Post Apartheid Security Policies in South Africa

The prospect for equitable and democratic security governance

Njål Rosingaunet

Master Thesis

April 2007

Department of Administration and Organization Theory

University of Bergen
NORWAY
Abstract

Contemporary South Africa is at large segregated into communities of different races and ethnicities situated within and between urban and rural districts. Even though the government has put much effort into the process of reconciliation, social transformation and nation-building, the majority of the population have remained poor with limited social upliftments. It consequently has evolved a devastating state of crime and violence that affects the quality of life for all South Africans and then in particular the poor and marginalised who reside in shack dwelling communities. For these constituencies life truly is ‘nasty, brutish and short’, while the well-to-do whom primarily resides in urban and gated communities are able to live a life in wealth being protected by private security providers.

It is against this context; where the state at large has failed to provide the necessary safety and security requirements for the majority of its constituencies, parallel to the well-to-do whom have obtained the means to provide their own security that this thesis sets out to explore an alternative, nodal manner of comprehending and providing security governance.

In order to provide a sound argument for this alternative route of nodal governance, there was first conducted a documental analysis of the South African policing policies in the period of 1990-2006, and the social and democratic consequences thereof. Subsequently, it was conducted two case studies which served the purpose of depicting how security is governed in one urban community and one rural community. The primary research technique used to map out the governing nodes within these two cases were fifteen partly structured interviews, in addition to archival data supplied by the informants.

The two case studies provide empirical data that neatly exhibits the utility of the nodal theory. Among other things, it depicts that security governance cannot and should not be conceived through a dichotomised state-society relationship, whereas the auspice and provision of safety and security is carried out by private and community based security nodes. It also depicts how and why the governmental agencies in rural areas employ control measures in order to improve service delivery. The sole focus upon efficiency circumscribes the poor and marginalised potential of deepening democracy concomitantly to establish more equitable security governance. The study also provides a proposal to deepen the nodal governance theory with ‘double agents’ as ‘change agents’.
Acknowledgment
A long journey of scientific and personal experiences is about to end. When I put my foot on South African soil for the first time in 2004 little did I know how much this country and this continent would come to mean for me. South Africa is for me a country of contrasts, between the extremes of poverty and wealth, between the rural and traditional African and the modern and urban lifestyle, between the fair beaches of the coastal areas, the green mellow hills of Transkei and the ever sunny Karoo, which besides is way too hot for such a pale Norwegian. Though, it is first of all the mixture of people that I forever will remember; some I met by coincidence while others were neatly planned, by some I was held at gunpoint while others were far friendlier. It is first of all with these friendly peoples gentle touch of warmth, passion and honesty that I will always remember South Africa.

From I set out to write my bachelor thesis in 2004 to this very end there has been one person in particular that has followed me along this scientific journey. Jan Froestad, I honour you for your persistency, support, guidance, and all the time you have dedicated to this thesis, allowing me to achieve the best I can. You are truly a fabulous supervisor. The second supervisor of this thesis has been Clifford Shearing, whom in person and through his writings has been one long lasting inspirational boost.

I would not been able to conduct this study without the help of my informants, especially I want to express my gratitude to the two key informants, Brian Gray and Juan Kariem, in addition to; John Cartwright, Jesse Marit Laitinen, Ganies Daniels, Helen Swart, Andries Toise, Russel Fave, Marc Clench, Paddy Chappel, Patrick Hall, Raymond Wenzel, Cedric Thomas, Roy Feldtman, Undine Ahande, Jasmin Nordien and my devoted tailor Ibrahim Frizlar. These have all provided me with much insight into their struggle and desire for safe and secure communities. In addition to these informants I have received much support from Elaine Atkins at the UCT Criminology Library. The facilities and resources provided by the Community Peace Programme have also been vital for the progress of this study, but perhaps most importantly, the daily interactions with all of the dedicated men and women at the CPP headquarter in Observatory has been scientifically and personally enriching.

Even though I have received much support from my supervisors along the road and have had many insightful meetings with my informants, there always exists a risk that some topics have been wrongfully undermined and that topics might have been wrongfully perceived. If this is
to become apparent by those who take the time to read through this lengthily thesis, its errors and misconceptions stands entirely to the author’s responsibility.

Last but not least, writing this thesis has been a long and struggling process, thus without the support from my beloved Hilde I would never had the spirit to conquer the many personal and academic hurdles that I along the road have had to face. Your optimism and everlasting trust have been priceless. I’m truly proud to be your chosen one.

-Forever Yours-

Bergen, April 2007

Njål Are Rosingaunet
Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgment .................................................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. v
List of Models ....................................................................................................................... vii
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. viii
Quotes .................................................................................................................................. x

1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Purpose of the study ....................................................................................................... 3
  1.2 Conceptual understanding ........................................................................................... 4
  1.3 Organisation of the thesis .......................................................................................... 7

2.0 The quest for a new paradigm and comprehension of societal change ..................... 9
  2.1 The origin of sovereign national states ....................................................................... 9
  2.2 The prospect for change in traditional theories of the state and its relation to society .. 11
    2.2.1 The prospect for change envisaged by pluralism theories .................................. 14
  2.3 Comprehending change through a comparative perspective ..................................... 16
  2.4 Prospect of change in times of neo-liberalism; effects, reactions and counter-reaction 19
  2.5 Locating traditional and contemporary theories within a preliminary model .......... 25
  2.6 Nodal governance an alternative paradigm for comprehending societal change ...... 27
    2.6.1 Providing a working definition of governance ...................................................... 28
    2.6.2 Introducing network governance ......................................................................... 29
    2.6.3 Introducing nodal governance ............................................................................. 31

3.0 The governance of human security in Africa ............................................................... 37
  3.1 The plurality in governance of security ......................................................................... 37
  3.2 Introducing human security ....................................................................................... 42
  3.3 Empowerment through the employment of local knowledge and capacity .............. 44
  3.4 The enrolment of nodes in weak and failing states, a call for state-society nexus .......... 46
  3.5 Situating a more holistic governance of human security paradigm within a model ... 52

4.0 Methodology ............................................................................................................... 54
  4.1 Research question, variables and limitations .............................................................. 54
  4.2 Qualitative versus quantitative designs ....................................................................... 56
  4.3 A multiple embedded case design ............................................................................. 58
  4.4 Data foundation ......................................................................................................... 60
    4.4.1 Documental analysis as research technique ......................................................... 61
    4.4.2 Interviews as research technique .......................................................................... 63
  4.5 Validity, reliability and ethical considerations of the research and its findings ......... 66

5.0 The democratic consequences related to the shift from RDP to GEAR .................... 70
  5.1 Post apartheid South Africa in flux between national and international alignments .... 70
    5.1.1. From a social developmental RDP to a neo-liberal developmental GEAR .......... 71
    5.1.2. Towards a socio-spatial apartheid structure ......................................................... 74

6.0 The shifting perspectives of South Africa’s policing policies .................................. 79
  6.1 The opening for dual policing ..................................................................................... 79
  6.2 The incremental state centeredness of community policing .................................... 84
    6.2.1 The community policing policy in the making .................................................... 85
6.2.2 Community policing forums partnering with civil society and private entities ...... 91
6.3 The origin and consequence of the unsuccessful ‘get tough on crime’ strategy .......... 96
6.4 Consolidating community policing with the sector policing strategy .................. 102
   6.4.1 The implementation process of sector policing .............................................. 104
6.5 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................... 106

7.0 A nodal conceptualisation of safety and security in Observatory ....................... 110
   7.1 A brief introduction of the historical background and recent developments ......... 110
   7.2 Contextualising the safety and security situation ................................................. 112
       7.2.1 The perceived safety and security threats in Observatory ......................... 114
   7.3 Nodes that takes part in directing and conducting safety and security operations ... 117
       7.3.1 Observatory Civic Association ................................................................. 117
       7.3.2 Private Security Providers ................................................................. 125
       7.3.3 CPF and Sector Policing ................................................................. 131
   7.4 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................... 136

8.0 Towards a more equitable and democratic governance of security .................... 143
   8.1 Contextualising the safety and security situation in Cape Winelands District ...... 144
       8.1.1 The safety and security situation in Worcester ........................................ 147
   8.2 Non-state justice systems as an alternative to urban private security providers .... 149
   8.3 Nodes that takes part in the governance of security in Breede Valley Municipality ... 153
       8.3.1 The Zwelethemba model ...................................................................... 154
       8.3.2 The Finnish Embassy ........................................................................... 166
       8.3.3 The Breede Valley Community Safety Forum ........................................ 168
   8.4 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................... 173

9.0 Conclusion and normative contributions ............................................................. 181
   9.1 Providing key answers for the research question ................................................. 181
   9.2 Normative contributions to the governance of security field ............................. 187
       9.2.1 Deepening the nodal conception with change agents as double agents ......... 187
       9.2.2 Club goods in Observatory? ................................................................. 190
       9.2.3 Contesting the state anchored pluralism notion ........................................ 193

10.0 Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 200
   10.1 Legal references, Policy documents, Annual reports and speeches ................... 208
   10.2 Archive documents ........................................................................................ 209
       10.2.1 Social Justice Resource Project, Institute of Criminology, UCT .............. 209
       10.2.2 Archive documents from informants .................................................... 211
   10.3 Interviews ....................................................................................................... 212
   10.4 Newspaper clippings ...................................................................................... 213

11.0 Appendix ........................................................................................................... 215
List of Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Traditional and Contemporary Theories</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nodal Governance</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Security Nodes with Prospect to Facilitate Human Security Governance</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Socio-Political Policy Development</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>South Africa’s Policing Policy, from Prospect to Reality</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Observatory’s Nodal Security Network</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A Characteristic Positioning of Two Nodal Actors</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>South Africa’s Contemporary Governance of Security Scheme</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Business against Crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economical Empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>City Improvement District</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Community Safety Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Police Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Community Peace Programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPs</td>
<td>National Crime Prevention Strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAR</td>
<td>Observatory Armed Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBF</td>
<td>Observatory Business Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Observatory Community Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Observatory Community Safety</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGS</td>
<td>Outcome Generating System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGAD</td>
<td>People against Gangsterism and Drugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Private Security Industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIRA</td>
<td>Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RID</td>
<td>Residential Improvement District</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SAP    South African Police
SAPS   South African Police Service (renamed SAP after apartheid ended)
SPF    Sector Policing Forum
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
“Fundamental shifts in scientific belief occur only when empirical changes are matched by the availability of alternative theoretical commitments.”
- Jeffrey Alexander (1982:32)

“We cannot solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
- Albert Einstein
1.0 Introduction

In the course of the past two decades South Africa has developed from a repressive apartheid regime to a developmental democracy. Contemporary South Africa is in general terms regarded as a rainbow nation, where people despite of their differences have come to mutual terms of how to live and work together. Under the auspice of the first and the second democratic elected president, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, the African National Congress (ANC) government has sought to build the nation through peace and reconciliation and social transformation processes. The government has rendered possible for a growing black middle class to arise at the same socio-economical status as the white middle class, and a minority black economical elite against the majority white economical elite.

Though, beneath the surface of the rainbow nation there is a looming tension and despair that is felt by South Africans. Since the first democratic election in 1994 several hundred thousands white South Africans have left the country because of the spiralling crime and violence and due to better job opportunities in the former British Commonwealth countries. The African continent’s future, they say, is dependent upon the future of South Africa, whereas they fear that the white population will suffer the same consequences as the whites in Zimbabwe, and that South Africa’s developmental trajectory consequently will follow the same devastating route. The governmental policies that have the intention of building one united nation, some coloureds maintain, have not been fair as they feel that it has worked in disfavour of them. While the coloureds were too brown to be white during the days of apartheid, they now feel that they are too white to be black. In the days of apartheid they were considered to be a secondary class beneath the whites though above the blacks. Now they feel that they are being squeezed between the whites and the growing black middle class. Even though South Africa has come a long way in the processes of social transformation and nation-building there is a majority of the black population, though also considerable proportions of the coloured population, that still live a life of despair in poor and marginalised shack dwellings communities. These communities are situated adjacent to urban cities and in rural areas. Where they have limited or none access to viable public goods such as health and educational services, and communal infrastructures such as roads, electricity and sanitation systems. These residents show a growing discontent with the governments pace of poverty alleviation and service delivery, in which there has been a significant upswing of violent
demonstration against local government and governmental officials whom they claim to be corrupt and unresponsive to local needs.

The shared concern of these groups is that of the state of safety and security, whereas they all are affected by some sort of security related threats. Since the transition to democracy started in 1990 the rates of crime and violence peaked within a twelve months period of 1995-1996 with of over 26,000 murders which subsequently have stabilised just beneath 20,000 in the first years of twenty-first century, and a with a rape rate of approximately 50,000 per twelve months\(^1\). Though, these are only reported cases, which imply that there are good reasons to believe that the dark figures are immense. Because of the devastating consequences of crime and violence, some constituencies actually maintain that certain aspects of life was better in the days of apartheid, such as the 70 years old coloured tailor Ibrahim Frizlar, whom is born and raised at the Cape Flats at the outskirts of Cape Town city. Even though we were poor and had little to survive on in the days of apartheid, he maintained, we were safe and could leave the house without being afraid of being robbed or shot dead, now we are not even safe within our own houses anymore\(^2\).

During the days of apartheid non-state justice systems, such as; street committees, vigilante organisations and other community based organisations had a central role in the ordering of safety and security throughout the black and coloured communities. The apartheid regime’s police force provided protection to its white citizens while using police force to suppress the segregated population. When the days of transition came there were significant discussions of how to structure and ensure peace and stability for all South Africans, whereas it in the beginning were many scientific scholars, ANC officials and police officials that thought that one should make use of the policing resources found in the rural communities’ non-state justice systems. Though as time passed it was implemented a community policing policy which had the conduct of policing firmly rooted within the state-centred locus, concomitant, in order to bring down the crime and violence the government invited private security companies to take part in the war against crime. Hereafter, the provision of private security in South Africa has grown into a multi-billion industry, by delivering security provision to individuals, private properties, communities, public spaces and mass private properties. The private security providers have not only been efficient in delivering security for their

\(^1\) South African Police Service, Crime Statistics

\(^2\) Ibrahim Frizlar, conversations in the period 2005-2006
subscribers, but they have along with a range of other private and civil society based organisations rendered possible to set the terms of this security. The growth of the private sector and their influence needs to be seen in relation to South Africa aligning to the global neo-liberal trend of fiscal polices. While the private sector gained strength in the governance of security, the police and local government have on the other hand been rather unsuccessful in their service provision. These governmental agents have struggled with limited resources and have been unable to tap into and establish a safe and secure environment, and then especially for the poor and marginalised constituencies of shack dwelling communities.

It is against this context, where the state have failed to deliver a satisfactory level of safety and security, and the challenges that arise from the pluralisation of security governance, that this thesis sets out to take a descriptive, explanatory and normative approach to an alternative comprehension of safety and security ordering, which consequently departs from an a priori state-centeredness.

1.1 Purpose of the study
The primary purpose of this study is twofold. First of all it sets out to provide a descriptive presentation of the nodal governance theory, which allows us to break out from a single-centred and state-centred locus in the comprehension of societal change. After having provided a solid foundation for this theory, its notion will be used to provide an explanatory approach to how security is governed. Moreover, the nodal notion will be used to depict how security governance can align closer to the people-centred notion of human security directed governance in Africa. This consequently implies that it will have a normative contribution. Subsequently the purpose of this study is to provide empirical data that can answer the research question, which states as follows;

“To what extent is security in South Africa governed through a multitude of nodes, what signifies the characteristic appearance of these nodal configurations, and subsequently what is the prospect for human security governance?”

In order to answer this three parted research question there has been conducted a multiple embedded case study. The first case is an extensive documental analysis that will highlight
how the security policies in South Africa have evolved within the period of 1990-2006. The two latter empirical cases look into how security is conceptualised and governed through a coordination and integration of multiple of nodes within an urban community known as Observatory, which is situated adjacent to Cape Town city centre and within a rural district, known as Cape Winelands District, that lays approximately 200 km north east of Cape Town. A more thorough elaboration of the research question will be presented in the methodology chapter.

Based upon what has been presented thus far the purpose of this study can briefly be summarised as an exploration of South Africa’s contemporary governance of security, and an exploration of the prospect of a nodal governance of security that is aligned to the people-centred human security notion. This will consequently yield a more equitable and democratic security governance to the poor and marginalised and not merely the well-to-do, whom at the present state have gained this possibility due to governmental decisions and global trends.

1.2 Conceptual understanding

Throughout this thesis there is employed a broad spectre of theoretical concepts. Though, as the list in full extent is too vast to introduce here it might be appropriate to introduce three elements that in particular sets the terms of this thesis.

Scholars who undertakes studies of agenda setting and decision making often observes that the actors within the spheres of the state, civil society, public and private are melded into complex constellations. While some look upon the state as a great Leviathan that subjugates the civil society, others consider the penetrating force of the private interest as so dominating that it subjugates the civil society, while others again are more attuned towards structural relationships that makes the public and private spheres mutually infiltrated (Sales, 1991). For instance, what the public is can be shaped by previously private tasks becoming subject of public service delivery, which is a typical welfare state phenomenon. The public can also be shaped by public affairs becoming private and visa versa. In order to comprehend what the public is one need to empirically investigate the grey areas of the public policy process. The social process that constructs the boundaries of the public can be approached through the concept of ‘politicization’, signifying a movement of political interest or control beyond previously accepted lines, whereas the boundaries of the public become established and re-
established (Erichsen, 1990). This accordingly requires that it is defended and elaborated through public debates. For instance the ‘Public Schools’ in England can serve as an example of the dyadic relationship between the public and private sphere. Whilst the school system was born into the public sphere it does in contemporary times constitute a school for the elite, but even though it is firmly rooted within the private sphere its affairs is debated and determined within the public sphere (ibid:5-6).

Throughout this thesis there will be made implicit arguments that consider the likelihood of private affairs to undergo interactive communicative public debates to increase when decisions are devolved from the state bureaucracy to collective organisations within the citizenry. In this thesis a dichotomised perspective of the state, public, civil society and private will be upheld as it for analytical purposes is important to separate the different spheres. When presenting the models of this thesis an even more dichotomised perspective will be depicted through a state versus society distinction. Though at the same time, it acknowledges that each of the different spheres in a specific setting might have the capacity to influence and in some settings subjugate other spheres as they are melded into a complex network of actors. This consequently implies that social spaces are being established and that these spaces necessarily can be inconsistent with traditional lines of demarcation.

What is meant with the governance of security? The concept has primarily been established by Clifford Shearing in collaboration with David Bayley, Les Johnston, Jennifer Wood and Benoit Dupont among others. The concept is a coalition of two independent concepts that makes the sum greater than the two parts. Security signifies both an objective and subjective dimension; whereas the objective dimension refers to the state of being without external threats that can diminish the liberty of the individual and thereby the quality of life, while the subjective dimension refers to the individuals feeling of being safe (Wood and Shearing, 2007). These two dimensions are to a large extent interrelated. Hence, the subjective feeling of not being safe initiate activities that can increase the objective state of security, though the objective dimension of being completely safe is a utopian condition, whereas technical and structural measures to increase security in addition to new social phenomena will pose new potential risk towards the individual. It is in the manner which individuals, groups of individuals, communities, business entities, governmental-, intergovernmental- and nongovernmental organisations have been given the opportunity to actively take part in managing security that governance comes to the fore. For this reason the police are not always
the dominant actor in making safe and secure communities, as traditional theories of the state often have come to reason. By introducing the concept of governance, one consequently is able to comprehend what kind of security scheme that is established by state and non-state actors entering into collaborative or conflicting composition of it. This being said, the governance of security should be considered as “bigger than the breadbox of police, but smaller than the elephant of social control” (Bayley and Shearing, 1996:586).

Studying the governance of security, and then particularly through a nodal governance notion it entails a vital need for explanatory conducted research and for researchers to carry out normative evaluations of the prospect and dangers to equitable and democratic security governance. In other words; it opens up for innovative contributions to the field of security governance. Whereas an innovation can be defined as; “an idea, practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other unit for adoption” (Rogers 1995:35 cited in Wood, 2006:217). The nodal governance theory is in itself an innovative contribution that provides a new method of understanding how the course of event in a social system takes shape as a result of the influence from a multitude of nodes from various locations. Even though the theory puts the multiple source of influence into a specific system of comprehension, it is not this in itself that provides the most innovative features. Rather it is the intrinsic features of each node and how these features enables them to cooperate and shape the course of event within the network that they exists which constitutes the most innovative contributions. Within the field of political science and criminology the nodal governance of security constitutes a revolutionary innovation. As a revolutionary innovation it consequently has generated much criticism from scholars who in empirical manners situates the state as pivotal actor of legislation-, legitimacy-, resource-, and public good provider. Hence, in normative terms these scholars maintain that the state is a precondition for security to be equitable and democratic governed. In order to contest this critic, nodal scholars need to both conduct sound explanatory mapping of nodal networks which subsequently can deepen the theoretical understanding, and further to put this knowledge into practice. In this regard this study provides a very modest contribution, through a nodal mapping of two security networks and a proposal to deepen the nodal theory with ‘double agents’ as ‘change agents’.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis

This introduction chapter has so far accounted for reasons behind choice of topic, and further explained the purpose of the study through which the research question was introduced. In addition there has been introduced some conceptual understandings that frames the approach of this study within a particular theoretical and scientific setting.

Chapter two is the first theoretical chapter. It provides a descriptive elaboration of traditional and contemporary theoretical contributions to the study of societal change. The main purpose of chapter two is to envisage how these theories have provided explanations of societal change from a single locus, and thereafter to contest these theories by introducing the theories of network governance and nodal governance as these theories is open-ended explanation of societal change. The chapter thereby serves the purpose of establishing the theoretical foundation of this thesis. Chapter three is the second theoretical chapter, which in addition also has normative features. First of all it sets out to envisage the plurality of actors in the governance of security. Thereafter the notion of human security is introduced in order to contest the state-centred perspective and render possible an alternative comprehension of security. Since the human security notion put forward four conditions that is required in order to emancipate a shift from state-centred to a people-centred security perspective it serves the purpose supporting the nodal governance of security. By elaborating these four conditions a normative contribution is made of what might make the governance of security in Africa more equitable and democratic.

Chapter four presents the methodological framework of this study and evaluates the framework in relation to the research techniques chosen and how the research has been carried out. An essential element of this chapter is to envisage the links between the nodal theory and the empirical research. In chapter five the context of this study is put forward. The primary purpose of chapter five is to provide a general description of the RDP policy and the GEAR strategy, which is two of the most essential national policies launched in post apartheid period. Subsequently the purpose is to evaluate the democratic prospect of these two. The introduction of these two policies serves the purpose of depicting how South Africa’s political regime gradually have aligned with neo-liberal trends and briefly to depict the socio-economical effects which this has caused.
The empirical contribution is presented in chapter six, seven and eight. Chapter six takes an explanatory approach to the South African policing policy and its different strategies. One of the key purposes of this chapter is to investigate how national, international, private and civil society based actors shaped the community policing policy, and the social consequences thereof. Chapter seven is based upon the case study conducted in Observatory, Cape Town. Here the primary purpose is to put the nodal governance theory into practice, and thereby to depict how a multitude of nodes enters into mutual cooperation in order to provide a safe and secure community. Chapter eight is based upon a case study conducted in Cape Winelands District, a rural area north of Cape Town. The primary purpose of this study is somewhat more extensive than the latter, as it first serves to elaborate the nodal governance of security in Worcester which is a rural town within the district, and thereafter to contest the Community Safety Forum’s prospect of a more equitable and democratic security governance.

Chapter nine is where this thesis concludes and makes some final normative contributions. Whereas each of the three empirical chapters makes concluding remarks of the most essential findings, the primary focus of this chapter is to employ the more specific findings to answer the research question. As a final section of this thesis, there will be made an attempt to situate this study and its key findings within the normative debate taking place between scholars of nodal governance and those scholars whom oppose the normative features of this theory, as they take a state anchored position in the governance of security.
2.0 The quest for a new paradigm and comprehension of societal change

This chapter sets out to highlight, though very briefly, how different scholars have come to reason about the primary driving forces for changing states and societies. The theories presented portray shifting perspectives on how the national and international divides and links up to the state/public and civil society/private sphere in the governance of change. When locating the theories within a preliminary model it will be argued that they all portray explanatory powers that are relevant within their specific ambit. However, as the world has become increasingly interconnected and new ways of looking at governance has evolved, traditional theories do not seem to possess sufficient explanatory powers for those phenomena that transcends the dichotomised distinctions that we have got accustomed to reason within. Consequently this chapter will enter a plea for a new paradigm and comprehension of societal structures. A nodal conceptualisation of governance will be introduced as one possible way of departing from this single-centred locus, as the nodal governance notion transcends the tendency of dichotomised thinking found within traditional theories.

2.1 The origin of sovereign national states

The history of Europe provides a grim picture of wars that was fought between emperors, kings, dukes, princes, caliphs, sultans and others that had the position to inflict their will upon others. In the sixteenth century, Europe consisted of approximately 80 million people which were divided among 500 various state-like territories. Hereafter the number of states was gradually reduced to the amount of contemporary times because of a set of events. The European states as we know them today exist partly because of the peace of Westphalia in 1648, but it would be a gross simplification to say that it was solely this event that the national state concept was built upon. Through contemporary conducted research, Marks (2002) maintains that the evolution of the national state concept instead should be looked upon as a trajectory of events, such as; international silver, fabric and slave trade, Conquistadors whom were looting gold and other natural resources, and a technological revolution that allowed Europe to break out from the biological regime. It was among these trajectories of events that led to this grand historic social structure. The peace treaty from 1648 after 30 years of war stands out in history because it made sure that the king had the right to rule sovereign over its territory and its people as opposed to the religious based authority from the past which was centred upon the pope. From that time and onwards what happened within the state territory
became an issue of internal matters which no external force had the right to oppose to (McGrew, 2004).

As a response to the ‘plurality of governance’ that existed prior to the outset of the peace of Westphalia, Thomas Hobbes through his book Leviathan first published in 1651, found it necessary to centralise governance within sovereign state-building projects. Since people were driven by greed, the state of nature was ‘nasty, brutish and short’, and consequently it was a ‘war of all against all’. Within a world where everyone was fighting for their own self-enrichment Hobbes observed that there were no common goods. In order to attain these goods he sought to create a great giant, known as the Leviathan, whom was constituted by everybody living within its territory. Leviathan was to define and govern these goods sovereignty on behalf of everyone subjected to its territory. Consequently three elements were required in order to prevent that people raged a war against all. First of all, the Leviathan had to establish a commonweal, which denotes a ‘common well-being’. Secondly, this required of the Leviathan to possess legitimate authority. The legitimate authority was governed through consent, symbolised by the sceptre Leviathan held in hand, as a social contract was drawn between everybody living within its territory and Leviathan. Thirdly, Hobbes foresaw that in order to govern sovereignty the state had to have an overwhelmingly physical force that would crush those whom were challenging the commonweal. This was symbolised by the sword Leviathan held in his other hand (Shearing, 2006;; Wood and Shearing, 2007).

This depiction implies that the governance of common goods is best attained when conducted from a state centre, and is a general perception that has prevailed, as portrayed in definitions of national state’s functions. One of the most influential definitions is given by Max Weber, as he defined it as “the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Vries, 2001:391). Consequently it can be said to constitute four features; sovereignty, legitimacy, provision of internal order and territory. This definition thereby portrays traces of Boolean constructions, which relate to either it exists or it does not, and if it does the state consist of these four features.

In general terms it can be argued that Hobbes and Weber constitute the origin and the end of classical political science. Hence, scholars of classic political science studied political theory and the history of political ideas in which the government and its internal structures was the locus of study. While scholars in the times of Hobbes took a normative approach, political
science gradually shifted towards empirical studies through the work of Weber. Nevertheless, in the state centralised structures of France and Germany the study of normative based jurisprudence still dominated the European versions (doctrine de l’état and staatslehre) of political science (Rokkan, 1986). Both before and in between Hobbes and Weber there were a series of scholars whom took the state and the government as the point of venture. Some were concerned with creating and justifying the state, such as; Machiavelli (1469-1527), Bodin (1530-1596), Hobbes (1588-1679), Weber (1864-1920), others sought to change and improve the state, such as; Locke (1632-1704), Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), while others sought to destroy or transcend the state, such as; Marx (1818-1883), Bakunin (1814-1876) and Kropotkin (1842-1921) (Waldo, 1975:12). In the next sections of this chapter the notion of Marx and Weber will resurface, as we look into how these among others considered the prospect for change within the state domain.

2.2 The prospect for change in traditional theories of the state and its relation to society

In the European enlightenment era of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, philosophers started to question the Catholic Church and the divine right of monarchs to govern over its citizens. Especially French philosophers looked into new ways of how the state could rule more legitimate with consent from the citizens. This in turn led to the French Revolution in 1789 (Marks, 2002). The idea that the citizens had a right to be political active instead of merely being subjects to the sovereign rulers challenged the bourgeois hegemony. As increased industrialisation in the early nineteenth century escalated the amount of people moving from rural to urban areas, additional tension was created between the social classes, between those of urban working class and those of capitalist class (ibid:140).

In Marxist political sociology the concept of social classes rose out of the historical economic relationships and of class struggle as fundamental elements within the political structure. This created two major theoretical alternatives for structural dynamics and of social change, which is the role of economical factors and that of ideas and culture.

Karl Marx maintained that in different societies the state takes on different forms. Because of this it was not possible to speak of any general ‘present-day state’, hence in order to gain knowledge of states it was necessary to analyse how historical circumstances shaped the development of states in various societies. Through Marx’s analysis of capitalist and
previously feudal societies, he noticed that the nature of the state was not only determined by production alone but also socio-political variables. This consequently signified for Marx that the reason why the American state, who did not have a feudal past, yielded such a powerful civil society and a mighty bourgeoisie. But it also explained why the Prussian state, who had a feudal past, was able to prevent the state to become a tool for the bourgeoisie at the same time as the state was able to press for independence over the civilian bureaucracy, the military and the police apparatus (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983).

Bureaucracy, Marx maintained, became the means for the government to exert control over the society. Independent of whether the different states had gone through feudal stages or not, all states were bound up with private property. This in turn implied that they were all based on modern bourgeois societies, which were more or less capitalistic developed. At the same time as the state controlled the society, its control was restricted by a continuously growing private property sphere. The independence of the state together with the growing private sphere resulted in a division of labour which subsequently resulted in a growing bureaucratisation. Marx thus argued that the state became an instrument for the ruling elites while social classes became alienated because of the social structures of capitalism (ibid:8-9).

While Marx often is being presented as a theoretician of conflict and social antagonism, Èmile Durkheim is being presented as a sociologist of conservatism, integration and consensus. The reason for this stems from Durkheim’s postulates of peaceful and stable industrial societies which were thought capable of harmonious development. Durkheim maintained that division of labour in itself could explain changes in states’ social systems, as specialisation of work tasks and responsibility was a source for development of new state structures, and consequently new forms of power. Hence, the more specialised division of labour, the greater amount of society modernisation took place, and the state became even more developed. Concomitant to this process Durkheim observed that states assimilated a larger share of civil society institutions which he deemed to be entirely good as it would emancipate the individual from being suppressed by certain segments of the society (Ritzer, 2000). Durkheim thus envisaged a ‘right disposition’ of state power by assimilating certain cultural segments of the society, while restricting others, in order to provide the greatest amount of liberty for the individual.
Contradictory to both Marx and Durkheim who devoted little direct attention towards the specificities of the state, this changed through the work of Max Weber. From this time onwards changes in social systems were no longer only explained in terms of production or division of labour but to a larger extent by means of administration. Changes in social history were by Weber understood through terms of domination, subordination, authority, might and power (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). Hence, the feudal governing structures were understood in terms of the ability to control material means of domination. Instead of proposing historical trajectories for social change Weber analysed social relations in terms of three legal forms of domination which to a certain degree would take place in all societies. These forms of domination were charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. The rational domination was conducted through the state apparatus as bureaucracy, which Weber maintained was the purest and most rational exercise of legal authority. Weber depicted bureaucracies in ideal-typical terms which were: rational and moral; objective and impartial; balanced between formal and substantive rationality; clearly defined hierarchy and work assignments; employment on behalf of technical qualifications; monetary remuneration; rules and regulations. Within these rather stringent structures bureaucracies took the shape of elite structures. Whereas the legal authority stems from legitimacy from a rational-legal system, the traditional authority is based upon cultural decedent rules and power. As the bureaucracy had to be held in check in order to prevent it from becoming totalitarian it was essential to recruit leaders and personnel from the civil society. Among these, Weber observed charismatic leaders that were people whom had significant persuasion gifts, which yielded a power base that could affect both social and states trajectory in distinct manners (Weber, 2000).

The book “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” of Barrington Moore is a neo-Marxist craftsmanship. It combines Weber’s thoughts on bureaucracy with the Marxist political sociology of social classes stemming from historically economic relationship. Barrington Moore studied three distinct routes to the modern world which elapsed and culminated through; ‘bourgeois revolution’ to a liberal democracy, ‘revolution from above’ to fascism, and ‘peasant revolution’ to communism. Out of these historical trajectories he mapped out five key variables. In general terms he explained the countries trajectories through the conduct of a sovereign king or political-bureaucratic elite, concomitant the enforced or voluntary interaction between subordinated though powerful urban-industrial
elites and rural-agricultural elites, and concomitant the potential of revolution from the peasants (Skocpol, 1973).

2.2.1 The prospect for change envisaged by pluralism theories
From the outset of the twentieth century political scientist was making headway in their struggle for new ways of comprehending how national politics were being formed. The primary concern for scholars of interest-group theory was to turn the attention away from ‘nineteenth century jurisprudence’, which considered the legal aspects embodied in formal constitutions to be an adequate depiction of politics. The core of the classic pluralist critique towards the scholars of institutional jurisprudential theory ascribed to the state not being as sovereign as they held it to be. This signified that states were conceived as one among many associations since business interest coupled with the supineness of the people had significant power over political decisions. In empirical terms classical pluralists envisaged how states not were sovereign over matters in which the church still had power, but also how weak states were unable to exert jurisdiction over economical interest (Garson, 1978:12-18). One of the most essential scholars of this time was Arthur Bentley, whom has been remembered because of his focus upon groups. Interest groups, he maintained, were not individuals but groups, because the individual is the product of the group. While departing from individualism he also departed from Marx’s perspective of working class and elites, as these were no less important in the political process than any other group (ibid:31).

Political science was in the 1920s at the crossroad turning away from law and jurisprudence towards becoming a descriptive science. This was primarily facilitated by a gradually shift of focus away from the traditional idea of the sovereign state into a new concept, ‘the political state’. With the rise of descriptive political science the study of politics became known as the study of influence and power. Along with this shift, the focus upon normative theories was abandoned while scholars of empirical studies gained strength (ibid:35-37).

Subsequently the focus upon descriptive empirical studies paved the way for looking into the interaction between government and interest groups as political systems in the 1950s. Hence, a ‘system’ was understood as an organised or complex whole, a set of interrelated and interdependent parts that form a collective entity. While Talcott Pearson depicted a social system, the political analyst David Easton depicted a ‘political system’ model. This model was based upon a definition of politics as; “the authoritative allocation of values” (Heywood,
1999:8), where those consistently linking processes which shaped the binding decisions were called ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’. Inputs took the shape of demands from interest groups exerting pressure upon the government for change, but also support by the constituencies as they paid their taxes and took part in voting. Outputs, on the other hand, consist of decisions and action carried out by the government through, among other things, policies and legislations. The effect created by the output did consequently create some sort of feedback which in turn would create additional demands and support (ibid:72-73). For Easton interest groups, were some of the most essential gate keepers which would keep the dynamic processes running by making sure that electoral outputs were aligned with the interest of the overall society.

While the most conservative classical pluralist considered rational citizens participation to be intrinsically good, serving the ends of self-actualisation and education, critical scholars questioned whether citizens actually were rational and whether they always were interested in taking part. David Truman, amongst others, assimilated this knowledge into his work from the 1950s and onwards as the most distinct elements of classical pluralism faded whilst opening up for a new and revised form of pluralism. This new and emerging group theory was an orientation that defended the legitimacy of positive governments against the previous laissez-fair conservatism but at the same time argued against the tendencies of corporatism which implied centralised systems of interest aggregation (Garson, 1978:68). It consequently was an eclectic perspective of a decentralised though consensual democratic polity. Though in terms of Truman it was not a theory that intended to link up and do coordination assignments for the state (ibid:71).

What separates Truman as a late classical pluralist from that of Robert Dahl whom is a modern pluralist can be found in their thoughts about power and the role of the government. Truman’s perspectives stems from the classical pluralist of power being dispersed, hence there was no single powerful decision-making centre. “…The total pattern of government over a period of time thus presents a protean complex of criss-crossing relationships that change in strengths and direction with alternations in power and standing of interest, organised and unorganised” (Truman 1951, quoted in Held, 1998:201). From the latter part of the 1950s Dahl conducted decision-making studies, looking into how individual preferences were aggregated by spontaneously formed pressure groups competing to influence government without taking part. These studies culminated in the pluralist classic, Who Governs? (1961). Though, through the writings of Dahl, pluralism gradually aligned
closer to political institutions, but at the same time upheld that group interest constituted
essential checks and balances of government. Within modern pluralism an essential aspect for
all polyarchal states was to be divided and fragmented in such a way that the entire
governmental machinery was in continuous competition and conflict with each other.
Moreover, democratic decision making should be preformed through intra-governmental
bargaining and compromises coincided with group integration and coordination, grounded
upon an underlying social consensus on basic values and norms (Garson, 1978:91-92). But
perhaps the most significant element with this polyarchal situation was that it would ensure a
‘government by multiple minorities’ as opposed to the tyrannical ‘government by a small
majority’ which Dahl maintained would take place when power became centralised (Held,
1998).

Thus far the shaping of politics and the state has been understood in terms of the consequence
of internal social structures and culture, through the writing of among others Marx and
Barrington More. Moreover, it has also been understood as a consequence of interest groups
aggregating their interest through the political system, as envisaged by Dahl and by Easton’s
political system model. Though, as will be envisaged in the latter section, the scope of these
perspectives has been too narrow as they have ignored the influence of international sovereign
states.

2.3 Comprehending change through a comparative perspective

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century two scholars in particular; a British historian,
Sir John Robert Seeley and a German constitutional historian, Otto Hintz, started to question
the introvert explanations of national change. In fact, as soon as 1886 did Sir Seeley point out
that one should never be satisfied with looking at states purely from within (Almond, 1989;;
Jacobsen, 1996). Hintz did among other things criticise those political and sociological
theorist whom attempted to explain the structures of states purely in terms of internal forces,
social structures and religious tendencies, as the democratic prospect and internal politics was
dependent upon external conditions. Through the work of Seeley, Hintz formulated their
observations as a theory which argued that; in communities of open space and limited
pressure it would be likely that they enjoyed large share of liberty, while communities which
found themselves at great difficulties and dangers it would be likely that they enjoyed limited
amount of liberty and a great share of government (Almond, 1989:242).
In the aftermath of WWII and almost thirty years of war where national states almost continuously had waged war against each others there sprung up a new tradition, known as the International Relations (IR) theory, a subfield of political science. It was institutionalised to explain the causes of war (problem of order) and the conditions for a peaceful international order (problem of cooperation). Accordingly it has been defined to explain the relation and inter-action patterns between sovereign states, better known as the study of global governance (Sending, 2004). Since the notion of global governance is essential within the growth of epistemic communities there will be a more thorough elaboration of these concepts at a later stage.

Throughout the first latter part of twentieth century a new tradition of comparative studies got its renaissance, though after scholars such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber had laid the foundation. This was a blend of historical and sociological conducted research, where the prior tradition contested the possibility to generalise statements of phenomena other than for single cases, while the latter tradition maintained that it was possible to generalise statements of phenomena for classes of cases. In general terms sociologist have been far more open to construct miscellaneous theories and concepts while historians theories and concepts have been far less explicit and less abstract (Bonnell, 1980). Though as segments of the two traditions merged a range of empirical approaches to comparative methods emerged, ranging from; parallel comparative history, which starts out with a predefined theory; contrast oriented comparative history, which starts out with various themes; and macro-analytic comparative history; which starts out with bounded generalisations (Skocpol and Somers, 1980). The scholars whom have been given the most attention for this type of historical-sociological comparisons are among others; “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” by Barrington Moore as mentioned previously, “The political systems of Empires” by S. N. Eisenstadt, “Nation-Building and Citizenship and Kings or People” by R. Bendix, “States and Social Revolutions” by T. Skocpol, “The Rebellious Century” by Charles-, Louise- and Richard Tilly and “State Formation and Nation-Building in Europe” by S. Rokkan (ibid.).

The advantages of comparative studies and then macro-analytic comparative history in particular are advocated by Charles Tilly (1984) in his book “Big Structures, Large Processes and Huge Comparisons”, where he sets out to explore the potential of ‘eradicate the pernicious postulates’. Tilly strongly argues for historically grounded analysis of big
structures and large process as alternatives to the timeless, placeless models of social organizations and of social change that came to us with the nineteenth-century heritage. He maintained that there are two approaches, one direct and one indirect that would do this job. The direct approach calls for participation on their own home ground, as one should look for logical and evidential bases for generalisations about social change. By confronting them with real historical cases and alternative descriptions of what actually went on, the scholar maintained, one is better apt in getting closer to postulates that will be convincing, rich and important. With the indirect approach one is able to discover historical cases and to construct alternative explanations. This should be sought done by generating statements that is attached to specific areas and parts of the world, specifying causes, involving variation from one instance to another within a time – space limit (ibid:60).

The Norwegian scholar Stein Rokkan (1975) constructed conceptual maps of Europe as he conducted encompassing comparisons based upon historical conditions when displacing his theory on variations in political systems and nation-building. The historical conditions put forward were accordingly based upon six postulates: the heritage of the Roman Empire; the late midlevel Catholic Church’s ‘supranational’ organisation; the heritage of Germanic Kingdoms; economical trading networks with strong and independent cities; the development of feudal/aristocratic agriculture structures; and the development literature on local languages. These historical conditions were subsequently deduced to four explanatory variables; geopolitical distance from Rome; distance from the central city network; concentration of agricultural land which he lent from Barrington More; and ethnic foundation. Thus the two prior ones were the most important, as they constituted a north-south and east-west axes. Where the north-south axis signified the possibility of nation-building, because the further away from Rome and the Catholic Church the less power they got within these emerging nations, hence the reformed church operated as agents for standardisation of culture and language. The east-west axis signified the potential of state formation, which was an intricate relationship between peripheries distance from the central city network and economical interests. Hence, the economical centres was for centuries strong enough to resist all attempts of military and administrative control, while those whom were further away form the centre were subsumed into state-building projects (Rokkan, 1975). This consequently signifies that Rokkan’s work is a meld of macro-analytic and contrast-oriented comparative history, since the postulates and the variables deduced from these functions as the principle heuristic devises which are bounded within Europe’s historical and social context. Though, the variables used
also served the means of analytical comparisons. Whereas the analytical comparisons served to identify independent variables that account for similar or contrasting patterns (Bonnell, 1980) between the north-south and east-west axes.

According to Tilly, Rokkan made a significant contribution through his historical grounded analysis, as he consequently honours Rokkan’s attempts of encompassing comparisons of Europe. Though he criticises him for not paying enough attention towards the effect that war and its preparations has on nations (Tilly, 1985), he also claim that the model lacks dynamism as paths taken by neighbouring countries have had a much larger affect on others nation-building process than Rokkan acknowledges. Moreover, Tilly maintains that Rokkan interpret nation-building as a conscious attempt to solve crisis, and thereby not being open enough to the unintended consequences of those choices being made at the time (Tilly, 1984:136-139). Notwithstanding that comparative studies are fright with difficulties which demands much from the researcher, it is a methodical approach that fails to take account of the warnings historians put forward in the first place. Hereof that it is impossible to construct a comparative framework beyond a single historical period, nation or culture, by making conceptual leaps in time and space (Bonnell, 1980). Thus by taking a set of states and move back in time, what set of variables are one to include and exclude, and what guarantee is there that the variables chosen is not a product of contemporary zeitgeists and not the present determent variables?

While scholars whom studied single or domestic trajectory of societal change were criticised for not taking account of the influence that other sovereign states has, students of comparative studies have tilted the other way, as they have placed too much focus upon external forces, and thereby undermined the domestic prospect. Though as will be envisaged beneath and throughout this thesis, there is a need to comprehend the prospect for change in more nuanced manners between; local, national, regional, international and global layers of governing actors.

2.4 Prospect of change in times of neo-liberalism; effects, reactions and counter-reaction

Henceforth the focus will be placed upon the phenomenon of neo-liberalism, concomitant how scholars comprehend the role of the state in the prospect of change under the influence of neo-liberalism. The Keynesian revolution from 1930 to 1960 set new standards for socioeconomic management of industrialized countries. According to Keynes principles, the state had to intervene and regulate the market economy to prevent it from collapsing as
happened during the great depression in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. The state should thereby increase public spending when the economic activity were falling, and reduce their spending when the market was overheating. By actively regulating the market, they sought to generate growth and thereby reduce unemployment (Heywood, 1999). In addition to the market based policies the ‘social democratic model’ of the welfare state constructed various social benefit structures and industrial regulations policies (Skocpol, 1992:13).

As a consequence of the welfare state continuously scaling up, critics argued that the welfare state had entered a permanent state of crisis. From the political right it was argued that the welfare state had grown too big and it was too expensive, hence money that was put into the state structure delivered too little results compared to the cost of it. It was also claimed that the current state structure took away the citizens feeling of responsibility and initiative, concomitant leading citizens to become welfare service dependent. Political left on the other hand argued that the welfare state had become too centralized, bureaucratized and alienated. Instead of levelling the general welfare among all of its citizens it rather generated new social classes (Alford, 1975; Selle and Berven, 2001). While the political right favoured a shift towards economy, effectiveness and efficiency as better means for new forms of governmental policies (Rhodes, 1997), the political left would rather emphasis new ways of revitalising the participatory democracy. The two political wings did however coincide on decentralisation, increased civilian participation and increased focus upon voluntary organisations as appropriate tools for compensating the ills created by the former state structure (Selle and Berven, 2001:1).

Skocpol maintains that the pre-eminence in talking about state structures in economical terms came as a result of both Britain and United States experienced more intense and uncertain international economical competition from the 1970s and onwards. This conjunction made it fashionable to speak of states as actors and society-shaping institutional structures (1985:6). The transformation process from a Keynesian welfare state into a neo-liberal one consequently constitutes some general though deep penetrating shifts in policies. These can be summarized as deregulation of key industries, privatisation of commercial activities previously operated by governments, a reduced role of the state and increased responsibility by individuals for themselves, reduced mercantilism which opened for competition and free trade, decentralization of decision-making and implementation in order to open up for the local level (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2005).
The effects these neo-liberal trends to some extent caused made a favourable climate for scholars to construct new conceptual reactions and counter-reactions as will be envisaged next, though starting out with the latter first. In a collection of essays under the theme *Bringing the State Back In*, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (1985) have sought to construct a historically grounded analysis of why and how one should bring the state back into its proper central place in explanations of social change, politics and policy making. Wherein they built their argument on the support from a divers set of scholars (state-centred and IR scholars) whom apprehend the state both as an organisation and social actor, and whom all put the state at the centre of attention. The reason for deducing such a necessity, Skocpol (1985) maintains, can be found in the work of previous scholars as they more or less have reduced the significance of the state as no more important than any other organisation.

Consequently, the first attack on the misplaced focus is directed to pluralist and structure-functionalist. In which the primarily problem was their deduction of government as a political stage for economical interest and social movements’ normative interests, and subsequently that government was not being taken seriously as an independent actor. Writings from neo-Marxist did not either get it completely right, even though the latter scholar maintains that these have contributed with new ideas and findings that have shown valuable. Nevertheless, neo-Marxist is still deeply embedded in the society-centred assumption of states being shaped by classes or class struggles in order to preserve or expand modes of production. Skocpol accordingly maintained that neo-Marxist primarily were failing because of two things; they were unable to comprehend that states can be autonomous and that they too often tended to generalise on behalf of one mode of production across national boarders (1985:4-5). The last point mentioned which makes out the reason for the renewed interest in states stems from two elements. The first relates to the macro-economical, hence neo-liberal, management of national interactions. And the latter relates to the dismantlement of colonial empires which made a upswing in new independent national states, whom subsequently was not directly welcoming Western liberal democratic patterns in their political organisations and political systems (ibid:5-6). Thus Evans et al. (1985) envisage that the renewed focus is founded upon two complementary strategies of states as capacitated and autonomous actors. States should be viewed upon as organisations through which official collectivities pursue distinct goals in relation to their social setting; and that states should be looked upon more macro-scopically as
configurations of organisations and action that influences the meaning and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society.

Within the frame of neo-liberalism the state-centred focus envisaged above took a new direction in the 1990s. The governmental apparatus of the state was now increasingly looked upon as an actor with regulatory power. An analogy put forward by Rose and Miller (1992) stresses that while the welfare state was ‘governing at close range’, the new neo-liberal government practiced ‘governing at a distance’. The ‘desirableness’ of the neo-liberalisation of governmental activities has neatly been depicted by Osborne and Gaebler throughout their “Reinventing Government” book. As when quoting E. S. Savas; “The word government is from a Greek word, which means ‘to steer’. The job of the government is to steer, not to row the boat. Delivering services is rowing, and government is not very good at rowing” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993:25). By this they argued that the governing authority is in charge of providing goals, values and norms, accordingly ‘steering’, while ‘rowing’ is to be accomplished by those who are in charge of the implementation process, notably individuals and communities. In more recent writings the rowing and steering analogy have among other things received criticism in terms of what extent states have the capacity to mobilise non-state actors. Johnston and Shearing (forthcoming) argues that it have failed to take into consideration the contingent uncertainties of state action, the turf wars within governmental agencies, and to examine the extent and manner in which the governance is constituted in relational terms between plural actors.

Through the neo-liberalisation of governmental activities the conceptualisation of governance resurfaced. Froestad and Shearing (2004) notes that ‘government’ and ‘governance’ was used interchangeably until the last two centuries. While ‘government’ came to the fore as a response to national state structures became the main source for development and implementation of public policies, ‘governance’ broke through as a fertile concept concomitance to the welfare state criticisms for attempting to manage everything. Even though both government and governance are referring to purposive behaviour, goal directed performance and a system of rule they should not be understood as synonymous. Government refers to activities that are regulated by a formal authority, police powers and an administration that can ensure implementation of public policies, whilst governance refers to activities that are backed by shared goals, values and norms, which may or may not be originated from legal and formal institutions (Rosenau, 1992:4). The governance concept
therefore indicates that one has gone from hierarchical forms of state rule, towards a more shifting interaction between state and non-state actors in shaping and implementing policies (Froestad and Shearing, 2004:14).

Though the governance concept do probably resonates even better at the increasingly globalised international arena, as it has become the main theme of studies within the IR field. Most scholars acknowledges that the phenomenon of globalisation have been widening, deepening and speeding up the worldwide interconnectedness in all aspect of social life and then especially since the end of the cold war (Chatterjee, 1998; Giddens, 1990; Held et al., 1999; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Ohmae, 1995; Rosenau, 1992). Thus in contemporary research most scholars takes it as a matter of fact that international structures and policies influence the structures and polices of national states in some distinct ways. Though there are disagreements on how to conceptualise, and how to reason about causal dynamics and structural consequences of the phenomenon. These disagreements do among other things materialise in scholars definitions of global governance. Finkelstein maintains that; “Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home” (Finkelstein, 1995:369). This definition emphasise how national states and the international institutions interacts with each other, and it points out that the international institution lacks sovereign authority. Väyrynen has constructed a slightly broader definition by arguing that global governance is; “collective actions to establish international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of adverse supranational, transnational or national problems” (Väyrynen, 1999:25). By constructing the definition in such a manner the scholar attempts to include a collective notion that addresses various problems through international institutions and norm building.

Observations of the effects caused by globalisation, such as; electronic mediation, environmental disasters, and mass migration because of hunger and regional conflicts have made it a necessity to think ourselves beyond the nation, as these phenomenon’s transcends the national states possibility to operate and act for the good of people (Chatterjee, 1998). Though, in accordance to Kaldor (2004) and McGrew (2004) it also requires of us to see beyond the immediate interaction between sovereign states and intergovernmental organisations (IGO). Hence, decision-making within the IR paradigm is primarily reserved for the hegemonic powers, which consequently signifies that there exist great inequalities of
power and access to decision-making among the poorer regions of the world, and subsequently the poor and marginalised people living within them.

As a counterweight to the skewed power-balance on the global arena, new initiatives within the civil society sphere have evolved in order to pressure for global change. These can among other things be understood through the notion of ‘transnational civil society’ or as a ‘global civil society’. A transnational civil society signifies the collective activities of all non-governmental organisations (NGO) in global politics. In accordance to this perspective the huge growth of NGOs since the latter years of 1980s has given ordinary people the leverage of reflexive power, which has increased the potential of citizen diplomacy (McGrew, 2004:140-141). One of the manners in which the transnational civil society has entered the political arena is through ‘epistemic communities’. These can be understood as transnational networks of experts whom de-politicise issues by redefining them as technical or procedural matters which consequently is best resolved by experts (ibid:159). While epistemic communities stand out from both states and IGO, they can be useful in the meditation between hegemonic powers and weak and failing states. But to what extent these merely operates as ‘convenient idiots’ for the hegemonic powers or whether they employ their knowledge for the betterment of those poor and marginalised whom do not have the possibility to voice their concerns is a intrinsic question deemed to be shaped by normative assumptions.

In Kaldor’s (2004) book “Global Civil Society; An Answer to War” the global civil society concept is presented as a way of addressing the problem of war, of debating, arguing about, discussing and pressing for possible solutions or alternatives. Though it can be defined much wider and in contestable normative terms; “global civil society is the sphere of idea, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies” (Anheier et al., 2005:17). While the concept both feeds and reacts to globalisation it also links to five different historic and contemporary conceptualisations of civil society. As these stems from; Immanuel Kant’s universal civil society in terms of the cosmopolitan rule of law, guaranteed by a combination of international treaties and institutions; from the Marxist and Capitalist perspectives of entities that are either below or beyond the state and thereby constitutes the civil society, such as international corporations, social movements and NGOs; an utopian activist perception that looks upon civil society as an arena for active
citizenship, in which they can take part in shaping politics outside formal political circles; in terms of a neo-liberal perception where civil society is made up by voluntary and non-profit organisations that not only restrain power but also is a substitute for state service delivery; and finally in terms of a post modern perspective of pluralism and contestations, which signify that one should be careful in the manner one constitutes the civil society for not upholding and imposing Eurocentric values on others (Kaldor, 2004:7-9).

The amount of actors that makes out the total network of global civil society is enormous, ranging from INGOs, NGOs, grass roots organisations and social movements, in which INGOs alone constitute approximately 13,000 different organisations (Anheier et al., 2005). But whatever constellation the global civil society materialises into, Kaldor (2004) implies that it is of necessity to stress and facilitate a reorientation of focus away from the traditional state-centred approach. Hence, a global civil society can contribute significantly to rectify the contemporary democratic deficit by deepening and widening democracy through a larger focus upon bottom-up decision-making structures where all voluntary subjects can participate in autonomous transnational associations and institutions. But then again, the direction the global civil society is taking and the consequences thereof will in the end be shaped by a reflexive interaction between these, sovereign states and IGOs.

2.5 Locating traditional and contemporary theories within a preliminary model

Thus far this chapter has very briefly touched upon a multitude of traditional and contemporary theories in the search of how the authors of these theories have come to reason about primary actors in social change. In model (1) beneath there has been made an attempt to map out these scholars and frame them within a model in order to envisage how they place themselves in a dichotomised system of state versus society and national versus international. Though when portraying these theories within the model they should be looked upon as typologies, since the complexity that these theories distinguish makes it difficult to demarcate them fully within the restricted quadrants of the model (Roness, 1997).

Hobbes, Weber and Skocpol have all been situated in quadrant 1 as they portray clear state-centred and national directed perspectives. Though, Weber has also been situated in quadrant 2 because of his notion that the bureaucracy had to retrieve leaders below the state domain. Bentley, Truman, Easton and Dahl are all pluralist though they are scholars of different
pluralistic stages which have been depicted in the model by the incremental tendency of acknowledging or aligning to the governmental domain. Marx, the neo-Marxist Barrington More and the sociologist Durkheim have also been situated in an incremental alignment towards the state domain. In particular does Durkheim’s writing link up to the state as he deemed a balanced interaction between state and civil society to emancipating individual liberty.

Model 1: Traditional and Contemporary Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant 1</th>
<th>Quadrant 2</th>
<th>Quadrant 3</th>
<th>Quadrant 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hobbes</td>
<td>Osborne &amp; Gaebler</td>
<td>Rokkan</td>
<td>IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber’s ideal bureaucracy</td>
<td>Weber’s charismatic leader</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skocpol</td>
<td>Easton</td>
<td>Dahl</td>
<td>Seeley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Durkheim</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hintz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truman</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barrington More</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bentley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seeley and Hintz are early writers on sovereign state’s prospect for peace and stability within an international paradigm, which later turned out to become an independent tradition of IR. The manner in which the IR tradition have developed, focusing on the interaction between sovereign states through among others IGOs, situates it in the upper right corner of quadrant 4. Under the theme state formation and nation-building Tilly departs from Rokkan in his way of comprehending how larger structures and process have shaped the national outcome. Consequently Tilly is situated in lower left of quadrant 4 while Rokkan, because of his focus...
upon geographically, cultural and economical conditions is situated in the middle left of quadrant 3. In the text above neo-liberalism along with a range of scholars misplaced focuses on social change, politics and policy making created a counter reaction which made Skocpol among others to argue that the state should be brought back in to its proper central place of focus. Though, the increased focus upon neo-liberalism created at least two additional theoretical reactions. The first one was described as Osborne and Gaebler’s reinvented regulatory government which situates them in the upper middle of quadrant 2. The second one facilitated a stronger prospect of change through organisations located beyond and below the state domain. Because of the epistemic community’s intricate relationship with the sovereign states and IGO, these have been situated in the upper right of quadrant 3 while Kaldor’s global civil society is situated in the lower right of the quadrant.

2.6 Nodal governance an alternative paradigm for comprehending societal change

What is more or less common for all of the above mentioned scholars is that they have had a pre-determined position when entering the field of study, which subsequently have formed their perception of societal change into their previsions. However, it is nothing new that researchers operating within a specific paradigm share a common understanding of what to be included and/or excluded from the study and how to approach the phenomenon in order to collect information. Scientific research carried out within research institutions regulates and signifies what to be regarded as scientific knowledge, which is knowledge that is difficult for scholars inside the research institution to break loose from (Roness, 1997). Though there are reasons to believe that our scientific theories and worldviews generally constitute paradigms that not only provide accounts and explanations but also constitute the world they explain. As Shearing (2006) maintains when referring Thomas Kuhn; paradigms are ways of seeing the world that exclude those parts of the world that do not fit within the pre-anticipated assumptions; consequently paradigms protect themselves by making invisible evidence that refutes their standpoint. Hence, the history of science has repeatedly made clear that the support for a particular paradigm that makes truth claims about the world is often as much political and social as it is scientific (ibid:12-13).

In the latter part of this chapter the nodal governance notion will be presented as a theoretical approach that refutes to take any pre-determined position when searching for significant and less significant nodes taking part in governing social change. Because it is only when one
takes an empirical approach where one is open to the idea that important nodes for change can arise from all spheres that one stand a chance to retrieve the most unadulterated empirical knowledge. The nodal governance notion consequently is a theoretical concept describing an ‘is’, not a normative one that takes sides by promoting that something ‘ought’ to be like (Johnston, 2006:47). Though prior to elaborating the more specificities of nodes and how nodes takes part in governance, it is of necessity to first provide a definition of governance which signifies how scholars of nodal governance looks upon it. And since nodes are thought to be communicating through networks there will also be a brief introduction of the network governance theory.

2.6.1 Providing a working definition of governance

Contemporary researchers conceptualise and employ governance in a broad spectre of theoretical and empirical fields, in which some have become more prominent than others. These range from governance as; Institutional Arrangements, Good Governance, Global Governance, Network Governance, within the field of Development Studies in terms of social capital, and within Foucault’s Governmentality notion (Kempa et al., 2005:7). What seem to be common among these governance theories is that they to a certain degree are bridging the gaps between the dichotomies, as they are arguing that the spheres of state, private, civil society, national and international is partly or all interconnected. Since the conceptualisations of governance have been both theory and field specific it can be useful to employ a definition that opens up and holds the potential of subsuming several theoretical fields.

Therefore and henceforth governance in this thesis will be employed as “the management of the course of events in a social system” (Burris et al., 2005:30). The definition is influenced and constructed upon the knowledge drawn from scholars such as Bruno Latour and Michel Foucault. In terms of Latour because power is understood as equal to that in the physical world. As power sets things in motion and will continue until it is met with a counter force in terms of resistance. Within this way of thinking, power is not limited to the amount power within one single actor, but to the amount of actors who takes part in the governing of it. But also in terms of Foucault as he sees power not only to be streaming in a top down manner but rather to be originating from a multiple of sites, as it comes from everywhere (Shearing, forthcoming). When constructing the definition as they have done it can be criticised as too broad and all-embracing, leading to everything and nothing. But at the same time, the width of the definition enables it to be used by a spectre of governing constellations independent of
whether it is located in the international, national and local sphere. As the scholars themselves maintains, the definition can be useful for many different scholars whom have their heart of interest in various fields, such as democracy, honest and efficient government, political stability and the rule of law (Burris et al., 2005).

2.6.2 Introducing network governance
There has been a re-balancing between the state, market and community spheres in the past twenty years. In between the belief that the state could do everything (welfare state) and the market could do everything (new right neo-liberalist), there have been given new attention towards the community and various civil society organisations. This shift of focus have given governments the means and opportunity to enrol the civil society sphere into various schemes of governance, as various partnerships between state, businesses and community actors has been created. Observations of these partnerships have led scholars to engage themselves with issues such as; collaboration, ‘joined-up’ governments and networking (Head, 2005). Those whom have embraced the network ideas have favoured for a new governance paradigm, a paradigm that departs from the traditional top down state-centred structures. As the network theory rather directs more attention towards decentralised structures that would allow for increased participation from a spectre of units within the private and civil society, it is often characterised as a way of deepening democracy.

Giddens (2000) is one of them whom calls for the immediate need to deepen the democracy, in which the scholar labelled the process ‘democratising democracy’. The manner in which the scholar saw this done was through devolution of power and enhancing the level of strong civic culture. The main argument for doing this has been related to the conviction that old mechanisms of government is malfunctioning in a society where the citizens live in the same information society as those who are in power. Though there are other and perhaps better reasons for deepening democracy and especially among the poor and marginalised constituencies. Burris et al. (2005) argues that in order to develop sound governance theories its of importance to look into how power actually is being distributed and put into practice across and within global, international, national and local spheres. As the mechanisms of governance are plural and thereby vary among; force, persuasion, economic pressure, norm creation and manipulation they leave limited room for poor and marginalised participation. Given these observations there is indeed a need for a new conceptualisations of governance
that will unmask the true face of power and which will provide the means to construct better strategies for deepening democracy.

The concept of network governance is not entirely new as it builds upon the knowledge of pluralism theories. What might be worth to have in mind is that pluralist and first generation of network theories frequently had more concerns regarding conflicts within the state versus market distinction, while second generation network governance scholars have put more attention towards negotiated rationality and trust. Marcussen and Torfing represent the latter tradition when arguing that contemporary governance networks can be understood as:

“Horizontal negotiations amongst independent but operationally autonomous actors. These negotiations transpire within an institutionalised framework containing regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary elements. The governance network is somewhat self-regulating, and a crucial characteristic is that governance networks contribute to the production of public purpose within a particular area” (Marcussen and Torfing, 2003:1).

Governance network emphasises that one have gone from vertical to horizontal negotiations. This indicates that the state-centred view of how government is being conducted has become fragmented and pluralised. A number of independent private, public and civil society actors are depending on each other to get things done. There are no formal chain of command in the network, which makes public authorities merely one actor among many. Political actors negotiate through bargaining and deliberation, where deliberation becomes an important feature in order to build trust and obligations. Conflicts over interests and resources will take place and make consensus difficult, political decisions can therefore be made by rough consensus (ibid:8). Negotiations take place within a relatively institutionalised framework which makes it more than the sum of its parts. The institutionalised framework portrays four aspects: regulation that provides rules, roles and procedures, norms that provide values and standards, a cognitive element that provides codes, concepts and specialised knowledge, and an imaginary element that provides identities, ideologies, common hopes and visions. Networks can consequently be seen as multi-dimensional system of actors that to a certain extent is self-regulating as it operates in the shadow of hierarchy while not being subjected to the laws of the market. Thus if networks are subjected to external regulation it stands the risk of being reduced to a bureaucratic agency. The last element of the definition states that
networks contribute to the production of public purpose, which express visions, understandings, values and policies that can be characterised in terms of public goods (ibid:9).

The definition above has been structured to meet the public policy arena as it argues that networks have to produce public purpose within a specific arena. Other scholars have taken a broader angle and simply argue that network is of “informal relationships between essentially equal social agents and agencies” (Frances et al. 1991 cited in Gill, 2006:28). The theories of network have been deployed into various fields of study in an ever increasing pace, in which Manuel Castells is one of the most prominent network scholars as he has been preoccupied with how the society is changing in the age of networks. Castells (1996) claims that globalisation, in terms of information technology and the reduction of time-space limit have produced horizontal networked companies rather than vertical hierarchical ones, which in turn have given corporations the means to grow into big international enterprises. Castells (2000b) further argues that networks are not structurally homogeneous as they are made of institutions and internals segments of institutions. As Dupont (2004) follows up on Castells remarks the scholar maintains that structural networks are distinctive of interpersonal networks, and the power possessed will therefore differ between these two. However, agents that form networks use these to distribute responsibility, resources and uncertainty evenly among the members in which their effectiveness and efficiency in doing this exceeds the traditional state-centred command and control structures (Kempa et al. 1999, referred to in Dupont, 2004:78). In terms of Castells (2000b), networks de-centre performance and share decision-making. In which the performance and decisions taken in the social system of network are value-free or neutral, as there is nothing ethical or normative concerns directing it other than the goals the actors and nodes are programmed to perform. A network is therefore a set of interconnected nodes, where interest intersects itself. Even though some nodes are more important than others they all need each other as long as they are within the network. By definition a network has no centre, only nodes (ibid:15-16). This then signifies that if one where to figure out how specific networks evolve it is of necessity to look into those nodes that takes part and how they shape the governance of these networks.

2.6.3 Introducing nodal governance
Nodal governance is thought organised in relational terms, between political institutions, commercial entities, non-governmental organisations, voluntary agencies and other civil bodies (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). By reviewing the nodal governance literature it can be
argued that scholars in the last couple of years have become more attuned to the thought that their theory can elaborate and thereby contribute significantly to deepen the understanding of network governance (Burris et al., 2005; Johnston and Shearing, forthcoming). The reason to this is that nodes use networks to communicate with other nodes. But while network theorist takes this as a matter of fact, nodal governance scholars argue that this depends on the structure and purpose of the specific node. Besides, the latter scholars emphasise that nodes can establish their own networks, rather than to incorporate themselves within already established networks (Johnston and Shearing, forthcoming). Compared to the network theory who say little of how specific actor contribute in the network, the strength of the nodal governance theory can be found within its focus upon how nodes possesses both specific and general knowledge, and how these nodes constitute points where governance is being conducted.

Thus far is Burris et al. (2005) work on nodes structural alignment one of the most thoroughly conducted elaborations in this regard. By drawing on the work of Friedrich Hayek they argue that ‘collectivity’ can be understood as ‘outcome-generating systems’ (OGS). Which signifies that people who live in the same place or people who share some form of common interests and for that reason identify themselves as a group can be described in terms of collectivities. Whilst these people act, they create some form of outcome in the time-space distinction. When referring to OGS the latter scholars emphasise the organic element of the node which subsequently will influence others nodes as ‘information’ floats through the network. It has been important for these scholars to emphasise that the theory in itself will not automatically lead to more democratic governance, as it is the constellation of the nodes and how these are allowed to influence other nodes that will determine whether it will deepen democracy or not. This consequently signifies that it is just as likely that the OGS can produce ‘problems’ as well as it can produce ‘goods’ (ibid:34-36).

The collectivity constitutes various norms, values and resources and these will in turn affect the OGS. When the nodes experience problems they will develop forms of governance to handle the complexity that the OGS creates. The outcome of this will not always lead to expected results, but rather unintentional effects created as a result of limited human and technological capacity to comprehend causality, but also because external nodes have the capacity to intervene throughout the process. This ascribes to the fact that all collectivities are situated in physical, environmental and social environment that will make up layers of various
collectivities that have the potential to influence the OGS. Last but not least, Burris et al. (2005:36) maintains that as every OGS have norms and governing systems, people living within these systems will not be capable to take an introvert view of their own system and therefore not be able to see nor express their own norms and governing structures.

The governance system is essentially made up of nodes, which can be said to be institutions with a set of technologies, mentalities and resources. The nodes practice governance through the use of local knowledge and capacity in order to manage the course of events (ibid:33). Mentality refers to a mental framework that shapes our worldview and the way we decide to act. The mentality can be said to be implicit rather than explicit thoughts, though we often take them as a matter of course, we often do not have made up a conscious thought, but rather acts as result of inhibited culture (Johnston and Shearing, 2003:29-30). Mentality in nodal governance therefore refers to ways of thinking about those issues that the node has managed to govern (Burris et al., 2005:37).

Technologies refer to the particular methods that the node is using to exert influence over the course of event. The various methods will therefore differ from node to node all depending on what kind of field it chooses to engage with. The spectre of methods can better be conceptualised by thinking in terms of tools. For the node to exert influence they can make use of different tools which will differ in strength such as, physical, legal, symbolic and personal. But as Johnston and Shearing (2003:28) argues, it is not the accessibility of a specific tool that will indicate the strength of the node but rather the combination of various tools.

Resources will provide support for the node and its ability to exert influence. Nodes will differ in terms of their accessibility of resources, but they will also depend on various forms of resources. Finances seem to a certain extent to be the main resource base for all nodes, and this is especially true for international enterprises and various IGOs who are financial strong and often uses economy as a coercion mechanism. But as resources also are defined in terms of a wide array of capital formation, in relation to the Bordieuian sense, local knowledge and capacity also becomes an essential resource. As Burris et al. (2005:39) argues, small NGOs with limited excess to fiscal resources can use social capital, which is the norms and network that facilitates collective action, to exert pressure on local and national governments for increased attention towards local needs.
In order for the node to be able to govern, it needs to have some sort of institutional structure. For the node to mobilise resources, mentalities and technologies over time, a certain degree of stability is required, but it does not need to be formally constituted nor legally recognised. The structure will differ in terms of what sphere it represents. As governmental nodes can be both hierarchical and legally recognised, nodes in the private sphere can also be hierarchical and legally recognised but less stable. In the NGO and voluntary sector they may be both less hierarchical, legally recognised as well as stable. Burris et al. (2005) actually rejects that the node needs to have a particular structure, as not all nodes have been developed with the intention of governing.

Nodes can take several shapes, as they are constituted by different societal structures. Some nodes can to a certain extent mistakenly be taken for granted because they are crucial elements within a society, such as various governmental institutions and their executive agencies, a town’s police stations or medical aid centres are examples of these. But there is also a numerous of possible nodes within a society, that is not possible to identify before one have studied the specific society. These are nodes that originate by themselves because of needs that they themselves have identified. Burris et al. (2005:38) argues that various nodes often can be one node among many within an integrated network, hence a smaller unit within a broader organisation. Other times a node can be one among many in a broader multiple network that works together with the purpose of concentrating members, technologies and resources to achieve a common goal. These nodes they identify as ‘superstructural’ nodes, as they make out the ‘command centres of networked governance’. Nodes such as these have significant powers at their disposal to govern the course of events (Shearing, 2006:26).

Implicit in the nodal governance approach there are several important implications which signifies an emergent need to depart from the state-centred view of governance when conducting empirical research. First of all Johnston and Shearing (2003) argues that the state must not be given any conceptual priority, as this will open up for the consideration of a multitude of governing nodes. Secondly, by refusing the conceptual priority of the state one is able to look at governance as operating through networks rather than through a single centred locus. Thirdly, the nodal approach looks upon governance, in relational terms, with shifting alliances between nodes. This thereby contradicts the state directed steering and rowing analogy. Last but not least, thoughts of how to govern as well as how we actually conduct it is
a product of human invention, it is therefore of necessity to have in mind that it has normative consequences (ibid:148).

Model 2: Nodal Governance

As depicted in model (2) above, it signifies that nodal governance does not take any \textit{a priori} postulates of where the nodes taking part in governing societal change transpire from. In fact it refutes to grant any societal actor from any quadratic location any \textit{a-priori} significance; whether it is the state as put forward by Skocpol, the private interest as put forward by Bentley, Truman and Dahl, the multitude of sovereign states and IGOs as put forward by the IR tradition, or the multitude of NGOs and INGOs which constitutes the global civil society. According to the nodal governance theory; the management of the course of events in a social system is conducted through a network or several non-integrated networks. Where nodes can transpire from a multiple of sites within these networks, in which it is the combination of nodes transpiring from the four quadrants of the model and their intrinsic institutions,
resources, technologies and mentalities that makes out their ability to govern and provide societal change.
3.0 The governance of human security in Africa

The previous chapter laid the ground for a different manner of comprehending how societal change transpires from a multiple of nodes and not from a single-centred locus. This chapter sets out to expand this notion thorough a human security perspective of security governance. First of all there will be an elaboration of the pluralisation of security governance that has taken place throughout the world, through which a broad spectre of security constellations will be identified and the consequences thereof will be highlighted. While remaining descriptive in this prior part, the latter will take on more normative features, as there will be an introduction of the human security notion that was put on the agenda by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994. This notion calls for a state-society nexus, whereas opening up for a greater balance between state-centred and people-centred security measurements is their pivotal goal. As the human security notion sets out preconditions required in order to emancipate the shift from a state-centred to a people-centred security measures, the two following sections provides possible manners through which these can be facilitated. And towards the end of this chapter there will be made an attempt to sum up human security governance through the introduction of a model.

3.1 The plurality in governance of security

Before commencing on the plurality of security nodes that takes part in governing security there will be made an attempt to conceptualise the ‘governance of security’ concept which are to be employed throughout this thesis. Governance of security is a concept combined of two words which denotes a specific meaning. Governance as introduced in the latter chapter indicates that one has gone from hierarchical forms of state rule towards a more balanced and often horizontal interaction between state and non-state actors in shaping and implementing policies, while security denotes both objective and subjective conditions. Objective security can be understood as a utopian state of absolute security or in more modest terms as being protected from potential dangers. The subjective condition on the other hand is tuned towards the feeling of being safe and free from anxiety (Zender 2003:155, cited in Wood and Shearing, 2007:4). When employing the concept of governance of security it is done with the specific purpose of facilitate a re-orientation of the role of the state in the provision of policing. Governance of security thereby departs from scholars whom employ the concept of ‘insecurity’ more frequent since insecurity most often is used within a frame of police-centred
crime and disorder protection. Hence, to govern security signifies what others other than solely the police can do in order to attain more safe and secure communities. It thereby opens up for multiple of nodes beyond and below the state, rather than to increase the dichotomies between a professionalised police and circumscribed recipient constituencies.

According to Hobbes the ‘plurality of governance’ which existed in the medieval times made individuals state of nature ‘nasty, brutish and short’. The solution devised by Hobbes through the book Leviathan was to centralise power under the king whom should rule legitimate and with a mighty force over the territory and the citizens living within it. Weber followed up this line of thought as he devised his definition of the state in terms of the legitimate use of physical force to impose social order within its territory. Throughout the years since 1829, when Sir Robert Peel the Minister of British Home Secretary devised the first civilian uniformed police, whom were set out to operate by ‘police by consent’, it has gradually become more and more state-centred. Hence, the police activity as one in contemporary times have come to reason about signifies; a public activity, a state-centralised activity, a specialised and re-active activity preoccupied with catching bandits, and a punishment centred activity which carries out retribution, prosecution and imprisonment (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). The police apparatus which has been entitled to carry out this physical force has been defined as; “the necessary component in a growing urban society and the thin blue line between order and anarchy” (Pinnock 1984, cited in Brogden and Shearing, 1993:8) Though when looking into the history of policing it reveals that the alleged connection with the state monopoly only tells half the truth. Policing as a state-centred activity only occurred in the mid twentieth century, both before and after policing stand out from this view (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Mazerolle and Ransley, 2005).

Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) maintains that the transformation from a Keynesian welfare state into neo-liberal one have had a profound effect on the police. Essential elements within neo-liberalistic philosophy such as increased focus upon the individual, community values and market principles provided the police with a toolbox full of new techniques and programs. Instead of thinking upon police as directed from a ‘top down’ perspective or ‘rule at short range’, one was now thinking more in terms of security through governance principles.

Consequently policing is a very elastic concept as it has been influenced by international thought on how it best can be accomplished. The transfer of policing policies from Anglo-
American models of state-centred community policing have raised critical questions whether these policies are able to comprehend and adjust to the specific norms, values, cultures and the specific challenges that the recipient country faces (Dixon, 2004). The concept of a state-centred community policing policy came as a response to the crisis of operation, efficiency, professionalism and accountability within the crime fighting policing institutions in North America. Its main features have come to be known as organisational decentralisation, liberal and problem-oriented police mandate, which should work towards consultation with, responding to, and working along side the public in setting priorities and facilitating partnerships (ibid:252). However, under a neo-liberal guise community policing is framed within the notion of decentralising provision activities but at the same time centralising resources and responsibilities. Since the community policing concept represents an essential governmental policy in South Africa it will be reintroduced at a later stage of this thesis.

Bayley and Shearing observe that policing has been reconstructed around the world in some distinct manners. As they argue that those who are conducting (providing) policing are now being separated from those who authorize (auspice) it, and both of these functions have increasingly been taking place outside of the governmental domain (2001:vii). This signifies that the term of privatisation, denoting a separation and devolution of security provision from the public to the private domain while upholding the auspice of it, does not cover the observed trends in policing. Instead the latter scholars maintain that the trend is better comprehended in terms of ‘multilateralization’ and ‘denationalization’ (ibid:5). Others whom have observed the multitude of policing institutions, such as Loader (2000) and Button (2003), have come to describe it in terms of ‘pluralisation’. Though, it is important to note that there is a substantial difference between the two concepts of multilateralization and pluralisation. While scholars such as Loader (2000), Loader and Walker (2006), Goldsmith (2003), Marks and Goldsmith (2006) acknowledge the existent of security provision being plural they do not necessarily concur with the observation that these are auspice in security governance, and in normative terms they maintain that security in order to be equitable and democratic requires to be anchored to the state. The normative debate of ‘state anchored pluralism’ within the governance of security field is vast and it is too early to raise it here, though at the end of this thesis it will be brought up for debate.

The tendency of security being pluralized signifies that it is a broader activity than merely what the police do; policing is everything the police do and more. Baker (2002) maintains that
there are particularly three different policing activities that constitute non-state policing; autonomous citizen response, responsible citizen responses and commercial private security. The autonomous citizen responses are groups that act independently of the state police. Most often they do not cooperate with the police because they are prepared to break the law in order to achieve their goals, which either can be for protection or investigation purposes. These groups are often described as vigilante organisations, which are characterised as re-active, ad hoc and often apply violent means to achieve their ends (ibid:34).

Responsible citizen responses are groups and organisations that cooperate with the state police. They often take place after being invited by the police to participate or the organisation themselves places their organisation at disposal for the police. These organisations originate from various spaces, from rural areas, in townships, in suburbs or city districts. In order to become a partner with the state police they will have to respect the rule of law, though as Baker points out this does not necessary imply that they always do that, as there are many examples of responsible citizen responses who steps over the line and breaks the law (ibid:36-37).

The commercial private security industry (PSI) makes out the third group of non-state policing. Their main assignments are to provide guards, armed response to residence areas and money transports. Brogden and Shearing described the introduction of the private security industry as a quiet revolution. The private alternative to security departs from the public in some distinct ways since it is mainly security for those who can afford it, and in many instances they provide better services for their customers because they are problem oriented and provide protection (1993:172). Thus, the PSI can no longer be labelled as any quiet revolution as it is more roaring and causes more deep-penetrating effects than most industries. Consequently the growth of the industry have created effects that does not necessary correspond with the establishment of public goods (Johnston and Shearing, 2003:141), but rather to that of common goods. While ‘public good’ can be defined as; “goods or services that promote common objectives and values” for all constituencies within a state (Kempa and Shearing, 2005b:5, italics in original), ‘common goods’ can be defined as; “any form of goods, services, infrastructure, or facility that yields benefits or disbenefits to individuals” which are situated in the common space between the public and private sphere (Shearing and Wood, 2003a:206, italics in original). Thus the growth of the private security industry has created some profound changes in the manner which safety and security is being governed.
As Bayley and Shearing (2001) points out through their multilateralization concept, there has been a shift from policing being owned by the police, to become owned by several institutions within the private sphere, as both state/non-state and commercial/non-commercial actors conduct auspice and provision in the governance of security. The tendency of a growing participation from a multitude of actors, especially a divers set of commercial associations, has shown to be problematic. Johnston and Shearing argues that there has been an evolving problem with private and commercial agents exploiting the governance of security, by creating ‘gated communities’. Gated communities which previously were public spaces have become privatised in an ever increasing pace. Video surveillance is found ubiquitously and those who can afford it creates their own private fortress with private guards that at all times can guarantee for their safety (2003:141), hence a re-feudalised of land has taken place.

Brogden and Shearing argues that the pluralisation of security has mainly benefited the citizens who are financial equipped and provided them with the means to become less dependent on the state. While the poor communities receive police ‘force’ and justice, the wealthier communities receive police ‘service’ and security (1993:171). As Johnston and Shearing observes the obvious inequalities, they fear that security can become even more polarised and lead to a potentially dangerous evolution where rich people accessing both public and commercial security service, and thereby leaving the poor people with public police ‘force’(2003:144).

Gated communities are only one of many phrases which have been used to highlight the fading distinction of the public-private dichotomy. Others whom have been looking into how public and private converge, and the concomitant effects this have caused have described it in terms of; ‘denizenship’ (Shearing and Wood, 2003b) ‘mass private property’ (Button, 2003) which is neatly portrayed in “From the Panopticon to Disney World” (Shearing and Stenning, 1985), ‘club goods’ (Crawford, 2006), ‘communal spaces’ (Kempa et al., 2004), ‘responsibilization’ (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) and ‘refeudalization’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). Button takes the growth of mass private property (airports, shopping malls, leisure facilities, etc.) as an indication of the public-private dichotomy to be partly dissolved. Thus the public-private distinction appears more in terms of a continuum, characterized and differentiated by level of access, type of agency and the interest being served (2003:229). Kempa and Shearing also explains the distinction in terms of a continuum line, arguing that
public and private spheres are carved up into a range of communal spaces. While a small proportion of private property makes out one end, the other far end constitutes a diminishing public space, and in between these two poles lays a ubiquitous mass private property (2005a:4).

The segmentation of the public space, concomitant the fading public-private distinction, concomitant refeudalization of land is a global phenomenon which has escalated because of a complex set of events. States, societies and communities are becoming increasingly entangled. While the previous North-South distinction was divided in geographical terms, this distinction can now be found within limited geographical spaces in both north and south. Instead of talking in terms of a ‘First and Third World’ divide, Castells maintains that large areas of the world make out black holes of social exclusions, which constitutes ‘Fourth Worlds’. In the current historical context, the latter scholar maintains, the rapid spiralling forth world evolves as a consequence of the rise of the informational global capitalism (2000a:168). Shearing (2006) concurs with this perspective as the scholar maintains that the informational global capitalism have transformed certain first world countries, cities and areas into the shape of a ‘Super First World’. In general terms it can be argued that the super first world is made up by Europe and North America, while the forth world is made up by countries and continents categorised and constituted by failing states, which consequently find themselves unable to come to grips with modernity and a global market system. Though the super first world can not only be found in the rich countries of the northern hemisphere, but also in urban areas constituted by large gated city-centres and communities within the fourth world (ibid:13-15). Thus making the boundaries blurred, but at the same time sharp as it makes a divide of denizenship (Shearing and Wood, 2003b), hence the inclusion and exclusion of people within communal spaces. It thus constitute a dived between rich people whom are living in gated communities where they can enjoy a life in wealth and safety while poor and marginalised people are forced to live their lives in deprived communities and shantytowns, situated at the outskirts of these safe havens.

3.2 Introducing human security

In 1994 the UNDP initiated a shift of focus on security as a result of increased awareness of genocides and ethnic conflicts taking place within national boarders. The “Human Development Report, New dimensions on human security” maintained that for too long have
the focus upon security been shaped by the potential of two states entering armed conflict, and too little focus have been devoted to people whom are trapped in quagmires of insecurity within national boarders (UNDP, 1994). Hereof the human security notion can be said to facilitate a shift from that of securing the national state towards the security of people independent of national borders (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

Human security is a holistic paradigm that attempts to shift the focus away from security measures that solely attempts to safeguard the state towards providing solutions that put human beings at risk to the forefront. The manner in which this is sought done constitutes an intrinsic human security and state security nexus. Human security, the commission maintained, complements state security in four regards: First of all it is people-centred, as it challenges state security to reduce their spending on territory protection, their protections of institutions, values and numbers, and rather protect their people from a range of menace. Secondly, menace to the society is people-centred and not territory centred. Citizens should consequently be protected from a range of hazards, such as environmental pollution, transitional terrorism, infectious diseases, and long term conditions of oppression and deprivation. Thirdly, states should not look upon themselves as sole actors. Human security is best achieved by the enrolment of a multitude of actors. These range from IGOs to regional IGOs, INGOs, NGOs and a broad array of community based organisation originating from the civil society whom all needs to be working together in order to mitigate security threats. Fourthly, securing people entails empowering people and societies. This is best sought done by letting the deprived people themselves contribute directly in identifying and implementing solutions to alleviate their insecurity (ibid:4).

The nexus of human security and state security as emphasised above makes out a dense network of security nodes ranging from human-centric, internationally-centric, state-centric and community-centric notions. These nodes voice their own special interests, but the nodes also mix and meld which subsequently provides techniques and mentalities of governance that they consider to be the best way to mitigated the security threats (Wood and Shearing, 2007).

In general terms human security have been approached on two adversary fronts; where the first and probably the most powerful one speaks of ‘freedom from want’ while the latter one speaks of ‘freedom from fear’ (Christie, 2003). The freedom from want approach is aligned with neo-liberal economic perspectives; hence it maintains that people are entitled to an
economic guarantee through job employment in order to purchase the necessities of a life in dignity for themselves and their children. The freedom from fear approach maintains that human security is best attained by; establishing a secure and non threatening social environment, guarantee for human rights, social equality, protection of human beings in conflicts, and the provision of a sustainable development (ibid:121-122). While the prior approach aligns with international neo-liberal perspectives concomitantly to upholding the national state as a driving force for seeing through the economic and social development, the latter approach constitutes a different manner of double movement. It aligns with cosmopolitan values and norms for human rights while arguing that safety and security is best attained by security measures taking place within the national state, in equal collaborations between governmental agencies and a multitude of civil society based organisations.

Nonetheless that these are presented as two adversary fronts they should not be perceived as Boolean constructions, but rather as two pillars whilst combined can facilitate better means for human security governance. Essential when combined is the right balance, as a skewed focus on either of the two can imply lost potentials. Cawthra and Luckham maintain that is important to harmonise economical and political reforms, as economic liberation can work against the political liberation of a country. The scholars accordingly maintain that a predominant focus upon neo-liberal economic prescriptions of modernisation will undermine human security if not counterbalanced by domestic developmental polices (2003:312).

Henceforth there will be made a brief account of what constitutes the challenges and opportunities of the four essential conditions (empowerment, people-centred, menace and a plurality of actors) required in order to emancipate the shift towards human security directed governance.

3.3 Empowerment through the employment of local knowledge and capacity
An essential feature that holds the potential to facilitate a re-orientation of the state’s role in the provision of policing relies upon the employment of local knowledge and capacity. Local knowledge and capacity can often be seen as contradictory to what epistemic communities and governmental bodies acknowledges as scientific knowledge through the process of professionalization and the phenomenon of professionalism (Appiah et al., 2004). It becomes a question of what type of knowledge the state should regard as scientific and beneficiary for the overall society. In other words, the state defines what to be included and what to be
excluded, and in the process of doing this local knowledge and capacity have often seen to be excluded to the advantage of other international beliefs of best practice.

Literature that considers the role of local knowledge and capacity in the governance of security has grown significantly in the latter decade. Scholars such as; Braithwaite (2000), Dupont et al. (2003), Kempa et al. (2004), Wood (2004), Burris et al. (2005) and Shearing (forthcoming) have either highlighted the importance of, proposed new ways of including, or questioned the government’s willingness to making use of local knowledge and capacity as one way of providing security for all of their constituencies.

The notion of local knowledge as its being used by these scholars refers to the work of Friedrich Hayek. Hayek as a classical liberalist saw the market as a better solution to organise the society rather than that of the state. The reason for this ascribes to his conception that people possess different aspirations, talents and dispositions, and for the state to treat them as equal would therefore only lead to more inequality (Heywood, 1999). Shearing (forthcoming) being influenced by the work of Hayek, then argues that to govern security requires a very detailed and varied knowledge. If security governance is to be efficient it cannot be conducted from a single locus but has to be decentralised in a manner that allows for knowledge and capacity of various sorts to be integrated into a joint governance structure. It is within this frame of thought that power as enrolment of actors, described by Latour, and in terms of Foucault as originating from a multitude of sites, that governance structures which opens up for new ways of engaging with local knowledge and capacity from actors decentralised from the centre can constitute a significant resource pool.

Political questions and the solutions devised for these questions take place in collaborations between various stakeholders. Interests being raised vary from national governmental agencies, private entities and civil society based interest organisations, to human rights INGOs and intergovernmental trade associations. When the interests of poor and marginalised constituencies have been left out from the political process, Jacobsen (1995) maintained, this is not only a sign but a consequence of them being poor on political power. In order to rectify the ‘political poverty’ of poor and marginalised constituencies it is of necessity to build democratic institutions within the communities and among constituencies (Wood and Shearing, 2007) that obviously are low on professional knowledge but has significant amounts of local knowledge and capacity. Because it is only when these institutions are built that
marginalised constituencies and communities will have the possibility to mobilise sufficient political power to enter genuine and equable collaborations with the governmental agencies. Hence, the establishment of democratic institutions situated in marginalised communities and operated by the poor themselves is a precondition for empowerment to take place, as set forward by the commission in order to facilitate the move from state security towards human security guided governance.

3.4 The enrolment of nodes in weak and failing states, a call for state-society nexus

According to the human security notion, states should no longer be conceived as sole actors in the provision of security, as states might be as much the problem as the solution. The manner in which the governance of security is carried out and what kind of institutional constellation that facilitates the auspice and provision of social control and conflict resolution fluctuates between formal and informal, state and non-state, commercial and voluntary organisations. Especially is this the case when states are “weak” or “failing”, as the governance of security then is regarded to be accomplished by constellations other than what usually is found in more developed countries (Dupont et al., 2003).

Evans (1995) maintained that there are essential conditions for which a developmental state will have to strive for in order to become legitimate and efficient. First of all the state should have an internal ideational unity, which constitutes a common sense of morality that binds the various state structures together forging common standards of decision making. The state apparatus should also have autonomy that is relative to private entities and various civil society based organisations. In addition, the state should be embedded by making sure that it is connected to the society by creating structures that facilitates efficient channels of communication between the state apparatus and the social groups in which they share mutual projects of transformations (ibid:59).

However, failing states and to a certain extent some weak states are far away from being able to climb such a developmental ladder. While weak states can be characterized in terms of a degeneration of governmental institutions and an inability to deliver basic services to their citizens, failing states can be characterized as states that fail to provide essential state tasks such as health, education and general internal security (Dupont et al., 2003:332). The distinction between these two is often seen to be sliding. For instance Zimbabwe could be
categorised as a weak state until the outset of twenty-first century but has since then experienced a total and detrimental social, economical and political deprivation process as Zimbabwe now constitute a failed state. The lack of governmental capacity and the visible signs of institutions not being attuned to the cultural values of society can be explained by several factors; such as heritage of colonial state structures in terms of the braking up of ethnic, religious and tribal divisions, as an effect of globalisation and increased economical pressure, or because power is being centralised in the hands of despotic leaders (ibid:336-337).

As weak and failing states provide a vacuum of internal security, this gap will subsequently be filled with auspice and providers from different security nodes. In which the nodes will enter into composition with other nodes and makes out a larger security scheme. As Luckham maintains, these security coalitions will assemble and reassemble in various manners as crisis occurs and reforms take place. Though when this vacuum is being filled the key challenge is how to establish human security directed governance schemes that can deliver equitable and democratic outcomes (2003:17). This is outcomes that must avoid the segregation and refeudalization effects caused by skewed attention on urban versus rural development.

Thus within weak states a multitude of national and international organisations takes over the role of authorizing and setting the criteria for security, rather than or in addition to that of the state. Their ability to do so on the other hand differs in terms of legitimacy and resources. Domestic civil society based organisations such as; human rights based NGOs, ethnic and spiritual organisations, and a divers set of organised non-state justice organisations can be said to have little resources but is regarded as legitimate because of their close connection with the cultural values and norms of the various communities. In terms of INGOs such as; Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières, it can be argued that they have legitimacy because of human rights values and being sensitive towards the cultural values within the countries and communities that they are engaged in. They also have resources, because individuals, various private entities, and national countries donate money to their organisation (ibid:338). Multinational business corporations on the other hand, such as oil/gas and other mineral corporations have significant excess to resources. Though when investing their money or when donating money to the civil society they are situated in their intentions are often doubted.
Transnational institutions have also significant access to resources and their legitimacy is often seen to be fragile. The reason why they often are deemed low on legitimacy ascribes to their rather coercive interaction with national governments and the concomitant effect their meddling often have had on the society. IGOs and regional IGOs such as; IMF, World Bank, WTO and SADC have been operating with the intention of providing economical growth, safer and more stable conditions for all through imposing neo-liberal fiscal policies in Southern Africa. Though Fournier (2002) maintains that the introduction of IMF’s ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ within developing countries have rather created detrimental effects whereby increasing the division between rich urban and poor rural areas. Thus the ‘Maputo Development Corridor’, a commercial transmission belt between Gauteng in South Africa and Maputo in Mozambique is an example of this. Through the notion of IMF’s structural adjustment programs the SADC in collaboration with multinational associations consider this particular project to be of great success. Though for the poor and marginalised people whom have been deprive the opportunity to sell fruit and vegetables along the road, due to the corporate contractors ban and tight regulations whereby they are obliged to pay a unreasonable high licence fee for their sales stall, have lost excess to the market and the income keeping food on the table for their children (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2001).

While the regionalisation processes have been effective in certain places of the world such as EU which more or less has become a supranational structure, it has been stumbling in Africa. Murphy and Smith argue that this is a troubling paradox as it is the least developed countries that have the most to gain on such bilateral cooperation. Though the reasons for the difficulties can be ascribed to the fact that the partnering countries have limited fiscal strengths, and concomitant limited finance is available for building such regional structures. But also, such regional structures in developmental regions face resistance both at home from national interest and abroad from hegemonic powers (2002:143). The most important regional IGO in Africa that operates for the good of the whole continent is the African Union (AU). Among the multitude of regional IGOs the AU has in turn recognised especially six additional regional building blocks, namely the; SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, AMU and EAC. These are covering a range of interest which varies from peace and stability, economical growth and development within and across Africa’s five regions (Cilliers, 2005).

Even though these regional IGOs are financial weak and young compared to the EU, they can make out a strong safety and security nexus if enrolled by NATO’s and EU’s ‘Rapid
Deployment Forces’ in order to prevent ethnic conflicts between population groups and states armed forces to escalate into genocides, and when enrolled with the UN’s long term peacemaking and peace-building operations. Though as Cilliers (2005) observes, these theoretical possibilities does not always coincide with the practice on the ground. While a dense network of institutions, ranging from; UN, EU, US, IGOs and regional IGOs are in the making of establishing peacekeeping structures that will prevent large scale ethnic conflicts to break out, there is scant resources set aside for long term peace-building initiatives. Cilliers notes that the reason why half of the countries that emerge from violent conflicts revert to conflict within five years stems from a lack of viable development initiatives. One of the main reasons why a failing country, such as the People’s Republic of Congo which is at the size of Europe is in a continuous state of strife, thus stems from their totally lack of infrastructure and democratic structures which otherwise could contribute in uniting the country (2005:73).

Thandika Mkandawire, whom is the former director of United Nations Research Institute on Social Development, challenges those whom have been arguing that globalisation and democratisation have led to increased developmental growth, stability and security in the developmental countries. While globalisation has benefited the richer areas of the world it has rather inflicted serve problems on Africa. In Mkandawire view, globalisation has contributed to social disharmony, reduced the African states ability and capacity to handle the effects of globalisation, as the many developmental policies from the international community have been proved unsuccessful (2002:4). Mkandawire’s perspective consequently diverges sharply with that of Samuel Huntington and this notion of ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation, as Huntington maintained that there is a causal relationship between globalisation and democratisation, which was ‘blowing like a wind’ across Africa in the 1990s. Huntington further argued that globalisation had the ability to open up economies and societies, facilitate political potentials by global institutions and bringing solidarity from movements in the global civil society to the developing world. In order for African states to turn the disadvantages of globalisation into advantages, Mkandawire maintained that they would have to establish a state-society nexus that would facilitate and promote economical growth and structural transformation (ibid:5).

Notwithstanding that IGOs often have failed with their structural adjustment programs in Africa there are a multitude of other INGOs and NGOs that together with civil society based organisations can contribute significantly in enhancing safety and security within specific
communities through such a state-society nexus. The enrolment of multiple non-state actors as Dupont et al. (2003:345) maintains, should not be looked upon as an attempt to eclipse the weak state, but should rather be looked upon as a manner that can relieve pressure, which subsequent would allow the state to rebuild and enhance both the capacity concomitant the legitimacy of state institutions. Hence, state’s capacity to deliver a minimum amount of human security is a precondition for legitimacy to be built. Goldsmith on the other hand, whom also has been looking into the multitude of non-state actors operating in weak states, has come to a different conclusion. While the scholar recognises the multitude of actors that shape the state of security in different manners, he thus calls for more ‘gray analyses’. Dividing actors into binary distinctions between good and bad actors is thus too simplistic, as both state and non-state actors will at different times in different contexts yield results that would provide human security at one time while in others constrain human security (2003:15). However, Goldsmith comes to the conclusion that the multitude of security agents constitutes a greater danger to the weak state than the positive elements that they can provide. Consequently the scholar maintains that the state should remain primacy in ensuring public safety, despite and because of the alternatives to the state (ibid:18).

It has been shown that a constructive and public good oriented state-society nexus is difficult to establish, as Eldred Masunungure (Appiah et al., 2004) neatly portrays in a Zimbabwean case study of the primordial tendency in the public administration. In traditional western conceptualisation of the state one has got accustomed to think in terms of fair and objective public goods. But in a Zimbabwean context Masunungure observes two publics that operates side by side where the primary goal of the public servants first of all were; self-, family- and tribal interest. While the sovereignty based institutions such as police, judiciary and military are based upon western ideals they have in the process of implementation become disembedded to the cultural values of the society. The primordial public on the other hand is made up by regional and local societal structures that maintain nepotistic traits. The link between these two publics can be found in the private realm, described as the culture of subsistence (ibid:69) referring to an orientation towards the possession and utilization of material goods for the sake of self- and family interest. While the end result as Masunungure concludes is that the private realm encapsulates everything and thereby constitutes the state-society nexus, the pivotal goal must be to construct a multitude of institutions within the civil society that emancipate a shift of state-society nexus from a private realm into that of a polyarchical institutional realm. Whereas the value and prospect for democratic processes lies
within the rule by a multiple though minority opposition (Dahl 1956, referred to in Held, 1998:206).

Though, Wunsch has come to describe the political revolution, which Huntington describes as third wave of democratisation, to have been limited to the centre and re-established the similar institutions that failed Africa in the 1960s. The reason for this the scholar maintains ascribes to the fact that contemporary state centralised structures are ineffective, as they benefit the rich while not being able to collect nor direct the collective money back to the community (2000:500). The elite driven developments in Africa can be viewed upon as a paradox since the major popular movements were working towards three major demands; abolition of the one party state in favour of democratic pluralism, decentralisation of power and greater local autonomy, and respect of human rights and the rule of law (Mafeje, 1998). In order to rectify the imbalance of African state’s, Wunsch maintained that one should rather look towards other structures that have proved its efficiency through slow bottom up processes (2000:505). Hence, civil societies in many African states have proved significantly that they are able to deal with internal conflicts through organising action at the local level.

Boyte (2004) actually argues that Africa and South Africa in particular holds the potential of a global leadership when challenging the dominant technocratic, state-centred, market-oriented understanding of democracy which has been fronted by the United States and Europe. Democracy should not simply be seen as a system of free elections and governmental institutions, but rather as a way of life in which citizens and their participation are at the centre (ibid:1). There are particular three features of everyday productive politics found within the South African society that will have the potential to shift the focus away from the centre and towards the people; one will have to continue building citizens power in communities, which requires that people will learn disciplines of pluralist, practical and non ideological politics. This particular polity will allow for new and various forms of knowledge to be embraced, which in turn will build and enhance citizen capacity, and consequently, this particular type of focus will be productive, problem-solving and public wealth generating by tapping the knowledge and capacity of all sectors of the society (ibid:11). It is within this notion that Wunsch (2000:505) maintains, that the state should draw experience from such processes and build solid local institutions to counterweight for the lack of capacity and proper governance, which the state themselves have generated and consequently should be held accountable for.
3.5 Situating a more holistic governance of human security paradigm within a model

The first section of this chapter was devoted to the governance of security and the observed pluralisation of security governance. Among other things it was argued that security nodes found in multiple of sites does not only provide policing but also conducts it. After having briefly introduced some of consequences stemming hereof, the new paradigm of human security was introduced. As this paradigm put forward four specific conditions that is required to emancipate the shift from state-centred security to a more holistic people-centred security initiative, these four conditions have in one or another way been reflected through the themes of local knowledge and capacity and enrolment of nodes in weak and failing states. Thus in order to summarize how the four conditions put forward by the Commission on Human Security might materialise, the multitude of security nodes located in this chapter has been framed within model (3) beneath.

Model 3: Security Nodes with Prospect to Facilitate Human Security Governance
In order to render possible a ‘people-centred’ and a ‘people defined menace’ policing approach the police will have to become less state-centred. This signifies that not only the provision of security will need to be decentralised and ‘multilateralized’ as already has taken place in the wealthy urban areas, but also to open up for poor and marginalised people to be enrolled in mutual collaborations with the police, and than in such a way that they are able to set the agenda and take part in the decision-making process. ‘Empowerment’ of marginalised people can take several forms. First of all it is vital to set up democratic institutions within specific citizenry, especially among the poor and marginalised in order to allow them a strong and effective democratic voice. This subsequent requires of the institutions to be based upon and provide the constituencies with means to learn pluralist, practical and non ideological politics which thereby would enable them to conduct various forms of problem-solving and public wealth generating activities based upon universal human rights values. It has been argued that the ‘plurality of actors’ such as NGOs and INGOs in particular, but also a range of regional IGOs that takes part in governing the security of weak states should not be deemed entirely negative, but to the contrary, as something that can alleviate the pressure upon the state and provide an environment that can help rebuild state capacity. Thus when establishing democratic institutions within the poor and marginalised communities, a nexus with the human right based NGOs and INGOs might create the best means for human security governance.
4.0 Methodology

This chapter will provide an account of the methodological approach of this study. The research question and the purpose of the study will be guiding the choice of research design, which can be thought of as an overall structure and orientation that provides a spectre of research techniques for which data can be collected and analysed (Bryman, 2000). In the following, the research question and variables will be introduced. Subsequently there will be an elaboration of the data foundation, the qualitative case study design, and the research techniques of document analysis and an open-ended interview structure. The main focus of this chapter will be on how the study was designed, and what kind of strengths and limitations that lies within how it was conducted.

4.1 Research question, variables and limitations

The theoretical conceptualisation of security governance was in the previous chapter employed as a phenomenon that both contradicts and provide theoretical means to break out of the traditional state/public and private/civil society dichotomy within the national and international domain. Instead of upholding that security ought to be governed through a state-centred paradigm, it was rather argued that contemporary security should be conceived as governed through multifaceted nodal networks in which many of these nodes are decoupled from the state-centred locus.

The research question that has been guiding the empirical studies consequently attempts to figure out:

“To what extent is security in South Africa governed through a multitude of nodes, what signifies the characteristic appearance of these nodal configurations, and subsequently what is the prospect for human security governance?”

This research question is divided into three sub questions. In order to provide answer to the first sub question there has been conducted a documental analysis that have sought to portray the governmental policies and the effect that these polices have had on actors found within the civil society and private sphere to take part in the governance of security. The answers for the
second sub question is provided by two conducted case studies. This question serves two purposes: first of all it indicates the utility of the nodal theory and the technique of nodal mapping in the provision of sound data that other data collection techniques would not be able to render; and secondly the data that is being gathered signifies each nodes ability to govern independently and together with other nodes in a larger security network. The question thereby provides answers that are needed in order to state, though in general terms, how private actors and community based organisations are able to take on not only the provision of security but also the auspice of it. The third sub question is based upon the answers provided by the two latter sub questions, in which the prospect of human security primarily is shaped by the governments willingness to provide policing that is more people-centred and to devolve a larger share of the agenda setting and decision making to segments of the society whom to this date have had little ability to influence the course of event. This consequently signifies that the focus upon human security governance will mainly be concentrated around the poor and marginalised constituencies’ ability to take part in governing their own security in cooperation with other state and non-state nodal actors.

A node as argued within the theoretical chapter portrays four features which in turn can indicate their ability and strength to govern, in order to recap:

- Mentalities are ways of thinking about the matters that the node has emerged to govern;
- Technologies are methods for exerting influence over the course of events at issues;
- Resources are means that supports the operation of a node and the exertion of influence;
- And the institutional structure enables the directed mobilisation of resources, mentalities and technologies over time (Burris et al., 2005; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood and Dupont, 2006b).

When conducting the research for the two latter empirical case studies it is these four essential characteristics that constituted the variables of the study. The purpose of the research has been to map out governing nodes within these cases, and then to investigate the nodes in terms of the four variables which subsequent provided evidence of their ability to take part and shape the governance of security. This manner of working within a nodal frame is aligned, though it is not as extensive as devised by the nodal scholars whom are in the process of taking a grounded theory approach (see especially, Dupont, 2006; Wood, 2006).
In the theoretical chapter there was put forward a model consisting of four quadrants reflecting the theoretical constrains it operates under. Quadrant 1: national versus state sphere. Quadrant 2: national versus society sphere. Quadrant 3: international versus society sphere. Quadrant 4: international versus state sphere. Employing all these spheres have been of particular importance for the theoretical scope of this thesis. But the international theoretical scope has to a certain extent been limited within the empirical research. It has been restricted to depict how international security policies have been transferred from an international, often Anglo-American origin, to a South African context and by looking into how a limited amount of foreign actors contributes in the governance of security. It was also decided not to conduct interviews with the community based organisations situated in rural areas, due to time and resource limitations, this weakness has been sought compensated by making use of other scholars’ interview findings. An additional demarcation refers to the employment of direct observations as a research technique. Even though I have been living, working and spending much of the time (15 months in total) in one of the case units, I have decided not to make use of this as a research technique. The reason to this refers to the fact that much of the time spent in the community happened prior to the decision of making it one of the cases, and for this reason much of the procedures that this technique is based upon have not been carried out.

4.2 Qualitative versus quantitative designs

Quantitative research designs do typically prefer width, by studying many units with relative few variables. Qualitative research designs on the other hand would rather concentrate on few units with a limited spectre of variables (Creswell, 2003). Grønmo (1996) argues that the concept of qualitative and quantitative methods first of all refer to characteristics of the data being collected and analysed. Characteristics of qualitative studies can briefly be summarised as follows; ability to make notice of the subject position, it acknowledge that reality is socially constructed, sensitivity towards the cultural context, it allows for the phenomenon to develop over time, and it is flexible as hypothesis and categories are developed during and after the study have taken place. Last but not least, it opens up for a wide array of techniques to be used, such as field notes from observation, different types of interviews and information withdrawn from various types of documents (Bryman, 2000:136-138).

Scholars being critical towards qualitative studies have argued that it is unscientific, as it is not rooted in physical laws and therefore cannot be re-examined, and that it is biased as result
of the close research contact which pose the risk of transferring his/her own values over to the study object (Ringdal, 2001). Others have come to describe this strategy as quantititative, but with text rather than numbers. Bryman (2000:168-169) discards this statement as he argues that qualitative research first of all upholds a different set of believes of how one can study social change that will provide a different type of knowledge. Pure forms of either qualitative or quantitative research do not necessary provide with the means to study the genuine phenomenon in depth. Various scholars (Bryman, 2000:; Creswell, 2003:; Grønmo, 1996) argue that a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods can be beneficial as it holds the potential to outweigh the weakness within single methods, and thereby will provide a richer data foundation.

When trying to weight whether this study should take on qualitative or quantitative research strategies, this decision has to be grounded within the research question and the overall purpose of the study. In order to study the phenomenon of security by using the features of nodes, the intention has been to make use of these four variables and investigate how they manifest themselves within various nodes that can be said to take part in governing security. Because of the predefined variables originating from nodal features, and the overall close link to an already established theory, this research becomes an explanatory study. This particular study is known to be based on a more structured design. Whereas the researcher do not start out with limited knowledge of the phenomenon, but rather operates out of a relatively precise research question, and subsequently chooses his/her research techniques in relation to it (Thagaard, 2003:16).

Even though concepts such as extent and variables usually are being refuted within qualitative strategies, as these portrays quantitative connotations, it will be claimed that the design and the various techniques being employed within this research are firmly grounded within the qualitative tradition. Thagaard (2003:167) argues that qualitative categories depict a clear lexical content and therefore cannot be divided into variables which indicate clearly defined and uniform categories. Yin (2003:3) seems to take a less stringent approach as the scholar maintains that even though case studies traditionally have been grounded within qualitative strategies, an explanatory case study design provides the means to include both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Thus the type of words and concepts used in this thesis will be originating both from qualitative and quantitative traditions, and therefore diverge from the most stringent qualitative tradition.
4.3 A multiple embedded case design

Various scholars treat case study and qualitative research as synonyms because they both seek to construct representations based on in-depth and detailed knowledge withdrawn from cases as unites of analysis. Bryman (2000:170) on the other hand treats qualitative research and case study as two different designs. The reason for this is that while qualitative research always refers to specific characteristics of the data, case studies often make use of quantitative research methods.

According to Bryman (2000:30) a case study can be understood as; “detailed examination of one or a small number of cases”. Yin’s (2003:13) definition is slightly broader when arguing; “an empirical inquiry that investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. The definition indicates that case studies are ideal for the purpose of retrieving data when there is a reason for suspecting that knowledge can be found within the contextual condition.

As previously elaborated, how governance of security is being perceived and conducted by nodes within the international, national, public, private and civil society domain can be understood in terms of the four specific abstract concepts: mentalities, institutions, technologies and resources, which constitute the variables of this study. Instead of perceiving the units as individuals or various entities as described by Yin (ibid:22-24), the units will interchangeably be referred to in terms of nodes/units/actors all depending on the context.

Since the individuals within the nodes and the nodes themselves often can be said to be unaware of how the variables affects their ability to conduct security, its ability to do so can be found within the context and environment of the particular node. It might therefore be reasonable to argue that by approaching the nodes in terms of a multiple embedded case study, and by triangulating various techniques it will be a better strategy than merely making use of a single strategy.

The three units which make up the cases of this study have been chosen intentionally. The first documental analytical case refers to the manner in which public officials come to reason about how to solve security problems that often seems to be based upon foreign policies and experiences portrayed as best practices and universal solutions. These are policies that South Africa has adopted in full or partly. While the first case establishes a background picture of
the various security policies that have been implemented, the two other cases highlights the
pre-assumed links and their dependency to the state structures, with the intention of
explaining how security in urban and rural areas relate to the state/public and civil
society/private distinction.

Yin argues that there are different ways of categorising the case study design. The scholar
makes distinctions between the study of single and multiple cases, and between holistic and
embedded case designs (2003:40). This case study has been structured as a multiple
embedded case design. This is because it has more than one level of analysis in which two of
the latter cases have independently subunits. The reason to this ascribes to the phenomenon of
security being an overall research topic, while the variables chosen will be investigated within
the independent cases, and where these cases again are divided into subunits embedded into
the independent case. Whilst the research topic embraces all units of the research they will
however differ in terms of public, urban and rural contextualisation.

The Observatory case is structured into four governing nodes; the Observatory Civic
Association, a node constituted by two police related forums, a private security provider that
operates in Observatory, and two private security providers that are both based and operates in
Observatory. Within the Cape Winelands District case there has been structured two nodes; a
civil society based conflict resolution organisation, known as CPP’s Zwelethemba model, and
a governmental Community Safety Forum. When choosing these cases this was done with the
purpose of providing contradictory cases, cases that it was reasonable to assume would
portray distinct patterns of security governance. Thereby the choice of the particular cases
were not based upon the interest of replication that holds the potential of predicting similar
results, but rather cases that could predict contrasting results but for predictable reasons
(ibid:47). When making use of multiple case studies in the manner which is being done here,
the goal is that the explanation can be generalised across the individual cases, as it explains
the phenomenon of interest and stipulates assumed casual links. One of the strengths of
explanatory studies refers to the fact that it can be used to contest the theory the study its
based upon (ibid:120-123).

Yin (ibid:45) warns that there are pitfalls within this design as the various units can become
the main level of analysis and the researcher thereby fails to return to the larger unit of
analysis. Elements within the nodal governance theory make this less likely to occur as the
theory emphasis that security is governed as result of coordination and integration within and among nodes at different locations. The strength and capacity of one particular node therefore needs to be viewed in relation to other nodes and to the overall security context. Conducting multiple embedded case designs is an ambitious approach, though when successfully structured and carried out it can provide significant and sound research. Analytical conclusions that arise independently from multiple cases will therefore weight stronger than conclusions arising from a single case. If one is able to argue a common conclusion irrespective of the varied context that these cases are situated in the ability to generalise on behalf of the findings will be strengthened (ibid:53).

4.4 Data foundation

In the process of gathering data, what to be regarded relevant is dependent upon focus and insight into the research topic. The thoroughly conducted literature research yielded a solid theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of security in general and within the South African context in particular. The relatively broad research conducted prior to the fieldwork rendered possible the means to structure a precise research question, which have benefited the data collecting activity during the nine months of fieldwork. As Hart (2001) argues, literature search is of grave importance because it helps the researcher to get an oversight of the background literature. Thus by knowing the background literature one is capable of framing the research topic and research question to a theoretical field. But also a proper literature research will prevent one from replicating previous studies and thereby enhance the potential of cumulative research (Hellevik, 1999).

When conducting a multiple embedded case study as done here there is a broad array of research techniques that can be employed simultaneously, such as documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003). Though, scholars differ in terms of how they structure these techniques, such as Creswell (2003) who classify the techniques into four groups: observation, interview, documents and audiovisual materials. Because single techniques have both strengths and weaknesses there have been chosen a mix of two techniques that have the potential to counterweight each others weaknesses. Documents and archive data have been subsumed into one technique in accordance to Creswell (2003) and there has been conducted open-ended interviews in terms of Yin (2003).
4.4.1 Documental analysis as research technique

Documents used as a technique with the purpose of collecting data serves different purposes; it can be used in terms of broadening the theoretical scope, and thereby contribute in forming the research topic and question, or it can be used in more specific ways to get detailed knowledge of a particular phenomenon. The link between literature search and collecting documents can often seem to be floating, though the main difference is whether the documents are collected prior or during the fieldwork. But it should be acknowledged that the process of collecting data during the fieldwork can have substantial influence on the research question and the preliminary ideas of the phenomenon possessed by the researcher. A multitude of documents can be of interest when conducting a documental analysis, such as memorandums, various types of reports, administrative documents, previous evaluations and studies, newspaper clippings and various types of restricted information (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003).

The literature search for this study provided a relatively good theoretical insight of the phenomenon of security, conceptualised in narrow terms as policing and in a broader human security notion. However in order to answer the research question it was of necessity to conduct a documental analysis of how the concept of security has evolved in the post apartheid South Africa. It was assumed that the knowledge from this analysis could provide a deeper understanding of how security has been governed in the general South African context and consequently to facilitate both of the two latter empirical cases.

With the assistance of Clifford Shearing, I was granted access to the criminology library at University of Cape Town. The document search commenced with a broad search on policing though it was too broad as it retrieved a couple of thousand hits on their computer system. The search was therefore limited to the community policing policy which has been the predominant policing policy in the post apartheid period. This produced approximately two hundred hits, which then was skimmed through and a hundred of the most relevant documents was chosen. The documents were categorised in terms of their origin, date and author. When analysing the documents three main documents were identified: policy documents originating from national, provincial and local government, research documents which are claiming to have been based on empirical studies and theoretical papers often based upon normative perspectives.
What can be said to have strengthening and limiting effects when having in mind how the
documental analysis was conducted? When screening the hits from the document search at the
criminology library half of the relevant documents were removed. This was necessary in order
to reducing the workload as time to do the documental analysis was limited. Also, if it had
been decided to review an even greater amount of documents this might have affected the
quality of the work. But then again, by reviewing these hundred documents to what extent
would it be possible to grasp the deeper meaning of these documents? The defence of this
choice of screening refers to the intention of the research not being indented to be an in-depth
documental analysis, but more of a superficial search that would provide the means to
comprehend how the governance of security has been evolving within the designated
timeframe. The selection process is a task which easily can become biased because of
incomplete collections or merely because the researcher lacks knowledge of the field (Yin,
2003). Though in general terms documents can be said to be stable as they can be
reinvestigated by other scholars, they are created external to the researchers own intentions
and the documents covers a long time span of many events, cases and setting. Besides, if the
documents are academically published work there are also good reasons to assume that they
are based upon empirical research, even though one cannot always take this as a matter of fact
(Creswell, 2003).

A potential weakness with the use of documents, refers to the fact that the present use of the
documents can differ from the purpose and context in which the data was collected by the
previous researcher (Thagaard, 2003). In order to level this weakness it is especially important
to question ones own ability to be critical towards the sources, the specific documents and the
specific zeitgeist it has been written in. When analysing these documents there is a demand
for an unspecified amount of cultural competence and historic knowledge (Neumann, 2002),
which is especially pressing since the documents spans over a period of nearly two decades
with continuous transformation. My own cultural knowledge is limited to have been living
and working as a student in South Africa over two periods for 15 months in total. It is very
difficult to weight ones own cultural competence and to evaluate to what extent one knows
enough about the South Africa history. But by being humble and by confronting my
assumptions through dialogues with South Africans I have sought to compensate for the lack
of historic and cultural understanding.
Another critical element within the employed documents refers to the fact that these library and archival documents are not easily accessible for everyone, which in turn makes it difficult to re-examine the presented discoveries. But also the very nature of secondary data, data which is collected and analysed by another researcher and for a different purpose, makes it difficult both in terms of time, resources and ability to check the reliability and validity of the previous work (Bryman, 2000).

4.4.2 Interviews as research technique

Essential limitations with documental analysis as a research technique refers to its inability to tap into the present situation since many of the documents are old. Besides, documents provide a certain type of information, which not always will highlight how people feel, think and reason about the present phenomenon. Thagaard (2003) argues that interviews as a technique is particularly suited to provide data that indicates how the informants understand the experiences and events that have affected their lives. Yin (2003) argues that interviews constitute an important technique for data collection within case studies. Interviews in terms of a guided conversation will help the researcher get access to hidden information, which would not be detected in more structured interviews or in terms of survey based strategies.

It was therefore decided to conduct several interviews that would provide data that not easily were obtained through the documental analysis. All in all fifteen interviews were conducted, though almost the doubled was planned but cancelled in the last minute by the informant. The intention was that the various interviews first of all should cover the two latter empirical case studies. It was also strived for setting up interviews that could shed light on how the international level, and especially among the actors representing quadrant 3. Three main sectors were interviewed: entities within Observatory, officials within the Cape Winelands District, and an NGO and its founder. Within Observatory it was focused on two main units; representatives from the Observatory Civic Association and representatives from the three main private security companies within the community. There were also conducted three additional interviews within Observatory with the purpose of contesting the information from the two units. These informants were the leader of the Community Police Forum, and the previous and present elected councillor of ward 54, which Observatory is constituted under. In the Cape Winelands District three interviews were conducted; one with the Deputy Provincial Commissioner of South African Police Service and with two of the officials in charge of Disaster Management Unit and Community Safety Forum. Within the last case unit there
were conducted three interviews. Two of them were directly linked to the NGO sector while one interview was linked to a founder, the Finnish Embassy whom has been highly involved in funding community based organisations with the purpose of strengthening the democratic dialogue originating from the civil society sphere.

The interview guide that was created can be defined as a qualitative research interview. This particular interview technique is based upon a partly structured, open-ended interview approach, where the themes are determined prior to the interview, but allowing the sequence and span of topics to be shifting from interview to interview. This technique is seen to improve the communication between the informant and researcher, taking shape of a dialogue rather than an artificial structured question – answer process (Yin, 2003). The guide was structured to highlight the interviewees’ thoughts, ideas and experiences based upon the four variables. In order for the informants to reflect around these variables they had to be operationalised into questions which directly links their position to the field of study. The questions framed within the interview guide were therefore also slightly different all depending on what kind of unit the informants represented.

Interview as a technique of gathering information have both strengthening and limiting effects. Creswell (2003) argues that the main advantages of the interview technique has to be seen in relation to what kind of information that is possible to obtain through the use of this technique, as it will give the researcher histories of events that have happened and provide information that cannot be directly observed by the researcher. Yin (2003) on the other hand emphasise that by doing interviews it allows the researcher to focus directly on the case study topic. The main weaknesses of the technique refer mainly to the interaction between the respondent and the researcher. Question asked are of critical importance, as they have to be clear and precise leaving limited room for misunderstanding. Inaccurate asked questions holds the potential for informants and researcher to talk at cross-purposes. There is also a risk of reflexivity, which takes place when informants are giving the researcher what he thinks he wants. The risk of reflexivity can be equalised by good informant-researcher relationship, built upon trust and a common understanding of what the researcher actually desire from the informant. One of the active ways in which trust was sought to be enhanced was by stopping the tape recorder when the informants desired so, or by self-initiative when the informant indicated that the information was of sensitive character that he would not like to be on tape.
When the interviews were conducted it was put particular attention towards the fact that the interviewer was an outsider looking in, trying to grasp how the informants considered the best means to security being attained. The perspectives of anonymity and voluntary commitments was always stressed in order enhance the working relationship, but also at means to provide genuine information, as a safeguard towards reflexivity. While Creswell (2003) takes the tendency of indirect information filtered through the views of the informants as something negative and limiting, there are reasons to presume that this can be of strengthening effects in this research. Hence, it is the informants personal perspectives that will provide the most fertile information of how security is being perceived, what constitute the challenges to attain security, and what role the informants pose in such ordering.

The setting where most of the interviews were conducted was either on common ground, in cafés and restaurants, or at the informants own office. When selecting the location it was always of the informants choosing. Since this affected the way the interviews were conducted in some distinct ways it might be worth mentioning one interview in particular. This interview was conducted on a Saturday in one of the more popular café’s in Observatory and the informant was the Safety and Security portfolio chairman who previously was the chairman of Observatory Civic Association. The chairman is one of the more prominent beneficiaries for the community, as he has devoted much time and resources into the community. The interview guide had been structured in such a way that it would cover the most important topics within one hour. But as the interview elapsed into the second hour people started to join in around the table. In the third hour of the interview it had more or less taken the shape of a focus group. Present were the owner of the café, previous councillor of the ward, leader of the Observatory Business Forum and others who came and went as they had been able to voice their concerns regarding the many safety and security problems in Observatory. What this event first of all indicates is the peoples’ genuine interest in making their community safer, but also the prominence safety and security holds, being embedded in all fractions of their lives. Safety and security is on everybody’s mind, how to be ‘safety consciousness’ constitute their lives in terms of specific ways of thinking, organising daily routines and different means of making sure that themselves, their families, their loved ones, and their residence are safe for all man made threats.

When figuring out whom to interview the decision was based upon what kind of information the informants were able to provide. First of all the informants had to represent a node of
interest. Secondly, they had to possess a central position within the unit, and being able to speak on behalf of the unit. Such strategic sampling can therefore be said to portray traces of theoretical and convenience sampling techniques (Thagaard, 2003). Theoretical because the choice of informants is based upon what kind of information it was likely that they would provide, information which then serves the means of highlighting the elements of the nodal governance theory within the research. Though also in terms of convenience sampling, as it was difficult to find informants that were willing to devote sufficient time to the interview. Especially was it difficult to make appointments with public officials. Most of the fifteen cancelled interviews were planned and a date was agreed upon with over a week notice, but when the day came it was either postponed or they did not show up at all. This has created a skew sample, with fewer interviews than anticipated within the Cape Winelands District and police officials in Observatory. Although this constitutes a severe weakness for this case there has been sought to compensate for this weakness by collecting additional documentation directly from those nodes that cancelled the interviews.

4.5 Validity, reliability and ethical considerations of the research and its findings

Within quantitative based designs validity and reliability is often used to indicate and evaluate the quality of the research. Validity is commonly referred to as the truth of the research, thereby indicating if one measures the social phenomenon that was intended to be measured. Reliability on the other hand refers to the level of trustworthiness of the research, indicating if the measurements of the phenomenon were repeated it would provide equal results (Ringdal, 2001). Researchers using qualitative strategies often have come to argue that these inquiring techniques are inadequate as they are being associated with quantitative measurements and thereby less able emphasize the specific qualitative approach. While quantitative studies provide thin descriptions, descriptions that only describes what is being observed, qualitative studies ought to provide thick descriptions. These descriptions do not only describe the phenomenon being observed but also interprets it. This is done by including what the informants have meant with their statement; including the informants own self interpretation of the situation and also the researcher’s interpretation of the phenomenon (Thagaard, 2003). The latter scholar have argued that instead of using the concepts of reliability, validity and generalisation one should rather be using the concepts of credibility, corroboratively and transferability (ibid:21). These concepts corresponds with those put forward by Marshall and Rossman (1989), and Lincoln and Guba (1985). As these authors argues that instead of
thinking in terms of internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity one should rather think of these in terms of: credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability.

Yin (2003:36) argues that internal validity cannot be used in descriptive and exploratory studies because it refers to establishing causal relationships which only can be done within explanatory and causal studies. Credibility, on the other hand, refers to whether the subject was accurately identified and described. The base foundation for enhancing credibility is often grounded in the interaction between the informants and researcher. One of the elements that can have contributed in limiting the case study’s credibility refers to the choice of location. When conducting the interviews in public spaces this can have made the informants more cautious to the information he or she was revealing. But on the other hand this can also be said to have strengthening effect as they might be able to speak without restraint, knowing that colleagues cannot do eavesdropping.

The concept of transferability refers to the relevance of one set of findings and the ability to generalise this to another context. It thereby combines both construct validity and external validity. The former quality measurement Yin (2003:35) argues are being grounded in the data collection process by using multiple source of evidence and by establishing a chain of evidence. Data triangulation has therefore been achieved by employing a mix of documents, archive documents and interviews. Prior to the fieldwork the literature search provided a multitude of books, articles from a spectre of journals and website information, during the fieldwork the documental analysis provided more specific and detailed knowledge. In addition to the interviews that were carried out there was gathered supplementary information directly from the informants during and after the interview on topics that had been discussed. These documents often took shapes of policy proposals, various information brochures and official reports. Even though it has been difficult to get most informants to review interviews transcripts, there has been some success in building solid relationship open for dialogue with some key informants. Hence, by doing this it confines the potential of falsely reporting events and other misunderstandings. The latter scholar further argues that it is of importance to build a chain of evidence (ibid.). It has been sought to construct a chain of evidence by selecting the four variables grounded within the nodal governance theory, for then to continuously linking the four variables which security is seen to be governed through with the case study, both within and between the cases and their subunits. In other words, by gathering, comparing and
analysing a broad spectre of information it has been sought to increase the construct validity of this study.

External validity, on the other hand, is grounded within the use of single versus multiple case study designs. The scope of study thereby indicates whether it is possible to generalize on behalf of the case studies being conducted (ibid:37). An embedded multiple case study design provides the opportunity of looking into how security is being governed through the means of the four variables. By contrasting how this is being done within and between the three cases and their underlying subunits, it can be said to have strengthening effect on the level of external validity. Quantitative researchers tend to argue that case studies have limited potential in delivering conclusions that can be generalized (Creswell, 2003:195). Yin (2003:53) on the other hand argues that by having two or more cases one strengthens the analytical potential, hence analytical conclusions arising out of two or more cases will weight stronger than conclusions arising out of one case. The fact that the urban and rural cases were conducted within different cultural and societal contexts can be argued to strengthen the external validity. The parallels that were found would therefore strengthen the ability to generalize beyond the immediate case study and thereby also strengthening the nodal governance theory. In addition to replicating the research in different contexts one must also look for conformability which refers to the degree one can find support for the findings in studies conducted by others. Even though this case study has been conducted independently it portrays dyadic features by linking these findings to those of others, especially from various scholars within the nodal governance perspective, but also in the process of collecting data. Much of the data that have been used stems from the work of this thesis’s supervisors and their work in Zwelethemba and data collected by two independent researchers from the NGO sector.

As the purpose behind the evaluation criteria of reliability refers to minimizing errors and biases in the research, it is of importance that the procedures have been thoroughly described and sufficient documentation being added. Throughout this methodological chapter the various data collection techniques and procedures have been described in detail. These techniques have been criticised in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, but also in relation to how it has been accomplished. In order for others whom might be interested to contest the results presented there has been made a separation between those documents that have been publicised in books, journals and at different internet hosts, from those documents which
stems from archive records, news clippings and segments of the documental analysis. Hence, the latter documents are often not published and many of them have been for internal use only. In addition, the interview guide and the list of the informants will be attached. Reliability Creswell (2003:195) argues, have gained limited space in traditional qualitative research. One of the ways that reliability can be obtained is by checking for consistent patterns of themes within the research among follow researching scholars. Though, as this research is conducted by the author alone this ability falls short. But since this study is one among several that make use of the similar variables it is possible to look at other studies for this consistency of themes.

Throughout this chapter, issues that can be linked to ethical questions have been highlighted. The primary concerns within ethical perspectives refer both to protection of the informants and how the researcher makes use of this information. As previously stated, informants were always given the chance to obtain anonymity. There were none however who did this, though they often provided information that they did not wanted to be quoted on. To what extent the information used in the thesis refers directly to the informants will be weighted in terms of ethical considerations. In the process of writing this thesis some key informants have been used in order to prevent biased and faulty information to be presented. This has been especially important when writing on pending policies and policies recently being implemented, as the ability to verify and contradict this information from other sources have been limited. Because of my limited experience in doing case studies and writing on topics that have the potential of being harmful for the informants, various ethical considerations have been stressed in dialogues with the supervisor of this project, whom has an extensive experience with such considerations.
5.0 The democratic consequences related to the shift from RDP to GEAR

This chapter will provide a brief introduction of two major governmental policies that have affected the democratic post apartheid South Africa in some distinct ways. The main purpose is to provide an account for those turning points transforming the democratic bottom up centred development approach into that of a top down centred one. In the process of doing this it is particularly two South African policies that is of interest; the closure of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) and the arrival of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. The introduction of the latter program marks a significant shift towards a neo-liberalistic policy approach that had and still has a detrimental effect on the majority of the South African constituencies. Alongside of this neo-liberalistic trend it will be argued that a new and more effective type of apartheid sprung up, known as socio-spatial apartheid. By displaying the South African context in such a way this chapter will provide background information which the subsequent chapters will have to be seen in relation to.

5.1 Post apartheid South Africa in flux between national and international alignments

Apartheid in South African became institutionalised by a fragmentation of geographically and politically divides. Racial and ethnically segregation facilitated through the implementation of homeland policy made sure that people categorised as black or coloured gained limited or no civil rights, access to employment and to state resources (Tapscott, 1999). When the apartheid state ceased to exist in April 1994, this constituted the end of three centuries of colonial conquest and a century of white minority rule. South Africa went from being an authoritarian, repressive and oligarchic, towards a continuously strive to become democratic, developmental and committed to create a culture of human rights (ibid.). It is difficult to comprehend the South African post apartheid period without keeping in mind the history of the past. Though there is limited space for such a review here, it should be acknowledged that much of the success, failures and continuous struggle for a democratic state are framed within the structural dispositions of the past (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001).

Since the mid 1970s South Africa experienced a deep and enduring multi-faceted crisis, in terms of economically, politically and ideologically strife. While much of the politically and ideologically issues can be said to have been left behind as the transition to democracy manifested itself, economical rearrangements conducted in this period have forwarded the
skewed economical dispositions to the advantage of the minority white working class, small farmers and business people. This consequently took place as the transition was being negotiated from above by elites whom thereby ensured the continuation of the free market system (Tapscott, 1999:306).

While most democratic states throughout the world opposed the apartheid regime for their suppression of the majority, others were far more reluctant to criticise the regime due to their own financial interest. It was first when the Johannesburg stock market crashed and the concomitance economical crisis mounting in 1985 that grand scale negotiation took form. In accordance to Pilger (2006) it was not the gruesome suppression of people that led the United States to put pressure upon the regime, but rather that the regime was not able to meet its obligations from the US funders. The US whom to this stage had vetoed most UN Security Council resolutions against the regime now considered it as bad for business. In September that year the first out of several secret meetings between international businesses stakeholders, such as the Anglo American Corporation and ANC elites were held. The central outcome of this meeting was the mutual understanding that a transition from apartheid to a black governed liberal democracy only was possible if order and stability were guaranteed. In the years to come between November 1987 and May 1990 the agreement on how the transition would elapse was struck in secrecy between elite members of the apartheid regime and ANC, in which Thabo Mbeki, now president of South Africa, took part (ibid.).

5.1.1. From a social developmental RDP to a neo-liberal developmental GEAR

When Nelson Mandela and the ANC won the first democratic election in 1994, it was made an unbreakable promise to see through the policy platform of the RDP. A program that was built upon the ANC’s Freedom Charter of 1955, as it states; “We the People of South Africa, declare that our country belongs to everyone and that all our people shall share in the wealth. The land shall be shared among those who work it. There shall be houses, security and the right to work” (ANC, 1955) Consequently, the RDP (ANC, 1994) was built upon six political and economical interlinked philosophical principles: an integrated and sustainable programme, which is people-driven, that provides peace and security for all, through nation-building, linking reconstruction and development in order to deepen the democracy of South Africa.

The primacy of the RDP was nation-building and under this umbrella reconstruction and development were to take stage. In order to enable these processes there was made an
essential provision for community based organisations and NGOs within the RDP. These latter types of organisations were to work with the emerging democratic local authorities in order to establish minimum conditions of good governance and to implement effective development projects. Though, the role of these community based structures was not solely to be passive implementation agencies, but to take actively part in the planning of these projects. Within the frameset of the RDP a vibrant and independent civil society was essential to the democratisation of the South African society, and by enrolling these organisations there were sought to nurture their conduct. Democracy was consequently not to be confined to periodic elections. It was rather looked upon as an active process whereby everyone should be enabled, through a people-centred approach, to contribute in the reconstruction and development of their country (ibid.).

In the years to come the RDP received substantial criticism as it portrayed itself more in terms of a state of mind, a philosophy, rather than an actual program. Bond (2000b:91) argues that there are at least three ways of reading the RDP; from the left as a socialist perspective, from the centre as a corporatist perspective and from the right as a neo-liberal perspective. Each philosophical school emphasised and contested the principles of the program based on their ideology. Hence, while the socialist emphasised the people-centred and driven developmental elements, this was contested by the corporatist and the neo-liberalist, undermined by politicians, bureaucrats and private entities. The neo-liberalist welcomed the RDP’s fiscal, monetary and trade policies as they opened up for foreign trade and investment by creating investor confidence. But they were nevertheless sceptical towards the ANC because they feared that the RDP could intervene with the market forces, by forcing the private companies to cross subsides from rich to poor customers (ibid:91-92).

Even though Mandela’s intention with the program truly was both nationalistic and socialistic only few years passed before South Africa’s foreign and domestic policies took the shape of a neo-liberalistic ‘best practice’. The man in charge for this shift was first of all Thabo Mbeki and a small group of men around him, such as Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and Trade Minister Alec Erwin. Mbeki whom fled the country, for since settling in Britain where he got his Masters degree in economics at Sussex University in 1966, where chosen by Mandela to become the deputy president after the 1994 election. Both before and after Mbeki was one of the key advisers of Mandela, in which there is little doubt whether his Anglo-American education influenced Mandela.
Pilger (2006:219) maintains that this ring of men were responsible for taking the most critical decisions that led to a shift of focus away from the nationalistic and socialistic development plan pledged in the RDP. In 1992 they convinced Mandela to drop nationalisation; in 1993 they convinced Mandela to endorse the apartheid regime’s agreement to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to repay the foreign debt of $25 billion which ironically had been borrowed by the apartheid regime to buy military materiel to suppress the black majority; and in 1995 to abolish exchange controls which allowed wealthy whites to take their capital overseas, and later that year South Africa’s biggest privatised natural resource companies were allowed to shift nationality and set up in London.

In April 1996, shortly before the neo-liberal GEAR strategy was introduced, the RDP office was quietly closed down and the budget transferred to the finance ministry and the deputy president. Mbeki argued that the GEAR strategy was a continuation of the RDP. Though, if this was accurate it had to be a continuation of the neo-liberal elements of the latter program, as GEAR more or less stands out as a quantum leap from the socialist RDP. The GEAR strategy did not come up for referendum, but was a result of a series of behind the scenes meetings between economists within the ANC government and representatives from the World Bank and the IMF. By introducing GEAR the focus shifted from micro to macro-economical perspectives. While the government previously had taken on a strong interventionist role in terms of growth through redistribution, the introduction of GEAR led the government to adopt a more orthodox enabling role in accordance to the ‘Washington consensus’ (Dollery and Wallis, 1999:4). Defenders of the GEAR policy claimed that it would create economical growth from domestic and foreign investment, concomitant to stimulating a growth of employment. However, in the four year period after the neo-liberal economic reform had been introduced, more than a half a million people lost their jobs, contradictory to the 600,000 it was meant to create (Carmody, 2002:256).

Steven Friedman (1998) maintains that the GEAR policy has received sound criticism from the left in terms of the increasing gap between the rich in urban areas and the poor in rural areas. Other critical voices from the left have argued that the policy have mainly enriched a handful of people. The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy has failed for almost the same reason, as a handful of former liberation heroes, known as ‘the struggle aristocracy” have been the primary beneficiaries. In 2000 Bond (2000b:39) argued that BEE only was a
tool for white companies as they employed black faces which they paid off by limited shears in the company enabling them to take on outsourced contract with the government.

After the GEAR strategy was launched in June 1996 the locus and appearance of democracy started to change. In order to govern the fiscal policies which were meant to capacitate local and provincial government, power became centralised under auspice of the national government. In addition to the reduction of local autonomy, new partnerships between national government and the private sector were forged which among other things materialised into the introduction of BEE. As a result of this Mbeki’s new democratic forefront became the arising black (upper) middle class, and not ordinary constituencies and their community based organisations. Hence, the community based organisations which previously had been looked upon as the key facilitators towards the deepening of democracy were seen to become depleted due to human resources and fiscal constrains. Consequently, the poor and marginalised constituencies’ ability to exercise democracy as a way of life became restrained to the use of the ballot box on the day of election. As a result of the GEAR strategy, democracy and accountability is not balanced between power and citizenship. Accountability has shifted upwards and not downwards to the people, as representatives and presidents have become accountable to powerful elites and international interest (IDASA, 2005).

5.1.2. Towards a socio-spatial apartheid structure

Whether South Africa should adapt to an ideal form of modern European states, or towards western state structures in general were highly debated early in the transition period. Thus, the South African government has been attempting to compromise between globalisation and a social democracy. In contrast to other developing countries in Africa, South Africa has been given relative leeway from the IMF and the World Bank to develop their own development strategies as a result of their relatively low levels of foreign depth (Carmody, 2002). In 1996 Mbeki made a speech in the Constitutional Assembly of South Africa where he announced “I am an African”, this statement has been linked to the emotional, ideological and political elements constituting the idea of African Renaissance. The notion of African Renaissance touches upon all areas of human endeavour; political, economical, social, technical, environmental and cultural. It has been argued that it makes out a third way between globalisation and social democracy, balancing between international demands and embracing the cultural values, norms and identity of the African society. Mbeki thereby nurtures the idea
of a prosperous and developed Africa have to be solved from within, by Africa’s own ideas and values, and not being dictated from above. And by doing this he attempts to bring new faith to South Africa and to the whole African continent (Bongmba, 2004; Vale and Maseko, 1998).

Even though Mbeki seems to argue that he is staking out a third way between global, hence neo-liberalistic fiscal policies and a social democracy, hence a domestic interventionist development strategy, his starkest opponents seems to disagree. Patrick Bond (2000a; 2000b) has come with sound critique towards the developmental outcome of the transition in terms of a refined Marxist analysis to contest the neo-liberalistic developmental trends. In the process of doing this the author argues that one has to look into the phenomenon of globalisation in order to understand the reason why South Africa has gained such limited developments for the poor and marginalised constituencies. Bond (2000a:25) implies that the well-structured geographical inequalities have become worse in the decade after the transition as because of a coherently linkage of over-accumulation of capital, rising financial speculation and uneven development. In 1998 when Mbeki still was the deputy president he made a statement at a national assembly on ‘reconciliation and nation-building’ where he stated the following;

\textit{South Africa is a country of two nations. One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographical dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worse affected being the women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation is living under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, and educational, communication and other infrastructure} (Mbeki 1998, cited in Hendricks, 2003:10).

Class and race are interlinked in complex ways, as they still reproduce and sustain the structural barriers and systematic constrains because of failing policies of resource redistribution. If one are to figure out why these policies are failing one has to understand how the phenomenon of globalisation increasingly manifested itself at the local level at the expense of the national. Concomitant to yielding benefiting conditions for the continuous growth of the urban areas it produces restricted conditions for development in the rural areas (Bond, 2000a). In terms of traditional modernization theories, the locus of development polity
has been firmly rooted within the national state. Bond (ibid:34) however argues that locus of development have shifted towards the cities, with the purpose of creating level playing field for competition among cities, across national boarders. This in turn has created ‘mega cities’, which cannot be understood as communities, but conglomerates of firms, institutions, organisations and individuals with contractual agreements among them.

Alongside the creation of mega cities, where development has been pooled into designated urban areas, a new type of apartheid has surfaced. Instead of segregating the people on behalf of race and ethnicity, mega cities segregate people in terms of socio-spatial structures, which according to Spinks (2001) is far more effective than the Boers ever dreamt off. While the poverty-stricken residents cry for equality as promised by the ANC government, the well-to-do residents driven by a mentality of fear enclose themselves and their business by high walls and/or private security providers. The paradox in Mbeki’s statement of the two nations refers to the fact that, while he address the urgency of levelling development among the blacks and the whites, the president has facilitated viable conditions for mega cities to develop through divers governmental policies.

A central, though underlying, theme among these policies has been to centralise power. Mbeki’s top-down authority has ensured that South Africa’s nine provinces and 284 municipalities remain tightly circumscribed in terms of taxation, spending and borrowing. In fact the president has used his ability to replace premiers and municipality councillors that does not keep in line with national government’s interest (Dickovick, 2005). Although, the first tendency of centralisation took place before Mbeki became president. The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was the first policing policy after the 1994 democratic election to retain centralised control previously decentralised as response to the turbulent days of the transition period. The NCPS Pretoria-centric nature was seen insensitive towards the contextual specificity and localised safety and security needs. In terms of urban development, centralisation of power has taken place through the creation of ‘unicity’ and compact-city designs. While the intention behind the unicity notion has been both financial and political, the compact-city design has sought to dam up for urban decay by increasing economical growth within the already existing urban boarders (Spinks, 2001). This in turn has increased the socio-spatial difference between urban and rural areas, where the urban areas have gained strength at the expense of rural areas. In the same manner as the old apartheid regime exploited cheap labour from the Bantustans and expelled black and coloured townships
situated at the brink of the urban towns, so does the contemporary urban cities. Marginalised constituencies, where many of them works as security officers for minimum wage travels for hours every day in order to satisfy the well-to-do’s fear of crime.

When summarising the socio political developments taking place under the guise of the RDP and the GEAR strategy the following trend can be depicted.

Model 4: Socio-Political Policy Developments

The RDP made a seemingly unbreakable promise to build the nation through a strong social platform. Central to this developmental process were the enrolment of community based organisations in the process of planning, decision making and conduct of these projects. It was further argued that democracy should not be confined to elections but it should comprise all human endeavours. Democracy should be a way of living. Decisions taken should therefore spring out and reflect the values and requirements from the very bottom. The outset of GEAR came about as a result of lacking economical growth and a limited growth of job
opportunities. The alignment of South Africa’s policies with international neo-liberal ‘best practice’ principles did however cost the poor and marginalised constituencies dearly. By centralising the power at the expense of local and provincial government’s authority, one was able to streamline the neo-liberal polices. Instead of developing the country as a whole, the centralised government chose to pool wealth around urban areas. This then created trading hubs suitable for international trade which yielded significant results for the business elites. The neo-liberal approach of the government made the private sector its most frequent partner. As a consequence, democratic power was forged and strengthened between a centralistic government and private interests, while democratic institutions within the civil society became neglected and consequently weakened, which confined the poor and marginalised constituencies’ democratic power to merely the choosing of political representatives.

In the following chapter there will be a thoroughly elaboration of how safety and security have been sought governed in South Africa from the outset of the 1990s and onwards. A central aim when displaying the shifting perspectives of South Africa’s policing policies is to identify the turning points that shifted the priorities from a bottom up centred possibility, which very much was in line with the RDP notion, into a top down and state-centred perspective of policing, which resembles much of the neo-liberalistic developments displayed above.
6.0 The shifting perspectives of South Africa’s policing policies

The evolution of South Africa’s policing policies portrays itself as a kaleidoscopically image. Policing in South Africa is a highly complex phenomenon which has to be seen in relation to historical events and theoretical considerations; the legacy of the National Party’s apartheid regime, the fact that the police operated as the apartheid regime suppressors, transfer of international neo-liberalistic policies, lay-participation, community empowerment and socio-economical developments.

This chapter’s main aim is to envisage how the government have sought to meet the changing terms of policing within the pre and post apartheid period. While the point of departure resides within the dual policing notion, the end departure resides within the sector policing strategy. By introducing governmental policing policies and developments taking place on the ground, there will be made an attempt to explain the reason to the end result of the contemporary South Africa’s policing policies. When introducing these events, they will be juxtaposition against the dichotomies of national versus international and state versus society. The incremental state centeredness of the South African policing models will be elaborated in accordance to; an institutional reorganisation of the SAP/S, policy developments, and the transfer of international policing polices. The intention behind this approach is to provide a limited amount of plausible reasons to why the dual policing model met a dead end while a state-centred community policing strategy gained momentum.

6.1 The opening for dual policing

The historical events that the dual system of policing partly is built upon, originated from the political struggles from within and international pressure from abroad during the preconfiguration period (1970-1990) and the first years of the transition period (1990-1998). As the pressure upon the apartheid regime increased, the amount of people, mainly blacks and coloureds but also whites, that were prepared to collaborate with the police decreased. The 1976 student uprising in Soweto was one of the first events that triggered the black mass liberation movement. This subsequently led informal ordering of townships to be passed on to a new generation of activists that were eager to set up alternative structures in opposition to the local government and the police. Schärf (1989) argues that the liberation movements operating within the townships ‘mushroomed’ throughout the country after September 1984. In 1985 the
ANC called on township residents to make the townships ungovernable. While the civil society within the marginalized and suppressed communities organised themselves with limited resources to oppose the current regime there were also a multitude of initiatives coupled or loosely coupled with the apartheid regime in order to perform the roles of policing and other social controls in urban areas. And it is within this context that the latter scholar maintain that policing can only be understood in terms of a formal state agent in any society if one understands how the police interacts with and make use of quasi-legal and informal ordering structures and processes (ibid:207).

From the 1990s and onwards, there was much debate to what extent policing in the new South Africa would become a top down directed process or a bottom up one as much of the political (ANC) signals indicated. ANC saw the transition of South African Police (SAP) as important because their action or inaction would affect the transition to democracy\(^3\). However, to what extent the SAP fully comprehended their role can be questioned as they more or less denounced their part in the causes of unrest and violence. As argued by Vlok the Minister of Law and Order; “At best the SAP is only in a position to doctor the symptoms of very serious antisocial human behaviour. The police are not responsible for the real causes of unrest and violence. There is very little we can do to prevent the real causes”\(^4\). The ANC therefore saw it as vital that the SAP confronted and overcame the apartheid legacy of poor community relations and internal structures and practices, by becoming a modern, democratic and effective police force which operates in accordance to Sir Robert Peel’s ideas, ‘of the community and for the community’. In order to achieve this, ANC maintained that the police had to reach out and draw on the many talents and resources of the neglected communities\(^5\).

The essence of the dual system of policing conceptualised by Brogden and Shearing (1993) is based upon the belief that policing had to be conducted in terms of more equable ordering systems, drawing on the immense experience of community involvement from the apartheid struggle together with state policing.

Brogden and Shearing (1993) and Nina (1995) have in common that they argued for a sound bottom up policing strategy that should be built upon the many policing initiatives developed

\(^3\) Statement of the African National Congress, September 1992
\(^4\) Vlok, A. J. Minister of Law and Order, August 1990
\(^5\) Statement of the African National Congress, September 1992
in the townships during the apartheid struggle. The former scholars argued for a dual system of policing, incorporating both civil and state policing. This was thought to create a supporting environment for community-police collaboration forums that identifies and coordinates policing resources in the maintenance of local safety and security, and subsequently it would also be of support to the new ethos of pro-active and problem-solving policing (Brogden and Shearing, 1993). Nina (1995) sheared much of these thoughts as the scholar observed that during the 1990-1994 period there were signs of peaceful coexistence between the old repressive regime and members of the contesting civil society. Political negotiation in the country forced both state and civil society entities to negotiate at the local level, and as a result of collaboration state repressiveness was seen to be decreasing. The collaboration generated a new culture of autonomy and acceptance within the civil society, but also gained acceptance from the state, and thereby facilitating the conditionality for a sustainable civil society (ibid:8).

An essential element within the dual system of policing is based upon international developments. An American policing scholar, Herman Goldstein, has been identified as the source behind the shift from bandit-catching to problem-solving. Within this shift there is a significant reduction of legal definitions of ‘wrong doings’ towards an increased attention towards the community’s definition of ‘wrong doings’ (Brogden and Shearing, 1993:167-168). The problem-solving strategy denotes a specific procedure which can be understood in terms of taking the problem apart, followed up by diagnosis of the causes and hypothesis regarding possible solution to the problem. And by approaching the problem in such manner it opens up for looking at the causes as highly complex social phenomenon’s, which cannot be sufficiently grasped in terms of the traditional crime directed strategy, but rather has to be conceptualised in broader terms, as disorder (ibid.). In order to solve disorders this demands of the policing agents’ new ways of approaching the problem, which most efficiently cannot be solely conducted from a single locus of control and coordination.

Brogden and Shearing therefore maintained that South Africa’s new policing strategy had to be structured in terms of a problem-solving state police that were sensitive and responsive to the community’s definition of disorder. The new strategy thereby demands of the police officers to be willing and able to provide communities with solutions to their problems, which then sharply diverges with what they were trained up to do (ibid:170). The latter scholars made up a list of principles that would facilitate the provision of safety within the policing
reform, which in turn has significant implications for two levels of policing; the reform of the state police and policing through civil society. The first principle maintains that the scope of the reform should be upon policing and not solely on the police, which is in accordance to Shearing’s perception of policing being everybody’s business. Secondly, policing should be understood as a product of a network of interrelated institutions operating at different levels and with different knowledge’s and resources. Thirdly, policing should be located primarily in the institutions of civil society. Fourthly, civil society should be understood as fractured and as made up of cross-cutting territorially-based as well as deterritorialised communities. Fifthly, the role of the state as problem-solvers should be defined as specific and not as all embracing. Sixthly, and related to the latter, the police should be limited to the capacity of enforcement (ibid:175-176).

As these principles signifies the core elements of the dual system of policing it has been argued that this particular way of comprehending policing have adapted to the structural shifts of internationally policing developments. Since policing in South Africa already denotes an increased drift towards private security providers and thereby a pluralisation of policing; this requires a modification of the perceived role and responsibilities of the public police. Consequently, the overall police reform had to be based upon a broader agenda than merely structural changes of the SAP as signified in the principles above.

Within the broader agenda of the policing reform, a new operational mentality of the SAP was required. The dual policing conceptualisation is based upon the premises of the transformation of the SAP and police officers embracing the problem-solving role. But equal important and highly interrelated; the SAP had to recognize that not only the urban civil society possess the means for dual policing as already occurring, but also the rural communities possess the knowledge and capacity to direct, in genuine partnership with the police, the policing of safe and secure environments in terms of what these deprived communities defines as disorder. In order to accomplish the dual system of civil and state policing, Brogden and Shearing (1993:165) maintained that it was necessary to establish dialogue forums. These would provide meeting points with the purpose of facilitating communication and coordination of resources and identify priorities within the local arena, which in turn would lead to a broader conceptualisation of safety and security. But in order to accomplish this Shearing argued that

---

the policing reform should not only be focusing upon implementing new policing strategies on top of the old structures, but there was also a need for more thorough and deep penetrating reforms. Reforms that would contest the senior SAP officers’ mentalities, hence their visions and understanding of what the new South African democracy demands of the contemporary policing strategy.

The investigations of the many township demonstrations and state of unrest, such as the 1992 Boipatong massacre which left 39 people murdered and many others injured, put pressure upon the government and the SAP to embrace international standards of democratic policing. Waddington’s investigation of the events in Boipatong also reviled that ANC and their affiliated organisations advised their township residents not to cooperate with the police, which merely perpetuated violence and intimidation⁸. In order to build a better relationship between the state and the township residents there were developed a regulatory framework for managing public demonstrations, which culminated in the Regulation of Gatherings Act 203 of 1993 (Van der Spuy, 2004).

Within this act three of the dual system of policing principles was incorporated. In accordance to the principle of policing being everyone’s business, public demonstrations require a collective responsibility shared through a ‘triangle of safety’, constituted by the organisers of the demonstration, the appropriate local authority and the public police. In order for the regulation to function one had to make sure that the ordinary citizens exercising their democratic rights to demonstrate would follow the rules. This was sought done through lay participation, by enrolling some of the protesters as marshals. Last but not least, the third principle refers to the police taking on a specialist and minimalist role in the purpose of maintaining public order (ibid:204).

Van der Spuy notes that the dual policing model has been and probably still is conceptually provocative. Among other things it has been criticised for being almost naïve when considering the possibility of dual policing in the highly factious South African social context. The model is presented as one possible way of policing the future, yet it has been argued that it is trapped within a “political voyeurism that glosses far too easily over the quagmires of reconstruction ahead” (ibid:205). Even though the ideas that the dual policing notion was

---

built upon received support from governmental officials and were incorporated into governmental policies, this particular notion was soon hedged by the manifestation of a state-centred community policing policy.

6.2 The incremental state centeredness of community policing

It can be argued that the community policing notion portray itself as a Janus-face shaped structure as it holds the potential of both bottom up and top down features. Stenson (1993) argued that community policing best can be understood as a cluster of techniques that operates under the ethos of problem-solving, emphasising the need for systematic gathering of local information about public concerns over generic violent and crime-stricken local conditions. The techniques that it makes use of is floating, all depending on the context. Following elements are often found; neighbourhood watch and special voluntary (reservist) constable schemes, sensitivity training, more constables patrolling on foot also known as ‘bobby on the beat’, in addition to programs of social regulation by linking up state/police structures with family and neighbourhood relations (ibid:380).

Initially, when the community policing concept was introduced and elaborated in various working groups in the early 1990s it was enthusiastically perceived. The enthusiasm was the result of the concepts apparent compatibility with the particular South African transition context, such as urgent need for community empowerment, community control and community conflict resolution. In fact the incremental international acceptance and embracement of this strategy seemed to be evaluated entirely positive by scholars as well as political elites.

Marais maintained that there were at least three different approaches of the police-community interaction in which the community policing strategy could be interpreted. The first approach argues that public relation is aimed primarily at informing the public and tends to be one way communication. The second argues that the police-community relation is aimed at establishing a dialogue with the police. And the latter approach argues that community policing is a broad term which involves proactive programs designed to integrate police-community relations with actual police work.

---


When looking into the different ways community policing were perceived in early 1990s South Africa, it can be understood in terms of a continuum line. At the one end of the line community policing refers to the complete exclusion of the formal police structures as it embraces policing ‘by the community’. On the other far end of the line it is understood as policing ‘in the community’. This approach is not fundamentally different from the way policing is currently conducted, though it signifies a closer police-community relationship. The third way, which lies in the middle of the two poles, represents community policing initiatives that operates parallel to the police, independently originating or initiated by the police themselves.

Within the South Africa context, community policing seems to have manifested itself as a strategy that gives hope for the scholars who favours a more bottom up directed policing strategy, but at the same time gives the recipe and the techniques of how to govern security from a state-centred locus. The essential question then becomes; to what extent is community policing, community directed or state directed? But as Hills (1996) argues, no matter how much effort that is put on community policing, policing will in the end be shaped by the political and cultural ethos of the state. Henceforth within this section there will be made an attempt to portray contingencies leading to a state-centred locus of community policing policy. The first section will look into developments leading to the 1997 conceptualisation of community policing and the latter section will look into the community police forum (CPF) strategy set out to improve the police-community relationship by means of democratizing policing through lay participant’s oversight functions.

6.2.1 The community policing policy in the making

In January 1990, President de Klerk attended a gathering for the 500 highest-ranking police officers, where he called for the police to be removed from the political arena, as the police no longer should be responsible for suppressing demonstrations and political protests. Hence, the police should no longer be used as instruments to reach political goals, as this was the job of the politicians (Cawthra, 1993). Several policies were introduced and put into action in order to restructure the SAP. The policies main intention was to build and enhance the legitimacy of the SAP, by making policing a service preformed out of and for the community, within black

---

and coloured communities where they previously had been operating as the apartheid regime suppressors\textsuperscript{12}.

The transformation from the old SAP into the new South African Police Service (SAPS) was set out in the interim Constitution of 1993. In which the transformation came as a result of the acknowledgment that in order to achieve real change one had to do more than superficial structural changes. One had to go deep into the organisational culture to address the policemen’s perceptions, knowledge, ideas and policing techniques in order to achieve policing service, rather than police force (Shaw, 2001). While order, peace and stability were seen to be the prerequisites for the new South Africa in 1990\textsuperscript{13}, the prime focus in 1993 when transforming the SAPS was democratic control, accountability and legitimacy.

Even though significant steps were taken to improve the quality of the police, the process was hedged by building the new SAPS on top of the old SAP structure. Cawthra argued that the difficulties of transformation had to be understood in terms of the history of SAP, as SAP conducted paramilitary activities and carried out political repression, which included extensive intelligence work with the means of infiltration and bureaucratic enforcement of discrimination (1993:41). While Cawthra emphasised the struggle of changing the mentality of the police, Shaw (2001) and Marsh (1999) have paid notice to the organisational challenges. Since the white SAP officers were still in charge, they had full control of the process and thereby made sure that little new blood was injected into the top level of the organisation, the transition process itself was therefore restricted by precious few skilled people to manage the transition (Shaw, 2001). But there was also a considerable knowledge drain, where highly qualified and skilled police officers left the service out of frustration or because they saw an opportunity to start working in the growing private security industry (Marsh, 1999).

SAP/S apparently limited abilities to transform during the transition period should not solely be blamed upon the institution itself. Nell and Williamson\textsuperscript{14} argued that both political leaders and the police deliberately misinterpreted the escalating political violence. While these leaders had a firm belief that order would return to South Africa when the new democratic regime was in place, the latter scholars warned that the public had seen little of the violence

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12} Marais, E. and Rauch, J. (1992) Policing South Africa: Reform and Prospects
\textsuperscript{13} Vlok, A.J. Minister of Law and Order, August 1990
\textsuperscript{14} Nell, V. and Williamson, G. (1993) Community Safety and Community Policing: Bottom-up and Top-down Accountability Initiatives
\end{flushright}
yet to come. ANC’s inabilities to comprehend the severe policing challenges internal and external to the organisation were ascribed to their history as a liberation movement. Being a liberation movement they more or less only focused on military training while being in exile and therefore did not learn the skills required to police a democratic state. Their strong military tradition therefore pervaded the discussion on security, which becomes apparent when looking into the relatively smooth transition of their military.\(^ {15,16}\)

In the 1992 ANC policy document on policing, it was presented a list of nine points which they maintained should be guiding the community policing strategy for the new South Africa.\(^ {17}\) First of all they prescribed the civilianisation of policing, where the police had to deliver service and a minimum of personal security. Secondly, it was of crucial importance that policing is visible and that they are in touch and present within their communities. Thirdly, local communities must gain increased influence and control over policing priorities and practices, as accountability to local communities cannot be achieved merely by public relations. Fourthly, policing resources should be used preventively by increasing the level of community co-operation and information. And there should be a significant shift of police resources away from those areas that already has excess to private security agencies to those poor and deprived communities. Fifthly, in order to attain genuine community support for the police they would have to become racial and gender representative. Sixthly, the police oversight bodies had to be democratically enacted or constituted. Seventhly, the transparency of the policing institutions had to be increased by making the decision making process and discipline enforcement open and visible to the public. In fact, independent lay people should participate in the investigation of complaints against the police. Eighthly, policing had to be seen as a profession. In order to achieve this there had to be better training and the police recruits should be educated as problem-solvers and not in terms of men of action. Ninthly, the police had to operate in accordance to human rights and defend the constitutional rights.

Several years prior to the community policing was officially acknowledge as a governmental policy, there were several working groups constituted by domestic and international scholars, police officials and representatives from various community based organisations coming together to consider how the policy might be implemented in post apartheid South Africa.

\(^{15}\) Rauch, J. (1993) State, Civil Society and Police Reform in South Africa
\(^{16}\) Dutch Police Unions (1993) From a Force to a Service, Report from the Dutch Police Unions
\(^{17}\) Statement of the African National Congress, September 1992
Even though these assemblies had slightly different priorities, they all portrayed a solid bottom up perspective of community policing.

One of the working groups from 1992 emphasised that formal community policing had to be structured around accountability and transparency, in which lay people should make up public oversight bodies. It was also of their interest to facilitate and support the organic and traditional systems of local policing such as anti-crime committees. Liaison forums should be established in order to provide equal relations with all sectors of the community, where all civil society structures should have the possibility to provide input into the management of local policing. As there was massive research into the field of community policing there was presented a more precise definition by another working group in October 1993. By this working group community policing was understood as:

“Community policing is the joint process in which communities, through representative structures, and the police work together towards the creation of safe, secure environments. It is a process which makes policing everybody’s business. It aims at a product that is achieved through a partnership in problem-solving”.

Both working groups recognised that this new ethos of policing was a highly slippery concept, portraying different meanings internationally, nationally and within the local context. Even though they were agreeing on the complexity with new policy, they had different perspectives on how the end result should materialise. While the SAPS saw the implementation of community policing as satellite police stations and meeting points between the police and the community, others such as the ANC looked upon it as building a genuine partnership. It was recognised that merely implementing community policing would not directly lead to a uniform process across South Africa, as the manifestation of the policy would differ all depending on the climate of the specific police-community interaction. The apparent skew power inequalities would put considerable constrains upon the partnership notion. If a

19 Discussion Document: Working Group on Community Policing, October 1993
partnership at all should be attained there had to be a great deal of flexibility in the way community policing were being pursued\textsuperscript{21}.

There are both similarities and differences between the ANC policy document and the working definition set up by the scholars. While the similarities are structured around the urgent need for restraining the policing activities in terms of accountability and transparency, the difference is based upon the working groups opening for including traditional local policing structures. In fact, Jagwanth (1994:173) argued that the work of these groups points towards a definition of community policing that shifts the locus of control of policing away from formal state agencies to a more self regulated community based strategy. It can therefore be argued that while the ANC positioned themselves in accordance to the policing ‘in the community’, the scholars have been more flexible and have opened up for a more intermediate position between the two poles as described by Marais above.

When the \textit{“Community Policing Policy, Framework and Guidelines”} was published by the Department of Safety and Security in 1997, it had gone through several years of consultation process involving a multitude of national and international scholars, governmental politicians and public officials (Pelser, 1999a). The policy was written retroactively in response to developments on the ground, as a result of the \textquote{Community Policing Forum Policy} stated in the interim Constitution of 1993 and the South African Police Service Act of 1995. The guidelines state that the major objective of community policing is to establish a collaborative and active partnership between the police and the community in order to solve local problems. And in order to accomplish this it defines five characteristics of community policing;

\begin{itemize}
  \item service orientation; the provision of a professional and client-centred policing service, responsive to community needs and accountable for addressing these needs;
  \item partnership; the facilitation of a co-operative, consultative process of problem solving through the established structures of Community Police Forums and Boards;
  \item problem solving; the joint identification and analysis of the actual and potential causes of crime and conflict within the communities, and the development of innovative measures to address these on short, medium and long term basis;
\end{itemize}

emPOWERment; the creation of a sense of joint responsibility and capacity for addressing crime, through the education of the Community Policing notion within all potential Community Policing Forum stakeholders;

Accountability; the creation of a culture of accountability and a more transparent service will be realised by creating mechanism through which the police can be made answerable for addressing the needs and concerns of the communities they serve.

Scholars who criticise the community policing policy often do this by questioning to what extent the South African model have implemented an international, neo-liberalistic, hence Anglo-American best practice approach. Concomitant to this policy transfer, it entailed a state-centred approach. As the shift towards a state-centred conceptualisation of community policing took place in an incremental manner there are reasons to assume that it was boosted as result of the democratic South African state gained legitimacy.

The National Crime Prevention Strategy proposed by the safety and security cabinet in 1995, can therefore be looked upon as the first step towards a centralised policing policy. This strategy portray state-centred features by shifting the focus of ordering security further away from the community towards the national domain, as the main aim was to streamline the national initiatives of how to fight crime (Marsh, 1999:5). When the NCPS was published in 1996 by the Department of Safety and Security it had gone through an extensive process of research and analysis, making use of international experiences. Throughout this process a network of private enterprises, such as the ‘business against crime’ (BAC) constellation and various NGOs made substantial contribution in shaping this policy.

The NCPS has four pillars; the criminal justice program, reducing crime through environmental design, public values and education, and transnational crime. While the first and the fourth pillar sought to fight and deter crime by increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the criminal justice program and by increasing the international co-operation these portray clear neo-liberalistic top down features. The second and third pillar can however be interpreted as more ambiguous. As they provide initiatives intended to change the manner communities react and participate in meaningful crime prevention, and construct designs that reduce the opportunity of crime, increase detection and identification of criminals.

---

Particularly the environmental design pillar has created a skew safety and security outcome in rich urban versus poor urban settings (Shaw and Louw, 1998). The reason to this stems from the multitude of actors, among these governmental institutions and private businesses, which in rich urban areas have been enrolled into creating safe and secure international trading hubs and tourist attractions. At the same time in deprived rural communities, little resources from the government has trickled down in order to uplift or in most cases building proper infrastructural facilities which are lacking and therefore constitute the most pressing safety and security threats.

While Dixon (2004) seems to argue that the NCPS strategy slightly furtherance the autonomous ordering of policing below rather than ‘by government’ because the encouragement made towards the civil society participation, there are reasons to question what this actually signifies. The focus upon unification, broader governmental department involvement, effectiveness and efficiency should rather be seen in relation to international neo-liberalistic realignments. Where more equable ordering of policing only is given its blessing when conducted in accordance to the governmental predefined values, whichBesides is becoming increasingly professionalised and centralised. In fact, Mr. Mufamadi whom is the Minister for Safety and Security argued that the NCPS is one of the key pillars for the GEAR policy.

When the NCPS and the Community Policing Policy of 1997 materialised into community police conduct, the focus upon lay participation shifted into that of lay participant’s police assistance. From this time onwards community policing became an instrument of crime prevention, as the constituencies were to assist the police in carrying out their police duties, or more to the point, to provide with intelligence by identifying hotspots of crime and violence within their own community. In the subsequent section there will be made an account on how this shift affected the original notion of the CPF as a lay participant’s democratic oversight function.

6.2.2 Community policing forums partnering with civil society and private entities
In terms of the dual policing strategy, community policing should be located primarily in the institutions of civil society. Policing should be understood as a product of a network of interrelated institutions operating at different levels and with different knowledge’s and

---

resources (Brogden and Shearing, 1993:175). Jagwanth argued that the forthcoming community policing policy had to recognize and accept the legitimacy and efficacy of already existing alternative community based mechanisms of policing. Though, constituting the new policy solely upon community structures is however based upon a false assumption of relatively high level of community cohesion and organisation (1994:175). The scholar further argued that it was an unrealistic assumption to presume that the various communities throughout South Africa were made up by a strong and vibrant civil society, which is an imperative for democratic, accountable and transparent conducted community policing.

Jagwanth therefore argued that a policy based essential upon a self-policing strategy would fail to provide the deprived communities with safety and security. Hence, the only practical alternative was a state directed policing strategy. Though because of the contextual complexity the scholar maintained that in order for the policy to be efficient it had to be flexible. To what extent the locus of control and assistance should be community or police directed had to be determined by a realistic assessment of the local condition. The mechanisms best equipped to take on such considerations were the CPFs (ibid:176).

In the process of political leaders recognising that the police cannot impose safety and security on the community from above, but rather should be negotiated in a bottom-up manner within the designated communities, CPFs were established with the means to improve the police-community relationship. This was sought done by bridging and facilitating a partnership notion. A central thought at the beginning of the transition period was that the partnership would only improve the relationship if policing priorities were set by a CPF cherishing democratic values, by including community representatives to advise, monitor and cooperate with the police within their community (Gordon, 2001). By including lay participation into the police structure it was thought to significantly deepen democracy. However, in the same manner as the community police policy have been in a state of flux between bottom-up and top-down perspectives, so has the CPF notion.

The interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes provision for the establishment of CPFs in every police station area25. As set out in section 221 (2) of the interim Constitution, the functions of the CPF is to promote local accountability of the police,

---
advice on local policing priorities, monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the service and the provision of visible services. Developments on the ground however signified limited success. The failures in terms of implementation and accomplishments were ascribed to the lack of understanding by both police officials and community members. In order to rectify these misunderstandings the CPF obligations were presented in a slightly different shape in the South African Police Act 68 of 1995. Instead of CPFs being community centred, the police Act portrayed a growing police-centeredness, in which the concern for crime and effectiveness should be provided by the police alone as crime fighters. Contradictory to the focus upon advisory, monitoring and evaluation functions stated within the 1993 interim Constitution, these elements were downgraded to the advantage of even more ambiguous concepts. The CPF were now to promote communication and co-operation between the service and the community, and to improve accountability and transparency.

But even though CPFs have been around for several years to be implemented and to start operating there is a significant amount of scholars who questions whether the CPF program actually is working. The reasons for this can be ascribed both to the state institutions and community entities, and the interaction between these two.

Mistry (1997) maintained that the main reason for the confusions, misconceptions and resistance to both community policing and the CPF must be seen in relation to the rapid and poorly conducted transformation of the SAPS. If then, one should evaluate whether these policies actually are working one will need to look into the effectiveness and efficiency of the SAPS. Mistry’s argument thereby falls in line with Badumuti’s argument as the scholar maintained that the SAPS had to take on much of the blame for the failing strategy. The primary reasons have been linked to the fact that police with lower ranks who are the ears and eyes of the SAPS know little about the new ethos of community policing. And as a consequence, they do not become community police officers but rather upholds the traditional police force attitudes. But as Schärf argues, it is simply not enough to solely look into the SAPS, as safety and security is interconnected with the entire state machinery, including all levels of government.

26 ibid: Section 221 (2)
27 South African Police Act 68 of 1995, Section 18 (1)
Contradictory to the ‘rosy picture’ which the politicians often are painting when arguing that people within the communities are becoming more involved by creating a culture of interest in the policing matters, through means of the lay visitor scheme, van Vuuren argues that CPFs being a self-generating force have rather fostered a culture of self-indulgence. Leaving the community constituencies with a feeling of particular political groups seizing power over the forums more or less in terms of a coup d’état (1996:104). This then creates power struggles among the political parties, within the forums and throughout the community (Mbhele, 1998). Badumuti related this tendency to the fact that little knowledge of these structures was filtered down to the community constituencies. Which then enabled the CPF to become an elite organisation, institutional structured to uphold the power of the station commander, where the elite representatives of the communities were seen detached from their community they were obliged to represent.\(^{30}\)

The culture of self-indulgence can also be understood in terms of a culture of subsistence. In accordance to Masunungure, this particular culture is oriented towards the use of material goods or objects (Appiah et al., 2004). The problem of this culture is not the consumption of goods in itself, but rather the unfortunate affects it has upon the production and protection of a common good which these representatives are obliged to serve. Even though the CPFs in some cases have been taken over by civic elites and political patronages, there still exists a significant skew power balance within them.

In order to balance these power inequalities and enable the community structures to become actual partners the various civil society institutions has to be significantly empowered. Ragoadi argues that most disadvantaged communities still suffer from the apartheid legacy, where the social fabric was torn down. And as a consequence these communities are now less organised and are lacking the capacity to meet their needs and to solve their problems in an efficient and effective manner.\(^{31}\) Schärf maintain that the new ANC regime has done little to strengthen the civil society, and especially among youths who are given limited opportunities, which have resulted in a blossoming of youth crime.\(^{32}\)


While NGOs in general received a significant amount of fiscal support in the period prior to the first democratic election, foreign founders either reduced or redirected their founding in support of the governmental RDP policy. And by doing this NGOs have been left in a state of flux where many of them have been forced to shut down. Though, in order to counter weight this trend civil society and their NGOs have to be empowered. Community empowerment, Ragoadi argues, refers to the process whereby people gain both the will, in terms of interest and education, and the means referring to the ability to take part in civil society structures. This in turn is thought to improve their conditions and quality of life. The scholar further argued that a vibrant and strong civil society can play a significant role in the empowerment of both the community and the police, through the CPF, by providing resources such as skills and information. And then particular in terms of conflict management- and resolution, mediation and facilitation activities, which can be seen essential for the survival of the CPFs. In short, it is believed that by empowering the community one would yield significant result for the constituents’ ability to make their voices heard regarding what they consider to be the most pressing safety and security threats.

The achievements gained by the CPFs in wealthier communities within an urban context stands in stark contrast to those of marginalised communities as noted above. The reason to this can among other things ascribe to the multitude of actors that are present within these communities. As safety and security are being attained through collaborative effort by the police, other governmental institutions, NGOs, community structures, individual citizens and private business. The primary objective of community policing is better attained in these areas as a proactive partnership between the police and the public through which crime and other safety related problems jointly are determined and appropriate solutions designed and implemented. Although simply stating that all well-to-do communities have succeeded in setting up and taking part in the CPF would be a gross simplification. Mistry notes from her study in Gauteng that rich communities have been reluctant to participate because they have a limited history of community participation, though as crime and violence continued to increase during the transition period these residents made the largest turnout at the CPF meetings.

---

However, not many years went by before the bottom up centred CPF notion was hedged by a more centralised one. When President Mbeki made his opening statement to the parliament in 1999 he fronted the CPFs as “the hallmarks of the national offensive against crime and violence” (Pelser, 1999a:10). Though somewhat contradictory, the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security explicitly provides for strengthening the elected local governments capacity to supplement the functions of the CPFs. The CPFs role in determining the local policing priorities and crime prevention strategies would therefore be downgraded to the advantage of a broader and less area specific entity. In accordance to the White paper, CPFs were now to co-operate with local government by jointly setting up crime prevention policies and ensure the implementation of these, mobilise and organise community based crime prevention campaigns, and facilitate regular attendance of local elected representatives. In the same manner as Dickovick (2005) noted that Mbeki’s top-down authority had circumscribed the subnational governments legal, political and fiscal autonomy, the same circumscription have taken place over the CPFs autonomy.

The autonomy of the CPF was circumscribed as a consequence of a larger share of crime preventative measures being devolved to the local government, which in turn can be seen in relation to national governments broader agenda of centralising police service. A mission that seems to contradict earlier priorities, as the government in 1990 chose a decentralised democratic police at the expense of a centralised one. Hence, a national centralised police were seen best capacitated to secure the state, while a decentralised police under local control were seen best capacitated to protect and serve the rights and the freedom of the individual, which are in line with democratic ideals (Smit and Botha, 1990), and the human security notion. In accordance to Gordon (2001), the centralisation of the police and the circumscription of the CPF under the guise of governmental crime prevention programmes have deprived the community policing strategy’s potential of deepening the democracy.

6.3 The origin and consequence of the unsuccessful ‘get tough on crime’ strategy

In 1996 the government launched a National Crime Prevention Strategy that makes provision for a social crime prevention initiative. Among other things it argued that local government, especially in urban areas, were to take on a central role in crime prevention. But while the intention behind the NCPS were to create long term preventative measures as opposed to

short term reactive law enforcement measures, exactly the opposite took place. Crime prevention by local government in urban areas took the shape of expanding their municipal police service enforcing by-laws and installing closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras in high crime areas, while neglecting the potential offspring of a long term local governmental co-ordinated initiatives. This is programs that are multi-disciplinary by nature, enrolling governmental departments and civil society actors whom have knowledge and experience in dealing with social crime prevention. David Bruce (1997) maintained that the government was failing to take on initiatives, such as children and youth at risk, that could contribute significantly in long term social crime preventative measures. A claim that still yields ground in 2006. Cheryl Frank (2006) maintains that the government still fails to support and enrol civil society actors and to target children and youth at risk whom are the future South Africa’s most important resource. However, the reason why long term preventative measures failed and still continues to fail, the two latter scholars maintain, is the government’s over-reliance on law enforcement strategies to prevent crime.

The growing outcry against crime and violence did not only take the form of increased protest against the government but also led to a multitude of public/private partnerships. As these partnerships had a tremendous effect on safety and security legislations, shifting the focus from democratic policing towards a reactive ‘tough on crime’ protection measures there will be made an account of the elements that lead to this and the consequences thereof.

There are several actors whom can be identified to have contributed to this shift of focus, in which funding from overseas governments in terms of Oversees Development Aid (ODA) are among the most central ones. From the 1996 onwards it became clear that the government would not stand a chance maintaining a proper state of peace and stability if not the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system were to be improved. Donor aid assistance to policing reform therefore increasingly targeted the police at the expense of NGOs (Van der Spuy, 2000). Even though the well-intended international donors often targeted police precincts as they were understaffed and under resourced their intervention produced rather dubious results. Their intervention was often seen to increase rather than reduce the pressure on the police and their capacity. While at first the SAPS often accepted almost all offers of assistance, this created an array of project shifting the priorities identified by the SAPS into the requirements and priorities of the donors. Shaw therefore maintained that the short term
gain of absorbing the funding and assistance from donors consumed rather than built police capacity (2001:35).

The second actor whom has taken part in this shift of focus refers to private entities. Although it is not a single actor per see, as it is made up of a network of interlinked private entities. Brogden and Shearing (1993) labelled the growth of the PSI ‘the silent revolution’, in which several factors can be pointed at to have encouraged such an evolution. First of all, as the transition elapsed the scale of crime became public known and broadcasted on television and highlighted in newspapers, it created a feeling of insecurity among the well-to-do population (Marsh, 1999). The communities where these people lived had previously been prioritised by the apartheid regime, but as the level of crime in the rural areas and in townships became known much of the policing resources were transferred into these areas. In order to compensate for this the privileged communities looked towards the private security companies for protection. But also, as the new government realised that they had serve problems in handling the escalating crime level they invited all potential security providers to become partners in the war against crime (Shaw, 2001). While there in 1996 were approximately 100,000 private security officers, the amount almost tripled within ten years. Mogapi, whom is the director of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA), stated that in addition to the 296,000 security officers currently employed among 4763 companies there are another 689,000 inactive ones, which makes up a total amount of 985,000 trained security officers.

In the shadow of this rapid and silent growth stands a mighty organisation known as the ‘business against crime’, whom among other things facilitated propitious conditions for the PSI. Although BAC, an organisation which mainly is constituted by a white business elite, probably is best known for their role in forging the ‘get tough on crime’ offensive, their means were to pressure the government into change by lobbying through channelling resources into the government. Initially the relationship between the BAC and government was uncoordinated, with a mixture of pressure and resource provision. Later on, the relationship became formalised, and agreements between the two parts were set, in which the BAC would focus upon issues such as white-collar crime and car hijackings among other things (Shaw, 2001). BAC’s success in influencing both focus and direction can be ascribed

to their ability to position central business individuals inside the government. Meyer Kahn from South African Breweries is one of these. By appointing Kahn as the Chief Executive Officer of the SAPS pressure upon change no longer came from external sources, but from within the governmental structures. Alongside the positioning of business related actors into the governmental institution the outcry against the government silenced as the new legislation on criminal justice was introduced in 1997, comprising a minimum sentence legislation (ibid:35).

Hannes Fagan, whom is the Inspecting Judge of Prisons argued that the “Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997” (referring to the introduction of harsh minimum sentences), was meant to act deterrent on the ever escalating violent crimes taking place throughout South Africa. The minimum sentences of 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25 years and life were introduced for a variety of offences such as; theft, corruption, drug dealing, assault, rape and murder. It thereby obliged the judge and magistrate to impose not less than the prescribed minimum sentence unless there were substantial circumstances justifying lesser sentences. Even though this legislation was regarded to be an emergency measure which would cease to have effect after two years, it has since been extended to April 2005 (Fagan, 2005). When criminologists have evaluated the deterrent effect of the minimum sentence legislation, they have found none significant evidence to support that it works. In fact crime rates have not decreased but rather increased, as crime statistics appear to indicate a gradual decrease in violent crime rates from 1994/95 to 1997/98, after which a sharp increase was recorded (Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers, 2005).

This tough on crime approach taken on by the government have had several sever consequences both in terms of previous policies, and in terms of service delivery outcome. For instance, the approach became a considerable setback for the community policing strategy. In order for the government to be seen as vigorous in ‘winning the war against crime’ they went for hard and fast policing operations rather than long term and holistic preventative initiatives as provided for in the Community Policing Policy Framework and Guidelines, NCPS and the Safety and Security White Paper of 1998 (Pelser and Louw, 2002). The new approach thereby shifted the focus away from democratic forms of policing where measures of accountable and transparent policing was a focal cord, towards contrasting and comparing accountability and effectiveness, and the rights of victims against that of the offender (Tait, 2005).
As a result of the minimum sentencing legislation, the effects on the ground have been detrimental in terms of the ability to rehabilitate the prisoners. Since 1995, prison overcrowding has mainly been caused by the massive increase in the numbers of awaiting-trail prisoners. In 1995 there were 24,265 prisoners awaiting-trail and in 2000 the number had increased to 63,964. While there were made attempts to reduce this tendency in 1995 onwards these efforts were nullified by the minimum sentencing legislation. In December 2004 there were 184,806 prisoners locked into cells designed to only hold 117,747, and in February 2005 the amount of prisoners had risen to 186,546 crammed into a space designed to hold 113,825 (Fagan, 2005).

The massive overcrowding in the prisons constitutes a major threat for the personal security of the inmates, but also for the overall society when they are released. The condition of the prisons in which they are supposed to be rehabilitated cannot be described as anything else than inhumane. Only 31 of South Africa’s 240 prisons are at capacity, while more than half are more than 150 percent full. In some cases, such as Umtata prison, they are at 370 percent above capacity (Witbooi, 2005). While the effect of overcrowding affects all inmates independent of what type of crime they have been found guilty, it is particular the youths being sentenced to harsh penalties for minor offences that yield the most disturbing trend. When youths are to sentence 5 years in an institution that treats them worse than cattle, their dignity are taken away from them. In order to make it through, or simply to survive the sentence, they will have to join prison gangs that provide protection for their members. If not being a full breed criminal when entering the prison they sure will become that before being allowed their freedom again.

As argued by Dennis Davis whom is a judge in the Cape High Court “The combination of overcrowding and dominant gang culture is an explosive mix which can only reproduce patterns of violent crime” (Davis, 2005). The mix of the government’s over-reliance on law enforcement strategies to prevent crime together with inhumane sentencing conditions has therefore escalated the rate of recidivism and violent crime. Instead of rehabilitating them, providing them with the social capital needed to be integrated into their community again, they have been enrolled into a criminal career.
Though, the government’s ‘get tough on crime’ failures can be understood in terms of, or as a consequence of, the government’s over-reliance on international ‘best practices’ policy transfer. According to Pelser and Louw (2002) from the Institute of Security Studies, South Africa’s crime prevention strategies have been adopting rather than adapting models from the developed countries from the northern hemisphere. Moreover, one has brought in policies that have been designed to work in democracies that is plural and stable, into a context which is far more complex and crime stricken. Shearing (1998) whom represents one of the more critical positions in this matter maintains that South Africa’s crime prevention policies corresponds with the distinctive features of Western neo-liberalistic community policing models, emphasising a service orientation, bandit-catching and intelligence gathering from the public.

When the law enforcement policy which originates from the United States have been put into practice and failed, the South African solution to the ever increasing crime and violence has more or less been based upon a single loop learning processes. Instead of actively making use of the problem-solving technique, which in the end would lead to new ways of approaching the problem, the solution has been to uphold the correctness of the strategy, while rather targeting the institutional mechanisms. The manner in which South Africa have attempted to solve their problems is based upon getting the police, prosecutors, courts and prisons to do a better job by upgrading their resources, management and training (ibid.). This is a picture that seems to be confirmed when looking into the government’s over-reliance in law enforcement in the war against crime. They continuously increased the criminal justice system budgets in order to tackle the overcrowding prisons, instead of evaluating why the minimum sentence legislation failed. In other words, since the policy is based upon international best practices where it has been proved significantly efficient, the department for Safety and Security decided to stick with the theory and rather improve the mechanism. This being implicit to the fact that the Department of Safety and Security as soon as January 1996 shifted its strategy of transforming the SAPS for the sake of community acceptance into efficiency and effectiveness.38

6.4 Consolidating community policing with the sector policing strategy

It can be useful to think of the period from 1998 and onwards as South Africa’s community policing policy consolidation period. The reason to this ascribe among other things to the reduction of policy statements, strategy documents and legislations which have been significant in the transition period. Along side of this developmental line, policing in terms lay participation through the CPF notion were shattered, and policing in terms of crime prevention have with ease been placed in the hands of the national government. From the outset of the consolidation period, sector policing soon became the new frontier of community policing. And if one was to believe governmental officials’ and a handful of scientific scholars, this new strategy are to reinvent the community representatives ability to actively take part in governing security.

The origin of the sector policing notion can be traced back to the London Metropolitan Police in the 1990s. In London it was understood as part of a decentralised service delivery system where policing took place through consultations with community representatives (Dixon, 2000b). When sector policing was mentioned for the first time in the Safety and Security White Paper of 1998 the resemblance with the British conceptualisation was apparent. Though, Dixon (2004) maintain that the South African sector policing strategy should not be conceived as borrowed from the British. The reason to this refers to the fact that sector policing was first employed two years prior to the White Paper, at two police stations in Western Cape. Sector policing was then used in order to multiply police personnel because of scarce resources, by activating the citizens in terms of letting them take part in the patrolling of their own communities (Dixon, 2000a). And it is particularly this features that makes Dixon argue that sector policing in South Africa, both then and now, departs from both American and British sector policing strategies. But at the same time that the policy it is not ‘cherry pie’ it not completely ‘melktert’ either, but something in between these two traditions (Dixon, 2004).

Dixon and Rauch (2004) notes that from 1998-2003 sector policing was used and interpreted differently all depending on the purpose of the policy, and thereby resembles much of the same process that community policing went through. What seems to be apparent when sector policing was mentioned for the first time in the Safety and Security White Paper of 1998 is the pre-eminence of state-centred policing, as it more or less abandoned the previous community centred policing strategies. However, later that year the conceptualisation of
sector policing as stated in the 1998 “Draft Guideline on Sector Policing” started to realign with the 1997 “Community Policing Policy Framework and Guidelines”. It now emphasised that; the main aim for sector policing is to render police service as close as possible to the community, sector policing personnel and the community should be in close and regular contact, in which the interaction should be pro-active or pro-emptive problem-solving, ensuring effective crime prevention (ibid:23-23).

From 2003 and onwards, sector policing has been presented by SAPS as a practical manifestation of community policing, which is a step towards the development of a modern, democratic policing style. Further it has been argued that sector policing provides an ideal opportunity for deprived communities whom are especially prone with high levels of crime and violence to get involved and participate in establishing safe and secure communities. In which service delivery, through the means of visible policing, will be conducted as close as possible to the community. In the 2005/2006 SAPS Annual Report it is maintained that sector policing is based on the premise of a collective responsibility in the establishment of safer communities. And within this premise, two objectives are of primary importance; local stake-holders must be involved in order to identify and address the safety and security needs of their sectors, and that local service delivery will be improved by enabling the station commander to render a ‘tailor-made policing service’ that will meet the unique needs of every individual within the sector communities.

The report further states that sector policing is based upon five specific principles: Geographical division of police stations into smaller and manageable sectors based on geographical constrains; The establishment of sector teams, which are to be managed by sector commanders who direct adequate resources to ensure appropriate and effective policing service; That various stake-holders participate in creating safer communities within their designated areas; In co-operation with these identified stake-holders, crime prevention within the sector will be intelligence driven; And that effective communication, integration and coordination will be maintained by establishing sector policing forums, which operates as sub-forum to the already established CPFs.

42 ibid: Chapter 9, Programme 2
6.4.1 The implementation process of sector policing

There are some discrepancies between scholars and the SAPS when dating the first attempts to implement sector policing. In accordance to the SAPS annual report from 2003/2004 the first attempts were made in 2000 on a small scale basis in the Johannesburg area\(^{43}\). However, according to Dixon and Rauch (2004) sector policing was first tried implemented as part of the Programme Johannesburg during March and April 1998, but was since terminated because of lacking results. The evaluation process brought to light that the main reason for the stranded implementation process ascribed to the police leaders whom felt lacking ownership, and that the participants did not understand nor had the proper education to comprehend the strategy. As a consequence, it became difficult for the participants to separate this particular strategy from the overall community policing ethos. The implementation process was also hampered because limited resources were made available (ibid:23-24).

The latter scholars argue that from the sector policing strategy was implemented to the mid 2000 there were only 21 sectors operating. Whereas those who operated well first of all were the traditional white middle-class areas north of Johannesburg, these observations are thereby similar to those of the implementation process of community policing in the previous years. From the 2001 onwards the SAPS started to role-out the sector policing strategy in which there were planned 100 operational sectors by the end of 2001 (ibid.). In 2002 it was planned to implement the strategy at 50 priority stations identified as high-crime areas (reduced to 47 in 2005), and 14 presidential stations identified as the poorest and least developed areas of the country\(^{44}\). While the SAPS argue that the sector policing strategy have yielded a great success since it has been successfully rolled out and implemented throughout the years, the data is however difficult to verify when looking into the annual reports from 2002-2006. This is mainly due to the different ways statistics were presented each year, but also because they operate with a shifting amount of sectors from year to year. Instead of showing the results in terms of standardized statistical models they tend to camouflage the results by showing percentages of positive trends, hence no negative trends in terms of failed or unsuccessful implementation of sector policing has been presented.


Maroga notes that there is bound to be some difficulties within the initial phase of implementing the new policy. In particular the scholar argues that given that sector policing is a customised policing style, one should have in mind that sector policing in locality A will be confronted with different challenges from sector policing in locality B. The first challenge is whether CPF and sector policing forums (SPF) are able to collaborate. While the intention of the prior forum is to operate as a statutory body the latter forum are to function as an operational body. If this is supposed to work, the sector policing managers will have to be seen as an incorporated unit in the overall police work, while community policing and the CPF must maintain their positions and not lose their powers. In the similar manner as CPF were seen to be serving the needs of elites and special interest groups, sector policing will also need to mobilise all potential role-players in the community in order to prevent this from happening.

The second issue raised by Maroga relates to the consequences of demarcating sectors. The quality of collaboration between the sector managers, station commanders and representatives from the municipal wards are highly dependent upon the extent of sector fragmentation. Because if an area was divided into too many units it would become impossible for relevant stake-holders to attend all meetings, this in turn would reduce the quality and feedback potential. Even though many sectors within a limited area will enhance the competition among the sectors and provide positive effects it might as well lead to reactive crime prevention (bandit-catching), and thereby depart from the long term pro-active crime prevention intention of community policing policy.

Within the sector policing strategy there are in particular two specific and distinct elements that are unique for the South African approach and therefore is of interest; the use of reservist and the employment of the strategy in highly diversified socio-economical contexts. A reservist can be understood as members of the public who does voluntary duty to assist the police (Dixon and Rauch, 2004:27). While the history of the reservist phenomenon dates back to the apartheid years, in which they were used as military voluntaries units, there has been a process since 2003 to close down the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF) commando system and transfer them into a capacitated SAPS reservist system. SAPS reservist system was implemented 1. April 2006, in which it now counts 25,734 in total and another

---

46 ibid: unpaged
15,000 is planned recruited in the three years forthcoming period\textsuperscript{47}. The intention behind police reservist working with sector policing is to improve rural safety and security, where they shall contribute in the broader governmental priority of job creation and improving the quality of service based on more effective and efficient policing.

In addition to the sector manager and his fellow police constables, reservist may provide one possible way of mobilising the civil society. Whether multiplying police resources with lay-participation will provide positive effects for rural communities in terms of improved community-police relationship that is more effective, accountable and democratic is a question that should be looked into. First of all the process in which this is sought done is of importance. In order to achieve the multiplier effect, the police needs to encourage all stakeholders in the community to come up with citizens they trust, respect and find worthy for such a position. If the citizens chosen for the job are unrepresentative for the community little of improved results can thus be expected, and in some cases it would rather result in an escalation of communities inter-group conflicts. And besides, mobilising the civil society in such manner does not automatically enable the citizenry to take part in democratic deliberation in accordance to a public-empowerment notion. While it most likely will enhance the extent of visible policing and create a certain amount of jobs it will not enable them to take part in planning and decision making, which is fundamental in order to establish crime prevention that is based upon a long term problem-solving approach.

\textbf{6.5 Concluding remarks}

The various strategies of the South African community policing notion have been apparently vague as it has been continuously shifting throughout its nearly two decade’s of development. However, Pelser (1999b) among other scholars have argued that this particular trait is what makes it so efficient. Nevertheless, there are reasons to question whether the community policing policy and its strategies, community policing forums and sector policing really have proved its ability to adapt into the specific context in which it operates, and than particular in the rural areas.

When Singh questioned the community notion in community policing the scholar did this by stating that the locality of the community has to be conceived in a wider socio-economic and

political environment\textsuperscript{48}. The policy is first of all based upon neo-liberal rationalities of freedom of the individual, autonomy, enterprise and the market, which attempts to govern the community through the means of the individual. However, when implemented in the South African context the policy will provide different outcomes and effects all depending on the socio-economic and political environment of the community. While the wealthier communities have the possibility to choose their freedom from a range of public/private alternatives, deprived communities merely are subjects of centralised governmental institutions.

de Klerk\textsuperscript{49} maintain that the vagueness and lack of clarification from the government have led to severe problems for the rural communities. Since deprived communities are susceptible to all innovation and especially those who embrace the totality of the community, the misconception that the CPF ‘is’ community policing is still prevalent in many rural communities. In fact the misconception has led people to get wrongfully expectations regarding their ability to control policing. But also, the extensively used expressions of service delivery, sheared responsibility and police accountability while not being able to deliver these have resulted in people feeling deceived by their own government. In order for marginalised citizens to feel safe and secure within their community they will need a certain extent of stability. The instability caused by the government’s action/inaction, whether national, provincial or locally, has thereby provided the unsafe and insecure environment they are obliged to prevent.

However, in terms of a national policy perspective the apparently vagueness and lack of clarification in both community policing and the more recent strategy, sector policing, have provided significant results for implementation agencies. Dixon and Rauch (2004:27) maintained that this inconsistency trait have been an advantage for the policy developers, whom attempts to build national unity around crime prevention. And since the policy concept have been understood as all things for all people it has been easier to get acceptance from a multitude of politicians and to gain widely support from the overall society.

\textsuperscript{48} Singh, A.M. (1994) Will the real community please stand up? Community in community policing
\textsuperscript{49} de Klerk, J.E. (2000) Community Police Forums, including Vigilantism?
As Bayley (1985) cited in Gordon (2001:123) so nicely put it, “the police are to government as the edge is to the knife”, as the government changes so does policing. This then brings us back to the very outset of this chapter as envisaged in model (5).

Model 5: South Africa’s Policing Policy, from Prospect to Reality

Late in the prefiguration and early transition period, a dual system of policing was introduced. According to this notion, the safety and security endeavours taking place throughout South Africa should not be conducted by the police alone, as policing was everybody’s business. Hence, safe and secure communities would be impossible to establish if not everybody were allowed to take part in the conduct of policing as well as the planning and decision making of it. This required of the police to re-conceptualise what the business of policing was all about. Policing should consequently not be understood as a solely state nor civil society domain, but it should be understood in terms of an equable ordering system, comprising a network of interrelated institutions from both spheres. The conduct of policing should therefore be framed within a problem-solving oriented manner which is sensitive and responsive to the communities’ definition of disorder. As this type of disorder is context based, the role of the police should be restrained to the capacity of enforcement and not be all embracing. By
establishing a more holistic policing paradigm, the dual policing notion envisaged a way to treat the causes of crime and violence instead of merely tackling its symptoms, as a reactive bandit-catching strategy does.

However, policing as everybody’s business did not come through. The already deprived civil society became weaker and weaker at the same pace as the new democratic government gained legitimacy concomitance to the boosting economy of private enterprises. With limited funding, and a government almost being hostile towards the civil society, they were neatly circumscribed of their democratic institutions below the government at the expense of a neo-liberal government highly supported by the business elites.

Consequently this led to at least four things: The government adopted community policing strategies from Anglo-American countries that not necessarily corresponded with the specific South African context, which subsequently created contestations and poor service delivery especially within the rural communities; It lead to a centralisation of policing, where institutions of the civil society and the CPFs as a source for deepening democracy through crime prevention more or less were transferred to an already constrained and central directed local government; Under the guise of the sector policing strategy, communities and lay participator’s potential of improving the quality of policing was shattered, as they have been enrolled as reservist under the auspice of the police, and thereby acts as intelligence officers for a bandit-catching police force; Besides, the business elites interest in curbing the spiralling violent crime concomitant to a government that was eager to appear vigorous in fighting crime initiated a reactive bandit-catching, tough on crime approach. This resulted in less attention towards a national social crime prevention strategy that actually could contribute in levelling the socio-economical difference between urban and rural areas instead of merely increasing the difference.
7.0 A nodal conceptualisation of safety and security in Observatory

In the latter chapter there was given a relatively brief elaboration of South Africa’s policing polices. It was argued that the opening for a dual system of policing was hedged by a centralisation process within the government’s safety and security policies. Alongside of this incremental developmental process there were introduced other deep penetrating policies, among these the introduction of the GEAR policy and a tough on crime strategy through the minimum sentences legislation. As effects on the ground caused by government created increased differences between urban and rural areas, scholars now describe this discrepancy in terms of a socio-spatial apartheid. This chapter therefore sets out to elaborate how private security providers and civil society institutions in relatively affluent urban communities have sought to create a state of safety and security for their community residents.

The main objective of this chapter is therefore to describe the various safety and security units that have been identified as governing nodes in Observatory. These nodes will be described in terms of the four characteristics; institutions, resources, technologies and mentalities, as referred to within the nodal governance notion. By investigating the nodes independently and as part of an extensive network there will be made an attempt to map out the most prominent nodes and the direction which these nodes governs safety and security. However, in order to comprehend the contextual frame of these nodes safety and security concerns, it will be useful to start out with a demographical introduction of the suburbs within Woodstock police precinct.

7.1 A brief introduction of the historical background and recent developments

Woodstock as an inter-city suburb has a seldom and often forgotten apartheid history. The area is of significance because it is one of the few multiracial spaces throughout South Africa that survived the apartheid regime’s urban ‘whitening’ policy, Group Areas Act of 1950. Contradictory to the District Six, where the government tore down the homes and social network of the 60,000 citizens living there, local government turned the ‘blind eye’ to the multiracial composition of the adjacent suburbs. During the two latter decades of the apartheid regime a broad spectre of civil society actors fought to consolidate the community as open to the many whites, coloured and Cape-Malay residence. In which one of the most significant attempts were made by the enrolment of several interest groups, including the
(white) Progressive Federal Party, Methodist church, City Council and concerned individual through the Open Woodstock Campaign launched in 1986 (Garside, 1993). And as a result, contemporary Woodstock is still more racial and ethnically mixed than other inter-city suburbs. Observatory on the other hand has not historically been as racial and ethnically mixed as Woodstock, as it mainly has been made up of a British descendent working class.

Among those who are aware of the specific historical achievements that took place in this area during the apartheid years displays a significant pride, as stated by one of the informants;

“You are now sitting in a ward that is steep in traditional history. In the time of apartheid throughout South Africa; Woodstock, Mowbray, Observatory and Salt River were the most cosmopolitan communities. Here whites, coloureds, blacks from all different nations met with their issues and problems openly as equal citizens”\(^{50}\).

Prior of looking into the safety and security situation of Woodstock and Observatory it is important to give a brief introduction to how the greater area is demarcated. In political terms Observatory resides under Ward 57, which is constituted by; Woodstock, Salt River, Mowbray, Rondebosch, Rosebank, Maitland Garden Village, Ndabeni, Foreshore, Table Mountain and Zonnebloem. The Ward which is run by the Democratic Alliance party, and the representative Cedric Thomas, represents in accordance to the 2001 census data supplied by Statistics South Africa, over 54,000 citizens\(^{51}\). In terms of SAPS it is however demarcated narrower, with three precincts within the Ward. Observatory thereby falls under the Woodstock precinct, in which the CPF and sector policing notion have been implemented in full extent. The precinct serves the suburbs; Woodstock, Salt River and Observatory which constitutes over 25,000 citizens\(^{52}\).

These suburbs have in the post apartheid years transformed into more distinct entities, resembling socio-economical class sections. In many ways it seems like the development is pooling around certain areas while others are staggering. While Salt River which always has been and still is a major Muslim community has experienced little change, the Lower

---

\(^{50}\) Cedric Thomas, interviewed March 30\(^{th}\) 2006

\(^{51}\) City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index

\(^{52}\) City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Ward Index
Woodstock area have degenerated and turned into a “crime dump, and drug lords territory”\(^{53}\). Observatory and Upper Woodstock on the other hand has developed slightly different as the relatively fair real estate prices in these areas have been attracting young couples with university degrees to settle, popular known as DINKY (dual income no kids). In addition to the DINKY’s Observatory’s proximity to the University of Cape Town has attracted several hundred international students to the community. The purchasing power of these has made it profitable to set up bars, restaurants, leisure activities and arts and crafts stores. Observatory with its fairly young and urban image is now regarded as one of the most vibrant communities in Cape Town, attracting not only youths but also well established Capetonians. This evolution does however create conflicts within the community. Between those who greets these new developments welcome, mainly business entrepreneurs, and those who would prefer that Observatory remains the traditional quiet working class environment, mainly residence owners.

7.2 Contextualising the safety and security situation

Crime statistics released by the SAPS annually only provide figures from the overall precinct, which cannot be traced back to the specific suburbs. Hence, there will be given a brief introduction of the crime statistics of the precinct and the interpretation of these before commenting on the most pressing safety and security issues of Observatory.

Crime in general has decreased during the four latter years within Woodstock precinct. The statistics presented under are provided by the SAPS and shows reports from a twelve months period from April to March in 2002/2003 and 2005/2006. While there were committed 27 murders in 2002/2003 there were committed 9 murders in 2005/2006. The attempted murder has also decreased from 44 to 18. Assaults with the intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm have however increased, from 156 to 172. Reported rapes have decreased from 42 to 28. Burglaries at residential premises have decreased from 838 to 546. Theft out of or from motor vehicles have decreased from 1848 to 1727. Drug-related crimes however have increased from 218 to 581, which should not be evaluated entirely negative as it is dependent upon police for detection\(^{54}\).

\(^{53}\) Cedric Thomas, interviewed March 30\(^{th}\) 2006
\(^{54}\) South African Police Service Crime Statistics, Woodstock Precinct
It should be noted that analysing crime statistics is prone with errors. Altbeker (2005a; 2005b) have stressed the importance of good crime statistics, arguing that there are some conditions that have to be met before crime statistics can be said to portray a realistic picture. In order for the SAPS to make use of the statistics, crime has to be noted, recorded and recorded accurately. And in order for the statistics to be evaluated as reliable, it is particularly the two latter steps that will have to be attained. Whereas the end result of poorly conducted crime statistics can be confusion and failing police strategies which in turn can lead to a degradation of the police-community relationship.

The reasons to the underreporting of crime can be traced back to various reasons. One reason can be that the victim knows the perpetrator, and decides not to report it because the victim fears for retribution or simply do not want him to end up in the criminal register. If the value of the belongings being stolen is of minor value to the victim, he/she can also find it not worth the hassle of reporting it, because of time-cost efficiency imperatives. The problem of not accurately recorded crime is however a much more complex phenomenon than most people believes it to be. Altbeker (2005b) seem to acknowledge the challenge which the police faces when recording crime. As the police often show up after the criminal act has taken place they only possess a limited ability to code and classify the crimes if the interaction with the victims is not improved. In order for crime statistics to become reliable there is put significant trust upon the victims to set off sufficient time to file a thorough report to the police.

The general presumption among the stakeholders in Observatory for the reason their fellow citizens’ are not reporting crime, points towards the structural adjustments at the police station and their interaction with the insurance company. If the victims regard the stolen goods valuable enough they will have to file a report and retrieve an entry reference from the front desk at the police station in order to claim compensation from their insurance company. This however does not necessary imply that the report will reach the official crime statistic. Thus, in order for the crime to appear in the statistics and recorded accurately there will have to be a more thorough investigation based upon the official complaint from the victim.

Crime statistics is however open to interpretation, as the interpreters can take whatever spin on it as they see fit their cause. While the Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, maintain that the battle against crime is being won and that ‘the future is rosy’, political parties in opposition have been tearing down this picture by spinning the statistics. Among
other things they have been pointing towards the rising drug-related crimes and domestic violence, as done by the Freedom Front Plus\textsuperscript{55}. And within the DA party there is a general perception that one will have to get tougher on crime. As one of the DA representatives put it; “I do believe that we need to get tougher on crime. We need to find a balance between draconian laws of the past and the struggle politics we have now, as these politics have given the criminals the control and even more rights than civilians”\textsuperscript{56}.

The general public opinion on crime is however largely shaped by the media coverage and their personal experiences. Altbeker\textsuperscript{57} interestingly notes that while the crime level in South Africa is decreasing the public’s fear of crime is rising. The main reason for this, the scholar argues, refers to the fact that more and more people have experienced the loss of their loved ones with a homicide rate of approximately 20,000 per twelve months. Another reason which was raised refers to the modernisation of society, where more and more people migrates to the urban city in a quest for fortune. Whereas the breakdown of their social network at home have tremendous effect on their perception of safety and security. The media coverage has also an effect on people’s perception of crime by making big headlines on murders and police mismanagement. When the daily newspaper press, Cape Argues, published the crime statistics for Cape Town they argued as follows; “What you see is not always what you get. It is understood that some station commanders play down crimes in their areas. So an attempted burglary that has led to some damage may be filed as malicious damage to property, or an attempted armed robbery could be filed as pointing a fire-arm”\textsuperscript{58}.

\subsection*{7.2.1 The perceived safety and security threats in Observatory}

The level of safety and security in any given area can be said to be highly related to the infrastructural and socio-economical context. Observatory as a traditional working class community is a density populated area where the majority of the people are living in single standing houses, flats in blocks, or duplex or triplex buildings. The approximately 3500 residences are relatively small, in which many of them have a Victorian architecture. The premises of the residences are usually surrounded by high walls of either bricks, concrete or wooden walls. Their courtyards are relatively small compared to the wealthier suburbs in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{55} Mail & Guardian, A spinner’s paradise
\item\textsuperscript{56} Cedric Thomas, interviewed March 30\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\item\textsuperscript{57} Mail & Guardian, Change is fear
\item\textsuperscript{58} Cape Argus, Crime Statistics
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Cape Town, and in order to make the most out of their premises they are often paved and roofed over.

Policing the area is often found difficult because of the infrastructural layout. The road standard has not been designed to the amount of cars that now is present. Because of the small courtyards and many buildings being used as student collectivities there is a considerable amount of cars parked along the road and on the pavements. The relative high amount of theft out of or from motor vehicles is usually ascribed to this situation. And often students inability to be ‘safety consciousness’, leaving valuables visible in the car is given the blame for this type of crime.

A different type of crime which is related to the specific infrastructure in the community is burglary at residential premises. As part of the old sewer system there were swage tanks behind every residence. In order for the sewage truck to get to these there were made small passages connecting the many swage tanks. When the sewage system was modernised, these alleys have remained, but closed off by high walls. Though, it is commonly known among security agents that criminals know about these secluded alleys. If they are able to get into these passages unseen they have the possibility to break into several houses at the same time undisturbed. Residence owners have attempted to curb this tendency and the crime in general by putting up electric fencing, barbwire or shattered glass bottles on top of the enclosing walls, in addition to motion detecting light system and an alarm system connected to a private security company who delivers armed response.

The excess and employment of private security can be seen in relation to the socio-economical status of the suburb. In accordance to the city of Cape Town census 2001, Observatory has a slightly higher socio-economical status than Woodstock and Salt River\textsuperscript{59}. While 93 percent of the citizens in Observatory have some sort of employment, Salt River and Woodstock is slightly lower with 86 and 84 percent. Observatory also distinguishes itself as the suburb with the least amount of people who earns less than R6400 pr month and the most with more than 25,000 per month. While nearly 90 percent of the workforce in Salt River earns less than R6400 per month there is a level of 60 percent in Observatory. And while 3,97 percent of the workforce earns more than 25,000 per month in Observatory, there is 0,18

\textsuperscript{59} City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index
percent in Salt River and 1.69 percent in Woodstock. Although, it should be noted that the socio-economical status of the Observatorian residents more than likely has been increasing after the data was compiled. The reason to this refers to; the increasing real estate prices, concomitance a new generation of young academics are mowing into the area while the old generation is mowing out, and because people have started to invest in the real-estate sector, buying up properties in order to turn them into student collectivities.

The CPF leader of Woodstock precinct indicates that there has been an increase of drug related homicides\textsuperscript{60}. However, among the most prominent stakeholders in the community there is a common assumption that violent crime is less frequent in Observatory compared to Woodstock. Though, when these acts occur they are usually committed in relation to robbery with aggravating circumstances at business premises. Another assumption is that drug related crime has been escalating in the past four years, which now has become the major threat towards the community’s state of safety and security. As stated by one of the informants;

\textit{“Alcohol and drugs are the biggest problems for this community. Before there were 1 bar and 13 churches in Obs, now there is 42 liquor outlets stores and 9 churches left. There was a time when my friend and I went down the main road and counted 27 drug dealers. There was a time when my next-door neighbour and I used to walk down the road with a baton looking for thieves”}\textsuperscript{61}.

While the drug-lords often are situated in Woodstock, they send out drug dealers to operate in adjacent suburbs. The general perception is that drug dealing takes place on a daily basis in some specific bars and restaurants along the two major roads that intersects the suburb. Along Station Road that runs throughout Observatory in a West-East direction which constitute the connection point between buss, taxies and the metro railway. And Lower Main Road that runs throughout Observatory in a North-South direction which connects all major bars, restaurants and the many small niche shops. The escalating drug dealing is often seen in relation to other criminal acts, because drug addicted needs finances in order to supply their drug abuse. As argued by one of the informants; \textit{“after we managed to get rid of drug dealing on the Lower Main the last time it has now started to increase again. And because of this petty crime and

\textsuperscript{60} Raymond Wenzel, interviewed March 10\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{61} Brian Gray, interviewed March 11\textsuperscript{th} 2006
car thefts have increased, Observatory is now in a whole deterioration process\textsuperscript{62}. It is assumed that Observatory is particular prone to an increase of crime in general as a result of drug dealers taking over their streets, in which they ascribe to the relatively high socio-economical standard of the people living here. Further it has been argued that the many financially strong students living in the area pay little attention towards necessary security preconditions. Moreover, because of the communication network in Observatory it is easy to quickly enter and exit the community by car, train, buss and taxi.

\section*{7.3 Nodes that takes part in directing and conducting safety and security operations}

When analysing the safety and security situation in Observatory there are four governing nodes that dominates the security agenda. These nodes have all subunits, which either operates as underlying though integrated units of their superior structure or as independent units because they are competitive business unites. However, each node does to some extent have unifying norms and values, as will be revealed when portraying their structural institutional alignments, resources, technologies and mentalities. Beneath there will be presented three nodes; node one is constituted by the Observatory Civic Association and its subcommittees; node two is constituted by the private security providers; node three is constituted by the CPF and sector policing unit.

\subsection*{7.3.1 Observatory Civic Association}

Observatory Civic Association (OCA) was established in 1996 because the Observatorian residents felt that the local government more or less ignored the community requirements of maintenance, cleaning and security. The feeling of being ignored have though not changed since the OCA was established as the deputy chairman argues; "...the line of communication between us and the local government have simply run into a brick wall. You can try calling the municipal officials, you can send letters and emails to the major's office, and you simply don't get a reply."\textsuperscript{63}. In order to solve the security situation, the OCA established a community based policing function, a neighbourhood watch group known as the Obs Watch. Obs Watch in its initial stage preformed voluntary citizens patrolling, a proactive rather than reactive policing. While effective at the beginning it became clear that patrolling the streets during the day and until 11 pm only pushed more crime into the late hours of the night.

\textsuperscript{62} Marc Clench, interviewed March 9\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{63} Brian Gray, interviewed March 11\textsuperscript{th} 2006
As this created an unstable force it was decided to rather pay security officers to patrol the community twenty-four-hours a day. But even though the community went away from their original citizens patrolling strategy, they continued with their philosophy of local people patrolling local areas, as they mainly employed local unemployed residents. In order to fund Obs Watch, residence donated money through the OCA. At Obs Watch peak period they had a subscription rate of approximately 40 percent, delivering services such as street patrol and more specific area protection when private and public gatherings were held.

After several years of good working relationship between Obs Watch and Woodstock police station their collaboration started to destabilise. The reasons for this were ascribed to; SAPS saw Obs Watch as a threat because they were making more arrests than they themselves were capable of and thereby put the Woodstock precinct in an awkward position, by illustrating their inability to perform their policing duties. The other reason that was given refers to the fact that the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act no 56 of 2001 started to materialise into real consequences for the many private security providers. According to section 20 and 21 of Act no 56 of 2001 it states that all persons in all sections of the security service provider has to be PSIRA compliant. This then obliged all board members of the OCA and all Obs Watch employees to undergo training and final test in order for them to carry on their business. As a result, OCA decided to declare Obs Watch insolvent late 2005 in order to prevent the already pending lawsuit from the provincial government.

Institution and Resources

The Observatory Civic Association operates as a mechanism for voicing the residents’ issues to other governing nodes in Observatory, to the Woodstock police precinct and the local government. It is an organisation which is made up for and by the community residents, in which those who decides to become a member of the OCA are complied to pay an annual subscriber fee of R20 for pensioners, R40 for household and R300 for business in Observatory. Once a month there is held a general meeting in which the members of the OCA, representatives from the Sector Policing unit, and other whom have a particular interest can voice their concerns. Participation rate varies from 20-70 residents out of 3500 potential ones.

64 Andries Toise, interviewed March 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
65 Brian Gray, interviewed March 11\textsuperscript{th} 2006
66 PSIRA, Private Security Industry Regulatory Act no 56 of 2001
all dependent upon the last month occurrences and than particularly in relation to criminal incidences. Decision-making on these meetings are based upon simple majority.

Brian Gray and Marc Clench are two of the most devoted and active individuals in the management of the OCA. Mr. Gray has served three years as the chairman of the OCA, and has now taken the position as deputy chairman as he considered that the OCA would benefit from voting in a younger chairman. The deputy chairman also holds the position as chairman for the safety & security subcommittee, which require him to sit on the Woodstock precinct CPF as he have done for the last three years. In addition to these voluntary duties, Mr. Gray is newly commissioned as the public relation officer at Woodstock police station. The new OCA chairman, Mr. Clench has also devoted much of his spare time doing community work. His primary occupation is within the real estate business, and as a property consultant he has much to offer for the OCA in terms of knowledge and business network. Prior to the position as chairman for the OCA he has been the former chairman for the Obs Watch and the Observatory Business Forum.

Among the OCA board members there is a common understanding that the low level of residents’ participation and limited excess to fiscal resources are the main reasons to why they have problems in achieving their goals. The residents’ unwillingness to participate in the OCA, show up at the meetings, join in with money to support the organisation, and subscribe to ‘collective’ private security providers have been ascribed to the “…visible level of apathy among the people living in this community”67. Moreover, the reason why people do not participate ascribes to; the residents’ unwillingness to pay extra for services that local government is obliged to provide since they pay taxes, but also, when paying for private security the service turn out to be of insufficient quality.

The tension in the community has among other things manifested itself in the conceptualisation of private security as individual or as communal. In which the OCA take on the part of the communal when trying to convince their residents of thinking holistically about the common good of their community. Observatory’s security problem, it is argued, refers to the fact that;”...a lot of residents ride on the backs of the few who do belong to various private security providers”68.

67 Helen Swart, interviewed March 7th 2006
68 Observatory Civic Association Annual General Meeting (OCA AGM), Minutes, February 8th 2006
It is believed that Observatory’s fellow feeling and desire to develop the community into a better place for all residents is highly crisis driven. “What we need to get things mowing is murder. We need a murder, and then people will come and yell at the councillor and at the OCA. And than we can say, sign up for the various OCA initiatives, take part and involve yourselves. But these issues normally don’t get people engaged at all, they don’t care!”

However, the chairman of the OCA displays a somewhat more optimistic picture when maintaining, “Observatory have always been crisis driven. If anybody gets shot, or there is a murder committed, everybody comes to the meeting to complain. But this year it seems like people are willing to take part and participate, which is great. I think that things have changed, attitude have changed. This year I do think that we will have the strongest OCA.”

In order to increase the level of participation, in the business of creating common good for the community, there has been a restructuring of the OCA. Voluntary residents have been enrolled into six subcommittees signifying the most pressing issues of the evolving community, these are; safety & security, business forum, cleansing & graffiti, greening & parks, heritage & development and libraries & NGOs. The main intention behind the establishment of these committees have been to enrol the residents local knowledge and capacity to improve the OCA ability to keep track off and exert influence over decisions taken elsewhere which inflicts upon Observatory’s future. The chairmen of each subcommittee are thereby supposed to engage in collaboration with actors and role-players that falls under their domain.

In order to facilitate the flow of information from the various role-players to the residents and visa versa there have been established two communication channels. Observatory News flyer, established in 2003, operates primarily as a medium for the business advertising their services. Though, it also operates as an information channel for the OCA, the sector policing unit and the various private security providers advising the residents on safety and security matters. The most recent communication channel, established in April 2006, constitutes an online discussion forum and voice-box for all of Observatory’s residents. Its purpose is to improve the feedback and information network between the residents and the association.

---

69 Paddy Chappel, interviewed March 9th 2006
70 Marc Clench, interviewed March 9th 2006
71 Observatory Civic Association, purpose statement at the website
Even though the enrolment of residents’ local knowledge and capacity in the various subcommittees is an essential resource for the OCA, there is an urgent need for financial support from the 70 businesses that already is situated in the community. However, the enrolment of these businesses has been difficult as less than 50 percent of them were seen to contribute on a regular basis. The enrolment of these 70 businesses has been seen as the first step towards a stronger organisation with more available financial assets. And concomitance to this process there is an outreach-project of enrolling the many pending new-developers in the area. In order to increase the funding the chairman has decided to target real estate agents, developers and big business in the area. For real estate agents it is asked for a minimum of R5000 per year, for big business it is asked for R10,000 per year and for developers all depending on their size between R15,000 and R20,000. 

Technology and mentality

The many stakeholders in Observatory have sought different means in order to protect themselves from criminals in Observatory and crime syndicates operating throughout Cape Town. The various techniques which denote a specific mentality range from a zero tolerance and the broken window philosophy to more structural alignments of city improvement district (CID) and residential improvement district (RID). Though many of these crime prevention techniques have been planned and sought implemented, yet little have materialised into sustainable mechanisms.

Observatory Business Forum (OBF), previously an independent stakeholder for all business in Observatory, which now constitutes one of the subcommittees of the OCA, launched their ‘zero tolerance security zone’ in and around Lower Main road, after one of the restaurants were robbed and the owner shot dead in 2003. This initiative therefore came as a response to that business owners felt continuously ignored by the Woodstock police precinct.

Originally, the New York developed strategy of zero tolerance and broken window philosophy is a state-centred policing approach. It is an approach that signifies that the police have to become assertive, confident, and aggressive when maintaining order and supporting communities that is wracked by crime, fear and insecurity. It is furthermore an approach that

---

72 Marc Clench, interviewed March 9th 2006
73 Cape Argus, Observatory firms give up on police
gets tougher on 'cosmetic' disorder; public drunkenness, aggressive begging and vagrants that troubles ordinary communities and law-abiding citizens (Dixon, 2000c). By approaching the community in such a multifaceted crime prevention manner it is believed to increase the state of safety and security.

These strategies have shown difficult to implement in South Africa because the police lacks the necessary resources to make them sustainable, but also because these strategies have shown to be conflicting upon the urgent need to improve the community-police relation. However, as the stakeholders in Observatory embrace these strategies they have not been understood as state directed, but rather as solely community directed. As it was argued; “we are supplying our own security service in the absence of police ability to do so”74. While zero tolerance have been thought enforced by private security providers, the broken window philosophy have been thought enforced through a strong and vibrant OCA. The first attempt to approach this philosophy was made through a combined CID/RID in 2003.

This initiative was however unsuccessful from the beginning as it received limited support from the residents in general as they thought that “putting money into the CID is like throwing good money into bad. The money will not trickle down to the OCA, the local government will sit on the money and spend it as they see fit”75. The initiative also received substantial criticism from the local ANC representatives, as they argued that the role players of Observatory were trying to set up an apartheid state in the middle of the democratic South Africa. These critical perceptions were however seen to be fading after a while. This can mainly be ascribed to the rapid drop of crime in the city bowl after the business got together and created a CID. And because the local government realised that such structures could be a significant partner in relieving the pressure upon the local government, concomitant providing better service delivery to distressed and fragmented areas.

CID is based upon international best practice, aimed at preventing the degeneration of cities and towns and the consequential urban decay. This is sought done by facilitating the upliftment, economical growth and sustainable development of the geographical area in which the model is implemented. In accordance to the City of Cape Town ‘City Improvement District By-Law’ of 2004 Section 1 (2) the purpose of the CID is to; enhance and supplement

74 ibid.
75 Brian Gray, interviewed March 11th 2006
the municipal service provision; facilitate investment in the district; facilitate a co-operative approach between the city and the private sector; halt the degeneration and uplift distressed business and mixed-used areas; and promote economical growth and sustainable development and thereby assist the council in fulfilling their objects and development duties. The OCA is now about to enrol all their resources in order to set up a sustainable CID/RID. It is argued that if they once again receive less than 50 percent support (as required in accordance to the City of Cape Town CID By-Law, Section 9) there will be made an attempt to set up a structure independent of the formal procedures. If this becomes the case, the CID/RID will operate as an independent business unit in which the residents will have less decision-making power. Among the stakeholders it is understood that such structures not necessarily address the generic problems of the overall society, but rather shove crime out of the community. The fact that the adjacent suburb Woodstock already has established a CID/RID, pose a viable threat towards the community whereas they fear that “all the crap is going to come to Observatory unless we are prepared.”

It is expected that CID/RID will provide a sustainable structure that will help the OCA in creating a safer and cleaner community in accordance to the zero tolerance and broken window philosophy. By topping up the residential governmental taxes by 2 percent it is expected that it would generate approximately R150,000-200,000, which then will be made available for the OCA to spend monthly on security and to hire people to clean the area regularly. As argued by one of the informants; “Number one is cleansing and number two is security. In those two projects there has to be a policy of jobs for locals, people hired should either be residents of Observatory or have family from Observatory, and they should be suitably qualified.”

When looking into the OCA’s and the ward councillor perception on what kind of initiatives and where to implement these there are conflicting interests. The leader of the OCA takes it for granted that the money generated by the CID/RID structure will be made entirely available for the OCA. It is looked upon as a structure that will give them these means to break out of

---

76 City of Cape Town By-Law, City Improvement District By-Law of 26 March 2004  
77 ibid: Section 9  
78 Observatory Civic Association Website, Observatory Business Forum, Zero Tolerance Zone, Shoddy Service  
79 Observatory Civic Association Annual General Meeting (OCA AGM), Statements, March 13th 2006  
80 Paddy Chappel, interviewed March 9th 2006
and curve the local government’s tendency of centralisation and poor service delivery. It is assumed that the 2 percent increase of property tax will give them the means to “start uplifting the area without having to go and ask for the money”\textsuperscript{81}. As the community will have money for security, cleansing the streets and removing graffiti, maintaining their parks and planting new trees and make available money for uplifting their dilapidated schools. Though, the local ward councillor portray a more holistic perspective, which transcends the geographical area of the CID/RID. The councillor argues that the question of service delivery when a CID is established becomes a question of “partnership between the state and the CID”\textsuperscript{82}, in which the local councillor plays a role as he “becomes the link between the state and the CID”\textsuperscript{83}. Because money for service delivery is demarcated into the ward as a whole, and not into the specific suburb, the distribution of service delivery will be based upon the specific community capacity of governance. “With uplifting the richer areas through the CID, done mostly by themselves, the local government can now concentrate on poorer areas that can’t afford creating such a CID themselves”\textsuperscript{84}. Hence, the councillor does not disagree with the thought that money generated by the CID/RID are to be spent within the geographical area, though he looks upon it as a mechanism that will make fiscal resources available for the local government to increase the service delivery in poor areas at the expense of the more affluent areas.

In addition, the different thought that such a structure denotes for the community there are two specific techniques that signify the OCA mentality; namely the perception of vagrants in terms of a broken window philosophy and a zero tolerance approach in terms of a name and shame campaign. It is expected that CID/RID will provide the community with the means to solve the vagrancy problem. Though, “the vagrancies are not seen upon as the people that make the community unsafe. They are about 30 people or so, they live on the street and do their business there. They drink most of the time and make bad scenes with noise, human vast and give the rest of the residents a general unpleasant feeling”\textsuperscript{85}. As the community believes in the broken window philosophy, vagrants is as much looked upon as a source for deterioration as litter in the streets, malfunctioning street lightening, roads with potholes,

\textsuperscript{81} Marc Clench, interviewed March 9\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{82} Cedric Thomas, interviewed March 30\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{83} ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Helen Swart, interviewed March 7\textsuperscript{th} 2006
grass growing out of the gutter and street signs not being replaced after being vandalised by youths or removed by criminals.

In order to get the businesses situated in Observatory to take part in building the community there will be launched a zero tolerance approach. “A zero tolerance approach is the only way of actually get something done in this community”\textsuperscript{86}. And further it is being argued;

"If you don’t want to be involved in Observatory, but only make a lot of money by being here. If you're actually not prepared to come to the party and participate and give something back to the community, what are you actually doing here, you are only here to make the money and not having the area at heart. And those types of people I will bring under the name and shame campaign"\textsuperscript{87}.

The name and shame campaign thereby signifies a transparent communication strategy within the overall community. Whereby those who contribute and those who do not will be accounted for on the OCA’s website and in the Observatory News flyer published monthly. And by doing this it is assumed that the negative publicity will force the business that does not participate to reconsider.

\textbf{7.3.2 Private Security Providers}

In order to curve the massive spiralling wave of crime and violence in the early days of post apartheid, the Department of Safety and Security invited the many private security companies throughout South Africa to take part in the fight against crime. It was within this context that Obs Watch was established as a legitimate private police force. Yet, much have changed within the private and community ordering of security.

There are mainly four private security providers that either are situated and/or operate in Observatory. These four security companies have in common that they have been employed, endorsed and recommended by either OBF and/or OCA. While these security providers often are regarded to be of private character, the OCA approach the safety and security issue in terms of collectivistic manner. As stated when endorsing the ADT as the new security provider; “\textit{please subscribe to their services and make a contribution to the overall safety of}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{86} March Clench, interviewed March 9\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{87} ibid.
\end{flushright}
our community, instead of "piggy-backing" on the good people in Obs who pay for the service. It is in all of our best interests to work together on keeping crime out of Obs."88 Henceforth, three of the private security providers which constitute the nodes that conduct security will be elaborated.

Institution and Resources
The reason why Obs Watch was declared insolvent is manifold and interrelated. While the subscription rate was at 40 percent of the Observatory market at its peak period, it started to decrease and ended at approximately 10 percent when it was shut down. Growing community apathy and decreasing trust and sustainability are often given as reasons to why people stopped subscribing to their services. In a time when residents stopped participating, the Obs Watch continued to deliver their services when people called for help. This created an environment leading people to believe that even though they did not take part and supported the security provider they would get help when help was called for. The reason to why the Obs Watch employees responded to all calls in the community can be understood in terms of their self-perception as reservist. While people employed in ordinary private security companies look upon themselves as security guards, Obs Watch looked upon themselves as policemen, because many of them were police reservist.89 As a reservist it was their duty to serve the community. However, as the Obs Watch employees refused to acknowledge that they had to be PSIRA registered and in fact a lawsuit was pending against them residents started to doubt whether they were able to deliver the service as they have done before.

After Obs Watch was declared insolvent in late 2005 by the OCA, the security provider immediately resurfaced under a new name, Observatory Community Safety (OCS). At the time OCS was declared insolvent they had a subscriber base of 523 private properties and business properties in which they employed 28 local residents. Since that time the subscriber base have decreased, concomitance their employment rate.90 The current OCS now constitutes as an independent private security provider which is run by a black manager. While the employees previously refused to take the PSIRA training and final exam they now have been officially classified as private security guards and authorised by PSIRA.

---

88 Observatory Civic Association Website, Observatory Business Forum, Zero Tolerance Zone, Shoddy Service
89 Helen Swart, interviewed March 7th 2006
90 Observatory Civic Association Annual General Meeting (OCA AGM), Minutes, February 8th 2006
Because of the rather turbulent Obs Watch – OCS transition which by some of the informants were described more or less as a coup d'état, OCS have not been able to establish a solid initial capital to maintain the organisation. The primary resource in which the organisation is more dependent upon than other private security providers in the community is residents subscribing to their services in order to make it sustainable. Their advantage in this matter refers to their employees being local residents who knows the area, and whom automatically possess a larger share of trust among the residents in the community. The ‘traditional’ working class, those of 50 years and older remain to be their main subscriber base. However, in order to survive the rather tough competition, OCS will have to gain a larger share of the community’s subscribers and in particular those from the younger generation.

The private security company that currently holds the majority of the subscription base in Observatory is ADT (a branch company of the American based Tyco international). In Cape Town, ADT holds 120,000 clients, employs 1800 people in which 800 of these are part of the armed response team which have 157 vehicles running at all times\(^1\). Since 2005 ADT has been gaining a bigger share of the market in Observatory. The primary reason refers to the OCA endorsing their fellow residents to subscribe for their services after Obs Watch was declared insolvent.

While the OCS is dependent upon a rapid increase of clients in order to make themselves sustainable ADT as a one of South Africa’s and Cape Town’s biggest security company have limited if any financial challenges. This signifies that ADT more or less can enter the Observatorian security market and provide their services without charge for a limited period until they have gained a significant share of the market, which they have done.

In the aftermath of Obs Watch, Lower Main road was without security provision. The OBF then decided to hire a new security provider for the business area enforcing the zero tolerance zone. The choice fell upon a newly established security provider, known as LMV. But merely after a limited period complaints against the company from residents and prominent stakeholders started to be voiced. LMV was looked upon as incapable of delivering the service which they had tendered for. The complaints range from them not being familiar with the streets they were protecting, as people asking for direction were given wrong directions.

---

\(^1\) Patrick Hall, interviewed March 24\(^{th}\) 2006
for well known establishments within the community. They were seen to make friends with the drug dealers, and the OCA suspected them to be in league with the criminals. As argued by some of the informants; “The LMV are more involved in promoting crime than reducing it”\textsuperscript{92} and “…the LMV holds the most lucrative contract, though they are not visible. Their standards are low and they are as bad as the criminals”\textsuperscript{93}. By June 2006 LMV’s contract with the OBF was cancelled and ADT was hired in as the main service provider to enforce the zero tolerance zone of the Lower Main road.

While ADT now holds the majority of general street and neighbourhood patrolling, their only genuine competition resides within the ‘armed response’ market in which Barneys Armed Response also operates (also known as Observatory Armed Response, OAR). The OAR service is the longest-lasting in the community. They mainly operate within the market of street and property surveillance and armed response. Though, OAR as a small local security company is seen to struggle in its competition with ADT. As argued by the manager; “The problem is that ADT comes in and become hostile towards the small business, as they buy up all the small companies. We had 1000 clients three years ago, now we only have 500 left”\textsuperscript{94}. The problem is though not only that of ADT as it also ascribes to the clients contracts with the insurance companies. According to the manager, insurance companies operate with a range of predefined and compulsory security providers, which benefits big international ones whom are BEE compliant while inhibiting the smaller ones. The problem for OAR then becomes; “ADT is such a referral insurance company while we aren’t”\textsuperscript{95}. In order to increase the subscriber base the OAR is now expanding into new areas, in which they have applied for surveillance tenders at garden sites and commercial properties throughout Cape Town.

Technology and mentality
Technology within the private security industry can be understood as the various means being employed in order to solve their security provision tasks. When looking into the OCS, ADT and OAR it becomes apparent that they uphold a basic framework of thoughts on how to provide security, though they do differ in terms of what kind of techniques they are able to employ because of fiscal restraints.

\textsuperscript{92} Brian Gray, interviewed March 11\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{93} Paddy Chappel, interviewed March 9\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{94} Russel Fave, interviewed March 14\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{95} ibid.
OCS’s main technique is based upon the employment of local residents, who possess local knowledge and are being trusted by the overall community. It is argued that the best approach towards a more secure community is through a residents-security provider partnership. Though, the competition between ADT and OCS is looked upon as destructive for the security situation. Residents’ inability to choose their services is thereby given much of the blame for the insecurity of the community. As argued by the OCS manager:

“There are two security providers in Observatory, and that is why there is no solution. The only solution that can be made is when one sticks to a company that has the local knowledge instead of bringing in a new company that doesn’t know the area at all. You need to know the area and the people that live in it”96.

While OCS provide services such as street and street-block patrols, escort services and security for people, cars and other facilities during private functions, ADT delivers a broader and perhaps more professionalised service. The most known initiatives delivered to neighbourhoods are known as ‘localised security schemes’. Currently there are 84 of these operating day and night throughout Western Cape, and each year for the last four years there have been started 19 of these annually97. As part of ADT’s security provision in the area they have also launched such an initiative in Observatory.

The localised security schemes have a very professional and structuralised procedure, which resembles military techniques and manoeuvres when solving their mission. At enter and exit points of the neighbourhood in which the scheme is initiated there are big boards informing the public that the area is being guarded by the ADT. Within the perimeter there are put down one or several guard huts, operating as the control room for the neighbourhood. While the guard hut is manned by one person at all times, there are also bicycles and foot patrols conducting proactive and reactive services, the number of these varies all depending on size and treats assessment. The proactive service refers to the security guard patrolling a demarcated area where he gets to know the area and the residents. When stranger and known criminals are apprehended on the street the guard are supposed to ask questions such as;

96 Andries Toise, interviewed March 3rd 2006
97 Patrick Hall, interviewed March 24th 2006
“What are you doing here? Why are you walking here? Where are you going?” In general the guards are thought upon as the eyes and ears for the community, paying notice to open windows and security gates and notifying the owner. But the guards are also taught to conduct meet and great services, as “if a lady comes home late at night it is our job, if desired by the client, to enter the house and check if everything is safe, then we wait outside until she has locked herself inside”. In case of emergency, every localised security scheme has one armed response vehicle within the demarcated area. When the first vehicles start mowing all others do as well, with the intention of tightening the gaps thereby providing more manpower into areas where crime is reported. As every car is monitored by a live GPS tracking system, ADT has a reaction time of 5 minutes from the alarm is activated.

Ever since Obs Watch closed down there has been a tension within the community whether one should choose security providers situated in Observatory or security providers that is situated elsewhere. The main argument from those who favours the local ones often base their arguments upon local knowledge and capacity, as they often have been stating “local is lekker”. Except from these strategic security considerations it also refers to the idea of building the community by employing local residents. These security providers are therefore sceptical towards ADT. They argue that ADT often employs people from other African nationalities which makes it difficult to figure out whether their employees truly complies with demands put down by PSIRA. Besides, they believe that the reason why ADT is endorsed by the OCA and OBF refers to the fact that the board is protecting the white’s interest by choosing a big white company.

While the OCA have tried to put up a picture of private security as a common solution in the best interest for all residents safety and security, these trends are however less significant displayed by the private security providers. Though, one example which can be interpreted in the direction of such common safety refers to the fact that ADT looks up themselves as educators. ADT teach the subscribing residents and their domestic workers, the SAPS and the foreign students coming to the community how to be safety consciousness. “I don’t have any sympathy with any who have experienced robbery or theft because it’s all about awareness. By not being aware of their action they are inviting crime into their area”.

---

98 ibid.
99 ibid.
100 ibid.
However, the rather superficial and preliminary security prevention strategy which the private security companies provides display itself through their own words, as the OCA manager maintained; “We are only coming here because of the business”\textsuperscript{101}. And in terms of the ADT region manager; “All we actually are doing here and people can’t really except it, is pushing crime here and there. And six months later the neighbouring area will call as they need backup. …crime is only being pushed further out, that is how it works”\textsuperscript{102}.

### 7.3.3 CPF and Sector Policing

The CPF at Woodstock police precinct and the sector policing unit based in Observatory constitute the third and last governing node. Though, it should be noted that treating these two units as one governing node can be rather misleading, as their assignments are rather different. As previously noted by Maroga\textsuperscript{103}, the CPF is to operate as a statuary body by looking into the overall safety and security picture, while the SPF is to operate as an operational body taking responsibility over the localised problems. Hence, as these to units originate from the governmental sphere it is useful to subsume them into a governing node in order to contrast them from the two other nodes originating from the private and civil society spheres.

#### Institution and Resources

The CPF assembles once a month, with representatives from different community based organisations and head departments at the police station. By linking up the station commander, the head of crime, murder and rape together with the various civic associations within the precinct the interest and perspectives of the two entities are being voiced. While communication between these two entities is being facilitated, trust and understanding have been built. To what extent this is true for the residents living in the area can be questioned as a survey conducted by the CPF outside the police station reviled that only 41 percent knew of their existence\textsuperscript{104}. Though, among the various role-players in Observatory, the CPF is looked upon as a well organised and an important institution. This can perhaps be ascribed to the fact that the well known and respected chairman for safety and security subcommittee affiliates on the CPF meetings, as he have done for several years.

\textsuperscript{101} Andries Toise, interviewed March 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
\textsuperscript{102} Patrick Hall, interviewed March 24\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{103} Maroga, M. (2004) Sector Policing: What are the challenges?
\textsuperscript{104} Raymond Wenzel, interviewed March 10\textsuperscript{th} 2006
Contradictory to CPFs in other provinces in South Africa, Western Cape is the only province that provides their CPFs with fiscal resources annually over the community safety budget\textsuperscript{105}. However, as the money provided by the department of community safety does not cover all CPF initiatives they are dependent upon setting up partnerships with a multitude of private and civil society institutions that possess both financial and social capital. The CPF partners range from local NGOs, to private business such as ADT, Clicks, Pick & Pay, and funeral companies situated in the area. One of the most successful partnerships for the Woodstock CPF have been with the BAC network, which among other things have materialised into a trauma room where the police can council traumatised victims of rape and domestic violence.

While the CPF has gained respect for their work among the role-players in Observatory, Woodstock police precinct has received rather harsh criticism. There are mainly two reasons for this; police mismanagement and police misconduct. First of all, there is general consensus among the interviewees that the infrastructural layout of the police station is not appropriate to run a police service from, as it “looks like shit, it’s not user friendly, it’s actually an old horse stable from the 1850’s, a historical monument”\textsuperscript{106}. Secondly, there is a severe lack of manpower. According to the size of the precinct there should have been a workforce of 129 policemen. Instead of this ideal level the precinct operates with an operational level of 116 policemen, but because the precinct is understaffed, there are only 78 policemen that are available to serve the residents. The lack of resources has a tremendous effect on the precincts detective work. Instead of two detectives sharing one vehicle, the lack of vehicles makes it necessary that it is sheared by four detectives\textsuperscript{107}. But there are also too few detectives, as each detective has approximately 40 cases that at all times are pending. Although, it should be noted that not all of the criticism can, nor should be, ascribed to the station commander domain, as there are others whom in the end of the line are responsible for the infrastructure and access to manpower.

In terms of police misconduct the precinct has experienced several episodes that have brought the precinct into disrepute and reduced the police-community trust. The first case refers to a police officer who is accused for giving a suspect false alibi in relation to the murder of a

\textsuperscript{105} ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Brian Gray, interviewed March 11\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{107} Raymond Wenzel, interviewed March 10\textsuperscript{th} 2006
priest\textsuperscript{108}. While the second incident refers to a case where nine policemen were charged for corruption and theft as they allegedly had collaborated with the drug lords operating in the area\textsuperscript{109}. There are also other episodes, though less severe, as restaurant and bar owners have accused certain policemen for demanding free drinks in order not to discredit their businesses.

The paradox of the police-community relationship in Observatory ascribes to the fact that while the precinct receives criticism because of their mismanagement and misconduct, the new sector policing initiative has been evaluated as a definitive success since it was initiated in 2005. Among the representatives for the OCA and the private security providers it is commonly agreed upon that there has been a decrease in crime since the sector policing initiative started up. The reason to this has been ascribed to the increase of visible policing, as opposed to previous times when the police only were seen driving through the community. By designating one vehicle and two policemen into Observatory, the police-community interaction have improved, as the designated policemen have taken a ‘bobby on the beat’ approach. Although the stake-holders in the community argues that the two designated police officials are too scant in order to cover the total need, their dedicated present have created positive collaboration effects. And by enrolling the many private and civil society structures into the business of policing, the sector policing initiative have managed to substitute for the lacking police resources.

\textbf{Technology and mentality}

The means in which the CPF and the sector policing unit in Observatory based their operations are highly dependent upon partnerships. But even though both units are dependent upon forming a collaborative partnership with the various private and civil society structures, their governing mentality is somewhat different. While the CPF takes a proactive problem-solving approach the sector policing unit tends towards a more reactive approach.

The chairman of the Woodstock CPF maintains that his main assignments is twofold; to liaison and educate the community on safety and security matters, and to improve the police-community relationship. There are many different programs run by the CPF that attempts to educate the residents on social problems that exist within their community. These programs vary from; drug awareness, youth awareness, abuse against women and children, adopt a cop

\textsuperscript{108} Cape Argus, Cop lied to help pastor’s killer
\textsuperscript{109} Cape Argus, Nine cops held over links with drug lords
and safer school program. Within the abuse against women and children program, they work in accordance to the belief that;

“It isn’t always about arresting people. We can’t go in and arrest the head of the family, because the mother is saying that he is abusive, we need to rehabilitate him. Taking him out of the family will cause poverty. If you have him locked up the whole family will suffer. So what will happen with family? You might have the oldest daughter that will take to the street and sell herself. The son will become a gang member, because they need to keep their family alive. So one of our aims is to keep the father there, but to rehabilitate him, in order to build the family again”\(^\text{110}\).

Though, in order to run these projects the CPF is highly dependent upon the partnerships with the private and civil society structures as noted previously. While these collaborations are looked upon as constructive and efficient, the CPF chairman maintains that “there is a lot of red tape that stops us from doing what we actually would like to do”\(^\text{111}\). Some of these unnecessary constrains lies within the Department of Community Safety, and SAPS national and provincial guidelines. In addition to these guidelines, there is also a lack of integration and participation from the various governmental bodies when it comes to the social crime and social upliftment projects, since each department always does their little ting instead of taking an integrated approach.

When it comes to the police-community relationship the chairman argues that it is their role to “pull the police out of the mud, because of the image of the police and the service that they should be able to provide”\(^\text{112}\). Though, in order to accomplish this, the station commander will to a certain extent be hold accountable to the CPF. As the chairman argues; “the station commander needs to keep me informed, if new officers comes in he needs to inform me. I have the mandate to look through all the files. I can talk to the people at the cells and see if they are being treated well. ...In a way the CPF works like an oversight body”\(^\text{113}\). In fact, several cases of police misconduct within the Woodstock precinct has been solved because the CPF requested external help to conduct covert operations among the policemen.

---

\(^{110}\) Raymond Wenzel, interviewed March 10\(^{th}\) 2006
\(^{111}\) ibid.
\(^{112}\) ibid.
\(^{113}\) ibid.
The sector policing unit employ different means in fighting crime. In accordance to the belief that many unresolved crimes can be solved by building the police-community relationship, the policemen designated to the area have familiarized themselves with the community and its residents. While the OCA board members meet with the unit twice a month for information exchange, the residents have the opportunity to meet with them once a month. At these meetings the two sector policing officials, the stations commander, the police officer in charge of all sector policing units within the precinct and the private security providers gathers for feedback and updates on the latest crimes in the community. In addition to these meetings the unit employs the Observatory News in order to inform the residents on general and specific safety hints.

In addition to the decrease of general and visible street crime, the interaction between the sector policing unit and the safety and security role-players has materialised into crackdowns on more concealed drug related crimes. On behalf of information filtered through the OCA, the sector policing unit has made several arrests among ‘hawkers’, among the people who sells cigarettes from the small provisory sales booths and at private premises, where the unit has confiscating huge amount of drugs and money114.

While the CPF can be seen to operate at a long term safety and security prevention strategy, the sector policing units operates within an environment where immediate action is demanded by the community. The manner in which this is solved is by enrolling the OCA and the private security providers, were ADT and OAR are the most frequent and preferred partners. As the OCS manager has felt shut out of the Observatory security network, the reason to this ascribes to the police and security providers mistrusting them, believing them to be far off. “It’s a problem that they will employ whatever guy they come across. I don’t believe they screen these people in a proper way”115. Because OAR is a small and community based private security company which demands little preplanning, they are often used in specific and emergent roadblocks and house raids operations. ADT on the other hand demands preplanning, and written approvals for each operation from the Johannesburg headquarter. Though, ADT’s size, resources and their professional appearance often make them a predefined and preferred choice before all other security providers in Observatory.

114 Observatory Civic Association Website, Safety and Security, Drug Bust
115 Raymond Wenzel, interviewed March 10th 2006
7.4 Concluding remarks

In accordance the notion of outcome-generating system, collectivities can be understood as people who lives and share a common interest, and for that reason identify themselves as a group. When these people act they create some form of outcomes within a time-space distinction. As the collectivity holds various nodes that possess both equal and conflicting norms, values, and resources these will in turn affect the OGS (Burris et al., 2005).

Among the different governing nodes in Observatory there is a common desire to create a safe and secure environment for the residents and for their businesses to prosper. While the residents in general want to re-establish the special vibe of Observatory as, “a laidback and really friendly place, almost like a village where people greets each other and tires to stay in contact”\textsuperscript{116}, the business owners are more attuned towards maintaining their new urban image as a safehaven for people who desires a night out on the many bar and restaurants in the community. As these two interests converge, there has sprung up a common mentality guiding their safety and security strategy.

Their mentality have materialised into a three specific strategies; a broken window philosophy that attempts to keep their community neat and clean by pushing the undesired elements (vagrants, hawkers, criminals, drug dealers) out by establishing a zero tolerance zone. In order to force the businesses into participating they are launching a name and shame campaign, in which they more or less argues that if you as a businessman do not want to contribute in building the community, we as a OCA would rather see you leave the area.

Local knowledge and international knowledge also signifies a shifting mentality among the residents, security providers and the OCA. Local knowledge is to some extent emphasised as vital for the community by the governing nodes, and especially among the small security providers. The primary governing mentality for the OCS refers to the interaction with the residents and their legitimacy as locally based and employed security providers. In which seems to be a shared conceptualisation among the OCS and the residents, as bringing in new faces into the community often is looked upon as a potential threat. The enrolment of local knowledge is also seen important by the OCA, signified by the establishment of

\textsuperscript{116} Helen Swart, interviewed March 7\textsuperscript{th} 2006
subcommittees. Thus, the purpose of setting up these subcommittees ascribes to process of dedicating devoted residents into positions in which they are able to protect their own, as well as the specific community interest. However, the OCA departs from their local knowledge notion when endorsing the ADT. Even though the ADT would uphold that they as well embrace the importance of local knowledge. By designating security guards into specific neighbourhoods, were they are to familiarize themselves with the residents, they are employing a standardised though localised security schemes.

This brings us to the most powerful and influential nodes, as none of these strategies would work if there was not a strong partnership, based upon the enrolment of the local knowledge and capacity that the various nodes possess. As noted previously in the theoretical chapter, power is not limited to the amount of power within one single actor, but to the amount of actors who takes part in the governing of it. And within this notion power does not necessarily stream in a top down manner, but rather originate from a multiple of sites. The power to act as a governing node is thereby not only determined by its own capabilities, but to what extent it is able to enrol the capabilities of other governing nodes and thereby to align them into a joint venture of governance.

As a result, when looking into the four characteristics (institution, resources, technology and mentality) of each node, it becomes apparent that certain nodes are financially stronger, better equipped and more able to enrol the resources of others into their own advantage than others. In this regard the most influential governing nodes in Observatory are the OCA, ADT and the sector policing unit. Information in the nodal governance notion is thought to float through networks among and between the nodes. The flows of communication have primarily been seen to be travelling between; ADT – Police, OCA – Police, and OCA – ADT, and as an integrated network were the police and ADT collaborates under the auspice of the OCA.

In power of ADT being one of the biggest security providers in Cape Town, ADT has established a close and effective partnership with the police, in which Woodstock police precinct is no exception. As the precinct is low on resources they have invited all security providers in a joint cooperation in the war against crime. Though, as the competition in the private security business have created many small and often unreliable service providers, there is a general perception that ADT is one of the best companies around. In order to facilitate the ongoing exercise of building a partnership, they take part in all sector and
precinct meetings. They have established emergency hotlines between the ADT headquarter and the precinct. And because the ADT is financially and technologically equipped they support the police in various ways. The most frequent and common support is; donations of bicycles and different types of clothes, printing of name cards and by holding workshops for them in order to educate and update them on ADTs latest technologies\textsuperscript{117}.

Even though the OCA has been struggling with financial resources and to enrol the residents into taking a joint stand against the degradation process, they have managed to put resourceful and respected individuals into influential safety and security positions within the area. In addition to the OCA and their public forum meetings they have managed to create suitable means for agenda setting and decision making through the OCA’s institutional substructures; hereunder Safety & Security and OBF, the Website, and the Obs Newspaper.

It is therefore reasonable to look upon the OCA as a super structural node within the Observatory safety and security network. In accordance to Burris et al. (2005) a super structural node can be one node among many in a broader multiple network that works together with the purpose of concentrating members, technology and resources to achieve a common goal. It can be argued that the OCA signifies such a node because of two things; their endorsement of ADT as the best security provider and because the sector policing unit is dependent upon the OCA in order to win the war against crime.

In the past three years the competition among the private security providers operating in Observatory has become critical. The small locally based providers have lost subscribers while the ADT has strengthened their position. Within this process the OCA has an essential role, as they discredit the smaller security service providers in Observatory through their online webpage, as they at one stage stated; “\textit{Shoddy service by Obs Armed Response has left a number of their clients up the creek without a paddle (or an OAR) for that matter. ...A number of businesses and residents have decided to terminate their contracts and change to a different security service provider}”\textsuperscript{118}. With the help of OCA the ADT have gained excess to the market, as they services the car park which is owned by the OCA, and when the LMV’s contract for the Lower Main Road was cancelled, ADT was given the contract on behalf of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{117} Patrick Hall, interviewed March 24\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{118} Observatory Civic Association Website, Observatory Business Forum, Zero Tolerance Zone, Shoddy Service
\end{flushleft}
the OBF. And most recently the OCA has recommended all residents to subscribe to their services in order to contribute to the overall safety of the community.

The police-community relationship is regarded to have taken a significantly upswing after the sector policing strategy was initiated. Within this process the OCA, hereunder the safety and security subcommittee have taken on the facilitator role for the collaborations. By aligning the sector policing meetings with the OCA forum meetings one have ensured that key role-players always have been present and thereby been able to put pressure upon change. As the achievements of the OCA have been ascribed to the fact that they have managed to put the ‘right man at the right job’, this also counts for the OCA’s relationship with the police. As the safety & security chairman enjoy confidence from both the ranking police officers and the community residents he operates as a transmission belt for suspicious activity to the police, in which he makes sure that pressure upon the police investigating the matter is kept high.

In fact, it can be argued that the chairman operates as a ‘double agent’. In accordance to Guilhot (2005), double agents are individuals whom possess special skills and knowledge that enables them to play at different levels, hence civil society, private, national and international. And by occupying key positions they are able to mobilise and enrol the diversified resources of all fields, including knowledge, affiliations, networks and financial resources. As the double agents operate at different levels it is vital that they appear to be both reformist and realist in order to accommodate different agendas and to fortify their position.

The reason for maintaining this ascribes to the multiple positions and roles in which the chairman carries out. As a consequence of his devotion into Observatory’s state of safety and security, he is one of the most present and prominent beneficiaries. By means of taking the lead role in funding and supervision of the OCA’s car park in the community, and by devoting much of his spare time to assist the residents in their contact with the private security providers, local government and the police. Within the private security sector he has established a close and friendship-based network with ADT, in which have contributed to their majority of market share in Observatory. And at the governmental level he sits in on the CPF, which have provided him with the means to establish a close partnership with the key police officials. In accordance to the double agent notion, these agents tend to occupy the middle ground, as they operate as intermediaries, arbiters and go-betweens shuttling back and forth between groups with conflicting interests (Guilhot, 2005:13). This is perhaps an
appropriate description of the chairman’s strategic position. As newly commissioned public relation officer for the Woodstock police precinct he represents the voice of the police, while being in a strategic position to push for change internal of the police precinct in accordance to the strategic agenda of the CPF and OCA.

By looking into the various nodes that takes part in governing Observatory’s security, it becomes apparent that the interaction between these nodes constitutes both strong and weak links. And as a result of the OCA’s ability to enrol the resources and technologies of other nodes in favour of its own ambit, there has been created an outcome-generating system that includes nodes that carries favourable mentalities while excluding those who do not. By presenting model (6) there has been made an attempt to envisage the nodal safety and security network in Observatory.

Model 6: Observatory’s Nodal Security Network
As this model displays, there have been forged strong partnerships between OCA-ADT, OCA-SPF and ADT-SPF. The triangle which this constitutes thereby makes out the nodal security network of Observatory. Apart from the OCA having two strong subcommittees, which are driven by an enforcement mentality of zero tolerance and broken window philosophy in order to increase profit, it is the OCA’s deputy chairman’s role as a double agent that renders the OCA as a super-structural node.

The OCA’s endorsement of the ADT and the continuously verbal attacks on those ‘who ride on the backs of those who do participate’ signifies the OCA attempt to create a common state of security outside of the governmental domain. This takes place as a consequence of the OCA consider themselves neglected by their local government as attempts to establish contact with the local government most often ran into a brick wall. The OCA’s continuously strive to establish a CID/RID should therefore be seen as an attempt made to free themselves from the poor service delivery provided by the local government. While the OCA suspects that the local government might hinder this process, as one of the interviewees argued; “I’ve got a sense of feeling that the reason they are ignoring us is that they don’t want to uplift the ward that haven’t voted for them”\(^{119}\), they are looking towards other ways of doing this. If the local government declines their residentially based application they will set up the CID/RID as a sole standing business unit.

However, the commonness of this security should be questioned because segmentation takes place between those whom are allowed to take part and those whom are shut out. While the partnership between OCA-ADT goes both ways, this is not the case between the OCA-OCS/OAR. The localised private security providers’ attempts to establish a more viable partnership with the OCA, but they often find themselves discredited by the association because of managerial, resource based and technological reasons. OCA thereby tends to favour ADT’s international knowledge at the expense of the OCS/OAR local knowledge. Though segmentation also takes place between those whom are the recipient of the security and those whom are looked upon as the cause to insecurity. These segmentations thereby primarily take place between the interest displayed by the residents and those of the business owners. And when the CID/RID is established, there are reasons to assume that this segmentation will be strengthened as the different interests becomes polarised in the face of

\(^{119}\) Brian Gray, interviewed March 11\(^{th}\) 2006
resource distribution between the two. But segmentation also takes place between the OCA’s business dominated mentality of zero tolerance and broken window philosophy and the vagrants/hawkers whom are making their living on the streets, as these are looked upon as bad for business.

Independent of what kind of CID/RID the OCA is able to establish there is a considerable mentality and practice of crime being pushed from street corner to street corner and from community to community. The main purpose for the OCA is to establish a ‘common’ state of safety and security within Observatory. As each suburb has its own safety and security network, the various suburbs compete to establish the greatest extent of safety and security for their ‘respected’ residents. Even though this creates competition between the suburbs, which leads to crime being pushed back and forth to where the security measures is the least, the long term effect can be said to be a greater state of safety and security within the suburb broader ward area. Hence, crime eventually might move on to suburbs and wards not being adjacent to its own. Whatever path the crime takes, OCA’s establishment of a CID/RID displays itself as a neo-liberal, hence feudal construction. Where artificial walls made out of various private security schemes are being built around the community under the auspice of the OCA. In which those whom desires to live there are obliged to pay both the CID/RID and their own private security providers for a cleaner, neater and safer community.

In the next chapter there will be looked into how safety and security is being governed by various state, private and civil society nodes in a much less affluent area. In the process of doing this there will be presented a model, known as the Zwelethemba model, that has achieved to govern security in a manner which avoids the segmentation effects observed in Observatory.
8.0 Towards a more equitable and democratic governance of security

Under the guise of South Africa’s neo-liberal policing strategy there has been created a cleavage between affluent and poor constituencies ability to take part in the governance of security. While the government through their neo-liberal policies have called for empowered community residents to voice their opinions, to offer their expertise, and take active responsibility for their state of security, little of these policies have benefited the poor constituencies living in rural communities. There has consequently been created a cleavage between urban and rural communities ability to take part in the governance of security. While the well-to-do population through community based organisations and private security providers have entered successful partnerships with both police and local government, poor and marginalized communities have not succeeded in creating as successful partnerships.

In Diana Gordon’s (2006) latest book “Transformation & Trouble: Crime, Justice and Participation in Democratic South Africa” she looks into the government’s response to the state of violence and crime in South Africa. Throughout the book she challenges the popular concerns about crime that led the government to take on a punitive criminal justice system that undermines the history of the country’s right-oriented political culture. While arguing that South Africa should reaffirm its commitment to public empowerment in the criminal justice system she honours the endeavours of the Community Peace Program’s (CPP), Zwelethemba model, as she maintains that it holds the potential of strengthening the country’s second decade of post apartheid democracy.

The quest of this chapter is therefore to follow up on Gordon’s remarks, when contesting the possibility of a more equitable governance of security, by including both non-state justice systems and traditional justice systems. As non-state justice systems have been prone to employ rather harsh and unconstitutional means in order to reach their ends, a central question within this elaboration is what kind of regulation mechanism that is needed in order to make these systems oblige to the law. The Zwelethemba model will then be introduced as one possible way of doing this, since the CPP has obtained regulatory power over the conflict resolution (peacemaking) process conducted by peace committee members. One of the unique elements of this model, which Gordon honours, refers to the public empowerment element ascribing to the employment of local knowledge and capacity through lay participation. However, the model exceeds being a conflict resolution model as it transfers financial
resources generated from the peacemaking process into a peace building fund. As the purpose of this fund is to attend generic problems identified by the peace committee members it also becomes a micro governance model.

By being a micro governance model it refuses to simply become a ‘rowing’ implementation agency for the local government, as it inhibits the local knowledge and capacity to both do the ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’. Their ability of doing so can on the other hand not be evaluated in isolation, as a sufficient service delivery requires local government to be deeply involved. But while CPP experiences that established partnerships with SAPS yields significant results, there are far more controversies when such partnerships have been established with local government. As a latter step before making some concluding remarks there will be made investigation into local government’s reluctances to enrol civil society based institutions as equal partners through the introduction of Breede Valley’s Community Safety Forum (CSF). But in order to comprehend the urgency of a more equitable governance of security it is of importance to start out with a contextualisation of the safety and security situation within Cape Winelands District Municipality.

8.1 Contextualising the safety and security situation in Cape Winelands District

Cape Winelands District Municipality subordinates five smaller local municipalities. Prior to 2000 these local municipalities were separate entities, but were merged with the intention of centralising the service of rural towns and rural communities in order to improve the overall service delivery for all of its constituencies. From 1996-2001 the population rate increased by 10 percent as it counts 629,494. The rapid growing population have been ascribed to the tendency of in-migration to the district, due to its function as a steppingstone into Cape Town. The population is fairly young, as two thirds is beneath the age of 34. Among those who are capable of working there is an approximately unemployment rate of 18 percent. Even though this is fairly low compared to the national average, the employment is rather unstable due to seasonal working conditions at the agricultural sector. According to the 2001 Census Survey 86, 3 percent of all residents in the district earned less than R1600 per month, which indicates that a total number of 543,742 persons are living in relative and often seasonal poverty. This poverty level stands in sharp contrast to the fact that it is the richest agricultural district

120 Roy Feldman, interviewed March 20th 2006
121 IDP Review 2005/2006, Cape Winelands District Municipality
in South Africa and the second largest of its kind in the whole world\textsuperscript{122}. It thereby signifies an intricate situation of economical developments transpiring into local safety and security challenges as well as opportunities.

Traditionally, development has been considered as a solution to crime. The key element within this notion refers to the idea that crime is caused by poverty, and that development strategies aimed at dealing with poverty also will serve as means to prevent crime (Bruce, 1997). Though, if this was accurate, the escalating crime and violence reported throughout South Africa in the post apartheid period stand out as a paradox. There are three major schools of classical criminology that predicts an increase of crime when a country undergoes the process of development. In the following, these theories will be linked up with criminal events taking place within the district.

In accordance to the anomie/strain theory it can be argued that “\textit{during periods of rapid social change, traditional norms may be viewed as no longer applicable behaviour, leaving people free to pursue any ends by any means}” (Leggett, 2000:145). The core element of this theory refers to deprived segments of the society whom are left out from the developmental trends applicable to other segments, and often it is seen in relation to materialistic values. 40 percent of the district’s population is under the age of 19, this group also constitutes the largest share of criminal offenders, whom are easily reached by the criminal justice institutions. The reason to why youths turn to crime have been ascribed to the lack of parents supervision, poor and often inadequate level of schooling, and a poor environment with limited recreation facilities. Lack of role models and the prevalent materialistic values makes it thereby tempting for the youth to join gangs, as these provide status, income and a sense of belonging\textsuperscript{123}.

The control theory maintains that human beings naturally break the law when sufficient social bonds do not constrain action. The lack of attachment, commitment, involvement and belief are thought to weaken the social bonds that enforce conformity (Leggett, 2000). As already noted, the population increased by 10 percent from 1996-2001, and it is believed that it has grown by another 10 percent the latter six years as it is now expected to be close to 700,000 residents. The significant amount of in-migration related to seasonal working possibilities, the

\textsuperscript{122} Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2006

\textsuperscript{123} A Scan Study: A preliminary study into crime prevention strategy pending a more detailed crime audit for the Boland District Municipality, Undertaken by UMAC 2003
movement of people from urban to rural areas and from rural towns to rural communities and visa versa are looked upon as a significant safety and security challenge. A scan study over the district undertaken by U Managing Conflict (UMAC), a democracy, human rights and tolerance NGO operating in Western Cape, argued that more stringent security measures in Cape Town city had led to an increase of organised crime on soft targets, such as affluent farms and rural towns. Crime has also been ascribed to the seasonal labour as there is a significant increase in violence and crime during the harvest season. Much of these offences occur in 15 hotspots, defined as localised geographical areas that have a higher average crime and disorder rate than other areas. These hotspots are localised adjacent to the growing rural towns in the many townships and informal settlements. Crime can therefore be said to be pushed out of the commercial areas and into densely populated areas, characterised by environmental blight, poverty, family breakdowns and people with blocked opportunities.

In accordance to the learning/differential association theory people who live under such harsh conditions, associated with anonymity and heterogeneity creates their own subcultures of crime. This theory thereby ascribes the reason to why so many youths turn to criminal activity and gang membership in order to survive the harsh living conditions of these communities. The theory further argues that by labelling those who conduct crime as ‘criminals’ one excludes them from the society, by making them secondary deviants which in turn strengthens the negative elements of their subculture and thereby effectively impedes integration (Leggett, 2000). The extent of recidivism within the district is a good ‘litmus’ indicator of this problem. While the national average of recidivism is approximately 50 percent, there is noted an amount of 80 percent within the district. This ascribes to the lack of job opportunities, discrimination on the basis of their criminal record, and an extensive alcohol and substance abuse which is implicated in 75 percent of all reported crimes. Though, subcultures aspiring from such conditions can also contribute in crime prevention. In which non-state justice systems often are the poor and marginalised people’s adaptation to the domain of private security providers found in the more affluent areas. Before giving an account of these systems there will first be given a brief description of the safety and security situation in Worcester.

---

124 Cape Winelands District, Facilitating Community Safety in the Boland, A Crime Prevention Strategy for Safe and Healthy Communities, Prepared by UMAC, August 2004
125 A Scan Study: A preliminary study into crime prevention strategy pending a more detailed crime audit for the Boland District Municipality, Undertaken by UMAC 2003
8.1.1 The safety and security situation in Worcester

Worcester with its 91,000 people is the largest rural town in Breede Valley Municipality which resides approximately 130,000 people\textsuperscript{126}. By labelling the town rural this only signify the overall geographical area; the city centre however must be regarded as urban with its many businesses and restaurants. Adjacent to the city centre there are several poor and marginalized communities and townships. As boundaries often are overlapping it creates a complicated picture of crime and violence. While crime and violence are being pushed out of the city centre by the six private security providers operating there, this creates hotspots of crime and violence often at the boarder to the affluent areas. And from these hotspots a state of crime and violence often repulse on the immediate surrounding areas by high rates of robbery, burglary and theft out of motor vehicles\textsuperscript{127}.

Because the town has the largest population rate it is also the place which has the largest share of crime and violence. Within a twelve months period between April 2004 and March 2005 there was reported 91 murders, in which 37 of them were categorised as culpable homicide, and in addition there was reported 16 attempted murders. Within crime categorised as social fabric crime there were reported 183 rapes. Common assaults were as high as 2,252 in addition to the 1,415 assaults with the purpose of inflict bodily harm. Another crime which also is related to social fabric crime is the 7,456 cases of illegal liquor trade often taking place at shabeen’s. The latter mentioned cases are on the other hand positive trends, as they have been attended by the police, which then increase the possibility to reduce the alcohol related crime and violence that take place in the marginalized communities and townships\textsuperscript{128}.

The Zwelethemba Township:

In the scan study conducted by UMAC Zwelethemba was often the first mentioned hotspot of crime and violence. The township resides approximately 23,000 people and makes out 40% of the reported crimes within Worcester precinct. These high levels have been ascribed to the culture of violence that developed during the apartheid era and remains to be the status quo today. The above mentioned study further argued that state of unrest were ascribed to other

\textsuperscript{126} Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
\textsuperscript{127} A Scan Study: A preliminary study into crime prevention strategy pending a more detailed crime audit for the Boland District Municipality, Undertaken by UMAC 2003
\textsuperscript{128} Worcester Safety Audit, research undertaken by the Unit for Religion and Development Research, University of Stellenbosch in partnership with the Western Cape Department of Community Safety, Stellenbosch 2005
factors such as; overcrowding, poor housing, alcohol and drugs, and few role-models for the youths.\textsuperscript{129}

Research conducted by the Unit for Religion and Development Research (URDR) at the University of Stellenbosch provides support for UMACs findings when revealing that Zwelethemba was one of the townships in the district most prone to crime and violence. This they argued ascribes to the low socio-economical status of the township residents. The average annual income per household were R17,625, while the adjacent community had an annual income of R51,219 and the more affluent had above R110,000.\textsuperscript{130} The unemployment rate in Zwelethemba explains this as 28.39 percent of the people between 15 and 65 could not find work, while the adjacent community had a unemployment rate of 14.63 percent. Zwelethemba had also the largest percentage (7.68) of adults above the age of 20 that did not have the opportunity to complete any schooling, while the adjacent community had percentage of 4.04 and within the more affluent communities this percentage dropped to less than 1 percent. The amount of informal dwellings follows this pattern, as 42 percent of the dwellings in Zwelethemba were classified as informal structures, while the adjacent community were down to 7 percent.\textsuperscript{131}

After presenting such “hard” facts it might also be interesting to look into how the township residents themselves perceived the level of crime in their community. In accordance to two focus group interviews conducted by the URDR in November 2005, following trends were evaluated to be the most devastating by the township residents; murder committed by gangsters, drug abuse where youths mostly were implicated, and alcohol abuse where all ages and sexes were highly represented. Rape, assaults, robbery and house break-ins were rated less sever, though still higher than most other communities within Worcester.\textsuperscript{132} One of the more interestingly parts of their research refers to the degree of bonding between residents that these participants felt within their community. By measuring the pride of belonging, the extent of friendship circles, and extent of social support systems, Zwelethemba was rated as

\textsuperscript{129} A Scan Study: A preliminary study into crime prevention strategy pending a more detailed crime audit for the Boland District Municipality, Undertaken by UMAC 2003

\textsuperscript{130} Worcester Safety Audit, research undertaken by the Unit for Religion and Development Research, University of Stellenbosch in partnership with the Western Cape Department of Community Safety, Stellenbosch 2005

\textsuperscript{131} ibid:11-15

\textsuperscript{132} ibid: 6-7
the township that had the highest degree of bonding compared to all other communities within Worcester\textsuperscript{133}.

### 8.2 Non-state justice systems as an alternative to urban private security providers

When affluent people have come to the conclusion that the protection provided by government and the police are insufficient they have sought to other means, among these the private security industry. In the same manner as the well-to-do have sought protection from private security providers so has poor people living in marginalized communities through private security initiatives, also known as non-state justice systems. Although there are at least two essential elements that separate the two; while the private security providers in affluent areas are for hire, the private security initiatives originating in marginalized communities’ civil society structures are less prone to demand payment from the already poor community residents; while the affluent people’s private security providers are looked upon as legitimate since they are tightly regulated by the government through PSIRA, the lack of such regulations makes the government deem marginalized communities private security initiatives as illegitimate. The purpose of this section is to consider the possibility of changing the illegitimate character of non-state justice systems. And concomitance, to consider what it is that makes non-state justice systems a viable and promising alternative to the private security providers operating in urban affluent areas.

The extent and nature of non-state justice systems are highly disputed and complex as it cannot be separated from politics and history (Schärf, 2005). Non-state justice systems can be said to constitute a multifaceted notion including; vigilantes, customary justice forums, community and neighbourhood dispute resolution forums, and religious courts. These various types have in common that they aspire from the civil society when the social contract is unclear or unfair to certain groups. But also if the state has limited capacity or will to deliver the extent of safety and security that the marginalized and victimised groups require. Non-state justice systems are thereby established in order to suit the needs and express the values of these groups (ibid.).

As Baker (2002) argues, vigilante organisations often arise as a result of the state incapacity to police and secure the citizens and their rights. These organisations are also known as

\textsuperscript{133} ibid:29-30
autonomous citizen responses that are groups of people operating independently of the police and whom are willing to break the law in order to achieve their means. Their means can either be of safety and security protection or in terms of investigation, in which they might approach their ends in a reactive, ad-hoc and often apply violent behaviour.

Vigilante activities prior to 1990 have largely been explained in terms of a political motivated liberation and struggle ideology. Where individuals and groups took the law into their own hands in what was perceived as legitimate attacks on agents and structures of the apartheid state. Yet these organisations have mostly seized to act as political agents, and rather taken on a formal and organised structure (Minnaar, 2002). The two most known groupings in South Africa are the *Mapogo a Mathmanga* and the *People Against Gangsterism and Drugs* (PAGAD). Mapogo a Mathmanga originated in the Northern Province in 1996 as a response to the violent killing of six business people. From this year onwards the organisation grew quickly, incorporating all sectors of civil society, including schools, churches, businesses and farmers. At its peak period it held over 70,000 members divided among 72 branches throughout South Africa. After starting out as a “moral community” with a political agenda of alternative citizenship it became a private security company in 2004 (Oomen, 2004). PAGAD on the other hand originated at the Cape Flats in Cape Town among the Coloured and Muslim population. It emerged as community response to years of endemic crime, drug abuse and gangsterism in 1995, in which they employed a spectre of legal and illegal methods in order to state their political motives. The organisation entered into consultation with the state, but was since rejected by the SAPS in 1996 as they had degenerated into a crime problem themselves. At the beginning of the new century PAGAD were labelled a terrorist group by several national and IGOs because they allegedly were responsible for several bombings throughout Western Cape between 1998 and 2000 (Monaghan, 2004).

A different type of non-state justice system is the people’s courts later known as Anti-Crime Committees. The system was originally established with the means of establishing law and order as a substitute to the failing state security system. But as Minnaar notes, often they more or less operated as kangaroo courts, where prominent people used it for self-enrichment by getting rid of opponents and by controlling the community through intimidation. The extent of these committees dropped somewhat during the early days of the post apartheid period, but was later seen to become more prevalent within informal squatter settlements (Minnaar, 2002). The reason to this can be ascribed to the lack of official control by local governments, as these
communities have had to decide either to organise their own policing and community guards or face the very real threat of being swamped and controlled by criminal gangs and crime syndicates.

However, not all have been as critical towards the Anti-Crime Committees as Minnaar. Through observations of Anti-Crime Committees, Nina (1995) portrays a slightly more nuanced picture. While there is little disagreement around the rather ruthless and inhuman methods that these committees often has employed, the scholar however notes a drift towards more humane and community representative institutions. In which the transformation often was facilitated by joint collaborations between the committees, NGOs and the police.

As noted above, the various types of non-state justice systems can take part in creating safe and secure communities in accordance to the rule of law, but they can also degenerate and turn into crime syndicates, such as PAGAD. To what extent these systems tilt one or the other way seems highly dependent upon the government’s ability to collaborate or to simply just communicate with these organisations. Even though partnering with these organisations are highly contested among various politicians and governmental officials, the South African Law Commission have been working on the possibility to create space for “community dispute resolution structures”. In more than five years the commission have been working on this issue, as they in 2004 completed a final draft of recommendations. The draft argues that one should create an enabling legislation to encourage the establishment and recognition by the state of community dispute resolution structures run by civilians. One should also enable links to the justice system such as the magistrates’ court and the police (Schärf, 2005).

Dennis Davis whom is a judge in the Cape High Court further elaborated this view by stating; “The criminal justice system must absorb more from the principles of restorative justice” (Davis, 2005). In accordance to the UN “Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century”, the restorative process was conceptualised as: any process in which the victim and offender where appropriate, and other individuals or community members affected by crime participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from crime with the help of a facilitator. The process may also include mediation, conciliation and conferencing and sentencing circles (United Nations, 2001). Davis further argued that in the process of aligning the justice system with the restorative justice
notion there should be put larger attention towards indigenous justice as these already contains elements of restorative justice (Davis, 2005).

Within the Cape Winelands District’s state of safety and security, there are numerous of reasons why restorative justice based non-state justice systems can yield significant results in crime prevention. While the community members to a certain extent always have weighted non-state justice systems as legitimate the governmental institutions are dependent upon legislations in order to do the same. By linking the restorative justice notion together with non-state justice systems, such as community dispute resolution structures, there now seems to be a more positive attitude towards alternative justice operating in the shadow of traditional justice, which if legislated is thought to improve the legitimacy of non-state justice systems.

However, even if such pro alternative criminal justice systems are legislated, legitimacy will in the end depend upon the community dispute resolution organisations being able to forge considerable regulatory powers. In order to curb the negative elements of non-state justice systems, such as self-enrichment, sectional interest and the use of physical force which must be restrained within the domain of the state, it is of pivotal importance to establish a system of rule and procedures, and review mechanisms. Because it is only when such regulatory powers are in place that a more equitable outcome for all community constituencies can be in line of sight.

If this is sought done there are reasons to believe that one are one step closer to a public-empowering justice system that hold the possibility of deepening democracy. Although, contributing in crime prevention in such a manner require a constructive and equal partnership with local government and the police. The relationship with the police is of importance because the police and the community dispute resolution institutions should be able to transfer ‘cases’ to the institution being in the best position to establish a peaceful tomorrow. For the entire criminal justice system this would yield significant results as it will reduce the districts high percentage of youths being imprisoned for minor offences, and thereby shielded them from the ‘Universities of Crime’. The relationship with the local government is of equal importance within a crime prevention notion since conflicts between disputants often are related to the community’s generic problems. These generic problems cannot be solved without local government being present, as they relate to poor housing and education, and communal facilities such as contaminated water, open sewage systems and limited excess to
electricity. However, an element that weights whether such organisations will contribute in strengthening democratic crime prevention is dependent upon them being welcomed into the circle of power or not. It requires of the local government and the police to decentralise a certain extent of responsibility, resources and control to community dispute resolution forums that has proved regulatory powers, which consequently will improve the potential of a broad based communal safety approach delivering safety as a common good. And if this is achieved there are reasons to believe that this way of governing security will contribute to curb the tendency of internal and external segmentation and a short term ‘bandit-catching approach’ facilitated by the nodal OCA network as observed in Observatory.

Thus far there has been given a brief overview of the safety and security situation in Breede Valley as related to a larger geographical area, and there has been envisaged a more detailed picture of the situation in Worcester and Zwelethemba. There has also been given a brief overview of the non-state justice systems often operating in poor and marginalised communities. It has been argued that a restorative justice based non-state justice system is an essential source for more equitable ordering of safety and security. Henceforth, there will be given a detailed description of three nodes that takes part in governing safety and security in Breede Valley. In which one of them, the CPP’s Zwelethemba model, represents one possible way of governing security through an equitable non-state justice unit.

8.3 Nodes that takes part in the governance of security in Breede Valley Municipality

The three nodes that will be elaborated is the CPP’s Zwelethemba model, the Finnish Embassy’s funding scheme, and Breede Valley’s CSF. The above mentioned nodes have been chosen deliberately, as they represent the perspectives from role-players such as a non-state justice unit (henceforth noted as a civil society based conflict resolution organisation), an international donor and a local government institution. By exposing these three nodes institutions, resources, technologies and mentalities there will be made an attempt to envisage their role and potential to take part in governing security. In the process of doing this it is in particular the conflict of interest between civil society and local government that will be highlighted. Among other things it will be argued that an empowered civil society can contribute significantly in strengthening democracy, through democratic deliberation, if local government enables rather than restricts movements in the civil society.
8.3.1 The Zwelethemba model

In the years following the first democratic election there was a growing discontent among the majority of the constituencies about the pace the RDP were able to deliver sound development within the many deprived communities and informal settlements. The ‘governance deficit’ in poor communities were multifaceted, relating to all aspects of human security, such as freedom of fear and freedom of want, health, education, housing and job opportunities. Alongside this discontent there was also a growing mood of dissatisfaction towards the various autocratic and often brutal manners of the non-state justice systems that came to exist throughout the many townships during the apartheid era. As noted above, these non-state justice systems resurfaced and flourished post 1994 as a response to SAPS incapacity to provide equitable services for all constituencies throughout the country.

Against this background a group of researchers at the University of the Western Cape through the CPP started to work on a new and innovate way of enabling laypeople, whom were living in marginalised communities, to take part in the governance of safety and security. By establishing a micro-level governance structure they were able to enrol the local knowledge and capacity of poor people in effective partnerships of mutual respect with professionals working in governmental institutions. Although, the ambit of the program was not only to establish a model for community-based conflict resolution, but also to create a holistic model that would enable marginalised communities to voice their needs and to take responsibility in such a manner that they were enabled to manage their own future through democratic deliberations with those agents being in control of their destiny. In the following sections the institutions, resources, technologies and mentalities that have enabled the marginalised community members into lay-participation will be elaborated.

Institution and Resources

The Zwelethemba model was named after the community where it was first rolled out in 1997, as the name Zwelethemba means ‘place of hope’ in Xhosa. Since the outset it has grown in extent and in terms of practical and normative conceptualisation. The model has been rolled out to 24 sites within three Provinces. In addition the model has been transferred to sites in Uganda, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and Australia where it has been or is being adapted into their specific national, cultural, and safety and security context. It is an expansion only made possible because of continuously conducted research by CPP employees and affiliated scholars. As a result, the scope of this model have been aligned closer to theoretical
conceptualisation of the restorative justice movement, deliberative democracy, micro enterprise development and human security.

Peace committees are the core institution of CPP’s Zwelethemba model. These committees are made up by voluntary and dedicated community residents, whom desire to contribute in facilitating peace between disputing residents through ‘peacemaking’, and to contribute in uplifting their community through ‘peace building’. In addition to the peace committee there are several institutions that the core institution is in continuous relationship with. These are both internal and external to the peace committees. By internal it is meant those institutions that provide support in terms of funding and facilitation, but also in terms of regulation. By external ones it is meant those institutions whom the peace committee is in partnership with on the ground, the most common one is the police but is desirable to get a better partnership with the local government. At this point it is the internal institutions that will be highlighted, while the external institutions will be dealt with at a later stage.

Apart from the peace committee there are primarily three institutions that through different though often overlapping means facilitates the core business of the peace committees. The primary institution is the CPP. Their role is to set up new peace committees in areas where they have been invited to do so, this usually take place after having presented for the community their mission and goals affiliated by peace committee members from already established peace committees. In light of CPP being headquarter for all peace committees it is their responsibility to extract funds from potential donors that will be spent on drifting the peace committees’ peacemaking and peace building initiatives. In the last couple of years there has been a search for new ways of gradually making the model sustainable and donor independent. The reason for this can partly be ascribed to the Finnish Embassy gradually pulling out after being the major founder since 1999. But also, there is an understanding that the model is more or less fully developed and can therefore in full or partly be handed over to implementation agencies who hereafter will take responsibility of CPP’s previous role. As some peace committees already are linked with police stations, this way of decoupling peace committees from the CPP is thereby an attempt to set up new public-private partnerships. Perhaps the most important role of the CPP is to monitor that the peace committees are following the basic values in which the model is founded upon. These values can briefly be described as; self direction, local conflict management, community development, and the prevention of sectional and personal interest. In order to make all CPP members accountable
to these values three mechanisms has been installed: First of all there are rules stipulating how all peace activities are to be conducted; Secondly, there is a system of data gathering and provision of feedback to and fro the peace committees and the CPP, which then enables evaluation and correction of practice; Thirdly, an incentive system is being employed, this allows personal interest to align with communal goods\(^{134}\).

However, the monitoring role is not only conducted by the CPP alone, as both the Finnish Embassy and the University of the Western Cape have their own internal mechanisms for either pre and/or post reviews. The Finnish Embassy has built a thorough check and balance system that first of all decides whether to fund the organisation or not, this is attended to through an external consultancy agency that have specialised in non-profit organisations. Subsequently the Embassy conducts annually audits with purpose of supporting the organisation in filling loopholes being detected in such a way that funding can be sustained\(^{135}\).

The School of Government at the University of Western Cape is the last threshold before payment is released to the peace committee members. Their decision to do so are dependent upon that data gathering is being conducted in fully by the peace committee members, which then has to be checked and signed by the peace committee co-ordinator and a CPP employee whom are monitoring the peace committee.

Taking all these institutions in to consideration and the values which were briefly stated above, the CPP stands out as a research-based community outreach program with a developmental agenda. Where CPP are linking international knowledge provided by a network of affiliated scientific scholars with the local knowledge and capacity of poor people living in marginalised communities. The manner in which the Zwelethemba model materialises on the ground through work conducted by the peace committees will be elaborated in the two following sections.

Technologies

When the CPP started to develop the model through a trial and error process in Zwelethemba it did so with an assumption that the state no longer had a real interest in providing a comprehensive program of crime prevention and social services, as deprived community

---


\(^{135}\) Jesse Maarit Laitinen, interviewed March 27\(^{th}\) 2006
members merely were supposed to be regular consumers\textsuperscript{136}. Since the CPP was contesting this notion they supplied the peace committees with two essential technologies (peacemaking and peace building) that would both guide and regulate their activities. These two technologies would then allow the marginalised Zwelethembian residents to enrol their local knowledge and capacity in the process of taking a lead role in the establishment of a safe and secure community. The model is thereby founded upon the notion that even if people are poor and marginalised they do not have to give their problem away to external experts, as they have the capacity, the essential knowledge and experience to devise appropriate solution themselves if suitable institutional structures are in place. Within this notion there are two key elements, namely local capacity governance and micro governance.

Even though the two former mentioned key elements should not be looked upon in isolation, as they constitute a totality that is greater than the sum of the parts, it is possible to link the elements with peacemaking and peace building. Hence, local capacity governance is essential within the peacemaking process, as it emphasises what local people know and can do themselves by devising their own solutions into creating a more peaceful tomorrow. And in terms of micro governance which is an essential element within the peace building process, as it emphasises the importance of grass root movements that operates in terms of a bottom-up approach\textsuperscript{137}. Money generated from successfully conducted peacemaking facilitations then binds the two structures together, as some of the money is being vested into micro-enterprise support that promotes social justice by increasing the circulation of money within their own community\textsuperscript{138}.

As mentioned above, all endeavours of the peace committee are tightly regulated. The primary regulatory document, which lists the core values for the peace committees are the ‘code of good practice’. The code states as follows: We help to create a safe and secure environment in our community; We respect the South African Constitution; We work within the law; We do not use force or violence; We do not take sides in disputes; We work in the community as a co-operative team, not as individuals; We follow procedures which are open for the community to see; We do not gossip about our work or about other people; We are

\textsuperscript{137} ibid:4
\textsuperscript{138} Cartwright, J. and Shearing, C. Local Knowledge and the Governance of Security
committed in what we do; Our aim is to heal, not to hurt\textsuperscript{139}. It is among these values and the enforcement of them that separates the Zwelethemba model from the negative elements of other non-state justice systems. In the following there will made a brief overview of the technical procedures relating to the peacemaking and peace building process in addition to reflect on the governing mentality of these procedures.

When a complaint has been addressed by fellow community members or referred to the peace committee by the police there is set up a ‘peacemaking gathering’. This gathering is usually arranged within days after the case has been notified. The purpose of the gathering is to bring together disputants and others whom might be in a position to help understand and resolve the dispute. During these gatherings the function of the committee members are regulated by the code. Their role is entirely to facilitate and thereby not to engage in blaming/judging, or to decide the ‘plan of action’, which is a decision taken by all through democratic deliberation (Cartwright and Jenneker, 2005). The subsequent steps that guides the gathering follows a problem-solving path where the focus always is directed towards the future in order to find solutions that can make sustainable peace between the disputing parts. Within this problem-solving manner there are three particular steps that make up the peacemaking path. Firstly, statements are given by those whom are directly involved in the dispute, thereafter a discussion on what happened and its consequences take place among the disputants and the invited ones. Secondly, there is made an attempt to map out what caused the problem, most often these are generic problems that can be found within the communal context. Thirdly, after having mapped out as many elements as possible from the dispute, there is produced an ‘action plan’ agreed upon by all if this is possible. The plan is designed in such a manner that it will prevent the dispute to reoccur (ibid:3).

By February 2005 the CPP had analysed 7000 gatherings, which had taken place within a four years period. These analyses revealed that about 40,000 people had taken part in the peace gatherings and thereby adhered to the code of good practice and to the pivotal goal of creating a better tomorrow by actively taking part. Of those taking part at these gatherings 59 percent of them were women and 17 percent were youths. In particular three types of disputes were most frequent. The most frequent dispute dealt with relates to money being borrowed and not

\textsuperscript{139} Cartwright, J. (2004) Mobilising Local Capacity and Knowledge: A South African Case Study
being repaid. While the second most frequent one was property offences and the third was related to insults, threats and gossiping (ibid:6).

Before moving on to the peace building part of the model it is useful to take a look at the payment structure. For every conflict resolution that is conducted in accordance to the code of good practice a sum of money is paid to the peace committee. This outcome-based payment structure serves two purposes. It recognises the hard work that the facilitators lay down and thereby responds to the criticism often raised as professional always are getting paid while poor people always are expected to volunteer (ibid:5). But the payment structure also serves a regulatory purpose through enforcing the facilitators to keep in line with the code of good practice in order to get paid. After payment being transferred to the peace committee it is divided between those who were in charge of the facilitation process and a peace building fund. In 2004 the ratio between these two was R200 and R100\textsuperscript{140}, although this is not a fixed amount due to its dependency upon external funders.

While the peacemaking process refers to negotiations between disputants, peace building refers to the allocation of generic problems that is being identified through the former process. Peacemaking and peace building is thereby interlinked by fiscal resources being made available through conflict resolutions which accordingly is to be spent within the community as a common good.

By February 2005 it had been conducted over 11,000 conflict resolutions which in turn had released approximately R2,5 million to be spent within the 20 peace committees which existed then (Cartwright and Jenneker, 2005). Although, effectively dealing with such generic problems is difficult as it requires a significant amount of fiscal resources that exceeds the amount mentioned above. But it is also difficult because those generic problems being identified often have a broader scope than what the community directly can attend to, as poverty caused by lack of job opportunities and lack of proper infrastructure requires a greater attention from the local government. Apart from trying to enrol local government into uplifting the community, peace building projects enters partnerships with local entrepreneurs and NGOs under a mutual ‘memorandum of understanding’ on how to approach and solve the generic problems identified within the community.

When approaching these generic problems there has been two preferable ways of solving them. One possibility is to spend the money on infrastructure which directly can reduce the potential of already experienced conflicts to reoccur. A different manner in which the money can be spent is also through infrastructure, though less directly coupled with the reduction of those generic problems that causes’ conflicts, but more towards recreational facilities which has long term strain reduction effects. Typical peace building projects have therefore taken the shape of constructing and maintenance of children’s playgrounds, uplifting and cleansing the most deprived shack areas, and different types of youth projects such as; sports, arts and culture activities. Whatever generic problems being attended by the committee’s solution gatherings, an essential goal is always to keep the fiscal resources circulating within the community, which thereby makes out the micro-enterprise element of this model.

Mentalities
There are particularly two interlinked governing mentalities that are of importance within both peacemaking and peace building. These are a restorative justice notion and a ‘risk based instrumentalism’ perspective. The peacemaking is aligned with the restorative justice notion in several ways. For instance, peace facilitators are to avoid at all cost the ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ dichotomy as it excludes rather than includes the disputing parties. Another reason to this is that under such harsh township conditions conflicts are bound to occur and reoccur in different compositions between families, friends and neighbours. As Froestad and Shearing (2007:546) notes, today’s ‘offender’ might as well have been yesterday’s ‘victim’. Hence, under such reoccurring conflicts with shifting compositions, it becomes difficult for the disputing parts to separate the current conflict from the history of the past, which then inhibits the models goal of a future oriented solution to the conflict.

Within the restorative justice notion it is often argued that an act of crime offset a balance that existed within a ‘collectivity’, which then has to be repaired in order to restore the previous relationship. Central aspects within the restorative process can therefore among other things be that the ‘offending’ part acknowledges guilt and shows remorse through emotional expressions as one step towards ‘balancing harm with doing good’. The peacemaking process

---

on the other hand does to some extent depart from this perspective. As the pivotal goal is to create a better tomorrow this makes restoration of relationships within the collectivity a secondary, ‘nice if it happens’ goal (ibid:546). The solution found appropriate through peace gatherings, which preferably are agreed upon by all parties, can materialise into an action plan best understood in terms of risk based instrumentalism. Directed towards a better tomorrow, the most appropriate solutions is the one that reduce the risk, which in accordance to Giddens (2000:51) is “inseparable from the ideas of probability and uncertainty” of future harms. As opposed to the restorative justice notion that tends to argue that the balance within the collectivity will have to be rebalanced when a wrongdoing have taken place. Froestad and Shearing (2007:546) on the other hand maintains that most of the disputes attended to by the peace committees are between parties that seldom has a collectivity that they together are directly bound, which consequent signifies that reintegration does not always have to take place. This then opens up for a more pragmatic manner of resolving disputes and to prevent them from reoccurring.

In a dispute facilitated by the Zwelethemba peace committee this risk based instrumentalism shaped the action plan in a very special manner. The dispute was between a married couple and the wife’s brother and his girlfriend, whom were living in a shack in the married couple’s back yard. As the shack did not have water and sanitation they were allowed to use the facilities of the house. However, it did not take long before this created much irritation, which led to several conflicts between the parts. The conflict escalated into physical violence after both parts had spread rumours about the other ones sleeping around. The wife whom was exposed by the physical violence then decided to report the incidents to the police, whom then referred the case to the peace committee. After many discussions at the peace gatherings, the cohabiting couple reluctantly decided to pull down the shack and set it up in different informal settlement. As devised by this plan of action, peace was restored between the two parts because of two things; the brother apologised to his sister for abusing her and by creating space between the two siblings (Froestad and Shearing, forthcoming). As this example exhibits, the shared collectivity between the siblings was sacrificed at the expense of the collectivity of the married couple, which in accordance to the cultural context is more sacred than a couple cohabiting. But also, the shared collectivity between the two parts was sacrificed at the expense of a greater ‘collectivity of sheared fate’, as the dispute between the parts evolved into physical violence it put the whole community at risk.
Nevertheless, conflicts can in accordance to Nils Christie (1977) strengthen local communities if the situation is utilised in a proper manner. Through efforts of creating a more peaceful tomorrow the peacemaking process follows up this line of thought, as each new case is considered a ‘window of opportunity’ to enhance the possibility of local capacity governance. Hence, for each new case the facilitators accumulate local knowledge and capacity on what type of conflicts that occurs, what kind of solutions that have shown to work in similar cases, and what kind of generic problems that trigger these conflicts. Within this perspective conflicts therefore becomes an opportunity for everybody to take part in crime prevention, which thereby fulfils Shearing’s notion of policing as everybody’s business. By designing the model in such a way it has incorporated a risk based mentality often found within the private sphere, where risks are governed rather instrumental in accordance to what end is good for business. As the driving force for the corporate sector is financial surplus, they are managing risks by preventing the loss of customers, goods and reputations. But perhaps the most important and effective element with this future risk prevention oriented mentality ascribes to it being embedded into the corporate design. Instead of solely depending upon security officers to be in charge of the security they are devolving this responsibility into the daily routines of regular employees.

By linking the generic problems identified through conflict resolutions with a peace building structure that can be attended to in ways found appropriate by the peace committee, the Zwelethemba model is not only a conflict resolution model but also a deliberative micro governance model. Because when people come together in order to solve their disputes, they unleash a bottom-up movement that provides knowledge and capacity on how to best govern their community. This manner of enrolling lay-participants in the conduct of governance might therefore restore the power balance between state and civil society which seems to be a pivotal goal within the restorative justice notion (Froestad and Shearing, 2007:544). However, the peace committee’s ability to govern cannot be evaluated in isolation, as governance is dependent upon the ability to enrol the institutions, resources, technologies and mentalities of others.

The model was accordingly designed in such a way that it easily could network its knowledge and capacity with the knowledge and capacity of others, whether to public agencies and/or
private entities. And by doing this it has tapped into the present situation where local government have come to realise that if they are to provide the services they are obliged to, they will have to join up in partnership with both private and civil society entities. But as local government have realised the potential of a neo-liberal decentralised service provision, the very nature of this partnership has indeed turned towards a state-centred one. But as Froestad and Shearing maintains; “the Zwelethemba model does not subscribe to a neoliberal strategy of governance whereby the state ‘steers’ and the community ‘rows’. On the contrary, the model assumes a devolution of both the ‘steering’ and the ‘rowing’ as a way of strengthening the capacity for local self-directedness in poor communities” (2007:550). However, when this has been said a vital question becomes; to what extent is local government and national police willing to enter partnerships with various civil society entities, where collaborations between these parts are based upon mutual respect and acknowledgment of all parts resources, knowledge’s, capacities and responsibilities?

An example: the Zwelethemba model partnering with national police and local government through project iThemba

From the very outset, partnering with local government and the SAPS was desirable, though this was not without concerns. In order to prevent the peace committee to merely become one among many implementing agencies for the local government, or used merely as a source for better intelligence gathering for the SAPS, there had to be a clear and agreed upon memorandum of understandings between the partnering units. In other words the partnership had to respect the particular expertise and resources that each of the different partners brought into the collaboration. Because if a respectful dialogue was not established it would severely undermine the local knowledge and capacity of the peace committee. Hence, it would re-establish the marginalised community’s inferiority towards the mighty and “better knowing” government, and consequently undermine the deliberative democratic governing potential of the peace committee’s.

The first partnership between a peace committee, the SAPS and a local government, known as project iThemba was established in Nkqubela, Robertson in 2002. This happened after the police station was forced to close down due to lacking resources. Within the arising state of emergency this was causing it to become an opening for a different kind of police station, a

---

police station being governed by different kind of community-police collaborative technique and mentality. In order to solve the problem the deputy provincial commissioner for the SAPS in the Western Cape, Mr Ganies Daniels, approached the community by introducing the CPP and the peace committee notion. As the community immediately favoured the peace committee notion it was decided that the police station would be reopened if the community would provide reservist to help out the police. The community then elected 12 members for their peace committee, which in turn chose 18 honourable fellow community members to become police reservist. After having succeeded in doing this the police and the peace committee in Nkqubela sat down to figure out how the two units could acknowledge and respect each others assignments. And as a result of this Mr Daniels argues that, “today the police station does not look like a police station, it is a peace centre a centre for peace”\(^{143}\).

Since the police and the peace committee are situated in the same building, this is now known as a “community peace centre”. Though, the community peace centre should not be looked upon merely as a building, as it signifies a particular community-police relationship (Cartwright and Jenneker, 2005). It is a relationship where the police have the possibility to transfer conflicts and problems that do not require police action directly to the peace committee. Alternatively, the peace facilitators have the possibility to transfer dispute over to the police if they come across elements that makes the case more appropriate for the police to handle.

Project iThemba in Nkqubela was the pilot project for such an extensive partnership, and soon after it was rolled out at different sites within Boland SAPS district. By opening community peace centres in Zwelethemba and Mbekweni in 2004 one has managed to establish a good working relationship with the police, CPF and the CSF\(^{144}\). According to SAPS deputy provisional commissioner, peace committees partnering with the SAPS through the new ethos of sector policing have yielded significant results. “Instead of opening police stations for money, we do not have, we can make use of the peace committee as a contact point, and in this way we can better utilise the community resources. ...the peace committee becomes a link between the sector policing unit and the specific community”\(^{145}\). Hence, by creating peace committee centres where designated policemen are working in close cooperation with the

\(^{143}\) Ganies Daniels, interviewed March 30\(^{th}\) 2006


\(^{145}\) Ganies Daniels, interviewed March 30\(^{th}\) 2006
peace committee facilitators’ one have managed to multiply scares police resources and thereby created better means for establishing a safe and secure community.

Though, both before and after they managed to establish joint collaborations the path has been somewhat winding for the CPP. In the beginning they were hoping for the local government to take partial ownership of the model as long as the CPP could prove the models efficiency. Among other things CPP tried to convince both local government and the police to think more in terms of a policing budget, rather than solely in terms of a police budget, as this would shift the focus from a sectional and pillared mindset into a more holistic notion. Even though this holistic notion did not really catch on, the general receptions from the police almost entirely have been positive, while the receptions made by local government on the other hand have been far more reluctant. In those cases where the partnership with the local government had been agreed upon their reluctances resulted in them seldom fulfilling their part of the agreement, which in turn resulted in four peace committees being forced to close down due to lacking finances. From this point onwards the CPP intensified the search for new ways within the private sphere to fund their peace committees. At the present state the CPP is in contact with several implementing agencies, looking into if they are willing to supply funding for peace committees situated within their area. One of these is an agricultural organisation, which has much to gain by establishing more safe and secure environments for their seasonal workers. The fact that vineries and vineyards compete on an international market and thereby are subjected to strict rules and regulation for means of harvesting and production, makes it vital for them to not only ensure their labours work conditions but also their living conditions. Hence, problems with drunkenness and poor hygienic conditions coincide with the state of safety and security of both spheres.

Even though the attempts to build partnerships with local government have been rather disappointing in the past, there has within the last couple of years been noted quite a positive trend. This trend does to some extent ascribe to the provincial government’s shift of focus, transforming the Department of Safety and Security into that of Community Safety. Mr Ramatlekane, whom is the present Provincial Minister of Community Safety in Western Cape, has endorsed the model and is looking into the possibility of funding the model, which in accordance to Mr Daniels might be ascribed to the significant results the iThemba project yielded. Though, it can also be ascribed to his personal conviction of the “Babanani” mentality, signifying the spirit of togetherness. It has been argued by Mr Ganies that
Ramatlekane portrays a firm belief in the civil society as actors whom can contribute significantly in the process of establishing safe and secure communities\textsuperscript{146}. Whether his belief in the Zwelethemba model will evolve into a prosperous and viable partnership between peace committees, local government and the police; whether it is going to become a partnership based upon mutual respect and acknowledgment of all parts resources, knowledge’s, capacities and responsibilities, will have to be evaluated at a later stage as this process only is in the making.

8.3.2 The Finnish Embassy
As already stated the Finnish Embassy initiated its partnership with CPP in 1999, and from that time onwards the Embassy has been one of the key players enabling the model to continuously develop and prosper. The purpose of this section is to envisage why the Embassy has kept working with the CPP for all these years, as their choosing of doing so portrays the Embassy’s belief in a strong and vibrant civil society being a necessity for genuine democratic governance.

Institution and resources
The Finnish Embassy has deployed considerable fiscal resources into the process of creating better means for governance and democratisation in South Africa since the first democratic election in 1994. Their initial official development assistance was rather limited in 1994 with €0,6 million, but has since then increased as the total amount in 2003 was €8,565 million (Ministry For Foreign Affairs Of Finland, 2006a). Out of this support €8,481 million goes into bilateral program and project assistance while only €0,017 million goes directly into the NGO sector (Ministry For Foreign Affairs Of Finland, 2006b).

In South Africa the Finnish Embassy has three programme co-ordinators whom are dealing with specific civil society, human rights, and democracy projects. The 2005 budget for these three were €4,1 million, which has been scaled down to €3,2 in 2006. Jesse Maarit Laitinen whom is a programme co-ordinator at the Finnish Consulate in Cape Town is responsible for the funding of 20 projects, and is hold accountable for €1,5 million. Out of these, the CPP received €0,275 millions in 2006 which is a cut of 40 percent from the 2005 budget.

\textsuperscript{146} Ganies Daniels, interviewed March 30\textsuperscript{th} 2006
Though, it is not only the CPP that have had to face cuts from their Finnish founders. Laitinen notes that the Finnish Ministry has become sceptical towards the amount of money that goes through the multitude of programs that these programme co-ordinates manages. Interlinked with this scepticism there is an increased focus upon accountability and transparency, which has led to a culture of micro-management functioning as a safeguard against money being misused. By taking into consideration the thorough financial and institutional backgrounds checks conducted prior of deciding whether to fund applicants or not, this shift of focus is somewhat frustrating for Laitinen as she argues; “I think that we tend to do micro-management too often, we should give more leeway to organisations and they would perform much better”\(^{147}\). As this signifies the tension between the technical imperatives of large international donors and projects outcome generating effect there will be given a brief account of this tension in the following part.

Technology and mentality

An essential notion with Finland’s development assistance has been to support the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The MDGs comprise; the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development (United Nations, 2000). In the process of working towards these goals Laitinen chooses her projects from a broad based dialogue perspective. In terms of this perspective a strong and vibrant civil society is vital in order to achieve democracy and human rights which are underlying factors for all of the MDGs. Hence, her main objective is therefore to contribute in deepening democracy where “interest from various sides of society should transform into solutions”\(^{148}\). Laitinen notes that at the present state such deliberative democratic practice have been reserved for the elites, as “the grass root organisations are to busy to survive, there simply is too little resources that will enable them to take up the political opportunities they are granted”\(^{149}\). It is within this frame of thought Laitinen argues that CPP through their window of security can contribute significantly by enabling deprived communities to enter such a broad based dialogue, through collaborations with those stakeholders whom are in control of their lives.

\(^{147}\) Jesse Maarit Laitinen, interviewed March 27\(^{th}\) 2006
\(^{148}\) ibid.
\(^{149}\) ibid.
By following up this lower level engagement funding scheme it contradicts the argument which other donor countries that rely far more heavily on bilateral funding schemes, so often seems to argue; “we are sceptical towards civil society organisations because they are not able to deliver to the extent of accountable and proper management that we require in order to provide with funding”\textsuperscript{150}. It should be acknowledged that unaccountable and mismanaged civil society organisations constitutes a genuine problem for donors, because those whom are educated and can deliver the means often required immigrate to more urban areas in search for job opportunities. Though, this should not be used as an argument against strengthening those institutions that could provide checks and balances, not only for the well-to-do population but also for the poor and marginalised. As Cartwright so nicely put it “development is more than simply putting money into a civil society project, it is about capacity building, enabling marginalised people to take part in those decisions whom affect their lives”\textsuperscript{151}. This consequently requires of donors whom operate under human security and democratisation umbrellas to as much contribute in institutional capacity building within the civil society as they do in general support through governmental departments.

However, it has been shown that international donors whom have decided to channel a larger share of funds through specific civil society projects instead of channelling it through bilateral programs have provoked anger and frustration within the ranks of national government. In the next section there will be given a brief introduction of the Breede Valley’s CSF, and central to this introduction is the tension displayed between local government and civil society based entities.

\textbf{8.3.3 The Breede Valley Community Safety Forum}

The School of Public and Development Management at the University of Witwatersrand and the Centre for Civil Society at Johns Hopkins University estimated that there were approximately 98,920 non-profit associations throughout South Africa in 1998. Out of these 53 percent were informal survivalist organisations operating in marginalised communities (Habib, 2003). With such a multitude of organisations there is little doubt among civil society researchers that they constitute a significant resource just waiting to become partners with local government’s service provision units. But as the Premier of Western Cape, Ebrahim

\textsuperscript{150} Royal Norwegian Consulate, Cape Town, South Africa, Telephone conversation

\textsuperscript{151} John Cartwright, interviewed March 15\textsuperscript{th} 2006
Rasool maintained in 2004, this require of the local government to be skilled in such a way that they can provide the leadership and direction for the people. But despite their willingness to do so, local government was regrettably not ready to take on leadership. The reasons to this, the premier argued, was multifaceted; ascribing to skewed representivity, lack of strategic competence, functional incoherence leading to silo thinking, which consequently resulted in unresponsive governance\textsuperscript{152}.

Though, when looking into the CSF in Breede Valley, there has been made significant steps to especially exceed those deficiencies that relates to the forum’s quantity of service delivery. These achievements thereby falls in-line with those of Cape Winelands District Municipality, as they were rated to have among the best financial managed service deliveries throughout South Africa in 2005 and the best one in 2006\textsuperscript{153}. But while succeeding to improve the quantity, the quality of service provision which can be evaluated in terms of representivity, is a far more debatable question. The reason to this ascribes to the CSF and their comprehension on how to establish popular consent. Should popular consent merely be restricted within a frame of political representation? Or should the comprehension on how to establish popular consent be reframed in such a manner that it becomes vital to enrol as many civil society based organisations as possible into the CSF composition? The willingness of the CSF to enrol constituencies’ and their civil society based organisations into the process of agenda setting and decision making is thus of vital importance in order to enhance representivity.

**Institution and Resources**

Community safety and community safety forums were developed in response to requirements set out in “The National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996 and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security. Both documents recommended an integrated approach to preventing crime and increasing the efficiency of law enforcement agencies. However, the development of CSFs did not occur in a streamlined process, as CSFs first started to appear within the rural areas subsequent to the community policing policy and sector policing strategy failed to establish an acceptable state of safe and secure communities.

Because the CPFs were seen to work in isolation, consequently being unable to push for a responsive local levelled safety and a viable crime prevention approach by the governmental

\textsuperscript{152} Budget Speech 2004/2005, Premier of the Western Cape, Mr Ebrahim Rasool, June 24\textsuperscript{th} 2004

\textsuperscript{153} Cape Winelands District Municipality, Performance Management
and police agencies, the CPF movement became degraded at the expense of a networked approach, known as CSF. In terms of democratisation, it is important to ask whether the democratic potential vested within the CPF are to become sustained within the new strategy of CSF? By coordinating national, provincial and local service delivery together with the law enforcement agencies one was trying to break down the tendency of silo operations and rather create a seamless service provision to their constituencies. Alongside of this, increasing the lower level participation was regarded as a primary objective, as it was an initiative to “enable poor people to participate in planning and implementing large-scale development project which will increase the quality of life in their areas” (Schärf 2003, referred to in Gordon, 2006:225).

The Breede Valley is currently the only Municipality under the jurisdiction of Cape Winelands District Municipality that has a fulltime employed community safety officer to run their CSF. Even though such a forum did exist in the past it was severely defunct due to local government’s priorities, in which they were lacking infrastructure support, resources and capacity. But the noted weakness of the forum can also be ascribed to the low representation, not only from local governmental bodies but from civil society organisations. By dedicating a fulltime community safety officer in Breede Valley there has been made a new attempt to establish a forum that could provide a seamless and representative community safety approach. In order to get the plan into action a memorandum of agreement was signed between Breede Valley Municipality and Cape Winelands District Municipality in December 2005, to which an amount of R50,000 was allocated for the purpose of establishing the CSF154.

Technology and Mentality:
The community safety officer in Breede Valley, Juan Kariem, notes that pressure upon local government to take on the lead role in the development and implementation of community levelled safety and crime prevention has been increasing in the latter years. Much of this pressure has been building up because local government officials have been incapable of performing in accordance to the Batho Pele, people first principles, as stated in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery155. An event that further signifies this pressure, Kariem notes, refers to President Mbeki’s launch of a controversial evaluation

154 Breede Valley Municipality Draft Corporate Plan & Draft Corporate Community Safety Policy
155 Department of Public Service and Administration (1997:Section 1) White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery
program that seek to pluck out the bad seeds from the basket. “By evaluating all ANC councillors in accordance to their conduct and achievements every six months Mbeki have sought to get rid of councillors whom have been involved in corruption, nepotism and incompetence”\(^{156}\).

Within the initial establishment process of the CSF, Kariem has endorsed a definition of community safety from Northern Ireland, when stating; “Community Safety means preventing, reducing or containing the social, environmental and intimidatory factor which affect people’s rights to live without fear or of crime and which impact upon their quality of life. It includes preventative measures that contribute to crime reduction and tackle anti-social behaviour”\(^{157}\). When adapted into the Breede Valley context it is meant to emphasise a sustained, multi-disciplinary approach to community safety and crime prevention. But it is also holistic in nature as it attempts to develop the community through the enrolment of a multitude of role-players.

In the process of doing this Kariem maintain that such a multi-disciplinary forum, which departs from the traditional single departmental forums, would provide a flow of information between the governmental departments and between the local government and the civil society\(^{158}\). Within this flow of information the memorandum recognise and honours the skills and expertise that each unit provides, arguing that when combined it would enhance the community safety approach. It would therefore bring role-players together to develop a common vision for each community within Breede Valley. When looking at the CSF through the window of lay participation among the multitude of civil society organisations that exist within Breede Valley it is of necessity to question; to what extent will these organisations actually become genuine partners? Or will their role merely be to follow up and take part in carrying out those decisions set forward by the forum?

When trying to shed light into these questions there is at least three factors that will inhibit the ability for community based organisations to take part in setting the agenda at the forum. Firstly, the CSF will be restricted from above. Since the CSF is supposed to strengthen institutional structures and improve intergovernmental relations in accordance to the

---

\(^{156}\) Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\(^{rd}\) 2006


\(^{158}\) Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\(^{rd}\) 2006
integrated development plan (IDP)\textsuperscript{159} they are bound to be restricted at the expense of overall goals set out by the Cape Winelands District Municipality. As argued by one of the informants; “The IDP is talking about directing the budget where it’s most needed, but that is still not the case. The politicians are always fighting, so it’s not a neutral evaluation mechanism of where and who needs it the most”\textsuperscript{160}. Secondly, the CSF will experience turf wars, because silo thinking and practice still exist among the departments\textsuperscript{161}. Even though the community safety officer cherish the forum as multi-disciplinary, where all stakeholders’ skills and experience are to be flowing between governmental institutions and civil society organisations, it is not likely that an institutionalised forum alone will be able to break down the extent of silo thinking. It is likely that strategies such as CSF will contribute, though it will happen incrementally over several years. And thirdly, the skewed power relations that naturally exist within the forum will make the contribution from constituencies’ and the various civil society based organisations of minor value. Consequently there are reasons to question whether the skills and expertise of the poor and marginalised constituencies which the community based organisations constitute will be honoured in the same manner as the professional expertise.

This consequently implies that the community based organisations ability to take part in the agenda setting and decision making process is severely limited. As the memorandum of understanding states; “The responsibility of implementing projects rest with those who introduce them. Projects identified on the basis of national policies are usually well received. Others that are based on local needs often needs to be lobbied with respective departments”\textsuperscript{162}. In order for community based organisation to see through their needs they will have to lobby with other departments directly and not with the forum as an entity. The potential of being heard and taken seriously are thereby restricted to the extent that the relevant department is open to these constituencies’ capacities and knowledge’s.

Even though the Breede Valley CSF only is in its initial period, it seems reasonable to argue that its governmental features portray itself in terms of a state anchored pluralism. Power is thus being tightly gathered within the forum, constituted by eight different governmental

\textsuperscript{159} Budget Speech 2006/2007, Western Cape Provincial Minister of Community Safety, Mr Leonard Ramatlakane, May 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
\textsuperscript{160} Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
\textsuperscript{161} Roy Feldman, interviewed March 20\textsuperscript{th} 2006
institutions, which in turn makes use of at least sixteen different NGOs and community based organisations as implementation agencies. As the primary function of these organisations are to implement predetermined policies and not to take part as equal partners in agenda setting and decision making, the extent of pluralism consequently become restricted to the traditional notion of political representation. The reason to this ascribes to the lead agents and the perception that they carry towards civil society based organisations taking part in the CSF. As argued by community safety officer; “In terms of section 21 companies, I’m not in favour of them, especially when they come to the CSF. ...Although section 21 companies are non-profit organisations they do generate money, and what mechanism is there in place that makes sure that these money are correctly spent”\textsuperscript{163}. The argument for being restrictive towards NGOs and section 21 companies then follows in terms of these organisations not being able to meet the financial criteria’s of accountability and being transparent about their work, but at the same time stating that “…we will not be able to follow up on these all the time. So it goes both ways, no use in controlling if we can’t control”\textsuperscript{164}. The extent of pluralism within the CSF is thereby also restricted to the extent that the forum is capable of controlling the civil society based institutions. This consequently denotes that the holistic and multi-disciplinary manner of CSF only is meant to provide more efficient service delivery and not lay-participatory determined quality. While the Breede Valley CSF is in the process of establishing a seamless service provision, this is taking place at the expense of a CSF that enables poor people to participate in planning and implementation of large-scale development projects, which in the end of the line were meant to increase their quality of life.

8.4 Concluding remarks

The tension which has been portrayed between civil society actors, such as the Zwelethemba model, and local government is not unique for the Breede Valley, and neither for the greater Cape Winelands District, as it is more or less common throughout South Africa. Collaboration between the governmental institutions and the multitude of civil society actors has been filled with antagonistic attitudes on both sides. The reason to this tension can among other things be traced back to the conflicting role perspectives of the two spheres. In particular does it seems like that this tension has been increasing as the South African ANC government has turned towards neo-liberal policies in order to compete on a global market. In general terms the

\textsuperscript{163} Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
\textsuperscript{164} ibid.
government looks upon the NGO sector as; monitors of the public good, safeguards of the disadvantage interest, and assistants in expanding access to social and economical service that creates jobs and eradicates poverty (Habib, 2003). But while expecting that the civil society is to fulfil this role they do not accept the very nature of civil society as plural. Because within the blocks of plurality, among NGOs, social movements and informal survivalist organisations, there will be as much resistance as there will be support.

Informal survivalist community based organisations have been observed to be on the rise in the latter years due to the lacking attention from the local government in delivering social services to the poor and marginalised. But while these networked associations are preoccupied with merely surviving there has also been an increase of social movements. These movements, Adam Habib notes, are “political animals”. They have established themselves within the marginalised communities where they are gathering voices with the purpose of contesting the hegemonic ANC (ibid:237). In many ways social movements represents the best hope of building mass opposition against the mighty ANC and their failing policies. As Ebrahim Harvey whom is a doctoral candidate in Sociology at Wits University argues; “social movements need to capitalise on grassroots discontent with the ruling party”165. Yet in order to attain this, local ANC leaders’ will have to stop the harassment, threats and assaults on members of the various social movements which have and still is happening.

Although, the tension and suspicion that is being observed on the ground also take place at the very top. At several occasions President Mbeki has been claiming that NGOs are being puppets of international donors whom have their own agendas which do not correspond with the national interests. This seems to be a pretty bold and ignorant statement, a statement that contradicts general perceptions of NGOs and INGOs as rich on legitimacy (Dupont et al., 2003). Hence, when international donors fund various NGOs the head agenda is to facilitate better means for human rights and human security, through the eradication of poverty, providing HIV/AIDS and malaria medicine and introducing good governance projects, which in turn are underlying elements for all of the MDGs. By these antagonistic statements Mbeki depicts that he is rather uncomfortable with a strong and vibrant civil society that is able to contest the government’s policies. But as Smith, Davids and Hollands whom writes on behalf of the “Good Governance Learning Network” argues; “In the political context of one-party

165 Mail & Guardian, A movement to applaud
dominance and a largely ineffective parliamentary opposition, it should be acknowledged that political pluralism rest heavily with the voices from below expressed through a diverse range of NGOs and other actors within civil society organisations.\textsuperscript{166}

The Breede Valley CSF can be understood in terms of a super structural node. That attempts to coordinate the resources and technology of other nodes, with the purpose of achieving public good. However, the potential vested within this super structural node does not seem to be fully capacitated, for which there are various reasons. The CSF reluctances to enrol all potential nodes as equal partners whether civil society based or private entities, can be ascribed to the CSF’s need to control and centralise the auspice of service delivery. Among other things the community safety officer had a general perception that devolving resources and responsibility to section 21 companies and NGOs would be “a model for conflict”.\textsuperscript{167} But it is not only the latter mentioned organisations that have been shut out from the circle of power. Contradictory to what was found in Observatory, where the private security providers were highly involved in all matters related to crime prevention, none of the six private security providers operating in Breede Valley was invited to take part at the CSF.

A reason that can explain why the CSF acts in this reactive and exclusionist manner ascribe to pressure taking place external to the CSF in terms of the urgent need to break down the tendency pillars between the governmental institutions. Froestad (2005:338) maintains that segmentation, which in sociological terms refers to ‘pillarisation’, take place along vertical lines of institutions when there are high risks related to trusting strangers and outsiders. Within this context it therefore seems reasonable to argue that when pillars are to be dismantled, institutions and their managers protect themselves by excluding those whom they cannot directly control in order to manage the risks involved. In addition to that process, the old mentality of centralised control which was used within the previous pillars are being reintroduced and installed within the CSF, though now in terms of an even stronger centralised multi-disciplinary super structural node. There are also reasons to believe that the massive outcry against poor service delivery, which materialised into mass demonstrations and revolts within the marginalised communities prior to the local government election in 2006, led governmental officials to push further for efficiency by improving its mechanism at the expense of a broad based representative focus that holds the potential to strengthen

\textsuperscript{166} Mail & Guardian, NGOs not puppets of donors
\textsuperscript{167} Juan Kariem, interviewed March 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2006
democracy through multiple sites of opinion gatherings. As a consequence to this, social movements and civil society based organisations requests of being enrolled into governing nodes where they can voice their opinions and take part on a larger scale have been downplayed even further, while the traditional democracy through political representation have gained strength.

Within the ambit of the CPP it is possible to locate two super structural nodes, even though this might appear artificial, it does signify each nodes specific functions and operational procedures. The first super structural node is constituted by the CPP, as it enrols the knowledge, capacity and resources of a multiple of nodes with the purpose of providing poor and marginalised constituencies with an institutional structure that can empower them into taking responsibility and control over their lives. Those nodes that enable the CPP to do this are the University of the Western Cape, the Finnish Embassy, and various police precincts. The CPP also enables the community peace centres to attain a super structural node feature through their institutional and technological structures. This super structural node engages in mutual partnership with the police agencies, and others whom may be potential partners in governing the security of their community. What takes place under the auspice of these super structural nodes is that the South African governments whom has shown too weak to provide equitable security for all are being alleviated by a cluster of international and national agencies, providing the institutions, resources, technologies needed in order to re-establish public excess to safety and security (Dupont et al., 2003).

One of the most essential features of the community peace centres is that it opposes the traditional neo-liberal policing policies, such as the sector policing strategy. The reason to this ascribes to the sector policing strategy tendency of multiplying scarce police resources with trained lay-participators or reservist whom are to take on police duties. This manner of enrolling lay-participators falls under the neo-liberal guise of ‘responsibilizing’ community members. Though, it does not provide them with the means to shape their environment from other than what the police strategy pre-programs them to do. Through the work conducted by peace committee members at the community peace centres, they are being enabled to take on a mutual partnership with the police. This signifies that they are not restricted to only carry out the ‘rowing’ as is usual within a neo-liberal notion, but through their mutual partnership with the police, empowered by their accumulated local knowledge and capacity, they are enabled to take on the ‘steering’ which signifies that they take part in setting the agenda and
takes decisions that affects their lives. But since the model is holistic, including both conflict resolutions through peacemaking interlinked with peace building that attends generic problems, the governing potential exceeds the window of security and enables the poor community constituencies to take part in governing an even greater part of their lives through the community.

According to Giddens (2000; 1998), the traditional mechanism for government does not work in a society where citizens live in the same information society as those who are in power, as a consequence there is an urgent need to deepen democracy, a process he labels ‘democratising democracy’. Among several ways, there were two specific ones that Giddens maintained would contribute to democratising democracy; these were devolution of governmental power and by actively enhancing a strong and vibrant civil society. These two noted manners of democratising democracy correspond with those of the Zwelethemba model. Central to the Zwelethemba model is that it enables new democratic institutions to establish within the civil society and that it challenges the traditional notions of democracy, where democracy first of all is determined through the ballot box vested within the majority party. In such a way the models democratic contribution falls in line with those scholars whom see democratic governance as broader than the scope of the government and those whom see civil society based organisations as a source for deepening democracy (Gordon, 2006:283).

The pivotal democratic purpose of this model is thereby to enable poor and marginalised constituencies to increase their governing potential through the community peace centre, and than in such a way that they are in control of both steering and the provision of governance. This thereby stands as a contrast to the democratic potential of the CSF, where civil society based organisations merely are to act as implementation agencies for the local government, and where their local needs are dependent upon the blessing of the governmental institutions in charge. This signifies that voices alone, which the CSF base their democratic representatively upon, does not ensure that the decision taken represent the majority of these voices. As argued by one of the informants when asked whether local government’s attempt to include the citizenry on public inquiry actually was leading to a broader and deeper popular consent; “…I think there are room for improvements in terms of real participation from the community side of it, both in terms of attending and participation. People do not easily stand up and say, I got a problem Sir. It is more the political spokespersons from the floor that does
Hence, when lay-participants as individual’s attempts to voice their democratic rights them stumbles trying for various reasons, but political spokespersons on the other hand who are supported by institutions within the civil society overcomes this right. In the quest for ways of deepening democracy concomitant to establish manners of a more equitable governance of security, should one not try to capitalise on democratic institutions within the citizenry?

As Wood and Shearing (2007:112) maintains, by establishing democratic institutions within the civil society one provides ways of coming to mutual agreements on how to face conflicts. Institutions in this manner constitute voices that are centred on a common desire or belief. In terms of the peace committees, this commonness directs the community towards a safer and more secure tomorrow, empowered by their institution. But perhaps the most essential element with the community peace centre is that it has been able to align what the community considers as common goods, with that of the broader public good. It is particular this element that distinguish this model from that of others, such as the OCA/private security regime accounted for in Observatory. As security there was seen first of all to be pooled around business areas and as a consequence of that security was not common, but segregated between different community interests and socio-economical status.

Throughout this chapter there has been made an attempt to contest the possibility of a more equitable governance of security for those whom do not have the prospect of hiring private security providers for their protection. As an alternative to the private security providers often found within affluent areas, the Zwelethemba model’s regulation mechanisms was introduced as a solution to the problem of unconstitutional manners often characterising other non-state justice systems. The deliberative democratic elements vested within the model have convinced Diana Gordon among others that it provides one solution on how to establish an empowered public criminal justice system. And in order to contrast how the Community Peace Centre node is governing security, the local governmental node Breede Valley Community Safety Forum was introduced. By present model (7) beneath there will be made an attempt to illustrate those core values of the two institutions which stand out and thereby to signify the democratic potential they have when governing security.

---

168 Roy Feldman, interviewed March 20th 2006
The core values of the CSF can briefly be summarised in terms of a ‘state-centred internationally inspired’ approach. Pressure upon local government to provide sufficient service delivery within a community safety frame made provision for the establishment of a CSF. The primary purpose of the forum is to operate as a multi-disciplinary coordination unit for all of the governmental institutions attached. By functioning as a coordination unit it is of vital importance to dedicate resources in such a manner that it reflects the needs on the ground, though due to few ways of tapping into the constituencies’ perception of the local context, the CSF potential becomes limited to a traditional state-centred perspective. When setting up the forum it has been inspired by international perceptions on what community safety signifies. The neo-liberal alignment through centralisation and efficiency is also elements that points in the direction of the Breede Valley CSF being inspired by international developments.

The Zwelethemba model on the other hand stands out as an ‘African focused though internationally informed’ approach on how to establish a more equitable manner of governing...
security. When the model was designed it was of crucial importance to align it within an African context. It draws experiences from the apartheid years when community members through a strong civic virtue took responsibility for their own security through different kinds of non-state justice systems, though it also restricts those elements that are destructive and unconstitutional within the non-state justice notion. It has also brought in elements which can be looked upon as international, though adapting them into the specific cultural context. The restorative justice notion and deliberative democracy are examples of these. What the Zwelethemba model has materialised into is this; Institutions within the civil society have been established. By combining peacemaking and peace building one has achieved to create a holistic model that provides the constituencies with human security, not only freedom of fear but also freedom from want. These democratic institutions thereby provide the constituencies with the means and resources to take responsibility for their lives. Though, essential for the model is to establish partnership under mutual agreements with a multitude of private and public entities. And by nurturing the common goods which are being facilitated through the community peace centres one has managed to align these goods with a broader public good which are being safeguarded by the governmental institutions.
9.0 Conclusion and normative contributions

At the outset of this thesis it was argued that both traditional and contemporary theories ability to comprehend societal change was limited to their specific ambit. These theories have mainly been preoccupied with studying societal change, politics and policy making from a single centred locus. But as new global phenomena such as neo-liberalism, concomitant globalisation, have affected the manner of societal change in some distinct ways, it was argued for the need to move beyond these dichotomised perspectives. A nodal comprehension of network governance was subsequently put forward as a better manner of comprehending how societal change takes place. Hence, both the provision and auspice of societal change originate from multiple of sites and not merely from a single centred locus. The nodal approach of conceiving governance shaped the third chapter under the topic of human security governance in Africa. Here the primary purpose was to sketch out how a nodal comprehension of security governance facilitates the four preconditions required in order to emancipate the shift from a state-centred to a people-centred security paradigm.

In the following section the research question will be reintroduced through which a conclusion will be put forward. Thereafter, the specific knowledge derived from the case studies will be employed with the purpose of comment on and situate this contribution within the ongoing normative governance of security debate. In which the following discussion will be framed within the book “Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security” edited by J. Wood and B. Dupont (2006a), which constitute a collection of essays where a multitude of contesting scholars rise descriptive observations and normative perspectives.

9.1 Providing key answers for the research question

This thesis research question is; “To what extent is security in South Africa governed through a multitude of nodes, what signifies the characteristic appearance of these nodal configurations, and subsequently what is the prospect for human security governance?” The research question constitutes three interrelated sub questions. Whereas the latter question is dependent upon the first and shaped by prospect of the second, which relates to the intrinsic features of single nodes and the structural alignment of nodes in the governance of security. Henceforth these three questions will be answered in sequence.
To what extent is security in South Africa governed through a multitude of nodes?

Throughout this thesis the tendency of state-centred community policing strategies have been evaluated against security nodes (or actors used interchangeably) emerging from the civil society/private sphere. In order to understand what kind of security nodes that has originated from this sphere, one needs to take account of the South African safety and security context and the policing polices implemented by the government in order to attain the state of insecurity. As a consequence of the high rates of crime and violence taking place throughout South Africa, there was a blossom of non-state security actors ranging from; vigilante organisations, community based organisations that cooperated with the police, to private security providers. Though as the ANC government gained institutional capacity at least three things in particular took place; the civil society became weakened as fiscal and human resources were transferred to the governmental and private sphere; the government established a neo-liberal security regime that provided the means for a state-centred community policing policy; and parallel to this the government with the support of private actors, such as BAC, used its capacity to regulate the providers of security, which then primarily benefited the private sphere. Hence, the government rendered possible for those who have fiscal resources to provide their own security while the poor and marginalised are to depend upon security provided by the police. This consequently signifies that providers of security primarily is either private or state driven. Even though civil society based providers of security do exist both in rural and urban areas, they often find themselves with scant resources and limited abilities to do other than provide information to the private security providers, and/or the police agencies, and/or the local government.

Though in order to grasp the full entity of nodes taking part in governing security one also needs to take account of those whom are auspice of security governance. In which the outreach of these auspices range far wider than the providers of it, such as; community based organisations, the PSI, private entities, NGOs and INGOs, IGOs, foreign funders, university outreach programs, and governmental institutions from all three levels. For instance, in Observatory the providers of security are primarily the private security companies in addition to the sector policing unit. Though when looking into the auspice of Observatory’s security scheme one needs to add the OCA and their subunits, in which the subcommittee of Safety and Security and the Business Forum have particular means to manage the course of event. When considering the case of Cape Winelands District there is a much more dense and contested web of both providers and auspices of safety and security governance. The reason
why there is contestation between governmental and non-governmental units will be made provision for in the next sub question.

What signifies the characteristic appearance of these nodal configurations?

The governance of security in Observatory is characterised by a feudal resonance where the local government is absent without the community necessarily wanting them to be that. Security governance is consequently constituted by a mix of nodes; the community is represented by the OCA and their subcommittees, the private sector is represented by business owner and private security providers, and the police are represented through their sector policing unit. In which it is the convergence of interest and mentalities among the nodes in this security network that render possible a common safety and security approach. Within this security network it can be argued that the OCA operates as the command centre and thereby takes on super structural features. Hence, the OCA operates as a relay node, between the residents within the community, the private interest, and the police. Though, their ability to do so is not based upon fiscal resources but rather on extracting key personnel from the private sector to their institution, and by positioning key personnel with the proper mentality in other nodes. The OCA is thus a node which filters information, which often sets the agenda, and which possess an amount of influential power that makes other nodes policies of minor value if not recognised by the OCA.

In the case of Cape Winelands District and the security regime put forward by the CSF in Worcester there is a completely different picture that materialises. The primary purpose of the CSF is to provide community safety and crime prevention that is holistic in nature through the means of a multi-disciplinary approach, where the information is to be floating between the departments, within the forum, and among the many role-players in the civil society. Though, while the CSF takes on a pivotal role in the governance of safety and security, they constrain the potential of nodes other than the governmental to take on safety and security functions. The CSF has accordingly opened up for organisations below and beyond the government to provide service delivery, but they are not allowing these organisations to take on auspice functions within the forum. The CSF’s recipe for a successful safety and security governance is attained by centralising control which subsequently is thought to improve service delivery efficiency. Though the prospect for community based organisations to take part in security
governance other than merely the provision of it, do consequently represent a threat to the centralisation of power and efficiency.

While the state of local government is characterised by its absence in Observatory and its overshadowing present in Worcester, the state of police involvement is characterised less by domain protection and more of an instrumental consideration of how one can attain the greatest state of safety and security through the best means available. In Observatory the mentality of the sector policing unit corresponds neatly with the mentality of both the OCA and the private actors, as security there is attained through a proactive protection measures and reactive bandit catching techniques. But when looking into the Cape Winelands District a duality of the police mentality appears. The predominant sector policing strategy within the community policing policy is a neo-liberal state-centred one, whereas it enrols community residents as reservist solely for the purpose of efficiency improvement. Though in communities which have established ‘community peace centre’ nodes, these institutions have to some extent been able to tone down the state-centred and neo-liberal operational features. In these communities the community peace centre and the sector policing unit enters into mutual partnership where the police primarily takes on the role as specialist bearers while the peace centre through their peace building and peacemaking functions takes on a larger share of long term preventative safety and security measures.

*What is the prospect for human security governance?*

The Commission on Human Security (2003) maintains that in order to achieve a greater state of human security it is of vital importance to make provision for the conditions of; people-centred security, menace oriented security, the empowerment of poor and marginalised constituencies and their communities, concomitant to open up for a plurality of actors to take part in the governance of human security. This consequently signifies that there has to be a balance between governmental enforcement and the citizenry’s ability to oppose and contest the government. Though in contemporary South Africa this balance is skewed to the advantage of the government and the private interest at the cost of the civil society based organisations.

In Observatory the prospect for human security is restricted due to its strong private interest and the lack of local governmental involvement. The coalition of security nodes have
established a security scheme that provides common security for those whom resides in permanent dwellings, but not necessarily for those whom are living and have their daily income on the street in the community. Instead of protecting and incorporating the poor and marginalised citizens into the community they are in the making of excluding them through techniques based upon zero-tolerance and the use of broken window philosophy measures.

The Worcester CSF prospect for human security governance is restricted due to other reasons than found in Observatory. The main reason to the limited prospect ascribes to the CSF’s centralised control and limited willingness to enrol role-players for other than service provision purposes, and in the process of upholding such a position the CSF falls through on the four human security conditions. Though, there exists a significant prospect for human security if the police continuous to adapt to the notions of dual policing as envisaged in the partnership between community peace centres and the sector policing unit, and if the CSF makes provisions for institutions such as the Zwelethemba community peace centre and their peacemaking and peace building operations.

Both the dual policing concept and the Zwelethemba model urge for more equable ordering of policing, whereas it incorporates both civil and state policing. Even though the CSF has made provision for more efficient service delivery through their multi-disciplinary approach they are never going to fulfil its obligations alone. It is therefore of necessity to efficiently make use of other resources beyond and below the state. In order to facilitate this shift of mentality, policing will have to be conceived as everybody’s business, where the police are the professionals and sole providers of enforcement while conflict and crime prevention is conducted in accordance to long term and holistic security measures. This consequently signifies that a problem-solving approach to crime and violence is vital. Though the neo-liberal policing strategy of enrolling people to take part in the provision of policing is simply not enough to make policing oriented towards what people define as menace. This requires a policing scheme that allows people to have a larger say through agenda setting and decision making. In this regard, the Zwelethemba model represents one possible way of empowering poor and marginalised community residents. As this is sought done by establishing democratic institutions within the civil society, which consequently enables them to govern security in mutual partnership with the support from a multitude of actors, such as; the police, local government, commercial entities, scientific institutions, human rights INGO and NGOs and international donors.
When summarising the observations made throughout this thesis, which briefly has been sketched out above in terms of answers to the research question, following nodal networked configuration can be portrayed.

Model 8: South Africa’s Contemporary Governance of Security Scheme

Instead of a dual system of policing, which was put forward by Brogden and Shearing (1993) and in general terms agreed upon by a multitude of ANC officials, the South African government established a security regime that; provided the government with centralised power; the wealthy with the means to influence the government through channels of power and to buy their own private security; and the poor and marginalised constituencies with a neo-liberalistic potential of providing security but never to influence the course of events themselves. With a networked security coalition that primarily is established between state-centred policing strategies coupled with private actors and their interest, the prospect for
human security governance will remain limited, unless counterweighted with a powerful citizenry that can oppose and contest both private interest and governmental enforcements.

9.2 Normative contributions to the governance of security field

Within the field of security governance there is much agreement of what is taking place but less so on what should be done against this background. This thesis has consequently contributed with empirical findings that both confirms and contest the empirical conception of other scholars. In addition to the empirical elaborations there has been dedicated space to place normative arguments on what needs to be done in order to provide more equitable and democratic governance of security, moreover security that would provide a greater state of human security in rural communities in particular though also in urban communities. In the final sections of this thesis some focus will be placed on one specific empirical contribution, but the majority of the space will be dedicated to the normative debate taking place between prominent scholars of security governance, in which the more specific and detailed knowledge put forward will be used to position this thesis within this debate.

9.2.1 Deepening the nodal conception with change agents as double agents

The governance of security is characterised by a pluralisation of actors and commodification of security provision. As a consequence of this trend, Dupont (2006) maintains, the course of security governance is shaped by power struggles within each node and across the nodal network. Though scholars of nodal governance have thus far devoted limited space for these power struggles, and when doing so the focus have primarily been on the structural alignments of nodes and the intrinsic features of nodes that enables them to cooperate with other nodes in the security network. It might be reasonable to assume that the lack of attention towards power struggles do not ascribe to it being irrelevant nor oversight, but more to the fact that nodal scholars have been preoccupied with depicting the usefulness and explanatory power of the nodal conception. But as the nodal notion of security governance now is in the process of getting a solid conceptual foundation, it is time to deepen the understanding of it. In fact, Wood maintains that scholars of plural policing and nodal governance need to move beyond ideal-typical descriptions of nodes and network of security governance. Whereas there is an urgent need to construct explanatory maps that will provide a more detailed and fertile picture of the security context and the actors taking part in mediating it. The knowledge deduced from these explanatory maps can be used to devise new designs, implementation strategies and diffusions of security innovations (2006:225-226).
One of the routes of deepening the nodal conception can and perhaps should be conducted through studies of these power struggles that take place within and between nodal actors, as both individuals and institutional actors deploy, mobilize and alter mentalities in accordance with a range of instrumental and normative agendas (ibid:224). In chapter six, fragments of this power struggle was envisaged through BAC’s strategic positioning of personnel within the governmental departments. Though BAC’s jockeying for position within the security field can also be understood in terms of the effects of ‘change agents’, which in terms of Cherney (2005) referred to in Wood (2006:225) are actors and institutions that exploit certain mentalities and employ strategies to support these mentalities and translate them in to actual technologies and practises of governance. BAC as an interest aggregator for the corporate sector was consequently able to push for more reactive policing strategies and harsher penalties for crime and violence. This ultimately created three things; detrimental long term effects of crime and violence because of unsuccessful crime prevention strategies; a symbolic effect of a government that were winning the war against crime; and a seemingly stability, as the corporate sector is dependent upon stability in order to establish the confidence that domestic and international trade requires.

The manner, in which change agents have been elaborated above, links it up with power struggles, which consequently signifies conflict and control features. Though in chapter seven the concept of ‘double agents’ was used deliberately in order to stress the mediating effect the OCA’s Chairman of the Safety and Security Committee has when pushing for change whilst being centrally positioned within several oppositional nodes. The concept of change agents does not necessarily acknowledge that these agents can host multiple of nodes, while the concept of double agents does. In terms of Guilhot (2005) double agents are individuals whom occupy the middle ground, as they operate as intermediaries and arbiters whom are shuttling back and forth between groups with conflicting interests. This description fits neatly with that of the chairman’s manifold positions. The chairman occupies key positions in the OCA, the CPF, at the police station as a public relation spokesman, and has established tight relations with ADT, which has become the largest security provider in Observatory primarily due to the chairman’s endorsements.

Even though the concept of double agent denotes espionage features wherein an individual works simultaneously for two oppositional parts without their knowledge of him doing so, it
is important to stress that, double agents in this setting is nothing else than overt. And besides, the manner in which double agent is used here it is meant to signify a descriptive term that raises normative issues. Or more to the point, the concept of double agent is aimed to describe how individual actors whom originally represent one essential node, which in this case is a super structural node, are able to tap into the mentality of other nodes in the security network and concomitant to shape the mentality and technology of other nodes and align it into one owns beneficiary.

Such manifold positioning as discovered in Observatory do and should raise normative and ethical considerations that among other things relates to questions of democratic prospect and dangers of corruption. Without entering these questions in fully due to lack of empirical data, it can on the other hand be argued that the interaction between the police, the CPF, the OCA and the private security providers are based upon an instrumental notion where the end almost justify the means. Hence, the triad positioning of the chairman was recognised as something entirely good by all nodes in the Observatory security network, as his positioning would facilitate a prosperous safety and security scheme between the community, the police, the business owners and the private security providers. Though when this has been said, it is important to stress that all data gathered points in the direction that the chairman as a double agent is anchored to what the Board of the OCA considers to be the best safety and security solution for the community. This consequently signifies that the chairman is not bought and paid by the private actors, but rather that the decisions taken represents the board of the OCA which have gained support from the majority of residents attending the OCA general meetings.

Whether one chooses to look at individuals who take on the agency of change making within a single node or through multiple nodes, as change agents or double agents, scholars of nodal governance whom are in the process of depicting new explanatory maps need to go deeper into the intrinsic feature of each node in the security network and investigate what it is that binds these together. It consequently is of interest to figure out whether it is an accidental coincidence that this double agent’s origin node is super structural node or not? Or said differently, are change agents and double agents an essential characteristic of super structural nodes or is it likely that they might as well arise from less significant nodes?
9.2.2 Club goods in Observatory?

In chapter three it was argued that the pluralisation of auspice and providers of policing cannot be understood in terms of a public-private dichotomy, but that it rather should be comprehended in terms of a continuum, where the public and private make out the two ends while the space in between is carved up in differentiated communal spaces. Though Crawford contests both the notion of the continuum and that the police should be regarded as one node among many, as the scholar observes that there is a “fluid interpenetration of additional and residual security in which forms of state, municipal, private and voluntary policing coalesce in a mixed economy” (Crawford, 2006:111). Initially it is important to note that when Johnston and Shearing (2003) argued that the state police should be conceptualised as one node among many, this was an entirely normative argument and not a descriptive one, as Crawford here puts forward. While Crawford takes his observations as a contradiction to what is maintained by scholars of nodal governance, it is reasonable to assume that the nodal scholars often, though not always might have come to the same conclusion as Crawford’s fluid interpenetration after having mapped out the security network of the designated area. Hence, the continuum can serve the purpose of localising actors, through nodal mapping, the actors distance from the ideal typical private and public distinction. Though when the mapping has been completed and a more thorough security network appears, it might be that the continuum depiction falls short. This consequently signifies that whether there actually exist a coalesce of state, municipal, private and voluntary policing in a specific area should not be taken as an a priori matter of fact, but rather as something that needs to be studied thoroughly within each and every case.

For instance the security network in Observatory is characterised by a strong community-private-police nexus, and with an absent local government. This subsequently signifies that the production and protection of public goods has been left for the police to carry through. This is unfortunate for several reasons, and not merely because the police whom claim to serve public purposes are found to serve private interest as argued by Crawford (2006:117). The crime protection strategy of the sector policing unit in Observatory is mainly articulated through techniques of property protection and personal conduct, in addition to their bandit-catching operations. Notwithstanding that bandit catching is a necessary and important police activity when criminal offences have taken place, but the main problem is that it is not counterweighted by long term crime prevention measures. This role has almost solely been
left for the CPF to carry out, though their resources needed to do so remains limited due to scant transfer of fiscal resources from the government.

Security as ‘club goods’, Crawford (2006) maintains, are being established as a result of; public goods being contemporary enclosed due to private and parochial interest, and as a consequence of private interest are clubbing together in order to provide collective local goods. Local public goods are distinct from collective local goods. While local public goods signify spaces, facilities and services that is open to those whom live nearby, do collective local goods signify a *de facto* or *de jure* exclusion of constituencies excess to these goods. Hence, since club goods primarily are driven by strong private interest there takes place processes of exclusion and inclusion through means of legality, technology, financial and cultural factors (ibid:131). When considering security as club goods in relation to the case of Observatory there are some distinct features that both support and undermine this notion.

First of all, the features of enclosure that Crawford employs are framed within the notion that the state is residual to it, whereas the enclosure has been facilitated, aided or licensed by the modern state. In areas which this is the case, public spaces have been sold into private ownership, such as mass private property. A different type of enclosure that yield club goods are gated communities, in which the scholar characterize as; walled or fenced housing developments to which public access is restricted through means of private security providers and legally binding contracts (2006:125-126). In Observatory none of these two enclosures exists for other than single private properties. Enclosures in this community do not take place through physical structures and less by legal prescriptions but more through technological practices initiated and ‘mandated’ by the OCA and exercised by the private security providers. The inclusion and exclusion effects caused by this enclosure thereby segregates between residents and none residents of the community.

Secondly, the primary element that makes up the club goods in Crawford’s manner is the private and parochial interests which clubs together in order to provide collective local goods. The pivotal role that the private interest has within club goods complicates the Observatory consideration even further. The nexus between residents-OCA-private interests represents an intricate relationship, as the OCA seems to take a middle ground mediating the pure private interest and the residents’ demands for safety and security. For instance, the OCA has been actively involved in the process of deciding upon which private security providers that are to
obtain tenders of security provision in designated areas of Observatory. As previously mentioned it is the ADT whom have gained the most on these contracts. And in the process of centralising security provision around one preferable provider the OCA has gained control through which the organisation has negotiated agreements with the ADT that yields more of the interest of all residents than merely the interest of the ADT. In Observatory both residents and the OCA concur to the fact that security providers’ yields the best means to provide safety and security for their community. Whether these providers are to be private ones or whether they should arise from the OCA is a different question. Accordingly Observatory has a history of both voluntary and community based security, such as ObsWatch, which did not shut down before there was a lawsuit pending forcing them to comply with the PSIRA requirements. And when or if the OCA are able to establish a CID/RID it is reasonable to expect that the OCA will attempt to establish a new security provider that is founded upon private principles, though regulated through what the OCA deems to be the best for the community. The perception of club goods as solely being directed by private and parochial interests does represent a contradiction if one at all is to consider Observatory’s security scheme as club goods. Hence, this is primarily due to OCA’s stake in the governance of security.

As a final point in the discussion of security as club goods, it is of interest to look into the prospect of Observatory’s CID/RID in relation to ‘bonding capital’ and ‘bridging capital’. Crawford maintains that bonding capital serves to bind and unite those members whom have access to security, as it is inward-looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups. While bridging capital is outward-looking and encompasses people from across different social groups in ways that creates reciprocity and solidarity. While the prior is an essential feature of club security, the existent of the latter within these clubs are less certain (Putnam 2000, referred to in Crawford, 2006:137). First of all, if the OCA chooses to establish a CID it is in this structure’s nature that the amount of bonding capital will be strengthened around the commercial interest of the community. Though if a CID or the already established security nexus are to be counterweighted by a RID, it is likely that there will take place a strengthening of bridging capital between commercial and residential interest. However, in a critical view it can also be argued that bridging capital does not take place at all, but what rather takes place is a strengthening and widening of bonding capital within the community as a whole across the different private and commercial interests. Against this background, what takes place is the establishment of new feudal structures. Although, within the legal requirements of CID/RID establishments its resources are to be
drawn from the property taxes and redistributed to the community. And it is within the redistribution process of these resources that there is a significant potential for bridging capital, as it will release fiscal resources for the local government to uplift other and more deprived communities adjacent to Observatory. Thus if local government should be able to make use of this potential they will have to approach the community, if not, and if the community deems the redistribution to be unfair, it is likely that the OCA will establish the CID/RID solely as a private initiative which then implies that the bridging of capital across community boarders most likely is lost. In the case of Observatory the visible absence of local governmental involvement is accordingly a larger problem than the presence of community and private interest.

Based upon the line of arguments presented above, security as club goods does represent an analytical frame that can be useful and descriptive. Though Crawford’s focus upon gated communities, mass private properties and enclosed public spaces do not take sufficient attention to actors whom do not fall directly into single private and commercial actors. Civil society based institution such as the OCA does not represent either of these, even though it obviously is influenced by them. Is the fact of influence sufficient enough to maintain that its conduct is based upon private and parochial interest? It consequently is of this thesis assessment that one cannot subsume all actors accept that of the governmental as directed by private and selfish interest, even though this particular line of argument makes a powerful support for the necessary virtue of the state and the state as more than one node among many.

9.2.3 Contesting the state anchored pluralism notion

An argument that was put forward in chapter three maintains that states can often be as much a threat to human security as it can be its protector, hence states are often found unable and though also in some cases unwilling to provide the necessary security that is required in order for constituencies’ to be able to live a life in dignity. In South Africa the lack of human security in poor and marginalised communities of rural areas stems not as much from the government being unable in terms of fiscal and institutional capacity. It is more of a question of the willingness to think anew about how these fiscal resources can be redistributed and how to reutilise their institutional capacity when the traditional state-centred mechanism of governance have failed.
Within this setting the central question becomes; what ought one to do about this? Should one continue to adjust, improve and pressure the traditional institutions to become more efficient in structuring service delivery?, as depicted through the CSF approach in Worcester; or should one explore new strategies of meta-authority governance in order to uphold the state as the best means for an anchor of collective security provision?, as argued by Loader and Walker (2006) and Marks and Goldsmith (2006); or should one forge new strategies and techniques whereas on pursues both state and non-state auspice to promote normative ends that coincide with both public and common goods?, as in different shades have been put forward by scholars of nodal governance, such as; Shearing (2006), Johnston (2006), Dupont (2006), Burris (2006) and Wood (2006).

The normative approach of Loader and Walker (2006) is based upon the notion that security as a thick public good only is attainable if one is willing to departure from an *a priori* state scepticism. Hence, the state must be the main anchor in order for collective security to become possible and to be deemed as a public good. In which security as a thick public good is shaped by an interrelated relationship between an instrumental, social and constitutive dimension. The instrumental dimension is a universal accepted notion of security being a prerequisite in order for individuals to enjoy a life in liberty which subsequently is a prerequisite for a ‘good life’. Though as the scholars maintain, the liberty of the individual is irreducible to the liberal notion of a minimalist state. The social dimension of security implies that the security of any individual depends on the security of others, which consequently makes all forms of private security oxymoronic to the security of the common. By the constitutive dimension they maintain that security as common good is deeply implicated in the very sense of what the social is and the public are. Whereas the social and the public is constantly mediated through new experiences, new strategies and by affective contexts coming together through a long term process. Community based action within such an unstable context is thereby deemed problematic due to short-term perspectives, self-interest, limited information and low trust. Accordingly, the scholars maintain that something additional is needed in order to provide collective commitment. In which the only institution that can subsume the social identity and provide individual means in terms of collective ends is the state (ibid:184-190).

Marks and Goldsmith (2006) concurs with the state anchored notion, as they maintain that security as a thick public good is of necessity in order to establish effective delivery of other
public goods, such as health and education. The thick public good of security is of vital importance in order to facilitate collective sentiments and identities, and then especially for countries that evolve from internal strife and which consequently strives towards nation-building. A central element within the nation-building process is the establishment of a ‘we-feeling’. Whereas the process of establishing security against internal and external threats through a strong state policing setting is considered to facilitate this ‘we-feeling’ among the constituencies. It is also thought that this ‘we-feeling’ consequently will facilitate the creation of social identities within communities as they engage in mutual projects towards collective ends (Loader and Walker 2004, referred to in Marks and Goldsmith, 2006:149). Though the creation of a ‘we-feeling’ at the expense of what a nation deems to be external threats, and that this consideration is based upon their singular internal requirements, is a dubious establishment within a human security frame. External threats that pose the most significant challenges are less of a kind where states wage war against states, and more of the kind that threatens human beings on a regional and global scale. For instance, there are reasons to believe that President Mbeki in South Africa hesitates to do other than exercise his silent diplomacy against the despotic regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, merely because a civil war would cause additional pressure upon the South African boarders. And besides, the establishment of a strong state identity have historically shown to be problematic, as ‘nationalism’ and other forms of unreflexive group identities creates insider-outsider segmentations (Kempa, forthcoming) which is similar to those created by club goods, although only at a smaller scale. In the same manner as insider-outsider segmentations on the local level have shown to impede the cooperation required solving collective problems, so does it at the national level.

There are also reasons to question whether not the ‘we-feeling’ can as much be created without being part of a state-based social identity project. Hence, among the many communities in Worcester it was the poorest of them all, the Zwelethemba community that rated the highest on the bonding scale, which signified pride of belonging, extent of friendship circles and social support systems. As Zwelethemba is without sufficient excess to the political community and consequently without sufficient service delivery, an open question becomes; do not the Zwelethembian residents identify themselves as South Africans, do they not respect and cherish the liberty the South African Constitution provides them? What this signifies, and moreover should be recognised by state-centred scholars, is that social identity is created by a dual process of both top down and bottom up constructions. This dual process
is neatly portrayed in a case study of the social and political construction of identities in Western Cape Province (Cornelissen and Horstmeier, 2002). Among other things the case study illustrates how central governmental identity measures, such as the BEE, which were intended to reduce the cleavage between white and black constituencies, rather increased the identity cleavage between coloureds and blacks. As opposed to the top-down social identity construction notion, these scholars concluded by arguing that the identity construction of the constituencies in Western Cape was not characterised by political constructions, as this was reserved for the governmental elites, but rather that regular constituencies constructed their identity in relation to their local surroundings and residential areas and its contiguous social relations (ibid:79-80).

The prospect for efficient and democratic state-centred governance in South Africa has to be considered against the reality on the ground. South Africa is not a homogeneous society, but to the contrary, it is highly heterogeneous with a plurality of races and ethnicities. Even though people no longer are officially segregated by race, they are now segregated through socio-spatial means, which makes up a multitude of social spaces. Through these social spaces South Africans do not merely attain their identity; they have also rendered the possibility to govern themselves with or without the support of the government, in which some are enclosed while others are more open and while some are legitimate while others are not. The answer to the plurality of governance put forward by Loader and Walker (2006) is that the state needs to retain as an anchor to collective security provision, though at the same time open up for as much pluralism as possible. The problem with this perspective ascribes to the government and their inclination to make more use of control measures than coordination measures, which necessarily becomes both an issue of efficiency as well as of democracy.

In the case of the CSF in Worcester, it is apparent that the primary purpose of the CSF establishment is to increase the efficiency of service delivery, through departmental unity governance in the venture of a multi-disciplinary forum. The demand for more efficiency coincides with the forum’s centralisation of control. Even though community based nodes were invited to take part at the forum, their role seems nothing less than for information purpose and to become better providers of safety and security within the community. Subsequently this has an affect on the extent of pluralism. Pluralism in the case of CSF is restricted to the ability to influence the forum from within, though not to the forum as a whole, but through the designated departments. As Johnston and Shearing (forthcoming) maintains,
and which also was found in the case of the CSF, state-anchored pluralism only signifies a certain extent of diversity to which the state has predefined in order to achieve its goals. This consequently signifies that the prospect of deepening the democratic channels through allowing the poor and marginalised the means of taking part in agenda setting and decision making has been circumscribed to the advantage of the ballot-box. Hence, the manner the CSF look upon democracy can be characterised in terms of an ‘institutional fetishism’, as they conceive the current institutional embodiment of democracy as the only viable model (Unger 1996, referred to in Burris, 2006:215).

It is of this thesis’ opinion that state-centralised governance does not render the best route to the betterment of the poor and marginalised constituencies. For the state to subsume the plurality of governance that exists among and within the localised social spaces, and through which constituencies obtain their social identity, the state needs to depart from their top down unity governance. Instead of building strong bonds of mutual solidarity and sheared identity around notions of state membership, the state should rather concentrate on building weak bonds among individuals and communities on the expectation that cooperation rather than control will lead to mutual beneficiary outcomes (Kempa, forthcoming). Though in order to ensure that the bridges that are being built between the nodes that constitute the security network within and between the social spaces not merely provides common goods but goods that are equal to the public goods, it is of necessity to establish a viable regulatory framework.

Thus within the notion of regulatory frameworks there are some key challenges; first of all one needs to construct regulatory systems that not necessarily lead back to the state-centred paradigm, subsequently one needs to construct regulatory schemes that first of all promotes measures of coordination and not merely control. The total regulatory structure that is built around the peace committee centre can serve as one possible manner towards solving this issue. Hence, the regulatory framework departs from the state-centred control and rather works through coordination and integrative measures between the nodes of; CPP, School of Government, the peace committee members, the Finnish Embassy, the police and local government. One of the key answers to why this regulatory framework is viable ascribes to the respectful dialogue which establishes a mutual understanding of each nodes assignments and responsibilities. But the mere fact that nodes from multiple locations comes together in a respectful dialogue does not automatically guarantee that some nodes renders the possibility to dominate the security network at the expense of others, whereas there needs to be built in
regulatory mechanism that ensures that the more powerful nodes are sensitive towards the weaker nodes in the network. The process of integrating nodes can subsequently lead to domination. For instance the UN is now in the process of centralising and coordinating their activity in order to improve out-put efficiency. This consequently represents a possible threat towards the independency and neutrality of human rights organisations as too much integration might lead to one dominating operational mentality.

The two normative positions presented above are divided, though not in terms of the prior being ‘for’ while the latter is ‘against’ the state, which is a conclusion that many of the state-centred scholars often seems to draw. Though it is rather that scholars of nodal governance maintain that one needs to move beyond an a priori state-centred answer to all problems transpiring from societal change, hence the state-centred view encapsulates our normative thinking in manners that make scholars continuously fall back on traditional paths that has failed us in the past and most likely will continue to do so in the future. Kempa maintains that there is an incontrovertible ‘inconvenient truth’ that confronts the state-centred governance paradigm;

“Currently, a small fraction of the Earth’s population – optimistically one quarter – can meaningfully be considered citizens of well-functioning states, in the sense of being full social and economic participants and beneficiaries of public services. Indeed, the fact that the ‘underclass’ of unemployable and marginalised individuals comprises the vast majority (and the fastest growing segment) of the Earth’s population stands as the great ‘elephant in the room’ for the future human security” (Kempa, forthcoming:19).

Against this background scholars of nodal governance do not propose a solution that implies that the states are irrelevant or redundant. But it does to the contrary maintain that in areas where the state are able to deliver the goods of human security it should continue to do so by seeking a dominant, but not a sovereign role in the networks of human security governance. Though in areas where the state is not able to deliver these goods the state should render possible for democratic collective organisations to be established within the citizenry through means of fiscal resources, symbolic support and legal prescriptions that makes sure that they can obtain a central role in the governance of human security.
One of the reasons why this does not take place in contemporary South Africa ascribes to the mentality of security being too tightly bound to the notion of the state, as this study has shown through the South African security polices and through the models delivered by donors. This study has accordingly sought to demonstrate that only by breaking out from this notion one is able to get one step closer to establishing security governance that is more effective, equitable and democratic.
10.0 Bibliography

Note: A listing of legal references, policy documents, speeches, archive documents and informants follows the bibliography.


of Criminal Justice in South Africa - Consolidating Transformation, February 7-8, at Gordon's Bay, Western Cape, South Africa.


10.1 Legal references, Policy documents, Annual reports and speeches


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997

Department of Public Service and Administration (1997) White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery


South African Police Act 68 of 1995


10.2 Archive documents

10.2.1 Social Justice Resource Project, Institute of Criminology, UCT


Singh, A.M. (1994) *Will the real community please stand up?* Community in community policing, unknown presentation/publication


Vlok, A. J. Minister of Law and Order, *Law and Order in a New South Africa*, Natal Congress of the National Party, 31 August 1990


**10.2.2 Archive documents from informants**

**CAPE WINELANDS DISTRICT:**

A Scan Study: A preliminary study into crime prevention strategy pending a more detailed crime audit for the Boland District Municipality, Undertaken by UMAC, 2003


Cape Winelands District, Facilitating Community Safety in the Boland, A Crime Prevention Strategy for Safe and Healthy Communities, Prepared by UMAC, August 2004


Worcester Safety Audit, research undertaken by the Unit for Religion and Development Research, University of Stellenbosch in partnership with the Western Cape Department of Community Safety, Stellenbosch 2005

**COMMUNITY PEACE PROGRAMME:**


Cartwright, J. and Shearing, C. *Local Knowledge and the Governance of Security*, unknown dating


**OBSERVATORY:**


Observatory Civic Association, Minutes from OCA Annual General Meeting (AGM), February 8th 2006

Observatory Civic Association, Statement from OCA Annual General Meeting (AGM), March 13th 2006

**10.3 Interviews**

Andries Toise, Manager of Observatory Community Safety, Interview conducted March 3rd 2006

Brain Gray, Chairman of the Observatory Civic Association’s Safety and Security Sub Committee, Interview conducted March 11th 2006
Cedric Thomas, Representative for the Democratic Alliance Party and Councillor of Ward 57, Interview conducted March 30th 2006

Ganies Daniels, South African Police Service Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Western Cape, Interview conducted, March 30th 2006

Helen Swart, Treasurer of the Observatory Civic Association, Interview conducted March 7th 2006

Ibrahim Frizlar, Tailor situated in Woodstock, personal conversations

Jesse Maarit Laitinen, Programme co-ordinator at the Finnish Embassy, Interview conducted March 27th 2006

John Cartwright, Community Peace Programme Manager, Interview conducted March 15th 2006

Juan Kariem, Community Safety Officer in Breede Valley Municipality, Interview conducted March 23rd 2006

Marc Clench, Chairman of the Observatory Civic Association, Interview conducted March 9th 2006

Paddy Chappel, Representative for the Democratic Alliance Party, Interview conducted March 9th 2006

Patrick Hall, ADT Region Manager for the Cape Town area, Interview conducted March 24th 2006

Roy Feldtman, Disaster Management Officer in Breede River/Winelands, Interview conducted March 20th 2006

Royal Norwegian Consulate, Cape Town, South Africa, Telephone conversation

Russel Fave, Manager of Barneys Armed Response (also known as OAR), Interview conducted March 14th 2006

Undine Whande and Jasmin Nordien, Independent NGO Advisors, Interview conducted March 2nd 2006

Wenzel, Raymond. Chairman of Woodstock CPF, Interview conducted March 10th 2006

10.4 Newspaper clippings


Cape Argus, Cop lied to help pastor’s killer. By Maughan, K. December 2nd 2005

Cape Argus, Crime Statistics, October 19th 2005
Cape Argus, *Nine cops held over links with drug lords*. By Schronen, J. January 30th 2006

Cape Argus, *Observatory firms give up on police*. By Marud, E. April 16th 2003

Mail & Guardian, *A movement to applaud*. By Harvey, E. February 17th to 23rd 2006

Mail & Guardian, *A spinner’s paradise*. By Moya, F.N. September 23rd to 29th 2005

Mail & Guardian, *Change is fear*. By Altbeker, A. September 23rd to 29th 2005

Mail & Guardian, *NGOs not puppets of donors*. By Smith, T., Davids, I. and Hollands, G. November 4th to 10th 2005
11.0 Appendix

A General Interview Guide
This is an example of an interview guide that was used during the interviews with the informants. The guides were shaped to fit each informant and the organisation the informant represented, though the themes usually remained the same. In addition to the questions put down below, it was asked follow-up questions to the informants. The interview process has been based upon a partly-structured and open-ended frame, where the goal has been to allow the informants to speak freely within the themes. And where the questions put down below have been functioning more in terms of a checklist and for comparative purpose between the informants.

Time dedicated, approximately 60 minutes.

Research Question
“To what extent is security in South Africa governed through a multitude of nodes, what signifies the characteristic appearance of these nodal configurations, and subsequently what is the prospect for human security governance?”

Purpose of the interviews
The purpose of the interviews were first of all to figure out what kind of nodes that takes part in governing security within one urban and one rural community. It was important to investigate the intrinsic features of each node and the structural alignments between these nodes. In the process of doing this it was important to investigate the relationship between governmental and none-governmental nodes.

Personal background
1. Can you tell me about yourself, and your current occupational position?
2. How long have you been working within this occupation?
3. In what way will you characterise this organisation (Institution, Resources and Interest)
The safety and security context

4. How would you characterise the safety and security situation?
   4.1 What kind of problems lay behind the most common cases?

Participating actors

5. Who is participating in the ordering of safety and security?
   5.1 What kind of units participates?
   5.2 What kind of interest do they represent?
   5.3 Can you describe the relationship between these units? (Communication and Power features)

6. What is the level of participation among people in the community? (Apathy?)

7. Which racial groups do participate (Whites, Blacks and/or Coloureds)
   7.1 Why do you think that these people are the most prominent ones?

Solutions to safety and security issues

8. How do you find a solution for those problems that occurs?
   8.1 Would you describe those solutions as sustainable?
   8.2 What can be done in order to achieve sustainability?

9. Are there other organisations that provide solutions for these specific problems?

10. What kind of stakeholders does one need in order to solve these problems?

Governmental participation

11. What kind of governmental policies are devised in order to address the safety and security situation?
    11.1 What characterise the intrinsic features of these policies?
    11.2 To what extent are these implemented?
    11.3 To what extent are these policies operational in regard to the predefined goals?

12. In the Community Policing Policy document from 1997 they state that the police should strive to create an atmosphere in which potential community partners are willing and able to co-operate with the police. If you were to reflect around willingness, ability and co-operation, what meaning do you put into these words?

13. How does community policing activity in your community stand towards these elements in the present situation compared to the past?
    13.1 How is the relationship between the community actors and police officials?
13.2 How is the relationship between the community actors and the local governmental representatives?

14. Does tension occur between these stakeholders?
   14.1 If tension occurs, what characterise this tension?

15. In what ways are local government/police restricting/hampering the various community proposals for action?

16. In what ways are local government/police enabling the community in governing themselves?

Community self governance

17. Would you prefer self governance above higher governmental involvement?

18. How do you evaluate the community’s ability and possibility of self governance?
   18.1 What can be done to increase it?

Debriefing

Thank you for the interview. Is there anything that you would like to go more thoroughly into? Is it possible to get in touch with you at a later stage for follow-up question? How can I reach you?