make a man’. This ideas is strongly advocated in certain kinds of popularized literature with a new age [Lee 1991] or mytho-poetic inspiration [see e.g. Biddulph 1994, 1997, Bly 1990]. Some of these authors even call for the revival of masculine rites of passage and claims are made that fathers have a particularly important role to play in such rites. It is, supposedly, a father’s responsibility to initiate the son’s first step into the public world of adult men. The involved father model thus contains a fundamental imperative contradiction: Gender equality concerning social organisation of the home and the family, essential gender difference concerning self-identity.

Family and home
The two contemporary Pakeha models of fatherhood are not only made up as clusters, they are also intimately and systematically linked to sets of notions and ideas about family, home and kinship. One of the more important differences between the breadwinner father model and the involved father model is that these two models imply radically different relationships between father and these other elements. For a number of reasons the breadwinner model places father in a relatively peripheral, and therefore weaker, position in relationship to the family, and particularly the home, than mother. The involved model, however, does not create this distinction between the parents.

The breadwinner model contains a fundamental contradiction between domestic and public aspects of parenthood. The ‘naturally’ given division of domestic labour intrinsic to the breadwinner model defines the father as the family’s representative and face towards important public institutions and agencies like schools, insurance companies, banks, legal authorities and the tax-department. Fatherhood bestows upon a man a number of rights ‘in rem’, to use a term from Radcliffe-Brown [1952], in relationship to his wife and children. ‘In rem’ rights are similar to rights of ownership over objects; they exclude other people from having the same rights over the same objects. Because he is the family’s face towards the public the breadwinner father also has more rights over the family towards the public than his wife. In this respect it may be said that the breadwinner father is the owner of the family. According to common sense logic the owner of a thing is not part of the thing owned, and as such ownership defines the owner as standing in an externalised relationship to the object. Thus, being the face of the family, and its owner towards outsiders by implication also places him at a somewhat peripheral position.

The breadwinner father thus holds a dual position, with one foot outside and one inside the family, to a far larger degree than the mother. This duality is important for his position within the family because it is a precondition for his task as final authority within. His greater knowledge about public life, and greater control over resources only obtainable in public, underpins his authority over his wife and children as far as relationships between the family and public actors are concerned. As far as daily life within the family, on the other hand, he lacks knowledge and control over the details. His authority is therefore a last appeal (“Just wait till father gets home”) and not part of the everyday run of activities in the home. The potency of the threat actually rest on the fact that he is the last appeal. If father were to take part in everyday decision in the home it is very likely that he would loose some of his power as final authority. His final authority thus rests on his remoteness and also enhances it.
The involved father model, on the other hand, does not favour one of the parents as the family’s representative toward the public. According to this model both are equally capable, and have equal rights to represent the family. Actual representation is a function of contact not pre-described formal rule; the parent who happens to come into contact with members of the public also acts as the family representative. Because mother and father, in principle, are supposed to be equally involved in all aspects of caring there are no systematic and structured reasons for any one of them to have particular tasks in relation to the public. However, due to the fact that many fathers in reality do not attend situations where the parents interact with public figures, e.g. parent day at school, the involved father model may actually decrease the importance of the father as the family’s face towards the world.

When both father and mother are supposed to be equally present within the home there is no structural reason for any one of them to be final authority either. In addition the entire question of authority is different in families where the involved father model and an equal distribution of parental tasks are fundamental models for family life, than in breadwinner father families. In the latter power is given by formal rules defined by principles of age and gender. In the former families legitimacy is based on the proven ability to make wise decisions, and legitimacy is established through a process of negotiation. In other words, the two different models of fatherhood provide very different criteria or judging whether the exercise of power is legitimate or not.

The ‘naturally’ given task of the breadwinner father, i.e. to earn money through having a job and a career, also contributes to placing him in a somewhat removed position in relation to home and family. For the home-making mother there is a dramatic discontinuation in her life prior to and after becoming a mother. Prior to becoming home-making mothers most women either attend some form of education or have jobs and for a period of time they give up these activities when they have children. Breadwinning fathers do not go through such breaks; they continue with the same public life as they had prior to becoming fathers. It is important to remember that in western society, including Pakeha society, being economically active and successful as a money maker is not primarily linked to fatherhood, but to adulthood and masculinity. In western societies the ability to earn a decent income is a sign of maturity and a defining trait of the autonomous and fully adult male person. For an adult man it is usually somewhat shameful to be economically dependent on others, particularly other persons, but also on charitable organisations or the state. To most adult male persons economic independence is a necessary requirement for achieving a sense of self-worth and dignity. For women the situation is different and it is culturally acceptable and legitimate for pregnant women and mothers of pre-adolescent children to be economically dependent on others. This dependence is not shameful, and does not deprive them of their adult dignity the way it does for men. Thus, in western society the obligation to make money attaches to manhood in general and not fatherhood in particular. In a sense the only difference between being an independent adult male and a breadwinner father is that in the latter case the unit which he must provide for is extended to contain not only himself, but also his wife and child.

In industrialized societies most kinds of money-making work removes the father from home and family for longer periods of time every day. It also requires that he spends considerable effort and imaginative energy on his work. To many men their working life and professional career is of equal or greater importance to their self-identity than their family life. Considering that the breadwinner father is the authoritative head of the family it is thus not
surprising that many men use the family as a means for furthering their own goals. It is a
commonly accepted fact that a supportive family, and particularly a wife who is responsible
for all domestic arrangements, is an invaluable asset for a man who wants to be a success at
work. In addition to actually relying on their families as a means of furthering their careers,
this also opens up for the idea that the family is a means rather than an end. As I mentioned
earlier in this chapter the relationship between means and ends is symbolically far from
innocent and carries a potential for certain value judgements. Means are easily and usually
considered less important, less valuable and more disposable than ends. Though heavily
criticised the saying still survives that ‘the end justifies the means’. My point here is that the
breadwinner father model opens up for this means-ends relationship to become part of a
father’s relationship to his family.

In an involved father family the mothers is, in principal, an equally important money earner,
and may spend as much time and effort on her public life as the father. Though the birth of
her child in most cases still implies a discontinuation of her education or work career, in
principle it should not disrupt her public life to any larger degree than for the father. The
involved father model does not open up for father to use the family as a means for furthering
his public career to any greater degree than for mother. In addition the concept family carries
different connotations in association with the different father models. For the breadwinner
father the family is a very important prerequisite for a successful public career. In that sense
too it is perfectly legitimate to look at the family as a means. For the involved father
on the other hand, the relationship between family and public life is reversed. The job and the
state ought to provide means for securing a good family life. If a person, usually a man in a
high position, wishes to resign he can now draw upon the involved father model and justify
his resignation on grounds that he wants to spend more time and energy on his family. The
breadwinner model does not open up for this particular reason for resigning.

The idea that kinship relationships are created by nature also contributes to placing the
mother in a more central position in the family than the father. A woman can develop into a
mother, and thus create a minimum family unit, in a fundamentally different way than a man
can develop into a father. A woman’s transformation into a mother does not require great
input from a man. The female contribution to the creation of a father is, in comparison,
formidable. Men need assistance by women to a far greater extent than vice versa in order to
create families they can be parts of. In this sense too fathers are more loosely connected to the
family than mothers.

Western kinship ideology also contributes to placing father in a more marginal position than
mother within the family. A family always consists of both cognates and affines. The former
category is a matter of descent and creates lineages. The latter category is a matter of
marriage and creates a web of relatives with the family in the centre. However, in western
kinship ideology blood is thicker than water and cognates more important than affines. A
person has allegiances to both his cognates (members of his lineage), and to his affines (the
in-laws in his family). However, if these two principles of allegiance come into conflict, e.g.
if there is a quarrel, the lineage is more important than in-laws. Within a family consisting of
only parents and children the dividing line, is therefore between mother and father. Because
mother, by nature, has a stronger connection to her children, and thus forms the nucleus of
the family, it may be argued that the father belongs to his own lineage of men and forefathers
to a greater degree than he belongs to his family.
Though descent in western kinship is traced through both mother and father (cognatic), for the individual man his own patriline will usually be of greater importance. Considering the strong patriarchal traditions in New Zealand and the western world in general it is obvious that there has always been a strong patrilineal bias [Solheim 1998]. The material and symbolic resources and wealth flowing through the patriline has always been more important than that which flows through the matriline. For a man his patriline is thus more important than his matriline. Only his sons are part of the patriline in the same way he is because it is only his sons who can propagate the lineage. His daughters belong to his patriline, but the children of his daughters will not belong to his patriline. They will belong to the patriline of her husband. It is the relationship between father and son which will secure the existence of that entity, the lineage, to which the father belongs; the entity which defines who he is. Thus it is his sons who will guarantee his existence after his death.

If the breadwinner father is more loosely connected to the family than the mother, his connections to the home are even less solid. Family and home are intimately related concepts though they refer to rather different cognitive categories. Family is a social unit consisting of certain human members, whereas home is the abstract social space that may (or may not) emerge where this unit resides. In this connection it is useful to distinguish between space and place. Relatively permanent dwellings are the physical places where the home as a symbolic space may emerge. I use the words ‘may emerge’ because a dwelling, no matter how permanent, is not automatically a home. In order for a home to emerge a lot of symbolic work needs to be done. In Pakeha culture the concept home is about such notions as a sense of belonging to the place where the home is, a sense of identity - of being an integral and necessary part of that space and place. It is also about a sense of security and safety in that place, a sense of ease and comfort. Whereas a place primarily is defined with reference to physical dimensions, the space is mainly symbolic. It takes a lot of creative and technical skills to create all the symbolic meaning necessary to turn a dwelling into a home. And once created it takes considerable effort to maintain. The home-making mother is not only a cook, a cleaner and a nurse. Some of the most important work that she does is to design and constantly recreate the aesthetics which is the home.

Breadwinner fathers are not supposed to contribute substantially to the creative task of transforming a house into a home. As far as the creation of the home is concerned he is predominantly responsible for providing the dwelling and to maintain it. Thus he is supposed to also be the janitor, someone who maintains and improves the physical structure (the house) inside which the home is to be found. But he does not have many tasks to perform inside the home and he is not much involved in home-making. He does not do any house-work and as such does not participate in most of the symbolic work of maintaining home.

It is also important to notice that the work which a breadwinner father is supposed to perform ‘at home’ actually may emphasize his remoteness from the home, rather than to include him. Maintenance activities like carpentry and painting are disruptive of normal home making activities like cooking, cleaning and small scale decorating. In addition maintenance work often takes place outside ‘the home’; in his workshop in the garage, the shed or the basement. In addition, because his main job is to earn money it is not uncommon for breadwinner fathers to think that when they get home they have done their job for the day. To the breadwinner father home is primarily ‘time out’ and a space to relax.
Though the breadwinner father holds the power of final authority over his home and family there can be no doubt that on an everyday basis the home-making mother is a far more powerful person in the home than he is. The home is a space that the father has neither defined nor created and it is quite common for men to be slightly uncomfortable in the home. Many New Zealand men are actually more comfortable in the shed. Only a few years ago the book *Blokes and Sheds* [Hopkins 1999] became a best seller in New Zealand. Its popularity, and the way it was received attests to the strong position of the shed in New Zealand culture as well as the intimate relationship many New Zealand men have with their shed, as opposed to the home.

The involved father is linked to family, kinship and home in a different way than the breadwinner father. Most importantly, according to the involved father model mother and father both have one foot inside the home and one in public life. This places him in an equally central position in the family and the home as the mother. He is no more outside the family than the mother and he does not ‘own’ it any more than her. He is not the family’s primary face towards the outside world, nor its most important representative towards public institutions. He is not the ultimate authority figure to be called upon in emergencies (‘just wait till father gets home’), nor is the home a space mainly for relaxation. He has equal responsibility for the symbolic and practical work of creating and maintaining the home.

**Corresponding models of ‘sonhood’**

So far I have only dealt with one side of the relationship between fathers and sons. But as there are models of different kinds of fathers there are models for different kinds of sons. These models are far from as obvious and easy to observe as fatherhood models partly because there is an important difference between these two kinds of models. There is a degree of absoluteness and inevitable necessity that attaches to the concept son, and that does not attach to the concept father. Children cannot exist without parents, and even orphans are sons (and daughters). All men are sons, one way or the other and for all men in western societies ‘sonhood’ is and integral and constituting part of being a male human being. That is not the case with fatherhood. A man can never fail to be a son, but he can fail to be a father. To become a father a man must change, and there is always the possibility that he will not manage to change. On the one hand he may never father a child, i.e. become a father in the genetic sense of the word. And if he does become a genetic father he may fail to live up to the duties specified by the models of fatherhood he and the people around him subscribe to. As far as ‘sonhood’ is concerned the potential for failure does not exist.

The cultural model for ‘sonhood’ is a much more integrated aspect of a man’s psychological and social personality than fatherhood and the cognitive models for ‘son’ are so intimately linked to models of ‘child’, ‘manhood’ and ‘person’ that it may be difficult to differentiate between these. In a sense models of sonhood are models of the male human child, rather than only models of the male child in relationship to his parents. Sonhood models also different from parental models in that they are seen to be less negotiable. The boy learns a particular model of sonhood as an integral part of learning the culture that surrounds him. He is not presented with a variety of models of sonhood to choose between. There is no choice; there is only the need to learn how to be a human male person.

In spite of these problems it is still possible to identify different models of sonhood in
contemporary Pakeha culture. Just as there are two models of fatherhood, there are two complementary models of being a son. On the one hand there is the model of ‘the obedient son’ which corresponds with the ‘breadwinner father’. On the other hand there is the ‘self-actualizing son’ which corresponds with the ‘involved father’. With reference to my arguments above, about the links between kinship, the lineage and the breadwinner father model, I will argue that the model for the obedient son contains one overriding duty towards his father: To stay alive and have sons so that the patriline may continue. The second most important rule, which also is necessary for the first one to be fulfilled, is for the son to obey and honour his father, and thus obey and honour the lineage. By disobeying and dishonouring his father a son risks bringing shame on his father, thus rendering the father and the line vulnerable and unable to defend the material and political foundations for its existence. In order to restore the honour of his name and his lineage a father may, as a last resort, feel compelled to disown the son who brought shame upon him. In order to remain a son, a son must not shame his father and his lineage.

In short it may be said that the primary duty of the obedient son is to grow up and become like his father and finally to take over the position of the father. Childhood and adolescence is a prolonged copying process. Through being exposed to the father, as well as other men who resemble him, the son will gradually take on the characteristics of those men. By successfully completing the copying process the son has become a proper man himself, ready to be a proper breadwinning father. The rules and duties prescribed by the model for the obedient son are, as with the breadwinner father model, formal in character. They are general rules, given by nature. Becoming a son is an act of nature, and to obey and honour ones father are commands given by nature, by God as well as by law. There is no room for individual and personal considerations, nor is there any point in it. All sons are the same and there is only one rule for all sons.

The primary duty of the self-actualizing son is totally opposed to the duty of the obedient son. The self-actualizing son is supposed to become himself, to actualize his own authentic innate potentials. Some times, and or for some sons that may necessitate being disobedient towards his parents. Obviously that is unfortunate, but his duty towards himself is greater than his duty towards his parents. Every child (son and daughter) was born with, and carries innate potentials that are uniquely his. Not to actualize these potentials is considered a deep sin because it is to squander these unique opportunities and to deprive the world of a set of unique personal characteristics that nobody else can bring into the world. According to this model growing up is not a copying process, it is a creative process. To copy someone else is directly anti-thetical to this model and is looked upon as equal to assuming a false self. Not only is it psychologically unhealthy, but it is also a form of deceit. For a self-actualizing son growing up is a process of learning and invention. It is not rote learning in the form of copying, but creative and reflexive learning where the outcome is supposed to be something new and unique. The father is of particular importance in this creative learning process because he is the only adult man with whom the son has such an intimate relationship, and from whom he can learn the intimate details of how to be a man. It is, supposedly, primarily through interactions with his father that a son can develop his own particular way of being a man. Not through copying his father, but by the father being a ‘role model’ who can inspire the son to act in proper ways.

The rules and duties prescribed by the model for the self-actualizing son are, even more so
than for the involved father, reflexive and non-formal. Because the son is supposed to become himself, individual and personal considerations are at the very core of how he ought to behave and think. Certainly there are a number of social rules of conduct, but the scope for how a son may behave towards his father is large. For a particular son, in a particular phase of development it may be ‘right’ to openly disobey his father, and be grossly rude towards him. If this is part of a ‘healthy’ development (in the sense that is helps the son to forge an autonomous and authentic self-identity) then it is the right thing for that son to do. If it is part of an ‘unhealthy’ development, then it is wrong and the son should be assisted and encouraged to change his demeanour.
Chapter 6 The hegemonic model and the disqualified father

The main argument in this chapter is that the involved father model is the hegemonic ideology in contemporary Pakeha society. All the fathers I observed, and the overwhelming majority of all the fathers I talked to, expressed a firm conviction that this is the correct and proper way to be a father. At the same time most of the fathers I observed, and I believe most fathers in general, behave in ways that do not correspond with this model. To me as an observer their behaviour actually has more in common with the breadwinner model, but without really corresponding to that model either. Later in this chapter, and in chapter seven, I will investigate some of the factors that discourage or make it difficult for fathers to live up to the involved father model. Before doing so, however, I need to argue in favour of my claim that the involved father model is the hegemonic ideology in contemporary Pakeha culture.

First of all it is necessary to keep in mind that the involved father model is the hegemonic ideology not only among contemporary Pakehas, but in western Anglo-Germanic cultures in general. A large majority of the academic literature on fatherhood and family in contemporary western culture attest to the existence of this ‘new, emerging’ model and its increasing popularity as the correct ideology of fatherhood [see e.g. Brandth & Kvande 1996, Hobson Ed. 2002, Julian 1999, Kedgley 1996, Lupton and Barclay 1997]. Much of the self-help literature, which has gained huge popularity in New Zealand [Biddulph 1994, 1997, Blankenhorn 1995, Bly 1990, Lee 1991] also argue strongly in favour of the ‘new’ model. As if that is not enough the involved father model is also presented, with great confidence, in the popular media as the only decent and proper way to be a father. The article Father Hunger in the New Zealand Listener May 3 1997 [Ansley 1997] is but one of many good examples.

Another important sign supporting my hypothesis is the fact that all the fathers I observed, plus all the men I interviewed, expressed a strong belief in the fathersly duty to ‘be there’ for their sons. The imperative to ‘be there’ is the very core of the involved father model and in a strict sense this imperative is not a part of the breadwinner model at all. This strong conviction is a clear suggestion that the involved father model looms large in the minds of all these men and fathers. Even though ‘being there’ means many different things to different fathers, and different fathers have different ways of fulfilling this duty, the essence of this imperative is quite clear. The duty is for a father to be available when he is needed. In practical terms that means he has to be quite heavily involved in the daily lives of his children, not only involved in securing the material framework within which they live and grow. The men and fathers I interviewed had varying ideas about how strongly involved a father must be, and they had different opinions about whether equality between the parents should be taken literally, or if some jobs were naturally male and others naturally female. Still, none of the fathers I observed and interviewed argued in favour of the breadwinner model as the proper way to be a father. If anyone in Pakeha society were to publicly argue in favour of the breadwinner model, claiming that the best way to be a father is to spend long hours at work, to arrive home late, expecting to be served a hot meal by his wife and only see his children long enough to kiss them good night, he or she would generally not be taken seriously. There can be no doubt that at the level of ideology the involved father is presently the dominant model in Pakeha culture.

The rise of the involved father

This raises the question why the involved father model has become hegemonic in Pakeha
culture. At a superficial level it is somewhat unexpected. The stereotypical image of the Pakeha man; the beer, rugby and racing bloke, who is more concerned about his mates than his family, does not fit well with the image of the involved father. A closer inspection reveals, however, that there are a number of factors that contribute to the gradual decline of the breadwinner and the increased dominance of the involved father model. Structural as well as practical reasons undermining the breadwinner model are becoming ever more acute at the same time as factors supporting the involved model are gaining strength.

A rather obvious set of reasons are of economic character and might, for the sake of expediency, be called a crisis of masculinity within the New Zealand economy. It is a crisis pertaining to the earning-power of certain sections of the male population in New Zealand. This crisis is not a phenomena peculiar to New Zealand but can be observed in many other countries in the western world. In her book *Stiffed: The Betrayal of the Modern Man* [1999] Susan Faludi describes how the restructuring of American economy; the phasing out of heavy industry and the growth of trade and the service sector, has left large numbers of low- or non-skilled labourers unemployed. For many of these men their occupations as technical industrial labourers used to provide not only a good family wage, but also a sense of competence and a sense of belonging to a collective of other competent men. According to Faludi, unemployment has not only robbed these men of their ability to be breadwinners supporting a family, but also their self-identity and belonging, and have generally left them feeling useless and worthless.

Over the last twenty years New Zealand has seen many of the same changes that Faludi describes. Most men who are presently fifty years or older talk about a ‘golden age’, particularly in the fifties and sixties when a man never needed to worry about getting a job that paid a family wage. (See snippet in chapter five). That era is long gone. In chapter one I argued that New Zealand is an integral part of a globalized economy, and the crisis of un- and low-skilled labour masculinity is part of this picture. Zygmunt Bauman [1997, 1998] argues that one of the consequences of the globalized economy is the increased marginalisation of large segments of the world population because the ‘dynamic’ and shifting labour marked demands an ever more mobile and adaptable workforce. Those who are not willing or able to move and adapt to the new jobs that emerge as the old jobs are relocated elsewhere, are silently pushed out of the labour marked. The crisis in masculinity in the western world is thus also a consequence of these kinds of marginalising processes.

Today there is, in my opinion, a deep seated insecurity about the state of the economy and what the future will bring. With the radical deregulation that has taken place since nineteen eighty four, the high unemployment for longer periods of time, decreased minimum wage and decreased unemployment benefits a general doubt about the usefulness of being a man has crept into Pakeha Culture. It is reasonable to assume that these economical changes and the concurring crisis of masculinity have had a general influence on the model of fatherhood Pakehas subscribe to. For a man who is unemployed, or only earning the minimum wage, it is very difficult to be a proper breadwinner father because he does not earn enough. For women too the breadwinner father is becoming gradually less attractive. Not only are women becoming increasingly independent of their husbands income. There are also a number of jobs in the service sector that women are perfectly able to take, but men do not want. On top of this the benefit system in New Zealand undermines the breadwinner father because a
breadwinner father who looses his job is likely to become a burden on the family economy. If his wife works he will not receive unemployment benefit, and if she does not work, she would be better of with the ‘Domestic Purposes Benefit’ (DPB) for single parents. The DPB is a better benefit than the dole, and as a consequence remaining married means the mother will receive less money, as well as an extra mouth to feed.

In her book *Mum’s the Word; the untold story of Motherhood in New Zealand* [1996] Sue Kedgley argues that one of the main motives for the introduction of the Domestic Purposes Benefit in New Zealand was to support and thus strengthen the position of the homemaker mother, and implicitly the breadwinner father. The DPB was introduced in case the breadwinner father for some reason or another disappeared. The state would then take over his responsibilities, thus allowing the mother to stay at home as a provider of care and nurture. As I understand Sue Kedgley the intention of the lawmakers was for the state to be a substitute for the breadwinner only until the woman/mother found a new man who would assume that role. It may, however, be argued that the consequences have been somewhat different, and that the DPB has seriously contributed to undermining the breadwinner father model. One the one hand many women seem to prefer the state as a breadwinner rather than finding a new man who is willing to assume that role. On the other hand an increasing number of men and women do not want the un-egalitarian division of power and labour that goes with this model of fatherhood. The DPB provides people on a low income an opportunity to avoid it.

The crisis in masculinity is one of several traits of late-modern society that contributes to the hegemony of the involved father model. The other traits can best be summed up under the heading ‘the transformation of intimacy’, as described by Anthony Giddens [1990, 1991, 1992]. Even though I have already presented Giddens’ arguments in chapter one I will reiterate. He argues that late-modern societies, involved in the globalized capitalist economy, are characterised by a number of disembedding mechanisms that are gradually dissolving older social structures like kinship, neighbourhoods and stable workplaces. The opportunity and necessity for individuals to be mobile and able to adjust to new circumstances is far greater than just a few decades ago and as a consequence individuals cannot, to the same degree as earlier, rely on these structures to provide them with a stable identities, neither social-identities nor self-identities. The creation and maintenance of identity is thus increasingly becoming an individual, reflexive project. As a consequence intimate relationships have become radically transformed because it is primarily through intimate relationships that self-identity is produced and maintained.

The involved father and the self-actualizing son models are both closely linked to these mechanisms characterising a late modern society. First of all the self-actualizing son model is basically the same as the model of personhood that prescribes that members of a late modern society engage in reflexive self-identity projects. Secondly, the increasing importance of the reflexive self-identity project makes it increasingly important and tempting for fathers to invest more time and energy on intimate rather than public relationships. Not only is it safer to build one’s self-identity in private than in public, but it also allows fathers to build their self-identities by to contributing to the processes whereby their sons develop their own self-identities.

Another late-modern trait inherent in the involved father and the self-actualizing son models
is that fact that these models resemble the ‘pure relationship’. According to Giddens the ‘pure relationship’ is characterised by not having any ‘ulterior motives’, so to speak. It is developed and maintained solely on the grounds of the experienced quality of the relationship itself and as long as both parties judge the relationship to be rewarding it is maintained. If no longer rewarding the relationship will gradually, but over relatively short time, be terminated [Giddens 1991, 1992]. Friendship and sexual love relationships are prime examples of pure relationships. The relationship between the involved father and his self-actualizing son resembles a pure relationship in that the experienced quality of the relationship is assumed to be of great importance. The relationship is supposed to be filled with good emotions like love, admiration, enjoying each other’s company etc. The presence of such emotions is also seen as the rewards and the justifications for the existence of the relationship, and they indicate that the relationship is ‘good’.

The disembedding mechanisms of late-modern society, and the concomitant transformation of intimacy, are important factors contributing to the contemporary dominance of the involved father model. The notion that father-son relationships have taken on traits of the pure relationship ought not to be taken too far, however. Father-son relationships differ from pure relationships on one important point; they cannot easily be terminated even if the quality should go bad. My argument still stands though; according to the involved father model the meaning, purpose and motivation of fatherhood is given, not by formal rules, but by the experience of the emotional contents of the relationship, just as is the case in pure relationships. Because it resembles the pure relationship while at the same time being far more solid, the relationship between father and son represents a unique resource for the reflexive construction of a father’s masculine self identity within the framework of late-modern society. That, I believe, is one of the reasons why this relationship receives so much attention these days.

The increasing dominance of the involved father model is also related to another disembedding mechanism, i.e. the declining importance of kinship as a principle for social organisation. Not long ago economic wealth, recruitment to trades and professions, political allegiance and even religious worship were all determined by kinship. Ownership (or the lack of it) of capital, both material capital like land and symbolic capital like trades and skills, were passed down through the generations, usually within the patriline. For the majority of the populations in western societies like Pakeha New Zealand that is no longer the case. Kinship is becoming increasingly irrelevant, particularly within the middle class, as a means for acquiring wealth, as a factor influencing a person’s choice of education and profession as well as recruitment to economic and political organisations. Today such matters have, to a large degree, become individualised and every person is becoming increasingly responsible for his or her own well-being. In western middle class society a heavy moral burden rests on every individual; he or she is supposed to find and cultivate his or her own inner potentials and build his or her fortune and happiness based on those personal characteristics. That again requires many years at school, and then a lot of creative, explorative and perhaps also therapeutic work. All these efforts the individual can only exert by and for him or her self and the gain cannot be inherited directly from one’s father or mother.

There can be no doubt that as far as social organisation is concerned kinship relationships are of little importance in contemporary Pakeha society. Kinship is still of great importance, however, as a resource for intimate relationships and thus for the creation and maintenance of
self-identity. Parallel with the gradual decline in the organisational importance of kinship and lineage there has been an increase in the symbolic importance of the family and the home. This shift in the relative importance, away from the more inclusive kinship and towards the more exclusive family, coincides with the increased dominance of the involved father model. In the previous chapter I argued that the breadwinner father in a sense belongs more to his lineage than to his family. With the involved father it is the opposite way around. When the balance of importance shifts in favour of the family, and away from the lineage, it is therefore reasonable to expect an increase in the importance of being an ‘involved’ family father.

A final, but important, factor contributing to establishing the hegemony of the involved father model is a change in western concepts about nature. In chapter five I argued that both father models rest on certain notions about nature, but that nature means rather different things within the two models. One concept of nature, i.e. nature defined by the various phenomena that take place in nature and by natural means, is helpful for understanding and justifying kinship and lineages. The other concept of nature, nature understood as natural laws and principles, is useful for understanding and justifying personal traits. There can be no doubt that the latter understanding of nature corresponds better with the involved father model than with the breadwinner model. The latter understanding of nature is also, for a number of reasons I will not explore here, rapidly gaining ground as the dominant popular view of nature.

This difference in the meaning of nature is also relevant as far as understanding Economical changes, the marginalisation of a certain kind of masculinity, disembedding mechanisms, the decline of kinship as an organising principle, and a changing concept of nature are all factors which I believe have contributed to the process whereby the involved father model has become the dominant model in contemporary Pakeha culture. In addition the fact that New Zealand is a small country with a colonial history and geographically remote, contributes to influences from culturally dominant areas being adopted with great vigour. I call it the ‘far away’ effect. Even though New Zealand is in the midst of building a national identity which is distinctly different from that of more dominant nations, New Zealand culture is also still very open, and often not very critical, to influences from abroad. The involved father model is not entirely home grown, and in this case too Pakeha culture has been heavily influenced by notions that have originated elsewhere.

**Far away**

It cannot be denied, New Zealand is remote. Along with Hawaii, Easter Island and Pitcairn it is one of the most remote places on our planet. From any perspective, sometimes even their own, New Zealand is isolated. Even more isolated than Hawaii. Hawaii is, after all, half way between America and Asia, between the two economical superpowers USA and Japan. New Zealand is only half way to going back to where you came from. It is not between anywhere and it is not on the way to anywhere either. It is not like Luxembourg, or Iowa or even Malaysia, places you may just happen to go through on your way to France, California or Australia, places where you can stop off for a few days and have a look around before you continue to wherever your real destination is. New Zealand is the end of a dead end road. It is a place you only go to if you have made a conscious decision to go there.

This sense of remoteness and isolation looms large in New Zealand culture, with both positive and negative
value. Isolation is both protection and an obstacle. The latter has, I believe, greatly contributed to the huge emphasis Kiwis place on the big OE, Overseas Experience. Some time during early adulthood, prior to starting a family, all New Zealanders are supposed to go abroad. This expectation is so strong that Kiwis who have not been on an OE seem compelled to excuse themselves, as if they have not gone through a compulsory rite of passage. And, as far as isolation is concerned, going on an OE implies visiting all those other places that somehow are believed to be more in the centre of the world.

Being at the end of the road New Zealand is the perfect point of departure for any international travel. All corners of the world (with the exception of Australia) are perceived to be equally far away. As a consequence they are also equally (in-) accessible and it is a major journey wherever you go. Even Australia, the next door neighbour, is more than two thousand kilometres away. That is the same distance as from London to Greece, or from New York to New Orleans. When leaving New Zealand one might as well go far and stay for long. Coupled with its colonial history and the (fading) sense that England is ‘home’, to most Kiwis the natural place to begin their OE is in London. Having worked there for a year or two or three they branch out, covering the globe on their way back.

The importance of the OE must not be underestimated. When travelling and living abroad Kiwis make contacts and establish relationships that contribute to making New Zealand an integral part of a globalized world. When returning home, and through communications with old friends abroad, Kiwis bring back ideas and inspirations with a profound impact on local consumption styles. The urban, chic consumerism I have written about elsewhere is but one of the consequences of the OE. New Zealand may thus still be remote, but it is not very isolated anymore.

The remoteness and long history of relative isolation has, however, lodged itself deep in the national identity and has contributed to a particular ambivalence in how they see their relationship with the rest of the world. In addition to being remote New Zealand is also a very small nation which has never been powerful or particularly significant in any arena apart from rugby, and recently yachting. As a nation New Zealand do not have many things to brag about. Being the first nation state in the world to grant women the right to vote is one of them, and once upon a time they had a welfare state that even the Scandinavians envied. Both those achievements have since faded, gender equality is not particularly advanced in contemporary New Zealand and the welfare state has almost gone. In the eighties they stood up to the mighty USA and refused nuclear warships to enter New Zealand harbours. That law still stands. A few isolated incidences of courage and a few important achievements is not enough, however, to foster a sense of being big and important. Thus Kiwis tend to think about their nation as small and insignificant (albeit offering a good quality of life).

Because they see themselves as small and insignificant, and in order not to be an isolated backwater, New Zealand is very open to outside influence. Within almost any field, from popular consumer culture to health practices, from new age self-help workshops to academic theories, with regular intervals the latest fads and fashions, (usually imported from USA), sweep over the country. In most other countries the new fashions blend in with a range of other styles, practices and theories, creating a somewhat colourful mosaic. In New Zealand, on the other hand, each wave tends to replace the old and whatever is in fashion dominates the scene. In their eagerness to be up to date New Zealanders become rather uncritical, and swallow, hook sinker and all, whatever some American missionary is preaching as the gospel truth right now.

Fortunately wherever there is dominance there is opposition. Openness to the world means picking up ideas and trends of all sorts, including some that fly in the face of the dominant fad. With the radical
deregulation of the economy it is now much easier than before to pick up and run with some wild idea about how to live and make a living. Behind and beneath the surface of the dominant fad there is thus today a thriving undergrowth of other kinds of businesses, products and lifestyles. Some home grown, others imported from abroad, and most of them mixes of both.

The national lack of self-confidence inherent in the self-image as small and insignificant is countered by a deep conviction that being isolated is, after all, a blessing. New Zealand may be way out in the periphery, but that also means far away from all political hot-spots, from wars and violence, from pollution, social and cultural disintegration. If, during their OE, a Kiwi meets a partner and expects children, he or she will wish to return home. ‘New Zealand is a great country for bringing up children.’ I have heard that phrase hundreds of times. Kiwis tend to think of New Zealand as being a green lung in a dirty world, a calm haven outside the political fighting going on elsewhere.

Open and curious to foreign influence, but still with a deep conviction that if necessary they can do without. Kiwis are avid do-it-yourselfers. Not only is it a man’s duty and pride to be able to build and repair anything; it is part of a national identity. New Zealanders will make do with whatever is at hand, and when inspired by some foreign idea they’ll give it a go and make it themselves. The cheese counter in the supermarket is a fascinating example. For every foreign cheese there is a New Zealand counterpart, equally tasty and with a slightly different but similar name to its foreign origin.

Obstacles to being either kind of father

The involved father model is undoubtedly the hegemonic ideology in contemporary Pakeha culture, and as I have described above there are a number of reasons why this has happened. It is therefore rather puzzling to observe that most of the fathers in my sample do not behave in a way that corresponds with this ideology. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no clear one to one correspondence between any of the models and how most men actually behave as fathers. Most men say that it is important to ‘be there’ for their children, and to be involved in their lives, and still the statistics reveal that women spend twice as much time on household work per day as men, and three times as much time on care-giving for household members [www.stats.govt.nz]. It is also a fact that in general fathers in New Zealand, as in all other western countries, spend more time at work, and provide a greater proportion of the family income than mothers. According to a time use survey by Statistics New Zealand from 1999 men spend an average of two hours more per day involved in paid work than women. In my sample nine out of thirteen fathers are involved in paid work every working day of the week. Three of the remaining four fathers are either part time or periodically employed. Only one father was full time caregiver and home-maker, and had been so for a considerable length of time, when I began my visits.

Going by these observations and the statistical information it is tempting to conclude that even though the involved father model is the dominant ideology, the dominant behaviour is far more in line with the breadwinner model. To a certain extent that is the case, but the picture is not that clear cut. My observations indicate that in contemporary Pakeha society it is actually difficult for fathers to live up to either of these models. Some of the factors contributing to these difficulties have to do with macro-social structures and organisation, others with interactional processes within the family. In the rest of this chapter I will present the social factors involved and I will present them in the order they were just mentioned.

First of all, however, I will once again underline that these are all social factors, and not
consequences of biological differences between men and women. To be an involved father requires a lot of knowledge and skills about how to provide care and nurture for children. Such knowledge is neither the product of gender specific inborn instincts nor can it be acquired from books alone. It is learned knowledge that women and men are equally able to acquire and it can only be acquired through practice. In a study of just over one thousand children, aged three to five, who lived with only one of their biological parents, half with their fathers, half with their mothers, Mogens Nygaard Christoffersen found that the single fathers were equally competent caregivers as the single mothers. [Christoffersen 1996]. It does, however, take a lot of time and effort to learn the skills and knowledge necessary to be an adequate caregiver and for a number of reasons most fathers do not have many opportunities to learn, nor do they use the opportunities given.

There are many reasons why men do not gain the experiences they need to become qualified caregivers and thereby learn the skills needed to live up to the involved father model. Most of these reasons are due to behaviour, institutions and social structures created and maintained by men. This point has been documented and discussed at length by a number of authors [see Hobson Ed. 2002 for an overview]. Men are not alone in maintaining this social situation, however. Nancy Chodorow’s work The Reproduction of Mothering [1978] demonstrates how both genders contribute to the maintenance of cultural beliefs and social practices that support a strict gender division in relation to care and nurturance. It is therefore not surprising that many men, even those who wish to be involved fathers, are ambivalent about participating in child care and housework and may not see any value in it. Generally speaking housework and childcare carry a negative valour for men and women equally. Most men and women in Pakeha society today accept that it is reasonable that they take their equal share of these tasks, but they still find it to be tedious and uninteresting work. It is not considered interesting and fulfilling and does not contribute in a positive way to one’s reflexive self-identity project.

One of the main obstacles blocking men from becoming involved fathers is the fact that most of what is culturally defined as valuable is still only obtainable through engaging in public life. Even though, as Giddens has pointed out, intimacy is becoming increasingly important as a source of self-identity, things like wealth, power and prestige are still defined as even more valuable and desirable. To most men the ability to provide well for ones family is still an important source of pride and self-confidence and there are strong incentives for fathers to invest a lot of time and energy in money earning activities outside and away from the home.

The obligation to provide for ones family is only one of these incentives, but it may not be the most important reason why many men choose to invest more time and energy at work than at home. There are numerous other rewards from being engaged in money making activities, rewards that are not available to the home-maker. Money making activities implies being involved in a number of public social relationships that carry obligations as well as rewards of a different kind than private relationships. It is also obvious that negotiating public space requires a lot of knowledge and skills that are different from those needed in private. Most men start acquiring this knowledge and these skills at a very early age. Not only do they learn public masculine behaviour, they also learn that this behaviour is of fundamental importance for their masculine self identity. It is primarily in public that men can exercise deeply ingrained knowledge and skills acquired from the day they were born.
For a boy or a man it is not only an option to display his masculinity in public, it is a necessity specified by the dominant models of masculinity. In chapter one I mentioned that New Zealand notions of masculinity demand a relatively high degree of exhibitionist public display. One example of this is that in public spaces Pakeha men in general stand out as particular kinds of men; the lawyer in his black suit and tie; the farmer in his khaki shorts and knee high socks; the farm labourer in his chequered shirt, shorts and gum-boots; the building worker in his steel-cap heavy work boots, woollen socks and shorts; the ruffian with long hair, perhaps dread locks, dressed in rags and barefoot. One of the more exaggerated, and perhaps the most exhibitionistic, displays of a particular kind of masculinity is, of course, the motorcycle gangs. When a fleet of twenty Harley-Davidsons glide past, with a roar, it is hard not to notice. There are several other categories of men and styles of masculinity as well. My point is that many of them stand out and stand apart, and it is apparent that these men have taken considerable care to properly display this particular kind of manhood. When walking down the street most Kiwi men, of whatever kind, carry their bodies with a certain swagger, as if to signal ‘I stand proud’.

My impression is that most Pakeha men are more comfortable in public places where they know what to do, than in the privacy of the home where they usually are far less competent. It is also in public that they receive feedback, admiration or disapproval from other men who have the same knowledge and who are therefore qualified to judge. And if such feedback is not overtly given, it takes the form of money and power. Or rather, people who act in public are prone to interpret money and power as signs of recognition. In addition money and power are desirable ends in themselves. It is obviously that men do not strive to make more money and become more powerful only in order to provide better for their families. Recognition and admiration form other men, wealth and power, these are some of the more important rewards of public life. Most Pakeha men have been taught that these rewards are far more valuable than the rewards of intimate private relationships. In order to even begin the movement towards acting in accordance with the involved father model it is necessary for men to revise some of the strongest cultural notions they have learned and some of the strongest social processes they have been part of since childhood.

Below I will explore how difficult it can be to live up to the breadwinner model of fatherhood. Prior to doing so I would like to point out that it is not altogether easy to be an involved father either. In face of the strong obstacles within Pakeha culture and society against men actively engaging in care-giving activities governmental policies and legal structures regulating child-care are of utmost importance in either encouraging or discouraging the actualisation of the involved father model. In New Zealand the government does not actively encourage greater involvement by fathers at all. Three months paid parental leave, and the right to leave of absence from their employment was introduced as late as 2003. This legislation does not, in any way, specifically encourage fathers to take time off from work in order to perform caring tasks. Considering the generally held Pakeha conviction that women are naturally better caregivers than men [Julian 1999] it is no wonder that mothers are usually the main beneficiaries of parental leave.

The fundamental principle upon which the involved father model rests is equality between the parents. If the structure of society does not provide for such equality, e.g. in the form of equal pay for equal work and equal opportunities to be caregivers, it is rather difficult for the parents to achieve on their own. If the opportunity for equal income and care-giving does not
exist one of the parents will usually assume the role of primary caregiver and home-maker and that will almost always be the mother. This is partly a consequence of the internal contradiction of parenthood, between providing economic resources on the one hand, and performing caring, nurturing tasks on the other. Modern economic organisation builds upon a strict institutionalized separation between work and family. Hardly any Pakeha families engage in paid work as cooperative units and rarely do all or most of the members of a family work together in order to make money. It is quite uncommon, and usually positively difficult, for parents to interact with their children as an integral part of being engaged in paid work. This is important because almost every other parental task except money making demands that the parent interacts with the child. Providing money is, in other words, inversely related to almost all other parental tasks.

For a particular period in the history of western societies the preferred solution to the above contradiction of parenthood was a strict division of labour by gender. Today that is no longer the preferred solution, though in practice there are still many remnants of it. In a survey of the opinions of 2002 New Zealanders 65% expressed a belief that mother and father should take equal responsibility for the day to day care of the children, 32% thought that the day to day care should mainly be carried out by the mother, and 0% thought it should mainly be the responsibility of the father [Julian 1999]. In other words, one third of the respondents still believe that fathers should be providers of income and mothers homemakers. Even though this survey supports my claim that the involved father models is the dominant model, it also shows that a rather large percentage of the population still clings to the breadwinner model. It is therefore important to understand how the breadwinner model, due to internal contradictions, acts as an obstacle for men who want to be proper fathers.

Consequences of being a breadwinner

In spite of the ideological hegemony of the involved father model the great majority of Pakeha fathers are still primary breadwinners in their families. This was the case in the thirteen families I observed and the claim is also supported by figures from Statistics New Zealand. Whether most men end up as main breadwinners by default or by conscious choice is a question I will leave aside for now. The question I will investigate now is how being main economic providers influences men’s ability to live up to other aspects of fatherhood. Based on my observations I will argue that within the framework of a modern society the consequence of being engaged in money earning activities is that it becomes very difficult to live up to all other aspects of fatherhood, including those specified by the breadwinner model.

Being the main breadwinner necessitates working long hours either away from home or engaged in activities that do not facilitate interactions with ones children. This contributes to making the father a superfluous person instead of a functional part of the activities that go on in the home. The other defining tasks of the breadwinner model, i.e. teacher, protector and authority figure, depends upon actual interactions between father and child in order for father to perform. The more he works the less he is in a position to fulfil these tasks. Two different trends in Pakeha New Zealand society have contributed to a situation where many fathers experience an increased pressure as economic providers. On the one hand the deregulation of the economy has led to a substantial drop in wages for large sections of the New Zealand workforce. For many New Zealand parents the balancing act between providing enough money and enough care is thus becoming increasingly problematic because the parents are experiencing increasing pressures as far as both sides of the scale is concerned. On the other
hand, and rather paradoxically, the deregulation has also led to an increase in consumption demands in general, particularly among young people. A new consumption style, what I call ‘new urban chic consumerism’, has become the dominant ideal.

**New urban chic consumerism**

My first visit to New Zealand was in April 1985. After eight months of living and travelling in Australia, mainly Sydney, I was on my way back to Europe. In Sydney there had been a wide range of modern, chic, mainly Italian inspired, cafés. Thus I had sustained the habit of drinking good coffee, a habit I had acquired on travels in southern Europe. Upon arriving in Auckland I assumed I would continue to nurture this benign dependency, and I expected to find a number of good cafés to choose between. That was not the case. Having searched all over down own Auckland I only found one café that served a decent cup of coffee.

Since then the café scene in New Zealand has gone through a radical metamorphosis. Good cafés, often with an Italian touch, have been established all over the place. In 1992 even the alternative Wholemeal trading company and Café in the remote town of Takaka in Golden Bay installed an espresso machine. Today it is possible to enjoy delicious cappuccinos and lattes in the most unlikely corners. Along with the good coffee they have maintained, and in some places even improved their tea drinking traditions. Coffee and tea being important for the consumption of a particular style of life, the food served at these new cafés is even more significant. A huge range of the most delicious dishes; usually based on local produce and with a fusion touch. By fusion I mean that they are mixes of various national cuisines and often totally new creations. The vegetarian and ecological movement have, as an example, greatly influenced the new Kiwi café cuisine.

One of the fathers in my sample, Jonah, told me that the New Zealand cooking (cuisine being to refined a term to denote the way food was prepared) used to be like the British, just worse. He grew up on boiled meat and over-boiled veggies, he said. Someone else told me that up until quite recently, the late sixties I believe, New Zealand cheese makers were not allowed to produce anything but cheddar. Today the scene is very different. Supermarkets abound with all sorts of high quality produce. Glossy magazines and TV programs celebrate the high quality and abundance of local produce, from kiwifruit to crayfish. Small scale production of different sorts of cheese has lead the way, and now some of the larger dairy companies produce a wide range, copying everything from Swiss Emmentaler to French brie.

Olive oil is another fascinating example of how the new consumerism is opening up new economic arenas. The first olive trees were planted in New Zealand more than one hundred years ago. In spite of the fact that there are areas in New Zealand that are perfect for growing olives, it never took off. Until quite recently, that is. Today there is a small, rapidly expanding olive industry, and some New Zealand olive oils receive top international acclaim.

Good food and good wine go together. The general New Zealand attitude to wine has been changing for quite some time. It used to be that New Zealand wine was relatively expensive, of poor quality, sweet and with high alcohol content. Today the entire topic of wine has become high fashion. Wine and boutique lager served out of a bottle, not a can, is definitely the alcohol of choice for the new urban consumer. In addition the production of fine wine has become a big and very successful business. The wine industry receives a lot of attention and praise and is considerable source of national pride.

The new chic urban consumerism is also reflected in other consumer choices; particularly the cars people
drive, the houses they live in and the properties they own. Cars of course being the most conspicuous. New Zealanders have a love affair with the private motorcar, and the chic urban consumer preferable drives a big four wheel drive wagon. That is so that he can access his ‘lifestyle block’ of land somewhere in country. A property where they plan to establish a vineyard, an olive grove or some other fancy and unique product aimed at a niche marked somewhere overseas, in Tokyo or New York. At his lifestyle block they are, of course, building a house designed by an architect, either a replica of a Tuscan villa, or a hybrid of a corrugated iron wool shed and highly modern steel and glass box. That at least is the impression one gets from TV shows like ‘Maggie’s Garden Show’ and glossy magazines about architectural and interior design.

Though I call this style of consumption urban and chic, that term is somewhat misleading. It is most commonly found in the cities, and does carry an air of being up-market. Still, it can be found other places too. Golden Bay, one hundred kilometres from the nearest city of any size, is definitely not an urban area. It is not up market, and not particularly rich. And still many aspects of this new style of consumerism abounds, and actually dominates the public image. Maybe I should have called the phenomena ‘late modern chic consumerism’, because it is far more a question of the kinds of consumer choices late modern society provides, than a matter of urbanity. On the other hand, late modern society and urbanity most often go together, so it might as well stand.

During my first stay in New Zealand in 1985 many consumer goods were not readily available, and most people seemed to accept that the only car they could afford was twenty to thirty years old. With the deregulation of the economy, and a strong, global, cultural influence, consumer goods have both become more accessible and an important ingredient in the creation of desired life-styles and social identities. There has, in other words, been a huge increase in the kinds and the numbers of consumer goods people ‘need’ to express their identity. As a consequence many New Zealand parents find that they have to work longer hours to provide for their own and their children’s physical and social needs. On the other side of the scale, parents in late modern western societies are continuously informed by ‘experts’ that they need to spend more time interacting with their children in ways that will stimulate the children’s emotional and cognitive development [Lupton and Barclay 1997]. There is, in other words, pressure on both ends of the scale; to provide more money and therefore work longer hours, as well as on spending more time engaged in the right kinds of activities with the children.

The institutionalized separation of work, school and leisure strongly determines the context for interactions between fathers and sons, and thus heavily influences the contents of these relationships. This influence is, on the one hand a matter of time, but also the kinds of situations during which it is possible for fathers and children to interact. In New Zealand children start mandatory school at the age of five and most children stay in school for thirteen years. The school day is long, almost as long as an adult working day. At elementary school the day lasts till three p.m. and high-school usually lasts twenty minutes to half an hour longer. In addition many children engage in leisure time activities outside the home or extra curriculum school activities like sports, after ordinary school hours. The normal adult working day begins at eight a.m. and usually ends at five p.m. The children may thus not have arrived home by the time the parents finish work. By implication the time for interaction is severely restricted, particularly for the parent who is the primary breadwinner.

The meaning of time
The restrictions on time are important for how men behave as fathers in two different ways.
On the one hand home-making mothers have more time to interact with their children than what fathers have. This is an important contribution to the phenomena that I call the disqualification of fathers; a phenomenon I will discuss in greater detail below. On the other hand, when time is severely restricted the meaning of time itself may take on new nuances. Several anthropologists have noticed that in pre-industrialised societies time is understood and expressed in radically different ways than in industrialized societies [Johansen 2001]. In the former kinds of societies the meaning of time is intimately and inseparably tied to the activities that take place and the units of time are commonly equal to the events that happen. The units of time are always ‘full’ in the sense that they are filled with particular activities. There is a particular time for any particular activity and the activity begins when everything is ready, and ends when all is over. The activity takes as long as it has to take and cannot be hurried along without seriously interrupting and most likely disturbing the activity that is going on.

Industrial or modern time, on the other hand, is empty and in a fundamental way separate from whatever activity is going on at any given time. One hour can be filled with anything without causing the hour to shrink or expand. Modern time is very useful for an efficient organisation of objects and people. It is a meaning of time which first and foremost belongs to the public realm. A major part of the symbolic meaning of home and family, which also means time for nurturance and leisure, is generated by the structural opposition between public and private, work and home. As an example care and nurture cannot be performed according to ‘modern time’ and a pre-set schedule. Comforting time cannot be planned in advance. Comfort must be given when the child has hurt him or herself and needs comforting. It must take as long as it takes until he or she has been soothed, not during a pre-specified and limited period that the parent has set aside for comforting.

When time for home and family life is limited and precious it is tempting for the person(s) experiencing the pressure to employ modern time in order to organise home life more effectively. The concept ‘quality time’ which emerged a decade or so ago is a good example. It has since been abandoned because child-care and the development and maintenance of relationships with one’s children cannot be planned and executed in the same manner as the production of commodities like tooth-paste. There is reason to believe that the meaning of time pertaining to public life, and to the organisation of economic activity in particular, can have serious and damaging consequences for the meaning of relationships between family members if employed to organize life at home. Considering the fact that fathers spend so much time at work, engaged in activities defined and ruled by modern time, it is reasonable to assume that fathers are more prone to employ this meaning of time when engaging in family life. To the extent that fathers do this it is a likely to contribute to a marginalising process placing them at the edge of the family and life in the home.

The institutionalised separation between work and home implies that fathers and sons almost only interact in situations that are defined as leisure time. Fun and play, recreation and recuperation is what leisure time is about, as opposed to the ‘important’, rational, goal oriented, instrumental activities of work and education. In other words, fathers and sons almost exclusively engage in playful or ‘not-so-serious’ activities together. As a consequence the care-giving parent is indispensable in a far more fundamental sense than the breadwinner because any other person or institution may, in principle, take over the function as breadwinner. It is far more difficult for other persons, and particularly for state institutions, to
successfully take over as caregivers than to take over as breadwinner. There can be no doubt that this contributes to the marginalisation of the breadwinner father in relationship to home and family that I discussed above.

**Teacher**

Engaging in breadwinning activities seriously limits a father’s chances to be a teacher and a protector. In order to teach and protect a father needs to be present in the situations when teaching is possible or required and protection is needed. Most of the time, and particularly as the child reaches adolescence, fathers rarely participate in such situations. As mentioned above fathers mainly interact with their children within contexts defined as leisure time. In general these are not the sorts of situations where important knowledge (the sorts of knowledge needed to deal with the kinds of subjects considered to be of greater importance in life) is learned. It is not the sorts of situations where serious dangers occur either. My observations confirm this. All but one of the sons in my sample go to school all day long, and usually do not return home until three of four o’clock in the afternoon. Three out of thirteen fathers worked close to home, however, and at times these sons did spend time with their fathers while the fathers were at work. Still, the sons work efforts were not consistent and systematic, and their manpower was not a necessary and integral part of the economic process. Rather it was my impression that these fathers mainly invited their sons to participate in the work because of the pleasure of having company. Though some of the fathers used these opportunities to teach their sons a few ‘tricks of the trade’, the teaching had more of the quality of leisure time, similar to teaching them how to play Rugby, than the quality of serious business.

Modern fathers, in New Zealand as well as other western countries, do not have many opportunities to be guides and teachers, particularly when it comes to professional skills and knowledge. James and Daniel were thus exceptions and even they did not involve their sons in their work on a regular basis and did not rely on their son’s work force. Outside of paid work the only areas where fathers can act as guides and instructors are schoolwork, and leisure time activities like sports. For the great majority of fathers being a provider limits or negates the task of being a teacher rather than creating opportunities for teaching. I observed very few situations where fathers acted as teachers, i.e. where they actually instructed their sons how to perform a task, solve a problem etc. In chapters three and five I have described how Jonah and Tom continuously engaged in debates. These discussions unfolded in ways that might be interpreted as a form of teaching; on the one hand teaching Tom the subject matter being debated, on the other hand teaching him how to debate. Still, the debates did not come across to me as ‘educational’, but as a mix of serious competition and play.

Though my material is inconclusive I would suggest that in general very few fathers ever engage in direct teaching behaviour in interactions with their adolescent sons. I do not think this is primarily a consequence of fathers being ‘slack’ or ‘lazy’, i.e. not doing their job. There are good reasons why fathers try to avoid instructing their sons. Nigel and Terry is a good example. Once a week Nigel and Terry cooked together. Nigel assured me they usually cooked together once a week anyway, but it was also for my benefit, so that I could observe them together. In these situations Nigel assumed the role of Chef. He decided the menu and instructed Terry how to prepare it. Terry was obviously quite competent in the kitchen. He was familiar with the layout and knew where all the implements could be found. He also knew how they worked. But he obviously did not enjoy being told what to do. Not that he
disagreed or quarrelled with his father. No, he just silently slipped away and left the room
when his father was not looking. This behaviour repeated itself every time I visited them and
I am convinced that what he tried to avoid was being instructed by his father.

I will propose the hypothesis that adolescence is a time when personal boundaries undergo
very active and sometimes quite dramatic readjustment. To take instructions is to allow the
instructor to transgress certain boundaries. If the instructor is an intimate person, like ones
father, in relationship to whom the negotiation of personal boundaries is already undergoing
radical change, to take instructions is a serious challenge to the new boundaries that are
emerging, boundaries expressing a larger degree of independence and autonomy than before.
I would suggest that to the extent that adolescent sons learn anything from their fathers is it
not from their instructions, but from the way the fathers behave. Fathers are not so much
active teachers as passive examples or models of behaviour. This does not mean that I think
of fathers as ‘role models’. Rather, I believe that fathers are examples of possible ways to
behave that sons learn, adopt and reject through more or less conscious reflection.

Protector
The desire to protect ones children is strongly expressed by all parents I have ever talked to.
However, when I ask parents exactly what is they need to protect their children from they
usually find it hard to specify. That was also the case when I asked Pakeha parents. Some of
the fathers I interviewed claimed that economical dangers are the most serious, and that it is a
father’s duty to secure the families finances. This answer of course conflates breadwinning
with protection and as such it only avoids the issue. In a common sense perspective
breadwinning and protection are concepts that refer to different kinds of activities. The
common sense notions of ‘protector’ do not, however, clearly define what those actions are
and which protective tasks fathers need to perform. To some fathers it means protection
against injuries and one of the fathers in my sample wanted to protect his son from the son’s
own lack of self-esteem. Daniel, who’s son Rick does home schooling, wants to protect Rick
from the stifling effects of ordinary school.

There are many kinds of perceived threats but common to most of them is that as a
breadwinner/protector it is predominantly people and agencies from outside the family that
the father must guard against. Dangers lurking inside the home is the domain of the mother.
Contemporary New Zealand public society is, however and fortunately, quite safe and the
need for protection against public malevolent forces is never very great. As the children
become older, the need for protection decreases and by the time sons are adolescents there are
hardly any dangers left. Consequently, as protectors Pakeha fathers of adolescent sons do not
have much to do, and protective action is not something they carry out on a regular daily
basis. And even if they do perceive some immediate danger lurking, they may not be in a
position, nor possess the means to protect their children. Alcohol and drugs is a very good
example. With the general deregulation over the last fifteen years alcohol has also become
more freely available. Other drugs are also easy to obtain. Many fathers are worried that their
sons (and daughters too) will start abusing alcohol and drugs and try to protect them in
different ways. One of the fathers in my sample tried to prevent his son from beginning too
early, and refused to let him go to parties where he knew there was a lot of alcohol and drugs
being consumed. In another of the families I visited they allowed their children to have
parties at home, under the condition that the parents were present. The means available to the
fathers (parents) are very limited however. The dangers that the parents are afraid of are
dependence as well as heavy intoxication. Neither of these problems can be avoided by those kinds of protective measures, such as control and interference, which are commonly available to breadwinner fathers.

Getting high
I have been to a lot of parties in New Zealand where large quantities of alcohol and marijuana has been consumed. Some of these parties have been with alternative lifestylers, others with middle class professionals. And never at such parties have I seen anyone become overly intoxicated, behaving in an unpleasant manner, vomiting, being excessively sentimental etc. And then I have witnessed university and high school students in the streets of Dunedin. More than mildly 'pissed', to use a Kiwi colloquialism. Loud, shouting obscenities at people passing by and eventually collapsing in an alleyway, next to the remains of what they recently had to eat and drink.

First time I lived in New Zealand for a longer period of time, from December 1990 to March 1992, the sale of alcohol was still relatively restricted. Only served in pubs and a few licensed restaurants, and sold from bottle shops with a particular off-licence. Since then it has, along with almost everything else, been deregulated. Now beer and wine is sold in most supermarkets and almost every café and restaurant serves alcohol. Distilled alcohol is still restricted though.

Il other 'recreational drugs' are illegal. When it comes to marijuana that does not seem to deter many people though. Pot is easy to obtain and its consumption widely accepted. The New Zealand climate is favourable for growing cannabis and hydroponic cultivation is getting increasingly common. A plantation of cannabis in the bush only has two enemies: Police in helicopters and Possums. The latter is a marsupial originally important from Australia and now a serious pest that destroys not only cannabis plantations, but large tracts or native New Zealand forests. The Police is still the biggest threat, though. Every year around harvest time rural areas infamous for cannabis production are plagued by noisy helicopters swishing just above the tree tops in search of the odd marijuana plant. And every year they make big scoops. Thousands of plants in each area. There must be some plantations that they miss though because the illegal markets still overflows with New Zealand grown pot.

New Zealand film-makers have a particular fascination with marijuana. The weed features prominently in a number of films made over the last twenty five years. `Goodbye Pork Pie' is, to my knowledge one of the earlier within this genre. A road/rail movie where many of the main characters are stoned a lot of the time. `Scarfies' is a more recent contribution. A film about Dunedin students who strike it lucky when they discover a plantation in the basement of the derelict house where they squat. `Snakeskin' is yet another good example' another road-movie, this time about a hitch-hiker and the two young people who give him a ride, who are fleeing from dope-dealers and buyers whom the hitch-hiker has conned. In both the latter films explicit scenes of young people merrily puffing away are presented as if it is a completely acceptable and non-problematic activity. Even the buying and selling of dope is presented as perfectly OK.

Though cannabis features extensively in all three films it does not constitute the problematic issue around which the plots of the films are build. The core issues of both films are about self-identity and the relationship between the individual and some collective or another. `Pork Pie' is about outsiders versus mainstream. In `Scarfies' the central issue is group pressure versus individual moral values. `Snakeskin' is about authenticity versus pretense; the reality of who a person is and the pretence of who and what he or she tries to present him- or herself to be. Marijuana is not really a topic in itself, but merely a prop in the film.
It is used for symbolic effect of creating a stage at the edge of ‘ordinary’ middle-class society, but still just within the boundary. Pot-smoking is not what ‘we’ solid good citizens do, but it is almost ‘us’ because ‘we’ all know people who indulge. Our children have tried it, a work-mate regularly smokes, and cousin John too. By using pot as a framing device in a film it is possible to set a stage where moral dilemmas are played out, situations that the majority of New Zealanders never actually will experience, but potentially it could happen to any of us.

I believe that films like those above reflect important aspects of marijuana use in New Zealand. Most obviously, its wide acceptance. More importantly, however, it constructs the user as living on the edge of ‘established’ society. And not any kind of edge either, but an edge which is also a stage where important, crucial, cultural and existential themes and dilemmas as played out and dealt with. Marijuana as a symbol of oppositional, on the edge, moral and existential meaningfulness of course must be understood in contrast to the other commonly used and legal drug, i.e. alcohol. Beer is a symbol of the ordinary bloke. If drunk out of a fancy bottle, a symbol of a bloke with success in life, or on his way there. Ordinary none the less. Beer is drunk by the man who deserves it after a hard days work. Wine, on the other hand, is for women and the cultural elite. Even though these latter categories are slightly more peripheral than the ‘good, keen man’, they are still well within the boundaries of solid ordinariness. Alcohol is a signal of conformity to this image. Pot is a signal of the opposite.

I have heard from people, and read in the papers that the deregulation of alcohol has not resulted in a general increase in alcohol consumption. The consumption of alcohol among young people has, however, changed since restrictions were lifted. The age limit for the purchase of alcohol was dropped from twenty one to eighteen only a few years ago. If I remember the statistics correctly young people now drink more than earlier. Not because more young people drink, or that they drink more frequently, but because those who drink consume more on each occasion. The drinking style of young New Zealanders (I have not observed nor heard or read about drinking among Maori youth in particular) is quite different from the drinking style I have observed among adults. The young get drunk and rowdy whereas adults take care to appear in control and to be civilized.

As far as other drugs are concerned I will not say much. I have not made any direct observations about the use of opiates, amphetamine and benzodiazepines and do not know much about it. Two interesting facts that I have managed to pick up are worth mentioning, however. First, in spite of the fact that there is very little import of heroin to New Zealand, there is still a relatively serious opiate scene. Opiate is locally produced, ‘home bake’ as it is called. It may be stolen medicine like morphine, codeine etc, or locally grown poppy, which is refined into opiate. Second, New Zealand health authorities distribute methadone to all opiate users regardless of age and length of use.

Recently methamphetamine has drawn a lot of public attention. From the news one gets the impression this is the most dangerous drug ever invented and the use is about to reach epidemic proportions. Allegedly P, as it is called, has been a contributing factor in several recent cases of severe violence and killings. I will not down play the seriousness of P, but I cannot avoid a critical comment. Once again mainstream society has managed to find a villain that can draw the attention away from the negative consequences of the mainstream drug of choice, i.e. alcohol.

The vagueness about the actual dangers their children face, combined the relatively high degree of impotence as far as protective action are concerned, does not mean that the desire
and readiness to protect is not a real and serious commitment with the most fathers. I believe that the strong desire to protect expresses something important about the contents of the relationship between fathers and teenage sons. If being a protector is interpreted as a concrete and specific task that a man must perform in order to be a proper father, then the failure to carry out such task is a sign that he is a poor father. That would, in my opinion, be a serious misinterpretation. Many of the potential dangers that may happen to a child are of such a nature that they cannot be foreseen, nor guarded against. The demand upon fathers to be protectors and the desire to protect therefore ought not to be understood literally. Rather it ought to be interpreted as a sign of the value that fathers, as well as Pakeha culture in general, place upon children. To protect is an overall attitude expressing a value judgement rather than a specific task. My point still stands, however; the more time and energy a father invests in being a good breadwinner, the less are his chances of being a good teacher and protector.

**Disqualified fathers**

With the increasing ideological dominance of the involved father model an increasing number of fathers express a wish to become involved in the daily care. There can be no doubt that most fathers are sincere when they express this wish. Some fathers may, of course, only pay lip service to a view they know that they cannot oppose without being branded ‘bad’ fathers. It is my clear impression, however, that most fathers are sincere in their wish to become more involved. At the same time something seems to be blocking their ability to turn the wish into actual behaviour. The kinds of cultural notions and public social practices that I mentioned above are obviously of utmost importance in understanding many of the structural factors deterring men from becoming competent caregivers. These general factors are not sufficient, however, because they do not provide us with an understanding of why some men do manage to become competent care givers while others do not. In order to understand how this difference emerges it is necessary to look at the specific relational processes individual men engage in as fathers. In other words, it is necessary to understand the patterns of interactions and signification between fathers and the other members of the family within the home.

In the rest of this chapter I will argue that the division of labour between father and mother within the household either facilitates of blocks fathers ability to become competent caregivers. In my material I observed that the distribution of labour and power in the home can be classified into four different categories. There are single fathers who obviously do not share the work or the power with their wives. These fathers are in full control in and over their own homes. Then there are couples who (try to) divide the work and power equally and where the father have as much knowledge and control over the home as the mother. A third category consists of couples who define separate spheres of activities for mother and father. The fourth and most common category consists of mothers who rule in and over the home and do most of the domestic work. To the extent that the fathers participate in home- making activities it is in subordinate positions as assistants. For the sake of expediency I label the fathers in the three former categories ‘qualified fathers’ and those in the latter category ‘disqualified fathers’.

The argument I will propose here is that the fathers in the latter category end up in a disqualified position as a consequence of a disempowering and marginalizing process in the relationship between mothers and fathers. This hypothesis grew out of a number of observations in several of the families I visited. I have already described some of these
observations in chapter three but in order to refresh memories I will present the descriptions again.

**Gina and Henry:**
Gina is the homemaker. She cooks, cleans, looks after everyone, and takes great care to ensure that everyone’s needs, material and emotional, are met. She usually sits next to her son Josh when he is eating, gently resting her arm on his shoulders, listen to him talk about his day, and bring more food if he has not had enough. In the lounge she sits in one of the chairs, knitting, while the kids (her son and daughter, Josh’s half siblings) all curl up in the sofa together, watching TV. Henry, on the other hand, is not a particularly home oriented person. He is very engaged in politics and religious affairs, and the injustices and cruelties of the world disturbs him a lot. Often when I arrive he is not present in the kitchen or living room, together with everybody else, but somewhere in another room meditating or organizing some political event. Gina is not happy about Henry spending so much energy outside the home and with regular intervals she lets him know that she would rather that he spent as much energy on his family as he is on trying to ‘save the world’. When Henry interacts with Josh it is often to inquire about his school work, to tell him to do the dishes, that he cannot have a Playstation, and similar commands.

After almost two months of visiting I arrive one evening to find that Gina has left to visits relatives up north. Henry behaves very differently now that Gina is absent. He has taken over her role, and now it is him who looks after everyone. He sits next to Josh while he is eating, with an arm resting over his shoulders. Pays great attention to how much he eats, and if he wants more. Even Karen (his step-daughter) receives much more, and far more positive attention than usual.

Gina is so good at being home-maker that there is no room for Henry to be an involved caregiver. When I ask Henry about it he admits that he is ambivalent about this. One the one hand he enjoys the freedom it gives him to pursue other interests. On the other hand he regrets that it prevents him from developing a closer, relationship with Karen and Josh.

My observations of Gina and Henry made me aware of how a fathers behaviour within the home, and thus also in relation to his son, can change depending upon whether the mother is present or not. Another set of observations, in another family, gave me a clue about why fathers change their behaviour depending on whether their wives are present or not.

**Bryan, Judy, Trudy and Brett**
When I arrive Bryan, the father, is alone in the kitchen preparing tea. I sit down in a sofa and we engage in small talk while Bryan cooks. Judy, the mother, arrives from work and almost immediately notices that Bryan is searching for a kitchen tool, but in the wrong place. She enters the kitchen, finds the tool, but instead of giving it to him she starts doing the job for which it was needed. At first Bryan does not know that to do. He is obviously annoyed but also bewildered. He then gently takes the tool away from Judy and tells her that he can do it. Judy hesitates, and does not leave the kitchen. Obviously embarrasses in front of me, Bryan tells Judy that if he is to learn, she must leave him to find out on his own.

Bryan used to have a very high position in a multinational corporation. Quite recently he resigned in order to spend more time with his family, and on doing things he enjoys. As Judy is working full time Bryan is adamant he wants to do a lot of the housework, but there are still many things he needs to learn.
When tea is ready Trudy and Brett are called for, and we all sit around the dining table to eat. Bryan directs a lot of his attention at Trudy, asks her about school, and other things she has been up to. Brett does not say much. He is good natured, slightly heavy set and a bit sluggish. Rather different from his father who is tall, lean and with a quick wit. When Bryan shifts his attention to Brett, there is a slight change of tone as well. There is much more of a joking edge in his voice when talking to Brett than with Trudy. The jokes shift back and forth between good humoured and slightly sarcastic. Brett is a bit wary of the sting in Bryan’s jokes, but all in all he is confident enough to tease him back.

Bryan is a self-reformed father. He has chosen to quit a highly prestigious job in order to spend more time with his family, but my impression is he is not yet comfortable with his new role. He also seems more comfortable with Tessa than with Brett. To my eye Tessa resembles her father more than Brett does, and Bryan seems somehow more awkward in his relationship with Bret. It is as if Bryan has not learned to understand his son very well yet.

Having observed Henry and Bryan I began to ask other fathers that I observed as well as the men I interviewed and most of them confirmed that they often felt sidelined by their wives, that there was not much room for them in the home, and that they tended to behave differently when they were alone at home with their children. These observations reminded me of the article by Fredrik Barth [1971] that I referred to in chapter one, in which Barth describes and analyses interactions between fathers and adult sons in the Middle East. As mentioned earlier Barth had noticed that most adult sons changed their behaviour towards their fathers depending upon whether they had an audience, and particularly if their own wives witnessed the interaction. Barth’s material is similar to mine in that we both focus on father-son relationships, but somewhat different from mine because in his material sons change their behaviour whereas in my material it is fathers who change behaviour. The important point, however, is that in both cases the change is intimately linked to the presence of an audience that includes the wife of the man who changes his behaviour. In both cases the changes cannot be understood as dictated by cultural models or social organisation.

Barth analyses the changes he observed as outcomes of interactional processes related to impression management concerning personal honour and dignity, and I believe that is the most adequate analysis of my material as well. In Barth’s material it is a matter of role conflict between how fathers are supposed to behave towards their wives and how they are supposed to behave towards their fathers. In my material, on the other hand, it is a conflict between how fathers are supposed to behave as men and the lack of possibilities to behave that way inside the home. In other words, it is an outcome of unequal distribution of power between mother and father concerning the social space called home. My claim is that when the mothers have the symbolic power in the home they often act in ways that humiliates the fathers. Not thereby saying mothers embarrass their husbands by intent. It is rather a question of practicalities and efficiency; getting the job done. The outcome is, however, that fathers are frequently put on display as incompetent, submissive assistants to their wives.

In order to understand how fathers end up as submissive assistants it is necessary to understand the dynamics of caregiving. Providing care and nurture are activities that almost exclusively takes place in the home, particularly so during the early years of childhood. In order to be an involved caregiver a father must therefore first create an active position for himself in the home. In order to provide a sufficient level of care he must have detailld and in-
depth knowledge about the home; know where things can be found and where they belong and he must have the know-how required to make it a good place to be. Most of all he must know the home well enough to be comfortable within it so that he can concentrate his attention on the caring tasks, rather than on his own sense of displacement. In the previous chapter I argued that the breadwinner model does not require that fathers have a strong position in the home at all. The involved model, on the other hand, not only requires the father to take part in life at home, but demands that he has an active position in the home. Unfortunately the involved father model does not specify the process whereby he is to achieve it.

If and when a man starts the movement towards becoming an involved father he is likely to face an important obstacle, i.e. his wife. It is an unquestionable fact that in the great majority of Pakeha families the mother is the primary home maker and caregiver and in that capacity she is likely to act, more or less inadvertently, in ways that will discourage the father from becoming involved in the daily care and home-making activities. In order to understand how the father becomes disqualified it is necessary to understand how the mother ends up as the dominant home-maker in the first place. In most families this is a process that unfolds over time as the couple gradually finds practical solutions to the immediate problems they face as a consequence of living together. Within the social sciences this process is often talked about as a form of ‘negotiation’ between husband and wife [See e.g. Brandth and Kvande 1991, Hobson (Ed) 2002, Kimmel (Ed) 1987]. Negotiation is a very broad term that can cover everything from rational discussion to how a person moves though an obstacle course. Even though some couples may distribute the domestic labour on the basis of rational debate, it is far more common that the process looks like the negation of an obstacle course. In most families there has been, from the very beginning, a lot of ‘processual unfolding’ whereby parents end up doing things differently than how they have agreed to do them. Just because men say that they agree with their wives about the distribution of house-work and care-giving does not mean that is what they actually do in the home. And just because wives express a wish for their husbands to be more involved, does not mean that they actually encourage and facilitate it.

The process whereby the distribution of domestic labour takes shape begins with defining and designing the home as a particular kind of space. In general women are far more active in this process than men. In most heterosexual relationships the woman spends far more time and energy on designing the home; everything from interior design to the kind of cutlery they will use. She decides what things are needed, where it will go, the layout of the furniture and what drapes to buy. She also determines how the home is to be used on an everyday basis; what it can be used for, the spaces where the children can play with crayons, paper and glue, and if the kitchen is only for preparing and consuming food and beverages or also a place to socialise. She makes most decisions about what kinds of food and beverages are to be consumed in the home. She decides when the proper activities are to take place, how the cleaning up afterwards is to be done, and the standard of cleanliness that applies in the kitchen. Mothers know their kitchen in and out. They have control over how much beef-stock is left if they want to make soup, how much sugar she needs to buy in order to bake a cake, how well the oven works and how long it takes for a chicken to roast. If someone else enters into her arena she behaves as if she has full right to interfere in their activities, fetch a spoon when they are looking in the wrong place, tell them where the beef-stock is even though they have not asked, and tell them off if it is too dirty after they have finished.

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Mothers are usually the superior decision makers concerning the rest of the home as well. In most cases mothers decide all the interior decoration. The colour scheme, what kinds of furniture and where it belongs, curtains, carpets and bric-a-brac. She decides the standards of cleanliness, and does most of the cleaning too. She can tell if something in the home is broken; a leaking faucet, a window that is a bit draughty, how the washing machine does not spin properly on a certain program, etc. As a general rule she will not, however, take it upon herself to repair these things, but will call in her husband or another hubby.

This description of the ruling mother may sound like a parody, but I do not think it is. Time use studies (www.stats.govt.nz) show that Pakeha men still do not participate much in everyday home-making tasks like cooking and cleaning. Their contribution has increased somewhat over the last decade, but not much. Men’s proportion of domestic work has also increased slightly, but mainly because women no longer spend as much time on housework as they did a few decades ago. My observations, both from the field in general, and during my visits in the thirteen different homes, also confirm that the mothers, particularly when they are primary home makers and caregivers, take possession of the home as if it was their natural right to do so. Not to say that they are authoritarian figures or tyrants in the home. Far from it; their control is a matter of everyone taking for granted that ‘mother knows best’. She knows best what needs to be done, and how it must be done. As a rule mothers use their knowledge and control over the home to make it a comfortable space for all members of the family. They still control it though.

If and when fathers in such families try to become more involved in the daily home making and care-giving the response of the mothers is decisive for what form his involvement will take. Even though many mothers have a strong interest in the fathers becoming more involved in domestic work, in itself this does not guarantee that her actual behaviour will contribute to the outcome she wants. If the mother has already established herself as the all powerful person in the home, and if she is not wiling and able to relinquish an enormous amount of that power, it is very likely that she will behave in ways that will push her husband into a subordinate position. As a consequence fathers frequently end up as an assistants rather than autonomous agents. The more involved such fathers try to be, the more frequently and acutely they will be reminded of their subordination.

Most men in the western world, Pakeha men no less so, are uncomfortable when they find themselves in subordinate positions in relation to their wives and will not choose to remain in such positions over time. As long as there are no spectators to his subordination he may tolerate it to some extent, but even then being inferior is likely to produce some sense of embarrassment. And this embarrassment is likely to increase if there are spectators. This is on of the more important reasons why people take great care, for example when they have visitors, to ensure that both husband and wife have independent tasks to perform, tasks that they are comfortable performing. Thus people can demonstrate to their audience that neither of them is incompetent and thus inferior in relationship to the other. If the wife should happen, even if by accident, to expose that her husband in reality was merely her assistant in the home, it is likely that he would suffer acute embarrassment. Whether the audience consists of relative strangers, like me when I observed how Judy sidelined Bryan in the kitchen, or his own children, it is still likely to generate a sense of humiliation.
Nobody likes to be embarrassed or humiliated, whether it is in front of strangers or their own children, and if humiliated most Pakeha men will feel an instant urge to repair the damage. There is a widespread belief that honour and shame are not of vital importance in modern Anglo-Germanic cultures. I do not subscribe to that view and I am convinced that there is a long and tradition for men to re-establish their honour if they have been shamed [see Miller 1993]. In a situation like the one Bryan experienced fathers are faced with only two options in order to regain a sense of dignity; either taking control over the situation the way Bryan did, thus taking power away from their wives, or withdrawing from the situation and leaving the tasks of home-making and care-giving to the mothers. The first strategy is likely lead to a power struggle, and the latter strategy leaves fathers with no purpose within the home.

When a father is disqualified in the home, and particularly if this unfolds via a process placing him in an embarrassing position, this is likely to also influence the relationship between father and son. One such influence is related to the strange phenomena that embarrassment is contagious. Watching someone being humiliated is likely to evoke a sense of embarrassment (or malignant joy if the humiliated person is an enemy) in the spectator as well. If a son were to witness his father being humiliated, even if ever so slightly it is likely that the son too would feel the embarrassment. I do not, however, have observational material from such situations and thus can only speculate. I do know, from other situations as well as interviews with some of the sons, that embarrassment is a tender topic to many sons in their dealings with their parents. When experiencing embarrassment over their parents the most common strategy employed by adolescent boys is avoidance. I can thus assume that the most likely consequence of witnessing his father being humiliated is that he will withdraw from the situation, and the distance between father and son will increase. Another important influence of disqualification is an outcome of how most fathers compensate for being demoted and marginalised in the home. Deprived of a functional role it is common for fathers to create the impression of being important by assuming an air of dominance in front of their audience, including their adolescent sons. I will return to both of these points in the next chapter.

As already mentioned heterosexual Pakeha parents negotiate the distribution of power in the family in three different ways: Equal sharing, separate spheres, or a hierarchy with mother on top and father relatively uninvolved. In the families I observed equal sharing of power seemed to depend on one important factor; whether the father had been primary home maker and caregiver for a longer period of time or not. Being a home maker is a skill and extensive technical knowledge is needed to make a home run well. In addition a lot of aesthetic knowledge is required to make the home a comfortable space, i.e. to transform it from a house into a home. Women start acquiring these skills and this knowledge at an early age, far earlier than boys start learning technical skills like carpentry and mechanics. New Zealand boys, particularly the generation who are now fathers in their late thirties, forties and early fifties, were hardly taught any home making skills at all. And if they were taught how to clean and maybe fry an egg, they rarely acquired the necessary aesthetic skills to transform a dwelling into a pleasant home. In order to learn the skills needed to be an autonomous person in the home, most men need a lot of time on their own as primary home makers. They need time and ample experience in order to take possession of the home and to define it in their own ways. And even if they do get to spend a lot of time as home-makers they have an enormous amount of knowledge to catch up on. The self-image as a second rate home maker may take even longer to get rid of. The case of Harry exemplifies this quite well. As a single father of three, the youngest only six, he did everything from cooking and cleaning to
caressing and comforting. He did hubby jobs as well, like repairing the washing machine. And still he believed himself unable to provide that motherly feeling, the warmth that only mothers can give.

The point is that it takes a lot of effort, as well as a lot of time to acquire the knowledge needed to be a good home maker and caregiver. It also requires special learning conditions. For the average kiwi bloke learning conditions are not optimal when they are continuously reminded of their subordination, when they are continuously told what to do and when it is not good enough. In short, the average person, kiwi bloke or not, does not learn well when he is continuously embarrassed or humiliated in front of others, particularly in front of his own children. This process may take on a new light if we understand the home as an arena for boundary management between husband and wife. The less a father has experienced that the home is an extension of himself the less safe he will feel as far as venturing into that space is concerned, and to a lesser degree he will fill it. Also, the more the woman has made the home an extension of herself, the more of a threat to her it will be if someone else moves in. When a father is left alone, or given his own areas of the home, free to discover, redefine and to experiment with ways of doing things inside that space, he is likely to acquire the technical skills of homemaking quite quickly.

The point I have tried to argue in this chapter is that the involved father model is the dominant ideology in contemporary Pakeha culture. Dominant ideology does not, however, necessarily lead to a dominant pattern of behaviour. Most Pakeha fathers, like the fathers in my sample, express a desire to be involved and yet behave in ways that more closely resemble the breadwinner model. For structural reasons many men do not want to, and do not put a lot of effort into being involved fathers. These reasons are twofold; on the one hand the rewards of spending time and energy on public relationships; careers, politics, projects and mates, are culturally considered to outweigh the rewards of being an involved father. On the other hand mothers often contribute to the marginalization and disqualification of fathers by assuming or holding onto the position as the ultimate authority in the home. In order to maintain their sense of dignity and self-respect disqualified father do not have many options. In my sample I only observed two ways out of this predicament; one option was to withdraw (emotionally and/or physically) from family life, an the other option was to assume an air of dominance. From my observations it seems that in order to acquire the knowledge and skills to be involved fathers men need experience as caregivers and home-makers. Because of the acute danger of embarrassment and humiliation most men will acquire this knowledge most successfully and effectively if left alone with the tasks.
Chapter 7 Relational power and self-identity

The hegemonic model of fatherhood, in present day Pakeha society, says that a father should be heavily involved in the daily care of his children. Some fathers manage to live up to this ideology, but most fathers do not. This difference is of great importance because the degree of involvement in the daily care greatly influences the meaning of the relationship between father and son. In chapter four I argued that when fathers are heavily involved in care giving work this provides potent resources for the development of the qualities I called ‘a magical union’. These qualities also play an important part in how father and son negotiate questions of power and the degrees of equality in the relationship. When fathers have ample experience as primary care givers this contributes to the growth of the kinds of relationships I call close parallel lives. Consequently, when fathers do not have a lot of experience as caregivers it is rather unlikely that such relationships will emerge, and far more likely that fathers will either dominate over their sons or withdraw from the relationship. In this chapter I will describe, in detail, the processes whereby father-son relationships emerge as either close parallel or hierarchical relationships, and how a father’s experiences as a caregiver contributes to the generation of one pattern or another.

In the previous chapter I investigated a number of contextual factors that contribute to why so many fathers do not behave in accordance with the involved father ideology that they actually believe in. External factors are not sufficient, however, for understanding the specific processes, internal to every father-son relationship itself, whereby these external factors come to inform the meaning of any particular relationship. In order to grasp these processes it is necessary to look for factors internal to these relationships themselves. In this chapter I will first describe the patterns of power distribution between the fathers and sons that I observed. Based on the assumption that self-identity is a fundamentally important and precarious topic in the relationship between father and adolescent son in a late modern society like Pakeha New Zealand I then argue that the strategies fathers and sons employ in order to develop and maintain their self-identities are intimately linked with how the relational power is distributed between them. I will try and show that the reflexive self-identity projects fathers and sons engage sometimes lead to power struggles and that in these struggles fathers almost always win. If he does not win it is because he chooses to withdraw from or avoid the situations where struggle takes place. In relationships where the fathers are dominant sons usually choose between three alternatives; they defer to their fathers dominance, oppose it or they withdraw as well. In other relationships fathers and sons adopt strategies for developing and maintaining their self-identity that do not lead to power struggle between them. I observed fathers and sons who worked hard to avoid dominating over each other and to develop as much of an egalitarian relationship as is possible. In these relationships the self-identity projects did not lead to competition, but to the development of ‘parallel lives’.

Based on my observations I argue that one important factor in determining whether the process of power distribution becomes competitive or not is the degree of experience a father has as caregiver and home maker. Another important factor is what kind of self-identity projects fathers are involved in. I argue that fathers who are strongly preoccupied with self-identity projects born out of and aimed at relationships in public, projects that are guided by the logic of relationships in public, are more prone to enter into power struggles than fathers who do not greatly emphasise such public self-identity projects.
Before I begin my analysis a few words on the concept ‘power’ are needed. Power is a multi
faceted concept and may refer to many different aspects of social phenomena. My concern is
with what I call relational power. In a broad sense relational power refers to the direct mutual
influence that two people have on each other, both during a particular interaction, and over a
series of interactions extending over time. It is a question of how power is acted out in
interactions between human beings rather than the abstract structural distributions of
resources of power that enable some categories of people to have greater access to wealth,
decision making processes, the definition of the meaning of reality etc. Relational power is
about how individuals employ the resources of power they have access to during interactions
with others. For analytical purposes it is useful to divide relational power into instrumental
and symbolic aspects. The instrumental aspect of relational power refers to the enforcement
of decisions, i.e. how other persons are made to do as one wants. It is thus a question of what
decisions are made, how they are made, and the practical means available in order to make
sure that the decisions become actions. The symbolic aspect of relational power is basically
about the establishment of meaning. On the one hand it is about knowledge and skills; who
has the knowledge needed to define the situation, the topics at hand, the standards for how to
perform, and who has the skills to meet these standards. On the other hand it is also about
presentation of self and how certain ways of behaving affects the emotional ‘atmosphere’ of
the relationship. In this latter sense relational power is a tool for understanding how people
manage to define (whether by intent or not) both the instrumental and the symbolic
definitions of the situations they take part in through the way they present themselves. This
kind of power unfolds by a multitude of emotionally charged messages that the participants
send each other about themselves and about the other; messages that eventually result in
some participants having more prestige, greater access to valuable objects and services as
well as greater influence on maintaining or changing both the definitions of the situation and
the definitions of other participants.

Dominant fathers
Before I embark on my analysis I would like to describe the patterns of relational power that I
observed. My first example is from the family consisting of the members James, Barbara,
Matt and Henk. As I wrote in chapter five James is not a strict father, both by his own words
and those of his sons. He has a few guidelines for how he wants his sons to be, but he is not
an enforcer of numerous and hard rules. He wants his sons to be considerate of others, i.e.
that they do not harm others, but beyond that he sees them as individuals with their own
personalities that he should not try to change, and actually cannot change. I emphasise that he
is not a strict father because when I call him dominant I want to make it perfectly clear that
he is not an authoritarian father. He is dominant in the sense that he talks most of the time; he
decides the topic of conversation, and also sets the tone.

James cares about sports and talks about sports. When he talks about sports he does not just
talk about the game, he includes himself and the community. He mentions his own
involvement, how he has been injured playing rugby, talks about how he is part of the team
but never joins in the drinking afterwards, and other feats he has been part off. Or he may talk
about a particular game, and simultaneously make some comment about New Zealand in
general. E.g. when talking about golf he made it clear that it is not an upper class sport in
New Zealand, there are more golf courses per capita in New Zealand than any other county in
the world. The tone of the conversation is slightly bragging, i.e. father presents himself,
sports, his community and country in a favourable light. This is his usual tone, he rarely
praises his sons, I never heard him being ironic, sarcastic, nor mocking, and seldom critical in an analytical way. Other conversational tones do exist, in other words, but James seems to prefer one of subtle praise of himself, his family, friends, community and country.

Matt who is fifteen years old does not actively oppose his father by openly contesting the distribution of talking time. He carefully attempts to break into the conversation when father is talking, but relies on positive signs of recognition in order to break into the small gaps father may leave in his stream of words. If father keeps on talking when Matt tries to enter, Matt pulls out again. Matt will also follow the topic and the tone introduced by father. He will neither change the subject, nor talk about the same subject in another tone. When talking Matt looks sideways up at his father, monitoring his reactions. Any sign of approval is appreciated, and it does not take many signs of disapproval before he loses his ground. Given approval he gradually stands firmer, and can actually take off and talk quite freely when given the time and attention. There are no overt signs that Matt does not accept that father talks so much and that he decides on the topic. In other words, Matt acts as if his father’s dominance is legitimate.

Twelve year old Henk responds very differently to his father’s dominance. Henk does not sit still and wait for a chance to enter the conversation. He breaks in, usually introducing a new topic, or even a different mode of interaction. During the meal and while the father is talking, e.g. about rugby, Henk may suddenly make some indecent noises, then make some macho remark, for example that boys who do not play rugby are soft, before he changes the topic entirely and asks me about one of my neighbours who is his teacher. He refers to his teacher by surname, and mother scolds him for not referring to him in a polite way as ‘Mister’. Throughout the situation father now and again sends him disapproving glances, but keeps on talking. Henk’s behaviour can be seen as a form of protest. He does not accept that his father talks so much of the time and receives so much of the attention. Henk would rather receive that attention himself, and through his protest he actually succeeds to some degree. The drawback is that the attention he receives is of negative value rather than positive, corrections rather than praise.

One possible interpretation of Henk’s behaviour is that it is more than just an opposition to his father’s dominance, but a fundamental opposition to his father’s right to define the situation. If Henk had competed for talking time, tried to introduce his own topics or maybe even changed the tone into e.g. a joking mode, it could still have been taken as a sign that he accepted the overall definition of the situation as being a conversation over socially accepted topics. But he does not accept this definition. He is continuously trying to be outrageous, making indecent noises, being very macho etc. That is, he is trying to make it into a conversation over topics that are socially unacceptable. The protest does not work, however. Father gives him some attention, stops him, corrects him in a mild way, but mainly ignores him, and Matt does not pay him any attention at all. Matt’s attention is focussed on father. It is mainly the mother who pays any attention to Henk, and she is mildly frustrated at his impolite behaviour. Usually Henk gives it up before long and leaves the situation. In spite of the fact that Henk openly contests his father, the balance of power between them remains.

Even though Matt and Henk behave in ways that look like direct opposites, it is worth noticing that there are close, implicit similarities. Both ways to behave make sense in light of the ‘obedient’ model of sonhood, which I described in chapter five. Matt is directly obedient.
whereas Henk inverts the model by being rebellious. They both also have in common that in the final analysis both sons seem to end up in the same position; i.e. they go for a solution of withdrawal. For Matt the route goes via attempts at entering the conversation, monitoring the father’s expression for signs of approval, and then pulling out. He then either returns to his room, or keeps to himself. Henk takes the route via opposition and rebellion, negative attention and then withdraw into his own world. For both of them, I seems, father is too strong. He defines the situation and decides upon the topic, he has taken most of the talking time and he receives most of the attention. Whether the sons accept or contest the father’s domination, the distribution of time and attention remains the same.

Though both sons seem to repeatedly end up in a position of withdrawal, it is not without significance how they arrive there. It is along this route that another aspect of power becomes visible, the power of defining and being defined as a particular person. Above I mentioned that the multitude of emotionally charged messages that the participants send each contribute to the definition of each other as persons. In this family the parents explicitly define their sons as having specific personalities. Matt is defined as quiet, shy, someone who does not speak much and who does not want to be the centre of attention. Henk is defined as the opposite, noisy, outgoing, likes to talk a lot and wants to be the centre of attention. In general these labels are maintained by the ways the sons behave in most situations when I am present. A significant and interesting point is that through these different routes they achieve opposite results. Matt does not get much attention, but on the other hand he is taken seriously. He is given the stamp of approval that father identifies with him. The fact that father talks a lot, and receives all the attention in the home does not keep him from having a view of himself as reserved and a person who likes to stay out of the limelight. Henk receives a lot more attention, but at a price.

Most of the fathers I observed behave in similar ways to James; i.e. they dominate within the home. By dominant I do not mean that they are authoritarian or even authority figures. On the contrary, almost all the fathers I observed (with only one exception), avoided or seemed to dislike being disciplinarians or decision makers. This reluctance towards being disciplinarians and authorities is significant because it is a strong indicator that these fathers do not base their ways of being fathers on the breadwinner father model. In chapters five and six I have argued that being the ultimate authority in the family, and therefore the disciplinarian is an integral part of the breadwinner model. I argued that part of the power needed to be an effective disciplinarian rests on father’s relative absence from the family. Correspondingly, when fathers actually are disciplinarians that behaviour is likely to maintenance or increase in the distance because punishment and the enforcement of unpopular decisions is likely to evoke fear and negatively valued emotions in his children. Refusing to be the designated disciplinarian is one of the easiest ways for a father to demonstrate that he tries to live up to the involved father model. Not only does he thereby repudiate a division of labour based on gender, but he also refuses to maintain the distance between himself and his family that the task as final authority is likely to result in.

On the other hand it may also be that the above reluctance to be authority figures is influenced by a general ambivalence within Pakeha culture towards authorities. My general impression from participating in everyday life in New Zealand society, as well as impressions gained from the mass media, literature etc, is that on the one hand there are strong tendencies towards masculine (or patriarchal) hierarchies, and on the other hand there is a strong anti-
authoritarian attitude in New Zealand culture. Public debates about political matters indicate that New Zealanders are fundamentally suspicious of authorities, powerful organisations and institutions, and simultaneously great admirers of persons who have become powerful by skilfully applying their personal qualities and abilities. People who are seen as powerful primarily by way of position are in general neither admired nor models for people’s aspirations. The power has to be personal, in other words, not given by some formal rule. Being the disciplinarian is a formal rule of fatherhood, as defined by the breadwinner model. It is not a position he acquires as a consequence of personal traits. And because it is not ‘personal power’ it is fundamentally dubious and questionable. When Pakeha fathers shy away from being disciplinarians it may be understood as an attempt to avoid the discomfort that attaches to formal power.

Politics
Politics in New Zealand puzzles me. I have spent considerable time and energy trying to grasp the political scene in New Zealand I am still quite bewildered. Let me therefore begin by sketching the easily observed patterns.

On the national level there are two obvious traits. First, that it is still a dualistic system. Labour versus National. I will return to that below. Secondly, politics is not for the masses, and in general politicians assume an arrogant and condescending attitude towards regular people. Or maybe they just keep a distance needed to retain a minimum of legitimacy? From watching them on TV, portrayed and reported about in Newspapers they take care not to appear as ordinary people. They do their best to look important, serious and sombre. They give the impression of belonging to a different class, one above everyone else. And if they do not manage to keep that front it is because they blunder, not because they deliberately want to appear to be ordinary humans.

A few years ago the old, ‘first past the pole takes all’, system was abandoned in favour of proportional representation. That move has not radically changed the dualism, however, not so far. Labour and National are still the big parties. At the election in 2002 Labour received 41 % of the votes and National 21%. And yet the change has been, because the two big parties no longer manage to get the majority of the seats in Parliament and have to form coalitions with various fringe parties. Though I am not in favour of proportional representation, in my opinion the current situation only increases an already confusing picture. My confusion is basically this: I cannot figure out whose interests the various parties are fighting for or against.

Similar to other western countries the big divide is between right and left, the big owners of capital vs. those who own very little or nothing, with National and Labour being the two large parties defining that continuum. However, considering the fact that it was Labour who began the economic restructuring in 1984, it is not altogether easy to understand whose interests the two parties represent today. To me as an outsider it seems that the difference between them is not so much their basic policy, but how fast, and how ruthless they are willing to be in order to implement it.

To the left of Labour are the two tiny parties Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition and Alliance. Both received less than 2% of the vote each at the last election and as far as national politics are concerned they might as well be non-existent. In between Labour and National, but on the right hand side of the divide, is United Future. To the right of National is Act New Zealand. As UF has popped up after I last lived in New Zealand I have only gained an impression of them from their web-site and my impression may be wrong.
They seem like a nostalgic, ‘back to the fifties’, family values on the family farm party, but combined with marked liberalism. Act, on the other hand leaves no doubt. It is marked liberalism and not much more. Together they gained fourteen percent of the vote.

Outside of the left-right continuum are two fairly big parties, the populist New Zealand First Party, and the environmentalist Green Party. The NZ First Party is run by a charismatic leader, and does not seem to have any particular ideological platform or principles. Their policies go all over the place and thus the party cannot really be positioned anywhere on a political map. Still, the party received ten percent of the vote. The Greens are green, of course, and as such on a different axis than the one defined by Labour and National. Broad environmentalism is the platform, with social responsibility as an almost equally important second leg. The greens received seven per cent of the votes.

But let me return to my puzzle: whose interests do these parties represent? As a pedestrian observer, and not a researcher of the political scene in New Zealand, I would say that the three ‘specialist’ parties (Act, United Future and Greens) are relatively easy to place. Act speaks for the business man, UF for the suburban middleclass, and Greens for ‘urban’ liberals and progressives. NZ First speaks for the politically illiterate masses. Labour and National speak for the rest, all those who do not really care, as long as things do not get out of hand. When National becomes too harsh in their marked liberalism the vote swings to Labour, and when Labour become too protective and ‘unionist’ it swings back.

But what about the huge Maori vote? Labour seems to get most of that, but I do not understand why. NZ First gets some as well, but mainly because of personal and regional allegiances and the history of the party, not because of the contents of their politics. Considering the strength of the Maori resurgence it is quite odd that there is no strong Maori party. The Mana Maori Party only received a quarter of one percent of the votes. Or perhaps this fact indicates that the resurgence is not as strong as the media images might lead one to believe?

If national politics is puzzling, local politics is worse. There are no parties involved at the local level and local politics is therefore all about persons. Consequently observers like me, who do not know the persons and their peculiar idiosyncratic political views and opinions, are lost. But even if one does know the candidate the picture can be quite messy. Personal idiosyncratic political views are often very muddled. The singular and therefore strong emphasis on the person of course means that personal image (of strength, efficiency and sex-appeal) is a major factor in determining the election result. It also means that personal ambitions, differences and animosities, or lack of ability to cooperate, may result in the fragmentation of the vote representing large sections of the community. I know this from Golden Bay where a large section of the community, somewhere between twenty and thirty per cent of the population, are ‘new-comers’ with left-green sympathies. However, because there are always too many candidates representing such views, none receive enough votes to be elected. Meanwhile local politics meanders back and forth, influenced by personal likes and dislikes, old grievances and individual (in-)competence. Come election time only a few of the voters remember how individual politicians actually performed, and so re-elects the old face or a new and sexier candidate.

When fathers dominate interactions with their sons it is a display of personal and not formal power. It is personal in the sense that they use their skills and abilities in order to dominate the situations they take part in and to make themselves the centre of attention. Some times other family members oppose this domination, but far from always. Usually all family members contribute to the same end. Dominant fathers are like kings in modern
democracies, figure heads of great symbolic importance, but with little or no instrumental power. Or maybe movie-stars is a better analogy; people who are admired, who receive a lot of attention, but who are not involved in the practicalities of everyday life.

**Non dominant and withdrawn fathers**
A few of the fathers in my sample did not dominate when interacting with their sons, but in two different ways. Jack and Henry because they assumed a withdrawn position, Harry and Peter because they had developed a seemingly egalitarian relationship with their sons. I will use Jack and Bob as an example of the withdrawn father position. As with all other descriptions I have presented his family earlier as well, but include more material this time.

**Jack, Pippa, Bob, Thor**
Both Jack and Pippa are in their early to mid forties. Bob is twelve and Thor is six. Jack is a professional, running his own, very successful company. His workspace is located in a separate building on the same property as the residence. Pippa is a health professional, working part time at the local hospital. Bob and Thor both attend local schools. Below are a few sketches from different visits:

**First sketch**
When I arrive Pippa, Bob and Thor are out on the deck, sorting and cleaning walnuts. Jack has not returned from work yet, and Pippa decides not to disturb him. Bob is full of energy and wants us all to play touch rugby with him. Pippa and I agree, and we form two teams; Tom and Pippa against Thor and I. Bob is in charge. He knows the rules, defines the court and orders us all around. We play for quite some time. Every time there is a dispute, about a rule or if someone was out of bounds, Bob is the authority. After half an hour or so Jack arrives. He had forgotten that I was coming to visit that day. Upon Jack’s arrival, Pippa pulls out of the game. She is exhausted. Jack takes her place, and we play for another fifteen minutes. By then I am exhausted too and need a brake. So we all stop, and stand around for a while, talking. I ask Jack how often he plays touch rugby with Bob, and it turns out this was the first time he ever has. We, the adults, talk for a little while longer, then I leave.

**Second sketch**
It is a rainy day and everyone is inside when I arrive. Bob, Thor and Jack are just about to start a game of Monopoly and they ask me if I will join. Pippa is not joining. She walks back and forth, preparing dinner etc.

Jack, Bob, Thor and I sit down around the lounge table. Bob immediately takes control of the bank, and Jack does not interfere with his decision. There is a bit of a discussion over how much money each person is supposed to be allocated, but it is sorted out with a careful, gentle input from Jack. We play a few rounds, buying up properties, passing ‘Go ‘a few times and slowly build up our portfolios. After a while only a few properties are left and the two most valuable ones have not been bought yet. Thor rolls the dice and cries out with excitement because they have landed him on one of the few remaining valuable properties. However, before any of us get to see what the dice showed, Thor has moved them. Thor is very excited about acquiring the valuable property, but Bob challenges his right to do so. Bob maintains that the dice did not show the number Thor needed to land on the valuable property and accuses Thor of cheating. Jack and I are both indecisive what to do. Thor starts getting upset. He really wants the property, and not only is he at risk of not getting it; he is also accused of being dishonest. Bob comes on very strong claiming that Thor should not have moved the dice and because he did he cannot prove his case. Bob demands that Thor roll them again. Thor is getting more upset by the minute. He does not want to roll again because he may not get the proper number, but the worst part is
his loss of dignity. He is adamant he did not cheat and that we have to trust his word. But Bob is very forceful, and gradually he sways both Jack and me. Bob is appealing to the rules of the game, and neither Jack nor I manage to take an overview of the situation and make a decision that could protect Thor’s dignity. Bob is very determined and argues very hard and aggressively. Jack and I are too passive and we end up supporting Bob. Thor gets furious, throws a handful of play money up in the air and runs to his room. Jack gets up to go after him, but Pippa stops him. A little while later she goes to his room.

Bob, Jack and I continue playing. Nothing important happens and we just keep playing the rounds. After fifteen minutes or so Thor returns, but by then we have redistributed his cards. I convince him to play with me, because I am leaving soon anyway and he can take over for me. That is OK with him.

Soon after there is a bit of a stir. At first I don’t understand what is happening. Jack has suddenly changed from being quite laidback to much more active. He has spotted Bob taking a $100 note of play money from the till that Bob is administrating. Jack takes the bill away from Bob and wants to take another $100 as well as punishment. Bob goes all red and flustered, tries to wriggle his way out, saying that it was only one note, it was only a joke etc. Father then takes the job of administering the bank away from Bob, and though Bob protests and dislikes it, the protest is not very forceful. It seems to me that Bob knows he has not got a strong case.

By then it is time for me to leave and I do not know what happens later.

Third sketch

Only Jack and Bob at home. It is late in autumn, and they decide to light up a fire, for the first time that season. The decision seems to be unanimous. At least, I do not discover the process whereby it is reached. Bob makes it very clear he wants to make and light up the fire. Jack does not trust his ability to do it and objects. He proceeds to tell Ben what to do, what wood to use, how to stack it etc, but Bob wants to do it differently. Jack does not insist, just steps aside and lets Bob do it his way. The fire does not catch. Again Jack tells Bob how to do it and yet again Bob wants to do it his own way. But this time father insists. At last they get it going, and afterwards we remain standing around the stove/oven in the kitchen.

Jack makes us hot drinks, but Bob is the most active talker. He defines the topic of conversation, and turns it into a quiz of word-games. Bob is in charge, asking us trick questions, trying to make us make logical mistakes. Jack and I both do not let him catch us out for a while. Bob continues, comes up with new quizzes when the previous one has been answered. In the end I pretend to be tricked and Bob really enjoys that. Ridicules and makes fun of me. Jack does not give Bob a chance to make fun of or ridicule him. Neither does he stop Bob from making fun of me, nor interfere to try and correct Bob’s behaviour in any way.

I get the impression that Jack is a rather reserved man. He is not at ease in social situations with strangers like me. In popular parlance he might be called an introvert, and it is not his style to actively define the situation, talk a lot and to dominate. He does not do that in relationship to Bob either. He will rather hold back and wait for others, including Bob, to make a move, and if what they do does not greatly bother him, he will leave it be. Jack is not an initiator, but more of a responder. As long as Bob or Thor behaves within certain rather widely defined limits, Jack does not interfere. When they overstep, e.g. when Bob took the $100 note from the Monopoly till, he reacts and draws the limit. Jack also interferes when
Bobs way of doing things does not work, e.g. lighting the stove. Usually, however, Jack does not decide the details of Bob’s behaviour. Neither does Jack take the initiative to guide and instruct Bob on Bob’s own terms. From my point of view it seems as if Jack is quite absorbed in his own world. He does not seem to engage very much with Bob or look at things from Bob’s perspective. Bob on the other hand is very active. He comes up with things to say or do all the time, and has a strong will. Bob gladly dominates situations, if given a chance. Pippa is also a great talker, however, and Thor is a beautiful young boy who has his own ways of gaining attention. Bob is no more of a dominant figure than his mother and brother. Jack is by far the most withdrawn member of the family. In interactions with his father Bob is given much room to define the situation, decide on the topic, the emotional tone of the conversation etc. Though Bob often dominates situations when interacting with his father I would not say that Bob dominates in the relationship. The large space that Bob fills is more a function of Jacks lack of activity than of Bob’s activity. When Jack finds it necessary to actively intervene, he does so without any problems.

Egalitarian fathers
In my sample I also found father-son relationships that carry many traits of equality. Before I enter into an analysis of the processes whereby different fathers end up in one position or the other I will describe one of these apparently egalitarian relationships as well.

Peter, Gwen, John and Dick
I have described the relationship between Peter and John in chapters three and four. To avoid too many repetitions I will not describe it again here, but refer back to those chapters. In the beginning the ways that Peter and John behaved towards each other puzzled me. None of them dominated family situations, father shied away from being an authority figure and both father and son seemed set on not engaging in the same kinds of activities as the other. At first I wondered if they were actively evading each other’s company, but that did not make sense either. As previously described they could be physically very close without it creating any obvious signs of discomfort. As mentioned in chapter three, I gradually came to the conclusion that their relationship can be described as a case of ‘close, parallel lives’.

When I interviewed them both Peter and John agreed that neither of them dominate or decide over the other persons life. From what I observed there is much evidence to support their views. To a large degree their relationship seems egalitarian. If in need of help neither of them assumes a superior position and demand assistance, they both politely ask for it. Both talk equally much during any particular conversation and both determine the topic and the tone. There are, obviously, structural inequalities and I will return to those later. In spite of these structural inequalities Peter and John have managed to create a relationship where neither of them dominates over the other and where Peter refrains from exercising most of the power he potentially could have exercised. In their daily interaction they have managed to create patterns of behaviour that appear to be close to an egalitarian distribution of power, in spite of the fact that structurally (legally), culturally and psychologically it is not. Having said this, the interesting question is how they have managed to overcome this dilemma? This is a complicated question to answer, and I do not believe the answer I will offer here is comprehensive. But I do believe it touches on something important.

One of the more important reasons why Peter and John can maintain an apparently egalitarian relationship is that they have, to a large extent, managed to develop what I will call parallel
lives. They both have developed ‘domains of interests’ that the other person respects, in the sense that the other does not interfere or invade this domain. Father enjoys rock climbing and mountain biking. Son is a surfer and a skater. They can joke about each other’s domains, demonstratively reject the other domain and then leave the other in peace with it. I saw the same pattern in the relationship between Harry and Julian. Harry can watch Julian play on the computer, but he never gets very involved, does not take over or try to keep Julian away from it. Julian, in contrast to his little brother Chris, does not interfere in Harry’s jewellery work even though there are a number of fascinating tools lying around, waiting to be played with. Even though I may push my point a bit too far here, I even believe the restraint on interfering in each others domain even influenced Peter’s reaction when John was apprehended by the police. John had pulled a mate on a skateboard after his car down the main road in town late at night and was caught by the police. Peter talked about it as if he demonstratively had refrained from punishing or sanctioning John. This reaction may, of course, have little to do with father and son having separate domains of interest. It may be a reflection on how these parents are trying to let John learn adult responsibilities. I still believe there is a connection to the parallel lives Peter and John have developed and strive to maintain. John was only sixteen when this incident occurred. If father had not been quite used to, and concerned with, acknowledging John’s spheres of interests, his personal boundaries and integrity, he would most probably have become quite upset. In a situation like this most fathers would have been tempted to interfere very strongly in their sons lives. In this case, however, father (and mother) left it to John to deal with it as an adult, i.e. receive his punishment from the police. This does not mean they did not feel uneasy about the incident. Their unease was easy to pick up. They were half serious and half light-hearted, joked about it to conceal a bit of embarrassment, a bit of worry. And then they closed the subject.

It is important to keep in mind that the apparent equality I have just described unfolds within a structural hierarchy and that formally a boy of sixteen is not considered an autonomous individual. The legal age in New Zealand varies, from being allowed to drive a car at the age of fifteen, vote at eighteen, buy alcohol at twenty (approximately one year after my fieldwork it was changed to eighteen), receive unemployment benefit at eighteen, and as a student one is considered economically dependent on ones parents till the age of twenty five. All together there is a gross imbalance in the means of power available for sons and fathers, regardless of whether they decide to use them or not. Not to mention the ownership of the home. An unmarried man, below the age of eighteen, does not have the right to own property and adolescent sons therefore cannot share the ownership of house and property with their parents. In legal terms, sons younger than that are always living under their parent's roof, so to speak.

Even though Peter and John have defined separate domains and they take great care not to interfere in each other’s domains at times the structural inequalities become visible. The episode where father and mother insisted that John do his homework is one example. I never saw John team up with anyone to insist on father do something in the same way that mother and father put pressure on him. It may be that it happens when I did not observe it, of course, but it is not very likely. John has no rights to make inquiries about Peter’s work, or to push him to work harder and better. Peter, on the other hand, does have such rights in relation to John, and he also exercises these rights by interfering in Johns school work. In this respect Peter behaves no differently than all the other fathers. It is important to notice how this interference proceeds, however, because the way Peter and John interact when dealing with
this subject matter, is quite different from interactions between dominant/withdrawn fathers and their sons. In chapter three and four I described how Peter tried to get John to do his homework. This was the only situation I observed where Peter played on his authority and tried to make John do anything. It is worth noticing that Peter was extremely careful and quickly pulled back. Jokingly he signalled that it was Gwen who actually had the means and the final responsibility to make John do as he was told. Through saying “Gwen, make your son do his graphics” Peter signalled that he does not want to exert any power over John. Peter thus pretends that he does not have the means to interfere in John’s domain. He also signals that Gwen does.

In another situation John was working on a project, but procrastinated. When I observed them Peter was trying to motivate John to put some more time and energy into it. From the way he talked it was obvious that Peter thought it was a fascinating and important topic. The harder Peter tried to inspire John, the more disinterested he became. Eventually father gave up and John took all the papers and put them away. I then asked John if he did not find the topic interesting. Curiously enough John answered that he did find it interesting. Simultaneously his demeanour, body language, tone of voice all signalled a reluctance to do the work. This prompted Peter to resume his attempts to persuade John into doing more work on it, but without any success. To me the clue to understanding how the interaction was unfolding came when Peter disclosed that it was he who had suggested the topic in the first place. Suddenly it was quite clear to me. The topic at hand was not the main issue. The main issue was that John was treating school work as his own domain of interest, and he was defending his right to decide within his own domain.

Creating separate domains and an appearance of equality allows father and son to maintain and/or explore their self-identity without accidentally violating each other’s personal space. Considering the fact that the relationship is structurally hierarchical, and that as caregivers, protectors and teachers fathers have a duty to be involved in the lives of their sons, it is not surprising that the strategy still creates a bit of tension and ambiguity in the relationship. I believe this can be seen in the kinds of jokes flowing between Peter and John. “Gwen, make your son do his graphics” was a joke. So was hitting John with the towel, John’s response by giving his father ‘the finger’, and a number of other little remarks and gestures between father and son. The jokes were good-hearted, to my ear neither malicious nor sarcastic, but at the same time not insignificant. In a classic anthropological study Radcliff-Brown discusses a particular style of interaction that he labelled ‘joking relationships’ [1952]. Radcliff-Brown had noticed that in a number of African societies certain relationships were characterized by a lot of joking or ‘licence’ to behave contrary to ordinary norms of behaviour, e.g. more sexually flirtatious, taking great liberty with the other persons belongings etc. According to Radcliff-Brown this kind of behaviour occurs in relationships that are structurally ambivalent or ambiguous, and the function of the jokes and licence is to relieve the tension caused by the ambivalence. Such structural ambivalence can e.g. exist in a patrilineal society in relationships between a boy and his mother’s brother. In such a society a boy might be expected to show deference towards an older man, but the boy also has the right to receive affection from his mother and those people closely associated with her. Thus the relationship between sister’s son and mother’s brother prescribes an ambiguous combination of both deference and intimate affection at the same time.

I never asked Peter and John if they experience any tension in their relationship and so I do
not really know if it is the case. Still, from my point of view, having observed their separate domains of activity, as well as the number of jokes and ‘licentious behaviour’ resembling ‘joking relationships, I believe it is reasonable to assume that such tension exist. It seems to me that Peter and John are continuously engaged in solving the dilemmas involved in building and maintaining a personal relationship that is egalitarian on top of a relationship that legally and materially is not.

Patterns of relational power
From my observations it seems clear to me that there are a limited number of patterns of how the relational power is distributed between fathers and adolescent sons among Pakeha New Zealanders. These patterns were very stable, and the interactions between fathers and sons unfolded in more or less the same way during all my visits. Only once did I see a change of pattern and that change was brought about by a change in the context rather than a change in processes internal to the relationship. I am referring to the changes in Harry’s behaviour when Gina went on holiday that I described in chapter six. The most common pattern, observed in eleven of thirteen relationships, was a hierarchical distribution of power between father and son. This is not a surprising observation considering the structural inequalities between parents and children. On the contrary one would expect it to always be the case. To my surprise it was not, in two of the relationships the father and the son had developed what seemed like equal relationships. I was intrigued, and puzzled by the existence of these two, fundamentally different patterns; obvious hierarchy in most relationships, apparent equality in a minority. A more precise picture would be to say that the patterns of relational power I observed spanned a continuum; from explicitly hierarchical to apparently egalitarian.

In egalitarian relationships the behaviour of father and son is symmetrical and fathers and sons behave in relatively similar ways. As mentioned above there are some obvious and structurally given difference in power in the sense that fathers have responsibilities that sons do not have, like having to repair or pay for the replacement of the washing machine when it brakes down. In the direct interactions between them, however, they could have traded places and the change would not have been radical. One way to describe these relationships would be to say that here is a foreground where the symmetrical equality is explicitly communicated against a background of implicit asymmetry. In hierarchical relationships on the other hand, fathers and sons behave distinctly different from each other and their behaviour is complimentary. In hierarchical relationships sons only seem to have three options to choose between: submission, opposition and withdrawal. Most sons have favourite strategies and in most situations a boy will choose the same strategy and will not change strategy until the favourite strategy does not work any more. At the same time most boys will change strategies if necessary and as a total picture most sons combine all three strategies, changing from one to the other.

Within hierarchical father son relationships the actual patterns of power can be seen as variations on four interactional themes: domination, subordination, opposition and avoidance. In nine of the eleven non-egalitarian relationships the fathers clearly have more power than their sons, and clearly dominate when interacting with their sons. The dominance takes several forms, but most commonly by fathers defining the situations (in a Goffmanian sense) so that they become the centre of attention. The father decides on the topics and the emotional tone of the conversation, the channel to watch on TV, who gets to talk and for how long etc. Some fathers, like James in the above example, dominate by talking a lot, and by
telling stories about situations and activities that focus upon him and put him in a favourable
light. Another father, Nigel, dominates by deciding which activities are to take place and how
to do them, e.g. what he and his son Terry are going to prepare for tea that evening. Nigel
decides on the recipe and then takes the role of instructing Terry. Other ways which fathers
dominate over their sons is by defining them as persons, e.g. by telling me what kind of a
person they are while they are listening, and not giving them a chance to disagree.

Opposition to a dominant father can be interpreted along a sliding scale, from being a sign of
light disagreement with a particular action or statement, to a sign that the son questions the
legitimacy of his father’s dominance. In most cases I believe that opposition is of the milder
version and that most sons basically accept that theirs father’s superiority is legitimate. I
would go as far as to claim that the majority of the sons I observed were quite satisfied with
having dominant fathers. A superior father is, among other things, a good target against
which a son can try out his own ways of being a powerful and forceful person. A fitting
analogy may be the relationship between referee and players at a football game. Though the
players may aggressively protest against individual decisions by the referee, and act as if they
do not accept his legitimacy to rule, it is the existence of the referee that fundamentally
makes the game possible. A dominant father may, through being dominant, create the
security a son needs to play the game of being an adult man. And as everybody knows, an
important part of any game is to know the rules, and to play with the rules themselves [Shore
1999]. Knowing how and when to break the rules, in order to construct his own particular
way of ‘playing’ at being a person and a man, is a fundamentally important part of growing
up. Play is, of course, also of fundamental importance in the process of developing cultural
competence [Bateson 1972, Shore 1996] and thus the knowledge and skills needed to be and
to be recognised as an adult person.

In chapters three and five I have described the recurrent competitions between Jonah and
Tom, and their relationship is a good example of the above. Tom’s opposition and
competitive behaviour is a kind of play. His father appears very solid, and his dominance
creates a safe space within which Tom can practice at developing his own debating skills, as
well as his own ideas, opinions and thus his own self-identity. On the other hand the
discussions between Tom and Jonah clearly show how domination can be a double edged
sword for the father in his attempts at maintaining a good image of himself, and thus a
positive self-identity. The father has no guarantee that he will always be on top and that the
son will never become better at it than him. On the contrary, the only likely scenario is that
one day the father will loose.

Tom’s opposition was built on an implicit acceptance of his father’s right to dominate. Other
sons were oppositional in a more rebellious way. Their behaviour might be interpreted as
simultaneous acceptance and repudiation of the legitimacy of their fathers dominance. Henk,
as I described him in chapter five and earlier in this chapter, is an example. He openly rebels
by breaking the accepted, adult codes of conduct, e.g. by making indecent noises and by
voicing a belief in ‘macho’ masculinity. On the one hand it is rather odd that Henk should
voice a preference for that kind of masculinity, and pretend to be ‘macho’, because he is
rather small and skinny. He does not at all have the outer appearance of a ‘tough guy’. In
addition it is clear that he is not copying or taking after his father. James definitely does not
express ‘macho’ opinions and values. The father is not a macho, is not a beer drinker, does
not see crying as a sign of weakness etc. Making indecent noises is a very clear sign that he
does not accept the rules. He wants a different set of rules, and he wants to choose them. In contrast to when Tom competes, Henk is not playing within the ground rules laid down by his father (and mother). A closer scrutiny reveals, however, that even though he challenges the rules he is still playing within a framework defined by his father. Implicit in most of what James says and does is a message about masculine virtues like ‘strength’, personal integrity, competence etc. By appearance and behaviour James is very much ‘a man’s man’, even to the point of having the courage to repudiate a number of macho characteristics. James is obviously so secure in his own manhood that he can afford to voice a preference for a lot of ‘soft’ values. Henk’s demonstrative machismo thus makes sense as a form of repudiation of his father’s softness. This is the same kind of opposition as when he makes indecent sounds; i.e. he rejects the rules. On the other hand he accepts the fundamental premises upon which James’ dominance rests, i.e. the masculine virtues James demonstrates. Henk is thus trying to reject his father’s premises and outdo him on his own terms at the same time.

At times, and for some sons, a strong and dominant father can be quite beneficial in a boy’s struggle to become an adult man. There is, however, also evidence to suggest that at times dominant fathers may overwhelm and disempower their sons. There seems to be a fine line between these two effects of dominance. From my observations it seems that opposition, submission and withdrawal may also be understood as different strategies for counteracting or coping with the disempowering effect of a father’s dominance. Opposition is quite obviously an attempt to counteract being overwhelmed, to regain composure and a sense of agency. For this purpose it is, however, neither an effective nor a sustainable strategy. As long as the son is an adolescent the father is bound to win in the end. The son might find opposition ‘fun’ for a while, a way to play-act and practice certain behaviours within the boundaries of the father’s premises. However, he is never allowed to really win and to exit the situation without some connotation of loss attaching to him or his behaviour. In a similar vein acts of rebellion may also serve a son well in the short term, giving him a sense of being on top. Rebellions tend to backfire, however, frequently turning the rebel into a slightly ridiculous person. In addition a rebel may gain attention but the value of the attention is almost always negative. As an example, in an overall perspective Henk’s rebellious strategies do not serve him all too well in his attempts at countering his fathers dominance. Having rebelled for a while Henk always ends up leaving the situation, going to another room.

Leaving the situation is the most frequently used strategy sons use for countering the overwhelming and disempowering effect of being dominated by their fathers. All the sons with dominant fathers withdraw on a regular basis. Sometimes they go outside to play rugby etc, but usually they go to another room and engage in a computer game. In some of the observed families the sons spend several hours every day playing on the computer and it is not unusual for sons to break off interactions with their fathers and go directly to their computer games. This fact that the computer often is employed as a substitute for interacting with their fathers, coupled with the frequency of game playing, makes it tempting to frame the computer and its games as an extra member of the family. On the one hand computer games serve as refuges for overwhelmed and disempowered sons and on the other hand it is also a means whereby the sons can actively counteract the effects of being dominated. In interactions with computer-games sons are able to build a sense of self as both competent and powerful individuals. The game may beat them from time to time, but the sons are always in a position to start over and eventually beat the game. Considering that sons are engaged in an identity project of constructing their self-identities, it makes perfect sense that when
interactions with their fathers becomes ‘too much’ they take refuge in interactions with an ‘actor’ over which they have ultimate power, and whom they can gradually build up their competence in competition with.

There are sons who do not oppose nor withdraw from dominant fathers, but who are happy in their subordinate position. Boys like Stan and Matt obviously admire their fathers and seek their approval. By being interested in the same kinds of activities as their fathers, and by being obedient, they can receive more praise and recognition than by being in opposition. But hidden within the subordinate position there is also a degree of withdrawal. The subordinate position is quiet and does not stand out and draw attention to itself. When Stan and Matt quietly pay attention to their fathers, follow his moves and wait for recognition in order to enter the conversation, they obviously defer to their fathers. On the other hand, when Matt is lying on the coach watching TV it is difficult to tell if he is at all participating in the situation or not paying attention. Subordinate sons frequently withdraw from the relationship, not by removing themselves physically, but by shutting down their attention.

The fact that submission is a quiet position is important for understanding a phenomenon often reported about adolescent boys. Parents, teachers, youth workers, girlfriends and other people who frequently interact with adolescent boys often claim that these boys do not have a language. When talked to, or asked questions, they often answer with mono syllables or dismissively short phrases: “Dunno, yeah, nope, sure, sweet, cool” or just “So?” and “I guess so. I don’t care.” I experienced this as well during my fieldwork. Some boys, but not all, just did not talk, and did not elaborate on any of the topics that came up. When large groups or entire categories of people seem to lack an appropriate language for expressing what the world looks and feels like to them, there is reason to suspect that it might be a case of what Edwin Ardener calls ‘a muted group’ [Ardener 1977]. Ardener had noticed that in most ethnographies about male dominated societies it is quite difficult to find descriptions of how the women live. Having investigated why this happens he came to the conclusion that the women did not have the power to define the language through which life is described. Thus, when asked about their lives, they did not have command of the words needed to describe it. I believe this is the case with a lot of adolescent boys as well. In my sample there are both kinds of sons, those who do have a language and who use it with confidence, and other boys who do not. In light of the above concept about muted groups it is interesting to notice that the parallel sons, as well as those who were openly in opposition to their dominant fathers used a far more elaborate language than sons who were openly submissive. All the muted boys had dominant fathers.

In most hierarchical relationships the fathers dominate, but in two out of thirteen relationships the fathers usually interact with their sons in ways that I would call hierarchical, but without dominating the interactions. The interactions cannot be called egalitarian, however, because the fathers obviously have more power than their sons and regularly use it to make and enforce decisions over their sons. The sons also clearly accept these decisions. Jack, in the above descriptions, is an example of this kind of father. The salient feature in the pattern of relational power in these relationships is not only the absence of domination, but also the relatively high degree of absence of imposition, and therefore absence of involvement, by the father. They seem distinctly less involved in their sons’ lives than all the other fathers. The pattern of relational power in these relationships is on the one hand non-egalitarian, and at the same time characterized by a relatively high degree of detachment.
Detachment and involvement are both highly problematic concepts. When used to describe relationships they mutually define each other in at least two different ways. On the one hand they are seen as two poles on a continuum. As such there is an element of mutual exclusion; any increase in either implies a decrease in the other. At the same time it is impossible to imagine any of them in their pure form. Pure detachment would mean that there is no relationship, and as such nothing that could be described as ‘detached’. Pure involvement would mean that the two relating parts would become one, and then there would be no relationship either. In this sense all relationships can be conceptualized as some combination or another of detachment and involvement. My lengthy discussions in chapter two make it clear that this dichotomy is a paradox inherent in all human relationships. One of the more awkward problems when dealing with this paradox is that these concepts are heavily laden with moral value. In most everyday contexts, and particularly considering the hegemony of the involved father model, involvement is regarded as morally good, and detachment as equally bad. Because of these moral connotations I am slightly nervous about employing these terms, but I see no other concepts that I can use to express what I have observed. Thus; I attach no value to these concepts and I do not pass judgement on whether involvement or detachment, or what degree of either, is good or bad.

Analytically ‘detachment’ can be divided into physical, cognitive and emotional aspects. These aspects might go together, but then again not necessarily. A father might be physically absent, and as such physically detached, for a while and still be emotionally and cognitively involved. On the other hand a father who is physically present might still be cognitively and/or emotionally detached. By cognitively and emotionally detached I basically mean that a person does not pay a lot of attention to the person he/she interacts with, thus not understanding the other persons situation, nor having much empathy with how he/she feels in the situation.

Fathers and sons use rather similar means for achieving greater distance in the relationship between them. Avoiding interaction, either by not entering into, or pulling out of interactional situations is the stronger form of withdrawal that I observed. Fathers who work a lot, or sons who stay in their rooms listening to music and playing computer games, are the typical examples. But there are other, more subtle means available as well. By directing their attention and recognition away from the other person, or by decreasing their overall involvement in the interaction, both fathers and sons manage to withdraw during the interaction, but without terminating it.

As I have already pointed out dominance may be understood as a form of imposition, and as such a means of achieving greater involvement. The relationship between dominance and involvement can, however, be rather paradoxical. Particularly if the dominance is in the form of making ones own person the centre of attention, and thus imposing a particular image of oneself on the other person. When fathers dominate by talking extensively about their own interests and achievements, or about non-personal topics like sport and politics, by implication they do not pay a lot of attention to their sons. If the son accepts father’s dominance the consequence may be that the son becomes involved in the life of his father, without the father necessarily becoming involved in the life of his son. On the other hand in those instances when a son rejects his father’s dominance that dominance may also increase the degree of detachment.
A final point concerning non-egalitarian relationships is that adolescent sons rarely try to impose themselves on their fathers in order to increase the father’s involvement in their own lives. I only observed two sons who imposed themselves on their fathers with the intent to engage the father’s attention. Neither of these attempts worked all too well and the boys did not manage to engage their fathers in a way that satisfied the sons. It is also worth noticing that both of the sons who tried to impose themselves on their fathers were the younger brothers in the family. I believe that position was significant, because it seems that the more adult the boys get, the less likely they are to try and impose themselves on their fathers. All in all it seems that sons do not have the power to successfully force themselves on their fathers, and to most adolescent sons it is not an option to beg for attention and involvement.

The pattern of relational power was apparently egalitarian in two out of the thirteen relationships I observed. I deliberately use the phrase ‘apparently egalitarian’ because even though the relationships are structurally hierarchical interactions both fathers and sons took great and equal care to avoid over-stepping each others boundaries and violating each others sense of autonomy. Peter and Jack in the above descriptions, have one of these two egalitarian relationships, Harry and Julian the other. From my perspective as an observer it looked as if nobody in these two families dominated over anybody else. In Harry and Julian’s family even the younger brother Chris, only six years old, is instructed not to barge in when others are talking, to wait for his turn and then given the word like anyone else. In both these families nobody took any more space than anybody else and nobody defined the topics more than others. From what I observed and learned through the interviews the parents did not make decisions that implicated their sons without involving them in the decision making process. Though the parents, from a structural point of view, had the right to make decisions concerning their sons they tried to avoid doing it. It is also worth noticing that to the extent that Jack’s parents did make decisions concerning him it was mainly the mother and not the father.

Peter and Jack took particular care to not invade each other’s personal space. One way to achieve this, and thus create an egalitarian relationship, was by defining separate domains of activity. Peter was a mountain-biker and rock climber, Jack a skateboarder and surfer. Though these activities may be seen as mere hobbies, I believe they are symptomatic, and can be seen as symbols of a fundamental separation of personal domains. I call this distribution of power parallel lives. It is important to keep in mind that a pattern of parallel lives does not imply that father and son have withdrawn from each other. There is a taken for granted ease in the relationship that I interpret as a fundamental knowledge of each other, and a fundamental acceptance of being part of each others lives. Particularly the way that they can be intimate with each other demonstrates this high degree of involvement.

Standing my ground
My observations indicate that the distribution of power can take many different forms in different father-son relationships. This means that when trying to understand the meaning of a particular relationship one cannot assume that there will be a particular pattern of power. It is always necessary to investigate the particular pattern obtaining in each relationship. This variety also raises the important question of how different patterns emerge. The point I will argue here is that processes both inside and outside the relationship influences how these patterns emerge. I base this hypothesis on the observation that apparently egalitarian
relationships only obtain when the fathers are or have been primary caregivers for their sons for considerable length of time. Having considerable experience as primary caregiver seems to greatly facilitate the emergence of egalitarian relationships and ‘close, parallel lives’, but it is not a sufficient criterion for the emergence of this kind of relationship. I observed two other fathers who had similar experience as primary caregivers for longer periods of time, but in general still dominated interactions with their sons. These two dominant, primary caregiving fathers had something in common though; they had strong self-identity projects going in relation to ‘public society’.

In the remaining part of this chapter I will argue that some of the most important factors influencing the process whereby these patterns of power emerge is how fathers and sons negotiate their identity projects. It is my belief that when fathers invest most of their self-identity in projects and relationships in public this is very likely to inhibit their ability to form magical unions with their sons. If they are too preoccupied with the logic of public relationships they may not acquire the logic of care, based on the law participation necessary to form such magical unions. A father’s preoccupation with a public self-identity project may in itself seriously contribute to his dominance and or withdrawal in relationship to his son. This pattern is likely to be further enhanced if the father is disqualified as a consequence of his relationship with his wife.

Before I proceed with my argument I would like to say something about how I came upon the idea that there may be a link between patterns of power and self-identity projects. The important clue came from by observations of Jonah and Tom, as described in chapters three and five. It was very common for Jonah and Tom to engage in competitions with each other. When I interviewed Jonah I asked him why this happened. Initially my question puzzled him and he did not understand what I referred to. He asked me if I meant that he competes with both his sons. I said it was only Tom. That seemed to make more sense to him, but he did not see it as a competition. “I am struggling just to stand my ground”, he said. I was intrigued by his answer. As an observer it did not look as if Jonah had anything to fear, and he definitely did not look like he was struggling. On the contrary it seemed to me as if he always was on top of the situation and that he won more or less every time. It is therefore significant that from Jonah’s perspective it was experienced as a struggle to maintain his position.

When I asked Tom about the competition he said it was just for fun. Only once had he experienced Jonah getting angry, he said. It was when Tom had been particularly stubborn about an argument that did not really hold water. Tom did not see the competition as a problem, and did not experience any animosity between himself and his father. When I asked him about why he so easily got irritated with Jesse Tom saw no link between his relationship with his father and with his brother. Tom attributed his own irritation over Jesse to Jesse’s immaturity.

Jonah’s reply combined with the difference in how father and son understood the competition was quite an eye-opener. I am not a father myself, but I am a son and my perspective on the interactions I observed were heavily influenced by my own experiences as a son. Prior to this situation it had not occurred to me that fathers might feel uneasy in situations that they dominate. It had not occurred to me that they might feel somewhat out of control. More importantly, Jonah’s answer brought to my attention that it is possible to understand relationships between fathers and sons as if something is at stake, and that what is at stake for
fathers is most probably qualitatively different from that which is at stake for sons.

Jonah was struggling to stand his ground. At a superficial level his statement can be interpreted to mean that he felt Tom was constantly picking a fight, provoking a competition, and that Jonah had to work hard to avoid losing. From my position as an observer it did not look as if Tom initiated the competitions more often than his father did. It may of course still be that at times Jonah was challenged when he would rather not be. On the other hand, most often he looked as if he enjoyed the competitions. I do not think that Jonah’s problem was the frequency of competitions, nor who initiated them, but the prospect of losing. I believe that to many fathers the concept of losing to, or in front of, his son, carries a significance that far exceeds merely a lost debate about, say, the size of the engine in a particular model Ferrari. Something about the strong passions involved suggest there is more at stake than the topic being discussed.

I believe that the kind of power struggles between fathers and sons that Jonah and Tom is an example of, may be understood as forms of deep play, somewhat similar to a Balinese cockfight [Geertz 1973], in the sense that the struggle embody meaning far beyond what the ‘game’ apparently is about. Whatever it is that fathers feel or believe they stand to loose is something very precious that they cannot really afford to loose. It is, however, not altogether easy to say what that ‘something’ is. I do not have any interview data, or explicit statements about what it is fathers stand to loose, and are afraid to loose, in competitions with their sons. What I have is Jonah’s comment “I am struggling to just stand my ground” and my observations of how adamant fathers keep on dominating situations when interacting with their sons.

I am convinced that this statement is indicative of a common theme and predicament existing to a greater or lesser extent in all relationships between fathers and adolescent sons. It is a predicament of all dyadic interpersonal relationships, a predicament relating to the continuous creation and recreation, confirmation and re-confirmation of self-identities and personal boundaries. It is a predicament related to the double, contradictory nature of all social relationships, and particularly interpersonal dyads, that I referred to in chapter two. As mentioned, various theoreticians have tried to grasp it in different ways. Strathern [1995] frames it as a question of parts and wholes, Simmel [1910-11] sees it as a question of insides and outsides, degrees vs. the ideal of unity. To Merlau-Ponty [Crossley 1996] it is a matter of consciousness, and whether a person relates to another in the form of conscious and deliberate reflection, or in the form of ‘enjoinment’ and direct ‘communion with otherness’. My point is that this duality is a constant challenge in all human relationships. Implicit in this contradiction is the constant potential for breakdown, i.e. that the relationship will dissolve into non-connected parts, or collapse inward into a non-distinguishable compact unit.

Jonah’s statement indicates two things; on the one hand that he already has a position, on the other hand a fear of losing it. As an adult in his mid forties he has already spent a lot of time and energy on building a self-identity. Though a self-identity must be constantly recreated to fit with changing circumstances, an adult man like Jonah also has a lot of personal history providing much of the framework and direction for the recreation/maintenance of a sense of self. When Jonah said he was only trying to stand his ground I believe it is reasonable to assume that he does not primarily mean his position as a father. Father is, after all and as already mentioned, a cluster model [Lakoff 1987] and as such the position as father can never
be totally lost. In order to get an idea what Jonah means by this statement it is necessary to ask what the father of an adolescent son stands to lose? The most obvious answer is that he stands to lose his superiority. Still, that does not seem to quite grasp it. Why would the loss of superiority be so dreadful? Most men do, after all, have ample experience of being something less than superior within the large male hierarchy we call society. I believe the loss of superiority is so threatening because it is not superiority as such which is at stake, but what it stands for; i.e. dignity and self-worth. I firmly believe that in all relationships between fathers and adolescent sons the fathers are concerned with maintaining their sense of autonomy, agency and competence. Power and dignity are, after all, the more important elements in Pakeha masculine self-identity.

**Power and self-identity**

Whereas some fathers, like Jonah, experience their sons as forceful and challenging, other fathers, like Peter and Harry, do not. The sons of these latter fathers went about their identity projects in ways that did not threaten the self-identity of the fathers. This difference is most informative because it raises the question why some men engage in power struggles and competitions as part of their efforts to maintain their self-identity, and why some men do not. In order to understand how this difference emerges we first need to understand the interconnections between power and self-identity, and secondly we need to investigate how men in general tend to build their self-identities.

As social scientist we are used to dealing with power in the abstract. Power is, however, also an enormously important aspect of the experience of being in the world. The experience of having the power to act in the world is very pleasant and being disempowered is usually a negatively valued experience. In addition the experience of power has serious existential consequences that seriously impact on a person’s sense of identity and dignity. Theoreticians of modernity, like Bauman, [1997, 1998], Beck [1994] and Giddens [1990, 1991] indicate that in a late modern society like Pakeha New Zealand the question of individual power has become more precarious and has taken on a greater sense of urgency than in earlier times and in other kinds of society. As a consequence of disembedding mechanisms, globalization and the increasing production of new forms of risk in late modern societies, a sense of a secure and stabile autonomy is essential for a person’s self-identity and dignity. It is the autonomous and individual ‘I’, who is identified a particular kind of ‘I’, who is the “self”. It is this independent ‘I’ who is, and carries, the personal identity. Likewise, it is the ability of the individual person to independently choose and to act in accordance with cultural values that determines and reflects the person’s dignity. Thus, without a sense of power and a relatively large degree of actual efficacy, a person cannot engage in a reflexive self-identity project, and will not be able to develop and maintain a self-identity as a valuable person.

According to Giddens, self-identity can be understood as a person’s reflexively constructed self-biography. Via a reflexive process of remembering, selecting, interpreting, re-interpreting and creating experiences these very experiences are used as a pool of resources for building a self-biography. Implicit in this process of constructing, maintaining or revising one’s autobiography are two very different, albeit closely linked, conceptual tasks. On the one hand the construction of an autobiography necessitates dealing with a set of ontological questions concerning the construction and maintenance of a *sense* of existence. It is a question with a double focus, on both existence as such and on the person who experiences being. It is thus a matter of such questions as ‘what is *my existence*?’; ‘how do I exist’ and
‘what is this ‘I’ that has an existence?’ The second question is about the social and cultural
dimensions of identity; i.e. the construction/maintenance of a particular kind of identity; ‘who
am I, what kind of person am I, with whom do I belong?’ An answer to the former question,
‘What am I?’ is a fundamental prerequisite for dealing with the latter. As such it is by far the
most important question. However, it is also a question that cannot be tackled directly. It is
only through the processes whereby a human being becomes a particular kind of person,
belonging to a certain social category, that his or her sense of existence is made manifest. It
is, in other word, only through being someone in particular that it is possible to experience
‘being’.

The acquisition of a social and cultural identity usually involves two different processes;
conformity and individuation. On the one hand people take on traits that characterise specific
categories of people in order to become a member of that category. This is a copying process
whereby already existing identity markers are adopted. On the other hand identity evolves or
comes into being via creative and reflexive interactional process whereby new identity
markers are created. Implicit in both of these processes is an element of power. Processes of
conformity are obviously phenomena of power, both in the sense that the existing members
have the poser to define what the newcomer has to adapt to, and in the sense that they have
the power to reject the novice. Exercising such power can have serious consequences, for
example a novice is rejected with no other category to turn to. Depending upon how
important it was to belong to that category such an experience could seriously undermine a
person’s self-esteem, and contribute to the erosion of his or her existential sense of being.
The creation of a ‘unique’ individual identity is an equally precarious process on the one
hand because it always against a background of conformity. This project always balances on
a knife’s edge; between going too far and not far enough. In the fist instance the person may
sever the links to the category he or she belongs to, not far enough and there is no sense of
uniqueness. On the other hand this project requires creative talents and skills, and without
that attempts at being unique can easily flop. As Giddens [1991] points out, a failed identity
project and the devastating sense of disempowerment it may produce can seriously erode a
persons ontological awareness and security.

Power fades quickly, and in order to for a person to retain a feeling of power it must be
repeatedly demonstrated and performed. It is, as an example, not sufficient to have walked
once in order to keep on feeling in control over ones body. To keep the experience of power
alive therefore requires facing and successfully overcoming new challenges when the old
challenges have become routine. When a father engages in competition with his son he enters
into an activity that carries a potential for great benefits as well as huge risks. Early in the
life-cycle of the relationship, when the son is not very good at the game, neither the feeling of
power, nor the chance of losing is overwhelming. Gradually, as the son grows and becomes
ever more competent at the game both the benefits and the risks increase. One benefit is that
the son continuously presents his father with new challenges and as a result the father
continuously experiences being a powerful person. On the other hand, as the son’s
competence grows the challenges become increasingly difficult to handle and the threat of
losing increasingly larger.

When fathers and sons develop competitive relationships it seems inevitable that in the end
the sons will eventually win and the fathers loose. Why then do fathers enter into such
competition in the first place? I do not pretend to offer anywhere near a full answer to this
question, but I believe there are a number of good reasons why it happens. First of all, the relationship starts off with a huge imbalance in power, and it is reasonable to assume that part of the pleasure of being a father (and mother) derives from having so much power over their child. Having all this power is, of course, also a necessary prerequisite of parenthood. If the parent does not have and use this power the child will either die or, in Pakeha society, be taken away by the authorities. As the child, which I my material means the son, grows older to become a more competent actor in the world, the gap in power between him and his father necessarily narrows. There are gradually fewer things his father can decide for him, instruct him about, teach him etc. The potential consequences are that the father may experience a decrease in the pleasure of being a father, as well as increased anxiety over losing the control he used to have. Fathers may therefore be reluctant to give away power when the sons are trying to gain power. In addition the maturation process boys go through is never clear cut and even. At times boys are quite competent but insecure and thus do not assume the power that goes with the competence. Other times they have a false sense of being more competent than they are. In relation to this uneven development fathers ideally should give up power when they see that their sons are competent, and retain it when the sons are not. Even though the room for faulty judgements is large proper judgement of how competent a son is in ay given situation is very difficult and require in depth knowledge of the son as a person. When fathers have not spent a lot of time and effort getting to know their sons they frequently also lack the necessary knowledge to be good judges. I will return to this point later on in this chapter. Another important factor is that when it comes to power most people, including fathers, do not act in an ideal fashion. In a certain perspective, and in accordance with the formal logic men usually employ in order to form and understand relationships, power is a sum-zero game; one actor can only gain power at the other actor’s expense. In this perspective giving away power and control is at best an uncomfortable experience, at worst deeply problematic.

In light of the theory of interpersonal dyads I presented in chapter two the management of personal boundaries is a matter of different kinds of concerns for a father and for his son. For a number of reasons these differences can easily result in a competition for power between them and when they do the different concerns of fathers and sons are relatively easy to see; fathers struggling to maintain their position and sons trying to gain a new and better one. These positions are, on the one hand, a question of power; sons are engaged in a struggle to become more powerful whereas fathers are struggling to maintain their power. However, it is not only about power. It is also about the existential consequences of relational power, i.e. self-identity. In western societies, and I believe this is also the case among Pakeha New Zealanders, most people forge their self-identities during adolescence and early adulthood. Throughout the rest of their lives this identity does not undergo fundamental change and the self-identity project consists in refining and maintaining the basis image. During interactions with others, including their sons, Pakeha fathers are engaged in continuously maintaining the best parts of their self-identities. Sons, on the other hand, have not yet forged the bulk of their adult self-identity, and are their task is to create one. This power struggle between fathers and sons is so common that it is easy to assume that it is unavoidable. It is therefore important to keep in mind that father-son relationships are not predestined to become competitive. Parallel father and sons take great care to avoid both competition and overstepping each other’s personal boundaries in ways that the other might experience as a form of violation.
Risk and trust
Power and identity are intimately linked and in order to understand how that link contributes to generating different kinds of father-on relationships, we need to explore how Pakeha men in general tend to build their self-identity. If self-identity emerges as part of the way people relate to each other we need to investigate what kinds of relationships men engage in and within what kinds of contexts they do so. The first two questions to ask are what kinds of relationships these two different ways of building self-identity emerge as part of, and in what kinds of situations do these relationships usually take place? A third, and perhaps the most important, question is what are the relational logics that guide these relationships within these situations?

In chapters two and four I argued that the meaning of interpersonal relationships can be generated by different kinds of logic; an Aristotelian objectivist logic guided by formal rules and another kind of logic guided by the law of participation. In general Pakeha men, like most men throughout western societies, tend to employ the former both when creating and when they try to understand their connections to their environment and other people. In order to understand why men in general tend to favour an Aristotelian logic I believe it is necessary to investigate the kinds of situations men usually take part in when interacting with others. The point I want to argue here is that some kinds of situations facilitate the latter kind of logic and connections leading to ‘magical unions’ whereas other kinds of situations facilitate the constitution of distinctly separate and autonomous persons in accordance with laws of formal logic. The different kinds of situations I have in mind are usually referred as private and public. I have decided to continue to use these terms, but because they have a history of use in anthropology they need to be clarified. As I use these terms they do not refer to ‘spheres’ of activity in the sense the terms were used for example by Rosaldo [1974]. Neither do they refer to different kinds of social spaces such as inside the home or outside in the street [see e.g. Dubish 1986].

In my opinion the salient quality and important difference between these terms is a matters of insecurity and risk\textsuperscript{16}, i.e. degrees of potential harm and degrees of trust that the situations afford. By public I mean the sorts of situations where the participants either do not know each other very well, or know that they have to guard against exploitation. Differences in degree of risk and trust necessitate radically different strategies for negotiating situations. When the degree of insecurity is high, and the potential for harm is difficult to estimate, it is sensible to proceed with caution and to interact on the basis of one-dimensional and clear-cut rules. In order to maximise security it is necessary to establish and guard ones boundaries, and gradually gain knowledge about the other from which to judge how trustworthy he or she is. The boundaries in question are those that surround whatever entity the person represents; individual personal boundaries, those of the family, the lineage, the village, the nation or human kind. In public relations, or what I prefer to call ‘risk relations’, it is necessary to proceed as if the entity is a complete and impenetrable whole, autonomous and inviolable. When a main concern is to secure the safety of the entity to which one belongs it is strategically wise to treat other entities as completely and entirely separate from oneself. Thus the other can be treated as an ‘object’ because this facilitates, if necessary, both defending oneself against ‘it’ and exploit ‘it’.

Suspicion is a necessity in public life, but social life is also a question of trust. Without some degree of trust that can act as a negative feedback to counteract suspicion all interpersonal
relationships are doomed to disintegrate by way of schizmogenetic process [Bateson 1979]. Without trust social life is destined to break down into the cycle of violence called war or feud. Trust is, however, a deeply problematic issue in all human relationships. The Norwegian anthropologists Tian Sørhaug, borrowing from Marcel Mauss, claims that

“Trust expresses a deep social paradox while simultaneously representing a ‘miraculous’ solution to the same paradox. Trust is to have faith in the gift not yet given, and (faith) that a gift will be given without a demand for reciprocation (Mauss, 1924/1966). These are courageous and risky acts because they are executed without any guarantees or conditions. Firstly, it is a matter of counting on events that have not yet taken place. Secondly, one must have confidence in the will of others, i.e. in matters which one can never have direct knowledge of. Trust is thus, fundamentally, its own precondition. One must already have trust (in the other) in order to receive it, and if one does not already possess it, logically one ought not to be able to get any back. Relations of trust are always paradoxical. They are conditioned upon themselves because they consist in mutual expectations to things that have not yet been realized and which thus only exist as expectations. To solicit trust is thus always precarious because it opens up for the possibility that there is no trust and therefore it cannot be given.” [Sørhaug 1996: 22-23, my translation]

As this quote indicates, in a fundamental sense trust always belongs to the future and as such trust never exists as anything but a hope. Trust is an more or less unfounded expectation that the other will act in ways that are benign to oneself. This expectation can be confirmed or falsified, but after the fact it is no longer trust, it is an experience. In itself, however, trust only exists as an expectation and by implication this means that trust is purely a form of fantasy. As I see it trust is a consequence of a transcendental cognitive processes whereby the trusting person establishes temporal connections not only between the present and the future, but also between self and other. Another word for this kind of connection-making is metonymic reasoning. As I argued in chapter two metonymic reasoning is a way of making connections between seemingly separate entities in such a way that they cease to be separate, and become members of the same larger entity or category. Trust is another word for the hope and the expectation that the other will behave, not as another, but as oneself.

When analysing dyads as processes of boundary management trust can be understood as a particular kind of movement; i.e. the opening up of one’s boundaries and an invitation for the other to join. In this light relationships can be seen as processes of trust; i.e. the establishment, maintenance, growth or breakdown of trust. Obviously trust develops from radically different points of departure whether it is a relationship between a small child and its caregiver, or between autonomous, and equal adults. Adults have to gradually build trust from a point of departure of suspicion. The infant child, on the other hand, has no option but to trust its caregiver. It cannot survive on its own, and cannot develop such traits of humanity as language and culture without trusting other human beings. The infant must take for granted that the caregiver will treat it as well or better than the caregiver treats him or her self. This is not only important as far as physical survival is concerned, but also existentially. An infant lacks the large reservoir of cognitive models necessary to discriminate between malevolent and benign aspects of the environment and the risk of existential anxiety is immanent. For a child’s sense of ontological security [Giddens 1992, Winnicot 1965] it is therefore of utmost importance that the caregiver learns to intuitively understand the signals the child gives off,
understand them as well as the caregiver understand the signals emanating from his/her own body. To a child it is, in other words, existentially important that the meaning of the relationship between itself and caregiver is based on metonymic reasoning.

Drawing on observations of infants such as those presented by Stern [1985] and Trevarten [2002] it is reasonable to conclude that humans are born with the capacity to experience themselves as separate individuals, as well as a capacity for magical thinking. In this perspective we can assume that an infant is able experience itself both as a separate individual and an integral part of its caregiver at the same time. If a new born child should happen to be an Aristotelian, and truly believe in the law of non-contradiction, it would be doomed to see itself as nothing but a separate individual, utterly alone, with no reason to hope and expect that anyone would care for it so that it might survive. Fortunately children are not born as logical robots, and through experiences of nearness and sameness they sustain the trust with which they are born and thus develop a fundamental sense of ontological security [Giddens 1992, Erikson 1950, Winnicot 1965].

In a common sense western perspective, however, the child and the caregiver are obviously not the same entity. This perspective is fundamentally based on the kind of metaphoric reasoning from which Aristotle developed his rules of logic and which constitutes child and caregiver as perfectly separate individuals. This common sense perspective establishes an inherent dualism between child and caregiver, and one of the uncomfortable consequences of this dualism is that it defines the child as a potential threat to the wellbeing and survival of the caregiver. During pregnancy and breast-feeding a child literally feeds on its mother. As long as a child is cared for it consumes the energy, time and wealth that the caregiver could otherwise have consumed him or herself. If a caregiver were to think about and understand the world only in accordance with an Aristotelian logic, and thus only saw the child as a separate entity, there would be very little reason for the caregiver not to see the child as a competitor and a threat. The quality of the care, and thus the child’s development, therefore depends upon the caregiver’s ability to think and understand the relationship in non-Aristotelian terms. Or, in other words, it depends on the caregiver’s ability to develop the kind of meaning that grows out of metonymic connection making. The caregiver too must think about him or herself and the child as both separate individuals and a magical union at the same time. Or as I wrote in chapter two, proper caregiving necessitates the ability to reason in ways whereby the law of contradiction both applies and does not apply at the same time.

In a ‘risky’ public setting, when two adults meet for the first time, having no prior knowledge of each other, the process of trust begins from a very different point than in a parent-child relationship. It would not be wise to enter into a public a relationship with the same trusting attitude as that with which a child enters into the world. In risk relationships it is necessary to negotiate between trust and suspicion, and establish a sustainable balance between the two. This balancing act is, of course, in itself uncertain and fundamentally risky because any act of trust may be exploited, and any act of caution may destroy the trust of the other. At any stage in the development of a public relationship it is therefore, on the one hand, sensible to hide vulnerable aspects of oneself (i.e. anything that the other may exploit or use as a means of power for gaining control over oneself) until one has ample experience that the other will not try to exploit that ‘weakness’. It is therefore strategically wise to begin such relationships as a connection where personal boundaries are clearly drawn and maintained and where no one
becomes dependent upon the other. Metaphoric connections are better suited for this purpose than metonymic relationships. As I wrote in chapter two metaphors establish *as if* connections base on bodily experiences of or imagined notions about similarity. Metaphors therefore contain a greater degree of pretence than metonymic relations and as such facilitate the establishment of indirect connections between persons, via external signs. By way of metaphoric reasoning almost any sign can be seen as standing for any other, and as such be imagined to be similar to what it stands for. By implication metaphors can create connections of similarity between one entity and another via a third entity. A shared interest in sport is a very common way for men to achieve an ‘indirect’ connection via an external and ‘third’ object.

**Sport**

New Zealanders are excessively interested in sport. That, at least, is the impression one receives from mass media, and by listening to the opinions of a lot of Kiwis. Rugby in particular, but other sports like yachting, cricket, golf, iron man competitions and you name it receive due attention. ‘An interest in sport’ may of course mean being a spectator, but may also mean being a participant. In New Zealand both aspects of ‘an interest in sport’ are important, but for different reasons.

As a spectator activity sport is found all over the place. Sport events are widely covered by Newspapers and TV, and adverts of all kinds (but particularly for beer) constantly play on it. Sport is used in attempts at selling anything from chocolate bars to cars. Shirts and caps with the names and colours of Rugby teams are common everyday apparel. In some cities the Rugby team parades through the main street prior to a game and after the New Zealand yachting team won the Americas Cup they toured the entire country, parading to enormous acclaim through all the main streets of all the major cities.

As a spectator sport Rugby is definitely on top and nowhere is this as evident as in the pub. Almost every pub I have visited (which is quite a few) was full of Rugby paraphernalia. The connection between sport and beer is quite interesting. Almost every New Zealand advertisement for beer I have ever seen has had some reference or another to sport. Different kinds of beer refer to different sports, though. Draught and bitter is portrayed as ‘the working man’s beer’ and is associated with ordinary men who play Rugby for rugged fun. Lager is an urban drink, often linked to more ‘sophisticated’ sports like yachting.

Sport in general, and Rugby in particular, plays a very important role in Kiwi nation building. Rugby is the most important arena, and some might say the only one, where New Zealanders can assert themselves as international big wigs. For a while yachting looked like a good runner-up and the New Zealand team won, by overwhelming margins, the Americas Cup. But that was a one off. In Rugby, however, the national team, The All Blacks, have had repeated successes for decades and on a regular basis the All Blacks can be trusted to beat the other important national rugby teams and lift New Zealand to the pivot of international esteem. The All Blacks also contribute to the creation of a particular and important image of New Zealand abroad. Prior to a match the All Blacks always perform the Haka; a stylized and extremely powerful Maori challenge, by some called a war dance. Even people who are not particularly interested in rugby find it difficult to watch the All Blacks perform the Haka without feeling some sense of pride.

Rugby is a tough and violent game, or at least that is the way it looks. The players are tall, muscular men who tackle each other in ways that look directly dangerous. For someone like me who has never played Rugby it is difficult to understand how anybody gets through a game without serious injury. It is tempting to suggest
that Rugby is such a popular spectator sport exactly because of its violence. Many critical commentators cannot resist comparing it with the gladiator games of the Roman Empire. I will refrain from such inferences because I do not believe that New Zealanders enjoy watching violence any more than other people on earth. In addition to the hard tackles Rugby is also a very elegant game. When a team manages to pull off a series of passes, and run the greater part of the field passing the ball from player to player, there is a smooth flow to the game that soccer or American football never achieves. On the other hand, it is clear that many Kiwis like to imagine a link between their national character and the toughness of Rugby: Like Rugby players Kiwis enjoy a self-image as a sturdy people who can take physical hardship and pain without whimpering.

So much for spectator sports. As far as participation goes it is my impression that it is rather common for New Zealanders to participate in some sport or another through all stages of life. During childhood and adolescence a number of team sports are encouraged at school. In adult life many people pick up golf, and there are more golf courses per capita in New Zealand than any other country. Other leisure time activities that may or may not be categorised as sport are popular. In childhood skateboarding, in-line skating and surfing. As an adult many people go tramping, skiing, or mountain-biking. Fishing, dredging for scallops, boating and sailing are also popular sports/leisure time activities, not to mention trout fishing. A substantial number of people also go hunting on a regular basis. New Zealand is, if not the birthplace, then definitely the home of extreme sports. Bungee Jumping was perfected and commercialised in New Zealand. Jet boating on narrow, swift flowing white water rivers is both a tourist magnet and a competitor sport in which Kiwis excel. Triathlon races over hundred of kilometres take place on a regular basis every year and attract hundreds of participants. And then, in old age, there is bowls, with separate bowling clubs and bowling greens. Every Sunday hundreds of people, sixty years and plus are out playing, just for fun, or in dire competition.

The Kiwi interest in sports is often given a psychological interpretation, both by New Zealanders themselves and foreign observers. Sports, particularly the more violent ones like Rugby is on the one hand seen as a safety valve through which the populace blow of the aggressions generated by living in a fundamentally violent society, with a culture that does not encourage or tolerate open displays of strong emotions. On the other hand Rugby is seen as ritualized warfare that functions as a check on the violence upon which society is founded.

Personally I am sceptical of such reductionist interpretations of social phenomena and I believe there are many aspects to this picture. In my opinion one of the contributing factors is a fascinating mix of casual playfulness and serious formality in New Zealand society. When engaged in serious business they tend to guard their self-presentation rather closely. As an example there is a rather strict dress code (black suit, white shirt and tie for men, blouse and skirt for women) for people working in private or public offices. When, on the other hand, they drop the formal front and don the casual gear, they enjoy fun and games, tossing around a football or a new idea, a new way of doing things to a far larger degree than what is common in, say, Norway. The high-school yard at recess is clear indicator of the degree to which New Zealanders encourage and enjoy play. Most of the students, up until seventh form (seventeen years of age) are involved in play of some sort or another; tossing a netball around, skateboarding, a circle of people kicking a hekki-sekki (a tennis size, soft ball made from cloth and filled with peas). At any Norwegian high school the students do not play during recess, but engage in conversations and pretend to be adults.

Finally, I cannot but speculate about sports having some thrill-seeking and exhibitionist function. I have already mentioned that there is a particular kind of exhibitionist flair to Kiwi masculinity. My impression is
that in general New Zealanders are not a Dionysian people. They enjoy having fun, but not in an uncontrolled manner. Sport is perhaps one of the better ways to have fun, and experience the thrill of pushing the boundaries of control without overstepping them. Being in control is perhaps one of the more important defining traits distinguishing sports from recklessness. Some people may interpret the Kiwi fascination with extreme sports as a sign of recklessness. I do not think so. It is first and foremost a sport and the whole point is to master the activity, push the boundaries and still be in control. I believe that is one of the important points about Rugby too; pushing the boundary, making it look like it hurts, but without getting hurt.

When two people share an interest in the same external object or activity, e.g. sports like rugby or golf, or Jesse and Jonah’s common interest in Ferraris, metaphoric reasoning opens up for the possibility that the object can be the common ground that unites them. At an early stage in the development of such a relationship the object or the activity (e.g. Ferraris and golf) can act as a metaphor for (certain aspects of) the relationship between them. As the relationship develops and if they participate in a number of joint activities like practising golf together, going to tournaments, buying and restoring an old golf cart together, the sport can change from a metaphor into a metonym. Gradually the meaning of golf can change from being just an activity to being a large pool of common experiences of being together. Simultaneously the new meaning of golf also becomes the meaning of the relationship. As a sign golf has changed character and has taken on new meaning. Golf now both stand for and is a part of the meaning of the relationship at the same time.

A shared interest in a ‘external’ object of activity does not, however, automatically develop into metonymic connections. Metonymic meaning depends upon bodily experiences of nearness and there is no automatic development from sharing a common interest in an object or activity to actually engaging in the kinds of activities whereby experiences of bodily nearness emerges. It is important to be aware that when people lack such bodily experiences they can still pretend and act and talk as if they have had them. There is ample evidence of ‘imagined community’ (to steal and distort a concept from Anderson [1983]) between people who have never even seen or met each other, or between a person and object (e.g. a national flag) where a person thinks and feels about the other as if there was a bodily based metonymic connection between them. My point is that even if these relationships can be very strong and of great importance they rely on far greater degrees of active pretense and conscious deliberation than metonymic meaning based on bodily experiences of nearness.

The most common way that men in Anglo-Germanic societies like Pakeha New Zealand build interpersonal relationships is through a shared interest in external objects or by participating in a joint project with an external aim. This has important social ramifications because such projects, for a number of reasons, favour hierarchical social structures. First of all such projects are inclusive as far as how many participants they can accommodate. Contrary to strict dyads, where there is never room for one extra person without seriously altering the quality of the original relationship, ‘indirect’ relationships via external projects always have room for one more. Indirect interpersonal relationships therefore carry a potential for building larger social groups, a potential which does not exist when people relate in a more ‘direct’ fashion. The size of the group is on important prerequisite for the emergence of a hierarchy; another important factor is the quality of the projects men engage in. Most commonly such projects take the form of tasks, and the performance of tasks usually requires some degree of organisation. With organisations comes division of labour and
responsibility. As the project unfolds over time whoever is instrumentally or organisationally
most competent tends to be given or take control over the project. The very same process
whereby control is allocated also establishes a particular way of organising the task, as well
as the hierarchical structure of the group. When a hierarchical social organisation is
established it is possible for the members to start thinking about it as an object in itself, and to
start using that object as a new ‘external’ medium for establishing ‘indirect’ interpersonal
relationships.

The vast majorities of public social organisations in western societies are created by men, and
it is also a well documented fact that men in western societies have an affinity for hierarchical
social structures [Bjerum Nielsen 1989, Gilmore 1990]. As a consequence it is tempting to
draw the conclusion that there is something inherently masculine about hierarchies; i.e. that
the mal biology somehow predisposes men to build such organisations. To counter that
temptation it is important to keep in mind that hierarchies are properties of public, social
organisations, and as such primarily related to the solution of tasks in public. Hierarchical
organizations are, on the one hand, good tools for solving instrumental tasks like defence,
building houses, hunting big animals etc. Equally important to keep in mind, however, is that
hierarchies are also outcomes of the social organisation of risk and trust in public situations.

The vast majority of Pakeha men have infinitely much more experience in building and
maintaining public risk relationships than they do in building and maintaining the kinds of
trust relationships that generally obtains between infants and their mothers. Men, in general,
are used to building large parts, often all, of their self-identity projects, as well as the
existential meaning of their existence, on public risk-relationships that are based on
metaphoric reasoning. As a consequence most men lack both the knowledge and the
experiences needed to build their self-identity on intimate dyadic relationships. In other
words, men lack knowledge about how to relate ‘directly’ to others without an external sign
as a medium for creating the connection.

Most men do not have a large stock of bodily experience as primary caregivers for their sons.
Thus they lack the bodily experiences needed to establish a deep sense of metonymic
meaning; of being one with their sons. Even fathers who have ample experience as primary
caregivers do not necessarily develop ‘magical unions’ with their sons and caregiving fathers
too may end up building ‘risk’ relationships with their sons. The stronger a father is involved
in the kinds of self-identity projects that build upon the Aristotelian logic pertaining to public
risk relationships, the more likely it is that he will also develop and maintain that kind of a
relationship with his son. Because the Aristotelian logic defines fathers and sons as
fundamentally separate individuals such relationship are more or less predestined to become
continuous negotiations of trust and suspicion. When father and son have not managed to use
their common bodily experiences to develop and maintain a metonymic ‘magical union’ the
relationship will always contain an element of danger.

Building interpersonal relationships via a shared interest in an external project has important
advantages as far as negotiating risk and trust is concerned, but at the same time has very
important ramifications for the meaning of the interpersonal relationships that emerge as well
as for the self-identity projects of the participants. If a man builds the mainstay of his self-
identity on such projects it is likely that his self identity will come to depend on his
competence in carrying out external projects. When interviewing one of the fathers in my
sample, asking him what he believes it is to be a man, his immediate was “to be competent at whatever you do”. This strong link between competence and masculinity in western culture is also clearly documented by Susan Faludi [1999].

An even more important ramification of this mode of building interpersonal relationships is the kind of knowledge participants in such projects are able to gain about each other. People tend to construct knowledge about whatever they focus upon. When attention is focussed on external objects or projects there is little left for developing knowledge about the other participants. To the extent that the participants do develop knowledge about each other it is primarily about what they do, rather than who they are. According to the basic Anglo-Germanic cultural model of personality, personal traits are stable and inherent traits belonging to the individual, regardless of context. Using external signs as manifestations of personal characteristics is quite problematic, however. As all students of social life have realized behaviour and ‘personalities’ are intimately linked to context, and it is therefore likely that external signs say more about the state of affairs than about inherent personal traits. In addition because metaphors create as if similarities between signifier and signified there is a large room for invention or contrivance. When external signs are interpreted as evidence about such stable traits a number of consequences follow. First of all external signs are usually poor indicators of internal processes. Secondly the relatively large degree of invention and the disregard for context means that there is also a fair chance that the interpretation will be inaccurate. Thirdly, and for the same reason as just stated, the question of power is of utmost importance. Claiming primarily on the basis of observations of external signs that somebody is a certain kind of person, with certain kinds of stable personal traits, is obviously an act of definitional power.

When fathers and sons base their relationships on the logic of risk relationships, relying on indirect and as if interpretations of external signs, the lack of direct and intimate knowledge of each other may easily lead them to define each other as particular kinds of people with set and unchangeable personalities, rather than seeing each other for how they actually communicate and behave. This strategy for solving the dilemma of risk and trust encourages relationships built on formal definitions. As I wrote in chapter five one of the defining differences between the breadwinner and the involved father model is that the former builds on formal definitions and rules, whereas the latter specifies that a father must do whatever is needed to secure the well-being of his children. At this point these models contradict each other, and the ‘external project’ strategy favours the breadwinner father model.

Self-identity, hierarchy and parallel lives
In contrast to their fathers most adolescent sons do not yet have clearly defined self-identities. While in the midst of one of the most radical transitions, both biologically and socially, that they will go through in their life they are also at the very beginning of developing the ability for conscious self-reflection. In order to forge a sense self that is uniquely their own they have to come to grips with and interpret all sorts of puzzling experiences. A huge pool of notions and ideas need to be processed and sorted, and there are multiple kinds of possible identities to choose between. Their personal histories are still short and do not greatly limit the framework and direction of their self-identity projects. They are, in other words, in the middle for forging the sense of self that they will spend much effort on maintaining later in life. Trying on identities, through engaging with the social and natural environment, is what this process is all about. Gradually some elements of identity are taken on and incorporated,
others taken on for a while and then discarded, while some are rejected off hand.

One of the central hypotheses of this chapter is that the characters of the self-identity projects fathers and sons are involved are fundamentally different. As adult men fathers are mainly concerned with maintaining the self-identity they acquired quite some time ago, whereas sons are mainly concerned with creating or developing theirs. As boys grow their self-identity projects will take the form of establishing themselves as separate, authentic and autonomous persons. In a late modern society like Pakeha New Zealand that means creating some degree of uniqueness which precludes them from copying others, e.g. their father. Some theoreticians call this reflexive self-identity project ‘individuation’ [see Dencik and Shultlz Jørgensen 1999] and obviously to a large degree it is about the constitution of individual identity. It is a process of trial and error, of experimenting with various ways of being which eventually leads to the emergence of outward expressions that resonates with inner self-images. This does not mean the inner images are given and static, and that only the outer expressions undergo change. On the contrary both the inner images and the outer expressions mutually affect each other and both gradually change through the process. That is not an important point, however. The important point is that this process takes different forms for different boys. Some sons engage heavily with their fathers as part of this process, others become more private and primarily engage in other relationships in order to pursue their self-identity project. In contemporary Pakeha society friends and computer-games are some of the more common relationships where boys and young men engage in self-identity projects outside the family.

When sons engage in reflexive self-identity projects as part of their relationships with their fathers, it is not uncommon that they become rather provocative and cocky. When they choose other arenas for this project they may easily appear distant, withdrawn and aloof in relation to their fathers. My impression is that in the former case fathers who do not have much experience as caregivers tend to interpret their sons’ behaviour as a threat to the maintenance of their own self-identities. Fathers who have acquired vast embodied knowledge through being primary caregivers for long periods of time seem less inclined to interpret their son’s behaviour as threatening. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand sons in the latter kinds of relationships are not as prone to provocative behaviour. Caring work implies a constant process of creation, transgression and re-creation of personal boundaries in the relationship between the giver and receiver of care, and thus provides a huge mass of experience of self and other that can be used in a self-identity project. When a father has been engaged in caring work for longer periods of time both father and son already have massive knowledge of themselves in relationship with each other, and when that experience is benign the continuation of the self-identity project can proceed in a similarly benign and non-turbulent way.

Caregiving necessarily involves benevolent transgressions of personal boundaries, and thus produces knowledge that such transgressions are not necessarily dangerous and threatening. Another interesting point to notice is that fathers and sons who have developed magical unions also take great care to avoid transgressions that may threaten the self-identity of the other. In those father-son relationships that I have called ‘close, parallel lives’ both fathers and sons deliberately create separate domains of activity, and avoid interfering in each other’s areas of interest. As I have argued earlier, in a late modern western society like Pakeha New Zealand the creation and maintenance of personal authenticity and autonomy is crucial to the
maintenance of a positively valued self-identity. I believe that for fathers and sons who are used to being heavily involved in each other's lives, and who have a long history of personal boundaries being transgressed as a consequence of caring work, the creation and maintenance of such separate domains is a way of establishing a sense of autonomy and authenticity while still remaining closely involved.

When fathers and sons lack a long history of involvement their individual self-identity projects easily become antagonistic. In order to maintain a positive self-identity fathers try to 'stand their ground', but because they do not have enough intimate knowledge about their sons they do not realize how this forces their sons to either fight harder, or to withdraw. In the first case the stage is set for a version of the Oedipus drama\(^\text{17}\), in the second the potential outcome is twofold; the son rejects his father or succumbs. This is where I believe my hypothesis that fathers and sons are involved in different projects of self-identity may shed some light on how the relationships between them unfold. I have argued that when fathers dominate it is in order to maintain a sense of being, as well as a sense that they are autonomous and competent. When sons interact with such dominant fathers the interactions will directly influence the sons’ attempts at creating or building their self-identities. From what I observed it seems that a father’s dominance can have two, mutually opposite effects on a son’s attempt at building his self-identity. On the one hand a dominant father can create a sense of security that allows the son to explore different ways of being himself. When fathers are good at being ‘heads’ of the family they can have that effect on the relationship and on their sons. They create a safe ‘space’ within which the family can exist, and flourish. Quite a few of the sons who’s behaviour I have called submissive, can actually be understood as having accepted the dominance of their fathers as premises for their own identity projects. Within such a frame a dominant father is also ‘useful’ for the son because as a dominant figure he is also quite clearly defined and as such someone the son can easily copy, emulate or oppose. On the other hand a dominant father may overwhelm his son, usually prompting the son to device strategies that are combinations of subordination, opposition and withdrawal.

A final and important point about the difference between hierarchical and apparently egalitarian father-son relationships is that when the latter is an integral part of a parallel relationship, build upon a magical union, the quality of equality and parallelism is to a large extent a consequence of the fact that the father’s authority does not need to be explicitly stated. As I have already mentioned in chapter two, interactions consisting of care and nurturance carry a large potential for the parties to develop very close and intimate knowledge about each other. Not only does the primary caregiver spend much more time with the son than the secondary caregiver, but the very nature of the care is also likely to be radically different. As I have already elaborated extensively on this point in chapter three I will not reiterate. Suffice to say that primary care giving fathers and their sons have had the possibility to develop a large body of intimate, and to a large extent non-linguistic knowledge of each other’s idiosyncrasies. Such knowledge is an integral part of what I have earlier called a ‘magical union’ and such detailed, intimate knowledge is an important prerequisite for developing relationships where the father’s authority does not need to be explicitly communicated. Both father and son have so much knowledge about each other that explicit signs of superiority and inferiority are neither necessary nor beneficial. On the contrary, the trust that intimate knowledge about each other can fostered can only be maintained and grow as long as both parties pay equal respect to each other’s boundaries.
**Disqualified fathers**

One of the factors contributing to fathers assuming a dominant or withdrawn position in relationships with their sons is the extent to which fathers are preoccupied with the kind of self-identity projects that take place in public. Another factor important variable is how the relationship between mother and father unfolds. The dynamics of this latter relationship is most likely to either strengthen or weaken the processes leading to dominant/withdrawn fathers, or close parallel lives between father and son. When fathers, as a consequence of the relationships between husband and wife, have become disqualified as home-makers and caregivers, fathers invariably assume a dominant or withdrawn position. This behaviour can to a large extent be understood as ways of avoiding or compensating for the quality of inferiority that necessarily attaches to the disqualified position. If a father is disqualified in front of the children there is even greater reason for him to avoid or compensate for looking inferior.

My observations suggests that when a man is disqualified in relationship to his wife this poses a set of fundamental and serious challenges to his self-identity and ontological security both as a father and as a man. Even though it is the dominant ideology in contemporary Pakeha culture the involved father model does not provide detailed descriptions and recipes for how a father should behave. The model only says that the father should be involved and that he should perform all parenting tasks, but not *how* he should do them. It is no wonder that in a survey of 2002 New Zealanders 57% agreed that one of the things that make it difficult for men to be fathers is that they are not taught how to do it [Julian 1999:18]. In a sense the involved father model simultaneously provides father with everything and nothing: He is given an immensely important position to fill, and no instructions how to do it.

Another factor contributing to the ambiguity of fatherhood is the continuous production of comical and/or ridiculous images of husbands and fathers; the wimpish man who is a tyrant boss but dominated by his wife, the public bully who is made to wear the apron at home etc. At the same time there are no proud images of men as home makers and caregivers. The end result is that there are no positively laden images of ‘the father’ which men can copy or use as a resource for creating his own way to be a dignified and involved father. Nor are there receipts, guidebooks or instructions manuals telling him how to go about the practicalities of actually doing the job. Each man is left on his own to become a husband and a father in his own way. There is great freedom, great opportunities, but also huge risks in that.

In my opinion dominance and withdrawal are the solutions fathers choose when they do not have a lot of experienced as caregivers. It is a solution to the predicament of having to be an involved father and not knowing how to do it; a way to maintain a positive self-identity and self-esteem in the face of disqualification in relationship to their wives and increasingly stronger competition from their sons. On the one hand dominance can be understood as a way for fathers to appear to be autonomous, to appear to have a position in the home in spite of the fact that their interactions with the mothers renders them inferior, disqualified and without any instrumental reasons for being there. By dominating situations fathers can avoid being exposed as disqualified, and at the same time create a position for himself as if he is an important figure in the home and the family.

Both dominance and withdrawal can be understood as avoidance behaviour. If a father tries
to become an involved father, tries to learn how to care for and nurture his children, it is crucial how the interaction between him and the mother unfolds while he is making these attempts. One usual scenario is that she waits and watches apprehensively as he clumsily goes about doing it, constantly monitoring, making instructive comments and forever ready, or eager, to take over when he has made a botch job of it. In this case he is likely to feel stupid, incompetent, frustrated, and there is a chance he will be angry at his partner both for making him feel like that, and because she is an audience who as such has exposed his poor performance, incompetence and unmanly behaviour. Another likely scenario is that the mother, for all sorts of practical reasons goes to the job ahead of the father, not giving him the opportunity to learn. Over time both of these scenarios will leave a father with less and less desire to do such tasks, and he will never become skilled at it. In both these scenarios the mother is merely trying to be a ‘good’ mother, but the consequences for the father is that he has no functional position to fill. If he should try to do any house-making or caring tasks he is destined to end up in an inferior position and will probably look like a fool. Feeling and looking like an incompetent fool is an experience most people, including men, loath and will try to avoid. More importantly, however, a disqualified father is deprived of the opportunity to be a morally upright person, someone who lives up to the model of fatherhood that he believes in. It also deprives him of a sense of purpose a father and reduces him to being little more than a money-generating machine.

A disqualified father cannot acquire power, and thus ontological security, through performing household- and caring tasks. If he wants to be, and be recognized as, an autonomous and proud man he has to rely exclusively on symbolic actions. Talking a lot, defining the topic, winning discussions, bragging about himself and similar acts of dominance have no apparent instrumental function. They are not part of performing instrumental tasks and merely serve to communicate an image of superiority. But then again if he does not perform these symbolic acts he has no way of counteracting the disempowering effect of acting in a setting in which he is functionally inferior to his wife and symbolically challenged by his son.

From my observations it seems that there are only two ways that disqualified fathers can avoid looking incompetent and inferior without being dominant. They can either avoid situations that involve performing tasks that the partner defines and controls while the mother and children are present, or they can reserve certain tasks for themselves, tasks that they define and control and thus master better than the mothers. In reality all the fathers who behaved in dominant ways in relation to their sons did a bit of both. Some fathers, like Henry and Jack, opted for withdrawal most of the times. When participating in situations where both mother and sons were present they openly, but often reluctantly, assumed the ‘authority’ position in relation to their sons, thus communicating their superior position. The majority of the other ‘dominant’ fathers, like James, did not avoid family situations, but put themselves forward as ‘the symbolic head’ of the family, and in other ways presented themselves as important persons without actually performing any household- and caring tasks. Nigel was the one father who most clearly had defined and reserved certain tasks as ‘his only’.

Power and thus autonomy is, among other things, a function of competence. To be competent at something also means having the power to make it happen. When a father has developed competence as a caregiver he performs such tasks in competent ways. Implicitly he also communicates to his sons that he is a powerful person, having the power to make certain things happen that are beneficial to them. However, when the father does not have the
competence and the knowledge necessary to carry out the task in an authoritative way, he has to compensate by doing things that communicates an appearance of superiority. But yet again it is of importance whether the mother is present or not. If she is present that makes her an audience and as Goffman [1959] has pointed out, in a front stage situation, in front of an audience, it is important to live up to the ideal standards. In the vast majority of families the mothers define these standards and when a father tries to perform as a home-maker and caregiver in the home it is very likely that he will fall short of the ideals. Another important consequence is that mother’s presence as an audience makes it impossible for the father to create ‘back stage’ situations where father and son can break the rules, and play with the situation in an attempt to arrive at ways to do the task that both of them feel comfortable with. In back stage situations people are allowed to break all sorts of social rules, thus gaining qualitatively different knowledge about each other than what is possible in front stage situations. To an extent back stage can be understood as a form of liminality, and as such these kids of situations can generate sentiments of ‘communitas’ among its participants. Lacking opportunities to create ‘back stage’ situations within the home, while engaged in tasks of care and nurturance, fathers and sons are left with relating to each other according to standards defined by various public discourses, or the domestic standards defined by the mother. If the children are old enough to watch, and understand how father ends up in an inferior position, humiliation is an added load of discomfort.

When fathers are competent home-makers and caregivers the above problems do not exist. However, when one set of problems vanish, another set emerges. An integral part of caring for children is the gradual process of decreasing the care and increasing the distance. Caregiving fathers thus face a new challenge: How to avoid becoming too close. Interpersonal relationships always face the threat of breakdown; either through withdrawal and abandonment, or from internal collapse and the dissolution of internal boundaries. When two persons have massive intimate knowledge of each other (the way that givers and receivers of primary care do) the most persistent and immediate problem they face is how to keep a sufficient distance in order to develop and maintain a sense of individuality. Not surprisingly this is the challenge mothers usually face as their children come of age. Fathers who are primary caregivers, or have been so for longer periods of time, obviously face this challenge to a larger degree than other fathers. Based on my observations, I believe that the patterns of behaviour I have called close, parallel lives is one of the solutions care-giving fathers and their sons develop in order to negotiate this problem. The solution they chose is, interestingly enough, based on how men negotiate the problem of personal boundaries in public settings. In order to avoid violating each other’s personal boundaries they construct separate areas of interest, clearly defined positions with obvious markers. In public, when men cannot take the trust for granted, and when they interact in accordance with an Aristotelian logic, this strategy often leads to competition and power struggle. When father and son have a large pool of knowledge and experience of each others boundaries, when the trust is unquestioned and the relationship is build upon the logic of participation, they can stay close, avoid violating each other and remain comfortable.
Chapter 8 Blood and love
So far I my descriptions, interpretations and analysis have focussed on how fathers and sons interact. I have described patterns of paternal care, and how most of the fathers in my sample are not heavily involved in providing the daily care for their sons even though they all subscribe to the involved father model. I have tried to understand some of the reasons for this discrepancy and have identified two major influences; the rewards men reap from investing time and energy on projects outside the home, and the disqualifying processes that often unfold within the home. I have argued that when care is given with proper attention to the communication of recognition of the other, caregiving carries an immanent logic which is different from the instrumental logic of manipulating objects. When care is performed in accordance with this logic it carries the potential or the development of magical unions between caregiver and receiver. One of the preconditions or the development of magical unions is that the caregiver has ample experience providing care for that particular receiver, enough experience to perform the care in a comforting, calm and confident fashion. I have argued that when fathers do not have the necessary experience for magical unions to develop they tend to compensate by either withdrawing or dominating in their relationships with their sons.

Describing how people act, and trying to understand the various factors influencing these actions, is obviously important for understanding relationships between people. And yet, a comprehensive understanding of what a relationship is, i.e. the contents and the meaning of the relationship, requires something more than an analysis of actions. In this last chapter I will try to show how all the factors I have already described and analysed come together and inform some of the meaning of relationships between Pakeha fathers and sons. In order to do so I will turn to the question of love. Love is, after all, one of the most (may be the most) important and precarious elements in father-son relationships in contemporary Pakeha society. When I now turn my gaze on love I will begin with a short story:

One day when I arrived for my weekly visit with Warren and Paul, Warren was not home. As previously mentioned Warren is a single father with a part time job. That day he was somewhat late returning from work. It was still summer and nice weather; Paul was sitting outside on the lawn, reading a book. I said “Hi” and sat down next to him, not too close, not too far away. We did not speak much at first. Paul was a quiet boy, never said much. At the start of this project I had decided I wanted to make ‘love’ a central topic of my inquiry. Love is a fundamental ingredient in western concepts of kinship and a considerable proportion of the available literature about men and father-son relationships reports that love is a fundamentally problematic topic in many of these relationships. But how is love observed? I did not really know. Being alone with Paul I decided I would ask him directly. I told him that love is one of the topics I wanted to know something about and asked him if he loved his father. Not surprisingly the answer was “Yes”. ”Does your father love you”, was my next question, and again the answer was immediate and affirmative; this time with a tinge of embarrassment. From the quick response, the firmness of the voice and the complete absence of doubt in both facial expression and posture I gathered that Paul took the love between him and his father absolutely for granted. I then asked how he knew that his father loved him, and the air of certainty disappeared. Paul was perfectly convinced that his father loved him, but was not able to tell how he knew. “Well, he buys me things, presents for my birthday, and stuff”, was all he could say.
This discrepancy between the absolute conviction that the love is strong, and the inability to explain how the love is communicated, intrigued me. I therefore made a point of asking all the fathers and sons in my sample the same question. I also included it in all my interviews. All of the fathers and son in my sample, and all the men I interviewed who were fathers, were absolutely convinced that the love in the relationship was strong and reciprocated. When I asked them how they knew that the other person loved them, what the signs of love were, the answers fell in two radically different categories. The majority of fathers and sons could not identify the signs of love, neither those expressed by themselves nor those expressed by the other. A minority of fathers and sons, however, knew exactly how the love was communicated. I also made a point, when observing fathers and sons together, of looking for conventional signs of love and affections. These observations revealed that those fathers and sons who did not openly communicate their love in my presence were also, in general, less able to answer the above question. They just knew, they said. When it came to being sure about the existence of love in the relationship, there was no difference, however. Whether the love was openly displayed or did not seem to matter. Being able to express how the love was communicated did not matter either. Regardless of being able to express this knowledge or not, they were equally convinced. They just knew, and there was no need to worry about it.

Obviously love can be expressed in a myriad of ways. There are, however, a relatively limited number of conventional signs of love and affection that are most frequently used and expected as ways of communicating and verifying the emotions of love between fathers and sons. The expression ‘I love you’ is of course the most obvious sign, but physical proximity like touching, gentle strokes and sitting close to each other on the couch are other conventional signs. One father, Nigel, told me that he knows that his son Terry loves him because his son forgives Nigel for his dominant ways. This is, of course, a very strong statement of love, but quite idiosyncratic for their relationship. A father forgiving his son is a conventional sign of love in Pakeha culture, but not the other way around. Thus signs like touching, stroking, sitting close to each other, gifts out of the ordinary, were what I looked for in order to find out how fathers and sons communicated the love between them. This obviously means that I missed other signs. I want to underline that I do not believe that the fathers who do not frequently display their love in these particular ways do not love their sons. It only means I did not see it.

The fact that all these fathers and sons take the love absolutely for granted presents quite a puzzle to me. First of all I need to ask myself is if my sample is representative of Pakeha fathers and adolescent sons in general. Without a statistical material I cannot say for sure, but I have strong reasons to believe it is. The strength of the conviction that the relationship is filled with love, and the fact that this opinion was unanimous, both point in that direction. Assuming then that it is a general trait of relationships between Pakeha fathers and their adolescent sons, the puzzle remains. It would have been less of a puzzle if there had been an element of doubt because love is not usually taken for granted in most relationships between people. On the contrary, love is usually held to be potentially ephemeral and precarious, something that can easily be lost, and something to worry about. Why then is love taken for granted between Pakeha fathers and adolescent sons? Is it taken for granted because it is fundamentally solid and there is no need to question it? Or is it taken for granted because, in the final analysis, it is not a ‘big deal’ and not as important as it is made out to be? Both of these questions are rhetorical. My impression is that love between father and son is of fundamental importance and in most relationships it is precarious. In this chapter I will argue
that love is a fundamentally ambiguous and paradoxical topic in relationships between Pakeha fathers and adolescent sons, and I will demonstrate how two different, but intimately connected processes, generate this ambivalence and these paradoxes. On the one hand, a contradiction exists within both the concept love itself and the way it is used to say something about the contents of relationships between fathers and sons. On the other hand there are large scale social processes within modern society which, among other things, have led to a radical change in how we deal with formal and informal aspects of social relationships. The leading argument in this chapter is that love is taken for granted as a consequence of how fathers and sons deal with these paradoxes and contradictions of love.

**Signs of love**

Prior to investigating the question why fathers and sons take the love for each other for granted I will present the phenomenon in some greater detail. None of the fathers and sons in my sample displayed their love for each other in demonstrative ways. By that I mean they did not kiss, sit on their fathers’ laps, snuggle tightly or hug, caress with large and ostentatious strokes etc. But in one family the younger brother did:

We are all sitting around the dining table in the kitchen. Jonah, the father, has just returned from work and the family has not yet eaten. Jonah asks Tom, who is fifteen, how his school day has been and Tom starts explaining about a project he is involved in. Jonah listens, asks a few critical questions about a certain procedure and Tom starts arguing for his way of doing it. The two of them engages in a rather competitive discussion. Meanwhile Jesse, who is twelve, has fetched an illustrated book on Ferraris that he has borrowed from the library that day. He brings it to the table and puts it down in front of Jonah. In the middle of the discussion between Jonah and Tom, Jesse then climbs up onto his father’s lap and starts browsing through the book. He actively tries to engage his father into looking at the pictures and eventually succeeds.

It was not unusual for Jesse to climb up onto his fathers lap and Jonah did not reject him. Only once did I observe that it did not suit Jonah to have Jesse on his lap and as far as I can remember it was because Jonah was reading the paper. But Jonah never invited Jesse; it was always on Jesse’s initiative. Jesse was unusual. He was the only son in the age group from ten to seventeen who would be so explicitly physical with his father. Even rather covert physical signs of affection were rare. Though rare they did happen, and exactly because they were rare I would like to describe one instance:

There are two sofas in the living room and John is lounging in the one with its back to the passage from the kitchen to the dining table. I sit on the other sofa, with its back to the wall. Peter, John’s father, arrives and starts talking to us and then sits down on the back of the sofa where John is lounging. Gradually Peter slips down from the back and into the seat next to John’s legs. Equally smoothly John moves his legs and accommodates Peter, and the two remains sitting very close together for quite some time. Peter rests his arm and hand on John’s leg as we all keep on talking. He does not caress the leg, nor draw any attention to his hand resting there. He just leaves it there as a matter of course.

In another family, where the son usually kept at a slight distance to his father and did not touch him much, I once noticed how the son stroked his father’s balding head as he walked past him. The son was in good spirits that day, and the stroke seemed to be both a caress and a teasing gesture pointing out that the father was going bald. Though infrequent physical touch as a sign of love did occur between most of the fathers and sons I observed, usually
these signs were subtle or partly disguised as teasing or fighting. A father would gently rest his arm on the sons shoulder as they were standing side by side facing the same direction, or they might nudge each other in the side in a friendly, teasing sort of way. The thirteen fathers and sons differed in how explicitly and how frequently they communicated their affection for each other this way. With most of them these signs were well hidden and infrequent, and I gained the impression they hid or refrained from such signs on purpose.

It may of course be that my presence was a deterrent. It defined the situation as somewhat ‘public’, and I was always an audience, a spectator. It may be that explicit signs of love were more frequently and readily displayed in private situations. My presence did not deter all fathers and sons, however, and I believe that the fact that some fathers and sons were more explicit with such signs than others is significant.

As I have already mentioned I asked the fathers, as well as the seventeen men that I interviewed, if they were convinced that they loved their sons and that their sons loved them. I also asked most of the sons about the same. All of them gave me affirmative answers. As a matter of fact, no one expressed a shadow of doubt. On face value this is not very surprising. Immediately it seems obvious. Fathers love their sons, parents love their children. It is the ‘natural’ thing to do. The statement that fathers love their sons, and sons their fathers, is self-evident, almost to the extent that it seems silly to state it. If, on the contrary, I had found that fathers did not love their sons that would be a surprising and alarming discovery. But as Toulmin has pointed out, one of the more important tasks of any science is to investigate and question that which is taken for granted, that which is held to be ‘the natural order’ [Toulmin 1961].

When I asked these men and boys how they knew that their fathers and sons loved them, the answers were far from as clear cut as the answers above. A few men and boys had the answers readily available. One fourteen year old son answered:

“He says so. Every morning when we leave for school, he says ‘I love you’.”

Nigel, a father of four sons and one daughter, answered:

“We are all very physical in this family. With all the kids, when I meet them I can hold out my hands and they will walk right into them. Even Jason, who is sixteen, when we talk he will stretch out a hand and just touch me as we talk.”

Only a minority of men and boys were able to tell how they knew that their fathers or sons loved them. The majority of answers from the adolescent sons were more like this:

“Oh........, I don’t know ........... eh ........................ well, eh......... he buys me presents for my birthday. And .... eh ...... he lets me use the car.”

One son’s complete answer was:

“I just know”.

And another said:
“He does not yell at me like some other fathers do.”

That was the only answer he could give. A third son said that his father

“helps out. Lets me go to my uncle’s place, go shooting. Teaches me golf.”

When I asked the fathers how they show their love for their sons I usually received similarly vague answers. One father, whom I only interviewed, said:

“It’s the natural thing I s’pose. He tends to never want for anything. Most things he wants we try and give him. Whether that is a sign of love or not, I don’t know. From time to time I try, bit of a cuddle, but he is not really into that. Get’s all tough and stroppy, ha ha ha. It is a hard thing to say. I just take it for granted that the kids know that we love them. Actually showing it? I guess we show it by putting meals on the table and things like that. They never wanted for anything.”

I asked Jonah, the father of Tom and Jesse, how he showed Tom that he appreciated him and Jonah answered:

“Tom has ceased to be particularly physically affectionate, so I don’t get to touch him much these days. It is not a big deal, if he is happy with that, I am happy with that. I kind of regret it, there is no need for that barrier to be there, but it’s not a problem. Tom is an easy person to acknowledge positively because he does a lot of things very well. And he has a lot of interests, some of them he does really well, some he does quite well. And he does very well at school, so he gets positive reinforcement from all that stuff. He is also for me a person..... I am able to talk to Tom about how I relate to him and things like that. I think that kind of conversation, how we relate, what makes me grumpy and what doesn’t, that sort of thing, is positive for both of us”.

It is important to notice that even though all the fathers in my sample took the love in their relationships with their own adolescent sons for granted, many of them were not as certain about the love in their relationships with their own fathers. Most commonly they said that their own fathers, i.e. father who are now (or would have been if still alive) sixty years and older, had not been very loving and affectionate men. Most of their fathers had been rather distant both emotionally and physically and had spent a lot of time at work, away from the home. The bulk of the men I interviewered believed that their own fathers had cared for them, that their fathers had really loved them and the rest of the family and that they had sacrificed a lot for their families. At the same time most of these men also felt that their fathers had not expressed that love very well and far from enough. This is not very surprising news. The topic about the emotionally distant father is actually one of the more common and important themes in much of the recent literature about men and masculinity [see e.g., Biddulph 1994, 1997, Bly 1991, Hudson and Jacob 1991, Lee 1991].

Both in the literature and in my material many men state that they have wanted to, and have tried to be more loving towards their own children then their own fathers had been towards them. This can be interpreted in different ways, and the most obvious interpretation is that the importance placed on love, and expectations about how it is supposed to be communicated in relationships between fathers and sons has changed over the last fifty years. Another possible interpretation is that this apparent change primarily is a matter of age and reflexive maturity.
It may be that the sons who are teenagers today may start doubting their father’s love when they get older? Of course this is a possibility and an empirical question that only time can answer. I am convinced, however, that there has not been a change in the importance and meaning of love and below I will argue my case. But that point is not of fundamental importance because regardless of whether there has been a change or not it is still a fact that contemporary fathers and adolescent sons take the love for granted and that it is important to them not to doubt it.

To sum it up so far, love between fathers and sons is taken for granted regardless of whether any of the parties have a clear notion of how they know that they are loved. Love is the natural state of affairs and as long as the normal state of affairs continues, that is in itself taken as a sign of love. Love does not have to be explicitly displayed because it is an implicit and necessary part of the relationship. Actually, it seems that the absence of the negation of love is in itself a confirmation of love. At first glance the central issue here is love and it seems obvious to ask how it can be that the love in these relationships is so strong? But I believe there is another, far more important issue hidden behind the image of the strong love. That issue is doubt and conviction. Thus the question why love is taken for granted also contains another question; why is it so important not to doubt the love?

Why do these fathers and sons take the love in the relationship for granted? That is my initial question, but in order to investigate it I rephrase it: Why is it so important to take the love for granted? My hypothesis is that love is an integral part of both of the two cultural models of fatherhood that I have presented earlier. According to the two models, the meaning of love and the role it plays in the relationship is, however, radically different and partly contradictory.

Why love became important
During my latter fieldwork I lived in a city for a while and became friendly with one of my neighbours. Let me call him George. He was in his fifties and had two sons and two step sons. George ran his own business and sometimes one of his sons, Aaron, in his late twenties, worked with him. Their relationship had been turbulent for many years. They had fallen out with each other and for quite a few years the son had refused to have anything to do with George. Lately the relationship had improved to the extent that they now actually enjoyed working together. I interviewed both George and Aaron, but prior to the interview I also discussed my work with George. During one of our talks George said something that has stuck in my mind. I cannot remember the exact words but the message was something like this:

“There is so much literature, music and so many films about the agonies and bliss of love between sexual partners. But that is nothing to the passions involved in the relationship between parents and children. I have never felt so torn apart by problems in my relationships with women as I have by the trouble between Aaron and me. It has been sheer hell all these years when he did not want to talk to me. And though things are better now the feelings in that relationship are stronger than anything I have ever felt for my partner. How come our culture and history is not full of books, music and films about the passions in the relationships between parents and children?”

What George said started me thinking about two things. One the one hand that love between parents and children is a very different phenomenon from love between sexual partners. On
the other hand the lack of literature, music, films etc. that George mentioned indicates that the
temporary passion, and thus the importance of love in relationships between parents and
children, is a relatively recent invention. I am not suggesting that parents did not experience
strong emotional attachment to their children in earlier times. My point is that the meaning
and importance of the emotional component in these relationships has changed. Another
recent development that supports this impression is the enormous growth in the literature on
men and masculinity that deals particularly with the passionate emotions many men, born in
the nineteen forties and fifties, experience because they never received the love and
recognition they wanted from their fathers. As mentioned in chapter one, the concept of the
‘father-wound’ has become a dogma in much of this literature, and to a large extent this
concept concerns the importance of, and the lack of, love. John Lee starts his book *At my
fathers wedding* [1991] like this:

> “Many thousands of men are now willing to stop denying that we are in pain. We
have begun to listen to the hurt that run thorough our bodies like the blood through
our veins. More and more of us are ready to go deep into our souls to find a father-
woind that we have always known was there but have been afraid to feel. We are
ready to seek the missing father who lives deeply buried in each of us, the dad we lost
to work, routine, drugs, alcohol, wars, TV, and the mind-numbing pursuit of money
and all the things that could be bought with it.

> We are ready to feel the truth that our fathers were not there for us
emotionally, physically or spiritually - or at all.”[xv]

All of a sudden, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, after several generations of
fathers who have been conservative in expressing their emotions, many men have started
experiencing this lack of explicit emotional expression as painful. Why is this happening and
why now? Why not earlier? Why has love suddenly become so important, and why were
these men, of the post WW II generation, unable to take their fathers’ love for granted? My
hypothesis is that these men could not take love for granted because love had not really been
an issue earlier. Or rather, love had a different meaning and was expressed in a different
ways. After WW II many sons began to give the concept ‘paternal love’ a new meaning, and
expected it to be expressed in ways other than how their fathers actually did express it. As a
consequence many sons began looking for signs of love from fathers who did not know that
what their sons wanted, and if they knew, did not know how to give it. As a matter of fact,
many of these fathers were of the opinion that it was necessary and proper to hide such
emotions to prevent turning their sons into ‘sissies’. One of the men I interviewed said:

> “My father had a strong belief in family values and I am convinced he loved us very much. But he had
an equally strong belief in not openly demonstrating these emotions.”

But this does not answer the question as to why love has suddenly become so important?
To investigate that question I believe that the theories of late modernity I presented in chapter
one and six may be useful. As I have already mentioned one of the characteristic features of
late modernity is a ‘transformation of intimacy’ [Giddens, 1992]. Giddens argues that the
webs of social relationships that used to tie individuals firmly into localized social structures
are rapidly disappearing. Kinship is also no longer of central importance in order to gain
access to economic or political resources, and most local communities, in the form of webs of
relationships between people who frequently interact in order to solve important problems,
are disintegrating. Along with this ‘disembedding’ of social relationships the very nature of personal relationships has changed. Individuals are no longer forced to relate to their relatives or neighbours, but are both free and forced to choose whom they want to relate to, for what purposes and for how long. Giddens calls this new way of relating ‘the pure relationship’. Such relationships are not anchored in external conditions of social or economic life, but are entered into and maintained only for the rewards inherent in the relationship itself [Giddens, 1991:89-90]. If the relationship is no longer ‘rewarding’ it can terminated. In other words, pure relationships are reflexively organized, continuously open to revision.

Giddens maintains that in a social world of disembedding mechanisms and reflexively organized pure relations it is increasingly difficult to maintain the notion that ones self-identity is a fixed entity. When no longer given a self-identity has to be continuously reshaped and reaffirmed. Along with this ‘reflexive project of self-identity’ the symbolic importance of the individual has increased enormously. According to our contemporary ideology collective entities like the family, the kinship group, the community and the nation are no longer paramount. The most important social entity is the individual. There is, however, a serious paradox implicit in this emphasis on the individual. Since every individual human being is supposed to be unique, i.e. different from everyone else, and because this uniqueness is of immense value, the individual human being has become sacred. Sacred in the sense ‘not to be violated’. On the other hand all individuals are also held to equally valuable and this equality means that in every individual can, in principle, be exchanged for any other individual [Solheim 1998]. In a late modern society both a king and a pauper has, in principle, the same human value and the same human rights. The paradox is that this on the one hand renders the individual sacred and immensely valuable, and on the other hand indistinguishable from everyone else, and therefore insignificant, at the same time. When everyone is equally unique, being special is the most common of all human traits. Consequently, when everybody is equally unique and valuable no one is more valuable than others, and the value is deflated.

Whether people experience this paradox as an acute dilemma or not is an empirical question which I have not investigated. I do believe, however, that this paradox exists as an integral part of late modern western culture and as such makes it impossible to engage in a reflexive self-identity project without also sensing, maybe even being aware of, the dilemma. When reflecting about ones self-identity, asking questions like ‘who am I now?’, ‘am I true to myself?’, ‘am I an OK guy?’ etc, the topics of individual uniqueness and value are of utmost importance. Uniqueness and value together form the basis for a sense of self-worth, self-respect and integrity in late modern society. And there is always a very good reason to doubt ones uniqueness and value. After all, everyone else is just as unique and equally valuable, so what is special about me? Why should I be different?

Nobody can determine these kinds of questions entirely on their own. A person’s sense of existence and value needs to be affirmed and continuously reaffirmed through his or her relationships with others and the qualities of these relationships are therefore crucial for how a person develops and/or maintains his or her self-identity. At different times, and in different societies, different relationship qualities play more important roles. Obedience is one of the most important virtues in societies where the contents of social relationships are largely prescribed by rights and duties of kinship. Relationship qualities such as love only become a crucial issue when the contents of relationships change in the direction of the pure
relationship based on voluntary and achieved commitment.

Giddens calls love ‘a codifying force’ of relationships [Giddens, 1991:91] and two of the more important messages codified in that notion is that the relationship is voluntary and egalitarian, and that the love is a reflection of the personal traits and the value of the loved one. Western cultural notions specify that love must be ‘free’. It cannot be produced on command; it must grow ‘voluntarily’ out of the people themselves. This ‘free’ love develops or is produced when the one who loves sees and recognises the idiosyncratic and highly valuable traits that constitutes the loved one as a truly unique person. Giddens, though reflecting upon sexual love, provides an important insight, which is useful for my analysis, into different meanings of love. He distinguishes between ‘romantic’ and ‘confluent’ love. Romantic love, he maintains:

“depends upon projective identification as the means whereby prospective partners become attracted and then bound to each other. Projection here creates a feeling of wholeness with the other,........ The traits of the other are ‘known’ in a sort of intuitive way. Yet in other respects projective identification cuts across the development of a relationship whose continuation depends upon intimacy. Opening oneself out to the other, the condition of what I call confluent love, is in a way the opposite of projective identification, even if such identification sometimes set up a pathway to it.” [ibid: 61]

Romantic love is a projection whereas confluent love is an opening up of oneself. This distinction resembles Merlau-Pontys distinction between egological and radical intersubjectivity that I wrote about in chapter two. Another similarity with Merlau-Ponty is Giddens’ argument that these two different kinds of love are likely to develop according to radically different symbolic and imaginative cognitive processes. Romantic love, created and maintained by projective identification, is a form of metaphorical connection making. It is an imaginative cognitive process based on notions of similarity. Confluent love, on the other hand, is achieved through a metonymic imaginative process based on experiences of nearness.

The same distinction is evident as far as the gratification of desire is concerned. There is an important element of desire in love in the sense that the lover wants to have a unique and often an exclusive relationship with the loved one. This desire is commonly experienced as involuntary; the desire ‘descends’ on the lover and cannot be controlled. This desire for the loved one can thus overwhelm a person. The difference is that whereas romantic lovers are supposed to desire each other in order to gratify themselves, the desire inherent in confluent love prescribes and depends on the ability to gratify the other. In order not to become exploitative romantic loves requires that the relationship is egalitarian. Confluent love, on the other hand, can exist in, and foster the growth of, non-egalitarian relationships, e.g. between parent and child

To my mind there is no doubt that human beings everywhere, and at all times, have the capacity to experience emotions similar to what we call love. So also in societies largely organised on the basis of prescribed relationships. There is reason to believe, however, that in such societies love does not play the crucial role it does in contemporary late modern society. In the former kinds of societies the members have very little or no choice but to enter into and maintain the prescribed relationships, and relationships based on prescribed rights and duties
do not depend upon the individual traits of the people involved. As an example, in a society
where people cannot call upon an external agency like the state to secure ones interests
people have nowhere else to turn but to relatives. It is therefore crucial that kinship relations
are honoured regardless of personality and individual traits and that reciprocal commitment is
not based on individual traits. Consequently individual traits have to be under-communicated
and largely disregarded as criteria for honouring the rights and duties of the relationships. Let
me put it like this: In such societies a son will receive a piece of land from his father because
he belongs to his father’s lineage (and in western kinship terminology because he shares his
father’s blood) not because he is has done anything to deserve it.

In Anglo-Germanic societies, like Pakeha New Zealand, the relationship between father and
son is, of course, also prescribed by our kinship ideology. With the advent of late modernity,
however, the relationship has also taken on important qualities belonging to pure
relationships. The strong contemporary emphasis on love signifies that today the total
meaning of such relationships is no longer given; some aspects of the relationship must also
be achieved. Love depends upon, and is a reflection upon the individual traits of those who
love and are loved. In a world of reflexive self-identity and fragile pure relations, love has a
double function. It can both reaffirm the value of the unique personal traits of the individual,
and be the ‘glue’ that prevents the pure relationship from dissolving. Prescribed relationships
cannot do these jobs because such connections are based on formal duty and formal duty
necessitates disregarding personal traits and individual uniqueness. Not only are prescribed
relations the very opposite of pure relationships, they may also undermine a persons reflexive
project of self-identity and his or her feeling of self-worth because it is in the nature of the
prescribed relationship to ignore individual traits.

The vast majority of fathers of the pre WW II generations modelled their ways of being
fathers on some version or another of the breadwinner father model. That model grew out of
and was part of a pre- and early- modern world of prescribed kinship- and community
obligations. Connections between the pre-WW II fathers and their sons were defined by
kinship ideology and as such given by blood. Individual character traits of both fathers and
sons were of no significance for determining the contents of the relationship. On the contrary
it was necessary to under-communicate and diminish the importance of individuality. Sons
were, by necessity and as a matter of course, treated as sons, not as individuals. Blood was not
only thicker than water, but in order to remain thick it was important not dilute it with all
sorts of irrelevant idiosyncrasies. With the emergence of late-modernity the involved father
model became gradually more accepted as the proper way to be a father. According to
feminist historians the emphasis upon emotional warmth in the relationship between mother
and child had developed among the white bourgeoisie in Europe and North America during
the latter part of the eighteenth century [Glenn1994:14]. Gradually the same emphasis
became part of the fathering model as well. Sons of the post WWII generations grew up in a
world of accelerating late-modernity and picked up both the need and the thrill of engaging in
reflexive projects of self-identity and pure relationships. The majority of their fathers did not.
The sons learned and adopted the involved father model. They used that model and came to
expect and want recognition as unique and valuable individuals by fathers who on their side
believed it was of utmost importance, for their sons’ benefit as well as their own, to treat the
sons as if their personal and unique traits did not exists. The fathers wanted to assure the sons
that they would honour their paternal duties and the sons wanted to be loved for their
personal qualities, not only by reason of their common blood.
**Blood and love**

Love is of utmost importance in relationships between Pakeha fathers and their adolescent sons. The basic argument in this chapter is that in order to understand why this love is taken for granted, and why it is so important not to doubt it, we must realize that he meaning of the connections between the fathers and sons is a matter of both blood and love. To understand the implications of this it is necessary to investigate, in even greater detail than I already have, the meaning of these two concepts. To some extent these concepts directly contradict each other. Let me consider the concept of ‘blood’ first. One way to understand this concept is to link it to a theory of essences as outlined by D’Andrade [1995].

‘It is a common belief, found in many western cultures, that certain things are the way they are because of some essence. Thus tigers are said to have a certain essence which make them tigers.’ [:176].

D’Andrade, borrowing from Pascal Boyer [1993], links the idea of essence to the idea of natural kinds. His argument is that in nature there are ‘natural kinds’ like plants, animals and certain substances like iron and water. According to D’Andrade and Boyer natural kinds are easy to think with because they lend themselves to strong inductive reasoning. Having, for example, observed a relatively small number of tigers it is easy to predict what the next tiger is going to look like and how it will behave. Boyer claims that people extend the idea of natural kind from that which really does form natural kinds, to that which does not, creating pseudo-natural kinds.

“An obvious example of the generalization of the doctrine of essence to pseudo-natural kinds is the notion that humans come from different races, and that, since races are natural kinds, one can generalize from skin colour to character.”[Op.cit:178, italics in origin]

Both D’Andrade and Boyer are of the opinion that such inappropriate generalizations and creations of pseudo-natural kinds are the results of deeply embedded cognitive models.

Personally I am sceptical to the idea of the existence of natural kinds, but accept the point that the idea of essence has to do with deeply held cognitive models. Bradd Shore distinguishes between special purpose models and foundational schemas. He says:

“While this distinction is inevitably fuzzy, cultural models differ quite dramatically in their schematizing power. Foundational models are distinctive in their capacity to organize a superficially diverse set of special purpose models with a common form” [Shore, 1996:68].

To my mind D’Andrade’s notion about natural kinds and essences is a particular kind of foundational schema. As I wrote in chapter five one of Shore’s better examples of a foundational schema in western culture is what he calls the modularity schema. It is a model for the breaking up of entities, e.g. the splitting up of any kind of entity, including that which D’Andrade calls natural kinds. In a way the idea of essence is the opposite model to the modularity schema. Where the modularity schema is useful for dividing entities, the essence schema is useful for uniting various elements into one entity. Or rather, the model of essences
is useful in ‘explaining’ how seemingly separate elements are united into a unitary form constituted either by ideology or perception.

Western notions of kinship is a special purpose model based on a foundational schema of essence. The essence that unites all members of the same lineage is ‘blood’. It is the common blood that make them the same, and that carries the rights and obligations that they all cannot but honour. This is precisely Schneider’s point in his *A Critique of the Study of Kinship*:

“The European and the anthropological notion of consanguinity, of blood relations and descent, rests on (…….) the state of being, on the sharing of certain inherent and therefore inalienable attributes, on the biogenetic relationship which is represented by one or another variant of the symbol of ‘blood’ (consanguinity), or on ‘birth’, on qualities rather than performance.” [1984:72 italics in origin].

While it seems clear that the notion of blood builds on a foundational schema of essence, it is obvious that the concept of love has nothing to do with essence. Love does not refer to anything concrete or material. It is an abstract notion through and through. However, like essence, it has to do with the process of creating connections, but in a very different fashion than blood. As the above citation from Schneider indicates there are other ways, in addition to shared essence, for modelling bonds. Schneider mentions performance and D’Andrade [ibid], referring to Keller and Lehman’s [1993] work from Vanuatu, indicates that “efficacious image” may be a third way of modelling how elements fit together as comprehensive wholes. In western culture both ‘image’ and ‘performance’ are foundational schemas of togetherness, or of being united, and the concept of love borrows some of its meaning from both of these. However, there is a fourth foundational schema that I believe to be even more important in understanding the meaning of love. That is the foundational schema of natural forces.

Love is usually talked about as something that hits people, an outside force that carries them away. The idea of abstract and intangible forces is very strong in western thinking. The entire body of knowledge we call physics is built upon it, and within the new religious beliefs and practices called ‘new age’ the image of ‘energies’ is pervasive. According to this foundational schema natural forces are omnipresent, and keep everything in place. Gravity is a prototypical example of a natural force. All sane members of western societies believe that it exists, we all take it for granted and it would be absurd to doubt it. The fact that it cannot be explained does not worry us. As a matter of fact the idea that gravity is a natural force may actually work better exactly because it cannot be explained. It is a fundamental given which, like God, can only loose credibility on being explained. When western people experience things that seem to be connected for no apparent reason at all it always makes sense to evoke either an idea of a natural force or some spiritual connection. To me natural and spiritual force are but two different words for the same underlying way of reasoning.

To link love with natural forces may seem like a far fetched idea. Still, the link has been made before and Peirce reasoned along some of the same lines. He regarded the laws of physics as deeply ingrained ‘habits of nature’ [Christiansen 1988]. These habits of nature are formed because matter is attracted to matter and this attraction can be understood as a form of love which he calls Agapistic development. If we think along Peirce’s lines the words love and natural force may actually be understood as substitutes for each other in trying to grasp the same phenomenon. By following Peirce we can engage in a chicken-egg speculation and
ask if experiences of ‘natural forces’ are the basis for understanding connections between people, or if experiences of love may be the basis for our way of conceptualizing connections in nature?

**Similarity and proximity**

So far I have only dealt with one side of the double phenomenon of cultural form, i.e. those meanings of blood and love that are distributed over instituted, public cognitive models. Understanding how these models become conventional mental models and how that influences the meaning of the concepts remains to be investigated. As I wrote in chapter two metaphors and metonyms are products of two fundamentally different cognitive processes for creating connections between entities. Though I have made this point earlier I still think it warrants repetition. Solheim [1998] employs this distinction in order to make sense of what she considers to be an element of magic in symbols of the body:

“The question is if we here are faced with two absolutely basic and general ways of conceptualizing connections - similarity and proximity - that at the deepest level is based on bodily/sensational experiences and images. In other words, that the human way of thinking, our way of establishing connections of meaning, is in a certain sense ‘magical’, and may say to derive from these two basic forms of ‘sensational’ associations.” [:63, my translation, italics in origin].

Shore on the other hand employs the same distinction in order to make new sense of the old debate about totemism:

“Both views of totemic symbolism - metaphoric and metonymic - may be understood as complementary modes of propagation. Metaphorical totemism suggests that naming is understood as a kind of symbolic propagation..... naming .....is a form of creation, and the transmission of names is a kind of reproduction. On the other hand, metonymic totemism celebrates the propagation of a group through physical and spiritual incorporations of animal and human, with sexual and eating relations the most frequent mediators. This generative ambiguity in totemism is not surprising, since both classification (differentiated relations) and incorporation and transformation (identity relations) are basic processes in human life and in human thought. Natural species are well suited to bridge these functions, since humans partake in a double relationship with “nature”, both participating in the natural order as a part to a whole (i.e., metonymy’) and categorically distinguishing themselves from nature as distinct but parallel forms of life (i.e., metaphor).” [ibid:173]

The modern family is as much of a ‘magical’ entity as the totems of the Murngin of Australia. Solheims main point in the above quotation is that the human way of establishing connections of meaning basically is derived from associations of bodily/sensational similarity and proximity. If that point is acceptable there is reason to speculate if the earliest experiences of bodily/sensational similarity and proximity may also carry special significance both as foundations for later associations, and because these early associations are less readily available for linguistic reflection. In the western world the great majority of babies are born into and grow up within some form of family or another (by family here I mean only a group of people consisting of no less than one parent and the child). Most children therefore have the bulk of their first, and formative, experiences of bodily/sensational associations within
this kind of human constellation. Considering the fact that the human brain is not fully developed until the age of five [Shore 1996:16] these experiences have a huge impact and actually contribute to how the brain is formed. From pre birth till at least one, if not two years of age, all these associations are pre-lingual. It is therefore reasonable to argue that the meaning of these experiences will, at least partly, remain beyond words.

One of the perspectives, employed by psychologists, for understanding this early developmental phase is to view it as a gradual process of individualization [Erikson 1963, Stern 1985]. An anthropological perspective supplied by Dumont suggests that this kind of identity formation can be investigated from two different angles; the holistic view which postulates that the individual is always an integral part of the social community which constitutes it, and the universalistic view of abstract individuals that carry their identity inside them regardless of the social relations they are involved in [Dumont 1994]. In Shore’s language we can talk about these same identity processes in different words; Children are at first “participating in the natural order as a part to a whole i.e., (metonymy)” [Shore 1996:173] and gradually learns to “distinguish themself from nature” (or in this case their parents) “as distinct but parallel forms of life (i.e., metaphor)”. [ibid]

The point that totemic symbolism (metaphorical and metonymic) can be understood as complementary modes of propagation seems even more readily applicable to the family than to individuals. The symbolism of the family is also about propagation, both materially, socially and symbolically. At the most inclusive metonymic level the family participates in the propagation of such holistic forms of human togetherness as the whole of humanity, society and culture. Simultaneously the family also metaphorically propagates fathers and mothers, as well as sons, daughters and siblings, and of course also the propagation of unique individuals. Thus the meaning of family relations, and particularly the relationships between fathers and sons, is totemic in the sense that they carry the same uneasy mix of metaphorical and metonymic meaning.

**Love, doubt and conviction**

Let me return to my initial question: Why do fathers and sons take the love in their relationship absolutely for granted? My first answer is that the tie in the relationship is conceptualized according to two different fathering models; the breadwinner father and the involved father. In the former model the tie is a matter of ‘blood’, i.e. essential shared properties. In the latter it is a matter of love, i.e. a natural force that emanate from personal characteristics. The argument that has structured this chapter so far is that in contemporary Pakeha culture the word love has taken on the meaning of both of these two different notions about what it is that connects fathers and sons. This connection has become a matter of both love and blood at the same time; a matter of both essential sameness that disregards idiosyncratic traits and a force that emanates form the personal characteristics of the father and the son as those two unique individuals. An essential aspect of the meaning of the shared essence is that it cannot and should not be doubted. Because the meaning of blood and love has coalesced, love cannot and should not be doubted either.

The insight that the concepts blood and love gradually inform each other and start sharing many elements of meaning contributes to our understanding of how it becomes possible to take love for granted. But the insight is not comprehensive because it does not help us to understand why it has become so important to take it for granted, and how the personal
conviction whereby it actually is taken for granted, is established. To answer these questions it is necessary to consider how the meaning of relationships between fathers and sons are established and develop, particularly for the first few years that the relationship exists. In the vast majority of cases the relationship between father and child starts off radically different from the relationship between mother and child. In a profound way the meaning of the relationship between a mother and a child starts off as a metonymic connection, especially during pregnancy and during breast feeding. During pregnancy the child is literally a part of the mother and during breastfeeding continues to make the mother part of itself. For the father this obvious and material metonymic relationship is not possible. For a father and child the ‘part of each other’ relationship has to be created either through joint participation in the same performances of togetherness or through abstract means such as a strong ideology of shared essence (blood) combined with frequently repeated statements of how this essence ties the child to the father.

From the infants point of view the ideology is obviously superfluous. Even though the child is born with the ability to act as if it has a sense of self it is also born into a ‘holistic’ world in the sense that its ability to clearly differentiate between itself and the surroundings is greatly limited. A child is, in other words, born into a world of metonymic connections, and though the mother usually is the most obvious ‘metonymic’ figure most children arrive into a larger and ‘total’ social constellation, i.e. the family. Both as a cultural model and a concrete social entity the family is not reducible to its members, and as such the child is born into a whole consisting of mother, father and perhaps siblings. As family members all these people are part of each other and that ‘being part of each other’ is what the metonymic meaning of a family is. During the first formative years of their lives children have an overwhelming number of bodily/sensational experiences that constitute all their cognitive (both ideas and emotions) associations about being the same as, as well as close to, the family and each and every one of the other members of the family. If, or when, these notions have been formed, on the basis of actual experiences of proximity and similarity, and because they are formed prior to and independent of language, they are not readily accessible to reflective thought, and thus hardly open to doubt.

The meaning of each and every relationship within the family is different for every family member. In a profound way the particular meanings for each person is linked to that person’s experiences of bodily/sensational connections of similarity and proximity to the other members. Such experiences depend on actual participation in acts of togetherness. In other words, the meaning of the relationships depends on performances. My point is that notions of togetherness are not derived from concepts, e.g. the concept of shared essence. On the contrary the concept of shared essence derives its meaning form experiences of togetherness. In the vast majority of father-son relationships, both historically and today, the metonymic meaning of the idea of shared essence between father and child was and is not based on bodily/sensational experiences of acting together. The breadwinner father is rarely present, and he is a peripheral member of the family unit that the child is born into. As a consequence the metonymic connection, based on the abstract ideology about shared blood, has no basis in early bodily experiences of being one. When western societies were kinship based societies this did not really matter because the ideology of blood and the social organization based on kinship were part of the make up of almost all aspects of a person’s life. When social organisation is based on an ideology about shared blood, the meaning of shared blood will also be an immanent and fundamental aspect of how people experience their world. For most
boys in such a society, after they have reached approximately five years of age, the great majority of their bodily/sensational experiences of connections of proximity and similarity will be a base for and a reinforcement of the ideologically shared blood.

In late-moderns societies like New Zealand the ideology of kinship has become very weak and has more or less disappeared as a principle for the organisation of material and political social structures and processes. The metonymic connection between father and child therefore cannot grow out of ideology and social organization; it depends entirely on concrete performances of togetherness. Most Pakeha fathers have not been greatly involved in such performances and as a consequence the embodied metonymic meaning of most father-child relationships is actually quite weak. Now that most vital social tasks are no longer organized on the basis of kinship the concept of blood (as one of the ties in the relationships between fathers and sons) has ceased to carry any embodied metonymic meaning. And because performative acts of nearness, caregiving and love have not yet become frequent and strong enough to fill that metonymic gap, there is a strong potential for a symbolic void in these relationships. That void is existentially threatening to both fathers and sons. For fathers who believe in the involved father model it is threatening because it undermines the connections that supposedly constitute them as fathers, for sons because it threatens to render them deserted in a world of strange men. The gap therefore has to be filled, and the ideology of blood is very well suited for the job. While the metonymic meaning of the relationship between father and son is not based on experiences of bodily/sensational connections of similarity it will be fundamentally doubt-able. In a relationship where both the material and the symbolic consequences of a breakdown of the relationship are so severe, such fundamental doubt is too uncomfortable to live with. The gap has to be filled, the doubt removed, and the concept of blood (shared essence) does so wonderfully.
Final remarks

Interpersonal connections are of such fundamental importance that in a sense they are a precondition of humanity. And yet, when trying to understand what it is that connects people we easily run into problems because we are so used to thinking about connections in terms of substance. One of my first points in this thesis is that substance is not a good metaphor for understanding the nature of interpersonal relationships because there is nothing tangible about connections between people. This metaphor thus directs our attention towards properties of relationships that do not exist. My suggestion is that we should rather think about connections between people as a matter of meaning. In order to understand interpersonal relationships we must, as a consequence, look for the ways whereby such relationships are constituted and maintained as symbolic entities.

Meaning, the contents of connections between people, emerges, twists, turns and changes as a consequence of things we say and do. Or, in more academic words, the meanings of interpersonal dyads emerge as a consequence of interplay between interaction and cultural notions. Sometimes and some aspects of such meaning emerges in accordance with our wishes and intentions, but most of the meaning of interpersonal relationships does not. In other words, it is very difficult (perhaps impossible) to deliberately construct the meanings of interpersonal relationships, and the self-identities that come with them. They grow, to blossom, distort or wilt through experiences of nearness, similarity, violation and abandonment. All attempts to control and intentionally create one kind of meaning will necessarily inform the meaning and thus transform it. The meaning is the relationship and the relationship is the meaning. As such the meaning/relationship is always larger than and beyond the control of individuals.

In this thesis I propose that methodologically interpersonal relationships can be understood as emergent outcomes of continuing processes of boundary management where acts of transgressions, defence and retreat are continuously interpreted as care or violation, pride or fear, aloofness, disinterest or autonomy as well as a wide range of other specific meaning. By interpreting each others movements within the interpersonal space power sometimes takes the form of care other times of exploitation. Within this symbolic and interpersonal landscape dominance can be an attempt to achieve nearness, and love can lead to respectful distance and parallel lives. In benevolent relationships boundary management are always paradoxical exercises, particularly so in relationships of love, based on a huge pool of experience of nearness. This paradox is less apparent in relationships of suspicion, fear and distrust which encourage an Aristotelian logic, and the constitution of individuals as bounded and autonomous entities. By this logic relationships are understood as external connections between independent entities. Trust, friendship and love, not to mention care, on the other hand is only possible when there is an element of magical thinking involved. Actually, and this is the paradox, the latter kinds of relationship necessitates both. They can only exist as long as the law of contradiction is seen as both valid, and not valid, at the same time. By this logic a relationship is understood as both an external connection and a magical union at the same time.

I have argued that in order to arrive at a reasonably comprehensive understanding of the process whereby the meaning of interpersonal dyads emerges at least three different analytical perspectives needs to be employed. One perspective involves uncovering the
cognitive models involved, the second perspective searches for the phenomenological
experience of the relationship, and the third aspect is the social reproduction of the conditions
on which the two other aspects rests.

Cultural and social processes impinge on personal boundary management. Culture provides
the models we use in order to conceive and recognise boundaries; models of personhood, of
the positions we have in relation to each other and of the relationships themselves. Culture
also provides major parts of the cognitive apparatus involved in how we experience the
world, but never dictates the contents of an experience. Social patterns, particularly of wealth
and power, provide opportunities and obstacles to fulfilling our aspirations and relationships
between fathers and sons in New Zealand Pakeha society provide good examples for how
these processes unfold in real life. The hegemonic model of fatherhood in Pakeha culture
encourages fathers to be involved. The great majority of Pakeha fathers say they would like
to do that, many of them try and only a few succeed. Conflicting ideals of both fatherhood
and masculinity combined with great rewards of money, power and prestige means many
fathers also have aspirations to succeed in other relationships, outside the home and the
family. Much time and energy is deflected from their children that way. If these fathers try to
be more involved they face the risk of being disqualified by their wives. Lacking knowledge
and skills as caregivers and home-makers the easiest strategies for managing their
boundaries, towards wives and children is to assume a dominant position, or to withdraw. As
a consequence, even though most Pakeha fathers believe in the involved father model, their
behaviour is far more in accordance with the breadwinner father model.

Those fathers who succeed in being involved fathers, who are not too preoccupied by some
public project or another, and who are qualified in the home, face another boundary
challenge. Their relationships to their sons carry many elements of ‘magical union’ and thus
these fathers face the same challenge mothers usually face; how to be close while
simultaneously gradually increasing the distance needed for the child to become an adult?
Pakeha men seem to do this in a different way from women. They employ the interactional
style men usually engage in in public. By defining an external object or sphere of interest
they can relate to each other indirectly via this external entity. When boundary management
requires distance they can define separate spheres for father and son and make sure not to
overstep each other’s areas.

Boys too struggle with the demands of conflicting cultural models and ideologies, the
restrictions of institutionalised social patterns and their own personal issues. According to
one model of ‘sonhood’ they are required to be totally egocentric, to explore and expand all
their immanent potential and thus become unique and wonderful individuals. On the other
hand, and in accordance with another cultural model, they must obey, be quiet and do as they
are told. This tension is evident in how most sons manage their boundaries towards their
fathers. When faced with dominant fathers sons handle their boundary management by
engaging in a dance of submission, opposition and withdrawal. Sometimes they play safe,
other times they challenge their fathers by exposing some aspect of their budding self-
identity, and other times they take time out to rest. When faced with withdrawn fathers the
sons either choose to withdraw too, or move in to fill the gap. When the father is an involved
caregiver the tension seems far less. Like father the son has an ingrained knowledge of the
other. Being close is not difficult, managing distance more of a challenge. The relationship is
symmetrical, apart from the fact that whereas the father tries to under-communicate his
structural superiority, that is not a problem to the son.

In chapters four, five, six and seven I describe and analyse interactions between fathers and sons in great detail in order both to understand what they do, and the various conditions influencing how fathers and sons interact. The ultimate aim, however, is to understand how their actions, cultural models and experiences informs the meaning of the relationship as such. In other words I want to understand how all these factors influence and constitute what the relationship is. Chapter eight is my attempt at pulling all these elements together and to show how different actions, cultural models and experience can generate the same notion that love is taken for granted, but for very different reasons. Today in Pakeha culture love is both the justification and the reward of the father-son relationship. But depending upon the models fathers actually manage to base their paternal behaviour upon different meaning of love emerges. Conflicting models of fatherhood and kinship renders love fundamentally problematic. On the one hand the relationship, and the love, is supposed to be given by blood. On the other hand the actual love is supposed to be unique for each relationship, grown out of the particular characteristics of the two people involved. Love cannot be both given and acquired at the same time. When fathers do not have much experience as primary care givers an element of doubt creeps in where the love should be unquestionable. The less intimate knowledge father and son have of each other the more reason to suspect that the love is flawed. But in relationships between fathers and sons that doubt cannot be allowed to grow because in late modern society there are no other reasons to justify the continued existence of the relationship. At the same time, but from another cognitive source, blood still exists as a symbolic foundation for the relationship. Blood is given, it is not doubt-able the same way that love is because blood is forever; it does not depend upon performance. Once the blood connection is established it is taken for granted. Blood eradicates the possibility of doubt. When the meaning of love and blood coalesce, love too is taken for granted and it can no longer be doubted, regardless of how the relationship is experienced.

Future research

Ever since anthropologists like Schneider [1984] and Gellner [1973] exposed the pre- and ill-conceived notion that ‘common blood’ was a cross-culturally valid foundation for kinship relationships, comparative studies of kinship have been in the doldrums. The interest in relationships between close kin has never disappeared, however, but as Carsten et al. [2000] argues we need a new basis for comparison. The old basis was a preconceived dogma about the contents that make up relationships between people. Even though the dogma was wrong, it may be that the idea about contents was right. If so, in order to reestablish the possibility to compare kinship relationships we need a procedure for understanding what makes up such connections.

In this thesis I have tried to establish a theory for understanding how the meanings of relationships come into being. Hopefully it is will prove useful for pointing out a new direction for kinship studies; a direction which does not grant such relationships an a priori meaning, but assists us in understanding what the various relationships mean as part of how people live.

The line of inquiry that I indicate does not take the contents of relationships for given, and as such I believe it may be useful for comparative studies of all kinds of relationships. In my study I compare thirteen different fathers and sons. The same theory and procedure can be
used for studying and comparing fathers and daughters, mothers and sons, mothers and
dughters, brothers and sisters, just to name a few. It would, of course, be particularly
valuable to conduct a similar study to this, of relationships between fathers and adolescent
sons, among a different group of people, e.g. Maories or Norwegians. Such studies would not
only show if my approach is applicable outside Pakeha New Zealand, but would also indicate
if it is useful for establishing a basis for comparison.

Last, but not least, this study demonstrates that there is a future for an anthropology of dyads.
At the very beginning of this thesis I expressed a certain discomfort because many
anthropological analysis make me loose sight of the people the analysis are about. I am
convinced that the approach I have applied in this study would help to rectify that problem. A
sharp focus on interpersonal relationships makes it virtually impossible to lose sight of real
people, because without the people there is no relationship. At the same time this approach
does not restrict the ethnographer and analyst to any particular scale. A sharp focus allows for
thick descriptions of all the various influences contributing to the makeup and the
constitution of the relationship. In other words, it acts as a hologram for the social and
cultural world it is a part of. A sharp focus on dyads has also proven to be a good tool for
uncovering the webs of relationships surrounding the dyad, and assists in uncovering the
wider field of relationships that actually influence the meaning of the relationship studied. By
focusing sharply we are in a position to describe the larger system of relationships radiating
out from the dyad.

An anthropology of dyads is not only a good tool for uncovering how social and cultural life
pans out, it is also an epistemological attitude. A large proportion of the anthropologists with
whom I have had the pleasure to discuss this matter carry a deep conviction that human life,
cultural and social phenomena, are far richer and far more complex than our descriptions and
interpretations manage to convey. In addition all descriptions and analysis of human life carry
a potential for reductionism. An anthropology of dyads can help to reduce this tendency on
the one hand because it is yet another perspective and thus expands our field of vision. More
importantly, however, it is medicine against reductionism because it aims to fathom the
paradoxical nature of relationships. An anthropology of dyads rests on the conviction that
connections between humans embody both magical and rational meaning, that human beings
understand their world by use of both magical and rational reasoning at the same time, and as
anthropologists we must do the same in other to understand their lives.
Endnotes

Notes to chapter 1

1. There is some controversy among Kiwis in general whether ‘Pakeha’ is a derogatory term or not. The scholarly point of view, as expressed by the sociolinguist Donn Bayard in his book *Kiwitalk* [1995] is that the word has no derogatory connotations in the Maori language. Some of the people who fall within the category I label Pakeha would still rather refer to themselves as Kiwi. The latter term, however, can refer to New Zealanders of Maori decent as well, and the term is thus not useful for my purpose. As far as spelling is concerned it is some times spelled with and sometimes without a capital P. I have chosen to use a capital P to signify that Pakeha is a proper name for a category of the New Zealand population.

2. Face to Face with Kim Hill, TV One, New Zealand Television, 2 October 2003.

3. Approximately equal to a masters thesis.

4. There are, of course, a number of exceptions. Malinowski’s *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* [1927/2001] is a fine example and provides a number of very excellent insights into the contents of specific relationships, particularly between boys, their fathers and their maternal uncles, among the Trobriands. Still, even here, these relationships are not the proper aim of the study. Malinowski’s real interests are larger social systems like ‘the family’ and kinship principles like ‘father right’ versus ‘mother’ right.

5. According to Bauman [1997] different terms are used by different theoreticians who try to understand and analyse the same or similar kinds of social phenomena Anthony Giddens uses the term ‘late modernity’, Ulrich Beck calls it ‘reflexive modernity’, George Balandier talks about ‘surmodernity’ and Zygmunt Bauman himself calls it ‘post-modernity’. As I see no obvious pros or cons with any of the terms, and since I rely heavily on literature by Giddens, I will stick with his

Notes to chapter 2

6. Cato Wadel uses the term ‘relational explanation’, but I find the word ‘explanation’ epistemologically too strong. It implies that it is possible both to identify all the relevant factors contributing to the way humans behave, and give a correct presentation of the facts of the matter. I do not think that is possible. All we can ever do is to interpret, and hope that our interpretations make sense.

7. Conceived as in a product of sexual intercourse, and conceived as in imagined.

8. The relationship between parts and wholes has been a problem in the social sciences for a long time. I will not enter into that debate here as it is peripheral to my thesis

9. I use the prefix extra- rather than ir- or non- so as to indicate that I am not taking about an opposition between rational and non-rational ways of grasping the world. Neither do I want to indicate that the ir-rational is inferior to the rational.

10. This philosophical standpoint is not universally accepted and the arguments I have presented here are obviously not sufficient. Elsewhere (Vandeskog 1999) I have presented my argument in far
greater detail, but because the problem is of limited relevance for my topic I have chosen not to include it in this thesis.

11. In cognitive anthropology the word schema and models are used interchangeably and refer to the same concept.


Notes to chapter 3


14. He did, however report that some of the women he met at the playground, the clinic etc made derogatory comments to the effect that he was pretentious because he would never be a ‘real mother’ to his children. The critique was not, in other words, directed at his lack of fatherliness, but at his deficiency as a ‘mother’. Though he thoroughly disliked such comments, to some extent he actually also agreed with them. He too was of the opinion that he could never provide the gentle, motherly love that the children needed, and which their mother was able to give.

Notes to chapter 6

15. Hubby is slang for husband. In New Zealand there is a company called ‘Hire a hubby’ that does odd jobs around the house, jobs that husbands are supposed to do, like fixing a leaking faucet and a broken window hinge.

Notes to chapter 7

16. I do not employ the concept risk in the same way as Beck [1994]. I am not talking about the production of risk in modern society, but about the degree of inherent potential for harm in all human relationships

17. The Oedipus theme occupies a major position within many discussions about father-son relationships. I have deliberately avoided entering into a debate about this theme. The main reason is that I do not believe the theme would inform my arguments. Rather, I believe it would be a barren tangent. In my material I certainly see sons who compete with, and thus ’fight’ and try to ’beat’ (‘kill’) their fathers. That part of the myth is present. But I see no signs of sons trying to win their mothers. There were actually signs to the contrary. One son who usually competed very hard with his father said he still preferred his fathers company to that of his mother. The reason was that his mother interfered too much. In other words, she did not honour his attempts at establishing personal boundaries. Another reason for not participating in the Oedipus discussion is that it is so large it would take up too much space in this thesis. A third and most important reason is that father-son relationships in late modern societies can be understood very well (perhaps better) without it.
Notes to chapter 8

18. The significance of this is different for daughters and sons. The metonymic connection between a
daughter and her mother, the sameness of both being women, is extremely difficult to break. Within
western culture there is a strong conviction that the metonymic connection between mother and son
must be broken for exactly the same reason. In order to become a man the boy must be separated from
the community and category of women, and enter into the world of men [Hudson and Jacob 1991]. If
the metonymic connection with the father has not been established prior to the symbolic break with
the mother, there is a danger that the son may find himself symbolically deserted in a world of
strangers. I believe that boys are thus more vulnerable to feelings of being fundamentally ‘ontological
insecure’ than girls.
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