Past and Present Sources of European Union

A Comparative Historical-Institutionalist Analysis

Tore Nedrebø

Dissertation for the degree doctor philosophiae (dr.philos) at the University of Bergen

04 December 2009
Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge a number of individuals and institutions whose support has been helpful, even critical, to the completion of this study and its presentation as a dissertation for the degree of doctor philosophiae at the University of Bergen. First of all, I wish to thank Associate Professor Jan Oskar Engene of the Department of Comparative Politics for taking a personal interest in my project. Without his reliable support, including letting me present my project in research seminars and offering many helpful substantive and technical comments, I would have been stranded. Special thanks also to Professor Sten Berglund of the School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences at Örebro University, Sweden, for finding time to read and comment on one of the final drafts.

I should also express my gratitude to Professor Johan P. Olsen at Arena, the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, for encouraging me to begin working seriously on the project in 1998, and to Arena generally for taking me in for three months in 2005. It has been my privilege to work with Arena in different ways since its inception in 1994. Thanks also to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for granting me a paid leave of absence during the said period.

Moreover, I want to recognise comments and assistance in various ways from Morten Egeberg, Andreas Føllesdal, Ulf Sverdrup and Ragnar Lie at Arena; Sveinung Arnesen and Frank Aarebrot at the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen; Atle Alvheim at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), as well as Eldbjørg Haug and Iver B. Neumann.

Naturally, none of these individuals or institutions can be blamed for any weaknesses in the text that follows. The study is mainly the result of my own drawn-out research and reflection. I have received little specific guidance or advice from others until the final stages. Therefore, more than usual in such endeavours, I am personally liable for any mistakes, inaccuracies, misinterpretations, misunderstandings etc. that may occur.
Preface

The present study is an enquiry into what variables influence Europeans’ attitudes to the idea of European union. The reason why I became interested in this problem is quite personal, and it may be illuminating if I start by briefly describing how the following pages came to be written. This will reveal not only some of my bias, but also the first-hand experience that forms the background of the project.

In the fall of 1978, when I began studying at the University of Bergen, I came across a youth organisation called the Young European Federalists (in French Jeunesse Européenne Fédéraliste, JEF; and in Norwegian Europeisk Ungdom, the youth section of the European Movement). As I had a need for meaningful free time activities and was interested in European and international affairs, I joined. I was also influenced by my father, who had been an ardent supporter of Norwegian membership of the European Communities during the referendum campaign in 1972. Soon I found myself engaged at all levels of the organisation, from the local to the European one.

Having just finished my undergraduate studies in the summer of 1982, I was accepted for the post of Secretary General of JEF Europe. Consequently, I moved to Brussels, where I lived and worked for two years. During my assignment in Brussels I had to travel extensively in Europe, east and west, north and south; to get acquainted with the European Community institutions (especially the Commission and Parliament); and to organise and attend innumerable meetings, conferences, seminars, etc. on issues related to European union.

During these two years on the Continent, I met much more positive attitudes to European union than I had at home. In Norway, where the issue of EC membership had been anathema since the “No” of the 1972 referendum, our advocacy of European union had mostly met with indifference or hostility. At university, the conventional wisdom was that European union was a cause of the elite and the political right. However, in continental Europe, I discovered that it was championed by most mainstream political currents, although more eagerly by some than others. Still, I was
struck by the diversity of opinions that could be encountered, especially in the European youth fora I attended.

Our discussions on Europe came to a head when we discussed the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984 (also known as the Spinelli Initiative). Generally, and on practical matters nearly always, in the meetings of the European youth networks I sided with the representatives of what I considered rational and pragmatic organisations with their mainstay in northern Europe. However, on the Draft Treaty I found myself sharing beds with what some of us sometimes referred to as the Latin or Catholic faction from continental and southern Europe, facing fierce and emotional opposition from the otherwise so sensible and cool north, i.e. the UK, Ireland and Denmark (the Swedes I met were equally sceptical, but as this was before the end of the Cold War they stood quite aloof from the issue of European union).

I discovered a similar geographical pattern of attitudes in the media and when I travelled in Europe. Moreover, I found that the votes in the European Parliament on the Draft Treaty, as well as the deliberations of the Council of Ministers and European Council generally reflected corresponding divisions. The further destiny of the initiative (Dooge Committee, various European Councils, the Maastricht Treaty, one referendum in Ireland, two in Denmark, etc.) indeed proved to be a contest between pro-Union and anti-Union tendencies along similar lines.

I began asking myself: What can explain this pattern of Euro-attitudes? Why are so many people in northern Europe, and notably in the UK and Scandinavia, sceptical to European union, while continental and southern Europeans sometimes see it as a question of survival? How is it possible that what is considered a perfectly laudable and logical idea in one part of Europe is seen as the complete opposite in another? What determines attitudes to European integration? When I returned to Bergen to join the graduate study of Comparative Politics in the autumn of 1984, I decided to address these questions in my graduate thesis (Nedrebø 1986).

Thesis and graduation done, I was admitted into the Norwegian foreign service. Most of the time since then I have been working on European issues and have
continued to observe the same pattern of attitudes to European integration I first noted when based in Brussels. Posted to Prague 1988-90, I could witness the fall of the Iron Curtain and Czechoslovakia’s ‘return to Europe’ from close quarters, and stationed in Bonn 1990-94 I observed first-hand German reunification, the debate about reunited Germany’s place in Europe as well as the controversy over the Maastricht treaty and European Monetary Union (my stay in Bonn resulted in a book on these questions: Nedrebø 1995).

Back in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, I worked in the Political Department helping to prepare for Norwegian membership of the EU. A majority rejected membership for the second time in the referendum of 28 November 1994, but I continued working on issues related to the EU. As head of the Ministry’s European Policy Section 2001-2005, I could closely monitor the enlargement of 2004 as well as the deliberations of the European Convention, the labours of the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference as well as the rejection of the ‘Constitutional Treaty’ in the French and Dutch referendums in 2005. Between September that year and the same month in 2009, I watched the convulsions over the final outcome, the Lisbon Treaty, from a more distant vantage point as ambassador to Nigeria, and after that from the MFA in Oslo.

My graduate thesis contained a similar argument in outline as the present study. Still, I felt I had not had the time to do a proper job of it. In particular, the historical analysis was too superficial. Although I realised that the additional effort required was very substantial, I felt that the project had important unrealised potential. So eventually, in 1998, I decided to return to the quest. I then happened to be working at Arena, the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, during a leave of absence from the MFA, and was encouraged by Professor Johan P. Olsen.

The present study differs so substantially from my graduate thesis as to constitute a separate, independent work. Although the research problem is the same and the basic argument and organisation similar, the framework of analysis and key concepts (see Figure 1 and Chapter 1.2 below) are new. Moreover, the analysis is now far more
wide-ranging and substantial, especially in the historical part. Much of it is based on
historiography published after 1986. The theoretical discussion has been updated too,
to take account of recent developments in European integration and international
relations theory as well as in more general social theory. The Eurobarometer survey
data analysis, which took up a larger part of my graduate thesis, has been greatly
reduced, reflecting my positivism-critical realisation since then that the main value of
survey analyses is descriptive and that their explanatory potential without extensive
contextualisation is limited. The analysis of voting patterns in the European Parliament
has been dropped altogether. In sum, the text is more or less completely rewritten.

Since 1998, many of my evenings, weekends and holidays have been devoted to
the present enquiry. Beside a lot of work, the effort has required a singular sense of
purpose and a lot of patience. But as the pieces of the jigsaw have fallen into place, my
endeavour has become increasingly rewarding. I hope reading it will be equally
worthwhile.
Abstract

This study sets out to explain why continental and southern Europe has been significantly more favourable to post-1945 European integration than the north. I argue that this is an important problem for two reasons. First, the fact that there are more and less Europeanist member states has been and remains the most basic political constraint on European integration. Second, I believe that by exploring this issue, I am able to present an innovative, comparative-historical analysis that not only advances our theoretical understanding of European integration, but also sheds new light on the evolution of nationalism and the nation-state.

In line with broad trends in political and social theory over the last twenty to thirty years, notably social constructivism, in the introductory discussion in Part 1 I assume that a search for the sources of Europeanism – territorial and other – requires an appropriate consideration of the role of ideas. I argue that the attitudes of individuals and collectivities to political issues like European integration reflect their ideological preferences as well as their material interests, both of which are in turn products of, and may be modified by, learning. Key concepts in the study are thus ‘interest,’ ‘ideology,’ and ‘learning.’ I assume that territorial-historical background fundamentally structures how agents are influenced by these variables.

Inspired by the Norwegian comparativist Stein Rokkan, I interpret European integration as a case of polity-building comparable to other instances of state- and nation-building in history. This approach suggests that integration is a fundamentally political process with the issue of sovereignty at its core. Hence, regionally differentiated patterns of attitudes to European union may reflect territorially distinct, historically evolved ideas of sovereignty. On this assumption, I construct a 2x2 table defining four basic ideas of sovereignty – polity-ideas, or normative ideas about a legitimate political order – that structures the study’s comparative-historical analysis: universalist-descending; particularist-descending; particularist-ascending; and universalist-ascending.
I argue that each polity-idea is associated with a particular discourse, ideology, and even an ontological and epistemological paradigm. The main controversy in the post-1945 European debate has been between what I term the national-liberal and the Christian-democratic paradigms of integration. The former is basically particularist and intergovernmentalist and is based in northern, Lutheran or Anglican Europe. The second is inspired by Christian universalism, favours a federal or unitary Europe, and has its mainstay in continental and southern, Catholic Europe.

In Part 2, I examine existing integration and international relations as well as general political science theory in order to identify theoretically possible sources of Europeanist attitudes. This discussion concludes with a working hypothesis based on Rokkan’s notion of the European city-belt. Could, as Rokkan himself explicitly suggested, the city-belt, stretching roughly from Central Italy to the North Sea and representing the historical core territory of the Catholic church and the Holy Roman Empire, be the home base or ‘primary territory’ of a European ‘nation’? Could it in this sense play a similar historical polity-building role as that assigned by Karl W. Deutsch to the Île de France as the hub of the French nation-state, to Leon-Castille in Spain, Savoy-Piemonte in Italy, Prussia in Germany, England in Britain etc.? If so, it is indeed worthwhile comparing contemporary European union-building to historical nation-building, Europeanism (pro-union ideology) to nationalism and Europeanness (European identity) to national identity.

While conceding that his perspective is indeed valuable and relevant, the historical discussion in Part 3 criticises Rokkan’s notion of the city-belt for national-liberal reductionism. The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis neglects the ancient and medieval tradition for unity and universalism espoused by the Roman Church and the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empire and underrates the continued influence of these institutions even after the Peace of Westphalia. Moreover, the thesis is too structuralist, implying that the European Union emerged more or less by default. Like intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory, it underestimates the role of ideologically aware and reasoning human agency. Hence it is argued that Rome, represented by the Roman Church as well as by successive Roman empires, is a more
important territorial and historical source of Europeanism than city-studded Central Europe.

Part 3 narrates how the ascendancy of particularist (or nationalist), discourse resulted from the fragmentation of unitary medieval Christendom into a modern Europe dominated by autonomous states. State-builders propagated the notion of territorial sovereignty, which eventually turned into the hegemonial, particularist-ascending idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the Protestant states of northwestern Europe were the pioneers, their kings’ control of national churches being an important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was particularly conducive to particularism, which notably in the German context turned exclusivist and eventually racist. The particularist paradigm survived two World Wars in its more benign North Atlantic, liberal form. I submit that this paradigm has been a major source of British and Scandinavian ideological reluctance to post-war European integration.

But the Holy See as well as the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires continued to represent a strong counterweight to particularist discourse even after the Reformation and the religious wars. The Papacy criticised nationalism as a political religion, and came to terms with the modern, secular nation-state and national mass politics only with difficulty. Still, in the late nineteenth century Catholic parties were allowed to emerge and enabled Catholics to participate in secular, national politics. But they continued to look beyond the nation-state. The final Part 4 of the study narrates how transnationally networked, Christian democratic parties of Western Continental Europe jointly formulated a Europeanist-ascending programme for European union after World War II. The European Union was launched on its supranational path when these parties, led mainly by statesmen from Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the governments of the six founding states from about 1945 to 1965. Their discourse in this regard was heavily informed by ideology rooted in the universalist European legacy, whose mainstay remains Catholic, continental and southern Europe.
### Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................III  

PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. V  

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... IX  

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1  
   1.1 PROBLEM AND APPROACH ................................................................................................. 1  
   1.2 THE CLASH OF PARADIGMS .............................................................................................. 9  
   1.3 THE RELEVANCE OF ROKKAN .......................................................................................... 19  
   1.4 METHODOLOGY AND ORGANISATION .............................................................................. 22  

2. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF EUROPEAN UNION .................................................................... 27  
   2.1 ATTITUDES .......................................................................................................................... 27  
   2.2 INTEREST .................................................................................................................................. 31  
   2.3 IDEOLOGY .................................................................................................................................. 35  
   2.4 LEARNING .............................................................................................................................. 43  
   2.5 LOCATION .............................................................................................................................. 47  
   2.6 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 57  

3. PAST SOURCES OF EUROPEAN UNION .............................................................................. 59  
   3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 59  
   3.2 THE NEAR EAST ..................................................................................................................... 66  
   3.3 ANCIENT ISRAEL ..................................................................................................................... 70  
   3.4 ANCIENT GREECE ................................................................................................................ 73  
   3.4.1 The Greek origin of geographical Europe ........................................................................... 73  
   3.4.2 The Greek contribution to Europeanness ......................................................................... 78  
   3.4.3 The national-liberal polis ................................................................................................. 88  
   3.5 THE HELLENISTIC MONARCHIES .................................................................................... 91  
   3.6 THE ROMAN EMPIRE ........................................................................................................... 98  
   3.6.1 The Roman idea of empire ............................................................................................... 100  
   3.6.2 The Romanisation of Europe .......................................................................................... 107  
   3.6.3 Roman law ....................................................................................................................... 110  
   3.6.4 The Christian empire ....................................................................................................... 115  
   3.7 EUROPEAN CHRISTENDOM ............................................................................................. 121  
   3.7.1 Christendom, West and East ............................................................................................ 124  
   3.7.2 The Making of Europe .................................................................................................... 137  
   3.7.3 Charlemagne’s Europe .................................................................................................... 165  
   3.7.4 The medieval papacy and empire .................................................................................. 174  
   3.8 MODERN EUROPE ............................................................................................................. 200  
   3.8.1 Universalist-descending ideology ................................................................................... 202  
   3.8.2 Particularist-descending ideology .................................................................................. 227
3.8.3 Particularist-ascending ideology ........................................... 244
3.8.4 Europeanist-ascending ideology ............................................. 259
3.9 Conclusion .................................................................................. 280

4. Present Sources of European Union ............................................. 283
   4.1 Introduction ................................................................................ 283
   4.2 Postwar Patterns of Europeanism ............................................. 287
   4.3 The Council of Europe ............................................................... 290
   4.4 The European Coal and Steel Community ............................. 292
   4.5 The European Defence Community ....................................... 307
   4.6 The European Economic Community ..................................... 310
   4.7 Enlargement and European Union ........................................ 312

5. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 321

References .......................................................................................... 327
1. Introduction

1.1 Problem and approach

Since the aftermath of the Second World War, when the initiative to what is now the European Union was taken, the public debate in Western Europe over European integration has evinced a striking territorial pattern. There has been a marked difference in attitudes between north and south. Public opinion surveys and referenda on European issues have shown northerners, notably Britons and Scandinavians, to take a more negative attitude to union than people from continental and southern Europe. Government policies have generally reflected this pattern: the original six member states as well as Spain, Portugal and, at least since the late 1980s, Greece have by and large been more Europeanist, i.e. favourably disposed to the idea of supranational European governance, than Britain and the Scandinavian countries (for empirical evidence, see Part 4 below).

As European integration has widened and deepened over the years, the picture has become more nuanced. For instance, Eurobarometer polls (see Chapter 4.2 below) indicate that people in Ireland and Denmark on the whole have turned more favourable. Moreover, Finland has since 1995 been a relatively pro-European Nordic member state. On the other hand, since the 1990s public opinion has become more sceptical in some continental member states. In 2005 a majority of Dutch and French voters rejected the draft European Constitutional Treaty, as did most Irish voters with the revised, Lisbon Treaty in the referendum of June 2008 (the latter however reversed their verdict in October 2009). Still, the negotiations over the latest treaty suggest that
the traditional pattern of positive and sceptical attitudes largely persists in the older, Western European member states.  

The aim of the present study is to explain why there has been such a basic territorial division in attitudes to integration, at least in Western Europe. This is an important issue for at least two reasons.

The first and most obvious is practical: The fact that there are more and less Europeanist member states has been and remains the most basic constraint on European integration. If more members had shared for instance the traditional Italian attitude, there would in all probability have been some kind of a ‘United States of Europe’ by now. Conversely, if more had adhered to traditional British or Scandinavian positions, it is likely that today there would at most be a Council of Europe and/or a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Thus the territorial variation of Europeanism in Europe has had major political consequences for European integration.

The other reason has to do with theory. I believe that by exploring this issue, I am able to present an innovative, comparative-historical analysis that not only advances our theoretical understanding of European integration, but also sheds new light on the evolution of nationalism and the nation-state in Europe.

Any analysis must build on some *a priori* ontological and epistemological, assumptions that guide its approach, methodology and empirical discussion. Most fundamentally, I will assume that a search for the sources of Europeanism – territorial and other – requires a thorough discussion of the role of ideas in European integration.

This assumption is supported by broad trends in the study of international relations and European integration over the last twenty to thirty years. The traditional theories or approaches, realism/intergovernmentalism and liberalism/neofunctionalism, have recently been complemented by a number of newer, ‘critical’ alternatives.

---

1 Although Caplanova, Orviska and Hudson (2004: 279) found that the more northerly Baltic states were less EU-positive than Poland, Bulgaria and Romania after 1989, it is difficult to see any clear pattern yet in the public opinion on the EU in the Central and Eastern European countries. However, see below, Chapter 4.7.
Most headway has been made by the approach known as ‘social constructivism.’ Its distinguishing mark is an insistence on the mutual constitutiveness of agents and structures, in the sense that agents (as well as observers, including researchers) necessarily interpret and attribute meaning to reality according to socially received ideas. Social constructivists therefore highlight the importance of culture, norms, ideas, identity, ideology, discourses etc. Methodologically, this means that constructivists focus more on communicative and discursive practices as well as epistemological issues than the traditional approaches have done (Risse 2004).

Still, Fierke (2007) argues that in practice the work of most constructivists has stayed within the bounds of well-established positivist methodological and epistemological assumptions. Checkel for his part discerns between ‘conventional,’ ‘interpretative’ and ‘critical/radical’ constructivism. Conventional constructivists emphasise norms and identity, but within a positivist epistemology. Interpretative constructivists explore the role of language in meditating and constructing social reality. Critical/radical constructivists maintain the linguistic focus, but add an explicitly normative dimension by probing the researcher’s own implication in the reproduction of the identities and world he or she is studying (Checkel 2006: 4-6)

Checkel (ibid: 14) associates the conventionalists with “American-style” positivism and the interpreters and critical-radicals with “European poststructuralism.” He recommends scientific realism as a possible bridge between them. Most fundamentally, scientific realists assume that objects of scientific theories have a real existence outside the student’s mind and are cognitively approachable. To them, “social science involves the study of the complex and interacting social objects that produce the patterns we observe. Because of their unobservable nature, most social objects have to be ‘got at’ through careful conceptualisation” (Kurki and Wight 2007: 24).

Moreover, according to Kurki and Wight (ibid.), scientific realism is relativist in the sense that no epistemological position is given priority in the acquisition of knowledge. However, this does not mean that all views are accepted as equally valid.
Scientific realism argues it is possible to rationally adjudicate between competing truth claims: “What is important to science is that any and every claim is open to challenge and, moreover, that all claims require epistemological support” (ibid.). Science rests on a commitment to constant critique; evidence-based, conceptual and otherwise.

Within international relations theory, Alexander Wendt (1999) is one scholar who has explicitly embraced scientific realism (Kurki and Wight 2007: 25). However, another, ‘critical’ strand of scientific realism (inspired by Bhaskar 1997) has emerged that distances itself from what it argues is Wendt’s too positivist, rationalist and materialist methodology. For critical realists such as Patomäki and Wight (2000), “both ideas and material factors are important in producing social outcomes, and both need to be integrated into the research process” (Kurki and Wight 2007: 25). The explanatory value assigned to each of them “is an empirical matter that can be decided only on the basis of research that examines the relationship and interplay of both.”

This study is informed by the constructivist, critical realist and poststructuralist epistemology just described. Although I believe in evidence-based, intersubjectively agreed approximations to the truth, and in spite of the fact that the methodology and epistemology I adopt thus are fairly conventional (positivist and empiricist), I accept that all truth-claims are inherently indeterminate: we all interpret and attribute our own meaning to reality (Campbell 2007).

However, a key poststructuralist insight is that what a society or social grouping considers true and right is fundamentally influenced by power structures. As Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and, notably, Foucault have successively pointed out, the relationship between power and knowledge, ideas, identity and ideology needs to be a central focus of social science. Moreover, as poststructuralists insist that agents (and students) are influenced by historically shaped power structures, they find it highly relevant to study the historical, ‘genealogical,’ or ‘archaeological’ emergence of particular modes of interpretation, representation, understanding, and discourse (Campbell 2007: 223-224). The poststructuralist approach has indeed entered the fray of European integration studies in the guise of ‘discourse analysis’ (Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004).
Among the core theses of discourse analysts (whom Checkel classifies as interpretative constructivists) is that ‘Europe’ is a contested concept with multiple meanings; that the EU should not (only) be interpreted in state terms; and that European questions cannot be studied in isolation from other questions (Wæver 2004). Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung presented a programmatic statement in favour of discourse analysis applied to European integration in a seminal article in 1998 (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998). Their concept of polity-ideas as normative ideas about a legitimate political order, and their ‘critical realist’ differentiation between interests and ideas, are taken up below.

However, social structures, as well as institutions, ultimately consist of humans – they are socially constructed rules and traditions that have no objective, tangible existence except as represented in man-made words, actions, and physical objects that must be attributed meanings. In this perspective, the individual is the fundamental agent of politics and the basic unit of analysis of social science. Human agents ‘construct,’ i.e. establish durable, widely shared interpretations or representations, of the social world of which they are part. Such constructions in turn become intellectual and epistemological, and, eventually, social structures. As the critical realists argue, in addition to the material incentives highlighted by rational choice theorists, individuals are motivated by beliefs, norms, values, ideas, identities and ideologies, and, I submit, a search for meaning and knowledge.

However, social structures certainly limit both the ideas and the scope for action of individuals. In most of the contemporary world, the predominant sociostructural given is the state. The segmentation of global society into states over at least the last half millennium severely limits our ability to imagine anything beyond the current multi-state reality. But poststructuralist ontology implies that the territorially bounded, internally sovereign and externally independent, so-called ‘Westphalian’ state, or ‘nation-state,’ is only one, historically and geographically contingent, type of political community. ‘Critically’ informed international relations theorists Ferguson and
Mansbach (1996) thus make a convincing case for the adoption of ‘polities’ rather than ‘states’ as the chief unit of IR historical analysis.

Similarly, Barry Buzan and Richard Little (1999: 18-22) accuse Realist IR theory not only of “state-centrism” and “anarchophilia,” but also of “presentism,” “ahistoricism” and “eurocentrism.” Andreas Osiander in his analysis of the Peace of Westphalia concludes that the whole concept of the ‘Westphalian’ state, sovereignty and the concomitant model of international relations “is based on nineteenth century rationalisations for conditions prevailing at the time that were not only historically unprecedented but by their very nature transitory” (Osiander 2001: 284).

Since the ‘constitutional turn’ inaugurated by the Maastricht treaty in the 1990s, in European integration theory there has been a related tendency to interpret the European Union as an emerging ‘polity’ (e.g. Sbragia 1992; Marks et al. 1996; Pierson 1996; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 1998; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, eds., 1999; Hix 1999; Wiener and Diez 2004). But also the original European integration theory, neo-functionalism, assumed that the European Community was a polity in the making (see e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). Theorists working on this assumption take a comparative politics rather than an international relations approach to the study of European integration.

A comparativist approach to European integration challenges the view that the European Union is a historically unprecedented, unique (“sui generis”) political phenomenon, requiring a wholly new vocabulary and methodology. Simon Hix argues vigorously that the EU should be studied using “the tools, methods and cross-systemic theories from the general study of government, politics and policy-making” (Hix 1999: 2).

However, in my opinion the advocates of a comparative politics approach to European integration have not yet drawn the full, radical consequences implied by their argument. I submit that this can only be properly done if European integration is seen in a deeply historical, comparative perspective in accordance with the poststructuralist approach. From this view, the evolution of the European Union may be seen as a case of polity-building similar to past cases of state- and nation-building. The common
French expression for European integration, *la construction de l’Europe*, is in this perspective apposite. It is trivial to observe that all emerging polities have been unique, or *sui generis*, and without any predetermined outcome. From a contemporary perspective, the interesting point is not *whether*, but *how* European Union-building differs from other cases of polity-building.

I propose that the answer is twofold. First, European Union-building is non-coercive: Democratically governed states voluntarily join a new political entity, delegate or ‘pool’ decision-making powers to a new centre, and adopt and abide by common laws and policies without the threat or use of physical force. This calls for special attention to be paid to the role of attitudes, political ideology and public opinion in the evolution of the project, and warrants a comparative politics approach.

However, the second unique feature of the European Union as an emerging polity is the fact that the integrating units are highly institutionalised, nominally sovereign (‘Westphalian’) states. This structural trait strongly suggests that the preoccupation of international relations theory with national power, sovereignty, prestige and interest is still highly relevant to understanding the dynamics of European integration. Together, these two aspects illustrate that what is unprecedented and unique in European integration as a polity-building process, is its bottom-up, or ascending, nature. Seen from a contemporary perspective, there is clearly a ‘democratic deficit,’ but from an historical point of view European polity-building is singularly democratic.

Interpreting the European Union as a case of polity-building may suggest that EU politics is indeed most basically a struggle over power, influence and resources. However, I find Realist international relations theory’s conception of power, with its focus on physical force and distributive power, too restrictive. This is especially so with European Union-building, which is essentially a voluntary process undertaken by democratic states, and whose very *raison d’être* is the enhancement of common interests and ideas. I prefer Michael Mann’s wider, poststructuralist conception of *social* power.
Mann (1986, 1993) assumes that there are four basic ‘sources’ of power: political, economic, military, and ideological. All of these are also ‘sources’ of European union in the sense that they in various ways, directly or indirectly, have influenced the people who have built or are building the European Union. Least relevant, in a post-WWII perspective at least, is military power. Accordingly, European Union politics is not only a zero-sum struggle over political and economic advantage (in the sense of allocation of votes in the Council, seats in the Parliament, contributions to and returns from the common budget, policy decisions more or less favourable to the ‘national’ interest in question, etc.), but also a non-zero-sum deliberation on how participants may best realise their political, economic and military interests and ideologies, ideas, norms and values collectively rather than individually.

If we (as in the current context I think we must) conceive of Europe as a whole and consider the whole of European history, we will see that there have not only been centrifugal tendencies towards diversity, freedom and anarchy, but also significant centripetal tendencies towards unity, order and hierarchy. Indeed, like many others before me, I will argue that the dialectic between unity and diversity is a fundamental characteristic of Europe’s development.

Europe has had and retains important supranational, universalist and cosmopolitan institutions, agents and traditions, with concomitant identities and ideologies, not only ‘national’ or state ones. I will discuss how these have significantly influenced attitudes to – and thus the actual course of – European integration, including how member state governments see their national interests in EU treaty negotiations. These legacies thus constitute past sources of European union (with a minuscule u), interacting with present, more short-term, i.e. post-1945, sources of European Union (with a capital U). Different parts of Europe are differently influenced, and that, I submit, is the key to solving the puzzle of territorially differentiated Europeanism.
1.2 The clash of paradigms

If we interpret European integration as polity-building, the question of sovereignty takes centre stage. I will assume that controversy over notions of sovereignty is also at the core of the political debate on European integration, and thus a primary cause of the differentiated pattern of opinion that I aim to explain. As Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 167) concludes from rigorous empirical testing, “attitudes toward supranational integration are shaped by distinct conceptions of sovereignty and political authority that prevail in the political culture of the member-states.” My empirical analysis will therefore be structured according to a conceptual framework of sovereignty. In this chapter I will first present this framework, then summarise the arguments based on it that appear in the empirical parts of the study.

Francis Hinsley, author of “the standard English language treatment of the history of sovereignty” (Onuf 1998: 115), defines sovereignty as “the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community” (Hinsley 1986: 1). This and indeed any definition of sovereignty logically distinguishes between what I will call the locus and the scope of sovereignty, i.e. between who exercises sovereignty and the community or territory over which it is exercised.

As to locus, “final and absolute authority” may be thought to be located either at the top of the political community, in one person (who may claim divine mandate), or below, ultimately in the whole people. The former case represents what the historian Walter Ullmann (1965) has called the descending (or absolutist) thesis of government, according to which supreme authority belongs at the apex of the social pyramid, or indeed above it, to God, and all authority below is delegated from above. The latter case, the ascending (or democratic) thesis, takes sovereignty ultimately to emanate from and belong to the people.

Samuel Finer (1997: 35) similarly distinguishes between the rule of the elite (the ‘Palace’ regime) and of the masses (the ‘Forum’ regime). Such notions of sovereignty are variations over the classical Greek taxonomy of polity types, most famously articulated by Plato and Aristotle. It posits three constitutional or legitimate types of
polity: the rule of one: monarchy; of the few: aristocracy (literally: rule of the ‘best’); and of the many: democracy. Each category also had an unconstitutional and illegitimate version.

However, political theorists have traditionally paid less critical attention to the territorial scope of sovereignty than to its social locus. The independent polis defined the classical world of Plato and Aristotle, and the nation-state the modern world within which historiography and political science developed as academic disciplines. Since the nineteenth century the nation-state has enjoyed conceptual near-monopoly as the fundamental unit of political-territorial organisation.

Already Montesquieu (1990 [1748]: Book VIII, ch. 16, 19, 20) identified multinational ‘empires’ with despotism. The American War of Independence (1775-1783), the Paris peace settlements after World War I and the decolonisation from the late 1950s onwards have successively undermined the legitimacy of supranational, imperial governance in general and augmented that of national self-determination (see e.g. Doyle 1986: 19; Pagden 1995; Muldoon 1999: 109-113; Lieven 2003: 4).

However, with today’s Europeanisation and globalisation, there is a new awareness of the need for effective authority to be exercised above and beyond the nation-state, and thus for a reconsideration of the scope of sovereignty and citizenship (see e.g. Linklater 1998). As we will see, there are solid historical precedents for supranational governance. Sovereigns have claimed authority not only over a particular part of the world – which I will term ‘particularism’ – but also over the whole human community (or at least the world they knew or thought to be civilised) – which I will call ‘universalism’.²

If the locus and scope of sovereignty are dichotomised into respectively universalist/particularist and descending/ascending dimensions, they may be combined

² For the present purposes I concentrate on the territorial scope of sovereignty, bearing in mind however that sovereignty also has what may be termed a functional scope, which is a question of what functions or aspects of a community’s organisation and life should be subject to political governance (and to what degree): the economy, the currency, culture, the judiciary, religious life, media, etc.
as in Figure 1 below. The figure defines four basic polity-ideas, i.e. “normative ideas about a legitimate political order” (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998): 1) universalist-descending; 2) particularist-descending; 3) particularist-ascending; and 4) universalist-ascending. I will argue that each polity-type has had or has a particular discourse, ideology, even an ontological and epistemological paradigm, attached to it.

Figure 1: Historical polity-ideas defined according to their idea of sovereignty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus</th>
<th>Universalist</th>
<th>Particularist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descending</td>
<td>Empire</td>
<td>Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascending</td>
<td>Federation/Union</td>
<td>City-state/ Nation-state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a general, deductive scheme for classifying polity-ideas according to their notions of the locus and scope of sovereignty. As such it may be applied to any part of the world. If related to the European context, I submit that the theoretically possible polity-ideas have been (or may be) realised empirically as the polity-types indicated in the four boxes of the figure. I will argue that the post-war debate over European integration has been dominated by the discourses based respectively on the particularist-descending and the universalist/Europeanist-descending polity-ideas. These in turn are expressions of what I will call the national-liberal and the Christian-democratic paradigms of European governance.

Based on this, I will try to demonstrate that the most politically salient cleavage in the history of European Union-building has been that between central and southern Christian democrats pursuing a federalist or unitary political vision for the European Union, and northern national-liberals working for an intergovernmental and free-trade Europe, or indeed fundamentally opposing European integration. For many in the Europeanist core, European unity has been an end in itself, whereas for the Eurosceptic periphery it has at most been a means to advance the interests of its own sui
generis end – the national community. The continental and southern core has generally favoured European state- and nation-building, the northern periphery at most an economically integrated Europe of sovereign nation-states.

The Peace of Westphalia was the major historical turning point as far as the scope of sovereignty is concerned. Before 1648, sovereignty was generally identified with the ruling dynasty and not with a fixed territory, but the peace treaties confirmed its replacement by the principle of territorial sovereignty. The period between 1648 and 1789 is conventionally seen as the classical era of particularist-descending, absolutist monarchy. Similarly, the French Revolution is commonly conceived as the critical juncture as far as the locus of sovereignty is concerned (although in fact the seventeenth-century Dutch republic and the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England, as well as the American Revolution of 1776 have fair claims to that title too). In Europe, that was when the ascent towards hegemony of particularist-ascending, or national-liberal, ideology began.

However, as we will also see, descending-sovereignty discourse survived 1789, and not only in the Restoration monarchies. Particularist-descending polity-ideas continued to find expression in the European overseas empires that endured, in the case of Portugal, until the 1970s. More significantly in the present context, the influence of the French idea of national sovereignty helped transform German particularist-descending discourse into exclusivist, totalising nationalism. German intellectuals, beginning with Herder, developed a notion of the nation-state with a closed rather than open membership, defining the nation as a unique linguistic, ethnic and/or cultural community. Later German nationalists made German mother tongue and ancestry the criterion of membership in the German Kulturnation. In the Wilhelmine Reich, German nationalism deteriorated into a cult of the German nation, the genius of which was claimed to be superior to all other nations. Spurred by social darwinism, these notions carried over to the racism espoused by Hitler and his Nazi movement. This was arguably still a descending version of particularism, as the cult of the nation, imagined as a transcendental god-like community, was used to justify descending, authoritarian/totalitarian government (see below, Section 3.8.2).
By contrast, the concept of the nation-state promoted by Rousseau and the French revolutionaries was civic or political rather than ethnic, linguistic or cultural. Anyone who supported the fundamental ideas of the political community as expressed in the constitution could be a citizen, regardless of his or her birthplace, language, religion, etc. The state defined the nation, not vice versa as in the German case. This idea of citizenship can be placed in the ancient Greek and Roman tradition of republicanism and cosmopolitanism, but also in the closely related Catholic tradition of universalism. Its immediate ideological background was French Enlightenment theory and British constitutionalist practice, and it was first institutionalised in the modern age in the United States of America (see below, Section 3.8.3).

Generally, the civic/liberal idea of the nation-state made its greatest impact in north-western Europe and North America, which is why it may also be designated the ‘Atlantic’ discourse on sovereignty. National/ethnic ideology by contrast originated in Germany and affected Central and Eastern Europe in particular. Racist nationalism and suprematism was discredited in the Second World War, but the ethnic/exclusivist variety has survived on the radical right of Western Europe. After the Cold War it enjoyed a revival in Central and Eastern Europe too (Mach and Požarlik 2008). The radical left has at the same time tended to reify the nation-state as the last and best defence against transnational capitalism, neo-liberalism and globalism.

Be that as it may; the common denominator for latter-day nationalists as well as national-liberals remains the particularist-ascending idea of sovereignty. Sanctioned by the Paris peace treaties, the League of Nations as well as the United Nations, the principle of national self-determination legitimised not only the break-up of the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires after World War I, but also decolonisation in the 1960s and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Speaking generally, two political notions with great normative and emotional appeal – popular sovereignty and the nation – have in the modern mind become indelibly associated with the territorially delimited state. Thus a core axiom of national-liberal ideology tends to be that democracy is only legitimate and workable in
the institutional framework of the sovereign nation-state. Moreover, the nation-state has become identified with the progress of modern (Western) egalitarian civilisation in general: human rights, rule of law, social welfare, compulsory schooling, universal health care, gender equality, rising living standards, employment, etc. It is the default that any alternative must trump.

The conventional interpretation of European political history is of a succession of polity-ideas and polity-types, from the Greek city-state to the Roman Empire, via unitary but anarchical Christendom to the medieval and early modern kingdoms, and on to the late modern nation-state. Although at a very general level this is true and demonstrates the underlying unity of European history, in a fairly large and diverse area such as Europe, prevalent polity-ideas do not uniformly change from one to another. There have been and remain transitional polity-ideas as well as polity-types. Different polities and associated ideas concerning the scope and locus of sovereignty have co-existed with those that are later taken to be paradigmatic for the age in question.

Even when revolutions have occurred, ideological and institutional elements, legacies and discourses from the old polities have survived into those that replaced them. The strength of such elements, discourses and legacies is socially and territorially differentiated, that is, it depends on the history of the particular territory in question and on the social power of their agents.

The cardinal point in the present context is the strength and longevity of the universalist tradition in Europe, even in the ages of kingdoms and nation-states. Institutions expressing universalist ideas, ideals and traditions have existed as living realities practically throughout known European history. The universalist political (‘imperial’) tradition arguably extends back some five thousand years (see below, Chapter 3.2).

However, probably most Europeans imagine ancient Rome as the paradigmatic empire. In today’s national-liberal world, the huge influence that notions from the Roman Empire (see below, Chapter 3.6) have had on subsequent European political thought tends to be neglected. The Papacy, the Byzantine empire, and the Holy Roman
Empire (as well as its close relative and descendant, the Habsburg monarchy) all claimed not only to succeed it institutionally and ideologically (see below, Chapter 3.7 and Section 3.8.1), but therefore also had some sense of universal authority, at least over Christians.

Even if the rivalry between the medieval Pope and emperor over sovereignty in Christendom fatally undermined the ability of each to assert his claims in practice (see below, Section 3.7.4), Roman universalist-descending ideas and ideals lingered on. The Byzantine empire represented an essentially unbroken institutional continuity with the Roman Empire until 1453. The Holy Roman Empire, established in 800 or 962 (depending on whether Charlemagne or Otto I the Great is taken as the founder), ended only in 1806. The Habsburg line of emperors, still claiming Roman lineage, continued to rule a Central European empire until 1918. The Russian empire and the Ottoman empire, both of which claimed descent from the Roman Empire (via Constantinople), expired only in 1917 and 1921, respectively. Defining itself as ‘Second’, the German Reich founded in 1871 associated itself with the tradition of the ‘first’, German-Roman empire. Napoleon, Mussolini as well as Hitler (at least indirectly when he called his totalitarian state the ‘Third’ Reich) evoked the Roman precedent to legitimise their power. Finally, the Holy See, located in Rome and intensely alert to its Roman lineage and universalist mission, is obviously still a hugely influential living institution.

As we will see, at a particularly propitious historical moment, the universalist tradition was able to bounce back and make the European Union possible. In the late nineteenth century, its previously mainly descending legacy began to be democratised, and after World War II it was transformed into Christian-democratic ideology and discourse. What is now the European Union was launched on its supranational path when transnationally networked Christian democratic parties, led by statesmen from Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the governments of the six founding states. As Wolfram Kaiser has recently demonstrated in a ground-breaking study (Kaiser 2007), transnational Christian democracy has remained the federalist ‘party of
Europe’ throughout the history of European integration (see also Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006, and Checkel and Katzenstein, eds., 2009).

Christian-democratic discourse was originally inspired by Catholic universalism and its main territorial base remains western, central and southern continental Europe. I submit this is the main reason why even non-Catholics from these parts are more Europeanist than citizens from mainly Protestant, northern/insular/peninsular Europe. The Christian-democratic, or Europeanist-ascending, tradition is arguably today the main inspiration of centre-right Europeanism, which has so far been the most influential strand of Europeanism.

Since Christian-democratic discourse draws much of its inspiration from ancient Roman and medieval Christian ideology, it attaches less intrinsic value to the national level of government. This discourse arguably takes the existence of European identity, or what I will call Europeanness, as granted because it is such an integral part of the historically and territorially conditioned individual identity of its proponents. I submit that the assumption that a European demos already exists, together with the tradition for top-down (‘descending’), patriarchal, clientelist and/or elitist governance in continental and southern Europe (Hofstede 2001), means that the adherents of the Christian-democratic paradigm tend to attach less importance to the problems of democracy and legitimacy in the European Union. In contrast to national-liberal discourse, it has been more concerned with the ‘output’ than the ‘input’ side of European governance.

Centre-left Europeanism, on the other hand, I would place closer to the secular republican and cosmopolitan tradition, which has also contributed so much to national-liberal ideology (see below, Section 3.4.3 ff). This tradition originally hails from Greco-Roman Stoicism, and has arguably been influenced by Italian, ‘Lotharingian’ and Dutch republicanism, by medieval natural law thought, by Calvinism and by Enlightenment ideas. Cosmopolitanism and universalism overlap etymologically and historically, and now sometimes tend to be treated as equal (Linklater 1998: Pagden 2008; Talbott 2008).
However, the respectively Greek and Latin origins of the terms remain relevant. ‘Universalism’ arguably reflects the Roman notion of a universal polity, ruled according to one law applying to all citizens, and with one ruler at its head to whom all owe loyalty. By contrast, modern advocates of ‘cosmopolitanism’ (e.g. Archibugi, Held and Kohler, eds., 1998; Beck 2004; Beck and Grande 2007) arguably retain more of the original Greek emphasis on multiple state and other collectivity independence combined with equal individual rights. I regard the Roman-Catholic universalist tradition as more Euro-centric and conservative than the Greek-secular cosmopolitan tradition, which I submit is today comparatively more multiculturalist and liberal/leftist (cf. the new debate over the limits and identity of Europe).

Particularist discourse may be expressed in opposition to joining the European Union, or in the case of states that are already members, to ‘deepening’ or federalising the Union by transferring more sovereignty and policy responsibilities to it. ‘Atlantic’ national-liberals seek to retain the nation-state as the primary polity, but tend to be favourable to ‘negative’ integration, i.e. abolition of restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, to mutual recognition and Lisbon Strategy best-practice learning, etc.

The varieties of European integration theories have tended to reflect these normative differences, intergovernmentalists seeking to retain as much national sovereignty as possible, neo-functionalists espousing the single market approach, and federalists of course a federal Europe with distinct supranational and direct democratic elements (see below, Part 2).

A basic tenet of the modern particularist paradigm is that the natural political unit is the sovereign, democratic nation-state. As we will see, the ideology of the nation-state emerged mainly north of the Alps, in a tension between liberal English, American and French notions of the civic state on the one hand and national-ethnic, nationalist and ultimately racist German ideas of the nation on the other. The continued strength of the particularist paradigm in northern Europe significantly contributes to the importance here being attached to the preservation of national sovereignty in European
integration. In addition, the national-liberal preoccupation with ascending democracy in the north\(^3\) conduces towards Euro-scepticism because a national community is seen as the ultimate framework for a functioning democracy. A supranational European Union cannot on this idealist view be democratically legitimate as there is allegedly no European identity, or at least no European *demos*, as the jargon goes.

Arguably, northern, Protestant national-liberals and southern, mainly Catholic Christian-democrats tend to clash over European integration also because they are ideologically inclined to emphasise two different aspects of European Union politics: respectively *distributive* and *collective* power (Parsons 1960: 199-225; cf. Mann 1986: 6-7). Distributive power is zero-sum: if A increases his power, B loses power, and vice-versa. Northern Europeans tend to focus on distributive power in European politics, and see the European Union mainly as an arena for the advancement or defence of national interests and national identity, i.e. of their nation-state. Their basic question is, “What’s in it for me, or for my nation”?

Collective power on the other hand means that if A and B co-operate they may enhance their combined power vis-à-vis third parties or nature. In this perspective, European Union politics is less about the allocation of distributive power between member states and EU institutions, and more about how participants can increase their collective power relative to other polities such as Russia, the United States, China etc. as well as their joint ability to handle common challenges such as terrorism, economic competitiveness, unemployment, migration and environmental degradation. Christian-democratic discourse tends to focus on collective power in European politics and generally on how joint governance can contribute to the good life for all according to common (European/Christian) values, rather than on struggles over distributive power within the Union. Its basic questions are, “What is the common interest, or the common good, and how do we most effectively realise it?”

\(^3\) Cf. not least the German Constitutional Court’s decisions regarding the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties.
Naturally, such a classification is a huge simplification. The two opposed paradigms, ideologies or discourses I have delineated are ideal-types. In practice there are many gradations and nuances that are changing over time as Europe and the world evolves. Moreover, the influence of these world-views is not restricted to their territorial origin but can be noted in every member state. As regards attitudes to European integration, they may be seen as two ends of a continuum, between adherence to complete national sovereignty on the one hand and to a centralised European ‘super-state’ on the other.

However, as ideal-types I submit that today the national-liberal and the Christian-democratic paradigms constitute the oft-observed dialectic nature of Europe, which Jonathan Steinberg recently has summarised as follows:

The secret of Europe has always been [...] the tension between universal and particular, between the empire and the estates, between the princes and their towns, between universalist religious claims and sectarian practice, between universal values and particular rights. That constant irritating, relentless but ultimately creative struggle has made Europe the vital, vigorous, inexhaustibly interesting place that it is. [...] The tension between universal and particular, between centre and periphery, between federal and state power, may not always be comfortable to live with but it is the very core of European identity. That is what Europe is. (Steinberg 2002: 48)

1.3 The relevance of Rokkan

The Norwegian social scientist Stein Rokkan (1921-1979) was one of the founding fathers of the modern discipline of comparative politics (Caramani 2008: 18). Rokkan, who published most of his work in the 1960s and 1970s, analysed the historical interplay between political, economic, cultural, and territorial variables in the evolution of modern politico-territorial diversity in Europe.4 His original interest in the

4 Rokkans main works are Rokkan (1966, 1970 and 1975). Rokkan (1999), which I will be referring to here, is a compilation edited by Peter Flora and Derek Urwin that also contains a full bibliography.
development of political participation expanded to encompass the evolution of Western European party systems and nation-states in general.

One of Rokkan’s fundamental ideas was that state- and nation-building in Europe has been structured around a European core, or what he called the ‘city-belt,’ stretching from central Italy to the North Sea. Rokkan saw the autonomy and strength of the cities at the centre of Europe as originating in the Roman Empire and having been sustained by trade and other economic interaction between northern and southern Europe. Moreover, according to Rokkan, this central area encompassed the traditional strongholds of the supranational Roman Catholic church. The economically and culturally integrated but politically fragmented central city-belt was able to resist domestic and foreign state- and nation-building efforts to the extent that the strongest and most centralised European nation-states arose not in the middle, but in the European periphery.

Rokkan in one brief passage explicitly suggested that his territorial, centre-periphery perspective offers a key to understanding post-1945 European integration: “It is no accident of history that the Roman Law countries were the ones to take the lead [...] in the struggle for a supranational Europe. The conflict over extension of the Common Market is very much a conflict between the economically cross-cut city belt at the centre and the culturally distinctive territorial systems in the peripheries of this Roman Europe” (Rokkan 1999: 167-168). Rokkan left the idea there, and no one has yet explored it further. But Peter Flora suggests that it is high time to follow up:

Europe regarded as a whole has the polycephalic structure of Central Europe, where the ideas of federalism and subsidiarity originated. Yet European-wide centre-periphery structures will form or solidify, and as they do so the ‘city belt’ so central to Rokkan’s theory may once again play a role. It is no coincidence that the politicians who have been most important for the process of European unification come from the ‘Lotharingian’ zone of Europe, or that the most important political institutions of Europe and the economic core of the Continent are located there. [...] Rokkan’s approach also offers a key to understanding the latest developments in Europe. One might argue that as nation-states have declined in significance, intensive research into their differences has also become less important. But I would counter that the process of European integration has given these differences a wholly new meaning. By looking back into the past, Rokkan points to the future. (Flora 1999: 91)
Flora’s suggestion to introduce Rokkan’s thinking to the study of European integration is taken up in Chapter 2.5 and in Part 3 below. However, as we will see, Rokkan himself was much influenced by the national-liberal paradigm. Indeed, what has become known as methodological nationalism (Smith 1983; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; Beck 2004; Beck and Grande 2007) is probably the most serious obstacle to a deeper theoretical and historical understanding of the European Union today.

The preoccupation of political scientists and historians with the nation-state is no doubt related to the fact that history and political science were established as academic disciplines in the context of state- and nation-building and nationalism (Berger, Donovan & Passmore, eds., 1999: 3). The first professional historians, from whom early political scientists like Weber (an outspoken German nationalist himself) took their cue, uncritically agreed that the proper units of historical analysis were national communities:

In this they reflected the fervent nationalism and intense state-building of nineteenth-century Europe. This state-building process prompted widespread fascination with national communities and profoundly influenced the development of historical scholarship. Indeed, professional historical scholarship is basically an artefact of the nation-state era of world history: in the absence of national states, professional historical scholarship as we know it is almost inconceivable […]. Contemporary historians have mostly moderated if not abandoned the patriotism of their nineteenth-century predecessors, but their enchantment with national communities persists until the present day (Bentley 1999: 90, 91).

However, a minority of scholars has upheld specifically European approaches to the interpretation of European history. A prominent early representative of this tradition was Christopher Dawson. According to him, “the ultimate foundation of our culture is not the national state, but the European unity” (Dawson 1932: 20). Dawson observed that the works of the greatest nineteenth century historians were often manuals of nationalist propaganda and as such had wide-ranging effects. They permeated the popular consciousness and determined ordinary peoples’ conception of history. Nationalist historiography “filtered down from the university to the elementary school, and from the scholar to the journalist and the novelist” (ibid: 21-22).
As other scholars in the same tradition may be mentioned Lord Acton, Ernest Barker, Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel, Hendrik Brugmans, Kenneth Clarke, Jürgen Fischer, Oskar Halecki, Denys Hay, Friedrich Heer, Francis Hinsley, Edmund Husserl, Salvador de Madariaga, Henri Pirenne, Gonzague de Reynold, Denis de Rougemont, and many others. A recent practitioner whom I will frequently consult is the French historian Jacques le Goff (2005). Significantly, many of these intellectuals were Catholics (like Dawson) and/or were based in continental and southern parts of Europe.\(^5\)

1.4 Methodology and organisation

It should be clear from the above that the methodology I have adopted for the present enquiry will mainly emanate from comparative politics (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 2006; Caramani, ed., 2008). However, the theoretical and empirical discussions also feed on international relations theory, historical sociology and, not least, historiography. The study may classified as an instance of comparative historical analysis, whose three distinctive features are a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualised comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 10). Within contemporary political science the study belongs in the camp of historical institutionalism, which according to Pierson and Skocpol (cf. also Pierson 2004) also has three important features:

Historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or puzzles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality. Historical institutionalists likewise analyse macro contexts and hypothesise about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time. (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 695-696; emphases in original)

---

\(^5\) See also the introduction to the historical Part 3 below.
To repeat, the research question is: Why has there been such a basic territorial division, mainly between northern European countries on the one hand and continental and southern countries on the other, in individual and governmental attitudes to European integration? The ‘dependent variable’ is thus attitude to European union, whereas the ‘independent variable’ is territorial location in Europe. That there is a significant and consistent pattern of variation between the variables appears in Part 4 below (see particularly Chapter 4.2). Therefore, the really interesting variables will be the intervening ones I will associate with the concepts of ‘interest,’ ‘ideology,’ and ‘learning’ (see below, Part 2).

The spatial unit of analysis is the territory today identified as Europe, i.e. in principle Europe from Iceland and Ireland to the Urals and the Caspian Sea; from Gibraltar, Sicily and the Bosporus to the North Cape. I will however concentrate on the countries with the longest history of association with the European integration process, i.e. Western Europe, and notably what are now France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Great Britain. This is because these parts are the most relevant to the research question. They contained the agents most involved, as proponents and opponents, in the creation of the current EU.

IR purists may reject Europe as a meaningful unit of analysis in anything but a geographical and, perhaps, contemporary institutional sense. But that Europe is more than a territory or a diplomatically constructed organisational unit is a fundamental premise of the present study. Indeed, without the historical-cultural developments that I will describe, the space we inhabit would hardly be called Europe. Europe does not even represent a clearly bounded territory; it is conceived as a ‘continent’ only for historical reasons. The name itself is probably of mythological rather than geographic or ethnic origin (unlike, e.g., the terms Norway or France). Time is thus an essential dimension of analysis for the current undertaking. Indeed, the main research strategy will be to investigate the development and interaction of similarity and difference, unity and diversity, centralisation and fragmentation, across European space and time.
As I argue that the historical perspective has to be very deep in order to be able to answer the research question adequately, it is not possible to operationalise the relevant variables in a way that can accommodate the quantitative (and overly positivist) analysis comparativists usually rely on. I will mainly refer to opinion surveys to document the pattern of attitudes I have personally observed and which inspired the research question (see Chapter 4.2). For reasons of capacity and space it will also not be possible to go much into primary historical material (this would be a very interesting follow-up for historians). The main source of empirical evidence and argument will thus have to be secondary historical accounts, the huge amount of which also necessitates a very selective approach.

Moreover, synthesising 5000 years of history would obviously be a risky undertaking even for a professional historian. There is bound to be mistakes of both fact and judgement. Still, due to what I perceive as the deplorable ahistoricism of European integration theory, notably expressed in its typically modernist failure to recognise anything but national identity and nationalism in European history (see Part 2 below), my narrative on Europeanness and Europeanism, and their predecessors, will be fairly detailed. My hope is that the general interpretative approach will yield results that are sufficiently valuable to compensate for particular errors.

I will begin in Part 2 by defining basic concepts of analysis and developing a working hypothesis (a tentative answer to the research question) based on existing political science and sociological literature. This will then be ‘tested’ against the empirical, historical evidence in Parts 3 and 4 by means of ‘thick description’ and qualitative analysis in the tradition of social anthropology, historiography and historical sociology. To be able to assess the variation in the dependent variable across time and space, it is reconceived according to Figure 1 above. Thus for Europeanism (pro-EU attitudes) I substitute ‘universalism,’ and for nationalism/national-liberalism (euro-sceptic or anti-EU attitudes) I substitute ‘particularism.’ Each of these has a descending and an ascending variety, so that four paradigms, ideologies and discourses are identified according to their norms regarding locus and the scope of sovereignty. Empirical expressions of these are discussed in Part 3, and notably in Chapter 3.8.
Regarding the validity and reliability of this operationalisation, the analysis will have to speak for itself. I am not aware of any way to ‘test’ it positively. The conclusion, i.e. the answer I will propose to the research question, will thus have to be provisional. What I will suggest, is one way of answering, an interpretation that I think is not only empirically valid, but also reasonable and plausible. It does not pretend to be the final truth. Still, I would not have invested as much time and effort in the present undertaking if I did not believe I would come considerably closer to that truth.
2. Possible Sources of European Union

2.1 Attitudes

In this theoretical chapter, I will discuss what clues I have found in political science and sociological literature to the question of how territorial belonging may affect attitudes to European union. Special attention will naturally be paid to European integration and international relations theory. However, it will be necessary to delve into comparative politics and political sociology literature more generally to find the beginnings of a satisfactory answer.

But first we need to consider the general nature of attitudes. An influential definition of attitude from social psychology that seems well suited to the problem at hand is “a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favourable or unfavourable manner with respect to a given object” (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975: 6; cf. Oskamp 1991: 5). In the debate over the essential nature of attitudes, some social psychologists have espoused the “three-componential” view and others the “separate entities” view (Oskamp 1991: 8-11; Stahlberg and Frey 1997: 207). The former viewpoint posits that an attitude is a single entity consisting of three components or dimensions: (1) a cognitive component, involving the knowledge, ideas and beliefs which the attitude-holder has about the attitude object; (2) an affective component, referring to the feelings and emotions one has toward the object; and (3) a behavioural component, consisting of one’s action tendencies toward the object (Festinger 1957; Rosenberg and Hovland 1960; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). The “separate entities” view agrees that these three components are the ones that predispose behaviour, but holds that they are distinct, separate entities that may or may not be related, depending on the particular situation, and that the term “attitude” should be used only for the affective component or dimension (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Petty and Cacioppo 1982).

The debate among social psychologists over this issue appears to be more empirically than theoretically grounded. Some empirical studies find a high correlation
between the three dimensions, others a low or insignificant one. However, theories of inherently innate and unobservable attitudes may of course not only be inferred from observed behaviour, but also from logical reasoning. In his *Knowledge and Human Interest*, Jürgen Habermas (1971, cf. Giddens 1985) sets out what may be seen as a deductive version of the three elements social psychologists assume to determine attitudes. He calls these ‘knowledge-constitutive interests,’ each corresponding to an aspect of human reality. The first is ‘labour,’ which relates to peoples’ relationship to their material environment and their interchanges with nature. ‘Labour’ promotes an ‘interest’ in prediction and control of events. The second is ‘symbolic interaction’ – the communication of individuals with one another. The study of symbolic interaction to Habermas – as to present-day constructivists – creates an ‘interest’ in the understanding of meaning. The third knowledge-constitutive interest is ‘emancipation’ from domination – be it the domination of nature over human life, or the domination of some individuals or groups over others.

Habermas later (1984, 1987) developed his theory of communicative action, which has been applied to the study of international relations and European integration in the guise of discourse analysis and, normatively, deliberation theory. According to Pollack (2005: 387), the deliberatist approach, as popularised by Risse (2000), assumes there are three ‘logics of social action.’ The two first have already been mentioned: the logic of consequentiality (or utility maximisation) emphasised by rational-choice theorists, and the logic of appropriateness (or rule-following behaviour) associated with constructivist theory. The third one is a logic of arguing derived largely from Habermas’s theory of communicative action.

Already Almond and Verba (1963, 1980), in their path-breaking enquiry into political culture, identified three modes of individuals’ orientations to objects: evaluations, affects, and cognitions. Generally, however, empirically minded political scientists have tended to emphasise the evaluative (or utilitarian, instrumental, or ‘specific’) and affective (or emotional, ideological, identive, or ‘diffuse’) ‘components’ of attitudes, omitting the cognitive one. Easton (1965, 1979) posits a dichotomy of diffuse (affective) and specific (utilitarian) support for political
institutions. March and Olsen (e.g. 1989, 1998; Olsen 2007) created the related twin terms of ‘logic of appropriateness’ (affective/ideational) and ‘logic of consequentiality’ (instrumental/utilitarian). Similarly, the notions of identive and utilitarian power are central in Etzioni’s (1965) discussion of political unification. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 40) developed a comparable typology of the basis for pro-European attitudes: “Utilitarian and affective [support permits] distinctions between support based on some perceived and relatively concrete interest (utilitarian) and support which seems to indicate a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity (affective).”

Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1987) also used the concepts of utilitarian and affective support when discussing Eurobarometer surveys of attitudes to European integration. Two of the central questions in the European Commission’s regular public opinion surveys were in fact constructed specifically to measure utilitarian and affective support (see Diagram 1 in Chapter 4.2 below). Utilitarian support is measured by a question designed to elicit a calculated appraisal of the immediate “costs and benefits of membership in the Community”, and affective or “diffuse” support by a question concerning attitude to “general efforts towards unifying Europe” (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1987: 141; see also Hewstone 1986; Gabel 1995; Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995). However, in reality the correlation between the two variables is high (Nedrebø 1986).

I for my part basically share the three-partite view of social psychologists as well as of Habermas and Risse. However, I think it is necessary to separate analytically between how individuals relate to the ‘external’ world – to nature and to other individuals – and the ‘internal’ working of the mind. It is primarily the two first points that concern us here: attitude to an ‘external’ issue that has both a material and an ideational dimension. Adapting Mann’s notion of four sources of social power, I will hence call the two basic attitudinal ‘sources’ of European integration interest and ideology.
‘Interest’ subsumes Mann’s political, economic and military sources into one, expressing the fundamental desire for integrity, independence and prosperity for oneself as an individual or for one’s preferred collectivity. Interest in this sense is self-regarding, instrumentalist and rather short-termist. The ‘interest’ of the ordinary members of a polity is that it helps provide them with physical protection and sustenance: security, food, shelter, health and wealth. ‘Interest’ approximates the behavioural component of attitudes identified by social psychologists insofar as I assume its pursuit to be more immediately action-oriented than ‘ideology’. It is also this action-oriented interest to predict and control the material world that approximates it to Habermas’ notion of ‘labour.’ As we will see, in the context of European integration, a predominant ‘interest’ of both states and individuals is economic. The significance of ‘interest’ in the present context is further discussed in Chapter 2.2 below.

The self-regarding pursuit of individual or collective interest is a central tenet of the national-liberal paradigm of politics and of rational choice theory. Machiavelli and Hobbes are usually considered its main theorists, but already Aristotle acknowledged that men are by nature primarily self-interested and that what they take to be their interest are wealth and glory. However, in contrast to Hobbes and his successors, Machiavelli, like Aristotle and all ancient, medieval and Renaissance political thinkers in between did not see individuals as calculating and pursuing utility maximisation in atomistic isolation. They in fact described humans as inclined by their very nature to live in societies and to pursue not only their own, but also the common interest (Coleman 2000b: 253).

Whereas I will place ‘interest’ mainly in the material realm, I will use ‘ideology’ in the present context to denote shared systems of doctrines, ideas, ideals, beliefs, values, norms, etc. about how humans should organise and make decisions collectively. ‘Ideology’ here thus implies political ideology, and influences not only how individuals pursue their material interest but also what objectives they pursue, how they interpret information, and which ideas of right and wrong they have. Ideology inevitably has an important historical, and usually also a territorial,
dimension. Ideology approximates the ‘affective’ component assumed by social psychologists and by Habermas’ notion of ‘symbolic interaction’ and the ‘normative’ variety of institutionalism. The significance of ideology in the present context is further explored in Chapter 2.3 below.⁶

However, if ‘interest’ and ‘ideology’ and thus attitudes in general are not to appear static and if we are to fully understand peaceful, long-term political change such as European Union-building, I submit that we need the concept of learning. Learning may be defined as change of attitudes and behaviour as a result of individual or collective experience and insight. It thus subsumes both individual and social learning. The significance of learning in the present context is further explored in Chapter 2.4 below.

2.2 Interest

The behaviouralist turn in political science entailed greatly increased focus on the economic or material interest component of attitudes. Much rational choice theory is still premised on it. According to this logic, people support political candidates, causes, parties, institutions, etc. that best meet their material interests on the basis of a constant calculation of individual or collective utility. Similarly, territorial integrity, political independence, national prestige, and economic and commercial advantage are assumed to be the primary national interests pursued by the modern state.

The international relations theories of Realism and Liberalism both assign a primary role to the pursuit of material interest. The state-centred logic of Realists obviously focuses on state interests. By implication, as regards individual attitudes, Realism would give primacy to citizens’ interest in their state’s role in assuring their survival and safety. Realists see human beings as basically egoistic and the world as

---

⁶ However, I realise that it is not possible to make an absolute and universal distinction between ‘interest’ and ‘ideology.’ Which interests individuals and collectivities pursue, and how they pursue them, are to varying extents ideologically and culturally determined, as well as influenced by social and temporal context. Still, I submit that a distinction is valid and fruitful in the relatively homogeneic context of modern Europe.
inherently divided into separate political communities (nation-states), each seeking to maximise its independence, power and prosperity. International relations according to Realism are therefore conflict-prone. Change mainly takes place as a result of war or serious crisis.

Classical Liberalism puts greater emphasis on individuals’ and groups’ interests within and between states than states’ interests vis-à-vis other states. Their primary interests are assumed to be peace and economic wellbeing. The fundamental boundary between domestic and international politics posited by Realists is thus blurred, and the importance of the state as actor correspondingly diminished. In contrast to international power, the international pursuit of peace and economic advantage is not seen as a zero-sum game. Liberal IR theorists stress that free trade, international co-operation, law, and institutions may enhance the welfare of everyone. They therefore also tend to stress common international interests and interdependence. On this basis they think peaceful international change for the better is possible.

The difference between the integration theory offshoots of these two strands of international relations theory, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is similar. Intergovernmentalists have traditionally assumed that territorial integrity and political independence are the main interests at the aggregate level of the state, which is the level that really matters for integration. The state is assumed to be the main actor as far as interest formulation, bargaining, and outcomes are concerned. At the secondary level of individual attitudes, intergovernmentalists tend to regard historically and socially shaped national identity, or nationality, as the best predictor of Europeanism.

In recent European integration studies, intergovernmentalists such as Alan Milward (1984, 1992) and Andrew Moravcsik (1998) have assigned particular significance to national economic interest. The self-styled ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ Moravcsik argues:
My central claim is that the broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors: patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. Most fundamental of these were commercial interest. European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macro-economic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy. (Moravcsik 1998: 3)

Neo-functionalist integration theory, as liberal international relations theory, assigns real influence to individuals, non-governmental organisations and transnational institutions and corporations as agents. The authors saw European integration as an aspect of general, mainly economy-driven modernisation (Rosamond 2000: 31-42). As a result, they expected group and elite loyalties to be transferred from national to supranational institutions, and similar shifts among mass publics (Lodge 1978; Rosamond 2000: 60, 66). Integration was assumed automatically to advance as individual and group welfare became increasingly dependent on a transnational economy. Material interest was the driving force: “Perhaps the most salient conclusion we can draw from the community-building experiment is the fact that major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of or opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage” (Haas 1958: xxxiv).

After the initial take-off, integration was assumed to ‘spill over’ from one policy sector to another through a process of more or less unintended consequences, helped by European institutions, particularly the European Commission, and by business, trade unions and other interest groups. Haas famously postulated that “it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys” to explain integration (Haas 1958: 17). Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 41-42) introduced the influential neofunctionalist notion that technocratic elites could operate in an environment of ‘permissive consensus.’ This neglect of national ideology, identity and public opinion in the member states was probably the greatest weakness of neofunctionalist theory and the main reason why its determinist assumptions have been abandoned.
A third traditional approach to European integration, federalism, generally also proceeds from the assumption of rational, self-interested actors and, like intergovernmentalist theory, expects states to be inherently opposed to ceding sovereignty. A founder and long-time leading figure of the European federalist movement, Altiero Spinelli, held national bureaucracies, and particularly diplomats, to be the natural enemies of European federation, as they would lose power and prestige if decision-making was moved to a new centre (Pistone 1990; Menéndez 2007). However, he expected those who do not hold permanent national power – elected governments, political parties, non-governmental organisations, ordinary citizens, etc. – to be far more open to what to him were eminently sensible arguments in favour of federation. What was required to take the leap, was a dedicated federalist movement and federalist individuals in key positions that in moments of crisis (‘constitutional moments’) could point out to such actors “that the national states have lost their proper rights since they cannot guarantee the political and economic safety of their citizens” (Spinelli 1972: 68).

Thus federalists, like neofunctionalists, assumed (or hoped) that society-based interests would ultimately override national-bureaucratic interests in Union-building. However, federalists were less optimistic than neofunctionalists about integration as a side-effect of general social modernisation and more optimistic than intergovernmentalists about the influence and rationality of civil society vis-à-vis entrenched national power structures. Federalists thus accepted that national ideology and identity may militate against integration, but trusted that individual attitudes may become more favourable, at least in propitious circumstances. In fact, they arguably advocated federation exactly because it represents a compromise between reason and emotion; (common) material interest and (separate) national identity; unity and diversity (Pinder 1991; Sbragia 1992).

In a constructivist or poststructuralist perspective, it can be argued that all these three traditional approaches are influenced by the territorial origin of their main proponents. Intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists tend to be Northern Europeans and/or Anglo-Americans working within the national-liberal paradigm, the
former stressing the national element, the latter the liberal. The main proponents of federalism tend to be continental and southern Europeans, most unequivocally Italians such as Pistone and Spinelli, influenced by the universalist and cosmopolitan traditions prevalent there.

2.3 Ideology

Andrew Heywood defines ideology as

a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power. All ideologies therefore (a) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view,’ (b) provide the model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’, and (c) outline how political change can and should be brought about. (Heywood 1998: 12)

The polity-ideas I outlined in Figure 1 (see above, page 11) with reference to sovereignty approximate this definition. In a poststructuralist, discourse-analytical perspective, ideology is closely related to identity and other social, cultural and historical contexts. Both intergovernmentalists and federalists explicitly or implicitly highlight the importance of national identity, national political culture and public opinion in shaping attitudes to European polity-building. Stanley Hoffmann, a founder of intergovernmentalism, criticised neofunctionalists for failing to locate the forces of integration within a proper historical context (Hoffmann 1964: 85).

More recently, perhaps inspired by constructivists’ rediscovery of the role played by ideas and identity, Hoffmann has described state interests as “constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a role” (Hoffmann 1995: 5, quoted by Rosamond 2000: 76). However, Charles Pentland, musing on the shortcomings of neofunctionalism, already in the early 1970s singled out variables related to culture, history and geography as meriting special attention as ‘background preconditions’ to European integration. In what he called the ‘attitudinal dimension’ the important background preconditions are shared cultural traits and the compatibility of the major values of groups in the system:
Cultural traits in this case have to do with the religious, literary and mythical traditions prevalent in the system, as perpetuated or evolved in practices of upbringing, education and socialisation. The more ephemeral value-systems represented in ideologies and in patterns of social and economic motivation (such as the ‘Protestant ethic’ or the ‘need for achievement’) must also be considered here. Neofunctionalist assertions about the irrelevance of ‘operative myths’ of a tradition of European unity stretching back to and beyond the Carolingian era, may be somewhat premature; in addition, ideology and myth seem to have played some part in integration schemes elsewhere.\(^7\) (Pentland 1973: 213-214; footnote added)

Regarding institutional choices for Europe, even the ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ Moravcsik lets transpire that ideology may in fact be the most important reason for what makes the EU institutionally unique relative to (other) international regimes, namely its degree of supranationality. For instance, in the negotiations of what became the Maastricht treaty, although according to Moravcsik national economic interests were generally decisive,

ideology appears to have played a particular role in areas with no immediate economic implications, such as co-decision for the European Parliament and co-operation in foreign and defence policy […] European federal ideas and their nationalist counterparts appear to have been responsible for general national tendencies for or against integration, which created, at the very least, considerable leads and lags. (Moravcsik 1998: 439; see also Chapter 4.1 below)

In a later article on the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdes confirm that “[w]here substantive implications of a choice are highly uncertain, as for example in assigning powers to the European Parliament (EP), national preferences are less predictable or more dependent on ideology” (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdes 1999: 61).

Whereas the state-centred logic of Realist international relations theory puts a premium on national identity, comparativists and sociologists are more open-minded as to which social identity is most relevant to attitudes and policies in which specific context. Rokkan stresses that national identity is only one among a number of identities

\(^7\) A reference to Pan-Africanism and East African integration.
a person can have: “Individuals can possess more than one identity, and several layers of identity can exist within a single territorial system: whether these multiple identities are benign or antagonistic depends in each instance upon the particular concatenation of events, policies, and trends” (Rokkan 1999: 171). The historian Eric Hobsbawm concurs:

[...W]e cannot assume that for most people national identification - when it exists – excludes, or is always or ever superior, to the remainder of the set of identifications which constitute the social being. In fact it is always combined with identifications of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior to them. [...]national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgement this is the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today. (Hobsbawm 1992: 11)

After the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the implosion of Yugoslavia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, identity – national, ethnic, religious or otherwise – regained currency in public and academic debate. The rise of constructivism in political science combined with the resurgence of nationalism in Europe led to a sharp increase in the study of national identity, nations and nationalism. With the draft Maastricht treaty, identity also took centre stage in the debate over European integration, where it has remained since. However, I prefer to use the notion of ‘ideology’ rather than ‘identity’ because of the latter’s connotation of passivity on the part of the agent. Focusing on ideology rather than identity highlights Mann’s concept of human nature as “restless, purposive, and rational” (Mann 1986: 4) and also accommodates my emphasis on learning (see Chapter 2.4 below).

An important issue in recent debate over European integration has turned out to be whether there can be a European demos that can legitimise the European Union like the ‘nation’ legitimises the nation-state. The sociologist Anthony D. Smith made a significant early contribution to this discussion. Having searched for ‘specifically European characteristics, qualities and experiences’ in European history, he gloomily concluded that, compared to national identity, “‘Europe’ is deficient both as idea and as process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past – a ‘pre-history’ which can provide it
with emotional sustenance and historical depth. In these terms it singularly fails to combine, in the words of Daniel Bell à propos ethnicity, ‘affect with interest’, resembling rather Shelley’s bright reason, ‘like the sun from a wintry sky’” (Smith 1992: 62).

Significantly, however, Smith adds the idea of ‘partially shared traditions and heritages’:

On the other hand, there are shared traditions, legal and political, and shared heritages, religious and cultural. Not all Europeans share in all of them; some share in particular traditions and heritages only minimally. But at one time or another all Europe’s communities have participated in at least some of these traditions and heritages, in some degree. [These] partially shared traditions and heritages […] include traditions like Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, and Judeo-Christian ethics, and cultural heritages like Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism, and romanticism and classicism. Together they constitute not a ‘unity in diversity’ - the official European cultural formula - but a ‘family of cultures’ made up of partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages. […] What now needs to be established is how far those shared traditions and heritages have become part of each of Europe’s national identities, how far each national tradition has embraced and assimilated these ‘trans-European’ cultural heritages. (Smith 1992: 70)

As if following Smith’s suggestion, Teija Tiilikainen (1998) distinguishes between three modern European political ideologies, cultures or traditions that each has had singular consequences for their adherents’ attitudes to European union-building. These are “Calvinist individualism,” “Lutheran state-centrism,” and “Counter-Reformation Catholic communitarianism.” Tiilikainen thus gives primacy to religious confession as an explanatory variable:
The Catholic political tradition is [...], due to its doctrine of Christian communitarianism, the original tradition of European unification, the tradition in which the idea of Europe as a federation originates. Protestant doctrines carried a different conception of Europe that originated in the denial of Christianity as a political community. Both the Calvinist and the Lutheran doctrines were based upon the State as the ultimate political community. The Calvinist tradition, bringing about the individualist conception of the State was, however, more internationally oriented as relations between States were conceptualised on the same model as relations between individuals provided with the same capacity of co-operation. The Calvinist tradition approached Europe through a position of liberal internationalism. Europe did not constitute the core political framework of liberal plans as it did in Catholic plans. It appeared, however, as a suitable first stage in liberal projects aiming at a universal peace, democracy or a market economy. Lutheranism, which conjured up a State-centric political tradition, is of all the three traditions doctrinally the most distant from the idea of a united Europe. From its point of view, the idea of European unification appears just as one political instrument to reinforce the power of the State. (Tiilikainen 1998: 56-57)

As I have indicated and will further argue in the historical discussion below (see Part 3), I certainly agree that religiously inspired ideologies have influenced the variety of Europeanism in Europe (see also Fraser, Nelsen and Guth 1997). However, I contend that Tiilikainen and other advocates of similar tripartite classifications (Bull 1977; Wight 1991, cf. Knutsen 1997: 252) fail to locate the traditions they identify in their proper territorial and historical context, and not least to explore their important pre-modern background. Also the theoretical basis and implications of such ideas need to be clarified.

Approaching the European Union as a case of polity-building suggests comparing Europe to a national territory, Europeanness to national identity, and Europeanism to nationalism. As Gerald Delanty argues, there is no difference in principle between the ‘construction’ of European identity and the ‘construction’ of a national ‘imagined community’ (Delanty 1995: viii, 4).

---

8 However keeping in mind that in contrast to nationalism, the most common variety of Europeanism, federalism, favours sharing sovereignty among territorial levels, not monopolizing it at one level.
Such comparisons however require a closer definition of ‘nation.’ If we take the demanding one of Anthony D. Smith, one of the most prolific contributors to the academic debate over nationalism, a nation is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991: 14).

Even if such a definition of the nation in reality presupposes the existence of a complementary state and thus raises the highly pertinent problem of the chicken and the egg, the European Union is arguably to some extent approaching even these strict criteria today. Economic and Monetary Union, the ‘four freedoms’ of the internal market, common competition rules, the Social Charter, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, etc. are considerable steps towards “a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.” More importantly in the current context, the criterion of “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories” is arguably also to an extent met, as we will see in Part 3 below.

However, I submit that the near-hegemony of the national-liberal paradigm has led to a great underestimation of the real strength of Europeanness relative to national identity. More precisely, it is seldom realised today to what extent European and national identity are interwoven and interdependent (see however Risse 2004). In this regard, I agree with José Ortega y Gasset:

If we were to take an inventory of our mental stock to-day – opinions, standards, desires, assumptions – we should discover that the greater part of it does not come to the Frenchman from France, or to the Spaniard from Spain, but from the common European stock. To-day, in fact, we are more influenced by what is European in us than by what is special to us as Frenchmen, Spaniards, and so on. If we were to make in imagination the experiment of limiting ourselves to living by what is ‘national’ in us, and if in fancy we could deprive the average Frenchman of all that he uses, thinks, feels, by reason of the influence of other sections of the Continent, he would be terror-stricken at the result. He would see that it was not possible to live merely on his own; that four-fifths of his spiritual wealth is the common property of Europe (Ortega y Gasset 1932: 180.)
The point will be elaborated in Part 3 below. The problem is of course for Europeans to be aware of and to accept how fundamental their European identity is, and, even if they do, to draw any operational conclusions from that realisation regarding European union. Put in Marxian terms, there is a gap between objective and subjective Europeanness. The clearly most challenging of Smith’s criteria for the EU to meet is indeed that of a subjectively felt “mass, public culture,” the lack of a common language being the major deficiency usually cited. According to national-liberal discourse, this fundamental shortcoming means that Europeanness and Europeanism are actually and necessarily elite phenomena, that the politically relevant identity must and should remain the national one, and that to establish democratic legitimacy for the European Union is thus inherently impossible. Any shift of sovereignty from the nation-state to supranational bodies must on this view entail a net loss of democracy.

To this a number of counter-arguments may be fielded. From an empirical point of view, most students of the rise of the nation-state agree that it was usually a political creation from the top down. National movements were mobilised and led by intellectual elites, who, in conjunction with state-builders and the predominant social class or classes (or ‘elites’) helped make ‘nations’ out of pre-existing, more vaguely national identities. This was the point of the famous nineteenth-century injunction: “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians.” \(^9\) Moreover, in some cases, notably in France and Italy, the national elite imposed a language standard from the centre. In others, notably Switzerland, a distinct and cohesive national identity developed across several language communities. Moreover, advocates of ‘integration through deliberation’ (e.g. Habermas 1995; Weiler 1999; Eriksen and Fossum, eds., 2000; Risse 2000) hold that a cultural, national, ethnic, racial, etc. community should not be seen as a precondition for a working European democracy at all. Rather than on exclusivist, totalising identity, a European demos must be based on common ethical
and civic norms arrived at as a result of rational public deliberation across Europe. An expanding literature on cosmopolitanism is arguing similarly regarding globalisation.

However that may be, in Part 3 below I will limit myself, as part of the historical discussion, to try to delineate the history of Europeanness and Europeanism in Europe as two interrelated, but separate phenomena. I will argue that Europeanness and Europeanism are ‘partially shared traditions and heritages’ whose strength varies across territorial Europe for specific historical reasons. At the most elementary level, Europeanness is a social identity whose salience is determined by the strength of common attributes, values or other signifiers, by who is seen as the most important ‘Other’ and the importance attached of the distinction from the ‘Other’ (see e.g. Delanty 1995; Neumann 1998). This varies over time according to changing political, economic, cultural etc. context, including not least the level of perceived external threat. I will discuss how Europeans have tried to collectively differentiate themselves from outsiders and what shared traditions and heritages they identify with. By contrast, I define Europeanism as an ideology favouring supranational European union, with federalism as the most specific version. A sense of European identity is a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for an individual to be an Europeanist. Europeanism is a distinct phenomenon that requires additional explanation.

As I will demonstrate in Part 3, Europe’s past abounds in people, events and artefacts (statesmen, philosophers, authors, composers, artists, scientists; monuments, cities, architectural objects, pieces of art, books, inventions; battles, revolutions; etc.) that demonstrate the unity, or at least organicity, of her development. As Ortega y Gasset argued, it is difficult to think of traits of national ‘identity’ that are not in some sense related to common European or indeed global experiences and traditions rather than exclusively national ones. Europeanness is thus arguably more of a cultural,

---

9 Often attributed to Massimo d’Azeglio, but according to d’Appolonia (2002: 183) actually pronounced by the Italian minister of public instruction, Ferdinando Martino, in 1896.
ideological and even intellectual phenomenon to Europeans than a question of identity. It is not only a way of life, but also a way of thinking. In this sense Europeanness is not a secondary identity, but prior to national identities, which are embedded in it as variations on a common theme.

I would argue that the main reason why most Europeans subjectively feel more national than European today is the centuries-old fact of political disunity, i.e. the fragmentation of modern Europe into nominally sovereign nation-states with national ‘mass, public cultures,’ generally based on a single language. Political disunity explains why conscious Europeanness – the awareness of a common identity based on shared traditions and heritages – and partly therefore also active Europeanism have remained ‘elitist’ phenomena. As Smith suggests, usually today the nation-state is simply too structurally/mentally entrenched to be much affected by cursory appeals to European identity or by rationalist arguments for European Union.

I will discuss Europeanness and Europeanism further in the introduction to Part 1. The importance of territorial location for these two phenomena is discussed below, in Chapter 2.5.

2.4 Learning

Interest and ideology alone are static notions, unable to explain attitudinal and institutional change. Individual and collective learning is a major factor, if obviously not the only one, in changing political attitudes, identities and ideologies. In democratic societies, institutional change follows to the extent agents manage to influence relevant decisions through access to powerful positions; advocacy and coalition-building; elections; deliberation in parliaments and other elected political bodies; policy development in and among non-elected public institutions; dialogues of such institutions with non-governmental organisations and business; etc., etc. Lobbying and thus financial strength is obviously part of this, and agents who already have power have greater influence than those who do not. Also, media of course
greatly impact public discourse. But without going into a lengthy argument, I assume
democratic deliberation also plays an important part.

As I have indicated, Habermasian proponents of ‘integration through
deliberation’ see European Union-building as a learning process. By “communication
through reason giving” (Eriksen and Fossum, eds., 2000) citizens involved in
deliberation on the future of Europe get a growing awareness of common problems and
interests and change their perception of personal and national interests accordingly. In
the long run this leads to a decrease of exclusivist national identity and an increase of
inclusivist European identity. The assumption is that deliberating Europeans learn to be
Europeanist because that is reasonable. The deliberatist approach to European Union-
building thus relies more on appeals to individual reason and common interest than to
ideology and common identity. However, just like neofunctionalists, the theorists of
deliberative integration implicitly deny the possibility that pre-existing Europeanness
and Europeanism, not just national identity and ideology, may be intervening variables
that affect attitudes to Union-building.

The deliberatist theory of communicative action is in effect close to the idea of
social learning of one of the original integration theorists, Karl W. Deutsch. Deutsch
studied historical cases of nation-building and developed a ‘transactionalist’ theory of
integration in which social learning was a key concept (cf. Rosamond 2000: 42-48). In
studying the emergence of modern nations, Deutsch began from the proposition

that both society and community are developed by social learning, and that a
community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other
and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and
services [...]. Experience and complementarity may [...] continue to reproduce
each other, like the proverbial chicken and the egg, in a syndrome of ethnic
learning, that is, a historical process of social learning in which individuals,
usually over several generations, learn to become a people. (Deutsch et al. 1957:
99, 174)

Deutsch et al. (1957: 5) furthermore define integration as “the attainment, within
a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ of institutions and practices strong enough and
widespread enough to assure for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of peaceful
change.” Sense of community is “a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalty; of we-
feeling,’ trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviours; and of co-operative action in accordance with it” (Deutsch 1957: 36). On the basis of empirical analysis, Deutsch found that common values and the development of a distinctive way of life have been the most important requirements for achieving an ‘amalgamated security community’ (union or federation) among formerly independent states (Deutsch et al. 1957: 104). Interestingly, he also concluded from his historical studies that popular participation is the most effective method of promoting ‘amalgamation.’

Deutsch later argued that “the same processes which made nationalism probably may soon come to turn against it” (Deutsch et al. 1967: 190). Similarly, Charles Pentland saw no logical reason why social learning cannot “operate to create broader political communities in the future. […] Certainly the growth of community through ‘social learning’ will be enhanced by certain geographical, economic, social and political background variables” (Pentland 1973: 49, 50).

These were notions on which also neofunctionalists relied heavily. Haas defined integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre […]” (Haas 1958: 16). However, even Haas and the other neofunctionalist writers conceived of integration as something that people would learn (“are persuaded”) to accept rather passively from scratch and from ‘above.’ Social constructivists (e.g. Checkel 2001) make similar assumptions. Again, the basic idea is national-liberal: national interests and identities are the preordained, incontestable point of departure.

Although also Ronald Inglehart subscribed to this ‘blank slate’ thesis of European identity, he is one of the very few scholars who have explicitly tried to explain the fact of territorially varied attitudes to European integration. His neofunctionalist inspiration and reliance on Deutschian notions of social learning are evident in his association of Europeanism with improved education and communication in modernising societies (‘cognitive mobilisation’). To Inglehart the post-war generation tends to be post-
nationalist and therefore Europeanist. In his Silent Revolution (1977) he developed the controversial concept of ‘post-materialism,’ according to which the material security of post-war Western society affords the younger generations to be more concerned with immaterial values such as democracy, quality of life, the environment, peace, European integration etc. than previous generations. The low level of European identity in Denmark, Greece and Great Britain (in the seventies) was seen to reflect these countries’ brief experience as European Community members. The development of Europeanness and Europeanism was thus understood as a question of time, of progressive socialisation and of learning to be European. The longer a country had been a member of the European Communities, the more Europeanist it was assumed to become. The proximity of the ideas of Inglehart and those of the ‘deliberatists’ is obvious. Inglehart makes little attempt to explain Euro-scepticism, preferring simply to label it ‘nationalist’ or ‘parochial.’

Intergovernmentalists do not rule out that reasoning and learning may lead to integration, but hold its potential to be limited because of the tenacity of national identity and the structural power of the state. As Pentland observes, the ‘social-psychological dimension’ of intergovernmentalist thinking like Hoffmann’s suggests “that changes in the political attitudes and behaviour of individuals may be central to the creation of a ‘community of states’” (Pentland 1973: 48). But unlike Lockeian neofunctionalists, Hobbesian intergovernmentalists dismiss – and to my mind rightly so – any determinist notion of inevitable progress towards greater rationality and integration.

Thus many integration theorists recognise the importance of reason and learning for attitudes to European Union-building. However, practically all the literature, including newer constructivist, ‘deliberatist’ and institutionalist contributions, has a very shallow historical perspective on the learning process, positing 1945 as its virtual ‘year zero.’ Few if any theorists have yet seen a need to venture further back in history in order to understand how historically shaped ideas, identities and experiences have influenced European Union-building. The exception is Tiilikainen, but she does not develop a ‘theory’ of integration, and integration theorists have neglected her
contribution. Only Ronald Inglehart has directly addressed the puzzle of territorially varied attitudes to European integration, but his historical horizon is also very limited.

2.5 Location

A brief glance at the map of Europe should suffice to indicate that geographical structures may exercise an independent influence on the pattern of attitudes to European integration in Europe. There is a mainland core and five or six insular or peninsular peripheries: the British Isles (and Iceland), Scandinavia (and Finland), the Iberian peninsula, the Italian peninsula, and the Balkan peninsula. In the western part of the continent, the Alps constitute a huge barrier between north and south. In eastern central Europe the main topographical features are the mountainous ranges in the north, west and south protecting the Danube basin. Generally on the continent, there are far fewer natural obstacles to east-west communications, at least north of the Alps, than to north-south contacts. From east to west, northern continental Europe has hardly any natural boundaries at all: the great Northern European Plain stretches unbroken from the French Atlantic coast to the Ural Mountains.

If observing Europe from space, a sociologist from Mars would thus probably not have too great difficulty in accepting two propositions at face value: that common identity, traditions and heritages would ceteris paribus be strongest in the continental core, and that to the extent there were territorial divisions of attitudes to European union, they would have developed along north-south lines.

As we have seen, however, established European integration and international relations theories offer few real clues as to the question of how territorial belonging affects attitudes to European integration. Only recently have some scholars started pointing to the importance of a territorial perspective:
[...] Territory - the political recalibration of geographical space - matters for a full understanding of societal and political change and conflict. Territory has three dimensions that fuel thick attachments. Territory is social, because independent of scale, people inhabit it collectively; political, because groups struggle to preserve as well as to enlarge their space; and cultural, because it contains the collective memories of its inhabitants. Territory excludes and includes, and it is intimately connected to issues of membership, from the macro-level of the nation-state to the micro-level of the household. [...] Our approach was informed by a collective hunch that territory in all its dimensions, as well as its modern iteration - the nation-state - would matter more in accounts of European integration and Europeanisation than standard accounts in either the social policy or cultural studies literature suggest. (Berezin and Schain, eds., 2003: vii, x)

However, even Berezin, Schain et al. do not make any suggestions concerning the relationship between Europeanism and territorial context. We therefore still need to venture outside European integration studies to find theoretical pointers regarding its significance.

In the political economy or structuralist tradition of international relations theory, dependency and Marxist theories (e.g. Gunder Frank 1967; Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989) start from the very observation that territorial units and functional groups have structurally determined, diverse and often conflicting identities and interests. On this view, international relations is characterised by the structural parasitism of a developed core on an under-developed periphery, and politics in general by the dominance of an elite over the mass of the people. Moreover, such theories greatly emphasise the historical dimension. “The revolutionist approach thrives on historical investigation. For only by understanding the long-term, large-scale forces which have shaped the world system is it possible to capture its essential dynamics and, in turn, understand the present interaction of its constituent parts” (Knutsen 1997: 253).

Writing in a similar, but domestic perspective, the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung (1964) assumed that individual attitudes to foreign policy issues are a function of an individual’s location on a social position scale, opposing ‘topdogs’ with a high score on the index to ‘underdogs’, with a low score. Galtung associated ‘topdog’ with urban, central residence, male sex, high-status profession, high income and education, and employment in the secondary or tertiary sector, and ‘underdog’ with the opposite. This interpretation thus privileges individual material interest in the formation of
attitudes, and the logic of action is rationalist interest-maximising. In this sense, a
dependency thesis on Europeanism would closely resemble the neofunctionalist one.
The difference would be that Marx-inspired dependency theorists assume that the
centre (or elites, or capitalist class) exercises structural hegemony over the periphery
(or mass, or lower classes), whereas (neo)functionalism is agnostic in this regard.

The enduring political controversy over Norwegian membership of the European
Community/Union is probably the reason for the particular preoccupation of
Norwegian social scientists with the nature of pro- and anti-EU attitudes (see e.g.,
Hellevik and Gleditsch 1977; Jenssen and Valen 1996; Gilljam et al., eds., 1998; cf.
also Ingebritsen 1998). Probably inspired by the Weberian Rokkan (1966) as much as
by the Marxian Galtung, Valen (1973, 1981), Bjørklund (1982, 1997) and Jenssen and
Valen (1996) include not only material interest, but also cultural variables such as
religiosity (pietism), language standard and attitude to alcohol consumption (the three
Norwegian ‘counter-cultures’) in their analyses of related problems.

On this basis, it is common to see the European debate in Norway as a centre-
periphery conflict along these dimensions. Thus, although the negative majorities in
the two EU referenda in Norway have not exactly been overwhelming (in 1972, 53.5
per cent voted ‘no;’ in 1994, 52.2 per cent) it is widely accepted that they expressed
peripheral (in both a territorial and a socio-cultural sense) rebellion against a central
‘establishment.’ Opinion surveys indicate that the majority of the less educated,
workers, fishermen, farmers, women, young people, rural and peripheral residents, left-
wing socialists, low-church Christians, teetotallers etc. have been against membership.
The referenda results in Sweden and Finland too indicated that the most fundamental
public opinion cleavage over EU membership is territorial, running between north and
south, centre and periphery, capital and province (Gilljam et al., eds., 1998; Ingebritsen
The implication is again that membership in the Union, and indeed integration itself, is a cause of the central elite and/or the economically well-off.

Stein Rokkan however suggests that this Scandinavian core-periphery pattern may be only part of a bigger European picture. To understand why, it is necessary now to explain Rokkan’s thinking on European state- and nation-building in more detail. Thus we will also delve into a historical discussion that is pursued in much more detail in Part 3.

Rokkan’s ambitious objective is “to identify the crucial variables in the long and complex process that led up to the current constellations of territories, economies, and political alignment systems [in Europe]” (Rokkan 1999: 135). Thus he aims not only to explain the post-1945 political-territorial map of Europe, but also the fundamental political issues and cleavages that have structured the ‘mass politics’ and, implicitly, the political cultures, of individual European polities. Rokkan is emphatic that any analytical history of state- and nation-building in Western Europe must start out from ‘six givens:’

10 Ingebritsen emphasises economic interest in explaining the north-south/centre-periphery pattern of pro- and anti-EU attitudes in Norway, Sweden and Finland, leaving out cultural and ideological variables. However, the empirical data she presents do not quite bear this out. Indeed, regarding Norway, she concedes that “in a public opinion survey conducted in Norway after the November 1994 referendum, loss of sovereignty and independence were the two most frequently voiced objections to the EC” (Ingebritsen 1998: 182). Moreover, Ingebritsen’s argument (ibid.: 187-189) that there is a basic difference between the (sceptical) EU policies of Denmark, Norway and Iceland on the one hand and those of Sweden and Finland (favourable) on the other, is not quite convincing. She does not mention that prior to membership negotiations, the Swedish government unilaterally declared that it would adopt a final decision on monetary union at a later stage, keeping open the option of not joining the EMU after EU membership. In 1997, the Swedish parliament indeed decided not to join EMU, a decision that was supported by 56 per cent of the voters in a referendum in 2003. 42 per cent voted against, and turnout was 81 per cent. The north-south/centre-periphery antagonism was even more pronounced in 2003 than in the referendum on membership in 1994. According to Aylott (2003: 4), the 2003 referendum confirmed that “Sweden is a Eurosceptical country”. Swedish public opinion, like that of Denmark and Norway, and unlike Finland, has remained considerably more negative to the EU than the EU average (see e.g. Eurobarometer 61, spring 2004, Swedish national report, p. 20, for a trend 1999-2004, cf. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/nat_sweden.pdf; accessed 15 September 2009). See also af Malmborg 1994; Matlary 2004; and below, page 312.
First, the heritage of the Roman Empire, the supremacy of the Emperor, the systematisation of legal rules, the idea of citizenship; second, the supraterritorial, cross-ethnic organisations of the Catholic Church and its central role in the channelling of elite communications during the millennium after the fall of the Western Empire; third, the Germanic kingdoms and the traditions of legislative-judicial assemblies of free heads of families; fourth, the extraordinary revival of trade between the Orient, the Mediterranean, and the North Sea after the defeat of the Moslems and the consequent growth of a network of independent cities across Western Europe from Italy to Flanders and the Baltic; fifth, the development and consolidation of feudal and manorial agrarian structures and the consequent concentrations of landholdings in important areas of the West; and sixth, and finally the emergence of literature in vernacular languages and the gradual decline of the dominant medium of cross-ethnic communication, Latin, quite particularly after the invention of printing. (Rokkan 1999: 149-150; emphases in original)

On this basis, Rokkan identifies four “crucially important” dimensions in the generation of the different systems of territorial control by the emerging modern European states. These dimensions, around which he constructs his ‘conceptual map of Europe,’ are:

the geopolitical distance northward, from Rome, the fountainhead of the old Empire, the focus of Western Christendom after the Schism of 1054 and the symbolic centre for the effort of legal unification through the revival of Roman law; the geopolitical distance westwards or eastwards from the central belt of trade route cities from Northern Italy to the areas once controlled by the Hanseatic League; the concentrations of landholdings and the consequent independence or dependence of the peasantry; and the ethnic basis of the early efforts of centre-building and the linguistic conditions for early vs. late consolidation. (Rokkan 1999: 150)

One particular value of Rokkan’s approach in the present context is that he treats Europe as an organic whole within which a number of economic, political, and cultural structures and agencies interact over time. He does not assign primacy to any one structure or agency: not only ‘national’ polities or institutions interact, but also a number of partly autonomous pre-, supra-, trans- and sub-national agents such as regions, cities, city leagues, the Roman church, kings, nobles, burghers, peasants, workers, etc.:
What needs to be emphasised is the multidimensionality of the model: at each stage it gives equal weight to economic/technological, political/territorial, and cultural/ethnic/religious dimensions. There is no economic determinism in the model, nor a geopolitical, nor a cultural: in this sense it seeks to combine the traditions of Karl Marx with those of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim [...] The central task for systematic macro-history is the analysis of the dynamics of interaction between the economic, the political, and the cultural systems: each system has its specific rhythm and its specific boundaries but the fate of a particular territory and its institutions is determined through processes of interaction among the systems across their boundaries. (Rokkan 1999: 140-141)

Still, the ‘dimensions’ of time and space are fundamental in Rokkan’s model, as they must be in any analysis of social development. Rokkan particularly emphasises the importance of historical timing, or the outcome of what he calls ‘critical junctures’ in history – notably the Reformation and the French Revolution – for later developments. Moreover, he acknowledges that next to time, the natural environment – territory, topology, climate and other structural features of nature, including physical distance – is the most basic constraint on human life. This means that “[a]ny analysis of variations among political systems must start from notions of territory. We cannot study such variations without looking into the structure of the space over which they exert some control” (Rokkan 1999: 108).

The fact that most politics has territorial aspects is the basis for Rokkan’s ‘conceptual map of Europe.’ The map is structured along a north-south and a west-east axis, with the ‘city belt’ as the centre-piece. According to Rokkan, the west-east axis differentiates conditions of state-building, and the south-north axis the conditions of nation-building. Rokkan describes the map as “a schematised system of co-ordinates” generated through the combination of three “precondition variables” – one economic (“strength/structure of city network”), one territorial (“geopolitical position [of the polity in question]”), and one cultural (“outcome of Reformation”). More specifically,
The west-east axis differentiates the economic resource bases of the state-building centres: surpluses from a highly monetised economy in the West, surpluses from agricultural labour in the East. The north-south axis measures the conditions for rapid cultural integration: the early closing of the borders in the Protestant North, the continued supraterritoriality of the Church in the Catholic South. This conceptual map reflects the fundamental asymmetry of the geopolitical structure of Europe: the dominant city network of the politically fragmented trade belt from the Mediterranean toward the north, the strength of the cities in the territories consolidated to the seaward side of this belt, the weakness of the cities in the territories brought together under the strong military centres on the landward marchland. (Rokkan 1999: 144)

The centrality of what Rokkan variously calls the ‘city belt’ or ‘trade belt’ in the politico-territorial development of Europe appears clearly from these quotations. In view of this and our interpretation of European integration as polity-building it is significant that Rokkan embraces Karl W. Deutsch’s observation that ‘amalgamated security communities’ (states) tend to grow around core areas:

Larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which the integrative process developed. Political amalgamation, in particular, usually turned out to be a nuclear process. It often occurred around single cores, as in the case of England, Piedmont, Prussia, and Sweden. Each of these came to form the core of a larger amalgamated political community […] Sometimes amalgamation occurred around composite cores, as in the case of the Habsburg monarchy [and in Switzerland and the United States] (Deutsch et al. 1957: 37).

As I have mentioned, Rokkan in fact himself specifically suggests that the European ‘city belt’ is the Deutschean core of a European ‘amalgamated security community’:

It is no accident of history that the Roman Law countries were the ones to take the lead [....] in the struggle for a supranational Europe. The conflict over extension of the Common Market is very much a conflict between the economically cross-cut city belt at the centre and the culturally distinctive territorial systems in the peripheries of this Roman Europe. (Rokkan 1999: 167-168)
However, in spite of his European erudition and perspective, national-liberal bias clearly influences Rokkan’s approach, analysis and terminology. The problem he sets out to explain – the formation of the sovereign European state – itself favours a teleological narrative. The history of European state- and nation-building is presented essentially as a one-way street towards the national-liberal welfare state that predominated in western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. Rokkan himself practically admits as much by positing four “ideal-typical” phases of state- and nation-building: penetration, standardisation, participation and redistribution (Rokkan 1999: 133). Moreover, he quite uncritically uses the denominations of twentieth century polities (“Denmark,” “Norway,” “Iceland,” “Poland,” “Austria,” “Germany,” etc.) as units of analysis, even when discussing earlier periods when they were parts of multinational, composite polities. A great deal of attention is paid to tiny Luxembourg, whereas polities such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman empire are discounted as ‘failures,’ even when they existed for a thousand years and only disappeared fairly recently.

When Rokkan does make a point of the significance of the “imperial heritage” (Roman, Carolingian, and Habsburg) for late modern Europe, it is presented in a negative light as one of three “crucial” explanatory variables in the breakdown of democratisation and growth of fascism in Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain, and Portugal (Rokkan 1999: 239 ff). Empire is conflated with reactionary repression of small nations and contrasted to the democracy and freedom of the ‘ideal-typical’ nation-state.

Furthermore, Anglo-American, national-liberal bias and the fact that he worked during the Cold War may explain why Rokkan’s definition of the larger regions of Europe today seems peculiar. Although it is actually placed in the western part of geographical Europe, the ‘city-belt’ takes centre stage, and the rest is either the eastern

11 The second crucial variable was “the geo-economic peripheralisation [of these five polities] brought about by the two great waves of capitalist advance, first the restructuring of trade flows in the sixteenth century, second the lags in the spread of industrial technology in the nineteenth”, and the third “the successive attempts to re-establish their position in the international system through deliberate military/industrial alliances” (Rokkan 1999: 239).
or western ‘periphery’. Even Prussia and the Habsburg monarchy are classified as ‘eastern’.

Indeed, Rokkan focuses quite exclusively on state- and nation-building in Western Europe. He writes a lot about the development of France, Britain, Italy, the Benelux and Nordic countries, but little about Central and Eastern Europe – about Imperial Germany as such, the Habsburg monarchy, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; even less about Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia; and nothing at all about Estonia and Latvia (part of the Soviet Union when he was writing). He gives a detailed analysis of the growth of regional and linguistic identities in western Europe (e.g., Alsace, Lorraine, Savoy, Val d’Aosta, the Norwegian periphery, Schleswig), but says next to nothing about such identities in central and eastern Europe (e.g., in Silesia, Galicia, Bukovina, Transylvania, the Banat, individual German principalities such as Saxony and Bavaria, even the Tyrol).  

In a similar national-liberal vein, Rokkan particularly emphasises the importance of linguistic mobilisation for nation-building, arguing that “[w]hile language is only one of several expressions of identity, it is the most pervasive and obvious stigma of distinctiveness” (Rokkan 1999: 171). In his description of nineteenth century nationalism, his terminology has a clearly national-liberal bias. Examples (from Rokkan 1999, emphasis added) include: “German possession of the Danish dynasty;” “centuries-old [Norwegian] dependence on Danish culture;” “the history of the liberation of Norwegian from the Danish inheritance;” “the politics of liberation;” “threat of submersion under alien culture;” “Austria and Prussia were rivals for the control of the territories of Middle Europe, but derive much of their strength from their subjection of other language areas to the East;” “The Belgians, the Luxembourgeois,

12 The reason may be, as Peter Flora suggests, that Rokkan was less conversant with the history of southern, central and eastern Europe than with that of western and northern Europe. Rokkan himself in fact concedes that his ‘model of Europe’ “does not cover the whole of Europe: to keep it within manageable bounds it concentrates on the Europe of the Celtic, the Latin, and the Germanic peoples” (Rokkan 1999: 138).
and the Swiss simply accepted standards from the outside;’’ “The territories acquired [by Sweden] from Denmark and Norway at the heyday of her imperial power.”

On the other hand, Rokkan’s description of the development of the United Kingdom is conspicuous for its failure to mention repressive British policies in Ireland. Instead he states that “In the United Kingdom the basic attitude to the peripheries was more one of benign neglect, with little conscious policy of integration” (Rokkan 1999: 198).13

Moreover, national-liberal, modernist bias may have played a role in Rokkan’s adoption of the perspective of power-hungry, calculating state-builders in his writings. He does not discuss possible independent effects on political events of intellectual developments; he leaves out the important subjective and unpredictable dimensions of history; and he neglects the social perspective from below. Agents appear as interest-calcultating automatons with socially given identities, not as actors with individual personality, will, and reason. States appear to be the result of domestic and international struggle for distributive power only, having nothing to do with any quest for the common good, for order, justice and meaning. Thus when Rokkan accords considerable importance to church and religion, Catholic or Protestant, it is primarily in view of their instrumental interest to state- and nation-builders. The emergence of nationalism is implied to be an expression of the material interests of the rising bourgeoisie, and ethical and ontological problems implied by the rise of nationalism are not considered.

Otherwise it may be noted that Rokkan pays too little attention to international power politics as a factor in the emergence and persistence of the European city-belt. IR theorists would correctly argue that the relative autonomy of the central European cities was very much a result of the search for a European balance of power. The

13 The Kingdom of Ireland merged with the Kingdom of Great Britain to form the United Kingdom through the Act of Union in 1800.
emerging Great Power nation-states on the ‘periphery’ had a common interest in preventing any one of them from controlling Central Europe, and in keeping ‘Germany’ fragmented and powerless. At the same time, as I will argue in Part 3, Rokkan as well as IR historians overly discount the Holy Roman Empire as a significant political actor in its own right, even after the Peace of Westphalia.

2.6 Conclusion

I have indicated that attitudes of individuals and collectivities to political issues like European integration reflect their material interests and ideological preferences, which are in turn products of, and may be modified by, individual and collective learning (in addition to personal idiosyncrasies). A fundamental influence on such learning, or socialisation, is territorial-historical context.

On the basis of this and the wider theoretical discussion above, a tentative answer to the research question may be formulated. This is the ‘Rokkanian-Deutschian’ working hypothesis on the territorial distribution of Europeanism in Europe whose validity will be considered in the following historical discussion:

The European ‘city-belt,’ stretching roughly from Central Italy to the North Sea, is the main historical and territorial source of European identity (Europeanness) and pro-European attitudes (Europeanism). It is the part of Europe that has been most continually influenced by the idea and reality of European unity. The ‘city-belt’ core of Europe may thus be seen to play the part of home base or ‘primary territory’ of a European ‘nation’, similar to the role of the Île de France as the expanding core of the French nation-state, Leon-Castille in Spain, Savoy-Piemonte in Italy, Prussia in Germany, England in Britain etc. The relative proximity of European territories to the core can be seen to be of major importance in predisposing attitudes to European Union-building. Citizens of well-established nation-states in the Protestant northern and western European ‘periphery’ with long-standing loyal and relatively homogeneous political cultures can be expected to be less intrinsically pro-European
than those of more problematic state- and nation-building cases in Roman-Catholic Europe-cum-city belt Europe.
3. Past Sources of European Union

3.1 Introduction

In this historical part of the study I will attempt to identify sources of post-1945 Europeanism – i.e. attitudes favourable to supranational European governance – as well as of opposition to it in pre-1945 history. I will be looking for ideas, ideologies and identities propitious or detrimental to authority being exercised at the universal-cum-supranational-cum-European level of governance and try to identify their institutional and individual agents. What follows is thus an attempt at a Nietzschean/Foucaultean ‘genealogy’ of Europeanism in the sense of an historical investigation of the sources and interaction of universalist and particularist discourse (Foucault 1977). The aim is to explain the emergence of what I have called respectively Christian-democratic and national-liberal ideology. According to Torbjørn Knutsen, this kind of genealogy is historiography written in the light of current concerns, undertaken “to shine a critical light on unquestioned values and truth-claims by showing how all truths are, in fact, products of past practices” (Knutsen 1997: 275).

In view of the empirical problem under investigation, I will particularly emphasise the territorial context. Thus I will focus on the possible causal relationship between material, ideological and intellectual developments in European history on the one hand and territorially differentiated levels of Europeanism and nationalism in post-World War II Europe on the other. The ground covered will in principle be the whole of what is today considered territorial Europe, i.e. Europe from Iceland and Ireland to the Urals and the Caspian Sea; from Gibraltar, Sicily and the Bosporus to the North Cape. However, I will concentrate on what is now France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Great Britain, because these are the countries that are most relevant to understanding the emergence and nature of the European Union, and thus to the current research question.

Moreover, these countries represent the area that since the early Middle Ages have made the greatest contribution to the formation of the modern European identity
that is today shared by large parts of the inhabitants of geographical Europe. However, as I have noted, we should differentiate between Europeanness as a common identity reflecting Europe’s cultural unity, and Europeanism as a normative ideology favouring European political unity. It is perfectly possible to identify with shared European traditions and heritages and still not support supranational European union. In fact, that is basically what national-liberal discourse is about. Explicitly or implicitly, it stipulates that the essence of European history is the growth of diversity and freedom, whose political-territorial conclusion, the national-liberal ‘end of history’ as it were, is the sovereign nation-state.

On the other hand, we may safely assume that most people who favour European union also to some extent identify with Europe, whatever they associate with it. I have argued that like national identity, Europeanness arises in two interdependent ways: exclusively as a joint feeling of difference from outsiders (non-Europeans, or even Europeans deemed beyond the pale, such as Hitler), and inclusively as a sense of distinct, shared traditions and heritages. The one presupposes the other. To understand the basis for Europeanness and Europeanism we therefore need to investigate not only how the European ‘Self’ has been differentiated from the ‘Other’ in European history, as Delanty (1995) does, but also the evolution and impact of the common legacy that is the substance of Europeanness. In fact, part of that legacy militates against exclusiveness and particularism.

Moreover, since in the following discussion we are interested in the historical sources of attitudes, it is just as important to identify relevant and influential interpretations, receptions or memories of the past as the actual events and junctures that constitute the past. Paradigms such as the Christian-democratic and national-liberal ones are in large part based on how the present has interpreted, received or remembered the past. My analysis will therefore be historiographical and ‘receptive’ quite as much as it will be empirically historical.

My comparative advantages in the search of new insights, I hope, lie in my research question and in my analytical framework for exploring it (cf. Figure 1 above). Unlike the predominant national-liberal approach in historiography and, particularly,
political science, I will be looking for the institutional and ideological sources of European unity and universalism more than those of diversity and particularism. General European historiography, especially the writing of political history, has tended to be narratives of the nation-state, either individually or collectively. Even the claims to truer Europeanness of Norman Davies’s *Europe – A History* (1996) are largely staked on just more particularism: giving more equitable narrative space to the histories of smaller nations relative to those of the Great Powers, and notably to the Central and Eastern European states that have gained sovereignty after the end of the Cold War. At least since the French historian and statesman François Guizot (see below, page 220), the most basic assumption of national-liberal historiography has indeed been that diversity is the main characteristic and explanatory factor of European history.

The question of whether unity or diversity has been more important cannot be positively answered. However, in a historical perspective, Christian/European unity was undeniably prior to national diversity. The problem is that the unity tradition has been under-researched and underestimated, not least by European integration theorists. A proper, critically informed history of European unity-in-diversity remains to be written. Attempts beyond fairly conventional histories of Europe like that of Davies focus too much on individual plans for European union or peace (de Reynold 1944-57; Gollwitzer 1951; de Rougemont 1957, Halecki 1957; Hay 1957, 1966; Barraclough 1963; Duroselle 1965; Heater 1992; etc.), neglecting the larger, structural context. They share two other fundamental weaknesses too: they do not distinguish between, but rather conflate Europe, Europeanness and Europeanism, and they assume that universalist-cum-Europeanist ideology for all practical purposes disappeared with the rise of the nation-state. Thus they largely ignore the significance of the Holy See and
the Holy Roman/Habsburg empires as institutional transmitters of this discourse to the post-WWII, mainly Christian-democrat politicians who founded the EU.\footnote{The more recent study by Peter Rietbergen (1998) is better in this regard, but focuses mainly on the evolution of Europeanness.}

These are also the main limitations of the work that so far probably has come closest to meeting my ambitions here, Gerard Delanty’s *Inventing Europe* (1995). Delanty makes an ambitious attempt at a post-modernist deconstruction of Europe as “idea, identity, reality.” His main target appears to be the EU’s official discourse on ‘the European idea,’ which as he rightly notes is not a self-evident, fixed entity but a construction whose meaning has varied over time and according to the advocates’ context, ideology and interests. However, Delanty’s argument is highly abstract, with many obscure assertions like “identities become pathological once they take on the character of a dominant ideology and the individual can no longer choose his or her identity” (Delanty 1995: 5). He inadequately specifies what agents, interests, ideologies and contexts have influenced the construction of the ‘European idea.’

Moreover, throughout his narrative, Delanty tends to contradict the whole argument of social construction, giving the European idea a life of its own. An example is the phrase, “Elevated to the status of consensus, the idea of Europe, by virtue of its own resonance, functions as a hegemon which operates to produce an induced consensus – which is less a compliance with power than acquiescence and helplessness – with which a system of power can be mobilised” (Delanty 1995: 6). In spite of his intentions, Delanty thus essentialises a rather vague ‘European idea’ without distinguishing between Europe as a geographic space, European identity and Europeanist ideology, or even between ideas, agents and structures.

From a normative point of view, the idea of Europe can of course be identified with negative traditions and heritages just as well as positive ones. It is thus legitimate to argue, like Delanty and other detractors do, in the self-critical tradition of
Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Spengler, Fanon, Sartre, Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and many others, that racism, nationalism, imperialism, anti-Semitism, totalitarianism, fascism, orientalism etc. are more salient ‘European’ legacies than rationalism, humanism, liberalism, pluralism, constitutionalism, democracy, etc. (cf. Herman 1997). But this is a matter of normative choice, depending on personal context and convictions.

I myself, being politically middle-of-the-road, born long after WWII, a northwest European, and considering European history retrospectively from today’s vantage point, take it as an empirical fact that the latter discourses or ideologies are more representative of the European legacy than the former (my experience in Africa has strengthened this conviction). After all, they are generally those that have prevailed and indeed, officially at least, received a fairly universal normative status. Moreover, learning-based critique and rejection of objectionable practices in the European past such as military aggression, the slave trade, the Holocaust and the Gulag may itself be seen as a constitutive part of contemporary Europeanness. But it is also my normative choice to critically accept modernity as mainly moulded by (north-western) Europe and to identify modern Europeanness with positive European traditions and heritages and the rejection of negative ones. Indeed, one of the worthy traditions is exactly the cosmopolitanism (“the idea of citizenship”) Delanty favours.

Which are the main historical-territorial sources of Europeanness, then? The conventional answer has been: Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome. Ernest Rénan famously said that “L’Europe est grecque par la pensée et l’art, romaine par le droit, et judéo-chrétienne par la religion” (quoted by Davies 1996: 44). Similarly, Paul Valéry concluded:

These, it seems to me, are the three essential conditions that define a true European, a man in whom the European mind can come to its full realisation. Wherever the names of Cæsar, Cajus, Trajan, and Virgil, of Moses and St. Paul and of Aristotle, Plato, and Euclid have had simultaneous meaning and authority, there is Europe. Every race and land that has been successively Romanised, Christianised, and, as regards the mind, disciplined by the Greeks, is absolutely European. (Valéry 1922, quoted by de Rougemont 1966: 367)
To posit a fourth, ‘Germanic,’ component has also been common, notably since the rise of Germanist historiography in eighteenth century Germany. Gonzague de Reynold is one of those who argue that the European ‘house’ has four floors: Greek, Roman, Germanic, and Christian: “Comment l’Europe s’est elle construite et quelle est son architecture? Sur un soubassement préhistorique, reposant lui-même sur un terrain géographique, on y verra s’élever, au cour des ages et des siècles, un rez-de-chaussée grec, un étage romain, un étage germain, puis se poser sur eux, pour les achever et les couvrir, un toit chrétien” (de Reynold 1944: I, 35). Hegel for his part saw World History unfold in East-West direction as a succession of Greek, Roman (Catholic) and Germanic (Protestant) stages. However, as we will see (especially in Section 3.7.2 below), the ‘Germanic’ element is today controversial. In fact, this may be one of the underlying reasons why the national-liberal world view is now increasingly contested, at least by cosmopolitan-minded intellectuals and scholars.

I for my part, based on my differentiation between Europe, Europeanness and Europeanism, will argue that the main pre-modern historical sources of the specifically European culture from which Europeanness emanates have indeed been biblical Israel, ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Ancient Israel and Greece are major sources of European cultural (including normative and intellectual) unity, but also inspirations of modern national diversity and thus European political disunity. The Roman Empire, on the other hand, contributed greatly to forging European cultural unity as well as to realising and transmitting universalist and cosmopolitan political ideas.

Universalist ideology and cosmopolitan practice had however emerged in the Near East over the preceding three millennia, and was transmitted to the Romans notably by Alexander the Great. The ancient Near East created other important traditions that were later transmitted to the West too, but then mainly through the medium of the Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament). Ancient Israel was of course an integral part of ancient Near Eastern civilisation, as was, more peripherally, classical Greece. Jewish and notably Hellenistic culture made significant contributions to the later Islamic and Indian civilisations. Moreover, the two main ‘Others’ to medieval Europe, the Byzantine empire and the Islamic Caliphates (Umayaad, Abbasid,
Hispanic, Ottoman), not only represented ancient universalist-imperial as well as, in part, Near Eastern-Hellenistic traditions, but also contributed to transmitting cultural and scientific legacies of the classical Greek and Roman world to Europe.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover, rather than introducing a pure ‘Germanic’ element of diversity in the development of Europe, the four centuries between c. 300 and 700 AD represent a cosmopolitan period when peoples speaking Latin, Germanic, Gallic/Celtic and other languages and dialects met and intermingled. This era of assimilation, now known as ‘Late Antiquity,’ is today considered ‘the birth of Europe,’ the time when a territorially and culturally distinct civilisation, Europe, emerged in the westernmost tip of Asia (le Goff 2005). We will see that the Middle Ages not only forged European cultural unity, but also inherited from the Romans and transformed the ancient tradition of cosmopolitan-imperial political and economic unity. The heyday of European Christendom, the period from roughly 700 to 1300 is thus probably the most important historical source of both Europeanness and Europeanism, with the Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire as the main institutional agents of cultural-religious and political unity.

Later, however, Europeanness and Europeanism have arguably parted ways. Europe’s cultural unity continued to increase, at least until World War II, at the same time as the rise of the nation-state entailed growing political and national particularism. Modernity, including not least national-liberal ideology, radiated mainly from north-western Europe. However, throughout even the modern era, the Roman Church and, to a lesser extent, the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires, continued to embody and propagate political and cultural-religious unity. After the Second World War, the universalist legacy was picked up and realised in the European Union by what may be considered the democratic progeny of the Roman Church: a transnationally organised network of Western European, mostly Roman Catholic, Christian-democratic parties.

\textsuperscript{15} However, the contribution of the former in this regard far outweighed that of the latter (Gouguenheim 2008).
3.2 The Near East

Europe was preceded and fundamentally influenced by ancient Near Eastern civilisation, the history of which may be bracketed by the years c. 3000 and 323 BC (van de Mieroop 2004). Indeed, the ancient Near East formed a nexus between what the Greeks towards the end of that period began calling respectively Europe, Asia and Africa (or Libya). It was a distinct cultural-historical community that stretched from the Indian Ocean to the Aegean Sea, and from the Nile River to Central Asia, encompassing ancient Israel as well as eastern parts of ancient Greece. Its core was Mesopotamia, a Greek word meaning ‘between rivers’, i.e. the Tigris and the Euphrates, but which can be broadly defined to encompass also what is now eastern Syria, south-eastern Turkey, and most of Iraq.

In this fertile region the first civilisation in world history emerged in the first city-states and empires, or in what Michael Mann (1986: 89) calls “civilisation as federation.” It had powerful and wealthy kings commanding effective armies, a sophisticated, literate bureaucracy and administrative system with some redistributive functions, an affluent and resourceful merchant class, private property, a productive agriculture with an intricate system of irrigation, and a developed network of roads and sea routes that allowed an extensive exchange of ideas and knowledge, texts, manpower, goods, services, artefacts, merchants, craftsmen, soldiers, diplomats, priests, scientists, etc.

The ancient Near East, or wider Mesopotamia, was characterised by great linguistic and cultural variety, numerous regime changes as well as by the lack of geographic unity and of a permanent capital city. It was a cosmopolitan civilisation whose main unifying factors may be summarised as four (Mann 1986: ch. 3; Watson 1992: 24-32; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 104-110; Buzan and Little 2000: 167-182; Talbott 2008: 32). First, the worship at common shrines of a rich, shared pantheon appeared and gradually evolved towards a common, increasingly monotheistic religion. Second, a shared tradition of literary and other texts in the cuneiform script emerged. Over time, this tradition increasingly converged on the city of Babylon and tended towards a common identity, clearly demarcated against outside ‘barbarians.’ Third,
evolving with hegemonic-imperial governance of varying length and territorial scope, a common ideology of universalist-descending rule emerged, according to which the responsibility of the king was to mediate between his realm and the cosmos, between humans and gods. This ideology was inherited and further developed from one regime to another. As Ferguson and Mansbach argue, successive centres had earlier models to imitate, and attempted to draw on and adapt the ideological discourse of the past for themselves. At the core of such discourse was the belief that the assembly of gods chose the common ‘great god’ as well as the king of the larger polity, so that both acted as officials of the cosmic state. Fourth, both elites and masses had an ‘interest’ in the establishment of an empire as it provided them with additional security, wealth, and prestige. “Empires needed both a secure ideological foundation and effective administration to survive” (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 110).

Van de Mieroop (2004: 195-280) identifies three Near Eastern ‘empires’: the (neo-)Assyrian (c. 880-612 BC), the (neo-) Babylonian (626-539 BC), and the Persian (539-323 BC). However, an imperial ideology emerged already with the hegemonic rule over the city-states of Sumer and Akkad (2350-2000 BC), as is indicated by universalistic titles invented by kings. The first such title was probably King of Kish, ‘King of the Land’, adopted by the early Sumerian king Lugal-Zagesi (r. c. 2375-2350 BC). His successor, Sargon of Akkad (r. 2334-2279 BC), used King of Kish and ‘King of the Four Quarters.’ The sixth ruler of the first Babylonian kingdom, Hammurabi (r. c. 1792-50 BC), called himself ‘King of Sumer and Akkad’ and ‘King of the Four Quarters of the World,’16 and the Assyrian king Shamsi-Adad I (c. 1808-1776 BC) adopted the title of ‘King of the Universe’ (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 105). The Persians embraced the title ‘King of Kings.’ Cyrus II (r. 559-530 BC) called himself ‘King of the world, great king, legitimate king, king of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters of the world.’ Darius the Great (Darius I, r. 552-486

16 The United Nations celebrates Hammurabi as the founder of international law. A replica of the tablet with his famous code is mounted outside the General Assembly Hall in New York (Talbott 2008: 43).
BC) was ‘king of all the people of all origin, king of the great earth and beyond.’ Xerxes II (r. 485-465 BC) was ‘king over all the distant and vast world’ (Talbott 2008: 32).

The first Near Eastern empire, the neo-Assyrian one, was a multicultural zone where people with many different backgrounds interacted closely, mixing languages, cultures, and devotion to various gods. Artistic styles mixed various influences without difficulty. People seem to have maintained an international spirit and were outward-looking (van de Mieroop 2004: 214). This Assyrian empire was ideologically focussed on the king, who expected loyalty from all his peoples and all subject rulers. The king, as representative of the god Assur, represented order. Wherever he was in control, there was peace, tranquillity, and justice, and where he did not rule, there was chaos. There was no religious intolerance, and vassal treaties were sworn in the name of the vassal’s gods as well as those of Assyria. The king’s duty to bring order to the entire world was the justification for military expansion. The royal palaces were decorated with wall-reliefs portraying the king as master of the world. Many peoples and cultures were incorporated under the rule of the Assyrian kings, but by their ideology they tried to erase the differences between them and to make them all Assyrian (van de Mieroop 2004: 242-244; 274).

The defeat of Assyria was mainly the work of two peoples, the Medes and the Babylonians, who afterwards divided the empire between them and further expanded their territories (van de Mieroop 2004: 253). Forced deportations and extensive contacts with foreign states made cities such as Babylon multiethnic, with a multitude of languages and customs. However, the kings pursued a policy of maintaining, or even reviving, ancient Babylonian culture and traditions. The Neo-Babylonian kings, although they represented the last native Mesopotamian dynasty in ancient Near Eastern history, saw themselves as very much part of an old tradition of Babylonian greatness going back to the third millennium, and promoted an awareness of that tradition. Babylonian culture was extremely strong by the time the dynasty was overthrown, and survived unscathed in the following historical era (van de Mieroop 2004: 265-266).
The Neo-Babylonian empire was replaced by the Persian empire, lasting for about two centuries (559-323 BC) and covering the entire Near East and regions beyond from the Indus valley to northern Greece, from Central Asia to southern Egypt. The willingness to adopt local customs and to insert the Persian king into existing traditions made it possible to bring unity to a vast empire created in a short time span. The Persian empire thus successfully brought together areas with different languages, cultures, economies, and socio-political organisations. It was the first in Near Eastern history to acknowledge the variety among its peoples, but was at the same time highly centralised (van de Mieroop 2004: 267-274). The ease with which Cyrus conquered the Median overlordship and Darius the Great extended and organised an enormous and heterogeneous area of Persian suzerainty suggests that imperial legitimacy was well established in most of its communities, and that powerful elements were eager for a restoration. Like the Assyrians, the Persians assimilated Mesopotamian civilisation, including the cuneiform writing and other inventions that derived originally from Sumer; and they fostered and diffused Egyptian skills in administration, science and medicine. They also took over the Assyrian governmental structure (Watson 1992: 40-46).

From a union of states held together by the person of the king, the Persian empire evolved into an “an imperially regulated confederacy, and a federated empire of native elites” (Watson 1992: 42). By the end of the fifth century the empire was divided into provinces, or satrapies, which provided administrative uniformity. Still, the person of the king remained pivotal; he appointed governors, granted estates as rewards, and made all decisions. He was king of Babylon, Egypt, and so on, but first and foremost he was the Great King and King of Kings. “The god and king guaranteed order and they represented justice and truth. This message is clear in the royal texts and imagery, but it was not imposed at the expense of other cults” (van de Mieroop 2004: 278).

Alexander the Great (see below, Chapter 3.5) embraced and emulated the Persian political tradition. Satrapies and political arrangements with local populations endured; kings used the local cults and their rituals to further their political interests; and administrative practices survived. New political offices did develop, new
administrative languages replaced older ones such as Babylonian, Greek buildings appeared in old cities and new cities were founded that followed a Greek layout, but these changes were gradual. Alexander has been called “the last of the Achamenids”, but his death in 323 did not present a clear end or a new beginning of the Near East (van de Mieroop 2004: 280).

The international relations theorists Buzan and Little summarise their positive reappraisal of the role of empires in global history by emphasising the importance of the early empires of Mesopotamia:

There was a learning process, and as history unfolded, the techniques of imperial control improved, enabling larger and more durable constructions to be built. In such a turbulent environment, military power and skilful, energetic, and ruthless leadership were the keys to successful empire. But even the possession of these did not guarantee more than short-term success. Creating a broader and more deeply rooted ruling elite better able to survive variations in the talent of leaders was one key. Another was the attraction of the imperial idea itself. This took root especially strongly in China and the Middle East, so that even during periods of fragmentation, the warring states were often motivated by the desire to re-establish a wider imperial domain. Over the five millennia of this era, there is a pattern of progressive development from Sumeria through Rome to the Ottoman, Chinese, and other empires that overlapped with the rise of Europe, in which the techniques of imperial construction and control discussed above [ideology, bureaucracy and administrative technique, professional army, merchant class] became more effective. (Buzan and Little 2000: 178)

3.3 Ancient Israel

Alexander the Great was the main transmitter of the Near Eastern imperial tradition to the future West. But ancient Israel also conveyed universalising impulses. Its main contribution in this regard was the Old Testament narrative with its monotheist message. As le Goff points out, in the Middle Ages “the Bible was regarded and used as an encyclopaedia that contained all the knowledge that God had passed to humankind. It was also a basic historical handbook which, after telling of the patriarchs and prophets, proceeded to unfold the meaning of history ever since the advent of royalty in the persons of Saul and David” (le Goff 2005: 12). Later Jewish historiography such as that of Flavius Josephus (AD 37- c. 100) conveyed the same
universalising sense of history, subsuming the histories of other nations into the biblical account and chronology (Kelley 1998: 79). Josephus initiated a tradition, later adopted by Jerome, Augustine, Orosius, Isidore and other Christian writers, that descendants of Japheth settled in Europe, those of Ham in Africa, and the progeny of Shem in Asia. Le Goff (2005: 13) concludes that “the historical memory that has become an essential element in European consciousness stemmed from a twofold source: on the one hand, Herodotus, the Greek father of history; on the other, the Bible.”

The ancient universalising tendency is reflected also in the myth of the four world empires that would pass from one kingdom to another until the end of the world. Based on Greek historiographical tradition as well as on the Old Testament (Daniel 7), the *translatio imperii* theory became a defining element of the historical ontology of medieval Christians. In the biblical version, Daniel interpreted a vision of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar and he dreamt of four beasts emerging from a river. To Daniel this signified a succession of four kingdoms and their rulers, beginning with Babylonia, all subject to God’s kingdom, which is everlasting. Later times took the Medes, the Persians and the Macedonians to be the three other empires. During Roman times, the Roman empire took the place of the fourth beast, and in Christian tradition Babylon was dropped from the series (Kelley 1998: 77).

St Augustine however reminded his readers that it was the kingdom of Antichrist that was prophesied to be the last of these states before final judgement (Kelley 1998: 92). God’s universal plan was thus held to be the passing of empire from the Babylonians to the Romans, whose empire was sanctified by the coming of Christ, and which would be succeeded by Antichrist (T. Brown 1988: 34; Pagden 1995: 42). This was one reason why the crumbling of the Roman Empire’s authority and the barbarian onslaughts in the fifth century west were considered so momentous. Post-Reformation Protestant propaganda often argued that the Roman Church was the final empire and the Pope Antichrist. In the heated debate over membership in the European Union, Lutheran fundamentalists in Norway have sometimes identified the EU with the fourth and final beast.
However, more important in the present context is the fact that ancient Israel became a powerful inspiration for tendencies towards particularism and nationalism in medieval and modern Europe. The Jews’ idea of history was characterised by a sense of the uniqueness of their nation, tied to their destiny as God’s chosen people (Kelley 1998: 76). They were the People of the Book, a distinctive, divinely favoured ethnos. “Genesis concludes with the story of how the covenant – the sacred pact between God and his chosen people – passes from one generation to the next and thus to an extended family, a tribe that has a piece of real estate it can rule and defend as its own” (Talbott 2008: 36). Moreover, according to Talbott, both the Genesis and the Exodus convey the notion of Israel born through liberation from an ancient empire, Babel (Babylon):

[....] in Exodus as in Genesis, a universal, inclusive, polytheistic divine order has become a national, exclusive, monotheistic one. [....] the idea emerges of Israel as an exemplar to all humanity, ‘a light unto the nations.’ [...] This is the small-is-beautiful alternative to imperialism: Israel will liberate other peoples not by the sword but by example – by the power of its God-given ideas and ideals about how to live and how to govern. (Talbott 2008: 37)17

In its representation of ancient Israel, the Old Testament thus provided the Christian world with the original model of the nation. Adrian Hastings (1997: 4) argues that “without it and its Christian interpretation and implementation, it is arguable that nations and nationalism, as we know them, could never have existed.” Moreover, he submits that the model of ancient Israel was destined to have a greater impact among Protestants than among Catholics:

_____________________________

17 Much of the foreign policy of latter-day Protestant, non-EU Norway could be similarly characterised.
Protestantism has [...] frequently been pressed along a nationalist road not only by erastianism but also by according greater weight to the Old Testament than Catholicism is prepared to do in the shaping of the Christian mind. Christians in general have always tended to use the Old Testament, especially its historical sections, as providing a set of precedents, pairing a situation there with one here. This leads only too easily to identifying the general experience of one’s people with that of Israel, in a way productive of nationalism and it long made much Protestant thinking naively nation-affirming. (Hastings 1997: 204)

As regards the evolution of Europeanness and Europeanism, the historical impact of ancient Israel has thus been a mixed one. Her legacy has deeply influenced the emergence of a common European identity, but politically it has provided modern Europeans with both universalist and particularist, cosmopolitan and nationalist, models. In this regard, its legacy has been similar to that of ancient Greece.

3.4 Ancient Greece

Ancient Greece – its historical reality as well as its later reception and interpretation – has made a deep impression on modern Europe. I will highlight three ways in which the received Greek legacy has influenced modern Europe, Europeanness and Europeanism. First and most obviously, the Greeks invented ‘Europe’ as a geographical notion and combined it with the idea of superior ‘Western’ civilisation. After having been revived in the Renaissance, these conceptions merged into the modern, secular idea of Europe. Second, ancient Greece created an intellectual and material legacy that has become a constituent part of European identity and society. Third, eighteenth-century Protestant Northern Europeans constructed a national-liberal or national-romantic ideological (particularist-ascending) alternative to Roman-French (universalist-descending) imperialism based on the particularist Greek political legacy.

3.4.1 The Greek origin of geographical Europe

The notion of Europe originates in ancient Greek mythology. The Greek historian Herodotus (c. 484-424 BC) writes that
[a]s for Europe, no one can say whether she is surrounded by the sea or not; neither is it known whence the name of Europe was derived, nor who gave it name, unless we say that Europe was so called after Tyrian Europé, and before her time was nameless, like the other divisions [Asia and Libya/Africa]. But it is certain that Europé was an Asiatic, and never even set foot on the land which the Greeks now call Europe. (Herodotus History: II, 45)

Herodotus’s Europé is the Phoenician princess of the myth sometimes known as ‘the rape of Europa.’ According to one version (Pagden 2008: 1-2), Zeus is supposed to have fallen in love with this daughter of King Agenor, metamorphosed himself into a bull and charmed her to go with him to Crete. Their union produced Minos, a civilising king and lawgiver. His offspring became the Europeans and Europé herself “the tutelary deity of their continent” (Hale 1994: 8). In another version, Herodotus however says (in History I, 2) that it was ordinary Greeks from Crete who abducted Europé as a retribution for an earlier Phoenician capture of the Greek woman Io from Argos. The abductions were supposed to be the original reasons for the fateful wars between Greeks and Persians that began with the Greek destruction of Troy and culminated with the battles of Marathon and Salamis, respectively in 490 and 480 BC. According to le Goff (2005: 8), the word ‘Europe’ was derived from a Semitic term that was taken over by Phoenician sailors in the eighth century BC to designate the setting sun. But while both the myth and the name of ‘Europe’ originated in the East, it was the Greeks who bestowed it on the extreme western tip of the continent of Asia.

The abduction of Europa was a popular theme in literature and the visual arts in the classical period (den Boer 1995: 15). Hale vividly relates how the myth much later was revived and became very popular in Renaissance Europe: “What a subject this was! Sex, violence, seascape, landscape, beauty and the beast, gestures of alarm and affection, all enriched by analogies with other increasingly popular subjects [...] In every medium, from painting to pottery, relief sculpture to enamel, the story soared on [...]” (Hale 1994: 8). According to de Rougemont, who thinks the background of the Greek myth is Semitic/Assyrian-Hebrew, later generations’ reception of it was most strongly influenced by the version produced by the second century BC poet Moschus from Syracuse:
He provided the vernal scenery which Western poets, sculptors, and painters have used for twenty centuries in their sensual and imaginative reinterpretations of the myth – works ranging from the metope of Selinus to the bas-relief decorating a modern railway station in Geneva, from Ovid to Victor Hugo, and from the creator of the Aquileia mosaics to painters such as Veronese, Titian, Claude Lorrain, and Tiepolo. (de Rougemont 1966: 7)

The legend may thus be seen as a powerful ‘common myth’ necessary for the creation of a national identity (cf. Smith 1992: 73), or in this case of Europeanness. The ancient Greeks arguably also made Europe a nation in Smith’s sense of “a named human population sharing an historic territory.” The earliest post-Homerian sources applied ‘Europe’ to mainland Greece in opposition to the Aegean islands (Hay 1957: 2). During the colonisation period from the ninth to the sixth centuries BC, Hay argues that it was extended to the whole of continental Greece and then also to areas to the west and north. At this time the terms Asia and Libya (the latter of whom the Romans re-baptised Africa) also gained currency.

At first the world was seen as divided into two parts, West and East, Europe and Asia (Libya was considered a part of the latter). But Herodotus adopted a tripartite division that may have existed among the ancient Egyptians (den Boer 1995: 15). At first it was debated whether the Nile was the boundary between Asia and Africa or the isthmus of Suez; and for a while the small River Phasis (Rioni, now in the Republic of Georgia), which flowed into the eastern end of the Black Sea was regarded as the true boundary between Europe and Asia, before this became established as falling at the Tanaïs river (Don). This fixing of the border between Europe and Asia at the Don prevailed until Peter the Great began Europeanising Russia. Russia was accepted as part of the European states system after its defeat of Sweden in the Great Nordic War, concluded by the Peace of Nystad in 1721. Its recognition as a European Great Power came with the Russian contribution to the joint defeat of Napoleon. Wilhelm Friedrich Volger confirmed the removal of the European frontier to the river Ural and the Ural mountains in his Handbuch der Geographie of 1833 (Hay 1957: 125; Davies 1996: 8). To the ancient Greeks, the ‘Pillars of Hercules’ (Gibraltar) constituted the western limit (de Rougemont 1966: 32).
However, as Hay also points out, for the Greeks ‘Europe’ remained primarily a neutral geographical name. Delanty (1995: 19) and others (Gollwitzer 1951) argue that their idea of Europe was subordinated to their notion of the ‘West’ or ‘Occident’. Herodotus (History: I, 4) suggests that antagonistic ideas of East and West, or Asia and Europe crystallised after the Persian Wars. Then a shared sense of Hellenistic identity emerged and all outsiders were lumped together as ‘barbarians’ (literally, speakers of unintelligible tongues) (Finley in Finley, ed., 1981: 8-9; Keene 2005: 27-31). “By the fifth century, ‘Asiatic’ was firmly linked with concepts of lavish splendour, of vulgarity, of arbitrary authority, of all that was antithetical to Greece and Greek values” (Hay 1957: 3). The theatre became the favourite place to express the Greek sense of superiority. Nearly half of the surviving Athenian tragedies of the fifth century B.C. portray barbarian personages: “a chamber of horrors of the most diverse kinds – incest, crimes, human sacrifices – characterises them and differentiates them from the Greeks” (Fontana 1995: 4). According to den Boer, it was also from the fifth century BC that

Greek authors began to connect the geographical concepts of Europe and Asia not only with differences in language, customs and characteristics, but also with distinct systems of government. The city-state of Athens became the symbol of Greek freedom, while Persia was seen as the immense empire of an absolute ruler who respected neither god nor law. The opposition between Greece and Persia was viewed by the Greeks as representing that between Europe and Asia, and stood for freedom as opposed to despotism. (den Boer 1995: 16)

Isocrates (d. 338 BC) thus equated Europe with Greece, and Asia with Persia, not only geographically, but in an active political sense, whereas Aristotle (384-322 BC) saw Greece as intermediate between Europe and Asia. Aristotle, who was to have a huge influence on European political thought in the Middle Ages, in his Politics (VII, 6) suggested that the climate made Greece a golden mean between the tribal anarchy of European barbarians and the absolutism of Asian empires.

Aristotle’s notions were probably influenced by an older Greek tradition expressed in the fifth-century BC study Influence of Atmosphere, Water and Situation attributed to Hippocrates, which praises the climate and natural geography as well as the political freedom of Greece as compared to that of Asia. However, with the
subjection of Greece first to the Macedonian, then the Roman empires, notions of Greek superiority seem to have been ‘Europeanised’; “by the time of Strabo [Greek geographer, c. 60 BC- AD 21] Europe and its peoples were regarded as best favoured by nature” (Hay 1957: 3).

Still, Michael Mann argues that the Greeks’ rationality took precedence over their ethnocentric tendencies:

The Greeks responded to the Persians in terms not of ethnic stereotypes but of geopolitical strategies in their own multistate system. Greek citizens wished to be self-governing. They did not wish to be ruled by Persians and they were willing to combine to avert that danger. When the danger receded, they were more concerned to avert being ruled by other Greeks. They treated Persia as just another state whose rulers were as capable of loyalty and reason as any Greek polis. The Greeks ultimately lacked a consistent sense of their own ethnic superiority. They were too outward-looking, too interested in the characteristics of (male) humanity at large, too inclined to project outward the diplomatic rationality of their multistate system. (Mann 1986: 215-216)

Mann indeed observes that “many Greeks proclaimed the unity of mankind at large and extended it further over class barriers than their predecessors” (Mann 1986: 225). He quotes Sophocles’ play Tereus, in which the chorus of citizens proclaim that “[t]here is one human race. A single day brought us all forth from our father and mother. No man is born superior to another. But one man’s fare is a doom of unhappy days, another’s is success; and on others the yoke of slavery’s hardship falls.” Mann concludes:
Greek self-consciousness was extraordinary – it was one of contradiction. On the one hand it saw the ‘unity of mankind’ [...], united by reason, pragmatically regulating the most violent interstate and class struggles. On the other hand, it recognised contradictory practices: the imputation of reason only to free civilised men, that is, not to slaves, the supposedly servile dependents of eastern rulers, women, children, or ‘barbarians’. Later a partial solution was found: Being a Greek, a Hellene, was a matter of the cultivation of reason through ‘education in wisdom and speech.’ as Isocrates expressed it. After Alexander’s conquests this definition was implemented as policy, Greeks and upper-class Persians and others became the cultivated rulers of the Hellenistic world, from which non-Greek natives were excluded. The definition worked as a restrictive ruling-class device for a time. But eventually Greek ‘humanity at large’ emerged transformed in the salvation religions of the Near East, now fused with other forces. (Mann 1986: 225-226)

Socrates was the first philosopher to say that his fatherland was ‘the human race’ and not merely his native city (de Rougemont 1966: 32). His declaration that he was a “citizen of the world” was one of the statements that led to his trial and subsequent death (Talbott 2008: 25). De Rougemont also reminds us that Isocrates, who he calls the ancestor of all subsequent European ‘federalists’ and ‘unionists,’ wrote that “the man who shares our paideia is a Greek in a higher sense than he who only shares our blood” (de Rougemont 1966: 34).

Thus if the ancient Greeks ‘invented’ Europe and the West in a geographical, mythological and perhaps ethno-centric sense (Delanty 1995: 19), if the notion of Greek and/or ‘European’ or ‘Western’ superiority was part of their legacy to future Europe, so was the cosmopolitan idea of a common mankind, suggesting a fundamental equality of all citizens.

3.4.2 The Greek contribution to Europeanness

The contribution of the ancient Greeks to the formation of modern European and Western civilisation and thus identity is massive. Their legacy of architecture, art, biology, ethics, historiography, law, literature, logic, mathematics, medicine, music, philosophy, physics, politics, and psychology has fundamentally and pervasively
influenced modern European values, norms and ideas. Practically all histories of Europe – and still today even many ‘world histories’ – begin with or exhaustively discuss ancient Greece.\footnote{One notable exception was Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s \textit{Europe: A History of its Peoples} (1991), a historical project sponsored by the European Commission, which hardly mentions ancient Greece and Byzantium. After many protests, in particular from Greece, the Commission eventually dissociated itself from it (Davies 1996: 43-44).} Jacques le Goff (2005: 10) identifies the figure of the hero, humanism, religious edifices, wine, the city, the word democracy, and the word Europe as Greek bequests to the Middle Ages, and thus to Europe. Norman Davies (1996: ch. II) avoids explicitly stating that the ancient Hellenes were the first ‘Europeans,’ but his ample coverage certainly suggests so. J.M. Roberts in his \textit{History of Europe} is more explicit:

\begin{quote}
[…W]hen sceptical modern scholars have done their spectacular best to qualify and explain the limits of civilisation in the Greek and Roman worlds, we are left with a huge mass of cultural facts which down to this day have helped to determine the way in which Europe and the minds of Europeans took shape in history. To understand that, we have to begin with the Greeks. (Roberts 1996: 25)
\end{quote}

Like most modern historians, Roberts particularly emphasises the ancient Greeks’ systematisation of rational philosophical enquiry:

\begin{quote}
The Greek challenge to the weight of irrationality tempered its force as it had never been tempered before even if that was not always obvious. For all the subsequent exaggeration and myth-making about it, the liberating effect of this emphasis was to be felt again and again for thousands of years. (Roberts 1996: 42-43)
\end{quote}

Similarly, Samuel Finer regards the ancient Greeks as “the pioneers of rational thought” (Finer 1997: 328), and Mann considers “the cult of human reason” one of three Greek institutions that together constituted a revolution in the history of collective power (Mann 1986: 195).

As to literature, Homer’s \textit{Iliad} and \textit{Odyssey} “are by general consent the beginning of European literature” (Gransden in Finley, ed., 1981: 65). T. G. Rosenmayer (in Finley, ed., 1981: 120) argues that “European drama […] is almost entirely descended
from Greek tragedy and comedy. [...] For two thousand years, beginning with the Roman developers of Greek drama, and again with the Humanists of the Renaissance, the Greek models exercised a dominant role”. On the figural arts, Peter Kidson (in Finley, ed., 1981: 401) writes that “until not so very long ago it was generally agreed that all art worthy of the name conformed to a single set of universal and unchanging standards. These had been discovered by the Greeks, transmitted to the Romans, destroyed or rejected by the barbarians, and slowly brought to light again by the Italians of the Renaissance.” Regarding historiography, Araldo Momigliano is of the opinion that

like the ancient Romans, we are conscious of having inherited ‘history’ (historia) from the Greeks. Herodotus is to us ‘the father of history’ as he was to Cicero. We are also conscious that history has come to us as part of a greater legacy which includes the most important intellectual activities (philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, natural history, figurative arts, etc.) in which we are still involved – and, more particularly, the most prestigious literary genres (epic, lyric, eloquence, tragedy, comedy, novel, idyll) by which we still satisfy our needs for verbal expression. (Momigliano in Finley, ed., 1981: 153)

Moreover, the ancient Greeks created a material infrastructure and extensive communications that later helped pave the way for the Hellenic and Roman empires. Visible and tangible expressions of Greek culture such as their alphabet, finely engraved silver coins, the Doric temple, and figural art were diffused by a steady traffic of travellers, merchants, artisans and migrants among the far-flung Greek communities around the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black seas (Finley in Finley, ed., 1981: 7). An unmistakably Greek material legacy came to characterise particularly the Greek mainland and islands (modern Greece), the western coast of Asia Minor (modern Turkey), much of the coast of Sicily, and Italy south of Naples. Many ruins of these, most famously the Acropolis of Athens, have survived to be embraced by modern Europeans as relics of their spiritual ancestors.

The Greek intellectual heritage was transmitted to the West, via the Hellenistic monarchies, by the Romans, who also adopted the Greek paideia ideal of upbringing as the cultivation of human perfection. Thus it was incorporated in the legacy of Rome, through which it would profoundly influence educational institutions and practices in
medieval Christian Europe, reinforced by the return to the antique that characterised the early renaissance of the twelfth century and the humanist one in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Marrou in Finley, ed., 1981: 185).

As I have indicated, the ancient Greeks themselves were the originators of the idea that came to inform the modern ‘cult of Greece’, that they were models of superior thought and action. The Romans, however, surpassed them in their fervent admiration of assumed Greek perfection. In the late first century BC, the poet Horace famously summarised the Roman sense of Greece when he wrote of the Roman conquest that “captive Greece captured her savage victor and brought civilisation to rustic Latium” (Graeca capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes intulit agresti Látio). Roman philhellenism reached a high point in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives (c. AD 100). After the fifth century collapse of Roman authority there, Greek learning and culture were largely lost in the West. The last important post-Roman philhellenist in the West was arguably the Visigoth encyclopaedist and theologian Isidore of Seville. A few works of Plato and Aristotle also survived in Latin versions or commentaries. Apart from this, Greece and Greek culture were almost entirely unknown during the centuries when the Western synthesis of classical and Christian culture took place (see below, Section 3.7.2). Meanwhile, however, the Greek legacy survived in the Byzantine empire. Scientific parts of it were also embraced by the Arabs as they conquered Byzantine, Hellenic and Christian territories.

In the High Middle Ages, a broader range of ancient Greek thought and science was rediscovered in the Latin West when complete Latin versions of Plato and Aristotle became available, some translated directly from Byzantine Greek versions and others from Arabic versions and commentaries. But this rediscovery was restricted, overwhelmingly, to Latin editions and to philosophy. Greek historians, poets, artist, and writers other than Plato and Aristotle remained known only to a few, and later medieval Europe knew nothing like the philhellenism of the Roman Empire.

According to David Gress (1998: 57-59), the first tentative return of Graecophilia was the work of Renaissance humanists who learned Greek and began recovering the complete range of ancient Greek literature, philosophy, history, theology, and medical
writings. Modern philhellenism, however, emerged in Germany, where it was transformed into a ‘cult of Greece’ in the eighteenth century (see also below, Section 3.8.1). As we will see, in the first decades of the sixteenth century Germans discovered similarities between their language and Greek. As Martin Bernal points out, after the Reformation Greek and Germanic languages emerged as the languages of Protestantism:

Luther fought the Church of Rome with the Greek Testament. Greek was a sacred Christian tongue which Protestants could plausibly claim was more authentically Christian than Latin. With the spread of the Reformation to England, Scotland and Scandinavia, a feeling developed that the Teutonic-speaking peoples were ‘better’ and more ‘manly’ than the Romance-speaking nations of France, Spain and Italy and that their languages as a whole were superior to Latin and on a par with Greek. (Bernal 1987: 193)

Greek studies flourished in Protestant schools and universities throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Bernal notes moreover that many of the major French Hellenists of the seventeenth century were Huguenots (Bernal 1987: 194). Also Gress points to a subtle affiliation between the secular Greek legacy and Protestantism in north-western Europe, particularly in English academia:

The study of ancient Greece flourished in the English Renaissance, both before and after the Reformation, but then gave way to the rising tide of Puritanism and doctrinal debate within Anglicanism that led to the English Civil War. From the early seventeenth to the late eighteenth century the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, with a few shining exceptions, were largely forgotten backwaters. […] When classical scholarship arrived on the scene, renovated and rejuvenated by the Germans, it filled the need left by the religious void. Nineteenth-century fellows were still like monks: they remained celibate and had to conform to Anglican doctrine. Now they had, again, a real source of worship and meaning in their lives: ancient Greece as interpreted by the new scholarship became an ersatz religion. The modern West adopted Greece as a partial replacement for Christianity. This was not the actual Greece of two thousand five hundred years ago, however, but the Greece re-created by adoring scholars, mostly in Germany and England, starting around 1770. (Gress 1998: 59-60)

The heavy predominance of northern German, secularised Lutherans in eighteenth to twentieth-century German Graecophilia and neohumanism is confirmed
by Suzanne L. Marchand. She concedes that even Catholics in e.g. Bavaria became smitten by Graecophilia. However:

German philhellenism partook so heavily of that peculiar form of secularised Lutheranism known as `secularised Protestantism’ (Kulturprotestantismus) that in 1862 the biographer of the philologist F. A. Wolf felt he had to correct the pervasive impression that Greek was exclusively the language of Protestantism. In addition, the basic institutions of neohumanism, the Gymnasium and the philological seminar – were borrowed from the north, and their integration into the Catholic lands occurred less as an abrupt shift in state policy than as a continuation of eighteenth-century classicism. Throughout the Second Empire and into the Weimar period, Berliners controlled central neohumanist institutions like the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut and the Royal Museums. Catholics rarely participated in their activities, sometimes by choice, sometimes by sociological coincidence (there were few Catholics in academia in comparison to their numbers in the general population), sometimes by deliberate exclusion. (Marchand 1996: xxiii)

The university of Göttingen, founded in 1734 by George II, elector of Hanover and King of England, formed a cultural bridge between Protestant Britain and Protestant Germany. The humanities were established at Göttingen as a modern disciplinary scholarship, including the historiography of peoples and races and their institutions. An important inspiration was Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-68), “the greatest champion of Greek youth and purity in the mid-18\textsuperscript{th} century” (Bernal 1987: 212). Winckelmann famously admired “the noble simplicity and serene greatness” and “the perfect law of art” which infused everything Greek, and took the motto of the ancient Greeks to be ‘nothing in excess’ and ‘moderation in all things’ (quoted by Davies 1986: 97).

Winckelmann founded not only art history as an academic discipline, but, together with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), also the modern cult of Greece (Gress 1998: 60 ff.). The ‘Weimar classicism’ of Goethe and Schiller served to inspire the outstanding young German poets and philosophers that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, including Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Hölderlin, Heinrich von Kleist and Friedrich von Hardenberg, known as Novalis. As a result of the ‘second Renaissance’ induced by Goethe and Schiller, “classical scholarship, and especially Greek
scholarship, replaced philosophy as the queen of the humanities and reigned supreme for a century” (Gress 1998: 62-63).

Moreover, Bernal sees the ancient Greeks’ association of virtue with climate as an important inspiration for the modern romantic reverence for a ‘barbarian,’ cold, wild and free north, i.e. of Northern, Germanic Europe. The predilections of nineteenth century romantics and racists “were nearly always for the misty and mountainous North of Europe, which was seen as the true repository of human virtue” (Bernal 1987: 204). Bernal notes that national romanticism and racism were less evident in eighteenth century France than in contemporary Britain and Germany. In addition to the rationalist and cosmopolitan tradition from the Enlightenment, an important reason for this was that the French remained more obsessed with ancient Rome than the Germans and British, who increasingly turned to Greece. Gress makes a similar point, noting that the Roman models invoked both by the French revolutionaries and Napoleon enhanced the prestige of Greece in Britain and Germany. “In Britain, people compared their struggle against Napoleon to the Greek struggle against the Persians and insisted that the final British victory against great odds was due, as was the Greek victory, to the superior morale and commitment of a free people” (Gress 1998: 65).

The ‘tyranny of Greece over Germany’ (the title of Butler 1935) that began in the 1770s thus had its counterpart in a ‘Roman tyranny over France.’ This phenomenon became politically significant during the French Revolution, but began much earlier. The revolutionaries sought models in the intense patriotism and virtuous frugality they identified with the Roman republic. For instance, Robespierre quoted Cicero’s justification of the murder of Caesar to defend the September Massacre of 1792: “The Republic killed them in order not to fall into their hands” (quoted by Gress 1998: 64). When Napoleon dissolved the revolutionary government and took power in 1799, he was accused of being a new Caesar. As a rejection of this claim, he took the title of ‘consul,’ the prime magistrate of the Roman republic. Still, five years later he had himself crowned emperor of the French, stressing the secular Roman imagery of the event. He insisted, just as had Augustus in 27 B.C., that he was emperor by popular will and acclamation, and that his mission was to bring law, clarity and order to a
Europe torn by strife and conflict. He therefore put the imperial crown on his head himself, with the Pope merely a witness (see below, section 3.8.3).

Napoleonic aggression reinforced the German identification with the ancient Greeks. According to Gress (1998: 65-66), an extraordinarily intense, almost religious philhellenism made most German thinkers and poets see themselves as Greek victims of Roman imperialism. German scholarship’s main interest in Greece was to discover the causes of Greek political decline in order to prevent a similar fate from befalling Germany. In particular, historians explored the reasons for the failure of the Greek city-states to unite in a nation-state against foreign enemies. This focus often led to a contempt for Athenian democracy, since ancient Greek writers themselves, notably Plato, had suggested that democracy was a hindrance to effective governance in war and therefore to victory. Thus Sparta became the model polis for German nationalists (Gress 1998: 68). Gress points in particular to the pro-Spartan bias of the German classicists Julius Beloch in the 1890s and Helmut Berve in the 1930s. In the words of Gress, Berve praised the National Socialist regime of Germany as “the true successor to Sparta and the veritable embodiment of Greece” (Gress 1998: 68).

Gress moreover notes the significant contrast between the German preference for Thucydides as a Greek historian over the British favourite, Herodotus:

According to Thucydides, Athens lost the war because the citizens, after Pericles’ death, listened to demagogues who promised riches and easy victories. Democracy, he implied, degenerated into policy by popular whim unless controlled by an authoritarian leader, such as Pericles. By contrast, Herodotus was more popular in Britain, because his history of the Persian War (490-479 BC) was also a paean to liberty. […] The Germans had little use for Herodotus. He was an optimist, and they considered themselves rational pessimists, at least in politics. Democracy was a dangerous gamble, especially if you lived in the middle of a continent, as they did, with borders open to enemies on all sides. […] To men like Beloch and Berve, it was not so much Greek freedom as the Greek nation that Leonidas and his men saved. (Gress 1998: 69)

Furthermore, still according to Gress, the idea of the nation as a collective entity, morally superior to the individual, gradually replaced Goethe’s and Hölderlin’s natural man as the focus of German philhellenism. Hegel turned the ancient Greek reverence of the polis into a cult of the state as the sublime expression of all human endeavours.
After a transitional period when Nietzsche stressed the Dionysian mysticism as well as the rationalism of the ancient Greeks, the intellectual ‘tyranny of Greece’ in Anglo-Saxon Europe and America reached its apogee in the years before World War I. Ironically, as Gress (1998: 75) points out, it was just before this war that Oswald Spengler in his Decline of the West launched the first serious blow against the idea of the West as the child of Greece. To Spengler, the Greeks and Romans were not ‘Western’ at all, but represented a different culture of their own, a closed chapter utterly alien to modernity.

Gress argues that in twentieth century Germany, Britain and the United States, the ‘cult of Greece’ evolved into a national-liberal intellectual canon, ‘the Grand Narrative.’ A reaction against the Narrative’s allegedly colonialist and Eurocentric ‘Plato to NATO’ assumptions set in with the radicalisation of American universities during the Vietnam war. In classical studies, the most prominent result was Martin Bernal’s attack on the traditionalist reverence of ancient Greece in his Black Athena (1987, quoted above).

Gress notes that the reverence for the Romans and their peace, order and harmony proved far more tenacious in Latin Europe than in Germany, Britain and the United States:
Roman or civil law predominated on the Continent, languages derived from Latin were spoken across southern Europe, and scores of millions of Europeans lived in regions that had been part of Rome for a thousand years or more when the empire ended. Roman names for political practices and institutions, such as consul, prefect, diocese, senate, forum, market, republic, city, or province, retained a resonance in Europe that neither did nor could exist in the new transatlantic democracy. Americans prided themselves on being innovators and free of the past; Europeans, including the revolutionaries of France, prided themselves on continuity. [...] The whole history of Europe could be read as the never-ending attempt to recreate the Roman Empire on foundations stronger, more permanent, and morally better than the original. [...] After the violent attempts at unification by Napoleon, imperial Germany, and Adolf Hitler, Europeans rallied in the 1950s for one final attempt, this time under the aegis of the Common Market, later known as the European Union. (Gress 1998: 125)

The idea of Rome has obviously survived most powerfully in the Roman Catholic Church, the only contemporary institution with an unbroken history from the time of the original Roman empire (see below, Chapter 3.7). But it also continues to exercise a profound influence on French and Italian identity in particular. According to Gress, the intellectual debate over Greece and Rome after World War II became a debate between on the one hand

Anglo-American liberals with their Christian-inspired, postimperial guilt; on the other, French and Italian thinkers for whom Rome was part of their history, and who saw it not as an oppressor but as the guarantor of order and peace. This rhetoric could still be heard from officials of the European Union in the 1990s. [...] The Continental narrative of Western identity culminated in a synthesis of Rome, Christianity, and modern social democracy. The [Anglo-American] liberal narrative preferred Greece, the Renaissance, and individualism. (Gress 1998: 126)

19 Here it must be added that the Founding Fathers of the United States obviously took the Roman Republic as their model and gave Latin-derived names to many of the central political institutions. The American fascination with ancient Greece followed at a later stage.
3.4.3 The national-liberal polis

The idea of ‘the Greek invention of politics’ is common (see e.g. Forrest 1986). According to Samuel Finer, the Greeks affected “a revolution in the theory and the practice of government” (1997: 316). Finer (1997: 90, 355) argues that their main political innovations were four: the idea of the citizen (as opposed to the subject); democracy; the accountability of the governors to the governed; and the distinction between deliberative, executive and judicial power. These innovations add up to the creation and institutionalisation of the first ‘Forum-type,’ ascending-locus polity in world history:

From the beginning of recorded history in Sumeria and Egypt – for some two-and-a-half thousands of years – every constituted state had been a monarchy: not only in the known world of the Middle East and eastern Mediterraneain, but in the worlds of India and distant China too. These monarchs had all been absolute, and godlike too, except for the Jewish kingdom where God ruled the kings. Suddenly there was government without kings or god. Instead, there were man-made, custom-built republics of citizens. These Greek polities speak to us in a modern idiom and it was the Greeks who coined such terms as monarchy, autocracy, tyranny, despotism, aristocracy, and oligarchy, as well as democracy. (Finer 1997: 316)

However, in retrospect, Greek democracy was a dead end. The classical polis was crushed by the Macedonians in 322 BC, and had no independent institutional issue. Finer (1997: 86) argues that “until the nineteenth century it was Sparta, not Athens, that was the model for the European avant-garde. The harsh fact is that the Greek democratic poleis form but a tiny spot, both spatially and temporally, on the five millennia of the world’s forms of government.” Modern political ideals indeed came to differ considerably from those of ancient Greece. The Greeks did not separate conceptually between the state and civil society as did the liberal theory espoused by the French and American Revolutions. Moreover, the Greek polis was obviously much
smaller than the modern nation-state. Also the fact that the Athenian political philosophers and publicists were in various degrees oligarchic in sympathy contributed to Greek democracy’s low appeal to modern democrats (Jones 1978: 41).

The main point in the present context is however that the *polis* was an particularist-ascending type of polity. To qualify as a citizen, one had to be a free male born in the polis concerned (Finley 1963: 57). Naturalisation was possible, but rare. In Athens, citizenship was hereditary and linked to local settlements called *demes* (from demos, people of a village settlement) with their own cults and self-government (Finer 1997: 343-344). Moreover, as we have seen, within the Hellene community as a whole there was a strong sense of community vis-à-vis the Other, the barbarians, in particular the Persians. Herodotus, ostensibly quoting Pericles, famously defined shared Greek identity as “[…] our common language, the altar and sacrifices of which we all partake, the common character which we bear” (*History*, VII: 144). Thus the Greeks, like modern Europeans, had multiple identities: as citizens of the individual states; as Greeks; and as rational human beings.

The Greek polis was belatedly but very effectively launched as a universal model by the English banker and scholar George Grote (1794-1871) when he published his *History of Greece* (1846-56). The twelve volumes were quickly recognised as the best Greek history in any language, and its authority remained unchallenged for half a century. Den Boer argues that Grote’s *History* brought about a fundamental reconsideration of the origin of Europe: “It was no longer the establishment of Christianity, but Athenian democracy, which was to be regarded as the cradle of European civilisation” (den Boer 1995: 74; see also below, page 222). Moreover, Grote’s work significantly contributed to the fact that in Britain, the idea of ancient Athens as the original precursor of modern democracy prevailed over older French and

---

20 However, many cities in the later Hellenistic world continued to practice democracy in their local government (see below, Chapter 3.5).
American progressive traditions that tended to take the Roman republic as their ideal. According to Gress, Grote aimed to demonstrate that Athenian democracy was both liberal and secular and constructed on principles opposed to the aristocratic and religious principles of the British old regime. [...] The Victorian view of Greece, strongly influenced by Grote, was positive and emphatic. Victorian liberals understood from Grote that Athenian democracy was the greatest political achievement in human history before their own day. The Greeks were our ancestors; their example showed that cultural and political progress could, and ought to, go hand in hand. (Gress 1998: 85, 86).

Also in inter-state relations, ancient Greece became a model for modern Europe, and notably for the ‘Realist’ school of international relations theory. The Greeks shared a Hellenic identity and joined forces against the Persians under the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta. But otherwise the poleis guarded their independence, pursued their ‘national’ interests, engaged in almost constant warfare among themselves, entered and left alliances and leagues in a constant game of balance of power dominated by Athens and Sparta, the ‘Great Powers’ of the Greek world and traditional arch-enemies when the Persian threat was not imminent. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is today considered a classic of Realism on a par with Machiavelli’s Prince and Hobbes’ Leviathan (Jackson and Sørensen 1999: 70-72).

Although Athens came to dominate the Delian-Attic League to the extent that modern historians tend to call it an Athenian ‘empire,’ the ancient Greeks, unlike the Mesopotamians, Macedonians and Romans, never developed an imperial ideology. Rather, the combination of polis independence and continuous outside (fellow Greek or Persian) threats to that independence encouraged the formation of confederal or federal arrangements between poleis. The Delian League started out as a sympoliteia of equals, consisting mostly of democratic poleis with a common decision-making assembly. The Peloponnesian League of mostly oligarchic poleis remained egalitarian, even if Sparta was clearly most powerful. The ‘sympolities’ probably coming closest to federation was the first and second Boeotian Leagues (c. 447-386 and 379-338 BC respectively), and the rival Aetolian and Achaean Leagues (c. 290/250-189 BC).
Whether the ancient Greeks thus also invented the concept of federation, i.e. the first ascending-universal polities in European history, is controversial. Larsen (1961) answers in the affirmative, whereas Finer (1997: 372-80) as well as Elazar (1987: 120-121) argue that the leagues were at most confederations (i.e., with ‘national’ sovereignty intact). The fact remains, however, that the Achaean League was invoked as a federal model for the British Empire as well as for the United States (Pinder 1991: 113; Pagden 1995: 127; see also below, page 271).

3.5 The Hellenistic Monarchies

Remarkably, a new and enlarged Hellas emerged in the eastern Mediterranean and Near East from the decay of the polis. The Hellenistic era lasted well over three centuries, stretching from the Macedonian king Philip II’s final destruction of Thebes in 335 BC, marking the end of the independent Greek polis (as was mentioned, classical Greek democracy came to an end in 322), to the Roman conquest of the last Hellenistic successor state, Cleopatra’s Ptolemaic Egypt in AD 30. The Hellenistic world was largely the achievement of one towering, if ephemeral, historical figure, Alexander III (the Great, r. 336-323 BC). He was the son of Philip II.

According to Alexander Demandt (1997: 23), modern historians have variously emphasised Alexander as the father of Western absolute monarchy; the trail-blazer for Christianity; the author of a Greek-barbarian synthesis; the initiator of the Hellenisation of the Orient; and the founder of world empire. He notes that in the modern age, the perceived absolutist, nation-building and heroic legacy of Alexander has been embraced by Prussian king Frederick the Great, the ‘Iron Chancellor’ Bismarck as well as by Adolf Hitler. Nazi propagandists even elevated him to the position of a Nordic-Germanic popular Führer. Many Prussian nationalist historians on the other hand objected to Alexander’s cosmopolitanism, which they thought fundamentally contradicted the national principle. The national-liberal Englishman George Grote (see above) blamed Alexander for the collapse of Athenian democracy and freedom. The early nineteenth century German historian Bertold Niebuhr saw Alexander as an ancestor of Napoleon, and the Macedonian invaders of Greece as the
equivalents of the French invaders of Germany. Conversely, Georges Clémenceau in 1926 published a biography of Alexander in which he trumpeted the 1913 German attack on France as a parallel to the invasion by rustic Macedonia of cultured Greece, casting himself as the French prime minister at the time in the role of Demosthenes, the late classical advocate of Athenian democracy and independence.

Demandt, an eminent historian of Antiquity himself, concludes that each of these readings, though dependent on the interpreters’ personal context and convictions, are valid in the sense that they are not emphatically contradicted by the sources. Each is also relevant in the present context.

Alexander embraced the Near Eastern tradition of universalist-descending government and transmitted it to Rome and Constantinople. The expansion of Hellenistic cosmopolitanism, civilisation and empire thus blazed a trail for the Roman Empire as well as for Christianity. However, Hellenism was not just a transitional phenomenon between classical Greece and the Roman Empire; it left a legacy of its own which was to prove of lasting significance to east as well as west. The eastern, Hellenistic and Greek-speaking half came to represent the material and intellectual mainstay of the Roman Empire, and was also the part that survived the longest, until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Hellenism left a mark on all the territories once directly and indirectly touched – present-day Eastern Europe and Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the rest of the Near East. Not only were large parts of the Near East thus Hellenised; the Roman Empire in turn also became the major mediator of the Greek and Hellenistic legacy to European Christendom as well as to its eastern successor empires. The Eastern Roman/Byzantine empire in particular, but also the Persian Abbasid Caliphate, the Umayyad Arab Caliphate, the Hispanic Caliphate, as well as the Ottoman Caliphate tolerated, embraced and preserved much of Greek and Hellenistic culture, not least in science, representational art and architecture.

The Macedonians spoke Greek, believed Achilles was their ancestor and saw themselves as part of greater Hellas. Aristotle, hailing from Macedonia himself, tutored Alexander. A passionate Hellene allegedly always carrying a copy of Homer on
his campaigns, Alexander enthusiastically adopted his assassinated father’s great ambition: to revenge the invasion of Greece by the Persian Great King Xerxes 150 years earlier. After conquering the Persians, he marched across present-day Iran and Afghanistan and invaded the Punjab. He wanted to go on along the Ganges to the ‘world ocean’ in the east to found a true world empire, but was forced to turn back towards home by his own exhausted soldiers in 325 BC. Alexander’s short-lived empire thus came to stretch roughly from the Adriatic and Egypt in the west to the mountains of Afghanistan in the east. After he died of fever at Babylon at the age of 33, it took forty years of infighting before the lands he conquered were conclusively divided into a number of kingdoms, each ruled by one of Alexander’s generals, or a descendant of one. By about 275 BC, three main successor states had emerged: the Seleucid empire, the Ptolemaic empire (the richest part, including Egypt) and Macedonia. These came to dominate the eastern Mediterranean until the arrival of the Romans.

For half a century before this resolution, whole armies of Macedonians and Greeks spent their lives fighting in the Near East. They were eventually settled in the conquered territories, establishing Hellenic influence in many places where it had never been felt before. Great numbers of migrants from overpopulated Greece and Macedonia followed, forming a new governing class, and adding merchants and artisans to the Greek-speaking soldier-settler middle class, on top of the native population. A degree of material and cultural Hellenisation followed, mainly in urban centres. The subject people in the countryside as well as in the cities remained largely untouched.
Everywhere Alexander and his successors founded new cities modelled on the Greek (or refounded old ones). Some, like Alexandria, Antioch and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris became great metropolises, far surpassing even classical Athens in size and prosperity. (These three reached and perhaps exceeded half a million in population, to be matched only by Rome and Carthage.) The characteristic elements of a Greek *polis* were transplanted: the Agora and temples, the gymnasia and stoas, assemblies, councils and magistrates. And of course the immigrants and their descendants spoke Greek, a modified Attic dialect which became uniform throughout most of the Hellenistic world (best known today as the Greek of the New Testament). The educated and the old ruling elements among the conquered people quickly adopted the Greek tongue and much of Greek culture. The natives of the lower class, however, clung tenaciously to their own speech and writing – Egyptian, for example, or Aramaic, the original language of the Gospels – and this was the most obvious external sign of a fundamental cleavage in the population. (Finley 1963: 172-173)

The initial material basis for Hellenisation was the enormous booty in bullion and precious objects released by Alexander’s wars. This and the rulers’ subsequent encouragement of economic development, communications and trade made it possible to pay for considerable standing armies and bureaucracies. The former Persian empire was joined with the Mediterranean world in a great common market controlled by Greek and Hellenised producers, traders and bankers. For instance, the reopening by Alexander of the old sea route around the Arabic peninsula and into the Red Sea facilitated a lively trade in luxuries like spice, ebony, and gemstones between the Mediterranean and India.

However, since the main trading centres were in the East and because of the emigration, the Greek homeland suffered great material decline. Politically, economically and even culturally it had to yield primacy to the Hellenistic centres in the East and South. Only in philosophy did the Athenian academy remain pre-eminent. The growing wealth made the great Hellenistic cities hubs of art and science. Egyptian Alexandria became the greatest cultural centre of the Hellenistic world through the Ptolemaic kings’ generous sponsorship of the Museion institute. One of the two greatest libraries of the ancient world was established there (the other was located at Pergamon in Asia Minor). Alexandria became pre-eminent in natural science by building on the scientific records from Alexander’s campaign and on the works of Aristotle. Most famous of all became the contributions of Archimedes to mathematics,
physics and chemistry, but many other scientists made important innovations in medicine, anatomy, physiology, biology, botany, zoology, astronomy, geography, agriculture, and (mostly military) technology. In short, “the Hellenistic period was the golden age of Greek science” (Barnes 1986: 441).

Moreover, the humanistic science of philology was founded, as was the so-called New Theatre. Architecture and the figural arts blossomed, if perhaps without the originality of the classical Greeks. Even classical Greek political ideas spread, as all Hellenistic cities had democratic constitutions and even practiced democratic local government. However,

while democracy was accepted by all as the ideal civic constitution, in practice real popular participation in government declined in the Hellenistic age and dominance by the wealthy increased. [...] By the end of the fourth century the balance between the power of rich and poor had shifted in favour of the rich. Cities became dependent on the rich for their very survival (Price 1986: 382, 383).

In religion, the veneration of the old Greek gods became merely a convention. Many Greeks turned to oriental mystery religions, in particular to the worship of the Egyptian goddess Isis and the Iranian god Mithra, which at the same time to some extent were Hellenised. However, many members of the enlightened elite found religion unsatisfactory and sought a rational philosophy adapted to the post-polis, cosmopolitan Hellenistic world. Thus around 300 BC two new philosophical schools were founded in Athens: that of the Epicureans and that of the Stoics. Epicureanism and Stoicism indeed became the main Hellenistic contributions to western philosophy. Stoicism was particularly portentous for the Roman and Christian future of the West:
Greek philosophy was a more potent force in its decline than it was in the great days of Plato and Aristotle; and Stoicism exerted a greater influence on the lives of men and the development of States than the Academy or the Lyceum. There is much in the philosophy of Stoicism which reflects the era of Alexander; and it was perhaps powerful because it marched with the times. The era was one of uprooting and emigration and the mixture of peoples, in which the West moved eastwards on a steady tide, and an ebb sometimes set from the East to the West. The early Stoics came from the East, and though they might inherit Greek physics and metaphysics, they were free from the prepossessions and prejudices of Greek political thought. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was a hellenised Phoenician from Cyprus [whose youth coincided with the beginning of Alexander’s rule] (Barker 1923: 51-52)

Both Epicureanism and Stoicism were initially individualistic systems of thought focussed on the achievement of the good and virtuous life in the private sphere. However, Stoicism was eventually able to go public, as it were, and become an ideology of empire:

Above all, it was Stoic quietism which underwent important changes. Indifference to social position – and hence acceptance of whatever status one happened to have – was turned into a doctrine of vocation and duty, particularly for rulers. The shift was largely the work of the Rhodian school, whose chief figures were Panaetius and the immensely learned Poseidonius (131-51 BC), Cicero’s teacher in philosophy. Stoicism then became the main philosophical school of the Romans as well. Among the outstanding Roman Stoics were Seneca (who held high office for a long time under Nero) and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. For such men of action obviously the brotherhood of man and the rule of natural reason had altogether different overtones from those of early Stoicism. The object now was to find a moral basis on which to rule an empire, and after Augustus established monarchical government in Rome this was further narrowed to rule by an absolute monarch. The king who was also a philosopher became the Stoic ideal, and the Cynic as well. (Finley 1963: 178)

This ideological development had been prepared by Philip’s and Alexander’s imperial practice. Macedonian rule forced the Greeks, first, to start grappling with the idea of a wider political unity than the polis, and second, to relate more closely to the ‘barbarians’ of the East. Although Alexander may have started his campaign towards the East as a crusade against the ‘barbarians,’ his purported aim became to unite East and West in a universal community of equal individuals regardless of nationality.
Alexander had united the known world of his time (save Italy and the confines of the West) in a single society; and he had assumed the equality of all the members of that society. He had contradicted the two axioms hitherto current in the political thought of the Greeks – that a multiplicity of separate self-governing and self-sufficing cities was the best constitution of politics, and that differences and inequalities between the members (enfranchised and disenfranchised, citizen and alien) were inevitably implied by the very genius of the city. His conquests and his policy had implied two opposite conceptions – that of a single cosmopolis of the inhabited earth, transcending cities as it transcended tribes and nations; and that of the equality of all men, or at any rate all free men, in the life of a common humanity. These are the two fundamental conceptions which inaugurate a new epoch – an epoch which succeeds to that of the polis, and precedes that of the national state; an epoch which covers the centuries that lie between Aristotle and Alexander at one end and Luther and Henry VIII at the other, and embraces in its scope the three empires of Macedon and Rome and Charlemagne. They are again the two conceptions which we find in the teaching of St. Paul, who believed in one Church of all Christians which should cover the world, and held that in that Church there was ‘neither Greek nor Jew … barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free.’ (Barker 1923: 47-48)

Thus, to help sustain his rule, Alexander fostered intermarriage between Greeks and Persians; received Persians into his army; adopted the ceremonial of the Persian court; dressed like a Persian king; appointed Persians to many important administrative positions (or left them in the places they had); and preserved the Persian system of provincial government (which was later taken over by the Romans). A particularly famous symbol of his policy of amalgamation was the mass wedding at Susa in 324, where he himself married two daughters of the defeated Persian Great King Dareios III; 80 Macedonian officers wed daughters of Persian aristocrats; and 10,000 members of the Macedonian army took Persian wives.

However, as has been noted, the successors of Alexander did not continue his amalgamation policy, but ruled through a Greek-speaking elite deeply separated from the native subjects. “The Greeks [still] believed in their cultural superiority over ‘barbarians’, and for them this belief justified political dominance” (Price 1986: 373).

Alexander also tried to advance imperial cohesion and loyalty by adopting the traditional Near Eastern cult of the ruler. His ‘absolutist’ ideas were perhaps conceived, or reinforced, at his visit to the shrine of the Egyptian god Ammon at the Siwa Oasis west of the Nile in 332-331. Here the priests greeted the new ruler in the
old Pharaonic tradition as the son of Ammon. Alexander seems henceforward to have actively encouraged this practice by e.g. forcing his Macedonian officers to salute him by prostration (*proskynesis*). Such veneration was however also in part a continuation of the Greek tradition to promote founders of cities when they died to the rank of hero and thus objects of hero-worship. Moreover, monarchy was a traditional part of the Macedonian state.

Alexander’s successors were in any case able to effectively carry on the worship of the ruler as the divine benefactor and saviour of the people. Not only the kings, but also the rulers of the Hellenistic cities were adored. This universal-descending tradition was eventually adopted by the Roman emperors as a means to hold together a divisive empire, as well as by the individual Roman cities. Thus Stoicism and emperor-worship became two of the main Hellenistic ideological legacies to the Roman Empire.

### 3.6 The Roman Empire

The Romans dominated the Mediterranean world and large parts of future Europe for well over half a millennium. The Graecophone part of the empire survived the fall of the western emperor in AD 476 and, though gradually diminished and taking on an increasingly distinct, ‘Byzantine’ character, lived on in the eastern Mediterranean and Near East for more than twice that time, until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. At the height of its power and prestige, the Antonine period (AD 96-180), the Empire ruled more than 3 million square kilometres and perhaps 56 million people. It stretched from today’s Northumberland to Algeria, from Portugal to Syria, from the Rhine to the Nile. A fairly regular and lawful imperial government, tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity, provided the territory of what is now more than thirty

---

21 The near-century from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus was, in Edward Gibbon’s opinion, the one when, in the entire history of the world, “the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous” (*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 3, quoted approvingly by Finer 1997: 564).

22 According to Finer, there is no evidence for the size of the population, but the estimate of 56 million is adopted by many scholars (Finer 1997: 532).
sovereign states with relative prosperity, civilisation, peace and unity (see e.g. Rietbergen 1998: 49 ff.).

As Jacques le Goff (2005: 10-11) points out, medieval Europe emerged directly from the Roman Empire. Among the major Roman legacies to Europe, le Goff identifies its Latin language and culture, military skills, the architectural tradition, superior technical expertise, “the opposition and complementarity that obtained between town and countryside,” Roman law, and the liberal arts (the trivium or arts of speech and the quadrivium or numerical arts).

However, the Romans did not identify themselves consciously as Europeans. Their empire was centred on the Mediterranean and covered parts of what is today considered Europe, Asia and Africa. According to Delanty (1995: 20), the Romans retained the basic Greek, geographical understanding of Europe as the present continent of Europe, with the exception of Scandinavia and, often, Britain and the Iberian peninsula. Sometimes the western half of the empire was called Europe and the eastern half Asia (de Rougemont 1966: 41). Still, the legacy of Rome has had a huge influence on subsequent Europeanness and Europeanism. As we have seen (in Chapter 2.5 above), among its effects, Rokkan stresses the significance of the Roman “tradition for the Emperor’s supremacy, the systematisation of legal rules, and the idea of citizenship” (Rokkan 1999: 149). I for my part will emphasise four elements of the Roman legacy as particularly pertinent for attitudes to post-1945 European Union-building.

First, the Roman empire embraced the universalist-descending, Near Eastern and Hellenistic tradition of empire (Rokkan’s “tradition for the Emperor’s supremacy”), creating an example of civilisation, peace and order that remained an ideal throughout the Middle Ages and which survived to significantly influence modern European political thought and practice. I submit that the Romans thus established an extensive basis for later Europeanism, particularly in areas with a Roman past. Moreover, as the Roman Empire during most of its history actually (if not in theory) was not a centralised empire but a federation of city-states, its political legacy contributed
towards the federalist ideas and practice that emerged in the European ‘city-belt’ (see Section 3.6.1).

Second, by extending Greco-Roman, Mediterranean civilisation (including political ideas, not least “the idea of citizenship”) northwards into transalpine Europe and leaving an immeasurable material and intellectual legacy to modern-day Europe, the Roman Empire has greatly influenced the identity and culture (Europeanness) of modern Europeans, most notably of those living in areas once ruled from Rome. The Romanisation of the barbarians living in or near the empire was effected either directly by the Roman empire itself or, later in the West, by the Roman Church under papal leadership (see Section 3.6.2 and later sections).

Third, an essential part of the Roman governmental and cultural legacy, and again, one that touches especially areas that were part of the empire, was a reverence for and application of Roman law (Rokkan’s “systematisation of legal rules”), which was universal-scope law. This contributed towards Europeanness as well as Europeanism (see Section 3.6.3).

Fourth and finally, the Roman empire provided an indispensable administrative-political and cultural basis for the rise of the transnational community of Christendom, which in turn facilitated the growth of European community feeling (Europeanness) and reinforced a predisposition, particularly in post-Roman parts of modern, geographic Europe, to accept cosmopolitan-cum-universal-cum-European governance (Europeanism) (see Section 3.6.4 and later sections).

3.6.1 The Roman idea of empire

The Roman polity was initially a traditional conquest empire, or what Samuel Finer calls a ‘Mark I’ empire, in which “an identifiable ethnic or communal group, and/or a core territorial unit (which might be state-generic, national, or, indeed, a city-state) exert dominion over other ethnic, territorial, or communal groups” (Finer 1997: 8). However, the endurance and stability of this far-flung, cosmopolitan empire rested not on physical coercion alone. The empire survived for so long due to the Romans’ unique ability to forge strong bonds of interest, identity and ideology between central
and peripheral oligarchies within their dominion, but also because of the political, economic and cultural advantages the Empire offered wider segments of Roman citizens. The principal means of cohesion were military force, political control and co-optation, economic development and integration, advancement of a common high culture, or civilisation, and the rule of law. Crucially in the current context, the application of these means were justified and legitimised by reference to an idea, or vision, of universal empire.

The practical success of Roman strategy and ideology eventually enabled the Romans, in the Dominate or Later Empire period, to establish what Mann calls “the first territorial empire, the first predominantly non-segmental extensive society, at least in its higher reaches” in world history (Mann 1986: 297). Finer speaks variously of ‘Empire Mark II’ where “there has evolved a common imperial culture which acts as ‘the ticket of entry’ for any who want to join the ruling stratum”; a “country-state”; or “an early form of a ‘consocial’ state” (Finer 1997: 8, 584, 602).

As we have seen, the Hellenistic empire of Alexander, and before that the Near Eastern empires, had in many ways foreshadowed the Roman Empire. But the European concept of empire is, like the term itself, mainly inspired by the Roman model. The Latin term imperium originally meant military order or command (Barker 1911; Keene 2005: 56-57). It related to the locus of such orders or commands, i.e. to a person, and not their scope. It had neither territorial nor, strictly speaking, political connotations. In the republican period, imperium indicated the sovereignty of the people and senate of Rome. Each of the higher magistrates was vested by a specific law with both military and civil imperium, which varied in degree according to the level of the office. In the later days of the Republic the resident consuls and praetors in Rome, and in the provinces the various proconsuls and propraetors, enjoyed such imperium.

But now the term began to be invested with universal scope: imperium merged with the Hellenistic-Stoic notion of a single universal human race (Pagden 1995: 19). By the first century AD imperium had come to be identified simply with ‘the world’, the orbis terrarum or orbis terrae:
De iure at least, Augustus and his successors had become rulers of the world. It now required only an act of legislation, duly provided by the Emperor Antonius Pius in the second century in the famous *Lex Rhodia*, to transform the imperator into the ‘Lord of all the World’: ‘dominus totius orbis’. The concept of the *orbis terrarum* became in effect the appropriation by the political realm of the Stoic notion of single human genus. It was, as the French historian Claude Nicolet has said of it, a ‘triple achievement: spatial, temporal and political’. (Pagden 1995: 23)

Pagden adds that this universalist notion of sovereignty did not mean that the Romans were unaware of an independent world outside the actual frontiers of the Empire. On the contrary. But it did mean that they thought e.g. the Chinese had no separate identity as a community, and that China one day would be absorbed by the universal Empire.

During the Principate (or Early Empire, 27 BC – AD 284), the locus of *imperium* was re-centralised in the hands of the *princeps* (literally, first among equals). In 27 BC Octavian (taking the title Augustus) obtained an *imperium* whose scope was coextensive with the whole of the Roman world, but whose locus was concurrent in some provinces with the *imperium* of the senatorial proconsuls. This diarchy disappeared with the Dominate. By the time of Constantine the Great, when a near-absolutist monarchy had been established, the emperor enjoyed sole *imperium*. According to Barker (1911), the locus of sovereignty, the *nomen imperii*, had shifted from the many via the few to one. At the same time, its scope remained universal.

In practice, however, considerable power remained with the governors of the provinces and with the cities. Moreover, by the fourth century AD the Empire was colloquially known as Romania, and everyone within it counted as a *romanus*, whether Roman or not (P. Brown 1971: 19, 41). More formally, however, even after the demise of the Republic, the Romans themselves persisted in calling their empire not the *Imperium Romanum* (though this name was sometimes used), but the *res publica*, which may be translated as the ‘common interest’ or the ‘common domain.’ Abstractly, this denomination was probably understood as ‘the commonwealth’ or simply ‘the state’ without any particular territorial, ethnic or other qualification. According to Finer, the Romans were thus the first to conceive of the *res publica* as “a nexus of
goods, activities, and institutions which belonged at large […as] an abstract, impersonal attribute of the collectivity” (Finer 1997: 603). Together, the Roman notions of \textit{imperium} and \textit{res publica} add up to something close to the idea of sovereignty usually associated with the rise of the modern state – but with a universalist rather than a particularist scope.

The ethos that informed the Roman notion of the \textit{res publica}, and thus their ‘empire,’ was strongly influenced by Greek and Hellenistic moral and political thought, particularly Stoicism. The Greek idea of the polis, or city-state, tending as we have seen in the Hellenistic period towards the universal-scope Stoic notion of the cosmopolis, or world state, helped produce an imperial ideology which inclined Rome “to think that she governed all men and that her own universal law was closely related to the natural law” (Hinsley 1986: 163). The influence of Stoicism was such that even the Christianity eventually embraced by the Romans acquired strong Stoic underpinnings:

The vogue which Stoic philosophy came to enjoy at Rome, from the days of the Scipios to the days of Marcus Aurelius, is a matter known to every scholar. It imbued the Roman lawyers with their tenets of a universal law of nature and the equality of all men before that law. […] The thought on which the best of the Romans fed was a thought of the World-State, the universal law of nature, the brotherhood and the equality of men; and thought of this nature inevitably penetrated and determined the general conception which they entertained of their empire. It is of peculiar importance, therefore, that we should understand the stage of development which Stoicism had reached, and the form of presentation which it had found, in the days of the establishment of the Roman Empire – the days, which we may also add, of the beginnings of the Christian Church, which also claimed to be a universal society, and also came under the influence of Stoicism. (Barker 1923: 53)

It was first and foremost in the writings of the intellectual, jurist and politician Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) that the Greek, political concept of \textit{polis} and the Roman and legal formulation of \textit{imperium} became merged with the Stoic notion of a single joint community of gods and men (Pagden 1995: 19). According to Cicero, there was, first, a universal law of nature arising from divine providential government of the world and from the rational and social nature of human beings which makes them similar to God (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 161 ff.). This constitution of the world-state
is equally present and binding everywhere. Second, in the light of this eternal law all persons are equal in the possession of reason. Cicero held that everybody has the same capacity for experience and for the same kinds of experience, and all are equally capable of discriminating between right and wrong. Thirdly, according to Cicero the state is a moral community, a group of persons who possesses the state and its law in common. Expressed in speeches that were later taken as models of Latin rhetoric, these Ciceronian-Stoic conceptions became a decisive influence on medieval European legal and political thought:

Cicero’s true importance in the history of political thought lies in the fact that he gave to the Stoic doctrine of natural law a statement in which it was universally known throughout western Europe from his own day down to the nineteenth century. From him it passed to the Roman lawyers and not less to the Fathers of the Church. The most important passages were quoted times without number throughout the Middle Ages. […] The ideas were, of course, in no sense original with Cicero but his statement of them, largely in Latin expressions of his own devising to render the Stoic Greek, became incomparably the most important single literary means for spreading them through western Europe. […] These general principles of government – that authority proceeds from the people, should be exercised only by warrant of law, and is justified only on moral grounds – achieved practically universal acceptance within a comparatively short time after Cicero wrote and remained commonplaces of political philosophy for many centuries. There was substantially no difference of opinion on the part of anyone in the whole course of the Middle Ages; they became a part of the common heritage of political ideas. (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 161, 164)

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC – AD 65) added another twist to the Stoicist notion that every person is a member of two commonwealths: the particular state he is a citizen of and the universal community of all rational beings, to which he belongs by virtue of his humanity. More than Cicero, Seneca emphasised the importance of the latter, which he saw as a moral and even religious society deserving of the greatest loyalty of men. Thus Seneca’s thought foreshadowed the Church Fathers’ idea of Christendom as the kingdom of God on earth. Seneca may have known St Paul, but insisted he was a Stoic rather than a Christian (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 171-176).

However, the material basis of Roman power was no doubt the military. The Roman army was “the core, the central, the critical institution […] the ultimately decisive political force. […] No previous culture, except perhaps the Assyrian and the
Ch’in, was so pervasively and intensely militaristic” (Finer 1997: 534). Still, the
gradual build-up of internal loyalty and/or submissiveness by non-coercive means –
ideological, political, legal, cultural and economic – allowed the army to concentrate
its resources on foreign wars and defence. “[T]he Empire was not held down by force:
for most of the first century A.D., for instance, there was only one legion stationed in
North Africa, and none at all in Spain” (Griffin 1986: 6). The presence of the army
significantly helped Romanise the provinces were it was stationed, and Romanised
‘barbarians’ eventually came to constitute its core troops and officers (see below, page
145).

The economic part of Roman polity-building consisted in incorporation of the
periphery into what Michael Mann calls ‘the legionary economy.’ The Roman army
legions not only conquered territories, but also built infrastructure and consumed goods
and services, thus facilitating economic integration. Space was pacified, the
agricultural surplus and population rose, the state’s military expenditures stimulated
demand and boosted the monetary economy. Economic complexity grew and living
standards improved. Roman rule became territorially continuous and resources
diffused across the Empire. “Thus there emerged a universal ruling class – extensive,
monopolising land and the labour of others, politically organised, and culturally
conscious of itself. The fully developed republic/empire was not ruled by congeries of
particularistic local rulers, or by a Roman conquering core over or through native
elites, but by a class “(Mann 1986: 270).

However, Mann stresses that the uniform economy also helped create “the first
extensive civil society, in our modern sense of the term” (Mann 1986: 297), or more
precisely, “a balance of power between state and ‘civil society,’ through a mixture of
state authority and privately organised supply and demand” (Mann 1986: 278). An
autonomous private economic sector arose, underpinned by an ethos which embraced
fundamental norms that later became foundations of capitalism and of western civil
society generally: private property and possession, inheritance, juridical personality,
individual legal responsibility and status, contract, liability, obligation, etc. Uniquely in
the contemporary global context, these and other norms regulating the relations
between citizens as well as their relations with the state became codified in a sophisticated, systematic, effectively enforced and generally respected system of law (see below, Section 3.6.2).

The political part of Roman polity-building combined the creation of a strong, but relatively small centre of control and the co-optation of local oligarchies that were largely left to govern the periphery as long as they deferred to some minimal central requirements, including the adoption of the imperial culture. The size of the central state apparatus remained limited even with the emergence of a de facto Mediterranean empire after the First and Second Punic Wars (resp. 261-241 and 219-202 BC). And so it remained after further conquests and the tumultuous politics of the late Roman “banana republic” (Finer 1997: 440) led to a centralisation of power in the princeps.

The new constitution instigated by Emperor Augustus in 27 BC confirmed the shift of power from the nobility to a populist princeps. The emperor eventually, after Diocletian’s (AD 284-305) restoration and reorganisation became an absolutist dominus. Mainly due to external pressure from Germanic, Hun, Slav and other restless ‘barbarian’ peoples, the empire during the ‘Dominate’ period (or Later Empire, 284-526) turned into a bureaucratic, unitary state that adopted the universalist-descending, Hellenistic tradition of emperor-worship. “The notion of the princeps vanished and the office was invested instead with all the attributes of the earlier divine monarchies of the Hellenistic East “(Finer 1997: 571).

Obedience was what the Empire most fundamentally demanded from its citizens and subjects. This however entailed mainly two things: that taxes be paid and Roman law be respected. Otherwise local affairs and ‘civil society’ were left largely alone. The Principate was “little but a superstructure for co-ordination and control; high policy was indeed made at the top, but the dynamics of workaday affairs came from the cities” (Finer 1997: 532). Cities retained a considerable degree of local self-rule until the Dominate. The classical Roman Empire may thus be seen as a “federation of city-states” (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 16).

Local elites were usually more than willing to let themselves be drawn into the empire-wide, ideologically integrated, politically and economically advantaged ruling
class. Key means of political co-optation were the conferral of citizenship and the diffusion across the Empire of membership in the Senate and of the imperial succession. In the latter case, “[t]he purple passed from Roman aristocrats to Italian ‘bourgeois,’ then to Italian settlers in Spain and Southern Gaul, then to Africans and Syrians, then to men from the Danubian and Balkan areas” (Mann 1986: 269). The 212 Edict of Caracalla, which conferred citizenship on all free male inhabitants of the Empire, was indeed the final confirmation of the Empire’s expressly cosmopolitan and universalist character:

There was no longer a single capital city, province, tribe, ethnos, sect, or any other segment in society that held imperium over the rest. Instead, this oecumene was overlaid and run by a stratum sharing the same imperial culture. This is what Romanitas now meant. To possess this culture was the necessary passport to an active role in society. (Finer 1997: 584)

Even after Diocletian in 293 divided the Empire into a western and an eastern half to be ruled by two emperors and two deputies (the so-called Tetrarchy) the empire was thought of as a single and indivisible state with two geographical and administrative halves: utraque pars, pars orientalis et pars occidentalis (see further below, Section 3.6.4).

3.6.2 The Romanisation of Europe

The Romanisation of the Empire, or Roman ‘nation-building,’ involved the diffusion across the Empire of an urban, literate, complex and remarkably uniform high culture or civilisation. After about a century of Roman dominance, it generally became impossible to detect local cultural survivals among the elites. Schoolboys studied the same books across the empire; cities arose with similar layout, temples and public buildings; there was a uniformity of style in private residences ranging from the silver on the table and the mosaics on the floor, to the floor heating (Griffin 1986: 6). According to Finer,
Romanisation spread downwards from the local oligarchies to the wider circle of city dwellers, and outwards, where it was often superficial and disappeared with the empire; as witness its rapid and total effacement in Britain. But it was substantial enough in its time to create a common pattern of urban life over the whole of this vast area, and a common identity, Romanitas, much like (it seems to me) the common pattern one observes throughout the length and breadth of the USA, despite widely different ethnic and religious backgrounds. (Finer 1997: 533)

Roman civilisation was however to a considerable extent Romanised Greek culture. By diffusing Hellenistic culture throughout the West, the Romans assured its historical survival and future influence on Western letters and thought. The Greco-Roman ‘common imperial culture’ thus came to be formative of European and western civilisation – of Europeanness.

Rome had enjoyed very close contacts with the Greek world from the very earliest times. The Greek influence on Rome began in earnest in the third century BC when the Romans began to take seriously and systematically study Greek culture. They imported goods and services from Greece, and after a while their writers began to copy Greek literary models. The Greek colonies of Magna Graecia in southern Italy and Sicily were subjected to Roman rule between 270 and 241 BC, and Rome conquered the whole Hellenistic East between 200 and 133 BC (including, in 146 BC, mainland Greece). As we have seen, rather than erasing the culture of their new subjects and imposing their own, the Romans recognised the cultural superiority of the Greeks, embraced their heritage, adulating the Greek genius and contriving to inherit it. Arguably, it was their entry into the rich Hellenistic East that gave the practically minded Romans the material and intellectual means to found and maintain a world empire.

The Romans began studying Greek rhetorical techniques, which were useful in a society dominated by deliberative assemblies and law courts, in the early second century BC. This meant setting up schools similar to those in Greece, which opened the door to a flood of Greek culture. By the time of Cicero, studying under Greek teachers in Rome and going to Athens or Rhodes to complete one’s education was common among the members of the ruling class. Assimilation of Greek skills in
dialectic, grammar and rhetoric was an important precondition for ruling the Greek world efficiently and thus keeping the empire united. After defeating the ‘oriental’ Mark Antony-Cleopatra alliance (at the battle of Actium off western Greece in 31 BC), Octavian (Augustus) pressed forward the development of a Latin culture to match the Greek. Freeborn immigrants, freedmen, and slaves who had received a Greek education (paideia) became prominent in the learned professions, arts, and luxury trades of the western part of the empire, serving as secretaries, tutors, actors, and courtesans. Absorption of the paideia, which in practice meant being able to read, write and speak Latin well in the rhetorical tradition that had developed under Greek influence, indeed became a precondition for elevation to the Roman elite (Rietbergen 1998: 50). Under the Flavians and the Antonines, men of Greek origin could be found alongside the Romans in all social categories, and a Latin literature and a Latin educational system evolved which quite successfully mirrored the Greek.

Thus the Romans came to do much more than passively transmit the Greek and Hellenistic legacy. Most obvious to modern Europeans are the tangible expressions of the Roman engineering talent: cities, roads, aqueducts, canals, forts, bridges, baths, harbours, amphitheatres. But they also left an impressive, if less original heritage of art in the form of mural paintings, frescoes, mosaics, and sculpture as well as innumerable pieces of handicraft, jewellery and utensils, etc. The intellectual legacy of the Romans is also exceptional and put an indelible stamp on European culture. The classical Latin writers of the first century B.C., above all Cicero, Virgil, Livy and Horace, came to be considered the second ‘fathers’ of the Western literary tradition (after Homer, whose pre-eminence they all recognised).

Moreover, the Latin linguistic heritage became the basis for the Romance languages that still prevail in large parts of Europe. This meant that the classical Latin authors were studied as part of the national literary heritage in the schools of all Romance-speaking nations, and due to the impression it made (and because of the later general veneration of the Roman empire) in other parts of the medieval and modern West too. Latin itself remained highly prestigious and influential as the academic, ecclesiastical, official and diplomatic lingua franca of Western and Central Europe.
until modern times. In the Hungarian kingdom, Latin was used as the language of state administration and higher education until the mid-nineteenth century (see below, Section 3.8.3).

3.6.3 Roman law

The legal element of Roman state- and nation-building – the institution and effective enforcement of a sophisticated and (mostly) humane system of law – became a constitutional political-normative contribution of ancient Rome to modern Europe. The Roman legal corpus left an indelible impression on European legal and political thought and became a crucial part of the common culture of Europe – of Europeanness. Roman law survived and prospered without interruption in the Byzantine empire, but had to be ‘rediscovered’ in the West in the eleventh century. Its impact on western and central Europe multiplied during the Renaissance when,

[d]espite the de facto validity of local law, Roman civil law provided an accepted ‘mind-set’, which formed the basis for political and legal thought throughout Europe. As part of the common culture of Christian Europe, it appeared quite naturally in great works of philosophy and literature. St Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa theologia* and Dante’s *Divina commedia* offer ready examples. (Stein 1999: 67)

From the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, Roman law together with canon and feudal law thus came to form the *jus commune* of Europe that put a permanent mark on national codes, *jura propria*, which would otherwise have been based exclusively on ethnic custom (Bellomo 1995). “In the end the Roman law became one of the greatest intellectual forces in the history of European civilisation, because it provided principles and categories in terms of which men thought about all sorts of subjects and not least about politics. Legalist argumentation – reasoning in terms of men’s rights and of the justifiable powers of rulers – became and remained a generally accepted method of political theorising” (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 165).

Roman law survived to be rediscovered in the West largely due to the compilation initiated by Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, the *Corpus juris civilis*. The *Corpus* originally consisted of three parts: the Digest contained general
jurisprudential principles and the private laws; the Code laid down the laws of the Roman emperors, the so-called imperial constitutions (constitutiones), largely dealing with public law; and the third part, the Institutes, was a short textbook for the students at the law school at Beirut. The constitutions of Justinian himself were collected as so-called Novellae (novae leges; new laws) and from the twelfth century onwards were published as the fourth part of the Corpus.

Roman civil or private law became a vehicle for Europeanness in the sense that it contained rules for civil society that became widely accepted in large parts of Europe. Thus it was a crucial precondition for the cross-boundary transactions that are so central to Rokkan’s concept of European development (Rokkan 1999: 167-168). Finer identifies the rule of law, or the “law-boundedness” of the Roman Empire – “the ubiquity of law in both the public and the private sector” – as one of the great Roman innovations in the history of government (Finer 1997: 601-604). The “humanistic, rational, and coherent nature of law” was another. “It was all to disappear in the West with the barbarian invaders and not to be reversed till the Middle Ages, but it was our current modern paradigm of ‘law’ that was here invented” (Finer 1997: 603).

The basic principles of Roman civil law included private property and possession, juridical personality, individual legal responsibility and status, contract and obligation. Finer stresses that this private law normatively presupposed and legally confirmed “a world of free-willing and equal individuals. More than that, it presupposes individual action to bring suits to law. The law is not imposed by the state, it is invoked by individuals” (Finer 1997: 604).

Of particular interest in the present context is the Roman establishment of ‘international’ civil law, the jus gentium, or law of nations. The need arose out of Roman imperial practice, but the inspiration was Greek. The Romans became aware of the potential utility of a universally binding legal regulation of civil society in the third century BC, after their expansion beyond Latium. Roman rule from that point onwards comprised an increasing number of often conflicting local customs and legal traditions, and Rome itself came to contain a growing body of resident aliens (peregrini) who had
to transact business among themselves and with Romans. As such business grew, it became more and more impractical to apply the principle of personal law.

The *jus gentium* was thus developed to extend the law to non-citizens, based on the Greek assumption of a natural reason (*naturalis ratio*) – ‘common sense’ – inherent in human nature. The *Institutes* declares that ‘natural law, which is uniformly observed by all peoples, was established by a kind of divine providence and remains always constant and unchanging’ (quoted by Canning 1996: 11). In practice this referred to the elements or principles that seemed to be common to the various customary laws of the Mediterranean local communities outside of Italy (Hinsley 1986: 162).\(^{23}\) The conception of natural law was inherent in Stoicist cosmopolitanism:

> It is quite possible that the Roman lawyers realised the ‘natural’ character of the *jus gentium* before they were imbued with Stoic philosophy: it is certain, as they came to understand the Stoic conception of a universal law of nature, they came to regard the *jus gentium* as a close approximation to that conception; and though it was never universally or completely identified with the law of nature, it was at any rate regarded as the concrete expression of such a law in actual human society – less perfect, in that it denied equality and recognised slavery; but more serviceable, because it was actually formulated and administered in courts. (Barker 1923: 69)

The practical differences between the customary *jus civile* and positive *jus gentium* ceased when citizenship was extended throughout the empire in AD 212. By making Roman law the common law of all the empire, the central government aimed to increase its control over (and taxation of) its subjects.

Roman public law became distinguished from civil or private law by Ulpian, one of the three Roman jurists generally considered most eminent (the other two being Papinian and Paul). This happened in the classical period of Roman jurisprudence that culminated in the decade following the Edict of Caracalla. Roman public law was

\(^{23}\) The *jus fetiale* was the original ‘international law’ of the Romans, and consisted of “the solemn forms to which it was proper to conform when the city was conducting relations – making war and concluding treaties – with other communities. With the territorial expansion of the Republic, and even more rapidly after the Republic’s replacement by the Empire, the outstanding development was one by which the *jus fetiale* fell into disuse and the *jus gentium*, while coming to greater prominence, lost even the tenuous resemblance to an international law it had once possessed” (Hinsley 1986: 162).
positive law (*constitutiones*) promulgated by the emperor concerning matters of politics and government, for instance the powers of magistrates and the state religion, in contrast to law that concerned the interests of private individuals (Stein 1999: 21). The imperial *constitutiones*, most notably the *lex regia* (the ‘royal law’ whereby the Roman people allegedly transferred its *imperium* to the emperor), conveyed politico-legal conceptions of universal monarchy that were to have a momentous effect on political thought and practice in later Christian Europe.

The positivist bias of the *Corpus*, in favour of seeing law as something made by the ruler rather than handed down by custom, was an important reason why it appealed to western Popes, emperors and kings after it had been revived in the eleventh century. However, it also contained ascending-locus notions that were embraced by democratically minded medieval thinkers, e.g. in the conciliar movement. A number of statements in the *Corpus* indicate the original possession of sovereignty by the Roman people. Moreover, even the ‘absolutist’ emperors of the later and Byzantine empire were expected not only to rule by law, but to live by the law themselves.

Ulpian developed the Roman doctrine of the emperor’s ‘absolute’ sovereignty based on two principles: the emperor is ‘*ab legibus solutus*’ (dispensed from the laws), and ‘*quod principi placuit habet legis vigorem*’ (‘what pleases the princeps has the force of law’). The former principle, from which the word ‘absolute’ is derived, originated in the Senate’s dispensation of Augustus and some later emperors from certain laws. However, “this and not the late Renaissance sense was what was meant by absolute. In point of fact many emperors averred that they were bound by the laws [...] Justinian’s *Codes* are specific in this respect” (Finer 1997: 544). Within a century of Augustus’s death the jurists were maintaining he could indeed make laws on his own account. In a surviving bronze tablet, the Senate formally and legally confers on Vespasian “the right and power [...] to transact and do whatever things divine, human, public and private he deems to serve the advantage and overriding interest of the state” (quoted by Finer 1997: 544; ‘state’ here probably being a translation of *res publica*).

The later juristic maxim relating to the absolutism of the emperor was a generalisation based on this law – but also on the fact that some emperors simply
ignored the laws and could not be called to account. Still, Finer argues that civil law to a very large extent remained free-standing, that is, independent of the emperor. In a largely autocratic empire lawyers were concerned with matters which concerned private individuals without involving the state. Jurists serving the emperor replied to appeals for clarification practically without changing established civil law. “In this way, a huge area of human regulation was extruded from the concern of the ruler and developed independently, in tandem with his contrastingly absolute discretion in ‘state matters’” (Finer 1997: 556).

Ulpian’s second principle, ‘quod principi placuit habet legis vigorem’, was incorporated into the lex regia. However, according to Finer, the epigram should be understood as saying ‘what has been approved by the emperor has the force of law’ (Finer 1997: 544). The late emperors continued to justify their conduct by reference to law and legal theory; even the most brutal emperors, such as Nero, Caligula and Domitian, generally did not interfere with, but rather encouraged the development of, private law. The lex regia also included a reference to the fact that the emperor’s power originates in the people: “the people transfers to him and vests in him all its own power and authority.” According to Canning, the significance of the lex regia for political thought “is that the emperor’s power derived from the people, and thus provided a model for the popular source of governmental power to be elaborated later in the Middle Ages and the early modern period” (Canning 1996: 9).

Imperium thus continued at least in theory to be exercised in the name of ‘the Senate and People of Rome’ (Senatus Populusque Romanus), i.e. in the Roman public interest, for the common good. The abbreviation SPQR adorned coins, monuments and the standards of the Roman armies. It was a part of the Roman ascending legacy that both the Byzantine and the Holy Roman imperial dignity, as well as the chair of St Peter, were to remain elective. The elevation ritual served as a constant reminder that the citizens had delegated sovereignty to the emperor, who was thus expected to rule in their interest. The same concern for the public interest or common good, the res publica, was contained in other famous maxims at the core of the Greco-Roman ethos: salus populi suprema lex (‘the welfare of the people is the highest law’); omnes
homines natura aequales sunt (‘all men are by nature equal’); and quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus comprobetur (‘what touches all should be approved by all’). Although in practice the late Roman empire was universalist-descending, its theory remained universalist-ascending.

### 3.6.4 The Christian empire

The starting point for the eventual triumph of Christianity in the Roman empire was the fact that in 4 BC the Romans took over the administration of Judea, the kingdom where Christ was born. The imperial peace and unity allowed people, goods and ideas to travel easily over long distances. Christianity spread first among the Hellenised Jews of the towns of Palestine and the Near East. One of them was St Paul of Tarsus (d. c. AD 65), the most important early Christian missionary and theologian. Christianity then followed Greek and Jewish traders and artisans along the seaways and roads of the Empire, northwards to Antioch, on to Ephesus, Corinth and Thessalonica, and westwards to Cyprus, Crete and Rome. The suppression of a great Jewish revolt in first-century Palestine added greatly to the new sect’s diffusion, as Greco-Jewish Christians (together with the Jews, who subsequently became a diaspora nation) fled to settle throughout the Mediterranean world.

By the mid-second century, Christian communities were established in every city in the eastern provinces, many in the central provinces, and a few in the western. Persecution in fact contributed to a particularly strong growth in the number of Christians during the third century. When emperor Constantine issued a decree of toleration in 313, probably about five percent of the inhabitants in the western half of the empire, and ten per cent in the east, were Christians (Bagge 2004: 33).

Among the factors working to the advantage of Christianity in the competition with the great number of other cults in the early empire, four in particular should be emphasised (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 30-31). First, Christianity built on a clearly defined and well-established Judaic historical heritage. Second, the Jewish legacy as well as its monotheistic doctrine gave the Christian church an exclusiveness, unity and autonomy that prevented it from succumbing to other cults or to the imperial
authorities. Third, because Christianity was a religion of the book, building on the literate traditions of the Jews and presenting a complete, alternative worldview, it intrigued Greco-Roman intellectuals and could blend with their tradition of analysis and argument. Fourth, despite its Judaic and eastern origin, the Christian canon evolved within and adapted to the reality of the empire. The New Testament was formulated in Greek in the second half of the second century under heavy Hellenistic influence.

The last point is particularly important in the present context. Early Christianity became much influenced by Greek and Roman rationalist and cosmopolitan thought. The famous letter allegedly sent in the 90s to the Christians of Corinth by the head of the Roman congregation, Clement (retroactively designated Pope Clement I), contained “a tremendous claim: The true inheritors of Athenian and Spartan civic virtue, and of Roman military virtu, were the Christians. It was an appeal to Greeks, but to their widest conception of themselves; not as bounded by ethnicity or language, but as bearers of civilisation itself to rational human beings at large” (Mann 1986: 319-320).

Because Greeks lived throughout the empire, the cosmopolitan part of their heritage combined with their new-won Christianity was influential everywhere. Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180) virtually made Stoicism the imperial philosophy, and the first Greek Church Father, St Clement of Alexandria (d. c. 215), incorporated it into Christianity (Herrin 1987: 58). As a result of expanding Christianity and the growing entanglement of Christian religion, imperial political realities and Greco-Roman civilisation, there arose

______________________________

24 The term Fathers of the Church (hence terms like ‘patristic’ writing) is usually applied to the Christian writers of the first five centuries. Sometimes the Greek and Latin fathers are distinguished, the former including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzen, and Chrysostom; the latter Tertullian, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine of Hippo, and even Gregory (Pope Gregory I) and Bernard.
a notion of the collective existence of humanity at large, in a universal organisation, the Church Universal, the ecumene. [...] Christianity implied that human society itself need not be bounded by existing states, by existing class or ethnic divides, that integration could be brought by something other than force, by transcendental ideological power itself. (Mann 1986: 326)

Christianity became cosmopolitan due to the influence of Stoicism and because it was shaped within the reality of a cosmopolitan empire. But its doctrines were also explicitly cosmopolitan. In his letter to the Colossians (3:10-11), Paul called on Christians to make no distinction between Greek and Christian, Jew and Gentile, slave and master. Each is individually obliged to Christ, who recognised no distinction between persons. Baptism was the means to transcend all temporal frontiers of race, sex, nation and social rank. “Transforming the Stoic tradition of the equality of human nature among all men, free and unfree, Christians insisted that it was Christ’s recognition of each and all that ensured universal equality” (Coleman 2000a: 298).

To overcome initial pagan intellectual resistance and prejudice against ‘the religion of the uneducated,’ the Christian church gradually came to accept and master the rhetoric, method of argument as well as many basic ideas of Greco-Roman learning. Most Christian thinkers came to agree with Origen of Alexandria (c. 185- c. 254), perhaps the greatest of the Greek Fathers, that Christians had to be able to refute the pagan philosophers on their own terms and intellectual level. Moreover, Christianity contributed decisively to closing the cultural divide between the new late fourth century ruling class that hailed from the frontiers and the urban civilisation of the Mediterranean.

Clement’s and Origen’s advocacy of the study of the best pagan philosophers was later taken up by Latin Fathers such as Jerome and Augustine, who crucially assisted the transmission of the classical intellectual heritage to medieval Europe. Late antique schoolbooks condensed and simplified ancient learning and literature into what became the standard medieval curriculum of the seven liberal arts: grammar, rhetoric, logic (the trivium), arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy (the quadrivium). “The Church was heir to Rome not only in ecclesiastical organisation; the Fathers of the
Church incorporated the intellectual heritage of Rome into Christian thought” (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 54).

Initially the early Christians were wary of the Empire: they refused to participate in the cult of the emperor as the *Sol invictus* (Unconquered Sun; that was the main reason why they were persecuted 249-64 and 303-12). Some, however, took a more positive attitude, recognising the necessity and indeed divine sanction of the Roman Empire according to the gospels: “Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s and to God the things that are God’s” (John 18:36); “Fear God, and honour the emperor” (St Peter quoted in Matthew 22:21); and “You must obey all the governing authorities” (St Paul in Romans 13:1). The view propagated by the gospel of St Paul, that there is one Church with Christ as the head, and of which all Christians are members, reinforced the conception of a necessary political unity of the entire world under a single, Christian head. Thus Origen taught that the foundation of the universal Christian Church had been expressly synchronised with the foundation of a universal Roman peace by Augustus. “A Christian could reject neither Greek culture nor the Roman Empire without seeming to turn his back on part of the divinely ordained progress of the human race” (P. Brown 1971: 83-84).

Building on Origen’s ideas, Eusebius of Cæsarea (263-339) founded what became the standard Christian view of the Middle Ages. The conversion of Constantine and his establishment of the Christian empire was a crucial turning-point in human history, nothing less than the fulfilment of God’s promise to Abraham. This view interpreted Roman history as being determined by divine providence: that the empire was founded under Augustus, in whose reign Christ was born, in order to facilitate the spread of the Christian religion, a development culminating in the conversion of the emperor himself. (Canning 1996: 4)

The conversion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century not only greatly advanced such ideas among Christians, but, significantly in the present context, reinforced the Roman imperial ideology and the position of the emperor. The Empire, already one and indivisible as a polity, was welded still more firmly together when it was permeated by a common Christianity. Christianity provided a more solid
ideological backbone than the pagan Greco-Roman imperial culture, and it improved its ability to mobilise the middle and lower social strata against increasing external pressure from barbarians.

Even before his official conversion (on his deathbed), and in accordance with ancient Roman traditions that placed all religious affairs under state control, emperor Constantine assumed active leadership in Christian ecclesiastical affairs. In relief at the end of persecution, the bulk of the Christian Church was only too willing to accept this. The first ecumenical (i.e. ‘world-wide’) council, the Council of Nicaea, summoned and led by Constantine in 325 to halt the spread of Arianism, tacitly accepted the emperor’s supremacy in the Church. The Council made the Church a corporation (corpus fideli) under Roman public (imperial) law. Thus Roman law was introduced into it. Particularly the western, Catholic, Church was set to follow a legalistic path, both in its later quarrels with the eastern and western emperors and in its internal administration. This greatly contributed to the transmission of Roman legal ideas, including of course the fundamental rule of law principle, to future Europe.

But Constantine accepted that bishops had authority over purely spiritual matters, such as the formulation of doctrine and the administration of sacraments. Theological issues were to be settled by future ecumenical councils. The emperor himself remained a layman throughout the Byzantine period, and the patriarch was recognised as the head of the Church at Constantinople (Canning 1996: 14).

The original Constantinian conception of the relations between temporal and spiritual power in the Christian empire was incorporated in Justinian’s Corpus Juris and became “the classic expression of Christian Roman emperors” (Canning 1996: 5-6). The emperor was cast in the role of earthly head of the Church seen as the Christian empire, i.e. the universal polity of Christians. According to the Novellae both emperorship (imperium) and priesthood (sacerdotium) derived from God. The emperor was commonly called ‘priest and king’ (Gr. hiereus kai basileus, Lat. rex et sacerdos) throughout the Byzantine period.

However, he was at the same time a layman. He was not a priest as he did not possess the sacramental power of orders: he had not been ordained. He was only priest
in the sense of possessing jurisdictional powers in ecclesiastical matters, including the requirement established by Constantine that he must confirm an elected bishop (and thus Pope and patriarch). “Although the emperor was the head of the church understood as the empire, he was definitely not the head of the church conceived as an ecclesiastical body. Justinian accepted the primacy of the Pope and the second place of the patriarch of Constantinople” (Canning 1996: 14).

When Constantine died in 337, as a mark of special reverence he was declared a Christian saint, the equal of the apostles (isapostolos). And indeed, without the conversion of Constantine and eventually the empire, Christianity may have remained a minority oriental cult. After some years of renewed persecution in mid-century under the pagan intellectual emperor Julian (‘the Apostate’), the Christianity of the Empire was confirmed in 380 when emperors Theodosius I and Valentinian II made Christianity the “catholic” (from Gr. katholikos: universal) and thus official religion. In 391 all pagan cults were proscribed. Henceforward, Christianity was integrated into the structure of the Roman empire and progressively Romanised. The church indeed became the emperors’ most effective source of loyalty and support. It established a hierarchical organisation that fitted itself into the imperial subdivisions of province, diocese, and parish; it adopted Roman law as the basis for canon and ecclesiastical law; and it increasingly collaborated in the enforcement of imperial decrees. Moreover,

After the triumph of Christianity, these notions of simultaneous singularity and exclusivity were further enforced by the Christian insistence upon the uniqueness both of the truth of the Gospels and of the Church as a source of interpretative authority. [...] The orbis terrarum thus became, in terms of the translation effected by Leo the Great in the fifth century, the ‘orbis Christianus’, which, in turn, soon developed into the ‘Imperium Christianum.’ A century later, Gregory the Great would translate this into the ‘sancta respublica,’ a community endowed with the same simultaneous open exclusiveness which had been a feature of the Ciceronian ‘respublica totius orbis’ (Pagden 1995: 24)

A contemporary Christian Roman lawyer, civil servant and poet, Prudentius (c. 348-405), wrote thus about the conversion of the empire in his poem Contra Summachum:
What is the secret of Rome’s destiny? It is that God wills the unity of mankind, since the religion of Christ demands a social foundation of peace and international amity. Hitherto the whole earth from east to west had been rent asunder by continual strife. To curb this madness, God has taught the nations to be obedient to the same laws and all to become Romans. Now we see mankind living as citizens of one city and members of a common household. Men come from distant lands across the seas to one common forum, and the peoples are united by commerce and culture and intermarriage. From the intermingling of peoples a single race is born. (Quoted by Dawson 1932: 23)

Finally, it may be noted that the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity did not at first have any effect on the concept of Europe, which remained geographical and secular until modern times. Still, the term ‘Europe’ was being used by Christians and arguably became “a part of the Christian way of thinking” (den Boer 1995: 19). Moreover, although the Bible does not mention ‘Europe,’ the Genesis story of the settlement of the sons of Noah reflects the ancient tripartite division of the world. As has been noted (see above, Chapter 3.3), the Jewish historian Josephus wrote down the tradition that descendants of Japheth settled in Europe, those of Ham in Africa, and the progeny of Shem in Asia. The notion of Europe’s Japhetic origin went virtually uncontested until the nineteenth century (de Rougemont 1966: 21).

3.7 European Christendom

In the fascinating period that is now labelled ‘Late Antiquity’ rather than the ‘Dark Ages’ (fourth to eighth centuries, or thereabouts), the Roman Empire came under increasing pressure. Historians have proposed literally dozens of theories to explain the breakdown of the western part of the Empire (Demandt 1984). The most contentious scholarly issue is whether the dissolution was caused by internal disintegration or by barbarian invasion (Noble, ed., 2006). After the fall of the Soviet empire, the controversy has become politicised too. Neo-particularists in Central and Eastern Europe (and some in the West too, like Jean-Marie le Pen) justify demands for national purity and self-government by claiming exclusive rights to land established during the migrations of Late Antiquity (Geary 2002: Introduction). However, as we will see, this period of presumed national ethnogenesis may equally well be interpreted as the era of the ‘Making of Europe,’ or, more precisely, of European Christendom.
Whether as cause or consequence, the influx of Germanic and Slav ‘barbarians’ from the north and east accompanied the collapse of the western part of the Empire and the near-collapse in the East. Contacts between East and West declined sharply. In the eighth and ninth centuries communications deteriorated further due to the westward advance of the new Islamic and Arab, Umayaad Caliphate. Europe north of the Alps was profoundly affected by these developments. Here, raids by Vikings from the north and nomads from the east too sharpened divisions and contributed to the emergence of the fragmented and personalised authority structure known as feudalism. The remaining Roman Empire in the East developed its distinct ‘Byzantine’ character in a constant struggle against Persian, Germanic, Avar, Slav, Bulgar, Arab, and eventually Turkic incursions. Still, it survived until 1453 and thus provided vital strategic protection for Western Europe and permitted its material and intellectual growth from the twelfth century onwards.

It was ultimately the ineffectiveness of the Byzantine emperor’s coercive power that enabled (or forced) the bishop of Rome to declare western independence in the eighth century, substituting Frankish for Byzantine protection. This made the Frankish king a papal client and ended the Pope’s subservience to the eastern emperor. The year which inaugurated the papal-Frankish, South-North alliance in the West, 754, thus in effect marked the birth of a distinct European Christendom. From this critical juncture onwards, differences between West and East only deepened. The mutual excommunication of the eastern and western churches in 1054 was thus the formal confirmation of a long-existing separation in fact.

At the same time the Pope, in conjunction with the new western emperor he had created, with other western kings and with monastic movements, was able to build up a strong church organisation with himself at the apex. The Roman Church eventually brought most of Europe under its sway. At the same time as it engineered the conversion of northern Europe, the Papacy also became the main depository and transmitter of the Greco-Roman cultural legacy to European Christendom. In an otherwise fragmented, rural and primitive society, Greco-Roman, Latin-writ
Christianity became the main identity and ideology of the inhabitants of western, central and northern Europe.

However, by allying with the Frankish king in 754, the Papacy also created a potential competitor for universalist-descending power. Later alliances with other kings eventually proved fatal for the idea of universal papal monarchy. But in spite of differing ideas of ultimate leadership in Christendom, until the later Middle Ages, according to Southern,

all agreed that a universal coercive power resided in the church. Whether in the hands of the Pope, the emperor, king, or community, the purpose of human government was to direct men into a single Christian path. [....But the church] was not just a government, however grandiose its operations. It was the whole of human society subject to the will of God. [...] It was membership of the church that gave men a thoroughly intelligible purpose and place in God’s universe. So the church was not just a state, it was the state; it was not just a society, it was the society – the human *societas perfecta*. Not only all political activity, but all learning and thought were functions of the church. Besides taking over the political order of the Roman Empire, the church appropriated the science of Greece and the literature of Rome, and it turned them into instruments of human well-being in this world. To all this it added the gift of salvation – the final and exclusive possession of its members. And so in all its fullness it was the society of rational and redeemed mankind. (Southern 1970: 21-22)

The significance of the Middle Ages in forming modern Europeanness and Europeanism can hardly be exaggerated. Jacques le Goff argues that

of all the legacies at work in the Europe of today and tomorrow, that of the Middle Ages is the most important. The Middle Ages manifested, and frequently embodied, the major real or supposed features of Europe: these include the combination of a potential unity and a fundamental diversity, the mixing of populations, West-East and North-South oppositions, the indefinite nature of its eastern frontier, and above all, the unifying role of culture. (Le Goff 2005: 3)

I for my part will highlight four medieval developments as particularly portentous for future Europeanness and Europeanism:

First, the division between East and West and discrete Eastern, or Byzantine, and Western, or European, Christendoms emerged (Section 3.7.1). Second, within European Christendom, the amalgamation of Roman-Latin, Christian, Celtic and Germanic elements facilitated the appearance of a distinct European identity, with its
political, economic and intellectual core north of the Alps (Section 3.7.2). Third, the first papally created emperor of the west, Charlemagne, boosted the nascent sense of Europeanness and its identification with the western peninsula of Eurasia, and came to have a formative influence on modern Europeanism too. Charlemagne was the only medieval ruler ever to unite most of European Christendom north and south of the Alps in one polity. The often observed fact that the original territorial extent of the European Union quite nearly matched that of the Carolingian empire, and that even their respective territorial centres, Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, and Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), lie not far apart, is a legacy of Charlemagne (Section 3.7.3).

Fourth, the struggle between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Papacy in the later Middle Ages not only facilitated the division between temporal and spiritual power in later Europe, but also added crucially to the territorial separation of temporal authority into sovereign states. These and other structural or institutional freedoms (e.g. between executive, legislative and judicial power, and between levels of government), together with individual liberties in the political, economic and religious realms, would be distinctive features of modern Europe and Europeanness, indeed of the ‘West’ generally. The Papacy advanced to its peak of universalist-descending power in the twelfth century, but in the process fatally undermined that of the Holy Roman Emperor and thus left itself at the mercy of emerging particularist-descending kings. Approximately the year 1300 may be seen as the turning point in the transformation of medieval, unitary Christendom into modern, multistate Europe (Section 3.7.4).

3.7.1 Christendom, West and East

In the late Roman Empire, the influx of mainly Germanic and Slavic-speaking peoples from the north and northeast as well as the continuing attacks of the Persians from the east widened the old Greco-Roman, East-West fissure. Constantine’s removal in 330 of the imperial capital to the old Greek colony Byzantion (Lat. Byzantium) on the Bosporus, renaming it Konstantinopolis/Constantinople, had already rendered the imperial core more Greek in language and Hellenistic in culture. In the fifth century,
the empire lost the western provinces, including Rome, to Germanic armies advancing from the north. Henceforth, autonomous new Roman-Gallic or Roman-Germanic polities emerged in western, central and northern Europe (see below, Section 3.7.2). The new ‘sub-Roman’ rulers were generally eager to adopt Roman ways, but in fact presided over a significant decline in economic complexity, living standards and general civilisation (Ward-Perkins 2006). However, they recognised the sovereignty of the Roman emperor and vaguely saw their kingdoms as part of the Empire. In the West, Latin became the supranational tongue indispensable for the extension of Christianity to non-Romans. Greek never obtained the same supremacy in the East (Herrin 1987: 92-93).

The Roman Church was the one imperial institution to survive the collapse of the western empire. It remained a vital element of continuity and contact with the Roman past and with the rump Empire in the East. Even after 476, the West was considered *de jure* part of the Christian and Roman Empire. There were Byzantine reconquests in the sixth century and large, but diminishing, parts of Italy stayed Byzantine until the eleventh century. The Pope remained the Byzantine emperor’s secular deputy in the Roman duchy, and the Roman Church was part of the empire’s administrative system. Its internal organisation has basically retained its imperial structure until the present day.

The Church came to offer the sole opportunity for a public career open to the remaining western senatorial class. As Roman and Gallo-Roman bishops they emerged as the main agents in the Romanisation and Christianisation of the new sub-Roman kingdoms. “The leaders of the new Christian society came from aristocratic families. The aristocracy was educated and it ensured that government fell to the new, Christian elite” (Le Goff 2005: 23). The bishops, and especially the bishop of Rome, also took on more and more responsibility of civil government, diplomacy and defence. Already in the sixth century, Justinian had conferred on the bishops administrative powers in wide areas of civil government: treatment of prisoners, orphans, foundlings and lunatics, civil expenditures, public works, aqueduct maintenance and the supply of foodstuffs to the troops (La Due 1999: 63).
As the Roman Church expanded in the North and West, the new territories were divided into dioceses according to Roman administrative tradition. The power of the bishops governing the dioceses was increasing, particularly in the administration of towns. In parallel to the remodelling of space, time was refashioned too. The seven-day weekly rhythm, with one day rest, as well as an annual rhythm of Christian holidays, notably Christmas and Easter, were introduced. New church bells marked daily, weekly and annual Christian time from bell-towers both in town and countryside. In parallel with the decline of towns that followed the fall of the western Roman empire, new monasteries were built all over the rural West. From the fourth century to the eighth, monks played a key role in the Christianisation of peasants, thus assimilating them into the formerly mainly urban Roman-Christian culture. A growing cult of Western saints and holy relics added to the unity of this culture. Places that contained famous relics, such as Tours, Rome and Santiago de Compostela, were promoted as destinations of pilgrimages. These forged links among the peoples of the European West and stimulated long-distance trade along the same routes. The routes were soon organised into definite stages and networks (le Goff 2005: 23-25). Another sign of ‘medieval Europeanisation’ was the diffusion throughout Europe of minting and charters (Bartlett 1993).

By contrast, repeated theological disputes undermined the religious and ecclesiastic unity of West and East, notably the quarrel over images (icons) in the eighth century. Other issues were Byzantine claims to dominate the whole of Christendom, Latin as well as Greek, along with Byzantium’s refusal to acknowledge the bishop of Rome as overall sovereign of the Church, in addition to differences in liturgical language (le Goff 2005: 26). In Roman eyes, the eastern churches were hopelessly prone to theological argument and heresy. In reality, the problem was the diversity and ambiguities of the Scriptures and the need to establish an authoritative Christian interpretation and canon. The Hellenistic tradition for philosophical argument and speculation enabled eastern scholars to make the major contribution to this task. Greek- and Syriac-speaking theologians had excelled at the councils and synods of the late ancient church, whereas the less erudite Roman and African
churches were sometimes not present at all. Many decisions did not even reach them, were not translated into Latin, or were mistranslated.

In the West, the pre-eminence of the bishop of Rome and the generally low intellectual level permitted the emerging Pope\textsuperscript{25} to impose a certain theological unity. Major arguments for his sovereignty, or primacy, was his residence in the ancient capital and in the city where the graves of the apostles Peter and Paul were located. A so-called Petrine or petrinological thesis emerged, according to which the ‘prince of the apostles,’ St Peter, had founded the Roman congregation and instituted its head, the Pope, as his successor.

The Latin Church Fathers, and notably Ss Ambrose (339-397), Jerome (c. 347-420) and Augustine (354-430), were instrumental in defining a distinct western or Latin Christian theology. The patristic doctrines also contributed fundamentally towards European cultural unity (le Goff 2005: 15). As bishop of Milan, Ambrose insisted on the autonomy of the Church in spiritual matters, thus challenging the Constantinian, Cæsaropapist argument. He claimed jurisdiction over all Christians, including the emperor, for the Church. St Jerome’s translation of the Hebrew Bible into Latin, a revised version of which became known as the ‘Vulgate,’ was crucial in impressing Roman legalistic, universalist-descending ideology and discourse on the European Middle Ages:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[25] The title of Pope (Latin \textit{papa}, father) was first used by Pope Siricius (384-99), but was applied to all the patriarchs until about 700 (Bagge 2004: 84). In the eastern orthodox church all priests are still called ‘Pope’, as is the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria. In the west, the title of ‘Pope’ became more and more exclusively reserved for the bishop of Rome during the ninth or tenth centuries, a practice Gregory VII formalised in 1073.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The original Hebrew as well as the Greek texts of the Bible now became available in a Latin which was the language of the late fourth-century educated Roman classes. But since a good deal of the Old Testament especially was legalistic, the employment of Roman law terminology to convey the meaning of Old Testament expressions suggested itself. Roman legal terminology was thus unobtrusively disseminated throughout the Bible text of the Vulgate. The readers of the Bible in the Middle Ages absorbed at the same time basic Roman jurisprudence. It is commonly overlooked that the Latinised Bible was one of the most influential transmitters of Roman law ideas to the European Middle Ages. That for the Papacy the availability of a competent and elegant Latin text of the Bible was of vital concern, was self-evident. What needs stressing however is that the legal and institutional character of the Papacy came to be strongly buttressed by the Vulgate: the service rendered by this translation to the nascent as well as the matured Papacy is hardly recognised, but deserves to be properly appreciated. (Ullmann 2003: 13)

However, according to le Goff (2005: 15), it was St Augustine who, after St Paul, made the greatest contribution to the establishment and development of Christianity. Augustine elaborated the Stoic notion of two commonwealths into the Christian idea of the two kingdoms, the kingdom of Earth and the kingdom of Heaven. Similarly, he argued that human beings have two natures: the material one emanating from the interests of the body and the immaterial one that belongs to the soul. This distinction was to be fundamental to all Christian thought on ethics and politics (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 184-186).

Later patristic writing, notably that of Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville, interpreted Augustine as identifying the Church with the Kingdom of God on earth. As the ultimate goal of earthly existence is to enter the Heavenly kingdom, God has instituted the Church to guide all of humanity to salvation. According to what has been termed political Augustinianism, the fundamental duty of temporal government is to help the Church achieve this (Canning 1996: 42-43). The earthly kingdom must therefore necessarily be Christian, and spiritually subject to the Church. Augustine’s
De civitate dei\textsuperscript{26} thus inspired the later medieval notion of Christendom as the kingdom of God on earth with the Church, headed by the Pope, as the guiding agency. But also the theory of the Holy Roman Empire was built upon Augustine’s City of God.

Pope Gregory I (‘the Great,’ 590-604) and his successors rejected claims by the patriarch of Constantinople to be styled ‘universal patriarch.’ Gregory strengthened his temporal power by gaining control over and developing the so-called Patrimony of St Peter – landed estates of the Holy See located mainly in Italy. His extensive pastoral activities greatly enhanced the Papacy’s general prestige in the West and advanced the emergence of a distinctly western Christian identity. He intervened in doctrinal disputes and ecclesiastical affairs of every western kingdom; promoted the conversion of the Arian Visigoths in Spain to Orthodox Catholicism; initiated the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons in England; and imposed a Roman rite that became the basic liturgy of the West. Especially important for the future, Gregory encouraged the cult of St Peter among the Christians of northern Europe, thus building up a religious fervour and loyalty there that would be essential for the future of the Roman Church, and for the emergence of a distinctly Latin Christian, western and ultimately European identity.

Another important means for the build-up of papal authority was the increasing reliance on Roman law and legal principles. According to Ullmann, the Papacy thus contributed vitally to making the rule of law a defining aspect of Europeanness:

\begin{quote}
From its infancy the Papacy had spent its life on Roman soil and in Roman environs. However much the legal complexion of the Papacy has been misunderstood, the great legacy which the institution handed to later medieval (and modern) Europe is undeniable, for in the public field it was the Papacy as primarily an organ of the law which formed the bridgehead between the raw, illiterate and barbarous Germanic West and the ancient, mature and fully developed Roman civilisation. There was no other link between these two but the Papacy in Rome. In transmitting the idea of the law as the vehicle of government the Roman Papacy has made a fundamental and perhaps its most important contribution to the making of Europe. (Ullmann 2003: 11)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{26} Normally translated as the ‘City of God,’ but \textit{civitate}, the Latin version of the Greek polis, may also be rendered as kingdom, state or society.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a reformist Papacy was to develop canon law out of Roman law as the basis for the practical exercise of papal authority (see below, Section 3.7.4). Canon law was ‘supranational,’ exacting obedience all over the Christian world. Although concerned primarily with spiritual, moral, and ecclesiastical matters, it intruded widely into secular affairs. As the problems facing the Church increased in complexity, its references to Roman law increased. This was also one reason why the Papacy came to play such a crucial role in promoting the western revival of Roman law in the eleventh century.

These developments contributed to a transformation of western attitudes to the role of the emperor. On the basis of the writings of the Latin Fathers (especially Ss Ambrose, Gelasius, Augustine and Gregory), a dualist western theory of Christian empire emerged. Influenced by Stoicist dualism and spurred by Roman disaffection with Byzantine aberration from orthodox (Nicean) doctrine, the idea emerged that imperium and sacerdotium, temporal and spiritual power, were distinct, parallel powers instituted by God. Though the most sacred duty of both princes and clerics remained to work jointly for the salvation of mankind, according to this western scheme the temporal and spiritual spheres of authority should have their own laws, organs of legislation and administration and proper right (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 189; Canning 1996: 34). Thus was born the idea of the libertas ecclesiae, a fundamentally important, early medieval contribution to western liberal theory and practice.

However, in the shorter term the rise of Islam from 622 onwards was more fateful for Christian unity and for the formation of European identity as distinct from Greco-Roman, Mediterranean identity. In the period from 632 to 656 newly converted Arabs conquered Syria, Palestine, Persia and Egypt in lightning succession. The Holy City of Jerusalem, the spiritual centre for all Christians and thus an essential part of the Christian Roman Empire, fell in 638. Blocked on the northern front by resilient and strategically well-located Constantinople, the Umayaad Caliphate advanced along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. In 711 they crossed the strait of Gibraltar, overwhelming Visigothic Spain, and advanced into southern France. Here they were
eventually stopped by the Austrasian (Frankish) king Charles Martel at the epic battle on the road between Tours and Poitiers in 732 (or 733). A contemporary source calls the members of Charles’ army ‘Europeans’ and presented the battle as a victory for them (le Goff 2005: 27). Also subsequent Frankish and papal propaganda glorified their victory as a great success for Christendom and Europe, which they came to see as one and the same.

This was the first time that the Muslim ‘Other’ was actively used in the construction of a distinct European identity. Islam was later to prove a “violent midwife” of Europe to the extent that Cardini (2001: 3) suggests that the prophet Mohammed should be named one of the ‘fathers of Europe.’ The establishment of the universalist Caliphate, which like the Ottomans later sought to wrench the title to world hegemony from the Roman emperor in Constantinople, had important consequences for Church politics. The loss of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem to the Arabs strengthened the relative position of the patriarch of Constantinople vis-à-vis his colleague in Rome. The bipolarity that replaced the earlier pentarchy increased the risk of head-on East-West clashes over theology and primacy. Moreover, the loss of Jerusalem to the Arabs augmented the importance of Rome, the site of the graves of Ss Peter and Paul, as a destination of pilgrimage.

The rise of an Islamic competitor for universal empire was also the main reason for the transformation of the remaining eastern Roman into the ‘Byzantine Empire’ in the seventh and eighth centuries. According to Ostrogorsky, the deposition and murder of the last emperor of the Heraclian dynasty in 711 was the turning-point in this regard:

The universal Roman Empire now belonged to the past. While Germanic kingdoms were growing up in the West, Byzantium, however much it clung to Roman political conceptions and Roman traditions, became a medieval Greek Empire. Greek culture and the Greek language finally triumphed in the eastern reaches over the artificially cultivated Romanism of the early Byzantine transitional period, thus giving the Eastern Empire its own distinctive character and guiding its development in a new direction. (Ostrogorsky 1969: 146)

The ineffectiveness of New Rome’s universalist pretensions was demonstrated by the failure of Heraclius’ successors to check not only Arab conquest of Roman possessions in the Near East, but also new barbarian encroachments from the north and
west. Increasing numbers of Slavs settled in the southern Balkans and in Greece, and just north of the Danube a Bulgarian kingdom arose. Only Asia Minor and the other predominantly Greek-speaking and Orthodox Christian areas put up serious resistance and remained part of the empire. Constantinople withstood repeated Arab attacks and eventually reversed its fortunes through crucial victories in 678, 718 and 740. But the ancient cultural unity of the Mediterranean had been lost forever.

The territorial extent of the Empire was now drastically reduced, but within its new frontiers it was more compact, cohesive, and ‘national’ than before. The Arab advance thus caused a new particularist tendency, expressed in increased references to Old Testament models. Having restored the True Cross to the rebuilt church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in 630, Emperor Heraclius took the title of king (basileus, to which was however added ton rhomaion when ‘Roman’ imperial pretensions re-emerged in the West; see below, page 169). Foreshadowing a later western European, nationalist idea, Emperor Leo III saw Byzantium as a new Israel (Angold 2001: 44, 71). The diminished empire came “to regard itself as the Christian fortress of the Near East: the Holy Cross at Jerusalem was the Ark of the Covenant, and the Byzantines regarded themselves no longer as citizens of a world-empire, but as a Chosen People ringed by hostile, pagan nations” (P. Brown 1971: 174).

The Byzantine Empire, like the original Roman Empire, straddled geographical Europe, Asia and (until the seventh century) Africa. Thus it could not consider itself ‘European’ in any but a partial, geographical sense. The ‘Byzantine’ denomination was promoted by Enlightenment historians and philosophes such as Edward Gibbon, Charles Lebeau, Montesquieu and Voltaire, who contrasted its un-European and oriental character with the rational civilisation of the proper (i.e. Western) Europe of their time (Ostrogorsky 1969: 4-5; Fontana 1995: 58).

However, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards the German historians Ranke and Mommsen began to dispel the Gibbonian myth of the “thousand years’ decline.” They thus paved the way for a better informed and more balanced scholarship of the period they began to call Late Antiquity (c. 300-800) in preference to the earlier usage of ‘the Dark Ages.’ In recent decades, Byzantine studies have
grown enormously (Mango 2002: v). This has led to an improved understanding of the
Byzantine Empire and its historical significance for Europe and the Mediterranean and
wider region. On the basis of this newer literature, it is possible to argue that the
Byzantine Empire contributed to the definition of future Europe, Europeanness and
Europeanism, in four important ways that can only be briefly described here:

First, as I have already indicated, its survival as a viable polity in the eastern
Mediterranean had critical implications for the whole region. In a European
geopolitical perspective, the protection Byzantium provided against Arab, Seljuk,
Mongol, and Ottoman invasions from the east was a necessary prerequisite for what
has been variably called ‘the rise of the West,’ ‘the making of Europe,’ ‘the European
miracle,’ etc.

Second, Constantinople remained the core of the distinct Eastern or Greek
Christianity that evolved from the increasing division between East and West just
described and that spread from Byzantium towards the northwest and north into the
eastern part of Europe. This assured that new Slavic and Bulgarian polities, most
significantly Russia, became part of wider Christendom and eventually also were
significantly influenced by the modern European civilisation that emerged in the West.

Third, the Byzantine Empire contributed importantly to the survival and
continued influence in Europe of the Roman universalist-descending idea, as well as
that of Greco-Roman, Stoic-Christian cosmopolitanism. The Byzantines continued to
see themselves as the true inheritors of the Roman legacy. The ‘golden age’ of the
Macedonian dynasty (867-1056) revived the Byzantine belief in the universality of the
emperor’s sovereignty, in the empire’s right to Italy and the West, and in the idea that
the rulers of western Europe, like those of the Slavs, held their authority by virtue of
their special relationship to the one true emperor in Constantinople. As Ostrogorsky
puts it,
Byzantine history is indeed only a new phase of Roman history, just as the Byzantine state is only a continuation of the old *imperium romanum*. The word ‘Byzantine’ is of course the expression of a later generation and was not used by the so-called ‘Byzantines.’ They always called themselves Romans (*Romaioi*) and their Emperor considered himself as a Roman ruler, the successor and heir of the old Roman Caesars. They remained under the spell of the name of Rome as long as the Empire lasted and to the end the tradition of Roman government dominated their political thought and purpose. The Empire contained many different races all bound together by means of the Roman idea of the state, and the relation of the Empire to the outside world was determined by the Roman concept of universality. As heir of the Roman *imperium* Byzantium aspired to be the sole Empire and claimed control of all lands which had originally belonged to the Roman *orbis* and now formed part of the Christian world (*oikoumene*). Hard reality thrust this claim further and further into the background, but the states which grew up within the Christian ecumenical jurisdiction on former Roman territory side by side with the Byzantine Empire were not regarded as being its equals. A complicated hierarchy of states developed, and at its apex was the ruler of Byzantium as Roman Emperor and head of Christendom. In the early Byzantine era imperial politics concentrated on maintaining direct control of the *orbis romanus*; in the middle and late Byzantine periods they were concerned with maintaining what was by then a theoretical supremacy. (Ostrogorsky 1969: 28)

Still, in its part-time role as the West’s ‘Other,’ Byzantium reinforced the self-awareness and ambitions of both the Pope and the new western emperor he created, as well as their joint forging of a distinct Western Christendom. From the eleventh century onwards, if not earlier, this entity was called *christianitas* (Jordan 2002: 75). 27 In this capacity the eastern empire also became a pretext for the designs on the East of the Normans, the crusaders and other high and late medieval westerners. Even Arabs, Bulgars, Serbs, Russians, and Turks were impressed – or provoked – by the Byzantines’ pretence that who ruled new Rome ruled ‘the world;’ or at least was pre-eminent among rulers. After the Ottomans captured Constantinople in 1453, the Sultan stepped into the Roman imperial legacy and made such claims for the Sublime Porte, whereupon Moscow presented a counter-claim to be ‘Third Rome.’ For almost a century after Greeks began the struggle for independence from the Ottomans in 1821,
Greek nation-builders were vexed by the question whether Constantinople must be recovered as the capital of a cosmopolitan empire including all Greeks in the East (the *megalea idea*) or they should aim instead for a compact Greek nation-state centred on Athens (Woodhouse 1991: Introduction, ch. IV-VI).

Fourth, it is Byzantium’s distinction to have introduced the Greco-Roman legacy to eastern Europe and Russia, and to have contributed to its revival in the West by way of Italy. While holding that Byzantine culture generally had an epigonic and eclectic character and a predilection for compilation, imitation and empty conventional rhetoric, Ostrogorsky thus argues that

> a great deal is owed to Byzantium for its solicitous preservation of classical masterpieces and its careful attention to Roman law and Greek culture. […] Christian Byzantium proscribed neither pagan art nor pagan learning. Roman law always remained the basis of its legal system and legal outlook, and Greek thought of its intellectual life. Greek learning and philosophy, Greek historians and poets, were the models of the most devout Byzantines. The church itself incorporated into its teaching much of the thought of the pagan philosophers and used their intellectual equipment in articulating Christian doctrine. This tenacious awareness of the classical achievements was a special source of strength to the Byzantine Empire. Rooted in the Greek tradition, Byzantium stood for a thousand years as the most important stronghold of culture and learning; rooted in Roman concepts of government, its Empire had a predominant place in the medieval world. (Ostrogorsky 1968: 32-33)

Similarly, Constantinople became such an important source of western (mainly north Italian) wealth through trade – and plunder – that it helped develop capitalism and the free city (and thus arguably even democracy) in emerging ‘Europe.’ Italian coastal cities (some, notably Venice, originally under Byzantine suzerainty) flourished as entrepots and entrepreneurs of long-distance trade with the Byzantine and Islamic east and the European north. This contributed importantly to the Italian Renaissance, which in turn prepared the subsequent scientific and philosophical revolutions, with all its repercussions for Europe and the world (see below, Chapter 3.8).

27 According to Melve (2009: 303), Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) was the first to use the term.
After Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, Byzantine traditions were assumed by the grand princes of Moscow and sealed by the marriage in 1472 between Sophia, niece of the last emperor, and Ivan the Great. Their grandson, Ivan IV (better known as ‘the Terrible’) was crowned Tsar (a word probably deriving from the Greek kaisar = Cæsar), adopted Byzantine court ceremonial, which he transferred to the newly constructed Kremlin in Moscow, and perpetuated descending-universalist elements in an empire that lasted until 1917 (Herrin 1987: 476).

The Tsars also adopted the Byzantine model of state-church relations, using the church as their primary support in the effort to create a strong central government. They therefore worked eagerly to reinforce the position of the church among the people and in the state administration, for instance through an extensive building of churches patterned on Byzantine architecture and iconography. After the establishment of a new patriarchate in Moscow in 1589 to oppose then expanding Polish and Catholic influence, Moscow began to be called ‘the Third Rome,’ i.e. the successor of ‘the Second Rome’, Constantinople. The patriarchate, which Peter the Great transformed into the Holy Synod in 1721, became an effective means to expand the Orthodox creed and Russian rule among the various non-Russian tribes to the south and east. The Russian Orthodox Church, like other Orthodox national churches in eastern and south-eastern Europe, thus became a vital instrument of nation-building.

Their historical disputes with Rome and close association with the state have in turn made the Orthodox churches in Europe apprehensive of contemporary European integration. On the other hand, they are anxious that the EU assumes a more explicitly Christian identity, differentiating itself both from secularism and Islam, including Turkish membership (Philpott and Shah in Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006).

As for the Greeks, under Ottoman rule and later they continued to call themselves Romans, and Rûm (Rome) remained the name of the areas where the majority of Greeks lived, be it Anatolia or mainland Greece (Woodhouse 1991: 16). The Sultan in the first phase after conquering Constantinople made clear his claim to Roman succession by calling himself Kaisar-i-Rûm and his empire mamâlik-i-Rûm. Later the Greek-orthodox ‘nation’ living in the empire was called millet-i-Rûm (Clogg 1992;
As noted, the Byzantine heritage inspired nineteenth century Greek state-builders to pursue a vision – the *megalea idea* – of a resurrected Constantinopolitan empire encompassing most of the Greeks scattered around the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. Arguably, two historical ideas thus have encouraged the identification of modern Greeks with Europe: Byzantine cosmopolitanism and the notion of ancient Greece as the cradle of Europe. The Greek Orthodox Church, although regarding itself as a guardian of Greek national identity, has since about 2002 voiced cautious support of European integration (including the accession of eastern Orthodox countries), albeit stressing that the European Union must be preserved as a Christian European project (Philpott and Shah in Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006: 56).

### 3.7.2 The Making of Europe

As we have seen (above, page 50), Rokkan stresses the significance for future nation-building of “the Germanic kingdoms and the traditions of legislative-judicial assemblies of free heads of families” (Rokkan 1999: 149). This statement reflects two common assumptions of national-liberal historiography: that the Germanic war-bands that penetrated the Roman Empire in the first century AD represented the origins of the later European nation-states, and that they practiced constitutional monarchy. These notions of the origins of particularist-ascending, modern sovereignty are now contested in a historiographical debate that is undermining the traditional national-liberal interpretation of the ‘Making of Europe.’

The modernist, national-liberal reading of Late Antiquity was mainly constructed by the nineteenth century ‘Borussian’ school of historiography, based in Protestant northern Germany. Its core thesis, that ‘Germanic’ society in the first century AD was composed of free and equal peasants organised into state-type polities, was launched in 1844 by the eminent historian Georg Waitz (Bakka 1998: 187-189). Bakka argues that
Waitz’s postulation of a Germanic *Urdemokratie* entered Marxism as the notion of an *Urkommunismus*, and also tied in with British Whig and French national-revolutionary historiography and with American social science.28

Against this ‘Germanist’ interpretation, ‘Romanist’ historians have emphasised the continued influence of Roman institutions and traditions (Noble, ed., 2006). According to Canning (1996: 16), there is “a growing opinion that [the] whole intellectual structure of Germanic [popular] kingship is a myth.” Canning (ibid.) argues that the kind of kingship that in fact emerged in the post-Roman barbarian kingdoms was overwhelmingly Roman and Christian in character and stressed the power and authority of the monarch. Similarly, Hagen Schulze starts his *Germany: A New History* with the assertion that “The origins of German history lie not in the primeval forests of the north but in Rome […]” (Schulze 1998: 1).

Patrick J. Geary’s *Myth of Nations* (2002) contains a particularly sustained critique of the ethnic nationalist, or ‘primordialistic’ (Smith 1966), view of the barbarians. According to Geary, the Germanic ‘nations’ of Roman and early medieval times were created from above; they did not grow democratically from below. In fact they first appeared in the imagination of the Romans as ideas that were only much later embraced and adapted by modern nation-builders. Political and military centralisation led to common government, which in turn resulted in the evolution of community feeling among ethnically and culturally disparate subjects. As far as political ideas are concerned, in the process of building early medieval *regna*, sophisticated Roman and Christian ideology was far more influential than Germanic, Celtic, Slav or other ‘barbarian’ traditions.

Roman authors such as Julius Cæsar indeed referred to the loose corporations of Franks, Alamanni, Goths etc. that appeared on the borders of the Empire in the second

28 According to Iggers (1999: 25), the historical discipline that emerged in the United States in the 1870s and 1880s “not only followed German models of scholarship but created a historical myth which saw the origins of American liberty in the primeval forests of Teutonic Northern Europe.” Geary reminds us that the third American president, Thomas Jefferson, proposed to put replicas of Hengist and Horsa, the first Saxon chiefs to arrive in Britain, on the official seal of the United States (Geary 2002: 6-7).
century AD as ‘Germans’ (Germani), but this “they would call all of the peoples who appeared on the Rhine frontier regardless of linguistic or other ‘ethnic’ criteria” (Geary 2002: 81). Cæsar had borrowed the name from the Gauls,

who used this term for the savage peoples who tried to penetrate Gaul from across the Rhine. From the name of these tribes Cæsar also derived the term for the region beyond the Rhine and the Danube: Germania. The word ‘German’ was not much more than a designation of origin for someone who came from the little-known regions east of the Rhine; the degree of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity prevailing among these peoples is still a matter of debate among scholars. (Schulze 1998: 4)

The first ethnographic description of the ‘Germans’ and the most important primary source of the glorification of ‘Germanic’ liberty is the work Germania by the first century Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus. Here Tacitus praises what he saw as the Germans’ love of freedom and bravery, which he contrasted unfavourably to the decadent Romans of his day.29 According to Geary, classical Roman ethnography came to contrast a constitutionally or politically defined populus romanus, whose membership was a matter of citizenship, with biologically defined ‘barbarian’ populi, gentes, natii or tribi, whose membership depended on descent, custom and geography. ‘We’, the glorious Romans, descendants of the Trojans and successors of the magnificent Greeks, were part of universal history, i.e. of the unfolding of civilisation. ‘They,’ the barbarians, were interesting but ultimately insignificant bystanders, destined to be Romanised and disappear or remain on the margin (Geary 2002: 49-50).

Once established in formerly Roman provinces, barbarian kings attempted to transform the culturally disparate members of their armies into a unified people with a common law and a common sense of identity. At the same time, they attempted to maintain a certain distance from the majority Roman population of their kingdoms. Equality however required equal antiquity, learning and virtue. Late Roman writers on ethnography such as Cassiodorus and Jordanes thus sought to give the ‘new’ peoples

29 Behind Tacitus and the other Roman ‘ethnographers’ stood Herodotus and the ancient Greek idea of the barbarians. Herodotus arguably pioneered not only historiography (see above, page 71), but ethnography too. But even Herodotus recognised that peoples (ethne; sing., ethnos) and tribes (gene, sing., genos) were contingent, volatile social entities that could appear as well as disappear in history.
on the imperial borders a history as ancient and glorious as that of the Romans and to place them in a Roman context as early as possible (Geary 2002: 61).

By the beginning of the fifth century, inhabitants of the Roman world, whether Christian, Jewish, or pagan, knew two theoretical models of ‘peoplehood’ – one ethnic, based on descent, custom, and territory; and one constitutional (or civic), based on law and adhesion (Geary 2002: 55). In reality, however, even the barbarian confederations were constitutional (political), and over time, the two models tended to converge. Tacitus’ *Germania* got lost and forgotten, and medieval men of learning tended to take Roman society and culture as their great model. Germanic groupings such as the Franks, Goths and Saxons flaunted parallel, not common, pedigrees, and did not think of themselves as related. The Franks indeed preferred to imagine that they originally were Trojans (like the Romans), not Germans.

The idea of a common Germanic past began to receive historical significance in a Germanic (rather than Roman) environment only in the court of Charlemagne. Carolingian patrons in Germany brought together under the single rubric of ‘Germanic tales’ the epics of various groups that had previously not shown any interest in what they had in common (P. Brown 1996: 309). Again the intention was clearly constitutional or political: to give cultural unity to an existing political reality: the new empire of Charlemagne. But this empire represented a loose amalgamation of amorphous Frankish (rather than ‘Germanic’), Roman and Christian elements, and soon broke into three parts (see below, Section 3.7.3. France and French emerged in the western part, Germany and German eventually in the eastern part, with Lotharingia-Burgundy for long a contested territory between them.

Schulze for his part argues that a German common identity only started to gel only around the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth century:

30 Obviously, ideas replicated much later in the differing French and German notions of nationality and citizenship (see below, Section 3.8.2)
For many centuries the people living east of the Rhine had no inkling that they were German; in contrast with the Franks or Anglo-Saxons, a single ‘German People’ did not exist. [...] The East Frankish kings called themselves rex, but not rex teutonicorum. [...] The unifying idea was Roman, not German. [...] Deutsch was a purely linguistic term and remained so for a long time [...] The German nation existed in the shadow of the Holy Roman Empire and its powerful mythical associations, and the important political symbols – the holy lance, the crown, Charlemagne’s throne in the Aachen cathedral – were all connected with the empire, not the kingdom. [...] In sum then, the period we are dealing with cannot be called the German Middle Ages or the noonday of the ‘German’ emperor, we cannot even speak of the beginnings of German history, for the people in question had no notion of being German. (Schulze 1998: 15-20).

Throughout most of the European Middle Ages, and later too, Roman order and civilisation remained the prevailing political ideal whatever the ethnic composition of the polity in question. As Keen argues,

To the peoples of the Mediterranean basin the Roman Empire had in its time provided a great measure of political, cultural and commercial unity. Under its rule, peace and prosperity had accompanied a high standard of civilisation. The men who lived in Europe in the Middle Ages were well aware of this, and knew too that a comparison between this Roman past and their own times would not be in their favour. Hence the Roman past for them appeared to have set a standard, which it should be their object to re-achieve. Everything which they rediscovered about the classical world, about its knowledge of philosophy and of natural science, about its systems of law, about its literary achievements, tended to underline this attitude. The restoration of the world-wide dominion of Rome was the dream not only of medieval Popes and emperors but also of many of their subjects and servants. It was a very natural desire, given the blessings which had once followed in the wake of Roman peace. (Keen 1968: 14-15)

When the Holy Roman Empire acquired the epithet ‘of the German nation’ in 1512,31 ‘nation’ referred to the aristocracy, “the only estate able to take political action” (Schulze 1998: 45). However, the term was soon to acquire cultural overtones. The Italian humanist Poggio Bracciolini had just rediscovered Tacitus’ Germania. Bracciolini’s efforts were part of the general Renaissance search for ancient, ‘classical’ origins. Humanists in the Holy Roman Empire, France and Poland became fascinated
with Tacitus’s image of a free, pure Germanic people. They began to sympathise with the victims of Roman imperialist expansion: the Gauls, the Germans, or the Slavs. Still, due to the lack of national unity, the word ‘Germany’ did not come into general use until about the end of the sixteenth century (Schulze 1998: 15).

The rediscovery of the *Germania* and emerging national awareness contributed to the famous debate between the ‘Ancients’ and the ‘Moderns,’ foreshadowing the later one between the Romanists and Germanists. Characteristic of the position of the Ancients were statements like “What is all history but the praise of Rome?” by the historian and poet Petrarch, and “ours [the Romans’] is Italy, ours Gaul, ours Spain, Germany [....] and many other lands; for wherever the Roman tongue holds sway, there is the Roman Empire” by the philologist Lorenzo Valla (quoted by Kelley 1998: 131, 176). ‘Modern’ historians developed an alternative narrative based on the *translatio imperii* myth, arguing that the modern empire was the German one, indeed that it had been Germanic since its inception in 800. Many humanists eventually concluded that the modern Germanic world was superior to the classical Greco-Roman one.

The quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns was exacerbated by the Reformation, with Lutheran scholars repudiating the whole Roman heritage, including Trojan ancestry, in favour of Germanic traditions and origins. “In the sixteenth century, truth took both national and confessional forms, as the European states, in imitation of ancient Rome, generated their own secular cults and ideology and their historiographers began the task of inventing traditions to suit modern needs and hopes” (Kelley 1998: 174).

As Kelley moreover notes, after the Reformation also English historiography “turned against the classical heritage and looked to its own national past as a source of legitimacy and prestige. As English Protestants rejected the tyranny of the Pope, so students of Anglo-Saxon liberty sought to throw off, retrospectively, the ‘Norman yoke’ and attendant French attributes” (Kelley 1998: 184). One of the first English

---

31 It should be noted that the Latin version is in the plural: *Sacrum Romanum Imperium Nationis Germaniae.*
historians to embrace the Germanist interpretation was Richard Verstegan. Also in
Spain and other countries, historical scholarship took a national turn after the
Reformation and Counter-Reformation.

Even Frenchmen – Gallicans as well as Protestants – now wanted to declare
historiographical and ancestral independence from Rome, celebrating their Frankish
and Gallic forefathers. Thus distinct Germanist and Gallic schools of historiography
emerged. According to Geary (2002: 21), in early modern France the king and nobility
(the first estate) came to hold the view that they themselves derived from the Germanic
Franks, whereas the commoners (the third estate) were the descendants of the original
Gallic population. They had been enslaved by Cæsar but liberated by the Franks, who
had thus established their right to rule. Later, Montesquieu was one the most notable
advocates of Germanism. Inspired not least by the association of the words ‘Frank’ and
‘Free,’ the French Germanists nurtured the myth of a traditional, age-old Germanic
love of freedom.

In early modern France, it was mainly monastic scholars who defended the
Romanist thesis against the Germanism championed by the nobility (Kelley 1999:
220). However, the Enlightenment added vital new support. Particularly important was
Edward Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-89). Gibbon depicted
the ‘Fall of Rome’ as a breakdown of civilisation caused by barbarian invasions and
followed, in his famous words, by the “religion and barbarism” of the ‘Dark Ages.’
During the French R*

By contrast, Augustin Thierry in his *History of the French Revolution* submitted
that the Revolution signified the final victory, after an age-long struggle, of the
democratic Gauls over the aristocratic Franks (Herman 1997: 62). In Geary’s words,
the Gallic thesis was that “the true French people, descendants of the Gauls, had long
borne the yoke of foreign servitude, first under the Romans and then under the Franks.
It was time to send this alien race back to the forests of Franconia and return France to
the third estate, the one true nation” (Geary 2002: 21). However, the continuing
influence of the Romanist tradition in France is illustrated by the French
revolutionaries’ adulation of the Roman republic and, even more notably, Napoleon’s carefully deployed Roman imagery (see below, Section 3.8.1).

Tacitus’ books came to be most enthusiastically embraced in Prussia, where historiography was pioneered as an academic discipline in the eighteenth century (see above, Section 3.4.3). Herder and the Göttingen historians (including Waitz), who were precursors of German national romanticism, took them as evidence of the antiquity and historical greatness of the German nation. By aggrandising the Tacitan myth they helped create German cultural nationalism and paved the way for political nationalism too (Geary 2002: 22). During the Napoleonic occupation, Fichte in his famous *Addresses to the German Nation* equated the imperialist Romans of the first century with the contemporary French occupants, and the German resistance to Roman expansion with himself and his German compatriots (see below, Section 3.8.3). German national identity became associated with Tacitus’s descriptions in his *Annales* of the German virtues and the account of Arminius’s (‘Hermann’s’) victory at the Teutoburg forest in 9 B.C. In the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* (Historical Monuments of Germany, one of whose original editors was Waitz) German historians posited an uninterrupted history for the German nation back to the Goths, the Franks, the Burgundians and the Vandals. Kelley concludes:

> How Franks and Gauls became ‘French’, Anglo-Saxons and Normans became ‘English’, Iberians and Visigoths became ‘Spanish’, and Teutons, Allemans, Saxons, and (again) Franks became ‘German’ involved complex processes of Christianisation, dynastic state building, and vernacular linguistic and cultural formations; but in fact the emergence of national traditions was due in large part to the retrospective labours of scholars – the legal fictions of jurists, the ideological constructs of publicists, the sentiments of poets, and especially the mythologising of historians, usually with the Roman model in mind. As Carlrichard Brüler has written, “It is a great historical falsehood to pretend that one is dealing with ‘French’ or ‘German’ history when in fact one should speak of Gallic, Frankish, or Germanic history.” The contentious and chauvinistic ways in which nationality was projected back into medieval times is a striking example of modern “work on myth,” and it is ironic that this has been a project carried on by the most learned and “scientific” of historians working in the service of political interests. (Kelley 1998: 118)
On this background, it seems natural to posit Julius Cæsar’s conquest of Gaul in 52 BC as the starting point of the ‘Making of Europe.’ It was his invasion that brought barbarian northwestern Europe into the Roman orbit. Later, in the second and third centuries AD, the economic centre of gravity of the western part of the Empire shifted from Italy to Gaul. Moreover, just as mounting barbarian pressure was a major reason for the removal of the overall imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople in the fourth century, barbarian incursions also caused the western capital to be moved from Rome, first to Milan, then to the Rhenish frontier. Northern Gaul from now on remained the political core of the West. The western emperor-general resided in Trier for much of the fourth century, and Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) became the capital of the Carolingian empire. There was thus a certain historical-territorial continuity between the last effective central government of the western Roman empire and its Frankish successor three hundred years later.

At the same time, Germanic, Celtic and Slav barbarians gradually adopted Roman ways. By the fourth century barbarians formed the bulk of the Roman army, especially in the West. *Foederati* were not only trained in Roman military and administrative systems, but were also exposed to other aspects of the Empire’s civilisation. “Barbarian leaders favourable to Rome found that they could reach previously unimaginable heights of power and influence, not by fighting against the Empire, but for it” (Geary 2002: 4). Romanisation also affected the tribes across the limes due to the considerable intercourse among all barbarian peoples, especially during periods of peace. When the great invasions began in the late fourth century, barbarian society had thus changed significantly, which eased the amalgamation of barbarians and Romans. The invaders-settlers were relatively few compared to the indigenous population, and tended naturally to assimilate the culture of the local Roman or Gallo-Roman aristocracy who had ruled the Romanised Celtic societies they conquered.

However, the other side of the coin was that the Roman army itself became barbarised (indeed in the late Empire the word ‘barbarian’ became interchangeable with ‘soldier’). This allowed barbarian Roman warriors to use their dual identity to enhance their position both in the empire and among their own people. Furthermore,
With the decline of central government in the fourth and fifth century western part of 
the Empire, local identities, expressed in terms at once derived from Roman civil 
subdivisions and from pre-Roman ‘ethnic’ vocabulary, came to dominate the rhetoric 
of provincial discourse.

Still, when the last western emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed in 476, 
no one supposed that the Empire had ceased in the West. There had already for 
centuries usually been two emperors, one ruling the West from Italy, and the other the 
East from Constantinople. Now there was only one, at Constantinople, who thus 
became, at least de jure, the sole ruler of both halves of the Empire (Keen 1968: 16-
17). Thus, when the barbarians set up kingdoms in the western provinces, they did not 
question the continuing authority of the Empire in the lands where they had settled:

Kingship denoted leadership of a barbarian people: such leaders looked to the 
eastern emperor to grant them titles which would give them authority over 
Roman citizens. Theodoric the Goth became patrician of Rome, and Clovis the 
Frank was hailed as Augustus. They used the emperor’s image on their coins, and 
continued to enforce the Roman law, not the barbarian laws by which their own 
people were bound, on the old inhabitants of the provinces. The empire never 
exactly ended; and though its influence became progressively more remote, deep 
respect remained for the unity it was supposed to enshrine. (Keen 1968: 17)

In the East, the imperial government co-operated with barbarian kingdoms on its 
borders that became ‘buffer states’ between the Empire and Persians advancing from 
the east and south and barbarians from the north. Among the barbarians on the Rhine-
Danube frontier, where there were no pre-existing kingdoms, the imperial strategy was 
to encourage the emergence of royal power. Chieftains turned kings could organise 
multi-tribal political units useful to the Romans. Under the kings, Germanic foederati 
were settled on Roman soil to perform the same duties as the barbarian buffer states in 
the east. Having created the German gentes as ideas, the Romans now proceeded to 
make them political realities.

Bakka (1998: 208) however notes a distinction between the western Germanic 
gentes such as the Franks and Alamanians and the northern Germanic Scandinavians:
Kingship was far more entrenched as a status position among the latter. In the ninth century age of the Vikings, this status was the node around which the Scandinavian kingdoms (riki) crystallised. It is perhaps also significant that the origin (probably mythical) of the eastern Germanic gentes (the Goths, Vandals, Burgundians and Heruls) was Scandinavia. Moreover, among these peoples kingship apparently became more firmly entrenched than among western Germanic peoples such as the Franks and the Alamanians. Roman influence decreased with increasing distance from Rome.

According to Geary (2002: 108-109), barbarian kings pursued three main strategies when they sought to forge a common identity in their new kingdoms. First and foremost, they claimed illustrious descent from ancient royal or noble families. Successful kings projected their family’s imagined past onto the people as a whole, providing a common sense of origin to be shared by the whole of the military elite while suppressing alternative claims to legitimate authority. Second, they used religion to promote a sense of common identity. The royal families of the Goths, Vandals, Burgundians and other Arian peoples cultivated Arianism for this purpose. Third, they relied on a ‘Germanic’ legal tradition sharply contrasting with Roman law, comprising a system of tariffs for offences (wergeld); the use of oaths and formal oral procedure; and with separate rights and responsibilities for barbarians and Romans.

As regards their attitude to the Roman or Romanised societies they conquered, according to Geary barbarian kings had two options. Depending on their present, religion, geopolitical location and geographic-mythical origin (far from or close to the Roman Empire), they chose either segregation or amalgamation. Kingdoms ruled by eastern Germanic kings on or close to the Mediterranean – the Vandal kingdom in North Africa; the Ostrogothic kingdom in the Italian peninsula; the Visigoth kingdom of Toulouse, later in the Iberian peninsula; the Burgundian kingdom in eastern Gaul and the western Alps – sought to keep the new ruling class and the indigenous inhabitants separate. The Visigoths pioneered a segregated polity that was replicated by the Vandals and Ostrogoths. It was based on the maintenance of two communities, one orthodox, Roman, and civilian, the other Arian, barbarian, and military, under the
unified command of a barbarian king holding an imperial commission as Roman patricians.

However, the failure of the segregation policy is well illustrated by the fate of the Ostrogothic kingdom. Odovacer, the Romano-barbarian general who deposed Romulus in 476, was recognised as Roman patrician with authority to rule in the name of the one remaining (eastern) emperor, Zeno. However, Zeno soon decided to give over the Italian peninsula to the Ostrogoths in order to deflect them from the eastern heartland of the Empire. The Ostrogothic king, Theodoric, was appointed patrician and founded a kingdom centred on Ravenna that lasted from 493 to 526. Theodoric was a Roman citizen and had held the office of consul in the East. He took his role of patrician and lieutenant in the West of the eastern Roman emperor very seriously. The essence of his policy, as had been that of Odovacer, was to preserve the civilisation of Rome. He “picked up the reins of the Roman government and the patronage of arts and culture to a degree unparalleled by the rulers of other Germanic kingdoms, encouraging the collaboration of his Roman aristocratic subjects” (Colish 1997: 44-45). Since he wanted to maintain diplomatic contact with Constantinople, he needed the services of men steeped in the classical tradition such as Cassiodorus and Boethius (see below), who knew Greek, court etiquette, and the operation of the late Roman bureaucracy.

At the same time, Theodoric sought to transform his heterogeneous, mobile barbarian army into a stable, settled, Gothic people capable of peaceful co-existence within Roman Italy. His goal for his Gothic following was civilitas, i.e. “to convince them to adopt Roman principles of the rule of law and Roman traditions of tolerance and consensus in civic society, which they were to protect with their military valour” (Geary 2002: 110-111). Nevertheless, Theodoric intended to maintain Goths and Romans as separate communities – one military, the other civilian – living in mutual dependence under his supreme authority. Gothic separateness was promoted by stressing the Arian faith and Theodoric’s august descent from the pre-Hunnic Amal family of kings.

As time passed, however, the boundaries between Ostrogothic warrior and Roman civilian blurred. Many barbarians became landowners increasingly tied to the
same economic and regional concerns as their Roman neighbours. The next generation of Goths, educated in the traditions of the Roman elite, felt even further removed from the warrior culture designated for them. At the same time, however, some Romans rose in the ranks of the military and adopted Gothic tradition even to the extent of learning the Gothic language and marrying Gothic women. An anti-Roman reaction emerged that allowed emperor Justinian to use Ostrogothic infighting as a pretext for invasion in 535.

The resultant ‘Gothic wars’ lasted for two decades, with devastating effects for the Ostrogothic kingdom and for Italy at large. By 556 Byzantine forces had recaptured most of the Italian peninsula (as well as northern Africa and southern Spain), but most was lost again to the newly invading people of the Lombards in the next fifty years. Only Ravenna and environs, the Patrimony of St Peter (mainly Rome and environs), Apulia, Calabria, Naples and Sicily remained in Byzantine hands. However, Justinian’s reconquest was a real turning-point in one sense: thereafter it seems that no western king sought imperial confirmation of his reign. Moreover, the devastations caused by the war, as well as tough imperial rule, taxation, and intervention in church affairs, caused local resentment. “The west from now on increasingly went its own way” (Canning 1996: 17). The Ostrogoths disappeared from history as a people as well as a polity. The Lombard kingdom, however, survived until the invasion by Charlemagne in 774, who took over the title King of the Lombards.

Like the Ostrogothic kingdom, the other new kingdoms ruled by Germanic invaders originating before the migrations in the east became fairly Romanised. The Visigoth king Ataulf (410-15) at one point renounced his earlier ambition to displace Rome by a Gothic empire and allegedly declared: “the unbridled barbarism of the Goth is incompatible with law, and without law there can be no state. Therefore, since I cannot supplant her, I hope to be known to posterity as the restorer of Rome” (quoted

32 The last Byzantine toehold in Italy, Bari, was lost in 1071.
33 Two years later he made the Lombard duchies of Spoleto and Benevento part of the papal state; see below, Section 3.7.3
by Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 65). In 414, attired in the garb of a Roman senator, he married Gallia Placida, the daughter of emperor Theodosius I. Roman Catholic Christianity replaced Arianism as the official faith of the Visigothic kingdom in 589, in part to help overcome resistance among the local Roman and Catholic bishops and nobles. The subsequent anointing and consecration of Reccared as Christian king was modelled on the sacred kingship in the Old Testament. The ceremony was later taken as a model for the instalment of the Frankish king as well as the Holy Roman emperor. The Visigothic kingdom survived as a divisive, but relatively prosperous and sophisticated Roman-Gothic-Celtic polity until the Arab conquest of 711.

The Visigoths were the first of the Germanic war-bands to receive Christianity. They were baptised into Arianism by bishop Ulfilas (c. 310-383) in the 340s. Germanist/modernist historiography has considered Ulfilas the creator of a distinctively ‘Germanic’ or ‘Gothic’ Christianity, replete with a ‘national’ church and with an alphabet and script he invented when translating the Bible from Greek to Gothic. However, the conversion of Germanic gentes to Arianism had a Romanising effect too. Ulfilas was a missionary of Constantinople, as at the time of his consecration as ‘bishop of the Goths’, the Arian creed held sway in the Roman capital. Thus, to the Visigoths themselves, ‘Arianism’ was the truly universal Christianity, received in the glory days of the Roman Empire, the reigns of emperors Constantius II and Valens (P. Brown 1996: 60, 88).

Germanic peoples from the east settled in Roman core areas on or near the Mediterranean. By contrast, western Germanic tribal confederations such as the Franks, Alamanni, Frisians, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes were able to found enduring kingdoms further north and with a more balanced Roman, Germanic and Celtic culture. Here, Roman and barbarian distinctions rapidly disappeared. Geary notes that the Franks and Saxons initially served as federates of the empire, but had no direct experience of the Mediterranean world of Constantinople or even Italy: “They, like the provincial Romans they absorbed, were far removed from the cultural and administrative traditions of a Theodoric or a Cassiodorus. The result was a simpler, but
in the long run more thorough, transformation of these peoples into new social and cultural forms” (Geary 2002: 115).

The Franks turned out to be the Germanic confederation that influenced the politico-territorial organisation and identity of future Europe most profoundly. Their political ideals, however, like those of other Germanic groupings, were not ‘nationalist’ or even ‘Germanic,’ but crucially influenced by the image of the Roman Empire as experienced both first hand and as later transmitted and transformed by the Roman Church. Under Charlemagne the Frankish kingdom developed into an empire that united Cisalpine and Transalpine Europe in its adherence to the Roman and Christian tradition of universalism.

As we have seen, the barbarian invasions began a process of amalgamation between the Germanic, Celtic and Slav barbarians on the one hand, and the society of the Christian Roman Empire on the other. Gaul, where the two societies met on more equal terms than elsewhere, was thus to be the centre of the process forming the European identity of the future. In spite of their paganism, the Franks had a longer tradition of association with the Empire than any of the other western Germanic peoples. The Salian Franks were the only of the western Germanic tribes to invade and establish a kingdom inside the Roman Empire. They settled on imperial territory in present-day Belgium and on the Lower Rhine in the middle of the fourth century. In the fifth century they fought as _foederati_ of the Roman governors of Gaul against the Saxons, the Visigoths and the Huns. In 486 King Clovis (481-511) conquered the territory between the Loire and the Somme, which was the last relic of independent Roman Gaul, thus becoming ruler of a mixed Roman-Germanic-Gallic kingdom.

For a number of reasons (the Franks’ long establishment in Gaul; their deep involvement in imperial and regional political struggles; the fact that Clovis’ authority had been recognised by representatives of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy since the death of his father, king Childeric, long before his conversion to Christianity; etc.) Clovis’s absorption of rival power centres caused much less dramatic change than had the conquests of earlier barbarian kings. He took over the remnants of the Roman civil administration, which however did not extend beyond the level of the individual
The stability of the Merovingian dynasty established by Clovis – it ruled without interruption for two and a half centuries – was without parallel in early medieval Europe. It was also “the only dynasty in north Europe which could justly claim to be the heirs to Roman power. The Byzantine emperor remained, in the eyes of the kings, their nominal sovereign. And Merovingian methods of government, even in the time of Dagobert [sixth to seventh century], were recognisably Roman” (James 1988: 95).

As I have indicated, there is little evidence that the Franks had or attempted to create as strong and distinct a sense of identity vis-à-vis the Roman population as had Theodoric or other Gothic leaders. Rather than claiming ancient traditions separate from Rome, the Franks emphasised their communalities. Already in the sixth century, they claimed Trojan ancestry, thus connecting themselves genealogically to their Roman neighbours. The baptism by the Gallo-Roman bishop of Rheims, Remigius, of Clovis and his army of some 3000 soldiers in 496 showed that the Franks were prepared to accept also a common religion with the Romans. Clovis presented himself as the champion of Christian orthodoxy in his campaign against the Arian Visigoths in 507. After his victory, emissaries of emperor Anastasius granted him imperial recognition.

In the course of the next thirty years the Frankish monarchy advanced with extraordinary rapidity. Gaul was united once more, and eastwards its power was projected far beyond the old Roman frontiers. The Alamanni, the Thuringians and the Bavarians were conquered (and, with the assistance of the papal missionary bishop Boniface, converted to Roman Catholic orthodoxy) in rapid succession. The Frankish state that arose, Francia, has been claimed by both French and German nationalists as the ancestor of their states. United by a common religion and a common legend of origin, Clovis’ Franks and the Roman provincials of his kingdom proceeded quickly to forge a common identity. Within only a few generations, the population north of the Loire had become uniformly Frankish. Roman legal traditions persisted in the south and Burgundian and Roman legal status endured in the old Burgundian kingdom conquered by Clovis’s sons in the 530s. But these differing legal traditions did not
come to constitute the basis of a separate social or political identity: “The great strength of the Frankish synthesis was the creation of a unified society, drawing from the legacies of Roman and barbarians traditions” (Geary 2002: 118).

Moreover, through their alliance with the Roman Church, the Franks offered decisive assistance to the rise to a dominant position in European Christendom of the other main centripetal institution of the Middle Ages, the Papacy. Whether by coincidence or design,34 the pontificate of Gregory the Great (590-604; see also above, page 129) may be considered the starting point of this path:

With every justification can Gregory be called ‘Father of Europe.’ Its parentage and physiognomy were Roman, and its cementing bond was the faith as expounded by the Roman church. A merely physical or geographical entity was to become an ideological body which was sustained by its own inner forces, of which none was more resilient than the Christian faith in its Roman ecclesiastical shape. In prophetic vision Gregory himself saw this European union as the union of a Christian commonwealth (‘societas reipublicae christianae’), the basic ingredient of which were of Roman and ecclesiastical provenance. (Ullmann 2003: 55-56)

Le Goff (2005: 18-19) too considers Gregory one of the “founding scholars” or “cultural fathers” of Europe, together with Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidore and Bede (see below). This reluctant but highly effective Pope helped the city of Rome overcome a serious flooding, an epidemic and the onslaught of the Lombards. He sent the monk Augustine with a group of missionaries to reconvert England; in his books he established Job and St Benedict as great models for Christians; he composed a highly influential pastoral handbook for clerics; and reformed the liturgical chant, henceforth known as the Gregorian Chant.

The alliance between the Frankish kingdom and the Roman Church inaugurated in 496 became instrumental to the transmission and extension of the Roman political

34 Ullmann’s (1972: 54-58) claim that Gregory intentionally turned to the “young” and “virile” Germanic nations of western Europe in his alleged pursuit of universal papal monarchy is controversial and probably not tenable (Herrin 1987: 182; Canning 1996: 38). Gregory still retained a unitary notion of Christendom and thus considered the western barbarian kingdoms to be subject to the universal Roman emperor at Constantinople. In retrospect, however, Ullmann is no doubt right to point out that Gregory’s mission to England paved the way for distinctly western, or European, Christendom.
tradition, the Catholic faith and the classical heritage to medieval Europe. As barbarians converted to the Roman faith, Latin increasingly became the *lingua franca* of western Christendom. Unlike the Byzantine missionaries Cyril and Methodius, who translated the Bible and the liturgy into a tongue understood by the Slavs they converted, western churchmen who evangelised the western barbarians stuck with the Latin Bible (Jerome’s Vulgate) and liturgy. Until Bede’s Old English version, Ulphilas’ translation of the Bible into the vernacular in the fourth century remained an exception. Celtic and Germanic students had to learn Latin before they could open the seals of the sacred books, the books of the liberal arts, and the works of the church fathers and transmitters.

Just as Christianity took on the coloration of classical literature and philosophy, and an institutional shape based on the bureaucratic and legal system of Rome, so church leaders made adjustments to the Celtic and Germanic mentalities and value systems in their efforts to evangelise these peoples, a process that intensified when thinkers from these very groups became the leaders who took charge of the schoolrooms and pulpits. (Colish 1997: 56-57)

The Church gradually took full control of education and thus the access to knowledge. One of the results was that in ex-Roman regions ruled by the Franks, Burgundians, Visigoths and Lombards, Latin or neo-Latinate dialects prevailed over and replaced the languages of the barbarian conquerors. This facilitated the adoption of Roman and Christian ideology while also laying the foundations of the modern Romance languages. The only part of ex-Roman Western Europe where Germanic speech struck permanent root was Britain under the Anglo-Saxons. The reason was probably the abrupt and thorough de-Romanisation of Britain in the fifth century, followed as it was by an almost complete breakdown of ecclesiastical structures in the sixth.

35 Pope John Paul II proclaimed Cyril and Methodius patron saints of Europe, along with St Benedict of Nursia so proclaimed earlier by Pope Paul VI.
Germanic languages also prevailed in areas which had not been part of the Roman Empire, such as trans-Rhine Germany and Scandinavia, as did Slavic languages in post-Roman as well as entirely non-Roman territories (with the exception of most of present-day Romania and Moldova). However, although the Germanic dialects were probably mutually comprehensible, there was no common German (‘Deutsch’, or Teutonic) language in Roman or medieval times. A standard German writ only developed in early modern times, on the basis of Luther’s translation of the Bible (Schulze 1998: 16-18).

Conversion to Catholicism thus meant adoption of Latin as the means of written communication in the whole of European Christendom. Latin script remained virtually hegemonic in official church and state correspondence as well as in scientific discourse until the Enlightenment, when it began to be substituted by French. Still, although by a declining proportion, Latin continued to be used in parallel with vernacular script in Europe. Universities exclusively used Latin until the eighteenth century, and in some cases into the twentieth. Today words of Greek or Latin origin constitute between 75 and 90 per cent of the English vocabulary, and even 20 per cent of Swedish (Janson 2004). The Catholic mass was held in Latin until the 1960s, and Latin is still the preferred means of communication in the Catholic Church.

Arian and pagan barbarians outside of Gaul were converted to Catholicism primarily by monastic orders. The growth in the number of monasteries and their increasing importance as missionary centres from the fifth century onwards represented a ‘religious revolution’ (P. Brown 1996: 65). It was a consequence of cultural, economic and demographic decline, which made the medieval West increasingly rural. The most important early western monasteries were established toward the end of the fourth century in southern Gaul, on the island of Lerins (opposite Antibes) and at Marseilles. Lerins came to supply most of the bishops that dominated southern Gaul in the fifth century. Contact with the church of southern Gaul and England as well as the missions of Palladius and Patrick, sent by Pope Celestine I in 431, led to the expansion of Christianity into Celtic Ireland. Here monasteries became the most important units of ecclesiastical organisation.
The monasteries became centres not only for Roman Christianity, i.e. Catholicism, but, due to the influence of patristic writing, also for the study and transmission of essential parts of the pagan Greco-Roman heritage. Moreover, embracing the classical tradition boosted the claim of the Roman Church to inherit the Roman Empire in ecclesiastical organisation. The survival of the Greco-Roman heritage into medieval Europe was assured by monasteries such as that of Cassiodorus at Vivarium in southern Italy, of St Columba in Ionia in the Irish Sea, or of St Columbanus at Luxeuil in Francia, but also by influential intellectuals such as the civil servant and philosopher Boethius in Ostrogoth Italy and bishop Isidore of Seville in Visigothic Spain. Le Goff (2005: 16) considers men like these “cultural fathers of Europe.”

Cassiodorus (c. 490-580) descended from an old Roman senatorial family. His work reflected the relative cultural blossoming of Ostrogothic and Byzantine Italy in the sixth century (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 99-100; Colish 1997: 48-50). The educational philosophy he strove to realise was, in his own words, “using the methods of the liberal arts to aid the study of sacred works.” This involved an effort to preserve and master all the literature of Antiquity in the service of Christian education. Cassiodorus translated the works of some Greek church fathers into Latin, sharing his contemporary Boethius’s concern for the decline of Greek studies in the West. Like Boethius, he held a series of high offices in the Ostrogothic state. However, unlike the Ostrogoths, the Lombards who replaced them were uninterested in the sponsorship of classical education. Having retired from the civil service in 538 or 540, Cassiodorus drew on his own personal wealth and created a model school in the monastery he founded at Vivarium. He served as head of the school for the rest of his life, devoting himself to building up a library of manuscripts on both secular and theological subjects. It was here that he produced his major work as a transmitter, the *Institutes concerning Divine and Human Readings*, an extremely detailed annotated bibliography covering both theology and the liberal arts. According to le Goff (2005: 16), Cassiodorus was “the first to promote a Europe of books and libraries, the first to stress the sanctifying value of intellectual work and to suggest a new field of activity for
monks; namely, study, the means of perfecting oneself and influencing others.” He produced a veritable encyclopaedia of the profane sciences, intended for the use of monks.36

Boethius (c. 480-524), like Cassiodorus, was a Roman Christian leader of distinguished aristocratic stock who contributed decisively to the survival of classical learning in the Latin West (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 100-101; Colish 1997: 45-48). He studied the ancient masters in Athens, and later joined and reached the highest office in the Ostrogothic civil administration. Boethius’s work, both his translations from Greek to Latin and his own writings, including the classic *Consolation of Philosophy*, provided the West with much of its technical philosophical vocabulary and its only knowledge of Greek logic until the twelfth century. One of his staunchly orthodox theological works was a systematic application of Aristotelean logic to the problems of Christian theology. His appeal to Stoic logic proved to be immensely influential in the later history of medieval philosophy. In a letter to a friend he stated that his purpose was to “reconcile faith and reason”. His translation of standard Greek texts in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, labelling them the quadrivium, provided medieval students with their introductions to the liberal arts in Latin for many centuries. Colish (1997: 47) argues that “the role of Boethius as a transmitter and his contribution to the history of medieval education were thus fundamental.” According to le Goff (2005: 16) Boethius conveyed to the Middle Ages “all it knew of Aristotle” until the mid-twelfth century and provided the earliest basis for scholasticism. He was also one of the creators of medieval humanism and instrumental in getting music recognised as a “superior cultural tool, in accordance with the ancient ideal” (ibid.).

Isidore (c. 570-636), bishop of Seville, was “the greatest intellectual of the Spanish renaissance of the seventh century” (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 104). Isidore

_________________________

36 Le Goff (ibid.) adds that “for Europe, the encyclopaedia, yet another legacy from the Greeks, was a key inheritance from the Middle Ages.”
contributed strongly to the revival of classical learning that resulted from the conversion from Arianism to Catholicism of Visigothic Spain. Like the Italian transmitters, Isidore spoke Latin as his native language. However, he was one of the shrinking number of people in his country, which had been among the most intensively Romanised provinces of the former Roman empire, who also knew Greek. His self-appointed task was to cull what he thought were the best interpretations of the Greek fathers of the Church and to anthologise them. His chief contribution as a transmitter was the *Etymologies*, an encyclopaedic collection seeking to preserve for posterity all extant knowledge, “up to and including the kitchen sink” (Colish 1997: 51). It became a standard reference work and basis for learning until the thirteenth century humanists. One of the most important early collections of canon law is also attributed to Isidore. When the Arabs conquered the Visigothic kingdom in the early eighth century, cultured Spanish churchmen took refuge in the Frankish kingdom and contributed to the so-called the Carolingian renaissance, centred on the court of Charlemagne (below, section 3.7.3). According to le Goff, (2005: 18) Isidore was “the greatest encyclopaedist of the Middle Ages.” His *Book of Etymologies* was “an attempt to summarise the whole of human knowledge, and for the people of the Middle Ages and their European descendants” it became a kind of second Bible in the field of profane knowledge” (ibid.).

St Columba (c. 521–97) founded several monasteries throughout Ireland. In 563, he left Ireland and founded an important monastery on the island of Iona. As Abbot of Iona, he strove to convert the Picts of northern Scotland to Christianity. St Colombanus (543-615) was a nobleman turned monk from Leinster who left Ireland for Gaul, where he reinvigorated the Merovingian (Roman-Gallic) church. He founded several monasteries in Burgundy, notably Luxeuil, and later one in Bobbio in northern Italy. Luxeuil, with its six hundred monks, became the monastic metropolis of the Frankish kingdom.

The Anglo-Saxon monk Bede (the ‘Venerable’; 673-736), is regarded as the last of the Church Fathers. He took over from the monks who had converted England, bringing with them the legacy of ancient culture from Italy. His *Ecclesiastical History*
of the English people was the first attempt at a national history, and he also produced remarkable scientific work, notably on measuring time (le Goff 2005: 18). Bede was “the intellectual equal of the Latin Fathers” (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 109). His work clearly demonstrated that by the eighth century, Anglo-Saxon England had replaced Ireland at the cutting edge of Latin Christian culture (Colish 1997: 64). Bede was one of the few western church leaders in the early Middle Ages with a thorough command of Greek. His translation of the Bible into Old English was an important contribution towards the creation of English literature and to the vernacularisation of the Christian message.

The monasteries that dominated the Celtic church became sheltered centres for the study of both sacred and secular learning. The Irish missionary movement towards England and the Continent spearheaded by Ss Columba and Columbanus “indicates how dramatically cultural leadership had shifted from the south to north. In all these monastic centres, the Irish provided bilingual education in Greek and Latin and produced a substantial secular as well as Christian literature, in connection with the teaching of the liberal arts, the writing of hagiography, and an extremely allegorical form of biblical exegesis” (Colish 1997: 63). Celtic and Anglo-Saxon missionaries became instrumental in the diffusion into the European countryside of Christianity and of what they had learned from the earlier transmitters about the classical heritage.

However, the great age of autonomous Celtic missionary activity (c. 550-650) petered out with the growth of papally directed, Benedictine monasticism. Gregory the Great, formerly a monk himself, took over the initiative in an alliance with the vigorous new monastic order founded by Benedict of Nursia (c. 480-550), often called ‘the father of Western monasticism’.37 St Benedict, who had studied in Rome, wrote a rule-book for the monks at the monastery he founded at Monte Cassino in 529. His Rule became the guide for monastic life in the West for more than five hundred years,

37 In 1964, Pope Paul VI named him Patron Saint of Europe.
and Monte Cassino the flagship monastery in the Europe-wide movement generated by Benedict and sponsored by Gregory.

One of the most important results of this movement was the advancement of Latin literacy. Benedictine monks and nuns had to be literate in order to read the required books, liturgical and spiritual texts. This meant that the monastery had to have a school. The education it provided was made available not only to the monks or nuns but to people from the region who wanted to send their children to the convent to study, whether they intended to enter monastic life or not. The provision of education to the wider Christian society was thus made an important public service of the monastery or convent.

The appointment of the Benedictine monk Augustine (d. 604/605) as bishop of Canterbury and his subsequent re-foundation of the Church of England stimulated a great fascination there with Rome and Greco-Roman civilisation. Anglo-Saxon bishops and monks became not only leaders of Christian missions to the continent, but also major authors of Latin literature, sacred and secular. Intellectual and cultural development resulted from the theological arguments between Irish monks and the Benedictines of Augustine’s Roman mission, and was boosted by impulses from Visigothic Spain. The works of Isidore of Seville and other Iberian writers were known in Ireland and England before the end of the seventh century. It was Northumbria, the mid-seventh century battleground between Celtic and Roman Christianity, that produced Bede, maybe the greatest scholar and literary figure of the early Middle Ages (see above).

The reinvigorated Anglo-Saxon church thus not only became a pillar of Roman Christianity in northern Europe. After Visigothic Iberia was lost to the Umayyad CalIPHate, it was able to take the religious and ecclesiastic leadership in the West generally too:
In fact, it was from the farthest corner of Western Europe and also the most recently converted region from which came the most powerful missionary impetus which eventually converted large parts of what was later to become Germany and also central Europe. Between the end of the sixth and the mid-eighth centuries firm foundations were laid for the impressive ideological edifice of what was later to become Latin Western Europe. This indeed was the conspicuous and concrete result of Gregory the Great’s mission to England. Rarely can an undertaking have been crowned with such outstanding success. As Gibbon once remarked, while Cæsar needed six legions for the invasion of Britain, Gregory achieved the same purpose with 40 monks. (Ullmann 2003: 55)

The foremost figure in the Anglo-Saxon missionary movement to the Continent was St Boniface (originally named Wynfrith; c. 675-754). His main sphere of activity was central Germany. In contrast to the Irish missionaries, Boniface gained the Pope’s express support by obtaining the portfolio of roving archbishop before leaving England. He also sought the backing of the kings of the people he aimed at converting, and prepared a renewal of the alliance between the Frankish kingdom and the Papacy. Where his evangelisation was successful, he had the authority to ordain clergy and to establish diocesan and parish structures along Roman lines. As his operational basis in Germany, Boniface founded the monastery of Fulda. He organised the Bavarian and central German churches into sees, presided over a number of reforming councils in the Frankish kingdom, and as bishop of Mainz presided over the unification of the German church (James 1988: 80).

It is difficult to overstate the effect that St. Boniface had in the forging of a lasting tie between the northern kingdoms and Rome. [...] The transformation that Boniface effected eventually involved an assimilation of Roman theology, Roman canon law and liturgy, but most of all, what Boniface and other missionaries left behind was a lasting affection and reverence for the chair of St. Peter. Gregory III could, in the late 730s, address Charles Martel as ‘a true son of St. Peter’ and call on him to ‘defend Peter’s church and the Pope’s own people’. (La Due 1999: 74)

These developments illustrate how north-western Europe had by now gained in political, intellectual and religious strength. As the wealth of northern Gaul increased by Frankish access to the Rhine estuary and to the new commerce of the North Sea, even the economic point of gravity of Western Christendom was moving northwards:
By the eighth and ninth centuries the north was the political centre of Europe, and could claim to be its intellectual leader as well. The Channel and North Sea ports were giving the area an economic vigour it had never had in Roman times. The coronation in 800 of a Frank, Charlemagne, as the first northern emperor, has often been seen, and rightly, as symbols of this shift of balance from south to north which is one of the most important developments of the early Middle Ages. Another, still more important for the historian, is that in this period the north finds its own voice. In the Roman period we know about it only through the writings of Romans and Greeks; now, thanks to the spread of Christianity, some northerners themselves begin to write in Latin, Germanic, or Celtic languages. The north (except for Scandinavia and the lands east of the Elbe) emerges into the light of history for the first time. (James 1988: 63)

According to Peter Brown, already by the mid-seventh century, northerners had begun to consider themselves European:

When Gertrude, abbess of Nivelles (south of modern Brussels) died, in 658, it mattered that it was on Saint Patrick’s day. It is our first reference, in a Continental source, to Patricius. After two centuries, the eccentric Romano-British bishop had become one of the great saints of the north. Gertrude’s family (from which, eventually, Charlemagne would descend) was spoken of as famous ‘to all the inhabitants of Europe.’ It was a self-conscious use of an old geographical term to speak of a new reality – a western world seen now, not from Rome or Constantinople, but from Ireland and Francia. As ‘Europe,’ the north-western frontiers of the old empire had come to be aware that they possessed an identity of their own, different from the less-familiar lands to their south and east. (P. Brown 1996: 166)

According to de Rougemont (1966: 43-44), it was the canonisation of a growing number of Western European saints from the fifth century onwards that at last set ‘Europe’ apart from the ‘the West’ and invested her with a dignity closer to that hitherto enjoyed by ‘the East.’ From now on until the Carolingian empire, the word Europe recurred in increasingly solemn contexts, “in apostrophes to the Pope, in ecclesiastical panegyrics, in prose and verse chronicles, and in the lives of the saints” (de Rougemont 1966: 44). Thus Colombanus about 600 addressed Pope Gregory as the “flower of all of Europe,” and in 615, Pope Boniface IV as “the head of all the churches of all of Europe.” Isidore, in his History of the Goths, speaks of “all peoples of Europe trembling before them.” Most famously, as mentioned above, the so-called Mozarabic Chronicle of 754 speaks of the victory of Charles Martel’s “European”
soldiers over the Arabs at Poitiers in 732 (ibid.: 44). “Thus the term ‘Europeans,’ for
the first time in our era, denotes a continental community, one which includes the
nations living north of the Pyrenees and the Alps, sharing the task of defence against
the common enemy” (ibid.: 45). To Bede, Europe essentially consisted of Gaul and
Germania, Spain being added later. He did not include his own England, or
Scandinavia (ibid: 45-46). According to le Goff, the frequent use of ‘Europe’ in the
ninth and tenth centuries was not purely geographical. It “signifies a certain sense of
community that antedated Christianisation, but from the eleventh century on, although
that sense of a collective identity persisted and even strengthened among ‘Europeans,’
a new word was mostly used to convey it, the word Christendom” (le Goff 2005: 48).

With the partial exception of the British isles, whose ties to Rome remained
strong, a ‘Europeanness’ thus emerged in the North that distinguished it from the
Roman-Greek, Mediterranean culture of the South. Northern France abandoned the
late classical style in architecture long before Italy, and founded the Gothic style. Also
the influence of the Latin Bible, the Vulgate, varied according to latitude. Ullmann
(1965: 53) argues that the relative failure of the Vulgate to reach northern Europe and
Scandinavia at least partly explains “why there was no trace of a theocratic-descending
form of government in the Scandinavian countries and Northern Europe until very
much later than in the Southern and Western parts.” Similarly, Roman law did not
influence Northern Europe to any extent comparable to that in the West and the South.
The distinction between juristic practice based on the written legal codes derived from
Roman models south of a line stretching from the mouth of the Gironde to the Jura
Mountains and customary law to the north of this line remained fundamental until the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Southern 1998: 7).

Ullmann also notes that the Latin Bible became known in Northern Europe far
later than anywhere else, and argues that this at least partly explains “the different
complexions” in these parts of Europe. He adds that the legal record upon which our
knowledge of matters relating to government is based reflects the divergence of
Roman-Latin influence:
The thickest and densest production of legal records can be found in the very same regions which were subjected to the combined influence of the Latin Bible and the Roman law, and the less noticeable this influence was, the fewer the legal products were, with the consequence that, for instance, in Scandinavia legal records did not begin before the high Middle Ages. It is therefore significant that in the Scandinavian countries the ascending theory of government enjoyed a longevity which stood in contrast to the prevailing theocratic-descending thesis observable throughout Southern and Western Europe. (Ullmann 1965: 53)

The question of the specifically Germanic contribution to ‘the Making of Europe,’ or the definition of Europeanness, is thus a complex one. There was hardly any inherently ‘Germanic’ urge for national independence and freedom from Rome. On the contrary, Germanic war leaders admired the order and sophistication of Roman civilisation, and sought recognition of their ‘sub-Roman’ character from the universal emperor at Constantinople. The centuries between the fall of the western Roman empire in 476 and its resurrection in 800 may indeed be seen as an interregnum, when western de facto rulers affected to govern in the name of the de jure sovereign, who was the Roman emperor residing in the still venerable if increasingly Greek and alien ‘New Rome’ on the Bosporus (Bakka 1998: 210). On the other hand, there was a certain ‘Germanisation’ of Christianity at the popular level in the sense that the church Christianised many Germanic traditions, like the celebration of mid-winter. Well into the seventeenth century, the clergy continued both to mediate between man and God and to play the role formerly taken by Celtic druids or Germanic pagan priests (Rietbergen 1998: 98).

However, together with vastly changed political, economic and social circumstances, Germanic, Roman and Christian ideas produced new political ideas and realities. The rise of Islam undercut Constantinople’s sway over the West in Christendom and threatened the West directly from the Iberian peninsula and Mediterranean islands. Thus a distinctly western, or European, Christendom emerged,

38 Here it must be added that Ullmann obviously is partial to the national-liberal notion of a Germanic Urdenkkratie, which, as we have just seen, is now controversially debated.
based on a new north-south, Frankish-papal power axis. Its point of gravity was in the north. The Pope’s coronation of Charlemagne as new ‘Roman’ emperor on Christmas Day 800 may be seen as the official declaration of the already effective independence of the new West.

### 3.7.3 Charlemagne’s Europe

For all practical purposes, the Papacy was acting independently of Constantinople by the middle of the eighth century. In 754 Pope Stephen II (752-757) renewed the alliance between the Church and the Franks by announcing his loyalty to the Frankish king as his temporal lord and protector. He travelled north to crown and anoint Pippin king of the Franks and patrician of the Romans in the cathedral of Saint-Denis. This may or may not have been part of a long-term strategy to establish ‘papal monarchy,’ but among the immediate causes were no doubt emperor Leo III’s (717-741) plan to reassert Byzantine sovereignty in Italy through stern new taxation of papal land; the emergence of what the Papacy considered the heresy of iconoclasm in the east; and a new Lombard descent on Rome. The Frankish king’s agreement to take over the role of the eastern emperor as patrician of the Romans and protector of the apostolic graves was revolutionary, as was the Pope’s giving legitimacy to what was in effect an usurpation of the Frankish throne.

After a swift Italian campaign, Pippin took Rome, Ravenna and many regions in central Italy from the Lombards and gave them to the Papacy. The ‘Donation of Pippin’ (to which Charlemagne later added nominally Byzantine Venetia, Istria and Corsica as well as the remaining Lombard territories of Spoleto and Benevento) facilitated the establishment in 756 of the Papal State, the ‘Republic of St Peter.’ This creation (or confirmation) of the Pope as temporal lord was another momentous development in the mid-eighth century. For more than eleven hundred years hence (until 1870), the Pope was not only the spiritual leader of Catholic Christians, but a significant player in temporal European politics too.

Pippin was succeeded by his son, Charles I ‘the Elder’ or Charlemagne (742-814). For the first time since the fall of the Western Roman Empire, Charlemagne
united Cisalpine and Transalpine Europe under one ruler, with Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) as the temporal capital and Rome the spiritual. By 800 he was undisputed ruler of Europe between the Pyrenees and the Elbe. His realm encompassed what is today France, Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany west of the Elbe, parts of Austria, and half of Italy. Parts of present-day Poland, Bohemia and Hungary were tributary states. With the notable exceptions of England, Ireland and southern Italy, the borders of the Carolingian dominion were by now practically coextensive with those of Western, Latin Christendom (Scandinavia and the Baltic shore had yet to be Christianised, and most of the Iberian peninsula was in the hands of the Saracens).

Charlemagne has long been hailed as a great forger of European unity. His court extolled him as ‘Rector [head] of Europe’ and ruler of ‘the kingdom of Europe.’ His conquests and cultural and religious programme reinforced the emerging sense in early medieval northwestern Europe of being somehow ‘European.’ However, Germanist historians have also seen in him the founder of the first Germanic Reich. Le Goff (2005: 29) maintains that the vision of Charlemagne the warrior was a “nationalist” one, inspired by a patriotic, Frankish spirit, and that his empire was the first example of “a perverted Europe,” dominated by one people. Beyond this, le Goff argues, the ideal that animated Charlemagne was not ‘European’ unity, but the ancient one of Roman-Christian, imperial-ecclesiastic unity. Both the Papacy and Charlemagne attempted to “resurrect the Roman Empire rather than a project that looked ahead to the future destiny of Europe. When he founded his new capital, Aix-la-Chapelle, in the ancient territory of the Franks, Charlemagne was no doubt dreaming of making it ‘the Rome of the future,’ essentially in defiance of ‘New Rome,’ namely Constantinople” (le Goff 2005: 32-33).

Pope Leo III’s coronation of Charles as ‘emperor of the Romans’ on Christmas Day 800 should thus be seen primarily in a Roman or Byzantine context. The immediate pretext for the papal initiative was the fact that a woman, Irene, ruled in Constantinople. In western eyes, that meant that the imperial throne was vacant. The visit of Charles to Rome provided the Papacy with a welcome opportunity to achieve emancipation from Constantinople and to consolidate the Frankish king’s role as
patrician of Rome. Leo by his action effectively declared that the eastern empire had ceased to exist as a legitimate Roman empire, and that Charlemagne himself should be the ‘true’ emperor of the Romans (Ullmann 2003: 83-84). According to Canning (1996: 70), “the papally inspired title imperator romanorum definitely was a denial of the validity of Byzantine emperorship.” The coronation was modelled after the Byzantine ceremony, but the constitutive involvement and prominence of the Pope was a crucial innovation. Charlemagne himself, however, most probably did not wish to replace the Byzantine emperor, only to obtain papal recognition as emperor of a renewed western Roman empire parallel to the existing eastern one:

He wanted in effect to be a Roman emperor rather than the Roman emperor; that is, to be emperor in the west without supplanting the Byzantine emperor – hence the wording on his seal after the coronation: Renovatio romani imperii (renovation of the Roman empire). He desired recognition of the position which he in fact held: that he ruled so much of what had once been the western Roman empire together with additional lands in Germany. (Canning 1996: 69)

Rather than ‘Emperor of the Romans,’ Charlemagne therefore took care to call himself emperor ‘ruling the Roman Empire’ (Muldoon 1999: 25). To him, “[t]he hegemonial and Roman aspects of Carolingian emperorship were complementary” (Canning 1996: 69). Also the Christian character of Charlemagne’s empire was paramount; his adviser Alcuin consistently referred to his rule over a ‘Christian empire’ (imperium christianum). Thus the notions of Europe, Christendom, kingdom of Europe, Roman empire and Christian empire were amalgamating:

[T]his Europe was no longer an ideologically unshaped and amorphous territorial mass. It was slowly being welded into a coherent ideological entity that was built on the foundations of the Christian faith. And this faith was of Roman papal provenance. The Roman Empire which he now governed as emperor (as his official title showed) was only another name for ‘Christian empire,’ and this again was the same as the kingdom of Europe. Moreover, the inscription on his imperial seal demonstrated that the ancient (pagan) Roman Empire was now reborn as a Christian empire – in a word it was a unit which was held together not by ethnic or historic ties but by the cementing bond of the faith enunciated by the church of Petrine Rome. (Ullmann 2003: 84-85)
Combined with his traditional role as head of the Frankish church, the Roman coronation allowed Charlemagne to make the ancient imperial claim to be ‘king and priest.’ Expecting the Pope to play the submissive role of the eastern patriarch, he came to regard himself as the ‘vicar of Christ’ and ‘Rector of all the Church of Europe’ (Keen 1968: 34). Charlemagne and his successors, the emperors of the ‘Holy Roman Empire,’ thus believed that they could create and dispose of prelates in the Constantinian and Byzantine tradition. Pope Leo III, when visiting Paderborn in 798-799, heard of Charlemagne’s ambitious building programme for Aix, ominously referred to as ‘Second Rome,’ which included a ‘sacred palace’ for the king himself modelled on the Byzantine exarch’s palace at Ravenna, and a ‘Lateran’ palace expressly designated ‘the house of the pontiff.’ By crowning Charlemagne in Rome within a year from then, Leo at least averted being reduced to the level of domestic imperial chaplain to the new western emperor.

Ullmann however stresses Charlemagne’s loyalty to the Pope as successor to St Peter and primate of the Christian church:

it was his genuine and deep veneration for Saint Peter and his successor which militated against any kind of opposition on the model of Constantinople. [....]
What Charlemagne in general conceded – and here lay the real contrast to Byzantium – was magisterial primacy, that is, primacy in matters of religion, faith and dogma. (Ullmann 2003: 80)

Ullmann considers the coronation of Charlemagne a crucial step in a programme originally conceived by Pope Gregory I two centuries earlier to achieve papal independence from Constantinople and sovereignty in the West. However, according to Southern, the solution of one problem created another:
Indeed it is evident that the idea of a western empire as a means of extending papal authority was a mistake from beginning to end. It was a mistake primarily because in creating an emperor the Pope created not a deputy, but a rival or even a master. The theoretical supremacy implied in the act of creation could never be translated into practical obedience to orders given and received. Hence the Pope’s practical supremacy over his emperor came to an end at the moment of coronation. It is not surprising that the Popes of the later Middle Ages sought to exercise their supreme temporal lordship through other channels than the empire, which Pope Leo III had rashly created for this purpose on Christmas Day 800. This action was the greatest mistake medieval Popes ever made in their efforts to translate theory into practice. (Southern 1970: 99)

Byzantium for its part steadfastly held on to the ancient view that there could be only one Empire as there could be only one Church. Hitherto Byzantium, new Rome, had been regarded unquestionably as the sole Empire which had taken over the inheritance of the old Roman imperium. To Byzantium, the only conceivable world order was a hierarchy of states, embracing the entire Christian oikoumene and culminating in a single Empire. “Byzantium could therefore only consider the elevation of Charles the Great to be an usurpation” (Ostrogorsky 1971: 185).

The coronation of Charles was at first ridiculed in Constantinople, later viewed as an arrogance without meaning. Only after Charles had made military inroads into imperial territory in Dalmatia, in 812, did a Byzantine embassy to Aix-la-Chapelle recognise him as basileus and imperator, but without any ‘Roman’ designation. Byzantium thus accepted his political, but not any traditional Roman claim to emperorship. Charles responded in a friendly manner, stressing the independence and equality of the two empires (Canning 1996: 70). At the same time, to make clear that they were the only true Roman emperors and had a sole right to the Roman heritage, the Byzantine emperor from now on began to style themselves not simply basileus, but basileus ton rhomaion.

However, the eventual disintegration of the Carolingian empire and the renewed vigour of Byzantium under the Macedonian dynasty (867-1025) induced later rulers of Constantinople to ignore the earlier recognition given to the western empire (Ostrogorsky 1971: 199). The eastern emperors to the very end in 1453 continued to see themselves as the direct successors of Cæsar and Augustus and therefore the
rightful rulers of the world. Theirs was, in their view, none other than the Roman Empire, founded shortly before the beginning of the Christian era by God’s grace to unify his people in preparation for the coming of his Son. In spite of their huge territorial losses to Arabs, Slavs and Bulgarians, they insisted that they were the sovereigns of all past and present imperial possessions, including those in the West. Seen from medieval Constantinople, the Muslims in Egypt and Syria as well as the barbarians in the kingdoms of the West were no more than temporary occupants of provinces that by rights belonged to the eternal and universal Roman Empire.

Charlemagne’s successors however continued to develop the Carolingian idea of a new western, Roman and Christian empire. The reign of his son Louis I the Pious (814-840) marked the high point in this regard (Canning 1996: 71). Louis, like Charlemagne, stressed the Frankish and Christian aspects at the expense of the Roman. The Papacy for its part stubbornly developed its claim to create the emperor. At the coronation of Emperor Louis at Rheims in 816 Pope Stephen IV thus added a highly symbolic new element to the ceremony: unction with holy oil, hitherto administered to kings only. The anointing element conspicuously distinguished the imperial coronation in the West from that practiced in Constantinople. In Constantinople there was no unction because the empire was conceived as a historical and man-made entity. “The anointing was, on the model of the Old Testament, understood to confer divine grace on the recipient in the shape of ruling power” (Ullmann 2003: 87-88). The Popes thus combined a Byzantine and Roman with a Western and Christian element when they henceforth both crowned and anointed the Holy Roman emperors.

The Pope and the emperor indeed had a common interest in making the western emperorship more and more Roman in complexion. After the death in 855 of Emperor Lothar, who was also king of new Middle Francia (or Lotharingia, the zone extending from the Low Countries to Italy, i.e. Rokkan’s ‘city-belt’), its Romanitas was reinforced with the rule of Louis I’s grandson, Louis II, in Italy and his patricianship of Rome. However, a new watershed was reached with Pope John VIII’s coronation and unction of Charles the Bald in 875. This was the first time that the Pope took the initiative as the sole, constitutive creator of the emperor. The emperors for their part
tended to be most concerned with Francia. But mounting Arab attacks in south Italy and the islands meant that the Papacy had a strong, material interest in assuring that the emperor remained committed to the protection of Italy, the Church of Rome and the papal lands made the need for effective imperial aid all the more pressing (Canning 1996: 72-73).

The protection of the papal patrimony was a central concern of a document that probably emerged in the 750s and which was to become a legal cornerstone of the medieval Papacy’s claim to universal sovereignty: the so-called Donation of Constantine (*Donatio Constantini*). Later demonstrated to be a forgery (by the humanist and first modern ‘philologist,’ Lorenzo Valla, in 1440), the document purported to be a letter from Emperor Constantine the Great to Pope Sylvester I. It stated that when Constantine had moved his capital to Constantinople he had left the Lateran palace, the imperial crown, the right to wear it and other imperial insignia and garments, the government of Rome, all of Italy and the regions of the west, as well as various islands, to the successor of St Peter.

Canning (1996: 73) emphasises that the Donation confirmed papal claims to the patrimony, accorded the Papacy imperial power in the west, and affirmed the primacy of the Pope in the Church. Ullmann (1972: 82-83) agrees that the Papacy interpreted the Donation to mean that the Pope was the rightful ruler of the universal empire, i.e. both east and west, because Constantine had given his crown to Sylvester, who was thus its owner but had chosen not to wear it. In the present context, however, the most important point is that “[t]he lasting legacy of the Carolingian era was the acceptance of the principle that it was the Pope who created the emperor” (Canning 1996: 74).

The juxtaposition of ‘Christian people’ and ‘Europe’ current at Charles’s court provided new confirmation of the emergence of a distinctly continental Western European identity. It reflected not only the long-term rise of north-western Europe towards economic and political supremacy, but also the new cultural and intellectual sophistication represented by the so-called Carolingian Renaissance. Although le Goff considers Charlemagne’s empire ‘an aborted Europe’ due to its brevity and ethnocentrism, and the notion of a Carolingian ‘Renaissance’ to be exaggerated, he
concedes that “the modern Carolingian myth does include certain basic elements that are relevant to the future Europe” (le Goff 2005: 33). In this regard he points to Charlemagne’s introduction of certain basic rules (‘capitularies’) as a contribution to the legal unification of Europe; to his introduction of a monetary system based on the silver coin as an attempt at monetary unity; his promotion of monastic networks and his contribution to the integration of a ‘Europe of warriors and peasants’ (le Goff 2005: 33-36). Moreover, “the intellectual activity of the Carolingians produced a layer of European culture of its own” that had an important civilising influence on later Europe (le Goff 2005: 36). Concrete examples that have survived include the Carolingian minuscule script, illustrated illuminated manuscripts, and architectural innovations such as the symbolism of the transept and “the west front with flanking towers that made the doorways of Romanesque and Gothic buildings so dramatic” (le Goff 2005: 38).

Judith Herrin (1986: 402-403) argues that the scholarship encouraged by Charles at his cosmopolitan court was a vital contribution to the preservation and development of a distinctly European culture. She especially stresses the Carolingian efforts to preserve the classical Greco-Roman and early Christian legacy. Barraclough (1976) highlights a basic similarity of institutions and civilisation in Europe as a legacy of the Franks, and notably of Charlemagne. According to him, the ideal (rather than the reality) of a united Europe was the chief ideological legacy of Charlemagne:

[The age] created a myth, which grew and was incorporated in the famous legend of Charlemagne - a legend which even today tends to overshadow the real man. In the second half of the ninth century, when decline was apparent on all hands, men looked back to the ‘empire’ of Charles as a time of peace and prosperity and unity, a ‘golden age’ which they only needed to recover for all to be well. It was a legend that badly corresponded to the facts; but in history legend is often more potent than reality, and it created the idea (or perhaps the ideal) of the unification of Europe, of all the people of Europe, in one Christian community of peace, under one government. This idea, or ideal, remained to counteract the opposite tendency of diversity, which sprang from the fact of the diversity and different origins of the various European peoples; and although earlier the same idea of unity had been bound up with reminiscence of the ‘universal’ government of Rome, after the ninth century it reflected above all else the ‘unity’ created by Charlemagne. (Barraclough 1976: 56)
The most recent monograph on Charlemagne by a professional historian concludes by emphasising his religious and cultural legacy over the political and military feats:

[....] the effect of Charlemagne’s emphasis on Christian Latin learning and Christian orthodoxy, taken up by Franks and by peoples newly incorporated into the Frankish realm alike throughout his realm was to align the whole of Carolingian Europe to Rome. His insistence on the Roman, Christian and Merovingian past, in all its complexity, as the foundation for the style of rulership, law, communications and culture of his kingdom, was the essential element of the formation of the political and cultural identity of the peoples over whom he ruled within the present. Culture, religion, law and the written text were intrinsic to the exercise and maintenance of political power. As it turned out, these were his most lasting legacies. (McKitterick 2008: 380)

Still, if the Carolingian empire created a long-lasting ideal of European unity, le Goff is right to stress its short life as a political reality. In fact, its main political legacy was arguably the tripartite territorial-administrative division which shaped the future political geography of Continental Western Europe (Bakka 1998: 250). This heritage was arguably far more important than that of the early medieval ‘Germanic kingdoms,’ none of which except Bavaria survived the year 1000. The modern European states system is ultimately predicated on the split of Charlemagne’s empire in 843 into West, East and Middle Francia. But the Carolingian intermezzo also confirmed that the Europe of the future would be built in the West, on a north-south axis, and that the point of gravity was to be north of the Alps.

However, in the remaining Middle Ages, the concept of Europe was relegated to the background. Until the rise of a new common enemy, the Turks, the annals were dominated by stories of the struggles between the two universalist institutions of the West, the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire (de Rougemont 1966: 48-49). In the next section, I will first describe the growth of these two institutions and of the associated notion of Christendom. Then I will outline their conflict among themselves as well as with emerging independent polities, which contributed towards the political and confessional fragmentation of the Reformation. In between, the revival of Roman law as the legal glue of European Christendom and the high medieval process of Europeanisation in general will be discussed.
3.7.4 The medieval papacy and empire

East Francia, the polity that succeeded the Carolingian empire in the east, was settled by four Germanic confederations: Swabians/Alemanians, Franks, Saxons and Bavarians. Their leaders were called dukes, from the Roman *dux*, and their realm duchies, after the Roman *ducati*, an administrative unit established by Emperor Justinian and introduced east of the Rhine by Charlemagne. Thus, according to Schulze (1994: 100), the name given to these units by the Germanist school of historiography, *Stammherzogtümer*, known in English as ‘stem’ or ‘tribal’ duchies, is as misleading as calling them ‘German.’ East Francia was at first mainly held together by a Frankish aristocracy. After 833, they recognised the rule of King Ludwig II, the son of Emperor Ludwig I. Retrospectively, Ludwig II has also been called ‘Louis the German.’

Susan Reynolds (1997: 289-297) argues that a sense of ‘regnal solidarity’ had emerged in East Francia by 919, when Duke Henry I (‘the Fowler’) of Saxony succeeded to the royal throne. Borussian historiography considered this the formative period of the medieval ‘German’ kingdom, soon to be transformed into the ‘German’ Reich they so venerated.

However, according to Schulze (1994: 100), not only is it doubtful whether there was any sense of ‘German’ or even ‘Germanic’ community in the kingdom. It is also uncertain whether the king himself used any ‘German’ epithet except perhaps the Roman designation *Rex Germaniae*, as the Romans had called the region east of the Rhine Germania. Being associated with Rome was what mattered. “Far into the eleventh century the kingdom that had emerged east of the Rhine was to be regarded as a Frankish realm founded on Frankish traditions that reached back via the Carolingians and Merovingians all the way to Rome and Troy, and this was equally the case with the west Frankish part of the empire” (ibid: 101).

Henry added significant parts of former Middle Francia – Lotharingia and Burgundy – to his kingdom, which already was multiethnic, consisting of Germanic as well as Avar, Slavic and Carinthian peoples. His son Otto (elected king 936) expanded the realm further. After defeating the Magyars at Lechfeld in 955, he began to use the title imperator to denote his military prowess (Muldoon 1999: 31). Otto secured control
of the Italian crown and in 962 was crowned Roman emperor by Pope John XII. In return, the Papacy was once again promised imperial protection. Otto persuaded Byzantium to recognise him as western emperor and arranged for the marriage of his heir, the future emperor Otto II (r. 967-983), to a Byzantine princess, Theophano.

Otto founded (or refounded) what became known as the Holy Roman Empire, uniting the German and Italian kingdoms as well as considerable parts of former Middle Francia (Burgundy and Lotharingia). The continued interest of the ‘Holy Roman’ emperors in Italy and the rest of the former Middle Kingdom henceforth blocked what according to Borussian historians should have been the natural course of German history towards a nation-state (Muldoon 1999: 33). To them, this was the beginning of the German *Sonderweg*, or detour from the ‘normal’ evolution towards a nation-state.

Otto the Great and his successors took the same theocratic line vis-à-vis the Papacy as Charlemagne and as the Greek emperor to the patriarch of Constantinople (Southern 1970: 100). They assumed that their role as *vicarius Christi* and *rex et sacerdos* gave them the right to appoint bishops, to have a decisive role in papal elections and, if necessary, to bring about the deposition of a Pope (Canning 1996: 99). Otto II (955-983) emphasised the Roman nature of emperorship even more strongly than his father. In 982 he adopted the title *romanorum imperator augustus*. Later, Otto III (996-1002) established the Roman character on a permanent basis (Canning 1996: 76). Together with Pope Sylvester II, Otto III also prepared an eastwards shift of European Christendom, giving Slavs and Hungarians a more central position (le Goff 2005: 41). His chosen official seal, *renovatio imperii romanorum*, indicated a vision of “a federation of Christian societies under the leadership of the Emperor” (Muldoon 1999: 33-34). Conrad II (1027-1039) was the first East Frankish monarch to call himself ‘king of the Romans’ (*rex romanorum*), implying a claim to the emperorship even before imperial coronation. Conrad’s seal bore the inscription, ‘Rome, the head of the world, holds the reins of the earth’s round orb’ (*Roma caput mundi tenet orbis frena rotundi*).
If Otto the Great was the founder of the temporal medieval empire, Pope Nicholas I (858-867) may be considered an early architect of papal monarchy. According to Walter Ullmann (1972: 102), Nicholas was the first Pope to make use of the so-called *Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals* in a long-term papal plan of “welding Europe into a homogeneous ecclesiastical unit under the Roman papal aegis.” *Pseudo-Isidore* was a forged collection of canon law probably produced shortly before Nicholas’ pontificate in or near Rheims. Containing also the spurious *Donation of Constantine*, it was to become a key legal basis of the Petrine argument for papal primacy and church independence from lay authority. The victory of Nicholas in the marriage dispute with King Lothar II of Lorraine was a first practical breakthrough for the vision of what Gollwitzer (1951: 35) calls the “Europa-Ecclesia.”

But Nicholas’s other achievements were modest. The Church of the time was in a bad state, fragmented, localised and dominated by the nobility. Many of the clergy could not read and write. The monasteries were in decay. Priests often lived in concubinage, or were married. The Papacy was prey of the noble families controlling Rome, and had little authority. From about the year 1000 there emerged a great wave of heresies. Also relations between Rome and Constantinople remained poor. Nicholas protested to no avail against Emperor Michael III’s appointment in 858 of Photius as new patriarch of Constantinople without papal approbation. The subsequent ‘Photian’ schism was ominous of the final schism in 1054. But, according to Ullmann (2003: 109), it was also a formative event in the emergence of a distinct European Christendom, making Europe “an ideological concept, and no longer a merely physical term”. It may have been from this time that the Popes began to consider themselves the leaders of ‘real,’ i.e. orthodox Christendom, as distinct from the heretical Greek East.

The foundation of a new Benedictine abbey in 910 at Cluny by the Duke of Aquitaine, William the Pious, was to greatly advance this new Western self-awareness. Cluny released a great movement against the corruption of the Church. It became an ‘alternative Rome’ (*altera Roma*) and its home region Burgundy the spiritual centre of Latin-cum-European Christendom (Gollwitzer 1951: 34). The movement challenged temporal control of the Church, and eventually led to the monumental struggle between
the Pope and the Emperor known as the Investiture Contest. Soon daughter houses were established all over Europe, strictly observing the authority of the abbot of Cluny, who himself recognised only the authority of the Pope. The Cluniacs slowly rebuilt the prestige of the Church. They were the driving force in the persecution of heresy as well as in the crusades (le Goff 2004: 83). In 1046, Emperor Henry III, a champion of Cluniac Church reform in Germany, rode into Rome in true imperial style and had three contending Popes replaced by a reformist German one, Clement II (1046-47).

This intervention inaugurated “a great revolution in papal government and policy” (Keen 1968: 73). Henceforward, a series of reformist monks-turned-Popes, most of them from the north of the Alps (ultramontane), promoted papal primacy and church independence with singular resolve. According to Canning (1996: 85), Clement II for the first time used the term papatus (Papacy) in 1047. The purpose was to emphasise his status above that of a bishopric (episcopatus). The very influential abbot of Clairvaux, Bernard (1090-1153), produced a classic definition of the Pope’s monarchical power, or sovereignty, in the formula ‘plenitude of power’ (plentitudo potestatis) (ibid: 108-109).

The western reform movement’s stress on the universal authority of the Papacy was incompatible with Byzantine tradition, and contributed to the final schism between the Latin and Greek Churches in 1054. The mutual excommunion of Patriarch Michael Cerularius and Cardinal Humbert in Constantinople signalled the abandonment of attempts to reconcile their theology. The schism was little noticed at first, but “the crusades would introduce a spirit of hatred and bitterness against the ‘Greeks’ that brought the issue down to the popular level” (La Due 1999: 96).

Then, in 1059, Pope Nicholas II (1058-1061) inaugurated the Papacy’s first alliance with the Normans. This may have been a mainly tactical move to redirect the martial energies of the Normans, already present in Italy, away from possible expansion into papal territory and towards the expulsion of the Byzantines and Muslims from southern Italy and Sicily. But it was also the first time the Papacy turned to anyone but a ‘Roman’ emperor for protection. It thus challenged the traditional notion of the Emperor as the first protector of the Church. Nicholas at the same time
laid down new rules for papal elections, giving a decisive voice to the cardinals and barely mentioning the need for the approval of the Emperor and of the Roman nobles. This was a “crucial step in the process whereby the Papacy was to develop as an autonomous European-wide institution” (Canning 1996: 87). Another step was the subsequent addition of coronation to the papal inauguration ritual, giving very concrete expression to the idea of papal monarchy.

One of the first Popes elected by cardinals was Gregory VII (1073-1085), previously known as Hildebrand. With Gregory’s pontificate, “the intellectual and moral leadership of Europe […] passed into the hands of the Papacy” (Ullmann 2003: 165). In his pursuit of church liberty (libertas ecclesiae), Gregory made very wide-ranging claims for papal authority. Emphasising the Petrine interpretation of Matthew 16:18-19 and John 21:15-17, he aimed “to reinforce the all-embracing scope of papal jurisdiction within Christendom: all were the Pope’s sheep; none was excluded. Gregory identified himself with St Peter whose responsibility for the Christian world he saw himself as inheriting” (Canning 1996: 87-88). Gregory’s Dictatus papae (‘dictates of the Pope,’ a list of statements probably intended as guidelines for papal lawyers) declared that “the Roman pontiff alone is rightly to be called universal;” “he alone may use the imperial insignia;” “he may depose emperors;” “he himself may be judged by no one;” and perhaps most significantly, “the Pope may absolve subjects of unjust men from their fealty.”

In the Investiture Contest (1078-1122), the Gregorian reformers not only achieved freedom for the Church from lay intervention, but also a general “separation between the clergy and the laity, between God and Cæsar, Pope and emperor” that stood in “total opposition” to the cæsaropapism of Byzantium (le Goff 2005: 60). The outcome of the controversy weakened the power and prestige of the Emperor. Emperor Henry III’s famous submission at Canossa was the first time a Pope was able to realise his claim of universal jurisdiction against the most powerful temporal ruler in Europe (Ullmann 2003: 157).

Gregory launched a great ‘state-building’ effort for the Papacy. Between 1050 and 1150 the College of Cardinals was established as the virtual government of the
Holy See. It was followed by the institution of the papal Chancery (for correspondence) and the Chamber (financial administration). The advanced administrative structure and procedures of the Holy See indeed became models for secular polity-builders, who eagerly recruited prelates to help them. At the same time, papal influence was extended throughout Christendom by monastic networks such as that centred on Cluny, new monastic orders like Bernard’s Cistercians, and the mendicant orders, notably the Dominicans and the Franciscans. The latter was strongly centralised and subject to direct papal control. Even more importantly in the long run, the Popes were also able to gain increasing control over the regular clergy.

According to the papally approbated Catholic Encyclopaedia (Urquardt 1908), papal power reached its historical peak between the end of the Investiture Contest (1122) and the “great disaster” of the Second Crusade (1147-49). The Papacy had now become “de facto the centre of a vast Christian nation […]. It was in the Papacy that Christendom, a temporal as well as a spiritual society, found its head in temporal and spiritual things alike” (ibid.).

As it put itself on top of a centralised, hierarchical machinery governing Christendom, the Papacy came to acquire more and more the characteristics of a temporal state, in addition to its spiritual functions. Newly converted territories in northern and north-eastern Europe were rapidly integrated into the Church structure through the establishment of archbishoprics, bishoprics and parishes, the introduction of Roman rites, Latin alphabetisation, Christian timekeeping etc. The Papacy had its own territorial capital (Rome) and dominion (the ‘Republic’ or ‘Patrimony’ of St Peter). It conducted its own foreign policy vis-à-vis non-Christian as well as other Christian powers; collected and developed its own ‘canon’ of law; created a police force (the Inquisition) and its own courts (whose verdicts could be appealed directly to the Pope); built up a sophisticated, extensive civil service; and was able to obtain a fairly regularised, tax-based income. It also had its own military force, although mainly mercenary.

In addition, in the anarchy of the ‘Dark Ages,’ the Church offered society many public functions that had earlier been assured by the Roman Empire and that were later
again to be taken over by temporal authorities. Almost alone in feudal society, it could provide services such as sick and poor relief and education. In parts of Christendom, the Church was the only institution that prosecuted murder. In its judiciary role, the Church reinforced Roman traditions and law. However, it also innovated: during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the requirement of due process was established as a legal principle that was to survive into modern Europe. The most significant growth in the Church’s judiciary activities appeared in central courts directly subject to papal control. By the time of Pope Innocent III (1198-1215), “the Papacy had become the most powerful of all the Christian monarchies” (le Goff 2005: 68).

According to Robert Bartlett, towards the High Middle Ages, Europeans identified themselves more and more deeply as Christians. Christendom had come to resemble not only a rudimentary state, but also a nation:

[....T]here is a sense in which the label ‘Christian’ came to have a quasi-ethnic meaning. It is true that Christians are made – by baptism – not born, but the vast majority of those born in Christian Europe in the High Middle ages underwent baptism as a matter of course. They could easily think of themselves, not as voluntary recruits to a particular community of believers, but as members of a Christian race or people. As Montaigne says: ‘we are Christians by the same title that we are either Perigordins or Germans.’ The ethnic sense of ‘Christian’ can be found repeatedly and perhaps increasingly in the High Middle Ages. The term ‘the Christian people’ (*populus christianus*), which was common, implies no more than ‘the community of Christians;’ but when the Saxons were forcibly converted to Christianity by Frankish arms in the decades around the year 800, adoption of the new religion made them ‘one race, as it were (quasi una gens), with the Franks’. […] Christians were a people or a race, they also had their own lands or regions, which could be described geographically. The most usual term for this land of the Christians was Christendom, and it is striking both that there is an enormous increase in the use of the term in the later eleventh century and that its semantic range moves increasingly towards a territorial, rather than an abstract sense. (Bartlett 1993: 251, 252)

Pope Urban II’s launching of the First Crusade at Clermont in 1095 was a significant new departure in the Papacy’s pursuit of universal sovereignty. Ostensibly the declaration was an answer to the Byzantine emperor’s appeal for help against the advancing Seljuk Turkomans. Urban most probably had a genuine wish to help fellow Christians in distress, but also to retake Jerusalem from the Muslims and to restore the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (it had been destroyed by the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah in 1009). Moreover, the crusades offered a possibility for the Church to Christianise and redirect the martial energies of feudal knights towards the Muslims, cast as the common enemy of Christendom. This helped pacify Christendom as demanded by the tenth century peace movement, which had campaigned against endless feudal warfare, particularly in France (Bagge 2004: 185, 189; le Goff 2005: 46-47). But the Papacy no doubt also perceived the eastern appeal as a new opportunity “to set itself firmly at the head of the whole of Christendom” (le Goff 2005: 95). The inspiration, support, and organisation of the supranational Roman church under strong papal leadership was decisive for the widespread appeal and initial success of the crusading movement. “The crusade demonstrated, indeed, what a real unifying force in Christendom the Roman Church had become” (Keen 1968: 122-123).

The First Crusade succeeded in capturing Jerusalem (followed by a massacre of Muslims) and also brought about the establishment of Latin kingdoms in Palestine. Later crusades, though, were failures. Once launched, they defied central direction and often became exercises in pure plunder and murder. The Fourth Crusade was especially disastrous, for the Byzantine Empire as well as for Christian unity under papal direction. Its main result was the vicious sack of Constantinople in 1204, followed by the establishment of several short-lived Latin ‘empires’ in the heartland of the original empire. The Byzantines were able to recover, restoring Constantinople as the imperial capital in 1261, but their confidence in the West had been crushed and the back of their ancient Roman state broken. The last remaining Christian fortresses in the Holy Land, Acre and Tyre, fell into Muslim hands in 1291.

The failure of the crusades marked the end of any idea there might yet have been of Jerusalem as the capital of Christendom (le Goff 2005: 97). From now until the fall of Constantinople, the territorial extent of Christendom and Europe were nearly identical. But ideologically and intellectually, the outcome of the Fourth Crusade widened the gap between western and eastern Europe. The crusades also caused increased rivalry between the emerging states of Christendom. Le Goff (2005: 97)
concludes that “the apricot was the only advantage gained for the West by the
Crusades.”

If the Holy Land eventually had to be relinquished, intra-European crusades had
more lasting results. In the Iberian peninsula the *reconquista* made dramatic advances
in the second half of the eleventh century, culminating in the capture of the old
Visigothic capital of Toledo in 1085. Sardinia was conquered from the Arabs by the
fleets of Pisa and Genoa in 1015/16, as was Sicily by the Normans between 1061 and
1091. The Byzantine Empire lost its last toe-hold on the Italian mainland with the
Norman capture of Bari in 1071. Denmark, Norway and Iceland were Christianised by
the mid-eleventh century, and Sweden (including what is now Finland) in the course of
the twelfth. In southern France, the thirteenth century Albigensian crusade put down
the Cathar heresy. The Teutonic Order, transferring its operations from the
Mediterranean to the Baltic in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, joined the
southern Baltic shore, including Prussia, to Christendom. The last outpost of paganism
in Europe, Lithuania, officially converted to Roman Christianity in 1386.

The great intellectual debate stimulated by the Investiture Contest brought no
solutions to the fundamental questions raised, particularly over ultimate sovereignty in
the temporal sphere (Muldoon 1999: 37). Therefore the Empire’s conflict with the
Papacy persisted. The final showdown occurred during the reign of the Hohenstaufen
dynasty, commonly considered “the summit and decline of German emperors’ power in
the Middle Ages” (Schulze 1998: 12). The Staufers emperors “brought the medieval
imperial idea to its fullest development” (Muldoon 1999: 37). The revival of Roman
law in the eleventh and twelfth centuries had recovered the Justinianic phrase that ‘the
emperor is the lord of the world’ (*dominus mundi*). The Staufers extended the phrase to
justify universal Roman imperial power without reference to the Papacy or to
Christianity. But they also emphasised their sacred role as defenders of the Church and
Christendom by taking the lead in several crusades. Ecclesiastical discourse saw all
power within the Christian community as descending from the Pope, whereas the
Roman law tradition considered the people the immediate source of power by way of
the *lex regia* (Muldoon 1999: 73; see above, page 114).
The most impressive Staufer emperor, Frederick I ‘Barbarossa’ (r. 1152-1190), pursued a particularly exalted vision of empire. In 1157 he added the word *sacrum* to its official name. He asserted imperial superiority over the kings of Europe, in correspondence referred to them as “petty kings” (*sub reguli*) or “kings of the provinces” (*reges provinciarum*) (Muldoon 1999: 37). The emperor was said to owe his position directly to God, and not to God through the meditation of the Pope. When representatives of the Roman senate asked Barbarossa from whom he held the empire, he responded ‘From God alone!’ (Hoyt and Chodorow 1975: 361).

However, in contrast to English and French monarchs, the Holy Roman emperor had no opportunity to amass a block of family lands that could serve as a base from which to build a centralised monarchy. In the German-speaking part of the empire, the nobility benefited from the decline of imperial authority during the Investiture Contest, and in Italy the Lombard cities seized the opportunity to free themselves from the control of the imperial bishops (Keen 1968: 112). With Frederick I’s death (while on crusade) an irreversible decline of imperial influence in Italy began.

This was fatal for the emperor’s universalist pretensions. The *romanitas* of the Empire was predicated on the emperor’s role as protector of Rome. Moreover, Italy was intimately associated with the ancient Roman past and represented great economic and artistic wealth. Emperor Frederick II (1212-1250) inherited the powerful Norman kingdom of Sicily from his mother, and developed the most sophisticated system of secular government of the day there on combined Roman, Byzantine, Norman, and Arabic foundations. However, to be able to ascend the imperial throne in 1214, he had to concede to Pope Innocent III that Sicily was a papal fief to be separated forever from the empire; that the German Imperial Church should be free from royal control and subject to full papal jurisdiction; and that the papal states should again be subject to the Pope’s authority. With the loss of Italy, the *de facto* authority of the emperor beyond his Central European heartland collapsed, although *de jure* he stuck to his universalist-descending guns.

The interregnum from 1254 to 1273 undermined the authority of the emperor even in the imperial core. After a partial consolidation during the reign of Rudolph of
Habsburg (1273-1291), political and administrative links within the Empire grew looser. To avoid centralisation of power, the electors brought a range of rulers from the houses of Habsburg, Nassau, Wittelsbach, and Luxembourg to the German throne in a deliberately mixed succession. The Golden Bull, a constitution promulgated in 1356 by Emperor Charles IV of Luxembourg (r. 1355-1378), impressed on the Empire the federal structure it retained to the end. The Bull confirmed that emperors, unlike other princes in Europe, whose position had become hereditary by about 1300, should continue to be elected. It also took away the Pope’s right to participate in the election and left him only the consecration ceremony to perform. Most importantly, the Bull ended the subjects’ right to appeal against the territorial princes to the Imperial Court.

Still, the emperor retained the personal authority to call out the imperial forces, and control of common facilities such as fortresses, roads, and rivers remained in his hands. Moreover, about 300 secular and ecclesiastical lords, some 2000 knights, and 85 ‘free’ or imperial cities scattered from the Baltic to Switzerland remained subject to the emperor’s jurisdiction as exercised through the imperial courts (van Creveld 1999: 78-79).

Although the emperor thus retained considerable clout in addition to his precedence of rank among European monarchs, in the course of the thirteenth century the French king overtook him as the de facto most powerful temporal ruler in European Christendom. The French ascendancy was inaugurated in 1214 by the victory at Bouvines of King Philip II Augustus (r. 1180-1223) over an English, Flemish and German coalition force headed by Emperor Otto IV. The victory buttressed the Capetians’ claim to be successors of Charlemagne (Keen 1968: 111). Improved administration of ancient royal rights and domains (much of it inspired by Holy See ‘best practice’) had by now made England as well as France effectively independent.

However, the Papacy at first appeared to triumph even against France. Pope Innocent III prevailed on the same Philip Augustus who was to triumph at Bouvines to take back the wife he had banished, Queen Ingeborg, in 1213. First King Constance of Sicily in 1198, then King John of England in 1213, recognised Innocent as their feudal lord. Innocent’s vast decretal production and the *Compilatio tertia* contributed very
considerably towards the unification of the Church under the centralised control of a reforming Pope. Innocent III’s decretal *Venerabilem* “provided the fullest development of the papal and canonistic conception of the empire and its place within Christian society. The Empire was a not a place but an office in the gift of the Papacy, and while the elected king of the Germans was the usual candidate for the office, it was open to any Christian” (Muldoon 1999: 85-86). However, as we will see, such grandiose claims to papal monarchy failed against the French monarchy.

Meanwhile, the Europeanisation of Latin Christendom was proceeding apace, advanced since the eleventh century notably by revived knowledge of Antiquity. Of particular significance in the present context was the already mentioned revitalisation of Roman law. In the search for old Church law instigated by the reform Papacy (to find support for its position against the emperor), scholars in the last quarter of the eleventh century came across an intact manuscript of Justinian’s *Corpus Juris* in Pisa. The discovery led to greatly increased interest in Roman law from both imperial and papal scholars. Soon Bologna emerged as a great centre of legal studies. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, new law schools sprouted in Catalonia, Rheims, Tolouse, Orleans, Paris and England. All university-trained lawyers were Roman lawyers, and “came to share a common legal culture, based on the same texts, expounded in the same language, Latin” (Stein 1999: 57). This eased the export of Roman law in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries into areas east of the Rhineland that had never been part of the old Roman Empire.

Revived Roman law thus served to increase the *romanitas* and homogeneity of Europe north of the Alps. More immediately important, however, it provided new ammunition to the evolving debate over temporal sovereignty. The Church became the main driving force in this process; to produce what became known as canon law it embraced Roman law as well as the dialectic logical method inspired by ancient authors ranging from Aristotle to Boethius. The turning point was the treatise *Concordia discordantium canonum* (Concordance of Discordant Canons), published about 1140 by the monk Gratian. Also called the *Decretum Gratiani*, this Church parallel to the *Corpus Juris* was an edited collection of nearly four thousand patristic
texts, conciliar decrees, and papal pronouncements touching all areas of Church life. Within a short time, canon law was added to civil law as a subject of study at the university of Bologna, and by the 1160s civil lawyers recognised canon law as a parallel, equally esteemed discipline to civil law. At the same time, the Papacy issued a growing number of new laws through regular legislation. Medieval canon law was completed with the publication of several additions to the *Decretum*, the final one in 1334. By now civil (lay Roman) and canon (ecclesiastic Roman) law were regarded as a single system, which together with remnants of feudal law became a *jus commune* for the whole of European Christendom (Bellomo 1995).

Canonists such as John of Salisbury, St Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St Victor, Honorius and many others spread and bolstered the image of a hierarchical and universal Christian polity whose ultimate arbiter was the Pope:

[... ] the standard of authority adopted by the canonists was a powerful force in spreading throughout Europe respect for the papal claims to ultimate directive control in the affairs of Christendom. The systematic mode of thought of the cathedral scholars now made it possible to justify these claims in terms quite independent of the canonists’ interpretation of the texts of pseudo-Isidore. In their writings John of Salisbury and Hugh of St Victor were able to present a systematic view of Christian society as a whole, based on an examination of its nature, its component parts, and their respective functions. The final goal of the Christian republic, in their analysis, was universal salvation in the next world: to this end all the terrestrial sphere must be functionally orientated. (Keen 1968: 99-100)

The ‘Renaissance’ of the twelfth century encompassed not only law, but also theology and philosophy, science and literature. One source of revitalised science, notably medicine, was Arabic learning in southern Italy and Spain (the Arabs had preserved and developed much of the Greek scientific heritage they had found in the Byzantine territories they had conquered). The literary revival was expressed in a new vernacular literature of epic and romance, history, biography and travel writing. It reflected the emergence of a ‘polite’ and bourgeois society in the growing towns, and had its centre in Northern France. This was also the centre of the new ‘Gothic’ style of architecture, which soon spread to most of Christian Europe. The largest and most independent towns were emerging along the highly urbanised arteries of the trade
routes, in north Italy, on the upper Danube and Rhine rivers, in Flanders and on the North and Baltic coasts. Trade and the cities brought “people from all over Christendom into closer and more regular communication, [promoted] a more common level of culture, [and sharpened] men’s awareness to problems which appeared general to their society” (Keen 1968: 94).

Together with growing church patronage and increased security and prosperity, city civilisation in the High Middle Ages thus provided an environment favourable for intellectual life. Among the most notable results was the emergence of universities out of the cathedral schools. By 1200 there was not only a university for legal studies at Bologna in north Italy, but also one for medical studies at Salerno in south Italy and one for theological studies at Paris. Oxford was founded about 1200 and Cambridge shortly afterwards. By 1300 there were a dozen universities in Europe; by 1500 there were almost a hundred (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2007: 41). The initial purpose of the universities was to assimilate or reconcile the body of rediscovered Greek learning, notably that of Aristotle, to the Christian faith. The ‘scholastic’ philosophers, or ‘schoolmen,’ performed this function. One of the most eminent was Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), whose life work was a grand attempt to reconcile Christian theology with Aristotelean reason. He thus helped legitimise intellectual freedom at a crucial historical moment. By about 1300, all the diverse peoples of Europe had been assimilated in the Roman church, the Latin language, the common institutions of feudalism, monarchy, a free town life, parliamentary assemblies, and scholastic learning. An increasingly connected and coherent culture ran from England to Sicily and from Portugal to Poland. [T]he ‘rise of Europe’ was an accomplished fact. [...] Europe had a civilisation of its own. (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2007: 46)

As part of the same process, according to le Goff (2005: 148-150) between the mid-twelfth and the mid-thirteenth centuries a great change of attitudes took place,

39 It is a sign of the marginalisation of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire, however, that the first imperial university was founded in Prague by Emperor Charles VI of Luxembourg only in 1348.
heralding the emergence of a more secular, civilisational European identity. One reason was the Mongol onslaught, which led to the abandonment of the crusades and caused Roman Christians to become more preoccupied “with their land, their goods and the affairs of the West” (le Goff 2005: 149). Slowly their attention turned from Constantinople and the Holy Land to the Atlantic and overseas territories in Africa, America and Asia. Another important factor was the recent inclusion of new states in Central and Eastern Europe into European Christendom. The conversion of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia to Roman Christianity was perceived as their accession to Europe; their leaders now expected solidarity from the West in the defence against Mongols as well as against pagan barbarians like the Cumans, Prussians and Lithuanians. King Bela IV of Hungary, in a letter to the Pope between 1247 and 1254, described the Mongols as a threat “against the whole of Europe” (quoted by le Goff 2005: 149).

A vital part of this development, according to le Goff (2005: 150), was the “great mutation in the fundamental collection of values within European Christian society.” It was predicated on the interaction of the growth of towns, a revolution in agriculture, demographic expansion, the appearance of scholasticism and the mendicant orders, emerging states, the evolving peasantry, and new urban categories, notably the bourgeoisie. It revealed itself in a growing consciousness that a “great surge forwards” was being made. Le Goff defines this period as “the time when heavenly values came down to earth” (le Goff 2005: 150). It was now that Europeans began to entertain the modern and European belief that human endeavour, creativity and progress could help approximate terrestrial to celestial life. According to le Goff, innovations that emerged as a result included the notions of economic growth, budgets and productivity; of purgatory; the writing of handbooks; cartography; gastronomy; courtliness and probity; and individuality.

However, after the death of Innocent the power and prestige of the Papacy, linchpin of universalist European Christendom, began to decline. The failure of the crusades demonstrated the limits of papal power, the disastrous Fourth Crusade reflecting badly on Innocent personally. Moreover, Innocent’s highhanded dealings
with temporal princes had left much negative feeling against Rome. In Italy, the Papacy became entangled in conflicts with increasingly independent-minded city-states, with the Emperor and, eventually, with the King of France. The growing wealth and involvement in temporal affairs of the Roman Church seemed to widen the gap between what it preached and what it practiced.

The distance between the Church apparatus and ordinary people tended to grow also due to the centralisation, institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the Church. By contrast, at the popular level, the mendicant orders and heretical movements such as the Cathars demonstrated an increasing religiousness, spirituality and individualism in society. In this new religious climate regional distinctions that foreshadowed the religious geography of the Reformation began to appear, “between the ecclesiastical outlook of France and Italy, where loyalty to the Popes was strongest, and of England and Germany, where popular pietism was turning away from the outward union of the Roman Church, to the inner union of brotherly love and the spirit” (Keen 1968: 284).

Moreover, even if European Christendom was becoming more economically, culturally and intellectually homogeneous, in political terms it was falling apart. Increased rivalry between emerging territorial rulers as well as between them and the Empire and the Papacy, together with improved military technology led to more frequent and violent wars. Europe was militarised; by the fifteenth century most European powers had standing armies. But it also stimulated an intensifying scholarly debate over ‘just war’ and who ultimately should be responsible for enforcing peace, justice and the common good generally. The experts on Roman civil law, the Glossators, where in no doubt that imperium mundi rested with the emperor, whereas the canonists continued to propagate papal plentitude potestatis.

However, in Italy there was rivalry not only between the Emperor and the Pope, but also between them and increasingly assertive city-states. When imperial influence in Italy declined after about 1200, the city-states’ struggle for the ‘liberties’ they had acquired from the Empire turned against the prospect of papal hegemony. Their claim to autonomy was developed by the so-called Commentators, at first Marsilius of Padua (1275/80-1342/3). In his Defensor Pacis (Defender of the Peace), Marsilius questioned
the temporal jurisdiction of the Papacy and held forth instead the Roman republican vision of a civil commonwealth regulated by self-imposed laws (Canning 1996: 154-158). Thus Marsilius also led an intellectual movement away from the ancient Roman Empire towards the Roman republic, and from Cæsar to Cicero, as models for early modern political theory and practice. In the course of the fifteenth century, when absolutist signori usurped power in most Italian city-states, the humanists reinforced this dissident republicanism. Marsilius however supported the Emperor in his struggle with the Pope. His ideas came to fruition when he witnessed his employer, King Louis IV of Bavaria, being crowned Roman emperor by delegates of the people, not the Pope, in Rome in 1328, and when Louis went on to appoint an anti-Pope.

Similarly, Dante Aligheri (1265-1321) made his famous call for a renovatio imperii in the context of widespread city-state opposition to papal hegemony (Skinner 1978a: 18). Baldus de Ubaldus (c. 1327-1400) saw emperorship and kingship as institutions whose primary function was serving their temporal communities rather than assuring passage into eternity (Canning 1996: 163-166). Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313/14-1357) elaborated a theory of popular sovereignty to accommodate the political reality of autonomous, republican city-states. To him, the consent of the people could act as a complete alternative to the will of the superior in the creation of law (Canning 1996: 169). In their endeavours to undermine the authority of the emperor, the canonists had already suggested that the king is emperor within his territory (rex in regno suo est imperator). But it was Bartolus and Baldus who introduced this doctrine into civil law, “thus making the first decisive move towards articulating the modern concept of the state” (Skinner 1978a: 11).

In this achievement the Italian Commentators received vital assistance from the lawyers of King Philip IV ‘the Fair’ of France (1285-1314). The conflict between Philip and Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) was a crucial juncture in the transition from medieval universalist Christendom to modern particularist Europe, inaugurating
as they did the decline of the Papacy as a temporal power. French interests had arrived in Italy with Charles of Anjou, who had won control of Sicily and Naples after the death of Emperor Frederick II in 1250. Philip IV won a dispute over the control and taxation of the French clergy as well as a controversy regarding the jurisdiction over a Languedoc bishop, Bernard Saisset. A response by Boniface, the bull *Unam Sanctam* (1303), made the most extreme claim for a theocratic world order of any medieval Pope. Boniface defended the universal primacy of the Pope in a way that amounted to an assertion that all secular power was derived from, and exercised at the will of, the priesthood. However, when he suffered a French attack and died shortly afterwards, the Papacy came under heavy French influence. In 1309 the papal residence was moved from Rome to Avignon, where it remained until 1377.

The Papacy’s ‘Babylonian captivity’ in Avignon was to prove an inspiration of the Gallic historiographical school that emerged in the Renaissance and saw “the children of Gaul by birth and character” as “a nation destined to be the European assembly point and the starting point for modern civilisation” (the French national historian Victor Martin writing in 1864, quoted by Kelley 2003: 203). Kelley summarises the Gallic view of history as ‘acts of God through the French’ (*Gesta Dei per Francos*, the title of Guibert’s history of the First Crusade): “France had saved Europe from Islam, crushed the papal theocracy, become the birthplace of Catholicism and philosophy and the cradle of liberty and equality, and now was taking on a new mission for the benefit of European civilisation” (Kelley 2003: 203).

Naturally, the defenders of French territorial sovereignty also referred to Roman law, which was adapted in parallel with the extension of the French king’s realm. Assisted by the Church and an emerging burgher class in the cities, King Philip II

---

40 This is at least the conventional view. James Muldoon however rightly points out that the modern concept of the state became fully formed much later than usually assumed: “rather than being simply the history of the development of the state, the history of political thought and institutions from 1500 to 1800 (or, perhaps, 1300 to 1800) can be more fruitfully understood as a conflict between two forms of government, a comparatively new one, the emerging nation-state, and an old form in the process of transformation, imperial government” (Muldoon 1999: 6). Kingdoms such as France and England tended to become empires before they became nation-states: internally they were ‘composite monarchies’ or ‘polyglot
Augustus had managed to extend the royal territory from the Île de France to most of northern France. He had changed his title from King of the Franks to King of France a few years into his reign. In the latter part of the thirteenth century, French royal lawyers had begun promoting Roman law-inspired notions such as ‘the king is emperor in his realm’ and ‘what pleases the king has the force of law.’ In the next century the French king adopted the title rex christianissimus (Most Christian King) and even (aping Charlemagne) ‘Vicar of Christ,’ challenging claims to Christian headship hitherto monopolised by the East Frankish/German emperor and the Pope.

It is probably in this context that we should consider the plan of Pierre du Bois (c. 1250-c. 1312) for ‘European’ union. Du Bois proposed that the Pope should forsake all his temporal power. Moreover, due to the weakness of the Empire, the imperial dignity should be transferred to the king of France, who should lead a joint new attempt to reconquer the Holy Land. In 1308, du Bois indeed proposed to King Philip IV to put himself forward for the imperial election (de Rougemont 1966: 62).

Du Bois and other publicists between 1280 and 1315, Dante as well as Boniface VIII and Giles of Rome, are often considered early advocates of European union (e.g. by Heater 1992: 7-14). However, the discourse still remained fundamentally Christian-universalist. None of the plans used the word Europe or European (de Rougemont 1966: 72). The pretext of the calls for unity was the perceived need to mount an effective new crusade against the infidel occupying Jerusalem, and later, to defend Christian Europe against the Ottomans. The context was the fragmentation of Christendom due to growing quarrels involving not only the Empire and the Papacy, but now also the French monarchy and the Italian city-states (de Rougemont 1966: 54).

Du Bois however added ‘modern,’ universal-ascending elements by proposing a representative council (to be convoked by the Pope) and a standing court to adjudicate disputes within the Christian federation he envisaged. In 1463, Antoine Marini, in the

_____________________

empires’ of disparate territories and externally they acquired overseas empires. Muldoon (1999: 16) even suggests that the ‘international law’ that emerged in the seventeenth century should be more properly called ‘inter-imperial law.’
name of the king of Bohemia, Jiří Poděbrad, proposed a similarly modern plan for continental federation to resist the Ottomans. A federal assembly of the states of Christendom should be convened at Basle and elect the King of France as emperor of the West. Jiří would assume the titles of Emperor in the East and of Germany. The federal assembly should vote by simple majority and there should be a joint court of justice, international arbitration, a common armed force and a budget financed by the Church tithe (de Rougemont 1966: 66-72; Heater 1992: 13-14).

Nevertheless, in 1313, a French Pope, Clement V, issued the earliest legal confirmation of territorial sovereignty in the decree *Pastoralis cura*. It was also the first principled denial of the universality of the emperor’s rule (Ullmann 1965: 196-198). Clement thus ruled in favour of his nominal vassal, the Norman King Robert of Sicily, and against Emperor Henry VII, who had charged Robert with high treason for inciting and abetting Italian imperial cities to rebel against him. Robert’s lawyers had advanced the same arguments for royal territorial sovereignty as the French royal lawyers had long done. This was a significant change of heart on the part of the Papacy. As late as ten years earlier, Boniface VIII in his *Unam sanctam* had upheld the traditional notion that the French king, like every king, was *de jure* subject to imperial authority (Ullmann 1965: 198).

However, the French monarchy did not yet propagate modern territorial sovereignty. A deeply rooted and pervasive idea of imperial kingship had lingered in West Francia since Roman and Carolingian times (Canning 1996: 78-79). The early west Frankish kings had deliberately sought to legitimise and bolster their authority by using imperial epithets and formulae in their official documents and by evoking the Carolingian imperial inheritance. Professing to be the legitimate descendants of the Frankish kings and emperors, the Capetian kings had also asserted a right to inherit their role as defender of the Roman Church. Adopting the epithet *rex christianissimus*, they had managed to impose a certain unity on their feudal territories and had taken virtual control of the Gallican Church (hence ‘Gallicanism’). Presuming that the French kingdom as ‘the eldest daughter of the Church’ was uniquely Catholic and Christian, the Most Christian King was claimed to be
‘chosen by the Lord and blessed above all other kingdoms of the world’ as Philip the Fair’s minister, Nogaret, insisted. [...] This claim to be a ‘peculiar people’ did not remain merely royal or ecclesiastical; rather it was mediated by the clergy to the people as a whole providing one of the most enduring roots of French nationhood and nationalism, but its justifying grounding remained a royal one. A century later, a peasant girl from Champagne [Jeanne d’Arc] could have no doubt that ‘all those who fight against the holy kingdom of France fight against the Lord Jesus’ [...] The unity of the French nation depended on the mystique of its monarchy in a way that of England never did, and the monarchy’s mystique was an intensely Catholic one (Hastings 1997: 98-99)

Already in the tenth century Adso, the abbot of Moustier, had claimed the imperial dignity for the western rather than the eastern Frankish kingdom (Gollwitzer 1951: 33). This demand was embraced by the western Frankish king from the end of the twelfth century, if not earlier. His cause was greatly assisted by the great prestige the French monarchy and Franco-Norman civilisation had now achieved. Franks or Normans had conquered England and Southern Italy; led the crusades; and had helped the Papacy to victory over the Empire. Paris had advanced to become Christendom’s main centre of learning and there was Frankish-Norman-Burgundian leadership in architecture, in courtly and knightly customs, fashions and manners, in painting, music, vernacular literature and language. French was spoken nearly as widely as Latin. Both the Valois and the Bourbon dynasties, like the Habsburgs, claimed descent from the Trojan Aenas via Charlemagne.

In 1519, King Francis I put himself forward as a candidate to the imperial election, but lost to King Charles I of Spain, the Habsburg who subsequently became emperor Charles V. According to Hinsley (1986: 177), “it is hardly an exaggeration to say that from the same date there was no French king for nearly four hundred years whose foreign policy was unaffected by the ambition to be elected to the imperial throne, to join the imperial Crown to the Crown of France.” Pagden (1995: 33) writes of “continuing [imperial] bids from Charles VIII to Louis XIV”. Hinsley (1963: 169-70) sees the French imperial ambitions as part of the struggle between the House of Valois and the House of Habsburg over an office that offered the opportunity to be “the sole arbiter of Europe.”

According to John Hale, by the fifteenth century
the imperial role had dwindled from being the widely acknowledged secular protector of Christendom to that of Europe’s senior chieftain, loaded with honours and associations reaching back to the empire of antiquity, but implying direct rule only within family lands and a wider influence limited to the extent to which other German princes and cities found it useful to them. It is, all the same, a significant comment on the non-domestic self-image of monarchs that on the death of Maximilian I of Habsburg in 1519, not just his territorial heir, his grandson Charles, but both Henry VIII of England and Francis I of France put themselves forward as candidates. For a foreigner to become Emperor would bring prestige, a source of patronage through the bestowal of imperial titles (count, marquis, duke), and a special diplomatic relationship with the Papacy, the empire’s spiritual alter ego. It would also immerse him in a thriving imbroglio of central European political discords. Yet to call Henry’s and Francis’s entry into the electoral competition irresponsible would be to overestimate the degree to which rulers thought of themselves simply as national leaders. (Hale 1993: 77)

The fourteenth century was disastrous for Christendom/Europe not only due to the exile of the Papacy to Avignon. The Hundred Years War between England and France began in 1339, and increasing famines and plagues reached a climax with the Black Death of 1348-49. Europe had become overpopulated and about one third of its inhabitants died. Subsequent economic decline caused widespread destitution and distress. The great peasant insurrection known as the *Jacquerie* followed in 1358; there were risings in England and France in 1381-2, etc. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 may be considered the final of this series of “European disasters” (Schulze 1994: 27-28).

The Papacy had hardly returned from Avignon to Rome before another calamity hit the Church. The Great Schism from 1378 to 1417, beginning with the nomination of two competing Popes, caused new loss of prestige and conclusively punctured the medieval Papacy’s claim to control secular lords. It also exacerbated emerging national animosities: France supported the French Pope, England the Pope of Rome; because England preferred the Pope of Rome, Scotland favoured Avignon; and so on (Hay 1957: 69). In an attempt to overcome the problem, a general council of the church was called. Meeting at Constance in 1417, the council managed to have all contenders withdrawn and to elect a single new Pope, Martin V. The council also instituted a conciliar church structure. The subsequent debate between conciliarists and the Pope over sovereignty in the Church dominated the subsequent councils of Pavia-Siena.
A leading conciliarist, Nicholas of Cusa, envisaged a Christian world ruled jointly by the Pope and the Emperor (Muldoon 1999: 108). Temporal rulers supported the conciliarists because a conciliar type of church government would have increased royal influence in ecclesiastical affairs.

However, the Papacy eventually prevailed. The conciliar movement came to an end with the dissolution of the Council of Basel, and in 1450 a great Jubilee was held to celebrate the papal triumph. The defeat of the conciliarists confirmed the principle of universalist-descending, absolutist rule within the Roman Church as far as doctrine was concerned. The price the Papacy paid was the so-called Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438, which established a ‘Gallican’ (French) church that was administratively autonomous of Rome, but under heavy royal influence. Eventually widespread anti-papal feeling allowed also other secular rulers to obtain greater control over national churches. They subsequently reinforced the practice of lay investiture, usually choosing nationals of their own country for bishops. Royal governments also took steps to gain control of the transnational orders of the church.

Even the Papacy itself began to look more and more national. The mitre now passed to the so-called Renaissance Popes, materially minded men whose main concern was to re-establish their control of Rome and the papal states in Central Italy. Struggling for survival in Italian power politics, the Holy See began to seem just one more Italian state. For almost half a millennium hence (until Karol Wojtyla), all Popes except one (Adrian VI, 1522-1523) were Italian. At the same time, the curia lost most of its supranational character. Mainly French before 1378, it became overwhelmingly Italian from the fifteenth century onwards (Hay 1957: 62).

But the Renaissance Popes also undertook a programme to enhance the prestige and power of Rome with extravagant spending on art and architecture. Pope Julius II (1464-1471) rebuilt the city as a centre of magnificent neo-classicism. It was he who started the construction of St Peter’s Basilica, designed by Bramante and decorated by Raphael and Michelangelo, which proved so expensive that ruthless fundraising for it triggered the protest of Martin Luther.
The Hundred Years’ War too demonstrated the increasing hollowness of the universalist-descending notion of Christendom. When it began, the kings of both England and France as well as of Burgundy were dreaming of recapturing the Holy Land for Christendom. Throughout the conflict (except during the Great Schism), Popes laboured to reconcile the belligerents so the unity of Christendom could be restored and its joint power be redirected into crusade. However, their efforts were fruitless. The drawn-out conflict taught the respective kings to give priority to their own lands, which in the process became territorially contiguous and administratively more centralised. Indeed, the war may be said to have turned from a dynastic or imperial into a national struggle, thus proving a milestone in the development of national feeling (Keen 1968: 244).

After the war, English kings became increasingly preoccupied with domestic developments. “Separated at last from continental dominions, their kingdom was English in language, outlook and customs, with a pride in its purely native history. England was beginning her career as the island realm of future history” (Keen 1968: 256). As for France, the hard-fought success of the House of Valois in securing the French crown helped ensure that it would not become a realm in name only, partitioned among numerous independent princes. Jeanne d’Arc stimulated the same national consciousness in France as was emerging in England. Towards the end of the conflict, French royal absolutism “gained strength in step with military success and the awakening of national spirit. [...] What [Kings Charles VII and Louis XI] built was at the core of the power of France, as it endured to the end of the Ancien Régime” (Keen 1968: 258).

However, the sense of community in European Christendom was to some extent revitalised when the Eurasian empire established by Batu, the grandchild of Genghis Khan, collapsed in the fifteenth century and the Ottomans took over as Europe’s common new ‘Other.’ Turkoman Muslim encroachment on the Byzantine Empire had begun already with the Seljuks’ victory at Manzikert in 1071, and was concluded by the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. It eventually confined Christendom to the territory of Europe, a fact highlighted by maps produced by the emerging science
of cartography. In the first half of the fifteenth century Byzantine refugees fleeing the Turks introduced the term *respublica christiana* to the West as more ancient and authentic than the medieval notion of *christianitas* (Hay 1957: 87). At the same time they advanced the usage of ‘Europe,’ which was a more familiar word to them as Greeks than it had been in the Latin West.

It was thus probably in part their achievement that Pope Pius II (1458-1464; formerly known as Silvio Piccolimini, an outstanding humanist scholar) called for the defence of the *respublica christiana* and of Europe in the same breath (Hay 1957: 94, Hale 1993, 3; den Boer 1995: 34-38). Pius frequently used the term ‘Europe,’ which he called “our fatherland, our home.” He also coined the adjective * europaeus*, European, which he used interchangeably with ‘Christian’ (de Rougemont 1966, 73; Hay 1957: 87). Against the backdrop of the advancing Ottoman-Muslim empire, the Byzantines and other Orthodox Christians in Eastern Europe now appeared as devout Christians and good Europeans.

Moreover, the concept of the ‘Occident’ was now simply conflated with Christianity and Europe, whereas the ‘Orient,’ dominated by the Ottoman Empire, came to be seen as un-Christian and non-European. As Delanty (1995: 37) argues, the new European identity that emerged in the fifteenth century was thus “adversarial” to the extent that it defined itself against the Ottoman Muslim enemy. But as le Goff indicates, there was no doubt also an element of pride and sense of superiority, to which not only progress in Europe, but also the discovery of previously unknown ‘savages’ overseas added. Moreover, le Goff (2005: 197) rightly points out that the Ottomans’ conquest of Constantinople in the long run released “European unity from a handicap.” Future Greek Orthodox Christians could identify with Europe without the “obstacle” of a separate political and religious centre on the Bosporus.

However, the decline in the temporal power and prestige of the two universal authorities of European Christendom and the rise of independent territorial rulers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not mean wholesale rejection of the notion of supranational law and order. According to Hinsley (1986: 171-175), the Pope and the Emperor were instead increasingly regarded as exercising powers similar to those of a
“modern-day international tribunal;” not as universal executive authorities but as
general supervisors who possessed judicial supremacy and emergency executive
powers. They continued to be held in special reverence. There was still general
recognition of their function of representing Christendom against the infidel and the
outer world; of their power to depose kings and to appoint rulers to new provinces; and
of their role of princeps pacis whose approval could alone make a war just. Kings
sought the sanction of the Emperor and the Pope for their wars until the sixteenth
century.

Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) made one last grand gesture of papal monarchy
when he, in the Bull Inter caetera of 1493, conferred to Spain the Indian (American)
isles and mainland beyond a line running one hundred leagues to the west of the Cape
Verde islands. According to the official papal version (Smith 1910), the decision was
made at the explicit solicitation of the sovereigns of Castile in order to avoid war
between Spain and Portugal. According to Nussbaum, it was meant to establish the
new territories as a feudal vassalage under the overlordship of the Pope. “The Holy
See’s plenitude of power had never been set forth in such challenging terms as was
done by this most unworthy occupant of the Holy See” (Nussbaum 1954: 63).

Thus towards the end of the Middle Ages, the universalism informing the notion
of unitary, hierarchical Christendom was waning and the particularism associated with
the modern idea of disparate, anarchical Europe was waxing. The Reformation may be
seen as the watershed event of this process. Obviously, the Catholic Church with Rome
at its centre survived, and with it also universalist/Europeanist ideology. However,
ascending versions of both universalism and particularism eventually replaced the
previously so predominant descending paradigms of governance.
3.8 Modern Europe

The Renaissance, the Discoveries, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and, most momentously, the French and Industrial Revolutions, were the major stages in the ‘modernisation’ of Europe. The geographical centre of the process, at least from the seventeenth century onwards, was northwestern Europe. The material and intellectual achievements of notably the Dutch, French and British polities made them pioneers and models of modernity. Modern/European/Western civilisation mainly – but of course not exclusively (Davies 1996) – expanded from a circle centred on Paris with a radius of some 500 miles. As a popular textbook on modern history argues, “It was within this zone that a secular society, modern natural science, a developed capitalism, the modern state, parliamentary government, democratic ideas, machine industry, and much else originated or received their first full expression” (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2006: 145).

While the emergence of a Europe of states facilitated law, order and economic growth within territorial borders, and thereby ultimately radically improved Europeans’ standard and quality of life, it also exacerbated the problem of anarchy, war and competition across borders. European progress was impeded by increasingly frequent and violent wars, starting with the long pan-European civil and religious war from the Reformation to the Westphalian settlement of 1648. This was a problem of great public concern, and further stimulated the already ongoing debate on how to preserve peace and avoid unjust wars. It was no coincidence that proposals for European peace and unity tended to be published near the end of, or just after, great and bloody wars (Kennedy 2006: 21). Among the consequences were the emergence of a law of nations, or international law, and of distinct theories, ideologies, and discourses concerning international relations and European governance. The reality of multi-state Europe was a common starting point, but as we will see, theorists and practitioners approached it variously according to their intellectual baggage and social position, and political, economic, religious and territorial context.
The resulting ideological trends, as far as they are relevant to post-1945 European governance, may all be related to the 2x2 table of polity-ideas outlined in Figure 1 of the Introduction (see above, page 11). The remaining discussion will therefore be organised according to the ideological categories defined by that table. For chronological reasons, I will begin with the transformation and decline of the medieval, universalist-descending discourse on Christendom and its replacement by modern, particularist discourse on Europe (see Section 3.8.1). This will also serve as a general background for the later sections. Second, I will consider particularist-descending ideology, already nascent since at least the thirteenth century (Section 3.8.2). Then the evolution of the properly modern approaches, particularist-ascending ideology (Section 3.8.3) and Europeanist-ascending ideology (Section 3.8.4) will be outlined.\cite{note41}

Incidentally (or not), these ideologies, discourses or paradigms coincide closely with Martin Wight’s (1991) and Headly Bull’s (1977) three “traditions” of international theory: Universalist-descending and universalist/Europeanist-ascending\cite{note42} with what Wight calls Revolutionism and Bull (even more confusingly) Kantianism, particularist-descending with Wight’s Realism and Bull’s Machiavellianism, and particularist-ascending with respectively Rationalism and Grotianism. More importantly in the present context, particularist-descending discourse can be seen as the antecedent of the European integration theory called intergovernmentalism;

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textbf{\cite{note41}} I am using ‘Europeanist-ascending’ here rather than ‘universalist-ascending’ because I am focussing on discourses advocating supranational, federal government for Europe. We will see that some schemes had potentially a universalist, or global, scope, but that most were implicitly or explicitly meant to cover Europe, at least as a starting point for global union. Most notably, the Roman Church has retained a universal outlook, but has emphasised unification of Europe as the originally Christian continent.

\textbf{\cite{note42}} Contrary to Wight, I distinguish between a descending and an ascending version of ‘Revolutionism,’ or universalism, as the acceptance of popular sovereignty by the chief proponents of European union – the Roman Church and, more to the point, the Christian Democratic parties – in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century represented a historical, qualitative change within the universalist paradigm. I will also argue that after 1648, if not before, the Holy Roman Empire became federalised and practiced an ascending, cosmopolitan type of government, even if not based on representative democracy. Therefore I discuss its post-1648 relevance to the current research question in the section on Europeanist-ascending ideology (Section 3.8.4). The same applies to some extent to the Habsburg monarchy, which did produce multinational and multiconfessional parliamentary assemblies at the supranational level. In both cases, however, the emperor remained a supranational focal point of governance and loyalty.
\end{flushleft}
particularist-ascending ideology of functionalism and neofunctionalism; and the Europeanist-ascending paradigm of federalism.

3.8.1 Universalist-descending ideology

The fortunes of the Roman-Christian universalist legacy continued to be closely linked to the fate of its two main agents, the Pope and the Holy Roman/Habsburg Emperor. For both, the Reformation was a disaster. The confessional fragmentation of Christendom meant that a large number of Europeans, notably in northwestern Europe, did not any more look to Rome for spiritual guidance. For many of them, notably German Lutherans, the nation-state became a demi-god and nationalism a political quasi-religion (see below, Section 3.8.2). Others, notably Calvinists, liberals and political pragmatists in Britain, the Netherlands and France became less nationalist (see below, Section 3.8.3). But for economic (development of capitalism, trade and industry), political (state consolidation, international competition) and theological (see below) reasons, the nation-state became a nearly unquestioned frame of reference in northwestern Europe.

Thus, if the ancient East-West antagonism within Europe paled after first Jerusalem, then Constantinople, fell to Muslims, the confessional split caused by the Reformation greatly reinforced divisions between North and South. This as well as the expansion of Christianity overseas after the Discoveries and the further westwards advance of the Ottomans, gradually undermined the equation of Christendom and Europe.

But the demise of the discourse of ‘Christendom’ was slow. The Reformation revitalised religious feeling among Protestants as well as Catholics. Christianity’s claim to *sui generis* legitimacy only became seriously undermined in the second half of the nineteenth century (Gaukroger 2006: 11-12). Adherents of all confessions continued to nurture the notion of a common *respublica christiana* (Hay 1957: 98ff). The signatories of the peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648 still conceived of themselves as members of Christendom. Delegates called their meeting the ‘senate of the Christian world’ and the treaties included frequent use of terms such as *respublica*
christiana, chrétienté, orbis christianum, and Christenheit (Hay 1957: 114; Philpott 2001: 82-83). According to Hinsley, in international legal discourse the idea that Christendom constituted a single polity survived well into the eighteenth century (on the emergence of international law, see below, Section 3.8.3). Hinsley even argues that for “most Europeans” Christendom until then continued to be seen as

a system in which the majority decisions of the members were valid and in which the natural law and the jus gentium imposed a network of common legal rights and duties. In Catholic Europe this image was sustained by papal and imperial ideologists, who kept on insisting after the Reformation and the Peace of Westphalia that separate governments had come into the world through the corruption of human nature, and thus that the Pope had a direct power over secular rulers, including the emperor, or, respectively, that the Emperor possessed the imperium mundi. They all asserted that the Romans had given Christendom a system of international rules in the shape of the jus gentium. (Hinsley 1986: 182)

The Roman Church, the principal mouthpiece of the discourse on Christendom, was thoroughly reformed by the Council of Trent (1545-1563). As we have seen, the Council’s decisions reinforced its universalist-descending, supranational organisation dominated by the Pope. Thus the conciliarist or episcopal attempt to introduce ascending, federal Church government, which may in time have led to entirely national churches, failed. Moreover, as sources of Catholic faith, Trent put scripture and tradition on an equal footing, rejecting the Protestants’ claim to find true faith in the Bible alone. Latin was retained as the language of religious worship, a requirement that was only abolished by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).

Pope Paul III’s sanctioning in 1540 of the new Jesuit order was another significant event, not only in the revival of Catholicism, but also in the formation of modern, continental Europeanness and Europeanism. Through their scholarly and educational work, the Jesuits came to contribute most importantly to the transmission to modern Europe of the legacy not only of the Christian Middle Ages, but also of classical and humanist learning. By their ardent educational efforts they forged a new Catholic élite on the Continent. They taught not only the Catholic faith and theology, but also the full humanistic programme from the Renaissance and classical era – Latin
and Greek letters, logic and metaphysics, ethics, science and mathematics, music, even acting and fencing. The objective was to develop a scholarly “soldier of Christ”:

a morally disciplined, liberally educated, critically intelligent Christian man capable of outwitting the Protestant heretics and furthering the great Western tradition of Catholic learning. Hundreds of educational institutions were founded by the Jesuits throughout Europe, and were soon replicated by Protestant leaders similarly mindful of the need to educate the faithful. The classical humanistic tradition based on the Greek *paideia* was thereby broadly sustained during the following two centuries, offering the growing educated class of Europeans a new source of cultural unity just as the old source, Christianity, was fragmenting. (Tarnas 1991: 246-247)

At the same time, Jesuit and Dominican jurists and theologians of the ‘School of Salamanca’ (the most notable of whom were Francisco Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Robert Bellarmine, Luis de Molina, Juan de Mariana and Francisco Suaréz) attempted to adapt Catholic universalist-descending theory to the new reality of a Europe of states. They now saw the worldly authority of the Pope as being of a limited, emergency nature (Smith 1910; Hinsley 1986: 96, 183-184). According to them, the Pope retained a universal moral and spiritual authority that curtailed the external and internal sovereignty of the state, but he could exercise no authority in the secular world and over non-Christians.

Thus the Salamancan scholars criticised Pope Alexander VI’s Bull *Inter caetera* of 1493 (Pagden 1995: 47; above, Section 3.6.4). They also rejected the Emperor’s claim to be *dominus mundi*, i.e. lord of the whole world, but conceded his pre-eminence among rulers and his right to *dominium* within his historically acquired territory. They saw the Empire as just another *res publica* (Pagden 1995: 55). They argued that kings had limited powers too, shared with higher and lower authorities. The Salamancan scholars thus were pioneers of subsidiarity, which remains a core principle of modern Catholic social and political thought.43

43 The principle of subsidiarity was developed by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum novarum* of 1891, formalised in Pope Pius XIV’s encyclical *Quadregesimo Anno* of 1931 and confirmed by the Vatican II council (1962-65).
The establishment of the Jesuit order was just one of the means the post-Reformation Papacy adopted to win back Protestants. As the Church became increasingly centralised, for the first time, in the later sixteenth century, Rome itself was made the centre of Church reform and renewal. New Roman seminaries produced large numbers of clergy dedicated to reconversion, to the Roman tradition, and to the Pope. The Popes, notably Gregory XIII, rebuilt churches and streets in Rome, “crammed with lavish imagery expressing the new dynamic spirit of orthodoxy, loyalty, activity for God” (Duffy 1997: 222). Thus they also continued the Papacy’s crucial contribution to preserving and developing the European cultural legacy. At the same time the Papacy created a diplomatic network; nuncios, or papal ambassadors, became the Pope’s “hands, eyes, and ears all over Europe” (Duffy 1997: 223). Moreover, with its promotion of the imposing Baroque style, the Church attempted to counter the popularity of Protestantism and the power of absolutist monarchies with its own appeals to the emotions of common people.

The Papacy of the Counter-Reformation, or ‘Catholic Revival’ in Roman Church terms, scored notable international successes. It encouraged the Christian league between Spain and Venice that led to the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto (today’s Nafpaktos on Peloponnes, Greece) in 1571, limiting its domination to the eastern Mediterranean. It raised and paid for the army that broke the Turkish hold on Hungary in the 1590s. It poured huge subsidies into Catholic armies in the early Thirty Years War. The outcome of that war confirmed the reconversion of much of central and eastern Europe. Such triumphs encouraged the continued papal belief that secular princes should pursue Catholic/Christian policies in all things, that the Papacy was the divinely chosen instrument for shaping such policies, and that they held universal jurisdictional powers (Duffy 1997: 224-225).

However, the increasing centralisation and self-glorification of the Catholic Revival Papacy mirrored a similar tendency among contemporary monarchies, and led to clashes that the popes were bound to lose. The Concordat of 1516 with France had already resulted in a practically autonomous Gallican church dominated by the king. During the Thirty Years War, the Roman See singularly failed to negotiate peace
among the Catholic belligerents, with the French king even joining forces with Protestant Sweden and the Muslim Ottoman empire against his fellow Catholic Habsburgs. The Westphalian settlement of that war in 1648 confirmed the 1555 Peace of Augsburg’s split of Western Christianity into politically and territorially confined confessions. But now Calvinism was recognised too, alongside Lutheranism and Catholicism. In the next century, concordats were successively concluded in every Catholic country, making the Church virtually a department of state (Duffy 1997: 236).

The kings at the same time deliberately sponsored theological ideas that undermined the position of the Pope. Even the College of Cardinals and papal elections became increasingly controlled by secular princes. In 1773, Pope Clement XIV gave in to pressure from the rulers of Spain, Portugal, France and Austria, and dissolved the Jesuit order, which the monarchs saw as a fifth column undermining royal authority (Duffy 1997: 245). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a persistent strain of Jansenist dissent also weakened the Church.

If we turn now to the Holy Roman Empire, the chief temporal champion of universalist-descending and proto-Europeanist discourse, a major characteristic of the modern era was that the House of Habsburg virtually monopolised the imperial dignity from 1438 until the end in 1806. The Habsburgs were thus the Papacy’s main support in the Counter-Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War.

From humble origins in the Swiss canton of Aargau, the Habsburgs greatly expanded their possessions in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In Europe, their modus operandi was mainly marriage and inheritance, whereas overseas territories were acquired through exploration and conquest. Emperor Charles V in 1519 took over a global empire on which, famously, the sun never set. At its late sixteenth century zenith, the Habsburg dynasty ruled three quarters of continental Europe – the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Portugal, the Low Countries, Burgundy, Austria, Naples, Milan – and various overseas territories, especially in the Americas, but also in Africa and Asia. In 1522, however, Charles assigned the Austrian lands to his brother Ferdinand, to whom he also bestowed the responsibilities for the Empire when he
retired in 1556. Ferdinand formally obtained the imperial dignity on Charles’s death in 1558. Previously, in 1526, he had acquired also the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia.

The death of Charles V signalled the eclipse of the political ideal of a Europe united under the crown of the Holy Roman Empire (de Rougemont 1966: 77). However, the unity of purpose and common vision of the Habsburg clan remained throughout (Wheatcroft 1995: 143-145). Charles’s successor to the Spanish throne, Philip II (r. 1556-1598) continued to pursue the imperial idea with great energy. As just king of Spain, however, he came to describe his ambition as *monarchia universalis* rather than *imperium*, which remained with Ferdinand I. Its massive military capabilities and great financial resources made Habsburg Spain the only viable candidate for European hegemony. Even with the decline of Spanish power after the loss of the Armada and northern Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century, the pursuit of universal monarchy remained part of Spanish royal rhetoric at least until the second half of the seventeenth century (Pagden 1995: 43). But it was pretence only; the drying up of the stream of bullion from its American empire soon undermined Spain’s international power. After the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, died childless in 1700, the French House of Bourbon inherited the throne. Their possession was confirmed after the War of Spanish Succession (1701-13).

The Holy Roman Empire did not lose its feudal character to the same extent as other western European monarchies. Its corporate nature persisted into the eighteenth century; the personal ties to the Emperor linked the territorial princes in a common framework of allegiance while preserving their autonomy (Wilson 1999: 36-40). However, Wilson argues that the gradual erosion of the Empire’s feudal character was also associated with ‘desacralisation’ of the imperial title. The coronation rituals lost their potency during the sixteenth century. The last papal coronation of an emperor (Charles V) occurred in Bologna in 1530. After 1562, coronations always took place in Frankfurt. The Reformation also undermined the emperor’s traditional position as defender of the Catholic Church, particularly as later Habsburg foreign policy often dictated alliances with Protestant states. The crusading element of the defence against the Ottomans also declined in importance after 1683. The defeat of ‘the Turk’ outside
Vienna inaugurated the decline of the Ottoman Empire, but also its integration into the European states system. The receding threat modified the Europeans’ image of the Ottomans (Quataert 2000: 8). By about 1700, the Ottoman Empire was almost universally perceived as a European state (Goffman 2002: 18).

Moreover, the Emperor’s position as first in the diplomatic order of precedence was eroded by the assumption of an imperial title by other rulers (Wilson 1999: 39-40). The sultan had used one from 1606, claiming to be the successor of the Byzantine emperors. Peter the Great adopted one for Russia in 1721 after his victory in the Great Nordic War, claiming the same Greek heritage that had been invoked by Ivan the Terrible when he declared himself tsar (Caesar) in 1547. The French king had long disputed the pre-eminence of the Emperor in the European diplomatic hierarchy. He was supported by his English colleague as the doctrine of territorial sovereignty gained ground. The fact that in 1648 foreign powers obtained a right to interfere in imperial affairs further stimulated the decline of the ‘Holy Roman’ Emperor’s international status. The Peace of Westphalia not only gave virtual sovereignty to the princes within the empire, but the kings of France and Sweden also received imperial principalities that gave them votes in the imperial diet. The peace settlement moreover confirmed the independence of Switzerland (a fact since 1499), of the northern Low Countries (the Netherlands) and of a number of principalities in Italy. Furthermore, Muldoon argues that the Westphalian settlement “completed the process whereby the Germans severed the Holy Roman Empire from the Papacy. […] From the papal perspective, Westphalia undid the knot that had joined the Empire to the Papacy since the coronation of Charlemagne eight centuries earlier” (Muldoon 1999: 155).

Henceforth, imperial interests became increasingly intertwined with the dynastic interests of the Austrian Habsburgs. The Danube monarchy solidified initially as a centre of resistance against the Ottomans; Europe’s last line of defence after the Balkan kingdoms and Hungary had succumbed (Quataert 2000: 5). Interference from imperial institutions in the Habsburg lands largely ceased after 1635, allowing the emperor to impose more absolutist rule there than in the old empire. In addition, an intensified pursuit of the emperor’s feudal rights in Italy; the development of the
Habsburg diplomatic system; of the Viennese court as the hub of an extensive patronage network; and military expansion after 1683 (conquest of Ottoman Hungary by 1699; further acquisitions in the Balkans 1716-18; takeover of Spain’s former Italian and Netherlands possessions during the War of the Spanish Succession), made possible the rise of Austria to the status of a Great Power with an identity distinct from that of the Empire. ‘Austria’ was created as a sovereign state by the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, but, significantly (like multinational ‘Prussia’), remained without any distinct territorial or ‘national’ name. Emperor Charles VI (1711-40) envisaged it “as the centre of a revitalised Holy Roman Empire within new borders” (Heer 1968: 244).

The Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy became increasingly preoccupied with their internal affairs, and in the case of the Habsburgs, with the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe. They lost most of their universalist allure outside their own borders. On the other hand, they retained the universalist-cosmopolitan discourse internally and adopted quasi-federal governmental practices, with the Kaiser as focal point. The further significance of the Holy Roman and Habsburg empires for the emergence of Europeanist federalism will be discussed in Section 3.8.4 below.

The weakening of the Holy Roman Empire after the Thirty Years’ War encouraged the King of France, Louis XIV, to reemphasise his role as Most Christian King and his claim to leadership in Christendom. Although epitomising particularist-descending, absolutist rule within France (see next section), ‘the Sun King’ also pursued French universalist-descending hegemony in Europe. Alan Watson (1992: 189) describes him as “a French Habsburg,” much influenced by his Habsburg mother, Anne of Austria; supporting Catholic causes and persecuting Huguenots; his court reflecting the style of Habsburg Spain; and marrying the daughter of the Habsburg king of Spain. Louis set out to bring the Holy Roman Empire under his sway, scheming with pro-French electors, notably Catholic Bavaria and Cologne. He considered allowing Alsace and Lorraine, ceded to France in 1648, to remain within the Empire to enable his candidature to the imperial throne. When his bid failed, he continued to
interfere actively in domestic imperial affairs. With the help of financial subsidies and other means he was indeed able to establish effective dominion over much of Europe. The quest of Louis XIV for European hegemony however eventually foundered on combined Dutch, English and imperial opposition.

The differentiated usage of ‘Christendom’ and ‘Europe’ in this context is noteworthy. In his struggle with Protestant Holland and England at the end of the sixteenth century, the ‘very Catholic emperor’ Charles V had spoken of ‘Empire’, ‘the Christian faith’ and ‘the dynasty,’ not of ‘Europe’ (den Boer 1995: 40). When Louis XIV descended on the United Provinces, “the French propaganda machine constantly represents the Sun King as the most powerful Christian prince and the great defender of the respublica christiana” (ibid: 42). By contrast, the Dutch Stadholder, William of Orange, presented himself as the ‘preserver of the liberties of Europe.’ In diplomatic exchanges, the French brandished the term chretienté, whereas William and the English spoke of ‘Europe.’ William’s landing in England and the grand alliance against Louis XIV, as well as the Glorious Revolution (1688), had as their slogan ‘the freedoms of Europe’ (ibid.). What was meant, was religious and political freedom from the Catholic centres of power, be they Rome, Madrid, Vienna or Paris. Whoever thwarted plans for European hegemony, and notably William of Orange, was applauded as the greatest and best ‘European’ (Gollwitzer 1951: 50).

‘Europe’ was thus now emerging as the name of a territory which ideally represented freedom and diversity, notably of states, just as much as Christianity. As such it was becoming “the unchallenged symbol of the largest human loyalty” while ‘Christendom’ slowly entered “the limbo of archaic words” (Hay 1957: 116). The humanist/Renaissance notion of the respublica christiana was already less unitary and more cosmopolitan than the medieval idea of Christendom, christianitas.

The association of ‘Europe’ with freedom and diversity was presumably stronger in the Protestant north than in the mainly Catholic centre and south, where the Roman Church, and partly also the Holy Roman Empire, retained authority and loyalty. The slogan of the ‘liberties of Europe’ may also have found particular resonance in ‘city-belt Europe’ with its network of largely autonomous and often trade-based cities. As
Rokkan stresses, the unitary, modern state and its associated particularist ideology made limited progress there. The old Empire still offered some joint protection against internal as well as external aggression, and the traditional veneration of the universalist-descending Emperor persisted. Moreover, this north-south, Central European corridor was mainly Catholic or Calvinist and thus more resistant to nationalism than Lutheran or Anglican parts (see below). And, not least, the emerging ‘Great Powers’ had a common interest in preventing any of their own from gaining hegemony, or a centralised state from emerging, in the middle of Europe. They wanted the Empire and Central Europe generally to remain weak and divided. A lacking appreciation of this fundamental fact, related to international rather than comparative politics, is one of the two major flaws in Rokkan’s notion of the city-belt. The other is neglect of the Holy Roman Empire as a significant polity in its own right.

In scholarly discourse, the notion of ‘the liberties of Europe’ became associated with increasingly abstract ideas of self-contained, rational states acting in a balance of power system (with the fragmented centre as pivot). Mechanical, ‘Realist’ theories of international relations arguably reflected not only the emergence of centralised, territorial states north of the Alps, but also that northwestern Europe was the engine of the scientific revolution. Modern international relations theory was greatly influenced by the mathematical, rationalist and deductive epistemology of Descartes and Newton.

Except in hard-core, ultramontane/universalist Catholic discourse (see below), the eighteenth century Enlightenment generally meant the final victory of ‘Europe’ over ‘Christendom.’ The treaties of Utrecht, settling the War of Spanish Succession in 1713/14, were the last international treaties in which the term Christendom was used, and the first explicitly recognising a secular, multi-state Europe based on balance of power (Hay 1957: 118; Osiander 1994: 110). The preambles of the treaties contain references to the orbis christianus and to the respublica christiana, but the less controversial ‘Europe’ was used much more frequently as a common denominator. According to Osiander (1994: 110-111), in foreign policy discourse ‘Europe’ was becoming synonymous with the common interest of the European states in peace and stability. Moreover, as Bödeker points out in an analysis of the texts of the emerging
German *Staatswissenschaft* in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the main objective of foreign policy had become

to ensure a reasonable balance between European powers. [...] the concept of balance came out of a sense of unity of the European community of states. This community was no longer understood as a unity within the framework of the ‘corpus christianum’ organised primarily by moral and legal principles. Instead it was regarded as the political community of necessity and interests. (Bödeker 2003)

This interest-based notion of a states-system was arguably one half of the modern concept of Europe that replaced the idea of Christendom. The Enlightenment *philosophes* provided the other, ideological part: the idea of Europe as a cultural and commercial *society* – a civilisation rather than a religious community. Thus, the legal scholar Éméric de Vattel (1714-1767) described Europe as “a political system in which the nations [...] are bound together by their relations and their various interests into a single body. It is [...] a sort of republic, whose members – each independent but all bound together by a common interest – united for the maintenance of order and the preservation of liberty” (quoted by Hinsley 1986: 194). Voltaire also spoke of Europe (“give or take Russia”) as a sort of great commonwealth (“*une espèce de grande république*”). Rousseau for his part lamented the lack of patriotism in Europe: “today there are no more any French, Germans, Spanish, even English, there are only Europeans” (quoted by Gollwitzer 1965: 90). Like Voltaire he thought that Europe, unlike Asia and Africa, was “a real community with a religion and a moral code, with customs and even laws of its own, which none of the component nations can renounce without causing a shock to the whole frame” (quoted by Heater 1992: 82). Edmund Burke (1729-1797), in his *Three letters on the proposals for peace with the Regicide Directory of France* (1796), argued that religion, laws and manners were essentially the same throughout Europe:
The writers on public law often called this aggregate of nations a commonwealth. They had reason. It is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law, with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The nations of Europe have had the very same Christian religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and economy of every country in Europe derived from the same sources. (Burke 1796, quoted by den Boer 1993: 67)

An important reason behind this Enlightenment enthusiasm for Europe was the fact that ancient, secular Greek and Roman civilisation was now again celebrated as ‘classical,’ i.e. as a model, inspiring a surge of neo-classical architecture, visual art and theatre. The rise of classical scholarship had been initiated by the fifteenth century Italian humanists (notably Lorenzo di Valla and Politian). In the Renaissance the classical style of architecture overtook the medieval, Gothic style; Molière and others had tried to replicate the classical Greek drama in French classicist theatre; Monteverdi had invented the opera in the belief that the Greeks had originally chanted or recited their plays to music (EB 2007a); painting and sculpture had turned from religious to human and natural subjects, also often depicting scenes from Greek and Roman literature and mythology (EB 2007b); and so on. Both Erasmus and Luther were outstanding Greek scholars. French Huguenot scholars such as Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609) and Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614) greatly advanced classical studies (notably of Greek; they conceded the revival of classical Latin to the Italians), but French classical scholarship declined after Henry IV converted to Catholicism in 1593.

Indeed, the Counter-Reformation stifled classical scholarship in Catholic Europe generally (EB 2007c). Whereas the Roman See had earlier encouraged the recovery of classical learning and science, the religious revolt of the north caused strictly orthodox limits to be imposed on Catholics’ pursuit of knowledge (cf. e.g. the suppression of the heliocentric world view). Jesuit education continued to promote the forms of the classical heritage, but suppressed the rationalist spirit of humanism.

44 Opera mostly revolved around themes from classical Greek and Roman literature for the next 300 years.
However, classical scholarship continued to develop in England. Here Richard Bentley (1662-1742) made a great contribution, which also inspired scholars in the Netherlands. The leadership of not only classical scholarship, but science generally, passed to northern Europe. Of particular interest in the present context is that the ‘new humanists’ of Lutheran Germany, notably at the university of Göttingen, developed archaeology as a science. This led to excavations in Greece and Rome that provided more exact knowledge, especially of the ancient civilisation of Greece. Combined with a reaction against the ornate Baroque style promoted by the Roman Church, this inspired a wave of Romantic neo-classicism in architecture, art and literature, particularly in Protestant Europe, from about 1750 to 1830 (EB 2007d). Protestant Northern Europe thus developed a particular identification with Greco-Roman Antiquity, and notably sympathised with the ‘freedom-loving’ ancient Greeks in their struggles with the ‘despotic’ Persian and Roman imperialists (see also above, Section 3.4.3, and below, Section 3.8.2).

At the same time, Enlightenment Europe was becoming more culturally, normatively and intellectually united on a secular basis now that the religious struggles of the previous centuries were resolved and the Westphalian order was settling down. Phrases like ‘European trade’, ‘European politics’, ‘European states’, ‘European philosophy’ etc. were becoming popular (Curcio 1958, I: 352). The educated classes travelled and intermarried across national boundaries, and sponsored a common high culture of music, literature, architecture, etc. The ‘Grand Tour’ to the sites of the ancient civilisation of Greece and Rome became something of a compulsory pilgrimage for the well-to-do.

Building on the association of ‘Europe’ and ‘freedom’ that had emerged in the previous century, and more aware of the rest of the world, Enlightenment intellectuals cast Europe as a historically favoured, uniquely advanced civilisation at the cutting edge of human progress. By common consent, France was its essence: French thought and literature, French classical theatre, French neoclassical architecture, French styles in clothes, cooking and etiquette, etc. became the universal standard for ‘polite society’ everywhere in Europe. The salons Paris were the gathering places for the discussions
of the European ‘republic of letters.’ One of the most popular salons of Enlightenment Paris was Baron d’Holbach’s Café de l’Europe. Virtually every member of the European nobility, including Russian aristocrats, as well as diplomats and scientists, communicated in French. French thus replaced Latin and Italian as the European lingua franca, providing “a nonreligious sense of normative community to rulers throughout Europe” (Mann 1986: 468).

According to den Boer (1995: 64), the association of ‘civilisation’ and ‘Europe’ became common in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. The expression civilisation européenne was used for the first time in 1766, and had a clear and positive connotation: it expressed a growing feeling of European superiority. The influential dictionary published by J. Chr. Adelung in 1808 defined Europe as “the name of the smallest, but most enlightened and civilised continent” (Gollwitzer 1951: 54; my translation). For Montesquieu, as for Aristotle and Machiavelli earlier, Europe represented progress and liberty, Asia stagnation and despotism (Hay 1957: 122). Montesquieu argued that “Europe is nothing more than a big nation made up of many small nations. France and England need the prosperity of Poland and Russia, just as any of their provinces the others” (quoted by Bödeker 2003).

However, politically, it was constitutional Britain rather than absolutist France that was the great ideal of the French philosophes. Uniquely in Europe, the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688-89 had made Parliament the centre of power. Moreover, British scholars such as Newton, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Adam Smith made crucial contributions to the scientific and intellectual ferment of the Enlightenment. All of this, combined with the Kingdom of Great Britain’s (thus named after the union of the English and Scottish crowns in 1707) rising commercial and naval power, made a great impression on Montesquieu and Voltaire. They conveyed their enthusiasm for British liberty, parliamentary government and empiricism to France and the Continent.

45 Italian was widely used throughout Europe as a literary language in the sixteenth century.
The most radical *philosophes* however thought in universalist or cosmopolitan rather than narrowly European terms. They believed in the unity of humankind, indeed in “the superiority of the universal rights of humanity as a whole over the collective egoism of a particular state” (Hampson 1968: 106). The campaign to abolish the slave trade was one expression of this vision. The trans-continental revolutionary Thomas Paine (1737-1809) famously wrote in his *Rights of Man* (1791) that “my country is the world and my religion is to do good.” The French revolutionaries shared these cosmopolitan ideas:

> It is almost as if, in the revolutionary mentality, there was hardly any place for Europe in between citizenship of the world and one’s own nation. [...] The idea of Europe and the realisation of belonging to a European community were much more clear among those who attempted to resist the revolution [such as Burke] than among its supporters. (Den Boer 1995: 66)

Arguably, it was the modern tendency of radicals to think in abstract, secular, cosmopolitan and global terms and of conservatives to favour more explicitly historical Christian and European ideals that was emerging. The quarrel was greatly advanced by the French Revolution and the figure of Napoleon.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) may be seen as a transitional figure between the universalist-descending pretensions of Louis XIV and modern, Europeanist-ascending federalism. In fact, his empire caused a briefly revived advocacy of universal monarchy in continental Europe, and not least in Germany (Gollwitzer 1964: 147). Elevating himself to the position of ‘First Consul’ in 1799, Napoleon established the most effective European union since Charlemagne. Moreover, he was a great Europeaniser. Even if his European *Grande empire* eventually collapsed, the Corsican contributed massively to modernising continental Europe according to the cosmopolitan ideas of the Enlightenment. In the process, he greatly reduced its administrative and legal diversity.

At the same time, invoking the imperial legacy of Alexander the Great, the Roman emperors and Charlemagne, he rebuilt Paris as the capital of a modern European empire, replicating the grandeur of ancient Rome. Justinian’s *Corpus juris* was a major inspiration of the *Code napoléon*. Napoleon took Roman models for his
titles of consul and emperor and of the eagles of his legions. He proclaimed his son the ‘King of Rome’ and Rome the second city of his empire. He imitated Charlemagne by bringing the Pope to Paris for his imperial coronation (but in conscious contrast to Charlemagne, he took care to put the crown on his head himself). He sought legitimacy and Roman-universal aura among fellow European monarchs by marrying a Habsburg princess. Fear that Bonaparte might usurp the Roman emperorship caused Emperor Leopold II to lay down the crown of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.

Moreover, Napoleon promoted an integrated continental economy with France as the pivot. The attendant embargo on trade with Great Britain was designed to destroy the international basis for British commercial and naval supremacy, and to encourage the resentment many continentals felt against British power.

In his memoirs, Bonaparte claimed that what he had tried to realise was the Abbé Saint-Pierre’s project for “a European association” or “common fatherland” (den Boer 1993: 68; see below, page 268). He said he had looked forward to the day when his son, the King of Rome, would “reunite Europe in indissoluble federal bonds” and hoped that the American system would be introduced into the affairs of “the great European family.” He insisted that his own objective had been to achieve this by peaceful means; only England’s refusal to collaborate had forced him to realise European federation by war. “Since my fall and the disappearance of my system I do not think that any system has been possible in Europe except the agglomeration and confederation of its chief peoples. The first sovereign who will embrace the good cause of the peoples will find himself at the head of all Europe and will be able to attempt all he wishes” (quotations from Hinsley 1963: 103).

As we will see, Napoleon’s notion of the “chief peoples of Europe” is quite representative of the liberal internationalist ideas that were emerging in the wake of his wars. Industrialisation, revolutionary turmoil and Napoleonic occupation caused a nationalist and Romantic-historicist reaction in both Protestant and Catholic parts of Europe. Together with the emergence of historiography as a scientific discipline this contributed to making ‘Europe’ a contested concept: “The idea of Europe became more significant, but there was no question of a version that commanded general agreement.
Various groupings had their own ideas of what Europe had been and ought to be” (den Boer 1995: 69).

For the Papacy, paradoxically, the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon meant a change of fortunes. The French revolutionaries’ militant policy of de-Christianisation caused a widespread reaction, especially in the rural population. Moreover, by 1800, Napoleon needed the Pope’s support in pacifying France and the parts of Europe he had occupied. He had already acknowledged that the Pope was a “lever of opinion” and his moral authority “equivalent to a corps of 200,000 men” (quoted by Duffy 1997: 262). The concordat of 1801 restored much of the Pope’s authority over the church in France, inaugurating a new era (ibid: 264-265). According to Duffy (ibid: 267), the presence of Pope Pius VII (1800-1823) at Napoleon’s coronation in 1804 did more to underpin the standing of the Pope than that of the new emperor. Napoleon’s later spats with Pius had the same effect. The 1815 Congress of Vienna restored Rome and almost all the lands it had lost during the Napoleonic wars to the Holy See. Thus the Pope obtained a territorial base from which he was able to build unprecedented popular support (and, incidentally, to obstruct Italian unification until 1870).

The Holy See, by nature a deeply conservative institution, subsequently became closely allied to the Restoration monarchies. New concordats with eventually all Catholic states again gave control of the appointment of bishops to temporal rulers. But the same reaction against Enlightenment rationalism that inspired the Romanticist movement enhanced the prestige of the Pope personally (Duffy 1997: 276; see below, Section 3.8.3). In 1819, the Sardinian ambassador to St. Petersburg, Count Joseph-Marie de Maistre (1753-1821), published a book, Du Pape, which advocated the revival of a European Christendom under papal leadership. His work helped inspire an ‘ultramontanist’ movement for church centralisation and papal absolutism. This was in part a reaction to temporal interference in Church affairs such as French ‘Gallicanism’ and Austrian ‘Josephism.’ Ultramontanists also argued that the increasing power of the state threatened the independence of the national churches, which therefore needed to be backed up by a strong, supranational Papacy.
Moreover, a conflict between the Papacy and the King of Prussia in the 1830s stimulated the formation of a “new and less docile Catholic identity [...] around loyalty to papal directives” (Duffy 1997: 285). Also growing papal control of Catholic congregations overseas, notably in the United States, added to “the growing focus of Church life on Rome” (ibid: 286). The romantic idealisation of medieval theocracy voiced by de Maistre contributed to an increased interest in ancient Roman liturgy, in plainchant, and sacramental symbolism. At the same time, the blossoming cults of Mary and of the Sacred Heart of Jesus reflected growing popular reverence for the Pope. “[...I]n the age of cheap popular print and the emergence of the mass media, the Pope himself became, quite literally, a popular icon” (ibid: 293).

A number of other Catholic romantic authors defended the universalist-descending tradition of medieval Christendom too. Most influential were Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis; 1772-1801) and François-Renée de Chateaubriand (1768-1848). Novalis in his *Christenheit oder Europa* (1799) attacked Protestantism for disrupting Christendom and called for the revival of a Christian-Germanic Europe on the Charlemagne model. Similarly, in his *Génie du christianisme* (1802), Chateaubriand “sang the praises of the influence of Christendom on poetry, literature, music, architecture, theology and forms of worship” with great effect (den Boer 1995: 69). Writings like these gave the idea of Europe “a clearly defined and developed historical perspective, which had been lacking even as late as the late eighteenth century. [...] The concept of Europe was therefore not only historicised, but also politicised; in other words, it was seen more and more in historical terms, with contemporary political debate forming the frame of reference” (ibid: 69, 70).

The tracts of de Maistre, Novalis, Chateaubriand, Schlegel, Görres and other Catholic romanticists espoused a historicist thinking according to which true European civilisation had been built progressively on the ruins of the Roman Empire (the Latin element), the barbarian peoples and the Carolingian empire (the Germanic element), and on Catholicism (the Christian element). The Papacy represented the single most important institution of continuity. Medieval Christendom was advanced as the ideal Europe, an ideal that alas had fallen into decay under the influence of atheism and
revolution. At the same time the neo-Gothic style emerged in a romantic reaction against classicism in architecture. The Gothic novel represented a similar effect in literature, as did national romanticism’s celebration of folk culture and dramatic nature in painting and music. Words like ‘Romanticism’ and ‘Roman’ (German for novel) indeed derived from the popular ‘romance’ literature of medieval, ‘Germanic’ France. Similarly, romantic nostalgia for the imagined peace and order of the Middle Ages influenced Tsar Alexander’s initiative of the ‘Holy Alliance,’ signed in 1815 by the absolutist monarchs of Russia, Prussia and Austria (den Boer 1995: 69-70).

The restoration and reaction represented by the Holy Alliance was a major reason why post-Napoleonic liberals were resurrecting the old distinction between West and East, or ‘Occident’ and ‘Orient.’ The West, now extending as far as America, was identified with ascending and constitutional government, and the East, represented most darkly by Tsarist Russia, with descending or ‘despotic’ rule (Gollwitzer 1951: 220; den Boer 1995: 71). Until the Congress of Vienna, Russia had been considered more neutrally as a ‘northern’ power (Bödeker 2003).

In a related development, the French historian and statesman François Guizot (1787-1874) made a momentous contribution to the national-liberal, secularised or Protestant interpretation of European history. Guizot identified the progress of Europe with the growth of freedom and diversity. The uniqueness of Europe was that throughout its history, no agent, institution, tradition or idea had been able to gain hegemony. There had always been dynamism and competition; at first, in the Middle Ages, between spiritual and temporal authority; later, in modern times between confessions, states, companies and individuals. For the Huguenot Guizot, the Reformation was the historical élan de liberté that separated the two ages, “an enormous step forward towards freedom of thought and the emancipation of the human spirit” (den Boer 1995: 72).

The Lutheran A.H.L. Heeren (1760-1842), historian at the Göttingen university, also interpreted the Reformation as the juncture when “Europe became European” (Gollwitzer 1951: 102). In his *Handbook of History of the European State System*, Heeren stated that the general character of the state system is “its inner freedom, which
is the autonomy and interactive independence of its members.” The system is a
“whole;” within it the nations of Christian Europe “morally constituted a nation that
was only politically divided” (quoted by Bödeker 2003). Heeren observed that the
stability of the system depended on the situation in Central Europe, and notably in
Germany.

The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 signalled the growth of radical democratic
ideas according to which ordinary people, and not just the meritocratic or aristocratic
best, should hold political power. According to den Boer, popular culture was now
recognised as deserving scientific and political attention. He argues that the French
historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874)

made the common people the driving force of history and the primary factor in
the development of civilisation. This popular culture was placed largely in the
context of the nation and [...] found literary and musical expression in national
romanticism. The concept of civilisation, which until then had been synonymous
with Europe in general, was now eagerly aligned with national borders; European
civilisation was subdivided into various national cultures. (Den Boer 1995: 73)

Michelet, however, was a French ‘enlightened’ type of nationalist, propounding
the universal mission of France in showing other nations the way to a particularist-
ascending and eventually universalist-ascending ‘End of History.’ Post -1848
‘progressive Romanticists’ inspired by this vision, notably Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-
1872), formulated a national-liberal discourse on Europe advocating human rights at
the individual level and equality and fraternity of all peoples (i.e. nations) at the
collective level. Den Boer thus argues that, in contrast to what had been the case in
1789, the concept of Europe had a very prominent place in the mentality of the
revolutionaries of 1848:

The liberation of the citizen is to take place within the nation and vast layers of
the population are to take part in the national culture: the country should
reconcile the social classes with one another. Subsequently, however, these
reborn nations should become part of the brotherhood of European peoples.
Democrats therefore see Europe not as a balance of powers according to the view
of political realism, but as a federation of nations; there was no place for hatred
among the individual nations, the ultimate aim being fraternisation. (Den Boer
1995: 74)
The prevailing view of emerging national-liberal historiography was that ‘European’ history had begun with the demise of the Roman Empire and that the ancestors of modern nations had been born out of the subsequent ‘Dark Ages.’ As we have seen (above, Section 3.4.3), it also praised the Germanic tribes as the originators of European freedom and democracy.

However, in his bestselling *History of Greece* the British banker, liberal and historian George Grote (1794-1871) introduced the idea that properly European political history had begun not with Germanic, but with *Greek* democracy. “Grote was the first to point out the political significance of Athens as the cradle of democracy. [...] It was emphasised that the highest achievement of the Greeks was to have established political freedom in a type of democracy which had for centuries been unsurpassed” (den Boer 1995: 74).

Den Boer argues that ‘Europe’ now had come full circle. Having begun as a Greek geographical indicator, it had been subsumed by ‘Christendom,’ which in turn had been replaced by a notion of European civilisation encompassing ancient Greek and Roman as well as medieval Christian and uniquely modern ideas. As the call for democratisation grew louder in the course of the nineteenth century, the national-liberal concept of ‘Europe’ returned to its Greek roots, whose democracy was now for the first time glorified on a par with other Greek achievements. With Grote’s contribution, the national-liberal discourse on Europe was complete. European history was the story of the progress of freedom, diversity, prosperity and democracy, now realised in the framework of the modern *polis*, the nation-state. (For more on particularist-descending ideology, see below, Section 3.8.3.)

However, at the same time the ground was being prepared for the twentieth-century Christian-democratic discourse on Europe. Catholicism and the Roman Church were becoming transnationalised and Europeanised, with Pope Pius IX (1846-78) as the driving force (Kaiser 2007: 12). Pius used the Catholic revival after Napoleon to encourage ultramontanist tendencies, streamline religious practice, centralise the formulation of doctrine, and to strengthen and increasingly control the bureaucracy and hierarchy of the Church. Centralisation was also assisted by religious orders, notably
the Jesuits, whose society had been refounded in 1814. In 1870 these trends came
together when a general church council, Vatican I, adopted a decree declaring the Pope
to be infallible when speaking in an especially solemn form (ex cathedra). Thence until
Vatican II (1962-65), ultramontanist, universalist philosophy – called papism by its
detractors – dominated official Catholic doctrine.

Ironically, Piedmontese troops shortly afterwards invaded and stripped the Pope
of his temporal sovereignty over Rome, which was declared capital of united Italy. A
law adopted by the new Italian parliament limited the Pope’s temporal sovereignty to
the tiny Vatican territory (he also kept the Lateran palace and the country retreat Castel
Gandolfo). In Italy proper, church and state were separated. Pius from now on
considered himself a prisoner, and forbade Catholics to vote or stand in Italian
elections. The Church only came to terms with the secular Italian state in 1929, when it
signed a concordat with the government of Mussolini. The law of 1870 however also
gave the Pope the right to appoint all Italian bishops, which hugely increased his
control of the Italian Church (Duffy 1997: 302).

In Germany too Catholics clashed with centralising national authority. The
Catholic Centre Party, established in 1870, protested the exclusion of Austria from the
new German Empire, which was thus predominantly Protestant. In what became
known as ‘the struggle over culture’ (Kulturkampf), Bismarck in conjunction with the
National Liberal Party sanctioned the German Catholic Church and the Centre Party
for their transnational loyalties. This effort to reinforce Prussian and Protestant
hegemony in the German Reich added significantly to the already critical Church
attitude to nationalism and the nation-state. However, it also stoked fears among
politically aware Catholics that they would be seen as insufficiently national-minded
and that transnational party co-operation would be perceived as an unpatriotic and
dangerous ‘black international’ (Kaiser 2007: 24, 31). The same fear caused a Catholic
nationalist over-compensation in late nineteenth century France, as expressed notably
in the Dreyfus affair between 1894 and 1900 (Thorsen 2008: 27).

In his 1891 encyclical Rerum novarum, Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) committed
the Church to the social and educational advancement of Catholic workers. Catholic
trade unions established a transnational network already in 1908, whereas Catholic parties did so only after World War I (Kaiser 2007: 25). Even this happened without Church support, as the new secretariat in Zürich was inter-confessional, including also Protestant trade unions.

Pope Leo continued his predecessor’s policy of church centralisation and papal absolutism, reinforcing the spiritual stature of the Papacy even as its temporal basis disappeared. Generally, however, the Papacy and therefore most of the Catholic establishment everywhere remained politically conservative, opposing liberalism, socialism and communism. Papal ultramontanism stigmatised liberal and radical Catholics inside the Church and inflamed the latent anti-Catholicism among Protestants. National integration in Europe was generally achieved against Catholic opposition. E.g. the Dutch Catholics, representing about a third of the population, where long known among Protestants as the ‘Spanish-Roman party.’ Thus, in contrast to what happened in the Church itself, nationalist pressures and the minority status of Catholics in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland prevented any transnationalisation of political Catholicism and Catholic parties. Besides, after the loss to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, French Catholics became virulently nationalistic and anti-German. Potential European party co-operation was also hampered by the fact that neither Italy nor France had a Catholic party until after the Great War (Kaiser 2007: 27-36).

The outbreak of World War I however caused the Holy See to reconsider its attitude to transnational Catholic party networking. Pope Benedict XV (1914-22) from his first pronouncements in September 1914 consistently condemned the war. In the supranational Roman Catholic perspective, the war appeared as a family feud that threatened to bring down not only the Papacy’s prime temporal ally in Europe, the Habsburg monarchy of Austria-Hungary, but also European-cum-Christian civilisation in general (Kaiser 2007: 40). In the hope of advancing peace and understanding, the Vatican strongly encouraged the first transnational meeting of German, Austro-Hungarian, Italian and French Catholic politicians. The International Catholic Union
(ICU) was launched in Switzerland in February 1917, but met only once again, in January 1918, before the armistice made it irrelevant.

Much due to the entrenchment of communism in Russia and Stalin’s repressive regime, from the late 1920s the Catholic Church became increasingly associated with right-wing authoritarianism. It was the Vatican’s accord with Hitler in 1933 that undid the German Centre Party, just as its concordat with Mussolini in 1929 had destroyed the pro-Catholic Partito Populare d’Italia (PPI). Most Italian clergy encouraged Catholics to vote Fascist, and in Germany the Centre Party helped Hitler come to power before it was outlawed. The tolerance shown by Pope Pius XI (1922-1939) towards emerging fascism, just as the social reforms he advocated in his encyclical Quadragesimo anno of 1931 and his encouragement of Franco-German reconciliation, was informed by his abhorrence of atheist communism and socialism. Moreover, the Vatican’s major preoccupation was to secure a legal basis for the Church, whatever the regime (Duffy 1997: 341).

But Pius had no illusions about the anti-Christian nature of Nazism. In 1937 he issued the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge, in which he “denounced the ‘idolatrous cult’ that replaced belief in the true God with a ‘national religion’ and the ‘myth of race and blood.’ He contrasted this perverted ideology with the teaching of the Church in which there was a home ‘for all peoples and all nations,’” including Jews (Duffy 1997: 344). Beginning in 1929, a number of German Catholic bishops denounced the National Socialist party’s racial and religious teachings.

After World War II, continued anti-communism made Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) pour money into the 1949 election campaign of the newly (re)founded Christian Democratic party of Italy. The post-war Roman Church remained persistently critical of nationalism, materialism and capitalism. However, eventually it came to accept the modern state, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In the encyclical Mater et Magistra, Pope John I (1958-63) “broke with Vatican suspicion of lurking socialism by welcoming the advent of the caring state” (Duffy 1997: 357). The second general council of the Church, Vatican II (1962-65), was “the most revolutionary Council ever since the Reformation” and “completely overturned” earlier denunciations of the
‘Modern World’ (ibid: 360; 361). In another historical move, Pope Paul VI (1963-78) together with Patriarch Athenagoras in 1964 lifted the mutual excommunication of the Latin and Greek Churches dating from 1054. The advent of the modern and charismatic, but still very much universalist-descending Papacy was confirmed by the long reign of John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla; 1978-2006), the first non-Italian Pope since 1522.

Even if the Vatican’s perspective has become ever more global, post-war Popes have not concealed their conviction that Europe should unite and close ranks behind European-Christian values. Pius XII vocally supported post-war efforts towards European federation (de Molènes 1971: 343-4). Kaiser notes that the Church broadly backed Europe integration and thus helped legitimise the policy of Franco-German reconciliation in the immediate post-war years. In June 1950, the French cardinals and bishops called upon all Catholics to work for European integration (Kaiser 2007: 180-181). In the apostolic exhortation *Ecclesia in Europa* of 28 June 2003, Pope John Paul II extensively restated the attitude of the Catholic Church to Europe. Paragraph 26 is particularly relevant in this regard:

*The Church's concern for Europe* is born of her very nature and mission. Down the centuries the Church has been closely linked to our continent, so that Europe's spiritual face gradually took shape thanks to the efforts of great missionaries, the witness of saints and martyrs, and the tireless efforts of monks and nuns, men and women religious and pastors. From the biblical conception of man Europe drew the best of its humanistic culture, found inspiration for its artistic and intellectual creations, created systems of law and, not least, advanced the dignity of the person as a subject of inalienable rights. The Church, as the bearer of the Gospel, thus helped to spread and consolidate those values which have made European culture universal. With all this in mind, the Church of today, with a renewed sense of responsibility, is conscious of the urgency of not squandering this precious patrimony and of helping Europe to build herself by revitalizing her original Christian roots (John Paul II 2003; emphasis in original)

We will revisit the crucial role of transnational Christian democracy in advancing Europeanist-ascending ideology and forging post-war European integration in Section 3.8.4 and, in more detail, in Part 4 below. Now I will turn to the rise and decline of particularist-descending ideology, propounded most notably by absolutist France and
Protestant Prussia. In France, the descending part of the equation was most prominent, whereas in Prussian-dominated Germany particularism prevailed.

3.8.2 Particularist-descending ideology

As we have just seen, medieval notions of Christendom survived to influence the modern European debate over the scope of sovereignty. However, as the acceptance of the territorial and eventually the national state grew, the locus of sovereignty became the overshadowing political issue of modernity. In Aristotelian terms, state-building rulers and their apologists tended to favour monarchy (on the Continent) or aristocracy (in Britain), whereas liberals and radicals advocated democratisation. Particularist-descending discourse came to defend absolutism in domestic and ‘Realism’ in international affairs. ‘Reason of state,’ the key logic in both respects, was articulated notably by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) in the context of the city-state rivalry of Renaissance Italy. Guicciardini pioneered the associated, Realist notion of balance of power too.

Particularism grew as embattled Protestants after the Reformation increasingly came to imagine themselves as the Chosen People of ancient Israel (Hale 1993: 98; Smith 2003). Dutch and English Protestants embraced the concept of balance of power to protect the independence of their states, their faith and their commercial interests against imperialist Spanish Habsburg and French Bourbon encroachment. Thus, as we have seen, the balance of power doctrine became closely associated with the Protestant cause and its cry for ‘the liberties of Europe.’ In effect, this was a cry for national sovereignty against Roman-Catholic universalism and imperialism as represented by the Pope, the Emperor and, to some extent at least, the Most Christian French king. As time passed and the balance shifted, any government which found itself on the defensive, whether Protestant or Catholic, would inevitably take up the advocacy of European ‘equilibrium’ or ‘repose’ and of the ‘liberties of Europe,’ as the best guarantee for their political, economic and religious self-determination. Thus particularistic discourse advanced towards hegemony.
The prime institutional vanguard of particularist-descending praxis (as opposed to the universalist-descending tendencies of its discourse; see above) was sixteenth to eighteenth century France, notably during the reigns of First Minister, Cardinal Richelieu (1624-42) and King Louis XIV (1661-1715).

When the religious upheavals struck France, they became mixed up with the regionalism of the nobility and resulted in a savage civil war (1562 -1598). The central government almost collapsed, but the monarchy eventually survived with Gallican Catholicism as a bedrock of central power. However, according to Leah Greenfeld, the Reformation dealt an irreparable blow to the Catholic self-image of the country. French Catholicism grew more and more idiosyncratic for centuries, and the kings, while flaunting the title of rex christianissimus, did everything possible to separate themselves from the Universal Church and its head in Rome. Yet this determined decatholisation was never made explicit; if anything it was the Pope who was accused of being not Catholic enough. (Greenfeld 1992: 106)

French particularism was advanced by the secularised pragmatism that resulted from the religious and civil struggles. It was further stimulated by the menace represented by the growing power of Habsburg Spain. To restore peace and order in France and to resist Habsburg universal monarchy, pragmatic Huguenot and Catholic politiques sought to build a feeling of joint Frenchness to replace the now divided Christian identity. The Huguenot leader, Henry of Navarre, converted to Catholicism to become king as Henry IV (1594-1610). He was the first of the centralising, Bourbon line of kings that lasted until the French Revolution. Henry called on his people “as Frenchmen” to live in peace “not because they are of the Faith, but inasmuch as they have been loyal servants to me and to the French crown” (quoted by Greenfeld 1992: 107). In 1598 he issued the Edict of Nantes, which gave individual and territorial rights to Protestants, thus recognising them as good Frenchmen.

Theoretically, the way for Henry IV had been prepared by the jurist and political philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-1596), who was a Huguenot politique too. In his Six livres de la republique (1576), Bodin developed the theory of absolute and indivisible political sovereignty, based on the Roman notion of summum imperium (Keene 2005:
103; see also above, page 114). He defined sovereignty as “the absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth,” arguing that a legitimate ruler may not be resisted, as he is ab solutus – above positive law (but still subject to divine and natural law). Pierre de Belloy in his De l’autorité du roi (1588) added the theory of Divine Right, thus ultimately advancing “the deification of the French polity” (Greenfeld 1992: 111). At Henry IV’s behest, Pierre Pithou for his part wrote a defence of the liberty of the Gallican Church vis-à-vis Rome. The Catholic politique Richelieu in turn implemented this programme for “the substitution of the worldly allegiance for the transcendental (and of the earthly patrie for the celestial)” (Greenfeld 1992: 112). Richelieu’s rule was symbolic of the alliance of throne and altar that since Capetian times had been the mainstay of political stability in France but had been rocked by the Reformation (le Goff 2005: 73).

Incidentally, towards the end of the Thirty Years’ War the First Minister of Henry IV, the Huguenot Duke of Sully (Maximile de Béthune; 1560-1641), produced arguably the first ‘modern’ scheme for European federation. It was modern in the sense that it envisaged a voluntary union of sovereign and equal states to avoid war and promote joint prosperity, based on fixed borders, intergovernmental deliberation, balance of power, religious toleration and free trade. Sully’s grand dessein may have been a “plan for the weakening of the Habsburgs and the establishment of French hegemony in Europe” (Heater 1992: 35), but much of the terminology remained traditional. Sully termed the union a Christian commonwealth (respublica christiana), and the intergovernmental body that should guide it “the Very Christian Council of Europe.” Moreover, he excluded ‘Asiatic’ Muscovy from the European federation he envisaged (Hale 1993: 140). The core should be Protestant Europe, but Sully envisaged a reorganisation of all of Europe as the ultimate goal. The Council would meet in designated cities in ‘Lotharingian’ Europe close to the Rhine (de Rougemont 1966: 100-101).

As we have seen, the universalist, Catholic-Carolingian tradition remained influential in France. This may have encouraged the cosmopolitanism that characterised assimitationalist French colonial policies (‘civilising’ natives into good
French citizens) as well as the French Enlightenment and Revolution. The French and Catholic concept of national identity and citizenship remained open and inclusivist, whereas that of Lutheran states, and notably Prussia, became closed and exclusivist (see below). Moreover, Louis XIV’s ‘absolutism’ was “prescribed by numerous restrictions and obstacles rooted in the multiplicity of customary rights, legal systems, and so on, that the mosaic nature of his dominions had kept in place for centuries” (Muldoon 1999: 63).

As Muldoon furthermore points out, the late medieval and early modern ‘territorial states’ were in effect empires struggling among themselves to become states in the European context while they at the same time were turning into global empires. Pagden concurs that the nineteenth century Great Powers were empires both due to their overseas possessions and to their still composite, or cosmopolitan, domestic nature. Indeed, they had “created in the shadow of an ancient and medieval legacy of universalism, of a presumed right of lordship over the entire world” (Pagden 1995: 8). Pagden views Queen Victoria’s coronation as Empress of India in 1858 as “the most fully elaborated attempt the modern world has ever witnessed to recreate the ancient Roman imperium” (ibid.: 9).

I therefore submit that in the formation of modern particularist-descending, nationalist ideology, Lutheranism was a more significant influence than French absolutism and patriotism. Although religiously individualist, the submissive attitude to temporal authority advocated by Luther encouraged authoritarian, top-down governance. Martin Wight (1991: 245) indeed classifies Luther morally as a Realist, and Cargill Thompson (1966: 43) notes that his view of government has much in common with that of Hobbes.

An Augustinian monk who lived all his life in what is today northeastern Germany, Martin Luther (1483-1546) thought that “men were justified by God’s grace alone and that all that was necessary was to have faith in the saving power of His mercy” (Cargill Thompson 1966: 36). What matters is the mystical union between man and God; the Pope or his clergy have no role to play as intermediaries. Thus Protestants were freed from “the Catholic womb of grand ceremony, historical tradition, and
sacramental authority” (Tarnas 1991: 240). Whereas Catholics continued to be told, as Montaigne put it, that “it is not by reasoning or understanding that we have received our religion, it is by authority and command from above” (quoted by Kenny 2006: 16), Luther advocated “the doctrine of the Priesthood of All Believers, - the belief that there was no essential distinction between priests and laymen” (Cargill Thompson 1966: 36). Catholics continued to belong to a supranational Church and owe loyalty to its universal leader, the Pope, whereas Luther decreed that the Bible – and thus ultimately one’s own interpretation of it – was the one and only source of Christian truth.

However, their liberation from Rome also exposed Protestants more to the influence of temporal powers-holders. In Lutheran and Anglican Europe, the religious sphere was absorbed by the state as secular princes became guardians of ‘state’ churches. According to Cargill Thompson, a state church was not Luther’s original intent, but it followed from his view that government was both a consequence of the sinfulness of human nature and a divine institution. “For Luther princes and magistrates are in a literal sense God’s ‘instruments’” (Cargill Thompson 1966: 43). Rebellion had to be resisted at all cost. Although Luther himself would most likely have rejected any worship of the state, many ‘neo-Constantinist’ Lutherans, particularly in future Prussia, came to see the state as a quasi-sacred institution.

Renée Rémond argues that also internal church organisation and majority or minority status within the state had a significant impact on the political thought of the different Christian denominations:
The principle of the churches’ internal organisation was a further differentiating factor, depending on whether it was rather hierarchical or made room for a certain democratic expression. As well as leading to a conception of the organisation of civil society, the type of discipline shaped behaviours, created customs, moulded sensibilities. In this regard Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism and Lutheranism, which all preserved the episcopal hierarchy, differed profoundly from the Presbyterian denominations, Calvinist or Scottish, whose functioning relies on the participation of their followers in the faith’s administration. The first group were more naturally disposed to accept all higher authority and to show it reverence and submission; the second, who practiced collective deliberation, were predisposed to accept democratic operation, and more likely to challenge the decisions of authority. To that difference must be added their relative situation within the state, according to whether they were associated with the ruling power and enjoyed a privileged position or, if in minority, whether they were persecuted or merely tolerated. Thus the Church of England had close links with the crown and its sympathies lay with the Tories, whereas the Whigs, Radicals and, later, Labour always recruited from the dissenters, among the Methodists or Baptists. (Rémond 1999: 24)

According to Duffy, Luther’s successful protest reflected in part an anti-Roman tradition in the German lands, “fuelled by memories of the struggle of Frederick Barbarossa with the twelfth-century Papacy, by the ideas of the Conciliar movement, by the example of the Hussite schism in Bohemia, and by the financial and jurisdictional demands of the Papacy in Germany” (Duffy 1997: 202).

However, the word ‘nation’ retained its medieval non-national meaning until at least the seventeenth century. Before that it was hardly ever used to refer to all inhabitants of a country, but rather signified the estates that held political power: “We are not dealing here with ‘people’s nations’ but with nations of aristocracy” (Schulze 1994: 104). Particularist-descending nationalism emerged in Germany, notably among Lutheran and Prussian Germans, only in the nineteenth century. The reasons then were many: nationalism was a reaction to the rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and to French occupation; Germany’s long experience as helpless battlefield for the Great Powers encouraged a unifying sense of being a victim of dark foreign forces; the German mystic tradition played a role; so did the success of France as model, invader and rival; industrialisation gave Germany the means to project power and at the same time encouraged or required national integration; and so on.
Significant was also the establishment of the humanities, notably philology and historiography, as university disciplines, first at Göttingen. Building on the humanism of the Renaissance, Gianbattista Vico (1668-1744), often seen as the first ethnologist, had argued that human nature was not universal, but a product of historical, geographical and social context, and particularly language. French philosophes such as Montesquieu, Pascal, Bayle and Rousseau took up his argument, but it was most systematically advanced by the German scholar Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). In Germany, Herder had been preceded by the ‘pre-romantic’ intellectuals of the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) movement, such as Möser, Klopstock and Wieland, who from the 1740s “rallied to the defence of German culture” (Hahn 1995: 60). This contributed to a new interest in old Germanic literature and mythology and to the foundation of Germanistik, German studies. Folktales and ballads of all types were collected and preserved, and an imagined Germanic past, not least the struggle against the Roman imperialists, eulogised. The epic Niebelungenlied, rediscovered in 1748 and later dramatised in Richard Wagner’s opera (1869-76), soon became the national poem of Germany, “associated with a pugnacious anti-Western attitude, advocating a return to Germanic barbarism and to pre-Christian traditions” (Hahn 1995: 97).

The human sciences in Germany were dominated by Protestant scholars preoccupied with the genealogy of the German nation. Tacitus’ Germania, rediscovered by the humanists about 1500, was embraced as incontrovertible evidence of German ancestry and freedom-loving greatness (as discussed above, Section 3.7.2). At the same time, in a nationalist parallel to the Catholic Romantic medievalism of de Maistre, Novalis and Chateaubriand (see previous section), the new, mainly Lutheran historians embraced the medieval Holy Roman Empire as a model of glory and power for the new Reich they imagined. “Germany’s future, then, was to be found in her past, in the middle ages. [...] The history of the German middle ages became something like a national obsession” (Schulze 1994: 170, 171). In his History of the German Imperial Age (1855), Wilhelm Giesebricht wrote that the age of the medieval emperors was “the period during which our nation, strong in its unity, enjoyed its greatest power and influence, not only governing its own destiny, but also holding sway over other
nations: it was an age when the German counted for most in the world, and an age when the German name had the sternest ring to it” (quoted by Schulze 1994: 171). Historians like him thought that the early medieval period had been a Germanic, or ‘Gothic,’ golden age.

In a parallel and related development, a significant revival of pietism affected Germany between about 1740 and 1780. Modern German pietism had been founded a century earlier by Philipp Jacob Spener, who drew on a mysticist tradition originating in the fifteenth century if not earlier. Moreover, as we have seen (above, Section 3.4.2), Winckelmann’s ‘discovery’ of the Greeks in the 1770s led to an assumption of a natural affinity between ancient Greeks and modern Germans. “Had not the Greeks and Romans been in classical times what the Germans and the French now were? Had not then, as now, an overbearing and powerful state dominated the West – rational, efficiently governed and organised, civilised, but lacking true culture and spirituality?” (Schulze 1994: 165). Schulze (ibid.) adds that “it was no mere chance that the first major German national monument, the ‘Valhalla’ near Regensburg, was constructed, in spite of its nebulous Nordic name, in the shape of the Athenian Parthenon”.

Such and other impulses came together in German national romanticism and historicism. Inspired by Rousseau, Herder argued that language and cultural traditions created and defined the Volk, or nation, as the most fundamental unit of human society. Polities not corresponding to a Volk, like the European empires of the day, were artificial creations.

However, although both Rousseau and Herder were pioneers of a nationalist-romanticist-historicist reaction against Enlightenment rationalism, they formulated two fundamentally different conceptions of nationhood (Brubaker 1992). That of Rousseau was informed by the Roman law tradition of jus soli (right of the soil) and destined to be accepted by most modern liberals and by France and the United States (and Canada, Australia, Argentina, Romania etc.) in their citizenship laws (EB 2007e). Jus soli means that individuals acquire the citizenship of the territory where they are born or naturalised, regardless of ancestral citizenship. The citizenship law adopted by the post-revolutionary French republic, inspired by Rousseau and Ernest Rénan, was
essentially civic, based on the notion of the people as a political unit made up of citizens who freely accept a common constitution. Even the natives of the French colonies became French citizens and could sit in the French National Assembly. As early as the seventeenth century, First Minister Colbert’s (1619-1683) explicit goal for the first French colonies had been to create a single, cultural as well as legal community with France (Pagden 1995: 149). This reflected the French universalist tradition and its historic antecedents.

By contrast, Herder’s (and later Fichte’s; see below) conception was organic, based on history, tradition and culture, expressed essentially in language. Its legal expression is the *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) tradition. *Jus sanguinis* means that to obtain nationality or citizenship of a state, individuals must have an ancestor who is or was a citizen or national of that state (even if living as ethnic minorities abroad, like the Volga Germans or the Banat Hungarians). The German Reich established in 1871 adopted the Prussian citizenship law that was based on *jus sanguinis*. This principle continues to inform German nationality law, although elements of *jus soli* were introduced in 2000. Brubaker (1992) calls the French notion of citizenship political and assimilationist, and the German conception ethnocultural and differentialist. Other terms often used are civic vs. ethnic, subjective vs. objective, and non-essentialist vs. essentialist national identity (see e.g. the discussion in Sicakkan 2006: 129-159). Gollwitzer (1951: 211) contrasts the related concepts of popular sovereignty and popular integrity (*Volkssouveränität* vs. *Volksintegrität*).

However, as Schulze (1994: 156-158) points out, the probably most important reason for the conceptual difference between what he calls respectively the political view of the French Revolution and the cultural view of German Romanticism was that a French state, around which the nation could rally, already existed when nationalism emerged. It had not yet appeared in Germany and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. Here, nationalism therefore had to be linguistic and ethnocultural first and political later.

In any case, Napoleonic occupation encouraged a non-political German nationalism hailing the unique virtues and mission of the German nation. Initially,
German national feeling as espoused by Herder, Fichte and many others was national-liberal, but it would later be co-opted by authoritarian Prussia when German unification was deemed favourable to its goals. In his famous *Addresses to the German nation* (1806), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) argued that the mission of the Germans was to regenerate European culture and morality (Hahn 1995: 69). Fichte thus was able to reconcile Enlightenment Europeanness with emerging German national romanticism: “Which is then the fatherland of the truly educated, Christian European? Generally, it is Europe. In particular, it is the European state that at any time is most cultured” (quoted by Gollwitzer 1951: 204). Inspired by Herder as well as Rousseau, in Gollwitzer’s formulation Fichte

identified the Germans with the *Urvolk* or *Normalvolk*; he spoke of the unique originality and authenticity of the German language family and assumed from its spiritual purity a singular political creativeness; he praised the Germans as liberators from the oppression by ancient imperial and papal Rome. He characterises Germany as the European peace empire, the ‘incarnation of the whole of Christian Europe on a smaller scale.’ (Gollwitzer 1951: 207-208; my translation)

According to Fichte, it was thus Germany’s historical mission to pioneer and lead a European federation of free peoples.

Generally, after the French Revolution, as Schulze affirms, the idea of the nation has had quasi-religious overtones: “since a nation has no visible physical presence, it has to be believed in. Nationalism is the secular faith of the industrial age. The new state was not sanctioned by god, but by the nation” (Schulze 1994: 158). In Germany, the religious connotations of nationalism were reinforced by the continued influence of Pietism. Protestant clergy and nationalist intellectuals, sometimes the same persons, joined forces. “[T]he politicisation of religion paralleled the sacralisation of politics and divine attributes were increasingly ascribed to the nation” (Burleigh 2005: 154). Thus the one-time Lutheran minister Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) wrote: “Leave all the little religions and perform the great duty to the single highest, and unite yourselves in it to one belief high above the Pope or Luther. That is the ultimate religion, to hold the Fatherland more dearly than lords and princes, than father and mother, than wives and children” (quoted by Burleigh 2005: 154). All the German
‘ideal’ philosophers were either former students of theology – Fichte at Jena and Leipzig (1780-84), Schelling and Hegel at the Tübingen seminary (1788–95) – or the sons of Protestant pastors (EB 2007f). Arndt was from Rügen, the “region of Lutheran Baltic Sea culture and the Nordic-Protestant revival of the eighteenth century” (Gollwitzer 1951: 211; my translation). Most of these perceived Europe as being fundamentally split between good and bad forces: the former represented by the Germanic and Protestant part and the other by ‘Welsh’ (Roman/Latin/French) and Catholic Europe (Gollwitzer 1951: 213). Due not only to her history, but also to her central position, Germany was destined to lead Europe beyond the traditional power politics that had proved so destructive (and so detrimental to the German nation).

Given the powerful French and British models, it was but a small step from German cultural nationalism to the argument that Germany needed its own national state to fulfil its unique world mission. The state should represent the collective, imagined nation (*Volksintegrität*); democracy, accountability and individual rights (*Volkssouveränität*) were secondary. Schleiermacher (1768-1834), often seen as the father of modern Protestant theology (EB 2007g), thus believed in the regenerative power of *Volk* and *Staat*, and gave both priority over the individual. According to Hahn, Hegel (1770-1831) defined the Greek polis as a work of art, since it “had achieved a harmonious totality between its individual members, overcoming any distinctions between human beings as individuals and human beings as citizens, between private and public matters” (Hahn 1995: 69-70). To Hahn, Hegel was the most distinguished representative of the secularised Prussian brand of Protestantism, “who interpreted the Lutheran belief in authority as unquestioned obedience towards the State” (Hahn 1995: 41).

Furthermore, Schulze stresses the role of Lutheran historians in the emergence of nineteenth century German nationalism: “A whole generation of politically committed historians now occupied chairs in German universities: Dahlmann in Bonn, Häuser in Freiburg, Duncker and Treitschke in Berlin, Droysen in Jena, Sybel in Munich – all of them liberals and all of them convinced of Prussia’s historic mission and the pernicious
influence of South German, ‘anti-national’ Catholicism.” These historians were now shaping Germans’ image of history:

They differed from liberals in Western Europe in that they saw the state not just as the product of natural forces, but also as the embodiment of ethical values, without which culture and social morality would not be possible. And those values were nowhere as clearly manifested as in Prussia. [...] Droysen drew the conclusion that the realisation of the German national state through the agency of Prussia was part of the ‘divine cosmic order.’ (Schulze 1994: 169)

However, in the first half-century after Napoleon’s defeat, the Great Powers managed to keep the brewing nationalism in Germany and in the smaller European nationalities within bounds. The Napoleonic experiment in European union was followed by the re-establishment of the particularist-descending balance of power system, inaugurated by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and reconfirmed by the Treaties of Utrecht in 1713-14. But the Congress of Vienna in 1815 realised that the balance of power does not operate automatically, and introduced a much more active management of European affairs than had been attempted earlier. According to Kissinger (1994: 82), the Congress System, the classical period of which was 1815-1822, came close to constituting “a European government”.

The System set the precedent, later continued by the League of Nations and United Nations Security Council, for an intergovernmental body with some supranational power to interfere in the affairs of other states. The initial members were Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, but already in 1818 France was readmitted as an equal partner. It was these five states that subsequently became known as Great Powers, and their diplomatic co-operation until 1914 as the Concert of Europe.

However, both because a prime objective of the Congress System was to defend the restored, pre-Napoleonic order and thus absolutist monarchy (however enlightened), and because of its incipient federative tendencies, Britain soon began distancing itself. Kissinger argues that Great Britain was the Great Power least interested in permanent alliances and in European unity. Its main interest was commercial: freedom of the seas and free trade. In Europe, Britain refused to make long-term commitments for anything but the balance of power: “The more the alliances
approached a system of collective security and European government, the more Great Britain felt compelled to dissociate itself from it” (Kissinger 1994: 88).

By contrast, it was the multinational, extensive Austro-Hungarian empire with its universalist-imperial legacy and Central European location that had the keenest interest in joint European governance. According to Kissinger (1994: 86), the linchpin of the Congress system was the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Klemens von Metternich, whose “consummate skill was in inducing the key countries to submit their disagreements to a sense of shared values.” Metternich wrote to Wellington in 1824: “For a long time now Europe has had for me the quality of a fatherland [patrie]” (quoted by Kissinger 1994: 86). According to Gollwitzer (1951: 226), Metternich did not think in terms of a großdeutsch national state in Central Europe. Rather, in the Austrian-universalist-imperial tradition he envisaged a federal organisation of Germany and Europe. Thus Metternich, as well as a number of contemporary Austrian and German publicists, was pioneering Mitteleuropa ideas that would be more explicitly espoused by Central European intellectuals in the following century (Gollwitzer 1951: 230-246; see below, Section 3.8.4).

The outbreak of bourgeois revolution and liberal nationalism in 1830 affected mainly France and the Low Countries. The main results were the particularist-ascending ‘July Monarchy’ in France (1830-1848) and Belgian independence from the Netherlands (1831). The 1848 ‘Spring of the Peoples’ had greater long-term effects, notably in Germany. Here absolutist resistance by the various princes as well as Prussian-Austrian antagonism prevented the revolutionaries of the Paulskirche from achieving the national-liberal unification they sought. Still, by military prowess and the political ingenuity of Otto von Bismarck (prime minister of Prussia 1862-73, of Germany 1873-1890), over the next two decades Prussia was able to eliminate Catholic Austria from German politics (in 1866) and establish its own, predominantly Protestant, particularist-descending Reich.

Piedmonte played a similar role in Italian unification as Prussia in the German case, but here an outside power, France, took a more active part. The particularist-descending, but populist Napoleon III (elected president of France from 1848 until
1852, when he made himself emperor in a *coup d’état*, consented to help Piedmont’s prime minister Cavour, and ejected the Austrians from Italy in 1859. A particularist-ascending Kingdom of Italy was declared in March 1861 with Victor Emmanuel II of Piedmonte as king. However, when Napoleon III took on Prussia in 1870, the French army was routed. The emperor resigned, and a Third French Republic was declared. The new German *Reich* was announced as a great national triumph from Louis XIV’s Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in January 1871.

The German unification of 1871 constituted a revolution in the European states system, permanently disrupting the previous relative stability. The balance of power was further disturbed by the growing influence of Italy (fully united after the inclusion of Rome in 1870), of the United States after the end of the Civil War in 1865, and of Japan after her defeat of the Russian fleet in 1895. It was mainly Bismarck’s prudent foreign policy that preserved European peace in the period from 1871 to 1890. After his resignation, nationalist and populist forces took over (Evans 2003). Emperor Wilhelm II, “ill-starred in every respect, modelled himself on the Saxon emperor, Otto the Great (912-73), embraced the latter’s policy, and regarded the claims of his medieval predecessor to universal authority as the justification of German imperialism at the start of the twentieth century” (Schulze 1996: 172).

The Wilhelmine *Reich*, dominated by Protestant Prussia, began a frantic search for a ‘place in the sun’ allowing it a part in world politics, including a colonial empire, commensurate with its self-proclaimed greatness and universalist mission. In military terms, this translated into a huge naval construction programme aiming at wresting control of the seas from Britain (which was not impossible since Germany had by now overtaken Britain as Europe’s greatest industrial power). Multilateral diplomacy increasingly gave way to a pursuit of national security through bilateral treaties and unilateral armament. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899, devoted mainly to disarmament, was unable to do more than state that the restriction of military budgets was “greatly to be desired.” At the same time social-darwinist, anti-semitist and racist ideas in general were gaining momentum, and not only in Germany. The loss to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine gave a great boost to French nationalism. From now
on, German, French, British and other nationalisms reinforced each other in a process that eventually spiralled out of control.

In the subsequent course of events, the deliberate promotion of national identity and nationalism from above by still largely descending-locus governments was crucial. National historiography was sponsored by the establishment of professorships and institutes of history at the universities, and curricula of national history were introduced in the expanding basic education systems. In Germany the new Humboldt University in Berlin, the capital of Prussia and now also of the united *Reich*, became a centre of particularist historiography. The pioneering German historian, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), declared that every nation “had been endowed by God with its own special character, and [that] the course of history was marked by ‘each nation’s independent development of its own specific character in the manner ordained by God’” (quoted by Schulze 1996: 164). In France, the Radical government’s policies on education (suppression of regional languages, compulsory education), mandatory military service, and control of the working classes eliminated internal dissent and regionalism.

As I have indicated earlier, the fact that France was the main ‘Other’ against which German nationalism emerged and solidified, resulted in a German identification with the struggle of the ancient Greeks as well as the Germanic barbarians against Rome. Thorsen (2008: 11) notes that both the French and the German national discourses “were marked by a common tendency to sacralise national politics, i.e. to make the nation a quasi-sacred object of cult.” However, he also observes that the “gospels” (discourses) attached to the two nations in the early twentieth century were distinctly different. The universalistic Catholic tradition meant that the republican rhetoric of France advanced a civic form of nationalism, whereas the particularistic political inclination of Lutheranism helped ethnic nationalism predominate in Germany.

As in Germany, a persistent “abhorrence of Romanism” in England was intensified by historical studies (Kelley 2003: 227). Partly due to the influence of German historiography and partly to anti-Napoleonic reaction, “the idea of the
‘barbarian’ and Germanic origins of the English nation” gained increasing acceptance (Kelley 2003: 230). The legal historian Frederic William Maitland emphasised how England had resisted the reception of Roman law. For James Anthony Froude, “breaking the bonds of Rome and the establishment of spiritual independence represented the greatest achievement of English history” (Kelley 2003: 244). By contrast, the historian Lord Acton was an insistent critic of nationalism. As a Catholic, he was prevented by law from attending any English university. Acton and similarly minded scholars saw the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a model state due to its multinational and decentralised, federal nature. Twentieth-century historians like Ernest Barker, who said that “history is a choice of ancestors,” carried on this tradition (Kelley 2003: 247-253).

Nations indeed largely had to be constructed retrospectively. For instance, French was spoken in only 15 of the 83 départements created after the Revolution. In the rest various forms of patois or dialects were spoken, and south of the Garonne a totally different language, the langue d’oc prevailed. The situation was similar in Britain, Spain and Italy. At the first national Italian assembly, in 1860 in Turin, the participants spoke French. It took the publication in Tuscan Italian of the great historical novel by Alessandro Manzoni, I Promesi Sposi (The Betrothed; 1840), to achieve a breakthrough for a national language.

National cultures were not in fact, as Herder’s disciples believed, collective entities that had surged up spontaneously from the primeval depths of the popular soul: they were largely the work of a handful of ‘revivalists’ – intellectuals, poets, philosophers, historians and philologists – who acted as godfathers to their nations, frequently in distant exile, in Paris, London or Vienna. [...] the majority of national languages that are now so firmly rooted in the cultural soil of Europe, were not standardised until the nineteenth century, dredged from the obscure recess of colloquial speech, cast in the mould of a grammatically standardised literary language, and, in some cases, largely invented. And what philologists could not do, the poets did for them, for it was the poets who thought they could detect the spirit of the nations in their epics, fairy stories and folksongs. What they in fact produced was an artificial kind of literature adapted in theme and style to the taste of a middle-class readership. (Schulze 1996: 162)

German nationalist ideas came to inspire nationalists also in the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires. “Herder’s view, that states and constitutions mattered
less than culture and language, reflected the continuing disparity between states and peoples that obtained in Central and Eastern Europe. Herder was subsequently regarded by the Slavs as the prophet of their national identity” (Schulze 1996: 157). But whereas in Germany and Italy the primary nationalist goal had been national unity, in Eastern Europe, the pursuit of national sovereignty had to be secessionist, aiming to destruct existing multinational polities. And indeed, in the hundred years after 1830, a whole belt of east European states, from Finland, through the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and Serbia came into existence by leaving the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires (Schulze 1996: 207). Like Germany, many of these eventually obtained authoritarian and nationalist (particularist-descending) governments.

In this Central and Eastern part of Europe, the patterns of conquest, settlement, and migration from the Middle Ages until the eighteenth century had rendered multinational the formerly independent feudal ‘nations,’ like the kingdoms of Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland-Lithuania, as well as the empires that had swallowed them (Johnson 1996: 135). In the nineteenth century Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and Croats kindled their nationalism from the precedents of their medieval independent polities, whereas ‘unhistorical nations’ such as the Slovaks, Ukrainians, Romanians, and Slovenes had to create some kind of national awareness or autonomous cultural identity more or less from scratch.

As in the West, an important part of Central European nation-building was the construction of national languages out of regional dialects. Johnson argues that Central European nations imitated the paradigm Herder and the German romantics had established “in an attempt to out-German the Germans by making their national traditions at least as glorious and chauvinistic as those of the Germans” (Johnson 1996: 134). Hungarian nationalists resurrected the old idea of a feudal nation, the natio Hungarica, to legitimise the new idea of a linguistic nation as the basis for a modern state. However, over half the population was not Hungarian, but German, Slovak, Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, etc. Because they were part of a multinational empire,
linguistic standardisation within the individual polities of the Habsburg empire thus reproduced the old problem of a dominant language on a smaller scale.

It was no coincidence, then, that until the eighteenth century and, in some cases, the nineteenth century in all four of Central Europe’s historical nations (Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and Croatia), the literary and administrative vernacular of public life – politics, government, and education – was Latin (Johnson 1996: 137). The Hungarian nobility protested vigorously when in 1788 emperor (and king of Hungary) Joseph II issued an imperial decree that replaced Latin with German as the language of state administration and higher education. As the self-perceived representatives of the old _natio Hungarica_, they saw this as a violation of their ‘historical rights’ and successfully insisted on the restoration of Latin. Meetings of the Hungarian Diet, the kingdom’s parliament of nobles, and lectures at the University of Budapest were held in Latin until 1840 and 1844, respectively, when it was replaced by Magyar (Johnson 1999: 139).

The further fate of particularist-descending-cum-authoritarian nationalism in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe is well-known (but see also Section 3.8.4 below). With some variations, it took two world wars in the twentieth century, both instigated by Germany, to overcome it. Due to their falling under Soviet sway, Central and Eastern European countries, including the eastern part of Germany, had to endure a Cold War too until they could institute (or reinstitute) ascending-type government. They were then faced with the challenge of reconciling celebration of national sovereignty with preparation for EU membership. They had a long tradition for particularism, but less for Europeanism, from whose post-war realisation the communist interlude moreover had insulated them.

### 3.8.3 Particularist-ascending ideology

Particularist-ascending, or national-liberal, government was pioneered by England, “the prototype nation-state” (Hastings 1997), long before the French Revolution and the rise of mass nationalism. The crucial difference from France and Germany was that in Britain, the particularist and the ascending aspects of governance
developed in parallel and tended to reinforce each other. National-liberal identity therefore became all the more entrenched and stable.

Bede’s eighth century *Ecclesiastical History of the English People* indicates that there was some sense of a particularist English identity already before the Norman invasion (Hastings 1997: 36-44; Smith 2003: 117-118). The Anglo-Saxon period laid important institutional bases for the relatively strong, but accountable, monarchy introduced by William the Conqueror and further strengthened by Henry II (1154-89). The *Magna Carta* of 1215 confirmed the willingness of the English king to share power with the nobility. Englishness became more pronounced in consequence of the thirteenth to fourteenth century wars against Wales, Scotland and France (on the Hundred Years’ War, see above, Section 3.7.4), the rise of English literature in the age of Chaucer and Shakespeare, and the use of the English language in administration and in the courts (Smith 2003: 118).

However, the Henrician Reformation of the sixteenth century was the event that gave English national identity the crucial early boost (Greenfeld 1992: 51; Smith 2003: 119). Adapting a central tenet of Roman law, in the 1533 Act of Appeals the House of Commons declared that “this realme of Englund is an Impire”, i.e. a sovereign polity, independent of both the Holy See and the Holy Empire. Subsequently, Parliament’s 1534 Act of Supremacy pronounced the king (Henry VIII; 1509-1547) ‘Protector and Only Supreme Head of the Church and Clergy of England.’ John Foxe’s hugely popular *Book of Martyrs* (1563) was particularly important in crystallising the Protestant English identity. In the words of Greenfeld, Foxe argued that England, like ancient Israel, was

in covenant with God, had remained faithful to the true religion in the past, and now was leading the world in the Reformation, because it was favoured in his sight. Being English in fact implied being a true Christian; the English people was chosen, separated from others and distinguished by God; the strength and glory of England was the interest of His Church; and the triumph of Protestantism was a national triumph. (Greenfeld 1992: 62)

By seizing the extensive monastic lands and passing them out to numerous followers in his Reformation, Henry VIII recreated the landed aristocracy that had been
seriously weakened by the 1455-85 War of the Roses. The new gentry, in Parliament and elsewhere, remained firm supporters of the House of Tudor and of the Church of England. From the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), monarchy was increasingly tempered by constitutionalism. The messianic impulse of the English was first expressed in Elizabeth’s support for Netherlands independence from Spain after the Dutch revolt of 1566. In 1588 the Spanish great Armada, the \textit{armada católica}, on its way to invade England, was practically wiped out, partly by a great storm (the famous ‘Protestant wind’), partly by the nascent English navy. This proved a historical setback for Habsburg attempts at re-establishing a Catholic European empire (or ‘universal monarchy’). England’s national independence was preserved and the Protestant and anti-papal character of English identity and constitutionalism increased. The victory also opened the seas for British expansion outside Europe, setting the stage for the growth of England into a Great Power and national-liberal model nation.

What Linda Colley (1992: 50) calls “a cult of Parliament” helped cement the uniquely ascending aspect of English national identity. During its struggles with the Catholic King James I (1603-1625), Parliament ceased to call England ‘his Majesty’s realm’, instead speaking of ‘our native community’ in the sense of a commonwealth (Greenfeld 1992: 39). The republican interlude (1642-1661), when the Puritan Oliver Cromwell dominated British politics, further bolstered constitutional and national government. When Cromwell called English warfare against the United Provinces to a halt, it was partly because he objected to fighting fellow Calvinists. The Protestant English and Dutch joined forces against ‘Most Christian’ (Catholic) King Louis XIV. Anti-Catholicism has remained a strong element in English nationalism ever since. English constitutionalism was confirmed by the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. Uniquely in Europe, government remained strong even as it came under parliamentary control. Henceforth, as Anthony Smith argues, the Puritan myth of missionary election helped diffuse English and later British nationalism:
This myth of English Protestant election was carried over into the constitutional settlement after 1689 and the rise of ‘British’ national identity in the eighteenth century. Despite the unevenness of religious affiliation and conviction across Britain, and much resistance to the idea of British political and religious unity, the dominant current remained ‘Protestant’ (or more accurately, Anglican) and it greatly reinforced the sense of national exclusiveness that expressed itself, not only in anti-Popery riots at home, but also in colonial attitudes of cultural (and much later, racial) superiority and paternalism overseas. One strand of the growth of an expansionist and imperial British nationalism, with its mission of conquest, civilisation, and Christianisation, can be traced back to the effects of this Protestant belief in English missionary election. (Smith 2003: 122)

The other European pioneer of particularist-ascending government was the Netherlands. The revolt against Spain (c. 1555-1609) was a formative event in the growth of Protestant-inspired Dutch proto-nationalism (Gorski 2000: 1436-50, cf. Zimmer 2003: 16-17). Dutch Calvinists rebelled against the Spanish Habsburgs and Catholicism as two aspects of the same universalist-descending, foreign rule. Like in England the model of ancient Israel was invoked to justify national self-determination. According to Gorski, initially the Dutch revolutionary discourse was thus couched in the terms of ‘holy’ or ‘Hebraic’ nationalism. In the seventeenth century, a more secular and republican, ‘Batavian’ nationalism emerged that emphasised political sovereignty. By the 1670s the two discourses – the Hebraic and the Batavian – had become closely intertwined and widely dispersed.

The Netherlands case raises the interesting question of the role of Calvinist Christianity in the promotion of respectively particularist-ascending and universalist-ascending discourse. In the Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, the United States and elsewhere Puritans, or Calvinists, and their offspring, the Quakers, have been vanguards both of liberal internationalism, including its legal expression, the law of nations, and of federalism (see also next section). The reasons are probably related to individual ideology as well as social structures.

At the individual level, after the crisis of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, when political authorities in France and Scotland threatened to extinguish the ‘heretic’ Calvinists, Calvinist theoreticians developed a theological justification for the right to resist tyrannical and idolatrous (Counter-Reformation) government. Radical Calvinists
like the Scots John Knox and Christopher Goodman argued that in certain circumstances citizens might legitimately engage in political revolution. Goodman reinterpreted the key Pauline statement that “there is no authority but of God” into referring only to those powers “as are orderly and lawfully instituted by God” (Skinner 1978b: 227). This helped legitimise also the French Huguenots’ appeal for popular rebellion against the centralising Valois monarchy after the St. Bartholomew’s night massacre in 1572. Thus, the political context in which Calvinists lived combined with Calvinist doctrine to produce the “Christian spirit most impervious to nationalism” (Hastings 1997: 205). Most European Calvinists today live in multinational or multiconfessional states.

Based on Weber’s famous theses on the relationship between capitalism, rationalism and Protestantism (Weber 1930), one could further speculate that the Reformation helped diffuse the puritan ideology characteristic of ‘the spirit of capitalism’ to the sphere of politics. If so, inhabitants of predominantly Calvinist parts of Europe could be assumed to more dispassionately than others assess the costs and benefits of various polity-ideas. But Weber’s thesis remains controversial.

Part of the structural explanation may be, as Rémond (1999: 24; see Section 3.7.2 above) indicates, that in contrast to Lutherans and Catholics, Calvinist ecclesiology inclined towards ascending government. In addition, the fact that in the Empire as well as in England, France, Poland, and Hungary Calvinists remained an unofficial minority arguably predisposed them towards an oppositional, cosmopolitan and republican outlook. In the controversy over Weber’s theses, Ernst Troeltsch (1911, 1966) moreover claimed that Calvinists were influenced by the fact that their capital, Geneva, was a commercial republic in which the church was autonomous of the state. Calvinism was for Troeltsch the “Protestantism of the progressive European peoples”, the doctrine of the liberal, commercial middle class (Troeltsch 1966: 142-149). Trevor-Roper for his part observed that many capitalist entrepreneurs of northern European cities were refugees of Counter-Reformation Europe, especially of Flanders and northern Italy, where capitalism was well on its way long before the Reformation: “Between the Catholic princes of the Mediterranean and Burgundy, fighting for the
preservation of an old supremacy, and the Lutheran princes of Germany, placing
themselves at the head of a national revolt, arose that slender dynamic force of the
surviving free cities of Europe: the Calvinist International” (Trevor-Roper 1967: 33).
In Rokkanian terms, a contributing factor to the cosmopolitanism of entrepreneurs
could thus be their belonging to ‘city-belt’ or ‘trade-belt’ Europe.

The argument above may also help explain why Calvinists appear to have played
a particular role in the development of the modern law of nations. The Dutch Calvinist
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is often considered the founder of international law. But the
Spanish scholastics of the sixteenth century (see above, page 204) anticipated many of
his basic ideas, which moreover built on well-established Christian and Roman
tradition. As we will see, also Lutherans and Anglicans contributed. For all, the notion
of Christendom as a commonwealth ruled by Christian ethics, Roman law (notably the
jus gentium) and natural law, in addition to customary law, was the common frame of
reference. What the Protestants did not accept any more after the Reformation, was the
Pope as ultimate arbiter of Christendom. On the other hand, the Holy See had great
trouble acknowledging an international law that did not recognise the Pope’s role in
this regard. Therefore international law was largely developed as a Protestant
jurisprudence.

The role of natural law in the development of international law is significant in
the present context. Natural law is universalist, applying to all nations and individuals,
and has had a major influence on both the particularist-ascending, or national-liberal,
paradigm and the universalist-ascending, Christian-democratic and federalist one.
Natural law jurisprudence assumed that justice exists outside and above all people and
is discovered by the natural reason that all human beings are endowed with.

As we have seen (above, Section 3.4.1), the philosophy of natural law originated
in Greek philosophy and permeated Roman law. After the fall of the western empire,
Roman law survived in the Byzantine Empire, in the Roman Church as well as, in
remnants at least, in some Germanic codes (e.g. the Visigothic law). In the Middle
Ages, canon lawyers and theological scholasticists, notably St Thomas of Aquinas,
conflated the natural law ideology inherent in Roman law with the theocratic idea of
divine law. The resultant *jus naturale* was presented as “a set of ethical rules of divine origin to which the reason of Christian men commanded obedience” (Hinsley 1963: 165). The Roman Church accommodated this philosophy to its notion of Christendom, promoting the Pope as ultimate interpreter of the divine law of nature and arbiter in disputes between princes.

Rediscovered in the eleventh century, Justinian’s *Corpus juris* was embraced and propagated by the Holy Roman emperors as still effective in Christendom (and useful in their disputes with the medieval Popes; see above, Section 3.7.4). It was introduced into the law of the empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In Holland, the result was Roman-Dutch law, an amalgam of Roman, Germanic (Frankish, Frisian, Saxon), Spanish and Burgundian legislation. Grotius’s *On the Laws of War and Peace* (1625) retained important elements of Roman-Christian, universalist-descending discourse:

If Grotius’s book was in one respect, as has been said, a statement of the Roman law of property and contract written especially for princes, it was also a statement written for princes who were seen not as independent rulers but as associated agents in the governing of Christendom. It was a set of rules for the conduct of war and the transfer of provinces within a single *civitas*. (Hinsley 1963: 165-166)

Grotius based himself notably on the *jus gentium* (see above, page 111 ff.), which he equated with natural law (*jus naturale*). Hinsley stresses that “all so-called international law writings after Grotius went on drawing scarcely any distinction between ethics or Natural Law on the one hand and international law on the other until the eighteenth century” (Hinsley 1963: 165). Nussbaum for his part argues that Grotius saw the *jus gentium* as a law of reasonableness and adapted it to the new international realities as a law *inter civitates*, i.e. between states. By removing international law from theology he prepared the ground for positive legislation and codification (Nussbaum 1954: 108-109).

Grotius’s work was so influential that after the Peace of Westphalia it served as a European code of international law. However, since the Pope immediately placed the *Laws* on his *Index of Forbidden Books* (where it remained until 1899), Grotius had less impact in the Catholic world (except France) than in Protestant countries (Nussbaum 1954: 114). Nussbaum notes that all the leading authors of international law until the
first decades of the nineteenth century were Protestants. This fact caused Carl von Kaltenborn, the first historiographer of international law, in 1848 to declare international law “a Protestant science” (Nussbaum 1954: 136).

Natural law was further developed by the Lutheran Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). According to Nussbaum (1954: 147), Pufendorf came to be considered the true founder of a secular law of nature. Not only was his work placed on the papal Index, but it was also severely censured by orthodox Protestants. Christian Wolff (1676-1756) and Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1741) were later theorists of natural law of Protestant provenance. In contrast to Pufendorf, they took a particular interest in international law.

Vattel’s Droit de gens attained a circulation second only to Grotius (Nussbaum 1954: 161). Onuf (1998) regards Vattel as the central author of what he calls ‘Atlantic republicanism,’ contrasting it to the tradition of ‘Continental republicanism,’ to which Wolff belonged. Basing himself on the natural law notion of a common interest (res publica, or in Wolff’s term, the civitas maxima) above the individual nations or states, Wolff argued that natural law imposed binding, or necessary, restrictions on state behaviour in international relations. Vattel disagreed, insisting that compliance with international law was voluntary. There was no binding authority or law limiting national sovereignty (Onuf 1998: ch. 3). According to Onuf, this difference of opinion is a major distinction between ‘Atlantic’ and ‘Continental’ republicanism. Aristotle, Plato, Cicero and Polybius being common inspirations, Onuf classifies Machiavelli, Giuccardini, Grotius, James Harrington (1611-1677), Vattel, Locke, Hume, Smith, Madison etc. as Atlantic republicans, and Pufendorf, Althusius, Leibniz, Wolff and Kant as Continental republicans.

Both Wolff and Vattel were inspired by John Locke’s (1632-1704) ideas of man as “a reasonable creature who has a God-given law of nature to govern him” (in the words of Knutsen 1997: 119). According to Locke, the law of nature gives every individual certain ‘natural’ rights, notably to life, liberty and property. This notion proved the basis for the definition and eventual codification of individual human rights. Locke indicated that he saw a state of nature between sovereign polities, but did
not elaborate. A small, but influential number of legal writers inspired by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) were more explicit. They “turned altogether against the notion of a legal bond between nations” (Nussbaum 1954: 135). Hobbes was an Anglican apologist of absolutist monarchy, but also emphasised the idea of an original social contract between rulers and ruled.

This particularist-descending opposition to the notion of a law-based international society however soon faded away. According to Nussbaum, the eighteenth century Enlightenment agreed that international law was real: “Not until the nineteenth, or more definitely the twentieth, century were doubts regarding the existence of such a law revived” (Nussbaum 1954: 147). However, as natural law was secularised, a reaction emerged, notably among British empiricists. The legal positivism that resulted emphasised treaties and custom, eventually pushing the law of nature into the background (ibid: 135). A notable British positivist was Richard Zouche (1590-1661). His basic approach was still Romanist, but he referred much more to Grotius than to the Corpus juris (ibid: 167). The Dutchman Cornelis van Brynkershoek (1673-1743) also subscribed to the positivist programme. He eschewed theological discourse in favour of treaties and other widely accepted precedents (ibid: 168). However, “as a judge he is quite naturally influenced by the Corpus juris which was then the general law of the Netherlands, as of other civil-law countries” (ibid: 169).

As legal positivism grew towards the end of the eighteenth century, its point of gravity shifted to Germany. Here Johan Jakob Moser (1701-1785) and Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756-1821) were its main advocates. According to Nussbaum (1954: 175), “like so many important figures in the early history of the law of nations,” Moser was deeply religious. A faithful Pietist, Moser’s peculiar point of view [was] a complete surrender of judgment [in favour of positivism]. One has to take into account a German conception, which was later termed beschränkter Unterthanenverstand (the limited comprehension of the common man) – a conception deepened by Lutheran-Pietist ideas, which in worldly matters stand for indulgence of, and subordination to, the government. (Nussbaum 1954: 179)
Thus, at least in the German context, legal positivism arguably reflected and facilitated particularist-descending attitudes.

Positivist legal practice however expanded everywhere alongside the nation-state. Indeed, it was a vital means of state- and nationbuilding. The development of international law also of course basically reflected the evolution of a Europe of nation-states. The Peace of Westphalia had thus been a “landmark in the development of international law” (Nussbaum 1954: 115). Henceforth Grotian international law doctrines, such as the freedom of the seas or the immunity of ambassadors, were accepted in European diplomacy as reasonable and mutually beneficial. Agreements between governments, certain kinds of admiralty and maritime law, and the terms of treaties such as Westphalia, Utrecht, and others were acknowledged as positive international law (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2007: 251).

The emerging German ‘sciences of state’ (Staatswissenschaften) saw the unity of Europe as a common body of laws and the sum of various similar legal elements and causes. Called the *jus publicum Europaeum* – European public law – it included the law of nations. At the end of the eighteenth century, a professor of international law at Göttingen, Georg Friedrich von Martens saw this law as demonstrating the “innumerable connections of each of the states with most of the others, the similarity of mores and of interest.” This meant that “Christian Europe should be viewed not only in geographic, but also in political and legal considerations as a whole that is different from the other nations of Europe, as if it were a *Volk* comprised of states that has its own laws, customs and beliefs” (quoted by Bödeker 2003). This reflected the already noted Enlightenment idea of Europe as a civilisation as well as a states-system.

After the 1815 Congress of Vienna, European public law expanded greatly. The Congress of Paris in 1856, which ended the Crimean War, wrote more international law, creating an International Commission of the Danube to match the Commission of the Rhine established by Vienna, and also instituted the Universal Telegraph Union. In 1874, the General Postal Union (later the Universal Postal Union) followed. In 1863 the International Red Cross was established as the first officially recognised international non-governmental organisation. Conferences in Berlin in 1878 and 1884-
5 prevented conflagrations over the Eastern and African questions. There were also attempts to introduce strictly legal procedures and bilateral arbitration treaties to resolve international conflicts. The Hague conference of 1899 established a Court of International Arbitration, albeit with highly circumscribed powers. International law, notably the law of treaties, spread to new domains. Important new treaties were concluded in the fields of commerce, consular affairs, extradition, monetary matters, postal, telegraphic, and railway communications, fishing at sea, copyrights and patents (Nussbaum 1954: 196).

During the eighteenth century, the increasingly precise ideas of international law were complemented by the formulation of a particularist-ascending theory of international relations. National-liberal internationalism was a functionalist ideology favouring bottom-up co-operation and amalgamation of free and democratic nation-states. It too was significantly influenced by Calvinist thought, notably of the British/Scottish variety (in the next section we will see that continental Calvinists tended towards federalism).

The Calvinist Englishman William Godwin (1756-1836) emphasised the key late-Enlightenment idea that “democracies are inherently peaceful because the vast majority of common people will always strive to avoid war” (Knutsen 1997: 123). This idea was also fundamental to Kant (see below). Montesquieu (1689-1755) had already stressed the peaceful effect of international trade. David Hume (1711-1776) averred that “nothing is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of neighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy” (quoted by Onuf 1998: 242). Even earlier, Émeric Crucé (1590-1648) in his peace plan Le nouveau Cynée (1683), had advocated the free circulation of persons and goods, standardisation of weights and measures, and even a common currency (de Rougemont 1966: 96-97). As we have seen (above, Section 3.8.1), the notion of Europe as a commercial ‘society’ or ‘republic’ was common in the Enlightenment. It drew inspiration from French physiocrats such as François Quesnay as well as from Dutch republican philosophes such as Grotius, Corvinus, Wassenaer, de la Court, Spinoza and Mandeville. Free and peaceful circulation of not only goods, services, capital and
labour, but also of beliefs, customs and ideas between individuals and nations was its fundamental precept (Blom 2002; Pagden in Pagden, ed., 2002: 32).

Adam Smith (1723-1790) is often seen as the real founder of ‘Atlantic’ liberal internationalism, with its emphasis on _laissez-faire_ economic policies, free trade and non-intervention as the best way to promote joint peace and prosperity. However, Walter (1995) argues convincingly that Smith’s political thought remained state-centred and should be seen as transitional between Hobbesian Realism/absolutism and Lockean Liberalism. More representative in this regard, in addition to the publicists and international lawyers mentioned above, are Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and, perhaps, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

Bentham and Mill formulated liberal schemes for European and international peace and order, foreshadowing the arguments of functionalist integration theory (and liberal/interdependence IR theory). They thought that the propensity of states to fight each other could be overcome by promoting common economic interests, international law, communication and understanding among peoples. Bentham called his a _Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace_ (1843). He proposed the establishment of a Congress of States, but saw no reason for supranational coercive power. Instead, Bentham would rely for sanctions on ‘the tribunal of public opinion’ (Knutsen 1997: 152). Mill for his part considered international commerce the best antidote to war (Pinder 1991: 105-106).

Immanuel Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_ (1795) is more radical. Kant lived his whole life in the cosmopolitan Hanse city of Königsberg, and considered himself more of a world citizen than a Prussian (Talbott 2008: 97, referring to Kuehn 2001). Like Bentham and Mills, he believed in the integrative power of commerce. However, he put much greater emphasis on the political preconditions of international peace than the British _philosophes_. It required first, a republican (democratic) constitution in every state; secondly, a law of nations founded on a federation of free states; and third, a cosmopolitan or world law requiring ‘universal hospitality,’ i.e. friendly treatment of foreigners as individuals endowed with reason and natural rights (Wight 1991: 74-75; Williams and Booth 1995: 89). According to Talbott, Kant was the first political
theorist to explicitly state that the individual is sovereign: “In Kant’s view, the legitimacy of a governing authority flowed upward, not just from the citizenry as a whole but from each citizen” (Talbott 2008: 98-99). In international affairs he advocated “a continuously growing state consisting of various nations (civitas gentium), which will ultimately include all the nations of the world” (Kant 1795, Art. 3).

While Kant was pessimistic regarding the propensity of states to go to war against each other, he also thought that since humanity as a whole is reasonable, this propensity may eventually be overcome. However, such progress requires political will and ceaseless effort, in addition to open communication and trade. Kant thus stressed the volitional aspect of international relations and the effect of history on human society more than the British liberal thinkers. He explicitly rejected the faith many of them had in the balance of power as a self-regulating, extra-human mechanism guaranteeing peace (Knutsen 1997: 126).

Kant was much influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who in Knutsen’s formulation had argued that “international peace cannot occur until human reason is transformed, educated, un-alienated by a good society and developed to its fullest potential. [...] Instead of embracing the faith in reason and self-equilibration, which was expressed by so many Atlantic authors, [Kant and Rousseau] stressed the role played by political will” (Knutsen 1997: 143). Knutsen argues that this emphasis on human will was characteristic of the continental humanist tradition and diverged from the rationalism and empiricism of the Anglo-French Enlightenment. Similarly, Onuf (1998) regards Kant as a prime, but also the final, advocate of Continental republicanism. However, Rousseau concluded that European union required a revolution and could only be imposed by force. It would therefore “perhaps do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages” (Rousseau quoted by Heater 1992: 84).

In the following century the ardent free trader Richard Cobden (1804-1865) was perhaps the most effective public champion of national-liberal internationalism, i.e. a particularist-ascending, functionalist ideology favouring bottom-up co-operation and
amalgamation of free and democratic nation-states. In the words of Knutsen, Cobden stressed the importance of modern communications in spinning “humanity into a web of wealth and understanding – parliaments, international conferences, the popular press, compulsory education, the public reading room, the penny postage stamp, railways, submarine telegraphs, three-funnelled ocean liners, and the Manchester cotton exchange were all forces for understanding, peace and harmony” (Knutsen 1997: 172). Cobden and Victor Hugo (see below) were the principal figures of the Third Universal Peace Congress held in Paris in 1849, which was devoted to the creation of the United States of Europe.

The growth of international law and institutions, combined with the expansion of international industry, trade, finance, communications and the gold standard (1870s-1913) contributed to an European economic and social integration in the later nineteenth century that was not to be matched until the 1990s. From the 1860s to 1914, tariffs were progressively reduced as trade continued to grow. The freedom to seek work and to establish businesses in other countries was greater in this period than in any other period of European history (Strikwerda 1997: 54). Between 1900 and 1909, 119 new international organisations were founded, and 112 more between 1909 and 1914. In the years before World War I, the leading social reformers, labour activists, and government administrators met frequently in international congresses on the eight-hour day, home production, women’s employment, and child welfare. The welfare states that were beginning to take shape in these years formed part of an ongoing international discourse that embraced most of Europe and the United States (ibid.: 61).

The growth of international organisation and law reflected not only the needs of an increasingly globalised, capitalist economy, but also the growth of ascending-locus governance. The franchise was expanded, popular opinion found expression in increasingly vociferous media, and the influence of social movements, labour unions, non-governmental organisations etc. grew. Associations with the most diverse aims and objects sprouted. Together with the emerging mass-circulation press, such societies contributed crucially to the advancement of national consciousness and nationalism (see previous section).
However, also emerging were civil society groups actively seeking to influence foreign policy in favour of international peace, amity and co-operation (see next section). As in the nationalist movement, the pioneers were academics, intellectuals and other middle class opinion leaders. Indeed, at this stage few if any saw any inherent contradiction between nationalism and internationalism. Liberals and radicals generally perceived popular sovereignty as a precondition to a federation or confederation of nations, a ‘United States of Europe.’ Herder as well as Fichte subscribed to this notion, expecting there to be a gradual extinction of national character.

Moreover, according to Hobsbawm (1992: 31-45), in spite of the ideas of Rousseau and Herder, the prevailing opinion in the nineteenth century was that the ‘principle of nationality’ should only apply to nationalities of a certain size, i.e. to nations that were economically and culturally viable. National movements were expected to be movements for unification or expansion. The emergence of large-scale states – *Großstaten* – were seen as a necessary stage in the natural transition to world unity. The word *Kleinstaaterei* was deliberately derogatory, and most people saw the multinationality or multilinguality or multiethnicity of old well-established nation-states such as Britain, France and Spain as inevitable:

From the point of view of liberalism, and – as the example of Marx and Engels demonstrates, not only of liberalism, the case for ‘the nation’ was that it represented a stage in the historical development of human society, and the case for the establishment of any particular nation-state, irrespective of the subjective feelings of the members of the nationality concerned, or the personal sympathies of the observer, depended on whether it could be shown to fit in with or to advance historical evolution and progress. (Hobsbawm 1992: 41)

It may be added here that by *Großstaten* was probably meant *Großmächte*, the balanced pentarchy of Great Powers to which intellectuals such as Ranke ascribed a leading role in Europe and the world. However, the argument that national sovereignty applied only to big nations, and not to small ones, was obviously not tenable in the long run. As we will see, particularist-ascending ideology broke through at the Versailles peace conference after World War I.
3.8.4 Europeanist-ascending ideology

In the previous section, I discussed the growth of national-liberal international law, theory and ideology. The proponents advocated various degrees of ascending-locus sovereignty in domestic affairs and ‘functional’ integration of democratic nation-states at the international level. In this section, the theme will be the emergence of a more radical, federalist discourse favouring the transfer of some sovereignty to the European level, i.e. European governance. I will argue that its core advocates, Catholics in continental Western Europe, were significantly influenced by medieval universalist-descending ideology. However, since the argument now became more consciously focussed on Europe as the common ‘homeland’ that gradually replaced Christendom as modernity progressed, I call this ideology Europeanist-ascending. As I have indicated, the key difference between the earlier universalist discourse and the later, Europeanist one is the latter’s insistence on democratic/ascending governance both at the national and the European level.

However, as the various interpretations of Kant’s scheme illustrate, the difference between internationalist and federalist plans for European peace and unity was not always very clear. It was arguably only with the American Federalist Papers that an elaborate, modern federalist ideology emerged. Moreover, federal models for the international level have remained contested. It is also not easy to delineate unambiguous territorial or confessional distinctions between advocates of particularist and universalist/Europeanist ascending ideas. The interpretation below is therefore particularly open to further discussion and research.

Generally, however, I think there is solid evidence for the following reading. As argued in the previous section, at the country level, Britain and the Netherlands, and at the individual level Calvinists and otherwise Reformed Protestants, tended to be the pioneers of national-liberal internationalism. I submit that the main advocates of Europeanist federalism tended to be Catholics from ‘city-belt’ or imperial Europe, although there was also a significant number of Calvinist federalists. Again, the reasons were structural and material as well as ideological.
Federalist thought and practice was structurally inherent in the Holy Roman Empire, the Netherlands and Switzerland (the latter two were *de jure* part of the former until 1648, although *de facto* independent much earlier). These polities were more or less federally organised, multiconfessional and, at least in the Swiss and imperial cases, multinational; they had many Calvinists in addition to a Catholic majority, and they contained most of city-belt Europe.

But also Northern Italy was Catholic and part of the city-belt. Most of Italy came under the dominion of the Spanish branch of the Habsburg dynasty in 1530, but was again divided, between Spanish, French and Austrian allegiance, after the death of the last Spanish Habsburg led to the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1713). Italy throughout remained split into various kingdoms, duchies, republics, and principates, including those of the Pope. Thus Italy, like Germany (as well as Spain and even France, for that matter), has a strong regionalist tradition. This combined with their location made both polities particularly prey to European power politics, war and conflict. This background has probably added to the receptivity of Italians as well as Germans to the idea of European federation.

Both Daniel Elazar (1987: 123) and Stein Rokkan (1999: 210) emphasise the pioneering role of the commercial towns and cities of the Empire in the establishment of federalist practice when they formed leagues for mutual defence and assistance. They refer to the Hanseatic and Lombard leagues, but Switzerland and the Netherlands were in fact more enduring cases in point. Both emerged as federations of city states or republics within the Empire. Rokkan, while otherwise excessively reducing the Empire to a city-belt characterised by the absence of central authority (see above, Chapter 2.5), interprets federalism as a general characteristic of Central Europe (Rokkan 1999: 210). Oskar Halecki too places the city leagues firmly in the context of a proto-federal Holy Roman Empire:
In its restored, Christian form, the empire itself can be considered some kind of federation, and it is perhaps because of that federal constitution that it lasted so long, notwithstanding so many imperfections. It is true that the lack of unity within the empire was a source of weakness, but only because federalism was not well enough organised in that early and unusually difficult case, and contained no guarantees of equality among the component members. This was precisely the reason why within the empire local federations were formed, which come much nearer to our present conception of federalism than the general structure. The two most striking examples are the League of Lombard cities in the twelfth century and the Swiss Confederation in the thirteenth. (Halecki 1957: 166-167)

However, there was federal practice also outside the city-belt. In the Iberian peninsula, the *fuero* system among the Christian states established during the *Riconquista* was continued by the kingdom of Aragon. The unification of Spain under a multiple monarchy in 1469 left most of these federal elements intact for the next two and a half centuries. Moreover, after the conversion to Christianity of Lithuania and Polish-Lithuanian union in 1385, a multinational, federal system developed there which culminated with the adoption of the first modern European constitution, that of the Commonwealth of Two Nations of 3 May 1791.

Due to the debate over the nature of church unity caused by the Great Schism, even the late medieval Roman Church was affected by a movement towards federal organisation. The early Christian idea of the church as a mystical union of all Christians returned and found expression when the Council of Constance passed legislation that instituted a conciliar church structure. The conciliar movement was supported by temporal rulers as the federal church structure it advanced would have increased their influence in church affairs through national churches. This was also a major reason why it was resisted by the Papacy, which successfully disputed and invalidated the doctrine of conciliar supremacy and constitutional notions of a ‘mixed government’ for the Church (Hay 1957: 71, 96-97; see above, Section 3.7.4).

The federal tendencies of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire have already been described (see above, Section 3.7.4). In addition to its fragmented sovereignty, the Empire continued to be characterised by imprecise boundaries; a cosmopolitan and diverse linguistic and national composition; the elective character of the imperial title; and by the emperor’s pan-European pretensions (Wilson 1999: 3). After 1512, the
Empire came to call itself the ‘Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation’ (or, significantly, ‘nations’ in Latin) in recognition of its now limited territorial scope.

However, the federal features and the degree of authority that its constitutions continued to give the Emperor prevented total disintegration. Outside powers, constantly involved in imperial affairs and fighting their wars on imperial territory, knew that the existence of the Empire was vital to the balance of power. Various post-Reformation emperors not only overcame critical challenges from outside, but were also able to introduce a number of reforms that preserved and even reinforced the imperial structure, gradually entrenching its federal characteristics (Wilson 1999: 47-49). In a first period of reform, from about 1495 to 1556, the Reichstag was consolidated as the forum for national debate; more manageable regional subdivisions were created within the Empire by grouping the territories into ten Kreise (circles); and two imperial courts of law, the Reichskammergericht and the Reichshofrat, were established.

As I have mentioned, at the same time Roman law was introduced as the jus publicum (common law) of the whole Empire. This initially met with proto-nationalist opposition, particularly among Lutherans. However, after some wavering, even influential Lutheran figures such as Philipp Melanchton embraced the gemeines Recht as standing above petty factionalism and representing the only impartial law of peace and order (Stein 1999: 92). Confessional tensions were defused through ‘juridification,’ whereby political debate was increasingly conducted in the language of the law. Especially lesser territorial princes and the free imperial cities continued to rely on the institutions and laws of the Empire for their legitimacy and security.

Although the Reformation and the religious upheavals encouraged further fragmentation, the religious peace of Augsburg (1555) demonstrated that emperors were able to deal with structural stress through consensus politics, facilitation and power brokering (Wilson 1999: 26). The settlement, which legalised Protestantism along with Catholicism and became one of the fundamental laws of the Empire, was largely the work of archduke Ferdinand of Habsburg (Emperor 1558-64). Catholic as well as Protestant princes backed imperial institutions and the Emperor. The common
view was still that the Holy Roman Empire was the most eminent of the European monarchies as successor of the Roman Empire and the last of the four universal monarchies prophesied by Daniel in the Old Testament (Asch 1997: 18-19).

In the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, imperial and Habsburg weaknesses advanced what Wilson (1999: 26) calls aristocratic federalism, i.e. a strengthening of the nobility’s position vis-à-vis that of the Emperor. The Bohemian revolt in 1618 and a subsequent constitutional crisis triggered the Thirty Years War. The outcome reinforced the federalising tendency, reason of state (Staatsräson) increasingly replacing faith and tradition as the chief logic of political thought and action even within the Empire. The 1648 Westphalian constitution, re-designed to deal with the confessional tensions of the preceding centuries, imposed an institutional rigidity that largely resisted subsequent reform (Asch 1997: 194). Still, Asch (ibid: 192) argues that due to insufficient sovereign resources, even the Hohenzollerns of Prussia “found it extremely difficult to establish their monarchy as a major European power” independent of the Empire.

Wilson (1999: 27) emphatically rejects the traditional interpretation, established by Borussian historiography, that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was the end of the Empire in all but name. He points out that there was in fact an imperial recovery roughly from 1658 to 1740, i.e., during the reigns of Leopold I, Joseph I and Charles VI (Wilson 1999: 29). The imperial courts as well as the Empire’s system of collective security, which obliged each territory to contribute a contingent to a common imperial army, were reinforced. The final demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 due to Napoleon has already been described (see above, section 3.8.1).

In concluding his analysis of the Empire, Wilson (1999: 72) emphasises decentralised federalism and a non-aggressive foreign policy (of which, I would add, Europeanism was a chief characteristic) as traditions surviving from the Holy Roman Empire to later German polities. The German Confederation of 1815 re-established Austrian pre-eminence within a framework exhibiting many similarities with the old Empire, including a federal diet and a system of collective security. These and other features reappeared in modified form in both the Prussian-led successors to the
Confederation; the North German Confederation (*Norddeutscher Bund*) of 1867 and the German Empire, or Second *Reich* of 1871. Wilson finds it striking that both the constitution of the Weimar Republic and that of the Federal Republic of (West) Germany incorporated a federal system of checks and balances, and devolved power to states (*Länder*) that were the direct successors of the old, consolidated territories. “It is equally striking that these later federal Germanies, like the old Empire, are associated with non-aggressive foreign policies, unlike the centralising governments of nineteenth-century Prussia and the Nazi Third *Reich*, which both ended in disastrous world wars” (ibid: 72).

After 1806, the Emperor remained head of the universalist-cosmopolitan Habsburg monarchy, whose Austro-Hungarian Empire and Kingdom (*Kaiser- und Königsreich*) survived the Holy Roman Empire by more than a hundred years. Since the Counter-Reformation, Catholicism had been the main binding element of the diverse peoples of the monarchy, and it remained a critical source of legitimacy for the emperor (Rémond 1999: 87).

Charles Ingrao (2000) suggests that the multinational, composite nature, central geopolitical location, and universalist ideology of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg dynasty made them structural forces for peace, stability, diversity, rationality, and humanity in Europe. He indeed indicates that the Habsburg and Holy Roman imperial-federal model could have offered a peaceful, cosmopolitan and potentially also democratic alternative to the nationalist stampede instigated by the French Revolution. Against the national-liberal tendency to see the predominance of the German language and Austro-German imperialism as the cause of nationalism in Central Europe, Ingrao argues that about the time of the French Revolution the Habsburg monarchy was laying the foundations for a ‘corporate soul’ that would transcend different regions and language groups:
After centuries of secundogenitures and split inheritances, the Pragmatic Sanction had finally visualised a singly sovereign entity. The abrupt end of the dynasty’s hegemony in the Holy Roman empire [1740-45] had helped Maria Theresa, her sons, and their German-speaking subjects to distinguish between their German roots and their loyalty to a separate Habsburg commonwealth. The massive bureaucratic and military establishment that they created to defend it served as a powerful vehicle for integrating the monarchy’s other ethnic groups, including the Magyar nation, which had readily begun dispatching its forces to conflicts and fought well beyond its own frontiers. That the monarchy’s military commanders, civil officials, merchants, and public affairs journals communicated in German did not overly concern the other language groups, which accepted its utility as an instrument of communication and social mobility. The evolution of a common elite culture that leaned heavily on German did not forestall the parallel development of other national cultures. Thus, the Baroque monarchy that had been forged by an alliance of crown, church and aristocracy was now supported by a much broader constituency that included an educated elite, a professional bureaucracy, and an imposing military establishment that literally spoke the same language. (Ingrao 2000: 218)

Ingrao maintains that on the eve of the Napoleonic wars, the Habsburg monarchy in fact had fewer unresolved problems than at any time before or later. For instance, its systems of education and justice were models for the rest of the continent. Not insurgent nationalism, but the effect of the French Revolution and the subsequent wars proved fateful for the ‘corporate culture’ of the Habsburg monarchy. It forced the emperor and his government to suspend controversial domestic reforms and generally to repudiate progressive Enlightenment ideas (Ingrao 2000: 230-231).

Alan Sked (2001), another iconoclastic historian, criticises Ingrao for being too timid in his rehabilitation of the Habsburg monarchy. Sked is particularly concerned to reject the view that the Austro-Hungarian empire of Francis I and Metternich represented a period of stagnation or reaction. He argues instead that the Metternich system was a continuation of the enlightened absolutism of Emperor Joseph II (‘Josephinism’). The Austro-Hungarian empire at this time, “despite its resistance to democracy, was a progressive state by contemporary standards. In short, it was not in a state of decline” (ibid: 299). No serious politicians called for its dissolution, and “even those who wanted reforms, wished to see them carried out within the framework of Habsburg rule” (ibid: 300).
Local nationalisms did indeed represent challenges to the integrity of the monarchy, but Sked finds no evidence that they posed “a vital threat by 1914” (Sked 2001: 300). He argues that while the nationality question “might have led in the long run to the downfall of the Monarchy, this did not happen before 1914; moreover, there is no reason to assume that if war had not broken out, more progress could not have been made towards solving it after that date” (ibid: 302). Sked concludes that like the two other European empires, Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia, the Habsburg monarchy eventually succumbed mainly because it lost the First World War:

The only conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that Austria-Hungary, Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia in 1914 were all completely viable states, quite similar to one another and not too unlike the states of Western Europe. Certainly, they faced many problems, yet most of the big issues were being tackled, just as western politicians in western countries found they had similar problems to tackle – social inequality, industrial unrest, electoral and constitutional reform. It is indeed ‘misplaced determinism’ that holds it impossible for these empires to have reformed successfully had peace been maintained in 1914. And for a historian this is philosophically unacceptable. Besides, it conflicts with the available evidence. (Sked 2001: 323)

Seen against this background, it is not surprising that between 1848 and 1918, Habsburg lands proved particularly fertile ground for authors of projects for multinational federation (Bugge 1995). After the violent nationality conflict of Hungary in 1848-49, József Eötvös advocated federalism as a more appropriate solution for multinational states than a centralised nation-state according to the French revolutionary model. The Czech historian František Palacký proposed creating a federation out of the eight autonomous cultural national groups of the Habsburg Empire (Bóka 2003: 14-15). At its 1899 congress at Brno, the Pan-Austrian Socialist Party adopted a resolution demanding that Austria be transformed into an autonomous and multinational federal state with several official languages. The two leading Social

46 Sked may here have added the Ottoman Empire, which like the Holy Roman and Habsburg Empires represented an imperial-cosmopolitan alternative to nationalism.

Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972), the indefatigable inter-war advocate of European federation and founder of the Pan-Europa movement, had an Austro-Hungarian diplomat as father and spent his pre-WWI years in Bohemia and Vienna. For Coudenhove, Switzerland was the best model for European federation. The fact that even the propagandists of the German Nazi party resorted to Europeanist discourse can be seen as an indication of its appeal on the continent. Otto von Habsburg, son of the last Habsburg emperor and member of the European Parliament for the Bavarian Christian-Social Union party from 1979 to 1999, has remained an ardent advocate of European union (and eastern EU enlargement). He headed the International Paneuropean Union, originally established by Coudenhove-Kalergi, from 1986 to 2004.

As far as earlier proposals for European federation are concerned, we have already noted (above, page 229) the plan advanced by the Huguenot Duke of Sully in the early seventeenth century. The increasingly frequent and ferocious wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries stimulated the publication of a growing number

47. However, Austrian socialists and federalists like Renner and Bauer saw themselves as part of the German cultural nation and advocated unification with Germany. In 1911 the multinational Pan-Austrian Socialist Party split into separate national parties (Zimmer 2003: 117).
48. However, it of course says nothing about the value of ‘the European idea’ as such, contrary to what Laughland (1997) and other anti-EU authors imply.
of similar schemes for European federation as a guarantee for ‘perpetual peace.’ The most notable plans were issued by William Penn in 1693, John Bellers in 1710, and by the abbot of Saint-Pierre (Charles-Irénée Castel) in 1713-17. Penn and Bellers were Quakers, and Saint-Pierre had been educated by Jesuits. Penn took the Dutch union as his model federation, while Bellers added Switzerland and his own United Kingdom (Heater 1992: 60).

These democratically inclined thinkers envisaged a federation of constitutionally governed states. In his *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693), Penn proposed an elaborate parliamentary structure and procedure for Europe (Nussbaum 1954: 142). The votes of the delegates of what he called ‘the sovereign or imperial diet, parliament or estate of Europe’ were to be determined by the yearly revenues or the foreign trade of the member states. Among the benefits accruing from unity and peace would be the saving of many lives, much money and considerable physical infrastructure, safer and easier travel, the improvement of the reputation of Christianity “in the sight of the infidel,” as well as greater security against the Ottomans (de Rougemont 1966: 111).

Penn wished to include the Russian and Ottoman empires in the federation he proposed. Such ideas had been foreign to Sully and remained so to most later peace theorists. To them, the Muscovites and Turks were aliens. Saint-Pierre in his *Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe*, invited only sovereigns of Christian Europe west of Russia to join a permanent alliance that would ensure joint peace and prosperity. Each member state would have one vote, and conflicts would be resolved by arbitration, the results of which would be adopted by majority voting (Heater 1992: 73-74). It was however Rousseau who made Saint-Pierre’s scheme famous with his elaborate critique (see previous section).

Elazar (1987: 115) argues that Calvinists were particularly inclined to support a federal type of government, calling the Calvinist theorists of modern federalism “federal theologians.” A core ideal was the Jews’ covenant with God. In the sixteenth century “the biblical grand design for humankind” was “recreated by the Reformed wing of Protestantism as the federal ideology from which Johannes Althusius, the
Huguenots, the Scottish Covenanters, and the English and American Puritans developed political theories and principles of constitutional design” (ibid: 119). Radical Calvinists and Zwinglian Protestants in Switzerland, Scotland, the Netherlands, England and parts of France and Germany, began to apply federalist principles for statebuilding purposes. “The Swiss and the Dutch created federal states; the Scots a national covenant; and the Puritans created the federal theology and organised their New England colonies and churches on federal principles” (ibid: 127). Elazar notes that the French term for Protestant was Huguenot, which is a corruption of the German Eidgenossen, literally members of an oath-based association, or federation.

Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) was a German Calvinist who lived, studied and worked in the border regions between what is now Germany and the Netherlands, as well as in Switzerland. His main work, *Politica Methodice Digesta* (1603), contained a universalist-ascending polemic against Jean Bodin’s absolutist, particularist-descending concept of sovereignty (Bóka 2003: 7). Onuf (1998: 129) argues that the ‘Continental republican’ Althusius was the first explicit advocate of popular sovereignty. To Elazar, Althusius was the most articulate spokesman and systematic early theorist of federalism:

Althusius was strongly influenced by the federal theology that had become the intellectual foundation of the Reformed wing of Protestantism during the course of the sixteenth century. It can hardly be a coincidence that the federal theology sprouted from the four intellectual centres of Switzerland, Basel, Bern, Geneva, and Zurich, in the very first days of the Reformation. It achieved its fullest theological and political expression in the last two, through John Calvin in Geneva and Ulrich Zwingli and his successor Heinrich Bullinger in Zurich. Both city-states became covenanted republics under the magistries of those figures and their colleagues. The writings of Calvin and Bullinger not only contributed directly to the “new federalism” of Althusius, but inspired an entire political thought that strongly influenced modern republicanism and shaped the two federal polities of the time, Switzerland and the Netherlands, both of which were dominated by Reform Protestants. (Elazar 1987: 139)

Also Burgess (2000: ch. 1) identifies early Calvinist and federal theorists like Heinrich Bullinger and Johannes Althusius, as well as the Puritan-inspired American federalist fathers, as intellectual ancestors of the post-1945 European integration movement. However, it remains unclear to what extent these ‘federal theologians’
advocated European federation or just federal government in general. It seems prudent to assume that their Europeanism was latent and implicit, a logical upshot of their general federalist argument that turned explicit only if and where European union became a salient political issue. That was certainly more the case on the European continent, and especially in the imperial or city-belt core, than in the Atlantic periphery.

Also the polymath Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) presented plans for European peace and unity. Although a Lutheran, Leibniz untiringly advocated Christian unity, working with both Lutheran and Catholic princes as well as the Habsburg, Holy Roman emperor. In 1677 and again in 1715 he called for a Dantinean *Reich Europa* centered on a reinforced Roman-German empire, with a common religion and governed by a council or senate whose members would represent the member states (Gollwitzer 1951: 49; Heer 1968: 223-225). Leibniz considered himself a citizen of the world who “wanted to serve all of mankind” (quoted by de Rougemont 1966: 128).

A more important early inspiration of modern Europeanism on the Continent was the eccentric French Count Henri de Saint-Simon’s *De la Réorganisation de la Société Européenne, ou de la nécessité et de moyens de rasssembler les peuples de l'Europe en un seul corps politique en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale* (1814). According to Hinsley (1963: 102), Saint-Simon’s (1760-1825) plan “was a more far-reaching proposal for the federal reorganisation of Europe than anyone had ever proposed”. It came to inform most of the peace plans produced in continental Europe in the next generation, all involving federation – a single government – for Europe. Saint-Simon insisted on parliamentary government and that the European federation he proposed should be a league of peoples rather than of governments.

Saint-Simon’s ideas were taken up by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and also by other radicals, such as Guiseppe Mazzini (1805-1872). For Mazzini, “humanity was not a cosmopolitan world split into immutable nation-states but a whole, created by God, that united peoples in the awareness of a common origin and an common future” (d’Appolonia 2002: 182). After his Young Italy and other nationalist movements had foundered on the co-ordinated resistance of the *anciens régimes* in 1830, Mazzini
founded Young Europe, an international association of progressive nationalists advocating the equality and fraternity of all peoples. In its statutes, a European federation was defined as “a unity that will be free, spontaneous, such as would exist in a regular Federation in which all the peoples sit in complete equality […] each remaining master of its own interests, its local affairs, its special faculties” (quoted by Hinsley 1963: 103).

By the 1840s, the term ‘United States of Europe’ had become “common linguistic currency” (Heater 1992: 113). Among continental peace schemes inspired by Saint-Simon, Hinsley (1963: 103) mentions Pierre Leroux’s Organon des vollkommenen Friedens (1837); Gustave d’Eichtal’s De l’Unité Européenne (1840); Victor Considérant’s De la Politique générale et du rôle de la France en Europe (1840); and Constantin Pecquereur’s De la Paix (1841). The founder of the Geneva Peace Society of 1830, the Count of Sellon, instituted the prize of a gold medal for the best essay outlining practical suggestions for realising the Grand Dessein of Henry IV. When French economists formed a Free Trade Society in 1847, their discussions soon led to the advocacy of a United States of Europe. Victor Hugo, welcoming the delegates to the third Universal Peace Congress in 1849 as president of the Congrès des Amis de la Paix, looked forward to the day when

we shall see those two immense communities, the United States of America and the United States of Europe, holding hands across the sea. [...] A day will come when you, France – you, Russia – you, England – you, Germany – all of you, nations of the Continent, will, without losing your distinctive qualities and your glorious individuality, be blended into a superior unity and constitute a European fraternity [...] by the universal suffrage of the nations, by the venerable arbitration of a great sovereign senate, which will be to Europe what the Parliament is to England, what the Diet is to Germany, what the legislative Assembly is to France. (quoted by Hinsley 1963: 103-4)

From the 1860s a considerable literature on federalism in the fields of history, politics and law emerged also in Britain, beginning with J.S. Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government (1861). The Federalist Papers published by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay between 1787 and 1788 were a main inspiration (Pinder 1991). The American Founding Fathers for their part were steeped
in British political philosophy, notably that of John Locke. But they were also inspired by e.g. Montesquieu, who advocated a confederal republic as an alternative to empire (Montesquieu 1990 [1743]: Book IX, Ch. 1). Most British federalists sympathised with the Liberal Party, whose ideology was strongly influenced by Locke. Its successor, the Liberal-Democratic Party is still the most Europeanist – but now also the smallest – of the major British parties. The idea of transforming the European overseas empires into confederations of nations, united by commercial ties and a common civilisation, was widespread in the Enlightenment. According to Pagden (1995: 198-199), authors like Mirabeau, Turgot, Condorcet, Diderot, Aranda, Campomanes, Andrew Fletcher, Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, James Madison, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant advocated the replacement of the model of the Roman imperium by that the ancient Greek Achaean League. But only in British North America was this project for an ‘Empire of Liberty’ realised.

Organised movements, as opposed to individual authors, promoting liberal and radical schemes for European unity began emerging in the early nineteenth century. The extent to which these organisations were dominated by Reformed Protestants and Catholics is notable. So, however, is the divergence that gradually evolved within their ranks between the national-liberal internationalist ideology of the Anglo-Saxon world and the federalist discourse on the European Continent.

The Anglo-American peace movement was centred on a number of Quaker or pacifist Peace Societies in England and America, and had ideas close to those of Bentham and Mill. The Quakers “had long gone back on Penn’s advocacy of international organisation and now relied for progress entirely on a religious, moral and pacifist appeal to the goodness of human nature” (Hinsley 1963: 93). According to Nussbaum (1954: 239), the first peace society was the New York Peace Society, founded in 1815 by the Quaker David L. Dodge. Quakers also founded the British Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace in 1816 (Hinsley 1963: 93). The American Peace Society’s constitution, drawn up by William Ladd in 1828, was directly inspired by Mill’s essay Law of Nations. A key element of Ladd’s plan was a Congress of Nations, but this “was no more than what Bentham and Mill had
had in mind, international meetings to make possible the establishment of an international court for the settlement of such few genuine disputes as remained between civilised nations” (ibid: 94).

The first Universal Peace Conference was organised by the British and American Peace Societies in London in 1843. These international conferences were instituted as a means of spreading the peace movement to the continent. However, Hinsley argues that the fact that delegates from the United Kingdom and the United States consistently outweighed those from the continent in the international peace congresses from 1843 to 1853 illustrates the gulf that had existed “between Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world on the question of peace and war since the Napoleonic wars” (Hinsley 1963: 100). Moreover, Anglo-Saxon, national-liberal internationalism was set on a “permanently different course” than the cosmopolitan-cum-federalist thinking on the Continent, at least from the middle of the eighteenth century (ibid.). In contrast to continental democrats and radicals, Anglo-Saxon liberals saw European political integration as “not so much unattainable and undesirable as utterly unnecessary” (ibid: 81). Hinsley elaborates:

What shaped the attitude of England and America to the problem of peace and war from Bentham’s day was the rise of the emphasis on material and economic, as opposed to political, ends; the rise of conceptions of nation and society in antithesis to the conceptions of government and the state; and the rise of the conviction that, whereas there was a natural disharmony between governments and states, there was a natural harmony between nations and societies. These factors produced the belief that progress was destined to replace inter-governmental relations by the free play of enlightened public opinion between societies. And when that day dawned – when international relations became relations between nations or peoples – war, which was materially profitless and absurd and morally wrong, would be replaced by free and peaceful economic competition, and such sources of dispute as still remained would easily be settled by judicial procedure. (Hinsley 1963: 110-111)

The wars of the third quarter of the nineteenth century (the Crimean war, the Franco-German war and the American civil war) were major setbacks for the Anglo-American peace movement. Its members were surprised that national public opinion in fact supported their governments’ war policies. It seemed that “democracy – at least in the shape of the extension of the suffrages – and nationalism were producing war
instead of peace” (Hinsley 1963: 119). This caused the peace societies to lose confidence in public opinion and to increase their lobbying of governments. At the same time Anglo-American liberals came to accept more international organisation as well as more domestic government. In 1864 the British Peace Society denounced nationalism as “a poor, low, selfish, un-Christian idea [....], fatal not only to peace but to all progress in liberty and good government” (quoted by Hinsley 1963: 123).

In 1867 a federalist International League of Peace and Liberty, publishing the journal *Les États Unis de L’Europe*, was set up in Geneva under the presidency of Guiseppe Garibaldi. Its guiding spirit was the veteran Saint-Simonian Charles Lemonnier. Thirteen countries were represented at its first annual conference in 1868, which called for the United States of Europe on a republican basis. The call was repeated by the next conference, in 1869 (Hinsley 1963: 121). Hinsley further reports that 1876 saw the appearance of the Universal Parliamentary Peace Union, consisting of parliamentarians from many European countries. Arbitration and Peace societies were founded in Denmark, Sweden and Norway in 1882-3. In 1889 the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for International Arbitration was founded, and in 1892 the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Inter-Parliamentary Bureau. These new groups in turn contributed to the foundation of peace societies in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.

Still according to Hinsley, growing nationalism and imperialism in the 1880s and 1890s led to a resumption of peace congresses. The first Universal Peace Congress since the 1850s was held in 1889. The Universal Peace conference in Rome 1891 invited the European Peace Societies to make the United States of Europe the chief aim of their propaganda. The Universal Peace Congress of 1892 called for the confederation of Europe on the lines laid down earlier by Lemonnier, and established a permanent secretariat, the International Peace Bureau. Four distinct kinds of peace

50 The Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel, who instituted the Nobel Peace Prize still awarded annually in Oslo, became a prominent supporter.
societies were represented: Anglo-American religious pacifists; secular pacifist
leagues; organisations modelled on Lemonnier’s federalist Geneva League;
international law associations and the International Arbitration and Peace Association
of Great Britain and Ireland, founded by Hodgson Pratt in 1880. Arbitration was the
only subject they could agree on (Hinsley 1963: 131).

Agreement on setting up a Permanent Court of Arbitration was indeed the main
result of the intergovernmental First and Second Peace Conferences at The Hague in
1899 and 1907 respectively. Disappointed, the peace movement again turned to more
radical federalist schemes (Hinsley 1963: 140). Now British liberals took over the
initiative. Sir Max Waechter (1837-1924), a businessman and art collector born in
Stettin, Germany (now Poland), embraced the idea of the United States of Europe in
1909 and founded a European Unity League in 1913. The British Peace Society
concurred, advocating a complete merger of sovereignties. The British Quakers
approved of the United States of Europe in 1910, as did the British National Peace
League in 1911.

However, at the same time as parts of British opinion became more favourable,
continental European radicals were turning against the unification of Europe. The
major stumbling block was the question of whether tsarist Russia should be part of it.
Non-German democrats and radicals found it impossible to include the Russian
continent, which they identified with eastern despotism. At the same time, European
pacifism was radicalised as the socialist movement embraced its tenets. The Second
Socialist International accepted the Marxist view of imperialism and militarism as
creatures of capitalist competition and warned that if the bosses provoked a war,
workers would refuse to take part. Jean Jaurès defined the proletariat as “masses of
men who collectively love peace and hate war.” The 1912 Basel Conference of the
Second International declared the proletariat “the herald of world peace” and
proclaimed “war on war.” Continental Catholic socialists and anarchists, inspired by
French intellectuals like Charles Fourier, Philippe Buchez and Joseph Proudhon,
specifically advocated a decentralised, federal Europe. However, the Second
International broke up in 1914 due to its inability to unite against the outbreak of the
war. Instead most of its individual member parties rallied to the nationalist cause of their respective governments.

By now, nationalism had acquired racist overtones, in part influenced by the scientific ideas of Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, Sigmund Freud and others. The idea that not only individuals, but also races, nations, classes and civilisations struggle for survival and that only the fittest survive became enormously influential. War, eugenics, racial hygiene etc. were widely celebrated as necessary mechanisms for natural selection among such collectivities. Europe was assumed to be the biologically favoured civilisation, the Germans the greatest nation and ‘Aryans’ the superior race. In the interest of the progress of mankind, all of these had the right or even duty to suppress inferior people. Notably in Germany, but also in other countries that could be hailed as ‘Germanic’ (Britain, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and even France), social-darwinist and bio-political ideology eventually fomented extreme particularist ideas of the superiority of the ‘Aryan’ race and its right to acquire Lebensraum and to ethnic cleansing (extermination of Jews and Gypsies, in addition to homosexuals). More charitably, in the still relatively liberal British context Walter Bagehot translated the idea of natural selection into international affairs as the notion of progress through peaceful competition and best-practice learning among nations.51

The outbreak of war in 1914 at first provoked a renewed demand from the peace movement for a federal Europe. Further calls were raised after the war, when Penn’s essay and extracts from Saint-Pierre and Rousseau were republished in London (Heater 1992: 116). But the ardour soon cooled. The peace movement came to support the pragmatic idea of a post-war intergovernmental league rather than a European federation. By January 1917 most European governments had expressed their agreement with U.S. president (and professor of political science) Woodrow Wilson’s proposal that a League of Nations should be established. The creation of the League

__________________________

51 A national-liberal discourse still much cherished by the magazine he edited, The Economist, and now institutionalised in the EU’s Lisbon strategy, which was instigated by the UK under the premiership of Tony Blair.
was central in Wilson’s Fourteen Points for Peace, notably the final point: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”

The League was founded in 1919 by the adoption of a ‘covenant,’ a word chosen by Wilson, as he said, “because I am an old Presbyterian” (EB 2007h). The Covenant was embodied in the Versailles and other peace treaties. The League’s institutions, established in Geneva, consisted of an Assembly, in which each member country had a veto and an equal vote, and a smaller (Security) Council of four permanent members and four (later six, then nine) temporary members chosen by the Assembly.

French statesmen such as Édouard Herriot and Aristide Briand, whom Coudenhove-Kalergi engaged for the pan-European cause, found the League too weak and heterogeneous. As Bugge notes, the Great War had been fought in large part on French territory and had “had a profound impact on French notions of Europe” (Bugge 1995: 101). The French government became preoccupied with finding durable means to maintain peace in Franco-German relations. Herriot in 1925 made a speech in favour of a United States of Europe within the larger framework of the League of Nations. Briand followed up in an address to the League in 1929, calling for “a sort of federal link” between European nations. About a year later, he presented his famous Briand memorandum where he called for a European “moral union,” however without any supranational power. But even this modest proposal (modest because Briand wanted British participation) came to nothing, mainly due to British opposition (Bugge 1995: 101-104). The League established a “Commission of Enquiry for European Union” which discussed the plan from 1930 to 1932 without concluding on any next steps (Kaiser 2007: 106).

The League of Nations was the first permanent and general intergovernmental organisation. It scored both notable successes and conspicuous fiascos, but failed the ultimate test of preventing another world war. In 1946 it was replaced by the United Nations, a truly universal organisation. The UN has a similarly national-liberal structure as the League of Nations, but the UN Security Council received a stronger
mandate and has been better able to launch peacekeeping operations than the League of Nations Council.

The Europeanist-ascending character of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952, was far clearer. The reason was not only the lessons drawn from the debacle of the toothless League and from World War II, but also, crucially, that it was founded by mainly Christian-democratic governments from core Europe. The rise of Catholic-oriented political parties and their tentative initiatives towards transnational party co-operation between the two World Wars are therefore of the greatest significance in the present context.

I discussed the evolution of Catholic thought on Europe until World War I in Section 3.8.1, and role of Christian democrats in the establishment of the European Union will be the focus of Part 4. However, it was in the early interwar years that Catholics got increasingly engaged in secular politics and that political Catholicism developed a Europe-wide sense of shared purpose and common identity (Kaiser 2007: 42). Catholic parties scored notable successes, not least in Belgium. In Germany, the Centre Party formed part of government throughout the Weimar Republic. Pope Benedict XV encouraged Catholic party mobilisation, primarily to thwart the progress of the left. In 1920 he lifted the ban on Catholics’ involvement in Italian politics, giving his blessing to the new Catholic-dominated, but non-confessional PPI. The party had been established the year before by the left-leaning Sicilian priest Luigi Sturzo.

The participation of Catholics in World War I had boosted their national credentials, easing the acceptance of Catholic-dominated parties in post-war national politics. Increased competition with internationally oriented, class-based socialist and communist parties encouraged greater co-operation between such parties and the growing Catholic trade union and social reform movement. Catholic unions and workers’ associations played a crucial role in the attempt to bind Catholic workers to Catholic parties. Crucially, these unions and associations provided a “social and ideological bridge” between Catholic parties and moderate socialist and left-liberal parties, preventing an exclusive orientation towards co-operation with conservative
and fascist forces (Kaiser 2007: 48). Left- or liberal-leaning Catholics also began to contemplate European party co-operation and policy formulation. With the establishment of a French Catholic-dominated party in 1924, the Parti Démocrate Populaire (PDP), a crucial precondition for this was put in place.

At the same time transnational contacts between Catholic trade unions, industrialists and intellectuals developed. In 1920, the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) was established. It held seven congresses until the outbreak of World War II. Regular contacts between Catholic workers associations led to the founding of a Catholic Workers International (CWI) in 1928 (Kaiser 2007: 64-65).

In December 1925 the Sécretariat Internationale des Partis Démocratiques d’Inspiration Chrétienne (SIPDIC) was established in Paris by the Catholic-dominated parties of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Poland (ibid: 86). Many Catholic politicians, e.g. Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi, were involved in several of these networks. The PPI’s Sturzo was a driving force in the creation of this ‘popular international,’ which he saw as a step towards the long-term goal of a political federation in Europe (ibid.: 79). Also the leader of the German Centre Party, Joseph Joos, supported by Konrad Adenauer, denounced nationalism and propagated European federalism. Kaiser sees this as reflecting “the traditional preference of Rhenish-Westfalian Catholicism for a more federal organisation of Germany with the aim of overcoming Prussian-Protestant hegemony” (ibid: 94). SIPDIC was dominated by left-leaning or liberal Catholics, but some conservatives also played a role. Robert Schuman was one of them (ibid.: 97; see below, page 292). The Catholic parties, notably the PDP, the PPI and the Centre Party, supported the Europeanist Briand initiative. The annual congress of the PDP in 1931 declared that “European Union has never been more essential” (quoted ibid: 105).

When the Briand Plan came to nothing, SIPDIC devoted its annual congress of 1932 to the theme of European economic integration. It adopted a resolution calling for a ‘common market’ for the production and trade of goods and for liberalising economic policies in favour of a “freer exchange of goods, capital and people”
(quoted ibid: 107). It also advocated Europe-wide measures to stabilise the income of farmers. However, SIPDIC lost much of its momentum and rationale when Hitler dissolved the Centre Party. It continued as a forum of discussion but without national congresses until January 1939 (ibid: 111).

According to Kaiser (ibid.: 117-118), the long-term significance of SIPDIC was, firstly, that it succeeded in establishing a transnational network of Catholic parties outside the direct control of the Vatican. Secondly, it facilitated a collective learning process, notably in the sense of realising that European co-operation among Catholic parties had to be pro-democratic and share some core strategic objectives. Thirdly, it was realised that a main such objective had to be European reconciliation and integration, and, significantly in view of post-war developments, that integration should start with the economy.

3.9 Conclusion

In Part 3, I have identified the Roman Empire, the Roman Church and the Holy Roman/Habsburg empire as the main institutional sources of proto-Europeanist discourse in the pre-1945 history of Europe. They represented a mainly top-down, or descending, form of government, but generally both the Roman and the Christian ethos favoured a benign attitude to diversity in ‘the brotherhood of mankind’ (though the Roman Church became increasingly intolerant of religious dissidence). The Roman legacy indeed incorporates a powerful memory of early Roman republicanism as well as of Greco-Roman cosmopolitanism. The Holy Roman and Habsburg empires were so diverse and decentralised as to be federal in all but name. Christian ideology is of course also fundamentally universalist and egalitarian.

The ascendancy of particularist, or nationalist, discourse resulted mainly from the fragmentation of unitary Christendom into a Europe of autonomous polities. Absolutist rulers propagated the notion of territorial sovereignty, which eventually turned into the hegemonial, particularist-ascending idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the Protestant states of north-western Europe were the pioneers, their kings’ control of the church being an important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was
particularly conducive to particularism, which in the German context turned exclusivist, ethnic and eventually racist. Two cataclysmic showdowns in the twentieth century in which nationalism was a major factor discredited racism, but did not conclusively wreck the particularist paradigm. The question of whether a supranational authority with some real powers would be erected or sovereignty would stay fully with the individual states of Europe remained open. As we will see immediately, attitudes to this question turned out to be territorially differentiated according to the pattern already outlined. National-liberal, Protestant Britain and Scandinavia advocated the latter solution and the Catholic Christian-democrats of continental and southern Europe the former, with Calvinist and/or republican city-state Europeans taking a cosmopolitan middle course.

The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis postulated at the end of Part 2 has held up well in the historical discussion. Its territorial, centre-periphery perspective is relevant, as is its emphasis on the confessional differentiation brought about by the Reformation. The fragmented political structure of city-belt Europe, its role as buffer area and battleground for the centralising states around it, and the growth of trade and capitalism (as well as Calvinism) indeed facilitated the growth of cosmopolitan Europeanness and Europeanism, notably among the emerging middle class and liberal intellectuals. Similarly, the emergence of varieties of Protestantism that tended to identify with the nation-state in northern Europe (England, Scandinavia, Prussia) facilitated particularist attitudes.

But such an explanation of the Europeanisation of the city-belt creates the impression that it happened by default, without any ideologically conscious and resolute institutional agents. The role the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires and notably of the Papacy/Roman Church as historical-institutional agents of universalist, proto-Europeanist ideology in all parts of Europe under their sway therefore need to be more strongly emphasised. Rome, represented by the Roman Church as well as by successive Roman empires, is a more important territorial and historical source of Europeanism than city-studded Central Europe. The Christian Democratic parties of
Western continental Europe were to give its legacy a new lease of life after World War II.
4. Present Sources of European Union

4.1 Introduction

In the context outlined in Part 2 above, I defined interest as a mainly short-term, material concern and ideology and identity as ideational products of historical experience and interpretations of the past. Then in Part 3, I extensively discussed historical sources of Europeanist and nationalist ideology, arguing that they have created a territorially and politically differentiated potential for European union in geographical Europe. In this final part of the study, I will explore the interplay between these past and present sources of European union, or between political-ideological and economic-material motivations for and against integration after 1945. I will not rehearse the history of European integration in any detail, nor engage in interpretational polemics. The focus remains the territorial distribution of Europeanism, which after the war became politically salient and determined the nature and scope of the first pan-European institutions. I will emphasise the early history of European integration because that was when the historically defining framework as well as the basic pattern of support and opposition emerged.

The scholarly debate over post-1945 European integration has been marked by similar cleavages as the political debate. As I indicated in Part 2, the field was first dominated by American political scientists who presented a liberal internationalist interpretation, neofunctionalism (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; etc.). They held that integration is basically driven by the needs of an increasingly interdependent international economy and transnational economic agents, aided by supranational institutional agencies and ‘spillover’ from one policy sector to another. Later federalist interpretations (Lipgens 1982; Pinder 1995; Burgess 2000; etc.) emphasise the role of individuals and pressure groups explicitly or implicitly pursuing a federalist political vision. Against the supranational or transnational emphasis of these writings, intergovernmentalist interpretations (Taylor 1983; Milward 1984, 1992; Dedman 1996; Moravcsik 1998; etc.) insist that member states and their
national interests have remained decisive. According to Alan Milward, European integration, far from signalling the end of the nation-state, was in fact devised in order to “rescue” it from collapse after World War 2. Both Milward and Andrew Moravcsik see the European Union as mainly an economic policy device, arising from a coincidence of national material interest.

However, as I have indicated (above, Chapter 2.3), Moravcsik in his historical analysis of the five treaty negotiations from Messina to Maastricht takes care to highlight the significance of federalist and nationalist ideological predispositions. Although he concludes that usually their influence was secondary, he admits that in some instances they were primary and that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain which was more important. In one place he even concedes that in eight out of fifteen British, French and German policy stances over the forty years he has studied, geopolitical ideology played a secondary “or parallel” role (Moravcsik 1998: 474).

Yet Moravcsik’s claim that commercial advantage, relative bargaining power, and the credibility of commitments are sufficient rather than just necessary conditions of post-war European integration is problematic. While any assignment of ‘sufficient’ rather than ‘necessary’ status to factors can be contested, with Wolfram Kaiser (2007) I will argue that such rather short-term materialist and rationalist explanations would be insufficient if ideologically Europeanist Christian-democratic parties had not been in power in the six founding states in the crucial period. Thus ideological as well as territorial variables rooted in the past must be added before we can claim to have a ‘sufficient’ account of the European Union such as it is, rather than of e.g. EFTA. Moravcsik in fact practically admits as much:

If the fifty-year post-war boom in trade and investment among industrialised nations rendered a measure of trade liberalisation, regulatory harmonisation, and monetary stabilisation inevitable, it is nonetheless likely that the EC would have evolved differently in the absence of a parallel set of geopolitical preferences for and against European integration. The likely outcome absent the impact of geopolitical concerns would have been a trade arrangement closer to the free trade area repeatedly proposed by Britain, backed by a series of bilateral and global agreements on multilateral trade and investment. (Moravcsik 1998: 477)
With his groundbreaking historical research, Kaiser has brought agency, partisan advocacy, political leadership, and ideology back to centre stage of the theoretical debate over European integration. Like the neofunctionalists and federalists, he highlights the significance of transnational and supranational networks and actors, but he is much more empirically specific as to the causal mechanisms involved than them. He agrees with historical institutionalists that the original design of the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 was decisive for the later development of the EU, but avers that they have insufficiently specified the human agents and networks involved. To Kaiser, transnationally organised Christian democratic parties represent the missing link between the federalist heroes identified by Lipgens and the entrenchment of federalist principles in European institutions.

The key to understanding why the present-day European Union was launched on a supranational path in 1952, is the fact that Christian democratic parties dominated the foreign policies of the six founding states for close to twenty years after the war, and that they were able to formulate and realise a joint Europeanist policy largely through their transnational party network. Kaiser criticises the intergovernmentalists’ state-centrism as well as their “extreme over-reliance on governmental sources,” which he thinks “has blinded them to the crucial agenda-setting role of partly transnationally constituted political forces in western European democracies after 1945, and their shared norms and policy ideas for initiating and driving the integration process forward” (Kaiser 2007: 249).

I agree with Kaiser that the European Union is neither an inevitable by-product of a globalising economy nor the feat of heroic entrepreneurship by individual federalists. It is a contingent political construction launched by transnationally networked agents, strategically placed both in governments and parties in key countries. They saw and acted upon a historically unique window of opportunity when the balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces in Europe favoured union. Structurally enabling factors were related to economic interest, political ideology, reason and learning, as well as territorial context. There was a long and venerable tradition of universalism and/or cosmopolitanism as well as of federalism in continental Europe; the six most
Europeanist states were contiguous not only territorially but also historically, economically and culturally; they represented the highest degree of European cultural unity and thus the deepest sense of Europeanness; and the idea of a United States of Europe had been discussed with increasing intensity and publicity since at least the seventeenth century, especially in core, i.e. Carolingian-Lotharingian, Europe (see notably Section 3.8.4 above).

More short-term, contingent factors included first of all the devastating learning experience of World War II, which had demonstrated more patently than any previous war the destructive potential of nationalism and inter-state rivalry when combined with modern technology, industry and communications. This helped give the European federalist movement a considerable boost after the war. Moreover, Carolingian-Lotharingian core Europe now shared key national interests, notably economic integration and political unity vis-à-vis the Soviet ‘Other.’ European union could reconcile the West German interest in regaining sovereignty to the interest of France and others in limiting that sovereignty by sharing some of it at the European level. The foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949 confirmed previous lessons learned that unity with some effective supranational elements would not be possible with Britain as a member. In addition, the international environment (U.S. support of European union after 1947; the Cold War; the Korean war) was propitious, as was the general trend towards interdependence in the international economy as well as in technology and communications.

However, in spite of all this, the European Union such as it is would most likely not exist today had not transnationally networked, Christian democratic parties held “hegemony by default” in the six states of “core Europe” for about twenty years after the war. The Europeanist cause had sympathisers across the political spectrum, but it was transnational Christian democracy that provided it with ‘sufficient’ institutional momentum and legitimacy in post-war Europe. Thus the Christian democratic parties, defining themselves as the ‘parties of Europe,’ embraced the universalist-Europeanist legacy previously espoused by the twin institutions of the Roman Church and the Roman Empire, and gave it a modern, secular expression.
However, this passing of the baton meant that the universalist discourse now definitely changed from advocating descending to defending an ascending locus of sovereignty. Thus the promotion of a supranational, democratically elected European Parliament, controlling a constitutionally constrained European government, became a key element of the post-war Christian democratic discourse on Europe.

4.2 Postwar patterns of Europeanism

Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the interwar Paneuropean Union, returned to Europe from American exile in 1946.\(^5^2\) Coudenhove perceived an essential change in attitudes and thought the wave of nationalism that had caused two world wars, had at last exhausted itself. The people were now ready for federation, he gathered, but their governments were still beset by pre-war ultra-nationalism. Kalergi hence wrote to the about 4000 national parliamentarians in Western Europe, asking them whether or not they favoured “the establishment of a European federation within the framework of the United Nations.” He received altogether 1735 answers, only 52 of which contained a ‘No’. The proportion of ‘Yeas’ out of the total membership of the national parliaments is reported in Table 1.

The result of Kalergi’s enquiry represents a pattern of Europeanism that has largely persisted throughout the post-war period, at least until the enlargement of 2004. In their discourse analysis of the attitudes of French, German and British

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Percentage of Parliaments’ Yeas to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Letter on European Federation in 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{52}\) In the U.S, together with Rudolf and Otto von Habsburg, he had toyed with the idea of a resurrected Habsburg empire (Kaiser 2007: 183).
political parties to European polity ideas from 1950 to 1995, Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (1998) found a clear continuity over time. The diagram below, showing a “Europeanism Index” based on the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trends file 1970-2002 ed. 2.0, illustrates that Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece (the latter after some initial hesitation) have had a more Europeanist public opinion than the EU average and that the publics of Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Norway have been the most negative. However, as also appears, Danish public opinion has turned considerably more favourable since the 1990s. Greece and Ireland too represent interesting cases, having gone from more negative to more positive attitudes than the average.

This pattern of public and parliamentary opinion coincides quite closely with government policies towards European integration after the war. Most obviously, it was the six states with the most favourable public opinion that launched the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community in 1958. The United Kingdom joined reluctantly, having unsuccessfully advanced intergovernmentalist alternatives such as the OEEC (OECD), the Council of Europe and EFTA. The UK and other northern latecomers generally also continued to resist attempts by the original six to federalise and extend the policy ambit of the EU. The UK, Denmark and Sweden remain outside the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and Denmark maintains three other opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty too. The UK only joined the Single European Act’s Social Chapter when Tony Blair took over as prime minister. The UK and (therefore) Ireland are not part of the Schengen area. Denmark has held six controversial referenda on EU issues (on membership, on the SEA, twice on the treaty of Maastricht, on the treaty of Amsterdam, and on EMU). Norway has two times rejected EU membership after obtaining negative majorities in highly divisive referenda, and remains the only country not having joined after completing accession talks.
Diagram 1: Europeanism index 1978-1995

Based on the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trends file 1970-2002 ed. 2.0, cf. http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/standard_eb_trend/trendfile.htm. The data were originally compiled for the European Commission and have been available for me by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). I have compiled the diagrams with the help of Sveinung Arnesen, Institute of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen. The “Europeanism Index” combines responses to two standard Eurobarometer questions: 1) “Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership in the European Community/Common Market is a) a good thing; b) neither good nor bad; c) a bad thing?” and 2) “In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against or very much against?” A respondent who thinks positively about his/her country’s membership of the EC/EU and who supports further efforts for European unification is classified as positive. A respondent who thinks negatively of his/her country’s membership of the EC/EU and who is against European unification is classified as negative. The attitude of all other respondents has been classified as ambivalent.
However, as we will see below, even if at the national level of analysis the six founding states have represented the Europeanist core of the European integration process, there have been important gradations of Europeanism at the sub-national levels. At each stage, transnationally minded and organised Christian democracy has constituted the core of the core.

4.3 The Council of Europe

During the war the idea of European federation was chiefly nurtured by the continental non-Communist resistance, notably in Italy (Lipgens 1982). However, Altiero Spinelli drew largely on pre-war British federalist literature (see above, page 271) when he drafted the *Ventotene Manifesto* and founded the Italian movement for European federation (Movimento Federalista Europea) while interned on the island of Ventotene (Dedman 1996: 17, 20). Also the Czechoslovak, French, Dutch, Polish and Yugoslav resistance published tracts favouring some kind of federal organisation of post-war Europe. But it was Italian activists who took the initiative to a meeting of resistance fighters in neutral Switzerland in 1944. The participants adopted a declaration advocating a federal Europe to which only Norwegian and Danish participants appear to have objected (Urwin 1995: 8-9). On 22 November 1944, the French Consultative Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the government to “prepare an international organisation which will lead the community of states towards a federation of free peoples within which the regional unions will not be in danger of giving rise to hostile blocks” (quoted by Lipgens 1982: 217).

However, the hopes of the continental resistance that after the war, Britain together with France would take the lead towards a federal Europe were dashed. Churchill and the Conservatives lost the 1945 election to the Labour Party and its leader Clement Attlee, who proved decidedly lukewarm on European union. Moreover, newly installed democratic governments in western continental Europe were too busy with regrouping and reconstruction to pay much attention to the Europeanist cause. But Churchill’s 19 September 1946 speech in Zürich for “a kind of United States of Europe” (Churchill 1946) inaugurated an ideological revival, which was facilitated by
the continuing economic problems in Europe as well as a radical change of U.S. policy in favour of European integration. The American shift towards ‘empire’ by integration (Lundestad 1998) in 1947 was a reaction to the policies of Stalin, and also led to the declaration of the Truman doctrine and to the Marshall Plan. Further conducive factors were the emerging division of Germany into a western democratic and an eastern communist part, and the domination also of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania by the Soviet Union.

Britain, supported by Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, initially opposed the formation of what became the Council of Europe, favouring instead “little more than an effective interlocking system of treaties” (Urwin 1995: 32). Foreign minister Ernest Bevin is famously supposed to have said of the initiative: “I don’t like it. I don’t like it. When you open that Pandora’s box, you will find it full of Trojan horses” (quoted by Hewstone 1986: VI). To forestall more federalist schemes, Bevin took the initiative to the Treaty of Brussels, concluded with France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1948. The treaty was a fifty-year pact for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters, and for collective self-defence. However, the Hague congress of the European Movement and U.S. as well as Belgian, French and Italian government support led to the foundation of the Council of Europe on 10 May 1949 by ten states – Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. At the last minute Britain defeated a French and Italian proposal that the new body should be named the European Union (Urwin 1995: 34). Britain also made sure that although the Council had a wide remit, it did not impinge on national sovereignty. Europeanist proposals adopted by majority vote in the parliamentary Consultative Assembly had no purchase with the unanimity-bound Committee of Ministers.
4.4 The European Coal and Steel Community

However, the Council of Europe’s parliamentary assembly proved an important forum for transnational party co-operation and joint European policy formulation, notably for the Christian Democratic parties (Kaiser 2007: 179-180). Moreover, the experience with the Council of Europe and the debates in its assembly strengthened the conviction of the core Europe governments, dominated by Christian Democratic parties, that they had to proceed towards union without Britain. On 9 May 1950 the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, proposed a pooling and joint administration of coal and steel resources “as a first step in the federation of Europe.” The plan had been formulated by Jean Monnet, who had been deputy secretary general to the League of Nations 1919-1923.

Monnet was a well-connected pragmatist without party affiliation, but with a strong liberal internationalist and Europeanist persuasion. He came from a traditional Catholic background in Cognac, France, and married a devoutly Catholic wife, but was apparently not very religious himself (Duchêne 1994: 56). Schuman came from Alsace-Lorraine and was a pious Catholic. Luxembourgish was his first language and German the second; he had fought in the German army 1914-1918; and only became a French citizen in 1919 (Dedman 1996: 57).

Walter Lipgens, who was an active member of the German Christian Democrat Party (CDU) and also of the German federalist movement (Kaiser 2007: 5), argues that Europeanist advocacy by federalists in the resistance and in the immediate post-war years gave crucial momentum to the European integration process. In 1946 Europeanist associations in Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland were amalgamated into the Union of European Federalists. Their membership doubled to 200,000 between 1947 and 1950 (Dedman 1996: 11). In May 1948 some 750 delegates representing 16 countries and most
political persuasions met in The Hague to discuss European union. Among them were Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, Harold Macmillan, François Mitterrand, and Altiero Spinelli. Most conspicuous was the absence of a strong delegation from the British Labour Party (Urwin 1995: 30). In October the same year the international European Movement was founded, with Duncan Sandys (the son-in-law of Churchill) as president and Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, Alcide de Gasperi and Paul-Henri Spaak as honorary presidents.

Kaiser (2007) however reminds us that the decisions to institutionalise supranationalist European integration had to be made by politicians, and that in this respect the driving role of the Christian democratic parties was crucial. Not least due to widespread fear of Soviet-sponsored communism, Catholic-dominated parties scored great electoral successes after the war, notably in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and West Germany. Even in France, where the Christian democratic PDP had received only about 3 per cent of the vote in the interwar years, its successor, the newly created Mouvement Républican Populaire (MRP) achieved a breakthrough by polling 28.2 per cent in June 1946. Even if electoral support declined later, at least in France, Catholic parties remained the major partner or one of the major coalition partners in the governments of ‘core Europe’ for about twenty years after the war. As Kaiser (2007: ch. 5) puts it, they held “hegemony by default.”

A decisive difference between pre-war and post-war Catholic-dominated parties was that the latter were fully committed to parliamentary democracy. No non-democratic party from the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe were tolerated in their transnational network, nor was membership of the ECSC or the EEC for authoritarian states like Spain seriously advocated by Christian Democrats from ‘core Europe.’ This marginalised Catholic traditions influenced by nationalism and authoritarianism (Kaiser 2007: 170, 178).

The heyday of the Christian democratic influence on the foreign and European policies of core Europe was the period from 1945 until about 1965. This singular era of reconstruction, growth and Cold War presented them with a window of opportunity to develop and implement, with cross-party support where necessary, their own concept for European cooperation and integration (Kaiser 2007: 179). Through transnational party networks, European supranational institutions as well as intergovernmental contacts Christian democracy in core Europe came to define itself simply as ‘the party of Europe’:

‘Europe’ became upgraded in the course of Christian democratic party networking and intergovernmental decision-making in the first decade after World War II to their main collective policy instrument. In the face of the external Soviet and domestic communist challenge in the Cold War, their evolving European policy was designed to simultaneously overcome the legacy of nationalism and national conflict and find common European-level solutions to domestic socio-economic issues. ‘Europe’ thus became a core element of the Christian democratic parties’ post-war identities, contributing in a major way to their distinctiveness in domestic party competition. As Étienne Borne claimed for the MRP at the national party congress at Lille in 1954, ‘We are the party of Europe. Europe is our form of refusing a return to the past.’” (Kaiser 2007: 189)

Kaiser identifies three important traditions of political Catholicism that facilitated the new European vocation of the Christian democratic parties: The first was “the quintessentially continental European, not global, orientation of political Catholicism as opposed to the ideologically and organisationally pan-European and internationalist socialism.” Secondly, the “unifying mistrust of the centralised almighty nation-state – a mistrust rooted in the collective European experience of liberal-dominated national integration and the culture wars in the nineteenth century and accentuated by the shared fear of the Stalinist version of centralisation.” The third, closely linked, tradition was
the strong regional anchoring and identity of political Catholicism – from the south-eastern provinces of Limburg and North Brabant in the case of the KVP, Flanders in the case of the CVP, the Rhineland and Bavaria in the case of the CDU and CSU, Alsace-Lorraine, Brittany and Savoy in the case of the MRP, and Trento [Trentino/South Tyrol], Lombardy and Sicily in the case of the DC. The MRP actually debated in 1950 to what extent its own political traditions – despite its post-revolutionary republican programme – had roots in Burgundian clericalism and provincialism going back to the eleventh century. (Kaiser 2007: 189)

Moreover, according to Kaiser,

The overlapping Catholic and strong regional identity and – in the case of many leading Christian democrats like Schuman and de Gasperi – experience of cross-border contacts between the different ‘petite patrie’, as Schuman called his Lorraine region, largely account for the interest in some kind of supranational solution for continental western Europe as a guarantee of subnational regional identity and autonomy. In contrast – with the partial exception of the Benelux and French parties – European socialists were committed to the national road to socialism in one country. As Donald Sassoon has emphasised, ‘The idea that post-war reconstruction would require a growing economic and political interdependence expressed […] through a ‘common market’ could not have come from the Left’’ (Kaiser 2007: 190).

A transnational Christian democratic network was established with the foundation of the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI) in Lucerne, Switzerland, on 2 March 1947 (ibid.: 205ff). The inclusion of the German CDU/CSU was momentous. However, the NEI initially embraced parties from countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were coming under the influence of the Soviet Union. Moreover, reconciliation with Germany was still too contentious to be discussed by French politicians in public. MRP leader and foreign minister Georges Bidault therefore took the initiative in establishing secret meetings of the so-called Geneva Circle in November 1947.

Here, from 1947 to 1955, a more limited group from Western Europe regularly discussed the German-Saar-Rhineland-Ruhr questions as well as European and foreign policy more generally, contributing crucially to the definition of a joint Christian democratic stance in favour of European union. Adenauer and Bidault were regular participants. But also the European Movement and Union of European Federalists
brought Christian democrats together. Adenauer and Schuman met for the first time after World War II at the launching of the European Movement in The Hague in May 1948. But they had probably become acquainted in SIPDIC meetings in the early 1930s, if not earlier (ibid.: 212-214).

Under the influence of the predominant ‘farmer-bourgeois alliance,’ the interwar SIPDIC had leaned towards the left. By contrast, the NEI, the Geneva Circle and the post-war Christian democratic parties generally were heavily dominated by middle-class liberal and conservative Catholics such as Adenauer, de Gasperi and Bidault. The Vatican refrained more and more from direct political interventions after the death of Pope Pius XII in 1958, but provided moral support that added to the legitimacy of Catholic party mobilisation and transnational co-operation (ibid: 173-174, 187-188).

Adenauer subscribed to the idea of ‘the two Germanies,’ which he shared with many Catholic politicians, both in West Germany and in France (ibid: 215-220). In an improvised speech at the NEI congress in Luxembourg in early 1948, Adenauer emphasised the role of Christians in the resistance against national socialism. He praised his own Rhinelanders, who, contrary to the eastern Germans, had always been filled with the spirit of liberty, and cited the fact that the Nazi party had recorded its worst result in the last Weimar elections in the heavily Catholic constituency of Cologne-Aachen.

In a report to the same congress, the Belgian trade unionist Petrus Serrarens argued that Germany west of the river Elbe had been first under the civilising influence of the Roman Empire, then of the Carolingian Empire, and, later of democratic and liberal ideas. The alienation of the German east from civilised Europe had begun with the destruction of Christian unity by Luther and the Reformation. The Protestant fight against the Roman Church had later culminated in Bismarck establishing Prussian-Protestant hegemony over Catholic Austria in 1866 and in the Prussian-liberal *Kulturkampf* in the 1870s. This Prussification of Germany had led straight to national socialism and World War II – “and, crucially, greater support for both nationalism and Marxism as derivatives of Protestant-influenced materialism in Soviet-occupied eastern Germany after 1945” (ibid.: 216).
Similarly, the Swiss deputy Karl Wick hailed the ‘European’ region between the Loire and the Rhine as a mediator between Germany and France and as the Lotharingian core of a reconstituted, but democratic Carolingian Europe. He was supplemented by the Luxembourger Pierre Frieden, who described the archetypical Protestant-Prussian German as a loud, self-important exhibitionist espousing a dangerous romanticism and idealism that could easily be exploited by somebody like Hitler. The NEI congress easily agreed to reject the notion of a collective ‘German’ guilt, and discerned instead between a guilty Protestant-Prussian east that was lost for Western civilisation, and the Catholic-Roman west, which should be rehabilitated and integrated into the new Europe (ibid.: 215).  

The discourse on the ‘two Germanies’ provided Adenauer with vital support from NEI allies against internal party competitors. Domestic attacks on him for failing the cause of national unity only raised his credibility abroad, which by feedback through the transnational party networks strengthened his position in the CDU. Moreover, “rather conveniently, this consensual Christian democratic view of recent European history not only absolved the western Germans from confronting their past, but also Catholic Europe from discussing its crucial role in the evolution and stabilisation of fascist, clerical and collaborationist regimes until 1945” (ibid.: 217).

The division of Germany and Europe that emerged in the late forties thus not only helped advance Franco-German reconciliation, but also to make Christian democratic parties the hegemonic political force in Western continental Europe. Kaiser however emphasises that Adenauer had held the idea of the two Germanies since long before the war. He quotes from an internal report to Bidault in 1951, which stated that:

54 However, as Kaiser (2007: 215) recalls, this Manichean image had its limitations. Fascism first succeeded in Catholic Italy and had considerable support among Catholic German-speakers in Czechoslovakia and Austria. Hitler was born in Braunau, Upper Austria, and socialised in Vienna. Prussia under social democratic leadership remained the bastion of the democratic Weimar Republic.
Chancellor Adenauer aims at the creation of a European federation. His entire foreign policy is essentially based on this objective. He considers the Franco-German entente as the cornerstone of his grand design which can only be realised in a wider western European context. Chancellor Adenauer thus sacrifices deliberately the question of German unity. He believes that the integration of western Germany is more important than the restoration of the unity of the former Reich. (quoted by Kaiser 2007: 219)

Already at the congress of SIPDIC in 1932, European Christian democrats had agreed that economic integration and a common market would be an appropriate starting point for European union (see above, page 279). However, to them, economic integration was a means towards political union, not an end in itself. In the Geneva Circle, Bidault and others pushed hard for economic integration. When France, Britain and the Benelux countries entered into a loose economic co-operation on the basis of the Brussels Pact in 1948, Bidault linked his proposal for a European assembly of national parliamentarians to the objective of creating a customs and economic union.

Later on, Christian democrats saw the ECSC as “the prototype for the European common market.” They agreed that economic integration should fully include West Germany, that it should enhance European security more generally, and that it must be market-based, but with a strong social dimension. It was thought that Europe needed to find a third way between liberal capitalism and Soviet communism. Nationalisation was accepted in some cases, but the main strategy would be Europeanisation of the economy combined with redistributional policies (ibid: 221-223).

Starting with the strategically important coal and steel sector was a natural policy choice. As early as 1923, Adenauer had suggested introducing some form of joint control of the coal and steel production in the Ruhr. He again advanced this proposal in conversations with French officers in 1945, and then repeatedly espoused it in the context of the NEI and the Geneva Circle (ibid: 223). The integration of basic industries was discussed at the Luxembourg congress of the NEI in 1948, where Adenauer may have suggested joint control for the first time in a transnational forum.

Adenauer raised the idea at a meeting in October 1948 with Robert Schuman, who had now taken over after his MRP colleague Bidault as foreign minister of France, and again in a subsequent letter to him. The West German foreign minister,
Heinrich von Brentano, pushed Adenauer’s idea again in the Geneva Circle in November 1949. Finally, Adenauer in a letter dated 22 March 1950 to Bidault (now prime minister) suggested the integration of the French and German coal, steel and chemical industries as a first concrete step towards close Franco-German relations after the conflicts over the Saar Conventions and the conditions for the membership of the Federal Republic in the Council of Europe (ibid: 225). Kaiser thinks these approaches facilitated Bidault’s acceptance of foreign minister Schuman’s plan for a European Coal and Steel Community when it was launched on 9 May 1950, even if Schuman had not consulted him beforehand.

Schuman stated that, if necessary, France would go ahead with only the newly established Federal Republic of Germany as ECSC partner. In terms of French ‘material interests,’ the Schuman plan could be seen as a response to the crisis riding the coal and steel sector as well as a means to keep a check on the political, military and economic potential of the new West German state (Urwin 1995: 44-45). For the FRG, it offered both a means for economic development and for regaining national sovereignty. However, according to Kaiser, to the Catholic founding fathers, the ideal of European union and Franco-German reconciliation were far more important than narrowly conceived national interests:

the Christian democrats developed their core Europe concept before the first signs of a continental Europeanisation of trade patterns became visible for bureaucrat experts. Moreover, Adenauer, Schuman and de Gasperi were neither interested in specific trade implications of integration nor deferential of bureaucratic policy-making by national administrations which is the focus of economic explanations of French and continental European policies. (Kaiser 2007: 250-251)

Not all Christian democrats were initially keen on the supranational nature of the incipient European union. Still, a broad consensus in favour of delegating sovereignty to the ECSC emerged. According to Kaiser, the main reasons were confessional and ideological and thus specific to transnational Christian democracy:
First, the political concept of supranationalism had an intriguing parallel in the quasi-supranational authority of the Pope and the Catholic hierarchy. Despite the post-war rhetoric of secularism and inter-confessionalism, this still seemed the natural order of things not only for stout Catholics like Schuman. Secondly, the widespread discursive cultural rationalisation of integration as the emergence of a kind of democratic Carolingian Empire also made supranationalism appear almost like the natural order of European history destroyed by modern nationalism. […] The Carolingian tradition was evoked again and again as exemplary for post-war Europe. This medieval order was defended against external enemies of Christendom as the emerging post-war world had to be protected against the Soviet threat. At the NEI congress in Bad Ems in 1951, for example, von Brentano spoke of the common defence of the European Abendland in what he presented as a tradition reaching from Charlemagne to the battle of 955 against the heathen Magyars, the ‘liberation’ of Granada in 1492 and the victory of the multinational army led by the Polish King Johann III Sobiesky against Ottoman troops in 1683, ending their siege of Vienna. Importantly, this was not merely a rhetorical construct to rally the Christian democratic troops behind the EDC project. Instead, it was the widely shared world-view of transnational Christian democracy. (Kaiser 2007: 228)

In addition, Kaiser (2007: 230-231) points to three pragmatic or contingent arguments in favour of supranationalism. First, the notion of a federal Europe could be presented to young Europeans as an attractive alternative to communism, which was why the youth sections of the Christian democratic parties pushed hard for a supranational design.

A second pragmatic advantage of supranational institutions and majority voting was that it would deprive domestic interest groups of easy access to political parties and ministries in areas of Europeanised policy-making. Thirdly and most importantly, insisting on supranational forms of integration was a conscious choice to exclude Britain from core European integration. The creation of a core Europe without Britain had become a central objective of transnational Christian democracy by May 1950. Adenauer, Bidault and Schuman were totally agreed on this. To them the choice appeared clear: “either a continental Europe under strong Christian democratic influence and with a German government directed by [Adenauer] or a larger socialist Europe with Britain governed by the Labour Party and the German government run by Schumacher” (Kaiser 2007: 232-233).
Kaiser (ibid: 237-249) argues that the transnational cooperation of Christian democrats fulfilled a number of important functions in the creation of core Europe without Britain between 1947 and 1951. First, it allowed them to build trust in each other, even to the extent of shoring each other up transnationally if domestic pressures threatened to put them off track. This was especially important in relations between the CDU/CSU and the MRP. Second, transnational networking facilitated the coordination of policy objectives, and notably the Schuman plan.

Third, it helped socialise individuals into the consensus of building a core Europe without Britain, and to marginalise dissenters. E.g. the Italian prime minister, de Gasperi, initially was Atlantically disposed, but gradually became an ardent supporter of core Europe supranationalism. Bidault’s acceptance of the Schuman plan had been prepared through his participation in discussions in the Geneva Circle. Fourth, the transnational networks provided opportunities for party politicians of one country to intervene strategically into the governmental apparatus of another and to secure inter-state negotiation outcomes consistent with joint Christian democratic objectives. Jean Monnet was a key go-between in this regard, even if he held no party membership.

Fifth, their European network allowed Christian democratic parties to calibrate their policies and approaches to other parties in a way that could secure the necessary governmental and parliamentary majorities for the Schuman plan. Although Christian democrats had the largest parties and were in government in all six core states after the Belgian elections of June 1950, entrepreneurial coalition-building was necessary, especially in France and with socialists. In France the centrist ‘Third force’ government depended on close cooperation between the MRP and the socialist party, SFIO. Initially, there was considerable scepticism against the Christian democratic advocacy of core Europe in the SFIO. In its Executive Committee, Guy Mollet and Jules Moch raised “the anticlerical spectre of the Vatican dominating Europe” (Kaiser 2007: 244). In West Germany, the nationally inclined SPD leader Kurt Schumacher stoked similar fears. According to Kaiser, some argued that the Christian democrats were not trying to create the United States of Europe, but to recreate the Holy Roman Empire:
This fear was accentuated by frequent reference by Catholic conservatives in particular to the need to recreate some kind of Christian *Abendland*, and the more widespread idea among Christian democrats like de Gasperi, for example, of core Europe as a Christian democratically updated version of a Carolingian *res publica christiana*. The socialist fears were also strongly reinforced by similar, although more confessionally motivated, perceptions of the Christian democratic core Europe project among Scandinavian socialists. (Kaiser 2007: 244)

While on the one hand leading socialists like André Philip, Salomon Grumbach and Guy Mollet were more federalist than many in the MRP, there was also a widespread desire in the SFIO to have Labour-led Britain join the ECSC. However, this dilemma was resolved after the British Labour Party issued a sharply anti-Europeanist statement on 12 June 1950. Labour rejected the Schuman Plan, arguing notably that it was inimical to democratic socialism in Britain. Prime Minister Attlee reiterated in the House of Commons that it would be impossible for Britain “to accept the principle that the most vital economic forces of this country should be handed over to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and is responsible to nobody” (quoted by Urwin 1995: 46). Urwin (ibid: 47) adds that there may have been economic arguments for Britain to stay out, but the decision was “quite clearly taken on political grounds.” He also notes that it was eventually the same six countries “in which agitation for closer political and economic integration had been strongest in the 1940s, with political support at the highest level,” that founded the European Coal and Steel Community.

Shortly after the Labour declaration, the SFIO came out strongly in favour of core Europe sectoral integration. The statement also strengthened the federalists in the Belgian socialist party, who were led by Paul-Henri Spaak. The Belgian chamber of deputies, including the socialists, hence voted overwhelmingly for ratification of the ECSC treaty. In the Netherlands too, many social democrats were convinced federalists. The PvdA parliamentarians there resigned themselves to British self-exclusion and voted for the treaty. The joint Christian democratic position that the treaty should not to allow coal and steel cartels was crucial for garnering socialist support (Kaiser 2007: 246).

In Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was in principle favourable to European union. On 11 May 1946, its first annual congress approved a political
programme stating that “German Social Democracy aims to bring about a United States of Europe, a democratic and Socialist federation of European states. It desires a Socialist Germany in a Socialist Europe” (quoted by Lipgens 1982: 244).

However, under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher and against the background of growing east-west division, the SPD turned increasingly towards national unity and traditional balance of power thinking, as expressed notably in the idea of a united, neutral Germany as mediator between east and west. In contrast to the CDU/CSU, the SPD insisted that Germany should have equal rights in all international fora from the outset. SPD parliamentarians voted against German participation in the Council of Europe and against ratification of the Paris Treaty founding the ECSC. The Social Democrats charged that rearmament of the Federal Republic and participation in Western European integration were incompatible with German reunification and the recovery of the Saar from France, that Germany would have an inferior status in the ECSC compared to the other member states, and that the ECSC ‘Little Europe’ excluded the progressive British and Scandinavian nations.

All of this played into the hands of Adenauer and the Christian democrats. According to Kaiser, Schumacher’s nationalist rhetoric was aggressive and loud, and he had an idealised vision of a unified Germany and its mediating role in Europe. The more Schumacher and the SPD seemed to incarnate the Christian democrats’ imagined German East, the more the Christian democrats and even many continental socialists saw Adenauer as the only hope for the German West in an integrated Europe embedded in larger Western structures. (Kaiser 2007: 221)

Internal dissent in the SPD and tacit trade union support for the Schuman Plan weakened Schumacher and in practice, Adenauer could dictate the Federal Republic’s European policy 1950-51. Schumacher’s policy came under growing attack from the SPD’s Bürgermeisterflügel (mayoral wing), and the German trade union congress DGB adopted a resolution in favour of the ECSC (ibid: 245).

The contrast between the territorial and cultural backgrounds of Adenauer and Schumacher is interesting in the present context:
Kurt Schumacher was born at Kulm near Danzig [on the Baltic coast], in the area known as the ‘Grenzdeutschentum’ and traditionally associated with national consciousness in Germany. His place of origin has also been accounted a reason for his marked anti-clericalism, which made him very suspicious of the motive of the three Allied High Commissioners, McCloy, François Ponçet and Kirkpatrick, who were all Catholics. In this connection, he stood in direct contrast to Konrad Adenauer, his main political rival, who was the scion of an old Rhenish Catholic family, and the inheritor, therefore, of an explicitly Catholic French oriented strain in German policy. (Patterson 1974: 7)

Patterson (ibid: 6) moreover indicates that the SPD’s preference for national over Western European unification can in part be explained by the very high proportion of eastern refugees in the party. Fifty out of the 131 SPD deputies in the first Bundestag were refugees. The Lutheran areas east of the Elbe had been the strongholds of the party before the war, consistently returning a 34 percent plurality for the SPD. During the whole period of post-war German division comparatively more Protestants than Catholics voted SPD. Hanrieder (1967: 97) moreover observes that SPD criticism of the ECSC met with some sympathy among CDU Protestants.

However, after Schumacher’s death in 1952, alongside the Wirtschaftswunder that paralleled the rise of the ECSC and German division, SPD European policy came to a complete turnaround (Patterson 1974: 130). Contributing to this development was Jean Monnet’s intimate contacts with German trade unionists in his Action Committee for the United States of Europe. After 1957, the main concern of German Social Democrats became to democratise European institutions, in particular by increasing the power of, and directly electing, the European Parliament. Establishment of macro-economic, Keynesian planning at the European level was another SPD priority. This pragmatic adjustment was confirmed by the party’s adoption of the reformist Bad Godesberg programme of 1959.

Similar considerations were probably behind the Italian Socialist party’s change of heart on Europe, following the dissolution of their alliance with the communists in 1956 (Timmermann 1982: 84-85). The Italian Communist Party (PCI) itself went through a comparable shift from opposition to principled support after 1963. At the same time and for basically the same reasons, French Communists also changed from outright hostility to conditional acceptance of economic integration and French EC
membership. In contrast to the PCI, however (Spinelli was elected to the European Parliament on the PCI ticket), the PCF never became federalist, but remained intergovernmentally inclined in its European policies.

Kaiser concludes his discussion of the key role of transnationally organised Christian democracy in the preparation and adoption of the European Coal and Steel Community as follows:

Crucially, [the] core objectives of transnational Christian democracy derived from a shared set of norms and policy ideas with a strong confessional dimension. The Christian democrats attempted to build a Catholic Europe – not in the culture war sense of Vatican rule, as Mollet and Schumacher alleged with their anticlerical rhetoric, but as a decentralised federation in the making based on the principle of subsidiarity and excluding Protestant-socialist Northern Europe in its formative phase. It is this shared set of norms and policy ideas combined with the political hegemony of the Christian democratic Centre-Right in continental western Europe around 1950 that largely account for what the socialist Pineau has rightly recalled as the start of integration ‘in a very Christian democratic manner.’ (Kaiser 2007: 251)

Ernst B. Haas too, in his classic account of the early moves towards European unification, notes “the general Catholic ideological impetus toward European unity” (Haas 1958: 143). By comparison, the Dutch Anti-Revolutionaries and the Christian Historical Union - as well as the liberal VVD – “certainly favour the kind of economic integration that will lead to a unified common market. However, they are suspicious of supranational institutions, though willing to grant the need for them during the transitional period. In no sense of the term can these people be considered federalists” (ibid: 150). Still, ECSC support turned out to be near unanimous in the Benelux countries. The Liberals here stressed in particular the free trade aspects of the Community, but also criticised it as insufficiently federalist.

Liberal and radical parties, as well as other parties in the non-Catholic centre and right, had at first been wary of the dirigiste appearance of the ECSC, while industrialists often cautioned against the disastrous foreign competition it could entail. In France there were numerous evocations of the French nation and warnings against resurrected German imperialism. However, according to Haas, most parties came down in favour of the ECSC for such instrumentalist-materialist reasons as the prospect of
controlling German enterprises, access to coke for the Lorraine coal and steel industry, new markets for steel, and exemption from ECSC control over French investments in Lorraine and protection of French coal production. “Opportunistic argument relating to immediate French political and industrial aims characterised the Centre. Of commitment to principle—for or against integration—there was little evidence” (Haas 1958: 117).

Haas observes that the German liberal party, FDP, at first was only concerned with the ‘German’ interests involved in the ECSC. “Identified with industrialists, Protestant - and therefore anti-Adenauer - middle class elements as well as former Nazis,” the FDP opposed ratification of the ECSC treaty until four weeks prior to the vote in parliament (Haas 1958: 130). According to Hanrieder, “the FDP right wing’s efforts to attract frankly nationalistic elements in Northern Germany led the party as a whole to champion national independence and sovereignty much more stridently and inflexibly than the CDU/CSU” (Hanrieder 1967: 113). The nationally minded Refugee Party (BHE) and German Party were equally ambivalent, but also in the end voted in favour of the ECSC together with their allies, the CDU/CSU.

Not even the non-Catholic Italian centre and right-wing parties were unanimous in their support. Italian industry was flatly opposed to the ECSC as it feared ruinous competition, and only the party whips brought centre parliamentarians to a favourable vote. Yet, all but the communist, Nenni-socialist, monarchist and neo-fascist Italian parties were firmly committed to European union (Haas 1958: 140-1).

The difference between the ECSC and the Nordic Council, established by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 1953 (Finland joined in 1956), is instructive. Like the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council was and has remained essentially intergovernmental. “None of the three [founding] states desired anything that would even smack of supranationalism” (Urwin 1995: 88).

55 Needless to say, this statement is incorrect at least as far as the MRP is concerned.
Britain too consistently favoured intergovernmentalism. As Urwin states, the advance towards the founding of the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957 took place without British participation “since Britain could not accept the fundamental supranational principle. In fact, in many ways Britain disapproved of the whole venture, though continuing to lend vocal encouragement to the idea of unity” (Urwin 1995: 90). Churchill as leader of the opposition advocated British participation in the European Defence Community and in the ECSC, and strongly criticised the negotiation policies of the Attlee government. However, when the Conservatives replaced the Labour government in 1951, they refused to join the ECSC as well as the European Defence Community.

4.5 The European Defence Community

The 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea by the communist North, assisted by the Soviet Union, caused new concern for Europe’s defences. The idea of a European army had already been suggested by Churchill in March 1950. On 11 August 1950 the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly by a large majority passed a resolution, proposed by Churchill, calling for “the immediate creation of a unified European army, under the authority of a European minister of defence, subject to European democratic control” (quoted by Burgess 2000: 67). The Christian democrats voted massively in favour. There were only five contrary votes, but 29 German, British and Scandinavian socialists abstained (Kaiser 2007: 271-272). Two weeks later Jean Monnet wrote to René Pleven, the Radical Party’s prime minister of France, urging him to take the opportunity to launch “the federation of Europe” under whose joint sovereignty the European army could be governed. In October, Pleven proposed the establishment of a European Defence Community (EDC), including a substantial German contingent, which would however have an inferior status.

The Pleven Plan was welcomed by the NATO Council in October 1950, and received the support of West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and eventually also the Netherlands, which had been waiting in vain for a positive British response (Burgess 2000: 68-69). Burgess (ibid.) adds that at the behest of Prime Minister de
Gasperi, the Italian government “took the lead in advocating a federal model [for a European Political Community that would complement the EDC] with a fully-fledged European Assembly directly elected by European citizens and having powers of taxation in a joint decision-making structure.” De Gasperi was a committed federalist, and many other federalists were heavily involved in drafting and lobbying for the EPC-EDC proposals. However, a procedural vote on 30 August 1954 in the French National Assembly torpedoed the draft Treaty.

The direct reason for the debacle was the decline of the Europeanist MRP and the rise of the intergovernmentalist Rally of the French People (RPF) headed by general Charles de Gaulle. In the legislative elections of June 1951, the MRP’s share of the votes had fallen to 12.6 per cent, and it had lost its controlling influence on French European policy. The RPF had scored 22.4 per cent of the vote. In January 1953, the Europeanist centre-left ‘Third force’ coalition government that had ruled since 1947 had been replaced by a centre-right government without the SFIO, but including the RPF. In June 1954, the intergovernmentally inclined Pierre Mendès-France had become prime minister. The MRP had gone into opposition, which further eroded their chances of influencing the fate of the EDC (Kaiser 2007: 258).

While the communists, most Gaullists and a slight majority of socialists and radicals voted against the EDC, all but two Christian democratic representatives voted in favour. Opinion polls showed that a clear majority of French voters supported the EDC. Even most Gaullist voters were favourable (ibid: 255). Earlier, the parliaments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic had ratified it, and the Italian parliament, which was clearly positive, was just waiting for the French vote. Christian democrats constituted the core of the large majorities in all these parliaments. Towards the end of 1954, the MRP reluctantly supplied the necessary majority in the National Assembly for an intergovernmentalist and Atlanticist substitute for the EDC, based on the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Its support was mainly due to bilateral and transnational advocacy by Adenauer (ibid: 280).

The EDC proposal was originally not a product of transnational Christian democratic policy formulation and sponsorship. However, leading Christian
democratic politicians rapidly mobilised to provide it with supranational features according to designs discussed in their transnational fora since early 1950. Schuman proposed a political authority for the future EDC on 20 September 1951. De Gasperi took this up and together with his close collaborator Paolo Emilio Taviani formulated a proposal that was inserted as article 38 into the EDC treaty during the intergovernmental negotiations in December 1951. It charged the future EDC parliamentary assembly with submitting proposals for a European Political Community (EPC) within six months after its constitution (Kaiser 2007: 283).

When the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC was established in 1952, Christian democrats assured that it had a solidly federalist majority. Two regular participants in the Geneva Circle, the lawyers Heinrich von Brentano from the CDU and Pierre-Henri Teitgen from the MRP, played a crucial role in drafting a detailed EPC proposal in the Assembly’s Constitutional Committee. The Assembly subsequently passed the proposal with a large majority, the Christian democrats voting unanimously in favour. The plan foresaw a bicameral system with two parliamentary chambers, one consisting of national parliamentarians and the other directly elected (Kaiser 2007: 284-285). Kaiser sees the proposal as a “federalist signpost” legitimising a strong parliamentary dimension of integration for the future. This made it more difficult for less federalist-minded coalition partners to retreat towards intergovernmentalist solutions. The subsequent intergovernmental negotiations indeed left the proposal for a directly elected European Parliament intact. It was eventually realised in 1979.
4.6 The European Economic Community

The British thought the failure of the EDC signalled the end of supranational schemes in Europe, which was obviously “a major miscalculation” (Dedman 1996: 92). Negotiations for closer economic integration would probably have started much earlier without the EDC obstacle. But according to Dedman (ibid.: 94-95), henceforward the word ‘federalism’ was never again mentioned in official EC/EU discourse.

Kaiser argues that the failure of the EDC allowed transnational Christian democracy to shift the integration process back to the economic path they had continued to discuss and favour throughout the EDC ordeal. The NEI congress of September 1954 was devoted to economic integration. It demanded the creation of a “European economic space” with “the complete freedom of exchange and circulation of citizens and ideas, the liberalisation of the exchange of goods, services and capital” (quoted by Kaiser 2007: 293). At the same time, the NEI reiterated its dual support of a strong supranational executive authority and of a directly elected parliament. These positions were repeated by the 1955 and 1956 NEI congresses. The EDC debacle indeed only strengthened the federalist resolve of the western European Christian democrats. It now appeared even more important than before to restrict integration to core Europe in order to avoid intergovernmentalist dilution. They fully realised that the common market and customs union they advocated would be incompatible with Britain’s participation in the Commonwealth preference system (ibid: 286-287).

The Christian democrats did not have the same direct influence over the negotiations leading up to the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euroatom as they had had over the deliberations on the ECSC. Still, Kaiser insists that “the determined collective push by transnational Christian democracy for horizontal economic integration in the form of a common market with clear supranational features from 1954 to 1956 strongly influenced the course of integration, once more highlighting the need for a reconceptualisation of the origins of the European Union” (ibid: 294-295). This time around, however, the consensus on core Europe stretched
well beyond the Christian democrats. Their efforts were importantly supplemented by a federalist network among socialists with Paul-Henri Spaak at the centre, and by Jean Monnet’s Action Committee, which as already indicated was crucial in converting the German social democrats and trade unions to the Treaties of Rome (ibid: 296). Protestant, liberal and socialist politicians as well as farmers’ organisations now joined a growing advocacy coalition for a supranational core Europe.

In February 1955, the MRP went as far as making their support of the government of Edgar Faure contingent on French participation in the process leading to the adoption of the treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom. Moreover, after the election on 12 January 1956, the party colluded with other groups in inducing president René Coty to appoint the pro-European socialist Guy Mollet new prime minister, instead of the Euro-sceptic Mendès-France. “Only the formation and continued stability of the Mollet government and of this advocacy coalition across the government-opposition divide eventually guaranteed the ratification of the Rome treaties with full MRP support by 342 to 239 votes in July 1957” (Kaiser 2007: 300).

The Common Agricultural Policy was a significant element of the European Economic Community. Its inclusion was in part a concession to farmers, who represented a significant share of the electoral constituency of the Christian democratic parties, notably of the MRP and the CDU/CSU. However, the farmers’ associations only reluctantly embraced the EEC. Kaiser (ibid: 301) also observes that both the German and the French federations of industry initially opposed the common market plan. With reference to the emphasis Milward and Moravcsik have placed on national economic interests in the creation of the EEC, Kaiser (ibid.) argues that there is “no convincing evidence” that pro-Community leaders in Christian democratic and other political parties were motivated by trade statistics and predictions about the sectoral and regional economic effects of economic integration.

The Christian democratic network discussed core Europe integration mainly as a political project. Economic benefits were certainly not neglected, especially for two of the Christian democrats’ most important electoral constituencies, the middle class and
the farmers. However, Kaiser argues that organised interest groups had to be persuaded of these economic benefits. Crucially,

The Christian democrats’ ideational motivation for these political objectives continued to be embedded in their shared, predominantly Catholic experience of confessional and regional identities and opposition to the overbearing centralised liberal and socialist nation-state and its perversion in the totalitarian Machtaat of interwar Europe. For Christian democrats, European integration was not a means of rescuing this type of nation-state, but for the first time of creating in their own image a tamed Europeanised nation-state embedded in a supranational constitutional system. This vision also informed their continued support for supranational forms of integration, which was actually more ideologically coherent by the mid-1950s than at the time of the Schuman Plan. (Kaiser 2007: 301-302)

Evidence of the federalist convictions of transnational Christian democracy is the insertion of the long-term goal of “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome; the planned introduction of majority voting in the Council of Ministers from stage two of the integration process at the start of 1966; the sole right of initiative for the European Commission; and the provision for the future direct election of the Parliamentary Assembly (Kaiser 2007: 302).

4.7 Enlargement and European Union

Although invited to send its foreign minister, the UK government only sent a civil servant to observe the Messina conference and the subsequent Spaak Committee leading to the Treaties of Rome. Instead, the UK together with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in May 1960. However, already half a year later the Conservative cabinet under Anthony Eden decided to apply for EEC membership. In subsequent negotiations (1961 and 1965), British Conservative governments consistently sought exceptions that could preserve Britain’s global commitment, in particular trade with the Commonwealth and the sterling’s status as an international reserve currency. However, the British (and thus the Danish, Irish and Norwegian) application for membership were blocked by President de Gaulle in 1963 and 1967.
The negotiations that were to take Britain into the Community in 1972 were initiated by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Like his fellow socialists on the continent earlier, Wilson seems to have been convinced by the functionalist logic of European integration. His grand design for membership was the erection of a ‘European Technological Community,’ however without surrendering sovereignty (Morgan 1982).

The British ambivalence to European integration was again demonstrated by Labour’s turnaround and anti-Market campaign on the occasion of the 1975 referendum on EC membership. The referendum was largely held at the party’s behest. The party returned to a pro-European stance after the European elections in 1984. The Liberals, by contrast, were early supporters of British EC membership and have remained ardent Europeanists, even at the cost of electoral setbacks (Lieber 1970: 146-147).

In the 1975 referendum a majority of voters in every region of the UK preferred to stay in, though the preponderance of favourable votes was slim in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. The Protestant Reverend and Ulster Unionist Ian Paisley fought a bluntly nationalist campaign, lambasting the EC as a “papal plot” and committing himself to the statement that “the Virgin Mary is the Madonna of the Common Market” (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 156). In heavily Catholic and rural Ireland, only the small Labour Party (which has since changed its mind) opposed membership during the referendum campaign in 1972.

In Denmark mostly left socialists and communists opposed Danish membership of the EC in the 1972 referendum, while in Norway these were joined by the agrarian Centre Party and large fractions of the social-liberal Left party, the (Lutheran, mostly low church) Christian People’s Party and of the Social Democrats. A major difference between these two Scandinavian countries, and one that has probably been decisive in forging negative majorities twice in Norway, was that while competitive Danish farmers (like their Swedish counterparts in 1994) lobbied actively in favour of membership, Norwegian farmers’ associations have campaigned vigorously against. Economic interest calculation indicated that the farmers in Denmark (and later Sweden
the assessment was more complex in Finland) would gain from membership, whereas those in Norway would lose, as generous Norwegian farm subsidies would have to be replaced by the less munificent CAP. In Denmark, the urban conurbation of Copenhagen remains the area most sceptical to European integration, and agrarian Jutland most favourable. In the Danish EC/EU referenda, areas with predominantly agricultural or industrial economies have voted heavily in favour of the EC, while those with a stronger (public) service sector have been more reluctant (Gilljam et al., eds., 1998; see also above, page 49).

However, while economic interests and foreign policy considerations have differentiated Nordic attitudes to the EU, the widely shared commitment to undivided national sovereignty and identity has inspired a joint euro-scepticism. Generally, the Nordic states have been reluctant Europeans, clearly preferring functional economic integration over political union (Matlary 2004).

Southern enlargement offers an interesting contrast. Greece joined in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Greek socialist party (PASOK) was long critical of Greek membership and European integration, and still retains a nationalist, Euro-sceptical wing (Philpott and Shah in Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006: 55-56). The conservative, western-oriented Nea Demokratia has however been consistently Europeanist. In Spain and Portugal, there has been little political controversy over EC/EU membership and European integration. Except for the Portuguese communist party, only industrial interests in Portugal expressed reservations against joining in 1980. The need for economic modernisation and to shore up democracy weighed heavily in favour of membership, but also these traditionally Catholic countries’ historical contributions to, and identification with, the common European cultural heritage have been stressed. Both countries have important Christian democratic/centre-right parties belonging to the EPP.

As a result of structural changes in European politics related to secularisation, economic growth and demographic change, the Christian democratic hegemony over the European policy of core Europe governments began to crumble in the early sixties. The French MRP was dissolved in 1967 and the German CDU/CSU went into
opposition in 1969. The Europeanist core Europe project was challenged by the intergovernmentalism of Charles de Gaulle (president of France 1959-1969) and by the application for EC membership by Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. De Gaulle caused a prolonged hiatus by his ‘empty chair policy’ and by preventing the introduction of majority voting as foreseen by the Treaty of Rome. British, Irish and Danish accession in 1973 brought Christian democratic hegemony in the supranational European institutions to an end. When the Labour Party terminated its boycott of the European Parliament following the favourable 1975 referendum, the socialists came to form its largest political group. The enlargement by three northern European countries, two of them predominantly Protestant and national-liberal, made intra-community policy-making more complex and unpredictable.

However, the EC summit meeting at The Hague in December 1969, when the more pro-European Georges Pompidou had replaced de Gaulle as president of France, re-infused dynamism into the integration process. Momentously, the focus now shifted to monetary and economic union and foreign policy cooperation. De Gaulle’s resignation also led to the lifting of the implicit French veto against direct election of the European Parliament. In 1977, ahead of the first such elections, the Christian democrats formed the European People’s Party (the designation European People’s, and not Peoples’, Party is significant) and agreed on a joint, solidly federalist European programme.

The opening up of the EPP to the British Conservatives and Scandinavian, Central and Eastern European parties in the 1980s and 1990s helped widen the Europeanist advocacy coalition beyond its original core. In this effort, the CDU/CSU under the guidance of the German federal chancellor, Helmut Kohl, was instrumental. Like Adenauer, Kohl was a liberal Catholic from the Rhineland. Other Christian democrats in key Christian democratic network positions from the 1960s onwards were Walter Hallstein, Etienne Davignon, Leo Tindemans, Jacques Santer, and Wilfried Martens. Former Belgian prime minister Martens remains the EPP’s president. On the EPP website, he presents the party as follows:
the EPP is the leading political force on the continent. The EPP is a family of the
political centre-right, whose roots run deep in the history and civilisation of the
European continent and has pioneered the European project from its inception.
The EPP is committed to a federal Europe, based on the principle of subsidiarity – a
democratic, transparent and efficient Europe. […] (Martens 2008)

According to the website, after the European elections of June 2009, the EPP has
74 member-parties from 38 countries, 20 heads of government (13 EU and seven non-
EU), nine European commissioners (including the president of the Commission), and
constituted, with 265 members, the largest group in the European Parliament. Jerzy
Buzek, a former prime minister representing the EPP’s Polish affiliate, is now the first
Parliament president from a formerly Communist member state. Unsurprisingly, the
first permanent president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, appointed in
November 2009, is also a Christian democrat, city-belt European (Belgian) and
federalist.

Kohl and the EPP easily consented to the Catholic socialist Jacques Delors as
new president of the European Commission in 1984, after the Christian democrat
Luxemburger Gaston Thorn. Delors had once been a member of the MRP and was well
disposed towards federalism, subsidiarity and regionalism (Kaiser 2007: 325). Robert
Lecourt, a convinced MRP federalist, for domestic reasons appointed by de Gaulle to
the European Court of Justice in 1962, had played a crucial role in shifting the ECJ in a
supranational direction. Under his influence, the two landmark decisions Van Gend en
Loos of 1963 and Costa versus E.N.E.L. in 1964 for the first time declared the direct
effect of Community law and its supremacy over national law (ibid: 324).

Analyses of public opinion surveys confirm the continued importance of
Catholicism as an influence on individual attitudes to European integration. The
findings of Fraser, Nelsen and Guth (1997) correspond to my own earlier conclusions
(Nedrebø 1986). Based on a Eurobarometer cumulative file of surveys taken from
1970 to 1992 (N=34,512), they find that “Roman Catholic and Orthodox believers are
most supportive of the Union, while Protestants as a category is slightly less supportive
than purely secular citizens, although their position often depends on national
circumstances” (ibid: 11). I too found that after nationality, religious confession was the best single predictor of Europeanism (Nedrebø 1986: 182, 204).

According to Fraser, Nelsen and Guth as well as my own study, there is moreover a tendency that greater religious commitment makes for greater Europeanism, regardless of confession (the main exception appears to be Protestants in Northern Ireland). But Europeanism is also significantly correlated with education and subjective class identification. Besides, Fraser, Nelsen and Guth confirm that the continental and southerly member states (before the 1995 and 2004 enlargements) are more Europeanist and the northerly less so, and that the left and right fringes are less Europeanist than the political centre.

Christian democrats have remained a driving force behind the increasingly frequent treaty revisions since the Single European Act of 1987. However, successive enlargements have diluted the influence in the Union not only of Christian democracy, but also of ‘core Europe.’ EU membership has increased from six relatively homogeneous member states with 169 million inhabitants in 1958, to 12 more diverse states with 367 million people in 1995, to a heterogeneous 27 countries with 494 million citizens in 2007.

This widening and the core’s response to it, accelerated deepening, has undermined the original ‘permissive consensus’ on European integration. Since 1992, controversial popular referenda have led to five national vetoes against governmentally agreed EU treaty revisions.56

The enlargement of 2004 was unprecedented not only as regards the number of new member states, but also in the degree to which it increased the diversity and thus the conflict potential within the Union. Obviously, the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have considerably lower living standards and therefore economic interests that are in part contrary to those of the older members. Moreover,

56 There were majorities against the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in 1992; against the Nice Treaty in Ireland in 2001; against the Constitutional Treaty in The Netherlands and France in 2005; and against the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland on 12 June 2008.
their historical experience is significantly different. Crucial in the present historical-institutionalist perspective would be their falling under Soviet control and subsequent exclusion from the Christian democratic party network after World War II. This prevented them from sharing in the foundation of European integration and the crucial adaptation, deliberation and learning that followed. It is arguable that these countries joined the EU more out of a wish to secure their Europeanness (independence from Russia, democracy, rule of law, human rights, market economy, membership itself, etc. – the famous ‘return to Europe’) and material interests (participation in single market and common agricultural policy, access to funds and transfers, etc.) than due to enthusiasm for Europeanist ideals.

It is possible that, if allowed, heavily Catholic Poland could have played an important role in the post-war Europeanist advocacy coalition. However, as the deliberations on the draft Constitutional Treaty’s voting rules showed, the Poles have many historical scores to settle not only with Germany, but also with France (not to mention Russia). This would probably have impeded a constructive Polish contribution to European union right after a conflict with neighbouring Germany that cost the lives of six millions of its citizens.

However, the fall of communism, the drafting of a Constitutional Treaty, and radical enlargement, potentially even including Turkey, have again increased the relevance of religion as a factor in EU politics (Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006). The Protestant Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, as well as the secularised (arguably crypto-Protestant or Hussite) Czech Republic, have tended to take a market-oriented, national-liberal attitude to integration, whereas Catholic Poland now contributes new, if nationally self-conscious, vigour to the traditional Christian-democratic discourse in favour of Europe. The Polish Pope John Paul II (1978-2005) renewed and reinforced the Vatican’s longstanding support of European integration. Like him, most of the Catholic Church of Poland has embraced European union both as a laudable peace project and as a chance to reinvigorate reunited Europe’s Christian identity. For similar reasons, most of the leadership of the respective Orthodox Churches have supported EU membership for Bulgaria and Romania (and Greece).
However, the Orthodox Church’s backing of European integration has been more equivocal than that of the Catholic Church. Arguably, the reason is its historical, ‘caesaropapist’ association with nation-building and its traditional antagonism with Rome and the West (see above, Section 3.7.1). A minority of Bulgarian and Romanian as well as Polish (and Greek) clerics have criticised the EU as a vehicle of Western European secularism and liberalism, joining ethnic nationalists in their opposition to membership. For the same reason, also conservative Catholics in Ireland and Germany (notably the Bavarian CSU) have tended towards Euro-scepticism in the recent debates over treaty change and enlargement (Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006.).

Among the Western European member states, the influence of secularism was such that it proved impossible to mention Christianity’s constitutive contribution to Europe in the draft constitutional treaty. On the other hand, that controversy and the issue of Turkish membership led to a great mobilisation on the part of the Vatican, in conjunction with Poland and the Orthodox Churches of Europe, in favour of a restatement of Europe’s Christian identity. Curiously, secularist France, opposed to Turkish membership, has in effect been reduced to championing a Union limited to historically Christian Europe.

We are thus now in the midst of an unprecedented political controversy over the identity, nature and limits of the EU, with history, religion, values and culture at the centre of attention (Berglund, Duvold and Ekman 2009). The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009, after the favourable new vote in Ireland on 2 October 2009 and some last-ditch brinkmanship by a quintessentially national-liberal Czech president, hardly signals the end of the debate either over Europeanness or over Europeanism.
5. Conclusion

So, returning to the original research question, why has there been a territorial division in attitudes to European integration in Western Europe, with the southern parts being consistently more favourable than the north? The theoretical discussion in Part 2 ended with a Rokkanian-Deutschian working hypothesis: the European ‘city-belt,’ stretching roughly from Central Italy to the North Sea, may be the historical and territorial core of European identity (Europeanness) and pro-EU, federalist attitudes (Europeanism). The proposition suggested that citizens of well-established nation-states in the Protestant northern and western European ‘periphery’ with long-standing loyal and relatively homogeneous political cultures could be expected to be less Europeanist than those of more problematic state- and nation-building cases in Roman Catholic-cum-city belt Europe.

The historical discussion in Part 3, which traced the tradition for unity in Europe and its interplay with that of diversity, the nation-state and nationalism, however modified this interpretation in important ways. It identified the Roman Empire, the Roman Church and the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires as the institutional protagonists of proto-Europeanist, universalist discourse in pre-1945 European history. Ancient Rome was the paradigmatic empire, and the Papacy, the Byzantine empire and the Holy Roman Empire (as well as its close relative and progeny, the Habsburg monarchy) all claimed to succeed it institutionally and ideologically and to have some kind of universal authority, at least over Christians. While the long-lived Holy Roman and Habsburg empires eventually declined and fell, the Holy See, located in Rome and intensely alert to its Roman lineage and universalist mission, remained a foremost supranational agency.

Criticising nationalism as a political religion, the Papacy came to terms with the modern, secular nation-state and national mass politics only with difficulty. However, the Church ultimately concluded that the atheism advanced by communists was the greater threat. In the late nineteenth century, it allowed the formation of Catholic parties to enable Catholics to participate in secular, democratic politics.
But Catholicism continued to look beyond the nation-state. What I have called
the Christian-democratic paradigm, favouring supranational European governance, was
formulated by networked Catholic parties of Western Continental Europe after World
War II. The European Union was launched on its supranationalist path when these
parties, led mainly by statesmen from Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the
governments of the six founding states from about 1945 to 1965. Transnational
Christian democracy, now represented by the European People’s Party, has remained
the federalist ‘party of Europe’ throughout the history of European integration.

The main territorial base of European political Catholicism remains Western and
Southern Continental Europe, but it has now been supplemented by more conservative
Polish Christian democrats. This ‘core Europe’ contains a strong federalist and
cosmopolitan tradition as well as a deep legacy of cultural unity. I submit that is why
even non-Catholics from these parts are historically predisposed to be more
Europeanist than citizens from other parts of Europe.

North-western European Protestants, on the other hand, are historically inclined
towards scepticism towards the EU by their historically determined, particularist
identity and ideology. The growth of particularist, or nationalistic, discourse resulted
from the fragmentation of unitary Christendom into a Europe of states. Absolutist
rulers propagated the notion of territorial sovereignty, which turned into the
particularist idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the Protestant states of
north-western Europe were the pioneers, their kings’ control of the Church being an
important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was particularly conducive to
particularism. In the German context nationalism turned exclusivist and eventually
racist.

The result was two cataclysmic showdowns in the twentieth century in which
nationalism was a major driving force. However, the particularist paradigm survived in
its more benign, North Atlantic form. Thus in the debate over European integration, the
natural inclination of national-liberal, Protestant Britain and Scandinavia has been to
advocate retention of as much sovereignty as possible in the nation-state. For most
people in these countries, the European project advocated by Continental Christian
democracy was unacceptably supranational. Arguably, they have joined only due to its success.

The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis itself belongs in the modernist, national-liberal tradition. It neglects the ancient and medieval tradition for unity and universalism. Moreover, the thesis is too structuralist, conveying a notion that the European Union emerged more or less by default as the result of impersonal, almost mechanical forces. Like intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory, it underestimates the role of ideologically aware human agency.

However, important elements of the working proposition survived the historical discussion in Part 3. Its territorial, centre-periphery perspective remains relevant, as does the emphasis on the confessional differentiation brought about by the Reformation. Moreover, the fragmented political structure of city-belt Europe, its role as buffer area and battleground for the centralising Great Powers around it, and the growth of trade and capitalism (as well as Calvinism) there indeed facilitated the growth of Europeanness and Europeanism, notably among the emerging middle class and liberal intellectuals. Similarly, the emergence of varieties of Protestantism that tended to identify with the nation-state north of the city-belt (England, Scandinavia, Prussia) encouraged particularist attitudes.

In Part 4, I discussed the balance between ‘past’ and ‘present’ sources of European union. I argued that the European Union is a contingent political construction launched by transnationally networked, ideologically aware agents, strategically placed both in governments and political parties, who acted upon a historically unique window of opportunity when the balance of power between centrifugal and centripetal forces in Europe favoured European union. Structurally enabling factors shaped by the past were related to economic interest, political ideology, reason and learning, as well as territorial context. However, the decisive factor was the influence of Christian democratic parties in the six states of core Europe for about twenty years after the war. The Europeanist cause had sympathisers across the political spectrum, but it was transnational Christian democracy that provided it with ‘sufficient’ institutional momentum and legitimacy in post-war Europe. The
Christian democratic parties had changed the universalist-Europeanist discourse they inherited from the Roman Church and the Roman Empire from defending descending to advocating an ascending locus of sovereignty. Thus the promotion of a democratically elected European Parliament, controlling a constitutionally constrained European government, became a key element of the post-war Christian democratic discourse on Europe. Considerations of commercial interest played a more ambiguous and secondary role.

Successive enlargements since 1973 have however strengthened the influence of Euro-sceptical, national-liberal or plainly nationalist discourse. So have core Europe’s attempts to reform and extend the remit of European institutions, as well as the undeniable shortcomings of the Union itself. Acrimony has also been fed by the prospect of Turkish accession.

However, as the final adoption of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates, Europeanism is still alive and kicking. This is the first of at least five reasons I see why the European Union will continue to evolve. The chief political champion of European union, the European People’s Party, remains the largest transnational European party grouping. Moreover, many of the other European parties, notably the socialists and the liberals, are preponderantly pro-European too. The latest European elections confirmed that scepticism and opposition is generally strongest on the fringes, and notably on the right. It is indeed the centrist consensus that has ensured the elaboration and adoption of increasingly ambitious treaty changes and policies even as EU membership has expanded.

Second, public opinion surveys continue to register significant majorities in favour of European unification, EU membership and decision-making at the European level in practically all member states. In the fall Eurobarometer survey of 2007, overall support for EU membership reached its highest level since 1994 (Eurobarometer 2007). In the following survey, the overall majority of respondents even said they had greater confidence in EU than in national institutions (Eurobarometer 2008).

Third, the community achievement, the *acquis communautaire*, is obviously hugely significant. Like any institution, the European Union is ‘path-dependent.’
Although most member states today have only recently joined, the institutional shape and logic it acquired at the inception means the EU cannot easily be changed into something quite different. This is a result not only of ideology and institutional inertia, but also of common interest, reason and learning.

Fourth, the extensive activities of EU institutions are involving and affecting a huge and growing number of people, thus helping to socialise them into the EU political culture. Path dependency combined with growing functionalist interdependence, neo-functionalist spillover and institutional acculturation may be strengthening the case for integration. At the end of the day, retreat may turn out to be more difficult than advance.

Fifth, deep structural developments related to globalisation may be strengthening the Europeanist cause. In a long-term perspective, the neofunctionalists may have been right that changes in the economic and technological base are making the national-liberal international superstructure increasingly obsolete. Moreover, the rise of new Great Powers outside the West, notably China, India and Brazil, may focus minds on the need for Europe to speak with fewer voices in world politics.

However, as I argued in the Introduction, there is of course no straightforward link from changing social structures to commensurate polity adjustment. Human, political agents must mediate, and they are constrained not only by individual ideology and interest, but also by existing collective power structures. The overwhelmingly most important social structure of our time remains the modern nation-state and its international system. Thus more European union is far from preordained. Viewing integration as polity-building highlights its contingent, inherently political nature.

Still, the prospects for union remain far better in Europe than in other regions of the world. The historical-institutionalist perspective adopted here indicates that European integration is predicated on uniquely favourable regional dynamics. Other regions and the world at large may try to replicate the European model, but lack the historically informed, ideological predispositions that were decisive in Europe as well as the path dependency they caused. In spite of globalisation, the structural bias of the world outside Europe still heavily favours intergovernmentalism. To become
effectively supranational, regional integration elsewhere therefore must rely even more on rationalist advocacy of the common interest than Europe has done.

As for European integration theory, I conclude that like the public debate over European integration it has suffered from a poverty of historical awareness and from national-liberal myopia. Intergovernmentalists still reify interest, either political or economic, as an explanatory variable in a rationalist and positivist theoretical framework. Constructivists, poststructuralists and discourse analysts have started to focus on ideas, identity and ideology, but due to their shallow historical perspective have difficulty escaping the national-liberal paradigm. Both sides seriously underestimate the importance of historically shaped Europeanness and Europeanism. This study has attempted to offer a corrective to these deficiencies.
References


Beck, U. (2004), *Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden* [The cosmopolitan view, or: War is peace] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).


--- et.al. (1967), *France, Germany and the Western Alliance. A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons).


Gasset, O. y (1932), The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.).


Gleditsch, N.P. and Hellevik O. (1977), Kampen om EF [The struggle over the EC] (Oslo: Pax).


Habermas, J. (1971), Knowledge and Human Interests, tr. J. Shapiro (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press).


Halecki, O. (1963), The Millennium of Europe (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press).


Herodotus (1990), History, Great Books of the Western World, 6, 2nd edn. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.).


--- (2003), *Fortunes of History: Historical Enquiry from Herder to Huizinga* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press).


Lindberg, L.N. (1963), *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press).


Pagden, A. (1995), Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c.1800 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University press).


Southern R.W. (1970), Western society and the Church in the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth: Penguin)


Troeltsch, E. (1911), *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der Modernen Welt* [The significance of Protestantism for the emergence of the modern world] (Munich: Verlag v. R. Oldenbourg).


