Embedded Movement

Senegalese Transcontinental Migration and Gender Identity

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................... v

CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 1
Research Questions and Arguments .................................................................................................................. 1
Aim of Project: Understanding the Interconnections between Migration, Globalization, and Senegalese
Social Relations and Identities ....................................................................................................................... 3
Regional Contexts ............................................................................................................................................. 5
Two Field Sites: Senegal and Spain ................................................................................................................... 6
Spain: Economic Recession Changes Attitudes towards Immigrants Workers ........................................... 6
The Basque Country: A Special Case of Migration Experiences .................................................................. 9
Senegal: A History of Movement .................................................................................................................... 12
Colonialism and Gender Roles ....................................................................................................................... 12
Consolidation of the State: Regional Migration Goes International and Transcontinental ..................... 13
Migration: A Social Project of ‘Modernity’ in Senegal? ................................................................................. 15
Dekka and The Sine Saloum Delta .................................................................................................................. 16
Theoretical Perspectives ................................................................................................................................... 17
Conceptualization of Migration: Movement and Friction between the Global, Local, and
Individual .......................................................................................................................................................... 17
Globalization ................................................................................................................................................... 19
‘Tradition’ in Contemporary Senegal ............................................................................................................. 20
The Structure/Agency Debate and Migration as Movement ....................................................................... 21
Gender and Identity .......................................................................................................................................... 24
Methodology .................................................................................................................................................... 25
Fieldwork in the Basque Country: Participant Observation and Interviews ............................................. 25
Selection of informants ...................................................................................................................................... 27
Fieldwork in Senegal: Village Study? ............................................................................................................. 28
The Time and Depth of Participant Observation ........................................................................................ 29
Language: Bridge and Barrier ........................................................................................................................ 30
Interpreter ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
Ethics and Anonymity ..................................................................................................................................... 32
Teranga and Transparency: Expectations of Reciprocity ............................................................................ 32
Safety Considerations ..................................................................................................................................... 34
Anonymity of People and Places .................................................................................................................. 35
Thesis Outline .................................................................................................................................................. 35

CHAPTER 2: ................................................................................................................................................... 37

SENEGAL: REMITTER OF MIGRANTS AND RECEIVER OF REMITTANCES ................................................................. 37
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 37
‘Modern’ Senegal and its History of Migration ............................................................................................... 38
Social Structures and Systems of Meaning .................................................................................................... 38
Migration: A Family Livelihood Strategy ....................................................................................................... 40
Migration Generates Social, Symbolical, and Cultural Capital ..................................................................... 42
Remittance and Social Obligations: “Taking Care of my Family” .................................................................. 43
The Push and the Pull within Senegalese Discourses on Migration ............................................................. 44
CHAPTER 3: ..........................................................50

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES IN SPAIN AND BEYOND ..............50

Introduction ........................................................................ 50
Migration and the State: Migrants as the New Nomads? .............. 51
  The ‘Deserving Poor’ and the Discourse of Refuge ................ 51
  The Nomad as Criminal .................................................. 54
International Law and Organizations: Laying the Ground for Spanish Immigration Law .................. 56
  The UN, EU, and Schengen ............................................. 56
  Prevention and Intervention: Frontex and Bilateral Agreements between Spain and Senegal ... 57
(II)legality and Spanish Immigration Law ................................ 59
  The ‘Initiality’ of Spanish Immigration Law ........................ 60
  Senegalese Immigrants and Labor Unions .......................... 62
  ‘Immigrant Niches’ in the Spanish Labor Market .................. 63
  The Paradox of Juridical Policies and Practices Affect Migrant Lives ................ 64
  La crisis in Spain ......................................................... 66
  The Causes .................................................................. 66
  Senegalese Resist Abandonment of Migration Project ............ 67
  Changes in Spanish Immigration Legislation and Practices as a Response to ‘La crisis’ .... 69
  Chapter Conclusions .................................................... 73

CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................75

SENEGALESE GENDER IDENTITY: NEGOTIATION AND REPRODUCTION OF THE PROVIDER AND NURTRER THROUGH ‘MODERNITY AND CHANGE’ .............................................................75

Introduction ....................................................................... 75
Movement without Revolt: Ascending within Senegalese Society .................................................. 77
Marriage and Migration ........................................................ 79
  Women and Marriage ..................................................... 81
  ‘Tradition’ and Gender Roles: Kinship and Household Organization ................ 82
Gender, Hospitality and Food: The Provider and the Nurturer .................................................... 85
  The Puzzle of Senegalese Feminine Identity .......................... 86
  Intergenerational Power Struggles ................................. 88
  Food and Hospitality: Teranga Abroad and at Home .......... 91
  Affluence and Polygyny ................................................. 92
  ‘Modern’ Paradox: Divorce and the Westernizing of Women ........ 95
Chapter Conclusions ..........................................................96

CHAPTER 5 .....................................................................98

RESPONSES TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ................................98
Introduction ......................................................................... 98
Global Crisis in Senegal ...................................................... 98
Social Networks and Agency in Exile .................................... 101
Failure of the Migration Project? ......................................... 104
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Research Questions and Arguments
This thesis examines Senegalese migration to Europe, particularly Spain, and seeks to show how the migration project of Senegalese families is shaped by structural factors in Senegal and Spain, as well as the (re-)production of identity as men and women. The migration project contains a strategy for changing one’s own predicament; a ‘path’ chosen by an agent from within the range of options for achieving better life opportunities conceived as feasible. The migration project is also a complex movement in a social landscape where gender, generation, household, kinship, and social networks are shaping the agent’s position within the Senegalese socio-economical structure (cf. Bourdieu 1977). Moreover, my understanding of migration emphasizes the global connections and the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action in social relations and institutions (cf. Tsing 2005). Migration thus means choosing a course of action from within the confines of structural frameworks such as social norms and the global dynamics of the market economy.

Expectations and ambitions towards life in general and migration in particular are intrinsically linked to identity. Important aspects of identity in the context of my research project are gender and generation. Identity is not a constant entity but shaped throughout one’s life by different dynamics within and around you, in the same way as culture and society is in constant flux (cf. Jenkins 2004, Moore 1994). The constant processes of change within Senegalese society and culture, and the world at large, provide for generational and gender conflicts. I shall here try to map out some of these conflicts and the way they are linked to migration. I (tentatively) argue that times of crisis, such as the current financial crisis, can challenge and enforce hegemonic discourses on (gender) identity, while rendering visible the changes that are occurring in the conceptualization of self and others. These conceptualizations might then influence important life decisions, like those having to be made concerning the migration project.
Migration in the Senegalese context is arguably gendered, and is more likely to be pursued by men. This thesis examines the processes gendering the migration project, and suggests that marriage can be a feminine ‘parallel’ strategy for socioeconomic advancement. The narratives of my informants show that the implementation of these strategies is not free of conflict. Senegalese men and women are part of the process of shaping the different and conflicting discourses and practices of gender, as discourses and practices of identity are shaped on various levels and by various agents (cf. Moore 1994). Senegalese gender identity is thus continuously renegotiated, fed by discourses and practices on a local, national, and global scale. I will discuss how my informants’ discourses on ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ reveal the Senegalese structures of kinship, household, and society that are a part of this renegotiation of identity. The way in which migration, ‘modernity’, and globalization play a role in this renegotiation allows for a very interesting research project.

By inquiring about Senegalese migrants and their families’ ambitions and expectations towards the migration project, I have sought to understand how Senegalese, particularly masculine, gender identity is played out in a global context that is perpetually undergoing change. Gender identity is significant when it comes to how and by whom Senegalese migration is carried out, but it is not ‘immune’ to the global dynamics it is shaped within. When the Senegalese household is ‘transnationalized’ and ‘globalized’ it has implications for how gender roles are perceived and practiced. These processes are what I wish to elaborate on in this thesis, especially those influenced by the current recession in Spain. Consequently, my main research questions are as follows:

1. In what ways is gender a crucial factor of Senegalese migration projects as a principle shaping the migrant’s quest for socioeconomic advancement?
2. How does the formation of Senegalese (masculine) gender identity interact with the processes of constant change of which the transnational migrant household is a part through its place in a globalized world?
3. Particularly; how might Senegalese social institutions (such as kinship, generational relations, tradition, and the household) and gender identity affect and
be affected by the predicaments of the current economic recession, seeing as they are shaped in the transaction between global and national structures and discourses?

4. How does the friction between agent and structures play out when it comes to Senegalese migrants and the Spanish state, especially considering the current economic crisis?

Also, as a backdrop throughout this thesis lie the following theoretical questions: What are the processes that shape migration and marriage as paths towards a ‘good life’? Are these paths an outcome of structures shaping the (potential) migrant’s desires, ambitions and decisions? Or do they take shape through the agency of the individual?

Aim of Project: Understanding the Interconnections between Migration, Globalization, and Senegalese Social Relations and Identities

I consider the above research questions to be important as they are very much queries of our time. The aspiration of this thesis is to contribute to the field of knowledge concerning migration in general and Senegalese migration to Spain, especially the Basque Country, in particular. As I explain more thoroughly below, immigration to the Spanish state is a relatively new phenomenon compared to immigration to the rest of the Western world, and I therefore see a need for more research within this field of interest.

Migration however is not a new phenomenon in itself; it has been a strategy for and process of life improvement since time immemorial. Still, the ‘face’ of migration changed during the 20th and 21st century. It no longer marks such an abrupt break with the place you leave behind; the diasporas of today’s world are to a much larger extent continuously bound to their place of origin, through both thought and action (Appadurai 1998, Fuglerud 2001). Migration has also contributed to a new way of thinking about culture and social structures within anthropology and the social sciences in general:

When we study migration rather than abstract cultural flows or representations, we see that transnational processes are located within the
life experience of individuals and families, making up the warp and the
woof of daily activities, concerns, fears, and achievements. (Schiller et al.
1995:50)

In this sense my field of research is not only an effort to understand how contemporary
migration unfolds. It can potentially shed significant light on other aspects of human
action and interaction, since how and why people move can render visible cultural
processes otherwise unseen.

Spain stands out in a European context when migration is concerned due to its rapid
population growth on account of immigration, and because of it is one of the countries in
Europe where the current economic recession has had the most effect. The informal\(^1\)
labor market in Spain evolved along with the economic growth the country experienced
since the 1980s. This growth enabled the local population to move into more high-skilled
work, leaving a need for low-skilled and unskilled laborers, and thus a place for
immigrants in the Spanish economy and labor market. According to Eurostat the number
of resident citizens with foreign nationality living in Spain had reached 5,262,095 in 2008,
amounting to 11.6% of the population\(^2\). Of these, 40% are from the EU\(^3\), 29.5% from
South America, and 17.2% from Africa\(^4\). Of the non-European immigrant groups
Moroccans is the biggest (644,688), followed by Ecuadorians (420,110) and Colombians
(280,705). The number of registered Senegalese living in Spain in 2007 was 37,000 and
increasing\(^5\).

Senegal is also an interesting context when it comes to migration studies. As this thesis
illustrates, migration holds great social and economical importance for the country’s
inhabitants due to the remittances sent by migrants to their families at home.

\(^1\) Also called secondary labor market.
\(^3\) Citizens of Rumania, the UK and Germany are the biggest groups.
\(^5\) INE 2007: [http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do](http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do)
Additionally, Senegal has served as a sort of West African gateway to ‘illegal’ immigration the last few years through the ‘pirogue route’ to the Canary Islands, after other routes via Morocco and Mauritania have been made increasingly more difficult through border patrolling and bilateral agreements between European countries and their African counterparts (Hernández 2008).

The current economic recession, *la crisis* or *la crise mondial*⁶, which is having severe effects in both Senegal and Spain, became an important aspect of my research as it illustrates the interconnectedness between the Southern and Northern hemispheres. My thesis also seeks to assess the impacts of the crisis not only on economic activity but also on the most intimate parts of people’s lives: The analysis of how migration, which is very much impacted by the current crisis, affects Senegalese gender relations and identity construction can serve as one example of how economy is about more than ‘rational actors’ seeking maximization of profit and income (cf. Fagertun 2009). Migration is also about how people get by and how they work the social structures they are a part of in order to make the most out of life, for themselves and those close to them. These practices are embedded in discourses on (gender) identity (cf. Moore 1994).

**Regional Contexts**

Multi-sited fieldwork, or “mobile ethnography”, a recent development within anthropology, is about adapting methodology to meet new ethnographic realities “in response to empirical changes in the world and therefore to transformed locations of cultural production” (Marcus 1995:97). I thereby trust that my use of two field sites can shed light on how gender identities and subject positions (Moore 1994) are being (re-) produced in a Senegalese context; a context that includes Senegal, the Basque Country in Spain, and the time/space continuum in between.

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⁶ The current economic recession is called *la crisis* in Spain and *la crise mondial* in Senegal. The Spanish use of simply ‘the crisis’ seems to imply how closely people are experiencing this event. In Senegal conditions have not changed as much the last couple of years, according to my informants; ‘the world crisis’ thus seems to imply that the recession is experienced as more distant from people’s lives than in Spain.
Two Field Sites: Senegal and Spain

To address the questions above I deemed it important to conduct my research in both of the places relevant to the Senegalese migration project; the sender and the receiver countries. In this case Senegal represents the former, while the Basque country in Spain the latter and I will briefly present my two field sites below.

I believe that having two field sites allows for a more profound comprehension of the Senegalese migrant’s predicament compared to what an analysis of only one of the field sites would bring to the table. Senegalese migration is arguably very much a family endeavor (cf. Riccio 2008, Cotula et al. 2004) and to get both sides of the story, the one of those abroad and of those back home, is important: It is in the relationships between people that identity is shaped, in the “interplay [between] similarity and difference” (Jenkins 2004:16). Also, since most Senegalese migrants are men, having two field sites was of substantial significance, so as to comprehend the transnationality of the Senegalese household (including the women back home). Furthermore, during my fieldwork in the Basque Country, my plans of going to Senegal became a way of building rapport among my informants; I was going to “understand them better” once I had experienced their homeland. I hold this to be true when it comes to migration research in general; where one has been socialized is part of one’s history and must thus be part of a study of the processes that has lead this individual to part for greener pastures. Migration is what you leave behind, what you are searching for, what you find, and the personal relationships that bind these together: “[A]n immigrant is always and also an emigrant” (Riccio 2008:218).

Spain: Economic Recession Changes Attitudes towards Immigrants Workers

Spain has been, until quite recent history, a land of emigrants, not immigrants. Migration in Spain has consisted mostly in internal migration; from rural regions to urban centers and from south to north. An example of this is the large migration from the regions of Andalucía, Extremadura and Galicia to Bilbao. It was not until the mid-80s that immigration into the Spanish state started to take shape (cf. Solé 2003, Calavita 2006). Since then immigration has been the major reason for Spain’s rapid population growth.
The main attraction for the transnational immigrants coming to Spain since the 1990s has been the **blooming labor market** provided by the second extensive\(^7\) economic growth period the country has experienced since the 1980s especially due to the expanding tourism industry and foreign investment. Both factors serve as so-called immigration ‘pull factors’ in terms of stimulating a secondary labor market based on an “informal and underground economy” with “casual, unorganised labour” (King 1993:288) that depends on ‘black’ employment. In southern Spain it has largely been construction (often of apartments and hotels for the tourist industry) and (seasonal) agriculture that have provided job opportunities for foreign laborers. In contrast, the now highly de-industrialized Basque Country, with its economy largely based on the tertiary economic sector, has had less immigration than the south due to the relatively smaller size of its informal secondary labor market\(^8\).

Because of the ongoing economic recession the Spanish and Basque labor market are going through significant change in terms of who are willing to do what and who are wanted in which sector. Unemployment in Spain is soaring at a record high of 18.83%\(^9\). The autonomous community of the Basque Country has not been hit as hard (11.75%\(^10\)), but the situation is causing different cases of antagonism towards immigrant workers on both national and regional levels, a tendency made visible by a public turn towards the political right\(^11\). With the escalation of unemployment, especially in the construction

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\(^7\) The first period of extensive economic growth in Spain was in the 1950s and 60s via Franco’s turn to market liberalization and cooperation with the USA, the IMF and the World Bank.

\(^8\) The largest foreign populations are in Cataluña (194 287), Madrid (171 611), Comunitat Valenciana (123 918), and Andalucia (110 741), while the Basque Country has 24 421 foreign residents, according to INE.

\(^9\) Numbers from the last quarter of 2009, according to press release delivered by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) January 29, 2010 (http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4211/epa0409.pdf) and The Times Online April 25, 2009: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article6164629.ece


sector, immigrant workers seem to be hit especially hard\textsuperscript{12}. One of the reasons might be that secondary market workers hold few legal rights when it comes to guarantees and economic support from the government, but unemployment hits immigrants working in registered jobs as well.

Historically migrants have often been the “last to be hired and the first to be fired” (Frost 1999:82). The example of Kru migrant workers, a West African ethnic group with long traditions for labor migration, in 20\textsuperscript{th} century Britain (Frost 1999:82), shows that one can expect an increase in conflict between domestic and migrant workers when the niche they both operate within is reduced (cf. Barth 1956). The Kru in Liverpool had taken over many of the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs the British soldiers of World War I had left behind, and thus filled a very necessary societal and economic function in Britain. The problem arose during the inter-war years when the soldiers returned and jobs became scarce, resulting in both overt and covert tension between the different ethnic groups, as seen in the race riots of 1919, and further on, as the world entered into the economic recession of the 1930s. As a result of these riots many whites refused to continue working with blacks and other immigrants, meaning the latter were left unemployed. The situation led to stigmatization of immigrants as so-called benefit scroungers; “lazy, parasites living on the dole and of “immoral earnings” (Frost 1999:82). As mentioned above one can already see these tendencies forming, e.g. in the anti-immigrant sentiments that were expressed in the right-wing votes of the EU Parliament elections of June 2009

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\textsuperscript{12} A search through Spanish newspapers renders no doubt about the evidence. Immigrants are those who are more likely to lose their job. El País (November 11, 2009) reports that unemployment among immigrants in the Basque Country rose with 70% between 2008 and 2009, and that is only counting those who are registered and “legal” immigrants (http://www.elpais.com/articulo/pais/vasco/paro/inmigrantes/crece/ultimo/ano/elpepiesppvs/20091122elpvas_9/Tes),


and the portrayal of the immigrant as criminal, lazy, trouble-making and as taking advantage of the Spanish state’s welfare system\textsuperscript{13}. An escalation in and expansion of such stigmatizing discourses can become more prominent due to the recession, affecting the Senegalese migrants’ situation and status within Spanish society. This can have implications for his migration project.

\textbf{The Basque Country: A Special Case of Migration Experiences}

Migration has had particular meaning in the Basque Country due to its role in the historical construction of Basque nationalist identity. Spain as a state is, as seen above, a comparatively new site for immigration when looking to Europe as a whole, but when it comes to Bilbao, its fifth largest city, immigration has been an important part of recent history. From the start of the region’s industrialization, but especially during the 1960s and 70s, a significant shift in Bilbao’s demography took place, a seemingly direct cause of the boom of an urban industrial center, offering those willing to move the opportunity to be part of the blooming economic sector of northern Spanish territory. The ones who decided to emigrate were particularly people from poor, rural regions of Spain, from Extremadura, Andalucía, Galicia, whose culture contrasted with that of the urban Basque bourgeoisie and other city dwellers.

The Basque Country’s reigning post war status\textsuperscript{14} and the presence of the immigrant ‘foreigners’ caused the nationalist movement towards Basque independence from Spain to flourish under Sabino Arana’s fierce and conservative leadership during the late 19\textsuperscript{th}/early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The ideology of Basque nationalism, constructed by Arana and his followers, was one of a strong racialized, and even racist, discourse, claiming Basque physical and moral superiority over the ‘small dark people’ of the South. The Basque Country has thus been a place of cultural contrasts for well over a century, a contrast its

\textsuperscript{13} I have done searches online in some of the major Spanish and Basque newspapers and looked at how immigrants are portrayed both in the articles and, especially, in the comments people can leave anonymously underneath. These comments can portray a good image of the actual opinion of “the street”, since one is not obliged to leave any trace of one’s actual identity and does thus not risk being stigmatized (in “real life”) as e.g. a racist when voicing your opinion.

\textsuperscript{14} Compliments of the Carlist Wars, where, amongst other central issues, the Basque Country’s special rights, the \textit{fueros}, were fought over and ultimately lost
people have grown accustomed to, though not forgotten, as seen in the present separatist discourse in both political directions.

The Basque labor market is mostly made up of the service sector and some industry, although fishing is an important sector in some coastal areas. The secondary economy and labor market is relatively small but usually better paid than in other parts of Spain. The number of immigrants here is also lower. The Senegalese population in the Bilbao area is thus not very large compared to other Spanish cities. The jobs in the secondary labor market are mainly related to domestic services, which is a sector almost entirely reserved for women, most of which are Latin-American and Rumanian. One also sees immigrants working in restaurants, but seldom Africans. In some villages in the borderland between the provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, the immigrant population (per capita) is comparatively larger, since fishing and the prominent industrial activities mainly take place in more rural areas of the Basque Country. The labor accessible for the Senegalese men within Gran Bilbao is thus construction and street vending. Of those living in other parts of the Basque Country, low or unskilled jobs in the industrial sector have been available until the economic recession, but is now nearly nonexistent as the industry here has been severely set back due to its dependence on the luxury goods market (e.g. cars, etc.). The fishery sector in the coastal towns and villages is also available to Senegalese immigrants in this region, and has fortunately been less affected by la crisis than the above mentioned sectors. According to INE there are about 700 registered Senegalese immigrants in Gran Bilbao, most of which are men, but according

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15 Racist reasons for this are not explicitly expressed, but with the early racialized discourse of Basque nationalism, it might be that the embodied experience of race and cleanliness can cause people to avoid hiring blacks in jobs that give them too much access to the “personal”, such as working in one’s home or preparing one’s food.

16 Gran Bilbao denotes the city of Bilbao and what were earlier close-by villages, but now part of the more suburban area beyond the city, though with their own small centers. Most of Gran Bilbao is part of the metro system of the city.

17 There were 676 registered Senegalese residing in the region of Gran Bilbao in 2008 according to numbers by INE - Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute of Spain), elaborated by Ikuspegi.

18 89, 2% of Senegalese in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country are men according to INE and Ikuspegi, and I assume the division between the sexes are approximately the same in Bilbao.
to one of my informants, Ousmane (28), the number is in reality around 2000. The number of Senegalese residents in the province of Bizkaia is 1860, according to Ikuspegi\textsuperscript{19}. If one follows Ousmane’s ratio of registered versus ‘real’ numbers, the actual number of Senegalese in Bizkaia is probably much higher.

My informants in the Basque Country can been divided into two sub groups: Those resident of Herrixka, a village in the industrial area described above. They are mostly of the Serer ethnic group and hail to the Sine Saloum area of Senegal. My informants in Herrixka are generally members of the same social network. The second sub group consists of my informants residing in Gran Bilbao. They are of various ethnicities and from different parts of Senegal, mostly larger cities. They are not representatives of one community, like the Serer in Herrixka, but many are part of a larger extensive social


1. Map of the Basque Country in Spain; Herrixka is situated approximately half way between Bilbao and San Sebastián\textsuperscript{20}.
network consisting of Senegalese in the Basque Country (as opposed to a network bound in social relations brought with them from Senegal).

**Senegal: A History of Movement**
The next chapter looks further into my second regional context, its experiences with migration, and the cultural and social structures that have developed in its wake. Here I give a brief introduction of Senegal as a country of migration and the areas which I visited during fieldwork.

In order to comprehend the structures Senegalese transnational migrants are faced with today it is important to look at Senegal’s place within the context of migration. Looking for ‘greener pastures’ is not a new phenomenon among the people who have inhabited this part of West Africa; migration within this region has been common since long before French colonial rule laid the premises for the transnational and international migration we see today, and regional migration both within and beyond Senegal’s borders is still a part of Senegalese culture and society. “Migration from [Senegal] is a reflection of its socio-economic dynamics over time” (Kohnert 2007:6, cf. Tsing 2005) and must be seen in the context of West Africa as a whole since “migrants have always considered [this region] as an economic unit within which people, trade in goods and services flowed freely” (Addo 1975 in Adepoju 2005:27), although shaped by the processes and power structures intrinsic in the shaping of society at that time such as inter-ethnic warfare, slave trade, raiding, and the continuous struggle access vital resources like food and shelter (Adepoju 2005:26).

**Colonialism and Gender Roles**
Under colonialism both the causes and the character of migration within West Africa, and thus what was to become today’s Senegal, changed through the new economic structure implemented by colonial rule. For Senegal this has meant a dependence on the global market through cash-crop farming of groundnuts for export. The French colonial administration experimented with a variety of agricultural produce in order to allow for a steady economic income base for their new land, eventually finding that the groundnut would “save the country”, seeing as few other products seemed to do well in Senegal’s
sandy soil. Since then the groundnut provided “for a viable colonial economy, [accounting] for the great bulk (90%) of Senegal’s export value” throughout the 20th century (O’Brien 1975:7). Agricultural activities today are divided into cash and subsistence crop farming. Linares (1985) shows how these two production activities are gendered: In the case of the Jola of the Senegalese region of Casamance subsistence crops like rice and palm oil reproduce existing parity in gender relations. They are “social glues; substances that bind the traditional social fabric” (Linares 1985:92). Groundnuts, the prevalent cash crop, are associated with male productive activities and exclude women from agricultural production and profits in that its production is gradually taking over for subsistence farming. Linares’ case shows how the ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ of Senegalese agriculture has contributed to the embedding of the gender roles of provider and nurturer as articulations of tradition (see Chapter 2). The same gender relations can be perceived through the phenomenon of rural-urban migration in the wake of colonialism in that “[male] migrants are anxious as to whether they will secure salaried employment in the city. Women want to ensure that they will marry a man who is employed” (Lambert 2002:166).

These gender roles are reproduced through other activities of production, such as migration, although the outcomes of this division of labor have different results. Migration is usually undertaken by men, but (unmarried) women have also been part of my group of informants in Herrixka in the Basque Country. Ndiaye (22) is the only one of her six siblings that has migrated. Her brothers are the ones who work the land at home in the Sine Saloum region; the women are usually not involved in agriculture. This was also confirmed by my informants in Senegal: According to Omar (47) “a woman should take care of the house work, the domestic chores”.

Consolidation of the State: Regional Migration Goes International and Transcontinental

The groundwork laid by the French continued into post-colonialism from 1960 and on, all the while reshaping both daily life and the migration patterns of the region (Buggenhagen 2001, Perry 2005). With the large scale agricultural activity and plantations seasonal migration became the norm, while at the same time the reconfiguring of migration as a
concept in terms of nationality made what had been “internal” or “regional” migration into “international” migration (Adepoju 2005). Colonialism, then, created not only artificial nation-states, but also contributed to the production of what is now conceptualized as ‘illegal’\textsuperscript{21} or ‘irregular’ migration, through the boundaries drawn and the fight for survival in a globalized local reality.

The rural-urban migration within Senegal and from neighboring States to, in most cases, Dakar, is often part of the process of transcontinental migration. Many young men travel to the big city to search for access to a migration scheme. They might try to save up money for a pirogue boat voyage to the Canary Islands by selling phone cards on the street or work as hawkers selling tourist souvenirs, or they might pay big money to have someone arrange a false visa to a European country and thereby travel in a seemingly legal manner. Many also attain financial support, either through loans or gifts, from relatives or other social contacts.

The different schemes out there also grant opportunities for new types of criminal behavior, apart from the by now well-known pirogue route ‘business men’. A common illegality is conning potential migrants into believing you have contacts within either Spanish or Senegalese authorities or businesses and that you thus can obtain a visa or work permit for them for a large sum of money. According to my informant Ousseynou’s (36) brother in law, who is a high-ranked police inspector, there are enough of those who are willing to believe just about anything in their desperate quest for a better life. For the people who get ripped off in this manner the tragedy is double; not only must they put their dreams on hold, but they probably now hold a huge debt both economically and socially to those who have contributed to them investing in migration. Ibou (34), my host in Dakar and a captain within the Senegalese military, confirmed that in some cases mothers save up money for years in order to give their son the opportunity to go abroad and get ahead. “If your mother gives you this gift you cannot just quit and go home again when times get tough”, he says, referring to the financial crisis in Spain.

\textsuperscript{21} In my thesis I use the term ‘illegal’ instead of the more ‘politically correct’ ‘irregular’ to underline the power of legislation over my informants’ lives.
And one can only imagine a mother’s reaction when discovering that her son has given away her life savings to a con artist.

**Migration: A Social Project of ‘Modernity’ in Senegal?**

‘Modernity’ is arguably a process Senegalese men and women experience as invasive, but also a generator of redefinitions of e.g. patterns of commodity consumption. These redefinitions can lead to ‘modern’ articulations of Senegalese culture, such as migration. Responses towards ‘modernity’ have materialized in Senegal, as it has in other (post)colonial contexts. The Muslim Sufi brotherhoods mentioned below have been one way of dealing with both local and global power elites (Buggenhagen 2001), and the uneven distribution of scarce resources. O’Brien (1975) blames the scarcity of food the Senegalese have experienced since the restructuring of agriculture on Malthusian-style factors of population growth and land shortage, but through Buggenhagen’s (2001) ethnography it seems more adequate to analyze the want of resources as a problem of lack of distribution, in the way Vaughan (1987) shapes her argument about the Malawian famine of 1949. The Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal and their inmost involvement with migration can be seen as a social contestation against power elites and the plights of ‘modernity’.

Migration is, on that account, a social project in the sense that it is a part of a historical process produced largely by colonial and postcolonial dominance. To face the socio-economic difficulties Senegal struggles with, much on account of this dominance, young Senegalese (men) go to Europe to search for the opportunities they cannot find at home (cf. Hernandez 2008). Paradoxically, belonging to a former French colony can provide these young men with opportunities they might not have had otherwise, such as easier access to a visa or citizenship and cultural advantages in the form of speaking French.

    Migrations are not autonomous processes – they ‘do not just happen; they are produced. And migrations do not involve just any possible combination of countries; they are patterned’. (Sassen 1998:56 in De Genova 2002:424)

France was thus the most common destination for Senegalese migrants until 1985 when change in legislation required them to apply for a visa in order to enter. Italy and Spain
have grown in popularity as destinations ever since, perhaps because these are both geographically and culturally close to France, and are also geographically closer to Africa itself. Migration in Senegal thus has a history going back to pre-colonial times, takes a ‘modern’ form in transcontinentality. It is a product of the friction between global structures, processes and power practices on the one hand, and the sociocultural agent on the other (cf. Tsing 2005, Bourdieu 1977).

**Dekka and The Sine Saloum Delta**

Senegal’s Goree Island off the harbor of Dakar was an important location within the Atlantic slave trade that took place between the 16th and 19th centuries, and Senegal’s coast is now the remitter of large numbers of ‘illegal’ migrants each year, heading for the shores of Spain’s Canary Islands.

![Map of Senegal with the Sine Saloum Delta just north of the border to the Gambia.](http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/senegal/)

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The Fatick region, and the area of the Sine Saloum Delta where I did my rural based fieldwork and where many of my informants in Herrixka are from, has not been “considered a zone of heavy migration” (Diop 1992:57 in Perry 2009:57). However, my own data indicates that this is changing, and other authors also confirm this tendency (Riccio 2008:219). Seeing as both Perry’s data and statistics are from the 1990s I find it reasonable to assume that the so-called ‘pirogue migration’ to the Canary Islands which commenced in 2006, has made transcontinental migration accessible to more people. My informants, both in the Basque Country and in Senegal, portrayed an image of their region as significant in terms of migration; ‘everyone’ knew someone who had gone abroad. In combination with the continuous decline in economic affluence most of my informants in Senegal articulated, my data seems to imply that the migration project is becoming a significant part of household livelihood strategies also in the Sine Saloum Delta.

Dekka, the base for my Senegalese village stay, is a small inland village off of the Saloum River. It is dry and sandy, but people here still lives mainly of agriculture and fishing. The Sine Saloum River Delta is largely inhabited by Serer people; all of my informants with ties to this area were of this ethnic group.

**Theoretical Perspectives**

*Conceptualization of Migration: Movement and Friction between the Global, Local, and Individual*

In this thesis I will discuss migration as constructed in the interplay between individual practices and global structures of politics and economics. On the one hand migration can be viewed as a way of opposing the structures people are born into, while it on the other can be seen as a direct result of the same structures. I argue that migration is not a case of either or; it is, on an individual level, a matter of taking advantage of the opportunities for movement and socioeconomic advancement within each subject’s lived context, while it in a macro perspective is the result of a global reality of inequality when it comes to access to resources. The chances to act as an agent of change within one’s own life are shaped on a local level through socio-cultural structures and economic realities such as
systems of kinship and marriage, and the available opportunities to earn an income. These chances are thereby intrinsically bound to identity but filtered through a macro order of political and market institutions (cf. Tsing 2005). The migration project is thus an attempt to ascend within the structures that make up different dimensions of society which includes building economic, social, and symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu 1977). Frames the (potential) migrant can act within are not incidental, but constructed via market forces and historical connections of territories that define the current sets of laws and regulations worldwide. These again govern the ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ status of the migrant, and thus his justified or not justified presence in the receiving communities/countries (cf. Fuglerud 2001, Katz 1990).

I perceive migration not as a dialectical process between nation states (Kearney 1990 in Riccio 2008:230, cf. Appadurai 1996), nor as a collective movement contesting global ‘class’ differences (cf. Comaroff 2004a&b, Solé 2003). Migration is constructed and construed through dynamics within different dimensions of global society today; dynamics that contest and intersect each other depending on the different agents participating in these encounters (cf. Tsing 2005, Moore 1994). These “encounters across difference” (Tsing 2005:3) produce friction, and friction leads to change, though in unexpected and often unpredictable ways (ibid.). Migration, as one encounter across difference, does not inherently contest global ‘structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 1977, Swartz 2002), but is a fragmented and fragmenting process produced by today’s global capitalist system (cf. Comaroff 2000). This process can generate new subject positions while concurrently maintaining hegemonic discourses (cf. Moore 1994, Bourdieu 1977). Depending on the agent’s position within societal structures, and on events and processes taking place in these, migration as an encounter between agent and structures can have different results in e.g. identity construction (see Chapter 3 and 4).

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23 Since most of my informants who are emigrants are men I will in most cases use ‘he’ as the generic form when discussing migration.
Globalization
Migration is both a product and a producer of the processes gathered in the concept of globalization. World system theory is relevant to my case in point. I see the world as connected through different layers of market relations, but also of social relations, and these, of course, affect each other and intertwine. I see migration as part of the dynamics within the globalized economic world; a response to, rather than a revolt towards, the extreme inequalities that exist between the global North and the global South. Migration answers to the demand of the global North’s (labor) market, while it signifies an important opportunity for social mobility for workers in the Southern hemisphere. Migration has, then, numerous dimensions. Perhaps ironically, it is a response to global inequalities of resource distribution, while it also shapes today’s world, continuously making new ‘glocal’ realities.

Migration is thus arguably more a result of ‘development’ than a strategy for it. Its inherent quest for prosperity is mostly on an individual or household level. The world is increasingly more unified in terms of capitalist market dynamics and these create a hierarchy of access to affluence supported by the same discourses of ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ (cf. Escobar 1995). These discourses are also present in the Southern hemisphere through the “cultural specificity of capitalist form [that brings] capitalist universals into action through worldly encounters” (Tsing 2005:4). As the global North ‘pulls’ workers from the global South towards its increasingly stratified labor market, these discourses of ‘modernity’ shape agents from the global South’s imagery of and desire for what ‘development’ curtails (Appadurai 1998). While ‘development’ excludes and includes, unifies and stratifies, local articulations of the feeling of ‘abjection’ surface and produce responses (Ferguson 1999). In Senegal one such reaction has been migration as a strategy for socioeconomic ascent. In this sense ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ can be both a cause and an aim for migration.

Friction shapes the discourses of global, local, and glocal realities (Tsing 2005). The Senegalese migration project is part of these realities. It appears in the discordance between the need for and the availability of resources seen as significant to make a ‘good
Appadurai (1998:7, author’s emphasis) argues that “the consumption of the mass media throughout the world often provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and in general, agency.” He conceptualizes the agent in terms of the consumerism inherent in his modernity; as part of the “capitalist civilizing process” (ibid.). While consumerism undoubtedly plays a part in my informants’ quest for the ‘good life’, I argue that migration is shaped as a strategy for social mobility not only through economic want and desires for ‘modern’ commodities, but as a response to structures of both culture and ‘tradition’, and global socioeconomic power. Global capitalism is thus a part of culture and ‘tradition’ on a local level, and ‘modernity’ is not the opposite of these (Tsing 2005).

According to Bourdieu the agent is “a part of contexts of practice and […] has a history that makes [him/her] disposed for behaving and acting in certain ways within these given contexts” (Kvalsvik 1993:12). Habitus, as Bourdieu has named this disposition, is what shapes the migration project. Intrinsic in habitus is the doxa and heterodoxa and in them lie the gendered subject positions and identities that are constructed via Senegalese culture and ‘tradition’. When these meet the global and national structures mentioned above, friction may occur. Culture thus becomes a collection of discourses within the global spectre of discourses on identity and the constituent rights to resources, coinciding and colliding, intersecting and merging, with hegemonic discourses shaped by structural powers of market and state interests (Tsing 2005).

‘Tradition’ in Contemporary Senegal

According to Hobsbawm ([1983]2002):2) tradition, both invented and not, is characterized by invariance. He opposes tradition to custom, a characteristic of what he deems “traditional societies”:

‘Custom’ in traditional societies has the double function of motor and fly-wheel. It does not preclude innovation and change up to a point, though evidently the requirement that it must appear compatible or even identical with precedent imposes substantial limitations on it. What it does is to

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give any desired change (or resistance to innovation) the sanction of precedent, social continuity and natural law as expressed in history.

The tradition my informants’ spoke of thus seems more in line with Hobsbawm’s definition of custom, although a distinction between modern and traditional society seems artificial, at least in the case of Senegal. The “invented tradition” of Hobsbawm is a common tool within modernization and nation building, but “custom” within Senegalese society is not opposed to modernity and can work much in the same way as an “invented tradition”. I therefore see “custom” more as discourse in Foucaultian terms. It is a tool for maintaining power structures; much like Perry (2009) describes the cooperation between village elders in rural Senegal and local state authorities to keep youth in check, punishing them with extra-legal violence (see Chapter 4). Perry’s cases also show how there are always more than one discourse at work in society (Moore 1994), and what is deemed “tradition” depends on the power structures at hand. When power is contested, e.g. in the way that gender and generational relations and identities are being renegotiated in Senegal, the hierarchy of discourses operating within society is challenged. The results of this contestation can be a new hegemonic discourse on gender/generational identity, or it might just shuffle the cards and perpetuate the “custom”. Throughout this thesis I will employ ‘tradition’ as an emic term describing the values and social structures my informants apprise as a part of the sociocultural practices they wish to preserve.

The Structure/Agency Debate and Migration as Movement

My informants’ narrations and comparative literature (cf. Lambert 2002) imply that the migration project is motivated by potential advancement within the socioeconomic structures of Senegalese society. One concept of such advancement is social mobility which implies the existence of a class structure. I understand class as a hybrid of ‘bourgeois’ and Marxist theory as described by Ortner (2006). In the case of Senegal class is arguably more “a set of differential positions on a scale of social advantage” than “inherently antagonistic” relations based on capitalism as a form of production (Ortner 2006:22). Senegalese migration is not a collective movement, e.g. a proletariat, employing migration as a revolt against the global capitalist structures, but rather a fragmented response to these on an individual, but socially engaged level (cf. Comaroff 2000, Lambert 2002). The cause of this form of migration is both the dynamics of global
structures and the ways that they have worked on people’s daily lives in the global South, and the flux of discourses within Senegalese culture, yet “classes are social categories that cannot be understood in terms of individual motives and desires” (Ortner 2006:26). The social and economical advancement desired by my informants must thus be seen in the context of their position within both global and Senegalese sociocultural structures.

It is important to underline that the strategies for socioeconomic advancement pursued by my informants is related both to the stratified structures of Senegalese society and those of the global economy. Europe’s history of industrialization merged with post-feudalistic social structures has developed a class discourse particular to its history, i.e. class in a Marxist perspective. The discussion of class as a native cultural discourse within Senegal is beyond the scope of this thesis, but social stratification and structures of domination in Senegal is arguably more articulated through e.g. ethnicity or caste than on “differential relations to the means of production” (Ortner 2006:24, my emphasis).

Throughout my thesis I will thus look at other aspects of social differentiation rather than class. Differentiation produces social organization and systems, e.g. social networks, kinship, and gender. Migration as a factor of Senegalese gender identity construction makes consideration of how identity is shaped through interpersonal relationships, e.g. in social networks or between gendered individuals, important (cf. Jenkins 2004). The two prevalent categories in terms of recruitment to organizational membership in e.g. social networks, are based on (1) who a person is; the innate characteristics of an individual that are “intersubjectively constructed […] as basic, natural or primordial”, such as age or gender; and (2) what he/she is, namely the characteristics bound to the “individual as an individual”; identifications that are “a matter of negotiation at the organisational boundary, and more or less competitive” (ibid. 2004:147-148). Following this perspective it is mainly the (2) achieved, and not the (1) ascribed, identifications an agent might manipulate in order to access other spheres of the social structures he/she resides within, although Jenkins himself stresses the difficulty in assessing what is what of the human identity in that the “ins and outs of biography conspire to ensure that [they] are not easily disentangled” (2004:148). It is through migration, a strategy for changing what
can be changed, i.e. income, that Senegalese men can aspire to achieve statuses perhaps otherwise unavailable. One such important status is that of household provider, an expansive status in that it can increase as one provides for more people, e.g. through polygyny or teranga.

I thus employ the concept of movement in terms of my informants’ individual desires for progress and change for the better for themselves and their families. This change arises within local structures of household, family, and social relations which are linked to the dimension of discourses of expectations in terms of e.g. gender roles. The presence of global capitalist discourses in the daily lives of Senegalese people contribute to the production of new consumption needs, while contesting important aspects of Senegalese ‘tradition’.

The embodiment of sociocultural structures and discourses is based on “[e]very established order[’s production of] the naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (Bourdieu 1977:164). In other words; “[how] we run depends on what shoes we have to run in” (Tsing 2005:5). Inherit in these statements is an understanding of an agent’s access to capital, both material, social, cultural, and symbolical, as significant for his/her position in life. This involves factors such as place of birth, sex, kin and/or cast membership (i.e. one’s position within the economical field in terms of e.g. relative affluence, education, and occupation). Access to different sorts of capital through one’s position in a (global) social structure can extensively influence the need and possibility for socioeconomic advancement. In a state where the public welfare system is limited people must rely on other systems, such as kinship and social networks. This is a form of social capital that has been decisive for the Senegalese migration project.

The structures around and within us do not only limit our movement, they guide it (cf. Bourdieu 1977). Tsing (2005:6) compares structures to roads: They facilitate movement but also confine it. My informants have been excluded from certain structures, or roads, that others might take for granted, but there are some opportunities these structures make available, such as migration. The road of migration holds its own confinement based on
local factors such as one’s position within a social network and the dynamics of cultural discourse. One such discourse is that of gender identity and roles. Within the Senegalese context the road of migration is far more accessible to men than to women, whose access to socioeconomic advancement is more available through marriage (see Chapter 4).

Another important factor in terms of movement is power. Through the doxa of a society its subjects will continue the internal logic of its structures. It is when this logic is questioned in orthodox or heterodox practice that structural change can occur (Bourdieu 1977:164…), as “people negotiate, bargain, violate, and compromise official rules in ways that reflect their interests, desires, and contingencies” (Swartz 2002:625). From a Marxist viewpoint migration as a strategy for socioeconomic advancement seems to question the doxa of global power relations, while ‘modernity’ questions ‘traditional’ power relations of Senegalese sociocultural structures. I argue that even if Senegalese agents act upon both global and local structures through the migration project, the hegemonic discourses inherit in these might still be regenerated through these practices.

**Gender and Identity**

Different discourses do not necessarily differ from the hegemonic at every turn, but can intersect or digress at different points (Moore 1994). The construction of gender identity in Senegalese society seems to follow a certain path, but the practice of gender does not necessarily always follow the hegemonic discourse.

Gender identities are part of the subject positions man and woman hold in the social structures of society. These are shaped by different discourses on what habitus should consist of. The hegemony of certain discourses, as in the Senegalese gendered subject positions of man as provider and woman as nurturer, does not rule out contestation, or the existence of other discourses (Moore 1994). ‘Tradition’ in Senegalese society is articulated through my informants’ opinions on what a ‘good’ woman and man are. As my data will render visible the cultural practices do not necessarily coincide with ‘tradition’, without this leading to severe sanctions. Pragmatism can lead to change in practice, although this may affect cultural discourses over time. As young Senegalese men and women pursue ‘roads’ of movement, Tsing’s friction “reminds us that
heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of culture and power” (2005:5). The dynamics of heterogeneous discourses that intersect, intertwine, and collide are susceptible to provoke change in both cultural practice and discursive hegemony.

Methodology

Fieldwork in the Basque Country: Participant Observation and Interviews
As a student of anthropology the most likely method to choose for fieldwork was participant observation. One might say that this is the very foundation for anthropological research and should thus shape any anthropological endeavor, but “the method of participant-observation needs to be modified to suit each particular situation” (Gutkind 1974:180). Gutkind (ibid.) argues further that even if the method of anthropological participant observation was developed with a small and concentrated field site in mind, it is pliable and can adjust to new types of studies, such as those of larger urban localities. Considering a large part of my fieldwork was to be done in an urban setting, I decided a greater focus on verbal communication and interviews would be adequate, since it would be difficult to actually live with my informants. I prepared an interview guide and from there proceeded on a quest to find people who would be interested in answering my questions. This quest led me through social relations and networks. I found this way of working adequate, as part of my interest when studying migration is exactly the social relations that shape and determine this phenomenon.

While preparing for my fieldwork I decided that using semi-structured informal interviews with a prepared interview guide would be a good initial method. Crane and Angrosino (1992:55) state that the “anthropologist builds up knowledge of a culture by asking the same questions in a variety of ways”. This means taking part in different types of interaction with (potential) informants, especially what Gottlieb (2006:49) deems “advanced hanging out”, or participant observation. Through the experience of culture the answers to one’s questions are replied not only verbally, but through action and sensation. Crane and Angrosino thus argue further that structured interviews are of better
use towards the end of the fieldwork period, when the anthropologist has gotten to know the culture under study (1992:58). I however decided to commence my interaction with the Senegalese in the Basque Country through interviews so as to access the culture I aimed to experience. Making an interview guide helped me contemplate on what the main focus of my research would be and I could thus explain my project to my informants with relevant ease. I believe this approach was of great use both when it came to initiate contact and when some of my informants ‘recommended’ me on to their friends, family members and acquaintances: They understood, for the most part, what type of work they were participating in, a fact I believe made them both trust me and also gave them the confidence to explain my project to others and invite them to join. The ‘excuse’ of doing interviews also gave the results I hoped for, namely invitations to more informal meetings and social gatherings.

On that note it is vital to underline that finding informants was easier than imagined. Most were happy to help me out, and many applauded me for my interest in their lives and situation. The fact that I too was a foreigner (a Norwegian in the Basque Country), created a common ground and I used this consciously so as to underline that I had gone through some of the experiences they expressed in terms of being an ‘outsider’ in Spanish/Basque society. I also believe part of the willingness to participate in my project was because it offered my informants something to do in their daily lives, currently marked by unemployment and thus many moments of boredom.

The interviews were a way to initiate more informal contact, and I was soon invited to visit some of my informants in their homes and attend different social gatherings they organized. I also spent many hours sitting around in Ousmane’s shop which was a whole-sale establishment for street vendors, most of them Senegalese. Consequently this was a great opportunity to not only meet different people of the Basque-Senegalese community, i.e. to ‘network’, but also to participate in their informal meetings in the shop; just chatting and drinking tea. The result of my ‘interviews’ was thus opportunities to engage in what resembled participant observation in the classical sense.
Oral history has long been significant when it comes to Africa (Giles-Vernick 2006:85), and is a way of recording events into the collective memory. When relying largely on interviews as a research method, I obtained a comparatively large amount of verbally transmitted data, as opposed to that ‘participatingly observed’. The reason for my choice of method was tied to the urban setting I was to do the first part of my fieldwork in. In an urban context one does not automatically get to know anyone unless you actively seek out the informants you are interested in, seeing as you are just one more of the faces of the city. Getting access to a ‘Senegalese place’, such as a workplace or living quarters, did not seem probable and I thus decided early on that my best bet was to move through social networks with the ‘excuse’ of doing interviews to get to know new informants. My data is thus based on verbal communication, and less on situational interaction and random events that arise when living with people over a longer period of time. Giles-Vernick (2006:87) argues that

[oral history methods provide a glimpse into how people of the past constructed their worlds – what they believed, imagined, and valued. These methods can translate for readers what large, seemingly impersonal processes might have meant to those who participated in, contributed to, ignored, opposed, or even imagined them.

Although she refers to methods for understanding events of the past, I argue that my informants’ oral accounts of their experiences serve as a sort of ‘history in the making’. They reflect on the “contemporary personal, social, political, and economic relations” (ibid. 2006:87) that shape the reality of transnational migrants today. My methods are valid for uncovering the type of data necessary to embark on an analysis of this reality, more so, in having to choose on account of time limitations, than what a one-sited more ‘experience’ based village study would have done. In interviewing and interacting with a variety of informants, both those living abroad and in Senegal, I believe I have gotten a general and in-depth impression of what migration means to this group of people, a sort of knowledge not observable had I only partaken in daily life in a Senegalese village.

Selection of informants
Apart from the aspect of gender there is extensive variety in terms of my key informants from the Basque Country, representing different ‘categories’ of Senegalese migrants. One factor was the time spent in Spain; from just months to many years. Another factor
was legal status; some had come ‘legally’, with a job already set up; some had arrived by ‘illegal’ means, crossing the ocean in small fishing vessels to the Canary Islands, or swimming from Morocco to Melilla. Some had obtained legal status in Spain, and some were still waiting. I also interviewed both married and unmarried men, younger and older, from bigger cities and from rural areas. There were those who had worked in the industry, in fishing and in street vending, and a couple who had their own businesses. In Senegal I was able to interview families of migrants, both of those who were doing relatively well and those who were still struggling economically. I find that my informants represent a good variety of the people that make up Senegalese reality, giving a broad picture of what migration means to the Senegalese through their stories.

**Fieldwork in Senegal: Village Study?**

In Senegal I was able to conduct a more ‘old school’ anthropological fieldwork, since I stayed with the family members of the informants I knew from my approximately four months spent in the Basque Country. I was thus able to observe more of daily life and its routines, and perhaps be more part of the latter, even if only for a short period of time (and always as more of guest than a member of the community). Yet also in this field site semi-structured informal interviews became an essential part as I was pressed for time and saw it as vital to focus on the gathering of data explicitly tied to migration.

When I arrived in Dakar I had been invited to stay in the home of Adawa (26), the niece of Ousseynou (36), one of my main informants from the Basque Country. Adawa lives with her husband, Ibou (34), in a small apartment in the very center of Dakar. This was a good point of departure for venturing out into the rest of the capital, which can be quite confusing and disorienting. I was able to use Adawa and Ibou’s home as a base for my entire stay, as I visited other places where my informants from the Basque Country had roots. In Dakar I also interviewed members of a family who were currently residing in Southern Spain.

Apart from Dakar I visited my informant Boukar’s (38) family in Thies, one of Senegal’s larger cities, about 60 km east of the capital, before going to the Sine Saloum Delta, as mentioned above. The village of Dekka, where I stayed with Ousseynou’s (36) direct
family headed by his older brother, became my base for day trips to other villages nearby and a longer trip to one of the Sine Saloum islands. Here I interviewed both families of some my informants in Herrixka, and other families many who had who had a member abroad, either in Spain or Italy, but whose migrant member I did not know personally. It turned out that many of them had connections to people I knew from the Basque Country; a definite door opener. My own place in the Senegalese social network made the importance of social capital in this context clear; it will help you get places in life, both as a migrant and as a student of anthropology trying to find your way through the field.

The Time and Depth of Participant Observation

According to anthropological tradition the ideal fieldwork should be done over a significant period of time, so as to be able to observe and participate in a society during all its seasonal stages and observe people’s relationship with both their natural surroundings and socio-cultural rites bound up to these and specific dates during the year. Des Chene (1997:68) argues that although the theoretical face of anthropology has changed immensely “the model of a sojourn of at least nine months, and preferably more than a year, in a geographically defined field site remains standard disciplinary practice.” Though there is no doubt as to the importance of time in order to achieve depth in one’s comprehension of a field site (Gottlieb 2006:51), I believe time well spent can partly compensate for the lack of time lived on location. As a master student I had a maximum of six months on my hands, a little more than two thirds of which were spent in the Basque Country and the rest in Senegal, so the holistic year-based approach fell through from the beginning. I therefore needed to be focused on the topic I wanted to gather data, namely the experience of migration, but then be open to the additional topics that would reveal themselves as relevant as I proceeded, such as that of gender and generational identity.

The essential meaning of participant observation, namely attempting to comprehend the ‘other’ by getting an in-depth view of her or his understanding of the world (Brockington and Sullivan 2003:59), was ever present during my fieldwork in both field sites. Crane and Angrosino’s (1992:64) description of participant observation as more “a state of mind, a framework for living in the field, [rather] than […] a specific program of action”
is adequate for my application of anthropological methodology. This ‘state of mind’ made me open to changing the planned course of action of my research as I understood more of the Senegalese migrants’ reality, e.g. in terms of the questions asked in interviews and the ways in which to ask them.

The use of yourself as a methodological tool makes fieldwork a very personal, even intimate, experience based on actions and reactions of yourself and other subjects. I thus argue that even if fieldwork, with the implicit methodology of participant observation, is the hegemonic method in anthropology, there is more to this method than simple actions. Undergoing several years of anthropological studies as university students before undertaking our own research project, means embodying certain knowledge, and it is this knowledge that becomes a “state of mind” (Crane and Angrosino 1992:64) which makes the absorption of information such a personal experience. This embodied knowledge also allows for connecting with your anthropological “state of mind” even when using more concrete methods for gathering information, such as interviewing in my case, or you work within an inadequate time limit. Other aspects of using yourself as research tool will be discussed further in the following sections.

**Language: Bridge and Barrier**

When conducting anthropological fieldwork one’s main tool is oneself; your personality and the knowledge and skills you possess. Language is one such skill.

During my fieldwork in the Basque Country Spanish was the natural choice for communicating with my informants, as this was the language we were most likely to share a common knowledge of. The fact that this was not the mother tongue of neither party has made some impact on the data gathered. I myself am fluent in Spanish and I usually do not have a problem expressing myself in this language, but my informants had, for the most part, a lower level of fluency than me, some to the extent that the interviews became quite short and fragmented. This resulted in me befriending, and thus getting more in-depth information from, those of my informants that did speak Spanish well. A factor here is that all my key informants are men; the few Senegalese women who have
migrated do not know as much Spanish since they have not been in Spain for long, nor have they, for the most part, had jobs where they mix with native speakers. I did encounter a couple of exceptions from this rule, but did not manage to access into these girls’ social spheres.

**Interpreter**

When it comes to my stay in Senegal, language, or rather lack thereof, as a barrier became painfully obvious. French is the official administrative language and during my stay in Dakar I was able to get by on my school French. As I tried to organize my trip to Sine Saloum I searched high and low for a decent interpreter willing to travel, that could translate from Serer (preferably) or Wolof, the common ‘national’ language, to either English or Spanish, but without luck. Finally I left Dakar without an interpreter, hoping for the best. The neighbor of my host family in Dekka, a student of Spanish at the University of Dakar, was home for vacation and Hassane (26) was quickly assigned the job as my guide and interpreter. This arrangement glimmered with both profound disadvantages and numerous benefits.

Hassane was halfway through his degree and without much experience actually speaking Spanish. The misunderstandings and miscommunication this resulted in during our interview sessions was the greatest drawback of having him as a *gatekeeper* (Leslie and Storey 2003:133). It was clear that he did not translate everything my informants said, and I could not be certain that he actually translated my questions to them correctly. The matter did improve the more we worked together, although several interviews resulted in me switching to French when noticing that my informants’ answers did not coincide with the questions I had asked. The latter solution worked quite well, as my informants were also non-native French speakers, and thus kept the vocabulary level within my reach.

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25 Since it is mostly Senegalese men who migrate, the discrepancy between male and female informants is representative of the reality of the Senegalese diaspora in Spain and the Basque Country. In Senegal, on the other hand, I sought to interact more with women than men, but this turned out to be more difficult than planned because of my lack of proficiency in Serer, Wolof, and French, and because I did not manage to find a female interpreter.
Hassane’s gender was arguably another disadvantage which seems to have impacted my research (cf. Berreman 1962). My contact with women was again limited by language. During interviews Hassane would automatically direct himself towards men, even when asked to concentrate on the women. It is difficult to assess what the difference a female interpreter would have made, but I assume I would have obtained more in-depth data from women.

The great advantage of working with Hassane was his intricate knowledge of, and friendship with, the other people from the area. We travelled to several villages together and there were social relations to move through at every turn. Had he not been my guide, I could not have obtained so many interviews in such a short period of time, both because I would not know where to start (i.e. which households had family members abroad), nor would my questions probably have been so easily accepted and answered. Again I experienced the importance of social networks in Senegal.

**Ethics and Anonymity**

*Teranga and Transparency: Expectations of Reciprocity*

I believe the openness I was met with during fieldwork is largely due to how important Senegalese hospitality, or *teranga*, is considered to be within Senegalese society (see Chapter 4). But there might also have been other reasons that have made it easier for my informants to welcome me into their lives.

While in the field I moved through social relations, meeting new informants via those I had already gotten to know. Senegalese in general are quite concerned with maintaining good relations with their peers; it is important to greet everyone, ask about the family, etc. I perceive the social network of a Senegalese individual, both abroad and at home, to functions as social capital both for the person in question and her/his immediate social ties (cf. Bourdieu 1977). To treat people well and help someone who needs it purports a better chance that you, or your children, will be treated well and helped out in a time of need.
Teranga also applies to the way you are supposed to treat strangers, and so by being met with this genuine openness I have also entered into a circle of reciprocity, a circle which will outlast me. This of course raises ethical questions in terms of anthropological fieldwork practice. According to Curran (2006) transparency is the bottom line when it comes to deeming a research project ethical. This involves respect for the research subjects, recognizing that they can only take part in the research project based on their own free will and with sufficient information on “the consequences of the research to evaluate their decision to participate” (Curran 2006:202). This is seems straightforward, but becomes complicated when, as an anthropologist, your research should be based largely on personal interaction with your informants; befriending them, to call a spade a spade. When getting to know new people, and especially people of an unfamiliar culture, it is difficult to assess how the other person perceives the content and consequences of your relationship.

Even if payment for information does not seem expected, getting involved in a social network means (potentially) participating in chains of reciprocity. Payment for information can be seen to jeopardize the veracity of informants’ accounts; if information is paid for it is more probable that the person giving the information will shape it into what she/he believes the researcher wants to hear, and the voluntarism of a subject can be put into question if conditions of “coercion or undue influence” are involved (Curran 2006:203). It is especially ‘undue influence’ that can be problematic during anthropological fieldwork. The mere presence of the anthropologist often implies imbalanced power relations between researcher and subject. In terms of my own fieldwork my presence and involvement seemed to invoke certain hopes for the future for many of my informants, even if payment for information was not a factor.

These power relations imply numerous reasons for why an informant would be eager to please the researcher, both when it comes agreeing to be an informant and to the type of information given, although “the relationship between an anthropologist and his informants ought to be transactional. In exchange for information the anthropologist offers ‘confirming behaviour’” (Brunt 1974:311). It can be difficult to decide what this
transactional relationship should consist of, when it is apparent that your informants might have expectations of an exchange of concrete favors and you know this might influence the information given. My informants in the Basque Country focused somewhat on their troubles, which I perceived as an intent of assimilation to the public refugee discourse, so as to be understood as in league with those in need, and thus those ‘deserving’ of residency in Europe (see Chapter 3). Also needs for assistance in finding employment were sometimes implied. In Senegal I was asked both directly and indirectly by informants whether I could help them migrate to Spain.

**Safety Considerations**

The anthropological endeavor requires using yourself as a research tool and thus potentially putting yourself at risk. One’s personality and (gender) identity become intrinsic parts of your research and impact the data gathered.

One aspect of being a female researcher is the possible amorous interest of men. To mark my status as a ‘taken’ woman I made it known early on that I was in a relationship. In Senegal I sometimes resorted to being ‘married’, and for the most part to ‘having a fiancé’, even though that was also due to my lack of French vocabulary to describe my status. Although I do believe it was an advantage to be considered a ‘taken’ woman, men were generally respectful. Having a ‘husband’ also made it easier when communicating with women since I am in the proper age to be married and hence we could relate through our statuses as ‘wives’.

As of general safety, Senegal is a relatively calm and peaceful place compared to other African countries, and when avoiding obvious high-risk situations such as walking alone at night I usually felt safe. There are, however, instances in which being too cautious will limit your research extensively. The mere fact of being a woman and alone in a new place makes you a potential victim of uncomfortable or even dangerous situations (Nowak and H. and R. Scheyvens 2003:165), but not taking any risks when becoming acquainted with potential informants will eventually isolate you from those you are supposed to get to know. I found that following my ‘instincts’, both in the Basque Country and in Senegal worked well, and did not experience anything more than
'uncomfortable' situations. Having a social network to move through was an important part of being safe, both in terms of not being alone in new places, and in terms of ‘social control’; when you know many people, there are many people paying attention to what is happening to you, and thus looking out for you.

Anonymity of People and Places
I have given pseudonyms to both people and places. Both Dekka and Herrixka are pseudonyms, although I have given their approximate locations in order to place my fieldwork site into its relevant context of livelihood strategies and, in Dekka’s case, ethnicity. The other villages I visited in Senegal shall remain nameless since they lie close to Dekka and are similar in terms of income strategies. In do name Bilbao, as it is a city with a fairly large Senegalese population, and my informants here thus have small chances of being recognized through my text. When choosing pseudonyms for my informants I have used random Senegalese names that do not represent the actual names of any of them. Combining pseudonyms of both people and places make my informants as untraceable as possible without breaking stories away from individuals, although out of principle I do not reveal information that I believe can harm them in any foreseeable way.

Thesis Outline
This Introduction chapter has introduced my problem approaches, field sites, theoretical perspectives, methodology, and ethical considerations. In Chapter 2 I will discuss migration as a Senegalese project for movement throughout national history, and how this movement is embedded in social relations of reciprocity (Mauss 1995). Chapter 3 discusses the structural dynamics and global events affecting the Senegalese migration project, with particular attention to the current economic recession. I argue that such structures create particular patterns, or paths, of migration, and are also present in the (re-) production of Senegalese identity (cf. Tsing 2005, Moore 1994). In Chapter 4 I discuss migration in light of cultural practices and discourses of gender relations and identity, showing how the practice and production of (gender) identity has implications for how an
agent’s strategy for socioeconomic ascent is constructed and undertaken. I will also consider the conflicts of ‘tradition’ versus ‘modernity’ visible through the articulations of different discourse dimensions in Senegalese culture today. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the global recession on Senegalese lives, contemplating the future fate of the Senegalese migration project.
Chapter 2:

Senegal: Remitter of Migrants and Receiver of Remittances

Modernization [...] has changed the customs we had before. We have taken some of the Western customs. And, well, there is always something bad about it that affects the people. [...] We thought that everything coming from our tradition is bad and that everything coming from the West is good. We cannot continue like this. Now the people are beginning to see that we have left some things behind that are much better than Western things. But now we cannot force people [to change back].

Ousseynou (36)

Introduction

In this chapter I will set the stage by more extensively conceptualizing Senegalese migration experiences over time. As shown in Chapter 1, Senegal’s history of migration is extensive as nomadic, regional, and rural-urban circular migration has been a part of society for centuries. Senegal’s interconnection with the global market, first through slavery and colonization, and then through ‘globalization’, has produced friction between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ discourses and practices. This comes to show in e.g. the ‘allure of commodities’, intergenerational conflict, and gendered strategies for socioeconomic advancement such as migration and marriage (cf. Lambert 2002, Perry 2009). I argue that such factors render the sociacultural embeddedness of economically motivated agency visible in the reciprocal relationships between the migrant and his family. The same relationships supports the perception of commodities as gifts, as the ‘modern’ ‘allure’ informs the transcontinental household’s strategies for socioeconomic advancement and (re-)production (cf. Mauss 1995).
‘Modern’ Senegal and its History of Migration

Social Structures and Systems of Meaning
Migration is more than just a rational economic action on a micro level as anthropologists before the 1970s reduced it to. Since then there was a rising recognition of the fact that migration did not fit into classic modernization theory (Kearney 1986:336). Lambert (2002), in his monography on the Jola of Casamance, shows that Senegalese migration is about much more than economic gain, in that through their mobility, the peoples of West Africa have long been crossing boundaries, redefining their communities, and imbuing the spaces into which they move with new meanings. The peoples of West Africa have been speaking with their feet. (2002:xxii)

Lambert has studied regional migration within Senegal, but it is reasonable to speak of Senegalese transnational migration in the same terms. The communal connections Lambert suggests extend through time and space, even when part of the community moves to a different continent, imbuing Senegalese migration in general with a sense of circularity (Riccio 2008:218-219). Nonetheless, it is important not to disregard the ideas of modernization when it comes to understanding migration. This is not because migration necessarily is a quest for ‘modernity’, but because ‘modernity’ is already part of the daily lives of people all around the globe. The allure of commodities have become embedded in people’s lives, and the desire for these, and a way of life which can assure access to them, drive Senegalese to e.g. migration, linking local lives to “supra-local events and processes” (Lambert 2002:167). Thus, instead of “resisting proletarianization” (ibid.), people in Senegal strive to become a part of ‘modern’ life and the capitalist market, regarded as a way to progress and prosper. The stories of my informants exemplifies one way in which “universals and particulars come together to create the forms of capitalism with which we live” (Tsing 2005:4). While the “cultural specificity of capitalist form arises from the necessity of bringing capitalist universals into action through worldly encounters” (ibid.), “migration [becomes] the legacy that demonstrates the power of commodities” (Lambert 2002:166). Thus, Senegalese perceive the world in terms of how their lives play out within the opportunities available to them. The structures that hold, or lack, these opportunities are bound by larger
structures on a national, regional and global scale and the Senegalese migrants and their families are not unaware of this.

To migrate is then to take a specific form of action in order to overcome certain obstacles that these structures hold in an attempt to fulfill locally conceptualized (gender) roles through global strategies for socioeconomic advancement, e.g. the man’s role as household *provider* (see Chapter 4). For most of my informants I would claim that they portray their sociality as ‘belonging to’ Senegalese, more than Spanish or Basque, society. One of the reasons for this might be that an eventual return to Senegal is one of the primary reasons for why they migrate in the first place (cf. Riccio 2008)\(^\text{26}\). Migration does not mean leaving the structures of their society behind; it is another form of responding to them rather than ‘sitting and waiting’ conceived by many as the alternative.

\(^{26}\) Although this return might not happen, judging by the experiences of other diasporas.
Migration becomes a sort of continuum of Senegalese culture through the migrant’s role as a provider for the household he belongs to. But migration also means meeting new structures; those of Spanish/Basque society. In as pointed out in Chapter 3 these structures can be difficult to access, and the migrants tend to reproduce Senegalese sociality rather than adopting new cultural ways. Migration thus represents a “shared system of meaning, a process that goes beyond the mere movement of people to encompass identity, status, and understandings of place” (Lambert 2002:xxvi). This system of meaning affects the identity construction of both the migrant himself and those back home. Migration thus produces connections between different systems of meaning, and generates new meanings in already existing structures, such as the social organization and gender relations (cf. Riccio 2008). In the next subsection I consider how migration can generate both economical and social capital. This capital arguably connects families to the systems of meanings discussed above.

**Migration: A Family Livelihood Strategy**

Regional and circular migration is still very much part of Senegalese life, but is now performed more in the rural-urban context (cf. Lambert 2002). Most families from rural regions have members who live in Dakar or other urban centers. The principle of remittance contribution to those at home is an important part of this, and can be considered the basis for what has expanded into transnational and transcontinental migration. One’s place within kinship and social networks are affirmed and nurtured through remittances (Jenkins 2004:149), as the migrant plays out his role of provider (see Chapter 3). Or as one informant in Bilbao, Masseck (27), articulated it: “You are where you are from. […] If you don’t help you turn your back. […] You lose ‘the thread’”.

In general my informants seemed very committed to their places of origin, even those who had lived their whole life in Dakar, but whose family was originally from another part of Senegal. “In Dakar everyone is an immigrant”, according to Ousmane (28), one informant in Bilbao, originally from Touba. Even if people work in Dakar most of the year, only to go back to their village during vacations, they still consider the village their home to the extent of regarding it as their place of residence. Diama, Ousseynou’s younger sister works the whole year in Dakar as a hairdresser and only goes back to
Dekka in summer, for Tabaski, and for Christmas vacations. Still, when I asked her where she lives (meaning where in Dakar), she said “I live here, in Dekka”. Diama says she just travels to Dakar to work, since there are few available economic activities in the Sine Saloum region, especially for women, but she likes Dekka so much more; “life here is simple.”

The transnational migrant’s relationship to his homestead is also clear in that he shapes his professional life in the Basque Country and Spain around his ability to visit Senegal as often as possible (cf. Riccio 2008). Temporary contracts are common among Senegalese immigrants so that he can have longer vacations in Senegal than allowed through a permanent contract. This has made great impact on their situation once the economic crisis hit (see Chapter 3 and 5). So for the Senegalese, it seems, home is definitely where the heart is and they are willing to go to great lengths in order to maintain their circular relationship with those in their country of origin.

Although transcontinental migration\(^{27}\) is of more recent character than migration within West Africa, it is intrinsically intertwined with Senegal’s colonial history. Perry (2005) shows how both post-independence economic reforms of collective agriculture and neoliberal reform in the 1980s through Structural Adjustment Programs funded by IMF and the World Bank has shaped family, religious, and gender relations, while Buggenhagen (2001) shows how migration also plays a part in these relations in that remittances shape the social realities of those at home.

According to Tall (2005:156) in “some villages in the region of Louga, remittances sent by international migrants account for 90% of household incomes, and an implicit contract links each migrant to his family.” At the same time estimates of Eurostat (2001) hold that international remittances account for 30 to 70% of the Senegalese household budget, and that most Senegalese families include a migrant (Cotula et al. 2004:33). Senegalese

\(^{27}\) Senegal’s borders have been re-negotiated on several occasions, so to speak of transnationality in this context seems a bit imprecise seeing as from one year to the next the same migrants could be thought of as “internal” or rural-to-urban instead of transnational, depending on the current state borders.
transcontinental migration is then a social project not only through its link to historical processes and religion, but also through economy and family life. Migration from Senegal is not only a response to a young man’s hopes for the future, but a part of his family's livelihood strategy (Cotula et. al 2004, Hernández 2008), where the economic capital he is expected to remit will provide his family with a more stable household economy.

**Migration Generates Social, Symbolical, and Cultural Capital**

As mentioned in Chapter 1 my data indicates that migrants’ remittances are an important source of income also in the Sine Saloum area, although the amounts received seem to vary extensively. Most use this extra income as a source for subsistence, while a relative few have the chance to actually save up and better their living standard substantially, depending on how much ‘their’ emigrant is earning, how many emigrants there are in the family, and, of course, how much those abroad choose to send back home. Migration is hence an investment in family welfare, a large part funded by the migrant’s social network, providing the resources for this costly project.

The migrant therefore “[tends] to follow paths shaped by social, kinship and religious networks” (Riccio 2008:220), as he arguably needs both economic and social capital to back him. The network this capital is drawn from includes members in both Senegal and abroad, and the migrant himself thus becomes a potential future resource for other aspiring migrants once he has undertaken his own project (cf. Lambert 2002). Being a migrant thus holds social value in itself, and having a migrant in the family is not only a basis for economic security but also an investment in social and symbolic capital as it raises the household’s ‘value’ in terms of connections abroad (cf. Bourdieu 1977) (see Chapter 5).

Visible in my data is, as argued, the importance of social networks. Most of my informants have moved through these in order to reach Spain. In this sense the migrant himself is a resource: Once he is abroad he generates not only economical capital, but also cultural, social, and symbolical. He symbolizes his family’s connection to the ‘modern’ world; he is a resource for those at home who wish to migrate through his
(assumed established) position within Spanish society. He symbolizes not only monetary wealth, but social success. The pride articulated by many of the migrants’ family members in Senegal argues for an understanding of migration’s significance in terms of increase in prestige and status for the migrant and his family (see Chapter 4 and 5).

**Remittance and Social Obligations: “Taking Care of my Family”**

The involvement of family and social relations in the migratory project has, then, a double edge.

[The] extended family and household display ambivalent characteristics: on the one hand they represent the most important source of never-ending special obligations; on the other they provide migrants with important status recognition. (Riccio 2008:221)

Or as Masseck (27) expressed it: “If you come to Europe you are a businessman without money,” in that having an income signifies sharing it with those at home, meaning you do not actually make much. The remittances the migrant contributes can make him a contemporary hero and a symbol of ‘modern’ society, sung of in songs of famous Senegalese musicians such as Yossou N’Dour and Ismael Lo. Remittances are regarded as “a fundamental symbol of the emigrant’s loyalty towards their non-migrant family”
(Riccio 2008:225), binding the household together in a social project across the transnationality that divides it. The migrant is never alone – the family structure constitutes a grand support network with inherent obligations of reciprocation. Expectations and aspirations regarding Senegalese transcontinental migration are thus bound to the different social scapes mentioned above (cf. Appadurai 1996); history, religion, and gender and family/household relations.

**The Push and the Pull within Senegalese Discourses on Migration**

To understand migration is to understand the migrant as a part of a socio-cultural system that is bound to today’s globalized world. He is not solely a rational ‘homo economicus’, “responding to spatial unevenness in labor markets, moving to where [he can] obtain higher wages” (Kearney 1986:334). He is more than a worker and consumer in the economic sense of these labels; a social being that bases his decisions on the values that have shaped his upbringing and that he sees fit to shape his future (cf. Bloch & Parry 1989). These values are, of course, linked to economics, in the sense that access to resources is a basic condition for life anywhere in the world. It is when this access is lacking, thus limiting one’s connection to a life that bears meaning that migration can become an option as is the case in Senegal. Furthermore, the migrant is not only part of the society he leaves behind but he also becomes a member of the society he encounters where he arrives, creating a transnational connection between his homeland and his new place of residence. To what extent does the new place of residence bear meaning for the migrant in terms of socioeconomic progress? How does Spanish society and culture influence his project? And how does this connect with the production and conceptualization of the Senegalese masculine identity and gender role? These are central processes discussed in the next chapters.

**Motivations and Aspirations at Home and Abroad**

It arguably takes strong convictions to embark on any journey as perilous as migration can be, as in the example of ‘pirogue’ boat migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands (Hernandez 2008). Within migration theory it has been common to categorize such
persuasion into ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. This model hails from neoclassical theory and applies economic argumentation where the mechanisms of supply and demand are those relevant. Within anthropology this analysis becomes too simplistic and rigid, as the ‘factors’ addressed are always embedded in systems of meaning and power, and thus need to be elaborated. The ambiguity of such ‘factors’ is visible in e.g. King’s (1993) claims that the economic want and political instability in the country of origin can be considered push factors, while Kohnert (2007:7) views economic want as a pull factor in the sense that the host countries of Europe are imagined as a sort of El Dorado, alluring and auspicious. Push-pull theory is thus “rather mechanical and there is little room left for the study of the ‘intervening obstacles’ […] and institutional, structures and interactional considerations that make the study of migration so subtle and so rewarding” (Cohen 1996:xv).

I consider migration to be about numerous intersecting processes from within all dimensions of life, producing circular, converging, and crisscrossing movement comparable to the process of discourse production as described by Moore (1994) (cf. Tsing 2005). Although many of my informants’ reasons for migrating share certain characteristics, each story of how this happened is unique and can thus not be understood schematically. I thus find it more interesting to look at the interplay between “individual motivation and structural causation” (Cohen 1996:xii), with emphasis on how these are part of one another through ‘structuring structures’ and the agent’s embodiment of and action upon these through the doxa and heterodoxa of his sociocultural reality (Bourdieu 1977). Economic behavior is thus more than the transaction of resources; it is embedded in a reciprocal relationship with sociocultural practices and discourses (cf. Lambert 2002, Fagertun 2009), while the concept of friction depicts how different dynamics of social interaction and global processes meet and create change (cf. Tsing 2005).

The Desire for a Better Life
It is clear that the lack of opportunity to escalate financially is an important factor when it comes to leaving Senegal behind; all of my informants in the Basque Country focus mainly on money and economic issues when asked why they decided to go. It is both the lack of resources at home and the fantasy of abundantly available resources abroad that

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make migration attractive; not only for those who go, but for those who hopefully receives remittances when their family members ‘strike gold’ abroad (cf. Riccio 2008).

As mentioned it is widely argued within migration literature that migration is a social project, a family decision (i.e. Cotula et al. 2004, Tall 2005, Riccio 2008). “Migration in general is in many African contexts as much a family as an individual strategy to minimise the risks of unstable income” (Massey et al. 1998 & Tacoli 2001 in Hernández 2008:43). This is also true regarding Senegalese migration, but this decision does not seem to be ‘explicitly’ collective. It is articulated on an individual level as a choice, through the migrant’s ideas and practices of responsibility and reciprocity towards his family. My informants rarely admitted to any pressure or force when it comes to sending remittances to their families; it is voluntary, it is why they came (cf. Mauss 1995). This commitment to those at home is also part of the migrant’s decision to stay put, even now when the Spanish state is in decline economically and politically28.

In the case of Khadim (29), a resident of Bilbao for almost seven years, there does not seem to be a specific event that drove him to migrate; he simply ceased an opportunity to embark on a life path he deemed more hopeful than the one he left behind. Khadim attained a tourist visa to go visit his uncle, who had lived years in Bilbao and had even brought his family to live with him, and then overstayed it. He has not been able to become ‘legal’ since he was arrested for selling ‘pirate’ CDs and DVDs as a street vendor. This meant that he was not allowed to apply for a residence permit until five years had passed and now with the economic crisis he cannot find a job and thus not apply for his residence permit.

His life is tough, Khadim says. He looks slightly disheveled and his clothes are worn. When I met him it was the beginning of Ramadan and he said he was tired and hungry because of that. But, he adds, he does not eat very much in general. He now works

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28 Political decline when it comes to immigrants due to the reforms done in Spanish law to make immigration more difficult, and the daily life of immigrants also so.
selling belts and purses in the streets, seeing as he is in between jobs. He has been able to
hold black market jobs within construction these past years, but now times are difficult.

I asked him what he thinks of his situation and his future. He said that it is difficult here
without his family, but that he will keep on going. He is still young and he will see if
things change. It is not an option to go home. He said that back home nothing ever
changes. There the situation is unbearable, both for his family and people in general. He
manages to send a little bit of money each month, but it is difficult. He tries to see things
positively; there are people who are worse off than him. Some die here and some are sent
back. In the place where everyone wants to go it is difficult to get ahead, but you have to
keep trying. He says that things change all the time; “whatever you thought would be
never arrives. You need to have an idea and keep trying; you cannot change your idea
even if things are difficult, or even if they are not!”

Khadim reproduces the dominant migrant discourse of sacrifice for one’s family, yet, it
also appears as though his sacrifice has as much to do with his own future as his family’s.
He does not feel he has anything to go back to; his family needs him and he cannot
provide anything for them if he goes back home. Even if his situation in Bilbao leaves
much to be desired he holds on (particularly to his religion).

Seydhi’s (32) reasons for leaving Senegal seem more apparent; perhaps it is possible to
say that he was ‘pushed’ to a certain extent. He comes from a village in the Sine Saloum
Delta, where much economic activity revolves around the river. In Seydhi’s case this
meant working within transport; bringing people up and down the river in a ‘pirogue’
boat. He told me that in general his life had been nice and tranquil, apart from one
particular year: He was working with the boat transportation and had vague plans of
going to Saudi Arabia to study since two of his cousins worked there. One day a man
came to him and asked him to take his money and, during his route with the boat, buy a
big load of shrimp that this man would sell later in the villages and make a big profit.
Seydhi agreed to this, took the man’s money and bought him the shrimp. “But when you
transport seafood you need a way of maintaining the produce cool; you need a lot of ice,
especially in Senegal where it is so hot, because shrimps turn bad very quickly in the heat,” Seydhi explained to me. And, as it turns out, he did not have enough ice in the boat to maintain the right temperature; the shrimps were rotten on arrival. Seydhi suddenly owed a lot of money. The man who had given him the money threatened to send him to jail. He finally decided to sell the house of his father, who had passed away when he was only a child, although this was not an easy task seeing as his sister also had legal rights to it. His cousin was the owner of the boat he was using for his transportation business and the bad year ended with him taking the boat back. Seydhi now stood without a job and with severed relations to several individuals within his social network. That is when he decided to leave; first to Mauritania to work as a fisherman, and later to Spain.

A focus on solely economical aspects of migration, through e.g. ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, arguably renders the migrant helpless; he is either pushed or pulled; without subjectivity, nor agency. The degree of agency through migration can be discussed infinitely. Does the migrant oppose the structures that hold him back? Or does he simply take advantage of the loopholes within that structure? Is migration yet another piece of the global political economy’s puzzle that drives people away from their home in order to be exploited as workers in another geographical place of this system where the market forces need them? Are my informants ‘victims’ of global socioeconomic power structures with implicit discourses of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’, or are they agents shaping their own destiny through the manipulation of structural processes?

Chapter Conclusions
So far I have argued that transcontinental migration as a strategy for socioeconomic ascent has taken shape through global encounters over time (cf. Tsing 2005). Through Senegal’s history as an important West African port for Atlantic trade and as a colony of France, certain paths of migration have become more probable than others. Migration has also been a strategy for socioeconomic advancement within Senegal and West Africa, creating circular movement and reciprocal interconnections between rural villages and urban centers (cf. Lambert 2002). By presenting cases from my empirical data I have
substantiated this argument showing how my informants’ attachment to their place of origin, both to Senegal as a country and to more specific regional locations, shape their migration projects in that their place within this society is a primary factor in the decision of departing. The connections within migrant’s social and kinship network serve as both a resource for being able to undertake this strategy and as the receiver of his remittances, thus regenerating social ties between the migrant and those at home. The migration project arguably implicates that social, cultural, and symbolic capital is generated for the migrant himself and for individuals within his social network in that he as an individual becomes an important resource of economic and social capital (for potential future migrants). Through the patterns in my informants’ narrations and my discussion of neoclassical migration theory of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors I have shown that Senegalese migration is imbued with circularity and reciprocity and that this strategy for social migration is embedded in socioeconomic practices in the country of origin (cf. Mauss 1995, Fagertun 2009). In Chapter 3 I present how Spain as the receiver of migration and an advocate of ‘Western’ discourses on migration holds particular structures that both allow for and challenge the Senegalese migration project.
Chapter 3:

Structural Challenges in Spain and Beyond

‘They look askance at you; you are not from here.’

Masseck (27), quoting a song about migrants by Youssou N’Dour

We cannot do anything without that piece of paper. That small, yet big, piece of paper. [...] Here there are many [social] relations, but what happens is that people can help you a lot with some things, but the matter of ‘papers’ is a matter of the Spanish administration.

Ousseynou (36)

Introduction

Previously I have shown how the migration project is shaped in light of socio-cultural and economical structures of Senegalese society influenced by global structures and processes beyond its borders. The focus of this chapter is on how national policies of the Spanish state, influenced by global discourses and events such as the economic crisis, influence this project. I argue that the Senegalese migration project is intrinsically bound to global structures, not only in the sense that they might be motivated by global discourses of ‘modernity’ (see Chapter 2), but in how these structures shape the possible routes to prosperity. These routes work for some, but compromise others, perhaps to the extent of them reconsidering their chosen strategy. The success of one’s strategy can also affect your ability to fill your role as provider, and thus the construction of manhood and self (see Chapter 4).
Migration and the State: Migrants as the New Nomads?

Transnational migration connects two (or more) states through individuals (cf. Hannerz 1996). These individuals’ access to their new place of residence is shaped by both national and international politics and law, according to which state is one’s origin and which state is one’s destination. In terms of destination, one’s point of departure, especially in terms of nationality, plays a major role in where you might choose to go. Fuglerud (2001:29) refers to Marx in saying that people make history, although not under the circumstances they themselves have chosen. Bourdieu’s concept of “structuring structures” also depicts the way in which my informants are positioned within both local and global power relations (cf. Swartz 2002). Senegal’s history and geographical location have developed into certain types of migration trajectories, as have the societal structures that are a result of these processes. As many Senegalese regard their access to movement and socioeconomic advancement as limited within local structures, one tempting option is ascending within these structures by moving away from them through migration. Masseck (27), resident of Bilbao and frustrated with Senegalese, Spanish, and international politics, described the situation in Senegal as follows:

In Senegal there is no middle class. Without money you are nothing. You are not a part of society. If you get sick you don’t get treatment, if your house is on fire you call the firefighters and they first ask you for money for gasoline for the truck before they come; your house will have burned down before they get there. If you call for an ambulance it might take an hour before they come; you’ll get sooner to the hospital if you take the bus. [...] The president sells his politics to the West. He says: ‘Send us our migrants back; they are needed here for work.’ But this is not true. There is no work.

Migration is thus a result of, and a way of dealing with, global structures and processes embedded in state politics and sociocultural practices (cf. Tsing 2005). Different intersecting encounters between these factors are presented below.

The ‘Deserving Poor’ and the Discourse of Refuge

The international concern for refugees since World War II has shaped the way the different nation states regard and treat non-citizens. A juridical distinction is made between people from places that have yet to experience open conflict, but e.g. have an extensive discrepancy between different segments of the population when it comes to
access to power and resources, and individuals from e.g. war zones. Although the reasons for war might be the similar to what those from non-war areas are experiencing, the legal difference between refugee and labor migrant is drawn along these lines; the former more deserving of ‘assistance’, i.e. rights, than the latter (Fuglerud 2001). The “degree of voluntariness involved in a persons movement from one country to another, will often have consequences for this person’s rights in terms of national and international law” (ibid. 2001:29), meaning whether or not a person is deemed a refugee by international standards can decide whether or not he/she gets residency and on what terms.

Through my fieldwork I became aware of how this international discourse on refugees shapes the way people in general conceive migration and migrants. The concept of “the deserving” versus “the undeserving poor” developed in late 18th and early 19th century Europe and North America (Katz 1990). The distinction between the two categories was based on two important characteristics; whether or not you were “able-bodied” and whether you were a resident or a stranger. The “impotent poor” were those who were deserving of aid because they were unable to work due to e.g. health problems, and the immediately responsible for aiding the poor were the local social networks and communities, making the issue of settlement important. As migration became more common since people kept moving in search of work, it became increasingly more difficult for the authorities to rely on the local communities to lend a hand to the poor, since nobody really knew where they belonged.

The connection between the way poor have been and are viewed and the way migrants are categorized seems apparent. When it comes to ‘deserving’, refugees are deemed worthy of the West’s ‘help’, while labor migrants, who are considered to be coming from places without armed conflict or persecution, i.e. ‘non-problematic’ countries, are normally only accepted as residents when and where there is a need for them in the niches rendered adequate for an immigrant labor force. This discourse of the ‘needy’ vs. the ‘able-bodied’ seems general in most European states in terms of how immigrants are

29 My translation from Norwegian.
greeted and treated. One example is the Norwegian government’s proclaimed restriction of asylum politics starting in 2008. The rhetoric was clear: Those who did not have a “real need of protection” were not welcome in Norway. Fuglerud (2001:32) puts it this way: “An unfortunate distinctive feature of the public debate on immigration is that it is done on the premises of internal politics and reflects only to a small degree the complexity of the places refugees and immigrants come from”. From a Marxist point of view migration can be seen as an effort to contest the current global distribution of wealth. I draw a parallel to the Comaroffs (cf. 2004a&b) who show how crime can be perceived as “a means of [...] productive redistribution” (ibid. 2004a:806) within the South African state. However, to regard migration as a revolt against ‘class’ structures would be misleading in terms of my empirical data.

5. “From this door for a journey without return they parted, their eyes fixed on infinite suffering.” Sign from museum of Isle de Goré off the port of Dakar, where thousands of slaves were remitted into the Atlantic trade network.

Within a context of economic growth the labor (im)migrant will probably be left to fend for himself within the state he has migrated to, as has been the tendency when it comes to

30 Aftenposten 03.09.08: An example of one of many articles from Norwegian newspapers about this reform: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/politikk/article2632992.ece
Spain. But, when the tide turns and the state experiences an economic crisis the sudden formation of an excess workforce poses a problem on how to handle the competition between the native and the immigrant, both for the state and for the people in general (cf. Calavita 1998, 2006; Solé 2003). The immigrant is in danger of being perceived as a threat, as an invader, an imposter and a thief, since he does not fit what is perceived as refugee characteristics; he is not in ‘need’ and is thus not ‘deserving’ (cf. Katz 1990).

**The Nomad as Criminal**

The controversy around nomadic and sedentary population is another vital dimension of the relation between the state and the poor which European states have struggled with for centuries (Katz 1990:12, Fuglerud 2001:59). I extend this relation to include the state versus migrants. Nomads are difficult to control and do not easily fit into the structure of the nation state. Parallels can be drawn here to address the uneasiness immigrants meet from the state and its people when residing in a new country. They do not hold an official nor an unofficial position in the social hierarchy of their new home and neither the immigrant nor the native (in this case) Basque or Spaniard might know exactly how to categorize and make sense of this new situation. In this respect it is interesting to see how the Senegalese immigrant himself appears to adapt to the situation. He expresses himself as a legitimate resident of Spanish society through his discourse of ‘need’, even when he has already attained an official residence permit. This constitutes an important aspect of the Senegalese migrants’ discourse on the migration experience, so as to construct a legitimate place for himself in Spanish/Basque society. One example of this is the expression of “*Barça o Barçakh*” 31, “Barcelona or ‘death at sea’” 32, a discourse promulgated by ‘pirogue’ migrants attempting to cross the Atlantic Ocean; an expression illustrating the desperation imbued in their actions.

The problem of the nomad is not new within the Spanish state. A prominent nomadic group that has been part of this society for centuries, and is very significant in the

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32 The above article translates ‘Barçakh’ with ‘hell’, but I have chosen to use my informant’s translation of ‘death at sea’.
consolidation of Spanish national identity through their folklore\textsuperscript{33}, is the \textit{gypsies}. Despite this function within national symbology they appear to be people on the border of society; marginalized and stigmatized (cf. Cazorla 1976). The portrayal of the immigrant as part of the categories of ‘criminals’ and ‘benefit scroungers’ is also increasingly frequent in Spanish media, although black Africans do not seem to be the most stigmatized group\textsuperscript{34}.

The discourses and practices construing, and perhaps constructing, the immigrant as ‘criminal’ were exemplified through Masseck’s (27) accounts. Of my informants he was the most ‘integrated’ one; married to a Basque woman and co-founder of an NGO promoting multi- and interculturalism. After 8 years in Bilbao he had strong opinions on both Spanish, Basque and Senegalese politics, including migration issues. Masseck told me that even if immigrants appreciate the help they get from the Basque government, there is still discrimination, and this discrimination engenders criminal actions:

\begin{quote}
You see all the immigrants being sent, when they arrive, to San Francisco; to the worst part of town. It is like this in all Western countries; the immigrants live in the worst part of town. Do you think they come here and are criminals? No, they are made criminals. When you don’t have anything to eat you start stealing. […] They want us to integrate; but how can we with the message we get?
\end{quote}

He gave me another example of this implicit message of official and folk discourse (Ortner 2006:26) from recent news stories:

\begin{quote}
About a year ago 4 or 5 pirogue boats in international waters were spotted. They were in the waters between Spain and Italy, but nobody wanted to help them. They stayed days in the pirogue boats because no one wanted to take responsibility. Not long after that a cow fell from a boat and a big rescue was set into action. What kind of message is this? If these people were Canadian the matter would be very different! […] But we have to put up with it.
\end{quote}

The Global North’s discourses on migration that have developed throughout centuries with other hegemonic discourses such as those of the deserving versus the undeserving

\textsuperscript{33} E.g. flamenco dance, cantautores, and colorful dresses.

\textsuperscript{34} When talking to autochthonous people in the Basque country the image of Africa south of Sahara is often that of poverty and despair, thus allowing for an understanding of black Africans as more ‘deserving’ of pity and assistance.
poor, and nomads versus the sedentary population, is arguably a part of Senegalese immigrants in Spain’s daily experiences. The contemporary European perception of “migration as a threat” (Boswell 2003) is a constructed concept hailing from experiences around the encounter, and thus conceptualization of, ‘the other’. This conceptualization contributes to the displacement of immigrants within Spanish/Basque societal structures and to implicit and explicit practices of discrimination. The Senegalese migrant’s trajectory for arrival to Spain is linked to the history of his country of origin, as this sets the stage for e.g. the international laws applying to Senegalese citizens’ right to travel.

**International Law and Organizations: Laying the Ground for Spanish Immigration Law**

*The UN, EU, and Schengen*

The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, the Schengen Agreement of 1985, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 have all contributed to the formation of policies regarding migration within and into what is now the European Union. These international agreements have in turn contributed in shaping both the current Spanish discourses of immigration and the legal measures taken to cope with what is now considered “the migration problem” (Boswell 2003:623-24, cf. Zimmerman 1995).

New realities within Europe and Spain are certainly also an important factor in the formation of these discourses and legal measures. Immigration to Spain has increased enormously in the last decade (see Chapter 1). As the immigrant becomes more visible in Spanish society the need for policies addressing the issues regarding the new residents of the Spanish state become more pressing, so as to show the public “audience” that the “problem” is being dealt with (cf. Neal 2009). Spain has been involved in one of the main current approaches to the “migration threat” (Boswell 2003) on EU level, the formation of Frontex, while also seeking to hinder immigration through direct interaction with the Senegalese state.
Prevention and Intervention: Frontex and Bilateral Agreements between Spain and Senegal

The Council of the European Union established its border protection agency Frontex on 26 October 2004, as a response to the perceived connection “between terrorism, security, migration and borders” (Neal 2009:338). It has been argued that this was done as a securitization measure in a post 9-11 world, and the Frontex Mission Statement also supports this argument: To coordinate “intelligence driven operational co-operation at EU level to strengthen security at the external borders” (Neal 2009:333), i.e. to hinder illegal immigration.

Frontex derived from the idea of a “European Border Police” discussed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain in October 2001 and “was created particularly to integrate national border security systems of Member States against all kind of threats that could happen at or through the external border of the Member States of the European Union”35, though Neal (2009) argues that EU cannot, despite its politics of European integration, be considered or treated as one polity. The different nation states within the EU are likely to perceive ‘threat’ and ‘insecurity’ differently according to their historical and more recent experiences of e.g. immigration. The ‘audience’ and policy makers within Mediterranean states are likely to feel more threatened by e.g. mass maritime migration than the Nordic countries and therefore see the need for different types of policies than their Nordic counterparts. Although Frontex can be understood as part of EU’s project of European awareness and identity construction, following the nation state paradigm, in practice it will hold different meanings to different nation states, depending on their histories and socio-political experiences, even if immigration is construed as an external threat within most, if not all, member states.


36 Image from FRONTEX home page, visited May 19, 2010: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/
It has also been argued (Calavita 2003:122) that part of the reason for Spanish immigration policy is exactly the general European discourse of seeing the ‘other’ as a threat to national security, a discourse that has been present in Europe for centuries (cf. Katz 1990), and that has been part of the basis of the nation state as a structure. This differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ is used as a justification of protectionist practices over domestic markets, with the idea of the autochthonous worker’s prevalent precedence over the guest worker in terms of legal rights and social security (Sole 2003, Calavita 1998, 2003). As I show below the discriminatory legal practices of this discourse has been pointed out by several authors. As Spain falls relentlessly deeper into economic decline, things are looking grim for its population of immigrant workers.

The ‘Rapid Border Intervention Teams’ (RABIT) established by Frontex in 2007 have been of substantial significance for potential Senegalese migrants. The stated purpose of these teams is to provide

**rapid operational assistance** for a limited period to a requesting Member State facing a situation of urgent and exceptional pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member State illegally.\(^{37}\)

Since Spain is one of the European countries most ‘threatened’ by non-EU migration due to its geographical location, such programs seem designed especially with Spanish (and Italian) challenges in mind.\(^{38}\)

The Spanish and Senegalese states have also signed bilateral agreements regarding legal immigration to Spain as a strategy towards stopping illegal migration. The strategy involves 15 million of Spanish aid to Senegal annually over a five year period (started in 2006) and the establishment of a Spanish worker recruitment office in Senegal. In response the Senegalese state should assist Spain in repatriating illegal migrants that have

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reached Spanish territory. The collaboration aims to “discourage illegal immigration”\(^{39}\), a goal that has not been properly reached. If old routes are intercepted, new routes are found (cf. Hernández 2008); the need and desire for movement among potential migrants do not seem to have been extinguished by these inter-government policies.

Prevention and intervention strategies, products of international collaborations, do not seem to have the desired effect. Migrants, both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ still seem to find their way to Spanish shores. In the next section I will address the ways in which the Spanish state have dealt with the “migration problem” within the legal dimension on a national level, before looking into the current global recession’s effect on Spanish immigration policies.

(Ill)legality and Spanish Immigration Law

Spain got its first immigration law in 1985 after the turnover from a country of emigration to a country of immigration (Calavita 2006, Solé 2003). Once Northern European countries closed their borders to labor migration after the 1973 oil crisis, Spain not only became a country of return migration, but also, among its Southern European counterparts, a gateway to Fortress Europe. Northern European countries’ decision to limit legal immigration to that based on rights to asylum (according to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951) and family reunion, made the Mediterranean countries attractive destinations for both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ work migrants (Boswell 2003, Zimmerman 1995).

The tendency towards a gradual closure of borders also in Southern Europe is becoming apparent as the Mediterranean countries follow in the footsteps of Northern Europe. This tendency shows both a protectionist maneuver in terms of the domestic (labor) market as national economies reaches new stages of ‘development’, and intents to adapt to EU’s intention of European integration. As the presence of ‘the Great Recession’ is felt

throughout the Spanish state, the pitfalls of Spanish immigration law become continuously clearer. Calavita (1998, 2006), Solé (2003), and De Genova (2002) show how immigrants in Spain simply ‘cannot win’. I argue that *la crisis* makes their plight even more difficult.

Calavita (2006:198) compares Spanish and Italian immigration policies and practices and shows how they place the transnational migrant from the Global South within the global economy, arguing that not only is this placement a result of a global historical inequality but it also regenerates the same inequalities in the continuous reproduction of the (im)migrant as the ‘other’. Although both Italy and Spain are new countries of immigration, Italy has a slightly longer history than Spain as a gateway for non-EU citizens to the European labor market. It has been argued that Spain’s practical and legal approach has been shaped with Italy as an example. States that the 1990s was a decade of stabilization for immigrants in Italy who have continuously become more important for the Italian economy, and more are being employed in ‘normal’ jobs. It is thus probable to see the same tendency in Spain, although the economic crisis seems to be slowing down this process to a great extent (Calavita 2006:196-197). An important example of this is the 2009 reform of Spanish Immigration Law which I will look into below.

**The ‘Initiality’ of Spanish Immigration Law**

The immigration law, *Ley de extranjería*, has been revised and reformed several times, in light of the Spanish labor market’s needs. Calavita (1998, 2006) and Solé (2003) argue that the intention of Spanish immigration law is first and foremost to control illegal immigration. The law itself claims to pursue the integration of the immigrant into Spanish society and ensure his/her rights. The result of the law, however, is neither. It does not control how many immigrants enter the Spanish state, but instead determines how those who do enter should be socioeconomically included or excluded. Calavita (1998:531) argues that Spanish policies of immigration are designed in a manner so “that the predictable consequence is to marginalize Third World immigrants and consign them to the extensive underground economy”. For this
makes little sense to draw distinctions between legal and illegal immigrants, as if they were different populations, because the law ensures that legal status is temporary and subject to continuous disruptions. (Calavita 1998:531)

Following Calavita’s argument Spanish immigration law is, then, focused on the initial stages of the immigration experience (Solé 2003:127), despite of several and recent reforms. Thorough consideration is not given to how new residents of Spanish territory best should be integrated into society. The characteristics of initiality of the policies in questions are similar to those of the post World War II German Gastarbeiterprogramm (Fuglerud 2001); the name of the scheme itself implying a clear supposition of the temporality of the immigrant’s residence; that he/she would leave once his/her job was done. The same attitude is visible in Spanish policies:

Immigrants in […] Spain are first and foremost workers, and they are reluctantly tolerated because there is work to be done. As if they were unexpected (and unpopular) guests at a dinner where they were the only ones willing to do the dishes, they are allowed to stay, but only on certain conditions and only until the dishes are done. (Calavita 2006:191)

The Spanish immigration law and programs of legalization that have been done every few years are thus specifically designed for the working immigrant. This means that the immigrant depends on having a work contract or recently having had one in order to acquire a resident permit. When the recession hit Spain, and especially sectors where many immigrants worked, the attainment of legal residency has become as good as impossible for those who were not already ‘in the system’. For those who have had legal residency, but lost their job on account of the recession, the maintenance of their legality depends on whether or not they succeed in finding new employment. Calavita (2006:193) argues that Spanish immigration law is actually based on illegality, through haphazard and temporary residence permits. She employs Santos’ (1993:111) concept of “institutionalized irregularity” to describe the situation. This irregularity is supported by a both symbiotic and competing relationship between immigrant and autochthonous workers (Solé 2003).

My translation from Spanish.
**Senegalese Immigrants and Labor Unions**

The Spanish labor unions have fought long and hard for their rights after the fall of Franco’s regime in 1975, but the immigrant worker, more often than not unorganized, is not accounted for in these agreements, and has for this reason been recruited by employers. Thus, the local worker is protected through the law and “networks of social protection” (Solé 2003:124), while the immigrant worker has little “bargaining capacity” (ibid.) since his network stands without a legal framework. He is therefore easily exploited in the Spanish labor market since he is dependant on his employer for his legal status (cf. Solé 2003).

The relationship between immigrant and local workers is severed by these legal practices. Instead of standing together they compete (cf. Solé 2003). Although the relationship between these two groups can be seen as symbiotic to a certain extent, considering the different niches they fill, it is actually a relation of competition steered by employers and an, once scrutinized, overall ethnified discourse. Labor unions side with employers to avoid what is perceived as immigrants’ “downward pressure on wages [that undermines] the social protection that labour has historically managed to win from capital” (Solé 2003:132).

The juridical discrimination of immigrants, especially those ‘illegal’, can threaten the migration project, but the Senegalese’s perception of his own position within Spanish society is of substantial significance in order to understand why he maintains his ambitions. As argued in Chapter 2, the ambitions for the migration project lay in an eventual return to Senegal; it is the socioeconomic advancement within the migrant’s own society that is imperative. This same perception can also partly explain the low level of immigrant membership in labor unions, since this

is not necessarily synonymous with a lack of organisation or involvement in collective initiatives by immigrant workers, since on occasions, such participation is channeled through organisations belonging to the respective ethnic communities (Colectivo IOÉ 1999b). (Solé 2003:134)

Again the membership in the migrant’s social network from home is crucial. It is usually through this that he accesses the migration project, finds employment and housing, and
builds social capital through having the possibility to give others access to the same resources. When I asked my informants about labor union membership most seemed to lack knowledge of this sort of organization, or they deemed it too costly. In the Basque Country, including Herrixka, there are several examples of formal Senegalese organizations that are based on an already existing (informal) social network, and thus often reflect e.g. ethnic belonging. These organizations are particularly directed towards the cultural and socioeconomic aspects of the Senegalese migrant’s predicament. The reliance on these (in-)formal organizations has had great significance for the viability of the migration project once the Spanish labor market was hit by la crisis (see next subsection and Chapter 5).

‘Immigrant Niches’ in the Spanish Labor Market

Calavita (2006:193) draws on Meillassoux (1981) when comparing Spanish policies of immigration to that of South Africa’s system of ‘passes’. Under apartheid black people could only work in white areas if they bore the required pass, and these passes were issued according to the needs of white employers. She argues that Spanish immigration law works in the same way in that it renders possible “the length of [the immigrant’s] stay according to the necessity of the [Spanish] economy” (2006:193). Another interesting comparison mentioned, with reference to Harris (1995), is of immigrants as the “new untouchables”, considering their vulnerability as a result of their dependence on a work contract for their legal residency (2006:197). One can draw these analogies further if one considers the system of quotas established by Spanish law in 1993, where a certain number of immigrants are allowed to (legally) enter Spanish territory each year. This number is decided upon based on the needs of certain sectors within the Spanish economy, such as those of agriculture, construction, domestic work, and catering. This practice contributes to the creation of ‘immigrant niches’ in the Spanish labor market (Calavita 2006:197) and thus opens for discrimination and racism both on the job and in society in general (Solé 2003), while maintaining the immigrant’s “dishwasher” role, often, but not exclusively, within the secondary economy.

The majority of the women I met in Herrixka worked in a local shop they called la goma; ‘the rubber’. Here they sit for hours on end cutting off excess rubber from molded pieces
that are to be sent and used within local factories of car parts. The workers are paid per piece cut and thus depend on working as fast as possible (I was told a day’s pay usually amounts to between 6 and 11 Euros). The owner of the shop is an Armenian man who apparently has found his own niche within the Basque market. He has employed a Senegalese ‘recruiter’ who is responsible for hiring workers for the shop. The employees are thus mostly Senegalese and ‘illegal’, making for inexpensive employees as they cannot access the formal labor market, especially not now during la crisis.

‘La goma’ exemplifies the duality of Spain’s immigration policies, allowing for the residence of “illegal” workers who do jobs that autochthonous workers would not accept. The same law allows for irregular immigrants to be empadronados, enrolled in the public census of one’s municipality of residence, giving them access to public goods such as education and health care. But when times are difficult, as they currently are, they still risk expulsion from the Spanish state. I will elaborate more on this paradox below.

The Paradox of Juridical Policies and Practices Affect Migrant Lives
The Spanish state has been in dire need of immigration in order to supply labor for certain sectors of its economy, but Spanish immigration law has concurrently opened for discriminative practices that can harm society over time, possibly creating racism, unrest and the type of revolts we have seen in France, Britain, and Italy in the last few years. The paradox of Spanish immigration law also severely impacts the lives of my informants. It sets the framework for how they shape their strategy for social mobility once they have entered the Spanish state, relying on the work opportunities available according to their legal status. Now that the Spanish state, economy, and labor market are trembling with fear for the future, the discourse of immigrants’ disposability of the law (and its recent reforms) exposes the immigrant as one of the most vulnerable of Spain’s residents, since his/her status as a “guest willing to do the dishes at the party” (Calavita 2006) now seems to have expired. So even if Spain has been very dependent on immigrant labor to develop its national economy, the applicable laws are formed through a discourse of the immigrant as a national threat and problem.
An indirect result of these discourses is then that “immigrants are made to depend on the renewal of their work contract in order to be able to continue to reside legally in the country, which consequently reduces their ‘negotiation power’” (Solé 2003:128). This is an important point in terms of my informants in the Basque Country. Because of their dependence on a work contract for becoming, or staying, ‘legal’, most do not risk leaving Spanish territory for fear that they never will be able to come back.

Had the immigrant held a more withstanding ‘negotiation power’, through e.g. trade unions, before la crisis, then he/she might have had a more stable residence status in the current recession ridden Spanish society. Spanish trade unions have few immigrant members and Solé (2003) argues that fear of losing one’s employment, together with the lack of knowledge of what a trade union is, are the main reasons for this. She points to the fact that most immigrant trade unionists are from Latin America, where this type of organization is quite common, while immigrants from Africa usually have little acquaintance with these formal social interest groups. This might result in a preference for a focus on their own social networks; networks that they see as more capable of promoting their interests.

In pre-recession Spain this way of thinking might very well have been the most adequate for the Senegalese immigrant’s interest. Seeing as the Spanish trade unions have not been able to adapt properly to the existence of a distinct workforce within their territory (cf. Solé 2003), perhaps with different interests than the autochthonous worker, “sticking to one’s own” might have been the best decision. It is through friendship and kinship contacts that most Senegalese immigrant workers attain work permits, employment, and a place to live:

Mouhamed arrived in Spain through his uncle who had lived many years in Herrixka, but with his two wives in Dakar. Mouhamed was first asked to go to Dakar and live in his uncle’s house to watch over his wives. After a couple of years in Dakar his uncle told him that he now ‘deserved’ to come to Spain. He arranged a work permit for his nephew, but Mouhamed himself had to organize the Senegalese paperwork. He needed to get a passport, and this can be an arduous process in Senegal; sometimes you will have to wait for two years! When he arrived at the passport issuing clerk’s desk the man behind it looked at his papers, at his
name. He asked Mouhamed “who is your father?” Mouhamed answered him whereas the clerk told him that he had lived in his father’s house before Mouhamed was born. The village where the clerk was from did not have a school and Mouhamed’s father had allowed him to stay with him to get an education. The clerk was very grateful. And Mouhamed got his passport within a week and could thus leave for Spain.

But relying on one’s social network has had repercussions once the recession set in in the Spanish market. Depending on an informal network with few strong ties to the power structures of law and economy in Spain, *la crisis* has left the Senegalese immigrant with few choices but to ‘wait it out’ if he is to keep following his strategy for social mobility.

**La crisis in Spain**

**The Causes**
The causes of the Spanish crisis are widely discussed, both academically and politically, and not entirely agreed upon. The interlinkages with the global financial crisis are apparent, but the degree to which these have mattered and made the crisis as severe as it has become, is not agreed upon. PSOE\(^{41}\) was in government for a second consecutive period\(^{42}\) when the crisis made its entrance, a fact that the Partido Popular (PP) has not let slide, blaming much of the crisis and what they deem a poor way of handling it, on PSOE. One example is Fernández\(^{43}\) (2008) article on the “foreboded crisis”. The “crisis of competitiveness” (ibid.) surges from the deficit and following bankruptcies of families and businesses, the latter leading to an enormous increase in unemployment, and thus an aggravation in the former’s situation. The reason for this situation, says Fernandez, cannot be blamed so much on the world financial crisis, although this may have accelerated the process, as on the poor politics of the Spanish government, meaning the PSOE: The ‘real’ reason for *la crisis* is the irresponsibility and short-sightedness of the PSOE government. The question then remains whether this short-sightedness has been

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\(^{41}\) PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (The Spanish Socialist Party)

\(^{42}\) PSOE were in government from the elections of 1982 to 1996, when they were replaced by PP (Partido Popular – The People’s Party). PP governed Spain until 2004 when they again were replaced by PSOE.

\(^{43}\) A liberal economist publishing through FAES, a private research institution headed by José María Aznar, former head of PP
part of PSOE’s plan (or lack thereof) for Spain, or whether what he calls the “construction monoculture” of the Spanish economy has not been a (not well thought through) strategy of the Spanish state in general. In their race to achieve economic growth and a ‘European’ standard of living, no one spoke of the monocultivated Spanish (labor) market (‘why fix it if it ain’t broke?’) until the bubble was about to burst. This tendency was present under both under PSOE’s and PP’s previous periods in government.

The Basque (labor) market is more diverse and not as dominated by one or a few important sectors, such as the case is in other regions of Spain. The sectors with strong ties to the secondary economy (and therefore employing ‘black’ workers), such as construction, agriculture, and the tourist industry, do not stand as strong in the Basque Country. This results in fewer immigrants in this region, but also greater chances of becoming ‘legal’, judging by my informants’ accounts. The greater variety in the Basque economy has been favorable when the recession hit, but has still lead to a severe increase in unemployment and a general downturn for many enterprises. Although la crisis, then, has not been as acute here as in other regions, the daily life of my informants in the Basque Country is still marked by a feeling of insecurity and doubts about one’s future within the Spanish state.

**Senegalese Resist Abandonment of Migration Project**

Most of my informants who had been employed formally in the Basque Country had only been so through temporary contracts, normally through an ‘ETT’\(^{44}\). This is a common way of hiring workers in Spain and allows employers the liberty to hire people for shorter periods of time and thus avoid extra expenses when business is slow. My informants told me that before the crisis this had been a good arrangement also for them, since it gave them the opportunity to spend long vacations in Senegal in between their contracts, a luxury a permanent contract would not allow. Seydhi (32) in Herrixka even told me he had declined an offer of a permanent contract from his employer not long before the crisis. This practice of temporary employment has thus, retrospectively, backfired for the Senegalese worker in general, but perhaps given some companies in the Basque Country

\(^{44}\) ETT – Empresa de trabajo temporal: Temporary staff recruitment agency
the ability to survive the crisis, hopefully giving workers employment possibilities in the future.

Solé (2003) argues from a Marxist point of view, that the discourse of the Spanish system of production and distribution presumes that immigrants will yield from the Spanish labor market in times of economic crisis, since it is then that “the role of reserve army that immigrant workers play is remembered, and it is assumed that they will not resist their potential exclusion or marginalisation [sic] in the economic sphere” (Solé 2003:123). In the case of my informants quite the opposite seems to be happening. The Senegalese in the Basque Country are not about to abandon the migration project just yet, even if they are aware of the rise in antagonism against them. Many stay on and wait it out, while others alter their strategies somewhat.

Yakhoub (53) left for the Basque Country in 2002; older than most migrants. He obtained a contract through Adecco, a well-known ‘ETT’, before leaving, and has been able to maintain his ‘legality’. I met him in Senegal, in a neighboring village of Dekka, through one of my informants there, and it soon turned out we knew some of the same people back in the Basque Country. He used to live in Herrixka, but now lives in a slightly larger village nearby. He says that before the crisis everything was fine. He has ‘always’ lived in the Basque Country, and the wage level and social benefits there are generally good, although life is more expensive than in other parts of Spain. But the crisis has brought a new reality. His last contract expired in September 2008, and after he finished his unemployment benefit in December 2008 he decided to go to Senegal to wait out the crisis there. This is a luxury available to those fortunate enough to have a long-term residence permit, allowing them to re-enter Spain once leaving. I asked him why he thought so many stayed in Spain even if they would be able to go to Senegal temporarily; “They think it will change. But living abroad is dangerous. The racism that it can produce. Many consequences.” He says that he only knows of one other person who has decided to go to Senegal like him; most people stay in Spain to wait (even if I did meet several people in Dakar who had done what he did, although they resided in the Southern Spain).
Yakhoub tries to do some small business while he is in Senegal. He has cultivated onions whenever he went home to visit while living in Spain. He is still trying that out, and he has also brought with him carpentry machines from Spain. He tells me that it is working out quite well:

I am trying out that business. If everything goes well I will bring more. If I cannot find a job [in Spain] I will continue with that. If you have customers and you have the opportunity to make a workshop here it will go well. […] I should not have sold them [(the machines)], but with the crisis you need to sell and make some money. But […] I will make a workshop. It goes well because the construction [sector] here is doing well. And agriculture too.

Yakhoub’s business schemes seem quite typical for many migrants. When I asked my informants in the Basque Country what they wanted for their future, most seemed reluctant to answer since the future of the present seems so insecure. But then many told me about this sort of schemes; making small businesses where their friends and family could work, finding ways of making money while keeping one foot in Spain and one in Senegal. But most are still waiting; to be able to put such a scheme into life you need certain resources like a residency permit, financial reserve, and a broad social network. Apparently Yakhoub has been fortunate in this sense. It is of course also a question of taking a leap of faith. When I asked him about what sort of effects he considered the crisis has had on people’s lives, he answered: “[Now] you have to work with your head. You cannot always work with [physical] strength. [But] some do it and some do not. It depends on the person’s spirit.”

Changes in Spanish Immigration Legislation and Practices as a Response to ‘La crisis’

The economic recession has lead to reconsiderations of state policies within several sectors. The policies regarding migration were questioned early on, while other reforms aiming to get the Spanish economy back on its feet has only recently been taking shape. I illustrate Spanish authorities’ ‘spectacle’ (cf. Neal 2009) of crisis governance through the following three cases: The reform of the Ley de extranjería, the municipal council of
Vic’s restrictions in terms of the above mentioned *empadronamiento* practices, and the *Plan de Retorno Voluntario*.

The main focus of the 2009 reform of Spanish immigration law has been to “obstruct the arrival of new immigrants given the economic crisis and the continuous increase of unemployment”\(^\text{46}\). It also aims to make the expulsion of immigrants already residing in Spain easier. The reform has been criticized\(^\text{47}\) for several reasons. It continues the favoring of EU citizens and it reinforces the criminalization of the non-EU immigrant. It also makes family reunification more difficult, and makes the legislation relevant to attain this vague so as to open for haphazard practices that can be manipulated to benefit the Spanish state in any given moment. The reform also makes the economical assistance of irregular migrants illegal, and criminalizes the *empadronamiento* of immigrants in a place of residence where he/she does not actually live, although NGOs dedicated to the assistance of ‘illegal’ immigrants are permitted to continue their work. This particular legislation can of course have severe impacts on the ways in which Senegalese immigrants in Spain assist each other in difficult times.

The recent case of the municipal council of Vic has been extensively covered by Spanish media\(^\text{48}\). Even if it is temporally situated mainly outside of my fieldwork period I have

\(^{45}\) The *empadronamiento* is one’s registration with the Spanish statistics and census services. It ensures the right to basic social goods, such as education and health services and is also employed by the immigrant to prove the duration of his stay (the requirement being 3 years in combination with an employment contract for at least one year) in Spain in order to apply for a residence permit.

\(^{46}\) “El gobierno endurece la ley de extranjería para frenar la llegada de inmigrantes” by Melchor Sáiz-Pardo October 5, 2008 in ideal.es. Viewed April 30, 2010 (quote translated from Spanish by me): 

\(^{47}\) “IU afirma que la reforma de la Ley de Extranjería muestra la ‘cara represiva’ de la política de inmigración del PSOE” by Europa Press in 20minutos online, January 27, 2010. Accessed May 20, 2010: 
http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/615687/0/

\(^{48}\) “No estoy en política para recortar derechos” by Eva Clota in El País, April 27, 2010. Viewed May 20, 2010: 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/cataluna/estoy/politica/recortar/derechos/elpepiespcat/20100427 elpcat_8/Tes

decided to include it here as an illustration of the conflictive processes at large in the Spanish state.

The general story of this case starts in January of 2010 when the municipal council of Vic in the Autonomous Community of Cataluña decides it will no longer accept the empadronamiento of “illegal” immigrants residing in the municipality. This decision goes against Spanish federal law, as stated in the Ley de extranjería even after the reform of 2009. The empadronamiento is done through the registration of oneself as a resident of a certain municipality. In order to be able to register you need to prove that you live at a given address, through e.g. presenting a lease. The empadronamiento then gives you rights to basic public services such as health care and education, basically ensuring your human rights even if you are an “illegal” resident of the Spanish state. The empadronamiento is also the easiest and most common way of proving the time of residency completed, so as to access legal residency more easily.\footnote{If one has completed 3 years of residency within the Spanish state and attains an employment contract, one is automatically granted a temporary contract of legal residence.}

To ensure these basic human rights take resources, and in a country undergoing critical economic difficulties costs have to be cut. The municipality of Vic decided to cut in the services offered to ‘illegals’ by denying them the right to empadronamiento. The Spanish state reacted with stating that this was against federal law. Vic complied temporarily before reporting the case to the EU Commission for Home Affairs, headed by Cecilia Malmström. It was there decided that “Spanish authorities are not free to...”

“Rajoy exige al Gobierno que modifique la Ley de Extranjería tras los ‘efectos de demagogia’ en Vic” in El Correo, Jan. 16, 2010. Viewed May 20, 2010: \url{http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/20100116/sociedad/rajoy-pide-gobierno-cambie-201001161602.html} \footnote{If one has completed 3 years of residency within the Spanish state and attains an employment contract, one is automatically granted a temporary contract of legal residence.}}
tolerate the irregular situation of immigrants once they are aware of it. Spanish federal law is thus deemed as going against EU regulations of immigration, although this part of the legislation was shaped to ensure ‘illegal’ immigrants basic rights as stated in international legislation of human rights. The outcome of this conflict is yet to be seen, but it thoroughly exemplifies pitfalls in both Spanish federal law, international law, and the intersections between these.

Another juridical result of the economic crisis in Spain is the elaboration of the Plan de Retorno Voluntario, or Voluntary Repatriation Plan. This was a program established to promote the voluntary return migration of already ‘legal’ migrants through the ‘capitalization’ of unemployment benefits. During my fieldwork in Bilbao I met with Elmami Brahim, a Southern Saharan lawyer specialized in Spanish immigration legislation. He explained the concept of this program to me and others, through his appearances on a show on Radio Tropical in Bilbao, directed at (primarily Latin-American) immigrants. Here he answered the legal questions of anonymous callers concerned about their situations. Many worried about family reunions and work contracts, but there were also several questions about the new repatriation plan. The immigrant is offered the disbursement of the unemployment benefits they are entitled to in two equal portions, instead of smaller, monthly shares. The first portion is to be paid while the immigrant is still in Spain, while the second is to be paid through representatives of Spanish authorities in the country of origin once the immigrant has returned home. The concerns of the callers to Radio Tropical were about the guarantees for the second payment; what were they to do if they upon their return did not receive the promised amount?

These types of concerns seem to have made most immigrants decide against this arrangement\(^{51}\). Most of those who have chosen to use this program have been from Colombia or Ecuador. My Senegalese informants were generally not considering return as an option, even if they did have the right to unemployment benefits. Migration for my informants is about more than economic gain (cf. Lambert 2002, Fagertun 2009); even if this stagnates temporarily one cannot take the easy way out and go home. Ousmane (28) told me that a Senegalese “always returns”; it is not an option for most to be buried outside of Senegal, nor to marry a non-Senegalese. People want to maintain their relationship with their country. Still, you cannot return home with “empty hands”. To ‘fill your hands’ is why you emigrate in the first place: to earn money, to help out, to take care of the family.

If you go back without anything people will talk. They will think you have not been working, that you are lazy. People will point to you in the street and say “the son of such-and-such has gone to Europe and done nothing, just ‘lived life’”. This is shameful for the family.

So even if the crisis has made filling one’s hands more difficult, going home would be the last resort. And staying holds a value in itself (cf. Bourdieu 1977).

**Chapter Conclusions**

This chapter has argued that the viability of the Senegalese migration project depends on power relations inherent in macro structures and processes (cf. Tsing 2005). The discussions of my informants’ narrations vis-à-vis structural factors like the Western discourse on nomads and migrants, Spanish immigration legislation, and the processes taking place in Spain due to the current economic crisis have sought to substantiate this argument. The migrant as an agent within his own life story must be understood in terms


him acting upon these (and other) structures. His ‘agency’ is an individual strategy to generate friction to create change, through the accumulation of economical, cultural, social, and symbolical capital (cf. Tsing 2005, Bourdieu 1977). But the “effects of encounters across difference can be compromising or empowering. Friction is not a synonym for resistance. Hegemony is made as well as unmade with friction” (Tsing 2005:6). Discourses define difference, and this definition excludes some groups from the possibility to access desirable subject positions such as those fronted by the discourse of ‘modernity’ (cf. Moore 1994). The migration project does therefore not necessarily challenge the mentioned power relations; it does not rebel against them. This chapter has sought to show how migration is movement through structures, but also how this movement is restricted.

In the following chapter I shall discuss the ways in which gender and identity construction is tied to the agent’s desire to migrate through the doxic and hegemonic discourses of man as providers and woman as nurturer (cf. Moore 1994, Bourdieu 1977). I thus discuss locally embedded power structures and I argue that migration is an outcome of Senegalese discourses on and practices of gender, but also a factor influencing the (re-)construction of these.
Chapter 4

Senegalese Gender Identity: Negotiation and Reproduction of the Provider and Nurturer through ‘Modernity and Change

We Serers say that the hand represents the different types of women. The thumb is what impedes the other hand from slipping when you shake the hand of another. The thumb grips. A good woman grips when she is told and lets go when she is told. She respects her husband. The index finger gives orders. A bad woman is like the index finger. The middle finger is situated above the other fingers. A bad woman thinks she is superior of others. The ring finger is noble; a good woman. And the little finger is the smallest, but the best one. She respects her husband. Even if she is small she is a good woman.

Hassane (26)

It is the right of a woman to have a rich man. If I want a rich man then I marry a rich man.

A fellow young female passenger on a pirogue boat on the Sine Saloum River

Introduction

So far I have shown how migration has been a part of Senegalese society for centuries, but that there are certain particularities to contemporary migration. In Chapter 2 I argued that the migration project is a strategy for socioeconomic advancement and the (re-) production of the Senegalese household. Chapter 3 showed how the migration project encounters macro structures of global processes and the Spanish state, generating friction. This friction can lead to change, but the sort of change created depends on the power relations present in the encounter between structures and agent (cf. Tsing 2005).
migration project as one such encounter thus enables movement towards the ‘good life’, but does not necessarily challenge the ‘structuring structures’ the migrant moves within (cf. Bourdieu 1977, Swartz 2002). Global events, e.g. the current economic recession, can also create unforeseen hinders for the continuation such movement, and thus has severe implications for the individuals involved in the migration project.

The reciprocal relationships (re-)produced within the Senegalese transcontinental household arguably involve gendered discourses on subject positions (cf. Moore 1994). I argue that the migration project as a strategy for socioeconomic advancement is in itself gendered, and is more likely to be pursued by men than women due to the Senegalese discourse of man as provider and woman as nurturer, and discuss marriage as a possible correlating strategy for women. Through my informants’ account I show how Senegalese gender identity is constructed and construed and how household and material production is organized through kinship and generation in (rural) Senegal. Furthermore I will shed light on the continuous processes of change at hand when it comes to the construction of (gender) identity, by showing the ambiguity by which Senegalese feminine identity is represented by her male counterparts; to the Senegalese man women seem to be both the continuation of and a danger to ‘tradition’.

As Senegalese society is continuously being reshaped, its cultural discourses are being renegotiated. This renegotiation seems to both challenge and preserve hegemonic gender discourses as they are shaped by both local and global socio-cultural processes (cf. Lambert 2002). Mass media and migration are two such processes (cf. Appadurai 1998). There is not always consensus as to what is the dominant gender discourse, as “the experience of race, sexuality and class, as well as other forms of salient difference, transform the experience of gender” (Moore 1994:15). Looking at the representations of woman- and manhood through hegemonic gendered subject positions, and how these are challenged through differing practices, is thus essential to understand which discourses are flowing beneath the surface of Senegalese ‘tradition’ (cf. Moore 1994).
Movement without Revolt: Ascending within Senegalese Society

Although Senegal is considered to be one of few countries in Africa where democracy has had relative success, Senegalese women and men seem to be relatively discontent with the condition of their state. Masseck’s (27) examples of firefighters and ambulances in Chapter 1 reflect a seemingly general experience of the state; that its supposed function of (re-)distributor of resources and enabler of socioeconomic stability and advancement is not fulfilled. To excel and prosper the agent needs to rely on himself and his contiguous social network (Lambert 2002:168-169).

Throughout a lifetime different opportunities for (arduously) climbing society’s socioeconomic hierarchy might present themselves to the agent. In Senegal there are certainly other such opportunities than those in focus here, migration and marriage, depending on factors such as age, generation, positions of power and prestige, ethnicity and economical affluence. Relative to the agent’s position in society he/she will make different choices regarding strategies for advancing socioeconomically, since one’s place within the societal structures to a large degree determines the access to the economic and social resources that lay the basis for maneuvering within and beyond these structures. One example in terms of gender and generation is the way many mothers in Senegal seem to wish for their sons to emigrate, so that they and their family will be secured economically in their old age. A strategy of social mobility for a middle aged or aging woman from rural Senegal thus might be to encourage her son, both morally and perhaps economically, to go abroad, or at least to a larger city, so that he will have the chance to make a better income than in the village. The reason for why it is specifically sons who are encouraged to migrate is tied to a man’s role as provider for the household, specifically if he is the eldest. I will elaborate on this later in this chapter.

The concept of strategy refers to choices made by individuals to achieve a goal, in this case the accumulation of economical, social, cultural, and symbolic capital in order to sustain and advance as an agent within one’s social networks (cf. Bourdieu 1977). My understanding of the migration project as a strategy for movement does not reflect a view of the world as free of socio-economic structures that can inhibit, enable, or even prevent
such strategies. The Comaroffs (cf. 2004a&b) discuss the post-apartheid rise in a South African “obsession” with crime in media, entertainment and folk discourse as a symptom of a governmentality process aimed at embedding and justifying power relations now taking shape in South Africa. As part of the discussion lays the argument that crime in South Africa can be viewed as a way for agents to attempt a redistribution of resources within a system that allows for and even promotes economical inequality, namely the capitalist state. Like crime, migration is a manner of operating outside established societal structures, although the moral implications of these schemes might be on the opposite side of the ‘right-wrong’ scale, depending on the cases in question. Transcontinental migration from Senegal often involves breaking national and international law (see Chapter 3), but socially it is not categorized with other sorts of ‘criminal’ activities such as theft or violence; it is not deemed immoral. In terms of the global economy migration is thus comparable to the Comaroffs’ (ibid.) view of criminality, although there are important differences when it comes to what these two strategies for economic gain might imply socially for the agents involved. I also wish to underline that I do not perceive Senegalese transcontinental migration as an indication of a consolidated rupture of, revolt against, or resistance towards these global structures, as the Comaroffs (ibid.) imply.

I do not find migration to be an organized attempt to fight a collective battle of and for the poor, but rather numerous individuals’ attempts to attain a better life for themselves and their families, through collaboration and dependency on each other. My informants have made what they believed to be educated choices based on certain factors; the opportunities, information and knowledge available to them. These factors are shaped by both ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, as they are part of the culture and society that fostered these individuals; a culture and society that are connected with the global market and media (cf. Appadurai 1996). Their “capacity to aspire” (cf. Appadurai 2004) is neither grounded in ‘tradition’ nor ‘modern’ market economics, but global structural realities that can hold people back, while allowing for, and even implicitly promoting, certain types of solutions to problems partially caused by the same structures. The strategies pursued by my informants have hence been shaped on the individual, social and global level.

78
Marriage and Migration

When looking at national surveys of immigration to Spain, the immense discrepancy between the number of Senegalese male and female immigrants within the Spanish state, and the Basque Country, is striking. Although the percentage of female migrants seems to be increasing, both from Senegal and Africa in general, the current statistics show that there are nine times as many Senegalese men in Spain as compared to their female counterparts. I argue that the reason for this vast contrast in numbers is the difference in master narratives of gender for men and women, making the migration project more available to men (cf. Moore 1994). This is not to say that the Senegalese master narrative of gender does not allow for variations. On the contrary; my data shows that women do migrate, and they are increasingly taking the same type of risks as men in order to reach their destination. Still, the contestation of hegemonic discourses on Senegalese gender roles these female migrants seem to represent are an exception from the rule. This exception can, then, arguably confirm the existence of a hegemonic discourse through the friction generated when discourses intersect (Tsing 2005). The same friction also explains the continuous change and flux inherent in such discourses:

[Even if] multiple discourses exist, some discourses are dominant over others and some are appropriate only to specific contexts [...]. In the case of discourses on the person/self, what appears as dominant models may actually turn out to be relatively divorced from everyday life and experience. (Moore 1994:34)

Female transnational migration shows that although there exists a general opinion as to what women ought to do in life, this opinion is not only undergoing change, but it allows for pragmatism when it comes to overcoming the strife of everyday life (Mbow & Bâ 2008). Even if a woman’s practice articulates a different discourse than the one hegemonic, this might be overlooked, or even applauded, in the cases in which the outcome of her practice is favorable for her peers and family. One such exception is the

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52 89, 2% of Senegalese in the Province of the Basque Country are men according to INE - Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute of Spain), elaborated by Ikuspegi.

collective of women I interviewed in the village of Herrixka. Several of them had arrived in the Basque Country through the same strategy: They had been recruited in Senegal to go to Huelva in the South of Spain as seasonal agricultural workers. Close to the expiration date of their issued visas of three months they made off for Herrixka where some of them had relatives. In sum these women, all unmarried, but one with a child back in Senegal, followed the same sort of strategy as what their male counterparts could have done. The motivations driving these migrant women seem to be much the same as the men’s; earning and saving up money, but they did not mention “helping the family” when listing their reasons, even if all of them claimed to send remittances as often as possible. The discrepancy in the discourse of male versus female migrants thus seems to lie in the articulation, or lack thereof, of their role of household provider. Additionally, the fact that these women migrate might also delineate a certain type of conflict created in the meeting of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in the Senegalese context that I will analyze further below.

But the bottom line remains; migration is predominantly undertaken by men. As my female informants have been fewer and less available, and I do not claim to present an exhaustive overview of strategies available to Senegalese women (or men) when it comes to socioeconomic advancement. I do, on the other hand, imply that one strategy which might sooner mean an upper socioeconomic climb for most women rather than men, in the way that the contrary is true for men and migration, is marriage. This does not mean that men cannot marry ‘upwards’; one example of this is marriages between Senegalese men and toubab\textsuperscript{54} women. But on the basis of social institutions in Senegal women are more likely to desire, expect, or demand a socioeconomic ascent through marriage than men. Part of the reasons for this, and for men’s migration strategy, lie in ‘tradition’, while, as I will illustrate further below, ‘modern’ types of needs and desires also seem to play a significant part in the motivation behind life paths chosen by young Senegalese today.

\textsuperscript{54} Toubab – Wolof term used for white people/foreigners of seemingly European descent.
**Women and Marriage**

Mbow and Bâ (2008) claim that the phenomenon of unmarried women is making itself continuously more prominent in Senegal, especially among those with higher education in urban areas, and that this is in general viewed as problematic. They argue that “in Senegal, the collective conscience, which holds great importance, pushes women to consider marriage as a social support, sometimes understood as ‘social peace’” (Mbow & Bâ 2008:255). My empirical data implies that this social support seems to consist in the reliance on one’s husband for income and thus the economic and social sustainability of one’s family (cf. Lambert 2002). Traditionally, remaining unmarried has meant being an economical burden on one’s ‘biological’ family, as one would be included in the household one’s father and brothers had the responsibility of maintaining. Hence, a woman’s social responsibility towards her kin has arguably been to get married. It has also been a ticket to socioeconomic ascent.

Women’s roles in society have changed, and there are those who work and support themselves economically. The probability of this is higher the more education one has (cf. Mbow & Bâ 2008). Still, I find that my data shows a tendency towards women’s desire to marry. Adawa (26), my hostess in Dakar, studies at the same university where Mbow teaches. Her face lights up when someone calls her by her husband’s last name; Madame Sow. Other women, with less formal education than Adawa, also expressed a desire to marry, even my informants in Herrexka; women who had emigrated on their own to try their luck in an unknown society. When I asked these women about plans for the future, marriage and children was mentioned by most everyone.

Mbow & Bâ claim that one of the reasons for why highly educated and working women marry less and later are the attitudes of Senegalese men: “[...] essentially patriarchal, makes the masculine gender difficultly accept the superior status of a woman” (Mbow and Bâ 2008: 2-3). But also women in rural areas, in regions like Fatick, where the ‘economic environment’ leaves much to be desired, have

55 My translation from Spanish.
56 My translation from Spanish.
trouble finding a husband due to migration. The authors thus claim that the economic crisis in Senegal is altering gender relations in that men are becoming more accepting of women’s status increase once they actually might depend economically on this, and that women in rural areas many times marry later than before, since so many of the young men migrate (Mbow and Bâ 2008:2).

This is in line with my own observations from the field. There exists a general discourse in terms of gendered subject positions, expressed by both women and men, but life’s challenges might cause a renegotiation of these for pragmatic reasons. But the gender identities tied to these subject positions are still strong and very much articulated in Senegalese society. While some women choose to get married later, others have to wait due to the absence of eligible bachelors. Still, as even rural villages are connected to the global processes at large in the world, young women (and men) are bound to make more varied choices than before. As traditional systems of production are altered and ‘development’ creates new needs, ‘modernity’ inspires new desires (cf. Lambert 2002).

One way for men to meet these desires is through the migration project. Based on ‘traditional’ structures of gender roles it is then natural that a woman’s ‘modern’ desires should be aspired to first through the most culturally accepted forms of social advancement; marriage. As both ‘modern’ law and ‘tradition’ permit Senegalese men to engage in polygyny, Senegalese womanhood also implies relating to this possibility. Since Senegalese women arguably desire to marry into socioeconomic stability, and even affluence, and the same qualities are necessary for a man to marry more than one woman, polygyny seems tied to migration through the concepts of social, economical, and symbolical capital (cf. Bourdieu 1977). This will be discussed further below, after discussing ‘traditional’ versus ‘modern’ conceptualizations of gender.

‘Tradition’ and Gender Roles: Kinship and Household Organization
The fact that my informants have certain ways of organizing their lives based on what they conceive as ‘tradition’ does not mean that there exists an essential institution within Senegalese society that has not been and will not be altered with time. It is in moments
of change what you had becomes clearer, although it might also lead to a glorification of past shapes of the institutions in question (cf. Hobsbawm 1995). Most of my male informants, young and old, insisted on maintaining ‘traditional’ gender roles. A woman should respect her husband and her elders, meaning a woman should do what she is asked to do. A good woman is a woman who “knows tradition”. She does not allow herself to be seduced by the Western culture allegedly promoted through television by e.g. wearing short skirts or low cut shirts. Senegalese ‘tradition’ is often postulated as against ‘Western culture’ when it comes to womanhood, and the traditional relation between husband and wife is one where the wife obeys her husband and the morality of the local community. To understand more I asked many of my informants what they considered to be a good wife.

Bachir (28) is the oldest brother of Adawa (26), my hostess in Dakar. He lives in an apartment in Herrixka with his uncle in law, Ousseynou (36), and three others. Bachir has been in Spain almost two years and speaks Spanish quite well already. He was able to obtain a contract with a company in the Autonomous Community\(^{57}\) of Asturias and is thus a legal resident of the Spanish state. The contract guaranteed him employment for one year, but since its expiration he has been without a job. He thus decided to stay with Ousseynou in Herrixka since the Basque Country still had not been hit as hard by ‘la crisis’ as other parts of Spain. He still has had no luck in terms of finding employment, but tries to keep himself busy by taking courses offered to the unemployed by the municipality or INEM\(^{58}\). I asked him about his plans for the future in terms of marriage and also what a good wife would be like. I find that he reproduced the dominant discourse of gender roles in Senegalese society through his reply:

To have a good wife… Since I am the oldest of my family and the one with responsibility…for maintaining the household. To live with…like all people… Have a wife, a son, a daughter. She should be able to help my

\(^{57}\) The Spanish state is made up of 19 “autonomous communities” (comunidades autónomas), including the two “autonomous cities” (ciudades autónomas) of Ceuta and Melilla. These are subdivided into provinces and then municipalities.

\(^{58}\) Abbreviation for ‘Instituto Nacional de Empleo’ – ‘National Employment Institute’, the state welfare and employment service, comparable to Norwegian NAV.
mother in the house. Since I have sisters; all of them will get married. Then it is good to have a wife that can help my mother. That’s why. But I have not found what I want. I am looking into what I would like.

The Senegalese household is generally large in terms of members, at least in the rural villages, which are organized on the grounds of extended agnatic households (cf. Fagertun 2009). In Senegalese, and Serer, society patrilineal practices of inheritance and virilocal residence dominate, although matrilineality was the rule in pre-colonized and pre-Islam Senegal (Sow 1985) (the legacy of matrilineality can still be seen in the glorification of motherhood (Bop 2005), as I will elaborate on below).

Access to productive resources mainly goes through social networks, in particular kin groups, thus one’s position within such networks is of vital importance for one’s ability to provide a livelihood (Sow 1985:564, Perry 2009:57). The eldest son is expected to bring his wife to live in his parents’ household so that this is reproduced and maintained, and his wife is considered a supplement to the workforce of the household. When the parents become old the eldest son is also responsible for their care, through his wife. If there are younger siblings living in the household while it is under his care, he is also economically and morally responsible for them. In many instances younger brothers will also bring their wives to live in the same household, but this is not ‘obligatory’ in the same sense. Things are also changing in the cities, where rent is expensive and maintaining a large household can be quite difficult.

Adawa (26) and Ibou (34) explained that they do not live with his family, even if he is the oldest son, because it is very unpractical in terms of his work and her studies at the university. Ibou works in the military and is stationed downtown. The job offers them inexpensive accommodation in the center, saving them perhaps a couple of hours of travelling every day through Dakar’s chaotic traffic in order to get to and from work. But Ibou still upholds his other obligations towards his family, such as weekly visits, financial support, and the participation in family religious celebrations, where Adawa, as his wife, is expected to join them, and not her own family as she would have done before she got married. ‘Tradition’ thus takes pragmatic turns to accommodate to city life,
although this does not mean a divergence from the master narrative of Senegalese gendered subject positions, simply a reshaping of the conditions for them. Conclusively it seems plausible to generalize Senegalese gender roles into a distinction between the man as provider and woman as nurturer.

Gender, Hospitality and Food: The Provider and the Nurturer
The first time I noticed how food matters to the Senegalese, I was invited to celebrate Korite\(^59\) in Herrixka. Ramadan was over and we were to celebrate; going from house to house to eat. It was not the first time food had been a topic with my informants; it seemed to be something they were in general concerned with. Food, especially Senegalese food, is not taken lightly, so to speak. It is heavy and filling and takes a long time to prepare.

7. Senegalese dinner at a ‘baptism’ celebration in Herrixka.

When watching television with Adawa in Dakar I recognized some of the dishes I had already tasted with my informants in the Basque Country popping up in commercials. Happy and laughing women prepare the most abundant dishes and offer them to their

\(^{59}\) The Wolof name for the celebration of the end of the fasting month of Ramadan (Eid ul-Fitr in Arabic).
husbands and children. Another woman spies on her neighbor to uncover her ‘secret’; how does her food always smell so good? In another commercial a man cannot decide between the two dishes offered to him by his two wives; they are both too tempting. He starts dancing of joy when they give him a taste of what they are cooking.

It seems a woman’s gender identity is, through Senegalese doxa, tied to her role as a nurturer for her husband and her children (cf. Bourdieu 1977). This view is confirmed by Bop (2005) who writes on women’s role within the Sufi tariqas of Senegal. These powerful religious organizations shape identity construction of both men and women, and especially in the Mouride tariqa[^60] where the image of the ideal woman is portrayed as mother (cf. Bop 2005). The mother holds a particular position for the Mouride through a separate cult for Mame Diarra Bousso, the mother tariqa’s founder, whose image represents extraordinary qualities such as patience, perseverance, commitment, loyalty, a spirit of sacrifice, modesty, and the acceptance of seclusion. [...] [The] behaviors and attitudes that support the structures of the tariqas are idealized and presented as normative for all women. (ibid. 2005:1114-1115).

**The Puzzle of Senegalese Feminine Identity**

Notwithstanding the normative virtues of the ideal Muslim woman, Senegalese womanhood holds dimensions that give her image certain ambiguity. These dimensions seem linked to what Bop calls “women’s assumed impurity” (2005:1114). Seydhi (32) once told me, when talking about religion, that they, as Muslims, regard women as a “secret”. That is why she should not be shared with other men. That is why she should dress appropriately when she is outside her home. Ousmane (28) stated some of the same opinions; Senegalese women have something indescribable, something special. So apart from their ability to nurture, they are alluring in the ways they relate to their men.

Women are both the object of men’s desire, beautiful and seductive, and representations of aspects of society gone wrong. They are at the same time the bearers and destroyers of

[^60]: The Mouride brotherhood was founded in Senegal, as opposed to the other large Sufi brotherhoods active in the country, by Ahmadou Bamba, now a respected historical figure of Senegal. Many of my informants belong to the Mouride brotherhood.
‘tradition’. Senegalese men seem to be proud of the beauty of their women, and Senegalese women in general take great care to look their best according to their means. But the conspicuous consumption involved in this quest for beauty is frowned upon by men, especially when they themselves are unable to finance it.

This ambiguity towards women appears related to men’s will to migrate. Migration can increase a man’s eligibility as a husband: It can help finance marriage and economically support the household. The factor of conspicuous consumption, by both men and women, is also important in this regard. Friedman (1991:161) argues in opposition to Appadurai (1986) that “[things] do not have social lives. Rather, social lives have things”.

Modernity in Senegal is characterized by a new pattern of consumption; its conspicuousness is now related to products that are economically difficult to attain for many, while the ‘need’ for the same products seems to augment (cf. Lambert 2002). Women are construed by men as unveiling “the fundamental principle of modern consumerism [, namely] the realization of the private fantasy driven by a desire that can, by definition, never be satisfied” (Friedman 1991:158, with reference to Campbell 1987).

Bashir’s (28) statement above shows that women, according to many men, are more readily seduced by the desires produced by globalized ‘modernity’. But this seduction of femininity also makes her all the more beautiful and desirable herself, while her demands in terms of what a man ought to bestow upon her become greater. A man’s desire to attract women can thus become frustrating in that ‘modernity’ unsettles the power relations between the genders. Although the doxic discourse on gendered subject positions appears unchanged, the dynamics between men and women are more unpredictable than before, and render a renegotiation of gender identity and power possible (cf. Bourdieu 1977, Moore 1994). Even if ‘traditional’ household structures are preached, both by individuals and e.g. through the media, what is practiced within families and couples is a subtle but perpetual (re-)negotiation of power structures that women might slowly be gaining more access to. The feelings of ‘abjection’ (cf. Ferguson
1999) this (re-)negotiation can produce are articulated in e.g. men’s dualistic conceptualization of the Senegalese woman and elders’ stance on today’s youth.

**Intergenerational Power Struggles**

“A generational contrast can […] be made between those who grew to adulthood in the first two decades of African independence (1960-80), and their successors who see their ‘youth’ as something which is at risk of becoming indefinitely prolonged” (Cruise O’Brien 1996:58). The structures present in the lives of contemporary Senegalese men and women are different than those of their parents’ or grandparents’ youth. As local lives and economies have become increasingly intertwined with global processes (cf. Lambert 2002, Tsing 2005), living a ‘good life’ becomes difficult. The definition of a ‘good life’ is informed by both ‘modern’ desires of commodity consumption (cf. Lambert 2002) and ‘traditional’ practices of household, gender, and generational relations. Although ‘traditional’ practices and discourses are a very significant part of contemporary Senegalese society, there arguably exists inter-generational conflict on account of ‘modern’ practices. The critique of youth by elders seems particularly directed towards the woman, perhaps because a change for the ‘Western’ in her subject position would indicate great instability within Senegalese patriarchal structures (cf. Perry 2009).

The power negotiation between the genders thus shares the characteristics of the processes taking place between the older and younger generations in Senegal. Perry (2009) describes the opposition of young men against their elders in rural areas of Senegal. The village elders sanction this opposition through coercive acts of physical violence performed by local police in cooperation with the elders. Perry argues that these sanctions show the male elders’ quest for power affirmation in a ‘modern’ environment that is continuously questioning their authority. There lies a paradox in the elders’ use of representatives of the same state that is challenging their authority, to affirm and regain their power.
Similar dynamics are arguably visible in the accounts of Madame Dia, one of the elderly women I was able to speak to in Dekka. She told me that today’s generation does not know the tradition because they do not live in it. When I asked for an example she spoke to me about women and the devils:

In the past women did not go out at night, but today they do. In the night the woman who goes out can meet a devil and it can make her sick. Both in her head and her body. It is not the same for men, because if men see the devil they can control it. The devil can be in the fields or outside of them. Everywhere. They can live in the trees.

My interpreter explains that there is a devil in the same tree we are sitting beneath: “There is a certain hour at night when the devils come out,” he says. “Around midnight”. I ask if Madame Dia has ever seen a devil. She replies that “the night is for the devils, the day is for the people”. But she and her son tell me a story of a man who met one:
Djibril met a devil. He lived on this land. Now he is dead. He died because he met a devil. He got sick in the head. In general men who meet the devils are not affected. Djibril lived in Dakar. He did not know the things that happen on this land. When he came to Dekka he went to see his sister at night. In the street he met a devil who gave him a sickness that killed him. The sister did not get sick. There are people who can fight against the devil. The sister could fight the devil, Djibril could not. His sister has seen five devils, while Djibril only saw the devil once. The sister could fight against the devil because she knew how. You use water and you recite a verse from God. You pour it on your body before going out in the street. Djibril did not know of this phenomenon to fight against the devil. In general people in Dekka know. There are people in Dakar who know how to fight with the devil because they come to Dekka to talk to the elders [to learn how].

We continue to talk about the city, about Dakar. Madame Dia expresses disapproval over the behavior of this generation’s women. In her time women did not go out at night. They did not have television and did not go to the cinema. A woman should stay with her family at night. If she sees films from Europe she should not practice what she sees: “It is not the same for the people who live in this village. It is not the same civilization.”

Perry’s (2009) cases of intergenerational conflict and the views of Madame Dia arguably show a tendency of elders’ discontent with today’s Senegalese youth. While Madame Dia did not seem to try to sanction the behavior of the youth other than through her verbal discontent, the elderly (men) in Perry’s accounts did. Still I find that both cases underline a general apprehension seen in Senegalese cultures today, namely the fear of loss of tradition.

In the traditional social structures lays power, and thus privileges (be they material or intangible), bestowed upon certain individuals. Both in the case of elderly versus youth, and in men versus women, the renegotiation of these power structures naturally alarm those currently in charge; the elderly and the men. I will now look at how the gendered subject positions discussed above are expressed through the symbolic values articulated through food and its consumption.
Food and Hospitality: Teranga Abroad and at Home

When the migrants are away they think back on the food prepared to them at home with longing, while they also stay connected with their homes through the food prepared and consumed in exile. Food is also important in terms of the rituals around eating, an aspect many of my informants commented on. They themselves drew parallels to what they consider an important difference between European and Senegalese culture; namely the teranga; the Senegalese hospitality and solidarity. Teranga is present in the way everyone gathers around the same big plate, eating together using their hands. They consume and reproduce their cultural identity through sharing a meal. Teranga through the consumption of food symbolizes how, and is one of the concrete ways in which, a Senegalese will always help someone in need if he/she can. I was told repeatedly, both in the Basque Country and in Senegal, that “in Senegal you will never go hungry”. Strangers are welcomed into homes to eat, sleep, and receive any assistance they need. Teranga is a cultural trope that is widely and proudly spoken of. It is even the slogan of Senegal as a country when advertised to tourists: “Senegal – The Land of Teranga”. The relationship between teranga and food is thus both material and symbolical, and it is also gendered.

The typical Senegalese way of serving a meal is in a big dish placed on the floor or the ground. People sit around it and everyone has their own little ‘corner’ in the dish. In the Sine Saloum region what is served every evening is Senegalese couscous, made of barley, while in other regions, such as Dakar, rice or potatoes is a more common basis of the meal. In the middle of the dish, on top of the couscous or rice, a mix of vegetables, meat or fish is placed. The amount varies with the number of people and what the family can afford. Usually a sauce is then poured into each person’s little ‘pocket’ rounded out with your right hand. Everyone then proceeds to eat, lumping the food together in their right hand and pushing it into their mouths. The women, usually the one ‘in charge’ of the meal, having made it, divides up the protein rich food in the middle of the dish with her hand and distributes small pieces of it throughout the meal to each person participating. She thus makes sure everyone gets their share and that nobody goes hungry. As a guest I was repeatedly told by both women and men to eat more: “Il faut manger!”
The woman thus becomes the nurturer of both the household members and those visiting; she is the one responsible for the materialization of teranga, while the man is the one responsible for ‘putting food on the table’ in a more abstract sense; for providing the means necessary for the family to be able to eat (Perry 2005: 215).

This sense of solidarity is a way of establishing new social relationships and maintaining those already at hand. It is also a manner in which one is able to show the household’s status. If one is able to care for and share with many, the household is both considered to hold enough resources for this, signifying economic stability or even abundance, and to consist of good people; people who share and redistribute their wealth. Since the distribution happens through the woman’s responsibilities within the household she becomes the signifier in the teranga symbolism, but the implicit cause of her ability to carry out the ‘sharing and caring’ is the man’s hard work and ability to care for his family. Hence, a man who is, through his income, able to care for many, is a good man, and the woman, or women, by his side, who convert the man’s financial care into nurture, are good women. Teranga thus means more than hospitality; it means distancing yourself from egotistical action and individualism, promoting what some of my informants have called the ‘African’ notion of family, reciprocity and solidarity, factors implicit in the gender identity and subject positions of Senegalese men and women.

**Affluence and Polygyny**

Another practice of the Senegalese teranga, and an important aspect of Senegalese male identity and status, is, as mentioned, reflected in polygyny. The general financial difficulties in Senegal in combination with a female population who allegedly demands increasingly more from their men, also leads to a reduction of the number of men who are able to marry more than one woman.

Omar (52) in Dekka tells me that before a man could maintain four wives with approximately 40,000 francs CFA per month, but now even 100,000 francs CFA a month are not enough. There are fewer marriages now than before, he says: “I will give you an example: I have been married 23 years. I would like to find another wife. But I cannot make it [financially]. I do not have the means. If I would have the means I would look
for one!” He tells me that his situation is common, that most men are like him. “There are not the means [to practice polygyny]. Life is expensive. […] You are forced to remain with only one wife”. I ask him why men want to have many wives.

I will explain everything now. Because our religion allows us to have four wives. Islam. If you have the means you can aspire to this. If you have the means; it is not obligatory. Because it is said that if you have four wives, you have to take care of the four of them. Everything they want, you should find the money so as to give it to them. Satisfy their needs. […] If you have the means… Well! You can find yourself up to four wives.

I ask him if such a man is considered a ‘big man’. He tells me that usually yes. If you have four wives you have a great responsibility. “Do people admire him?” I ask. “Admire?” he replies, “Yes, especially the women, eh! Those four women… Each one has their turn. They take good care of their husband. […] Everything [he] wants [they] find to please [him].” Polygyny thus seems to be desired, in every sense of the word, by many men. More than one wife would signify a rise in status, and imply an a-priori possession of the financial means to provide for a large household.

Having more than one wife has long been a sign of affluence and power in Senegal. Senegalese feminists argue against polygyny due to the imbalanced power relation between a man and his wives in such a marriage (Mbow and Bâ 2008, Bop 2005), but the discourses used by intellectuals are not in the same genre as those employed by my informants. Moore’s (1994) contesting discourses conceptualize the ways in which my female informants have talked about polygyny.

Bintou is approximately 35 years old and lives in Dekka. She is originally from Ghana, so we speak in English together, but is married to a man from Dekka. Her husband is currently in Spain, where he has made a good life for both himself abroad and his wife and children at home. He has even brought one of their sons there to live with him and go to school and the economic success of his endeavors is visible in their home. The house stands apart from many of the other houses of Dekka. It is made of concrete, as opposed to clay. It has several rooms divided between just her and the children. There
are many pieces of furniture and a big flat screen television. Bintou is very happy with her husband: “My husband is very good to me. He loves me very much. He always helps me.”

When I ask her what is needed for a woman to marry a man she says it is important that he has a good job: “If you do not have money, if you do not work, they will not marry you”. This is because women want many children, and many children imply many expenses. She herself only has three, but she would like to have 10, even 15. She says her husband would like this. “If you do not have many children [your husband] will marry another woman to have [them]”. She does not want to have a co-wife, but she says that that is not for her to decide. Her religion allows her husband to get another wife if he so chooses. For now this is not something he wants, but perhaps in the future, she says. If he has the money. But for her, ‘enough money’ would mean sufficient means to build another compound, so that she and the potential co-wife would not live together. And her husband respects this wish.

Amina (26) lives in a neighboring village of Dekka and is married to Biram (32) who migrated to the Basque Country two years ago. She lives with her family in law and takes care of her two children. She used to go to school, but had to leave once she got married to perform her duties as a wife. While Bintou opposes polygyny on a personal level because she dreads having to share her household and her husband with another woman, Amina welcomes the thought. For her polygyny is normal and if Biram married a second wife it would free her from some of her responsibilities in the house and she would be able to pursue her own goals, such as her studies or getting a job to earn her own money. She would like to work in the police or as a teacher and make an income so as to take care of her parents and children.

The difference between the discourses employed by my informants vis-à-vis the more intellectual discourse of Senegalese feminists, is that they are more pragmatic. They seem largely influenced by my informants’ hopes and aspirations for their own future; the ethics and ideology of the practice itself is not questioned. My informants’ views on
polygyny illustrate that ‘traditional’ gendered subject positions remain hegemonic in Senegalese society, although how and why they are practiced might vary. In the next section I will look further into the institution of marriage through what is by many considered an increasing problem in Senegal; divorce.

‘Modern’ Paradox: Divorce and the Westernizing of Women

The paradox at hand comes to show in the conflicts created by these new ways of reproducing cultural norms. While the transcontinental migration of men and the desire of women to marry someone well off represent continuity with ‘tradition’, it creates a rupture with what is depicted as a harmonious past (cf. Hobsbawm 1983), when everyone knew and lived according to ‘tradition’. Again I will present a mostly male view of this paradox, but I find that these views articulate the issues in question substantially.

When talking with people in Senegal I became aware of an acute concern about increasing divorce rates and the implication women were seen to have in these. Seeing as women nowadays have become more and more concerned with money and luxury they were no longer happy with their husbands even if they were hard workers. I asked Bashir (28) about this upon my return to the Basque Country:

It is true [that divorce rates are increasing]. […] It is the women’s fault! The women’s, and the men’s also, but more the women’s. But it is life that is changing. You can have a husband that works and he helps you, and then one day you see your [girl]friend that is very [economically] stable. That’s why they look at their friend and they think “oh my husband does not have the capacity to support me, it is better to find a man who has more”. Those are the ideas that break up many marriages in Senegal. That’s the way it is. It’s the truth. Many young women break out. That is the problem. Many materialists. It is not good. But I swear it is the truth. […] That is why, before getting married, it is important to take it slow, to look for what is good for you. I am here and I call those living in Senegal. It is better to “look” slowly, call your family, friends… And they tell you about her. It is better. And when I go there I will go to her house to see how her family lives. Everything depends on the family, the family of the girl. It is true. It’s the materialism. There are many materialist girls. That is why there are many divorced women. Not everyone is like that; there are men who are lucky. But we cannot all have the same type of luck. And the girls do not understand that. “Give me 100 Euros, give me money to buy a mobile phone, give me money to buy I
don’t know what, I don’t have that.” And later she yells “it cannot be, my friend, her husband gives her everything she wants!” That’s it. There is a lot of it. That’s why now... Slowly. Before getting married you have to move slowly.

Ousseynou (36), who lives with Bashir in Herrixka, has his wife and child in Senegal and whom he has not seen for 3 years due to his ‘illegality’. He also told me that Senegalese women in general want “a lot of money and things”, but in terms of divorce his views are more moderate:

Well, I think divorce is the reality of all countries. Because we are living in the time of globalization. Of modernization. Well... There is something that changes in people. Because before having a wife was a ‘fortune’. It was not something easy. To have a wife was a ‘fortune’ and you had to preserve that. But now people get married when they want and when they do not want it anymore they get a divorce and that’s that. Before it was not like that. I think it’s the effect of modernization. I think it’s the only reason.

An increase in what Bashir calls materialism might very well be one of the reasons why divorce rates have gone up. But this ‘modern’ conspicuous consumption is arguably practiced by both men and women; it is men who undertake migration. Consequently migration is part of ‘modern’ Senegal and is one process that splits up families, like in Ousseynou’s case. It is also a way for young men to challenge patriarchal power relations, as women do through their requirements for a man worth marrying and staying married to. Migration must thus be seen in light of the seeming dissolve of ‘traditional’ patriarchy and kinship organization, although discourses of these organizations continue in the practices of the younger generations.

**Chapter Conclusions**

This chapter has shown how the gendered subject positions of provider and nurturer are negotiated and reproduced within the context of ‘modernity’ and change. I have argued that the Senegalese strategies for socioeconomic advance are generally different for men and women. These strategies derive from the Senegalese doxa of hegemonic gender discourses, but also challenge the same discourses as they renegotiate ‘traditional’ power
relations of gender and generation inherent in Senegalese patriarchal social structures. I have focused on two such strategies; marriage for women and migration for men, and I have situated my discussions within the Senegalese context of kinship and hospitality practices. Through the social institutions in Senegalese culture gendered subject positions and complementary identities are shaped, and these again render different strategies more applicable to one gender than the other.

Migration and marriage as current aspects of transnationality and transcontinentality are tied to global forces that act upon local structures of power, resource distribution, and income opportunities (cf. Tsing 2005). These are again reproduced and negotiated through social relations such as those between men and women and those within the household. Social relations are shaped by emotions, but these emotions are circumscribed by interpersonal and reciprocal expectations both in the sense of what is deemed ‘good’ or ‘normal’ behavior and in how a person is supposed to be reciprocated (see also Chapter 3). The shaping of Senegalese gender identity is thus part of migration as a global and globalizing process.

The constant flux of gender identities in Senegalese society affects the way migration is carried out, but also how migration might be shaping these gender identities. I have postulated that the ways in which Senegalese manhood is construed within Senegalese culture, both in terms of men’s role of household provider and the masculine identity running parallel to this, molds the patterns of migration both within Senegal and on a transnational and transcontinental scale. Women’s gendered subject positions and identity are of course part of this, as the ascription and acquisition of identity is formed in the relations between people (cf. Jenkins 2004). Different aspects of Senegalese gender relations, such as family and household structures and what the Senegalese deem ‘tradition’ and ‘modern’/‘Western’ influences intersect to continue the ever changing construction of gender identity. Chapter 5 will discuss how the current economic crisis as a global process affects the Senegalese migration project, and what implications this might have on the subject positions discussed above.

97
Chapter 5

Responses to the Economic Crisis

We are always in crisis.

Seydhi (32)

Introduction

‘The Great Recession’ has had enormous impact on the world economy. Its affect on Spain was discussed in Chapter 3, and in this chapter I will elaborate on the discussion of how the recession has influenced the migration project in light of the social relations and gendered discourses illustrated in the previous chapters. I will first briefly present the predicaments of la crise mondial in Senegal before substantiating the argument that global events such as the current economic recession can, over time, have implications for the negotiation and reproduction of (gender) identity in Senegal. Since the global event in question is still taking place it is difficult to assess exact outcomes in terms of the migration project, but through the narrations of my informants I render visible some of the current responses.

Global Crisis in Senegal

The impacts of the global recession in Senegal are in many cases more indirect and perhaps more subtle than in the Global North in general, and Spain in particular (see Chapter 3). Seeing as much of the Senegalese economy is informal and locally based less of an effect has been expected here, since the effect of the financial world seems far from people’s every day lives.

When talking to people in Senegal I asked them about the economic crisis; if life had changed in any way during the last couple of years. The main concern expressed was the rise in prices of basic consumption goods like electricity and staple foods. This rise in
prices is also tied to the international food crisis that commenced the year before the
global recession, and has run parallel to and intertwined with the latter since its infancy in
2007. It is, of course, difficult to assess which ‘crisis’ is causing which changes in
Senegalese society, as the separation of these global processes seems largely artificial.
This is not an issue I shall discuss here. The aim of this section is to appraise the main
challenges currently faced by the people in Senegal; challenges that illustrate the
individual’s connection to and vulnerability for global structures at work in the world.

Many of my informants expressed a decline in the access to basic consumption goods.
The type of goods consumed has not changed, but for many the frequency or the amount
accessible has. One elderly woman I interviewed in one of the neighboring villages of
Dekka told me: “Right now everything is expensive! This child (pointing to her
grandson) eats so much and I cannot work!” The price of rice, an imported good, has
gone up, and now they practically only eat couscous, which they produce themselves, thus making them even more dependent on seasonal agricultural yield. This year’s yield has been good, one informant in Dakar explained to me, but for the last decade drought has been a major problem. According to him the Senegalese poverty is not as visible in Dakar as other places, especially in the rural villages. “There you see the reason for why people emigrate. They do not have food. They survive on solidarity.” He said that this year the rains have been plentiful, so people have not starved. But the agriculture in Senegal depends entirely on the rains because of the lack of technology common in Europe and Asia, such as irrigation schemes. In combination with the lack of employment opportunities in rural areas, migration is an important income strategy for many, even most, rural households.

Omar (47) in Dekka gave me details about the effects of the crises for his household. His account also illustrates the relationship between husband and wife (see Chapter 4); being a man, the provider, means administering the funds of the household by giving his wife, the nurturer, money to buy food and fulfill her role:

Now, in the morning, I give my wife 500 francs [to go to the market] and she is not able to make it suffice. But when I give her 1000 francs, she will buy everything for the midday meal. But before you gave 500 francs and she would give you change. You even got change! But now you give 500 francs and you do not get change. So the prices.. Everything is expensive! Everything has gone up [in price…]. 500 francs is just for the fish. I have not taken the rice, the oil into account... That I have not counted. When you take into account the rice, the fish, the vegetables; that will make it 2000 francs or 2500 a day. That, at the end of the month, for the midday meal, makes 75000. Not counting the evening meal. […] Because here you make couscous in the evenings. […] It’s a lot! So… The crise mondial has arrived here, eh!

The Senegalese household’s vulnerability has thus been compensated for by migrant remittances; another important factor to take into account upon assessing the impact of the international crises. Many of my informants underlined their dependency on this income, especially those in rural areas. Few admitted great changes in terms of the amounts remitted, but official numbers show that this is an important tendency; as the migrants in the Global North become unemployed they send less and less to those back
home. One feature article written by the Spanish consul in Dakar, J.V. Sampedro, illustrates the loss of income for Senegalese families by pointing to national statistics showing the replacement of more nutritious foods, such as meat, eggs, and vegetables, with bread: “The data is clear: the children’s bellies must somehow be filled, even if they are not nutritiously fed.”

Sampedro also points to the fact that the Senegalese financial sector is noticing the recession, leaving construction projects around Dakar unfinished, while World Bank Managing Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala identifies the "four Fs - the fuel crisis, food crisis, the fertilizer crisis and now the financial crisis" as the dangers threatening Africans’ daily lives. She also claims that the financial crisis will have “spillover effects” in Africa, e.g. through the potential decrease in international aid remitted by “developed countries”.

In sum the global recession is having effects on both macro-related structures within the formal Senegalese economy, and on people’s daily lives. The effects experienced by my informants in Senegal are bound to the processes taking place in Europe. As Senegalese immigrants in Spain and other European countries struggle to maintain their strategies for social mobility, their families back home notice the household economy becoming increasingly tighter. The next section will look at some of the migrants’ responses to the global event at hand and the importance of social networks and relations.

Social Networks and Agency in Exile
Spain is struggling with record high unemployment and socio-political unrest due to the enormous increase in downward socioeconomic mobility. In this economy immigrants’ efforts to not only get by, but to climb upwards within their own socioeconomic

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hierarchy offer a contrasting, unnerving, and threatening predicament. In European immigration discourse ‘economic’ migrants are not granted the status as ‘deserving’ members of society, more common for refugees (cf. Katz 1990, Fuglerud 2001) (see Chapter 3). As people question the state’s ability to provide for its citizens and sustain the current welfare system, this is becoming more visible in Spanish “folk discourse” (Ortner 2006:24), increasing the impression of immigrants as a threat to the rights of autochthonous residents experiencing abjection due to la crisis (cf. Ferguson 1999, Frost 1999, Newman 1999). Senegalese in the Basque Country also find themselves in a completely different scenario than the one imagined before heading for ‘greener pastures’ in Europe. Practically all of my informants were now unemployed and many had not even obtained work experience before the crisis set in, a fact that has had severe implications for their current situation in exile, both legally and economically.

Chapter 1 and 4 showed how an agent’s access to the migration project depends on certain factors of your point of departure. Your upbringing shapes the choices you make, but the availability of particular resources is paramount. To be able to undertake transcontinental migration from Senegal to Spain social capital in the sense of a social network is crucial (cf. Bourdieu 1977). It is a way of working out, or working around, the obstacles faced by Senegalese aiming for migration. As mentioned above, these networks consist of friendship and kinship relations connected through ties of e.g. reciprocity. Relations of reciprocity can be vital when searching for the economical or legal support necessary to emigrate from Senegal. In this subsection I will consider how Senegalese social networks and their relations of reciprocity adapt to the environment of the Spanish and Basque labor market, and general life in exile. How does this type of social capital matter once the project of migration is threatened by economic downfall?

Solé (2003) regards social networks as an important factor in the Spanish labor market in terms of hiring. The employer often depends on his employees to recruit new employees, and the immigrant worker often gets hired through friends or family members who are employed. This sort of informal recruitment and hiring process is quite common in the Spanish labor market, but, as seen in Solé (2003); it is not a mere cultural coincidence
and not without consequence: “the immigrant has little bargaining capacity, due to the lack of networks of social protection” (Solé 2003:124).

“Networks of social protection” refers to both social networks and more institutionalized networks, e.g. the Spanish welfare system. The immigrant’s access to the latter is limited, especially if he is ‘illegal’. Although laws on *empadronamiento* (see Chapter 3) ensure the ‘illegal’ immigrant basic rights, he does not have access to unemployment benefits or education schemes offered by INEM to ‘legal’ workers.

When it comes to social networks I would argue that it is not the lack of social networks that poses a problem, but the nature of the networks at hand, confirming Solé’s (2003:124) statement that these render the Senegalese immigrant with little “bargaining capacity”. As the Senegalese social networks within and beyond Spain are mainly targeted on *access* to the migration project, its focus has been on making the trip to Spain economically available, job recruitment, and facilitating housing to members of the network. A change is visible in this regard through the consolidation of various formal organizations of Senegalese immigrants, but these organizations hold disadvantages vis-à-vis e.g. labor unions in that they have a short history of dealing with the Spanish state and institutions (cf. Solé 2003).

Nonetheless the social networks do offer the Senegalese migrant valuable assistance. Many of my informants expressed their dependency on social relations to get through ‘la crisis’. As most Senegalese live together they support each other economically. *Teranga* is always present. It is trusted that the person who is unable to contribute to the household will reciprocate at some point.

We who live here [in this apartment] always help each other out. If there is someone who does not have papers, work, unemployment benefits, nor financial aid... You can live with everything, but nobody will ask you to pay the rent if they know you don’t have unemployment benefits or financial aid. We have that [ideology]. We are all the same. It is like that, but life here is tough. Life here is very expensive, that is why you have to have the same [ideology] to live more stable. For example I could not [live alone] here and pay 600-700 Euros a month. No, I couldn’t. It’s impossible. It’s better to be 3 or 4 in one house, and every month people
contribute and later we pay. Also with food it’s like that. Go to [the supermarket], buy things. It is better to search. It is cheaper. But that is the life of the immigrant. A life together. It’s like that, to make life easier.

Bashir (28)

Failure of the Migration Project?

Global events like the economic recession produces questions of the continuing viability of the migration project. As life takes a turn for the worse and those at home are dependant on an income that is not being received, the migrant might ask himself if it is better to abandon his mission.

As mentioned it is still difficult to assess the gravity of the economic recession’s effects on life of the Senegalese involved, since it is still going on. But through my informants’ narrations it seems that few consider return as an option. “We are always in crisis,” Seydhi (32) said, meaning life in Senegal and the immigrant life in Spain has never been easy. If they have made it so far they will carry on.

Visible in my informants’ accounts is also the significance, beyond economic gain, of migration. Since it is not only the migrants’ own life that is affected the recession, but also the conditions for livelihood and prosperity for their families in Senegal, continuing their role as provider seems important, both in practice and symbolically. Bashir (28) has been working ‘legally’ and has thus received unemployment benefits, but his quota has now been paid and he will apply for public financial assistance from INEM, which means a significant drop in income. He will keep remitting, he says. His family in Dakar is relatively economically stable compared to many other household. Still he wants to help:

My heart feels a lot for my family. That is why, each month, I can take a little and send. My mother and father always say that “don’t worry about sending money. We are well. We are living comfortably. You resolve the problems you have there before sending us money”. But I am not like that. What I have every month I will take a little and send. To share. I always want to share with people. It is better!
Boukar’s (38) story also seems to reflect the discourse inherent in Bashir’s narrations. He lives in Gran Bilbao and has been struggling economically since he came to Spain, working as a street vendor. He sells ‘pirate’ CDs and DVDs, but their market is diminishing as internet downloading has become the norm. *La crisis* has also made it difficult to sell, and he earns less now than he used to: “I walk and walk, but people do not buy.” He only sends his family remittances when his unstable income allows it: “I only send a little and not every month, if not you cannot eat!” When I visited Boukar’s mother in Thies she exclaimed that “he is a good son; he chose to go so he could help his family. He went in the *pirogue* and risked everything to help.” She stressed the importance of his contribution for the family’s survival, and pointed out that he sends more money now than before: “Before he did not have a job; now he sells well and sends more”.

Bashir’s accounts and the contradiction in Boukar’s and his mother’s narrative of his remittances indicate that the migration project arguably bears sociocultural meaning in itself. Knowing that your son is ‘out there’ holds a great significance to those at home. The symbolic value of migration as a strategy for fulfilling the male gender role as provider, a central aspect of Senegalese masculine identity, shows that social mobility moves beyond remittances; it is about taking responsibility and thus cultivating and affirming membership in kinship and social networks (Jenkins 2004:150). In this sense migration can be a *rite de passage* in a young man’s transition into Senegalese masculine adulthood (Hernández 2008:45). Or as Boukar said: “My father had always helped me, so I had to get out and find my way in life.”

It is arguably this aspect of the migration project; the conglomerate of social, economical, cultural and symbolical capital that it holds (cf. Bourdieu 1977), that contribute to its prolongation, even when global structures and events challenge it extensively (see also Chapter 3). It seems the mere fact that the Senegalese migrant finds himself in Europe can produce and maintain these types of capital. Even if the accumulation of economical capital is in a rut, the potential for future income is maintained as long as the migrant stays abroad. His exile also produces symbolic capital
in that the maintenance of the migration project theoretically can contribute to shape new
migration projects in the future. This aspect can also accumulate a rise in social status for
both him and his family. Finally, his prolongation of migrant life contributes to the
cultural symbology of migration in Senegal, visible in e.g. media and folk discourse; the
migrant as national heroes of the nation, as agents against structural difficulties.

In the friction between Senegalese agents and global and national events and structures
the impediment of the migration project’s movement could seem probable. One can
canceptualize migration as a road in that they are

  a food image for conceptualizing how friction works: Roads create
pathways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they
limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of
confinement. Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, excluding,
and particularizing. (Tsing 2005:6)

In terms of the economic crisis it seems that the road which global capitalism has made
available to Senegalese migrants might be restructured. International and national
legislation and practices attempt to inhibit the movement that previously has been partly
welcomed (cf. Solé 2003, Calavita 1998, 2005); the road is being blocked, or at least
drizzled with check points. The future of migration between Senegal and Spain is
difficult to predict. Through the accumulation of different types of capital Senegalese
migrants (re-)produce themselves as men and social beings (cf. Bourdieu 1977). The
migration projects’ importance for the maintenance and generation of (gender) identity
and the (re-)production of social relations for both migrant himself and those at home,
seems to motivate a prolongation of the migration project in spite of the ‘roadblocks’ or
‘check points’ the crisis seems to generate (cf. Tsing 2005).
Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

In this thesis I have asked the questions:

1. In what ways is gender a crucial factor of Senegalese migration projects as a principle shaping the migrant’s quest for socioeconomic advancement?

2. How does the formation of Senegalese (masculine) gender identity interact with the processes of constant change of which the transnational migrant household is a part through its place in a globalized world?

3. Particularly; how might Senegalese social institutions (such as kinship, generational relations, tradition, and the household) and gender identity affect and be affected by the predicaments of the current economic recession, seeing as they are shaped in the transaction between global and national structures and discourses?

4. How does the friction between agent and structures play out when it comes to Senegalese migrants and the Spanish state, especially considering the current economic crisis?

And:

- What are the processes that shape migration and marriage as a as paths towards a ‘good life’?
- Is this strategy an outcome of structures shaping the (potential) migrant’s desires, ambitions and decisions?
- Or does this strategy take shape through the agency of the individual?

I argue that the migration project is constructed within several dimensions and on several levels within the global society.
In Chapter 2 I show that migration as a strategy for the maintenance and acquisition of livelihood has been a part of the way of life for the West African peoples for centuries. This includes nomadic, but also sedentary, groups. Organizing Senegalese village lives into transregional households is common (Lambert 2002), and I argue that transnational and transcontinental migration as such represent a continuation of this way of ensuring the economical security of the family, as migration has become embedded in socio-cultural and economical practices of the Senegalese populations over time (cf. Lambert 2002, Fagertun 2009). I take a critical stance towards economic migration theory, such as the push/pull model, as my informants’ narrations substantiate an argument portraying the migration project as based on more than rationale by an economic actor. It is a circular movement and a reciprocal family project (cf. Lambert 2002, Mauss 1995). Migration is a result of cultural, historical, and structural processes and is performed by individuals who have been socialized by a society and culture that somehow promote this strategy through their design. This has design been shaped, and is promoted, through the “power of commodities” as “objects of desire” (Lambert 2002:166, cf. Appadurai 1996, Tsing 2005). The historical, geographical, and globalized economic context of today’s Senegal also allow for certain ways of migration, while excluding others, through a complex set of circular-like processes (cf. Tsing 2005).

In Chapter 3 I consider how global, international, and national power structures and events influence my informants’ strategies for social mobility (cf. Tsing 2005). I especially focus on Spanish immigration law and the current economic crisis at large in Spain. The synthesis of Spanish legislation has implicitly and explicitly allowed for, even encouraged, certain types of immigration that have been beneficial to the Spanish economy’s growth (cf. Calavita 2006). International legislation, as articulated through the UN and EU, reproduce discourses of immigration both as a threat and a moral responsibility (when it comes to those in ‘need’; refugees). These discourses are hegemonic in the Global North countries’ immigration policies in general, also in Spain (cf. Fuglerud 2001).
I argue that although my informants verbally try to adapt to what I call the discourse of ‘need’ (cf. Katz 1990, Fuglerud 2001) so as to ‘deserve’ their presence within the Spanish state, they generally continue their socio-cultural practices from Senegal, as it is within this doxa their sociality, and thus aspirations for socioeconomic ascent, are embedded (cf. Bourdieu 1977). Spanish immigration policies have until recently ‘allowed’ for this arguable quest for upward social mobility. Although the legislation appears paradoxical, aiming towards a Spain free of ‘illegal’ immigrants, it is shaped in a manner that makes ‘illegality’ almost inevitable. Several authors have argued that these paradoxical policies have been beneficial to a Spanish economy in dire need for cheap labor while undergoing its own quest for upward mobility; development (cf. Calavita 1998, 2006; Solé 2003).

It is now that the recession has affected Spain’s core that this legislation, and all the new residents of Spain, are causing a headache for the authorities and evoking fear in its autochthonous people. The discourse of “migration as a threat” (cf. Boswell 2003) has been strengthened in the last few years on the grounds of ‘the terrorism threat’ and the ‘avalanche’ of ‘illegal’ migrants reaching Mediterranean Europe’s shores. As examples of the escalation of the “migration threat” discourse I show how Spain has been highly involved in the formation and activities of EU’s Frontex in order to limit illegal immigration. Once the recession commenced this discourse has become even more relevant and both legislation and legal practices have been altered, as exemplified through the case of the 2009 reform of the Ley de extranjería and the municipal government of Vic’s change of empadronamiento practice. Through my informants’ narrations I illustrate the friction generated between the agent and macro structures (cf. Tsing 2005).

In Chapter 4 I argue that the migration project is embedded in local sociocultural practices and that in order to understand this project it is important to investigate its embeddedness. Access to this ‘strategy’ for movement is thus shaped by dimensions such as economy, social capital, generation, and, perhaps especially, gendered subject positions (cf. Lambert 2002, Moore 1994, Bourdieu 1997). Hence I show how migration is a more likely to be undertaken by men than women when considering the dominant
discourse of gender. This also ties migration to the construction of gender identity, as it is one of the ways in which Senegalese men strive to fulfill their expected roles as providers (cf. Jenkins 2004). This role relates dualistically to that of women’s role as nurturer as illustrated in how household and kinship is organized ‘traditionally’. My informants’ stories support my argument that this leads to difference in the most probable strategies taken for social mobility by men versus women; migration being more common for men, and marriage for women. Through my their narrations I show how ‘modern’ influences both challenge the hegemonic gender identities of Senegalese society, and preserve them through the practices of ‘traditional’ values, such as those reflected in religious practices and discourse, within ‘modern’ lives, by many seen as corrupted by materialism (cf. Moore 1994, Tsing 2005).

The dynamics between transnational migration as a ‘modern’ phenomenon, on the one hand, and its implications in the construction of Senegalese gender relations and identities on the other, thus present a paradox. This identity construction is largely done according to normative and hegemonic discourses of gender embedded in Senegalese social and cultural structures, and it is these structures the agent seeks to ascend within through transnational migration, making him a more desired husband and provider. The migration project thus contributes to the reproduction of women’s desire for marrying ‘upwards’ to better fulfill their role as nurturer. Hence, migration, despite its inherent transnational ‘modernity’, arguably contributes to a reproduction of ‘traditional’ gender discourse.

Chapter 5 muses briefly on Senegalese responses to the current economic crisis. In Senegal my empirical data indicates that the current increase in the prices of basic goods is arguably tied to both the economical recession and the international food crisis. The difficulty in sustaining a household is noticed by my informants in Senegal due to the price increase, but currently it seems it is my informants in Europe who have noticed the greater change. From having a stable income, or at least prospects for it, they are left to wait. But their unwavering attitudes regarding their strategy of movement implicate the importance of the migration project for the accumulation of social, economical, cultural,
and symbolic capital. This capital accumulation contributes to the (re-production) of the Senegalese household and the gendered identities embedded in it. Global events like the current economic crisis can therefore potentially produce change in discourses on identity and gendered subject positions (cf. Moore 1994, Tsing 2005).

Through patterns in my informants’ narrations I argue that the socio-cultural network my Senegalese informants are a part of as migrants constitutes a form of (social) capital. This capital has arguably been invested in the migration project allowing my informants to reach Spain through friendship and kinship relations. Through these relations the migrants can access the financial aid for travel expenses, documents, employment, and domicile necessary for their project. The social network of solidarity between the Senegalese has stayed strong and has been one of the ways in which my informants have survived, and are still surviving, the crisis. I posed the question of how things might have been different if it were not for this social network of solidarity. If my informants had relied more on formal organizations, such as trade unions, for assistance before the crisis, and thus become part of a more formal network with power within the Spanish state, perhaps their economic ascent would not have stagnated as quickly as is the current case, since they might have had more of an opportunity to contest the structures that no longer make room for them. Still, through presenting cases from both Senegal and Spain, I have substantiated my argument of the migration project’s significance in terms of the accumulation of capital; economical, social, cultural and symbolical. The Senegalese migrant’s strategy of ‘waiting the crisis out’ is thus arguably the best investment he can do for the future of him and his family.

* 

My informants’ ambitions are thus directed towards the social and economic structures of Senegal, where his family resides. To the extent that the migration project can be said to be a strategy for social mobility, as indicated by my informants’ accounts, it is the structures of ‘back home’ the mobility is measured against. Still, the migration project depends on a functioning Spanish economy and society. I therefore ultimately argue that
the economic recession of Spain has severe impact on the Senegalese migration project through global encounters and events (cf. Tsing 2005). However, since migration, as argued in Chapter 2 and 4, goes beyond economic meaning in Senegalese culture, it would not be reasonable to abort this strategy for movement. Being a migrant is also about identity and gender relations, and ‘waiting out’ the recession is thus meaningful both to the migrant and to those he provides for in Senegal.

To answer the initial questions of migration in terms of the structure/agency debate I have argued that in the case of Senegalese migration to Spain and the Basque Country there are local, national and global structures at work (cf. Tsing 2005). The agent bears with him the *habitus* of his culture and society, shaping his way of acting upon structures (cf. Bourdieu 1977, Swartz 2002). The flux within *doxa* itself is important here, as discourses are articulated and challenged on different levels and within different dimensions (cf. Moore 1994). The hegemonic discourse on e.g. Senegalese gender relations and identities are thus challenged, intersected, and overlapped by alternative discourses within the same social structures (ibid.), while the agent himself seeks to both ascend within social networks and construct his identity through the engagement with these different discourses (Jenkins 2004:149-150). The possible effects of these processes on an individual’s construction of identity are apparent in “the importance of cross-cultural and long-distance encounters in forming everything we know as culture […]. Cultures are continually co-produced [through] ‘friction’: the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” (Tsing 2005:4).

In Chapter 2 I argued that although the motivations behind the strategy of migration might be primarily economic, in that they are articulated through “the allure of commodities” (Lambert 2002:166), it is important to consider how economics is embedded in other aspects of life, i.e. social relations and organization (cf. Fagertun 2009, Lambert 2002). In Chapter 4 I showed how migration is tied to discourses of gender relations and identity and that (transnational) migration seen through such a lens represents a more probable strategy for socioeconomic ascent for men than for women. In Chapter 3 and 5 demonstrated that strategies laid do not always work out and might
need revision as you go along. Intervening events, like *la crisis* in this case, can lead to the reconsideration of one’s life course. I have shown that some migrants take an active stand to their situation, and put plans they had in mind for the far future into life at an earlier stage. But in many cases advancing economically in spite of the financial crisis is practically impossible due to the migrant’s legal, economical and social situation. In this regard I point out that the failure to succeed economically might not mean social failure to those at home, since the *doxa* of Senegalese society applauds men taking their responsibility as providers seriously (cf. Bourdieu 1977). My empirical data shows that for those at home having a family member abroad arguably increases social capital since their exile symbolizes future access to valued commodities through ties of reciprocity, or even a pathway for future migrants from within the same social network (cf. Lambert 2002). The meaning of migration as a re-negotiator and re-embedder of social identity within Senegalese society thus rings true for the migrant, while also giving hope of material and social wealth for both him and his social relations. Hence, by ‘waiting out’ the crisis he demonstrates action, even agency; a willingness to overcome great obstacles in order to (re-)produce his subject position as *provider* (cf. Moore 1994).

Conclusively, by presenting cases from both Senegal and Spain I have substantiated my argument throughout this thesis that the migration project bears meaning beyond that of economic gain seen through the lens of linear ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (cf. Riccio 2008, Lambert 2002, Fagertun 2009). Senegalese migration is a social endeavor as it is embedded in social relations and institutions. It bears significance both in terms of identity construction and the symbolic value in having a family member abroad inherent in the migration project (cf. Bourdieu 1977). Migration as *movement* is severely challenged by external dynamics, such as the worldwide economic recession and Spanish immigration legislation, particularly in terms of its economic dimension (cf. Tsing 2005). However, the migration project does not lose all meaning and value when faced by such global encounters; it might still contribute to agents’ accumulation of different capital, and even upward social mobility, through the mere ‘waiting it out’-strategy performed by many Senegalese migrants in Spain.
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