Wittgenstein Nachlass Ts-226: A case of Wittgensteinian (Self-)Translation

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Abstract: Wittgenstein engaged in translating his Austrian German philosophical writings into English in various ways and at different levels. One notable example is the commitment of R. Rhees’ to translate the *Philosophical Investigations* “Frühfassung”, and Wittgenstein’s revisions to Rhees’ translation draft of part of it in Wittgenstein Nachlass Ts-226. The main objective of this contribution is to draw the reader’s attention to this relatively little studied and discussed item and to encourage translation research on it. The contribution offers transcriptions of selected portions of Ts-226 in parallel with their sources in Ts-239.

Keywords: Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226, Rush Rhees, Translation Practice, Philosophical Translation, Manuscript and Text Revision

Introduction

Wittgenstein engaged in translating his Austrian German philosophical writings into English in various ways and at different levels. Some notable examples are the following: his input for the translation of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (TLP 1921) into English (TLP 1922),¹ the 1935-36 work on a second philosophical book in parallel German-English based on the *Brown Book* (Pichler 2004, p. 130),² his work with T. Redpath on the 1938/39 translation of the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1953) “Frühfassung” version (Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-247, see

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¹ See CCO 1973, WC 2008 and LPA 2016 for primary sources and research studies on this project.
² For a list of correspondences (parallel corpus) between the English original in Ts-310 and the German in Ms-115 see Pichler & Smith 2013.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
Venturinha 2010), and finally the 1938 commitment of R. Rhees’ to translate the “Frühfassung” itself and Wittgenstein’s revisions to Rhees’ translation draft of part of it. It is the texts of this translation project of (part of) the “Frühfassung”,\(^3\) begun but not completed by Rhees and revised by Wittgenstein in cooperation with Y. Smythies, that is the focus of this contribution. This project is preserved in the Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226.\(^4\)

By the beginning of November 1936 when Wittgenstein was residing at his house over the Eidsvatnet in Skjolden, he had dismissed not only the project of translating the Brown Book into German (Ms-115, second part) but also the Brown Book project in its entirety (Pichler 2004, pp. 132ff). Then in 1936-37 he wrote a first compact version of what we today know as PI §§1-188. This text is today called the PI “Urfassung” (PI 2001) and preserved in the Nachlass as Ms-142. A typescript with a clean version of Ms-142, Ts-220, was begun and probably also completed in the summer of 1937 at the latest. It is Ts-239, a later version of Ts-220, which eventually formed the basis for Rhees’ English translation draft in Ts-226.\(^5\)

Ts-226, as it is preserved in the Nachlass, consists of 72 sheets (plus half a sheet at the beginning containing the famous citation from Augustine’s Confessiones about the learning of language) and corresponds to PI §§1-107. The entire typescript contains numerous revisions in Wittgenstein’s hand, and it is common opinion that these revisions are all corrections to Rhees’ translation draft, something that Wittgenstein himself suggests in his letter to G.E. Moore from February 2, 1939 (ICE 2011):

\(^3\) The PI “Frühfassung” consists of Ts-220 and Ts-221, the first corresponding roughly to PI §§1-188/189. The latter contains a synopsis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics 1937-38 and was published in its later version Ts-222 in Part I of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956).

\(^4\) On the Wittgenstein Nachlass see von Wright 1969.

Dear Moore,
I had a p.c. on Wednesday from Keynes saying that he would like to see the English version of my book, or whatever is ready of it. I needn’t say the whole thing is absurd as he couldn’t even make head or tail of it if it were translated very well. But as a matter of fact the translation is pretty awful as I saw today when I tried to go through it in order to correct it before giving it to Keynes. Though I worked quite hard on it the whole day with Smythies we only did 12 pages, because masses of it had to be altered. Tomorrow I must go on with it because tomorrow night Keynes ought to get it. So I’m afraid I shan’t be able to come to you in the afternoon. I have written to Keynes that you have read the first half of my first volume & could give him some information about it; for obviously you must be able to get more out of reading the original than Keynes could get out of a bad translation & in a hurry. So I hope he’ll ask you to give him your opinion. By the way, please don’t mention to anyone that I don’t think highly of the translation. Rhees did his very best & the stuff is damn difficult to translate.

I hope to see you soon. Best wishes!

Yours Ludwig Wittgenstein

It must be pointed out that many of Wittgenstein’s revisions in Ts-226 may be regarded as revisions to the German source text itself and to introduce new meanings as much as corrections to the translation. Wittgenstein was, at least partly, clearly not only correcting Rhees’ translation but also used it as a basis for developing the PI text and project itself further. Cases where Wittgenstein introduces new meanings include in my view the following replacements:

- “What is the meaning of the word ‘five’? – There was no question of any here; ...” → “But what’s the meaning of the word “five”? – There was no question of such an entity ‘meaning’ here; ...” (§ 2); Wittgenstein replaces “any” with “such an entity ‘meaning’”.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
Ts-239, § 2 the German original had read “Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes ‘fünf’? – Von einer solchen war hier gar nicht die Rede; ...”

- “kinds” → “cases” (§ 8); the German original read “Arten” (Ts-239, § 6)
- “long string” → “a whole lot” (§ 73); the German original read “eine ganze Reihe” (Ts-239, § 70)
- “correspondence” → “similarity” (§ 73); the German original read “Entsprechungen” (Ts-239, § 70)
- “cannot characterize these similarities better than by” → “can’t find a better || a more appropriate name for these similarities than” (§ 74); the German original read “kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren, als durch” (Ts-239, § 71)
- “But if someone wished || were to say” → “But if someone said” (§ 74); the German original read “Wenn aber Einer sagen wollte” (Ts-239, § 71)
- “In fact, can one always replace an indistinct photograph by a distinct one to advantage?” → “In fact, is it always desirable to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one?” (§ 78); the German original read “Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen?” (Ts-239, § 75)
- “place” → “street” (§ 78); the German original read “Platz” (Ts-239, § 75)
- “an indirect means” → “an indirect way” (§ 78); the German original read “ein indirektes Mittel” (Ts-239, § 75)
- “expression” → “language” (§ 99); the German original read “Ausdruck” (Ts-239, § 95). 

Wittgenstein’s revisions didn’t eventually seem to have any significant bearing on his further reworking of the German text because the final PI “Endfassung” in Ts-227 (1944-46) is in its wording again much closer to Ts-239 than to the revised text of Ts-226. The entire revision project in Ts-226 seemed then to have been more or less simply forgotten or left

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6 Note that the section numbering of Ts-226, added by Wittgenstein, skips number 99. There is also a mistake in the pagination which jumps from 65 to 67.
aside. This fits with what J. Schulte generally says about Wittgenstein: “... now and then, Wittgenstein disregarded the reworked text and went back to an earlier version.” (1992, p. 36)

In the following, I offer transcriptions of selected portions of Ts-226 in parallel with their sources in Ts-239. I have selected parts of which I thought it was reasonable to assume that they were of considerable importance to Wittgenstein:

- First, the discussion of Augustine’s description of the learning of language, including Wittgenstein’s transition to using it positively as the framework for introducing “primitive languages” / “language games” as means for seeing clearly the functioning of our language (Ts-226, 3).
- Second, the introduction and discussion of what in Wittgenstein research is standardly called “family resemblance” but Wittgenstein here, correcting Rhees, himself calls “family likenesses” (Ts-226, 48).
- Third, the discussion of the role and nature of achieving a clear view of our language, especially as it relates to the idea of philosophical analysis in the Tractatus sense – thus an “übersichtliche Darstellung” which (again in the wording of Wittgenstein’s revision) makes the structure of language “capable of being all seen at a glance” (Ts-226, 65).

The transcriptions start with a section here presented en face, “I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226”:

- The verso page offers the German Ts-239 §§1-6, 69-71, 75, 94-96, along with their section numbers (= §239).

7 To include the entire Ts-226 along with its counterparts in Ts-220 / Ts-239 would naturally have by far exceeded the limits of this publication. The reader has access to the entire Ts-226 as also all other Wittgenstein Nachlass items edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) through IDP 2016 (transcriptions) and BNE 2015 (facsimiles).

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
The recto page offers Rhees’ English translation of the same passages, thus Ts-226 §§1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101 (the section numbering deviates from the numbering in Ts-239 post §3) – before Wittgenstein’s revision in hand (= ¤226).

The subsequent section “II: Wittgenstein’s text additions and deletions in ¤226” renders the Ts-226 selection as revised in Wittgenstein’s hand (= ¤226+w) on text level – text added is marked green, text removed pink. With Sections I and II, it should be possible to study Rhees’ translation and Wittgenstein’s revisions to it in not too cumbersome a way. At the same time, the first two sections should not be taken as a substitute for a thorough study of the sources for which I in a concluding section offer “III: Diplomatic transcription of ¤226+w”. Naturally, the reader is encouraged to take the further step of also consulting the facsimile of Ts-226 on Wittgenstein Source, http://wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-226_f, and using the diplomatic transcription as help for reading in the original.

I should add a word about how the text renderings were produced – and how they can be reproduced and verified by the reader:

The transcription of ¤239 in I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226 was produced from the Bergen Wittgenstein Archives’ (WAB) open access “Nachlass transcriptions” site which offers “interactive dynamic presentation” access to WAB’s transcriptions of the Wittgenstein Nachlass (IDP 2016). Here I select “Ts-239” from the drop-down list and run it through the linear transformation scenario (option “Display original line breaks?” clicked to Yes) thus producing a linear and slightly normalized version of the document. Subsequently I copy the selected portions into a MS Word document. ¤239 thus gives a reader-friendly version of the text: orthography is gently normalized; deficiencies due to typewriter limitations (such as “Aepfel” in stead of “Äpfel”, “weiss” in stead of “weiß”) are tacitly

8 Phrasing of these options as of January 2019. Please note that the rendering of the original line breaks is not flawless, neither on the online site nor in the transcriptions included here.
corrected; indentation is unified; deleted text is omitted; undecided alternatives are however still retained and marked … | | … .

The transcription of 226\(^{-}w\) on the recto page was produced on the same IDP site by picking “Ts-226” from the drop-down list and likewise running it through the linear transformation scenario (option “Display original line breaks?” clicked to Yes); this time however additionally the option “Exclude handwritten revisions in typescript?” was clicked to Yes. Thus a text was produced that omits Wittgenstein’s corrections and revisions. In toto, the 239 and 226\(^{-}w\) transcriptions permit the reader to easily read the German translation source and Rhees’ English translation in parallel and without being distracted by the many additions in Wittgenstein’s hand since both columns offer linearized renderings.

II: Wittgenstein’s text additions and deletions in 226 was produced by running linear versions of both 226\(^{+}w\) and 226\(^{-}w\) through the “Compare two documents” function of MS Word and having MS Word mark both additions and deletions. Text additions were marked green, text deletions pink and with strikethrough.\(^9\)

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\(^9\) The MS Word “Compare two documents” function occasionally produced an unhappy word order that I put right. Please note that pasting the HTML output of WAB’s transcriptions from the web browser into a MS Word document can produce faults in the text rendering; for example, markup features such as colouring of lines and underlinings as well as the lines and underlinings themselves can get lost, and separate words can be joined together by MS Word. Unfortunately this also affects III: Diplomatic transcription of 226\(^{+}w\) which does not always distinguish between deletions of typed text made by Wittgenstein in hand (which should consistently be marked by a strikethrough line in olive green) and deletions of typed text already made by Rhees in typewriter (which are marked by strikethrough lines in black). MS Word seems to throughout render strikethrough lines in the colour of the underlying text. For a rendering of the sources as intended please consult the IDP 2016 site. With regard to different writing pens used by Wittgenstein in his typescript revision (see for example Ts-226,65 which contains revisions not only in pencil, but also blue ink and black ink), please note that these currently are not distinguished in WAB’s transcriptions; thus, independent of whether a handwritten revision in typescript is in pencil or pen or this or that colour, all will be rendered in olive green.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
The final section III: “Diplomatic transcription of □226+w” was produced by again using IDP 2016 but this time Ts-226 was run through the diplomatic scenario (option “Original line breaks” on), and Wittgenstein’s additions in hand included (option “Handwritten revisions in typescript” on). This part thus gives a diplomatic version of □226 and marks all corrections and additions, be they in typescript by Rhees or the result from Wittgenstein’s later revision. For a detailed guide to the markup please consult the legend available from the output produced on the IDP 2016 site.

The main objective of this contribution is to draw the reader’s attention to the relatively little studied and discussed Wittgenstein Nachlass item Ts-226 and to encourage translation research on it. Though Baker and Hacker (2009) pays attention to them, a thorough study of Wittgenstein’s changes to Rhees’ translation is to my knowledge still lacking. It could reveal patterns which might help us understand better not only Wittgenstein’s translation and translation revision practices, but also contribute to obtaining better insight into his overall manuscript and text revision and composition practices. My first impression is that some of Wittgenstein’s revisions clearly answer to what often is called the “accessibility” requirement of translation while Rhees’ translation itself seems mostly to have tried to follow the “equivalence” requirement and is thus often simply more faithful to the original than Wittgenstein’s revision.10

10 About these two requirements see further P. Oliveira’s contribution in this volume. – I am indebted to Konrad Bucher and Nivedita Gangopadhyay for comments and corrections to an earlier version of this paper. The transcriptions of selected parts of Ts-226 and Ts-239 are published by kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College Cambridge and the University of Bergen.

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Alois Pichler
[Appendix]
I: From German Ts-239 to English Ts-226

(Ts-239: §§ 1-6, 69-71, 75, 94-96 from pages 1-3, 49-51, 53-54, 67-68)

Augustinus, in den Confessionen I/8
cum ipsi (maiores homines) appellabant rem illam, et cum
tempore eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbant,
et tenebant hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos veile ex motu corporis
aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
quae flunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
dis, habendis, rejiciendis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba
in variis sententiiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
tiabam.

In diesen Worten erhalten wir – so scheint
es mir – ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen der menschlichen
Sprache. Nämlich dieses: Die Wörter der Sprache benennen
Gegenstände – Sätze sind Verbindungen von solchen Benennun-
gen.

In diesem Bild von der Sprache finden wir
die Wurzeln der Idee: Jedes Wort hat eine Bedeutung. Diese Bedeutung ist dem Wort zugeordnet. Sie ist
der Gegenstand, für welchen das Wort steht.

Von einem Unterschied der Wortarten spricht
Augustinus nicht. Wer das Lernen der Sprache so beschreibt,
[p. 2] denkt – so möchte ich glauben – zunächst an Hauptwörter,
iw "Tisch", "Stuhl", "Brot"
und die Namen von Personen, erst in zweiter Linie
an die Namen gewisser Tätigkeiten und Eigenschaften, und
an die übrigen Wortarten als an etwas, was sich finden wird.

Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Spra-
che:- Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen
Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: "fünf rote Äpfel".
Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf
welcher das Zeichen "Äpfel" steht; dann sucht er in einer
Tabelle das Wort "rot" auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein
färbiges Täfelchen; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahl-
wörter – ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig – bis zum
Worte "fünf" und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel
aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Täfelchens hat. So, und
ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten.- "Wie weiß er aber, wo
und wie er das Wort 'rot' nachschlagen soll und was er
mit dem Wort 'fünf' anzufangen hat?” – Nun, ich nehme an,
er hat die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort "fünf" gebraucht
wird.

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Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
1 Augustinus, in den Confessionen I/8
cum (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum
secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum
eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis
aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium,
quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum
actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in peten-
dis, habendis, rejiciendis, faciendis rebus. Ita verba
in variis sententis locis suis posita, et crebro audita,
quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque
jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enun-
tiabam.

In these words we have - it seems to me - a definite
picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words
of the language designate objects - sentences are combinations of
such designations.

In this picture of language we find the root of the idea:
every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word.
It is the object which the word stands for.

Augustine does not speak of a distinction between parts of
speech. Whoever Anyone who
describes the learning of language in this way
thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives like “table”,
“chair”, “bread” and the names of persons; and of the other parts
of speech as something that will work out all right.

2 Consider this application of language: I send someone
shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which are the marks:
“five red apples”. He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens
the box that has the mark “apples” on it; then he looks up the word
“red” in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now
speaks || pronounces the series of cardinal numerals - I assume that he knows them
by heart - up to the word “five” and with each numeral he takes an
apple from the box that has the colour of the square. - This is
how one works with words. - “But how does he know where and how
he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he has to do with the
word ‘five’?” - Well, I am assuming that he acts as I have described.
The explanations come to an end somewhere. - What is the meaning of
the word “five”? - There was no question of any here; only of the
way in which “five” is used. // Nothing of that sort was being
discussed, only the way in which “five” is used.

Fasse dies als vollständige primitive Sprache auf. Augustinus beschreibt, könnten wir sagen, ein System der Verständigung; nur ist nicht alles, was wir Sprache nennen, dieses System.

(Und das muß man in so vielen Fällen sagen, wo sich die Frage erhebt: "ist diese Darstellung brauchbar, oder unbrauchbar?" Die Antwort ist dann: "Ja, brauchbar; aber nur für dieses eng umschriebene Gebiet, nicht für das ganze, das Du darzustellen vorgabst." Denke z.B. an Theorien der Nationalökonom.)

Es ist, als erklärte jemand: "Spielen besteht darin, daß man Dinge, gewissen Regeln gemäß, auf einer Fläche verschiebt ..." - und wir ihm antworten: Du scheinst an die Brettspiele zu denken; aber das sind nicht alle Spiele. Du kannst deine Erklärung richtigstellen, indem du sie ausdrücklich auf diese Spiele einschränkst.

Denk' dir eine Schrift, in welcher Buchstaben zur Bezeichnung von Lauten benützt würden, aber auch zur Bezeichnung der Betonung und als Interpunktionssymbole. (Eine Schrift kann man auffassen als eine Sprache zur Beschreibung von Lautbildern.) Denke dir nun, daß einer jene Schrift so verstünde, als entspräche einfach jedem Buchstaben ein Laut und als hätten die Buchstaben nicht auch andere Funktionen. So einer – zu einfachen – Auffassung der Schrift gleicht Augustinus' Auffassung der Sprache.

Wenn man das Beispiel (2) betrachtet, so ahnt man vielleicht inwiefern der allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte das Funktionieren der Sprache mit einem Dunst umgibt, der das klare Sehen unmöglich macht. Es zerstreut den Nebel, wenn wir die Erscheinungen der Sprache an primitiven Arten ihrer Verwendung studieren, in denen man den Zweck und das Funktionieren der Wörter klar übersehen kann.

Solche primitiven Formen der Sprache verwendet das Kind, wenn es sprechen lernt. Das Lehren der Sprache ist hier kein Erklären, sondern ein Abrichten.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of the way in which language functions. But one might also say it is the notion of a more primitive language than ours.

Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help a builder A to make himself understood by an assistant B. A is constructing a building out of building stones; there is a supply of cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A shouts || calls out the words; B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.

Take this as a complete primitive language.

Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system.

(And this must be said in ever so many cases where the question arises, "can this description be used or can't it be used?". The answer is, "Yes, it can be used; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you were professing to describe." Think of the theories of the economists.)

It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we were to answer him: You are apparently thinking of games played on a board; but those aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

Imagine a way of writing || type in which letters are used to indicate sounds, but also to indicate emphasis and as marks of punctuation. (One can regard a way of writing || type as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone understood this way of writing || type as though it were one in which to every letter there simply corresponded a sound, and as though the letters did not have other very different functions as well. – An oversimplified view of the type like this one resembles, I believe, Augustine's view of language.

If one considers example (2) one may perhaps begin to suspect how far the commonly accepted concept of the meaning of words surrounds the functioning of language with a mist that makes clear vision impossible. It scatters the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application, where the simplicity enables one to get a clear view of the way the words function and of what their purpose is.

Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

...
Hier stoßen wir auf die große Frage, die hinter allen diesen Betrachtungen steht. — Denn man könnte mir nun einwenden: "Du machst dir's leicht! Du redest von allen möglichen Sprachspielen, hast aber nirgends gesagt, was denn das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels, und d.h. der Sprache, ist. [p. 50]\[1][2]

Was allen diesen Vorgängen gemeinsam ist und sie zur Sprache, oder zu Teilen der Sprache macht. Du schenkt dir also gerade den Teil der Untersuchung, der dir selbst seinerzeit das meiste Kopfzerbrechen gemacht hat, nämlich den, die allgemeine Form des Satzes und der Sprache betreffend."

Und das ist wahr. — Statt etwas anzugeben, was allem, was wir Sprache nennen, gemeinsam ist, sage ich, es ist diesen Erscheinungen gar nicht Eines gemeinsam, weswegen wir für alle das gleiche Wort verwenden, — sondern sie sind miteinander in vielen verschiedenen Weisen verbunden. Und dieser Verwandtschaft, oder dieser Verwandtschaften, wegen nennen wir sie alle "Sprachen". Ich will versuchen, dies zu erklären.


Und das Ergebnis dieser Betrachtung lautet nun: Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen.
Here we come up against the big question that lies behind all these considerations: For one might object to me: “You take it easy! You talk about all sorts of language games, but you have never said what it is that is essential to a language game, and that means to language. What it is that is common to all these processes and makes them language or parts of the language. You treat yourself to precisely that part of the enquiry, therefore, which at one time gave you the greatest puzzlement, namely that concerning the general form of the proposition.”

And that is true. – Instead of stating something which is common to all that we call language, I say there is nothing common to these phenomena in virtue of which we use the same name for all of them,– they are related to one another in many different ways. And on account of this relationship, or these relationships, we call them all “languages”. I will try to explain this.

Consider for a moment the processes that we call “games”, for instance. I mean games played on a board, card games, ball games, contests in the ring prize fighting, etc. What is common to all these? – Don’t say, “there must be something common to them, otherwise they would not be called ‘games’”; but look and see whether something is common to all of them. – Because if you look at them you will not see something common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections, – a long string of them. As I say: don’t think, but look. – Look for instance at the games played on a board, with their various connections. Now pass to card games; here you find many points of correspondence to the first class, but many characteristic common features disappear, and new ones appear. If you now pass to ball games, much that is common remains, but a lot is lost. – Are they all “amusing”? Compare chess with . Or is there in every case such a thing as winning and losing or ([p. 48]) rivalry between the players? Think of the games of patiences. In ball games there is winning and losing, but if when a child throws the ball against the wall and catches it again this feature has disappeared. See what part skill and luck play. And what a difference there is between skill in a game of chess and skill in a game of tennis. Think now of round games: here there is the element of amusement, but how many of the other characteristic features have disappeared. And so we may go through the many, many other groups of games. Watching similarities show themselves and disappear.

And now the result of these considerations is: We see a complicated net of similarities which overlap and cross one another. Similarities in large respects and in small.
Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren, als durch das Wort "Familienähnlichkeiten"; denn so übergehen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. - Und ich werde sagen: die 'Spiele' bilden eine Familie.

Und ebenso bilden z.B. die Zahlenarten eine Familie. Warum benennen wir etwas "Zahl"? Nun etwa, weil es eine - direkte - Verwandtschaft mit manchem hat, was man bisher Zahl genannt hat; und dadurch, kann man sagen, erhält es eine indirekte Verwandtschaft zu anderem, was wir auch so nennen. Und wir dehnen unseren Begriff der Zahl aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern sich überkreuzen.

Wenn aber Einer sagen wollte: "Also ist allen diesen Gebilden etwas gemeinsam, - nämlich die Disjunktion aller dieser Gemeinsamkeiten" - so würde ich antworten: hier spielst du nur mit einem Wort. Ebenso könnte man sagen: es läuft E t w a s durch den ganzen Faden, nämlich das lückenlose Überkreuzen dieser Fasern.

Man kann sagen, der Begriff 'Spiel' ist ein Begriff mit verschwommenen Rändern. - "Aber ist ein verschwommener Begriff überhaupt ein Begriff?" - Ist eine unscharfe Photographie überhaupt ein Bild eines Menschen? - Ja, kann man ein unscharfes Bild immer mit Vorteil durch ein scharfes ersetzen? Ist das unscharfe nicht oft gerade das, was wir brauchen?

Frege vergleicht den B e g r i f f mit einem Bezirk und sagt: einen unklar begrenzten Bezirk könne man überhaupt keinen Bezirk nennen. Das heißt wohl, wir können mit ihm nichts anfangen. Aber ist es sinnlos zu sagen: "Halte Dich ungefähr hier auf!" Denk dir ich stünde mit einem Andern auf einem Platz und sagte dies. Dabei werde ich nicht einmal i r g e n d eine Grenze ziehen, sondern etwa mit der Hand eine zeigende Bewegung machen - ganz als zeigte ich ihm einen bestimmten P u n k t. Und gerade so erklärt man etwa, was ein Spiel ist. Man gibt Beispiele, und will, daß sie in einem gewissen Sinne verstanden werden. - Aber mit diesem Ausdruck meine ich n i c h t: er solle nun in diesen Beispielen das G e m e i n s a m e a u s irgend einem Grunde - nicht aussprechen konnte. Sondern - er solle diese Beispiele nun in bestimmter Weise v e r w e n - d e n. Das Exemplifizieren ist hier nicht ein i n d i r e k t e s Mittel der Erklärung, - in Ermangelung eines Bessern. - Denn, mißverstanden kann auch jede allgemeine Erklärung werden. So spielen wir eben das Spiel. (Ich meine das Sprachspiel mit dem Worte "Spiel".)
I cannot characterize these similarities better than by the expression “family similarities”; for that is the way the different similarities overlap and cross one another which hold between the members of a family: build, facial characteristics, colour of the eyes, walk, temperament, etc. etc.— And I shall say the “games” constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, for instance, constitute a family. Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a — direct — kinship with many things which we have called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it receives an indirect connection with other things which we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of number as we twist fibre on fibre in spinning a thread. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the [p. 49] whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.

But if someone wished were to say, “Then there is something common to all these creations; namely the disjunction of all these common features”, then I should answer: Here you’re merely playing with a word. One might just as well say: something runs through the entire thread, namely the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

We may say the concept “game” is a concept with hazy edges. — “But is a hazy concept a concept at all?” — Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? — In fact, can one always replace an indistinct photograph by a distinct one to advantage? Isn’t what is indistinct often just the thing we want?

Frege compares the concept with a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you could not call a district at all. That means no doubt, we couldn’t do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say, “Stay approximately here”? Imagine I were standing with another person in a place and said this. In doing so I shall not even draw any boundary, but rather make say a pointing movement with my hand, — just as though I were pointing to a particular point. And in just this way we may explain what a game is. We give examples and want them in a certain sense to be understood. — But by this expression I do not mean he is supposed to see what is common in these examples, — which for some reason or other I could not express. Giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining, — in want of a better one. — For any general explanation can be misunderstood too. That just is how we play the game. (I mean the language game with the word “game”.)
Es ist uns, als müßten wir die Erscheinungen durchschauen: unsere Untersuchung aber richtet sich nicht auf die Erscheinungen, sondern – wie man sagen könnte – auf die Möglichkeiten der Erscheinungen. Wir besinnen uns, heißt das, auf die Art der Aussagen, die wir über die Erscheinungen machen. Daher besinnt sich auch Augustinus auf die verschiedenen Aussagen, die man über die Dauer von Ereignissen, über ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, oder Zukunft macht. (Dies sind natürlich nicht philosophische Aussagen über die Zeit, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft.)


Nun aber kann es den Anschein gewinnen, als gäbe es so etwas, wie eine letzte Analyse unserer Sprachformen, also eine vollkommen zerlegte Form ([p. 68]) des Ausdrucks. D.h.: als seien unsere gebräuchlichen Ausdrucksformen, wesentlich, noch unanalysiert; als sei in ihnen etwas verborgen, was ans Licht zu befördern ist. Ist dies geschehen, so sei der Ausdruck damit vollkommen geklärt und unsere Aufgabe gelöst.

Man kann das auch so sagen: Wir beseitigen Mißverständnisse, indem wir unsern Ausdruck exakter machen: aber es kann nun so scheinen, als ob wir einem bestimmten Zustand, der vollkommenen Exaktheit, zustreben; und als wäre das das eigentliche Ziel unserer Untersuchung.

Dies drückt sich aus in der Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, des Satzes, des Denkens. – Denn wenn wir auch in unseren Untersuchungen das Wesen der Sprache – ihre Funktion, ihren Bau – zu verstehen trachten, so ist es doch nicht das, was diese Frage im Auge hat. Denn sie sieht in dem Wesen nicht etwas, was schon offen zutage liegt, und was durch Ordnen über-sichtlich wird. Sondern etwas, was unter der Oberfläche liegt. Etwas, was im Innern liegt, was wir sehen, wenn wir die Sache durchschauen und was eine Analyse hervorgraben soll.

'Das Wesen ist uns verborgen': das ist die Form, die unser Problem nun annimmt. Wir fragen: "Was ist die Sprache?"; "Was ist der Satz?". Und die Antwort auf diese Fragen ist ein für allemal zu geben; und unabhängig von jeder künftigen Erfahrung.
It is as though we had to look through the phenomena: our enquiry, however, is directed not upon the phenomena but rather - as we might say - upon the “possibilities” of phenomena. We recollect, that is, the kind of statements that we make about phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements which one makes about the duration of events, about their past, present or future. (These, of course, are not philosophical statements about time, past, present and future.)

Our view || examination is thus a grammatical one. And this view || examination brings light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, namely, which concern the use of the words of our language and which are brought about by analogies which hold between our forms of expression. - And one can remove these misunderstandings by replacing a certain form of expression by [[p. 65]] others. We may call this “analysing” our forms of expression, since the procedure sometimes bears a resemblance to taking something to pieces.

It may now seem, however, as though there were something like an ultimate analysis of our forms of speech, one completely analysed form of the expression. That is: as though our usual forms of expression were, essentially, still unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light // which has to be brought out into the light. // Once this has been done, the expression is completely explained and our problem is solved.

We may put it also in this way: We remove misunderstandings by making our expression more exact: But it may seem as though we were trying to reach one particular state, that of perfect exactness; as though that were the real aim of our inquiry.

This is expressed in the question as to the essence of language, of the proposition, of thinking. - For if we try in our inquiries also to understand the essence of language - its function, its construction - still it isn’t that which that question has in view. For it sees the essence, not in something that is already open to view, and which by being put in order becomes visible at a glance. But rather something which lies beneath the surface. Something which lies within; which we see when we look through the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

"The essence is hidden from us": that is the form which our problem takes now. We ask, “What is language?”, “What is the proposition?”. And the answer to these questions is given once and [[p. 67]] for all, and independent of all future experience.
II: Wittgenstein’s text additions and deletions in §226


   In these words we have – it seems to me – a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of the language designate name objects – sentences are combinations of such designations names.

   In this picture of human language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word. It is the object which the word stands for.

   Augustine however does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. Whoever || Anyone who if one describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks – I should imagine – primarily of substantives, like “table”, “chair”, “bread” and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will come out all right. eventually...

2. Consider now this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which I have written the marks signs: “five red apples”. He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the drawer that has the mark sign “apples” on it; then he looks up the word “red” in a table, and finds opposite it a coloured square; he now speaks says out loud the series of cardinal numbers – I assume that he knows them by heart – up to the word “five” and with each numeral he takes an apple from the box that has the colour of the square from the drawer. In this way & in similar ways. This is how one operates with words. – “But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he has to do with the word ‘five’?” – Well, I am assuming that he acts, as I have described. The explanations come to an end somewhere. What is. – But what's the meaning of the word “five”? – There was no question of any such an entity 'meaning' here; only of the way in which “five” is used. Nothing of that sort was being discussed, only the way in which words operate.

3. That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion picture of the way in which our language functions. But we might also say that it is the notion a picture of a more primitive language than ours.

4. Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct. The language shall help is to be the means of communication between a builder A to make himself understood by – and his assistant B. [p. 2] A is constructing a building out of building stones blocks; there is a supply of are cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the building stones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: “cube”, “column”, “slab”, “beam”. A shouts calls out the words; – B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call. Take this as a complete primitive language.
Augustine describes, we might say, a system of communication; only not everything; however, that we call language is this system.

(And this one must be said say in most so many cases where when the question arises, "is this an appropriate description or not?". The answer is, "Yes, it can be used is appropriate; but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you can profess to describe by it." Think of the theories of the economists.)

It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we were to answer: "You are apparently seem to be thinking of games played on a board; but these aren't all the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

Imagine a way of writing II type script in which letters are used to indicate sounds, but are also used also to indicate emphasis as accents and as marks as punctuation signs. (One can regard a way of writing II type script as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone understood this way of writing II type interpreted our script as though it were one in which to every letter there simply corresponded a sound all letters just stood for sounds, and as though the letters here did not also have other very quite different functions as well. An such an oversimplified view of the type like this one resembles our script is the analogon, I believe, to Augustine's view of language.

If one considers we look at our example (2) we may perhaps begin to suspect get an idea of how the commonly accepted general concept of the meaning of words a word surrounds the workings of language with a mist that makes clear [p. 3] vision it impossible to see clearly. It scatters the fog is dispersed if we study the workings of language in primitive cases of its application, where the simplicity enables one in which it is easy to get a clear view of the purpose of the words and of the way they function and of what their purpose is.

Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.

Here And here we come up against the big question that lies lying behind all these considerations: For the enquiries we have been making: for one might object say to me: "You take You're taking it easy! You talk about all of language games, but you have [p. 47] never said what it is that's essential is that about to a language game, and that means thus to language. What it is that is, what's in common to all the phenomena these processes || procedures and makes us call them language languages, or parts of the a language. You treat yourself to precisely: That means you don't bother now about that part of the enquiry, therefore, which at one time gave you the greatest puzzlement, namely difficulty, that concerning the general form of the proposition and of language."

And this is true. - Instead of relating one something which is in common to all that we call language, I say there is no one thing || nothing in common to these phenomena, in virtue of which we that makes us use the same word for all of them: they are related || akin to each one another in many different ways. And on account of this relationship, or these relationships, kinship we call them all "languages". I will shall try to explain this.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
Consider for a moment let us consider, e.g., the processes that which we call “games”, for instance, I mean board-games played on a board, card games, ball games, athletic contests in the ring or prize fighting, etc. What is in common to all these? – Don’t say: “there must be something in common to them, otherwise all, or they would not all be called ‘games’” – but look and see whether something is in common to all of them. – Remember all. For if you look at them, though you will not see something that’s common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections, a long string – a whole lot of them. As I may said: don’t think, but look. – Look for instance e.g. at the games played on a board, with their games and the various connections between them. Now pass to card games; here you will find many points of correspondence to similarity between this group and the first class; but many characteristics – common features disappear and new ones appear. If you now pass to ball games, much that is there was in common remains, but a lot great deal is lost. – Are they all “amusing” ‘entertaining’? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or is there in every case always such a thing as winning and losing or ([p. 48]) creating a competition between the players? Think of the games of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing, but if when a child throws the in bouncing a ball against the a wall and catches catching it again this feature has disappeared. See what, there is no winning and losing. Look at the part which skill and luck play. And what a difference there is between skill in a game of chess and skill in a game of tennis. There are of course now think of singing & dancing games: here there is we have the element of amusement entertainment, but how many of the other characteristic features have disappeared! And so we may go through the many, many other groups of games. Watching: seeing similarities show themselves appear and disappear.

And now the result of these considerations i.e.: We observations is: we see a complicated web network of similarities which overlap and cross one another, overlapping and crossing each other. Similarities in the large respects and in the small.

I cannot characterize can’t find a better [[ a more appropriate name for the] similarities than in the expression “family similarities likenesses”; for this is how the various similarities overlap and cross one another which hold between the members of a family overlap and cross: build, facial characteristics, features, the colour of the eyes, walk gait, temperament, etc. etc. And I shall say the ‘games’ ‘games’ constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, for instance, (e.g.) constitute a family. Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a – (direct) – kinship with many to some things which we, up to the present, have been called numbers in the past; and thereby, we may say, it receives an indirect connection which gets related indirectly to other things which we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre in spinning a thread. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.

But if someone said: “Then there is something common to all these communities – family objects – the disjunction of all these common properties”, I should answer: Here you’re merely you are just playing with a word. One might. You may just as well say: something runs through the entire whole thread, namely the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

Oliveira, Paulo; Pichler, Alois; Moreno, Arley (guest eds.). Wittgenstein in/on Translation, Coleção CLE, p. 153-188, v. 86, 2019
We may might say the concept “game” is a concept with hazy blurred edges. – But is a hazy blurred concept a concept at all? – Is an indistinct photograph a blurred photo a picture of a person man at all? – In fact, can one is it always desirable to replace an indistinct photograph picture by a distinct sharp one to advantage? Isn’t what is an indistinct one often just the thing what we want?

Frege compares the concept to a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you cannot call a district at all. This means – doubt, I suppose, we couldn’t do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say, “Stay approximately here?” “Stand roughly there”? Imagine I were yourself standing with another person in a piece street with someone and said saying this. In doing so, I shall saying it you will not even draw any boundary, but rather just make say a pointing movement with my hand – just gesture – exactly as though – you were pointing to at a particular point spot. And in just this way may way way this is how we explain to someone, say, what a game is. We give him examples and want them in a certain sense to be understood in a certain way. – But by this explanation I do not mean: that he is supposed now to see what is in common is to all these examples, the common factor being one which, for some reason or other I could not express, I am unable to point out – but I mean that he is to use these examples in a particular way. Giving examples is here not an indirect means way of explaining, is used for want of a better one. – For any general explanation can be misunderstood. What that, just as as examples can. – That’s how we play the game is played (I mean the language game with the word “game”).

...
We may put it also in this way: We can put as follows: we remove misunderstandings by making our expression more exact; and thus it may seem as though we were trying to reach one particular state, that of perfect exactness; and as though this were the real aim of our inquiry, investigation.

This is what's expressed in the question as to the essence of language, of the essence of a proposition, of thinking. - For if we try although in our inquiries into investigations we are trying to understand the essence the essence of language - (its function, its construction -), still it isn't that which the question has in view. For this question does not see the essence, not in as something that is which already open to view lies open before us, and which by a process of ordering becomes transparent - I mean capable of being put in order becomes visible all seen at a glance. But: but rather as something which lies beneath lies under the surface. Something, which lies within, which we see when we look through see into the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

"The essence is hidden from us": that: The essence is what's hidden: this is the form which our problem now takes now. We ask: "What is language?". "What is a proposition?". And the answer to these questions is to be given once and for all, and independent of all future experience.
III: Diplomatic transcription of □226w

(Ts-226: §§ 1-8, 72-74, 78, 98-99, 100-101
from pages 0-3, 46-49, 64-67 - with Wittgenstein’s revisions)

1 Augustinus, in [den] the Confession [en] I/8:

Cum (maiores homines) appellabant rem aliquam et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam,
et tenebam hor ab eis vocari res illam, quod sonabant, cum cum vellent ostendere. Hoc uteb eos sive ex motu corporis
aperiebatur; tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae sunt voce et motu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu voce indicante affectionem anini in petendi,
dis, habendi, rejiciendis, faciendis rebus. Ite verba in varia sententia locita sole posita, et aequo audit, quorum resum signa essent, paulatin colligebas, maxque
jam voluntates, edito in eis signis ore, per haec enum-
tiasan.
In these words we have it seems to me -- [[In these words we are given, it seems to me,]] a definite picture of the nature of human language. Namely this: the words of language designate objects -- sentences are combinations of such designations. Hence, in this picture of language we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated to the word.

It is the object which the word stands for.

Augustine does not speak of a distinction between parts of speech. Unfortunately, if we describes the learning of language in this way, one thinks - I should imagine - primarily of substantives, like "table", "chair", "bread" and the names of persons; and of the other parts of speech as something that will cut out all right eventually.

2. Consider this application of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper, on which I have written the signs: "five red apples". He takes it to the grocer; the grocer opens the box that has the mark "apples" on it; then he looks up the word "red" in a table, and finds opposite it a colored square; he now speaks loudly the series of cardinal numerals -- I assume he knows them by heart -- up to the word "five" and with each numeral he takes an apple that has the colour of the square. -- This way he is to look up the word 'red' and what he has to do with the word 'five'? -- Well, I am assuming that he has done as I have described.

3. That philosophical concept of meaning is at home in a primitive notion of the way in which our language functions. But one might say -- it is a picture of a more primitive language than ours.

4. Let us imagine a language for which the description which Augustine has given would be correct: the language should be the means of communication between a builder A and his assistant B...
assistant B. A is constructing a building out of building stones; there are cubes, columns, slabs and beams. B has to hand him the buildingstones in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words: "cube", "column", "slab", "beam". A shouts out the words; B brings the stone that he has learned to bring at this call.

5

As Wittgenstein describes, we might say, a system of communication; not, that we call language is this system. And this language is not everything, but only for this narrowly restricted field, not for everything that you profess to describe. Think of the theories of the economists.

6

It is as though someone explained: "Playing a game consists in moving things about on a surface according to certain rules ...", and we answered him: You are apparently thinking of board games; but there aren't all games the games there are. You can put your description right by confining it explicitly to those games.

7

Imagine a way of writing in which letters are used to indicate sounds, but are also used to indicate emphasis, and as marks of punctuation in. (One can regard a way of writing in which letters are used to indicate sounds, but are also used to indicate emphasis, and as marks of punctuation as a language for the description of sounds.) Now suppose someone understood our way of writing, though he supposed that in which to sound our letters might correspond to sound, and as though the letters did not have different functions, and thought of them as the analogon to Augustine's view of language.

8

If the economy is our example (2) may perhaps be an oversimplified view of how the concept of the meaning of a word surrounds the words of language with a mist that makes
It is impossible to see clearly, if we study the *phenomena* of language in primitive *cases* of its application, where the simplicity enables us to get a clear view of the *words* and of what their purpose is. The way they function.

Primitive forms of language of this sort are what the child uses when it learns to speak. And here teaching the language does not consist in explaining but in training.
And where we come up against the big question that lies behind all these considerations: the enquiries we have been making: "you're taking it easy! You talk about all sorts of language games, but you have never said what it is that's essential to a language game, and that means, to language. What is it that is in common to all these processes, all these ways of using the same name for all of them, that makes us call them language." And that is true. Instead of saying something which is in common to all that we call language, I say there is no one thing in common to these processes. To name just one, use the same name for all of them, they are all alike in that and another in many different ways. And one cannot know of this relationship of these relationships, which we call then all "languages". I want to try to explain this.

Let us consider the processes we call "games". I mean games, board games, card games, ball games, athletic contests, etc. What is it common to all these? Don't say: "there must be something common to them", because they would not be called "games". But whether something is common to all of them is because if you look at them, though you will not see something that's common to all of them, but you will see similarities, connections, etc. of them. As I said: don't think, but look. Look at similarities at these "games" and these "languages" and these various similarities between them. Now pass to card games: you will find many points of similarity between them, because they are the first class; but many features disappear, and new ones appear. If you pass to ball games, much that is common remains, but a lot is lost. Are they all "amusing"? Compare chess with Noughts & Crosses. Or is there such a thing as winning and losing or...
In ball games there is winning and losing, but a child playing two against two against the wall and catching the ball, it is a game which is lost or won in part by skill and luck. But what a difference there is between skill in chess and skill in tennis. We link two of these games here and two of these games there where there is no winning and losing. And what a difference there is between skill and luck in games like patience and in ball games. In ball games there is winning and losing, but a child is throwing the ball against the wall and catching the ball, again this feature has disappeared there is no winning and losing.

And now the result of these considerations is: we see a complicated net of similarities which overlap and cross one another. And in this way we may go through the various similarities which overlap and cross one another which hold between the members of a family: build, facial characteristics, the colour of the eyes, temper, etc. And I shall say the constitute a family.

And in the same way the kinds of numbers, constitute a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a direct kind of connection with other things which we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number, as we twist fibre on fibre in spinning a thread. And the strength of the thread does not lie in the fact that one fibre runs through the

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through the whole length of it, but in the fact that many fibres overlap.

But if someone wished to say: "Then there is something common to all these — the disjunction of all these common —", then I should answer: Here you are playing with a vexed question just as well as — especially runs through the three — the uninterrupted overlapping of these fibres.

We say the concept "game" is a concept with hazy blurred edges. — But is a hazy blurred concept a concept at all? — Is a indistinct blurred photo a picture of a person at all? — In fact, can one always replace an indistinct picture by a distinct one? — I mean then do we want? Frege compares the concept of a district, and says: a district without clear boundaries you could not call a district at all. Th means, we couldn’t do anything with it. But is it meaningless to say, "Stay approximately here"? Imagine I were standing in a street with another person in a place and said this. In doing so, I shall say, you will not draw any boundary, but rather make a pointing movement with my hand, gesture — just exactly as though I were pointing to a particular spot. And in just this way, giving examples and want them to be understood in a certain way. — But will this expression I do not mean: that he is to see what is common in all these examples, in the common factor being the which, for some reason or other, I could not express, but I mean that he is to use these examples in a particular way. Giving examples is not of explaining, to want of a better one. — For any general explanation can be misunderstood — — — That’s how the game is played — (I mean the language game with the word "game").
It is as though we had to look through the phenomena: our enquiry, however, is not to be directed at the phenomena, but, as we might say, the possibilities of phenomena. The kind of statements we make about the phenomena. Thus Augustine calls to mind the various statements about the duration of events, about past, present and future. (These, of course, are not philosophical statements about time, past, present and future.)

Our examination is therefore a grammatical one. And brings light into our problem by clearing away misunderstandings. Misunderstandings, arising out of the use of the words of our language, are brought about by analogies between forms of expression. And these misunderstandings are removed by replacing certain forms of expression by...
others. We may call this "analysing" our forms of expression,

the procedure sometimes resembles as if one completely

analyzes what is the essence of an analysis:

as though there is something like an ultimate analysis of our forms of expression, essentially unanalysed; as though something were hidden in them which has to be brought to light; which has to be brought out into the light. If this has been done, the expression is completely explained, and our problem is solved.

We may put it in this way: This can be put as follows: We remove misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact: This is expressed in the question as to the essence of language, of the proposition, of thinking. For in our investigations, to understand the essence of language (its function, its construction), still it isn't that which lies beneath the surface which is the form which lies within; which something which lies beneath the surface becomes visible at a glance: transparent – I mean capable of being all seen at a glance – but rather as something which lies beneath the surface, which lies within, which we see when we look through into the thing, and which an analysis has to dig out.

The essence is hidden from us: The essence is what's hidden: this is the form which our problem takes now. We ask: "What is language?", "What is a proposition?". And the answer to these questions is: given once and
and for all, and independent of all future experience.