OUTSOURCING PEACE?
The United Nations’ Use of Private Security and Military Companies

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Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Candidata Rerum Politicarum

Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen. September 2005
Abstract

Private companies provide security and military services to states, international organizations, international non-governmental organizations, and individuals. This thesis addresses the United Nation’s use of private security and military companies. The study looks into the characteristics of this practice and subsequently provides some explanations for the pattern and rationale thereof. The systematization of compiled data on 32 contracts between the UN and private security and military companies (PSCs and PMCs) reveals that three main categories of services are supplied; Security services, logistic and support services, and what is here collectively termed expert services.

The analytical framework deployed focuses both on enhanced need on part of the UN, and on enhanced offer from the private sector. The role of the private security and military industry has evolved substantially since the beginning of the 1990s when the phenomenon was first paid attention to in academic writing. In order to explain the UN’s use of these companies, both the UN organization and the industry as such is subject to examination. A twofold analytical framework is thus presented. Interviews and official documents are used to examine the validity of five propositions derived from the analytical framework. The propositions regarding UN demand suggest both radicalized external operating environments and internal organizational capacities have contributed to the UN deploying PSCs and PMCs. On the supply side, the last set of propositions indicate that comprehensive image refinement efforts on part of the industry have added to the UN deploying these companies, while quantitative expansion of the industry does not appear to influence UN PSC/PMC contracting in a direct manner.

This thesis thus argues that the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs can be explained by the UN simultaneously facing more difficult premises for its operations, enhanced expectations for action, and proportionally deteriorated internal capacity. The private security and military industry on its part has detected the UN potential market and strive to accommodate to the demands of this potentially very profitable market.
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Acknowledgements

This thesis has benefited greatly from the assistance of a number of people.

First, I would like to thank my tutor, Jan Oskar Engene, for his encouragement, constructive comments, and for always being quick to respond.

Special thanks to Doug Brooks (IPOA), for always answering my questions, for providing me with further contacts, and for good fun at pub-crawls! Additionally, Brigadier-General (Ret’d), Ernest B. Beno (Pacific Architects and Engineers), John Millar (ArmorGroup), Mike Pearson (Security Support Solutions,) all took time out of their busy schedules to answer my many inquiries. I also owe great thanks Lieutenant-Colonel Bjørn-Robert Dahl (The Norwegian Defense Research Establishment) who provided me with his professional judgements and comments on matters out of my range.

I am grateful to a number of people who read parts of the manuscript and provided me with valuable comments and corrections: Ingvill, Tørgrim, Marthe, Sølve, Gyrid, Stian and Paul, who had little choice but to assist with technical hitches. Thanks also to Bente and Maren who made an effort to help me with the lay-out.

Thanks to friends at Rokkan and Garage, and to Ruben for your encouragement and dark sense of humour!

Finally, I want to thank to my parents, Hege, and Eva Lene for invaluable support!

Bergen, September 2005
## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contigency Operations Training</td>
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<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>The African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), now defunct</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Computer Sciences Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>US Department of Defence</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DSL</td>
<td>Defence Systems Limited (aka ArmorGroup)</td>
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<td>DTAP</td>
<td>Democracy Transition Assistance Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Outcomes</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSG</td>
<td>Global Strategies Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>IAPSO</td>
<td>UN Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IPOA</td>
<td>International Peace Operations Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEJA</td>
<td>Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Missions des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects &amp; Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>PMC</td>
<td>Private Military Company</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnerships</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Private Security Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Personal Security Detail</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force (before April 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade For UN Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;SS</td>
<td>Safety and Security Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Iraq</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMISIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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1. Introduction

In June 2004 Congolese students released a wave of violence in central and eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo in protest of the UN mission’s failure to stop the atrocities in the Ituri province. The frustration of the Congolese civil war, which has claimed close to four million lives since the war began in 1994, was thus directed towards UN associated personnel and facilities. Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), a US company, was an integrated part of the UN operation by running six airfields for the mission, their employees were driving UN vehicles and considered UN workers by the people and hence also subject to the attacks. The violence in Kisangani, in the northeastern Congo, caused the UN headquarters in the city to burn to the ground, UN staff housing was attacked and burned, while over 70 UN vehicles were stoned and set ablaze. As the UN’s military contingent was led to simply withdraw without making any effort to stop the anarchy, 300 terrified UN staff was thus set into full flight to the local airport, where they demanded emergency evacuation from the city fearing they would be killed by the rioting mobs. While PAE workers prepared for, and carried out the evacuation of the UN staff, the PAE teams were themselves declared ‘mission essential’ by the UN Director of Administration, and were not permitted to leave unless the entire mission were decided abandoned (Joly 2004: 1-2).

The scenario from Congo is not a single case. The UN partners with what is termed private security companies and private military companies on a regular basis to support its peace and humanitarian operations around the globe. The concept of private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs) has caught the public’s eye in the wake of the US Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the killing and mutilation of four Blackwater employees in Fallujah drew additional attention to the practice of using private security providers. While such companies are not a new phenomenon, it is a lesser known fact that some of these companies have been present in most major conflicts since the 1990s, and that a few of them have a history working for the United Nations which at least dates two decades back.

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1 Joly was the PAE project manager in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The document was obtained from PAE officials and is yet to be published, but is available from the author.
2 The title of the thesis refers to peace operations; however this thesis considers the humanitarian operations inherent in the broader peace concept and thereby also concerns humanitarian operations.
There is no consensus as to what constitutes a private security or private military company, nor to the appropriate term to be used for the rather wide variety of companies usually referred to as PSCs or PMCs. In this thesis a PSC or a PMC is understood as a commercial company employing mainly former military personnel to perform security services, either in the shape of guards or bodyguards, armed or unarmed, or consultant security services; logistics or other support services; or specialized operational services such as demining, policing, operation of advanced weapons systems etc.  

The activities of PSCs and PMCs have spurred contentious debate among experts and commentators whether these companies constitute a menace or a blessing to peace. In the context of the UN’s long history of failures to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Doyle 1999: 451), how then does the UN actually make use of these companies, and how can this practice be explained? This thesis attempts to answer these two questions by looking at both the changes in the UN’s preconditions for peace and humanitarian operations, as well as the evolution in the private security and military industry, and finally how these changes interact to prepare for the UN’s use of these companies.

The future role of the United Nations is currently subject to debate. There are obviously strong opinions in the world community as to what roles and responsibilities the organization is to be bestowed and how they are to be carried out. The United States has a particularly heavy bearing upon the organization’s effectiveness and striking power and preferences emanating from this member state thus necessarily carry a lot of weight. In the case of PSC/PMC reliance the UN is strongly encouraged to follow the US example and expand its outsourcing practice. In a US Senate appropriations bill regarding contributions for international peacekeeping activities in 2005 the private sector solution to cutting UN peacekeeping costs appears only semi-eligible:

“The Committee is aware that, in some cases, private companies can carry out effective peacekeeping missions for a fraction of the funding the United Nations requires to carry out the same missions. At a minimum such companies should be utilized to supplement the number of blue berets and blue helmets which, in these

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3 See "Definitional problems" section under 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of the denotations of the companies.
One can thus infer that the topic of UN dependence upon PSCs and PMCs will only gain relevance in the time ahead. Additionally, the new US ambassador to the UN as of March 2005, John Bolton (Rice 2005), will most likely not contribute to slow down these developments.

The great paradox surrounding the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs involves the UN’s attitude towards this practice. The only coherence in the handling of the matter appears to be the consistent avoidance of the issue altogether. The strategy of evasion can most likely be traced back to the sensitivity of the issue. The different UN agencies are very sensitive to the issue of PSCs as, in the press and in the general public perception, their use is frequently equated with the use of private armies or mercenaries. The rather contentious moral debate pending is apparently not on the UN’s agenda for the time being. This has accordingly led individual staff members within UN organizations to flatly deny, contrary to the facts, that their organization has ever sought advice from PSCs or contracted any such company (Van Brabant 2002: 9). Illustrative of the apparent ignorance of the topic, officials of the Best Practices Section at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) claim not to have the qualifications for answering questions concerning UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs (personal communication with Ikegaya 17 August 2005). In the meantime the practice continues without any systematic framework or set of official regulatory measures.

It is not only in UN circles that the issue of privatized means of security is contentious. In academic circles, as well as in media, the debate on the use of privatized means of security has been characterized by entrenched and polarized views. The tendency of the media to sensationalize has not contributed to a more serious and constructive debate. Until the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the focus of debate had for the most part resided around some companies’ history in African conflicts, especially in situations where the presence of these companies coincided with large deposits of minerals. Much has thus been written about the infamous South African enterprise, Executive Outcomes (EO), and its
interference in conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, and about Sandline in Papua New Guinea and in Sierra Leone (Musah and Fayemi, 2000, Howe 2001, Pech 1999 etc.). While there are still companies around which operate in the spirit of EO and Sandline, a somewhat different niche appeared in the mid 1990s, which led to the formation of companies with a somewhat altered impact area. Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and Defence Systems Limited (DSL) already represented companies doing business with the developed states, and hence debate was spurred about the degree to which such companies were acting as government proxies substituting state force in sensitive areas or contexts. This particular debate has again gained currency in relation to the Iraq invasion. The American authorities have used PSCs and PMCs extensively to take load of the tested state armed forces. The debate is of current interest and a stronger emphasis should be put on the links between government and global private means of security.

As the practice becomes established and apparently hard to reverse, the current debate is mainly focused on the terms on which the companies work. Alternatives for regulation of PSCs/ PMCs and their activities have thus emerged as one of the most debated issues concerning the private security and military industry. The scope of PSC/PMC dependence is also a matter of discussion, particularly in the Iraqi context. While not a formal part of the coalition force in Iraq, the private security teams are taking part of the hostilities in a direct manner. A South African/ British company, Erinys, admits having killed approximately 70 insurgents while in Iraq (PBS, Melville 2005). The scope of PSC/ PMC use, their globalized nature, along with the fact that PSC personnel fall into a loophole in terms of international law render it an important issue to be discussed, preferably internationally. In terms of the UN, there has been sporadic debate whether to substitute UN peacekeeping operations with private initiatives in certain situations, however, in most cases this still seems too far flung for it becoming a serious matter of discussion.\(^4\) Little has, however, been said about the partial outsourcing of UN functions although the issue obviously involves multiple concerns. The practice of outsourcing parts of UN peacekeeping does compromise one of the major ideas behind multinational peacekeeping: a multifaceted international presence reflecting interference from the international community into conflicts as opposed to the interference of single states or biased groups of states. Calls for diverse personnel, in terms of geography,

\(^4\) Reportedly, during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 deploying Executive Outcomes to end the anarchic situation in some UN refugee camps was one of the alternatives considered. In the end, it was considered too contentious and Congolese forces were brought to remedy the precarious situation (Annan 1998: 8).
Introduction

culture, religion, etc to perform security related duties in order not to deter or to provoke local parties is perhaps not adhered to by a private company relying on whatever is most cost-efficient. In addition, concern is due as to how the UN manages the outsourcing. The organization should have to deal with the issue in an overt manner to ensure that the very valuable contracts are administered in a responsible and transparent manner. Current practices of evasion and ignorance only serves to add uncertainty and unpredictability to a practice already considered contentious.

While the 1990s interventions in mineral rich developing countries are often explained by the weak state structures leading governments to hire PMCs to contribute to solving their internal problems (Howe, Mandel 2001, Musah and Fayemi 2000 etc.), developed state deployment of private means of security is explained largely as part of a general shift from 'government' to 'governance' in which policy sectors that had been centralized during the last century currently are privatized or partly so (Krahmann 2002). The use of PMCs by the United Nations can, as will be done in this thesis, be linked to both factors but not exclusively so. As the organization normally operates in developing countries on the conditions there present, the organization’s use of private military services can only be explained with the use of a multilayered set of variables reflecting external operational limitations, internal organizational deficiencies, as well as changes in the industry itself. Two sets of variables are thus used to explain the changes in the operating preconditions of the organization on the one hand, and industry developments on the other. Altogether these developments have prepared for the United Nations using privatized security and military services to assist in carrying out its operations.

In the remainder of this chapter it will first be attempted to give an overview of the various strands of private military and security providers, pertaining both a historical and a contemporary outlook, whereas the methodology of the thesis will be dealt with in the latter part. The chapter closes with a full oversight of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Private security providers, an overview

Throughout most of history security has been a commodity, a privilege to those who could afford to offer something in return and as such, the Weberian state monopoly of violence where the state is the lone supplier of security provision is historically an exception rather
than the rule. \(^5\) During the post-Cold War era there has been a new upsurge and evolution in private security provision, this time in the shape of corporate entities that seek distance from the mercenary label. The dominance of market liberal economic ideologies has lead privatization to become a preferred means as to reforming organizations across the public sector. The security sector is thus only the latest arena to have been marked by the privatization incentive. According to Robert Mandel (2001: 130) three trends seem to be of particular notice concerning the privatization of security functions: The spread of arms to the civilian population at large, the growth of formally organized private security outfits, and the increasing involvement of these private security providers in global turmoil (Mandel 2002: 7). Although these three trends can not be considered being independent of each other, but rather as highly interrelated developments, this thesis will in essence deal with the two last trends; the increase in supply of multinational private security providers and their increasing performance on the international arena, in this case in relation to the United Nations.

The private security business can be divided in three rather broad categories: classic mercenaries (acting individually, but also in groups or even firms), private military companies, and private security companies. The distinctions between the last two categories are vague; service offer is inconsistent and often depending on profit margins, commercial opportunity, as well as the preponderant legal and moral environment. The private security/military industry is at present in considerable flux, it is highly heterogeneous both with regard to each categorization and the type of services offered. Some companies aspire to operate in a legal environment characterized by legitimacy, while others are far less fussy about their assignments. Meanwhile, the more unscrupulous classic mercenarism is regrettably, not a closed chapter.

\(^5\) See the “Traditional mercenarism” section below.
1.1.1 Traditional mercenarism

Mercenarism⁶ - the use of paid foreign professional soldiers freelancing their skills to a party of a conflict- is as old as conflict itself and has historically attracted little attention as it was accepted as normal practice. The ancient Greeks employed Macedonians; Rome hired one Germanic tribe to defend its imperial borders against another, and even earlier, in 334 BC, Greek mercenaries were used by Persia in the war against Alexander the Great (Musah and Fayemi 2000: 5). However, it was in the warring mini-states of Renaissance Italy that mercenaries probably enjoyed the highest prominence. During the 1⁴th and 1⁵th century the competing city-states used highly organized mercenary armies to conquer rich and strategic neighbouring states, and the condottieri served whoever was willing to pay.⁷ After the French Revolution, with the identification of the state as the locus of loyalty, it was considered correct that every man should serve his country only. This attitude was institutionalized through the universal conscription, and it became an ideal that was spread throughout Europe and the West (Adams 1999: 2). Hiring of mercenaries was in the period after 1799 generally considered immoral and treacherous. As the European powers extended their world influence and created their empires throughout the nineteenth century, hiring of mercenaries was, however, a common tool in the attempt to maintain control of the colonies. The decolonization period, especially in Africa, therefore coincided with the modern upsurge of mercenary activity. During the 1960s and 1970s the people’s struggles to assert their right to self- determination were on several occasions met by small groups, or even individual mercenaries, hired by the colonial powers and other external interests to undermine the liberation struggles.⁸ Hired for their perceived combat supremacy, a relatively small force or group of individuals could pose a threat to an emerging newly independent African state (Lilly 2000b: 8). Individuals such as ‘Mad’ Mike Hoare, Jack ‘Black Jack’ Schramme, and Bob Denard have thus become notorious elements in African liberation history (Musah and

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⁶ Article 47 of the Geneva Convention Protocol I defines a mercenary by six cumulative criterions which all must be fulfilled in order to be defined legally as a mercenary. A mercenary is then any one who a) Is especially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; b) Does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities; c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict, nor a resident of a territory controlled by a Party to the conflict e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the armed conflict, and f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces (Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions 1949, Article 47).

⁷ The captains of these forces were called condottieri because they signed a written contract - a condotta – to fight for a feudal lord or a rich city.

⁸ Mercenaries were involved in halting the liberating process in i.e. Algeria (1956), the Congo (1960), the Comoros Islands (1970s-1990s), Benin (1970s), as well as in Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, the Seychelles etc. (Musah and Fayemi 2000: 6).
Introduction

Fayemi 2000: 6). The image they had established was one of an agent of the colonial powers and therefore a reactionary symbol of racism and opposition to self-determination (Shearer 1998: 15).

A slightly distinct version of the hired soldier, which is more prevalent today, is the volunteer. Although a volunteer might not exclusively be motivated by financial gains, but also by ideology, religion, ethnicity or other factors, he would for the most part also merit the label ‘mercenary’ as the outlook for financial gains in most cases should not be excluded as part of the impetus. The dispatch of this kind of mercenaries is apparently quite widespread and volunteers have been reported fighting in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and most recently in Iraq. The Muhajedddin forces are presently perhaps the best-known example of this kind of mercenaries.

Although the de-colonization period is considered the ‘golden age’ of mercenarism, classic mercenary activity has recently also been reported from other war-zones, notably in different parts of Africa. The “White Legion”, a unit of approximately 300 mercenaries from Serbia, Morocco, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Belgium, France, and Britain was fighting for President Mobutu Sese Seko during the 1996-97 Zairean conflict. Following his defeat the Legion was reported to have moved on to Congo-Brazzaville where they fought for the besieged Lissouba government (SCFA 2002a: appendix 2). During the hostilities in Sierra Leone in early 1999, mercenaries from Ukraine, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Italy, Liberia, Britain, and South Africa were reported fighting for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Lilly 2000b: 15). Other conflicts where mercenaries have been reported fighting include Angola, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Colombia. The UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism concluded in a 1997 report that there had been a “detected expansion in mercenary activities, observing that mercenaries are involved in serious crimes such as terrorist attacks and drug and arms trafficking, in which they are usually the perpetrators of serious violations of human rights” (UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries 1997: §115). More recently, a group of mainly South African mercenaries, apparently organized in lieu of a logistics company, Logo Logistics, were arrested in Zimbabwe in 2004 as they were to start an operation to topple the regime of Teodoro Obiang Nguema in oil rich Guinea-Bissau (Leigh, Pallister and Wilson 2004). A rather new type of mercenary is Keith Jonathan ‘John’ Idema, a US citizen operating in conjunction with a few other US citizens in Afghanistan. Idema was financed by revenues from media coverage of his ‘adventures’, not by any party to the conflict and was convicted in
Afghanistan on charges of torture and other crimes after it was revealed he had been running his own personal interrogation facility (Maitra 2004).

1.1.2 Executive Outcomes and the early PMC industry

Private Military Companies is a late 20th century phenomenon and the company most often recognized as the first-ever private military company dates back to 1967 when Colonel Sir David Stirling founded WatchGuard International, a company employing former British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel to train militaries overseas (Lilly 2000b: 10). According to industry analyst Kevin O’Brien, the number of PMCs engaged in Africa began to boom in 1992. By mid-1997, it was estimated that there were about 90 such companies operating throughout Africa, the majority in Angola. Companies offered a range of different services with combat services at one extreme. The number of companies offering combat type services thus appeared to be limited. The better-known company known to have engaged in direct combat is Executive Outcomes (EO). The South African company, now officially disbanded, was founded in 1989 and sprung out of the Apartheid era South African Defence Force (SADF). As SADF members started to leave the Special Forces in anticipation of the transition about to come, many joined the private venture (O’Brien 2000: 49). EO has later frequently been renown as “the world’s first corporate army” and for good reasons. The company had a range of (more or less secretly) affiliated companies that would supply virtually all the services and goods a private army would need, among them was a private airline (Ibis Air), a telecommunications company (Advanced Systems Communications Ltd), a logistics company (Trans Africa Logistics Ltd), a company providing military equipment (Steelpact & Falconer Systems), a demining company (Shibata Ltd.), along with mining and extraction companies such as Branch Mining Ltd., Diamond Works and Heritage Oil (Pech 1999: 86-88). EO provided services in armoured warfare, battle strategies, confidential ‘advisory’ training, clandestine warfare, combat air patrol, equipment capabilities, medical aid, sniper and special-forces training (Isenberg 1997: 6). Executive Outcomes was reportedly involved in combat through several successful operations in Angola and Sierra Leone in the years from 1993 to 1997, operations that were conducted on behalf of the respective governments (Pech 1999: 85-88). In Sierra Leone the company was considered

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9 Idema himself claimed to be working in accordance with the Pentagon, an assertion which was disproved by the US authorities (ibid).
10 Ibis Air was partly owned by Raymond Moi, son of former Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi (Musah 2002: 928).
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decisive in defeating the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion, establishing internal
order, and help bringing about democratic elections (Isenberg 1997: 6).

Although Executive Outcomes appears the ancestor company of parts of the industry, today’s
PSCs/PMCs are mainly low-profiled companies that aim to distance themselves of the EO
legacy. They form a heterogeneous group of companies with different specializations and
services and hence with different markets around the world.

1.1.3 The contemporary private security and military business; PMCs
and PSCs
PMCs and PSCs tend to be organized as corporate hierarchies in scale and trans-nationally
networked in operational scope. A 2002 Report by the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) identified at least 90 PMCs, which were active in 110
countries worldwide. Some analysts estimate the total annual revenue at more than US$100
billion (Singer 2003c), a number which is not devoid of controversy. The prime clients of the
industry now include Western government departments such as the US Department of
Defence. The areas that are being outsourced include a variety of areas such as security,
military advice, training, logistics, policing, technological expertise, and intelligence, all
critical to the US armed forces’ core missions. Private firms also provide the logistics of
every major US military deployment and maintain such strategic weapons systems as the B-2
stealth bomber and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (Von Boemcken 2003).

PMC/PSC staffing typically number former military personnel from the industrialized
countries, notably the US Army, the British armed forces and Special Forces (SAS) as well as
French and Israeli military personnel. Lately there has also been a tendency towards
employing former military personnel from places like Fiji, Chile, and the Balkans. Retired
senior officers and non-commissioned officers of major armed forces are very often involved
in the management of these companies. The personnel is employed within a defined structure,
with established terms and conditions, and work with a degree of organization and

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11 The ICIJ does not appear to distinguish between PMCs and PSCs. The database appears not to have been
updated since August 2002 and the developments in the industry in the wake of the Iraq invasion have not been
recorded in the database. For instance, companies that currently hold very large contracts in Iraq, such as Aegis
and Erinys Iraq, was not recorded in the database by August 2005.
accountability to the company. The company in return normally offer high salaries and sometimes life insurance packages to its employees.

As there is no consensus as to how to categorize private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs), a variety of denotations coexist. Some observers refrain from differentiating between the two and in stead choose to denote them all as private security companies (See for example Herbert Howe 2001, or David Shearer 1998, Holmqvist 2005, Avant 2005) or private military companies (see SCFA 2002, David Isenberg 2004). Others have chosen the more value laden term “mercenary firms” to both PMCs and PSCs (See David Isenberg 1997). Some analysts choose to categorize the companies by the perceived proximity to actual combat functions. Peter Singer’s Tip-of-the-Spear typology hence distinguishes between ‘Military Provider Firms’, ‘Military Consultant Firms’ and ‘Military Support Firms’ (Singer 2003a: 91). In addition to the multitude of denotations, categorizations and typologies of these companies, as observed by Holmqvist, the inflation and partial confusion in terminology is worsened by the frequent reference in mainstream media simply to ‘contractors’ (Holmqvist 2005: 5). The fact that PSCs and PMCs are not the lone suppliers of many of its services also serves to confuse the distinctions to what constitute a PSC or a PMC. Many companies offer logistics and support functions to armed forces without qualifying as a PSC or a PMC, Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root is often mentioned as a PSC/PMC, but even though it has a logistics section, it is essentially an engineering and construction company (Halliburton home page). Weapon manufacturers such as Northrop Grumman also offers services related to their weapons systems without offering security services in general etc. In this thesis only the companies which specialize in security and military support functions will qualify as PSCs/ PMCs, these companies will offer a range of the services discussed below, and not just a couple of services related to their products. Acknowledging that in practice there are no fixed categories explicitly separating PSCs and PMCs from all other companies, nor between PMCs/ and PSCs, in general one can say that private military companies are associated more with activities designed to have a military impact, or in the words of industry analyst David Shearer “to enhance the capability of a client’s military forces to function better in war and to deter conflict more effectively” (Shearer 1998: 23), while private security companies specialize in the tactical and strategic provision of security. Traditionally PSCs have had less of a military profile than PMCs. They provide highly specialized services with a military application, but are not in themselves notably military or paramilitary in organization or methods. Although its employees may or
may not have a military background, they have skills and abilities with military as well as
civilian use (Adams 1999: 105). PSC are often smaller organizations than PMCs and many of
them have been known to only provide guards (and not always armed ones), while others are
increasingly used by cash strapped governments for selected tasks. Industry representative
Doug Brooks has attempted to display the differences between PMCs and PSC by
categorizing the most common service distribution among the two company types:

**Fig. 1.1: PSC versus PSC activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>PMC or PSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Offensive combat operations (pulling triggers)</td>
<td>PMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Armed security services in unstable states to private clients</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Armed security services in unstable states to public or international clients, including law and order operations</td>
<td>PMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Humanitarian protection, operations, and support</td>
<td>PMC/PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Military surveillance, strategic advice and intelligence</td>
<td>PMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Demining</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Military and police training</td>
<td>PMC/PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Logistics and supply for military operations</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hostage situation advice and/or rescue operations</td>
<td>PMC/PSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Brooks 2001: 130)

Apparent from the table above, most companies are engaged in business on both sides of the
PSC/ PMC divide. In this thesis the terms will thus be used in tandem and accordingly no
attempt of categorizing individual companies will be attempted. In stead, a general
introduction to the services commonly offered by the PMC/PSC industry will be provided
below.

**Services commonly offered by PSCs and PMCs**

Although there obviously are subcategories to these companies with corresponding deviations
in services offered, the services discussed below constitute the services most commonly on
offer.

**Military advice**

This includes high quality tactical, operational, and strategic advice for the restructuring,
equipping, and employment of forces. The aim of such services would be military
restructuring or dramatic increase in capabilities. Such services would also include advice on the procurement of weapons. Companies known to provide these services include the Virginia based Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Vinnell, and Levdan (Singer 2003a: 95).

**Military and security training**

Military training includes training of military personnel for combat situations or on general terms regarding ground forces, naval or airborne special-forces etc., however it would also include training in the use of advanced weapons systems on behalf of national forces, intelligence training, surveillance, counter-surveillance, interrogation, and counter-interrogation skills. Training of bodyguards and other security personnel is also common, as well as training of police forces. A leading company in the training field is Military Professional Resources Incorporated, best known for its training of the Croatian army in 1995. Shortly after the official training program was completed the Croatian forces won a decisive and unexpected victory in the Serb-held Krajina region, a victory that had serious humanitarian consequences (Shearer 1998: 58). Currently another US based company, DynCorp, has a contract worth tens of millions of dollars to recruit and train a new Iraqi police force (Traynor 2003). Other companies offering advice and training services as described above would include a range of other US based companies, such as Blackwater USA, a company which claim to have the most comprehensive private tactical training facility in the United States (Blackwater homepage 2005), British based-companies like Aegis Defence Services (Aegis home page 2005), as well as French companies like SECRETS and ABAC, and Israeli Companies such as Levdan and Silver Shadow (Pech 1999: 100), among others.

**Security services**

Most PMCs/PSCs provides a broad range of security services, and the majority of companies have both an analytical arm and a ‘hands-on’ physical security arm – usually operating in close concert. The types of service offered can thus be subdivided into a) ‘consulting services’, where the security company acts as an expert adviser, and b) ‘specialist security services’ where the security company actually provides a physical service (Black 2004: 173).

a) Consulting services tend to include threat assessment and security risk analysis. In light of the current globalized terrorist threat, comprehensive security risk analysis,
including projections of future risks, is increasingly undertaken by private companies (Black 2004: 174); security surveys and audits, this process involves a detailed inspection of premises and staff activity in order to identify physical or electronic vulnerabilities (ibid); penetration testing, that is testing in order to detect weaknesses in procedures and training of staff (ibid).

b) Hands-on tactical security provision can entail high-risk operations; the provision of a full range of protective and training security services to allow a client to carry out its business or task in hostile environments; close protection, a service which has been increasingly in demand for the protection of key individuals or those carrying out necessary duties in particularly threatening environments, such as that in Iraq or as perceived in the flood stricken and lawless areas in and around New Orleans, in addition to ‘close’ body guarding skills, this service usually involves the gathering of protective intelligence (Black 2004: 174-75); personal security details (PSD), essentially the same as the above, but on a less personalized scale, such as for convoy protection.

**Intelligence**

Private firms have a requirement to gather and then analyse intelligence to support either particular projects for clients or their own general operations (Black 2004: 174), increasingly companies are also hired to provide independent intelligence to organizations, companies, governments etc. Counter-surveillance in particular is becoming an increasingly important part of the private security business. Most serious crimes and nearly all terrorist attacks require some form of detailed reconnaissance in advance. British companies are particularly strong in this area because of the British military’s extensive experience of counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland (ibid: 175).

**Logistical support**

Logistical services include equipment delivery, all forms of transport and heavy lift, communications and sometimes even the delivery of aid. Transporting and supplying troops on the battlefield as well as maintaining and running airports are services often offered by PSCs and PMCs. Companies specializing in logistic support services often aim at building capabilities and efficiencies that the client cannot sustain. Pacific Architects and Engineers

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12 Blackwater USA is reported to have sent about 150 of its workers to the affected area in support of the US Coast Guard (Higgins 2005).
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(PAE) and International Charter Incorporated of Oregon (ICI of Oregon) are companies specializing in logistic support.

Mine clearance
Demining services is both a popular and lucrative sector of the private military industry. Saracen International (an EO spin-off) is frequently hired by a variety of oil companies, as well as several UN departments to clear off explosives and land mines (Pech 1999: 101). ArmorGroup and Saladin are other companies specializing in humanitarian demining.

Technological expertise
The management and development of high capacity technological services is a niche often attempted entered by the private security industry. This could entail management of sophisticated weaponry, sophisticated information technology services etc. Titan Corporations and DynCorp are among the companies specializing in technology demanding services to state militaries and other potential clients.

Other and more specialized services are also found. DynCorp e.g. has since 1997 been operating on behalf of the US State Department to help eliminate drug production in Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia (Bigwood 2001).

While some companies tend to specialize on some security related services, many have been known to expand service offers in order to better be able to cover the full range of security related services which customers could demand in high-risk environments. The variety of the services on offer is nevertheless testimony of a diverse and potent private security and military industry offering a wide range of services tailored to fill the needs of private companies, national governments, and international organizations like the UN.

1.2 Methodology
Choice of method is often held to be conditional on research question and data availability, both considerations that have accounted for the qualitative approach of this thesis. The research question of this thesis is twofold in that it aims to provide an insight to the characteristics of the UN’s use of private security and military companies as well as to
explain such use. Efforts to unveil UN reliance on private means of security, both in terms of scope and essence could naturally have benefited from greater data availability. In the eventuality of readily available data, the study could have benefited by further quantitative measures. The explanatory parts taking into account why this particular use is taking place, depends on a qualitative approach. In order to provide answers to the two research questions a case study approach has been chosen. In-depth analysis will be carried out of relevant aspects of both the UN organization, as well as of relevant strata of the private security/military industry in order to explain aspects of the two sets of units, which again generate the UN to deploy the industry’s services.

1.2.1 The case study

According to Yin, case studies are the preferred strategy when three conditions are present: 1) when “how” and “why” questions are posed; 2) when the investigator has little control over events; and 3) when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin 2003: 1). In relation to the aims of this thesis all three conditions are present: 1) The first part of the research question deals with detecting and classifying the UN’s use of private security and military services (“how”), while the second part addresses the rationale and the reasons for such use (“why”); 2) the phenomenon is of macro-political character in that the UN is the only global intergovernmental organization, and the PSC/PMC industry is an industry of distinct international character; and 3) both the patterns of UN use, as well as the industry size and characteristics, are in flux.

The two ‘sets of units of analysis’ are the United Nations as well as the PSC/PMC industry. The United Nations, albeit most often referred to as a singular unit, comprises an extensive and frequently intricate unit to study. In a reflection of the multifaceted structure of the organization, the term “the UN family” has gradually emerged as a collective term encompassing the principal organs and its web of programmes, agencies, funds and bodies. The vastness of the UN organizational apparatus is added to by the fact that while formally part of the UN apparatus the specialized agencies are major intergovernmental organizations operating on large scale within their separate specific fields such as trade, health, education.

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13 The units are termed ‘sets of units’ in order to point out the multifaceted nature of both the UN and the private security and military industry.

14 Defining the UN as a singular or multiple unit raises several questions about the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the various component organizations, the policy making procedures etc. Although relevant to this thesis, such a discussion is not embarked upon in this context due to the limited scope of the thesis.
and agriculture. These agencies subsequently enjoy a large degree of independence from the rest of the organization. Needless to say, all aspects of the Organization have not been subject to this study. In accordance with the multifaceted structure of the units, the study could be termed an embedded case study in that it studies not only the main organization as a whole, but also but also subcategories such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian operations separately. The most relevant units of the UN organization to this study hence constitutes the Secretariat and especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and Office of the United Nations Security Officer (UNSECOORD), all three which can be found on the right hand side of the UN organizational chart presented in figure 1.2. Less specific attention will be paid to some of the Programmes and Funds such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High-Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and World Food Program (WFP), on upper the left side of the chart. The organizational chart presented below thus serves to give an overview of some of the principal compositional organs of the UN family.
Within the component parts of the Secretariat, specific sub-offices and agencies have been studied, these include e.g. the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) integral to the DPKO, and various security instances integral to the UNSECOORD.

The second unit of analysis is the rather broad category of the PSC/PMC industry. The industry consists of a wide variety of companies. However, as this thesis aims at explaining the interactions of the industry with the UN, it consequently deals primarily with the more
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legitimate segments of the industry. The industry, like the UN, thus constitutes a compound set of units of analysis.

1.2.2 Theory

The theoretical framework used to explain the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs is composed of two sets of explanatory variables, that is, one set for each unit of analysis. The variables are gathered and arranged by the author in an attempt to best explain the UN’s increased demand for PSC/PMC related services, as well as to explain the changes that correspondingly have taken place on the supply side. The explanatory factors are combined in a chart and will be referred to as the analytical framework. This framework also serves as a dispositional overview of the theory chapters, and later of the corresponding analysis chapters. A set of propositions are derived from each of the two parts of the analytical framework and will be attempted confirmed or rejected in the analyzing chapters.

1.2.3 Data availability

There is a considerable lack of coherent and available data on the use of PMCs by NGOs and aid agencies in general, and even less concerning the UN’s use of these companies. Hence, completely mapping UN use of PSC/PMC services has not been feasible. Instead, empirical illustrations of the practice are provided. The data on security privatization is by nature both proprietary and confidential and the particularly high sensitivity in relation to the UN has clearly limited the collection of data obtained. Information of 32 contracts between the UN and various PSCs and PMCs has, however been collected. Having information on “contracts” implies that information is provided on incidents of the UN using a particular company in a particular setting for particular tasks. It does not imply that the author is in possession of the actual contract document in question or the details therein. Companies practice client confidentiality and do not share any such detailed information. The gathering of this information has been a long cumulative process, which has not been easy to plan for or to control. The various types of sources described in the following section have all been used to try to provide a picture of which companies are used, for what, when, and where. As far as possible each recorded contract has been attempted proven through multiple references (see section on reliability below). The compilation of contracts could, as mentioned, preferably be more exhaustive, however, none such compilation of cases of UN use has to date been seen by the author, and it is the author’s belief that the current list (see table AI.1) does serve to provide an impression of the practice.
Within the UN there appears, as mentioned above, to be little coherence regarding the topic other than that it is best avoided. This fact has no doubt impeded heavily on the access to sources and data. Potential interview subjects early made it clear that issues of loyalty prevented them from answering in-depth inquiries concerning both the UN’s use of PSCs/PMCs, as well as the potential causes thereof. The same hindrances and lack of information are confirmed met by academics and researchers in general (e.g. Krahmann 2005, personal communication).

Companies are usually also quite averse in terms of providing contract information. Client confidentiality very often precludes information. The industry is in general not too easily accessible, partly due to the sensibility of the operations in which they have taken part, partly because there has been quite a lot of negative publicity and sensationalist journalism covering these companies. Attendance at a Brussels conference named “Peacekeeping and Stability Operations” in June 2005 very much had a door-opening effect in terms of the industry. President of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), Doug Brooks, was very open for inquiries and provided a very good source of information. As electronic inquiries had already been attempted with little success, personal contact and introduction of the topic of the thesis proved to be crucial in order to obtain interviews and opinions, most of which was permitted used, although some was not permitted quoted. Audio recording from conference presentations and discussions also represent a source of information.  

1.2.4 Primary sources

The UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs is hence not a much-publicized phenomenon. In order to verify and analyze the actual phenomenon, qualitative first hand sources have been gathered and utilized to the degree possible in the pursuit of multiple sources of evidence. Document analysis, interviews and personal communication have thus been applied as sources.

**Document analysis**

Administrative UN reports have been used extensively in order to gather data on internal organizational procedures as well as positions on the subject. Thorough examinations have

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15 These sources are available from the author.
been performed on Reports of the Secretary-General and of the General Assembly as well as reports and internal guidelines of other UN entities such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The UN Social and Economic Council, The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, the former Department of Humanitarian Affairs, The UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries etc. In addition, several specialized UN inquiries reports have been studied in close detail.

Documentary confirmation has also been sought through government reports and records such as reports of the US Department of State, The US Department of Defence, the US Senate, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, as well as documents of the now defunct Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority.

Other documents have been retrieved from the private security industry such as various reports of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and Concept Papers for proposed IPOA contributions to peace operations.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Interviews and personal communication}

Interviews and personal communication play a significant part in the data basis of the thesis. I conducted one longer face-to-face interview with IPOA president Doug Brooks in Brussels. The interview lasted about two hours and took the shape of an audio-recorded conversation guided by an interview guide prepared in advance.\textsuperscript{17} Questions ranged from personal opinions to questions relating directly to IPOA’s work etc. The interview can be described as a semi-structured interview (Johannessen, Tufte and Kristoffersen 2004: 133) as questions were prepared in advance, but the succession was flexible and spontaneous and questions were added along the way. This type of interview was deliberately chosen over a very structured version as it was assumed that a relaxed approach, a conversation-like interview, would be beneficial to the amount of information obtained.

Knowing that Brooks is often the outward face of the industry in media and in academic fora it came as no surprise that indeed some of the questions received almost ‘by heart’ answers, meaning that argumentation in some cases appeared mere routine. Other questions received

\textsuperscript{16} All documents referred to in this section are listed in the bibliography under ‘Official documents’.
\textsuperscript{17} The recording was carried out with permission from the subject.
more ‘interesting’ answers, particularly those relating to deliberate image refinement efforts, which is less of a topic in the different public discussions related to the industry.\textsuperscript{18} The sensitivity of some aspects of the topic was illustrated by the fact that parts of the conversation was asked to be done ‘off the record’, meaning that the recorder was switched off and the information was not permitted used in any way. A transcript of the interview is available from the author.

One interview was also conducted by e-mail. The interview was agreed to in advance after meeting in the Brussels conference where lack of time prevented a face-to-face interview. John Millar, Director of Business Development of ArmorGroup was sent a range of questions, which he responded to in the shape of a continuous text rather than as separate questions. As in the case of Brooks, Millar also seems accustomed to answering inquiries. Although providing some degree of answers to most questions, Millar appeared more limited in his response, which might be attributed to him representing one particular company, and not the more unspecific ‘industry’, which is the case with Brooks.

One telephone interview was carried out with Mike Pearson, Director of Security Support Solutions (3S). This interview also followed face-to-face conversation at the Brussels conference. Parts of this conversation were asked to be held “off the record”, and are hence not included in the data material.

Other correspondence has been maintained per e-mail. Senior consultant Ernest E. Beno of Pacific Architects & Engineers has in particular been open to questions and has confirmed the company’s contracts with the UN as compiled by the author. Richard T. Lee, Business Development Manager of PAE, answered questions in person at the Brussels conference. No thorough interviews were conducted with any of these sources; however statements have been used with their permission. Millar, Brooks as well as some academics and some UN officials have answered e-mail inquiries on a case-by-case basis. Documentation of all communication is available from the author.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} This topic is discussed in detail in chapter 7.
\textsuperscript{19} All personal communication, e- mails and interviews are listed in the bibliography under ‘interviews and personal communication’.
1.2.5 Secondary sources

Various sources of secondary literature have been used, mainly for the background and analytical framework sections.

**Internet sources and newspaper articles**

Many of the events described in the thesis are of very recent character, which makes internet and news agency sources indispensable. Internet sources are also frequently used to gather information on companies, their services and activities. Company home pages, NGO web pages etc. are thus repeatedly used as sources of information. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) database of PMCs has also been consulted for information dating prior to 2002. Internet sources are listed separately in the bibliography.

**Television**

In Chapter 6, quotations are made from interviews conducted for a PBS television documentary. Industry representatives are quoted directly from the documentary and in some cases from the interview transcript. The documentary is available on the internet along with transcripts of interviews (see bibliography).

**Expert evaluation**

In relation to an evaluation of proposed military operation support, Lt. Col. Bjørn Robert Dahl of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, agreed to provide an evaluation on professional grounds. Dahl provided views based on professional and personal peacekeeping experience.

Consequently, in tracing evidence of the UN’s use of PMCs/PSCs it has been necessary to search through rather large amounts of potential sources, both the more conventional ones such as books, articles and papers on relevant matters, but it has also been necessary to look into each company’s website and search through countless web pages and newspaper articles. This process has without doubt been time-consuming, but has also been very interesting, as it has led me in closer contact with the private military industry and its personnel. The participation in a PMC discussion group administered by Brooks of IPOA, has in particular contributed with an inside view of the industry as it hosts both PMC/PSC employees, company managers, industry analysts and others.
1.2.6 Validity and reliability

According to Yin four logical tests are relevant for testing the quality of case studies: 1) Construct validity; 2) Internal validity; 3) External validity; and 4) Reliability (Yin 2003: 33-34).

**Construct validity**

Establishing correct operational measures for the concept studied in this thesis is a matter of selecting the more specific changes that can be derived from the analytical framework to explain both external and internal UN need enhancing factors, as well as external and internal offer increasing factors. This selection is in part done in the light of findings of the first research question which aims at answering the “how” question. That is e.g., the characteristics of the way and for what the UN makes use of PSC/PMC services indicate the corresponding UN organs to study. As inferred by the research question then, the most relevant parts of the Organization have been the DPKO, various humanitarian agencies and the organizational arrangements affecting these agencies. In terms of the PSC/PMC industry, the “how” question also gives clues to which companies to study.

**Internal validity**

As the main purpose of this study is to identify the main causal factors of the development pointed out by the preliminary research question (the “how” question) there is always the necessity of considering other inferences than those presented in the analytical framework. The easiest identifiable problem with maximizing internal validity in this thesis resides with the fact that the issue being studied is in relatively rapid development. Throughout the research period it has therefore been important to remain observant to developments in order to detect potential operationalizations of the analytical framework, which have the potential of not being sufficiently idiomatic. In order to assure internal validity one extra part-variable was added at a later stage of the process, the terrorism variable was thus added to the analytical framework in order to better explain ‘radicalization of operating environment’. It is important to point out that the aim cannot be to disclose every attributing factor to the UN hiring a PSC or a PMC, as they will vary depending on context. However, the goal is to provide an explanatory framework that can be generalized within the UN context and which can be supplemented by situation specific details in each case of contracting with PSCs and PMCs.
External validity

Inherent in the nature of case analysis one normally find restricted prospects for generalization (Yin 2003: 38). Generalization purposes in most case studies are directed towards broader theory as opposed to generalization among other cases. Apart from the prospects for generalization within the UN context, exportation of findings will not be attempted in this thesis, although it could be subject for discussion whether certain findings from this study could be valid for other intergovernmental organizations involved in peacekeeping, such as the African Union or the European Union, or in relation to humanitarian operations, humanitarian NGOs or other humanitarian agencies. The second part of the analysis that deals with the changes taking place in the industry will hold relevance for other potential users of PSC/PMC services. As more and more state militaries embark on rather extensive outsourcing programs to cut costs and to adjust to different threats in the international community, the relevance of studying the private security and military industry is increasing. The objective considered most interesting in this context is looking at policy implications of the findings, both for the UN and the principles and ideas upon which the organization was founded, other intergovernmental organizations, as well as member states, a topic which will be touched upon in the concluding chapter.

Reliability

According to Patton (2002) the aim of using qualitative methods is to describe and explain phenomena as accurately as possible so that descriptions and explanations correspond as closely as possible to the way the world is and actually operates (Patton 2002: 545-46). Assuring reliability has been a particularly important priority and concern in the gathering of data for this thesis as the phenomenon studied is not well known, nor well researched. There are certain concerns regarding information availability and accuracy as the UN’s strategy for dealing with the subject has been one of avoidance, and it has therefore been difficult to verify information found elsewhere through the organization. Because of the lack of transparency in UN practice regarding its PSCs/ PMCs reliance it has been crucial to establish the central facts upon which the rest of the thesis is based. The fact that dealing with the subject seems intentionally avoided by the UN also raises concerns of potential manipulation of information. The same also goes for the PSC/PMC industry, which seems to release information on particular contracts as they see fit their aims. It is no coincidence that information on logistic support contracts is seemingly more often listed on individual companies’ web pages than
security contracts. Similarly, contracts involving services that are considered, of a ‘humanist’ character, such as demining services, and hence more advantageous for the company profile, are apparently more often made public than other contracts. This selective dispatch of information does constitute a concern for the reliability of information, especially so when trying to get an overview of the services most often sold.

Strong sensationalist tendencies in media coverage also contribute to cloud the relevant information on the subject. To avoid exposure to such potentially biased information, newspaper sources have been chosen with care.

The limited availability of data has thus been a challenge throughout the process (as mentioned under 1.2.3) and in order to compensate for having to use second hand sources to detect UN contracts, the principle of data triangulation has been applied. The second hand references have thus been attempted confirmed either through using multiple sources, or through first hand sources, such as company representatives confirming contracts. The collection of recorded contracts included in Table AI.1 and Appendix I all meet the above requirements for sources, while the records of contracts that could not be confirmed or verified to the same degree were consequently left out.

Although the reliability of UN and other official documents will not be questioned in this context, it is clear that some UN documents are strikingly evasive in their approach to the organization’s use of PSC/PMC services. UN documents not providing the required information on the subject has been more of a problem than the actual quality of the sparse information available. A greater amount of documents have thus been consulted than perhaps anticipated.

The data obtained from interviews are normally less secure since they rely on personal conceptions of realities. There are no guarantees that other industry representatives could not have given different opinions. However, by interviewing both the president of the main interest organization of PSCs/PMCs (IPOA), as well as company representatives from companies that already have long established business relations with the UN, it was felt that some of the most relevant actors within the industry were represented with their views. However, failing to obtain interviews with the concerned UN representatives represents a potential worrying aspect in terms of reliability. Several UN offices and representatives have
been repeatedly contacted without getting any response. Consequently, the UN’s version had to be puzzled together through statements made in reports and other official documents, press statements and the like. These documents have had to compensate for the lack of willingness of UN officials to make personal statements.

**Definitional considerations**

One of the problems concerning discussing private security and military companies relates to their definitions. A variety of terms is used by analysts and commentators, and while ‘private military company’ (PMC) seemed to be the most common term until recently, ‘private security company’ (PSC) now seems to have taken precedence among many observers. There is as mentioned in section 1.1.3, however, no consensus to what constitutes either one of the terms, and consequently the choice of term often has reflected ideological stands. In the midst of definitional chaos, I find that it is useful not to simplify the terminology to an extent where the military aspect of the service provision is lost. In fact, a great deal of the contracts received by these companies is for tasks formerly carried out by state militaries. Similarly, some of the support-tasks carried out by these companies are only indirectly linked to enhancing security. In the end, with the present lack of consensus of how to define the industry, and consequently at the expense of simplicity, I have chosen to maintain the two terms PSCs and PMCs collaterally. The terminology used in this thesis hence reflects a) the diversity of the companies concerned, and b) reference to the actual functions that these companies carry out, and less their potential bottom line potential or motivation.

1.3 The structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 consists of an examination of the theoretical framework used to explain the UN’s use of PMCs and PSCs. The chapter is divided in two as the first part deals with explaining external and internal preconditions for the UN developing a need for external service provision by PSCs and PMCs, while the second part introduces the set of variables used to analyse the changes in the PSC/PMC industry leading to a changed offer of security and other related services.

Chapter three to seven constitute the two analysing parts of the thesis. Whereas the first section (chapter 3-5) deals with analyzing the preconditions for a UN need for PSC/PMC services, the second half (chapter 6 and 7) discusses the industry potentials for providing an
offer of such services. At the offset of chapter three an outline of the empirical findings of the actual UN use will be provided. This brief introduction to the analysis hence attempts to capture the essence and nature of the services actually contracted for by the organization and to present the findings in a clear fashion. The findings of this section provides the logic for the structure of the following three analysis chapters which hence deal with security, logistic and support functions, and expert functions in turn. Chapter 6 and 7 are then devoted to analyzing changes in the presentation of industry, as well as to the service offer of the industry in light of the second part of the analytical framework.

The final chapter of the thesis sums up the findings from the previous analysis, before commenting on some of the political implications for the UN and its member states of the UN’s engagement with private security and military companies.
2. Analytical framework

The analytical framework aimed at explaining the UN’s increased use of private military and security companies consists of two main explanatory variables: increased demand for alternative personnel and increased supply of PMC and PSC personnel. On the one hand, the United Nations have faced enhanced expectations concerning the comprehensiveness of its activities and have met increased challenges concerning personnel contributions. These developments have again corresponded with the organization facing tougher operating conditions. On the other hand, there has emerged an alternative source of personnel, suitable to fill certain gaps in the UN’s operational machinery.

2.1 Increased need for external service provision

This set of variables is two-dimensional as it attempts to explain the UN’s need for extra ordinary personnel by looking into the external circumstances conditional on the UN’s opportunity set, as well as internal features of the World Organization that have limited the organization’s access to qualified personnel.

The variables can be outlined and displayed as beneath:
Three propositions are derived from set of variables: \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) relates to the external need enhancing factors, while \( P_3 \) relates to the internal need enhancing factors.

\( P_1 \): Enhanced expectations to the comprehensiveness of UN action have contributed to the organization’s deployment of private security and private military companies.

\( P_2 \): Radicalization of operating environments has contributed to the UN deploying private security and private military companies.
P3: Inadequate internal capacity has contributed to the UN deploying private security and private military companies.

2.1.1 Enhanced expectations concerning the comprehensiveness of UN activities and responsibility (P1)

The post-Cold War era has been marked by significant changes concerning the expectations to what responsibility should be assumed by the international community, and in particular by the United Nations. With the spread of technology and widespread acceptance of human rights, both the content and the application of these expectations have changed and consequently led to increased demands for UN to take action in situations involving war or human rights violations (Karns and Mingst 2001: 222).

The Globalization of human rights

A transition from a culture stressing national sovereignty to a culture where international law and norms opt for a higher national and international accountability has gradually emerged after World War II. The core of this effort was a more ethical understanding and arrangement of relations between individuals and the institutions governing them (Coicaud 2003: 178). Although the concept of the rights of the individual was not a new one, the founding of the United Nations represented the beginning of a newfound appetite for humanitarian principles. The United Nations Charters states as one of the main purposes of the organization “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Charter of the United Nations 1945: Article 1). Further milestones in this progression have been the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in armed conflict; the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the two 1966 Covenants relating to civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights; and the establishment of the Rome Statute (1998) and its enter into force, realizing the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 (ICISS 2001: 6).

The number, scope and implementation strategies of international human rights treaties and conventions have increased over the past half-century, creating a vast body of human rights law, which although far from always implemented, has changed international law and the principles for the rights of the individual in a significant manner.
The further evolution in international human rights has produced a change of emphasis from promotion of rights (articulation in declarations and conventions) to active protection of human rights (mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement) (Doyle and Gardner 2003: 3). In this respect the UN has often been protracted, and has certainly protracted itself, as a locus for action. In his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace* then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for a new role for the organization in managing global security and identified the Security Council as the catalyst for such action (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §16). In his 2001 report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict Secretary-General Kofi Annan followed up by launching the term “a culture of protection”, which would entail the UN to act on issues of war crimes, fact-finding missions, separation of civilians and armed elements, media monitoring mechanisms, protection of journalists etc. (UN SG 2001: §9-45).

The organization’s Millennium Declaration, and its corresponding eight Millennium Development Goals, also reflects this enhanced responsibility that the General Assembly asserts for the organization in achieving a greater accordance with the human rights aspirations. Yet another example of the high ambitions on the matter is displayed in the 2001 *Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, which reflects the evolution of peacekeeping from inter-positioning to peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction in light of the diffusion of human rights regime. The report proceeds to establish that the international community has a “responsibility to protect” in cases where the state is unwilling or unable to fulfil its designated tasks. The responsibility encompasses three specific tasks: the responsibility to *prevent* armed conflict, the responsibility to *react to* “situations of compelling human need”, as well as the responsibility to *rebuild*, after intervention (ICISS 2001: XI).

‘The CNN effect’

While considering the changed expectations and conduct concerning the protection of human rights, nationally and internationally, it is impossible to ignore the impact of globalization and technology. The revolution in information technology has made global communications instantaneous and provided unprecedented access to information worldwide. The popular concern and political pressure on governments to act in cases where mass sufferings are broadcasted to the public is often referred to as ‘the CNN effect’. As humanitarian action rarely is taken unilaterally, ‘the CNN effect’ has a direct effect on the agenda of both member state governments and public opinion as well as of the UN bodies. Former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has referred to CNN as “the sixteenth member of the Security
Council”: “The member states never take action on a problem unless the media takes up the case”. When the media gets involved, public opinion is aroused; "Public emotion is so intense that United Nations work is undermined and constructive statesmanship is almost impossible” (quotation from Cate 2002: 5).

Although some commentators (Cate 2002 and others) recently have argued that the CNN-effect is exaggerated, and that the countless disaster reports instead are making the public immune to disturbing television images, the point remains, that it has become more difficult for political actors and institutions that subscribe to the humanitarian regime to ignore well-publicized crisis.

2.1.2 Radicalization of operating environment (P_2)

From the typical inter-positioning and observation role that the UN characteristically played during the Cold War, the concept of "peacekeeping" evolved in the post-Cold War era to involve interference in ongoing conflict environments. The organization now entered environments from which the Super Powers had withdrawn their support and overall engagement, areas that were awash with local rivalries and antagonisms. The UN agencies during the 1990s thus increasingly found themselves facing extremely complex conflict environments in the areas where the organization launched its missions. In this thesis it will be claimed that the radicalization of the operational environment is due mainly to three interacting factors; the increased amount of weak states, often resulting in failed states, and in some cases even in the total collapse of state structures; the changed nature of war in such environments; and the prevalence of terrorism. Terrorism is a phenomenon that may or may not be attributed to new wars and disrupted states, but which in this thesis is chosen dealt with as a related, yet separable variable. All three factors contribute to decreased security and bigger challenges posed to peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel.

**Dysfunctional/disrupted states**

Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly evident that the Westphalian ideal-state is facing serious challenges in the modern era and that ‘weak’, ‘failed’, ‘disrupted’, ‘collapsed states’, or as they collectively will be termed in this context; ‘fragile states’, are likely to be a permanent feature of the international order. Fragile states need not be suffering from complete state ‘failure’ or ‘collapse’; rather, they are marked by varying degrees of incapacity. Fragile states are in this thesis defined according to the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) which asserts fragile states to be those “where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions of the state for poverty reduction, territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people can support themselves” (DFID 2005: 7). It follows that there are certain historical, political and economic features that help explain the context in which states fail to function (see for instance The African Studies Centre 2003), and that the phenomenon manifests itself in different ways (see Saikal 2003). Full-blown cases of state collapse, which involve the extreme disintegration of public authority and the metamorphosis of societies into a Hobbesian anarchy, remain relatively rare; in recent years, only states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Congo (DRC) and perhaps Albania seem to fit this definition (Milliken and Krause 2002: 754). However, there is a range of other states that fail to provide security and public order, legitimate representation, and wealth and welfare to their citizens. Places such as the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Haiti, Colombia and Afghanistan have witnessed the near-total collapse of central authority over part, or all of their territory, with the resulting disorder often causing great human suffering (ibid: 754-55).

Disrupted states tend to be vulnerable to physical rupture, open civil conflict and foreign intervention (Saikal 2003: 19), and thus represent highly complex conflict environments. They need an appropriate, integrated response that not only handles immediate suffering, but also assists in political resolution addressing the causal roots of the suffering, as well as post-conflict reconstruction measures. In these quasi-states there is a flawed monopoly of violence and armed actors tend to be fragmented, dispersed, or even privatized. Warlords, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, mercenaries, or private military companies may in part substitute a state’s armed forces (The African Studies Centre 2003:6).

**New wars**

The character of new wars is interlinked to the phenomenon of disrupted states. It is generally regarded that new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases, the disintegration of the state, in particular, they occur in the context of the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Kaldor 2002: 4). Disrupted states are characteristically engaged in virtually continuous internal wars; and war makes a strong state less likely (Clapham 2002:786).
Mary Kaldor has defined ‘new wars’ as disputes that involve “a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals)” (Kaldor 2002:2). The new wars can thus be contrasted with old wars in terms of their goals, their main actors, their methods of warfare, and how they are financed (ibid: 6).

The goals behind new wars would typically be to contest the legitimacy of the state on the grounds of identity politics, in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of the past wars. In such wars, the state’s armed forces are hence not organically linked to their populations, but are instead to be associated with one particular section of the population, or with the attempt to impose the control of an autocratic regime (Clapham 2002:786). The SIPRI yearbook testifies to this tendency by stating that of the 58 different major armed conflicts between 1990 and 2002, 55 were internal. The majority of these wars were also waged over governmental power as opposed to territory, a tendency which has been enforced after 1997 (Eriksson, Sollenberg and Wallersteen 2003: 109-111).

The main actors of new wars are often non-state actors. In contrast to the vertically organized hierarchical units that were typical of ‘old wars’, the units that fight these wars include a disparate range of different types of groups such as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, mercenaries and also regular armies including breakaway units of regular armies (Kaldor 2002:8). Several, and often unpredictable numbers of fighting factions complicate the general conflict overview. The war in contemporary Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an explicit illustration. A further complication involves the blurring of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, as well as the use of child soldiers.

The methods new wars are influenced by informal warfare techniques such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency warfare. The aim is normally to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity (and/or of a different opinion). Hence the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation (ibid:8).
Analytical framework

The funding for new wars often includes plunder and black market trading, or external assistance. The latter can be remittance from diasporas, ‘taxation’ of humanitarian assistance, support from neighbouring governments or illegal trade in arms, drugs or valuable commodities such as gems or oil (Kaldor 2002: 9). New wars are therefore often dependent on regional networks for sympathizers and business partners and thus often assume more of a regional than a strictly internal character, whereas the ‘old wars’ were dependent on superpower patrons for their intrastate interstate warfare.

Terrorism and new patterns of tension

Among the new security threats identified by contemporary governments, terrorism is the most limited in terms of intensity. Empirical data on the degree of threat posed by terrorism shows that terrorism causes relatively few deaths in comparison to other security threats, such as interstate war, civil conflict, or infectious diseases, although recent data do show an increase in the lethality of individual terrorist incidents (Krahmann 2005: 5).

As there is no international consensus as to the exact entailment of the term, a UN treaty on counterterrorism measures has been stalled for years over the failure of its member states to agree upon a definition of the phenomenon. Recently Secretary-General Kofi Annan has urged world leaders to agree on a universal definition of terrorism. The new UN proposal declare that “any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to carry out or to abstain from any act constitutes an act of terrorism” (UN Draft Outcome Document 2005: §85).

While terrorism takes on many forms and stems from many motivations, the post-September 11 environment has seen new lines of tensions on the world scene caused by a growing fear of particularly religiously motivated terrorism. Such a concept has proven to entail a broad definition of the enemy stretching beyond functional and power elites to take in whole civilizations (Münkler 2005: 113). Reinforcing the tension, the American-led approach to

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20 The definition was in the end not endorsed by the World Summit 14-16, September, 2005 (UN General Assembly 2005: §81-91).
21 Other motivations for groups to pursue terrorist strategies would include e.g. national, ethnic, linguistic, regional, and ideological motivations, or a mixture of such objectives. Acts of terrorism could in turn also be carried out by governments.
counterterrorism post September 11, the frequently termed “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) has had implications for actors associated with the cultural and religious basis of North America and Western Europe in general.

2.1.3 Inadequate availability of qualified personnel (P₃)

As the workload of the United Nations has expanded substantially in the post-Cold War environment it has placed formidable challenges to the organization's adjustment abilities. The UN has frequently been accused of having a contemporary conceptual design for the organized maintenance of peace that only partly corresponds with actuality.

Lack of Political will

“By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the peoples of Africa; the international community has failed them; the UN has failed them.”

- Kofi Annan

The failures of the UN lead missions in Somalia in 1993, in Rwanda in 1994, and in the Balkans in 1995 are all well publicized; in addition to these are the failures in Angola and Liberia, which attracted less media interest. The Somalia failure eventually had dramatic effects for UN multilateral peacekeeping in general. The killing of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu led the Clinton Administration to issue a presidential decision directive named Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD25) that in instead of altering, in effect withdrew, US support not only from this particular mission, but also largely disassociated the US from UN peace operations in general. The Directive orders a reduction in the peacekeeping assessment percentage from 31.7% to 25 % by January 1996 (US Department of State 1996: §2), and goes on to ensure the American public that the losses of the 18 soldiers were accidental and that no further cooperation with the UN in enforcement operations is impending.

"The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large

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22 Quoted in Donald Rothschild “The Us Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa” SAIS review, vol. 21, no. I (Winter, Spring 2001 pp 201). S. 6
scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc organizations." (PDD25: §3).

Statistics of personnel contributions to UN multilateral peace operations testify to the PDD25 implementation, as well as to the military priorities that have dominated US foreign policies after September 2001. As of 31 July 2004, The United States' contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping counted 427 American personnel, six of which served as troops. The American contribution amounts to 0.73 per cent of the grand total of peacekeepers deployed in July 2004. Other major Western democracies are also virtually absent. The top-ten list of contributors shows Pakistan contributing the most, with more than 8500 peacekeepers, followed by Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uruguay, Jordan and Kenya. Although the present war in Iraq and the NATO engagement in Afghanistan mission tie up large parts of Western, and especially US resources, this list serves to confirm a pattern that has been emergent for some time: Western democracies are highly risk averse regarding committing troops to UN missions, and as a result limit their contributions to financial or material means as opposed to personnel. Michael Doyle labels the present condition among core contributing countries, whether new or old, “Peace-enforcing fatigue” (Doyle 1999: 450), meaning that rich states are rarely willing to invest their resources or the lives of their soldiers in war other than for important national interests.

Other measures are also taken to avoid the commitment of troops to UN peacekeeping operations; the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), recently renamed the African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) is one such measure. The program was initiated in 1997 by the Clinton Administration and was aimed at training African militaries to improve their capacities and potentials for peacekeeping on the African continent. By the end of 2001 US special forces and American PMCs had trained nearly 9,000 troops (O’Hanlon 2003:72). Other Western countries, like France and Britain, have also

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24 The top-ten list for September 2000 (no numbers for July 2000 were available) shows few deviations from the 2004 list, with Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, India and Jordan ranking top-five. The only deviations are Australia and Portugal ranking as number eight and ten due to the extensive mission in East Timor that year, where both countries had strategic interests.
arranged similar programs. However, many of the forces that have attained a training program have received only limited assistance in programs lasting only ten to forty days (ibid: 73).

As a result, the United Nations is finding it increasingly difficult to acquire qualified troops for the dangerous operations it is commissioned to take on and militaries of a woeful quality are consequently pushed forward. For many poorer states the prospect of earning around $1 million a month for each battalion contributed to a UN mission is the chief incentive (Shearer 2001: 2). In some extreme cases, the only way that some states can pay their soldiers is by having them serve with UN peacekeeping operations (Bratt 1997: 5). Such contingencies, however bold, often suffer from limited defence budgets, the very fact of maintaining substantial numbers of proficient infantry soldiers makes it difficult also to provide them the necessary lift and logistics for operations abroad (O'Hanlon 2003: 74-75). Lack of adequate training and basic equipment are other well-known problems concerning contingencies from developing countries. The second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations as of July 2004, the Nigerian military, was described in an external audit (interestingly also performed by the American PMC, MPRI) as performing little to no active training, lacking basic equipment such as helmets, canteens and eyeglasses, as well as that 75 percent of the force's equipment was described as faulty or out of commission (Singer 2003a: 57).

Health issues also inflict on the capabilities of many developing countries' contingencies. According to a report prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, African military personnel, peacekeepers, and peace observers rank consistently among the groups most affected by HIV/AIDS, often with infection rates 2 to 3 times that of the local population. Preliminary testing by South Africa's National Defence Force, according to the same report, suggests that 66 to 70 per cent of troops are HIV positive, with the rate among some units rising as high as 90 per cent (Schneider and Moodie 2002: 6). Subsequently, high rates of HIV/AIDS are likely to affect military readiness, as well as encourage risk-taking and inappropriate behaviour among soldiers who believe they have already received a death sentence (ibid: 6-7).

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25 According to Peter W. Singer, ACRI was administered by the American PMC, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) from 1998 on (Singer 2003:60).
26 For an analysis of the causes of the poor conditions of especially African militaries see Herbert Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001)
Under the portrayed circumstances the quality of UN peacekeeping forces is in some contexts subject to mere casualty, adding a substantial element of uncertainty to accomplishment of the mandate, putting both the local population as well as personnel at elevated risk.

**Organizational incapacities**

The multilateral nature of UN peacekeeping implies a range of inherent weaknesses such as language difficulties, incoherent training, differences in equipment etc. These weaknesses are to a certain degree natural consequences of the principles under which the UN works, e.g. the principle of ‘geographic distribution’, meaning preferably a UN peacekeeping force should contain personnel from a variety of regions of the world to avoid missions from representing only a small and hence biased sphere of countries. However, other weaknesses appear less generic.

On the political level, divisions within the Security Council and especially among the five permanent members (P5), in several cases have created an atmosphere of confusion and indecision. The operations in Bosnia and Rwanda e.g. resulted as resolutions with a Chapter VII component, but lacking P5 commitment to the use of force (Coicaud 2001: 273). Coherence in policymaking is thus frequently hampered by the seemingly obsolete distribution of veto powers. Lack of flexibility also tend to be a problem when the United Nations agree on a mediating a proposal or a framework, it cannot easily be modified in response to changing circumstances. Modification requires renegotiation among UN members, an often lengthy process that delays mediation (Bratt 1997: 3).

The United Nations Family of agencies, boards, committees, offices, networks, programs and funds makes out a complex web in the organizational structure of the organization. Above-mentioned lack of flexibility in decision-making, combined with slow processing time has given the organization a reputation of a cumbersome bureaucracy. In addition, the organization is often condescendingly termed a "headquarter organization", an expression which relates to the divisions often apparent between field personnel and the secretariat in New York. Military personnel have commented, "Mandates are often written in an operational vacuum by civilians who may not fully appreciate the military implications of undertakings made with immediate diplomatic and political considerations in mind" (Bratt 1997: 3). A similar distrust of UN headquarters was reflected in a comment made by former United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander Lewis Mackenzie: "if you are a commander of a UN mission, don't get in trouble after five p.m. or on the weekend. There is no one in the UN to answer phone!" (Mackenzie, quoted in Bratt 1997: 3).

2.2 Increased offer of alternative personnel

Increased offer of alternative personnel is attempted explained through a two-dimensional set of variables. The analytical framework meant to explain enhanced offer covers both external conditions affecting the potential expansion of the industry, as well as internal features of the industry with implications for its perceived appeal. The variables of the analytical framework can be outlined and displayed as beneath:
Two propositions can be derived from this set of variables, the first relates to the external offer increasing factors, while the second relates to the internal offer increasing factors.

P₄: Pools of available trained personnel have contributed to the organization’s deployment of private security and private military companies.

Ps: A credible private security and military industry has contributed to the organization’s deployment of private security and military companies.
2.2.1 Pools of qualified personnel

Global post-Cold War demobilization

The disintegration of the former Soviet bloc and the de facto end of the Cold War was met with a global downsizing and a corresponding restructuring of military forces that affected almost the entire world. Although military downsizing is a phenomenon that has been associated with the end of war in general, such as the Napoleonic wars or the two World Wars (Lock 1999: 11), the hyper-militarization of the Cold War years enforced a comprehensive downsizing. According to the US Department of State, by 1999 26 per cent fewer people served in the world's armed forces than in 1989 (US Dept of State 2002: 5), of which developed nations' armed forces accounted for most of the reduction. By 1999, developed nations' armed forces were 44 per cent smaller than in 1989 (ibid: 5). Correspondingly, developing nations' forces declined by 14 per cent during the same decade. The global numerical military downsizing is clearly illustrated in figure 2.3.

![Fig. 2.3: World armed forces 1989-1999](source: US Dept of State 2002: 5)

As a result of the differing rates of decline, the two groups' size disparity widened steadily over the decade, and of the world's twenty largest armed forces in 1999, only six were in the
developed nations group (ibid: 5). The ratio of soldiers per 1000 people on a global basis also serves to illustrate the developments as it steadily decreased from 5.5 in 1989 to 3.6 in 1999 (US Dept of State 2002: 8).

Although new antagonisms have recently emerged on the international political scene, the general trend of restructuring and streamlining of the world's armed forces persists, of which the common NATO strategy is testimony. One of the key decisions of the Prague Summit 2003 concerns a "streamlining of NATO's military command arrangements" (NATO 2003: 11). Moreover, enhanced emphasis is put on numerically smaller multinational forces that are flexible, equipped with high technology and that have a high operational radius capability, such as the new NATO Response Force (NRF), intended to be "a catalyst for the transformation of NATO's capabilities" (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004).

Another important aspect of the cutbacks in state military organizations is the functional areas in which they have taken place. A great part of the cuts have been in back-end support areas, e.g. the US Army Material Command alone was reduced by 60 per cent during the first post-Cold War decade (Zamparelli 1999, in Singer 2003a: 53). This part of the downsizing strategy is confirmed by the Norwegian Chief of Defence in his 2003 report on the status of the Norwegian Defence Forces by stating that the advised measures for strength production, logistics and support operations include a considerable streamlining of remaining support functions and staff, as well as material cooperation. The cutbacks should preferably amount to about NOK 1,250 million annually (Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003: 30). The Norwegian Ministry of Defence confirms that between 2005 and 2008 NOK 2 billion will be transferred from logistics and other support activities to material investments and operational activity through increasing efficiency of leadership, logistics, support, and education (The Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004: 7).

Demobilization and restructuring consequently have, and will continue to release large numbers of former soldiers and other trained military personnel on to the job market. The contraction of a state's armed forces has also narrowed opportunities for promotion and advancement and encouraged others to leave.
Analytical framework

The privatization trend

"The best minds are not in government. If any were, business would steal them away"

- Ronald Reagan (Quoted in Singer 2003a: 49)

The penetrability of national economic borders, pressures on public resources in the wake of a welfare state crisis, disenchantment of the public with the quality of public services, and the rise of neo-liberalism have led western governments to increasingly permit or encourage private actors to assume responsibilities once monopolized by the state (Gupta 2000: xiv). Privatization defined broadly as "the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector" (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998: 1), has been pursued in liberal democracies, post-communist societies and developing countries - comprising military or authoritarian regimes alike (Gupta 2000: xii-xiii). However, as privatization covered a wide range of ideas and policies both in economic theory and political practice (Gupta 2000: viii), different countries pursued privatization with different strategies and to different extents.

There are differing views upon the background for privatization being a nearly universal restructuring instrument. While some seem to think of privatization as a predominantly economic instrument generic to globalization, others see it much more as a political tool. Similarly, some commentators regard the privatization of security and military functions as an aspect of ongoing state sovereignty erosion (Van Creveld 1999) fuelled by globalization, while others understand it rather as a deliberate expansion of the coercive and violent capacities of states (Whyte 2003). Whatever the driving forces, the fact remains that privatization plays a considerable role in the dominant political economy paradigm to the point that it has reached the domain of state security.

Privatization of national defence is apparently used as a means to accomplish a two-fold goal: Reduce public defence spending, often through restructuring of personnel structures; and increase operational efficiency. These goals are clearly articulated by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence in its plans for defence modernization and NATO accommodations of the Norwegian Defence (Ministry of Defence 2004: 6-7), as well as by then Norwegian Chief of Defence, Sigurd Frisvold, as he describes a future Norwegian defence that is "more technology intensive with fewer soldiers, in line with all the NATO member states' ongoing
restructuring which imply an enhanced ability to deploy and operate military forces both within and outside NATO territory" (Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003: 4-5, this author’s translation).

In the defence industry the preferred strategy has been to *outsource* or *contract out* former government functions, measures that imply public officials to act as service arrangers, deciding on what needs to be done and soliciting bids from private firms that are willing and able to perform the specified task (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998: 7-8). A 1995 report of the Defence Science Board, a standing committee that advises the Pentagon on technical, scientific, and other issues, suggested that the Pentagon could save up to $6 billion annually by 2002 if it contracted out all of its support functions to private vendors, except those that deal directly with war fighting. Deploying this political strategy Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a 2002 state-of-the-military review emphasized the success of the department's outsourcing of non-core responsibilities, stating that he would "pursue additional opportunities to outsource and privatize."

(Peterson 2002: 2-3). According to a study of the US Defence Department's contracting patterns performed by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, by September 2004, half of the Defence Department's budget was spent on private contractors, a percentage which reportedly has stayed virtually constant over the past six years.

Unlike outsourcing which includes retaining the basic responsibility for services, privatizing involves transferring responsibility for planning, organization, financing and managing a program or activity from the military to private contractors (Mitchell 2002: 1). According to National Center for Policy Analysis, the British Army saved $410 million by leasing 92 tank-transporter trucks from the US company Brown and Root, and an additional $140 million by privatizing the training facilities and services for its tank crews (ibid: 2). The same study also estimates that within few years, about half of the British defence establishment will have been privatized (ibid: 2).

In other countries somewhat less abide to comprehensive load-shedding so-called *public-private partnerships (PPPs)*, in which governments work directly with private firms in formal or informal relationships to jointly pursue common goals, have emerged as the preferred strategy (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998: 7-8). According to the home page of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the privatization and outsourcing process that is taking place
in public sector in general affects the defence to a high degree. PPPs strategies relevant to the armed forces include outsourcing, contracting out and private investments. The goal is to accomplish enhanced attention to strategic areas, improvement of the quality of core functions, and a general reduction of costs. PPPs are further considered a substantial contribution to the modernizing process (The Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004).

In sum, privatization has emerged as a dominant economic strategy as it assumes lower costs, less state responsibility or accountability, and greater efficiency (Howe 2001: 18). Privatizing state defence is only another aspect of the general trend and the military the latest area to be affected by it.

2.2.2 A credible private military industry

The evolution of a credible private security and military industry has been dependent on the ability of the industry to align itself to ‘any other legitimate business’ both in normative and in practical terms.

Sanitizing the industry image

“We would love to be accredited by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, but we cannot be (...) without support from our government and because of the poor conception about our company and what we do, mainly due to bad press”

- Nick van den Bergh, head of Executive Outcomes (Isenberg 1997: 18)

There is little doubt that the privatized military industry initially faced obstacles due to decades of controversial intervention in the developing world and hence, to their close association with traditional mercenary activity. The general perception during most of the 1990s was that PMCs were merely mercenaries in a corporate skin, performing their usual services under better organization (Leander 2003, Godoy 2003, etc.). Both individual companies, as well as the industry in general, later seem to have discovered the value of corporate reputation and image and its direct connection to competitive success.27

27 The difference between a corporate image and corporate reputation is that while a corporate image is the immediate picture that audiences have of an organization, the reputation is based on long-term value judgement about the company’s attributes (Gray and Balmer 1998: 697).
Governments have also been recognized as an important factor to consider since the reputation of an entire industry can be critical in determining the degree of friendliness of the industry legislation passed (Gray and Balmer 1998: 698).

Efforts to emerge as a trustworthy industry can thus be traced both from general developments in the industry, as well as by looking into how specific companies have strived to accommodate and transform themselves in order to keep up with the evolving market opportunities. On the individual company level there are examples of companies having struggled to construct a corporate image that would make up for a damaged corporate reputation. Tim Spicer, ex-British army officer and a prominent figure within the private military industry, describes in his autobiography how Executive Outcomes, a company that had attracted a heavy load of negative publicity due to its combat operations in Africa, was planned rebranded, restyled, sanitized and relaunched as a "private military company" and gradually merge into Sandline International (Campbell 2003: 7), as well as into a range of other new affiliated companies, such as Saracen International and others (Pech 1999: 91). 28

Sandline’s reputation did however also take a serious blow as Spicer was charged of illegally importing arms to Papua New Guinea in 1997 (Pech 1999: 93). The so-called “arms to Africa affair”, in Sierra Leone in 1998, where Sandline ignored the UN arms embargo on the country and shipped 35 tons of AK-47s, ammunition, mortars and a helicopter and provided logistical advice to help restore the Kabbah government that had been overthrown in a violent coup the year before also seriously stained the company (Campbell 2003: 9, Musah 2002: 925). According to the company’s home page, by April 2004 Sandline International had closed down its business allegedly due to "the general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa in the absence of effective international intervention" (Sandline 2004). 29

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28 According to an exhaustive search of English language publications carried out by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalist, “PMC” was never used in the context of private military operations (and hardly used at all) until after the relaunch of Executive Outcomes, suggesting it being a part of a deliberate plan to sanitize the image of the business (Campbell, ICIJ 2003d: 7-9). In an effort to distance itself from the controversial EO, some companies refuse the PMC label. ArmourGroup for instance does not want the label PMC. In stead they term themselves a “risk management company” (SCFA Appendix 6:§83).

29 Tim Spicer, former head of Sandline, and the protagonist in "the Sandline scandal" is now Chairman and Chief Executive of Aegis, a new company that in May 2004 surprisingly was awarded a $293 million contract by the Pentagon to act as "a coordination and management hub" for the about fifty PMCs operating in Iraq, plus to protect the U.S. Project Management Office (Aegis webpage 2005).
Efforts made on the industry level include the formation of the International Peace Operations Association, an industry trade organization. The association represents an effort by a group of companies to synchronize the reputation and lobby effort. The Washington-based association of PMCs and PSCs is open to "any organization offering services to military, governmental, and non-governmental organizations" (IPOA 2004: 3). Apparently efforts to refine the image of the private military industry have paid off. They have largely managed to constitute themselves as credible alternatives to the insufficient or inexistent public means of regulating violence. (Leander 2003: 3). As late as in 1999 Greg Mills and John Stremlau wrote:

“International security services are a peculiar industry. The product is deadly force, the labour required is highly specialised but highly mobile and unorganised. (…).Contracts are typically extra-legal, and difficult to secure and enforce.” (1999: 12)

This paragraph shows that commentators only six years considered the industry an extra-legal and illegitimate industry. A quick glance at the American coalition’s operation Restore Hope in Iraq reveals that the outsourcing of certain military capabilities to PMCs by big western powers has become a discernible trend. Singer (2003c) asserts that during the first part of the war in Iraq the ratio of private contractors to US military personnel was roughly 1 to 10. This is a clear indication that there has been a major change in the attitudes concerning buying these types of services. According to Sir John Stanley, a member of the Select Committee of Foreign Affairs there has been "a striking change of tenor in terms of their [Ministers in the British Government] approach to private military companies" (Examination of Witness” for the Minutes of Evidence Report by the SCFA, 2002: §130).

Corporate responsiveness

The dilemma whether to modify products to particular markets, or to promote a more standardized universal product is well known in international marketing theory. According to Head, a modification strategy may be limited to the way the product is promoted, i.e. the “‘message’ sent out to customers in an attempt to influence their perceptions of the product. In most cases the firm or the industry will also need to consider modifying the objective attributes of the product. In some cases, the nature of the product attributes change so much that it effectively introduces a new product (Head 2004: 91). Such adaptation does however come at a price, and there will naturally be a greater incentive to adapt for a larger market. The gains from adaptation will be larger if the demand differences are a) widespread b)
permanent (Head 2004: 102). According to Harding, what the PMCs and their mining partners did so well in the 1990s was to interpret political instability in Africa as a market issue, and position themselves perfectly in that market (Harding cited in Musah 2002: 921). Lately the business has proven to sustain its remarkable corporate responsiveness, its role in the war in Iraq being testimony of this ability. While initially being made up of a limited number of firms offering limited military specialties, the industry is expanding to offer a wide range of sophisticated services (Singer 2003a: 83). The requirements of high-technology warfare have dramatically increased the need for such specialized expertise, which often is sought in the private sphere. PSC personnel not only support sophisticated weapons systems but in some cases also operate them; the unmanned aircraft, Predator, is in fact flown into missile launch position by PSC personnel (Avant 2004: 154). In order to compete on the global scene many companies seek to partner up with equals or acquiring smaller market participants with niche market and technology specializations. Broader based firms can more easily offer the wider range of services that are necessary for complex conflict environments (Singer 2003a: 83). The merger of the British based firm Defence Systems Limited (DSL) with the US based Armor Holding exemplifies this trend; DSL originally offered security training and consultation to governments and multinational companies using mainly former SAS- personnel. Armor Holdings acquired DSL in 1996 and created the new ArmorGroup with DSL at its core. Over the past four years, ArmorGroup has acquired over 20 companies, among them the Alpha firm, which is essentially the privatized unit of the elite special forces of the same name, bringing under its control an array of military-related services, ranging from mine clearance to intelligence (Singer 2003a: 84). The diversification of the service offer within each company not only leads to a simplified contracting process, but also to greater flexibility, as the same company can take on tasks that might not have been anticipated when signing the contract. In return, the companies increase their market share correspondingly. As the need for alternative military personnel persists, there is now an anticipating and responsive industry willing to adjust to each new market/demand fluctuation, which holds true not only for service selection, but also for moral standards and human rights concerns as seen in the sanitizing section above.
Analysis part I

The analysis of how the UN’s use of private security and military companies can be explained is organized into two main parts. This first part focuses on the UN and to what degree external and internal need enhancing factors have led the organization to deploy PSCs and PMCs. The validity of the propositions P₁-P₃ will be examined separately in the three chapters belonging to Analysis I. The part of the research question aimed at looking at the characteristics and patterns of the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs is integrated into primarily this first part of the analysis. At the offset, a brief presentation of the compilation of the 32 contracts between UN organizations and different private security and military companies is due.

The United Nations’ use of private security companies and private military companies

The extensive list of approved suppliers by the United Nations Office of Central support services (United Nations Office of Central support services, 2005) reveals that at least 11 private security or military companies are formally approved for service procurement to the UN. Some of these supply peace and humanitarian operations with a range of services on a regular basis. According to Avant hardly any multilateral PKO conducted by the UN during the 1990s was accomplished without the contributions of private security and private military companies (2005: 7).

Most analysts testify to the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs but largely fail to provide extensive information thereof. For this thesis 32 reports of the UN deploying a PSC or a PMC were recorded. After an examination of which type of services was supplied, a categorization including three main categories was made. Services contracted for by the UN could thus be grouped in the following rather broad categories: ‘security functions’, ‘logistics and support functions’, and ‘expert functions’. The security category includes services such as direct security provision (armed or unarmed), security assessments and audits, security training, close protection, and all kinds of security consulting services. Logistics and support services would entail communication, transport, running of airports, and other military support services, while the third category, ‘expert functions’, includes services which require
specialized skills such as demining, intelligence, civilian policing, etc. All three categories exclude any trade in goods, and are hence limited to trade in services.

An overview of the compiled contracts, their location and the categories of services provided is presented in table AI.1. A short presentation of each contract is presented in Appendix Ia; while an alphabetical short list of company profiles are provided in Appendix II.  

Table AI.1 UN contracts with PSCs and PMCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company contracts in country by year*</th>
<th>Support functions</th>
<th>Security provision</th>
<th>Expert services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DSL in the Balkans 1992*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. DSL in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. DSL in Angola</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. DSL in Sudan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. DSL in Mozambique probl. 1995</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>6. EO in Sierra Leone 1996-97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DSL in Angola</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. DSL in Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. ICI of Oregon in Liberia mid 1990s</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>10. ICI of Oregon in Haiti 1996</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. ArmourGroup in Bosnia 1996 and on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Lifeguard in Sierra Leone 1998</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. DynCorp in Bosnia early 1990s</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. DSL in Sierra Leone 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. DynCorp in East Timor 1999</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. DynCorp in Sierra Leone 2000</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18. PAE in Sierra Leone 2000</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19. DSL in Kosovo 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>20. PAE in DRC 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21. PAE in East Timor 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>22. GD4 in Kosovo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25. KZN Security in East Timor 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Empowerment Loss Control East Timor 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27. PAE in DCR 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28. PAE in Ivory Coast 2004</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Global Strategies Group in Iraq 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Global Strategies Group in Afghanistan 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31. ArmorGroup in Cyprus 2004 and on</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32. ArmorGroup in Iraq 2005</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

30 Appendix II is not limited to the companies registered in table 3.1, but presents a short introduction of companies discussed whatsoever.
The distribution of services along contracts as found in the 32 contracts obtained for this thesis is displayed in figure AI.1:

### Fig. AI.1: The distribution of service types along contracts

![Bar chart showing the distribution of contracts including each service category. Security: 18, Logistics and Support: 14, Expert: 6.](source=Appendix I)

As evident from figure AI.1, logistic and support functions constitute the PSC/PMC service category most often procured by the UN according to the data obtained for this thesis. Security services range as the second most demanded category, while expert services were included in the lowest number of contracts. Due to the controversy associated with procuring security services, especially strategic ones, it is likely that security contracts are somewhat less publicized than e.g. logistic contracts. The distribution of each service as displayed in figure AI.1 should thus be read with a degree of caution. Additionally, the small number of contracts obtained implies that reservations are due concerning the further elaboration of these numbers. The very restricted access to information must account for the small sample of contracts (32), and thus for the eventuality of the sample not being completely random.
3. Enhanced expectations to the UN – a catalyst for PSC/PMC deployment?

After decades of paralysis during the Cold War the 1990s saw an unprecedented activism on behalf of the Security Council. The UN responded to enhanced expectations on its behalf by expanding its operations not only quantitatively, but it also qualitatively. From having the traditional intermediary role in interstate wars, the UN now assumed responsibility in nearly all dimensions of peace advancement: From conflict prevention, via peacemaking and peacekeeping, to post-conflict reconstruction. It is the argument of this chapter that the dramatic expansion of the organization’s workload during the 1990s contributed to the organization hiring private security and private military companies to perform tasks integral to these operations. As displayed in the introduction to this section, the services procured by the organization can be grouped into three categories; security services, logistics and support services, and expert services. This chapter will thus discuss the validity of P₁, that is, whether enhanced expectations to the UN have triggered the UN to deploy PSCs and PMCs for each of these service categories.

3.1 Enhanced expectations contributing to UN procurement of security services

UN peace operations have expanded both in numbers and in scope. Whereas the UN used to take on monitoring and interpositioning tasks in interstate wars, the organization has increasingly assumed responsibility also in intrastate wars. As apparent from figure 3.1, since the end of the 1980s the UN has proportionally launched peace operations for a growing share of the civil wars in the world, and has thus increasingly assumed responsibility for ending wars.
The most dramatic qualitative change in UN peace operations has been the introduction of enforcement components in peacekeeping mandates. The idea was first introduced under Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 *Agenda For Peace*, and later confirmed as a viable strategy in the 2000 ‘Brahimi Report’ (Report of the Panel on UN Peace operations 2000: §49). The UN’s engagement in peace enforcement has had implications for the sustainability of core peacekeeping principles. The triad of principles of peacekeeping traditionally included: consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force only in self-defence (Nambiar 2001: 167), and it is those very principles that have enabled the UN to operate as a non-party in the midst of conflicts around the world.\(^{31}\)

It is the argument of this section that enhanced expectations to the UN for ending ongoing civil wars have led the organization to use enforcement measures, which in turn have had

\(^{31}\) Humanitarian principles also include independence.
detrimental effects on the operating principles of the organization. Whereas the UN flag in itself used to imply a substantial degree of security to peacekeepers, observers and humanitarians, the corrosion of these principles has had consequences for the security of UN personnel. The process of how tainted operation principles have resulted in security costs for all segments of UN operations and personnel and hence led to greater demand for PSC/PMC services will be outlined beneath.

3.1.1 The corrosion of core operating principles

Although the two terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ are frequently mentioned in the same breath both in academia and in UN parlance, the terms cannot, however, be used interchangeably as their semantic meanings do not fully overlap. Given that the terms also hold partly different substance whether used in humanitarian contexts or peacekeeping contexts, it is perhaps unsurprising that there exists a certain degree of confusion not only regarding the practical achievement of the two conditions, but also on a more theoretical level regarding the substance of each principle. The constraints on the core operational principles of the organization are felt throughout the fieldwork of the organization, and deterioration in one operational field tend to inflict negatively on others causing generally felt security costs.

Acting in correspondence with both neutrality and impartiality simultaneously in contemporary peacekeeping contexts is at best problematic. According to Donald:

“an impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, based on judgements of the situation, it is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking sides. A neutral is much more passive; its limited actions are within restriction imposed by the belligerents, while its abstention from the conflict is based on an absence of decided views” (Donald 2002: 22).

Traditionally the blue helmets were defenders of the status quo, and operated with light arms under the strict instruction to use force only in self-defence. Such operations were termed ‘Chapter VI and a half’ peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and required, in principle, an invitation or consent on the part of the recipient state (Malone and Wermester 2001: 38). However, as the UN has moved from first generation peacekeeping of inter-positioning and into third generation peacekeeping, potentially involving enforcement, it becomes clear that neutrality is no longer feasible. Enforcement in itself is simply not compatible with neutrality.
Subsequently, according to Donald, appliance of the neutrality concept in relation to PKOs has largely congested in official UN parlance (Donald 2002: 27). After the Safe Havens tragedy in Bosnia, for peacekeepers to be “neutral” is now frequently even perceived negatively (Donald 2002: 32). In the words of Kofi Annan: “Impartiality does not – and must not – mean neutrality in the face of evil” (Annan 1999: 4).\(^{32}\)

The principle of impartiality is also subject to some degree of inconsistency (Donald 2002: 27). The problem, largely, again relates to the use of force. However, peacekeeping missions that are launched in areas of ongoing conflict will be mandated to the use of force in self-defence and to protect civilians under imminent threat. Missions that contain elements of enforcement, while claiming impartiality, have often had to render more enforcement in disfavour of one party. An illustration of such a situation is to be found in the current UN Mission in Eastern Congo (MONUC), where heavy enforcement actions have been carried out (including the use of helicopter gun ships and armoured vehicles) against an ethnically Lendu-based militia group in order to protect the civilian parts of the opposing ethnic group (the Hemas) from atrocities (BBC NEWS, 2 March 2005). In this case, the killing of between 50 and 60 militiamen belonging to the Lendus will hardly be perceived as an act of impartiality by any of the numerous warring factions.\(^{33}\) Furthermore, it is unlikely that a warring faction which is militarily and politically disadvantaged by the actions of a peace enforcing mission will take any comfort in not formally having been designated an enemy (Berdal 2001: 67). Consequently, there seems to exist a degree of incoherence in terms of principles as set out in mandates and realities on the ground, as a ‘peace enforcement’ operation hardly can apply force without simultaneously assuming that such action will influence the political dynamics of the conflict. The Congo-case mentioned above illustrates the implausibility that such beliefs exist outside high office parlance. UN spokeswoman in Ituri, Eliane Nabaa, stated in the aftermath of the UN taking action against the militia: "This group continues to loot, kill and rape these people, making life miserable. It's time to put an end to this militia." (BBC NEWS, 2 March 2005).

\(^{32}\) The shift is also well demonstrated by the evolving doctrines from former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), *Supplement to Agenda for Peace* (1995) and to Kofi Annan’s line represented by e.g. the Report of the Brahimi panel (2000) and the Reports that followed the Rwandan genocide and the massacres in Srebrenica (Donald 2002: 22).

\(^{33}\) In this particular case the targeted militia has even claimed that the actions taken by MONUC forces were retaliation in order to revenge the slaughtering of nine Bengali peacekeepers, which took place just days before, an act which in itself is testimony of perceptions of UN partiality.
UN peacekeeping has thus to a certain extent assumed the role of an active participant in internal conflicts: neutrality in peace operations is no longer aspired for and impartiality is often compromised, especially in operations involving elements of enforcement. The grave implications of perceived bias of the organization tend to reach beyond the scope of peace operations as actions taken by one division of the organization will often reverberate and influence heavily on other parts of the organization’s work in that particular conflict theatre. Humanitarian missions are thus often constrained by their relations to peace operations. By belonging to an intergovernmental framework, the UN humanitarian agencies do not have opportunities for isolationism such as e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to some extent possesses. Being completely neutral would imply independence from the rest of the UN system, and thus from their own political and institutional framework. Even though some agencies do enjoy a great degree of organizational independence, they are not in a position to distance themselves from the political aspects of crisis due to institutional and legal obligations (Studer 2001: 385). In the general perception of the public, it is probably practically impossible to separate military operations completely from activities in the name of humanitarian principles when both are carried out under the UN flag (ibid). Association with a peace operation involved in acts of enforcement thus works to compromise the humanitarian space, increase insecurity for humanitarians and necessitate additional security measures for protection.\(^{34}\) As ‘acceptance’ as a model of security for aid agencies no longer work and in order to avoid direct association with military forces, PSCs and PMCs are apparently used on an ad hoc basis to secure humanitarian assets, property and personnel.\(^{35}\) World Food Programme is among the companies reported to use PSCs or PMCs in lawless situations (Vaux 2002: 15).

\(^{34}\) Humanitarian space is defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross as “the scope for neutral and impartial humanitarian action in the midst of conflict” (Studer: 2001: 372).

\(^{35}\) The deployment of PSCs or PMCs is however problematic to aid agencies. There are a number of considerations which disfavour the use of PSCS/PMCs. Their association with armed guards is e.g. contentious because such associations can work to legitimize the proliferation of weapons, the use of private security provides island of security, while insecurity is forced on to the elements of the society who cannot afford to pay for security etc. (Vaux 2002: 13).
3.2 Enhanced expectations contributing to UN procurement of expert services

Expanding the scope for UN missions has also meant that an expansion in the organization’s competence is deemed necessary. Post-conflict reconstruction has especially posed several new challenges to the organization. Like many state militaries the UN has encountered the need to contract private security or military companies for the supply of certain expert services. The services apparently most frequently bought according to table AI.1 include demining, civilian police capacities and intelligence. A report of the Joint Inspection Unit on reforming the Field Services noted in 2002 that all the UN officials conferred to by the inspector concurred that as of 2002 there was a “growing need for more specialized skills, proficiency in modern technology, and middle management capacity” among civilian specialists in the field (A/57/78 2002: §7). Figure AI.1 indicates that expert functions account for roughly one third of the recorded PMC/PSC contracts with the United Nations, that is, 10 out of 32 contracts included expert services.

Demining
With an enhanced focus on rebuilding war-torn societies the removal of mines has emerged as a main priority in peacebuilding contexts. While military demining has long been a priority for armed forces, it is only recently in the context of post-conflict reconstruction endeavours that the clearing of mines for humanitarian reasons is being tackled on a large scale (Faltas 2001: 430). Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) do not only pose serious hazard in terms of maiming or death, but are also known to affect the delivery of emergency relief, discourage investment, alter patterns of production and transportation, delay the return of refugees and the demobilization of combatants, fuel malnutrition and the spread of disease, all vital parts of post-conflict societal recovery. (Spearin 2001a: 3-4). The removal of mines is hence considered prerequisite for further peace building efforts.

While the signing of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction is thought to have had a positive effect on the dispersal of landmines, in 2001 there were still some 60 million
antipersonnel land mines dispersed in about 64 countries (Faltas 2001: 428). In Afghanistan alone it is estimated that more than 160,000 antipersonnel mines, 14,000 antitank mines, 100,000 cluster munitions, and 2.3 million items of (UXO) were removed between 1989 and 2003 (UNMAS 2004: 18). In addition, as of 1999, sixteen countries had not officially ended their landmine production: China, Cuba, Russia, Turkey, the United States, Yugoslavia, and ten states in the Middle East and Asia (Faltas 2001: 429). As the expectations to the UN for post-conflict reconstruction have augmented, a considerable capacity building effort is needed in order to diminish the demand for demining capabilities in the near future. Four out of the 32 contracts recorded in table A1.1 included demining services.

Civilian Police (CIVPOL)
According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations police duties have had an increasingly important function in PKOs over the years as the organization has invoked on more comprehensive measures to reconstruct civil societies in the wake of wars (UN DPKO 2005). The strengthening of criminal justice systems has been acknowledged as crucial in this connection, and although the criminal justice systems would also refer to institutions like the judiciary and penal system, most resources have been allocated to the process through reforming and re-establishing the police component (Training for Peace homepage).

Intelligence
Intelligence gathering in relation to UN peacekeeping has been, and to some extent still is, politically sensitive. Indeed the UN continues to avoid official use of the term military intelligence because of its association with illegal or undercover activities and chooses to use the term “military information” (Cline 2002: 179). In the 1960s it was even proposed that the UN should ban the word “intelligence” from its parlance (Dorn 1999: 414). However, there has been a growing acknowledgement of the importance of intelligence especially in modern multidimensional PKOs with their vast range of responsibilities frequently including elections monitoring, arms control verification (often including potential surprise inspections), law enforcement agency supervision, mediation (where confidential bargaining positions should not be revealed to the opposing side), sanctions and border monitoring (where clandestine activities must be uncovered or intercepted before perpetrators are able to take evasive

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36 The Convention was signed by 120 states and entered into force as part of international law in March 1999 (Spearin 2001a: 1), however, some of the world’s leading manufacturers and owners of land mines, including the United States, Russia and China abstained from signing (Faltas 2001: 428).
action), and protection of so-called ‘safe areas’ (Dorn 1999: 416). In order to protect peacekeepers, humanitarian personnel, staff as well as assets, intelligence is an inherent part of any security precautions.

The effort to coordinate the political, diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to resolve an internal crisis demands more integrated deployment of information. According to A. Walter Dorn, information-gathering can be allocated on a continuum from the permitted (white) overt information-gathering characterised by visible sensors, clearly identified UN personnel, unpaid informants and public documents, both regarding gathering and distribution, via questionable (grey) information gathering including less overt sensors, observers and human communications and more active gathering efforts, to prohibited (black) spying activities including paid agents and undercover agents, stolen documents, covert observation and active means of achieving information (Dorn 1999: 420). While the black areas are normally dismissed as part of UN operations, grey area information gathering is becoming more needed as several tragic lessons have been learned regarding the consequences of overt information gathering in the midst of conflict (Dorn 1999: 417). As the organization has invoked on more complex tasks in more dangerous environments there has been a considerable change in attitudes regarding intelligence gathering. While concern for issues of sovereignty and the fears of jeopardizing perceptions of impartiality traditionally have constituted major constraints to more active information gathering, intelligence personnel was increasingly sent to the most dangerous operating arenas during the 1990s (Dorn 1999: 428). Towards the end of the decade these military information/intelligence units were even labelled G2 units in conformity with military parlance (ibid). Illustrative of the change in attitude was the vast intelligence effort put into work in the second Somalia operation (UNOSOM II) where the UN in fact crossed the line into the ‘black zone’ of information gathering by paying informants and agents for provision of information (Dorn 1999: 430). Intelligence is thus becoming a more required service resulting from the widening of the UN operational scope and PSCs and PMCs were hired for intelligence assignments in both Angola and in East Timor (see Table AI.1).

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37 Dorn lists as an example the UN monitoring mission in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and the way radio communication from UNPROFOR soldiers were monitored by Serb forces and used to rearrange their attacks (Dorn 1999: 416).
3.3 Enhanced expectations contributing to UN procurement of logistics and support services

Good mission support has always been critical to mission success and as the size and scope of missions expand so must the mission support. While infantry and military observers to UN missions were once easily accessible due to the prevailing optimism towards the potentials of UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s, the situation was never as prosperous what regards logistic units. According to then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the shortage of logistic contributions was already a problem to the DPKO in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §51). Figure 3.2 shows the development in deployment of UN Peacekeeping forces from 1947 to 2004. It follows from the five-fold increase in deployed peacekeeping personnel from 1990 to 1995 that the logistical requirements for that period increased correspondingly.

Fig. 3.2: Size of UN peacekeeping forces 1947-2004

In 2004 UN peace operations rotated 120,000 military and civilian police personnel around 15 missions (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2005), an amount which obviously
will place strains on all aspects of the organization’s existing support and logistic apparatus. Furthermore, qualitative changes of peace operations have added to the burden. As PKOs have been launched in environments where there is no peace to keep, but rather where peace making is part of the mandate, greater demands are placed upon planning and logistic capacity in order to avoid exposing personnel to unnecessary risks. The dramatic augmentation in PKO deployment during the 1990s and its coincidence with aspirations for unprecedented levels of mission complexity, has served to put further strains on the organization’s ability to muster the support services demanded by any given mission. According to table AI.1, half the contracts between the UN and PSCs/PMCs included support service provision.

The contract signed in 1992 between the British company Defence Systems Limited and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for assistance to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) illustrates how enhanced expectations to the scope of a UN mission led the Department to seek assistance from private security/military companies. Although the accounts of the organization’s use of PSCs and PMCs presented in table AI.1 frequently involves more than one service, few of the contracts recorded have reached the comprehensiveness of the contract between Defence Systems Limited (DSL) and UNPROFOR which covered Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UN Department of Public Information 1996). In this case DPKO hired at least four PSCs/PMCs, or approximately 2,000 civilians, in order to mount the personnel necessary for the intended operation. (SCFAb 2002, Annex 6: §74). DSL contributed with 425 international staff from 24 nations. Among the tasks carried out were crime prevention, crime detection, close protection and border security duties. The contract lasted four years until NATO forces assumed primary responsibility from the UN (ibid: §75). As the mission grew so did DSL responsibilities, and as peacekeepers from Asia and Africa in many cases lacked armour, DSL was requested to acquire surplus armoured vehicles (so-called APCs) from the Czech Republic. As these battalions also lacked the expertise to maintain and operate the APCs, UNPROFOR requested DSL to supply APC drivers and mechanics. DSL in this way became involved in operational peacekeeping duties with its drivers in armoured vehicles, maintained and fuelled by DSL personnel, out of bases constructed and maintained by DSL, and coordinated by DSL planners in Zagreb (ibid: §76). While initially hired for a diversity of security purposes, DSL ended up performing tasks pertaining to all three service categories. According to former DSL’s Director of International Affairs, General Sir David Ramsbotham,
it was a case of employing fully qualified and experienced personnel to fill gaps created by the lack of regular UN civil and military personnel (ibid: §76). DSL employees wore civilian pattern UN uniforms with UN badges and identification papers and were fully integrated into the UNPROFOR organization. Where regular soldiers normally would serve for six months, DSL personnel would typically serve for the entire contracted period of four years (ibid: §77). DSL contractors were also given access to classified information (ibid: §78).

According to Thakur and Schnabel, UNPROFOR represents the fourth generation of UN peacekeeping operations characterized by the inclusion of enforcement efforts into an otherwise complex mandate (Thakur and Schnabel 2001: 12-13). UNPROFOR was by 2001 the largest PKO ever conducted and was eventually replaced by three separate but interlinked operations (UN Dept. of Public Information 1996). This mission illustrates how expanded mandates tend to infer a multitude of activities, including security functions, expert functions and support functions, which in complex missions frequently are partly fulfilled by PSCs and PMCs.

3.4 Conclusions

Enhanced expectations to the UN imply both a quantitative and a qualitative expansion of the UN’s responsibility, which means that UN peacekeeping operations have thus become more expensive, more complex, and more dangerous. In assessing the validity of P₁ then it appears that greater demand for a wider spectre of activities, which often coincide in time, has fuelled a demand for external provision of these services. The more comprehensive role assigned by the organization has had serious consequences for the demands for security functions and logistic capabilities, but it has also introduced new tasks to the organization, and thus created a need for further specializations. P₁ is hence supported as PSCs and PMCs are in fact often hired to take off load from overburdened UN operations, and additionally to perform specialized tasks that only recently have fallen within the domain of the United Nations.
4. Radicalized operating environments and UN PSC/PMC dependence

The operations embarked upon by the UN in the 1990s increasingly took place in environments characterized by complex conflict structures and involved multifaceted emergencies. These environments have often been characterized by brutal civil wars and consequently of inadequate state structures to deal with these problems. In these “orphans of the Cold War” (Dame Margareth Anstee, quoted in Thakur and Schnabel 2001: 14) the UN has faced severely aggravated operating conditions which have put stress on the existing arrangements for logistics and support function, expert functions, and especially on the security apparatus of the organization. This chapter thus aims at discussing to which degree aggravated operating environments as represented by failed states and new wars have contributed to the organization procuring services from the private security and military industry.

4.1 Radicalization of the UN’s operating environment contributing to procurement of security services

At present, most of the world’s armed conflicts take place in fragile states. Such conflicts tend to create millions of victims and deaths, social and economic destruction and in some cases environmental stress, generating refugees and internally displaced people (The African Studies Center 2003:16). The complexity of the problems met in these states mean that there are multiple dimensions that need to be addressed and a correspondingly increased demand for specialized personnel. It does also imply that the conditions under which UN personnel work are severely aggravated. According to judgements made by the United Nations Office of the Security Coordinator, UN personnel are increasingly exposed to aggravated operating environments. Table 4.1 shows a sensational increase in the number of hazardous operating environments since the beginning of the 1990s. While apparently no UN staff was deployed in dangerous operations in 1990, 40,062 were exposed to hazardous environments by 2003.

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38 The UN Security Coordinator declares a mission hazardous when prevailing security conditions require the application of security measures under UN security phases (Report of the Independent Panel 2003: 19). The five
Table 4.1: Number of UN staff deployed in hazardous missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Hazardous UN Missions (*)</th>
<th>Number of Staff deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>25,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>30,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>31,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>33,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>37,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>40,062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the table, these numbers have risen steadily in pace with the amount of missions launched in dangerous operating environments.

The primary responsibility for the safety and security of UN personnel in field operations rest with host governments and hardly any security measures can be effective without their full commitment and efficiency (UN SG 2000: 1). It is therefore obvious that operating in environments where there no longer exist anything close to a state monopoly of violence represent the riskiest situations for humanitarian personnel. Factors resulting from weak state structures, and which represent a risk to international relief or peacekeeping personnel, would include e.g. the wide proliferation of arms in the hands of unskilled or undisciplined soldiers (such as child soldiers and soldiers under the influence of narcotics), as well as criminality (Currier 2003: 7).

The problem of lacking host state security is accentuated by the character of new wars, or ‘low intensity conflicts’ which they used to be termed. These conflicts not only complicate and multiply the tasks of UN personnel, they also implicate an undermined respect for the

security phases are: (a) Phase One- Precautionary (b) Phase Two – Restricted Movement (c) Phase three – Relocation (d) Phase Four – Programme Suspension (e) Phase Five – Evacuation (ibid 34:35).
Radicalized operating environments and UN PSC/PMC dependence

legal status of relief workers (traditionally considered a war crime) and might even make them valuable targets in order to sabotage the war effort of an adversary (Currier 2003:7). As discussed in chapter 3, flawed perceptions of UN personnel impartiality has to a greater extent made them targets of new wars. Figure 4.1 shows the fatalities of UN peacekeeping personnel in percentage of total UN forces deployed every year in the period 1948-2005. The graph shows a general positive trend, however, in spite of technological advances, as well more than 50 years of peacekeeping experience; from around 1990 and onwards there is a slightly negative trend with a higher fatality rate among UN peacekeeping personnel.

**Fig: 4.1 Developments in UN peacekeeper fatalities in percentage of total UN force**

![Graph showing fatalities of UN peacekeepers](image)

Source: Numbers obtained from UNDP “Fatalities by year” webpage 21.09.05.

The situation is no better, and perhaps even worse, for UN aid personnel. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) there has been a recent increase in violent attacks on humanitarian personnel in the field. Between January 1992 and 31 August 1998, 153 staff members lost their lives and 43 were taken hostage or

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39 Numbers include military, civilian police, and civilian international and local personnel in UN peace operations only. Personnel representing other agencies are not included. The figure for 2005 was estimated by doubling the fatalities as of June 30th 2005.
Radicalized operating environments and UN PSC/PMC dependence

kidnapped; by September 2000, the numbers had risen to 198 and 240, respectively. Hundreds more have been taken hostage, or have become victims to violent security incidents (OCHA webpage). These tendencies have been reinforced by the increased use of terrorist strategies in new wars. Attacks on UN personnel, assets or property carry a lot of symbolic value in some theatres. In addition to spreading fear and confusion, such attacks will carry messages, which are effectively delivered through a globalized media. Terrorism as a way to fight new wars thus presents another factor that seriously deteriorates the conditions under which UN humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers work.

In Appendix Ib information on the operating contexts of the 32 contracts between UN and PSCs/PMCs compiled for this thesis is systematized along with information on which services were procured in each contract.  

Table 4.2 presents the covariation of aggravated operating environments (Ao) (where both the ‘intrastate wars’ and ‘disrupted states’ variables are present) and the procurement of security services (Sp).

Table 4.2: Aggravated operating environments (Ao) and security provision (Sp)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combinations</th>
<th>Number of entities</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ao and Sp</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ao and -Sp</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ao and Sp</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ao and -Sp</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix 1

13 contracts included security service provision. These services were bought in 31 per cent of the cases where the operating environment qualified as ‘aggravated’ or ‘radicalized’. In these cases, the combination of a hostile operating environment and a host state unable to fully provide security for the UN mission, appear to contribute to UN entities buying security off the private market in the absence of member state forces. Although security was not bought in the majority of cases where there was aggravated operating environments (34, 5 per cent), the percentage of cases where security was in fact procured is still considerable, especially seen in the light of the limited numbers of failed states and the high levels of controversy.

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40 See Appendix Ic regarding the criterions for plotting of the table.
41 ‘Aggravated operating environment’ is used synonymously with ‘radicalized operating environment’.
42 A discussion of the limitations of relying of member state forces for security will be undertaken in chapter 5.
associated with such contracting. Not only is the connection between the organization and the private security and military controversial, but the contracting out of security functions is particularly so as it represents a transferral of the authority of violence already delegated from the member states on to private actors. In addition, the mere fact that 31 per cent of the contracts in aggravated environments comprised private security procurement is also somewhat noteworthy since it officially is not an established practice. The use of armed guards in UN contexts in general should only be used “in exceptional circumstances” and when “the level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian assistance would lead to unacceptable human suffering” (OCHA 2001: 7-10). In accordance with P2, security services were only bought in 9.5 per cent of the operating theatres, which according to the plotting of Appendix Ib do not constitute aggravated environments. It follows, however, from the categorizing of the data in Appendix Ib that some of these environments can be disrupted states, and hence lack a state monopoly of violence, while not being registered as an aggravated environment.\footnote{Contexts not registered as ‘aggravated’ can thus very well require additional security measures on a short notice. The final combination of absence of aggravated operating environment and absence of security procurement reveals that in one-fourth of the contracts compiled, other services but security was procured and possibly for other reasons than for hostile operating environments.} The problem posed by fragile or even collapsed states that confront the international community, and in particular the United Nations, is a relatively new one, not so much because the component parts are unprecedented, but because they now occur simultaneously. Failed or collapsed states thus represent the most complex operating environment for both UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The multitude of problems that needs to be addressed result in a corresponding increased demand for specialized personnel.

\subsection{4.2 Aggravated operating environments contributing to the procurement of PSC/PMC expert services}

The problem posed by fragile or even collapsed states that confront the international community, and in particular the United Nations, is a relatively new one, not so much because the component parts are unprecedented, but because they now occur simultaneously. Failed or collapsed states thus represent the most complex operating environment for both UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The multitude of problems that needs to be addressed result in a corresponding increased demand for specialized personnel.

\footnote{In accordance with the analytical framework, both the ‘intrastate war’ and the ‘disrupted state’ variable should be present in order for the contract to be registered in Appendix Ib as taking place in a radicalized operating environment. Arguably, the criterions for formally qualifying as an aggravated operating environment are rather strict. It should thus be born in mind that the threshold for qualifying for this category is high, meaning that environments characterized by insecurity might not always be registered as ‘aggravated’ in this context. On the other hand, the small amount of security contracts taking place in environments categorized as non-aggravated seems to support the rather strict categorization.}
The demand for some of the expert services can be traced to the operating environment in terms of the lack of a functioning state apparatus. Others are more intrinsically liked to the terms on which new wars are fought, such as the density of landmines in areas of little military strategic importance. The targeting of civilians is symptomatic of new wars and landmines are an efficient means to that end. Since new wars are also characterized by a blurred division of civilians and belligerent forces, the use of landmines serves a twofold purpose by also constituting an efficient instrument in the more traditional goals of destroying the enemy’s fighting capacity.

Re-establishing civil order in failed or disrupted states often requires an almost completely new police force to be trained. This was the task for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), where efforts were made to establish a police force in ethnographic balance which was not associated with human rights violations (Aboagye and Bah 2004: 10-11). As it is also of paramount priority that the new police forces have a police culture that reflects the democratized regime (McFarlane and Maley 2001: 185), the requirements for training skills and level of professionalism cannot always be met by the random selection of police officers offered to the DPKO by its member states. Whereas UN civilian police (CivPol) officers were deployed for the first time in the DRC during the 1960s, civilian police involvement in PKOs expanded rapidly in the 1990s. The UN CivPol division has thus had a steep learning curve. In January 1995 civilian police officers accounted for just below two per cent of the total peacekeeping forces deployed, by January 2004 the share had increased to approximately 10 per cent, dispersed on 17 and 15 PKOs respectively (DPKO webpage 08.06.05).

In particularly dangerous areas, such as in new wars fought in disrupted states, e.g. in former Yugoslavia, Haiti, East Timor or Somalia, or in theatres where genocidal activities take place, intelligence takes on added importance and calls for specialized skills in order to prevent hostile attacks on the local population, attacks on premises or personnel of the peacekeeping mission, or on humanitarian actors (Dorn 1999: 416). One of the main conclusions drawn by the panel investigating the security effort in the aftermath of the Canal hotel bombing in Baghdad was that the organization had failed to “adequately analyze and utilize information made available to the system on threats against UN staff and premises” (Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 2003: 1).
There are 10 contracts involving expert services. The findings from Appendix Ib regarding the connection between aggravated operating environment and the procurement of these services show that the two variables coexist in 12.5 per cent of the contracts compiled. In most cases (53 percent) where the environment is characterized as aggravated, expert functions such as demining, civilian police, and intelligence are not procured from PSCs and PMCs. \( P_2 \) is thus not supported in relation to expert services.

### Table 4.3: Aggravated operating environment (Ao) and expert functions (E)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combinations</th>
<th>Number of entities</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ao and E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ao and -E</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ao and E</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ao and -E</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix Ib

What regards demining and civilian police, the tendency can be explained by these services being common post-conflict reconstruction measures. It is likely that these services thus are sought on a higher scale when the conflict is terminated and when the conflict environment allows for rebuilding initiatives to take place. Looking at the number of contract entities where there is an absence of aggravated operating environment and a presence of expert service procurement is nevertheless not as high as one should expect (18.5 per cent). Only two contracts in fact separate the presence and absence of expert services in aggravated operating environments. This divergence might be attributed to the fact that intelligence is normally an in-conflict measure used to reduce risk levels, and that the need for such services would normally be higher the more difficult operating environments. Second, the fact that the total number of expert contracts is low (10 contracts) may result in data not being completely representative.
4.3 Aggravated operating environments contributing to UN procurement of PSC/PMC support and logistic services

As a great number of peace and political missions are carried out in states missing a functioning state apparatus, there are obvious obstacles in terms of communication and transport for these missions. Little developed, or destroyed in the fighting, communications tend to be poor, while the density of landmines often is high. According to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the new UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) e.g. is likely to face “unprecedented logistical obstacles” (IRIN, 25 March). Logistic and communication obstacles also tend to be exacerbated by the way in which new wars are fought. Hampering of humanitarian access to certain population groups can be an efficient tool used by fighting factions. In response to the difficult operating environment in Sudan and because its member states do not possess the adequate logistical means, the African Union has e.g. accepted logistic support and planning capacities from NATO for its peace-monitoring mission in the strife-torn Darfur province (Agence France-Presse 28 April 2005). 17 of the 32 contracts were found to include support services.

Table 4.4 provides an insight into the frequency of aggravated operating environment versus UN procurement of support services.

Table 4.4: Aggravated operating environment (Ao) and support functions (S)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combinations</th>
<th>Number of entities</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ao and S</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ao and -S</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ao and S</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ao and -S</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix Ib

At first glance the figures illustrating the connection between the aggravated operating environment (Ao) and support functions (S) resemble those found for security services. Dangerous operating environments coincided with the presence of support service
procurement in 31 per cent of the cases, and with the absence of support procurement in 34.5 per cent of the contracts. However, while security services was provided in less frequently in safer environments, the number of support and logistic contracts remain high in environments not categorized as aggravated. Logistic and support services thus are likely to be a much demanded service category regardless of environment. However, the fact that there is a difference between the support service procurement in aggravated operating environments and other environments is in fact supportive of P₂. In case of support functions, the separation of the category ‘aggravated operating environments’ into its two component parts would most likely provide some clarity. Given that enhanced expectations to the organization have led to peace operations increasingly being present in ongoing conflicts, the war status might not be decisive for whether support functions are bought or not. The capabilities of the host state are likely to be all the more decisive to whether PSCs and PMCs are hired for support assignments.⁴⁴

Radicalized operating environments place obstacles to the carrying out of UN tasks. Afghanistan represents an example at hand. In the Zabul province, one of the heartlands of the Taleban-led insurgency, the UN-staffed Joint Electoral Management Body was represented by two employees of Global Risk Strategies due to very high security risks.⁴⁵ According to the BBC’s correspondent in Zabul, Andrew North, “In effect, here in Zabul, these two contractors have become the United Nations” (BBC News 29.09.04). The two contractors were identifying and assessing potential voter registration sites for Afghanistan’s presidential election, as well as providing “other critical operational and logistic support” to the registration process (The Asia Foundation webpage). In cases such as these the need for specialist services seems to have developed not out of lack of internal skills, but for security reasons. Radicalized operating environments thus directly and indirectly accentuate the need for other service types.

⁴⁴ Internal organizational incapacities partly due to member state contributions will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.
⁴⁵ More than 30 Afghan election workers from JEMB and two PSC personnel had been killed by October 2004 according to a 2004 Report of the Secretary-General (SG 2004: §7). It is unknown whether these contractors belonged to Global Risk Securities.
4.4 Conclusions

UN missions increasingly take place in operating environments characterized by the UNSECOORD as hazardous. These environments are often characterised by disrupted state structures and civil wars. UN missions in these settings represent serious challenges to the UN as they tend to pose severe constraints on personnel, require high levels of experience and competence, and call for high quality material and high levels of resources. In order for UN personnel not to solely be engaged in protecting the mission and its assets but also in achieving its mandate, missions also frequently require additional security measures to be put in place, as well as professional risk analysis (Currier 2003: 6). According to information of the 32 contracts compiled for this thesis, P2 “Radicalization of operating environment has contributed to the UN deploying private security and private military companies” appear to be largely confirmed by the data in Appendix I. Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, there is a clear tendency for security services to be procured in dangerous operating environments, whereas they are rarely sought in non-aggravated circumstances. It can thus be inferred that the difficult conditions represented by these environments have contributed to the UN procurement of security services from the private security and military industry.

Expert services, on the other hand, were more frequently bought in environments not characterized as radicalized. Only a small number of expert contracting took place in dangerous operating environments. P2 is thus not confirmed by the data represented in table Appendix I., on the contrary, absence of dangerous operating environment seems to explain a greater number of the contracts for expert services.

In terms of support and logistic services P2 appears to be strengthened. However, it is likely that the single variable of disrupted state would explain a higher share of the support services contracts than the aggregated variable taking intrastate war into account do. In any case, radicalized or aggravated operating environments do seem to contribute to the UN hiring PSCs and PMCs for support and logistic assignments.

In sum, aggravated operating environment do appear to have the effect of increasing the UN demand for PSC/PMC services.
5. PSCs and PMCs - substituting inadequate internal UN capacities?

"The orchestration and management of the various inputs and programmes of the UN system – the military, political humanitarian and human rights dimensions – is extraordinary complicated. It is not for nothing that the label ‘complex emergency’ has gained currency."

- Thomas G. Weiss (1999: 51)

The ability of the United Nations to act upon mandates is limited both by the will of member states to supply personnel and equipment and the permanent arrangements to support and arrange peace operations. This chapter intends to discuss the validity of proposition P3, to what degree inadequate internal capacity has contributed to the organization’s deployment of PSCs and PMCs. The proposition will be discussed by looking at how limitations of political will on behalf of member states and internal organizational deficiencies provide an insufficient response to the enhanced needs faced by the organization. The chapter subsequently examines the internal capacities of the UN in each of the three main service categories identified as repeatedly procured by the UN.

5.1 Meeting the need for security

The ability of the United Nations to fulfil its objectives, i.e. protect civilians and help end conflicts, is directly linked to UN staff security (High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004: 74). While the UN has come to acknowledge the fact that their personnel is increasingly targeted in the field, until recently very little has been done to the institutional design in order to meet the need for additional security measures. The bottom line of the UN security arrangements is still the principle of it being the responsibility of the host government to provide security for the personnel, premises, property, and activities of UN humanitarian agencies (Barber 1999: 35).46 As the nature of peacekeeping has changed in tandem with a general tendency of aggravated operating climate and degenerating perceptions of the organization’s neutrality and impartiality, the UN’s reaction has been a continued reliance on legal measures such as the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and

46 This principle which stems from the Vienna Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Personnel of the UN (ibid.)
Associated Personnel. The convention did not enter into force until 1999 and it quickly became clear that the convention had little de facto influence on the security situation in the field (Spearin 2005: 59). It is only over the past couple of years that greater attention has been directed towards the improvement of the UN’s capacity to maintain safety and security of its personnel. A thorough review of the UN security system was carried out only after a series of attacks on UN personnel culminating in the attacks on the UN headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, which killed 22 staff and visitors, including the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello (The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 2003: 1). The initiative in turn led to the adoption in December 2004 of Resolution 59/276, which by establishing the new Department of Security aims at professionalizing the security system of the organization (Press Release DSG/SM/242, Res. 59/276: XI). The new Department was formally inaugurated in February 2005 (Press Release DSG/SM/242) and it is thus the security system existing prior to this date that will be relevant in terms of explaining past use of PSCs and PMCs.\(^{47}\)

The UN security arrangements in existence until February 2005 has been managed by four separate structures: (1) The DPKO, which manages the security of peacekeeping operations; (2) The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), responsible for all policy and procedural matters related to security in the organization (UN SG 2000: 5); (3) The Safety and Security Services (S&SS), which manages the security of major UN headquarters around the world, as well as the close protection of senior UN staff members; and (4) parallel security management structures operated within the UN agencies, funds and programmes (The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 2003: 3).\(^{48}\)

5.1.1 The security capacity in peace operations

As discussed in chapter 3, when humanitarians operate in dangerous conflict environments that call for security measures, UN forces engaged in enforcement actions in that conflict

\(^{47}\) Some comments on the new security arrangements, including the establishment of a new Directorate of Security, will be made in the concluding chapter.

\(^{48}\) Although highly relevant, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the individual security arrangement of each UN agency, programme or fund.
theatre will not necessarily work to alleviate the security situation as their association will further contribute to perceptions of flawed humanitarian neutrality and impartiality. In theatres where there are polarizations due to the US-led ‘global war on terrorism’ the process of reversed security also seems to be exacerbated. This has e.g. lead the ICRC to turn down US government offers of military protection for its delegates in Iraq, no matter how hazardous environment (Hazan and Berger 2004). The emerging ‘security spiral’, where a quest for security offered by armed forces have the side effect of increasing humanitarians’ exposure to threats, is well illustrated by the situation created by the UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) in 1992-95. Although UNPROFOR did much to improve the security of humanitarian personnel, there were times when the result was the opposite. The Bosnian Serbs in particular were very hostile to UNPROFOR after it called for punitive NATO air strikes against them. UNHCR, which had become the hub of all humanitarian action in Bosnia, and cooperated closely with UNPROFOR therefore often had huge difficulties presenting itself as impartial (Cutts 1999: 6). On a number of occasions, UNHCR convoy teams complained that the presence of UNPROFOR escorts had the effect of drawing fire onto them, and that they would be safer with no military escort (ibid). More recently, the NGO Forum in Kabul has expressed concern that humanitarian action may be seen as a front for intelligence gathering and has urged the intervening forces to concentrate on creating a secure environment by helping to rebuild the Afghan security forces (Lilly 2002b: 11). There are also situations where a PKO in charge of humanitarian security could be tempted to make humanitarian assistance dependent on the warring parties’ compliance with political conditions (Studer 2001: 374). Problems concerning perceptions of flawed neutrality stemming from associations of humanitarians with the political and military objectives of the armed forces that provided the protection, are often exacerbated when, as is usually the case, humanitarian actors remain in the conflict zone after the departure of peacekeepers or other external military forces (OCHA 2001: 7).

In situations where there is a potential security spiral at work, humanitarians are left with the choice of establishing even closer links with armed forces present (which potentially will work to further deprive them of perceived impartiality and neutrality); choose isolation from the armed forces (which will potentially leave them virtually unprotected); or seek protection from other capacities, such as local warlords (which will contribute to legitimize their rule), or

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49 ‘Reversed security’ is used synonymous with what was termed ‘security spiral’ in chapter 3.
PSCs and PMCs – substituting inadequate internal UN capacities?

from private security/military companies. According to Martin Barber, former Chief of Policy Development and Advocacy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, PSCs/PMCs have been hired by UN humanitarian agencies both in situations where law and order has broken down, and where the host state thus is unable to provide security; as well as in countries where the government has lost control over parts of its territory (Barber 1999: 35). In the first scenario, the only criteria for humanitarian agencies using PSCs concern the approval of the host state. The company must be registered by the government of the country in which they are operating, and authorized for each specific contract (ibid). The problem in such cases relates to the value of a government approval where the government is not able to sustain law and order. More specifically, the registration procedures are likely to be insufficient, at best, in states where “law and order have broken down.” In the second scenario, where there is a flawed monopoly of violence, the strategy of humanitarian agencies, according to Barber, is to hold armed groups responsible for security (ibid). The problems in such cases are multiple. However, the alternative of hiring PSCs is in most such cases not feasible “because their operations are not endorsed by host governments” (ibid). Paradoxically, Barber holds that in cases where armed groups are not interested in political legitimacy, aid agencies are faced with the dilemma of either abandoning civilians or seeking arrangements with PSCs to enable the aid to be delivered (ibid). Barbers account thus adds little clarity by providing two rather unhelpful criterions and simultaneously admit that these criterions are frequently not adhered to. More recent and general UN guidelines developed for humanitarian interaction with military elements are based upon the 2004 OCHA guidelines Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, which again serve as a point of reference for humanitarian practitioners drawing up context specific guidelines. Interestingly, while emphasizing the importance of maintaining “an active and perceived distance from the military” and “that cooperation with the belligerent forces should in principle not take place”, the guidelines specifically excludes PMCs and PSCs from its scope (Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004a: 5-7). While the exclusion could possibly be interpreted as an official embracement of PSC/PMC deployment, it is more likely to be a maneuver to avoid taking a stance on private security dependency by noting that

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50 To which extent PSC/PMC deployment works to compromise the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarians is also subject to discussion. It is, however, likely that it will vary depending on context, as guards can be armed or unarmed, and their general behaviour and tactics may vary considerably in degree of militancy.

51 It can easily be imagined how warlords can take advantage of such power, as well as what problems such strategies pose in situations where convoys move between areas controlled by different warlords.

52 This would frequently be the case in new wars in mineral rich areas.
“although highly relevant in today’s conflict situations” the relationship between humanitarian agencies and PMCs and PSCs “are excluded from the analysis of this paper to avoid dilution of focus” (OCHA 2004a: 5). Apparently it is left to the individual aid agency in each context which attitude to assume in relation to privatized means of security.

Usually, direct security provision in the field is the responsibility of UN peacekeepers. In the absence of a PKO, LifeGuard (a South African company with close ties to infamous Executive Outcomes) and DSL were both contracted to protect UN relief operations in Sierra Leone in 1998, one year prior to the establishment of the peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL). Similarly, DSL was approached by the organization in Somalia in 1992, the very year the peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM) was established, to deploy no less than 7000 Nepalese Ghurkhas to protect NGO relief convoys from threats posed by warlords. DSL, however, did not accept the contract (Vines 1999: 134). In some difficult missions, the UN peacekeeping troops would seem overstretched and therefore unable to fulfil all their duties. In such situations they are sometimes supplemented with private security resources. Currently this seems to be the case in the highly complex UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) where Pacific Architects and Engineers are reported to be handling security for UN infrastructure and personnel in Kinshasa (Hukill 2004: 1527).

A central part of most peacekeeping mandates is the facilitation of a secure operating environment for humanitarian assistance. There are at least three problems related to this matter: Firstly, as discussed above, the association of humanitarians with armed forces could compromise their impartiality and neutrality and produce what here has been termed a ‘security spiral’, which has counterproductive effects on the actual security of humanitarians. Secondly, peacekeeping forces might not always possess the capacity to provide security to all agencies on the ground; and thirdly, in modern complex emergencies the humanitarians are normally the first to arrive, while the early days are often also the most dangerous (Newland and Waller Meyer 1999: 26-27). A peacekeeping operation normally takes three to four

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53 Nepalese Ghurkha soldiers first served as mercenaries for the British East India Company, but became fully integrated in the British Army in 1857 and operate in formed units of the brigade of Ghurkhas. Ghurkha soldiers also serve in the Indian army. Ghurkhas are generally known for their fighting skills, devotedness and for their dependence on the Kukri knives in battle (Nationmaster Encyclopedia).

54 Of the current eight peacekeeping missions in Africa six of them are specifically mandated to contribute to create the necessary security conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (DPKO homepage 13.09.05).
months, at best, from Security Council request to initial deployment (ibid: 26). The organizational inertia thus implies that the security of humanitarian agencies normally is in the hands of UNSECOORD for the first few months irrespective of a PKO mandate.

5.1.2 The security capacity of the Office of the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD)

For any UN operation apart from those administered by the DPKO, the Office of the UN Security Coordinator has the overall responsibility for safeguarding a response to security threats faced by UN personnel. In environments where the local authority is not able to guarantee the security of UN personnel, the UNSECOORD is then responsible for adequate security measures to be put in place. UNSECOORD is, however, a policy-making agency based in New York, and is therefore dependent on a structure of officials in the field to make judgements about risk levels. In order to improve risk assessments, measures were taken in 2000 for field officers to develop systematic audits of threats and “minimum operational safety standards” (MOSS) for each location. UNSECOORD officials also conduct security compliance inspection programs as well as develop criteria for the suspension of operations (UN SG 2000: §64). Surprisingly, these basic security routines were only introduced at a stage when UN personnel had already been targeted in conflict environments for years, a development illustrated by the 198 civilian staff who lost their lives in service of the UN between 1992 and 2000 (ibid: §2).

The UN security system managed by the Office of the UN Security Coordinator is thus a headquarters based system dependant on liaison with appointed officials in the field. At the headquarters level the Executive Head of each organization of the UN system has appointed an official who acts as the security focal point for the management of security within his/her respective organization, and liaises with the Security Coordinator (UN SG 2000: §34). These officials then interact with the designated official in the field. The security system is illustrated by figure 5.1.

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55 The Brahimi Report proposed timelines for deployment of peacekeeping operations to be set at 30 days from the adoption of a Security Council resolution for traditional peacekeeping operations and 90 days in case of complex missions (Brahimi 2000: §88), these goals have so far proven hard to meet.
Fig. 5.1: The UN security system for operations other than PKOs

![Diagram of UN security system]

Source: UN SG 2000: §34

In the field, a designated officer for security is appointed. In many countries this position is taken on top of other obligations, such as being the resident coordinator, head of an operation, or head of other UN organizations. The position of resident field official for security has then clearly not been prioritized within the organization, which is admitted by the words of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “Unfortunately, owing to insufficient capacity for training, motoring and evaluation, [designated] officials cannot always carry out their functions as effectively as would be desirable” (ibid: §44). The workload included in the position of designated official is substantial at the offset as he/she is responsible for preparing a security plan for the country and on security issues in general. In order to do so, the designated official will establish a security management team, often consisting of the heads of the UN agencies, programmes, and funds present at the duty station, who will assist and advice on the security plan (ibid: §46). Another serious default of the handling of security in the field is the lack of competency of the officials responsible for security. While designated officials receive some security training (ibid: §46), these individuals are not professional security advisors, and the one security position that actually is meant for a professional, the field security official, is
often not made available to UN duty stations. Consequently, any duty station lacking a field security officer, lacks the means to provide professional security advice to the designated official and the security management team, identify and report on potential security hazards; maintain and manage the security and contingency plans; and coordinate the activities of other agency specific security officers (ibid: §8). In 2004, there were only field security officers in 64 of the 146 countries where a designated official had been appointed (UN SG 2004a: §18). Considering that the number of “hazardous UN missions” in 2003 counted 93 (The independent Panel 2003: 19), it can be implied that there must be a striking shortage of professional security advisors present at the duty stations. Indicative of the overburdened security system is the fact that UNSECOORD, the unit specializing in staff security, does not have the capacity to recruit and administer the field security officers, but has outsourced this task to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), while day-to day management remains the responsibility of the Office of the Security Coordinator (UN SG 2004a: §20). The activities of UNSECOORD is further limited by the fact that the financing of “field-related cost” incurred either in the field or at headquarters locations through the provision of operational support, has been based on a cost-sharing formula and voluntary contributions from member states (SG 2004a: §60-61).

There are also organizational limitations concerning the management of the limited resources available. The fact that there is virtually no flexibility as to the assignment of a field security officer if the operating environment suddenly should require professional assistance, serves to accentuate the shortage of field security officers. The decision to recruit a field security officer is made by the security management team in the field in consultation with UNSECOORD, a process that can take up to a year due to cost sharing regulations (UN SG 2000: §49). Ann Paludan, a consultant to the World Food Programme, has noted, “The only fast way to deploy security staff is through professional security companies” (Vaux 2002: 15). The Secretary-General Kofi Annan has characterized the system as “cumbersome and completely inadequate” (ibid: 49), and acknowledge that due to the severe limitations of the security arrangements in the field, UN agencies, funds and programmes have been obliged to engage their own security officers to provide essential protection for their staff and activities

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56 The field security officer is sometimes referred to as the field security coordination officer in UN parlance.
57 The UNSECOORD declared a mission “hazardous” when prevailing security conditions require the application of security measures under UN security phases (The independent Panel 2003: 19).
58 See Chapter 4.
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(UN SG 2004a: §19). It is estimated that as of October 2004, there were 164 agency-specific security officers working at field duty stations employed by WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO and UNHCR (UN SG 2004a: §27). It is unknown how many of these officials are recruited from the private security and military industry. On a more general basis, many of the tasks belonging to the field security officer such as security training of staff, comprehensive threat and risk assessments (normally also including some degree of intelligence gathering and analysis), monitoring and management of staff movements are likely to be contracted out, e.g. to PSCs/PMCs even in cases where there is a security officer present, due to the daunting work load of such officers. According to the Secretary-General, these officers are in many instances hard-pressed and entirely overwhelmed in attempting to carry out the wide array of tasks of the necessary frequency, depth and geographic range (ibid: §19). In cases such as Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia and the Sudan, and Iraq, it has been necessary to deploy up to 20 officers (ibid). These apparently highly difficult operating environments all represent disrupted states that have been affected by ‘new wars’.59 Considering the time lag, in many cases, hiring PSC/PMC professionals is likely to avoid placing urgent humanitarian operations at significant risk while waiting for additional internal officers to be recruited, trained and deployed. Consequently, the British company Defence Systems Limited (DSL) has provided the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) with security officers both in Somalia and in Sudan in the past (Vaux 2002: 16). The same company also supplied the World Food Program with a temporary security officer in Angola (ibid).

Even if UNSECOORD should manage to curb the demand for security officers in the field, these officers are strategic specialists and in the absence of a peacekeeping operation lack the tactical means to remedy dangerous operating environments. In extreme conflict theatres such as those in Iraq and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), PSCs or PMCs appear to be deployed on a broader basis. The British company, Global Risk Strategies, is e.g. the main supplier of security to the UN Mission in Iraq (UNMI) according to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF 2004: 5).

59 According to the SIPRI yearbooks Iraq was last registered as engaged in civil war in 2001, the warring factions being the supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) vs. the Iraqi government (Eriksson, Sollenberg and Wallersten 2002: Appendix 1). However, there are also clearly features characterizing the current conflict scenario in Iraq that resemble those of new wars such as the struggle for political influence over mineral rich areas between different groups of the population, and in addition, antagonisms within these groups. Iraq is clearly a borderline case, which in this context is registered as an ‘aggravated operating environment’ (see Appendix Ic).
5.1.3 The security capacity of the Safety and Security Services (S&SS)

The S&SS posit the responsibility of headquarter security and close protection of UN officials. With UN headquarters increasingly being seen as valuable symbolic targets for insurgents and terrorist groupings, the requirements to the S&SS in each location have increased substantially in a relatively short period of time. The bombing of the UN headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, is to date the clearest evidence of the Safety and Security Services not having kept alertness to match the threat level. The Independent Panel appointed to examine “all relevant facts” regarding the attack concluded in detail that there were severe flaws concerning the chain of command, information management capabilities, division of labour, and coordination of the security arrangements by the S&SS (the Independent Panel 2003: 1-2). An S&SS team e.g. carried out a security assessment, including a risk analysis, prior to the establishment of the UN headquarters in the Canal hotel. The assessment was however limited to the potential threats to the SRSG and not to the UN in general. The report wisely concluded that the risk of the SRSG being a direct target was low, unless “he would be at the wrong place at the wrong time” which would imply high security risks (Report of the Independent Panel 2003: 10).

Defence Systems Limited and ArmorGroup have on a number of occasions covered services pertaining to the domain of the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) both regarding protection of headquarters, premises, training, the supply of guards, close protection, etc. The UN headquarters in New York and Nairobi are the only locations to have their own small training units, these are also complemented by regular budget funds to contract specialized training services on an “as-needed basis” (UN SG 2004b: §32). Other headquarters thus have to rely on the services of S&SS, which is administered from New York. According to John Mayo, Director of Public Affairs Triple Canopy Inc, the UN was about to contract out the security of its Baghdad compound after the 2003 bombings. Several companies were bidding for the contract, including Triple Canopy and ArmorGroup. In the last minute, however, it was decided to hand the task over to the Fijian armed forces (Mayo, personal communication June 13 2005). Furthermore, according to Sir David Ramsbotham, former Director of International Affairs of Defence Systems Limited (DSL), DSL was e.g. hired for security training of UN staff in Afghanistan in the early- to mid 1990s, and for the close protection of

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60 There are speculations that so happened because the current UN Special Rapporteur on mercenaries, Shaista Shameem, happen to be Fijian.
the UN Special Representative (Dame Margaret Anstee) in Angola.\textsuperscript{61} The current mission in Afghanistan (UNAME) currently relies on Global Risk Strategies for security training and assistance (The Asia Foundation and BBC News 2004).

5.1.4 The independent security capacity of agencies, funds and programmes

In addition to the shortage of personnel there are also serious qualitative shortcomings in terms of the UN security arrangements for agencies, funds and programmes. The protection of humanitarian supplies and convoys, as well as the maintenance of security at refugee camps are considered “special requirements” and are consequently not met by means of the central organization (UN SG 2004: §28). A number of programme headquarters (UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR) have thus established their own security sections, which are guided by the policy adopted by the UN Security Coordinator (UN SG 2000: §35). The security arrangements of agencies, programmes, and funds are dependent on voluntary contributions as field security measures are not funded centrally from the regular budget (SG 2004a: §61-64). In the absence of protective tactical measures available from within the organization, these services will largely be acquired from the private market. DSL was e.g. hired to perform security duties for UN humanitarian relief convoys for the UNDP in Sierra Leone in 1998 (Musah and Fayemi 2000: 273). More recently, ArmorGroup has been granted a contract to “secure a UN organization in Baghdad” (John Millar, personal communication 4 July 2005).

5.2 Meeting the need for expert and specialized functions

According to a study conducted by the U.S. think-tank the Henry L. Stimson Center, finding expertise for peace operations for many years was a matter of hope more than planning and programming, and as missions became more complex, the UN recruited a wider variety of specialists from outside the system (Durch, Holt, Earle, and Shanahan 2003: 86). Although the training programs for staff in missions have been improved, the recruitment, training, and retention of mission oriented staff have been less emphasized than management training (ibid 2003: 87-88).

\textsuperscript{61} Ramsbotham has interestingly also worked for the UN prior to his position in DSL, performing a study of the general management of UN peacekeeping on behalf of the Security Council (SCFA 2002, appendix 1: §4).
5.2.1 Meeting the need for demining

The humanitarian UN bodies involved in mine action do not carry out mine clearance themselves but rely on peacekeeping troops, national civilian agencies, NGOs, or commercial actors (UN Electronic Mine Information Network). However, as expert services in general are especially resource demanding, the major UN troop contributing countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc. are unlikely to inhibit large amounts of the technology and competence that some of the expert functions demand. Effective demining is a particularly technology demanding activity and at the same time a vital part of the peace building effort. Mainly due to the technical requirements of effective mine removal many PSCs and PMCs have made their way into the demining market e.g. in service of the UN where they provide both mine clearance services as well as training for indigenous deminers (Spearin 2001a: 6-8). In Bosnia ArmorGroup performed clearance and training work for several UN agencies to the extent that the company even established a local entity in Bosnia, named Mine Action Services Limited (ArmorGroup 2005). Other examples of DSL/ArmorGroup performing demining work for the UN include the contract with the UN mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) for disarming of militia and demolition of munitions and mines. DSL also ran UN courses in the same country, training managers and quality controllers of demining programs for a few years (SCFA 2002, app.1: §6-7, app. 6: §80). The same company also performed clearance work under the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Mine Action Coordination Centre. Currently ArmorGroup is responsible for the demining of the buffer zone in Cyprus (Millar, personal communication 02.09.2005). Although table AI.1 and only shows four records of UN contracting specifically for demining, the likeliness of demining being one of the services very often included in other contracts is nevertheless substantial. The lack of information available on the contents of each contract is likely to account for the low number of demining records in the chart.

5.2.2 Meeting the need for civilian police

While the need for highly skilled civil police officers for deployment in UN operations is high, the offer of such individuals is very low. Many CivPol candidates offered to the UN are still fundamentally unqualified. For the UN deployment to Liberia in 2003, a majority of

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62 DSL was acquired and incorporated into ArmorHolding in April 1997 (Vines 1999: 71), the new security division of which was named ArmorGroup.
63 The contract in this case was funded by the UK Department of International Development (Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordination for Kosovo 2001: Annex A).
those interviewed for the CivPol positions failed to meet basic standards such as having driving licence and speaking English (the mission’s language) (Durch et al 2003: 80). Other impediments to providing better police include the lack of a common set of standards and doctrine for training. The UN Secretariat has presented an initiative to draft standardized CivPol rules and procedures, which so far has been hampered by lack of member state feedback (ibid). Analysts also indicate that the inconsistent national attention to civilian policing, and the corresponding inconsistent quality of CivPol contributed to UN operations, leave little hope for timely contributions of well-trained and well-qualified police to the organization’s operations in the nearest future (Durch et al. 2003: 81). However, the US has lately increased its CivPol contributions through the signing of Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71) *Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems Support of Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies* (U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2003). Civilian Police has thus allegedly become “a vital tool for US foreign policy” (ibid). Ironically, or perhaps characteristic of US policies, enhanced US CivPol contributions only means more PMC/PSC personnel under the auspices of the UN. As the US does not have a national police force, and the federal law enforcement agencies are highly specialized and inapt sources for civilian police, the State Department has contracted DynCorp to recruit, hire, train, equip, and deploy all state and local police to be employed in UN CivPol operations (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2003). As a result, all US police officers participating in UN CivPol are currently DynCorp employees, meaning that approximately 92 per cent of all U.S. Military observers, troops and civilian police serving under the UN flag by 31 March 2005 were DynCorp employees.64

Remedying poor contributions from other member states, both police officers and training packages have been procured from PSCs and PMCs in the past. On several occasions the UN has hired DynCorp to supply missions with qualified police officers; both for direct deployment and for training purposes (see Appendix Ia). DSL has reportedly also been hired by the UN for police training purposes in Somalia in the early 1990s (SCFA app. 1: §5). Although table AI.1 only contains two records involving police services, DynCorp has been known to contract with the UN on a regular basis, and it is likely that police training and related services are a preliminary ‘commodity’ in these contracts. It is worth noting, however, that DynCorp is not listed among the approved suppliers by the United Nations Office of

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64 Numbers obtained from the DPKO homepage 08.06.09.
Central Support Services as of January 2005, while the company itself continues to list the organization among its core customers (DynCorp homepage May 2005).

5.2.3 Meeting the need for intelligence

The strongest analytical capacity of the organization exists within the Information & Research Unit of the Situation Centre, which is part of the DPKO. The unit was created in 1994 and consists of four officers from the intelligence branches of the militaries of four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Dorn 1999: 433). However, while the UN has come a long way in acknowledging the need for intelligence to support peace operations as well as humanitarian efforts in conflict environments, several constraints nevertheless persist as to the proficiency of the organization to obtain such information.

Governments currently share information with the UN on a “need to know basis”, when governments think that the UN needs to know (ibid: 436). However, member states have traditionally been reluctant to empower the UN to gather and utilize intelligence due to concerns of interference in internal affairs (Rice 2004: 2). On a practical basis, many states have been under the impression that the UN is inherently insecure and that any intelligence in its possession would inevitably leak to their ‘enemies’ (Dorn 1999: 442). Moreover, when such intelligence has been shared, as by the US in the case of The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, its quality has frequently been questioned, further tainting the perceptions of poor intelligence in the UN context (Rice 2004: 2). As a consequence, the UN weapons inspector team led by Hans Blix did little to conceal that the organization was indeed contracting for intelligence in addition to the information it received from member states (Lynch 2001: A15). An attempt by the Secretary-General to improve the organization’s ability to anticipate crisis by the means of intelligence gathering and henceforth create an in-house analysis unit to integrate the UN’s various databases and reports was stalled by governments fearing it would evolve into a central intelligence agency (ibid).

Thus, lacking both internal means to supply the organizational apparatus with adequate amounts of reliable information and the will from member states to remedy such conditions, the UN has begun to buy intelligence services e.g. from the private security industry. In the 2001 a Security Council committee monitoring sanctions violations in Angola hired Kroll
Associates for nearly $100,000 to trace the financial assets of União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, a measure which was met by scepticism by a range of member states (Lynch 2001: A15). Similarly, the UN operation in East Timor (UNTAET) sought local intelligence-gathering services from two South African PSCs, KZN Security and Empower Loss Control Services (Singer 2003a: 183).

5.3 Meeting the need for logistics and support functions

As the shortage in supply of logistic services has been felt for a considerably longer time than the shortage of troops, the organization has had to work on alternative measures for quite some time already. While most national forces do not have surplus of specialized enabling units performing functions such as engineering, communications, logistics, transport, strategic lift (often considered the achilles heel of transport), or medical support services, funding PSC/PMC support for such services is a way to go around tying up its own resources (Durch et al. 2003: 71).

5.3.1 The Logistic capacity

In line with the recommendations made by the Panel of UN Peace Operations in the Brahimi Report (Report of the Independent Panel on UN peace Operations 2000: §169) there have been improvements to the pre-deployment arrangements for equipment. The upgrading of the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, resulted in the base being able to support the rapid deployment of a headquarters for one traditional peacekeeping mission by 2002 (Durch et al. 2003: 93). This indicates that in the case of the UN launching more than one traditional PKO, the logistic support provided from the Brindisi base will already be deployed, meaning that logistic requirements in the field remain to be met either by troop contributing countries, by partners such as The Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), or by private companies.66

65 The goal for the Brindisi capacity was set to the support of one traditional and one complex PKO, a goal that is was out of reach as of early 2003 (ibid).
66 The Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations is a multinational rapid deployment force consisting of non-standing contributions from 16 member states. Members decide on a case-by-case basis whether they will participate under Chapter VI of the Charter. So far SHIRBRIG has only been deployed in the UN Operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), but is currently planning for deployment in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), both of which have a mandate based on Chapter VI. SHIRBRIG forces are expected to be self-sufficient for 60 days, and will be deployed for a maximum of 6 months (SHIRBRIG homepage 2005).
The UN logistic systems relies on member states being self sufficient at unit level for a given period, normally between 60 and 120 days awaiting the UN Field Service to organize (US Army 1994: 2). Such a system is problematic knowing that the bulk of personnel issued for UN peace operations tend to be drawn from developing countries. The top-ten list of contributors shows Pakistan contributing the most, with more than 8500 peacekeeping personnel, followed by Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uruguay, Jordan, and Kenya. Western countries are virtually absent. The American contribution e.g. amounted to 0.73 per cent of the grand total of peacekeepers deployed in UN operations in July 2004. Skills such as maintenance of helicopters and planes, airlift services, managing complicated logistic and communication systems are resource demanding, and poorly equipped and trained contingents are therefore not likely to inhibit such skills. This problem was illustrated in a study of deaths of humanitarian workers between 1985 and 1998, which demonstrated that the death rates due to motor vehicle accidents are especially high among UN peacekeepers, a tendency that is ascribed to inadequate driving skills (Sheik, Gutierrez, Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren, and Burnham 2000: 168). Other UN organizations, in contrast, are more likely to have full-time drivers (ibid). The increasing inclination of member states not to keep large amounts of standing personnel on a permanent basis, but rather to lease such skills in situations of need, also contributes to there being little indication of a decrease in the demand for additional logistic and technical support services provided by PMCs and PSCs (Tufts University 2001: 4).

Lack of commitment to supplying PKOs with the necessary personnel has often only become apparent in the aftermath of the shaping of mandates. While member states, especially members of the Security Council have demonstrated an apparent will to respond to crisis by supporting the erstwhile issuing of peacekeeping mandates, they have often failed to comply with the obligations by not contributing sufficiently to the compilation of troops and support measures once the PKO mandate is established (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000: §60). As an effect of words rarely being matched by action, understaffed and under-resourced missions have tended to be the rule rather than the exception in UN contexts. In accordance with recommendations from the Brahimi panel, resolutions now remain in draft until the mandate is matched with the human, material, and political support.

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67 The US government has for example awarded contracts worth more than $20 million to two companies, the PAE Group and DynCorp to provide logistical support for some 3,500 troops from the African Union anticipated to Sudan’s troubled western province of Darfur (IPOA homepage 01.12.04).
required to enable the full implementation of the mandate (UN SG 2001: 4). Logistics were contracted for in many missions where developing countries were the main personnel contributors. Both Pacific Architects & Engineers (PAE) and ArmorGroup supply the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) with logistic services (Beno, personal communication 17 August 2005, SCFA 2002, app. 6: §80). In the case of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) International Charter Incorporated (ICI) of Oregon has been engaged at various times by the UN to ferry personnel, troops and humanitarian supplies into and within the country to support the peacekeeping operations (ICI homepage). In Angola Defence Systems Limited (DSL) has provided logistic support to the UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM I-III) in the past (Lilly 2000a: 55). Even in missions where a developed state has taken the lead, PSCs/PMCs are likely to be hired for logistic tasks; in the case of the Australia-led mission in East Timor (UNTAET) DynCorp is reported to supply the UN with logistics, transport, and communications (Singer 2003a: 183). East Timor being a much more accessible country than e.g. the DRC and with less complex conflict patterns, however, private companies are likely to be hired in cases such as UNTAET because leading states have embarked upon a privatization strategy for its own logistic supply.

Another obstacle to the effective managing of logistics and other support functions has been the reimbursement system. The arrangements for contingency reimbursements until very recently were based on each contingency counting all equipment used in an operation, including each spare part down to screws, nails and cutlery, in advance of deployment (Eide 2005). In the aftermath of the operation all would have to be counted again in order to calculate what had been spent and the due amount to be reimbursed. Such a system surely can be considered an effective guarantee against the rapid deployment of units to conflict emergencies and a weighty factor contributing to external needs for logistic support. Additionally, as the process of reimbursement has been known to delay for years, it is very likely to have had negative effects on the inspiration for countries to contribute, as it could mean that resources in some cases would be tied up in the UN system for up to a decade (ibid).

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68 The main troop contributors to MONUC as of May 2005 are Pakistan, India, Uruguay, South Africa, Bangladesh and Nepal (MONUC webpage 25.05.05). PAE manages air control in DRC (Beno, personal communication, 17 August 2005), while ArmorGroup provides MONUC with logistics in general (SCFA 2002, app. 6: §80).

69 The reimbursement system has now been revised and the new system called “Contingent Owned Engagement” is currently being implemented (Eide 2005).
5.3.2 The internal support apparatus’ capacity

The UN Field Service is the unit created in 1949 to provide support functions such as land transport, radio communications maintenance, security of premises, mission personnel etc. to peace operations (Durch et al. 2003: 89). Table 5.1 displays the capacity of the Field Service as of 2000:

Table 5.2: The distribution of Field Service Officers among occupational groups as of mid-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building Management Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricians</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator Mechanics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Operators</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Technicians</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Officers</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle mechanics</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>460</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics provided by Field Administration and Logistics Division and Personnel Management Support Service (A/57/78: §20).

As apparent from the table, the total number of field service officers is very low compared to the fact that the UN had 38,500 peacekeepers dispatched around the 17 ongoing missions in 2000. Moreover, the span of occupations seems narrow and relevant functional categories such as those related to information technology are strikingly absent. Additionally, it is perhaps suggestive that more than a third of the total capacity, 35.9 per cent, are devoted to “general administration” tasks.

The scarcity of support personnel is due to the unit being seriously under-prioritized during the years, it has e.g. been subjected to a hiring freeze since 1993, which has prevented the rejuvenation of staff and the acquisition of up to date technological and logistic skills (Othman 2002: §20). The Brahimi Panel recorded in 2000 that the technical knowledge of the unit appeared outdated and that the Field Services’ composition no longer matched the needs of the newer generation of peacekeeping (The Panel on UN Peace Opearitions 2000: §140).
Consequently, by 2000 the obsolete and inadequate skill base of the unit had led the DPKO to base itself mainly on services other than those of the Field Service Unit; eventually the unit’s 460 personnel constituted just 13 per cent of the international civilian staff employed in UN peacekeeping (Othman 2002: §12). Considering that the total size of UN peacekeepers deployed in 2000 only counted 38,500, whereas by January 2005 the numbers had increased to 65,050 (Global Policy Forum web page 06.09.05), the Field Support Services is currently likely to play an even more peripheral role in the day-to-day support of UN peace operations. In spite of the flaws of the Field Service, it remains the only UN staff category “exclusively oriented to the field and to peace operations” (ibid: §20) and remains the first response team for critical elements of peace operations. With regard to humanitarian operations, each agency is responsible for its own Field Service category, and although there have been suggestions to establishing a joint pool of field specialists common to all the United Nations organizations, the initiative has not been endorsed by the humanitarian agencies (ibid 2002:§26). In reforming the Field Service it is also suggested that the future teams of field service officers include fewer internationally recruited staff (Othman 2002: §30). More cost-efficient alternatives present themselves as UN volunteers, as well as locally and internationally privately contracted personnel (ibid). Among the companies most often recorded in table AI.1 is PAE, which reportedly provide a range of support services to the new UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (Hukill 2004: 1527), while DSL provided the full range of support, expert and security services to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia from 1992 on (SCFA, app. 1 2002: §5). Both PAE and DSL are approved as service suppliers as of January 2005 (United Nations Office of Central Support Services webpage).

5.4 Conclusions

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the only structure within the United Nations security management system to have a dedicated force generation unit and a capacity, albeit limited, for rapid response to security emergencies (SG 2004a: 32). However, peacekeeping operations do not always coincide with humanitarian efforts, are frequently overstretched, and in general do not always represent the best way to provide security for humanitarians. UNSECOORD represents a civilian means to civilian security. However by lacking both the capacity, due to resources not being granted by member states, coupled with organizational inflexibility, UNSECOORD is only capable of offering a very limited contribution to field security. Agencies, programmes and funds are thus dependent on ad hoc arrangements for basic security related to convoy and asset protection and for security in refugee camps. As the
main reasons for the aggregate security measures of the organization not being fit to meet the needs in modern day conflict can be ascribed to lacking member state will to fund alternatives, P3 can thus be considered largely confirmed concerning security. Similarly, it can thus be inferred that due to the organizational bottlenecks and lack of predictability regarding funding, agencies, programmes and funds operating in the field cannot afford not to provide for their own security advice through the private market.

Inadequate access to expert services appears to be primarily a result of lacking member state dedication. The UN is still confined to a coordinating role what regards demining due to lack of internal capacity. UN civilian police is also limited. Key member states have not contributed adequate numbers of skilled police neither to serve as police officers nor to conduct training. However, it is with regard to intelligence capacities that the problems of intergovernmental cooperation are illustrated. While upgrading intelligence capacities does not require the financial costs of demining, neither the potential political costs of risking civilian police lives, reluctance to support intelligence capacities is based on a fundamental lack of political will due to distrust of other member states. In the case of expert functions P3 thus seems relevant mostly in terms of lack of political will, and is henceforth only partly confirmed by the analytical framework.

While the UN has made some progress what regards its logistic capability, it remains one of the greatest challenges to the organization when deploying peace operations. Lack of member state commitment to supplying logistic capacities has indeed contributed to the UN having to seek logistic support elsewhere. Organizational weaknesses, however, must partly account for the launching of missions without having assured that the discrepancy of words and action would not spoil logistic capabilities. P3 is thus supported in terms of support functions. Lack of resources due to member states not prioritizing the UN operations accounts for need not being met by internal means, and hence to discrepant need being filled by the private security and military market. Similarly, the support system appears outdated and completely inadequate to meet the needs of modern complex peace operations. While the organization in general is experiencing a shortage of funds, the incapacity to direct the limited funds to the benefit of a functioning support apparatus has thus contributed to the organization frequently procuring support functions from the private security and military industry.
P3 is largely supported in terms of all three service categories. Although some reservations apply to the relevance of the proposition in terms of expert functions, it can be confirmed that inadequate internal capacity to a greater or lesser extent has contributed to the UN deploying private security and military companies in peace and humanitarian operations.
Analysis Part II

The following analysis sections focus on the private security and military industry’s ability to become a viable alternative source for security, expert, and support personnel. The influence of both external and internal offer enhancing factors is thus examined in order to evaluate the relevance of the propositions $P_4$ and $P_5$. The two propositions will be dealt with in separate chapters.
6. Availability - an impetus for PSC/PMC deployment?

The most dramatic change taken place in the private military/security industry concerns its volume. While demobilization and restructuring of armed forces in the post-Cold War era freed large amounts of military professionals, the industry depended on another impetus to institute itself. It is the argument of this section that while demobilization laid the premises for the industry, its endurance and growth was dependent upon the coincidence with certain normative changes embedded in the general acceptance of privatization and outsourcing as a means to enhance state efficiency. Combined, these two factors will be used to discuss the validity of P₄, whether pools of available personnel have contributed to the UN’s deployment of private security and military companies.

6.1 Push versus pull factors

In explaining the background for the dramatic quantitative changes that have taken place within the private security/military industry, both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors should be considered. Force availability resulting from demobilization in the aftermath of the Gulf War was a forced change, or what can be termed as a ‘push’ factor for ex-military personnel to join the private marketplace. Quite a few companies established during the 1990s have been products of the post-Cold War defence downsizing. More recently established companies on the other hand, tend to be products of downsizing, reorganizing, and privatization efforts in combination with the extreme market emerging in connection with the present efforts in Iraq and the Afghanistan invasion. The impetus for these companies appears to be profit potentials (‘pull factors’) rather than the forced ‘push factors’ described above. The pull factors are however also dependent upon the privatization scheme becoming a sufficiently dominant paradigm. Relaxed attitudes towards privatization among politicians have thus enabled the industry to respond to the high demand for security services that e.g. the coalition forces have been faced with in Iraq. Facilitated both by the fact that the industry was already an incorporated part of army support, and by the lax attitudes towards privatization of former military functions, the sudden and very high need for security providers, especially in relation to the US led ‘War on Terrorism’, led to a rapid and largely uncontrolled growth in the

70 MPRI was established in 1990 (Cilliers and Douglas 1999: 112), while DSL came about already in 1981 (O’Brien 2000: 47).
security providing industry. In industrialized countries the pull factor now clearly dominates the push factor. The industry not only attracts senior or retired military personnel, however, enlisted military personnel at any level is also drawn to the industry on an individual basis. Younger personnel, who under different circumstances would have a long military career ahead of them, are attracted by the ‘easy money’ in the private sector. Consequently, as demand for contractors has augmented sharply during the Iraq war, the private military business has not only absorbed demobilized or retired personnel, but also it has also become a drain on the regular armed services. This tendency is especially demanding in the U.S. where the salary system has coincided more with rank and time-in-grade than with performance, hazard and hardship (Isenberg 2004: 28). With daily salaries anywhere between $400 and $1200, sometimes even as high as $2000 (ibid: 25), depending on the contract and the client, the private industry does represent a challenge to state forces. It is thus becoming a problem to some army divisions to maintain its troops in rank.71 By February 2005 The British special forces reportedly had lost 120 troops, more than a fifth of their total number to the private sector, while the paratroopers had lost almost 200 soldiers, 11 per cent of their manpower (the Herald Feb. 15, 2005: 9). In response to a similar tendency in its ranks, the US Defence Department has approved a series of incentives for members of elite Special Operations Forces who remain in the military, including a $150,000 bonus for the most experienced and highly trained combat personnel to prolong their contracts (New York Times, Feb. 6, 2005). South African forces have similarly experienced a serious drain on the Police Services’ elite task force. As many as half of their employees are reportedly asking for early retirement in order to go to Iraq, their $5,000 monthly salary in Iraq being equivalent to about six months pay at home (Glantz 2004).

6.1.1 Ephemeras

Quite a few companies appear to be products of the unprecedented pull factor prevailing in the private security market. According to US Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes (Ret.), who served in Iraq in 2004, shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 “anybody who could start a

71 Few companies are willing to inform on exact payments, and reports on the levels of one days pay in Iraq especially varies considerably. For Western security escorts numbers are often suggested between $400 and $1,200 a day, however, considering that journalism often tend to be tainted with some degree of sensationalism, it is reasonable to infer that numbers are most often more likely to lie closer to the lower estimate while certain VIP close protection assignments are likely to pay more. Non-Western employees reportedly earn a fraction of these amounts. According to CorpWatch, a South African ex-commando will earn about $1,000 a month (CorpWatch 14.09.05).
company started piling into the country, threw something together, had no training program, no vetting program…” (PBS, Hammes interview transcript 2005). Resulting from this ‘gold rush’, scores of new companies were created to meet the urgent demand of commercial clients, as well as government agencies, NGOs or other actors present. Some of these companies appear to be small and almost created ad hoc to meet short time demand, they are hence expected to close down whenever business slows down. Others tend to get to establish a client base among government agencies, NGOs and UN agencies, which probably will keep them in business longer. Custer Battles is one of the companies reportedly founded nine months ahead of receiving its first Iraq contract (Isenberg 2004:32) while Triple Canopy, now employing approximately 1,000 men in Iraq, reportedly was awarded CPA contracts worth about $90 million while still constituting “little but a name” (Bergner 2005). Other companies refrain from informing on its foundation, but stand out as products of the Iraq invasion by being a company of westerners without having other headquarters but those in Iraq. However, the perhaps newest company with the most lucrative contract is Aegis Defence Services. The company surprisingly received a three year contract valued up to maximum $293 million from the US Department of Defence (DoD) to coordinate the communication and intelligence between coalition forces and contractors through the operation of Regional Operations Centres in Iraq in addition to provide force protection (Aegis home page, Isenberg 2004: 29).72

6.1.2 Well established companies

The Klondike-like climate resulting from the anarchic situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, has not only spurred new companies to be established, it has also provided the established ones with extraordinary growth. ArmorGroup, a company which has been working for the UN for many years providing security training, mine action services and protective services (Millar, e-mail interview 04.07.05), is apparently one of the companies which has expanded the most in the past few years. The company’s revenues almost doubled in one year with a 92 per cent increase from 2003 to 2004, leaving the company with revenues of $191.1 million in 2004 (ArmorGroup International plc 2005: 1). Quite a few other

72 This contract was unexpectedly awarded to Aegis, which is Tim Spicer’s (former head of Sandline International) latest venture. Aegis was primarily known to supply specialized maritime security services. The contract was subsequently contested by competing companies. There have been speculations that the contract was reserved for any British company as a way for DoD to reward the British for contributing to the Iraq effort, and that Aegis thus had been chosen primarily on the grounds of being British.
companies have had their revenues skyrocket, such as British/South African Erinys. According to the head of Erinys Iraq, the company was rather small until 2003 when they received the largest security contract in Iraq that year; a contract valued $100 million for oil pipeline protection, employing some 15,000 people (PBS, Melville 2005). Business has also boomed in other areas but security; reconstruction companies like PAE, military training companies like DynCorp, companies performing explosive disposals etc. are all experiencing an expansion unlike any other. It is however not only in Iraq and Afghanistan that business has been booming for the private security and military industry, some analysts even assert that the private security and military industry in general has expanded to a combined level of 100 billion (Singer 2003c), a number which industry representatives strongly contest (Brooks interview 2005).

6.2 Expansion exceeding oversight

The gold rush effect has dwarfed most efforts to maintain effective control of which companies are doing what where, and what companies and individuals are inflicting on the conflict and reconstruction environment at whatever time.

6.2.1 Lack of quantitative oversight

According to US Department of State’s PSC records, there are 30 private security companies doing business in Iraq (US Dept. of State webpage). However, David Isenberg, long time analyst of the industry, on an assessment assignment of the British-American Security Information Council found 68 companies doing business in Iraq, more than double the amount reported by the Dept. of State (Isenberg 2004: 80-99). While Isenberg’s investigation was undertaken in 2004, the Dept. of State does not inform of when from their assessment was made, or whether it has been updated recently. Isenberg, however, admits to that nobody knows for sure how many PMCs are operating in Iraq (ibid: 7). Industry representatives

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73 Some reports file the Erinys International as British (Frontline Documentary) while others (Isenberg 2004) list it as South African. The South African newspaper The Sunday Times claim to have evidence the company is based in Johannesburg and run by South Africans with local ID numbers (The Sunday Times 7th Dec 2003).

74 In the 2005 Peace and Stability Operations Conference in Brussels representatives of several companies discussed how the immense growth had to be slowed in order for it not to outgrow the different organizational structures (Personal communication).

75 PSCs and PMCs most likely do inflict rather heavily not only on the local population’s view of the occupying power, but also more directly as they frequently are engaged in fire exchange. Erinys Iraq officials admits the company has killed some 70 Iraqis since the invasion started (Melville interview, PBS Frontline documentary 2005).
Availability an impetus for PSC/PMC deployment?

themselves, such as head of Erinys Iraq, Andy Melville, states that they believe around 40 known companies are operating in Iraq, and many more that will only “spring out of the woodwork whenever they have an incident” (PBS, Melville 2005).

Lawrence Peter, former consultant to the US Department of Defence on outsourced security, now director of the Private Security Association in Iraq contributes to the confusion by estimating 60 companies to be present in Iraq, but adding that the accurate number might also be 100 (Bergner 2005). Obviously, the ‘pull factor’ has led companies to have popped up before and during the war in Iraq to the point that analysts, the US administration, as well as the industry itself have lost oversight of the general scope of the industry. Testimony of the unripe state of the industry, especially as seen in Iraq at present, is the frequent corporate mergers and acquisitions through which the industry apparently is accommodating itself, elements which are also contributing to the prevalent lack of oversight. Oversight over contracting procedures is further obfuscated by the practice of sub-contracting between companies, which means that although a contract is given to a company with good records of accomplishment, there are no guarantees that this particular company will carry out the actual assignment. Sub-contracting thus leads to a further dispersal in authority, and leaves the original client with few means of oversight (Holmqvist 2005: 33).

6.2.2 Lack of qualitative oversight

When services are bought ‘back’ from the private sector, they do not come with any guarantees of track records of the individuals providing the services. Most PSCs and PMCs rely on personnel from a wide range of countries and backgrounds. Erinys was founded in 2002 by two former servicemen, at least one of whom was a former Apartheid official, the company still recruits a lot from South Africa. Company representatives of their Iraq division state that the South Africans constitute the largest group of non-Iraqis employed by the company (PBS, Melville interview transcript 2005). Furthermore, it is stated that their employees are “all former military servicemen. They’re all combat veterans, every single one of them” (ibid), which implies that a considerable amount of the employees are combat veterans of the pro-apartheid wars. The fact that these “former military servicemen” also

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76 One such company is Zapata Engineering, a US company which only appeared after a so-called “blue on white incident”, a fire exchange with US marines (The Guardian June 9, 2005).

77 The massive and rapid expansion, currently pushed to the extremes in Iraq, has also had implications for the operating environment. Companies themselves have a hard time keeping track of the industry. In the words of Melville: “There are a lot of guys out there with guns, and it’s very hard sometimes to differentiate between who are the Anti-Iraqi Forces and who aren’t” (Melville, Frontline Documentary).
include ex-apartheid troops, only caught the attention of the media after an attack that claimed the life of one Erinys trainer, and injured another. The two turned out to be members of South Africa’s secret police in the 1980s, one of whom had recently received an amnesty application from the Truth And Reconciliation Commission after admitting to between 40 and 60 petrol bombings, a car bombing, and an arson attack of political activists’ houses during the 1980s (Glantz 2004). Similarly, several companies, among them Blackwater and Triple Canopy, have been reported to hire troops from the Gen. Pinochet era (Franklin 2004, Bergner 2005), while other companies hire ex-combatants from the Balkans. Clients in these cases will have no way of guaranteeing that the company employees do not have records of human rights abuse. Demobilization as a push factor is hence not to be ruled out. Demobilization following brutal conflicts has thus supplied the market with private security actors, some of which have records of human rights breaches, which the client rarely will be informed of. The result is a lack of transparency as each company is responsible for its own vetting and training procedures. The privatization incentives of Western governments in particular, have in turn contributed to including these former soldiers into not only functions in support of industrialized armies, or security provision for people involved in reconstruction, human rights agencies, aid agencies and the like, but also into rather sensitive information gathering and dispersal.

The recent boom in the private security and military industry has not been met with the adequate supervision and control measures, which has implications for potential clients like the UN. Not only does the large amount of smaller and bigger companies make it harder to ‘shop’ for services, but it also contributes to preclude the guarantee as to whom one is hiring. Doug Brooks, president of the PSC/PMC interest organization International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) admits to this uncertainty by adding that the nature of the industry is such that if you hire someone to do demining, that individual might be former Executive Outcomes and go off to work for PSCs and PMCs in war zones afterwards (Brooks interview 2005).

Not only has demobilization in the aftermath of the Cold War produced large numbers of unemployed soldiers and other military personnel available for the private market, but the lure of this well-paid industry has also attracted large amounts of personnel still employed by state forces. The ‘push’ factor is still viable although the resources are now freed from countries frequently emerging from brutal civil wars instead of from the surplus created by the end of the Cold War. The ‘pull’ factor can be attributed to the privatization scheme, which frequently
results in a competitive advantage what regards salaries compared to corresponding public positions. The ‘pull’ factor, although hard to measure, appears more relevant than the ‘pull’ factors at the moment, as there is a tendency of personnel already employed in state forces to move over to the private sphere. Both the push and the pull factors are thus influencing the private security and military industry and its growth. The result is indeed a private security industry that attracts experienced military personnel among its employees contributing to a quantitative boost in offer both for newcomers and well-established companies. To an organization like the UN this means a greater and a more varied offer of alternative personnel. While it is likely that greater availability may have indirectly influenced the UN’s use of these companies, through increased accessibility, through customization to their conflict zones as part of developed countries capability etc., there is however, no direct link between a quantitatively greater offer and UN procurement which can be confirmed by the two variables at hand in this context. Although ‘pools of qualified personnel’ is not dismissed as irrelevant in this connection, there appear to be other explanatory factors present, which are not dealt with directly in P4, which apparently carry more weight in explaining UN PSC/PMC dependence.
7. Sanitization for market shares: From the private security and military industry to the ‘peace and stability industry’

Along with its massive quantitative expansion, the private security and military industry has undergone serious qualitative changes. It is the argument of this thesis that these qualitative changes have so far, and are in fact still occurring, along two dimensions; there has been a tendency towards de facto alterations to the repertoire of core services offered, and there has been marked developments regarding the conceptual outward presentation of the business. The two dimensions will be treated in separate parts for practical reasons, although they are closely intertwined and in fact occurring simultaneously. This chapter hence attempts to assess the relevance of whether a “credible PSC/PMC industry has contributed to the organization deploying PSCs/PMCs”. P will thus be attempted verified or unproven by applying the two explanatory factors ‘sanitization’ and ‘corporate responsiveness’. Both arguments should be seen in the context of the radicalization of operating environments as discussed in chapter 4. The argumentation subsequently leads to an assertion of an industry with aspirations for inclusive legitimacy and which opts for re-branding as peacekeepers and conflict resolvers, a strategy pursued to acquire the ultimate goals of any commercial entity; market shares.

7.1 Adjusting the menu of core competencies

In line with the second explanatory chart from chapter two, corporate responsiveness is used in this section to explain the marked qualitative adjustments to the service offer of the private security and military industry. It is the argument of this section that the service offer has changed both because of the actual shift in client base, but also as a result of the potential of further market expansion in the realm of government work. The de facto responsiveness of the industry is thus occurring both by adjusting not only to their developed state clients, but also to additional market potentials.

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78 Again, by treating the business as a whole one runs the risk of over-simplifying. There are extreme elements within the industry that do not necessarily fit the descriptions in this thesis, however, as this thesis intends to explain the interactions of the industry with the UN, it consequently primarily deals with the more legitimate segments of the business.
It is possible to detect at least five tendencies in terms of service adjustments: 1) Companies today most often offer to perform specific tasks within operations as opposed to take on entire operations; 2) services offered are perceivably of a more defensive or non-lethal character than during the 1990s, they are hence often presented as being more of a ‘humanitarian or peace building character’ as opposed to of a military character; 3) technology demanding services are most often included in the service offer; 4) services related to anti-terrorism at land and sea have made their marked entry. These changes can be detected e.g. by studying the service offerings of individual companies over time, by their marketing efforts, or by looking into the services most often contracted. The changes 1) to 3) are particularly relevant to P_5.

7.1.1 Mission support as opposed to mission takeover

The scope of the service offer of the private security and military business has been modified since the mid 1990s. The bulk of services advertised today are aimed at supporting missions in an indirect manner whereas before EO, Sandline and others were looking to substitute missions. Most companies today thus aim at performing specific tasks within missions, or preferably categories of tasks. Contemporary companies do not have the capacity to perform the extreme variety of services necessary to take on entire missions.

7.1.2 The new service menus

Alterations have also been made concerning the character of individual service menus. MPRI, the largest American PMC, in 1998 reportedly offered “security assistance and special forces, fire support, maritime operations, intelligence training and explosive ordnance” (Cilliers and Douglas 1999: 113), services which by medio 2005 are no longer advertised. Instead, new services have appeared such as e.g. Democracy Transition Assistance Programs (DTAP), IPOA’s proposals for the association’s member companies to take on several tasks within operations in Sudan and in the DRC as discussed under 7.4 might at first seem not to support the tendency, however, the proposals deal with individual companies and suggesting roles for these companies within the UN mission not as a combined force, but rather as separate entities. Some of these companies might also compete for certain tasks as they include similar core competencies within their repertoire. Security services related to piracy is a niche that is being exploited by several companies. Strategic Consulting International, later renamed Trident Maritime, is a former Tim Spicer company specializing in maritime security (Catterjee 2004). Although a thorough study of individual companies over time is beyond the scope of this thesis some information on individual service changes will be provided.
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peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, anti-terrorism/force protection etc. (MPRI website 2005). MPRI has evidently made some obvious changes to its centre of attention in the direction of peace building, state building, and anti-terrorism focus. ArmorGroup, a company that caters to a slightly different market segment than MPRI, has traditionally listed protective security services, security training and demining as its three main service areas.\(^{82}\) When asked about current areas of particular attention John Millar, Director of Business Development, ArmorGroup, lists post-conflict reconstruction services, DDR programmes and reconstruction; as well as state building services such as security sector reform (SSR) and police training. Emphasis is placed on the large DDR related contract the company holds in Iraq for ordnance and explosives destruction (Millar 2005, e-mail interview). Clearly ArmorGroup is directing its services in a post-conflict service direction, instead of towards in-conflict services. The focal points of ArmorGroup services also fit in quite nicely with a greater degree of humanitarianism, as disposing of weapons obviously would carry more weight in humanitarian circles than weapon’s instruction, or their actual use, as might be the case in direct security provision.

7.1.3 Technology demanding services

While there currently are many new and small actors in the business (which necessarily must limit their service offer) as discussed in the last chapter, some of the preponderant actors have made an effort to expand their service menu and hence cover a larger segment of the market. Especially in terms of logistics and specialized services, one can detect some degree of specialization among smaller firms and a broadening in services among bigger actors. To larger firms the broadening of service basis is necessary in order to cater to clients in complex conflict environments. Such expansion has taken place through mergers with other companies and in particular, by acquisitions of smaller companies holding particular competencies. The broadening of service menus has led to a growing connection between the private military industry and related, but more mainstream industrial undertakings such as goods and services from the arms production, construction, computer, electronics, and communications industries. Mergers and acquisitions can be helpful not only to attract more customers with multiple needs, but according to Larry Makinson at the Center for Public Integrity also to

\(^{82}\) One of the main differences being that MPRI specializes in training while not actually supplying security services directly, whereas ArmorGroup does protective security provision as well.
acquire contracts on the US market reserved for companies with a so-called “small business status” (Makinson 2004). In some cases acquisitions and mergers also tend to be undertaken in the wake of negative publicity, as was the case when DynCorp was acquired by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and Titan by L3 Communications. However, it is likely that responding to needs in the market and expanding its reach is the most common reason for the frequent mergers and acquisitions in the industry. After the takeover of DynCorp, CSC managers stated that the takeover was done in order for the company to augment their capabilities and adjust to the needs of the new US Homeland Security Department (CSC webpage 2005).

7.1.4 Tailor made service menus

Counter-terrorism related security measures are especially on domestic markets on great demand. PSCs and PMCs are therefore doing their best to position themselves perfectly in the market by combining technology intensive capabilities with security offering advanced solutions within the intelligence market (Holmqvist 2005: 37-38). The fact that counterintelligence measures also must be undertaken in relation to security assignments, also works to strengthen the capacity of the private security and military industry in this particular area.

A closer look at the needs of the UN as identified in the chapters 3-5 (security, support functions and expertise), reveals that there are many new actors in the security field. More companies are offering a combination of support functions and expertise, often technology demanding solutions as such. These modifications in service offer in progress within the private military and security industry must be seen in connection with analysis of market potentials. Adapting to the market represented by the UN has meant a specialization that somewhat paradoxically entails a broadening of service offers for bigger companies in order to be better suited for contracts in complex environments. The industry itself has been quick to point to the shortcomings of UN operations and it appears no less than striking at times how services are moulded to fit these shortcomings. Most companies emphasize their rapid

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83 Under an informal quota system set by the US Congress, federal agencies are encouraged, though not required, to distribute 23 per cent of their procurement dollars to small businesses.

84 DynCorp employees were allegedly involved in organizing prostitution rings and human trafficking (The Observer, London, 29th July 2001), while Titan employees were involved in the Abu Ghraib prison abuse (Washington Post December 13, 2004: E01).
deployment abilities, their technological mastery, their unsurpassed training and training skills, as well as their logistical abilities. One particularly interesting finding is the tendency among well-reputed companies to offer services that normally have been regarded core functions of the organization. These would include e.g. the establishment and running of DDR programs along with newer areas of attention in which private actors have very little tradition, such as Democracy Transition Assistance Programs. These developments are arguably testimony of the adapting abilities of the private sector and in this case an intergovernmental organization such as the UN might not even detect its own need for assistance until it is readily available.

The development in service menus described above indicates a flexible private security and military industry, which has adapted to a market represented by organizations such as the UN. A service offer tailored to the needs of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations should indicate the validity of proposition $P_4$, which states that the industry’s responsiveness to market fluctuations have contributed to it being hired by the UN.

7.2 Re-branding for market shares

As the private security and military industry has been surrounded by much controversy and has attracted a large amount of sensationalist press, it is clear that in order to expand into new market segments and attract additional business within organizations such as the UN, some of the preponderant perceptions of the industry should be altered. The fundamental scepticism of many member states towards contracting out former security and military functions should also not be underestimated. The mercenary association, which has lingered with the industry, is in particular seen as a hindrance to accomplishment of the potentials of the industry, and the disposal of this association is crucial to the entrance onto the vast market that the UN does represent. In this section the sanitizing variable, displayed in the lower part of the second analytical chart (Figure 2.2), will be used to explain the qualitative changes that the industry has submitted itself to in order to accomplish greater market shares.

7.2.1 The International Peace Operations Association as a re-branding locus

The conveniently Washington DC located PMC/PSC interest organization, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), appears a reflection of the efforts made by large parts of the industry towards changing public associations with the business. The association itself
states on its homepage that among its core purposes is to contribute to “raise the profile and acceptance of its members in the world foreign policy community” (IPOA homepage 01.12.04). Certainly, some of IPOA’s founding members could use their profile to be altered somewhat. One of the initial members of the association was Sandline International (Brooks interview 2005), which at the time of joining IPOA was having a rather rough time facing the accusations of breaking the UN arms embargo to Sierra Leone in 1998. Apart from providing its members with a connection to peace operations through its name, the association is, in practice, also an advocacy agency for the industry in general, including for non-members. According to IPOA president Dough Brooks, while some companies find the member fee a threshold of actually joining the association, many company agents express their support and appreciation for the work done by the association for the industry in general (Brooks interview 2005). One of the most visible efforts made by IPOA to reinvent the private security and military industry, is the recent renaming of the entire industry. Whereas IPOA until very recently used the term “military provider industry”, Brooks and the association now insists on the industry to be termed “the peace and stability industry”, a name which does little to cover up the ambitions of the industry. Whereas the industry has boomed in the wake of the offensive operations undertaken outside of the auspices of the UN, such as the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan’ and ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, commonly termed “stability operations”, the peacekeeping market is yet to be fully conquered. When asked about this sudden ‘metamorphosis’, Brooks holds that the name was created in order to better cover the range of services offered by the IPOA member companies, which range from medical services, logistics, security provision, military training, construction etc (Brooks interview 2005). Recently Security Support Solutions (commonly named 3S), a supplier of armoured vehicles and other protective equipment has also joined the association (Mike Pearson, Director of 3S, personal communication). Brooks further asserts that the alternative name would be “companies that work in conflict/ post-conflict environments” (Brooks interview 2005). The target customer of the industry has hence clearly evolved from militaries (as reflected in the associations’ earlier preferred term ‘military service providers’) to ‘anyone performing peace and stability operations’. The market segment thus has expanded into including intergovernmental organizations like NATO, the EU, the AU, and of course the UN.

85 The member fee is currently $5000 for logistic companies and $ 15,000 for security companies (ibid).
86 The term first appeared on the IPOA web pages as well as other material produced by the association in early 2005.
87 See e.g. the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s homepage.
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that the new name is strikingly similar to the Pentagon think tank the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, which acquired its name in 2003, association with which would not harm IPOA.\(^88\)

Other efforts are also being made to promote a more ‘humanitarian’ image of the industry. One striking example was put to the fore in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami disaster as IPOA launched a ‘Peace and Stability Industry Tsunami Relief Effort’ campaign, detecting “an opportunity to show unity and to make a positive statement in a truly meaningful way” (IPOA webpage January 2005). In relation to the destructions of the hurricane Katrina in the US, the association has also apparently taken initiative: “As an association of companies specializing in activities that alleviate human suffering all over the world we have discussed with our membership how we can best help” (IPOA home page 25.09.2005). Furthermore, the IPOA home page states that their members provide “services related to conflict alleviation and avoidance, post-conflict reconstruction, and emergency humanitarian rescue worldwide”. Such an outline conveniently misses the additional services related to business segments, such as protection for extraction companies as well as services sold to despotic regimes such as Equatorial Guinea etc.\(^89\) When confronted with the fact that in many cases only a small part of the business of member companies actually relates to peace or stability operations, Brooks defends the name by arguing that as long as a company does some peace and stability operations related work, it can be considered part of the industry. The consequences of such an argumentation/logic could however, if stretched far enough be that a range of far-flung service and goods providers would have to be included in the ‘peace and stability industry’, a logic which Brooks himself is aware of (Brooks interview 2005). It is therefore reasonable to assume that such a re-naming primarily is designed to link public associations of the industry with concepts such as humanitarianism, benevolence, altruism, and peace versus associations of mercenarism, cynicism and profit in order to achieve the desired inclusion into e.g. the UN market. The renaming represents a carefully designed disassociation with the mercenary label which has haunted the industry and which has caused customers such as the UN to question the legitimacy of the industry.

\(^88\) The former name was the US Army Peacekeeping institute.
\(^89\) MPRI in 2001 was engaged in a contract to train the Equatorial Guinean Coast Guard (Silverstein 2001).
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While the US-led war in Iraq currently is boosting the demand for PMC and PSC services, rebranding appears a longer-term investment that is meant to secure business prospects in the long run. For an organization such as IPOA to maintain focus on the peace and stability segments of the market is apparently rewarding. IPOA has had a significant expansion in its member base during the past year or so. While in May 2004 IPOA consisted of nine executive member companies and one affiliated member, in May 2005, the association counted 14 executives and one “provisional” company (IPOA website 2004 and 2005). By 2005 the association had lost two member companies and acquired eight (the one affiliated company, O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt was acquired by Armor Holding). The two companies lost were Sandline International, which closed down due to lack of corporate confidence after a couple of infamous and highly controversial projects. The other was AirScan, a company specializing in airborne surveillance and security operations, which according to Brooks left the association for its own reasons, but apparently is welcomed back (Brooks, personal communication, May 2005).  

The eight new member companies include some high profiled PMCs/PSCs like Blackwater USA, Hart, Triple Canopy and SOC-SMG in addition to companies such as Security Support Solutions (3S), Evergreen International Aviation, Medical Support Solutions and Groupe EHC (a French security company listed as a provisional member).

Considering the effort made by IPOA to “raise the profile and acceptance of association members in the world foreign policy community” (IPOA website 01.12.05), the rapid expansion of IPOA can be interpreted as a sign of companies realizing the worth of a ‘healthy’ image. Some of the recent members of the association could use some profile work and image polishing while others appear to be opting for more international attention and market shares. Blackwater has received some negative publicity on a few occasions relating to e.g. Blackwater president Gary Jackson in an electronic newsletter stating that “actually it is ‘fun’ to shoot some people” (Townsend 2005). Triple Canopy on its part, is a new company which had much of it’s site security contracts reduced in Iraq (Isenberg 2004: 98), while Groupe EHC is a French company likely to be opting for market shares in the wake of the booming business originating from the war in Iraq and the Afghanistan reconstruction efforts.

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90 There are indications that the status of AirScan is somewhat undetermined; their webpage does no longer provide any information whatsoever. PMCs and PSCs sometimes appear to disappear from the arena for shorter periods, sometimes due to lack of business, rearrangements, rebranding efforts, or due to being in a process of merging with other companies.
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Brooks himself asserts that the association has attracted new members due to the Code of Conduct having “caught on” among potential clients, an effect he expects to bring in further member companies (Brooks, personal communication, May 2005).

7.3 Regulation – a tool for legitimization?

“To put it bluntly, the cheese industry is better regulated than the private military industry”


The private security and military industry is currently evaded from any international regulatory regime or international legislation. According to Holmqvist there is little hope of any such measures to be established sometime soon (Holmqvist 2005: 45).

7.3.1 The legal limbo

On a national level, only the US and South Africa have regulation concerning the export of military services, while Great Britain has embarked upon the process through a Green Paper, but has so far failed to produce any legislation (Holmqvist 2005: 50). In the case of Iraq, contractors are effectively granted immunity from local prosecution under CPA Order 17 (issued in June 2003 and renewed on 27 June 2004 to remain in force for the duration of the mandate authorizing the Multinational Force) (CPA 2004: section 4). However, contractors working for the US Department of Defence can in theory be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (House of Representatives, Public Law 106-778), known as MEJA. To this date, however, there are apparently no reports of PSC/PMC personnel having been prosecuted under MEJA. Company employees working for any other agency, or companies of other nationalities, are subject to the eventuality of a prosecution by the host nation or, possibly in that contractor’s particular home nation. In practice this has meant that PSC and PMC employees essentially have been in a ‘legal limbo’ in states such as Iraq and many other disrupted states. While lack of formal accountability could at times work out to a company’s advantage, it certainly has its price in terms of the industry’s legitimacy.
7.3.2 Lack of accountability

The fact that apparently not one criminal charge has been charged against any of the approximately 20,000 security contractors working in Iraq over the past two years, while the military justice system has investigated and prosecuted hundreds of soldiers in Iraq, (The News and Observer January 9th 2005), lends few signs of any accountability in terms of PSC/PMCs operating in Iraq. These conditions are confirmed by the Director of the Private Security Association of Iraq, Lawrence Peter, who cannot even recall one single reprimand of a PSC employee in Iraq during the past year (Frontline Documentary 2005). The sharp difference between the status of soldiers and private personnel was illustrated by the handling of the Abu Graib scandal. Several soldiers have been prosecuted and sentenced, while none of the implicated CACI and TITAN contractors faced prosecution despite the fact that these contractors allegedly were involved in an estimated 36 per cent of the proven abuse incidents at the interrogation facility (Singer 2004: 13). Brooks testifies to the fact that improving accountability “makes good business sense, because potential clients are much more likely to hire firms with records of proper behaviour” (Neff and Price 2005). The lacking regulation has thus not served to bestow the industry with a genuine legitimacy. Since some degree of legitimacy is a prerequisite for UN contracting, as well as for contracting with most developed states, the industry has become much more focused on improving its legitimacy base. The opting for regulation on part of individual companies as well as collectively through IPOA can indeed be seen as a bid for legitimacy. As an illustration of the attention to the subject, Brooks himself is currently working on a PhD relating to the regulation of the industry (Brooks interview 2005). Regulation would in fact help keep the legitimate segments of the industry from the less serious ones and help potential customers choosing business partners. To the serious reputable segments of the industry, regulation would then arguably serve as a stamp of approval.

7.3.3 Self-regulation for legitimacy

In the absence of international regulation, the industry has embarked upon its own regulation. IPOA has drafted a code of conduct compulsive to their member companies stressing e.g.

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91 Iraq is in many respects the ‘laboratory’ of how legal issues concerning security contractors are to be dealt with. Therefore, the privatized elements of the Iraq war are likely to stir additional debate in its aftermath and most likely provoke some changes in terms of regulatory measures.
member companies’ adherence to international human rights protocols and conventions (IPOA code of conduct 2005). The code appears however, to be more of an advertisement tool to company managers for IPOA membership, than a guide for field staff. Additionally, it is likely to be helpful in that IPOA have something to show for in discussion with NGOs and other actors that might worry about the residing lack of regulation of the industry. Brooks affirms that the Code received no resistance or efforts of amendment by the member companies when it was introduced to them, because they would individually already have a set of established rules to go by, which were in fact stricter than the IPOA code (Brooks interview 2005). IPOA is apparently also working on some financial penalty arrangements that would be used to reinforce the message of the Code (ibid). Whether IPOA could muster the needed authority among its members to make such an initiative assert to more than another PR trick, is uncertain, at best. The role of the association seems to be limited to an outward advocacy role, rather than as one with much leverage on the day-to-day dealings of its member companies. Regulation is thus seen by the segments of the business opting for business in the international realm, such as UN engagement, as a very important door opener.

7.3.4 Other impediments to legitimacy

Disassociation with mercenarism is another crucial aspect in terms of legitimacy. As long as PSCs and PMCs are not covered by international regulations and there are ambiguities in terms of how they are to be handled in terms of international law, they will not be fully excluded from the perceived mercenary realm. One of the problems here is that the legal definition of the term ‘mercenary’ is out of date by failing to fully cover contemporary versions of mercenarism and therefore does little good to companies seeking to distance themselves from that label.

Industry advocates are also eager to remove practical impediments to the alignment of the industry to the mainstream business community. Arrangements such as insurance and liability issues are currently worked on. In particular, the question of liability is described by Lt Col. La Brie, Senior Staff Officer Contracts Canadian National Defence, as an especially difficult

92 Triple Canopy, Hart, DynCorp are among the companies with their own code of conduct (Triple Canopy home page, Hart home page, DynCorp home page).

93 This is seems to have been brought to interest especially in the aftermath of the killing and lynching of four Blackwater employees in Fallujah in March 2004, which led the families of the victims to file lawsuits against Blackwater for fraud and wrongful deaths (Neff and Price 2005).
arrangement to solve on a general basis (Conference discussion), such arrangements would go both ways in serving both the industry as well as their employer. However, any arrangements that will serve to align the PSC/PMC industry to just any other industry serve their legitimizing purpose in that it would decrease mystery and sensationalism that still surround the industry, reduce risks, and assure a more even profit base.

The intrinsic relationship between legitimacy and profit is acknowledged by Doug Brooks, as he asserts that “the increasing number of public sector contracts will result in legitimization” and that “the key to accessing these future international contracts will be to develop rapidly stellar reputations for efficiency, ethics and humanitarianism” (Brooks 2001: 141). UN cooperation is hence beneficial in two ways; not only does it represent a huge market potential in itself, but association with the UN agencies, programmes and funds is no doubt a way for the companies to enhance their reputation given the political and moral salience of the organization. Such association will also provide a door opener to other market segments such as to individual state militaries in countries still sceptical of widespread outsourcing.

As set out in P3 it seems the determined focus on the more acceptable normative outlook of the industry has been successful. The continuous efforts to sanitize the industry’s image have led to improved moral affiliations of the industry, which in turn have contributed to it becoming a viable option for remedying the shortcomings of the United Nations identified in chapter 5.

7.4 The private security and military industry’s aspirations for UN work

“The consortium is prepared to offer a greater degree of transparency and accountability than any UN peacekeeping operation has EVER provided. The consortium members fully expect to be held at a higher standard than typical UN operations and are committed to earning the confidence of all concerned parties with professionalism and responsiveness” (Brooks 2003: 4)

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94 La Brie is responsible for the operational level management of the Canadian Contractor Augmentation Program for all Canadian Forces deployed including Iraq and Afghanistan (Conference material, available from the author).
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The UN represents an expanding marketplace for the PSC/PMC industry. The UN peacekeeping budget alone is expected to reach close to $5 billion in 2005/2006 (UN Information Service 2005), while UN agencies in 2004 procured more than $276 million on air transportation services, $21 million on airfield operations and $12 million on security equipment and services (UN Procurements Service website). The industry is well aware of the market which the organization represents as confirmed by most industry representatives spoken to in relation to this thesis (e.g. Mayo of Triple Canopy, Lee of PAE, Pearson of 3S, and Brooks of IPOA). ArmorGroup also identifies the UN as a source for profit in its 2005 Preliminary Results Report: “There are many billions of dollars pledged via the United Nations to assist Sudan as soon as the internal situation stabilises sufficiently. ArmorGroup is in a prime situation to assist in all these areas” (ArmorGroup 2005: 5).

7.4.1 The UN, the difficult client

Whereas the mere size of the existing (and potential) UN market most certainly is attractive to the industry, the UN is apparently, however, far from an ideal client. According to Brooks, head of the International Peace Operations Associations, some companies allegedly have a problem engaging with the UN directly, “due to hassles with contracts, bad payment records, bias towards US companies, inefficient bureaucracy etc.” and therefore prefer to be hired for UN service by member states (Brooks, personal communication, Jan. 2005). Mike Pearson of 3S, a company that so far has not worked with the UN, confirms that there are rumours in the industry of the organization being a challenging client, but that nonetheless, 3S will be making an effort to get UN contracts in the future (Pearson, personal conversation 11.07.05). Richard Lee of PAE, a company which currently runs six airports in DRC for the UN mission in the country affirms that delays in payment sometimes forces companies to take up loans in order to keep up while they are awaiting payment. Still, Lee says, companies like his is aware of what they are going to with the UN and still pursue UN contracts because “there is a lot of business and they like this kind of business” (Lee, personal conversation June 13, 2005). Though the organization might be a challenging client to have, the main hindrance appears to be to manoeuvre your company in a position to actually be considered for UN contracts in the first place. The UN Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) and UNDP have developed a 21-pages ‘guide’ to doing business with the UN system, a document that lists

95 ICI of Oregon allegedly belongs to this category according to Brooks.
among its advice: “don’t give up too easily” (IAPSO 2004: 11). The US UN Association further has developed a five-step approach of how to do business with the UN in which establishing relationships with UN officials and procurement officers is heavily stressed. Although potential suppliers should register in supplier roosters to guarantee “equal consideration in the selection process”, it is nonetheless stated, “many field officers do not rely on supplier rosters, but select bidders based solely on personal relationships” (UNA-USA webpage). The apparent lack of coherence and perhaps predictability to procurement procedures makes soliciting a contract with the UN a time-consuming and complicated process. Mike Pearson Director of 3S, affirms that his company has consulted various UN personnel, other suppliers etc. on how to best approach the UN (personal conversation July 11, 2005).

The UN does keep a list of approved service suppliers, which is updated every year. The criteria for becoming listed on this apparently advantageous list, appears however, far less streamlined than one should expect. When asked specifically about these criteria IAPSO officials refer to a 13-step online registration procedure, which will be evaluated by individual agencies. Apparently the agencies evaluate potential business partners from rather undefined criteria: “Most agencies will be concerned with the types of goods/services being offered by the supplier and whether or not these are relevant, whether the supplier has experience in doing business on an international basis, if the company is financially stable and can provide trade references etc. (Kerry Kassow, UN Global Marketplace, personal communication 17 Aug., 2005).” While there is little controversy invoked in these cited criterions, there appears to be equally little systematic coherence or substance. Apparently, personal judgements play a rather significant role in this selection process. The lack of systematic coherence and procedures thus seems to be a common feature in the UN’s procurement procedures, making it increasingly difficult for companies to gain ground commercially with the organization solely based on comparative advantages.

7.4.2 Self-invitations for UN work

In spite of the admission obstacles to the UN market, quite a few companies are willing to make the extra effort. Some companies also go beyond ordinary advertisement and lobby measures. The first company to suggest a UN operation should be outsourced to them in total or in part was Executive Outcomes, which suggested it intervene in Rwanda during the
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genocide in 1994. According to internal firm plans EO, could have had armed troops on the ground in 14 days and fully deployed 1500 personnel, supported by its own air and fire support, in six weeks (Singer 2003a: 186). The concept of the operation would have been the creation of “security islands” that would have been used to provide safe havens for refugees and disaster relief. The estimated costs for a 6-month operation would have been $600,000 per day ($150 million total), while the UN operation ended up costing approximately $3 million per day (ibid). While EO had a reputation that (for the most part) was incompatible with UN work, other companies have emerged with less stained track records.96 IPOA has on behalf of some of its member companies, drafted suggestions for how these companies combined could handle parts of the UN operations in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2004 and in DRC (MONUC) in 2003.97 The proposal made for supporting the MONUC mandate is a quite ambitious one despite the fact that it is described “modest” in the Operational Concept Paper (IPOA 2003), while the UNMIS proposal (IPOA 2004a) appears more limited in scale and scope.

The proposal for “empowering MONUC” to become “a UN success story” (IPOA 2003: 2-3) includes five of IPOA’s member companies: PAE, ICI of Oregon, MPRI, AirScan International and Task International (the last two of which are no longer members). These companies were envisioned to help establish and maintain a so-called “Security Curtain”, a 50km-wide demilitarized zone in the Eastern Congo, which would serve as a safe haven for internally displaced persons by providing high-tech aerial surveillance, effective rapid deployment units, assist in setting up a disarmament program that would implement the disarmament and subsequent protection of fighting factions, and run a training program for a future Congolese gendarme (IPOA 2003: 4).

Lt. Col. Bjørn Robert Dahl of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment describes the ‘Details of Operations’ section included in both proposals as indeed very little detailed.98 However, it is clear that the services the IPOA companies presumably could render MONUC cover almost the entire range of services detected as insufficiently taken care of from within

96 EO was reportedly once deployed by UN personnel for emergency evacuation services in Sierra Leone during 1996-97 (Pech 1999: 93).
97 IPOA has also prepared other proposals for PKO assistance.
98 Lt. Col. Dahl was asked by the author to consider the proposals from a professional military angle. He has commented on the two papers in part on a general basis, that is, without having extensive knowledge of operational details and scale, and in part based on personal empirical experience.
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the organization in chapter 3-5. In terms of security provision the proposal covers protection of civilians under imminent threat; protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; protection of MONUC personnel; protection for international humanitarian operations, and emergency evacuation capabilities for key personnel in crisis situations and a 24-hour rapid rescue service for MONUC and NGOs (IPOA 2003: 5-6). The proposal includes training of Congolese forces for border protection functions; however, there is no mention of any security training for UN or UN-related personnel, nor supply of security advisors. Otherwise the MONUC proposal comes a long way in covering the full range of security duties. It is also noticeable that IPOA takes into account having “forces” on the ground as it proposes to protect civilians under imminent threat, and not least, “deter, or if necessary, interdict armed factions undermining the UN mandate” (ibid: 5). In an extremely violent conflict such as the one in the Ituri province in Eastern Congo, one would have to infer that such actions would fall little short of combat, making the proposal increasingly controversial. The use of these companies for offensive assignments will necessarily have implications what regards international law and the Geneva Convention in particular, as private military/security personnel seems to fall in between the established categories, conditions which do not seem to be taken into consideration in the proposals.

Furthermore, the MONUC proposal covers contributions to the carrying out of a comprehensive demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. The program would include complex tasks such as disarmament of the numerous militias and other irregular forces present in that conflict, and in particular the Interahamwe and ex-Far, thought to be instrumental in the Rwandan genocide (Berdal 2001: 69), “in a peacefully and orderly fashion” (IPOA 2003: 5), disarming of civilians, cataloguing, removing and immediately destroying all weapons retrieved as well as ensuring that disarmed factions are protected from reprisals (ibid). While DDR services is an area where private actors can be expected to expand (7.1 above), the proposal with regard to DDR seems to be in line with the rest of the proposal as described by Lt Col. Dahl as somewhat superficial and not very well considered in that it seems to underestimate the degree of difficulty and the scale of the suggested assignments (Dahl, personal correspondence June 22, 2005).
When asked why ArmorGroup, an IPOA company which contracts with the UN on a regular basis, was not among the companies behind the Congo proposal, John Millar, the company’s Director of Business Development answered:

“We do not see our company as an offensive company or company that can replace military force other than for purely non-military protective services such as say protecting humanitarian resupply in a sufficiently permissive environment. There are many services and contracts that we will not consider, and we do not advocate that private security companies are a replacement for military personnel” (Millar, e-mail interview July 4, 2005).

Evidently, ArmorGroup has rendered the proposal too controversial to go along with based on the envisioned use of force included in the proposal.

In terms of support functions the proposal contains the establishment of communication networks, medical evacuations, and general logistics for both NGOs and humanitarian organizations. The consortium also proposes to carry out demining activities as well as ordnance disposal operations and to provide 24-hour medical facilities (IPOA 2003: 6), which can be categorized as expert functions. The support and expert functions are less controversial services in general, but nonetheless demanding.

The total costs of such a deployment would presumably amount to between $ 100 and 200 million annually, providing MONUC expanded to its authorized size of 8,700. The estimate then totals 10 to 20 per cent of the total cost ($ 1 billion) of the current mission (ibid). IPOA further suggests its fee to be provided as a proportion of the United States’ normal 27% contribution to the MONUC budget. This last aspect is interesting in light of the industry’s concern with the UN as a client, and also since TASK international, a specialized security firm utilizing primarily Nepalese Gurkha veterans (ibid: 3), is a British firm (TASK international website). The cost estimate can only be described as extremely rough, and appears rather unfounded (Dahl, personal correspondence June 22, 2005).

A somewhat less ambitious proposal was launched in 2004 for the UN Mission in Sudan. No offensive support is offered on the offset, even though the UNMIS mandate does in fact
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contain a Chapter VII component. The likelihood of extensive enforcement being required in the Sudan mission is however not impending. The proposal for UNMIS is very brief and contains a very limited amount of information as to what exactly the companies are offering. Roughly it is stated that the companies (in this case there is no listing of the actual companies included in the proposal) would provide “critical aerial intelligence and mobility capabilities along with essential logistical support and construction capabilities” (IPOA 2004a: 1). These services thus belong to the expert and support categories of services. No security services are offered; on the contrary, IPOA in this case bases the proposal on the 3,000 UN peacekeepers to provide base security (ibid). The proposal also asserts that “base locations would be made available and would not require extensive reconstruction”, an assumption that, according to Dahl, very likely would spoil the plan at the offset (Dahl, personal communication) 22.06.05). Sudan being geographically the biggest country on the continent, the lack of infrastructure and the provision of only 3,000 peacekeepers would thus render these two assumptions rather unrealistic, as peacekeepers would be needed for other tasks but base security. Base security, on the other hand, would perhaps be a more reasonable task to contract out (ibid). Curiously, IPOA presents no offer to perform the “base reconstruction” referred to in the proposal, even though IPOA member company PAE has a division specializing in camp construction and maintenance (PAE advertisement material).

In general, the two IPOA concept papers appear to be more for commercial purposes than a source for extensive information for UN mission planners. The fact that these proposals are readily available on the Internet also seems to support this conclusion. According to Dahl, some of the formulations in the Congo paper would most likely have negative effects on mission officials, as they display a rather arrogant attitude by both blatantly questioning UN skills and praising the consortium’s skills (Dahl, personal communication 22.06.05).

Blackwater USA, a rather high profiled PMC, is another company to have launched the idea of their company performing peace operations duties. Eric Prince, Blackwater CEO, in February 2005 proposed the company could put together a “quick-reaction force” to provide security for NGOs and to “deal with” the Janjaweed militia in Sudan’s western region of Darfur (Hodge 2005). Such a force would be put under UN, NATO or US control, but would be supplied, managed and lead by Blackwater (ibid).
These kinds of suggestions echoes the EO suggestion for Rwanda by in an obvious manner, crossing the threshold of offensiveness of which most companies currently working with the UN tends to steer clear of. Crossing the threshold would have implications for the already porous dividing line between mercenarism and security work, which most companies eagerly work to uphold. Initiatives such as the Blackwater proposal will most likely not serve to win them many UN contracts, on the contrary, UN contracts are more likely to go to companies that stay clear of offering offensive services, such as ArmorGroup and others. It is interesting to note that according to Appendix I, it is the companies with fewest UN contracts, or more commonly, none at all, which tend to launch uninvited proposals for how they could make a UN operation work. As evident from figure 7.1, ArmorGroup and its predecessor DSL is the company most often awarded UN contracts while PAE is represented in 16 per cent of the contracts in table AI.1 and Appendix I. PAE was among the companies willing to take part in the MONUC proposal, however, the company specializes in logistics and support services, which constitute the uncontroversial elements of the proposal. None of the companies envisioned for enforcement actions in the proposal are included in the ‘other’ category.

Figure 7.1: The distribution of companies in UN contracts as recorded in Appendix I
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The distribution of UN contracts on IPOA member companies versus non-IPOA member companies reveals a striking predominance of IPOA companies in the UN realm. Figure 7.2 illustrates the balance of the two categories.

![Figure 7.2: IPOA member companies vs. non-IPOA companies percentage of UN contracts](image)

Companies which subscribe to the IPOA code of conduct, companies which term regards themselves parts of the ‘peace and stability industry’ in stead of the ‘military provider industry’ or the ‘private security/military industry’ thus received 62.5 per cent of the total contracts recorded for this thesis. Even though the numbers of contracts operated with is rather low, the tendency cannot however be dismissed.

### 7.5 Conclusions

Evidently, little precludes the industry’s efforts to renovate its character and that way to justify and secure its future client base. Quite a few companies have come a long way in accommodating to the normative and de facto requirements of the UN and there seems to be a general tendency to make an effort to shed any historical ties to illegitimate business among the strata of more well reputed companies. While some companies enjoy more success than others with their rebranding processes, most companies appear to join the trend and opt for images that inspire confidence, responsibility, and accountability. Although there are few guarantees that these marketing efforts pay off in every case, developments in the industry suggest the selection of services will not decrease in relevance to organizations like the UN.
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Looking at the total share of the contracts awarded to PSCs/PMCs by the United Nations, P5 appears largely supported. The efforts to build a profile fitted to the target market appears to have paid off and the result is a group of companies that appears an alternative source of security, logistics and specialist personnel needed to answer to some of the internal shortcomings of the United Nations.
8. Concluding remarks

“The United Nations once dealt only with Governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving Governments, international organizations, the business community and civil society. In today’s world we depend on each other.”

- Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General (UN webpage 26.09.05).

In the current period of increasing proliferation of transnational threats to peace and security the relevance of the UN should be as high as ever. Nevertheless, the organization is at present facing a broad range of challenges related to its future role in the world community. The difficult negotiations of the World Summit 14-16 September 2005, is only the latest testimony of the increasingly difficult climate facing the UN. At the same time, the private sector’s role in security has burgeoned. A growing transnational market for force now exists alongside, and intertwined with, national and inter-governmental forces. The private security and military industry has recently undergone both quantitative and qualitative changes that have enabled them to be hired by commercial companies, national governments and international organizations like the United Nations on a global scale. This thesis has attempted to shed light on the UN’s actual use of private security and military companies by providing systemized accounts of such use, as well as a combined explanatory framework for why the UN has come to depend on these companies in a range of its missions. In order to do so, 32 reports of UN contracts with PSCs/PMCs were collected and categorized. Three main service categories were singled out as the ones mostly made use of by the UN: security services, logistic and support services, and services requiring expert competencies. To explain the use of these services, five propositions were drawn up based on the analytical framework presented in chapter 2:

$P_1$: Enhanced expectations to the comprehensiveness of UN action have contributed to the organization’s deployment of private security and private military companies.

$P_2$: Radicalization of operating environments has contributed to the UN deploying private security and private military companies.
Concluding remarks

P₃: Inadequate internal capacity has contributed to the UN deploying private security and private military companies.

P₄: Pools of available trained personnel have contributed to the organization’s deployment of private security and private military companies.

P₅: A credible private security and military industry has contributed to the organization’s deployment of private security and military companies.

In the corresponding five analyzing chapters all five propositions were found to have validity, however to different degrees. While enhanced expectations to the UN and radicalization of operating environment have worked to deteriorate the preconditions for UN missions, the organization has had serious limitations regarding internal capacity to deal with the existing workload, and even less so with the challenges placed by new and complicated tasks. Pools of available personnel have enabled the industry to become a booming business, but have not directly lead the UN to use PSCs and PMCs. The relevance of P₄ was then questioned to some degree in the analysis. It was subsequently regarded more of an underlying factor than an explanatory factor in the UN context. Sanitizing efforts resulting in an altered character of the industry, both in terms of de facto service offer as well as normative appearance were confirmed to have a considerable effect. The companies that have subscribed to these efforts tend to frequent the UN supplier base and the list of contracts in Appendix I, while other companies appear used in a more ad hoc manner. Although each of these factors individually was to found have contributed to explaining the UN’s use of private security and military companies, they need to be seen in aggregate terms in order to fully explain the phenomenon. The interaction of these explanatory factors have worked to have mutual reinforcement, and although not excluding other factors, appear to largely have provided a clarification of the UN’s deployment of PSCs and PMCs during the past decade and a half.

In the current international climate it has become essential for the UN to evolve beyond exclusively working through government channels, and to discover new ways of improving its missions. A number of private security and military companies have contributed to enhancing levels of proficiency and efficiency of UN operations in the past. In some cases where they were not deployed their use might have benefited the operation and populations
affected by conflict. However, continued or increased UN reliance on PSCs and PMCs entails several concerns.

8.1 A double-edged solution

Individual member states such as the UK, The US and South Africa have embarked upon the examination of legislation and regulation of the private security industry. The ICRC has admitted using PSCs and PMCs in “exceptional circumstances” and has consequently worked out plans for a more systematic approach to establish dialogues with the industry (ICRC 2004). The UN however, has taken no initiative to come to terms with the many problematic aspects of PSC/PMC presence in conflicts. There is a growing need for the UN to start discussing its own use of PSCs and PMCs; only then will it be possible to fully disclose the background for their PSC/PMC service demand. The current strategy of concealment only works to mystify the practice, and not least to add to present perceptions of a biased and opaque business culture within the organization. The UN then needs to develop coherent standards and criterions for companies to comply with, in order to qualify for contracts with the organization. These would include adherence to international humanitarian law and track records of individual adherence to the same standards (Holmqvist 2005: 46). The disclosed nature of UN PSC/PMC contracting needs to be altered. Efforts to make the practice more transparent would have the effect of increasing accountability and would imply a relaxation of the principle of ‘client confidentiality’ in UN contexts, which effectively blocks discussions of companies’ roles and conduct in UN operations (ibid).\textsuperscript{99} Publication of rules of engagement and contract scope would in the end only constitute further details of the UN mandates. In this connection issues concerning chain of command would also need to be resolved. There is thus a need not only for the UN to tackle the issue of its own use, but also to invite to further debate on the conditions on which private means of security are used by member states within conflict zones in general. The UN should develop specific guidelines for humanitarian use of PSCs and PMCs and the corresponding tools to monitor them. Such guidelines would serve both humanitarians and the industry by simplifying the contracting in each case and assuring adherence to international humanitarian law.

The prospects for international regulation are limited by the UN’s use of PSCs/PMCs. It appears that the organization is not willing to deal with their own use until there is

\textsuperscript{99} Client confidentiality is practiced throughout the industry.
international regulation (and thus some degree of legitimacy) on the table, the paradox thus resides with the fact that the UN is often pointed out as the vehicle for such regulation either through the office of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

There are other problems related to the privatization of security highly relevant to the UN as an agent for international security. While member states prioritize which missions to support by its internal interests, increased reliance of privatized security suggests that the problem of uneven provision of security be unresolved, or possibly accentuated through UN deployment of PSCs and PMCs as it could lead to a more dispersed and differentiated provision of security and services. Such problems were evident during the NATO operation in Croatia, where MPRI was hired to train the new Croatian army, an exercise financed by a number of Muslim countries including Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Mandel 2001: 142). In a UN context differing cleavages between member states in such scenarios carry the potential of undermining the broadening of the security community of the organization. The eventuality of member states taking advantage of PSC/PMC endorsement to a greater degree should also be kept in mind. As pointed out by Avant, rather than being a tool for enhancing UN operations, PSCs and PMCs could become a means through which individual states or organizations could accomplish goals abroad without the involvement of the UN (Avant 2004: 157).

Privatization has its costs. Outsourcing tasks formerly taken care of by the organization requires resources in order to administer contracts and contract compliance. The organization has, as mentioned above, already certain limitations to its internal procurement arrangements. The satisfactory handling of sensitive PSC/PMC contracts is thus likely to pose a considerable burden on this system. "Establishing personal relationships with the procurement officers in the field" should hardly be the continued guideline for PSCs and PMCs seeking to do business with the UN.¹⁰⁰ The shortcomings of UN contracting routines are illustrated by the listing of Titan Corp. on its January 2005 List of Approved Suppliers. Titan Corp. employees were e.g. central in the abuse scandal related to the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2004.¹⁰¹ The UN has also been known to contract so-called ‘double dippers’ on a regular basis. These

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¹⁰⁰ See section 7.4 above.
¹⁰¹ The company also happen to be under investigation by the US Justice Department Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for bribery charges in five countries, according to the US NGO CorpWatch homepage.
Concluding remarks

129 companies are accused of having profited from previously producing the landmines they are now being paid to remove (Sherman 2005). The apparent lack of contracting proficiency holds few promises for the current transparency and management of PSC/PMC contracts in the UN system.

8.2 Prospects and realities

The private security and military industry is not a temporary phenomenon. The industry’s exceptional expansion at the commencement of the 21st century has been in the realm of industrialized state endeavours, and is likely to continue along that path. Although segments of the industry will continue to cater primarily to governments and non-state actors in developing countries, there are vast market potentials in relation to developed countries, both domestically and internationally. Streamlining and restructuring of national defences are producing niches in the market for the private market to fill. The demonstrated ability of the PSC/PMC industry to adapt to market fluctuations suggests that the service menus are likely to be equally streamlined. While the recent uncontrolled boom in relation to the war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq has produced an uneven and unripe industry, the industry in all likelihood now faces a stabilization period, which will dry up the industry segments that fail to comply with normative and practical standards. In the absence of international regulation companies are vulnerable to reputational shifts, and in the process of maturation, the private security and military industry scene is likely to face certain replacements.

Illustrated by the US Senate appropriations bill quoted in the Introduction chapter to this thesis, admittance to national markets for PSC/PMC services is closely linked to an expanded admittance to the UN market. Little also indicates that the organization will face a decreased need for PSC/PMC services in the future. The current international climate does not seem to favour the UN in terms of contributions of skilled personnel. The fact that the most powerful member states appear to regard the organization an instrument always possible to ‘fall back on’, does not hold much promise of an immediate improvement in developed member state

102 The South African company Mechem and the Zimbabwean Mine Tech are companies accused of ‘double-dipping’. Mechem has been contracted by the UN agencies on numerous occasions: By the UNDP’s Mine Action Capacity Building Programme in Eritrea in 2004 (UNMEE 2004), by the UN Office for Project Services in Sudan in 2004, by MONUC in DRC in 2002, by the UN Oil for Food Programme in Northern Iraq in 1997 (Landmine Monitor Report 2004). Mine Tech has, according to its website, been hired by the UN in places like Croatia and Kosovo (Mine Tech web page 26.09.05).
Concluding remarks

Contributions of support, expert or security personnel. On the other hand, the optimism on part of the UN regarding personnel contributions also appears to have its limitations. The new security system, which includes the establishment of a UN Directorate of Security\footnote{The new Directorate of Security was formally established as of January 2005.}, is estimated to cost $97.1 million, including one-time requirements of $29.6 million, which is to be funded to a greater extend through the regular budget (UN SG 2004b: §16). Table 8.1 illustrates the increased focus on organizational security as an alternative of relying on donations and extra-budgetary sources.

Table 8.1 UN Security spending as part of the new security system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular budget for the biennium 2004-2005: requirements by object of expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Thousands of United States dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Object of expenditure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other staff costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants and experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General operating expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants and contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Secretary-General 2004b: Annex II)

The increase in spending on security sector posts amounts to 48 per cent. There will be 778 new posts emerging from the establishment of the Directorate of Security (ibid: Annex IV), the distribution of which will grant 309 positions to the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) and 112 to the Field Security Operations (the former UNSECOORD) (UN SG 2004b: Annex VIII). It can thus be concluded that a reasonable share of the new post will be directed towards fieldwork, or as is often the case, to the administration thereof. The most interesting resource growth however, is found in the increase in “contractual services” and in “consultants and experts”. The expenses related to security contracts are estimated to increase with 110 per cent in the biennium 2004-2005, as a consequence of the new security system. $2,7 million additional dollars are expected spent on these services. The resources spent on
consultants and experts are planned increased by 400 per cent, or 0.2 million dollars (ibid: Annex II). Contracting for security thus appears to be an inherent part of the new security system, and although it is uncertain how big a share will be awarded PSCs and PMCs specifically, the UN market for private security and military companies clearly is in expansion.

There are clear indications to that the scenarios described from Congo and from the former Yugoslavia have become more than anecdotes from especially underprivileged missions. The future ability of the UN to make a real difference in conflicts is by the end of the day in the hands of its member states. So, it appears, are the revenues of the private security and military industry. Unless the promises made at formal conventions such as the Millennium Summit, are met by member state means, there are certain possibilities that they increasingly will be met by private means.
Appendix I: UN’s use of PMCs and PSCs

Appendix I presents the empirical basis for answering the “how” part of the research question. The first part (a) is thus an account of the 32 contracts between UN organizations (normally the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or one of the humanitarian agencies, programmes and funds) and private security and military companies. The different contracts records vary in terms of specification, as the access to information is often very limited. The sources are listed under each contract. As mentioned in chapter one, in cases where the sources appear less secure (such as newspapers etc.), these are supplemented with additional sources. However, the presence of multiple sources does not necessarily infer inferiority of any of them.

The second part of the Appendix, part b, systemizes the information from the contracts with regard to service category and context, that is, the operating environment of the contract. Appendix Ic explains the basis and particularities of the plotting of the table in b).

Appendix Ia

DSL began providing security and logistical personnel to the UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1992, becoming the largest contractor to this mission with at least 430 personnel by February 1995.
Ref: Alex Vines 1999: 134
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5
2. **DSL in Somalia**

Ref: Vaux 2002: 16.
Ref: Appendix I, Musah and Fayemi

DSL in Somalia

DSL was hired by the UN for police training purposes in Somalia in the early 1990s.
Ref: Memorandum from General Sir David Ramsbotham, SCFA appendix 1: §5)

3. **DSL in Angola**

DSL also provided the WFP with a temporary Security Officer in Angola
Ref: Vaux 2002: 16.

4. **DSL in Sudan.**

Defence Systems Limited provided a temporary Security Officer for UNICEF in Sudan.
Ref: Vaux 2002: 16.

5. **DSL in Mozambique approximately 1995.**

DSL was hired by the UN mission (ONUMOZ) for disarming of militia and demining of munitions and mines. For the following four years DSL ran UN courses in the same country, training managers and quality controllers of demining programs. DSL also provided security and logistic support to ONUMOZ.
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §6-7, appendix 6, §80
John Millar (e-mail interview 04.07.05), however does not specify what the contract was for.

6. **EO in Sierra Leone 1996-1997**

EO provided emergency evacuation services to UN staff members in Sierra Leone.

7. **DSL in Angola**

DSL has provided local guards and logistic support to UN peacekeepers in UNAVEM in Angola in the past.
DSL in Angola
DSL was also hired to protect the UN Special Representative (Dame Margaret Anstey) in Angola.
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5

8. DSL in Afghanistan, early-mid 1990s
DSL was hired to train UN staff in security and other practical requirements.
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5

9. ICI Oregon in Liberia in the mid-1990s
ICI provided heavy airlift services as well as transported troops into combat zones. During the Liberia contract ICI crew was caught by a fighting faction and tortured.
Ref: Hukill 2004: 1527

10. International Charter Incorporated (ICI) in Haiti 1996
ICI of Oregon was engaged at various times by the UN (as well as by the US and ECOWAS) to ferry by helicopter personnel, troops and humanitarian supplies into and within the country to support the peacekeeping operations as well as to provide medical evacuation capability.
Ref: International Charter Incorporated of Oregon homepage.

ArmorGroup’s locally registered entity Mine Action Services Limited performed training and clearance works for various UN agencies.
Ref: John Millar Director of Business Development personal communication 2005
ArmourGroup Mine Action web page.

LifeGuard provided security services to UN relief operations in and around Freetown, Sierra Leone. (LifeGuard is associated with the EO/ Sandline network and draws its personnel from the same pool.
DynCorp provided logistic support for to the UN mission in Angola (MONUA) in 1998.
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004

14. DynCorp in Bosnia
DynCorp was contracted to provide police officers for the 2,100-member UN international police task force in Bosnia. DynCorp employees were later found incorporated in criminal acts as in child prostitution rings.

15. DSL in Sierra Leone 1998.
DSL was hired to perform security duties for UN humanitarian relief convoys by the UNDP in Sierra Leone.
Ref: Musah and Fayemi Appendix I
Ref: Africa Confidential, Vol 39, no21

DynCorp won a $10 million contract to operate and maintain helicopters for the Australia-led UN mission in East Timor. The company’s work was extended to June 30 2002 by a $6 million contract awarded to the firm in November 2001.
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004

DynCorp in East Timor
DynCorp is reported to in general supply the UN’s logistics, transport, and communications in the East Timor operation
Ref: Singer 2003a: 183

The company provided logistic support for the UN force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
Ref: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002: 8
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004
18. **PAE in Sierra Leone 2000.**

The company has provided logistic support for the UN force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).


Ref: [www.ICIJ.org](http://www.ICIJ.org), accessed 23.02.2004


19. **DSL in Kosovo 2001.**

DSL worked under the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre removing landmines. DSL was funded by the United Kingdom Department of International Development

Ref: Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordination for Kosovo 2001: Annex A

20. **PAE in DRC 2001.**

PAE was contracted by the UN to support the expanded UN peacekeeping mission by replacing South African Air Force Specialists. The company’s work was later subject to investigation by the UN auditors on grounds of over-billing

Ref: Chatterjee 2004.


21. **Pacific Architects & Engineers in East Timor 2001.**

PAE won a $4.7 million contract to support the UN mission in the country. The contract includes the logistics and maintenance of four airfields on the island nation.

Ref: [www.ICIJ.org](http://www.ICIJ.org), accessed 23.02.2004


22. **Global Development Four in Kosovo**

GD4 supplied and maintained vehicles used by the Kosovo police through the UN mission in the region.

Ref: [www.ICIJ.org](http://www.ICIJ.org), accessed 23.02.2004
A Security Council committee monitoring sanctions violations in Angola in 2001 hired Kroll Associates for nearly $100,000 to trace the financial assets of UNITA rebel Jonas Savimbi.

24. ArmorGroup in DRC.
ArmorGroup has provided security and logistic support to the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC (MONUC).
Ref: Memorandum from ArmorGroup Services Limited Select Committee of Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence., appendix 6, §80.

KZN Security was contracted to provide local intelligence to the UN operation in East Timor in 2001.
Ref: Singer 2003a: 183

Another South African based companies, which were contracted to provide local intelligence to the UN operation.
Ref: Singer 2003a: 183

Manages air traffic control in that country, as well as security for UN infrastructure and personnel in Kinshasa.
Ref: Richard T. Lee, PAE Business Development Manager, personal communication June 2005
Ref: Hukill 2004: 1527
Ref: Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 208

28. PAE in Ivory Coast
Provide fuel, vehicles, and rations for the new UN mission in Ivory Coast
Global Strategies Group provides security in general in Iraq.
Ref: DCAF 2004: 5.

Global Risk Strategies provided advice to the UN on security for the presidential elections.
GRS staff assisted the Joint Electoral Management Body and the UN by identifying and assessing potential Voter Registration Sites, and provided other critical operational and logistical support to this process. GRS also provided security training and assistance.
Ref: The Asia Foundation website
Ref: North 2004.
Ref: Global Strategies Group webpage.

Armorgroup is currently responsible for the demining of the buffer zone on the island.
Ref: John Millar, Director of Business Development ArmorGroup, personal communication 02.09.2005

ArmorGroup has recently won a contract to secure a UN organization in Baghdad.
Ref: John Millar, Director of Business Development personal communication 2005
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inter state war</th>
<th>Intra state war</th>
<th>Disrupted state</th>
<th>Support Functions</th>
<th>Security provision</th>
<th>Expert Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>DSL in the Balkans 1992</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>DSL in Somalia</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>DSL in Angola</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>DSL in Sudan</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>DSL in Mozambique probl. 1995</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>EO in Sierra Leone 1996-97</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>DSL in Angola</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>DSL in Afghanistan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>ICI of Oregon in Liberia mid 1990s</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>ICI of Oregon Haiti 1996</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>ArmorGroup in Bosnia 1996 and on</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>LifeGuard in Sierra Leone 1998</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>DynCorp in Bosnia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>DLS in Sierra Leone in 1998</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>DynCorp in East Timor 1999</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>DynCorp in Sierra Leone 2000</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>PAE in Sierra Leone 2000</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>DSL in Kosovo 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>PAE in DRC 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>PAE in East Timor 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>GD4 in Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>ArmorGroup DRC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>KZN Security in East Timor, 2001</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>PAE in DCR, 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>PAE in Ivory Coast 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Global Strategies Group in Iraq 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Global Strategies Group in Afghanistan 2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>ArmorGroup in Cyprus 2004 and on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>ArmorGroup in Iraq 2005</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Ic

The war status of each contract context is plotted based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbooks Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, editions 1993-2004. In the case of Afghanistan (record number 8), by lacking exact information on the year of the contract the status of the country has been set to ‘internal war’ as this was the status recorded in the SIPRI yearbooks during most of the 1990s. The same principle was applied in report number 24 regarding the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was reportedly in status of civil war largely from 1999 and until the present.

The operationalization of the ‘disrupted states’ category is based on four main indicators derived from the UK Department for International Development (DFID)’s definitions of fragile states: Territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources and the delivery of basic services (DFID 2005: 7). These indicators are further elaborated in Box 1.

Box 1: Indicative features of fragile states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Willingness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State authority for safety and security</td>
<td>• The state lacks clear international sovereign status</td>
<td>• One or more groups are systematically subjected to violence or deliberately not provided security by the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The state cannot control its external borders or significant parts of its internal territory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective political power</td>
<td>• The power of the executive is not subjected to controls, either through informal (political party) or formal (legislature) channels.</td>
<td>• Major groups are systematically excluded from political processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There are no effective channels for political participation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Management</td>
<td>• Weak or partial public financial tools, such as a budget cycle or planning process</td>
<td>• There is no transparency in the management of natural resource extraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to deliver services</td>
<td>• The state levies less than 15% of GDP in tax</td>
<td>• Access to public services for specific regions of the country is deliberately limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DFID 2005: 8
For the years 1999-2004 contract theatres are thus classified as disrupted or not, based on the DFID’s list of fragile states for that period. For 2005, the four indicators have been read from the 2005 *Foreign Policy Failed States Index*, while the years prior to 1999 have been plotted by scaling data from the *Europa World Yearbook* on the four indicators. The Europa World Yearbook editions used includes 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. In addition, in relation the borderline cases, Haiti in 1996 and Mozambique during the mid 1990s, Robert Rotberg’s *Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators* (2003), has been used to back up information from the Europa World Yearbooks.

The calculations of probability in chapter 4 were conducted by combining the ‘intra state war’ variable and the ‘disrupted state’ variable to form on category named ‘aggravated operating environment’ (Ao). Presence and absence of Ao was thus combined with the presence and absence of ‘support functions’ (S), ‘security provision’, and ‘expert functions’ in turn.
In the case of the current war in Iraq, an exception was made in that the combination ‘interstate war’ and ‘disrupted state’ was treated as Ao. This was done in accordance with the prevailing disagreements over the status of the war in that country.
Appendix II: Alphabetical short list and description of companies discussed

The companies marked * are recorded with UN contracts in this thesis, all others are not.

**Aegis Defence Services (UK)**

http://www.aegisdef.com/default.aspx

Headquarters: 118 Piccadilly, London W1J 7NW, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7495 7495, Fax: +44 20 7495 3979, E-mail: centre@aegisdef.com

Aegis is a new company that surprisingly received a $293 million contract from the US DoD to coordinate information between contractors and coalition forces in Iraq. The company is headed by Tim Spicer, who is well known from his former company, Sandline International, as well as from the Executive Outcomes realm. According to its website, Aegis has two divisions: ‘Research and intelligence’ and ‘Security Operations’. The company lists among its services “advanced due diligence investigations on companies, individuals and organizations”, crisis management and advice, a range of pre-emptive and reactive security services etc. (Aegis web page).

**ArmorGroup* (UK)**

http://www.armorgroup.com

Headquarters: 25 Buckingham Gate, London SW1E 6LD, United Kingdom
Tel: 44 (0)20 7808 5800, Fax 44 (0)20 7828 2845, E-Mail: Info@armorgroup.com

ArmorGroup is a London-based company that terms itself a “global risk management services business”. ArmourGroup is one of the better-established companies in the industry. The company is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and reportedly has over 7600 employees (ArmorGroup webpage). ArmorGroup is one of the companies most frequently contracted by
the UN and is listed by the UN as an approved supplier. ArmorGroup reportedly has a long history of working with the UN in mine action services and protective security services in countries such as Mozambique, DRC, Kenya, Iraq, Bosnia, Cyprus, NYC, Croatia and other places (Millar personal correspondence 2005).

Blackwater USA (US)
http://www.blackwaterusa.com

Headquarters: 850 Pudding Ridge Rd. Moyock, NC 27958, USA
Tel: 252-435-2488, Fax: 252-435-6388, E-mail: susanm@blackwaterusa.com

Blackwater is a US company that markets itself, as “not simply a private security company but a turnkey solution provider for 4th generation warfare” has not worked for the UN as far as this author is concerned. The company holds several contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Services include security services for coalition facilities, escorting convoys, and providing personal bodyguards (e.g. for Paul Bremer). The company also holds training contracts with the US navy. Blackwater has recruited ex-Chilean soldiers, including some who served during the dictatorship of Gen. Pinochet (Isenberg 2004: 83). The company’s name frequented the media in 2004 when four of its employees were killed and mutilated in an ambush in Fallujah, an attack that triggered the occupational forces to alter its strategy in the town and launch a ground attack (Frontline Documentary). The killing of the four men also spurred much debate regarding liability because of families suing the company on the grounds that the four were unequipped for the assignment they were on.

CACI (UK)
http://www.caci.com

Headquarters: 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, VA 22201, USA
Tel: 703-841-7800, Fax: 703-841-7882

however under the name Defence Systems Limited, a company which became after an acquisition constituted the main part of ArmorGroup.
CACI is a logistics company most famous for its involvement in the Abu Ghraib prison abuse where it provided interrogation services. According to their homepage, CACI International Inc provides “the IT and network solutions needed to prevail in today's new era of defence, intelligence and e-government”. CACI provides a range of services including logistics to the US Navy, with a combined value of $125 million (Isenberg 2004: 84).

**Control Risk Group* (CRG) (UK)**

http://www.crg.com

Headquarters: 83 Victoria Street, London SW1H OHW, United Kingdom
Tel: (44) (20) 722 1552, Fax: (44) (20) 722 2296

CRG is a company based in London that offers armed guards to protect V.I.Ps, aid workers and business. Directors include Sir Michael Rose, former SAS commander and head of UN protection force of Bosnia. Currently deploying approximately 500 mainly ex-British military personnel in Iraq, especially former SAS personnel (Isenberg 2004: 86).

**Custer Battles (US)**

http://www.custerbattles.com

Headquarters: 8210 Greensboro Drive, Suite 214, McLean, VA 22102, USA
Tel: 703-356-2424, Fax: 703-356-3001, E-mail: info@custerbattles.com

Custer Battles is an American veteran owned company formed in 2002 that offers a range of security services, kidnap and ransom support, life support, construction, logistics, transportation etc. (Custerbattles webpage). The company was charged in a federal lawsuit of having charged $ 15 million for security work not performed at the Baghdad International Airport. The Pentagon eventually suspended the company from receiving new contracts (Witte 2005: A03).
Defence Systems Limited (DSL) (AKA ArmorGroup) (UK)

One of the first companies of its kind DSL was founded in 1981 by Alastair Morrison, a former SAS officer. DSL was by 1999 reported to have 130 contracts for 115 clients in 22 countries (Vines 1999: 71). DSL was the largest PMC/PSC contributor to the UN mission in former Yugoslavia in 1992 (SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5). DSL’s core business was devising and then implementing solutions to complex security problems. Armor Holding bought the company in April 1997 (Vines 1999: 71), the new security division of which was named ArmorGroup.

DynCorp* (US)

http://www.dyn-intl.com/

E-mail: inquiry@dyn-intl.com

DynCorp has an extensive contracting record with US government agencies especially for training purposes (Avant 2005: 121). It is responsible for nationally recruiting police officers for international assignments on behalf of the US government. In relation to its contract to provide police officers for the 2,100 member UN international police task force in Bosnia DynCorp employees were found incorporated in organizing child prostitution rings and other criminal acts (Singer 2003b: 6).

Empower Loss Control Services *

Empower Loss Control Services is a South African company reported to have supplied intelligence services to the UN mission in East Timor in 2001 (Singer 2003a: 183).
**Erinys International Limited (UK/ South Africa)**

http://www.erinysinternational.com

Headquarters: Old Bank of Kuwait Building, Debra, Dubai, UAE
Tel: 971 422 33 646, Fax: 971 422 70 099

British/ South African company which’ main business segment is security escort services. Currently holds a contract with the US Army Corps of Engineers. Testifies to only employ personnel with combat experience, and reports that their employees frequently have had to kill insurgents (Melville 2005 interview). The company has held a contract issued by the CPA to train a new Iraqi private security force to defend oil facilities and pipelines.

**Executive Outcomes (South Africa)**

*Defunct*

South African company commonly called the “world’s first corporate army” which included a range of affiliated companies ranging from a travel agency and an airline to extraction companies, logistic and military services. The Company was originally based on former members of notorious 32 Battalion as well as members of other SADF Special Forces regiments from the Apartheid era (O’Brien 2000: 50). EO took an active part in many African civil wars, among them, the company was hired by the Sierra Leonian government to help fight off RUF rebels in 1995. EO reportedly deployed at least 300 troops in Sierra Leone and helped tilt the power balance in favour of the government (Musah and Fayemi 2000: 88-89). The company frequently engaged in direct combat and by doing so stands out in comparison to the grand majority of companies active today.

**Global Risk Strategies Ltd. (UK)**

http://www.globalgroup.com/risk/

Headquarters: 6 Stratton Street, London W1J 8LD, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7491 7492, Email: info.uk@globalgroup.com
GRS is the security division of Global Strategies Group according to their web site “specialises in security at all levels”. The company is a significant actor in Iraq where it has had various UN contracts. GRS is thought to number 1,500 personnel with over 500 ex-members of the British Army Gurkha regiment (Isenberg 2004: 89).

**International Charter Incorporated of Oregon***

http://www.icioregon.com/

Headquarters: 1860 Hawthorne Ave., NE., Ste 390 Salem, Oregon 97303 USA
Tel: 503 589 1437, Fax: 503 371 7285, E-mail: info@icioregon.com

According to the IPOA web page ICI is a “private aviation company specializing in relief services, peacekeeping support, project management, heavy lift, industry, and VIP transport, as well as training for exposure to high risk environments”. ICI crew was reportedly kidnapped and tortured while on an assignment for the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia in the mid 1990s (Hukill 2004: 1527).

**Kroll * (US)**

http://www.krollworldwide.com/

Headquarters: 900 Third Avenue, New York, NY, 10022
Tel: 212-593-1000, Fax: 212-593-2631

Terms itself a “risk consulting company” which according to their web site in addition to protective security and training, provides a range of other security services, intelligence gathering, forensics etc. through their many associated companies.
KZN Security Services (South Africa)*

KZN Security Services is another South African company reported to have supplied intelligence services to the UN mission in East Timor in 2001 (Singer 2003a: 183). A pastor of the African Evangelical Church allegedly runs the company.

Logo Logistics

Apparently based in the Virgin Island and run by Simon Mann, one of the founders of Executive Outcomes. The company was involved in the aborted coup attempt aimed at overthrowing Equatorial Guinea president Obiang (Barnett and Smith 2004). The 15 suspected mercenaries were arrested loading weapons at the Harare Airport in March 2004. It was later revealed that Mark Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher’s son had been involved by financing a helicopter to be used in the coup. Logo Logistics do not appear to have a web page.

Mechem*

http://www.mechemdemining.com/

Headquarters: Admin. B. Building, 368 Selbourne Avenue, Lyttelton Centurion 0157, South Africa.
Tel: +27 12 620 3403, Fax: +27 12 664 3528, E-mail: mechem@liw.denel.co.za

Mechem is not regarded a PSC or PMC, but constitutes a division of the South African arms manufacturer Denel pty. Mechem is involved in demining and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The company is known for its Apartheid era links, which include implication in schemes to supply weapons and explosive devices to ex-members of the state sanctioned hit squads. Mechem is also accused of so-called ‘double-dipping’ by having been instrumental in the manufacturing of landmines, which they now are paid to clear (Sherman 2005)
Medical Support Solutions Ltd. (MSS)
http://www.medsupportsolutions.com/home.htm

Headquarters: Pine Grove, Garderners Lane, East Wellow, Hamshire SO 51 6AD, United Kingdom
Tel: + 44 (0) 1794 324 877, Fax: + 44 (0) 1794 324 898

MSS specializes in the provision of medical and emergency risk management and remote site medical services around the world (IPOA web page). Among the specific services the company lists on its web page are surveys and site risk assessments, contingency and emergency planning, establishing medical facilities and air ambulances etc. (MSS web page).

Mine Tech* (Zimbabwe)
http://www.minetech.co.uk/

Headquarters: 22 York Avenue, Highlands, Harare, Zimbabwe.
Tel: 00 263 477 6216, E-mail: minetech@minetech.co.uk

Mine Tech is a Zimbabwean demining company with a security division. MineTech Security, according to their website, has the ability to be deployed and work anywhere in the world within seven days. MineTech has been accused of hiring workers who were previously involved in laying minefields in Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Sherman 2005).

MPRI (US)
http://www.mpri.com/

Headquarters: 1201 East Abingdon Drive, Suite 425, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, USA
Tel: 703-684-0853, Fax: 703-684-3528, E-mail: Info@mpri.l-3com.com

MPRI, a branch of L-3 Communications, was formerly known as Military Professional Resources Incorporated, but currently only uses its acronym. MPRI is one of the best-known private military companies and it holds a very significant position in the lucrative American
defence market, which is illustrated by the fact that the company also apparently wrote the book on rules for contractors on the battlefield on an assignment for US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (Werve 2004). The company offers a very wide selection of services ranging from all levels of force training, war-gaming and anti terrorism/force protection to “peacekeeping and humanitarian aid” and Democracy Assistance Programs (MPRI web page).

**Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) (US)**

http://www.paechl.com

Headquarters: 888 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1700, Los Angeles, California 90017-5466
Tel: 213-593-3200, Fax: 213-593-3300, E-mail:

PAE constitutes 9 affiliated companies based in the US that offer worldwide operations and maintenance services as well as many other capabilities for all types of military and commercial installations. The PAE Group lists five areas of expertise: Base operations support services, logistical support services, peacekeeping support services, airfield/ airport support services and personnel placement services (advertisement material). Established in 1955, PAE has a long history of supplying both governments and the UN.

**Sandline International**

http://www.sandline.com/

Sandline was a British Executive Outcomes spin-off headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Timothy Spicer. Sandline was shut down in April 2004 after a series of bad press in relation to e.g. Spicer’s arrest for illegal weapons possession in Papua New Guinea where the company had been hired to quell a nine year long armed independence movement in 1997, as well as accused of breaking a UN arms embargo to Sierra Leone (Pech 1999: 93-94).

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105 Field Manual 100-21, titled Contractors on the Battlefield
Security Support Solutions (3S) (UK)
http://www.sss3.co.uk/

Headquarters: Prince Consort House, 27 Albert Enbankment, London SE1 7TJ, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0) 207 735 8197, Fax: +44 (0) 207 793 0533, E-mail: Enquiries@sss3.co.uk

3S is a London-based supplier of armoured vehicles and other protective equipment, such as helmets, bullets proof vests etc. The Company also provides independent advice, guidance, and products to government and non-government clients seeking to increase security and protection globally. Does not offer direct security provision.

SOC-SMG (Special Operations Consulting – Security Management Group)
http://www.soc-smg.com/

Headquarters: 2393 Heyborne Road, Minden Nevada 83423.
Tel: 775-783-9277, Fax: 1-775-783-9366

SOC-SMG is a private security consulting and management company, the company offers capable of providing international force protection, personal security detail, convoy security operations, security consulting and threat assessment, and training (IPOA web page). The company claims being veteran owned and with resources to operate worldwide. The company lists the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority, the US Department of Defence and several commercial companies among their clients (SOC-SMG web page).

Titan Corp.
http://www.titan.com/

3033 Science Park Road, San Diego, California 92121
Tel: (858) 552-9500, Fax: (858) 552-9645

Titan Corporation is one of the companies listed by the UN as approved provider of supplies or services on the January 2005 list of approved companies. According to the corporation’s
home page (www.titan.com) the company provides a very wide range of communications and intelligence including war games, army vehicle trainers, force structure analysis, surveillance, advice on the management on military assistance to civil authorities and on weapons of mass destruction etc. Titan employees were central in the abuse scandal related to the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2004 were they supplied translation services. The company has been subject to an investigation by the US Justice Department Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for bribery charges against the company in five countries (CorpWatch homepage).

**Triple Canopy (US)**

http://www.triplecanopy.com/

Headquarters: 2250 Corporate Park Drive, Suite 300, Herndon, VA 20171, USA
Tel: +1 703 673 5000, Fax: +1 703 673 5001

Triple Canopy according to their website “excels in executive protection and site security”. The company claims to have employees with an average of more than 20 years in “the most elite military Special Operations units” Their services furthermore range from discreet travel companions to heavily armoured, high profile convoy escort (TP web site). The company is a relatively new one, formed in 2003, but quickly received lucrative contracts with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (Isenberg 2004: 98).
Appendix III: Organizational structure of the new UN security system

Source: UN Secretary-General 2004b: §17
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