«Persecute the Deviant» - investigating power’s “apparatus” of social exclusion

«Forfølg avvikeren» - en undersøkelse av maktas eksklusjonsapparat

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Abstract

In this thesis in social philosophy, I investigate mechanisms of Foucauldian power that can lead to social exclusion, ostracism and violence. The fundamental idea is that the way we construct societies in the modern era tends to exclude certain individuals who are perceived not to fit in to the society’s basic project. According to Foucault, we are constituted as individuals in and through power, which is to say that we stand in various kinds of strategic relations to each other as persons and as members of social groups. There is then a correlation between the way we perceive the world and how we are socialized into social networks. This is an important aspect of the dynamics of exclusion. There are various ways to exclude, which has much to do with status and stigmatization, and in my thesis I will focus on four of them, that are in some ways interrelated. These are racism, classism, sexism and homophobia. In the thesis, I will look at how these social problems can be explained by social hierarchies of power and status, and how the problems can shed light on the nature of such hierarchies. My hope is that such understanding can reduce the likelihood of violent exclusion and make it easier for us to inter-act together in the face of individual differences.

Sammendrag

I denne masteroppgaven i sosial filosofi undersøker jeg hvordan mekanismer som er særegne for Foucaults maktbegrep kan føre til sosial eksklusjon, utfrysning og vold. Den grunnleggende tanken bak undersøkelsen er at måten vi skaper samfunn på i moderne tid har en tendens til å ekskludere enkelte individer som oppfattes ikke å passe inn i samfunnets basale prosjekt. Ifølge Foucault konstitueres vi som individer i og gjennom makt, hvilket innebærer at vi står i forskjellige slags strategiske relasjoner overfor hverandre, som personer og som medlemmer av sosiale grupper. Det finnes altså en sammenheng mellom måten vi forstår verden på og hvordan vi sosialiseres inn i forskjellige sosiale nettverk. Dette påvirker igjen ekskluderingens dynamikk. Det finnes ulike måter å ekskludere på, hvor status og stigmatisering inngår som fellesnevnere. Jeg vil her sette søkelys på fire slike former for eksklusjon, som jeg vil hevde er gjenstandig relaterte. Eksklusjonsformene jeg vil skrive om er rasisme, klasseforakt, sexisme og homofobi. I oppgaven vil jeg se på hvordan disse problemene kan forstås i lys av sosiale hierarkier av makt og status, og hvordan problemene kan bidra til å forstå slike hierarkiers vesen. I beste fall kan slik forståelse redusere faren for voldelig eksklusjon og gjøre det enklere for oss å fungere sammen, hvor forskjellige vi enn måtte være.
1. Introduction

Human beings relate to each other in various ways, guided by our cultures and various norms that help us regulate our interactions, such that we may interact together constructively and harmoniously. To what extent our behaviour should be guided by strict rules and norms may be a matter of some dispute, itself probably driven by fundamental norms and values. The degree of freedom we have in our interpersonal affairs is not a simple question either, but depends largely on what we mean by freedom and the preferences we have, which are also to a large extent culturally determined. In any case, we are guided by such underlying codes, norms and values and these factors help determine who we are as social beings and even as persons. The French philosopher Michel Foucault used the term "dispositif" to indicate these heterogeneous mechanisms of “producing” and “developing” human beings into subjects in the power's process of social body. This thesis will be about the nature and development of such dispositifs with an eye on a specific theme.

How does it come about that the way we think and perceive the world, the way we behave and regulate our communities, may lead to the exclusion and hatred of various groups of human beings? In this thesis, I will argue that this has much to do with how we construe personhood, and that it has much to do with power. This is power in a Foucauldian sense, meant as a sort of social field that runs through individuals. One is always within power, and within the boundaries of power various forces may stand in strategic relations to each other. When a phenomenon of whatever kind has the potential to influence the relative position of different dispositifs, I will call it a strategic vector. This is then a word meant to entail a function. The goal of the thesis is to show how human beings come to be excluded from societies where they should feel at home and be included. I will try to understand and communicate how the process of forming a community creates hierarchies of power and status («economies of merit and fault», as Foucault put it) that stigmatize and exclude certain groups of individuals. I will focus on racism, classism, sexism and homophobia and show how these problems can shed light on human hierarchies and how the mechanisms proper to such hierarchies can shed light on the aforementioned problems.

Hatred and exclusion are social and cultural phenomena, so even though the thesis is on social philosophy, I will make use of work made in fields other than philosophy. I will make rather liberal use of social sciences such as anthropology and sociology, and I will use
gender theory and postcolonial theory to explore the mechanisms of sexism, racism and homophobia. I will make use of the works of various social theorists, but most of the anthropology I use in my thesis will be gathered from Mary Douglas, who, in her classic work *Purity and Danger*, presents a framework of order and social contagion that is eminently suitable to my project.

The thesis will follow this trajectory: First, I will present a case study from Chechnya, Russia, which sparked my interest in the topic of this thesis. The persecution of suspected homosexuals is a contemporary atrocity, and I find it important to understand why things like that can happen. This chapter will function as an entrance to the thesis proper, and is followed by a chapter on theory. Here, I will start with an introduction of Foucault, the philosopher on whom I will base the basic framework of my thesis. Other authors I will introduce here are Douglas, Bataille, Agamben and Nietzsche. These are all thinkers whose work I will read along with the fundamentally Foucauldian framework in order to explore the nature of group formation and the ways such common projects can lead to exclusion and stigmatization.

After these introductory chapters, I will explore the nature of nationalism. This will be the foundation of my critique of the group and social belonging that go prior to exclusion from the group, as well as social hierarchies proper to social formations. The nation is a project that has significant moral and epistemic aspects to it, which have explanatory value for the creation and maintenance of in- and outgroups. Following that chapter, I will look at the mechanisms of social capital, focusing on racism and classism and the way these forms of stigmatization follow from social power within the context of neo-liberalism.

Following that, I will start exploring the colony, as the counter-topos to the national project of the imperialist state. The colony is a place where imperial powers enforce their self-appointed mission of civilization, and thus a topic that is suitable to a critique of the universalizing ambitions of the modern state. This chapter is followed by a look at political processes pertaining to two different regimes, where the main goal is to describe the interplay between major discourses and counterdiscourses, focusing especially on the perils and promises of the counterdiscourse. This chapter is followed by another chapter about social contagion.

After these chapters, I will look at social paranoia and normalization, focusing on homophobia and the economy of gender. This is followed by an in-depth exploration of gender dynamics and sexism, and how such mechanisms play into the national project, as well as interactions with other sorts of social hierarchy. After these two chapters, I will explore how
well-intended projects of liberation can backfire and lead to other sorts of unfreedom, as well as stigmatization of relevant groups who become demonized as the great enemies of goodness and civilization. This is a critique of universalizing discourses in general and the corresponding blindness to local specificities of power and community. This is an aspect of discursivity that can lead to stigmatization and exclusion. Then follows the conclusion.

To begin all this, I will present a brief overview the situation in Chechnya that provoked me to explore the nature of stigmatization and social exclusion. Chechnya may be an especially relevant case for my topic, because the republic has been subject to imperial policies and oppression from the larger Russian state. There have therefore been grounds for political paranoia long before the current persecution. In my opinion, a study of the powers at work in Chechnya has explanatory value for the mechanisms of stigmatization and social exclusion in general. There is a vicious sort of agency at work in Chechnya, particularly in the police and the political class, but it depends on social processes with mechanisms that are relevant beyond the boundaries of this relatively small republic.

2. Enter the Dungeon

On July 9th, 2017, the internet edition of the newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* presented an awful news item from the Russian republic of Chechnya. Tens of people had become victims of extrajudicial executions, murdered because they were suspected of homosexual leanings. At the same time, the same newspaper had gathered eyewitness accounts of secret prisons in Chechnya where people had been tortured for the same reason. 27 of the murdered persons’ names were published in this July issue, and the journalist Yelena Milashina could inform us that the list was not complete¹.

When I first read this story, I was angry and disgusted by the fact that something like this could happen in our contemporary world. After two world wars, a long and tragic history of pointless violence and ethnic cleansing and far too many lives lost because of scrambles for power, land and resources we were supposed to have learned something. «Never again» has been uttered *ad nauseam* by record keepers of brutal events, and yet here, in one of the count-

¹ Milashina, Yelena: «Это была казнь. В ночь на 26 января в Грозном расстреляли десятки людей». In: *Novya Gazeta*. July 9th, 2017
ries most ravaged by the onslaught of the Nazi Reich, a devilry of the same kind was brewing. Human lives were being extinguished for no good reason, and the only people who seemed to be in a position to stop this thing from happening were not only not intervening. They were accomplices to the violence.

The present *de facto* dictator in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has publicly proclaimed many times that «there are no gay people in Chechnya», and Russia’s LGBT Network, led by Igor Kotchetkov, once published a screenshot where Kadyrov urged people to take part in «gay hunting». This is a bloody «sport» that seems to have many adherents among activists on Russia’s far right, as witnessed by the recent murder of Yelena Grigoriyeva in St. Petersburg. The Network is a reliable source of information about the situation for LGBT people in Russia, and has saved a lot of lives by setting up a telephone hotline and helping people flee from Chechnya and Russia.

The current situation for LGBT people in Russia is a tragedy that deserves our attention, and which I have been following rather closely for some time. It is not, however, historically unprecedented. Even in our present time people are persecuted for apparently arbitrary factors such as their sexual orientation and skin colour. Examples of this are far too easy to find. The Nazi persecution of Jews, Roma, gay people and mentally handicapped persons has a special place in the history of political violence, but today we see brutal repression against the Oromo in Ethiopia, Palestinians in areas occupied by Israel, and Kashmiri people victimized by the Indian government, to name but a few cases. In Norway, a fascist madman murdered 69 people at a summer camp for young politicians because he disagreed with them on immigration.

In Europe we see escalating xenophobia and homophobia. Far right parties in many countries have been on the rise for some time, adding to rising tensions. In such a context, a couple of questions must be asked if we are to have any hope of stopping and averting the violence. One of these questions is historical: What is the background for the current hatred? What is its origin and the nature of its historical development? Building on these questions, some political questions must be investigated, such as the role of the economy in the rise of the far right, and what cohorts in society are most likely to support rising xenophobic tendencies and even violence against people whom they consider to be superfluous or unworthy. Asking such questions, and finding good answers to them, is necessary in the effort to curb undesirable tendencies, and it is a necessary aid in the effort to probe into a more fundamental philosophical question: What kinds of social mechanisms lead to hatred and exclusion?
In the present thesis I shall assume that hatred is a feeling created in a subject through the subject’s personality in conjunction with various forces that are perceived to be threatening to the subject’s identity and values. Subjects are constituted in and through power, and the processes of subject formation give rise to various desires and aversions. The processes of subject formation depend on habituation, which also leads to different ways of interpreting the world. The way communities are constructed, and the way we are constituted as persons are conducive to the development of various prejudices. As persons we have a need for identities that give meaning to a life, and thereby a sort of anchorage point in one’s existence (or with Heidegger: Being-in-the-World). A real or imagined threat to one’s identity, and thus one’s sense of meaning, value and direction, can make us want to get rid of the present threat, be that a discourse, an object or a human being.

It seems that modernity as such is far from providing a guarantee against violent kinds of exclusion. Indeed, the Jewish philosopher Zygmunt Bauman posited that the Holocaust was a product of the dark side of modernity itself. Civilizing powers have constructed an efficient social machinery where science, art and philosophy could flourish in a community built for the common good. Then one must ask how this common good is defined. For this machinery, while it provides quite wonderful human services, is fueled by slavery and death camps. If that is the case, then we must ask how social organization can contribute to processes that lead to extermination. One sees, when one reads Bauman, a scepticism to instrumental reason. A «scientific» attitude can be quite useful when one wants to develop fields of inquiry and structures of production, but the necessarily narrow focus pertaining to such projects always leaves something out. These unknown factors can be experienced as irritating anomalies, noise in a perfect process. Such anomalies can appear difficult to assimilate and may be problematic for an otherwise smooth operation. Principles that have worked fine up to this point no longer apply. In a social system, these are Strangers who challenge our ways of doing things, our political projects. Normally, these people are not murdered, but when the stars are perfectly aligned around a bad moon, history has shown that this can happen.

A somewhat fresher news item from Chechnya than the one previously mentioned seems to suggest that questions of hatred and violence are tightly connected to the nature of power. On July 23rd, 2019, a news item from Novaya Gazeta informed the paper’s readers that 27 Chechens had been found dead as a result of a series of extrajudicial executions. They were suspected of being members of an underground oppositionist group. According to the
article, the victims of these executions were arrested in early 2017, that is very close to the
time when the victims of the Chechen «gay hunt» were found².

The coincidence of time and place between the case of the murdered suspected homosexuals and the executed suspected members of an underground oppositionist movement, and the apparent connections between these two cases and the local government of Chechnya, seems to reveal something about the nature of Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya. It clearly tells us that the regime in the Russian republic is a terror regime, not much troubled by the use of extreme violence against its own citizens. That is not all, however. The desire to get rid of political opponents coincides with the desire to get rid of persons whose personal identities do not conform to the government’s standards of conduct in such a way that the common underlying desire for control comes rather clearly into view. The will to use violence against persons who do not conform to certain standards, as innocent as such deviations may be, coincides with a desire to keep and maintain political power and control. It seems likely that this desire will be particularly acute in times of crisis. In the course of this thesis, I will discuss what I, following the lead of Michel Foucault, will call counterdiscourses. These are challenges to a dominant way of thinking, which is the main (or «Jupiterian») discourse of that society. Especially in times of crisis, people who are perceived as representatives of such counterdiscourses are vulnerable to ostracism, and even persecution. We also see a connection between the rhetorics of civilizatory progress or regress and the presumed qualities of people belonging to a designated «race».

«Race», as I use the word in this thesis, is not the same as skin colour. Skin colour is an objective factor pertaining to the amount of melanin in a persons’s skin. «Race» is the set of connotations pertaining to a certain skin colour. It is important to be clear about this difference from the beginning, as I will use the word «race» several times, without in any way endorsing any of the theories about different biological human races, which is dangerous bunk science. The idea of races seems to be connected to ideas of genetic purity, therefore one would expect racism and sexism to share some common features.

The central place of sexuality in ensuring the continuation of the race, as well as a tight connection between corporal and genetic factors and moral value are apparent in the current Chechen witch hunt on homosexuals and in the Nazi anti-semitism that led to one of

² Milashina, Yelena: «Подвал имени Кадырова; Новые подробности массовой внесудебной казни 27 жителей Чечни. Расследование Елены Милашиной». In: Novya Gazeta. July 23rd, 2019
world history’s greatest atrocities, the Holocaust. A perceived need for control and domination are also present in both cases. These are extraordinary cases in a history of class struggle, ethnic tensions and everyday racism and homophobia, but the hatred and brutality leading up to them, particularly the idea that some people are more or less worth than others, are dangerous forces that are present in more ordinary times as well. There are dynamics of power and discourse at work that have the potential to take the shape and form of atrocities. In order to prevent large scale violence, it is necessary to analyze elements of power and discourse and the dynamics that operate between them. A thinker who provided us with important instruments to do just that, and upon whose work I will base most of my thesis, was the French philosopher Michel Foucault. I will turn to him and his work in the next chapter.

3. Some Thoughts on Theory

This thesis on social philosophy belongs to a theoretical tradition that originally started with Friedrich Nietzsche, but whose specific focus is on Michel Foucault. In my opinion, Foucault’s ideas about normativity, governmentality and social power provide extremely valuable and important tools for understanding the social mechanisms of exclusion and hatred. Even though the basic framework of my thesis will be a Foucauldian one, this is not per se a thesis on Foucault, but one that makes use of his theoretical work and conceptual tools in order to explore social problems of my own choosing. As this is the way Foucault himself wanted his work to be used, I think my work remains faithful to Foucault’s philosophical project. Even though this is not a biographical study, I find it suitable to start my thesis with some notes on Foucault’s life and work.

Foucault as an intellectual was something of a paradox. As the son of a distinguished surgeon and a student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, he was very much a product of establishment academia, yet through his work he presented what may be regarded as the most scathing critique of normalizing power and knowledge regimes in modern history. One factor that may help explain this apparent paradox is Foucault’s homosexuality, which he had to suppress because of a less than generous culture in the French academic community, aided by a law barring people considered to be of «dubious morality» from employment in the service of
the state\(^3\). Another such factor is his short engagement with the French Communist Party (PCF). The atmosphere in the PCF was hardly more welcoming to people with Foucault’s inclinations than the French academia, additionally Foucault experienced a «spirit of ascetism and intellectual self-flagellation» among students trying to be communists that was a staple of Communist parties of the Stalinist type, of which the PCF was one\(^4\). Relatedly, most of his life Foucault was a political, sometimes militant, leftist, still he was born and remained a part of a cultural elite, and he was a constant, and sometimes harsh, critic of the Marxist tradition which he distrusted because of the totalizing tendencies he perceived in the tradition.

Self-sensorship, ascetism and the relationship between power and knowledge were all to become recurring themes in Foucault’s work The themes were present in Foucault’s first book, *Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique*, which Macey describes as the archaeology of a silence. A history of limits where the phenomena that a culture rejects come to constitute that culture’s Outside\(^5\). Thus, we see early on in Foucault’s work the development of conceptual tools for understanding such phenomena as rejection and exclusion that in important ways come to define a given culture, because the phenomena that are excluded set the limits for the culture’s accepted sense of identity. The Outside is related to a sense of taboo, and we can also see here a relation between identity and normativity. The mad are characters that must be confined, and thus controlled. What Foucault described as «the great confinement», however, was not primarily concerned with the insane, but rather with labour and efficiency. In order to control labour and ensure efficiency, a police system was established.

The emergence of the police is discussed by Foucault near the end of his lecture series at the Collège de France 1977 – 1978, which is published as a book with the title *Security, Territory, Population*. The police is here presented as one of two major assemblages of political technology, the other being the procedures maintaining the balance of Europe\(^6\). What characterizes these two assemblages is their deployment in a field of relations of forces. These are vectors in a dynamic network of relations in internal competition with each other. The balance of Europe and the police seem to be vectors established to maintain a degree of order and foreseeableableness necessary to maintain this competitive system.

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\(^3\) Macey, David: *The Lives of Michel Foucault*, p. 30
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 40-43
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 95
\(^6\) Foucault, Michel: *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 312
The meaning of the word «police», according to Foucault, went through an evolution from the fifteenth to the end of the eighteenth century\(^7\). In the fifteenth and sixteenth century «police» implied a form of community or association governed by a public authority, the set of actions that direct these communities under public authority, and, thirdly, the result of a good government. «Police» in its earlier manifestation, then, can be understood as a sort of institution that has the power to control a community for that community’s own good. This is comparable to the notion of «pastoral power» discussed in the same series of lectures. From the seventeenth century Foucault considers «police» to refer to the set of means by which the state’s forces can be increased while simultaneously maintaining the internal order of the state. The end of this venture is to serve the happiness of all the state’s citizens as well as the state’s «splendor», understood as visible order and manifest force\(^8\). In order to achieve this end there is a general need of statistics, which is made both possible and necessary by the police. This indicates a clear relationship between the police and the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics. Statistics is described as the state’s knowledge of itself and of other states\(^9\). This serves to emphasize the relationship between power and knowledge in Foucault’s thinking.

Macey points explicitly to this relationship between power and knowledge, or police and epistemology, when he writes that this combination ensures that «madness is perceived in terms of an ethical condemnation of idleness»\(^10\). We have here not only a relation between political power and epistemology, but a relation between power, epistemology and morality. The political order, guarded by the police, entails a certain way of thinking (an epistemic profile, if you will), which in turn implies certain norms serving to keep the subjects of the state within acceptable boundaries of action and conduct. This brings us closer to a proper Foucauldian understanding of hatred, because the strong grounding of society’s norms in the political basis for the state, as well as the epistemic profiles of its citizens, makes it plausible that anyone who is perceived to break with these norms risks moral condemnation and social exclusion. This implies two things, on the metatextual and on the theoretical level.

One thing is that, as Derrida famously quipped: «il n’ya pas de hors-texte». Everything is context dependent, such that my own work with this thesis, for example, will clearly be coloured by my own prejudices, which will probably manifest themselves in various ways in what follows. Another point is that morality is never innocent. There is no great and true

\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 313-314
\(^9\) Ibid., p. 315
\(^10\) Macey, David: *The Lives of Michel Foucault*, p. 98
Good (in capital letter to denote universal singularity), such that morality must be seen as a social product that can be more or less internally coherent, and not some great and final Judge that cannot be wrong and must always be obeyed. One’s frames of thinking, one’s references and the norms and values that «conduct conduct» are thus, in Foucault’s opinion, always already within power. This is a point of view that I certainly share with Foucault. This does not mean that there are structures of power out there that produce and reproduce human clones ready for use, but that we are situated in various strategic relations to each other in what we may think of as spheres of power similar to the moral metaphysics we meet in the works of Immanuel Kant. Foucault wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant’s anthropology and was clearly influenced by him. His view of morality, however, was probably even closer to the Nietzschean one, particularly elaborated in the Genealogy of Morals. It is a well-known fact that Foucault was deeply influenced by Nietzsche and it seems fitting here to give a brief presentation of Nietzsche’s understanding of morality.

According to Friedrich Nietzsche, the accepted morality of a given society has its origin in the more basic relationship between creditor and debtor\(^\text{11}\). Like Foucault, Nietzsche emphasizes a social balance that must be upheld. If harm has been done to someone, the person doing the harm must pay back an equivalent to the harm being done. We can consider this a part of a social contract and as the basis for a general economy of viciousness and pain. The relationship between creditor and debtor serves as a basis for morality, but also for human cognition\(^\text{12}\). Power, morality and epistemology are thus tightly bound up together in the work of both philosophers. Further, Nietzsche claims that phenomena such as guilt, debt and obligation lead to a habit of measurement. People measure themselves up against each other. This seems conducive to social hierarchies, and since the basis for these hierarchies is equivalent to the basis for the society’s morality these social hierarchies are morally sanctioned. Nietzsche goes even further than this when he says that measurement is a basis for people’s experience of themselves as human beings\(^\text{13}\). Not only have we a morally sanctioned hierarchical stratification between persons in a society, but we have a culture conducive to differential evaluation of personhood itself. A stratified hierarchy of humanity.

Given that formal law functions equally for all the community’s members, there is likely to be a shared basic system where the multifarious dynamics of status and power play

\(^{11}\) Nietzsche, Friedrich: Morals Genealogy, p. 58

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 65

\(^{13}\) Ibid., pp. 65-66
themselves out. As Mary Douglas points out in *Purity and Danger*, dirt implies system, more precisely system characterized by ideas of purity. Dirt is matter out of place in a system of ordering and classification. In the same vein, the misfits and dregs of society are thus characterized only on the basis of a system that denies them their fundamental human dignity and worth. Every society creates its own outcasts.

It should be kept in mind that the hierarchized model of society discussed here is not a static model, but one of conflict and different points of view. Nietzsche traces the evaluative categories «good» and «bad» back to the dominating classes of society. The term «good» was used by the noble, wealthy and powerful to distance themselves from the dregs, who were expediently characterized as «bad». The poor and oppressed, on their account, name their opponents «evil» because they imply harm. The fear of these evil people lead to the creation of ascetic ideals such as obedience, meekness and patience. These are then different perspectives on relations of power within a community, which may lead to different standards of behaviour within a broader cultural fellowship.

The normative evaluation of different groups and group identities are relevant to the notion of the «phantasm» that I will gather mostly from Georges Bataille, a philosopher who will figure prominently in this thesis. The reason for the focus on Bataille is that his work on anthropology and inner experience has influenced later work in philosophical anthropology and, also importantly, made a profound impact on Foucault’s academic development. His notion of the phantasm has explanatory value for how different epistemic communities come to perceive other groups that these communities situate themselves in relation to. I will expand on this early in the chapter on nationalism. His notions of heterogeneity and homogeneity are useful for explaining the connections between group identity and hatred. The connection between group identity and animosity brings us back to Nietzsche.

In Nietzsche’s setup, what he calls «slave morality» defines a «good» group identity in opposition to an «evil» threat from outside the group. In opposition to this slave morality, Nietzsche’s «master morality» is characterized by strength, arrogance and a rather brutal callousness towards those that the masters consider inferior. On one side we find hatred and on the other we find contempt, and these emotions reinforce one another. Profiting on the slave

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14 Douglas, Mary: *Purity and Danger*, p. 36
15 Nietzsche, Friedrich: *Moralens Genealogi*, p. 19
16 Ibid., pp. 38-4
17 Ibid., pp. 30-31
morality and the set of values ignited by resentment are the priests, who lead their flock towards purity and decadence\textsuperscript{18}. It may be objected here that the masters’ contempt may contain its own sort of hatred, because the chance that people from the oppressed class do not bow to the masters’ wishes may imply its own sort of threat towards the masters’ designs. If disvalued people choose to rebel against people who consider themselves to be of a higher kind this may in itself lead to a desire to destroy these rebels. As Mary Douglas reminds us: «Dirt offends against order»\textsuperscript{19}. Members of the oppressed class may further aspire to reach the position of masters and thus come to identify with, rather than hate, their oppressors, and there may be cases of mutual threats on the top of various hierarchies. We must, in short, regard Nietzsche’s conflict model as rather more complex than it may seem at first glance.

The priests’ role in Nietzsche’s book is reminiscent of the phenomenon that Foucault describes as «pastoral power». Foucault describes pastoral power as power over a flock, which the pastor, or shepherd, has in common with Nietzsche’s priest. There is also a religious aspect to both roles, as Foucault presents God as the ultimate shepherd and the king as an intermediate between God and the king’s subjects. The king is part of a pastoral structure that characterizes the relationship between God and men\textsuperscript{20}. Pastoral power is power over a collective rather than a territory. Foucault speaks of a «multiplicity in movement»\textsuperscript{21}. The god as shepherd, in contradistinction to the Greek god, is a mobile god, not confined to a given territory. The pastoral god leads the flock towards good pastures.

The pastoral power is a beneficial power, as the pastor cares for his flock and ensures it salvation. In order to safeguard the flock, the shepherd needs to take care of every single sheep, which indicates an individualizing feature of pastoral power. The totality and the individual must be safeguarded simultaneously. The care for the individual may necessitate neglecting the entire flock for the salvation of the one sheep\textsuperscript{22}. Logically, however, the importance of the individual implies the nature of its relation to the group. As Mary Douglas reminds us, holiness implies wholeness, unity and integrity\textsuperscript{23}. This in turn implies separation and conformity according to class, and subordination to the order of creation. Hence, we can start to see the need for individual subjectivation for the sake of the community as well as the

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 24-26
\textsuperscript{19} Douglas, Mary: Purity and Danger, p. 2
\textsuperscript{20} Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population, p. 124
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 125
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 126-129
\textsuperscript{23} Douglas, Mary: Purity and Danger, p. 55
individual. For the group to be ensured salvation according to some cosmological ideal it is important for each individual participant to function according to this ideal. Hence also, the appropriateness of the shepherd and the priestly class in the works of respectively Foucault and Nietzsche.

As becomes apparent from Foucault’s description, the community, or flock, led by the shepherd is a community of a political or spiritual kind that is not reducible to a state. What matters here is the composition of the flock itself and its salvation or survival. This community is not place bound, but is rather characterized by movement towards good pastures. Still, it is a unitary fellowship, so even if the state as such is not directly relevant, the nation may be. More important than protecting a territory is defending an order. According to Douglas, ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is clear that such rituals fulfill social functions, that they are not restricted to pure hygiene. Imposing such a system may be important to vulnerable groups by securing a place for them in their respective communities, and it may be important for the powerful by strengthening their positions of privilege. There seems to be grounds for a common purpose here that are likely to solidify systems that may or may not be unjust. Breaking with such a system comes at a perceived cost even by community members who are unfairly disadvantaged by the prevailing status quo.

Another interesting point is that the safeguarding of the flock necessitates counting the sheep, which necessitates statistics when the flock gets big enough. The necessity of statistics seems to be a common denominator between the shepherd and the police discussed earlier. In fact, Foucault himself places the role of the shepherd between a policeman and a legislator. The shepherd creates the law and sees to it that it is upheld. The responsibilities of the shepherd as lawmaker and caretaker include such things as distributing food, directing the flock, indicating the right direction and saying how the sheep must mate so as to have good offspring. Hence, a range of administrative practices which regulate society. It is these practices, more than the law as such that will become important in the formation of biopower, which one can regard as a political heir to pastoral power.

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24 Ibid., p. 4
25 Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population, p. 139
26 Ibid., p. 137
Biopower is described by Foucault as «the right to make live and to let die»\textsuperscript{27}. This was a reversal of the right of the old sovereign to make die and let live, and it took the shape and form of a multitude of techniques for achieving the subjection of bodies and control of populations\textsuperscript{28}. Biopower works on a macro-level through administration of population and on a microlevel through the control of individuals’ bodies. The latter is closer to disciplinary power that is an older form of power and has been particularly thoroughly explored in *Discipline and Punish*. Biopolitics comes later and depends on various administrative apparata, which together with normalization constitute the basis for biopolitics. The most important purpose of biopolitics is the regulation and administration of populations in order to ensure the well-being and progress of the whole.

The sort of pastoral power discussed above, including the regulation of population for its own good, was also problematized in an earlier work, called *The Will to Knowledge*. This was the first book in his series about *The History of Sexuality*, where the concept of biopower was mentioned for the first time. Here, Foucault explains that the use of sex was made a matter of analysis and intervention in the eighteenth century and that this sort of interventionary politics provided anchorage points for later varieties of racism\textsuperscript{29}.

The regulation of sexuality and its concomitant efforts to control the population in «useful» ways has a sinister potential, according to Foucault. His example about the simple-minded farm hand Jouy and the little girl is meant to tell us something about the popular imaginary of degeneracy in nineteenth century France. His brainpan was measured, the bone structure of his face studied, and ultimately he was shut away for the rest of his life in the hospital at Máreville as a pure object of medical study\textsuperscript{30}. Even though there may be grounds for moral condemnation of Jouy’s behaviour, he was treated inhumanely. As an object of study, Jouy was in a sense removed from the community of persons in his native village, even after he was acquitted in court. In this respect his situation is similar to that of the monster that Foucault describes in *Abnormal*.

The monster is a character outside the law in two senses: The monster is, as such, a violation of the laws of society and a violation of the laws of nature. The monster is a liminal

\textsuperscript{27} Taylor, Chloë: «Biopower». In: Taylor, Dianna (ed.): *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts*, p. 41
\textsuperscript{28} Oksala, Johanna: «From Biopower to Governmentality». In: Falzon, Christopher; O’Leary, Timothy; Sawicki, Jana: *A Companion to Foucault*, p. 321
\textsuperscript{29} Foucault, Michel: *The Will to Knowledge*, p. 26
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 31-32
figure that combines the impossible and the forbidden. Further, the monster does not bring about a legal response from the law, but provokes either violence, medical care or pity. The monster represents the Outside of the established order, which, as we have seen, tends to frighten people, and thus by its very presence provokes responses of confinement or violence. It would serve us well here to remember that pity is a subordinating, albeit beneficent attitude and certainly an ascetic virtue par excellence. Another thing to keep in mind here is the nature of the term «nature». «Nature» must be understood here as a normative concept. In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault establishes a link between nature and law, where acts «contrary to nature» are defined as an extreme form of acts «against the law».

The «unnatural» is also a specific dimension in the field of sexuality. The «unnatural» in this context is the established order of relations given official approval more than it is a biological term. There are, however, connections between the scientific order and the normative order, and Foucault was most certainly aware of this. He makes it particularly explicit in his discussion about confessional practices that made use of a scientific framework in order to shape identities along the lines of the structures of psychological science. The inner truth of the patient became the truth of scientific discourse, hence a sort of Procrustean bed for non-conforming subjectivities. Finally, one should be aware that the status of a liminal creature not only places the creature outside of the established order, but by representing society’s Outside it contributes to setting its boundaries and by so doing it helps define the shape and structure of society itself. Therefore, it is not only the case that society creates its own outcasts, but these outcasts are instrumental in defining the societies that exclude them. We will return to this mechanism in the discussion of Bataille’s notions of homogeneity and heterogeneity in chapter 7.

The monster is presented as one of three figures in what Foucault calls a «genealogy of abnormality», along with the individual to be corrected and the (child) masturbator. The monster is certainly the most spectacular figure here, but these are all important figures of deviance who challenge the normative order. Where the monster is a cosmological figure, the two other figures are barely noticeable in their deviance. The individual to be corrected is distinguished by his incorrigibility, which calls for particular techniques of training and correction, whereas the masturbator embodies the universal secret shared by everyone. The mastur-

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31 Foucault, Michel: Abnormal, pp. 55-56
32 Foucault, Michel: The Will to Knowledge, pp. 38-39
33 Ibid., p. 64
34 Foucault, Michel: Abnormal, pp. 57-63
bator’s universality turns him into the root of every possible evil. The spheres of power these figures challenge, before they merge towards the end of the nineteenth century, are respectively the framework of politico-juridical powers, the family, and the individual’s body.

Foucault’s ideas about monstrosity and primary exclusion are relevant to the work of another theorist to whom I will turn repeatedly in the course of this thesis, namely Giorgio Agamben, an Italian philosopher who has frequently been quite explicit about his theoretical indebtedness to Foucault. According to Agamben, legal order and the state in the Western hemisphere was based on an act of exclusion. The political group is defined by the individuals that it chooses to exclude. Agamben posits a hierarchy of humanity inherent to the basic framework of the modern state, which he insists we must understand as biopolitical. Agamben’s theory of law and society contain some interesting moments that will be important for the development of the present thesis. His ideas about exceptionality and ambiguous sacredness makes him an illuminating and constructive companion to Georges Bataille.

The religious aspect of pastoral power, as well as the emphasis on the shepherd’s devotion to the flock, indicates a strong community of values. For a community like the pastoral one to function there has to be, at the outset, a set of values that guides the conduct of the shepherd as well as the flock. This seems likely to be conducive to two things: A strengthened feeling of community between the members of a given cultural system and conflict between opposing systems of this kind. Indeed, Foucault reminds us that a great part of the struggles that permeated the Christian world from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century were struggles about pastoral power, all the while keeping the pastorate as a leading force. The struggles were about the governance of men, «the regimen of souls» and the right to lay down the law for the conduct of everyday life. Particularly interesting here is that the pastor also has the power to expel from the flock «those sheep that by disease or scandal are liable to contaminate the whole flock». There is a connection between conduct, contagion and obedience. The shepherd and the flock thus enters a system of obedience in which the end point is to reach the point of complete subordination. There will be patterns of purity, dirt and contagion here, which will be important for logics of inclusion and exclusion. Even the shepherd cannot break with this system because it is bestowed on him by God, regarded here as the Leitmotif, or highest principle, of the community. In this system everyone is, in principle, responsible for

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35 Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population, pp. 149-151
36 Ibid., p. 153
37 Ibid., pp. 177-179
everyone else, such that a structure is established in which obedience is assured through power, investigation, self-examination and examination of others. This will make a difference for consequent normalization and administrative regulation relevant to biopolitics.

These systems described by Foucault and Nietzsche, in which human beings are reduced, and reduce themselves, to puppets for the will of others seem to be fertile grounds for dynamic fields of sadomasochistic relations. The dynamics of cultural sadomasochism, as elaborated by Lynn S. Chancer, requires a frame of habit based on rather stable relations of power and powerlessness. There is an excessive attachment between the dominant and the dominated parties and these parties are driven towards their respective roles by repetitive and ritualistic structures. As with Foucault, Chancer’s sadomasochistic schema is in constant flux, operating on the basis of forces and counterforces. Finally, people in the masochistic position (that is, the dominated) face severe consequences if they challenge the power of individuals in more dominant positions. It must, however, be remembered that a sadomasochistic relationship should not be thought of as a «pure» or static relation. The sadistic position depends on the submission of the masochistic party. Thus, there will normally be an element of masochism in the sadist and an element of sadism in the masochist. One might say that the sadist and the masochist enter a dialectic relation with clear tendencies on both sides.

Chancer emphasizes a deepseated need for community that is particularly salient in times of solitude and uncertainty. A bit paradoxically, perhaps, the need for moral community is stronger in cultures characterized by individualism and competition. In times of normative individualism sadomasochism becomes a strategy for coping with the experienced dissolution of social bonds. Nietzsche points out something similar when he says that feelings about values express conditions of preservation and growth belonging to times gone by. There is a need to hold on to patterns of established order that are no longer culturally relevant. The leap into modernity necessarily implies a leap into an unknown state of affairs. As Hamlet said, such existential uncertainty «puzzles the will and makes us rather bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of». It will not always be practically possible to make such a flight, and so we can probably expect a kind of Hegelian Aufhebung in times of transition that is stronger than in more stable times. It also seems likely that such a situation would make one

\[38\] Ibid., p. 183
\[39\] Chancer, Lynn S.: Sadomasochism in Everyday Life, p. 3
\[40\] Ibid., p. 16
\[41\] Nietzsche, Friedrich: The Will to Power, p. 69
more inclined to support authority figures, which in turn is a sign of an underlying sadomasochistic tendency. Chancer herself seems to lean towards such an interpretation\textsuperscript{42}.

4. Nationalism – The situated Self

As my thesis is about mechanisms of exclusion, the patterns of group formation will be important for the basic structure of the present work. Ideas about belonging and social boundaries are particularly salient in theories about the nation and nationalism. This is a field of study where the problems of community have been discussed in a fruitful and critical way. Here, I will in particular make use of Benedict Anderson’s work, whose book \textit{Imagined Communities}, is regarded as one of the foundational works in the academic study of nationalism.

The struggle for biopower, the right to administrate populations according to their own good, seems simultaneously to be a struggle between ideas, and the ideas governing a given society have a strong binding power on its population. Benedict Anderson, in his \textit{Imagined Communities}, points out that the fraternity of nations tends to have a strange power of conviction, strong enough for people to willingly die for them\textsuperscript{43}. This is the case even though the likelihood that most of the people within these communities have even met each other is remarkably slight. A central pillar in such a community, Anderson claims, is a shared discourse, channeled in Anderson’s example through the morning newspaper\textsuperscript{44}. This paper serves as a tangible link to other readers that each individual reader knows nothing about, except that there is a rather strong likelihood that they will also consume the same gossip at roughly the same point in time.

The way the news is presented to us gives us a frame of reference for focusing our attention. This is relevant to the structure of the phantasm, as the link between image, association and external reality can have an effect on our physical conduct in our encounters with the external world\textsuperscript{45}. The phantasm combines representations (ideas) with hallucinations and produces images that one perceives in the surrounding world\textsuperscript{46}. This concept is very important

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42} Chancer, Lynn S.: \textit{Sadomasochism in Everyday Life}, p. 15-16
\textsuperscript{43} Anderson, Benedict: \textit{Imagined Communities}, p. 7
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., pp. 33-36
\textsuperscript{45} Douglas, Mary: \textit{Purity and Danger}, p. 64
\textsuperscript{46} Gasché, Rodolphe: \textit{Georges Bataille; Phenomenology and Phantasmatology}, p. 125
\end{footnotesize}
for the practical function of a stereotype or trope in a social sphere. It helps to explain, for example, why dark skin can be associated with savagery or homosexuality can be associated with decadence even by subjects who would morally condemn such associations. On the other hand, the phantasm also helps to explain how one can summon the spirits of one’s ancestors by the aid of a piece of cloth one has chosen to call a «flag». This is less a matter of rational deliberation than it is a matter of emotions and drives that are often channeled through stereotypes, which in turn define the kinds of phantasms that come to influence social behaviour.

Thus, rational thinking interacts continually with pre- and pararational dynamics to influence behaviour and normativity. I believe it is constructive to consider the phantasms in light of power relations along the line of Foucault’s power/knowledge axis. The emotional content attached to norms and shared world views contribute to a large extent with establishing bonds of community between people who share a social world and norms that regulate behaviour. A common pool of similar world views is important for the creation of a nation.

A link is established between strangers within a shared community of newspaper readers, amounting to what Hegel called «a substitute for morning prayers». The regularity of publication also serves to provide a vital service for any community, namely a degree of continuity. Anderson emphasizes this when he points out the perceived link between the dead and the yet unborn, providing some limits to personal mortality. The morning newspaper thus does a more basic service than that of an information provider. It enters a structure of everyday nation building, for which we need a certain amount of shared rituals, habits and myths. We thus have a rational aspect of newspaper reading, which is information gathering, and we have an aspect of the same behaviour which is closer to the prerational, which is not necessarily less important on that account. The way a story is presented gives us more than a shared system of beliefs. It is also likely to affect the way we feel about various phenomena relevant to our social and everyday lives.

Nationalism, in Anderson’s interpretation, is not necessarily exclusionary. The nation as such is more a matter of language than of blood, and foreigners are usually welcome if only they will learn the language of the host country. He also distinguishes between the idea of destiny connected to the nation, and the idea of contamination connected to race. Race thinking is more a matter of class than of nation. Here I think Anderson is onto something impor-
tant, but that his assessment of nationalism may be a bit too optimistic. Like him, I do not think that nationalism has to be exclusionary, and one should strive to make one’s community accessible to others, regardless of culture, skin colour or other relatively arbitrary factors. Two points where I disagree with him, or think he should have been more nuanced are, first, the matter of language and language acquisition, and, second, the dividing line between the ideas of national destiny and racial contamination. The idea that a nation has a destiny, holy or otherwise, may be a dangerous facilitator of racism, even if the most important factor in the development of fullblown racism is the hierarchical stratification of human beings inherent to classism. This is a point where I agree with Anderson.

First, language: It seems problematic to state as a fact that everyone can learn any language the way Anderson does. Language learning is a skill and some will be better equipped for it than others. Whether someone is or is not capable of learning a language can depend on factors other than time, such as general aptitude, social proximity to native language users, and the resources to acquire the tools necessary for learning the relevant language. Language can also be a tool for conveying status, hierarchy and identity. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon explains, among other things, the role of language for establishing and maintaining a dividing line between the civilized French colonizers and the primitive colonized Negro of the Antilles. «Mastery of language affords remarkable power», Fanon says. Further: «The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter – that is, he will be closer to being a real human being – in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language». Finally: «The Negro who knows the mother country is a demigod»50. All these quotations about language seem to say something of general interest about power and differential valuation of human beings. Fanon, both as a citizen of a colonized people and as a psychiatrist who dealt with traumatized patients, knew better than most what it means to be oppressed. He ascribed a basic importance to language because it is a primary means to convey identity and quite often status. It can therefore be considered a sort of capital, not necessarily secondary to the capital of money. A dominant language has the prerogative to define reality and normativity. The less fluent one is in the «master language», the less powerful and «civilized» one is regarded.

The second point is somewhat related to the first, and also related to Foucault’s description of pastoral power. The nation is a project common to a group of people. As Anderson quite correctly points out, the stakes tied to this project are rather high, as it has to do with pe-
ople’s basic feeling of identity and social cohesion. Even on this level, one should be careful with how one thinks about one’s group. As Reicher and Hopkins have shown in their book *Self and Nation*, social identification necessarily involves social comparison, where one’s in-group is experienced as distinct from various outgroups, which in turn can lead to discrimination. Reicher and Hopkins are quick to point out that differentiation and discrimination are not equivalents, but are contingent on one’s attitude to one’s group and its relation to other groups. Once again, valuation is a decisive factor.

If a degree of differentiation is unavoidable simply in virtue of belonging to a social group, it seems quite important to find out how such differentiation can retain a positive valence. Not least because the way one thinks about group belonging and group identity necessarily has profound consequences for how one thinks about oneself, one’s personal identity and one’s relations with others. As human beings, we are social animals who need groups in order to survive and thrive, but discrimination on arbitrary grounds has often led to blatant injustices and can pose a problem for liberal democracy. In light of this, one should reflect on what it means to be a member of a group and what kinds of value one attaches to one’s group. In the case of the nation, we can interpret this kind of group as a more or less stable project that one has in common with various relevant others. One can relate to the project of nation in multiple ways, but one important difference is whether one’s attitude to nation is open or closed. If it is open, I would expect it to be more likely for one to accept new people and impulses possibly at odds with one’s preconceived ideas about the nation.

An open attitude to nationality, as I see it, implies an acceptance that one’s culture and community can change. Tying nationality to a sense of destiny seems more conducive to a closed attitude, because it can lead to a belief that such a destiny can be betrayed. Such a belief does not necessarily dispose one to embrace people or experiences contrary to one’s ideas about the nation. This would have consequences for personal freedom, as well, because personal identity, like national identity, can either be a matter of constant creation, recreation and negotiation, or it can be a matter of firmly set articles of faith not to be trifled with. The latter seems likely to lead to neurosis and suspicion more than a healthy sense of community. Reicher and Hopkins point to Hitler’s Germany when they explicate the danger of thinking in terms of national character. Focusing on presumed national identity (perhaps particularly one with a prophesied «destiny») rather than distinct patterns of variability is likely to strengh-

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51 Reicher, Stephen; Hopkins, Nick: *Self and Nation*, p. 33
52 Ibid.,, pp. 29-30
hen existing stereotypes and potentials for authoritarianism. Just making such a statement, however, is not enough. One should also try to understand which «constellations of forces» that lead to one social phenomenon rather than another.

Foucault himself would probably be sceptical to Andersons’s schema. Not only was he ill disposed to grand, sweeping narratives, but his ideas of social forces at war with each other is at odds with a strictly class oriented account. To him, a proper analysis of power and domination in a society had to take into account a multiplicity of subjugations functioning within a social body.\textsuperscript{53} Scrutinizing the workings of capital will be important in such a model, but it will not be sufficient. The preceding discussion about pastoral power shows that the hierarchical division between human beings is not a feature on which capitalism has a monopoly. Besides the pecuniary economy proper to capitalism there is also an economy of merits and fault\textsuperscript{54} where the methods of evaluation are different from the market mechanisms of a capitalist economy. Merit and fault are moral categories, to the effect that the standards proper to an economy based on these categories must involve other metrics in addition to a critique of class society.

Chancer’s sadomasochistic dynamics seem applicable to further explore this moral economy that Foucault mentions. Her discussion about the social dynamics of patriarchy seems quite suitable for this, as there clearly is a dominant party to this structure, as well as a dominated party whose contribution to society is less valued. First, we have to be clear that there are structures of valuation more basic than the capitalist one. Here we should keep in mind that the function of money is to provide a standard for measuring worth. It is a fixed, external recognizable sign meant to provide order to our social world, and it works only for so long as people have faith in it. These are the factors that Douglas points to in her explanation of the ritualistic function of money\textsuperscript{55}. The role of money is to provide a common standard for interpersonal transactions within a capitalist society. This is exactly the same function that gender provides in a patriarchal, or for that matter excessively heteronormative, society.

In a patriarchal society, higher value is typically bestowed on virtues and positions associated with the male gender. This has a tendency to make women socially subordinate to men. Normatively, women have traditionally been considered to be closer to «nature», domesticity and emotionality than men, who have been considered to be more «rational» and action

\textsuperscript{53} Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», p. 27
\textsuperscript{54} Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population, p. 173
\textsuperscript{55} Douglas, Mary: Purity and Danger, p. 70-71
oriented than women\textsuperscript{56}. Additionally, as Foucault reminds us, women’s pregnancy has been used as a pretext to control women’s bodies. Women are precious because of their reproductive function, and children are precious because they replenish the population. Because of their reproductive role, women also have a sacred role in the economic system of the transmission of household goods to descendants\textsuperscript{57}. They are thereby tied to the home, domesticated. As Anderson points out, this role, coupled with intermarriages within the bourgeoisie, has also made it easier to solidify a hierarchical class society\textsuperscript{58}. We see here that prescribed gender roles, coupled with a sharp stratification of classes can perpetuate, and thereby «naturalize» a hegemonic order. Blood becomes perceived to be a legitimate basis for privilege.

Even though a critique of class society is probably insufficient to account for human conflict and possible sources of hatred, then, it is certainly not superfluous. The conflict between labour and capital is a basic dynamic of any society, and in Foucault’s account of the moral monster he identifies two antagonists: The Jacobin enemy and the anti-Jacobin enemy. The Jacobin enemy is here the tyrant, particularly embodied in the original monster by the name of king. The king is a monster because he has the power to arbitrarily break the social contract regulating society and thus threatens the natural development of interest by opposing it to the original state of nature represented by his own selfish interest\textsuperscript{59}. In this regard, the king in Foucault’s account shares the position of the Sovereign in the work of Giorgio Agamben, who is simultaneously inside and outside the law, as a foundation for the legal order, and the raison d’être of the state. The king is the foundation of order, but also a danger to it, as he can dissolve it at will. The tyrant is a monster and a criminal in light of his arbitrary power. In popular literature, the myth of the tyrant as feral beast is particularly embodied in the figure of Marie-Antoinette, who is both a foreigner and, in light of her privileged position, believed to be greedy for the blood of the people. In addition to her royal privileges, Marie-Antoinette was known for her sexual escapades. The royal beast is therefore associated with debauchery and excess\textsuperscript{60}.

On the opposite side, we find another monster with several heads, which is opposed to the king monster, and also to the established political order. This is the anti-Jacobin enemy, by the name of the people in revolt. As is the case with the tyrant, the revolutionary people

\textsuperscript{56} Chancer, Lynn S.: \emph{Sadomasochism in Everyday Life}, p. 27
\textsuperscript{57} Foucault, Michel: \emph{Abnormal}, pp. 69-70
\textsuperscript{58} Anderson, Benedict: \emph{Imagined Communities}, p. 77
\textsuperscript{59} Foucault, Michel: \emph{Abnormal}, pp. 90-94
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., pp. 97-98
threaten the social body and is suspected of cannibalism. As with the despot, there is a real threat of violence embodied in a long oppressed people. In this case, however, the role of the oppressed is not to function as a formal foundation of law. We recognize here another character from the work of Agamben. *Homo sacer*, the individual excluded from the law, perpetually in a precarious condition, but precisely as excluded, the *homo sacer* serves to define the status of citizenship, and may therefore be regarded as a foundation for the legal order. As an outcast, however, *homo sacer* may be regarded as a threat to the established order of things. How these two monsters were represented by whom, and which kind of threat that was emphasized, had much to do with whose interests were at stake, which again underlines the legacy of Nietzsche in Foucault’s thinking. Foucault makes this especially clear in «Society Must Be Defended», where he says that the truth of discourse is always a truth from a decentered position, as a vector in the perpetual war between discourses. As the interests of the rulers and the oppressed are constantly at odds, any peace must not be thought of as neutral, but always just a metastable state of presumed equilibrium between different forces.

The depiction of the two monsters in Foucault’s *Abnormal* is apt to make one think that different sorts of prejudices and stereotypes will manifest themselves differently in different social strata. I will look into this through analyses of racism, classism, homophobia and sexism. As these kinds of prejudices are in some ways linked, there will inevitably also be a degree of overlap here.

5. **Racism – A Class Issue**

To begin with racism, it is important to see the connection between this social ill and classism, which is remarkably similar to it. There are some striking similarities between the discussion about racism and white privilege in the USA in the book *Whitewashing Race*, and issues pertaining to the demonization of the British working class discussed in the book *Chavs* by the journalist Owen Jones. That there should be some common features between these phenomena is unsurprising as both groups have long been oppressed by more dominant social groups, but scrutinizing these similarities can give us some important pointers as to why these

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61 Ibid., pp. 98-99
62 Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», pp. 52-53
groups are sometimes demonized. In this section, I will start exploring racism and classism in an effort to find similarities between the mechanisms of each of these problems, and I will explore the nature of social exclusion related to the notions of race and class.

The first thing to notice is the belief in the failure of something called «aspiration» or «ambition» on the side of black people and workers. These terms give a semblance of a fairly neutral explanation of a pervasive cultural problem. If someone is lacking in one of these virtues, then they lack the will or «grit» to «succeed». If someone falls behind, then, that is because of their own individual failure to make good of the opportunities available to them. Again, however, we must keep in mind that virtues are always proper to a context, and what it means to have a «will to succeed» may not be as obvious as it seems at first glance.

A good critique of the notion of «grit» must take into account that societies stratified along the lines of factors such as race or class tend to be rigged in favour of people who are already privileged. Being aspirational in this context means, explains Jones, to «rise above one’s station» to get ahead of the other members of one’s class. The lack of aspiration, defined as not being willing to rise above one’s station (perhaps out of a sense of loyalty to other workers) is also thought to be an inheritable vice. The idea that features of personality are passed down through bloodlines is typical of racist thinking and the authors of *Whitewashing Race* point to similar mechanisms at work in the United States. As with the working class in Britain, the systemic colour line in the USA is presented as a moral and cultural failure, a product of «black failure, selfdoubt and lack of effort». In so many words a failure of ambition on the part of a disadvantaged group in society.

The emphasis on morality in a specific cultural context is interesting because it says something about which values are mobilized in order to maintain a given system in the face of undeniable social inequities. The stated intent of the critics of African-American culture is not to keep black people down, rather the contrary. As they see it, one must turn one’s focus away from colour if one is to have any hope of overcoming the «development gap» between black and white people. We see a persistant shift of focus from institutional barriers to individual failings such as antisocial choices of poor blacks leading to crime and «babies out of wedlock». Again we see a connection between morality and the regulation of populations. Theo-

63 Jones, Owen: *Chavs*, pp. 89-91
64 Brown, Michael K.; Carnoy, Martin; Currie, Elliott; Duster, Troy; Oppenheimer, David B.; Shultz, Marjorie M.; Wellman, David: *Whitewashing Race*, pp. 6-7
65 Ibid., pp. 7, 10
dore W. Allen has pointed out that such regulation in the colonies took the shape and form of limits on marriage, family life and sexual relations on the part of bond-labourers. The reason for that is that family would take energy away from productive labour. This regulation was accompanied by moral lessons about «fornication», «bastardy» and abstinence. The connection between class, sex and morality is hence not new, and as Allen has also pointed out, one can easily see more or less explicit racist and sexist aspects of this triad.

From a Foucauldian point of view, the connection between power, the correct use of sex and moral condemnation makes one think of biopolitics, and indeed in *The Birth of Biopolitics*, he writes something that brings us closer to an understanding of the cult of ambition. As Foucault sees it, the standard of human excellence under neo-liberalism can be described as something like an entrepreneur of himself. This entrepreneurial role is closely tied to consumption and the consumer society. Through consumption the entrepreneurial man becomes a producer of his own satisfaction, we have therefore a view of productive relations based on consumption. The point of this critique of neo-liberalism is not some elaborate way of saying «down with capitalism», but should be understood as an attempt to show how a governing idea (what Foucault dubbed «governmentality») has a tendency to create in- and outgroups, in a way that provides necessary coordinates for behaviour and coordination of populations, but also leads to stigmatization of individuals who do not fit in to the prevailing system.

The social logic pertaining to productivity and labour is an important theme in Foucault’s work, and we shall see later that it is central to the notion of homogeneity in Bataille’s work, as well. Linking production to consumption, and regulating this relation by the aid of a moral framework revolving around personal ambition, makes the individualist entrepreneurialism proper to neo-liberalism a driving force for the consumer society Foucault described in his lectures and that remains the prevailing system in most countries. This neo-liberal discourse is then habituated in the contemporary subject through various social apparata (dispositifs). Production and consumption enter a kind of dialectical relationship in Foucault’s thinking. Not only must one produce in order to consume, but one must consume in order to produce, and the product of this consumption is the entrepreneurial man himself, or rather the increase of his satisfaction. The way one goes about doing that is acting as a «rational actor», competing with other such actors in a competitive market. In the neo-liberal system, this is a moral

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66 Allen, Theodore W.: *The Invention of the White Race, Volume Two*, pp. 128-129, 158-159
67 Foucault, Michel: *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 226
imperative. As the model citizen is defined as a rational agent maximizing utilities in a laisser faire economy, it seems to follow that the raison d’etat in this system is pecuniary capital.

The myth of the «rational actor», or the homo oeconomicus, presumes a certain view of human rationality which is far from innocent, but which in our time is all too often taken for granted. This view of human nature carries with it a lot of consequences, which flow from a dominant narrative, tied to an epistemological framework particularly embodied in what we call «methodological individualism». Saying that the dominant narrative carries with it certain consequences is not in itself a condemnation of the narrative, as the same thing would be true of any such narrative, including the prevailing framework’s opposite. Given the current narrative, which is being discussed by Foucault, one would presume that each actor’s chosen action in the markets available to them is a purely individual venture, where fairness is ensured through the market’s propensity to self-regulate. All it comes down to then is individual effort and «grit». As with other divine miracles, the magic of the market requires the aid of humans.

The logic behind this culturally prescribed production of satisfaction has been discussed a bit earlier on in this paper. It is present in Security, Territory, Population in connection with the development of the police and its role in securing the happiness of citizens and the splendor of the state. Rather than being just an individual venture, the manufacture of satisfaction is necessary for the maintenance of a society’s internal order. Producing a semblance of free choice is vital for securing the will to produce and the system’s legitimacy, but only within certain boundaries provided by the logic of the prevailing system. This dependency is conducive to normative rules of behaviour that keeps deviance in check, but also to institutions that ensure obedience to the system. Conformity within a system of prescribed freedom necessitates a security apparatus, which is built to serve the dominant discourse, which here is a neo-liberal one. As indicated by Foucault, such an apparatus is likely to operate in the shape and form of a system of police, particularly exemplified by the penitentiary, or prison. The people who are most vulnerable to this institution will be individuals who deviate from the prevailing raison d’état, which in this case will be people who are short on money.

Jones writes about the phenomenon of teenage gangs who in many people’s minds are linked to crime. These gangs are often from poor families and are thus heterogenous to the order of capital. As we have seen, standing outside the reigning order of society is perilous in many ways, one of them being perceived as a threat in one’s own right. In a system where

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68 Jones, Owen: Chavs, pp. 212-214
«cash is king» in a literal sense, poverty may be considered a punishable vice. The anti-social behaviour associated with teenage gangs is typically blamed on bad parenting and moral failure, while Jones argues that it would be more constructive to provide these kids with other opportunities for validation and success. What is most interesting in this context are the various governmental tactics against deviance which can be summarized under the heading «Tough on Crime», particularly the legion of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, issued by New Labour. These orders served to strengthen the link between teenage gangs and criminal behaviour in popular opinion and vastly increased the number of young people in jail without serving any rehabilitative function. We have then a dispositif that serves to strengthen a given stereotype, which in turn feeds into the phantasm «criminal pauper». It might be worth asking whether rehabilitation is really the purpose of the penal system. Foucault argued that it wasn’t.

According to Foucault, the penal system was developed to protect the interests of a social category with an interest in order against another social class dedicated to disorder\(^69\), or the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The legal order of a given society works in favour of the ruling class, which helps explain why teenagers from poor families are often associated with crime. Turning now to the monsters in *Abnormal*, we see that the social category Foucault indicates here is the manyheaded monster by the name of the people in revolt, whose ferocity and potential for violence was a source of terror for the upper classes. The police, and in extension the penal system, is here used not only, or even primarily, as a means towards social harmony, but as a weapon to pacify the potential for revolt among the many in order to satisfy the interests of the affluent few. The prison, then, does not work to make itself superfluous, as the case would be if it had rehabilitation as its main goal, but rather for the continuity of the system itself. For this purpose, creating an image of threatening working class teenagers is far more useful than the healing of social wounds and the restoration of trust between all the society’s members. One must by all means ensure that the wounds remain open because it serves to strengthen the perceived need of a political *status quo* which produces delinquency in order to delinate a barrier between «decent society» on the one hand and what someone named Target called a «bastardized race»\(^70\).

There is a couple of things to notice about the preceding critique of the penitentiary. First, the words «bastardized race» seems to indicate a connection between the hierarchical stratification of a class society and racial thinking. The word «bastard» calls to mind the fear

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\(^{69}\) Foucault, Michel: *Discipline and Punish*, p. 276
\(^{70}\) Ibid., pp. 276-277
of «babies out of wedlock» associated with African-Americans, which implies a lack of control over people perceived to stand outside civilized order. Second, capital seems to be present in two senses. There is the classical Marxist one, that pecuniary capital tends to accumulate and get progressively more concentrated in a few centres, which is true on an international scale as well as, to a varying extent, within countries. There is also a sense that social capital attaches itself to factors that are not necessarily pecuniary. One of these factors is skin colour. Foucault points out that this mechanism is salient in the colony, where any solidarity between working class representatives of the colonizing power and the peoples being colonized was effectively curtailed by racialized images of the colonized peoples as cannibals, that is dangerous individuals\(^71\). A similar mechanism may work between workers of the same ethnic group, where the incarcerated people are pathologized, such that a person breaking the law becomes associated with degeneracy, such that the criminal is close to the animal, to be feared as a ferocious beast far removed from the virtues of the bourgeoisie. The stereotypes relevant to the colony will then to a certain extent be relevant to the prison and vice versa.

As the authors of *Whitewashing Race* point out, white Americans have accumulated advantages in housing, work, education and security based solely on skin colour, which has led to a «possessive investment in whiteness»\(^72\). In the minds of many whites, this investment tends to take the form of a zero-sum game where white people feel that they must hold black people at bay in order to protect their own privileges. If black people get ahead, it is assumed, that must result in a corresponding loss for white people. Thus relative group status, based on colour, as well as individual advancement becomes important, which cements the segregation between black and white people, and so on in a vicious circle\(^73\). This may be particularly salient among groups of persons from ethnic majorities who are otherwise disadvantaged, as one will tend to grasp for the privileges one does have in the light of deficiencies in other forms of capital. This does not necessarily mean that disadvantaged people are more racist than people who are better off (the opposite may be the case, as they are more likely to establish bonds of friendship with other disadvantaged people), but their racism may be more aggressive where it does occur. Reicher and Hopkins’ work on identity and nation is interesting here, because it does go some way in helping one understand «white nationalism» as a concept. If a group of people attaches great value to skin colour as an important identity marker, and that in turn is

\(^{71}\) Foucault, Michel: *Power/Knowledge*, p. 17
\(^{72}\) Brown, Michael K.; Carnoy, Martin; Currie, Elliott; Duster, Troy; Oppenheimer, David B.; Shultz, Marjorie M.; Wellman, David: *Whitewashing Race*, pp. 30-31
\(^{73}\) Ibid., pp. 51-53
attached to the struggle for scarce resources, then that group’s value system is likely to provide fertile ground for discriminatory group formations, potentially of a violent kind.

A third thing to notice is that more than just being an institution meant to correct misdemeanors and punish criminals, the prison becomes central to a kind of social logic. In line with what we have seen regarding biopolitics, it is this logic that makes out the discursive basis for the penitentiary, while the penitentiary serves as an administrative tool for inclusion and exclusion of individuals according to the normative order, such that the ideological basis of a social order may be upheld. The penal system is the mechanism that makes a stratified society work with a certain degree of stability. This system is, in other words, a guarantee for the privileged classes in opposition to the most numerous group in society, the underprivileged. One must suppose that this opposition is particularly salient in the face of a potentially revolutionary popular group, which calls to mind the moral monsters of Foucault’s *Abnormal*. If the penal system represents the remains of a despotic monarchy, as Foucault claims in *The Will to Knowledge*\(^ {74}\), and the logic of the prison can be generalized, then it seems to follow that there is a fundamental tension between the state and the people, because the king is one of two opposing monsters in *Abnormal*. The despot is dangerous because of his excessive power, which holds potential for arbitrary violence. The king represents a sort of ultimate power and his spirit endures in the pen.

According to Foucault, the model of the prison was generalized to the family, the army, the workshop and the school, in short to society, with the goal being general obedience to the prevailing system\(^ {75}\). In order to ensure such obedience, a hierarchy of delinquents was established, through which the police would be capable to keep tabs on the entire social field\(^ {76}\). In other words, through the production of delinquency the police was enabled to establish an all-pervasive panopticon. This is the Benthamite construction which allowed for control over groups of individuals through a constant sense that someone in the tower at the centre of the field could be watching your every move\(^ {77}\). The brilliance of the panopticon lies particularly in the fact that the presence of the tower and the consciousness that someone might be watching you makes a lot of actual surveillance on the part of the authorities rather superfluous. The targets of surveillance are placed in a situation where they, through their own self-awareness, are the relays of their own imprisonment. Disciplinary power is at the same time individualiz-

\(^{74}\) Foucault, Michel: *The Will to Knowledge*, pp. 88-89
\(^{75}\) Foucault, Michel: *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 293-294
\(^{76}\) Ibid., pp. 279-282
\(^{77}\) Ibid., pp. 200-201
ing and normalizing through the individual’s obedience to the system, the system itself being the normative social field within which various strategies of power is made possible and to some extent socially acceptable.

Foucault hints at something to this effect in «Society Must Be Defended» where he claims that power is exercised through networks, and individuals are the relays of this power, rather than inert, consenting targets. Power is both an effect and producer of social fields and it is submitted and exercised through individuals, who in turn are effects and relays of power. This does not imply an even distribution of power, but it does imply that, far from being a static phenomenon, power works differently throughout the social body. We get a skewed understanding of power if we focus too much on the great power centres and too little on its everyday functions. Power must be studied from the bottom up. In the case of Foucault’s panoptic model, this implies moving one’s focus from Bentham’s tower, never forgetting its function, and taking a look at what the snitches, or «crows», are doing.

The crows in Foucault’s narrative are the intendants, syndics and guards who see to it that none of the citizens in a plague infested town leave their area of residence and that everything is in order. They are people of little consequence, but with some authority as middlemen and observers. They are in turn watched by good officers trusted to ensure the obedience of the people and the authority of the magistrates. In order to ensure total control over the town a constant regimen of observation, registration and report is established. The plague is met with order, disorder is met with discipline. The citizens of the town can be regarded as a group, but each citizen is also individualized by means of epidemiological analysis. Confinement is necessary in this instance because the plague is contagious, but there is a danger that the plague as narrative achieves hegemony as social discourse. Thus, «contagion» becomes a danger associated with every deviance that is perceived to be a challenge to hierarchy and order. The «leper» becomes the symbolic inhabitant of a space later populated by beggars, vagabonds, madmen and the disorderly. This is a feature that is particularly salient in the colony.

6. Privilege extended

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78 Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», pp. 29-31
79 Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish, pp. 195-200
Imperialism has been a horribly bloody affair. Academically, however, it lends itself quite well to studies on the mechanisms of hatred, ressentiment and, of course, racism. The exploitation of human beings in distant lands, on the grounds that they were creatures of a lower kind, has led to political and economic hardships that exist even today, and to racist ideas about «underdeveloped peoples». In this chapter I will take a closer look on imperialism and its ideological causes and effects the better to explore the nature of racism and the rise of animosity and hatred between different groups of people. Because of the exploitative nature of the imperial project, the present analysis will also lend itself to the study of power and its connection with knowledge and morality.

We see an ideological connection between law and nature and a hierarchy of normativity and deviance, which seems to be linked with the economy of faults and merits mentioned in *Security, Territory, Population*. Note here that faults and merits are not necessarily categories based on achieved accomplishment. They denote value, and value is a socially contingent marker. In a strictly normative society deviance, of whatever kind, in itself becomes a fault and in a racist society whiteness becomes a virtue. This makes it expedient to consult Fanon again, where we see that not only is the black man regarded as a type whose personhood is diminished, but there is a hierarchy among colonized peoples. A person from the Antilles will not stand being taken for a Senegalese, and a Martinician will take offense if a person from Guadeloupe tries to pass off as one of them. The Martinician regards himself as less «savage» because he is closer to the white man.

The more one is seen as a black man, the more savage and childlike one is thought to be, even among colonized black people. Both characteristics can be regarded as a perceived lack of civilization, or «being closer to the jungle», as Fanon put it. The eye of the magistrate leads to discrimination even amongst inmates under the same tower. This learned prejudice has another side to it, as well, as Fanon explains. The situation in which the colonized people find themselves, and the consequences this situation has on the minds of both black and white people, naturally build up a lot of anger. This anger shows itself in situations where teachers and physicians go down to the level of the natives by speaking as if to a child, or in pidgin. This behaviour does not necessarily reveal any ill intent, it comes naturally because the colonial situation creates the atmosphere for it. Even a person as aware and sensitive to the colonial

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80 Fanon, Frantz: *Black Skin, White Masks*, pp. 15-16
situation as Fanon admits to a degree of slippage\textsuperscript{81}. The colonial situation and its ontological commitments lead to dysfunctional interpersonal conduct and to social alienation.

In such a situation, two strategies seem to be available to the colonized person. Either one can resist, perhaps to the point of establishing a counterforce to the prevailing hierarchy of power, or one can cooperate by demonstrating one’s allegiance to the prevailing system. Passivity might be a third option, but given the pervasive functioning of the colonial structure, it seems very unlikely, probably impossible, to actually avoid reacting to the situation in either of the first two ways. Resistance is here most likely to be the preferred strategy before it is put to the test, but it is not necessarily the strategy one chooses to follow in practice. This is quite understandable, as by cooperating one can escape hardships that befall those who resist, and get access to goods and privileges that are not available to people who do not cooperate. This will in turn probably influence the value system of the people coopted into the colonial system. Cooperation, then, is likely to be seen in practice as a viable option. Hannah Arendt once wrote about Jews who cooperated in the Nazi camp system, the same thing could be said about various people in Norway under Nazi occupation (particularly the police) and Caroline Elkins writes about a substantial loyalist army in Kenya under British colonial rule.

The Kenyan loyalist army consisted of several native Kenyans who joined the ranks of the Home Guard and were rewarded with Loyalty Sertificates allowing them to run for office, vote in elections and walk around freely. They were also granted permission to plant and sell cash crops, and they were exempted from special taxes all detainees had to pay even if they had no source of income\textsuperscript{82}. The British colonizers in Kenya had created a system not totally unlike the one Foucault writes about in \textit{Discipline and Punish}. The precondition for setting up the colonial structure in Kenya was economic decline, which led to a shift from the «imperialism of free trade» to settler colonialism. Economic motives were followed by a moral pretext grounded in the idea of a «civilizing mission». People who cooperate with the colonial power will probably buy into this rhetoric. They will see a superiour civilization ready to bestow upon their society the means to higher living standards, if only their fellow citizens will give up their traditional customs holding them back. It is then the loyalists who stand for progress and civilization in opposition to reactionary nationalists and criminals standing in the way of enlightenment and prosperity. We have here two different strategies based on two different interpretations of the colonial situation. The defenders of both strategies believe that

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 20
\textsuperscript{82} Elkins, Caroline: \textit{Imperial Reckoning}, pp. 44, 273, 336
their fight is the just one, and wishes the other side would take off their blindfold and see the truth. Corresponding to these strategies, we have two different moral frameworks, the function of which is to justify different positions. The loyalists identify with the imperial power the oath takers oppose, and the imperialists will draw moral inspiration from the loyalists.

Through Christian values, superior genetics and economic know-how, the Britons had obliged themselves to bring light to the Dark Continent. Following the notion of politics as the continuation of war laid out in «Society Must Be Defended», we can speak of a project for world peace on terms set by the imperialist powers and their missionaries (the Pax Britannica). We find something to that effect in Anderson, as well, who claims that the British colonizers in India introduced a school system, designed to create a class of persons «Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect.» The Indians were to abandon their Hindu ways and embrace Christianity, the religion of civilization.83

For the civilizing mission to have any prospects of succeeding, obedience had to be ensured through paternalistic authority.84 The civilizing mission depended, in the minds of the colonizers, on a mixture of discipline and aristocratic pedigree. It would be a mistake to think of imperialist civilization as a project exclusive to Christianity, however. Tendencies of imperialism and slavery have been present in other cultures, as well, (take the Ottoman Empire, for instance) and Warren Montag mentions a similar tendency based on a teleological view of evolution, which he calls «creationism without a creator».85 This in turn is a classic origin for biopolitics, where the fitness of a population is bargained for through the privileged treatment of «fit» individuals. From the point of view of the colonizer, the colonial situation not only reflects the natural dominance of the stronger race, but it is also an opportunity for the weaker race to be brought up a couple of steps on the evolutionary ladder. In order for that to happen, a healthy regimen under the auspices of the colonizing power is necessary. The differences between civilizations calls for a biopolitics of colonialism for the good of humanity.

In a colonial situation such as the one presently being discussed, there will be tensions between black and white, between loyalists and oppositionists or oath takers, and between people situated on the margins of any of these groups. Constant racial contempt and systemic and physical violence on the part of the colonialists, aided and abetted by loyalist natives, will

83 Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities, p. 91
84 Ibid., pp. 4-8
leave festering wounds of hatred that remain long after the colonial forces have retreated from the scene. The censorship falling on anyone who tried to speak about the atrocities happening in Kenya contributed to a lack of reconciliation that keeps old hatreds alive.\textsuperscript{86}

Much the same mechanisms were at work in Rwanda, where colonial favourization of Tutsi natives contributed to an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred that resulted in the massacres of 1994. Other factors than ideology must be taken into account. Gérard Prunier mentions a great number of people on a relatively small area as a contributing factor to the tragedy of 1994, but racial thinking by colonial powers was decisive in forming the discriminatory social structures that fostered hatred and later genocide.\textsuperscript{87} The Tutsi were considered to be closer to the Europeans, and therefore, tellingly, «meant to reign» over the Hutu Rwandans.\textsuperscript{88} This «manifest destiny» was supported by European anthropology that had the authoritative status of «science.»\textsuperscript{89} The history of colonial exploitation, then, is clearly a phenomenon that lends itself to analysis of the power/knowledge kind. Studies of skulls and observation of social phenomena from a European imperialist perspective lent themselves to the support of ideas about inherent superiority and imagined social types. One should not be surprised in this context to find strong ressentiment amongst the supposedly inferior Hutu, who came to hate all Tutsi.\textsuperscript{90} Lasting contempt by European colonialists and relatively privileged Tutsi neighbours contributed to a trajectory of hatred that ultimately exploded in terrible vengeance.

There were certain characteristics believed to be common to the different «races». It is important to keep those in mind because they tell us something about the racial mythology that provided a sense of legitimacy to the colonial project. The African «savages» were believed, first of all, to be biologically inferior. According to popular myth, they were also stupid, they lacked the capacity to feel pain, they had low nutritional needs, yet they were sexually aggressive, thus threatening the racial purity of the settlers. Through a mythology of racial destiny, Africans were permanently assigned to an underclass of manual labourers. The European empires were places where class and racial thinking merged, and this to a great extent set the rules for the strategic field of interacting forces.

\textsuperscript{86} Elkins, Caroline: \textit{Imperial Reckoning}, p. 367
\textsuperscript{87} Prunier, Gérard: \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, pp. 4-9
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 11
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 38
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 39
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, p. 12
To the imperialist, the colonial subjects were not regarded as equal persons. We see that in the differential treatment given to loyalists and oath takers, and we see it in the case of the favourization of Tutsi over Hutu Rwandese. We have to see this in light of the mission civilisatrice the European imperialists had given themselves. According to Foucault, there are two tropes that stand outside of civilization. One of these is the savage, and the other is the barbarian. The savages are relatively benign in that one may trade with them and they are motivated by self-interest\textsuperscript{92}. In the British case, these would be the loyalists. They are people who are not yet properly civilized, but for whom there is hope if only they are exposed to correct training. The other trope is the barbarian. The barbarians are dangerous individuals outside civilization against which they place themselves in an adversarial position. Being thus defined as opposed to civilization, this trope cannot exist without an existing civilization. The modi operandi of the barbarians are not barter and cultivation of land, but plunder and domination\textsuperscript{93}. The barbarians cannot be presented sympathetically, because they represent a counterforce to the progress of civilization. They will not give up their freedom and are therefore seen as violent and monstrous.

The barbarism of a colonized people calls to mind the popular monster from Abnormal, but there is more to this trope than this similarity. If plunder and domination are activities associated with the barbarian, then the oath takers would certainly not be wrong to ascribe a degree of barbarianism to the European conquerors. Neither would it be surprising if the conquerors recognized some barbarism in themselves. In such a situation it would be the more important to create and maintain a clear division between the colonizer and the colonized. The colonized could not be perceived as a human being on par with the colonizer, but rather as a pet or a piece of property\textsuperscript{94}. The racial discourses present in scientific anthropology will certainly be a useful tool in this regard, but discourses in ordinary media channels will perhaps be even more important, if we keep in mind the relative predominance of such media, and the link between news media and the feeling of shared identity. In order to keep power relations as stable as possible, it would be in the interest of the ruling classes to establish a social ladder of humanity where the closer one is to whiteness and wealth, the closer one is to a proper human being.

\textsuperscript{92} Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», p. 194
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., pp. 195-196
\textsuperscript{94} Mbembe, Achille: On the Postcolony, p. 26
In such a situation, there seem to be two logical ways in which the white worker can interact with the black worker. One is cooperation, as they are both placed at the lower end of a social ladder set down by people who oppress all of them and whom they outnumber. The other possible strategy is to ally themselves with the system’s ruling elite. If skin colour is a form of capital, then the present situation affords them opportunities that are not available to the losers of the lottery of colour. Proximity to the ruling strata is associated with temptations that are hard to resist, thus we see that the idea of contagion is not only relevant to the leper, but also to the aristocrat, but with opposite flavour. Friends of the rulers may even aspire to reach the top of the pyramid and become rulers themselves. In such a setup, the masters in power have much to gain from appeals to racism.

Such a view is supported by Theodore W. Allen. He cites Edmund S. Morgan in saying that American plantation owners, in order to guard against a unified rebellion from the ranks of disappointed freemen and desperate slaves, did what they could to foster the contempt of whites for blacks and Indians. The instrument for this manufacturing of racism was the law. Through differential access to certain benefits it was hoped that one could «separate free whites from dangerous slave blacks by a screen of racial contempt»\(^{95}\). Allen also cites Lerone Bennett Jr., in offering three bearing points for the socio-economic explanation of racism: First, that racial slavery constituted a ruling-class response to a problem of labour solidarity. Second, that a system of racial privileges for the propertyless «whites» was deliberately instituted in order to align them on the side of the plantation owners against African-American bond-labourers. Third, that the consequence of such a policy had disastrous consequences for white and black labourers\(^{96}\). Racism was constructed by property owners in order to manipulate the social field through a policy of divide and rule.

Foucault seems to be indicating something similar when he claims that history should be understood as the history of race struggle\(^{97}\). Such a claim is apt to provoke immediate disgust, because it makes one think of such things as eugenics and social Darwinism. Yet there is really nothing in the biography of Foucault that should make one believe that he was particularly racist. In «Society Must Be Defended» he claims that the social body is articulated around two races, and that the clash between them runs through society from top to bottom. There are differences between these races such as ethnic differences, differences between languages and

\(^{95}\) Allen, Theodore W.: *The Invention of the White Race, Volume One*, p. 17
\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 21
\(^{97}\) Foucault, Michel: «*Society Must Be Defended*», p. 69
different degrees of force, energy and violence. The struggle between these races leads to the subjugation of one race by another\textsuperscript{98}.

Now, from biological research we know that there really are no different races as such, and from historical research we know that the concept of «race» is an ideological construct that has some force as a social phenomenon. In order to make sense of Foucault’s words we must focus on the social field. Foucault gives credence to this interpretation when he says that what he sees as a binary rift within society is not a clash between two distinct races, but the splitting of a single race into a superrace and a subrace\textsuperscript{99}. Furthermore, he denies that «race» is pinned to a stable biological meaning, but comes about because of differences in language and often religion. Barriers between races consist in various differences in privileges, customs, rights, wealth and power\textsuperscript{100}. In other words, various social markers are used to justify the subjugation of one group by another. Speaking about the struggle between these groups as a class struggle places the discourse in the domain of Marxism, and perhaps an overemphasis on purely socio-economic factors, which was not something Foucault would be willing to put up with. In Foucault’s thinking processes of normalization and normative subjugation were more central phenomena, and his theory of race struggle must be seen in light of this.

These social markers that Foucault mentions are not just arbitrary factors, rather they contribute in creating social cohesion and identity. To a significant extent it was these factors that colonizers attacked in order to subjugate their new colonial subjects. Allen emphasizes this when he says that it is typical for the colonizing power to disregard and delegitimate already existing social distinctions regulating the society of the colonized people. These are distinctions based on kinship and tribal identity. The aim of such policies is subjugation through social death. This kind of racial oppression normally comes prior to national oppression\textsuperscript{101}. According to Foucault, biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, as well as institutions that serve to exclude and segregate, have their roots in the normalizing function inherent to the discourse of race struggle\textsuperscript{102}. It is a kind of discourse that serves to subjugate and even exterminate various peoples because they are considered inferior. Thus, my initial claim that societies tend to create their own outcasts is supported by Foucault, who links this tendency with

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 60
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 61
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 77
\textsuperscript{101} Allen, Theodore W.: \textit{The Invention of the White Race, Volume One}, pp. 35-36
\textsuperscript{102} Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», p. 60
the development of what he calls State racism. Foucault’s discourse is not racist, rather it provides conceptual tools for understanding the phenomenon of racism.

7. On Chiefs and Monsters

For Foucault, actual racism is a distortion of the discourse on race struggle, and replaces the theme of historical war with a postevolutionist theme of the struggle for existence. This distortion takes place at about the same time that the notion of race struggle is taken over by the notion of class struggle. For the State, this means that it goes from being an instrument that one race uses against another to be a protector of the integrity, superiority and purity of the race. The State goes from being a locus of conflict and struggle for domination to an exclusionary tool for the purity of the fittest race, guided by a new ideology of social Darwinism. In order to do that, it is necessary to create an underclass, such as Allen and Brown et al have demonstrated. On the other hand, we have seen that discourses tend to engender counterdiscourses. The powers that be will meet resistance, imperialism will meet oath takers and truths will encounter alternatives. According to Foucault, there is no power without resistance. In this section, I will explore Bataille’s notions of homogeneity and heterogeneity through a reading of his *Psychological Structure of Fascism* in conjunction with the tensions between master («Jupiterian») discourses and counterdiscourses elaborated by Foucault. I will explore the affective potential that lies in the counterdiscourse and investigate how tensions between various discourses in a political setting can lead to hatred and violent aggression. In doing this, I will prepare the ground for a more substantial theoretical basis for the rest of the thesis. I will here rely on anthropological work focusing on Francois Duvalier’s regime in Haiti and the election of Donald Trump as president of the USA.

For Bataille, there is a basic rift in society between factors constituting what he calls «homogeneity» on the one hand and, correspondingly, «heterogeneity» on the other. «Homogeneity» is here understood as commensurability of elements and the awareness of this commensurability, based on fixed rules that stem from mental principles of identification of persons and situations. Homogenous society is the productive, or useful, society, and useless

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103 Ibid., p. 62
104 Ibid., pp. 80-81
105 Bataille, Georges: «The Psychological Structure of Fascism», p. 64
and violent elements are excluded from the homogenous sphere. In this way an Outside is created consisting of forms that are impossible to assimilate, both socially and scientifically. According to Bataille, social and scientific assimilation share a single structure, the goal of which is to establish homogeneity and functional satisfaction. The heterogenous world is largely made up by the sacred, which in turn is linked to the categories of mana and taboo. These are, in the first case, thought of as mysterious and impersonal forces possessed by individuals such as kings and witch doctors, and in the second case social prohibition of contact with e.g. cadavers and menstruating women.

An interesting case in this regard is the use made by Papa Doc Duvalier of Vodou in setting himself up as a dictator in Haiti. The Vodou religion is particularly interesting in this context because the relationship between the spirit world and the mundane (or in Bataillean parlance: profane) world is so salient there. In my opinion, transcendence is a more visible aspect of the Vodou religion than the Christian one. The historic and geopolitical situation of Haiti makes this country even more interesting.

The successful uprising against French colonial rule, resulting in Haitian independence in 1804, has served as an inspiration for anticolonial struggles elsewhere. It must be remembered that this was a spectacularly bloody affair, which is understandable as a reaction to years of colonial oppression. Jean-Jaques Dessalines defined Haiti as a «black» state of indigènes, which must be seen in light of previous European («white») rule and the strategic space of relations colonization had contributed to establish. Simultaneously, this first Haitian Emperor hunted down practitioners of the indigenous Vodou religion, which must also be considered as a strategic move in the context of the resultant interplay of various forces. This same religion had played an emancipatory role in both the opposition to French colonial rule and was later to be oppressed during US occupation (1915-1934) and the Catholic Church’s «anti-superstition» campaign of 1941. The Vodou religion thus had important symbolic functions through its emancipatory role, and as a constitutive force of a popular movement. There was, then, a multiplicity of sacred, profane, homogenous and heterogenous forces in the Haitian social field where Papa Doc would take on the function of chief and absolute ruler.

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106 Ibid., pp. 64-65
107 Ibid., pp. 67-68
108 Ibid., pp. 68-69
In Bataille’s ideas about the heterogenous as something beyond the realm of the homogenous, and about figures of authority and status, such as the king and witch doctor, on the one hand and exclusion based on social prohibition on the other, it is possible to recognize Foucault’s ideas about the law and the monsters on the outside of the law presented in Abnormal and discussed above here. The lower strata of society belong to the heterogenous realm because they cannot be assimilated and provoke feelings of disgust and repulsion\textsuperscript{110}. As we have seen, and particularly emphasized by Nietzsche, this contempt tends to build up resentment in those who are thus discriminated, which in turn can be a potent force in the constantly developing social field. We see this quite clearly in the Papa Doc case, as he played on real and imagined tensions between the «state» (urban and elite, white and mulatto, and Catholics) and «nation» (rural and poor, black, and Vodouisants)\textsuperscript{111}.

The limits between heterogenous and homogenous must not be seen as constant, but rather as latent potentialities in more or less stable political and epistemological frameworks. Foucault explains that heterogeneity is not a principle of exclusion, and does not prevent coexistence, conjunction or connection. Various heterogenous factors stand in strategic relations to each other, such that different phenomena are held together with strategic links\textsuperscript{112}. In a political setting, this strategic interplay of forces would probably involve various social projects with different ideas about the nature and goals of community. The boundaries between the homogenous realm and the heterogenous realm can be more or less strict, depending largely on historic trajectories.

Bataille’s work can further help explaining concepts such as the sacredness of the king and how this figure can constitute the law while remaining outside of it. The heterogenous is difficult to describe, as it escapes scientific definition, yet it seems largely to define the homogenous because it constitutes a limit case, and as such it serves to define the boundaries of the homogenous world. One can also see hints of Foucault’s pastoral power in that virtues such as duty, discipline and obedience are central virtues within the homogenous realm, which are mobilized in order to serve the chief who stands as a sort of raison d’etre of the national community\textsuperscript{113}. Furthermore, as Agamben emphasizes, the Sovereign is himself a sort of liminal figure in that he represents the intersection between justice and violence\textsuperscript{114}. Devotion to a sup-

\textsuperscript{110} Bataille, Georges: «The Psychological Structure of Fascism», pp. 69, 71
\textsuperscript{111} Johnson, Paul Christopher: «Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier», p. 430
\textsuperscript{112} Foucault, Michel: The Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 42-43
\textsuperscript{113} Bataille, Georges: «The Psychological Structure of Fascism», p. 81
\textsuperscript{114} Agamben, Giorgio: Homo Sacer, p. 54
reme leader is therefore likely to imply aggression to persons who are perceived as the chief’s enemies. If the violent order of sovereignty is mixed with the politics of population proper to biopolitics, we have classic fascism according to the Foucauldian schema.

The chief is here a totalising principle where the principles of religious and martial power are concentrated in one person. The fact that the chief stands for the collective raison d’etre of state power implies the simultaneous destruction of every other imperative form that is opposed to it115. This allows for the identification of the chief with a higher Idea, and the people’s identification with the sovereign such that his glory becomes the people’s glory116. Papa Doc’s appropriation of Vodou as an instrument of state power is a remarkable case in point. Johnson summarizes Duvalier’s doctrine in three points, which I repeat here verbatim: (1) Haiti is Black and must be ruled by Blacks; (2) ethnic cohesion requires its own religious symbol, Vodou; (3) the national faith must have a national leader117. The national Idea is here defined by religious identity, which is associated with (indigène) race. In this way an exclusionary ethno-state is developed, centered around the person of the leader. There are strong historic and political factors that lend credence to such a political project, but importantly we must notice here how popular notions of belonging and identity are appropriated by one person, making him in effect the constitutive symbol of the Haitian nation state.

A brilliant move in this particular venture is Duvalier’s emphasis on factors previously associated with low status, but important to a large constituency in the country. A constituency that was previously largely excluded. The hopes and desires of this population are then represented by the chief, and whatever is outside the ideological sphere of the chief is looked upon with fear and suspicion, and not without good reason. The chief embodies the homogenous realm of the body politic. As Foucault has pointed out many times, however, the body politic is a concept liable to be misleading. We must constantly bear in mind the struggles going on beneath the throne of the emperor, the forces of which the chief is but one representation. Even when the chief seems to embody the supreme power of the State, he is after all just one individual, constituted by and functioning as a relay of the power of a larger social field. In this case, Duvalier has tapped into social forces with remarkable social potency, such as indigenous religion and repressed nationalism.

115 Bataille, Georges: «The Psychological Structure of Fascism», pp. 76-77
116 Ibid., pp. 80,
117 Johnson, Paul Christopher: «Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier», p. 431
The totalising power of the chief is, in the Duvalier case, made possible through a mixture of political manouvering and personal mana. First, he removed access to weapons from common soldiers and gave them to his own loyal Palace Guard, many of whom were recruited amongst the ranks of Vodou priests. Second, he expelled all church leaders involved with the anti-superstition campaign, thus simultaneously demonstrating strength and getting rid of potential political opponents. Third, he pleased the power brokers in the USA by persecuting communists and leftist students. At the same time he cultivated a public image as spiritually possessed by the nation’s founder, Dessalines, who was rumoured to be a clandestine devotee of Vodou and whose martial ferocity and «black authenticity» carried weight. While the national religion was militarized, the legitimacy of political and military power was supported by an active use of national religion, which also provided a framework for political practice during Duvalier’s reign. In line with Bataille’s proposed structure, religious and military power merged in the person of the chief, or supreme leader, who represented the nation as legitimate manifestation of the popular will.

Thus, the power of the chief turns infamy into order and glory, and the persecution of the chief’s enemies becomes an exalted duty. Like Foucault, Bataille emphasizes the disappearance of revolutionary discourse as a precondition for the development of fascism. This seems to leave the impoverished classes with two options: Subversive action, going against the current structures of power vs imperative action where they choose to identify themselves with the sovereign and, through vanquishing his enemies, hope for a social salvation through his power. The persecution of leftists and the concentration of power in the hands of the chief makes the subversive strategy collectively rational, but given the attractions of power and the risks inherent to subversion, it would not be surprising to see members from the working class invest their energy and identities in the imperative form. This is even more likely in a case such as this, where the chief reinvigorates symbols associated with the disposessed.

Two other aspects of Bataille’s essay are important in the context of the present thesis. One is that the sovereign, as an imperative heterogeneity, is sadistic without a corresponding masochism. From what we have seen earlier on in this thesis, we can take this as implying that the sovereign’s power is beyond the dependence present in a normal sadomasochistic structure. Because the sovereign is above the law, and because he constitutes the raison d’etre

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118 Ibid., p. 432
119 Ibid., pp. 435-436
120 Bataille, Georges: «The Psychological Structure of Fascism», p. 82
121 Ibid., pp. 73-76
of the state, he is vested with a power without constraint, which again is characteristic of the
king as moral monster. The other thing to notice is the description that Bataille attaches to the
lowest strata of society, giving an impression as of a contagious air. The destitute people in
what he calls «advanced civilizations» have something in common with India’s caste of un-
touchables. Contact with the heterogenous is subject to taboo, and heterogeneity, as we
have seen, is bound up with social status in both directions. But where the presence of the
king calls forth feelings of glory and exaltation, the presence of the beggar or the prostitute
provokes feelings of disgust.

As we have seen, the relationship between the homogenous and the heterogenous
realms is not as straight forward as a superficial reading of Bataille may make one believe.
The heterogenous and the homogenous are not static realms, but mutually definitory aspects
of social and epistemological situations. The heterogenous must here be understood as the
liminal Outside of the established Inside that makes up the homogenous. These structures are
not entirely commensurable, but neither are they entirely exclusionary. They are strategically
related to each other, such that they are able to join together in specific junctures. This seems
to imply potential for change and variability in relations of forces. We must try to see the re-
lationship between the homogenous and the heterogenous in light of Foucault’s opposition
between «Jupiterian history» and counterhistory (Foucault explicitly uses the word «hetero-
geneity»). In this regard there is one more aspect of Duvalier’s political persona that is of
interest here, namely his use of the Vodouan loa (spirit) Baron Samedi.

According to legend, Baron Samedi is a liminal spirit par excellence. He is the loa of
senators and diplomats, so one can say that his formal role is as a sort of divine door open-
er. He is also a ruler of graveyards and a connoisseur of healing urbs, he makes his horses (the
people he possesses) dress up according to their opposite sex and as offering he accepts clairin
and rum. He is also said to be fond of foul language and obscenities, but regularly keeps
himself in a dignified manner. He is thus representative of homogeneity and heterogeneity at
the same time. He can be said to represent a heterogenous potential inside the realm of homo-
geneity, and seems to some extent to turn accepted normativity upside down. Discursively,
Baron Samedi can be said to represent a counterdiscourse inherent to the divine (dominant)

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122 Ibid., P. 71
123 Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», pp. 68-70
124 Johnson, Paul Christopher: «Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier», p. 438
125 Hurston, Zora: Voodoo Gods, pp. 215-216
order. I would argue that the symbolic connotations of Baron Samedi can tell us something about a political earthquake far away from Haiti: The 2016 election of Donald Trump.

As Jason L. Mast claims in the book *Politics of Meaning/ Meaning of Politics*, the defining feature of the 2016 election is the amount of noncivil criteria and anticivil symbolism present in the civil sphere during the election campaign. Mast defines the civil sphere as a structure of meaning and a feeling of membership and belonging. It is a sort of greater community, where one is respected and where one bestows respect on others, even without knowing them personally. One is at home in a discursive structure within which one is «free from hesitation or doubt that one might fail to embody the sphere’s criteria for inclusion in some absolute and perfect sense».

One will recognize Foucault’s notions of counterhistories and the opposing «Jupiterian» history here. One will also recognize Anderson’s thoughts about the imagined community, where one is ultimately willing to give one’s life for a person one does not know because of a feeling of community with others stemming, for example, from the morning newspaper. Depending on the various narratives within a social sphere, and the relative power of these narratives, the sense of belonging and social and personal identity can feel more or less beleaguered. Hence, the anger at «elite cultural feminists» and «postmodern neo-marxists» who are considered threatening to the identity of conservative identitarians. Regardless of the actual threat (or even reality) such groups represent, the experience of having an enemy can be a quite potent drug.

Important here are various counternarratives to the hegemonic narrative which one does not accept as one’s own. When asked why they voted for Trump, these voters have often answered that he is not «politically correct», and that he says «what everybody is thinking, but is too afraid to say».

In other words, he functions as a door opener, a strategic vector that can change the political game in favour of people who do not feel that they are being listened to, and whose interests are bound up with race, religion and «family values». The relative importance of these factors to factors such as «the economy» or other more sanitary social questions will depend on how one feels included in the reigning narrative. If one, for example, feels that one’s traditional position as a man in society is threatened because of more inclusive policies for transsexuals, then one may be more easily swayed to vote for a candidate that argues

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127 Ibid., p. 5
128 Ibid., p. 7
against those inclusive policies, more than one will reward someone for their sound stance on taxation. As the quotations from the Trump voters suggest, the further a stated policy goal is from the perceived homogenous realm, the more one will reward the candidate for «having the balls» to stand for it. In this regard, Trump’s scandalous behaviour and lewd comments will not be seen as a drawback. On the contrary, he will be rewarded for them, because they are testament to his authenticity as a candidate for the silent majority at the outside of civility. In a backlash against civil discourse, incivility becomes an asset.

In such an atmosphere, the rhetorics of the opposition becomes quite important, and for that reason Hilary Clinton’s words about the «deplorables» must have been quite disheartening for anyone opposed to Trump’s presidency. There is a Nietzschean point to be made here in that those who feel left out by the current dominant discourse will feel resentment if representatives of the mainstream political class belittle their social situation and experience of loss. The Trump supporters must be conceded a point if they claim that Clinton’s «basket of deplorables» echoed the political establishment of the USA, and politicians’ contempt of the people they are supposed to represent is in itself not a sign of a healthy democracy. Far from stopping racism and sexism, Clinton gave the followers of Trump a suitable anchorage for collective identity formation. Deplorability became a sign of infamy that could be turned to the opposite after the deplorables had had their revenge. «Wear it as a badge of pride», as Steve Bannon said. With Trump, there was finally a person who could turn the basket cases’ deplorability into glory, and that was a basis for his pastoral power.

The ressentiment such contempt feeds has, as Nietzsche explained, a strong potential for hatred, which along with encouragement from likeminded culture warriors will strengthen them in their resolve to fight the system («drain the swamp»). At its roots, one might argue that such an attitude is planted in healthy opposition. Protest against a political system that does not represent the brunt of the members of the polity is a sign of political vigour. It gets problematic when this desire for change is channeled through identitarian conduits rather than through revolutionary discourse. In a political culture which emphasizes such virtues as aspiration, ambition and grit, members of relatively privileged groups (white, straight males) will probably not be swayed by promises of social harmony and equality, especially if such harmony comes at their expence. One does not (is not even supposed to want) to get along, one wants to get ahead, and in an effort to protect valued dimensions of one’s social status a white womanizer opposed to the current credo of political correctness will be a perfect conduit for discontent. «Perhaps some of his mana will rub off on me».
These are mechanisms closely tied up with the sort of social contagion Bataille writes about in his book *Eroticism*. A yawn makes us yawn, for example\(^{129}\). The presence of signs of what we might call other people’s life worlds has a contagious effect. We are bound up together as human beings and our experience as humans compels us to relate. In that regard, the degraded situation of the low prostitute who lives side by side with taboo may provoke disgust precisely because she lives so close to the heterogenous realm. She is regarded as lower than an animal in dignity, which places her at a distance from the community of human persons, and still, as we shall see, her function as prostitute places her in the center of the system that excludes her. Like other deviants, the prostitute helps defining the capitalist system by virtue of her very situation as a social outcast.

### 8. On the Margins

I ended the last section with some thoughts about social contagion, which is what this section will have as its focus. Given a social hierarchy, there will be individuals one will try to associate with and people that one will shun, or exclude, based on these people’s positions in the social structure. There will be people with lower and higher status within a given community and there will often be stereotypes associated with various groups dependent on their status. This sort of social gravitation will have a tendency to cement social hierarchies, which in turn may affect the degree of personhood one attaches to an individual on the basis of his or her group affiliation. In this section I will explore the dynamics of group status within a political community and possible ideas of contagion arising from those dynamics.

As Bataille points out, the animal is not a thing in itself, but is considered as such while it is treated as mere means of production\(^{130}\). The same principle applies for human beings. There’s a difference in status between the capitalist who owns the means of production, and the workers who are dependent on selling their labour power to the capitalist in exchange for a set wage. This is not the same as a profit, which is the surplus value extracted by the capitalist from the productive function of an enterprise. We have here the classic tension between worker and capitalist posited by Marx, who in turn was inspired by Hegel’s master/slave dia-

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\(^{129}\) Bataille, Georges: *Eroticism*, p. 152

\(^{130}\) Ibid., pp. 156-158,
The basis for the relation between worker and capitalist is the contract, and the regulating power beneath the contract is monetary capital, which makes the social basis for the terms of the contract a capitalist one. The prostitute of Bataille’s narrative uses her own body as access to necessary goods regulated by the capitalist system, which is comparable to, but somewhat different from the situation of other manual labourers who sell the product of their manual labour and not themselves as such. The means of production used by the prostitute are not tools per se, but rather herself as corporal entity.

Here one must ask oneself to what means the prostitute is used as a means of production, and the answer gives itself readily: The satisfaction of other human beings. As Foucault has explained, the entrepreneurial man defines himself through the production of his own satisfaction, and he does this through consumption. The prostitute, then, is in this case the means through which the entrepreneurial man realizes himself as a rational agent in the neo-liberal social structure. Ironically, this function makes the prostitute eminently useful as a productive mechanism in the prevailing system. As we have seen, the homogenous realm is defined by production and, ultimately, use value. If the central standard of a given society is satisfaction, then the prostitute, as a provider of pleasure, satisfies her society’s fundamental use value. This makes the prostitute’s situation paradoxical. She is both, as an outcast and a carrier of low status, a member of a heterogenous group, while simultaneously, as a provider of the commonly accepted standard of value, a constitutive member of the homogenous society. As an objectified means to other people’s satisfaction, she functions as a sort of focal point of capitalist logic. In a Hegelian turn of phrase, the prostitute can be said to represent the «truth» of neo-liberal society, this kind of system’s dirty secret.

The function of the prostitute qua prostitute is to provide pleasure to her clients, to provide the condition for the entrepreneurial man’s self-realization through satisfaction. This makes her social function central to the neo-liberal society. This is not to say that prostitution is not compatible with other models of society. If that were the case, there would not be any prostitution in the USSR, which indeed there was. I would argue, though, that prostitution as a social function is more representative of neo-liberalism than of communism, or even of classic liberalism. In liberalism, the fundamental point is to make a social space apart from both politics and capital. In neo-liberalism on the other hand, the function of the state is to serve the rule of capital, that is, to make it so that the logic of social interaction follows the ratio of capital. This logic is particularly relevant to the prostitute, who not only has to sell her labour power, like other workers, but she is forced to sell access to herself as a means of exchange. If
the chief is a liminal figure on the top of society, the prostitute is a liminal figure on society’s bottom, and is associated with contagion of a different kind.

The prostitute is conscious of her status beneath the dignity of ordinary people, closer to the status of an animal, and that has an impact on her behaviour. She knows that she has fallen outside of what one might call «decent» or «civilized» society, so she no longer strictly observes the taboos that serve to regulate that society. This provokes disgust in other people, who distance themselves from «that kind of woman» through expressions such as that a person is going to «snuff it»\textsuperscript{131}. The outcast is here excluded from the civilized community of persons. She is reduced to what Agamben called a pure \textit{zoé}, a bare life on the margin between humanity and thinghood, as opposed to the qualified life of the citizen, called \textit{bios}. As \textit{zoé} the prostitute is considered expendable by the rest of the political community. Through a lot of such small acts society stays hierarchically stratified between civilized men and the dregs of society, with an aura of bad air and damnation around the outcast.

Douglas helps us understand how this mechanism works throughout society. «Danger lies in transitional states», she says, because in those states the situation is undefinable\textsuperscript{132}. A person who must pass from one state to another is in danger, and emanates danger to others. The classic case here is the passage from childhood to adulthood and other initiation rites. One must die from one’s old life so that one may be reborn to a new life in another group, preferably one with more status and more responsibility. Both inclusion in the community and personal status within it are thus confirmed through temporary exclusion. This is not only a feature of primitive societies, but a basic mechanism for community as such. The group is confirmed through external negativity. During the ritual the initiate temporarily becomes an outcast, a status that signifies death. They are licensed to waylay, steal and rape, which is classic anti-social behaviour associated with savagery. A clear distinction between civilization and savagery, form and non-form is continually established, where people are variously situated according to the patterns of the relevant social structure\textsuperscript{133}. We see here the relevance of characteristics bestowed on colonial subjects by imperialist powers. If one can convince settlers, and preferably natives, of the association between natives and savagery, policies of divide and rule will be that much easier to execute, and proximity to stigmatized individuals can even be considered dangerous.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 135
\textsuperscript{132} Douglas, Mary: \textit{Purity and Danger}, p. 97
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., pp. 97-101
In a class society such fear of transition can be equally salient. Class journeys can happen upwards or downwards, and the people one surrounds oneself with largely determine what kind of journey it will be. Distinguishing high status from low status people can therefore be quite important for one’s life prospects, especially in a rigidly stratified society. For this reason, in a society with a sharp colour line, it can sort of make sense for a person on the bottom of the social ladder to cling to a racist demagogue belonging to a high status group. For the same reason, it can make sense for a person on the middle rung of society to exaggerate this effect, as Jones exemplifies in Chavs.

A problem that Jones emphasizes is how working class people are presented in the media, often by pundits who consider themselves liberal leftists. The tension that is likely to run through this class because of the aforementioned factors is exaggerated by people who have a vested interest in portraying themselves as morally superior, particularly in contrast to the «vile plebs». The characteristics attributed to the demonized working class are tellingly close to those attributed to racially oppressed people by intellectuals with a vested interest in racism. Focus is diverted away from social and economic issues towards the moral failings of people presented as a race-obsessed, hard-drinking rump, always a step away from anarchy. He cites columnist Janet Daley, characterizing the British working class as «self-loathing», «self-destructive» and lacking in «civic culture». These are characteristics similar to those directed against black people struggling to get by in an American society marked by cumulative advantages for white people. Also, following Douglas’ description of the structure of initiation rites, as well as the descriptions of imperialist rhetorics directed against colonized peoples, one sees a clear parallel between the working class people being singled out for moral condemnation and culturally alienated peoples associated with «the jungle».

With Fanon’s account of interethnic rivalry in mind, one would expect to discover ranges of phobia within the working class itself, from middle managers and engineers down to the low prostitute in Bataille’sEroticism. While people from these reviled groups are the most numerous, and the very people who make society function, it is important to associate them with stigma in order to keep them in their place. Given that the strategic situation is defined by markers such as socio-economic status and «race», it makes sense for each of the participant in the social field to demonstrate distance from the socially stigmatized groups and, correspondingly, proximity to agents who represent «order» and «civilization».

134 Jones, Owen: Chavs, pp. 117-118
Stating a straight forward line of identification from the higher to the lower rungs of society seems overly facile, however, and not very realistic. As we have seen from Bataille’s example of social contagion (and this also makes sense from Douglas’ elaborations on social patterns) we tend to associate most with people who are close to us. Our sense of identity is socially nested, but it begins with our experiences of ourselves, with a sort of narcissistic investment. Given any stratified society, one would probably do well to keep in mind Nietzsche’s model with fear and ressentiment one one side, and contempt and callousness on the other. Fear and ressentiment are directed against those at the top of the social hierarchy and contempt and callousness are directed against those at the bottom. It would make sense to gather together against those on the top of the ladder, and equally to keep out those at the bottom. The perception of social contagion is contingent on social identity, so while there is a potential for strategies of divide and rule on the part of the powerful, there is also potential for solidarity among the disposessed. Individual strategies would also be expected. Given these various economies of fault, merit, money and status, and the need to associate oneself with one’s chosen peers (who are not necessarily above one in status), certain telltale signs would be established, such that one’s general dress and demeanour, one’s habituation, function as markers of economic class as well as where one thinks one belongs in the social pattern or field.

Foucault brings us closer to an understanding of such habituation, and how it becomes physically visible on the body of the person thus habituated. From the proud soldier to the subdued peasant, the bodies of a social field’s actors enter a political economy of utility, the goal of which is discipline. Discipline is here understood as a balance between increased aptitude or mastery of the body on the one hand, and the subjection of the same body on the other. The energy that results from increased mastery of the body becomes, through training, directed inwards and becomes a tool for the body’s own oppression. The various forms of training take place in schools, hospitals, armies and workshops. It is clear that various forms of training, and thus various forms of conduct, take place in various forms of institutions, workplaces, social groups and stations. This bears directly on the formations of various in- and out-groups, because it allows one more or less to recognize one’s peers. The way one moves one’s body says something important about which social group one belongs to.

With this in mind, the youth gangs’ body language that Jones describes is interesting. He describes them as «loitering menacingly on street corners» and as displaying «anti-social

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135 Foucault, Michel: *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 135-141
Jones, of course, shows a rather sympathetic attitude towards these teenagers, stressing that they group together in order to stay away from trouble and in order to find a kind of solidarity that they will not find elsewhere. The point of interest here, though, is what this body language entails for the group displaying them. First, Jones is clearly on the right track in his emphasis on intragroup protection and peer solidarity. Taking into account the fact that poor people in impoverished areas are more likely to suffer from crime than is the case for people from middle or upper classes, and given that people from high-crime, low-income communities are not likely to be prioritized for police protection, it makes sense that they would band together in order to protect themselves. In line with a Foucauldian framework, it also makes sense that together with such a social function, there will be a corresponding conduct.

A social function and a corresponding normative framework are likely conducive to a certain kind of behaviour, which can be intentionally frightening both because of the felt need to protect oneself and one’s community, and the need to display such virtues that seem necessary for the provision of such protection. Thus, social function and normative framework can give rise to a hierarchy of status that is more complex than mere differences in wealth, even if economic differences are important underlying causes conducive to such hierarchies to arise in the first place. If such hierarchies are pervasive in a given stratum of a given populace, that can lead to relatively stable behaviour associated with that stratum. This can in turn help explain how pinning differences in general social status and power on the personal characteristics of individuals and cultures can stick and be considered valid truths. Thus, within the same polity, we have different «races» of the Foucauldian kind, and the reigning discourse on aspiration and moral failure can be regarded as a weapon of domination over the people living in poverty. With sufficient habituation, the cultural becomes natural, and the victims of class oppression become pathologized as «dangerous individuals».

Foucault makes this clear in *Abnormal*, when he writes that nineteenth century psychiatry gave rise to a sort of racism through the theory of hereditary degeneracy. The goal to which psychiatry is used as a means here is to protect society from internal anomalies that may pose a danger to it. The dangerous individual becomes an epidemiological challenge, a possible carrier of either disease or «fitness». The fear of contagion from individuals perceived to be dangerous, and its link to visible features loaded with phantasmic significance, sugg-

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136 Jones, Owen: *Chavs*, pp. 212-213
137 Foucault, Michel: *Abnormal*, pp. 316-317
ests that health, status and hierarchies of various sorts of capital tend to cement social distance between individuals through affective investment in preservation of self.

It seems prudent also to see such a shift in light of Bataille’s notions of homogeneity and heterogeneity. The degenerate individual can be considered an individual on the margin, an individual that does not entirely fit into the present paradigm (in a Khunian sense). That which one cannot control, or what does not seem immediately useful, here becomes a threat to order, and the populace must therefore be protected against these individuals. As we have also seen, the people who belong to the heterogenous realm correspond roughly to Foucault’s two political monsters, that is either the king, who benefits from the prevailing order, and can be seen as somehow above the law, or it can mean the destitute people who are outcasts of their own societies, and from whom one therefore may fear revolutionary violence. What is threatened is not merely the normative order of society, but a person challenges through heterogeneity the fundamental social contract that ensures the continuation and prosperity of the social body. The heterogenous, as Bataille has explained, is that which refuses to assimilate to the homogenous system based on contractual relations and useful productivity. Where Bataille characterizes human nature as that in us which is geared to specific ends in work and makes things of us at the expense of sexual exuberance, animal nature is, in contrast, presented as sexual exuberance. Animal nature is that which prevents us from being reduced to things. That which lives for itself rather than as an act of social service is thus closer to the beast. As Deleuze and Guattari would say, animal nature is manifest in the form of libido.

This helps us understand why the child masturbator is singled out as a classic figure of deviance in Foucault’s framework. If the human community is based on production, and if the productive forces are tied to libido, as we see in Bataille, the act of masturbation lurks as a beastly threat to human civilization. The human person is always potentially animal, never entirely reducible to a productive member of the polis. Foucault claims, in The Care of the Self that the masturbator was considered by Christian Western literature to be the prototype of unnatural pleasure, invented to break loose from the limits set for humanity. Masturbation can then be considered a form of excess that indicates a universal potential for monstrosity, given the framework presented in Abnormal.

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138 Bataille, Georges: Eroticism, p. 158  
139 Foucault, Michel: Omsorgen for seg selv, p. 166
At this point the notion of instinct seems relevant. Foucault claims that illness has been construed as a bad setup in the structures that ensures that instincts are made to function «normally»\(^{140}\). Furthermore, there is a fiction of total illness in texts written by anti-masturbation campaigners, to the effect that there seems to be an irresistible drive on the side of the masturbator, causing him to «[satisfy] the call of nature wherever he happened to be», accompanied with a nauseating odour and several other signs of illness, as well as a presence of death\(^{141}\). Death, as we have seen, is a concept often associated with the realm at the Outside of civilization. Face to face with the potential masturbator, one encounters the potential demise of civilization from within. It seems that there is a paranoia in the reigning logos stemming from the fact that there is a realm outside it, that is accessible to every person through the Dionysian part of their psyche. Earlier in *Abnormal*, Foucault explains that the very development of instinct as concept began as an explanation of motiveless crimes. Once again, what we are dealing with is an irresistible drive, outside the domain of intelligence, pushing the person affected by it to acts of madness. As this is a physical condition, rather than a rational mechanism, it is tied to an evolutionist discourse, feeding into the discourse of eugenics\(^{142}\).

We are dealing with a link between a lack of correct training, coupled with an instinct that can be either constructive or destructive, in a civilizational framework. Individuals that are not successfully assimilated into the human community are not entirely to be trusted, always a bit dangerous. This, however, is a danger that affects all of us. As the practice of masturbation is so generally widespread there will always potentially be a heterogeneous element in every human being. The potential danger associated with the stranger is at the same time, though to a lesser degree, a danger that is permanently present within one’s own community. Hence, the means of correct training become even more important. Presumably, there will also be a perceived need to separate decadent from healthy individuals. We get a biopolitics, but also what Achille Mbembe calls a «necropolitics». Mbembe defines this notion as the power to decide who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not\(^{143}\). For Mbembe, the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations are part and parcel of the modern state\(^{144}\).

\(^{140}\) Foucault, Michel: *Abnormal*, p. 299
\(^{141}\) Ibid., pp. 238-239
\(^{142}\) Ibid., pp. 131-133, 139
\(^{143}\) Mbembe, Achille: «Necropolitics», p. 27
\(^{144}\) Ibid., p. 14
9. The Perils of Dependency

Various sorts of capital give rise to various forms of normalization and exclusion. In this section I will explore the nature of the state as a political body, people’s roles within that state and how the reliance on various social roles may lead to social hierarchies, stereotypes based on these social roles and hierarchies and possible mechanisms of violence and exclusion arising from these social frameworks. I will start with an idea of the state presented by the postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe, examine class relations relevant to relations of production, and then move on to explore how social capital based on gender roles can be conducive to forms of oppression and exclusion similar to those relevant to the precarious worker. I will focus particularly on homophobia as a product of hierarchized gender relations and on how this problem can be aggravated by an overly competitive society. I will also focus on the way a society’s or group’s normative framework can lead to mechanisms of normalization that not only tends to exclude, but also to discipline the society’s members in patterns of paranoia.

There are various ways of imagining the origin of the state. One theory that is held by Achille Mbembe (and that also makes sense within a basically Foucauldian framework) is that the state is founded on an act of violence. Sovereignty can here be interpreted as the right to kill, which is presented as the basis for the Sovereign’s power in The Will to Knowledge. This hypothesis makes sense in light of the dichotomy between the European civilizers and their barbarian opponents. Civilization must be protected for the good of all, even if it may cost a couple of lives. The modern state is always watchful for the barbarians at the gates and possible traitors within. The ultimate counter-topos to the modern state is the colony, where the laws that govern civilized societies no longer apply, where war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political stand side by side or alternate with each other. The colony is the heterogenous nature outside order and civilization. The colony itself is strictly delineated in a way reminiscent of Foucault’s plague ridden town. The township is where «those people» live: The colonized subjects, the lepers of modernity.

The township is, however, for that very reason a necessary precondition for the order governing the state. According to Agamben, the rule has no other way to constitute itself as such than to take its exception into account. By constituting the sphere of the rule, one simul-

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145 Ibid., p. 24
146 Ibid., p. 26
taneously establishes the state of exception, which Agamben defines as the margin between the state of order and utter chaos\textsuperscript{147}. The state of order exists at the mercy of the realm of chaos, and can therefore not exist other than through a violation of that realm. Judith Butler has pointed out that the supposed lawlessness of the situation before the institution of the law can function as a self-justification of a repressive or subordinating law\textsuperscript{148}. Butler made the point in the context of gender and sexuality, but it is clearly applicable to the colony, especially given the alleged responsibility to «civilize the natives».

Mbembe claims that the fear of the Other as a mortal threat and absolute danger, whose destruction would strengthen my potential to life and security is inherent in early and late modernity. Thence comes the need to subordinate everything to impersonal logic and instrumental rationality. Mechanization and racial stereotypes contribute to a development where the working classes and the «stateless people» of the industrial world are conflated with the savages of the colonies. There is, then, a perception of both the working class and the colonized subjects as somehow subhuman. As the colonized subject and the industrial labourer are reduced to units of commerce, their humanity is dissolved to the point of being a thing in the master’s possession\textsuperscript{149}. The master gains sovereignty over them, which entails a sort of legal dependency. As their status shifts from person to thing, existing at the mercy of a person with ultimate authority over their life condition, they go from being autonous to being disposable. This is the status that Agamben calls \textit{homo sacer}\textsuperscript{150}.

Since we have already dealt with Bataille’s notions of homogeneity, heterogeneity and sacredness, the time seems apt to explain Agamben’s \textit{homo sacer} in a little more detail. \textit{Homo sacer} is a figure in old Roman law, and is described as someone who can be murdered with impunity, but cannot be sacrificed\textsuperscript{151}. He cannot be sacrificed because he is defined as sacred, which also implies that he is condemned. Drawing on Bataille (who had in common with Agamben that he was influenced by Durkheim and Mauss), we know that defining someone as sacred already is to place them outside of homogeneity, thus outside the civilized, productive realm. According to Agamben, sacredness is an ambivalent term, in that it implies respect as well as disgust, awe as well as fear\textsuperscript{152}. It is clear that we are dealing with a phenomenon simi-

\textsuperscript{147} Agamben, Giorgio: \textit{Homo Sacer}, pp. 41-42
\textsuperscript{148} Butler, Judith: \textit{Gender Trouble}, p. 46
\textsuperscript{149} Mbembe, Achille: «Necropolitics», p. 22
\textsuperscript{150} Agamben, Giorgio: \textit{Homo Sacer}, p. 105
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 92
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 98-99
lar to Foucault’s monstrosity, which on one hand is represented by the king and on the other hand with the people in revolt. The king is here constitutive of the homogenous order and feared because of his power as tyrant. That is clearly not the case with precarious workers or colonized subjects, who are feared or despised because they represent the dirty end of society’s stick. Hence a fear of contagion, as well as chaos and violence as opposite to order. The homines sacri live «in a close symbiosis with death, but still not in the world of the deceased»\textsuperscript{153}. That is, they find themselves on the margins of society, always in danger of being cast out into the great unknown realm on the Outside of civilized order.

The status as thing, and as means of production is something that is recognizable from Bataille’s work. It is by subjection to the system instituted by the master that the slave enters the homogenous realm. The slave does not live for himself, but for another person who has taken ownership over his person. The remaining potential for self-worth remaining in the slave is seen as something bestial because it remains outside the homogenous realm. The remaining energy that is still regarded as self-affirmatory is, according to Bataille, bound up with sexual exuberance, and therefore a man’s innermost pride is tied to his virility\textsuperscript{154}. In order to bring the worker in line with the homogenous sphere of production this energy needs to be tamed, so there is a potential source of conflict in this tension. The master is the one who constitutes the law, but who, as owner, stands outside it. In line with a Foucauldian approach, this master will not be an individual capitalist, but rather the neo-liberal framework itself, that sets the rules for society that all must follow. Cash is now king, and money knows no master. There are, however, individuals who stand closer to the source of power than others, and who stand to gain from the neo-liberal system. These people will, more than poor and powerless people, have the privilege of shaping the rules in accordance with the neo-liberal credo.

The relationship between the master and the slave is certainly not characterized by any sort of equality, but rather takes the shape we know from Hegel’s dialectic, where the slave, as we see, becomes a «thing» for the master. The more the worker remains his own person, the more he is seen as feral and dangerous. The more he is subdued, the less pleasure the master is able to take in the resultant obedience. Any genuine relationship based on mutual recognition is thus rendered impossible. Breaking this bond is dangerous by definition, because outside the sphere of the law, of homogeneity, there is the great Outside associated with chaos and death. In such a setup, a set of presumptions are made. One such presumption is that the

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 123
\textsuperscript{154} Bataille, Georges: Eroticism, p. 158
main area of conflict in the class struggle is that between the industrial worker and the (bourgeois) manager. This is a conflict that has certainly changed since Marx’s time, but which is still with us culturally. Given Bataille’s masculinist bias, we are here primarily thinking about a male worker who depends on his job not only for his own good, but in order to support his family, as well. In Marx’s case, it must be said that he did write about the subjugation of women and about the violence of child labour. One might make the case that Marx theorized on intersectionality before it became commonly acknowledged, but in his revolutionary rhetorics, there are aspects that may be conducive to masculine bias and heteronormativity.

Particularly the emphasis on war between classes may contribute to biased thinking of the sort relevant here. We know from Plato’s Republic that martial valour was particularly cherished in the old polis and that this sort of valour was particularly associated with the male gender. Women were supposed to stay at home and take care of children and the household, which were important tasks, to be sure, but not really as highly prized as political oratory or soldiery, which were thought of as male domains. As Foucault emphasizes, the normative division between the active male and the passive female has been deeply ingrained in Western culture up to our times, and sexual normativity has revolved around a passive and receiving part associated with femininity, and an active and executing part associated with masculinity. Agency is here associated with the second part, which in turn is relevant to patterns of dominance and therefore martial valour. So when Marx, for example speaks about the «reserve army of labour», this may be efficient as a call to arms in the struggle between labour and capital, but it is also liable to strengthen the imagined bond between the worker and the male gender as imagined symbolic tropes.

The link between the discourse of war and machismo may lend itself not only to male bias, but also possibly to homophobia. The American anthropologist Philippe Bourgois points to mechanisms of machismo and homophobia in an East Harlem gang with whom he has been living as part of his work. He has himself been suspected of not being heterosexual because of his parlance and behaviour. This is not a totally harmless belief in this context, because LGBT people are generally not trusted or respected in this particular community. In fact, it’s worse than that, as people whose sexual orientations do not correspond sufficiently with reigning gender norms are inordinately exposed to violence. As a gang member with the pseudo-

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155 Foucault, Michel: Bruken av Nytelsene, pp. 26-27
156 Ibid., pp. 56-58
157 Bourgois, Philippe: In Search of Respect, p. 43
nym Caesar puts it: «And if you’re a new nigga’ and you’re a fag and you like it [...] they take your ass and stuff it with some mad concrete»\(^{158}\). Here we see the dynamics of racism and homophobia at work in an immigrant community in New York. The social dynamics in East Harlem are such that Puerto Ricans define themselves in opposition to the relatively dominant whites and the relatively stigmatized blacks, which has various and somewhat contradictory consequences for Puerto Rican street culture in East Harlem.

Pierre Bourdieu noted something similar about the French working class, where opposition to the bourgeoisie meets sexual morality\(^{159}\). In classic Greek thinking, the problem proper to sexual morality was not the direction of attraction, but one’s attitude to pleasure\(^{160}\). If one had a passive (effeminate) attitude to pleasure (such as in Caesar’s scenario), one could not be counted upon to govern oneself properly, which may be considered a liability in the context of class struggle. The trappings of capital may be tempting. Given more contemporary stereotypes about sexuality, the fear of insufficient self-control tied to ideas of femininity may lead to homophobia. One should therefore be wary not only of the abstractions that take place at the top of the social hierarchy, but also at the bottom rungs.

The social codes dominating a given social sphere can be conducive not only to social ostracism, but also potentially to physical violence. Caesar’s outburst about the American prison system is suggestive, but certainly not unique. As has already been mentioned, there seems to have been a nasty current of homophobia in the French working class. Homophobia as such, however, is clearly not exclusively a working class phenomenon. In «The «faggot clause»», Michele Rene Gregory makes clear that there is a strong culture of homophobia in white collar corporate culture, as well. The problem, then, is not unrelated to class, but seems to be more tied up with machismo in general. There is, as Gregory sees it, a strong link in the corporate imaginary between machismo, competitiveness and dominance that privileges heterosexual men at the expense of women and gay men\(^{161}\). Gregory does not mention lesbian women, but according to Foucault, «it was better for a woman to take the place of a man than it is for a man to stoop to the level of women»\(^{162}\), so it seems safe to assume that lesbians take part in the general economy of gender. It is important to note here also that since the focus of

\(^{158}\) Ibid., p. 38
\(^{159}\) Bourdieu, Pierre: *Distinction*, pp. 382-383
\(^{160}\) Foucault, Michel: *Bruken av Nytefsene*, p. 104
\(^{161}\) Gregory, Michele Rene: ««The faggot clause»: the embodiment of homophobia in the corporate locker room». In: *Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal*, p. 653
\(^{162}\) Foucault, Michel: *Omsorgen for seg selv*, p. 259
sexual discourse in the West has been on the male agent, women were long thought not to have any agency in this area, such that the lesbian woman has been a non-entity in this paradigm. This is dangerous for at least two reasons. One is that denial of identity in itself is a sort of violent exclusion, another is that it might make the man believe that the lesbian identity exists for his own enticement.

What goes as being explicitly «gay» in Gregory’s account are particularly open emotionality, aesthetic body movements and a lack of perceived toughness, which again has roots in ancient Greece where masculinity was associated with rationality as opposed to emotionality, and what one can call a will to dominance. The aesthetic features of «gay» gestures may also signify readiness to function as an object of pleasure, that to the minds of the ancient Greeks made the beloved take the place of a woman. According to the Greeks, such behaviour was a breach of the natural order, and was therefore taboo. Such supposedly feminine characteristics were associated with emotionality, irrationality and the body, and hence indicated a lack of «maturity». These stereotypes are reminiscent of the racist tropes Fanon writes about, so the dynamics that lead to racist violence and oppression may also be relevant to sexually determined violence and oppression.

Besides showing homophobia to be a persistent problem in corporate culture, Gregory’s research also demonstrates sexuality and gender as performative factors, having to do with culture at least as much as nature. He did not mention physical violence so much as a part of corporate culture, but these are powerful actors. As Hannah Arendt reminded us, «power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent». The possible absence of physical violence in this sector does not necessarily show that there is less homophobia there. It might just mean that the «softer» threat of power is more potent, so there will be less use for fists. As with racism, it might be the case that people from disadvantaged groups feel that they have more to lose and are therefore more likely to lash out. One would in any case expect people within a culture dominated by normative heterosexuality to avoid behaviour that may be perceived as «gay», in an effort to steer away from the judgement of what Foucault called the «normalizing gaze».

164 Foucault, Michel: Bruken av Nytelsene, pp. 257-258
165 Foucault, Michel: Omsorgen for seg selv, p. 240
166 Arendt, Hannah: On Violence, p. 56
As Mbembe has argued, the execution of errors in a social machinery is normally seen as something to be avoided. The normalizing gaze works as a penal mechanism to reduce the amount of errors appearing in this machinery through a system of penalties and rewards\textsuperscript{167}. In Foucault’s narrative, the emphasis is on reward, because the system is best served if it is aided by trust and encouragement. As such, the normalizing gaze fulfills a disciplinary function that serves to make the members of society conduct themselves according to the rules regulating this society. The factors being regulated in this way revolve around the axes of time, activity, behaviour, speech, body and sexuality. Neither of these factors should be understood as objective measures, but are given meaning by being situated within a system of values and norms. Those who do not measure up to the norms established by the code of conduct, or who deviate from it, stand in risk of punishment. The function of punishment is here to correct deviance. Those who break rank either by voluntary or involuntary failure must be taught not to repeat the committed offence. Foucault claims that this is done through additional exercise, but one might expect, in other contexts, that the same lesson might be conveyed through social ostracism or through physical violence. Interestingly, given Foucault’s schema in Discipline and Punish, where the panopticon of the prison is generalized to function as an apparatus of control in society at large, we can see some similarities between the normalizing gaze affecting the gay person and the colonial system imposed upon the colonized subject.

On the basis of the normalizing gaze, a field of distinctions is set up, such as the distinction between good and evil. There is a sort of moral economy of merit and fault set up by this mechanism, which in turn makes it possible to quantify the amount of good and evil in each person. Individuals are thus measured according to merit, and bear visible marks that convey information about where people are positioned in this moral hierarchy. Foucault lists four ranks from «very good» to «bad», and adds that there was for a time a fifth class, «the shameful» who would always be separated from the others and be dressed in sackcloth. In this group we recognize the untouchables in Bataille’s account, such that the four ranks can also be seen as standing on an axis from fully integrated in the homogenous realm to those condemned to dwell in a separate heterogenous realm, apart from the others and deprived of the solidarity of the group. Those who want to partake in the community of their fellow human beings are forced to partake in the moral economy of merit and fault and to abide by the rules that govern the flock. Those who fail to live up to the standards are not considered merely deficient, as if that wasn’t bad enough, but evil, with all that entails of righteousness and moral

\textsuperscript{167} Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish, pp. 177-184
scorn. Deviance is conceived as a betrayal of the larger whole that protects the individual as well as the group, and it gives the flock a right to punish.

Butler elaborates on that theme as she claims that failure to perform their gender right is liable to attract the flock’s scorn. As gender is a collective fiction, it depends on an economy of reward and punishment in order to function, or even to exist. The ritual of gender reinforces itself continually through stylized performance and gets its own reality from the patterned behaviour of human beings. Those who fail to comply in such a display are seen as anomalies in the homogenous order and are to that extent shunned. The status of outcast implies both a lowering of status and increased exposure to violence because community members tend to protect the «natural» homogenous order, the boundaries of which are associated with chaos and death. It is likely that the stigmatized person will also condemn the heterogeneous aspects of his own psyche, possibly leading to self-contempt and self-harm. We all internalize norms and values proper to our respective communities. In the case of stigmatized persons, norms that may not fit them as human beings may drive them to overperformance on a toxic cocktail of paranoia and self-loathing in an effort to «prove themselves». As Foucault puts it, «the soul is the prison of the body». The external marks born by the subjects variously situated in this moral economy also suggest that the rank orders are tied to more tangible benefits, which has explanatory value for the «criminal pauper» phantasm discussed in chapter 5. Like the panopticon, the normalizing gaze homogenizes at the same time that it individualizes. It disciplines the flock to move in the same direction at the same time that it places its individual members at different steps of the hierarchical ladder through the use of external marks of allegiance.

In a homophobic community, being marked as «gay» sets one down one notch in the moral pecking order regulated by the normalizing gaze. One has to ask oneself why that is. Most of the people applying the «faggot clause» either as an attack or as self-defense, were men, but women, too, can sometimes use the clause. We seem, then, to be dealing with a sort of gendered hierarchy, where straight men are on top, based on their supposed toughness and rationality, whereas women and homosexuals are placed in a complex dynamic of merits and faults beneath them. This seems to have quite a bit in common with the dynamics of racism discussed above. W. Allen is onto something similar in the second volume of The Invention of

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168 Butler, Judith: Gender Trouble, pp. 178-180
169 Butler, Judith: Undoing Gender, pp. 34-35
170 Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish, pp. 29-30
the White Race, where he claims that an intermediate stratum of people of colour was installed between the status of white and black in order to prevent a collective challenge from the ranks of workers towards the prevailing system of bond-labour\textsuperscript{171}. Expanding from this, one might perhaps make the semi-Lacanian argument that a bank account serves the symbolic function of a phallus in a capitalist economy, and that this symbolic function may serve as a locus for interpretation of power dynamics on the intersection between hierarchies of class and gender. This would influence the development of phantasms, as well, with stereotypes that share some particular features pertaining to social power. Where Fanon theorized about the «Negro myth» in the case of people with dark skin, it might make sense to speak of a «faggot myth» in the case of non-heterosexual people. As the connotations of race go beyond mere skin colour, one would expect the connotations of sexuality to go beyond mere sexual attraction. Where black people in the colonies were subjugated by white imperialists, it makes sense to look for the causes of homophobia and heterosexual bias in a nexus of power centered around male privilege.

10. Sex & Violence

Racism has been used by owners of capital to foment divisions between white and black workers. Giving white workers certain privileges has tended to create feelings of superiority through a «screen of racial contempt». The subjugation of women has been a feature of Western societies for just as long. Similar to racist discourse, women have been thought less intelligent than men, less stable and more prone to emotional outbursts. From ancient times, men have been considered more in tune with rationality, and with virtues that were valued in the ancient polis, such as science and martial valour. In order for such a story to seem plausible, there had to be a difference between the sexes that seemed to call for the domesticity of women. As we have seen earlier in this thesis, this difference was largely tied to women’s pregnancy. In this section, I will explore the social economy of gender, and I will explore the commonalities between sexism, racism and classism.

Women were needed to create offspring, who in their turn could take care of the family inheritance. In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler mentions the child as an eroticized site of

\textsuperscript{171} Allen, Theodore W.: The Invention of the White Race, Volume Two, pp. 236-237
cultural reproduction. She claims that the child affirms the pure transmission of culture through a patrilinear system such that heterosexuality and monolithic culture support each other in a self-affirming loop. Foucault makes an argument in *The Use of Pleasure* that fits well with Butler’s theory. He argues that people through the act of procreation try to take part in a sort of immortality by having children that will prolong their parents' lineage after they as individuals die. The idea of attempted immortality makes it easier to see how regulations on child birth can lead to sexual normativity and general biopolitics, and possibly also help us make sense of racism as well as homophobia. Immortality suggests not only a will to create new life that lasts long into the future, but also the will to hold on to something old in this new life. Such a project can possibly lead to ideas about sexual duty and genetic purity.

In times of globalization and disputed identities, the fundamental structures beneath monolithic cultures are not necessarily weakened. The opposite can be the case, because of the deepseated need for community that characterizes the human creature. In *Gender Trouble*, Butler informs us that women have also been used as objects of exchange between patriarchal clans, who interact on the basis of a repressed homosocial desire. There is support for this notion in Foucault’s book *The Care of the Self*, where he ties practices of human transaction to patterns of Greek thinking revolving around the economy (οικος). If this is true, then, given Foucault’s account of the normalizing gaze, it seems fair to assume that homophobia may, at least in part, be based on a paranoiac hypervigilance based on anxiety for loss of status. Butler offers another interpretation, that may not stand in conflict with the first one. She believes that the interplay of various gay and lesbian identities within a framework of compulsory heterosexuality may destabilize the semiotic structures of gender.

The mediatory position of the women between the two men sending and receiving her implies a latent homosexuality beneath the regulatory heterosexuality that cannot be named, because that would upset the economy of marital exchange. In that case it seems to be the structure of power itself that is at stake. The logic here will be similar to that of the normalizing gaze, which is certainly not contradictory to paranoia. It is, however, important to see that this paranoiac schema holds a liberatory potential. Reappropriation and reconfiguration of op-

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172 Butler, Judith: *Undoing Gender*, p. 124-125
173 Foucault, Michel: *Bruken av Nytelsene*, pp. 159-160
174 Butler, Judith: *Gender Trouble*, p. 52
175 Foucault, Michel: *Omsorgen for seg selv*, p. 87
176 Butler, Judith: *Gender Trouble*, pp. 156-157
177 Butler, Judith: *Undoing Gender*, pp. 138-139
pressive languages may then be said to play an emancipatory role that mere denial of the same system cannot fulfill. It is interesting to observe that Mbembe makes a similar point in the case of postcolonial societies, where humour is used to resituate and reconfigure the semantic languages of power\textsuperscript{178}.

There is, however, another side to this setup. As Klaus Theweleit has pointed out, the role of the woman as a placeholder of social status and as means of exchange makes her a central locus for social aspiration to the effect that phantasmatic investment in women from the upper classes may turn revolutionary potency into ambition of a more conservative kind «through the back door», as it were\textsuperscript{179}. The fetishization of the domesticated woman may thus turn revolutionary discourse into its opposite, in a way that is reminiscent of the chief. This does seem to open up a space of particularly female agency to the effect that even in their subordinate position thrust upon them by patriarchy it would be wrong to consider women in such systems to be entirely powerless. The best portrayal of this feminine power is probably given by Shakespeare through the character of Lady Macbeth. Social power of this kind is not the same as equality between the sexes, and may even be a hindrance to such equality because it gives women a stake in the game of patriarchy. At the same time that it makes room for various forms of power, the system also prepares the ground for various forms of goals, tensions and resistances that may stand in internal conflict.

Along with the homosocial dimension, the desire of men to be associated with each other through the marriage of respective offspring may have been part of an effort to strengthen the race by acquisition of the desired qualities one sees in the other’s land. The Nazi slogan \textit{Blut und Boden} may be understood as an explication of such a regulatory heterosexist economy. It seems that racism and patriarchy share certain qualities that are also related to what Foucault has called the «splendor» of the state. The blood and the soil go together in this framework, and it must be regulated by strict gender roles, as well as racial purity, in order to keep the national project alive. There will be a homosocial dimension to this project loaded with sexual dimensions that cannot be spoken for fear of degeneracy. Actual lived-out homosexual desires can be experienced as a threat to the national project. Such leanings may be looked upon as a danger to the established order and a potential weakening of homogenous civilization and must therefore be strongly discouraged. We have then a basis for a biopolitics

\textsuperscript{178}Mbembe, Achille: \textit{On the Postcolony}, pp. 83-85
\textsuperscript{179}Theweleit, Klaus: \textit{Male Fantasies, Volume 1}, p. 353
of sexuality that is similar to the biopolitics of race. Also similar to racism, it is clear that we may be dealing with a fear of contagion here, as well.

According to patriarchal mythology, such as the one behind the «faggot myth» described by Gregory, women and gay men are more prone to emotional outbursts than is the case with straight men. For the sake of efficiency, then, the power to make decisions should be granted to heterosexual men, who are to be thought of as utility maximizing «rational agents». Emotions are dangerous because they seem to imply a lack of control. In a social context, however, the lack of passion may be at least as dangerous, because it simultaneously entails a lack of compassion. In the colony, this was a test of manhood and virility. If one could display an absence of compassion in the presence of suffering one was regarded a splendid representative of one’s race. As both colonizer and colonized were human beings, and humans are fundamentally social beings, racial myths about the colonized people’s resistance to pain must surely have helped facilitate this violent test of manhood.

According to the assumptions built into patriarchal mythology, traditionally masculine men are thought to be the only people responsible enough to take charge and make decisions. Butler claims that developments in cell biology build on the assumption that the male sex denotes activity and presence, whereas the female sex denotes passivity and absence. If that is so, the culturally constructed male/female dichotomy has influenced, and is lent credence by, scientific work such that prescribed gender roles may seem more natural than would be the case in the case of different scientific trajectories. She considers this an affirmation of the continuing applicability of a Foucauldian critique. Certainly, we see the contours of a power/knowledge critique here, as well as an epistemological framework built for domination of one sex over another, and strictly prescribed gender roles to maintain this domination. These are features that sexism shares with racism, as we have seen in the case of Rwanda. Both racism and sexism build on tropes which are largely fictitious, and they depend on the assent of subjugated people in order to continue to function. For this reason one would expect both ideologies to come with a degree of paranoia and an exaggerated need of control.

Elizabeth Grosz links this need, and its corresponding paranoia, to a primary violence where the man tries to repress the debt he and his society stand in to the maternal body. One could add to this that if a central source of men’s social power is rationality as opposed to em-

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180 Stoler, Ann Laura: Race and the Education of Desire, p. 129
181 Butler, Judith: Gender Trouble, pp. 135-141
otion, this necessitates a repression of their own personalities as well, such that the myth of patriarchy implies a denial of male as well as female subjectivity. Expanding from this, one could also argue that homophobia may entail a paranoid vigilance over the parts of one’s own psyche that corresponds with the «faggot myth», regardless of sexual preference, along with a corresponding fear of contagion. This double repression, which one must suppose is given additional force through processes of normalization, results in phantasmatic and paranoid projections that erase the feminine basis of society through the superimposition of masculine significatory phantasms. As with the foundation of the state in Mbembe’s narrative, we see here a primary violence that establishes a civilizational order, from which further kinds of violence arise. We can derive from Grosz’s analysis a basic similarity between racism, classism and sexism, which allows for a critique of the violence inherent to all these systems. This also helps us understand how subjugated groups can come to invest their identities in the interplay of various social hierarchies and develop strategies according to an interplay of social forces. This can further explain developments of hatred and violence as factors arising from the competition between various hierarchical orders.

Grosz’s description of world building on the basis of an erasure of bodies, and the instrumentalization of human lives is particularly interesting because it shares some features with Mbembe’s theories about the colony. The situation of women in a patriarchal society is both a crucial part of the interiority of the social system it supports, but also, somehow, on the outside of that system because of the violent subjugation that women are exposed to. Women are here supposed to be pillars of support without agency, bodies without minds. In that regard, they share a status similar to Bataille’s low prostitute. This is then a status similar to that of precarious workers. They are central bearers of a system that abuses and exploits them. They fulfill a central function in society, but the system regulating this same society depends on their silence and submission.

The patterns of dominance pertaining to imperialist exploitation and the subjugation of women in a patriarchal society share some fundamental features. It is interesting to note that Ann Laura Stoler has found similar patterns of subjugation and dependency between native women and European men. It is likely that such patterns of domination and exploitation in foreign lands would have consequences on the domestic scene, as well. As Stoler describes it,
the native woman fulfills a nurturing role that made it possible for the colonizers to remake the colonized world according to their ideas of order and civilization. In order to maintain that system and thereby hold on to white and male privilege, discriminatory narratives and projections are applied, which may lead to hatred and self-loathing. This in turn may lower the barriers to physical violence.

Empirical findings by Bourgois supports such an interpretation. He informs us that men in East Harlem meet the loss of authoritarian power over their families by lashing out against women and children. Old patterns of systemic violence are conducive to physical violence when combined with additional pressure. Women accustomed to patriarchal structures are also deeply committed to the relevant system and can react violently when its codes are broken. Women’s support for patriarchal codes of conduct gives some further credence to the idea that systems as such are self-perpetuating by providing their members with frames of reference and structures of value needed to make sense of everyday life. Patterns of normalization and internalization of values are apt to influence the way people evaluate themselves as well as others, so as I’ve pointed out earlier, changes to traditional social structures will probably lead to anxiety even in the case of relatively subordinate groups.

In addition to fidelity to the system itself, Butler posits a fidelity to one’s own role in it, such that, in the case of gender, the taboos relevant to each sex makes it likely for people to position themselves according to the situationally constructed ego ideal, and thus perform the gender roles they are expected to perform on the basis of the social economy relevant for their lives. If this is true, then not only is gender not destiny, but individuals will be freer to explore various possible gender roles if there are several gender identities present in their social sphere. On the other hand rigid gender norms are likely to work in self-perpetuating patterns as deviations from such norms can be construed as a threat not only to social normativity, but also to personal identities. Breaking a norm can be considered an attack on valued personhood and possibly a threat to socially strategic positions. As we have seen in the case of patriarchal structures during new strategic openings for women, a perceived attack on valued identities may provoke a violent response. Of course, moving towards more equal societies where more people are capable of pursuing ways of living in tune with their liking is to be desired, and there is no excuse for violence or victim blaming, but as has been discussed already in the

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184 Bourgois, Philippe: *In Search of Respect*, p. 214
185 Ibid., p. 226
186 Butler, Judith: *Gender Trouble*, p. 81
context of Trump’s electoral victory in 2016, there are dangers associated with feelings of beleaguered identities, especially when goods of existential value are perceived to be compromised.

According to patriarchal ideology, women make up the necessary basis from which men can change the world according to their rational intellect and realize themselves in society. The man works both for himself and his extended family, including the wife at home. Such a division of labour seems liable to create contempt and a feeling of entitlement in the mind of the man and resentment in the mind of the woman, in addition to a lack of self-esteem as well as resentment and an anxiousness to «prove oneself» on the part of human beings who are unwilling or unable to live according to the prescribed gender roles. This, however, is the way things have to be, because it is the way the world works, according to the divine order. We recognize here the pastoral power, where the shepherd takes control of the flock for the good of all, because God gave him this mission. This is the way the world is constructed, the way it will go on for perpetuity, until suddenly at some point in history it is not like that anymore. This does something to the boundaries between the homogenous and the heterogenous realms. A move away from previously established hierarchies may blur those boundaries and lead to perceived crisis for all members of the previously accepted system, but probably particularly for people advantageously positioned.

The revolutionary idea that women are people changed the field of social relations in such a way that the traditional man (pater familias) is no longer the self-explanatory top of the pyramid. Still, whose rules apply even in this new society remains a valid question. If women partake on an equal footing in a game that was originally written for men, does that necessarily entail that the game has been fundamentally changed? Butler would argue that it has not, and I tend to agree with her. As Foucault sees it, the epistemic web ordering the dominant social discourse is a precondition for not thinking along the same lines. For it to be possible that different subjects find themselves in mutually adversarial positions, there has to be a very tightly woven network to regularize historic knowledge. This may lead to a perception that the struggle for equality can only take place along a strictly defined axis that has previously been the domain of subjugation and injustice.

If it is true that discourses and counterdiscourses are positioned along the same line, however, it seems likely that struggling for positions within the same framework really just

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187 Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», p. 208
changes the positions of the pieces on the board without challenging the rules of the game that creates and maintains existing injustices in the first place. On the other hand, improving the standing of women in a patriarchal society is of the utmost importance, both for the lives of the women involved and for the chances of establishing a social space where the negotiation of gender and sexuality is at all possible. There are thus two struggles that must be fought at the same time if one wishes a world of equal opportunity. One is centered on a political axis, fighting for equality of opportunity within the established framework. The other is centered on the ontological and epistemic axis. Using the tools available in the present culture, one must constantly question and deconstruct prevailing assumptions about sexuality and gender. Butler argues that one must question the underlying rules, one must explore the basic assumptions pertaining to gender and sexuality the better to dismantle those of them that are harmful. This holds true for racism, as well. We must explore the undercurrents of racist discourse in order to challenge it, and hopefully at some point get rid of racism all together.

11. The Contingency of Freedom

If we assume that freedom and autonomy are values worth pursuing, they are also values worth problematizing. In this section, I will look at two different struggles for freedom, the one being Steve Biko’s struggle against white supremacy in South Africa and the other being local feminists’ struggle against patriarchy in the MENA region. I shall argue that both these struggles demonstrate that freedom is dependent on context and not all sorts of freedom are always equal or necessarily even compatible. As Foucault reminded us, we are always situated in relations of power that shape us as individuals and set the conditions for possible strategies within the limits of various dispositifs. What freedoms different people have cause to value must be decided by those people themselves and the idea of freedom as something that can be given by external agents can too easily function as the basis for a new priesthood and thus make the freedom thus granted the foundation of other kinds of dependency and resentment. In line with Bataille’s dictum that one cannot «be everything» I here want to demonstrate how campaigns for the common good can create or solidify patterns of hatred, resentment and social ostracism unless one respects the logics of local power structures.

Racism is a social ill, and getting rid of it would benefit society and lead to healthier relationship between persons living in a shared community. This was the goal of Steve Biko,
the political activist and philosopher who was the chief ideologist and leader of the Black Consciousness Movement. Biko had been stricken by the attitude of white superiority present even in relatively progressive anti-apartheid students. Similar to the experience of Fanon, it was taken for granted that the language used at anti-apartheid meetings was to be English and there was an attitude among the white activists that they had a duty to represent «the voice of the oppressed», thus in practice contributing to the marginalization of the very people they were ostensibly trying to save\textsuperscript{188}. We recognize here the role of the priests in Nietzsche’s genealogy, who take it upon themselves to lead the downtrodden according to the precepts of the priestly class. The agency of the people thus led, according to the principle of ressentiment, is thereby undermined. As Biko clearly saw, such a liberation movement cannot lead to genuine freedom for the people being oppressed, especially if the guiding principle of the struggle for liberation takes the form of a reigning morality.

Theweleit points out that revolution in the name of a «new morality» tends to keep old patterns of dominance and subjugation alive such that social hierarchies are maintained in the face of shifting power relations\textsuperscript{189}. Foucault concurs, claiming that the philosophy of Ideologists tends to provide the discursive foundation upon which more overt struggles for political power take place. The revolutionaries are then led according to the dictate of hegemonic philosophers\textsuperscript{190}. He was here in agreement with Marx, who was convinced that the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself. In Biko’s case this would imply that black people could not trust «white saviours» to give them freedom. Struggles against white supremacy had to be based on the principle of black solidarity.

In line with this, Biko came to the realization that the removal of apartheid was not enough to ensure freedom for black people living under white rule. There also had to be a struggle against white supremacy in general, and one of the loci in which this struggle had to take place was the minds of black people having internalized the racist system of values that served to support and legitimize racist oppression. Along with capitalist exploitation, the colonized subject had to get rid of an oppression of the soul\textsuperscript{191}. In order to do that, different groups of people had to get together to fight the common enemy, which was white supremacy\textsuperscript{192}.

\textsuperscript{188} Cloete, Michael: «STEVE BIKO: black consciousness and the african other – the struggle for the political». In: Angelaki, 04 March 2019, Vol.24(2) p. 108
\textsuperscript{189} Theweleit, Klaus: Male Fantasies, Volume 1, pp. 366-367
\textsuperscript{190} Foucault, Michel: The Will to Knowledge, pp. 140-141
\textsuperscript{191} Cloete, Michael: «STEVE BIKO: black consciousness and the african other – the struggle for the political». In: Angelaki, 04 March 2019, Vol.24(2), p. 110
\textsuperscript{192} Ibíd., pp. 112-113
There is in Biko’s thinking an emphasis on unity in difference. While oppression against the Indian, the Xhosas, the Vendi and the Zulu were rooted in the same ideology, there had to be a recognition of different experiences beneath that common oppression, as the alternative might well be a new form of oppression. There is also a focus on the economic exploitation inherent to the apartheid regime, while recognizing that the economic dimension of apartheid was not the only dimension of oppression. Neglecting any of these dimensions because of an overemphasis on a single issue might undermine the struggle against white supremacy.

Hence, the struggle for liberation, and against the racist discourse that stands in the way of it, must be fought on several different frontiers at the same time. The problem is multifaceted, so it must be solved through a multiplicity of strategies. Ignoring one aspect of the problem can lead to problems in other areas. This might also serve as a reminder that logics come prior to strategies. This lesson is brought home by the anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod in her work on the situation of Muslim women, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?

Abu-Lughod argues that the trope of the Muslim woman being oppressed by Muslim religion and culture is largely an Orientalist phantasm made up for the sake of legitimacy of intervention by the «international community». Actual Muslim women she has spoken to do not recognize the situation described through this trope. Islam for them is rather a valued part of their identity that add meaning to their lives. There are patterns of oppression that influence these women’s lives, but the way they see it, they are oppressed by their political situations rather than their shared religion. On the other hand, there are reasons for being sceptical to accepting such statements at face value. There are patterns of oppression that seem to be particularly salient in Muslim communities, and societies where women are assigned to a domestic role are often based on monotheistic religions, of which Islam is one.

One should certainly not ignore the fundamental role general culture plays for political situations and regimes, but neither should one ignore the testimonies given by the people whose lives are impacted by these regimes. Neither is there anything wrong in having feelings of solidarity with women suffering under oppressive social practices, but one should generally ask for their consent before acting on it. Sacredness is, as we have seen, an ambivalent thing, and that is likely to be the case for organized religion, as well. The same institutions that may oppress people in some ways may also function in ways that provide them with a sense of identity and belonging. At the same time, then, that one should be supportive of challenges to

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193 Abu-Lughod, Lila: Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, pp. 4-7
conservative practices, one should be aware that these challenges do not take place in a social vacuum. That, I think, is Abu-Lughod’s particular strength as an anthropologist. Trying to grant people freedom and empowerment in accordance with norms of societies far away from them may well be tantamount to enforcing a Procrustean bed on the people one is trying to help, and also a certain kind of epistemic colonialism, which would probably be counterproductive, if not outright harmful. Abu-Lughod certainly sees the danger inherent to such well intended projects.

The Western rationale behind the discourse of rescue is clarified by Abu-Lughod when she explains how the narrative has been focused on «cultural issues», and how, for example, the work of local feminists in Bangladesh has been ignored in favour of the exploits of «enlightened saviours» from the West. The stories behind the news, she says, have been radically altered in order to fit into a narrative where agents of civilization save culturally oppressed women from the claws of authoritarian «savages»\(^{194}\). Implicit in that term is not only the essential wickedness of these oppressors, but also a potent threat to goodness and civilization. As noted, the intention behind the campaign for Muslim liberation may be quite benign, but there are other elements pertaining to Western Orientalist discourse that one should pay attention to, as well. As Edward Said pointed out in the book *Orientalism*, Western colonial powers have a long history of essentialising the Muslim Other in the Near East as a central strategy in their quests for domination. Even though criticism of practices in Muslim countries is often legitimate, and even necessary, they can easily be tainted by ingrained discourses.

The interests of outside powers in the MENA region are certainly not new. Before our time, there was the Great Game in Afghanistan and the Sykes-Picot line dividing Syria and Iraq. With examples like these in mind, it should not come as a surprise if a campaign for liberation from particularly Russia or Western powers might further worsen the position of women in these societies. The reactionary regimes we see, for example in Iran, can in part be understood as structures of ressentiment. The sometimes legitimate notion that «society must be defended» can be conducive to strictly normative societies, and from that to hierarchies of human worth and dignity. These earlier campaigns, given the lessons of Fanon, will probably make an impact on the minds of imperialist agents, as well. The trope of the Savage Orient, as Abu-Lughod describes it, combines the discourse of racism with the discourse of sexism. Muslim women are here presented as victims of a culture ruled by authoritarian men, they are de-

\(^{194}\) Ibid., pp. 13-14
void of agency and, apparently, not far from the «blank slate» that Locke spoke of. There seems to be a view of women as devoid of agency that sexisms in East and West have in common, and historic trajectories in the West can be of use to feminists in the MENA region. As Biko taught us, however, progressive change must happen from below in local societies, using the social and cultural tools available to them.

We have seen that classic sexist mythology posits women as corporal entities and guardians of home and hearth. To rescue these women can be construed as saving the pure land from the hands of barbarians. It is also a cause that can be used to uphold the racist discourse necessary to legitimate military campaigns. I turn again to the great postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe, who in his book *On the Postcolony* states that the form of domination imposed during colonialism and slave trade in Africa could be understood as phallic. It is based on a mobilization of the subjective foundations of masculinity and femininity and it has direct, close contact with the general economy of sexuality\(^\text{195}\).

As Edward Said explains, this kind of phallic domination has certainly been present in the Near East, as well. Given the strictly regulated sexual life in Europe, the Orient was seen as a place one could go to for sexual experiences unobtainable in Europe\(^\text{196}\). Like the daughters of the working class, Middle Eastern women were seen as training ground the sons of the upper class could go to for experience before continuing their bourgeois lineage with a suitable match. Foucault (with support from Bourdieu, as we have seen) suggests that the «deployment of sexuality» from the bourgeoisie contributed to strict sexual norms in the working class\(^\text{197}\). It would probably not be out of place to assume that such exploitation has made an impact on gender relations in some of the countries where colonial powers have been at work, such that the prevailing economy of gender is connected to a distrust of foreigners, for much the same reasons that sexism and racism are operative in our own cultural sphere, only magnified because of the wounds of imperial violence. This may further help explain why some Muslim women choose to wear this garb in spite of their families’ wishes. For them, it may be a proud expression of loyalty to their nation and independence from foreign domination. As we have seen, feelings of beleaguered identities, which colonialism has a tendency to produce, may also help explain why one would choose to follow leaders like Osama bin Laden.

\(^{195}\) Mbembe, Achille: *On the Postcolony*, p. 17  
\(^{196}\) Said, Edward W.: *Orientalism*, p. 190  
\(^{197}\) Foucault, Michel: *The Will to Knowledge*, pp. 126-127
There seem to be two factors relevant to the struggles of the Muslim feminist, which she fundamentally has in common with feminists in the West, but with somewhat different challenges because of cultural and historic contingencies. One of these factors is improving the situation of women in the area where she lives. The other is to negotiate within the system of values and social strategies proper to her culture and social sphere, that is to define the parameters of feminism according to her own life. That is certainly not to say that any divergence from orthodox Islam is to be considered a concession to Western imperialism, but any project for Muslim liberation is probably destined to fail if it ignores the sensemaking features of people’s social lives. There are practices and traditions proper to some Muslim communities, such as female genital mutilation, that we should condemn and try to change, but in order to be effective that must be done in cooperation with local opponents to such practices.

As Foucault has pointed out, power is not best construed as something that one does or does not have, but rather as a field of relations within which various individuals are differently situated. It is more constructive to see power in terms of relations between people than as a tangible good. Perhaps something similar could be said about freedom. Freedom should then not be understood primarily as a basic resource, but rather as a mechanism that regulates relations between people. If that is the case, then emphasizing local traditions and customs in the meetings between people of different cultures becomes even more important, as breaches with culturally accepted ideas of freedom may be conducive to the establishment of stereotypes that tend to present a distorted conception of the culturally Other. These stereotypes may further erode trust between men and women in societies which are already fraught with strict gender divisions, especially given reciprocal dynamics of fear and distrust where «their savages» come to hate «our heathens» and the heathens justify wars in the lands of savages through their mission to save women from their cultures. The same dynamics may lead to general distrust between people of different cultures within the same polity.

If failures of cultural interpretation make us see Muslims in foreign countries as savages and as a threat to civilization, then that will have an impact on The Muslim as stereotype. All of us have prejudices of various sorts, which is probably necessary given our limited cognitive horizons as well as our culturally constituted personalities. Hence, we are all liable to see our ways of living as the «right» one, that should be universally accepted. A person challenging such conceptions of proper behaviour may therefore risk being treated unfairly by a majority or by a hegemonic group. The trope of «Muslim as Barbarian» may be conflated with the «Muslim as dangerous individual», thus contributing to the stereotype «Muslim as
carrier of disease», given the narrative about the dangerous individual present in Foucault’s *Abnormal*. The resulting ostracism and irrational hostility on the part of society at large may in turn increase the risk of isolation and resentment, possibly leading to actual recruitment to fringe groups reacting violently to the systemic violence perpetrated against them.

### 12. Conclusion: «Why Can’t We All Just Get Along?»

Armed with the theoretical tools acquired through working on this thesis, I return to Kadyrov’s dungeons in Chechnya. I will use the conclusion of this case study as a conduit for the theoretical lessons I have drawn through working on this thesis. My concluding thoughts on Chechnya will be my concluding thoughts in this thesis on the social dynamics of hatred and exclusion. Why is it that persons suspected of not being heterosexual are considered such a threat to the North Caucasian republic that torture chambers have been prepared for them? One very important factor is the history of the republic.

The Northern Caucasus, including Chechnya, was an object of Russian imperial ambitions since the 18th century, and has been a rather unstable region since it was brought under Russian rule. When Yeltsin famously said that the Russian republics «could take as much power as they can swallow», Chechnya followed suit and bid for independence, only to be crushed by Russia’s military might. There is therefore reason to expect a certain siege mentality in the republic’s political culture. An experience that one is under siege has a tendency to make people look for real or imagined enemies, such as «elite cultural feminists» and «post-modern neo-marxists». In a region such as the northern Caucasus, where military campaigns could not but make an impact on the political culture in the region, a tendency of machismo and militarism is to be expected.

Given its history, it is understandable that there are currents of political paranoia in the Chechen republic. Kadyrov has cultivated a political image as a tough guy since he took over for his father, whom he previously served as a body guard. He is a person whom people can and must follow in order to build a strong nation, particularly in its relations with greater Russia. There is therefore ground for a cult of personality, where Kadyrov’s enemies become the nation’s enemies. Because of old metaphysical and political ideas pertaining to gender, homosexuality may be considered a threat to the virility, and hence the readiness for combat, of the
general population. Societies marked by troubled relations with stronger significant others are more likely to be vulnerable to homophobia because of prevailing gendered notions of activity and passivity. Kadyrov has, time and again, added to the relevant stigma by saying that «there are no such people in our republic». If we take his words literally, this seems to suggest that any gay person in Chechnya is not a part of the polity, and is therefore dispensable. He has defined Chechnya’s LGBT people as homines sacri, outcasts who can be killed («hunted») with impunity. As we have seen, however, it would be overly simple to pin the entire responsibility for the situation on the President, who is a subject formed in and by power as everybody else. Chechnya’s LGBT have been stigmatized by the Chechen community and Kadyrov is riding a bloody wave of hatred in order to keep his position in society.

Along with the renunciation of gay Chechens, there will probably also be a fear of social contagion. As we have seen, part of the fear of people standing outside what is counted as civil society stems from a fear that their presence can have a contagious effect on people in the proximity of the stigmatized person. There will therefore be a perceived need to get rid of, or even «cleanse», people who are marked by a social taboo. This may help explain why associating stigmatized people with rodents and vermin has had such an accelerating effect on processes of exclusion and violent persecution. This kind of manufactured association was a prominent part of anti-semitic propaganda by the Nazis and the propaganda against Tutsi Rwandese by Hutu militants before the genocide in 1994. Interpreting these horrible cases of violence and destruction as simply a result of the evil natures of their perpetrators is not an acceptable attitude to history and is not fair to the victims of these atrocities. Refusing to acknowledge the general lessons we can draw from these tragedies makes us more liable to repeat them. Rather, I think they should be seen as extreme instances of dangers inherent to community building, which has a tendency to create zones of inclusion and exclusion.

Naturalization of social structures can entail a sort of «denaturalization» of alternatives, defining them as what Freud called the «unheimlich», which in turn may associate the stranger with the notion of monstrosity. Individuals who deviate from the norm may be associated with disorder and dirt, as we know from Douglas, and ultimately with chaos and death, which characterizes the Outside of civilization. We have then an imaginary link between social deviance, physical degeneracy and possible contamination, which can yield violent results. This is a phenomenon that is particularly salient in the dynamics of racism, which again seems to indicate a link between homophobia and racism, as well as a paranoid obsession with holding on to «our women», «lest the Negroes get to them and contaminate the race».
Societies are guided by norms that give us ideas about «good» and «evil», or «good» and «bad», which are never innocent concepts, but rather coordinates defined by the field of power that regulates a given society. In this society, norms and values become naturalized in individuals through processes of habituation and normalization. This happens through various dispositifs deployed through institutions such as schools, armies and workshops. Along with the normalization of individuals, we have a perpetuation of social structures that have practical consequences for the members of any given community. The governing ideas in society have normalizing power over individuals through the workings of administrative dispositifs.

The inherent logic of any society necessarily leaves something out. Societies create their own outcasts, and are indeed largely defined by them. That means that there will in all likelihood be groups of people against whom people will have negative prejudices. These tend to be individuals of low status, often exploited individuals, as we have seen in the case of imperialism. This is an unfortunate side effect of binding normativity, and should be a reminder that we always need to negotiate and redefine the norms and values that guide us in our everyday lives. The norms proper to an individual has much to do with the role he or she has in which communities, or what role people themself expects to fulfill in these communities. The aspects of one’s identity that are valued seem to be the aspects that bring positive sense to one’s place in one’s community. They are phenomena that bring meaning and value to one’s sense of community. For example, a white anti-racist will hate anti-black racism even if this is a phenomenon that is obviously not targeted against said anti-racist.

The ideas that prevail in various communities are also important for moral decisions. If one is convinced that something or someone is harmful to community and civilization, then one is more likely to hate that thing or person. Other external factors are also decisive, hence the central importance of the dispositif. Various stressors can contribute to various forms of hatred and aggression. People who find themselves powerless or on the bottom of the social hierarchy are apparently more likely to lash out because of unresolved hatreds than people higher up in the pecking order. Given a pecking order, one is likely to want to keep one’s place in the hierarchy rather than move further down.

If there is one take-home message to get out of this thesis, it will probably be a reminder of what the Nigerian feminist writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie called «the danger of a single story». If a reader, having gone through these pages has gotten the impression that I am opposed to norms and civilization, that is quite understandable. The thesis has been written to warn against the dangers inherent to those concepts, that are often associated with something
good that we need to function together as persons. They are that as well. Without any kinds of norms or any kind of civilization it would certainly be difficult to find meaning in the world, or to function together as people, but one should not be blind to the potential violence present in discourses that promise perfect Truth, Goodness, Democracy, or any other perfect ideals. Such discourses have a tendency to close out other truths and kinds of civilizations, and to suffocate alternatives. A person who in some way breaks the codes of conduct pertaining to a dominant project can often be in danger of ostracism or persecution. The hatreds arising from such processes can be of many kinds, depending on the interplay of social forces. That, however, is not to say that the codes of conduct should not be there, but they should normally be open to negotiation.

Any predominating discourse has a potential to turn violent. If it stifles and suffocates relevant counterdiscourses, then that will be dangerous for people who do not fit into the prevalent order. This is a danger on the left as well as the right, as several authoritarian polities have served to demonstrate. Since the late 1970s/ early 1980s, the predominant discourse in the West, and probably the world, is that of neo-liberalism. Structures inherent to this discourse are likely to keep old hatreds intact, or perhaps strengthen them, because they tend to undermine and devalue the kinds of solidarity necessary to sympathize with people on the same rung as oneself or lower down. The tenets of neo-liberalism tend to induce the idea that destitute people are merely «lacking in grit» and turn one’s focus away from actual oppressive structures at the same time that it produces its own outcasts, as the «criminal pauper» demonstrates.

In the face of any dominant discourse, it is necessary to develop counterdiscourses and to maintain a degree of heterogeneity in the face of homogenous social order. Such counterdiscourses can be constructive or destructive, as Foucault and Bataille have pointed out by emphasizing the difference between revolutionary and fascist discourse. The latter is, as we have seen, often a result of resentment to the prevalent master discourse. One cannot simply disregard the reigning homogenous order, but as Butler and Mbembe have pointed out, it is possible to work on the semiotic structure of the dominant discourse and reconfigure it in order to challenge its basic presumptions. In the face of neo-liberalism, individual measures will not be sufficient, counterstructures of solidarity must be established. A reawakening of class consciousness could be helpful here, such that classes that are currently «in themselves» can become classes «for themselves». A critical form of Marxism may be quite useful, while a vulgar form of anti-capitalism might just move the pawns without changing the rules of the
game. As the idea of the perfect society is dangerous, so is the idea of the perfect individual. One should take Bataille’s lessons to heart and remember that we are mortal, final and fallible creatures, and that we cannot «be everything». Ultimately, people need other people in order to get help where they fall short, and in order to make sense of the world. Emphasizing the values of community and solidarity may finally lead to the death of *homo oeconomicus* so that *homo solidaricus* may live.

If «the soul is the prison of the body», then at least it is a prison capable of constant modification. It is important to point that out, because these days there seems to be a tendency in the ideology of Rationality, which poses a danger similar to that of neo-liberalism. This ideology is not really new, but is rather a sort of rehash of old Greek prejudices that have led to misogyny and cultural chauvinism in the past. Nietzsche saw that quite clearly and left behind warnings that are available for all who bother to read them. If we allow ourselves to believe that instrumental rationality can lead us toward some final goal of Freedom and Happiness, we are likely to forget that the discourse of science is not some objective haven free from ideology, as I have demonstrated several times during the course of this thesis. Normativity is always with us, and must constantly be scrutinized. Blind faith in objective Truths can lead to irrational hatreds.

Research on the mechanisms of stigmatization and exclusion highlights the need for more or less neutral arenas where people of different opinions and persuasions can come together and try their opinions. For communities to be inclusive, people must be able to meet in the knowledge that clearly defined rules will defend them from the tyranny of opinion and prejudice. Such negotiable rules may also help us avoid a scenario where these same arenas become testing grounds for powerful demagogues. There is, then, a need for norms, while one should also be aware of their dangers. The pursuit of good ends makes us liable to overlook specificities of communities and situations, as I tried to demonstrate through the critique of feminism in the MENA region. The prospects of a sufficiently neutral arena will improve substantially with the establishment of venues where people can meet to negotiate norms and values, particularly paying attention to voices from minority groups.

Finally, societies should beware of their potential sources of paranoia. In the words of Danny Vinyard in *American History X*: «Life’s too short to be pissed off all the time.»
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