Threat, Anti-Western Hostility and Violence among European Muslims: The Mediating Role of Acculturation

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ABSTRACT

In many Western countries, the public has extensively debated factors potentially leading Muslim minority-group members to support violence by foreign extremist states or to commit violence themselves. Here, one central question has been whether their acculturation orientations may play a role. Combining perspectives from intergroup threat theory and acculturation psychology, the present study investigated whether one reason for why threat perceptions lead to higher violent behavioral intentions among Muslims, as evidence by previous research, may be that they are related to distinct acculturation orientations. It tested this proposition in two samples comprising of Norwegian (N = 253) and British Muslims (N = 194). The more Norwegian Muslims perceived realistic threat, the more violent behavioral intentions they showed, but this relation was not mediated by acculturation. Among British Muslims, mainstream acculturation orientation was related to more violent intentions, while threat was not. In both samples, symbolic threat was associated with more support for Muslim military violence and this relationship was mediated by religious acculturation in the U.K. In contrast to previous research, symbolic threat was linked with less personal intentions to commit violence in the U.K., mediated by religious acculturation. Complementary analyses calculating acculturation strategies indicated that assimilated, and to some extent integrated, Muslims in both countries tended to show the highest violent behavioral intentions. By contrast, separated individuals showed the highest level of support for Muslim military violence. Ways in which these findings can be used to counter violence and improve intergroup relations in Western ethnically diverse societies are discussed.

Introduction

Academic research and the wider public debate in many Western countries has increasingly focused on Islamic terrorism in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. The discussions have mainly centered on the cultural position of Muslim terrorists in their respective societies. A common question has been whether being integrated, assimilated, marginalized or separated from society – cultural styles that in academic research commonly are referred to as acculturation strategies (Berry, 1997; Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & van Egmond, 2015) – constitute risk factors (see e.g., Stroink, 2007; Martinez, 2016). On the one hand, anecdotal evidence such as the case of Karim Cheurfi, a French national with a criminal record who in April 2017 shot three police officers in the Champs-Élysées (Dearden, 2017) implies that marginalization may play a role for radicalization and violent acts. On the other hand, the case of the assailters involved in the London bombings in 2005 suggest that highly educated and well-integrated individuals, who

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are born and raised in Western societies and positioned in well-paying occupations, might support or conduct terrorist acts (Krueger & Malecková, 2003).

Against this background, the present research aims to investigate the factors that undergird violent behavioral intentions and attitudes among Muslims living in two Western European countries. It focuses especially on the mediating role of acculturation in the relationship between perceived threats and support of violence.

**Perceived threat and hostility towards out-groups**

Integrated threat theory (ITT) (Stephan & Stephan, 1993) explains how perceiving threats to one’s group can contribute to negative attitudes and hostility towards an out-group. ITT includes four types of factors, namely realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes. A more recent development of the model, Intergroup Threat Theory, focuses primarily on two basic types of threats – realistic and symbolic (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). In addition, another form of threat, which was previously considered a sub-form of realistic threat, named ‘safety threats,’ is treated as distinct in the present research, due to empirical and qualitative differences and its different role in predicting attitudes towards outgroups (Crawford, 2014). Symbolic threats arise as a result of perceived threats to the cultural norms, traditions, and belief system of a group (Stephan & Stephan, 1993). Realistic threats arise when a group perceives other groups as a threat to their social welfare and resources, which are short in supply, such as jobs, politics, land and power (Obaidi, Bergh, Sidanis, & Thomsen, 2018; Quillian, 1995). Finally, safety threat refers to the perception of threat towards the physical safety, security and well-being of the group (Kottrell & Neuberg, 2005). While symbolic and realistic threats are often associated with resentment and antipathy towards the out-group as emotional responses, safety threat tends to be linked with fear of the other group (Uenal, 2016).

According to the Intergroup Threat Theory, threat does not have to be real (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). The very perception of it is sufficient to initiate a prejudiced response. As minorities in western countries, Muslims are often confronted with intergroup tensions and external stressors such as perceived and actual discrimination, Islamophobic sentiments in everyday lives and in the media (Kunst & Sam, 2013; Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Thus, in the current study, we argue that Muslim minority members might perceive the majority society as a threat to their religious culture and practices, economic stability and safety, which in turn might be related to out-group hostility and retaliatory reactions in the form of violence (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Fischer, Haslam, & Smith, 2010). There is ample evidence to support the idea that perceived threat to religious cultural norms and values can result in aggressive outcomes and correlates with support for antipathy, political violent intentions and behavior towards an out-group (see e.g., Sniderman, Hagemoorn, & Prior, 2004; Ysseldek, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Thus, perceived realistic, safety and symbolic threat, might act as factors that initiate violent attitudes and violent behavioral intentions among the Muslim Diaspora living in Western countries.

**The potential mediating role of acculturation**

When an individual moves from one cultural society to another, their experiences in the new society may modify their cultural self-concept through the process of acculturation (Berry, 1997). Berry (1997)’s acculturation model proposes four strategies: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization. Assimilation occurs when individuals give up their heritage culture in favor of the host society’s culture. Integration is the outcome when individuals adopt the new culture while maintaining their heritage culture. Separation happens when an individual maintains his or her heritage culture, and rejects the dominant culture. Finally, marginalisation takes place when individuals give up their heritage culture and do not adopt the new culture. Marginalization and separation are linked with less positive psychological adaptation (i.e., psychological problems and poor well-being), whereas integration and assimilation tend to be associated with the best psychological adaptation (i.e., fewer experiences of discrimination and greater occupational success; see Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Vanclayson & Van Craen, 2010). This fourfold view of acculturation has, however, been criticized for its lack of conceptual framing, weak psychometric properties and inability to explain differences between individuals and groups (see Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001 for a discussion). Therefore, in the field of acculturation, many researchers nowadays focus mainly on ethnic and host culture orientations and, sometimes compute the four strategies in addition.

Instead of examining acculturation orientations in terms of an individual’s ethnic culture in addition to the host country’s culture, as is commonly done, the present research focus on their religious culture. Religion is considered a powerful source of group identity for many individuals, as religious cultural norms form cognition and direct actions, providing its followers with a sense of security, a set of shared values, and group boundaries (Kinnvall, 2004; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015; Gattino, Miglietta, Rizzo, & Testa, 2016). Studies show that for a high proportion of Western Muslims, affiliation with and commitment to their religious culture, values and group membership is a more important element of their self-definition than affiliation with their ethnic culture (Mood, 2003; Saeed, Blain, & Forbes, 1999; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). For this purpose, the current research focuses on religious acculturation rather than religious identity. Religious acculturation, in this study, refers to the degree to which individuals prefer or choose religious values, entertainment and religious sociability, whereas host acculturation, in line with previous research, refers to the extent to which individuals adopt and adhere to the values and behaviors that are a part of the majority society.

Research on terrorism posits that perceived threat from the society in the form of discrimination, and perceived humiliation might lead to separation or marginalization from the host society (King & Taylor, 2011; Moghaddam, 2005). Further, literature suggests that marginalization and separation correlates with aggressive behavior and even political violence (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). Thus, we argue that even though threat might function as important predictors of radicalization and political violence (Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013), the acculturation process might mediate this relationship. While evidence suggest that religion may not act as the
primary motivator for joining violent extremist organizations or committing acts of terrorism (Pearce, 2014; Zirkov, Verkuyten, & Weesie, 2014), many Muslims might be attracted to violent religious groups as a result of disengagement and separation from the host society (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010; Butler, 2015). That is, for Muslim immigrants who perceive the majority society as threatening their religious culture and norms and therefore dis-identify from the mainstream culture or society, these organizations, with their clear ideology coated with religious teachings, may provide group certainty, a sense of belonging and significance. By contrast, the ideologies of many militant organizations contrast sharply with Western culture, norms and values. Hence, we argue that Muslims living in Western societies who show high host cultural adoption (i.e., adopting its norms and culture) are less likely to support violent religious ideologies or behavior of such organizations (e.g., see Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006). Based on this argument, the current research investigates the potential role of religious and mainstream acculturation in mediating the relationship between perceived threats and violence.

Anti-Muslim rise in Norway and the U.K.

We wanted to examine the relations of interest in two countries to test for their cultural dependency versus generalizability. For that reason, we choose the Muslim communities in Norway and the U.K. Both communities share many cultural similarities, and, are, therefore, comparable on several dimensions. While both countries encouraged immigration from Muslim majority countries for work and study purposes during the 1960s (Ali, 2015; Darke, 2019; Mathismonen, 2005), the nation state of Norway has historically been a relatively homogeneous country, whereas the U.K., due to its colonial history, has experienced different types of migration from Muslim countries for longer parts of their history. Hence, we were interested to what extent the phenomena of interest would differ or be the same in both contexts.

Norway. Modern day Norway is the homeland of various ethnic minorities, with third-generation immigrants currently accounting for 14.1% of the total population (Statistics Norway, 2017). Norwegian-Muslims constitute approximately 5% of the entire Norwegian population (Statistics Norway, 2017). The attacks of 9/11 brought an intense focus on the Muslim community’s religious practices and their compatibility with European values (ECRI, 2009), giving birth to widespread skepticism towards the Muslim population (IMDI, 2007). However, the narrative took a new shift in the aftermath of the terror attacks on 22nd July 2011 by the Norwegian, White right-wing extremist and Islamaphobe Anders Behring Breivik who proclaimed a war against Islam and demanded the deportation of Muslims from Europe. After the attacks, the Norwegian nation responded with positive attitudes towards the Muslim minority (Jakobsson & Blom, 2014). Yet, due to the emergence of ISIS and their attacks on Western soil, and a high proportion of second-generation Norwegian Muslims’ going to Syria as foreign fighters (Kristiansen, 2016), frequent and widespread suspicion and prejudiced attitudes towards Muslims were reported in Norway (Moen & Hoffmann, 2017). More specifically, concern for foreign fighters’ motivation to carry out attacks in Norway (PST, 2018), combined with the immensely debated Islamic religious practices, created an environment of distrust and contributed to anti-Muslim hate (Bangstad, 2016; Urbuye, 2018). Moreover, due to the high outflow of Norwegian Muslims to Syria and the frequent terror attacks in other parts of Europe following the “refugee crisis,” the populist Norwegian government comprising of the anti-immigration Progress Party started blaming the previously governing Labor Party for their lenient immigration policies. As a result, the party’s campaigns directed negative media and public attention towards Norwegian Muslims (Bangstad, 2016; Færaas, 2011).

Consequently, Muslims in Norway experience multifaceted levels of religious discrimination, attacks on mosques and verbal and physical hate crimes (Johnsen, 2016; Linstad, 2018). As a result, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) criticized the current Norwegian government for their insufficient efforts to stop hate speech (ECRI, 2015).

U.K. Approximately 6% of the U.K.’s total population comprises of Muslims (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The country has lately witnessed reports of increasingly negative attitudes towards the Muslim Diaspora and, more recently, serious hate crimes, cyber bullying, and verbal and physical threats against Muslims (Field, 2013; Sheridan, 2006). Specifically, following the high outflow of U.K. born Muslims to Syria to join the ISIS (Bakker, Paulussen, & Entenmann, 2013), combined with the Woolwich attacks in 2013, British Muslims are being stereotyped more often as violent extremists. Additionally, a potential threat of British-born ISIS fighters trained in combat, instructed to conduct violent attacks on British soil has further increased anti-Muslim prejudice, making it an inveterate part of not only public and political discourse but also the mainstream society (Awan, 2014). Following these events, a sharp rise in anti-Muslim sentiments and behavior has been reported, where mosques have been the target of vandalism. Moreover, multiple incidents of acid attacks on Muslims by non-Muslims, and Islamophobic assaults on individuals with a visible Muslim identity have been recorded (Atta, Randall, Charalambou, & Rose, 2018; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Littler & Feldman, 2015).

Furthermore, as a consequence of the announcement of Brexit in June 2016, the already existing and well documented anti-Muslim racism during the Brexit campaign escalated even more (Atta et al., 2018). Since Brexit dealt with “who belongs to the U.K.,” visible and non-visible Muslims alike and individuals who were perceived as looking like citizens of a Muslim country experienced increased verbal and physical racism and were repeatedly told to abide by the British laws and rules or leave (Burnett, 2017; Virdee & McGeever, 2018). Consequently, Muslim individuals, despite succeeding in higher education more than their non-Muslim counterparts, face labor market and housing discrimination due to the label of belonging to a “suspect community” (Stevenson et al., 2017; Office for National Statistics, 2018).

The present research

The focus of this paper is to examine the relationship between perceived symbolic, realistic and safety threats, and violent behavioral intentions and support for Muslim military violence in two samples of Muslims from Norway and the U.K. Importantly, the
study aims to investigate the mediating role of religious and mainstream acculturation in the relationship between perceived threats and violence.

The research differentiates between two types of violence. First, we measure support for Muslim military violence, which we treat as a proxy measure of support for organizations such as ISIS. That is, we ask the participants whether they support that Muslim majority states use military force to achieve their interests. Second, we measured participants’ own intentions to conduct violence as a proxy of behavior (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).

We expected that the higher the perception of threat, the more Muslims would show violent behavioral intentions and support for Muslim military violence (Fig. 1). As our focus was on three types of threat, we also test their referential roles on the outcomes of interest,

H1. Symbolic, realistic and safety threats are expected to have a direct and positive association with violent behavioral intentions and support for Muslim military violence.

Next, research shows mixed results regarding the relationship between commitment to religious belief and violent behavior. While some literature indicates that high religiosity may predict less violence among Muslims living in Muslim majority countries (Zirkov et al., 2014), others suggest that it predicts more violence among European Muslims (Canetti, Hobfoll, Pedahzur, & Zaidise, 2010; Zirkov et al., 2014). However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no literature on the relationship between religious acculturation and violence. Thus, as an exploratory research objective, we aimed to examine the direction of the relationship between religious acculturation and violent behavioral intentions and support for Muslim military violence.

H2. Religious acculturation is expected to be related to the violence constructs, but we had no clear predictions in terms of the valence of this relationship.

Yet, because higher degrees of host society acculturation involve adopting and endorsement of Western norms and values, we predict that it should be negatively related to violent behavioral intentions and support for Muslim military violence.

H3. Mainstream acculturation will be negatively related to violent military and behavioral intentions.

As we expect perceived threats to be positively related to Muslims’ religious acculturation and inversely related to their mainstream acculturation, we also expect these two constructs to mediate the effects of threats on the violence constructs.

H4. All threat constructs are expected to have an indirect positive effect on violent military support and violent behavioral intentions, mediated by religious and mainstream acculturation.

Method

Participants

In total, 253 participants from Norway and 194 from the U.K. completed the survey. The mean age was 32.49, $SD = 10.02$, in Norway, and 37.13, $SD = 13.70$, in the U.K. The age difference between the two samples was significant $t(341) = 4.13$, $p = .001$, $\Delta M = 4.81$, 95% CI [2.61, 7.01]. Table 1 summarizes results for the demographic variables in both samples.

Procedure

We contacted various mosques, Islamic cultural and ethnic organizations in both countries, and asked them to distribute an anonymous link of the survey via their listservs and post it on their Facebook page. Data was collected from January to February 2018. Participants read an informed consent at the beginning of the survey where they were informed about the purpose of the study, and the time it would take to participate. The informed consent also contained information about confidentiality and anonymity. To
Table 1
Demographic Variables of the Sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway (n = 253)</th>
<th>U.K. (n = 194)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (M, SD)</strong></td>
<td>32.49 (10.02)</td>
<td>37.13 (13.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender women in %</strong></td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil status %</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic Status (M, SD)</strong></td>
<td>1.88 (.82)</td>
<td>1.40 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation in %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious orientation %</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiously visible in %</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host nationality in %</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in religious organization in %</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a significant age difference between the two samples $t(341) = 4.31, p = .001, \Delta M = 4.81, 95\% CI[2.61, 7.01]$. The remaining missing percentages correspond to missing responses.

take part in the study, respondents had to identify as a Muslim and be above 18 years old. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the internet survey did not save IP addresses of the respondents. The study was approved by the Norwegian Center for Research Data.

**Measures**

The questionnaire was originally developed in English and was forward-back translated into Norwegian by a translation company. All scales were tested for configural invariance (same structure across groups, Cheung & Rensvold, 2009) using MPLUS version 8.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017).

**Realistic, symbolic and safety threats.** Two separate threat scales, developed by González, Verkuyten, Weesie, and Poppe (2008), measured realistic (e.g., “Because of the presence of non-Muslim Norwegians/Britons, Muslims have more difficulties in finding a job”) and symbolic (e.g., “Muslim norms and values are being threatened because of non-Muslim Norwegians/Britons”) threats. Each scale had three items that were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (**totally disagree**) to 7 (**totally agree**).

A third scale, designed specifically for this study, measured safety threat. The scale comprised of 3-items (e.g., “Because of the presence of non-Muslim Norwegians/Britons, Muslims are physically threatened”). Factor analyses showed that the three threat types were distinct from each other and configural invariance was achieved (see Supplementary Online Materials [SOM]).

**Acculturation scale.** Twenty items from the Vancouver Index of Acculturation (VIA) developed by Ryder, Alden, and Paulhus (2000) captured several domains relevant to religious (10 items) and mainstream (10 items) acculturation for the current study. Originally, the VIA measures heritage and mainstream culture orientation, but the heritage culture dimension here was adjusted to measure religious acculturation. Items for mainstream culture referred to attitudes and behaviors across various domains such as cultural traditions, values and entertainment (e.g., “I often participate in Islamic cultural traditions/ I often participate in Norwegian/ British cultural traditions”). Both scales were rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (**strongly disagree**) to 9 (**strongly agree**) as in the original version of Ryder et al. (2000). The 20-items scale did not achieve configural invariance (see SOM).

**Support for Muslim military violence.** Six items from the Attitude towards Violence (ATV) scale (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995), abbreviated by Davidson and Canivez (2012), were adapted to measure participants’ support for Muslim military violence. The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements such as, “Muslim nations should be ready with a strong military at all times.” Responses were scored on a 1 (**strongly disagree**) to 7 (**strongly agree**) rating scale as used by Davidson and Canivez (2012). The 6-items scale did not achieve measurement invariance (see SOM). However, after deleting 3-items from the scale, configural equivalence was achieved, and this version of the scale was used in further analysis.

**Violent behavioral intentions.** A 7-item scale was adopted from Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen, and Sidnius (2018) to measure violent behavioral intentions (e.g., “As a last resort, I am personally ready to use violence for the sake of other Muslims*”). Responses were scored on a 0 (**strongly disagree**) to 6 (**strongly agree**) rating scale as in the original version that Obaidi, Kunst et al. (2018) used. The 7-items scale did not achieve configural invariance (see SOM). Therefore, two negatively worded items were deleted, so that configural invariance was achieved. For further analysis, the resulting 5-items scale was used.

All the scales had acceptable to satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha values for both groups of Muslims. The reliability coefficients ranged from .68 to .94 (see Table 2 for details).
Table 2
Means, SDs, Cronbach Alpha values and Correlations (Norway and U.K.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Realistic Threat</td>
<td>3.75/.32</td>
<td>1.54/1.61</td>
<td>.96/ .91</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.80**</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.94**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Safety Threat</td>
<td>2.15/.25</td>
<td>1.57/.72</td>
<td>.87/ .97</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.82**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Symbolic Threat</td>
<td>2.95/2.7</td>
<td>1.58/1.67</td>
<td>.87/ .94</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Religious Acculturation</td>
<td>6.50/5.88</td>
<td>1.68/1.08</td>
<td>.87/ .84</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mainstream Acculturation</td>
<td>6.32/5.78</td>
<td>1.41/1.11</td>
<td>.89/ .85</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Support for Muslim Military</td>
<td>3.35/4.03</td>
<td>1.38/1.30</td>
<td>.68/ .71</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Violent Behavioral Intentions</td>
<td>4.47/4.06</td>
<td>1.29/1.25</td>
<td>.83/ .83</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standardized coefficients are presented for the correlations. Norwegian sample (non-italic values), the U.K. sample (italic values), * p < .05. ** p < .001.

Results

Table 2 displays the correlations between the major variables for each sample. Because configural invariance could not be achieved for the acculturation scales that were an integral part of our model, we analyzed both datasets and estimated our models separately.

Norwegian sample

Gender differences. An independent samples t-test was run to determine if there were gender differences in the level of perceived threats, acculturation or violence. There was a significant difference between men and women’s perceptions of safety threat, t (227) = 2.16, p = .032, d = 0.27, with men (M = 2.38, SD = 1.67) experiencing more safety threat than women (M = 2.95, SD = 1.45). The results also showed that men scored higher (M = 6.56, SD = 1.42) on mainstream acculturation than women (M = 6.11, SD = 1.37), t(250) = 2.56, p = .011, d = 0.32. Scores on support for Muslim military violence scale were higher for men (M = 3.58, SD = 1.38) than women (M = 3.15, SD = 1.36), t(249) = 2.48, p = .014, d = 0.31. Violent behavioral intentions, however, were significantly higher in women (M = 4.66, SD = 1.23) than men (M = 4.26, SD = 1.32), t(249) = 2.46, p = .014, d = 0.31.

Level of education and income. As determined by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), individuals showed significantly different levels of mainstream acculturation depending on their level of education, F(3, 248) = 5.09, p = .002, η² = .25. Tukey post-hoc test revealed that mainstream acculturation was significantly higher in participants with a university degree (M = 6.48, SD = 1.25, p = .001) than individuals with a high school diploma (M = 5.60, SD = 1.78, p = .001). A one-way ANOVA also showed a significant difference in mainstream acculturation orientations with regard to the informants’ level of income, F(3, 247) = 8.24, p = .006, η² = .23. Specifically, mainstream acculturation was higher among individuals with high income (M = 6.88, SD = 1.41) compared to average (M = 6.25, SD = 1.43, p = .026) and low (M = 5.69, SD = 1.23, p = .004) income.

Membership in a religious organization. Religious acculturation was significantly higher among individuals who were members of a religious organization (M = 6.84, SD = 1.32) than non-members (M = 5.96, SD = 1.21), t(249) = -5.30, p < .001, d = 0.70. However, mainstream acculturation was also higher among members of religious organizations (M = 6.48, SD = 1.38) compared with non-members (M = 6.07, SD = 1.44), t(248) = -2.25, p = .026, d = 0.29.

UK sample

Gender. An independent samples t-test showed no significant gender differences in experiences of realistic, t(193) = -1.30, p = .195, safety, t(193) = -1.45, p = .149, and symbolic threats, t(192) = -1.36, p = .195, religious, t(190) = -0.23, p = .819; and mainstream acculturation, t(193) = -1.50, p = .134, violent behavioral intentions, t(185) = -0.07, p = .944, and support for Muslim military violence, t(191) = -0.07, p = .335.

Level of education and income. There were significant differences in experiences of realistic, safety and symbolic threats depending on the participants’ education level. University graduates (M = 3.19, SD = 1.50) experienced the lowest levels of realistic threats compared to individuals with an elementary school education (M = 6.83, SD = 0.24, p = .006) and individuals with a high school diploma (M = 4.23, SD = 1.98, p = .053), F(3, 191) = 5.69, p = .001, η² = .30. In addition, the highest degree of safety threat was reported among individuals with an elementary school education (M = 6.33, SD = 0.94) compared to university graduates (M = 3.11, SD = 1.63, p = .036) and respondents with a high school diploma (M = 4.19, SD = 2.15, p = .320), F(3, 191) = 4.40, p = .005, η² = .27. Moreover, individuals with an elementary school education (M = 6.83, SD = 0.24) reported higher levels of symbolic threat than university graduates (M = 3.23, SD = 1.61, p = .011), F(3, 190) = 4.88, p = .003, η² = .28.

In the U.K. sample, individuals with low income (M = 3.82, SD = 1.52) experienced higher levels of symbolic threat compared to individuals with high income (M = 2.87, SD = 2.73, p = .038), F(3, 191) = 3.05, p = .030, η² = .22. Moreover, individuals with a high income (M = 6.33, SD = 1.14) reported more mainstream acculturation than low (M = 5.71, SD = 1.19, p = .043) and no income individuals (M = 5.33, SD = .90, p = .001), F(3, 191) = 5.61, p = .001, η² = .30. Violent behavioral intentions were also significantly higher among individuals with a high income (M = 4.77, SD = 1.21, p < .001) compared to low (M = 3.63,
Table 3
Significant and Non-significant Direct Effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realistic Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>( p )</td>
<td>( \beta )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic threat</td>
<td>Support for Muslim Military Violence</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent behavioral Intentions</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Threat</td>
<td>Support for Muslim Military Violence</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent behavioral Intentions</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic threat</td>
<td>Support for Muslim Military Violence</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent behavioral intentions</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. \( p < .001 \). Significant effects in italics.

SD = 1.18, \( p < .001 \) or no income (\( M = 3.66, SD = 1.05, p < .001 \), \( F(3, 183) = 10.14, p < .001, \eta^2 = .41 \). Attitudes regarding support for Muslim military violence did not yield significant results with respect to income levels, \( F(3, 189) = 1.95, p = .1.24 \). Significant ANOVA results were found for realistic threat, \( F(3, 191) = 2.82, p = .040, \eta^2 = .21 \), and religious acculturation, \( F(3, 188) = 2.69, p = .047, \eta^2 = .21 \), with respect to income levels. However, post-hoc tests (Tukey and Scheffe tests) did not reveal any significant differences between the groups (all \( p s > .056 \)).

Membership in a religious organization. There were significant differences in religious acculturation depending on the participant's membership in a religious organization. Individuals who were not members of a religious organization (\( M = 6.51, SD = 1.01 \)) indicated lower degrees of religious acculturation than individuals who were members of a religious organization (\( M = 7.05, SD = 1.04 \)), t(183) = -2.94, \( p = .004, d = 0.53 \).

Structural equation model results

For the current research, we used MPLUS software version 8.0 with the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator. The models were tested separately for both samples given the lack of configural invariance on some of the key variables.

Hypothesis 1. To test the first hypothesis, we ran two unmediated, fully saturated models, one for each sample. See Table 3 for the direct effects in each sample.

Norway. In the Norwegian sample, safety threat showed no significant impact on support for Muslim military violence or violent behavioral intentions (all \( ps > .767 \)). Yet, realistic threat was positively related to violent behavioral intentions (\( \beta = .20, p = .006 \)), but not to support for Muslim military violence (\( p = .412 \)) giving some support for the first hypothesis. In addition, symbolic threat had a positive effect on support for Muslim military violence (\( \beta = .31, p < .001 \)) but an unexpected negative effect on violent behavioral intentions (\( \beta = -.36, p < .001 \)).

U.K. In the U.K. sample, the path analysis did not show any significant effect of realistic and safety threats on support for Muslim military violence and violent behavioral intentions (all \( ps > .129 \)). Symbolic threat did not influence violent behavioral intentions (\( p = .700 \)), however a strong, positive effect on support for Muslim military violence was found (\( \beta = .54, p < .000 \), giving partial support to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2. For the second and the remaining hypotheses, we estimated a mediated model. Again, this model was estimated separately for both samples due to lack of measurement invariance for the acculturation scales. All possible paths between the outcome (violence), independent (threats), and mediating (religious and mainstream acculturation) variables were drawn in the initial stage of constructing the model (Fig. 2). The indirect effects were tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 random re-samples. The chi-square test and standard fit indices indicated a well-fitting mediation model in Norway, \( \chi^2 (1, N = 253) = 0.09, p = .770, RMSEA < 0.001, 90\% CI [0.000, 0.112], CFI = 1.0, sRMR = 0.003 \). Also in the U.K., the chi-square test, \( \chi^2 (1, N = 193) = .86, p = .354 \), and other fit indices showed a very close fit (\( CFI = 1.0, RMSEA < 0.001, 90\% CI [0.000, 0.185], sRMR = 0.01 \)), see Fig. 3 and 4 for the estimated mediation model with standardized effects for each sample. Full models with all paths displayed (including non-significant ones) can be found in SOM.

Norway. In the Norwegian sample, results indicated a positive relationship between religious acculturation and support for Muslim military violence (\( \beta = .18, p = .002 \)), but no link between religious acculturation and violent behavioral intentions (\( p = .942 \)).

U.K. In the U.K., religious acculturation showed a significant positive effect on support for Muslim military violence (\( \beta = .30, p < .001 \)), but a negative effect on violent behavioral intentions (\( \beta = -0.21, p = .003 \)).

Hypothesis 3. Norway. In the Norwegian sample, mainstream acculturation had no significant relationship with support for Muslim military violence and violent behavioral intentions (\( ps > .134 \)). Thus, the third hypothesis found no empirical support in the Norwegian sample.

U.K. In the U.K., mainstream acculturation was not related to support for Muslim military violence (\( p = .526 \). However,
Fig. 2. Hypothetical path model. Various types of threats and violence are each presented under one variable for presentational purposes.

Fig. 3. Significant, standardized paths in structural equation model predicting Muslim military violence support and behavioral intentions among Muslims in Norway. Unmediated direct effects are presented in parentheses. Non-significant paths and variables with no significant effect are not displayed for simplicity. Please see SOM for full model containing all paths. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Fig. 4. Significant standardized paths in structural equation model predicting Muslim military violence support and behavioral intentions among Muslims in the U.K. Unmediated direct effects are presented in parentheses. Non-significant paths and variables with no significant effect are not displayed for simplicity. Please see SOM for full model containing all paths * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. 
contrary to the hypothesis, mainstream acculturation was positively associated with violent behavioral intentions ($\beta = .28$, $p < .001$), giving no support to the third hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 4.** In the fourth hypothesis, we expected that the threat constructs would have an indirect positive effect on support for Muslim military violence and behavioral intentions, mediated by religious and mainstream acculturation. All standardized significant and non-significant indirect effects in Norway and the U.K. are presented in Table 4.

**Norway.** As the model did not reveal any significant indirect effects in the Norwegian sample, we can conclude that, in this sample, religious and mainstream acculturation did not mediate the relationship between the independent variables and the outcome variables.

**U.K.** In the U.K., religious acculturation mediated the relationship between symbolic threat and support for Muslim military violence (indirect effect: $\beta = 0.12$, $p = .016$, 90% CI [0.04, 0.22]), partially supporting the hypothesis. However, the opposite indirect relationship was observed in terms of violent behavioral intentions. Here, symbolic threat predicted higher levels of religious acculturation, which in turn predicted lower levels of violent behavioral intentions, resulting in an indirect negative relationship ($\beta = -.08$, $p = .036$, 90% CI [-.17, -.02]).

No evidence indicated that mainstream acculturation mediated the relationship between threat and violence in this sample. Hence, the fourth hypotheses gained partial support in the U.K. sample, but found no empirical confirmation in the Norwegian sample.

**Acculturation strategies**

In addition to these tests of our hypotheses, we also conducted some exploratory analyses computing acculturation strategies using the mid-point-split procedure (Arends-Töth & Van de Vijver, 2007). Here, the mid-point of the Likert scale was taken as the cut-off point to classify participants into low or high acculturation groups in terms of mainstream and religious culture. Based on these groups, we then, following the conceptualization of Berry (1997), categorized each participant into one of the four acculturation strategies. In both countries, integration was the most frequent strategy (Norway = 71.3%, U.K. = 66.8%), followed by separation (Norway = 14.6%, U.K. = 25.4%), assimilation (Norway = 11.8%, U.K. = 6.2%), and marginalization (Norway = 2.4%, U.K. = 1.6%). We ran a one-way ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc comparisons in each country to determine whether there were any statistically significant differences in the independent (threats) and dependent (behavior) variables depending on the acculturation strategies (see Fig. 5). Please note that we recoded the violent behavioral intentions variable from 0 – 6 to 1 – 7 to facilitate comparisons with the other scales.

**Norway.** While participants’ symbolic threat differed significantly depending on their acculturation strategy, $F(3, 250) = 4.81$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = 0.24$, no difference was observed for realistic, $F(3, 250) = 1.85$, $p = .138$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, and safety threat, $F(3, 250) = 1.59$, $p = .192$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$. Tukey’s tests revealed that separated individuals experienced higher levels of symbolic threat than individuals who were integrated ($p = .008$) or assimilated ($p = .003$), see Fig. 5.

There were also significant differences in support for Muslim military violence depending on participants’ acculturation strategies, $F(3, 248) = 2.66$, $p = .049$, $\eta^2 = .18$. Separated individuals showed more Muslim military violence than assimilated individuals ($p = .045$). Significant differences were also found for violent behavioral intentions, $F(3, 247) = 4.62$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = 0.24$(Fig. 5). Integrated individuals had higher violent behavioral intentions than marginalized individuals ($p = .046$). Moreover, assimilated individuals showed higher violent behavioral intentions than marginalized ($p = .016$) and separated individuals ($p = .047$).

**U.K.** In the U.K. sample, participants differed significantly in their perception of symbolic threat depending on their acculturation strategies, $F(3, 188) = 2.88$, $p = .038$, $\eta^2 = .21$. No significant differences were observed for realistic, $F(3, 189) = 1.65$, $p = .179$, $\eta^2 = 0.03$ and safety threat, $F(3, 250) = 1.65$, $p = .179$, $\eta^2 = 0.03$. As shown in Fig. 5, symbolic threat was higher among separated
Norway

- Violent Behavioral Intentions
- Support for Muslim Military Violence
- Symbolic Threat

STRATEGIES

U.K.

- Violent Behavioral Intentions
- Support for Muslim Military Violence
- Symbolic Threat

STRATEGIES

Fig. 5. Acculturation Strategies on the Main Study Variables in Norway and the U.K. Error bars represent standard error.

Individuals than assimilated individuals ($p = .020$). Support for Muslim military violence was also significantly different between the four acculturation strategies, $F(3, 189) = 4.57, p = .004, \eta^2 = .27$. Specifically, separated individuals reported more Muslim military violence than assimilated individuals ($p = .006$). Moreover, violent behavioral intentions differed significantly between the four acculturation strategies $F(3, 188) = 5.53, p = .001, \eta^2 = .30$. Integrated and assimilated individuals reported higher violent behavioral intentions than separated individuals ($p = .005$ for integration and $p = .016$ for assimilation comparison).

Discussion

The primary objective of this study was to investigate the factors that might underpin European Muslims’ willingness to support and engage in religiously motivated violence using data from Muslim diaspora in two countries. For that purpose, the study, based on
Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009), examined the relationship of three forms of perceived threats with violent behavioral intentions and support for Muslim majority countries’ military violence, and the potential mediating role of religious and mainstream acculturation.

Whether threat perceptions were related to the violence variables depended on the type of threat and the cultural context. To start with, symbolic threat was related to more support of military violence by Muslim states in both countries. The majority of participants from both Norway and the U.K. had a Pakistani background. Many regard a powerful military institution as an essential component for survival in a competitive world (Morgenthau, 1951). Since Pakistan’s establishment as a country in 1947, the Pakistani military has been known for being an integrated part of the Pakistani society, and for having a strong hold in the political, economic and state development in Pakistan (Lieven, 2010; Rizvi, 2000) by not only influencing politics from the sidelines, but also as the governing institution. In 1977, the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq reinforced the idea of a Muslim identity and started the Islamization of state institutions, especially the Pakistani military, to establish a model Islamic state (Ziring, 1982). Thus, it can be argued that for majority Pakistani Muslims in Pakistan and across the globe, the Pakistani military is considered a model Islamic army. Indeed, according to a public survey, the Pakistani military enjoyed support and trust of 78% of Pakistanis, more than any other state institution in the country, even after the Pakistani military and intelligence services were accused of knowing about Osama bin Laden’s hideout (Naurath & Ray, 2011). This cultural background may explain why in the present study, participants who experienced threat to the symbolic values of Muslims’ belief system, were supportive of Muslim military aggression and presence internationally.

However, it is important to note that the path model in the Norwegian sample showed that symbolic threat at the same time was also related to less violent behavioral intentions, in contrast with previous research (Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018). Realistic threat was also related to more violent behavioral intentions only in Norway. These results suggest that Muslims in Norway are not willing to use violence if they fear the West as a danger to their Islamic culture and values. However, in line with previous studies, they would be prepared to use violence if they perceive the majority society as rivals for scarce economic resources (Caldwell, Kohn-Wood, Schmeelk-Conlon, Chavous, & Zimmerman, 2004; Obaidi, Kunst et al., 2018). It is also important to note that the link between realistic threats and violent behavioral intentions in the Norwegian sample might suggest a suppressor effect as no such relationship was observed in terms of zero-order correlations. Hence, this finding has to be interpreted with caution.

While safety threat had a significant correlation with violent behavioral intentions, in the path model it did not predict this variable. Yet, the correlation between realistic and safety threat was strong indicating that both independent variables shared variance, which might explain why safety threat did not predict violent behavioral intentions, while realistic threat did in this more controlled analysis.

The role of acculturation orientations and strategies

One central objective of this paper was to investigate the link between acculturation and Muslims’ own intentions to commit violence and their support for military violence by Muslim states. Some interesting relations were observed. To our surprise, in the U.K. model, higher levels of mainstream acculturation were positively related to violent behavioral intentions. Research suggests that increased participation in the mainstream culture provides better opportunities for work, improved language skills and social network. However, in some instances, high degrees of engagement in the host society may also give more awareness of prejudiced sentiments, discrimination and negative attitudes towards one’s group (Awad, 2010; Foroutan, 2008). Thus, this may possibly explain the positive link between mainstream acculturation and violent behavioral intentions in the U.K. No such relationship was, however, observed among Norwegian Muslims. Hence, violent behavioral intentions seem for Norwegian Muslims have little to do with how they acculturate, including whether or not they are engaged in the national sphere, and more with the (realistic) threats they experience from the majority society due to their group membership.

Again, only in the U.K. path model was religious acculturation negatively associated with violent behavioral intentions and mediated the respective effects of symbolic threat. In line with previous research (Zirkov et al., 2014), this finding suggests that Muslims’ religious involvement does not predict a higher willingness to commit violence, but may even have the opposite effect. It is possible that when faced with threats towards their religious culture and belief system, religious British Muslims increased their religious acculturation even more, in turn, showing lower levels of violent behavioral intentions. These reduced violent behavioral intentions may be seen as an attempt to reduce intergroup tensions, and counter the negative image that many Britons may have of Muslims as intolerant and violent extremists (see e.g., Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Bakker et al., 2013). Hence, for British Muslims, an increased involvement in their religious culture may be a negative predictor of violent behavior, and this process may be elicited by perceptions of symbolic threat (Zirkov et al., 2014).

Yet, how can such an interpretation be reconciled with the fact that religious acculturation predicted more support of Muslim military violence and thus mediated the effects of symbolic threat? Literature points out that although indirect and direct observation and experiences of violence and adversities may lead to more support of political violence, vicarious experiences may be the most powerful ones (Carnaghey & Anderson, 2007; but see Obaidi, Bergh et al., 2018). It is possible that religiously acculturated Muslims in particular feel solidarity with Muslims living in countries experiencing Western military occupations, drone strikes and bombings. For example, since the War on Terror, the involvement of Western military and NATO troops has been salient in Pakistan particularly due to its geographical location next to Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistanis living in Pakistan and across the world have numerous times protested against the presence of Western military and NATO troops (BBC, 2013). It may be that British-Pakistani Muslims perceive Western involvement in their homeland as an attempt to westernize their ethnic country’s Islamic and cultural values. This may explain why religiously acculturated Muslims in the U.K. sample were supportive of Muslim countries being militarily armed and
active. One reason for why such a relationship was not observed in Norway may be that the country has no history as colonial power and is less involved in foreign interventions than the U.K.

To complement our analyses, we also divided our samples into the four acculturation strategies (Berry, 1995). In accordance with previous research (Berry et al., 2006), the majority of respondents in both samples were integrated individuals, followed by separation and assimilation. Only few individuals fell into the marginalized category. Therefore, the interpretation of the results involving this strategy must be done with caution. Separated and marginalized individuals tend to be prone to poor adaptation and are at a higher risk of engaging in and justifying violent behavior in the form of political violence (Stroink, 2007; Treadwell & Garland, 2011), while assimilated and integrated individuals are considered as acculturative successful (Berry et al., 2006). In the current study, and to some extent in both countries, it was, however, integrated and assimilated individuals who indicated higher degrees of violent behavioral intentions than separated and marginalized individuals. By contrast, in both samples, separated individuals showed more support for Muslim military violence than assimilated individuals did. One answer to this finding may be that separated individuals also experienced higher levels of symbolic threat and, hence, their motivation and goals may differ as discussed earlier. Assimilated and integrated individuals may have personally experienced discrimination and exclusion, which drives them to react violently in a retaliatory manner. Separated individuals, may perceive higher degrees of symbolic threats from the mainstream society and feel stronger allegiance with their Muslim countries of origin, and therefore support violence by Muslim states’ militaries abroad.

Strengths, limitations and future directions

To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to test the role of acculturation in the relationship between perceived threats and extremist violence. Although our study provides new and important insights, several limitations should be noted.

First, we used convenience samples that were drawn from the Norwegian and British Muslim communities. This was a necessity because the public registries in neither country records inhabitants religious and ethnic background, making representative sampling almost impossible. In both samples, several Muslim organizations, and specifically one Norwegian Muslim organization that has been in the limelight due to its members supporting violence, did not respond to the invitation to participate in the research. Not being able to recruit members from such organizations might have hindered us from sampling possibly more radical individuals than those represented in our samples. Moreover, the small samples in this study comprised of mostly respondents with a Pakistani origin who belonged to the Sunni direction within Islam. Hence, findings are not necessarily representative for the broader Muslim Diaspora in the Norwegian and British societies. The interpretation of the results in terms of generalizability should, therefore, be done with caution. Nevertheless, in order to examine possibly different results, we recommend a replication of this study with diverse samples.

There was a significant age difference between the two samples. This difference was probably a result of the way the data was collected (i.e., convenience sampling), rather than representing actual age differences in the population.

The study used a cross-sectional approach, which does not allow for causal inferences. A suggestion for future research would be to conduct a longitudinal study to establish causal relationships between perceived threats and the violence variables, and to establish the role of acculturation as causal mediator.

Direct cross-cultural comparison was not possible within the current work because measurement invariance was not achieved for the acculturation scales. Absence of invariance can reveal important cross-cultural differences between samples. The lack of invariance in the current study can reflect important cultural differences at the conceptual level. We used a well-established acculturation instrument, which was thoroughly translated from English into Norwegian. This may suggest that lack of measurement invariance was caused by the acculturation orientations having different cultural meanings to participants in both countries. Yet, future research may try to replicate our findings with different types of acculturation scales that preferably were developed specifically for the European context and for Muslim populations.

Finally, the current work measured outgroup hostility through violent behavioral intentions instead of actual behavior. Thus, the results do not directly indicate whether Muslims would act violently, rather they show Muslims’ intent to act violently for the sake of other Muslims. For this purpose, it is also important to mention that actual behavior is, both methodically and ethically, difficult to measure. Hence, as intentional behavior is a proxy for actual behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), we assessed Muslims’ willingness to act violently.

Societal implications

We believe that the present research has valuable implications for improving intergroup relations and for the government policymakers and religious institutions that work with Muslim communities in the West. The current work showed that realistic and symbolic threats are related to outgroup hostility. Importantly, it extended previous knowledge by showing that threat perceptions not only relate to own violent intentions but also to more support for military violence by Muslim states. While we did not directly assess support for ISIS, this finding may suggest that the more Muslims in the West perceive threats to their culture, the more they may support such extremist state-like organizations as well. Hence, one important way to reduce sympathies for ISIS or similar organizations may be to reduce the threat perceptions Muslims feel in the West. Here, policymakers are advised to actively engage in portraying a positive image of the Muslim community in their respective societies by providing the majority society with basic and positive information about Islam (see e.g., Barise, 2005). It is also important to have common goals that require intergroup cooperation to decrease distrust between the Muslim minority group and the majority society. For that purpose, partnership between policymakers, social workers and Imams (religious leaders) is recommended in order to eliminate incorrect images that Muslims can
have of the mainstream society due to the heated political climate. In their effort to counter terrorism and eliminate violent radicalization, government officials and policymakers are advised to make less intrusive policies for the mainstream Muslim community, such as banning the female head covering and other cultural practices. Rather, it is important to have more focus on institutions and mosques that can approach people who are at risk of becoming violent extremists.

Some of the acculturation findings may also have important societal implications. Mainstream acculturation was associated with more violent behavioral intentions in the U.K., which suggests that increasing Muslims’ involvement in the host society is not necessarily a solution but may even backfire in terms of extremist violence. Although not assessed in the present research, we believe that this relationship is likely moderated by the degree of exclusion and discrimination Muslims experience. While mainstream acculturation may be related to less extremist tendencies in a tolerant society, the opposite may be the case in contexts characterized by intergroup tensions and intolerance. This, once more, highlights the importance of any intervention that may reduce Islamophobia in society.

Finally, the finding that religious acculturation was related to more support for Muslim military violence but less personal violent intentions shows that religious acculturation can be both a detriment and asset for society. We recommend that religious organizations, specifically mosques and Muslim religious leaders and stakeholders from the mainstream society, should work together to find ways to capitalize on the positive effect of Muslims’ religious acculturation, while minimizing its negative effects. Ultimately, however, this is also a global political problem because Muslims’ tendency to support military violence by Muslim states likely is nurtured by foreign interventions by the West.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2019.08.001.

References
