Nigerian Criminal Networks;
A comparative analysis.

By

Aimar Alkholt

Department of Administration and Organization Theory

Master of Philosophy in Public Administration

December 2010
Dedication

Phlebas the Phoenician, a fortnight dead,
Forgot the cry of gulls, and the deep sea swell
And the profit and loss…

O you who turn the wheel and look windward,
Consider Phlebas, who was once handsome and tall as you.


This thesis is dedicated to the Cultures of southern Sahara, who keeps me wondering.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, thanks to Associate Professor Jan Froestad, who showed me the means how to achieve this Thesis through his excellent supervision.

Also thanks to Associate Professor Thor Øyvind Jensen for his last hour, but important, suggestions.

Thanks to Associate Professor Steinar Askvik for providing me with some of the literature in use.

Last but not least, thank you Anna, for helping me with that immensely frustrating experience called Microsoft Word.
Abstract

Why is an African federation the home for one of the more dominating criminal networks operating globally? Nigeria has one of the world lowest levels of Internet-infrastructure. Still, it is in a class of its own when it comes to e-fraud or 419 spam mails. It is also prominent within drug trading and trafficking.

By comparatively analysing other forms of Organized Crime against the Nigerian Brand, the thesis has tried to find the particulars of Nigerian Criminal Networks. The thesis found two particular indicators that stood out in the analysis: Social Networking and the 419 industry. After looking at the level of integration between Nigerian politics and Criminal networks, the argumentation used by agents within Criminal Networks and the dynamics of the Nigerian E-fraud, this thesis argues that the same socio-cultural dynamics stemming from before the colonial period of the “great scramble” to present time, is the very same driving force behind Nigerian Criminal Networks, forming an Internet Economy of Affection. Individuals growing up in the Nigerian federation seem to have a higher potential for social networking since their weak state gives them little protection in economic, welfare, security and education spheres. They have to rely on the informal sector instead: the sphere of social networking. This may be one explanation toward how the dynamics of e-fraud, trafficking and drug-trade in Nigerian Criminal Networks, works at present.
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List of acronyms and Abbreviations

NOC Nigerian Organized Crime
NOCN Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks
NCN Nigerian Criminal Networks (see part 4.1.2)
OC Organized Crime, (see Alan Block’s definition, part 3.6.1)
EoA Economy of Affection
ISP Internet Service Provider
CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

Nigerian organized crime seems to connote a special type of organized crime, both when it comes to scope and peculiarities. Why do Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks dominate other forms of Organized Crime both in south-Sahara and abroad in certain areas? For example: why are these networks in the forefront of the e-mail fraud industry when Nigeria has one of the least developed Internet-infrastructures in the world?

This thesis focuses on the contemporary theoretic works which have been written about Nigerian organized crime (NOC) in a comparative analysis set up against other more well known forms of organized crime. What factors can be said to stand out when it comes to the type NOC seems to represent. Which similarities can be found between NOC and other forms of organized crime that cannot be an explanatory factor in what makes NOC different from other types?

Even the very definition can appear to be problematic; should we use the catch-all phrase Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks (NOCN) to be sure not to leave out any form of organized crime not currently being described by criminal sciences or should we dare to be more specific? Initially we will use the general phrase NOCN, since we have not properly discussed and found sufficient arguments to use a more specific definition as yet.

This chapter will explain the background of my study, the research problem, and give a basic sketch of the conceptual and theoretical framework in use.

1.1. Background

The Nigerian organized criminal networks seems significant world wide when it comes to visible criminal franchise like e-mail scam or other attempts at e-fraud, and also when it comes to covert criminal industry like trafficking and drug transportation. Is it possible the
visible (e-fraud) and largely invisible crime spheres are two separate arenas where we have some clear data when it comes to e-fraud because its mode of operation always leaves some sort of electronic trail, while the hidden criminal industry is much more unclear to which ethnic groups actually are responsible for the crime being committed?

If you have an Internet connection and some sort of mail provider, you will most probable have experienced the notorious Nigerian e-mail scams or “419 industry” as its known in contemporary literature (Buchanan 2001: 39-40, Ebbe 1997: 74, Edelson 2003: 392). How can west Africa, and particularly Nigeria, be dominant in a venture so dependent on Internet-infrastructure?

Nigerians seems to dominate the drug trade in southern-Sahara, for example in South Africa. Trafficking of women and labour is also connected to the power-sphere of Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. Cases like Italy (Aghatise 2004: 1134) and Norway (Carling 2006: 2) seems to show a large percentage of its sex-labour force to originate from Nigeria.

Is this because of a particular historic background? Can its 120 million strong population be solely responsible for this? Is it connected to the fragmented ethnic puzzle the Nigerian federation is divided into? Or is it the power-structures of the Nigerian state or lack of state that dictates this very particular state of affairs?

1.2. Statement of Problem

This thesis will firstly try to draw out the significant differences from Nigerian organized criminal networks to underline significant divergent factors in an attempt to find the peculiarisms inherent in this subject. It will therefore try to put the more well described forms of organized crime, like the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese in that very order of importance up against the Nigerian type of organized criminal networks to discover its similarities and discrepancies.

The Italian brand of organized crime is perhaps the best described, together with the factors of history, culture and state that has formed its very type. The Italian state history and current form has also shown to be important for the understanding of the Italian organized crime and
the concept of state linked together with type of organized crime will be an important direction to venture in this thesis.

Secondly, the thesis will attempt to find some significant explanation for these peculiarisms in Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. Can it be explained by its type of state, fragmented cultural bias, population factor, diaspora or its very cultural and socioeconomic history?

1.3. Significance of study

The most important goal of this thesis is to find the specifics that differ in Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. There are, at this time, no well-known attempts to find the specific factors that stand out in Nigerian organized crime and perhaps more importantly, try to find out why Nigerian Organized crime works in its particular fashion. This thesis may then of course conclude with that NOCN’s has no significant discrepancies from other better known types of organized crime, and the difference is merely superficial. This is however unlikely looking at the way Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks manifest themselves today. We can on the other hand discover that there is a significant difference, but not achieve a plausible explanation why there is one in the first place, which is more likely.

As an attempt to draw together the theoretic perspectives and tools of both criminology and more state related sciences, the very concept of miscommunication between these two forms of science may be an issue. This problem may be most apparent in the methodological part, where we try to connect state-science with a more purely criminology oriented theory. On the other hand criminology is perhaps an area that should be more scrutinized by social scientists as a further tool to explain the workings or failures of state. That the case of organized crime is connected to weak states, or a states failure to deliver a sufficient level of security (Sung 2004:112, Gambetta 1996:4, Rabasa and Chalk 2001:(1, 65), Varese 1997:594, Bandiera 2003:222), is well known in criminology but maybe less focused on in social sciences. Perhaps some time in the future the brands of organized crime, or the very form the organized crime takes, may be used as a further indicator to strengthen or weaken theoretic frameworks used to explain some parts of the complex machine, we define as State.
1.4. Concepts of Methodology

When first embarking on the task of writing a thesis that was meant to do a comparative study between Nigerian and other forms of organized criminal networks, some hard choices had to be made. To collect data on both of these spheres at the limited amount of time would be close to impossible. To collect data on the Nigerian type only would be difficult at best. The subject is not an aboveboard sphere of society that is easy to access in the first place. The fact that collection of data was to be made in Nigeria made the case even more uncertain taking into account the infrastructure and information problems in particular existence here.

This thesis is therefore first and foremost a theoretical one. This means the divide between theory and methodology is much more unclear than a quantitative or qualitative thesis. There is a divide however, and it lies in the indirectness or directness the text relate to the concept of organized crime. The methodology texts are there to underbuild the method of analysing text directly relating to organized crime. Concepts of methodology will therefore reflect subjects like state, a problematic concept in itself or not, comparisons between culture or socioeconomics and historical analysis.

We have already discussed the importance of the state. The state gives us either an indirect or direct causal connection to forms of Organized Crime. When no state is present, no law is present, the level of security will be minimal and the very concept of organized crime becomes almost meaningless. If we can agree to this chain of arguments, the state needs to be a part of the arsenal of causal factors explaining workings, origins and underlying factors of Organized Crime. However, if the state can explain partly the workings of organized crime, the form of organized crime needs to resonate in some degree to the form and workings of the state. If this is not the case our causal factors on organized crime may be spurious.

If the state is to be used as a tool we need to look closer on it is socioeconomic and cultural history through different methods of analysis;

A basic perspective is JSS Mill’s modes of induction to single out factors. This method will of course be even more important when it comes to the compare between Nigerian and Other forms of Organized Criminal Networks.
Nettl’s text “The state as a conceptual variable” will give us a basic and fundamental discussion and understanding around the very concept of state. This is important to build up a further analysis of the weak state connected to organized crime.

Putnam’s “civic traditions in modern Italy” gives us an insight in the particular divide between a loose north and south axis between the socio-economic factors dividing Italy. This is in accordance with the very same attempt this thesis will make in explaining the differences with Nigerian and other forms of organized crime with the state as a causal context.

Lastly Goran Hyden’s economy of affection is perhaps at the time the most general theory explaining the significant factors giving southern Sahara its particular brand of society and therefore may give us an explanatory background for Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks.

1.5. Disposition of Thesis

The thesis will first try to lay a foundation of methodological tools to attempt to get a significant level of comparative factors that is either connected to all forms of organized crime or singular to the Nigerian form. We will then describe the way Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese organized crime have manifested to achieve some level of comparative data to use against the current literature on Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. Having described these forms we will try to sum up a basic level of similarity between the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms to produce a basic connection. This level of connection will be used comparatively against the Nigerian and will lead us to;

A. There are no significant discrepancies between Nigerian and other forms of organized crime.

Or

B. There are significant differences between Other forms of organized crime and the Nigerian Brand.
If A is the preliminary result we have to analyse further the implications of this and look upon closer upon why such an unexpected result have appeared. If B is the case we need to scrutinize the causal explanations why the discrepancies are in place. If we find no significant causal factors to explain the difference, this also has to be the thesis main conclusion.

1.6. Conclusion

This chapter have explained the central problem this thesis will attempt to analyse. A preliminary disposition has also been provided. The next chapter will discuss the methodological tools that are needed to achieve a basic level of comparative analysis.
CHAPTER TWO

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will outline the specifics of analytic tools we have to take into account to achieve some basic level of comparison between the main groups of Organized Crime put against the Nigerian type. How can we look upon any level of Organized Crime without scrutinizing its context of state? How can we use the state as a plausible context for causality without looking upon its socio-economic and cultural history? Lastly we will scrutinize the selection of sources used in the thesis.

2.1.1. Historical Sociology

Philip Abrahams “Historical sociology” gives us an insight into this way of thinking by his work on the ideas of Edward Thompson; regarding the notion of class, sociologists would for example all disregard the term:

"The notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure ... sociologists who have stopped the time machine and gone down to the engine room and look, tell us that nowhere at all can they locate and classify a class. They can only find a multitude of people with different occupations, incomes, status hierarchies and the rest. They are right of course, because class is not this or that part of the machine, but the way the machine works once its set in motion, not this interest or that, but the friction of interests, the movement itself, the heat and the thundering noise.”

(Abrams 1982: xii)

This gives us a good description and understanding into why we need to find some level of historic connection to the way the state and therefore indirectly how organized crime have
developed, both in Nigeria and in other countries. The state in itself however is not an unproblematic concept, specifically when it comes to southern Sahara as Hyden describes in his book “African Politics in Comparative Perspective”. We need therefore to discuss the implications of the state concept through Nettl’s “The State as a Conceptual Variable”.

### 2.2. State as conceptual variable

“Insofar as social science aims at scientific reductionism and attempts to separate all epiphenomenal or occasional factors from exigencies, fundamentals, and invariants, the concept of state is at risk. But if it can be made into an operating variable that points up significant differences and discontinuities between societies, making possible systematically qualitative or even quantitative distinctions, there may be a case for bringing it back in.” (Nettl 1968:562).

#### 2.2.1. Introduction

How can we aptly define the concept of state? The English monarchy and its north American offspring are both in different ways atypical states, breaking clearly away from the old “Nationstate” definition; The United states through its cultural plurality and federation-political system, the British commonwealth through its ageing focus on monarchy and former colonies (Nettl 1968:561-562). The problems further evolve when one throws the former third world colonies into the fray; the African continent for example, which after a rushed colonization by European powers in the late 19th century suddenly finds itself in the position of creating modern democratic states, without the means and cultural history for achieving this anytime soon. As Goran Hyden puts it;

“To most Africans, local community institutions carried much greater legitimacy than the civic institutions established by the colonial powers.” (Hyden 2006:51).

Nettl sets up four notions of state to achieve a comparative analysis of the subject. Firstly Nettl delves into the problem of connecting state and sovereignty. For him, this concept is at the same time too broad and too narrow. Firstly to broad by failing to “prepare”
the idea at an adequate level in preparation to connect it to other relevant concepts, too narrow in the sense that it leaves out much of the spatial and social dimensions. For him the concept of sovereign state points exclusively on its status as superordinate over inferior associations, and as such hinders the possibility of analyzing the connections with other summatin concepts such as nation, society, or territory (Nettl 1968:562).

The state must also be cut off from any “personal” connotations, if this is not the case the state devolves into a ragbag synonym of government and looses much of its inherent meaning (Nettl 1968:563).

Conceptualizing the state with law, bureaucracy or with government alone recreates an artificial, and to a large extent, self-defining notion of state by bundling structures together that are better polarized and that are a part of the state in some situations but in many others not. These factors may altogether substitute the state in some cases all together (Ibidem).

Secondly, the state represents a unit in the environment of international relations. In the view of a sovereign authority as stated by Hobbes, there is a fundamental gap between civil society (an area we would today describe as a society or social system), and the international arena, with chaotic and random collisions and collusions. In the before mentioned, the state works as a basic irreducible unit, equivalent to an individual in a society. In today’s world it is quite fashionable to refer to “national actors” rather than states. In this international system the state concept generates an almost exclusive and acceptable node of resource mobilization (Ibidem). Nettl however focuses his article on the “internal affairs”, so to speak, of the state. The meaning is therefore to focus on the societal aspects of the state, connecting the international arena by putting the state as a gatekeeper between the internal and international flows of action (Nettl 1968:564).

Thirdly, the state represents an autonomous collectivity and a generalized concept of the high societal system. As such it can be equalled in a functional sense as a distinct sector or arena of society (Ibidem). It is important to emphasize the autonomy aspect. In one aspect this focus on a limitation upon sovereignty; every connection points in the direction of a maximization of autonomy, and once the idea of a pluralistic view of society is accepted, the greater autonomy of the state versus other connections or collectivities becomes a empirical question for each particular case (Nettl 1968:565).
Fourth, the state is in essence a sociocultural phenomenon. This is connected to the liberation from the concept of exclusive connection to particular structures, and from the emphasis on autonomy. Friedrich in his generalization of state politics, shows us some of the inherent faults in the concept of autonomy:

“Such is the dialectic of the political that the state seeks and must seek to foster the growth of a nation, indeed must posit its potential coming into being…” (Ibidem).

This is mainly limited to the European arena, and a limited segment of the continental Europa at that. What summarize a nation is surely the organized diffusion of common experience as Nettl puts it, and this may be amplified and structured by a King, leader church, party, army or state – or all of them together (Ibidem).

2.2.2. Three traditions of statehood: Historical

Nettl structures his article by categorizing the notion of statehood or “stateness” into tree specific traditions: historic, intellectual and cultural.

The historical tradition is connected to the randomness of events that often lay as primary factors for concretization of statehood (Nettl 1968:567). It is, for example, no clear findings of a historical state with ethnically homogenous, united and centralized countries; if this was a possibility as such, England would manifest an easily accessible pattern of state. The factors points in contrary to this in the opposite direction, because it is more likely to find these strongly articulated patterns of statehood in countries that were fragmented long after France and England was united. The state has then evolved by extending its impact from one dominant geographical component to the whole “nation-state”, or it has found a new hybrid of “stateless” fragments and unified these. There are then no clear or discernible factors that give away the primary foundations for a crystallization of statehood from any easily identifiable comparable historical events (Ibidem).
The historical state in Europe may therefore be connected to a kind of “state-envy” according to Nettl. He finds considerable evidence that the seeking toward stateness on the part of newly united European nations was in part linked to deliberate borrowing from envied European leaders. The French example from the 17th century and onward was a dominant factor in providing conscious and unconscious models for countries seeking national integrative revolution in the 19th century (Ibidem).

One can find a number of states like the United States whose historical experience connotes a similar connection to “statehood” but where the notion of the state itself has glimmered by its absence, or rather been transformed into something of a very different meaning (Nettl 1968:567-568). It is difficult for a federal system under any circumstance to incorporate any meaningful notion of state, since the factors and functions for such a system demands an coordination with regional units, and the concept of overall superordination or sovereignty will be displaced by the system itself. Autonomy will therefore manifest itself in legal terms only, rather than the sociocultural (Nettl 1968:568).

Another factor in the historical analysis of stateness and the identification of a conceptually meaningful state concerns the problem of autonomy. Neutral and transformatory structures that merely process inputs into outputs and live up to the models emphasized by certain types of social science would run directly in opposition to the conceptual components of autonomy that is needed. Nettl also points out that the problem of autonomy is quite separate from that of sovereignty (Nettl 1968:569):

“..a state may be sovereign as well as autonomous or it may merely be autonomous.”
(Ibidem).

As such the German tradition has emphasized sovereignty, the autonomy of the state a natural offspring of its sovereign nature. In Italy the autonomy is, on the other hand, clearly defined, but the notion of sovereignty is vague and inconsistent in a high degree. Whatever its formal claims to sovereignty, the Italian state can be demonstrated to consist of no more than a sector of activities polarized from other spheres, but only meaningful sovereign in its own particular sphere. According to Nettl, a third alternative exists; a concept of state where the structures we would normally ascertain in connection with the state are not autonomous, or at least, much less than the non-state ones. Using the example of the United states we can see that
there is a clear breach between the well maintained autonomy of certain federal institutions such as federal courts, regulatory commissions and departments of the federal government. The legislative branch on the other hand is distinguished by its lack of autonomy and by its cross-pressures and interests, which has been called “a government of separated institutions sharing powers” (Ibidem).

“America perpetuated a fusion of functions and a division of power, while Europe developed a differentiation of functions and a centralization of power.”
Samuel P. Huntington (Nettl 1968:569-570).

2.2.3. Intellectual tradition

Various intellectual and philosophical ideas around the concept of state from Germany have played a leading part for over the last 150 years. The range of intellectual tradition of the state gives an insight in its position of dominance. It has been a part of even the most individualistic approach to social problems, for example psychoanalysis (Nettl 1968:572).

“no German ever escapes Hegel, [even] a German Marxist is suspect of saying Marx when he means Hegel.”
Philip Rieff (Nettl 1968:572-573)

Hegel both summarizes and fathers an intellectual tradition of highly articulate and absolute stateness, in which the concept of state is given supreme predominance, but that he transforms the cold notion of legal and political sovereignty into a “warm” cultural concept of self-identification and affect for the state. What Hegel did through his idealized and philosophical concept, Freud later perfected with much more personal terms. Love became the factor that the basic power of the state rested on. The state becomes a transfer and extension, in terms of social development, from the connection between child and parents in a family to the relations between subject and state in society. By going from Hegel to Freud, Nettl conceptualize the span and importance of intellectual influences that cannot as such be traced directly back to Hegel at all (Nettl 1968:572-573):
“The suffusion of German thinking with the concept of state, and the articulation of the state as the quintessential sociological phenomenon of modernity through the writings of historians like Treitschke and Meinecke, need not be spelled out in detail; in referring to Hegel, we are merely encapsulating a widespread and dominant intellectual tradition which by no means adopts his particular phenomenology or dialectical form of analysis.” (Nettl 1968:573).

2.2.4. The cultural tradition

The state concept as it stands in itself and the way it is manifested in society, can be transformed in various ways to meet specific demands of cultural variables in a political context (Nettl 1968:578).

In the example of the USSR, where the soviet state had a strong hand in the development of soviet society, we find that the apparently co-opting functions of the USSR state were in fact, in most instances, handled by the Party – a singular and autonomous structure whose position in the Soviet state hierarchy has been on the outside rather than the inside. Looking for Nettl’s level of autonomy to denote any meaningful concept of state, we only find it with the party itself, instead of the USSR state. The concept of the Soviet citizen is also an important one in this regard. Instead of creating a soviet citizenship, separate and above ethnic communities, through the creation of a Soviet state, Nettl argues that the dynamics behind the Soviet citizen status lie in close conjuncture with the American citizen dynamics. Rather than identifying directly to the state, both the American and Soviet identity is connected to a “crystallization of status” as Nettl puts it. It is connected firmly to the concept of “way of life”, either soviet or American, and is connected to this concept rather than the state itself (Nettl 1968:579).

2.2.5. Third world states

The state is far from being institutionalized into the political system of third world countries. What appears to be the case is rather a focus on parties rather on the state, this even in countries ruled by military dictatorships, where one could expect a larger chance of some degree of state-building (Nettl 1968:589).
The state-building “implosions” that generated the new state-centred nations of Europe, never took place in the third worlds, but rather a multi-ethnic “explosion” fuelled by colonial legacy and insurrectionary organizations (Nettl 1968:590-591).

2.2.6. Closing on state as a variable

The state as concept, though present in most socio-political analysis, is still victim of a multitude of definitional problems. Universal definitions of the state, Weber is one example of an attempt at universalizing the concept of state, shows us the geographical problem, that the state is functioning in different ways in different global spheres, which has not been properly addressed in western tradition of state definition. Nettl suggests that “stateness” is a variable that is useful for comparing Western societies and that the presence and absence of the concept of state identifies important empirical differences in these societies (Nettl 1968: 591-592).

2.2.7. Methodological implications of state as variable

Firstly Nettl’s discussion regarding the concept of state gives us an important foundation when it comes to the inherent differences between states. In which way will sovereignty dictate a states composition and ability to hold together? Nettl argues that the implicit connection to sovereignty is not in itself enough to explain the concept. Nettl uses the African continent as an important argument when it comes to this problem. And it is exactly the inherent differences between African organized criminal networks and other organized crime based groups that this thesis tries to analyse. What implications will the colonization of southern Sahara have in the current form of state and contemporary Nigerian Organized Criminal networks? This is a question that Nettl together with Hyden gives us a theoretical significance to aptly raise.

Looking at Nettl’s divide in forms of statehood the historical and cultural perspective will most likely important in the discussion of Economy of affection and the Nigerian state. Like Nettl’s case of the United States, were a meaningful concept of state gets event trickier through the fact that the federal system will manifest itself through legal terms rather than the
sociocultural. This has to have some impact on the Nigerian federation too, put together with the already problematic concept of state that has evolved after colonizaton.

When it comes to the Italian organized crime, Nettl also gives us some basis for discussion as he views the state in this case as consisting of no more than a sector of activites polarized from other spheres. Together with Putnam’s article about the divided Italy, this will give us a further foundation for discussing the specific context of organized crime in the region. The intellectual perspective is perhaps the least meaningful connected to the Nigerian sphere or the economy of affection because it has to involve some kind of historic cultural background that has not been in play in Nigeria’s relative short history as a state. The cultural tradition therefore stands out as even more significant as the economy of affection, which we will discuss later, is a general cultural background in the southern Saharan region.

We particularly must note Nettl’s point around the socio-cultural foundation for the state. Science reductionism towards explaining state solely as a power-monopoly structure is a weak notion according to Nettl. We must understand the historic and socio-cultural foundations that must be in place for a state to achieve a high enough level of acceptance to exist. Nettl, concludes broadly on both Federal states and third world states particular problems when it comes to this. Here we have, in effect, states with neither a long history of statehood and no great socio-cultural acceptance of the state as mentioned in the literature from Hyden and Ekeh. When it comes specific to Nigeria, it is a Federation on top of it all. To summarize; most of the indicator that Nettl describes as being particular problematic toward the establishment of state-acceptance is in play when it comes to Nigeria:

1. It is a third world state with its colonial past

2. It is a federation

3. It has no long tradition for statehood or any intellectual past linked to state.

4. It has no sociocultural affinity toward state-structure, as explained in both Ekeh’s “two publics”, and Hyden’s Economy of Affection.
We have therefore through Nettl’s Historical, Cultural and intellectual perspectives on state shown some of the very fundamental problems connected to the Nigerian Federation.

Lastly, in his focus on third world states, we come close to the thesis problem. The state is even less a meaningful concept in this region than it is in the rest of the world. What implications will the multi-ethnic “explosions” that was fuelled by the colonial legacy have on the Nigerian form of Organized Criminal Networks?

### 2.3. The Italian divide

#### 2.3.1. Introduction Putnam

The significance of this text is twofold. First of all it gives us a basic insight in the comparative analysis of two institutional divided geographic areas on a state level. The thesis is meant to use the same statement of problem when it comes to explaining potential differences between Nigerian context and other cases. This potential divide exists on an international scale rather than Putnam’s national one, but the basics of comparison and explanation is the same. Secondly, the fact that the divide between southern and northern Italy is so large, may give us a connection to the Economy of Affection and the means to analyse this concept in a broader sense.

#### 2.3.2. Civic Traditions

In Robert D. Putnams Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, Putnam describes a divide between democratic institutional capacity between northern Italy and south (Putman1994:5). By asking the question of how social, economic and culture influence democratic performance, he sketches an image of a divide, ruled by an historical context and socio-economic contemporary factors.

In the early 1970s Italy started a process of sudden transference of administrative power from centralized Rome, to the Italian regions (Putnam1994:4). The transfer included civic problems like health, safety among others (Ibid.). Since the unification of Italy in 1870 no attempts before the 1970 on decentralization to the regions was ever made (Putnam1994:5). Italy was a
centralized state, perhaps a consequence of trying to break from the largely city-state ruled past. Putnam tries to follow and interpret the consequence and difference manifested by the “regional-reforms”. In the north (Bologna) a description of Habermasian “deliberate paradise” ensues, where citizens gathers on the local piazza\(^1\) debating the days political agenda which echoes can be heard in the chambers of the regional council (Putnam 1994: 6). In the south (Bari, Puglia), the Puglesi has problems even locating the regional administration, not to mention the fact that said regional office consists of largely empty desks (Putnam 1994: 5). Further, the public system of administration is bogged down by internal feuds and institutionalized corruption:

“A rampant spoils system undermines administrative efficiency; as a clerk once responded to his nominal superior in our presence, “you can’t give me orders! I am ‘well protected’.” Meanwhile, the region’s leaders engage in Byzantine factional feuds over patronage and posts, and offer rhetorical promises of regional renewal that seem never to reach reality. If Puglia is to become “a new California”, as local boosters sometimes say, it will be despite the performance of its new regional government, not because of it.” (Putnam1994: 5)

It is therefore prudent of Putnam to ask the question regarding the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions (Putnam1994: 6)? Why is the inherent variation between southern and northern Italy so strong?

The reforms of the 1970s gives an opportunity to try out some hypotheses regarding these questions. The fifteen regional governments were established at the same time, all with the same constitutional mandates and structures. 5 special regions were given some wider constitutional guaranteed powers. Putnam uses all 20 regions for his comparative analysis (Ibidem).

Looking at the broad picture, all 20 regions are almost identical. Looking more at the context of the regions reveals the social, economic, political and cultural differences that have shaped the administration of these regions for the decades that have passed since the 70s reforms. Some regions were influenced by a political socialistic past, some were stronger influenced by

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\(^1\) Italian municipal common.
the Catholic Church, some regions even retained the patron-client system of the feudal past (Putnam 1994: 6-7). As Putnam aptly puts it, looking at these different regions and their administrative development gave an important insight in these different ‘biospheres of context’:

“The Italian regional experiment was tailor-made for a comparative study of the dynamics and ecology of institutional development. Just as a botanist might study plant development by measuring the growth of genetically identical seeds sown in different plots, so a student of government performance might examine the fate of these new organizations, formally identical, in their diverse social and economic and cultural and political settings.” (Putnam 1994: 7).

2.3.3. **New institutionalism**

New institutionalism is a broad spectre of hypotheses where the tools of game theory and rational choice models have been used (Ibidem). Theorists of organizational systems have used and focused on institutional roles, routines, symbols and duties. Historical institutionalists have traced red threads of government and politics emphasizing on timing and sequences in institutional development (Ibidem).

There are many diverse views and opinions on the theoretical and methodological points of new institutionalism. On two important points they agree, however:

1. **Institutions shape politics.** The rules and standard operating procedures that make up institutions leave their imprint on political outcomes by structuring political behaviour. Outcomes are not simply reducible to the billiard-ball interaction of individuals nor to the intersection of broad social forces. Institutions influence outcomes because they shape actors’ identities, power, and strategies.

2. **Institutions are shaped by history.** Whatever other factors may affect their form, institutions have inertia and “robustness”. They therefore embody historical trajectories and turning points. History matters because it is “path dependent”: what comes first (even if it was in some sense “accidental”) conditions what comes later. Individuals may “choose” their institutions, but they do not choose them under circumstances of their own making, and their choices in turn influence the rules within
which their successors choose.

(Putnam 1994: 7-8)

Putnam’s study of the regional reform experiment is meant to focus on both of these themes. Using institutions as an independent variable, he empirically explores how institutional change influence identity, power and strategies of political actors. In a later part, taking institutions as a dependent variable by exploring how institutional performance is influenced by history. Putnam expands the field of new institutionalism by adding a third step: the practical performance of institutions, he conjectures, is formed by the social context which they operate in (Putnam1994:8).

2.3.4. Institutional performance

What is the inherent meaning of institutional performance? Political theorists may see them as “the rules of the game”, procedures that govern collective decision-making, as systems that deal and sometimes resolve conflict. Putnam furthers this thesis by adding that institutions are not only devices for achieving agreement but also a device for achieving purpose. Governments should do things, not only decide things; to educate children, deliver social services, deliver security, create a functional job-market, manage the economy, encourage social stability etc. (Putnam1994:8-9).

Comparative social sciences have also shown an interest in institutional performance. One may name three broad schools of explaining performance, which one can find in existing literature. The first, “school of thought”, has its focus on institutional design. Rooted in formal legal studies, and a mode of political analysis that grew out of the enthusiasm surrounding constitution building in the 19th century. John Stuart Mill “Considerations on representative Government” is representative for this brand of school (Putnam1994: 9).

Today, a focus on the organizational determinants of institutional performance has appeared among the advocates of the “new institutionalism”, and among practical reformers: “Arturo Israel, a specialist in Third World development, observes that it is easier to build a road than to build an organization to maintain that road” (Putnam1994: 10).
Putnam’s research speaks only indirectly to these questions of institutional design. His research does in fact hold institutional design as a constant because the regional governments with similar organizational structures were all introduced at the same time. What on the other hand varied in Putnam’s study was the context of the institutions: economic or political tradition. These kind of factors are much more robust to change in a short-term notice. The upside is of course the fact that the similarity between the institutional design creates an environment that even easier detect the contextual differences and implications of these differences (Ibidem).

2.3.5. Concluding on Putnam

After looking at Putnam’s points regarding the north south divide we can partially conclude that Hyden’s economy of affection is not exclusive to the area of southern Sahara. When it comes to Europe for example, the Mediterranean countries seem to manifest a particular affinity for the concept. The very term Putnam uses; institutionalized corruption, resonates with Hyden’s point of the informal being institutionalized to the point that they are dominating the way formal institutions operate. There is of course great variety between the level of economy of affection in the different Mediterranean countries. The case that Putnam makes in his text underlines this to some degree. It would therefore be likely that the same variation is significant to different parts of southern Sahara.

Another important point Putnam makes is that Institutions are shaped by history. This will be important in the explanation of the Economy of affection. What factors or historical paths have shaped this current state of affairs in southern Sahara, and more importantly can we connect the same paths to the development of the Nigerian brand of Organized crime?

2.4. Comparative Induction

2.4.1. Introduction

The works of Johannes Kepler and Tycho Brae in the 16th century are some of the beginnings of scientific method. John Stuart Mill work on inductive logic is perhaps one of the more
central theoretical works on the cornerstones of scientific method. In the book “A System of logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive” 1843, Mills expansive broad work also focuses on the proper (and improper) uses of the term Induction. As we mentioned Kepler in the beginning, it could be interesting to mention that Mill did not view Keplers discovery of planetary elliptical trajectories was a result of inductive work, but rather a series of direct observations. As a sailing captain who makes his first landfall will not know if the landmass in front of him is an island or a continent, he needs to sail around the landmass to properly ascertain that it is in fact an island. This is done by a series of direct observations. The same observations that Kepler made in the 16th century, by not only fixing the planets relative positions, but also their curvature, of course a much more difficult work then merely sailing around an island as Mills states (Mill 1843:193).

2.4.2. Methods of agreement and difference

Mills looks at Induction as a theoretical tool for providing proof:

“Induction is proof: it is inferring something unobserved from something observed, it requires therefore, an appropriate test of proof, and to provide that test is the special purpose of inductive logic” (John Stuart Mill, 1843 p.199).

Nature for Mills is a series of almost endless complex phenomenon. If we therefore in nature experience recurrence of the same phenomenon in the same context, we both consciously and passively assign an expectation of the same phenomenon to appear at the given conjuncture of context and factors (Mill 1843:203 and 206).

There are two experimental methods:

1. Method of agreement;
   By looking at two instances of a phenomenon, and finding that only one factor or circumstance in common, that factor is the cause, effect or important part of that phenomenon. Mills use the example of the man shot through the hearth as a description of this method; the man was in his fullness of life before the wound, no circumstance have changed except the wound itself, therefore the wound is the cause of his death (Mill 1843:255 - 256).
2. Method of difference;
If you have two instances where the phenomenon occurs, and where it does not, and both
instances have every factor in common except one, this anomalous factor is the cause, effect
or important part of that phenomenon (Mill 1843:256).

2.4.3. Concluding on JSS Mill’s methods.

In this thesis we will use Mill’s method of agreement when it comes to explaining a set of
factors that all Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of organized crime share to some
degree in chapter 3. These sets of shared factors will be put up against Nigerian Organized
Criminal Networks characteristics to try to find some degree of discrepancy, and thereby
using Mill’s method of difference.

2.5. Economy of affection

2.5.1. Introducing the Economy of affection.

While having no strong state to give basic security, Hydens theory states that the African
solution is to knit informal networks with your fellow man to replace some of the state lack of
security nets. The very social mechanics or intelligence involved in such a network building is
the same one that will need to approach foreigners and strangers via the Internet to facilitate
for example e-fraud. This may be the very area that sub-Saharan surpass other continents;

network-building.

Some further questions arise; why aren’t all of Africa dominant actors in Organized Criminal
Networks and not mostly Nigeria? Can the population plus diaspora be the only explanation?
Or should we look at some further divide on the economy of affection between the regions in
Africa?
“Quo vadis” asks Goran Hyden in his book “African Politics in Comparative Perspective” (Cambridge, 2006). The question is asked to the contemporary sub-Saharan continent regarding its way forward toward democracy and development.

Hyden’s book is a compact insight into the many problems and differences that riddles the sub-Saharan continent. The continent stands out in a singular way contemplating its marginal economic situation, and democratic vacuum. However, such a generalization covering one of the worlds most expansive continents are problematic, but still important when a pattern of informality and social networking predominates the area.

As Hyden states as his most important notion explaining contemporary African politics, the economy of affection is first and foremost an understanding that people, and not recourses, is the currency of sub-Sahara; large networks of persons leads to monetary affluence, not the other way around as a more western modernistic approach could lead us to believe. Sub-Sahara has a long history of slave economy, both transatlantic and locally. The transatlantic triangle between Europe, the African west-coast and the Americas is both well known and described. However the local African inter-tribal slavery is not. The classical connection between state-services and taxation on agricultural produce has historically never been a factor in sub-Sahara. However slave economy has been one of the more important economic factors in the pre-colonial times (Hyden 2006:141-142). Tribal wars have been one way of obtaining slaves, direct obtainment through raids another. That a slave economy existed both locally through native means, and transatlantic through foreign means, show us some of the foundations of the economy of affection. It also gives us an understanding regarding why sub-Sahara and west-Africa differs both economically and socially.

“The informal has been institutionalized to the point where it tends to dominate the way formal institutions operate. Formal rules, for instance, are often bent to serve informal institutions. The informal institutions are not unique to Africa, but their significance is

1 The question has its origin in Peters question to Jesus while he flees crucifixion in Rome; “Quo vadis Domine”; where goes the way lord?
particularly noticeable there. Nowhere else can they be studied more extensively than in African countries” (Hyden 2006:72)

One may even go so far to call this economy of affection as a fundamental social logic, particularly as these institutions permeate social life and political life. It is more important who you know than what you know, sharing wealth is prioritized rather than investing wealth and helping your fellow man today generates returns tomorrow. These three notions can be called an essence of the economy of affection (Ibidem).

This economy can be said to diverge from both capitalism and socialism. Money is not the final goal of the day and the state is not the primary mechanism for redistributing wealth. The handshake is more important than the written contract; personal discretion is used to allocate resources rather than official policy. As such, one may claim it coexists with capitalism and socialism, helping individuals to get around these two systems. The economy of affection is invisible, leaving no formal or official trace and does not go into some system of registration. It frustrates policy makers and economists alike, leaving them no possible solutions to incorporate the economy of affection into their analysis or calculations (Ibidem).

2.5.3. Definition on Economy of affection

Definition:

“The easiest way of describing the economy of affection is to suggest that it is constituted by personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain.” (Hyden 2006:73)

It is important to note that many instances of investments may be incidental or a form of regularized behaviour, but not necessarily an institution. To approach public officials to obtain an illegal licence or piece of property, is probably not part of an informal institution, but exercising affective behaviour to achieve advantages. In the economy of affection however, informal institutions arises and a code of unwritten rules develop to guide their activities and sanctions of those who may break the rules (Hyden 2006:73-74)
2.5.4. Economy of affection in Nigeria

“As Barber writes about Yoruba society in south-western Nigeria:

[Yoruba society was] animated by a dynamic, competitive struggle for self-aggrandisement, which permeated the society from top to bottom. There was scope for people to create a place for themselves and expand it by their own efforts. Like the “Big Men” of New Guinea, they did it through the recruitment of supporters. A Yoruba proverb says, “I have money, I have people, what else is there that I have not got?” Money was one of the principal ways of gaining public acknowledgement as a big man; but “having people” constituted that acknowledgement itself.”

(Hyden 2006:74)

The economy of affection cannot be viewed as only a negative cultural institution. It also works as a medium for the attempt to reach a common good. Institutionalizing affective norms tend to work best in small communities. One example can be the rotating credit institutions, like “esusu” among the Yoruba in western Nigeria and “adaski” among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria (Hyden 2006:76).

The Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh was perhaps the first scholar to question some fundamental social science perspectives when it comes to African countries. He stated that these were characterized by a much higher level of tension between community and state (Hyden 2006:52). This view may be in accordance with the level of socio-professional friction existing in south-Sahara or the divide between the formal and informal.

In his insightful article “Colonialism and the Two publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” (Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol 17, no 1, pp 21-112.) Ekeh describes a breach in trust between the civil society and the states civil service. Local community based on social organization such as lineage, clan or tribe is a far more potent social security than the states civil service for the average African (Ekeh 1975:107). The duality between a primordial public and civic public creates an amoral orientation toward the civic, where corruption is looked upon as opportunity, while the primordial public realm is viewed as moral where corruption is harshly sanctioned (Ekeh 1975:110). The implications of these views are interesting. To look upon the state as legitimate prey, as Hyden also states, gives us some connotations why the political-criminal nexus is a possibility in Nigeria.
Pre-colonial Nigeria did not have the same emphasis on lineage or corporate entity as the post-colonial subject. People were relating to city-states, kingdoms or quasi-kingdoms. Others again centered themselves around the concept of village with no larger conceptions of political affiliation. The colonial project of drawing new ethnic map may even be responsible for much of the current languages (Ekeh 1975:105).

Important contemporary ethnic concepts like Yoruba or Ibo was strengthened through small nation-state-like projects, were prominent leaders of the groups toured Nigeria in an attempt to strengthen these ethnic-corporate entities. One may find instances where villages needed convincing that they were a part of the Ibo nation (Ibidem);

“In the 1930's many Aro and Onitsha Ibos consciously rejected identification as Ibos, preferring to think of themselves as separate, superior groups. The very term 'Yoruba' was popularized by Church Missionary Society leaders during the nineteenth century who were anxious to produce a Bible in a uniform language for several city-states that were warring against each other at the time.”
(Ekeh, 1975:105)

On the one hand, Nigeria is a federal state with a large variety of fragmented ethnic groups spread out over a geographical area. As Ekeh points out, these nations in themselves are partly a product of colonialism, disconnecting them from the concept of the Nigeria state, not only once, but doubly: firstly by a state that copies the geopolitical colonial project, secondly by the very loose and spurious segmenting of ethnic affiliation that was also attempted strengthened in colonial times, and in some instances even partly constructed.

The two publics, one civic and one primordial, harmonize with Hyden’s Economy of affection. On the one hand Africans “bend backwards”, as Ekeh describes it, to meet the needs and demands of their primordial publics, the civic only exists as a arena of resource without returning anything the other way. The colonial projects disconnect from its mother-country fermented the idea that the state was an overflowing horn of plenty that could never run out of funds; the civic public could never be impoverished. The primordial public, on the other hand, is pictured as an arena in need of careful care, even from the civic public itself (Ekeh 1975:107-108).
2.5.5. The particular case of southern-Sahara

In the period from the 1870s toward the beginning of the 1910s 110 million severely surprised subjects suddenly find themselves under a European flag. The chaotic and escalating way this colonization took place was named “torrschlusspanik” by the “iron”-Chancellor Bismarck, a way to describe the panic that broke out, between major European nation-states when the last uncolonized area of the world was up for grabs. After about 50 years of the colonial project delivering the three C’s (Christianity, civilization and commerce) among other things, the process reverses. A “scramble out of Africa” takes place in an even quicker break-neck pace, after the inherent ethical and economic problems regarding colonization became more and more clear. Most of Africa is de-colonized and “free” within 1968 (Greaves 1996:1111-1112).

Most of southern Sahara shares these historical characteristics, on one hand it may explain the level of basic cultural similarities between south Saharan countries, like in the Economy of affection, on the other hand it may also explain, in itself, the weighting on the informal rather than the formal. However, how can we not take into account the historical factors leading up to today’s contemporary situation? Hydens theory is based on these given historical factors leading up to an emphasis on the informal today (Hyden 2006:72). How can we then not use the economy of affection in connection with Nigerian organized crime?

We must also not forget that Hyden uses examples from Nigeria, like the Yoruba culture, in his chapter about economy of affection (Hyden 2006:74) and that his urban-rural links is exemplified from Nigeria and generalized loosely onward to Africa as a whole (Hyden 2006:77). Further, in the two chapters building up to economy of affection, the Nigerian sociologist Ekeh uses mainly Nigerian examples to explain his two publics, and his theory is perhaps one of the cornerstones in Hyden’s theoretical foundation for economy of affection.

On the one hand Hyden’s theory is exemplified often in the Nigerian context, on the other hand how can we not attempt to explain Nigerian OCN without looking at the particular historical context that has possibly lead up to economy of affection?
2.5.6. Concluding on Economy of affection

Hyden’s economy of affection together with Ekeh’s two publics gives us an important insight into socioeconomic structures in southern Sahara and Nigeria. People are important, not money directly, as money is a way to get stronger networks of people. Remembering Putnam’s points regarding the south in Italy, the same dynamics are in place, but not in the sense that it dominates the formal institutions to the same level. Hyden states that informal institutions are not unique to Africa, but their significance is particularly in play at this area.

Another question that rises when looking at Nettl, Ekeh and Hyden together is the question of ethnicity. The ethnically fragmented federation of Nigeria is an important factor when remembering Nettl’s point on Soviet-Russia and the United States. At the one hand the ethnic divide in a federation is problematic enough when it comes to the trust in a state without some project of super-identity like the Soviet or American dream. But tossing the economy of affection and its historical background into the mix, the implications can only be more severe. This in connection that organized crime thrives in the context of weak states that has little or no trust in its citizens as discussed in part 1.3.

Finally, the historic background for the contemporary south Saharan states and the Nigerian federation are probably unique. The level of change over so short a period of time in cornerstone institutions in society must have an impact not only leading to the economy of affection, but in some degree to the specific brand of Nigerian organized crime also. As Thompson pointed out in his metaphor toward class-relations, and Abrams used to explain historical method, we have here an example on how the machine have worked, the friction, the sound and the heat, that has led us up to the particular form of the Nigerian federation and Organized Criminal Networks have today.

2.6. Critique of sources

2.6.1. Introduction

In this part of the chapter we will look on the sources positive or negative credentials. The following table (table 2.6) will be divided broadly between scientific journals and books.
When it comes to books we have no other means to look for their qualities than the apparent level of citations that have already been done together with a more general view of the sources acceptance in science. When it comes to journals an important indicator of its qualities will be if it is at least under peer-review secondly the level of citation. Lastly we will also have a variable of significance for the thesis. Some of the texts in use are more important than others when it comes to underbuilding the central arguments in the thesis.

When it comes to level of citation, this is collected from the Google scholar search engine, because this is the most readily available and extensive data source connected to citations. This means, however, that we have to take the numbers with a large portion of salt. Probably, only very high levels of citation will give us any meaningful indicator on a source’s strengths and weaknesses as the scholar search engine only has a limited selection of citations to draw from.

Table 2.6. Sources

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2.6.2. Discussion of significant sources

Alan Block, “East Side–West Side: Organizing Crime in New York City”.
This text is significant because it lays the level of defining the concept of organized crime in the thesis, the connection between upper and lower level segments of society. All other organizational forms used in the thesis are all derived from this basic formula. When I use the loose criminal network form like the Nigerian, or the hierarchical organized form like, for example, the Italian, they all are based on Block’s concept of upper and lower level connection.

The text from the book used in the thesis does not show any blatant particular weaknesses. As a book its not peer reviewed, so we don’t have any clear way of deeming it clearly accepted or approved of on a scientific level.

Ebbe, O. “Political-Criminal Nexus: The Nigerian Case: Slicing Nigeria’s 'National Cake’”
This text is significant in the way it connects the social network factor to Nigeria, and the particular level social networks play in Nigeria. It does not enjoy a particular high level of citation, still, the journal is peer-reviewed, and this should involve at least a competent level of scientific quality.

Ekeh, P. “Colonialism and the Two publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement”
The text has been around for 35 years, and is still relevant for discussion of African Politics and society. It is important to the thesis as it gives the particular view of a Nigerian on the case of the colonial background and the institutions formed by the very same colonial past.

Hyden, G. “African Politics in Comparative Perspective”
This is maybe the most important text for the thesis. As a book we cannot clearly state that its quality is undisputed, however, the text seems to enjoy an acceptance in African-sphere science. Mamdani have criticised the book for giving a wrong view on the “uncaptured” peasant class of the rural. This is however not significant to the thesis as the class relations from the urban and rural is not an important part of the discussion. This may perhaps also stem from Mamdani’s research primarily being based in east-Africa and Hyden’s in west-Africa. The book seems to have an acceptable level of citations. We may however criticise Hyden for a very broad general analysis for vast areas that is cultural fragmented.
Mamdani, M. “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism”
A classic within African political theory, this text also shows its scientific acceptance through its high level of citations. The book is important for the thesis as it is another significant argument how the colonial past form the present shape of African politics as both Ekeh and Hyden argues. Just like Hyden’s book, it may however suffer from generalizing vast fragmented cultural areas.

Mazzitelli, A. “Transnational organized crime in West Africa: the additional challenge”
Important for the thesis as it gives us a set of indicators to describe west-African and Nigerian forms of criminal-networks. Comes from a peer-reviewed journal, and that Mazzitelli is head of the regional office for Central and West Africa of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), gives us at least an indicator that he is competent in the field he is describing.

Implicit important through the one connection between other forms of Organized crime and Nigerian Criminal networks that was significant: Social Networking. Comes from a peer-reviewed journal and seems to be an accepted work of scientific level.

Nettl, J. P. “The State as a Conceptual Variable”
This is an old and tested text that has very good credentials. Important for the text in its discussion around the state-concept that we connect to the weak-state connected to organized crime discussion, and the particular problems of African states.

Putnam, R. “Making Democracy Work: Civil Traditions in Modern Italy”
Classic text that enjoys a seemingly high level of citations. Gives an important insight into how the economy of affection also is in place in Europe.

Is important for the text since it gives us some rare detailed insights into the way Nigerian Criminal Networks dynamics works in society. Is a collective work between groups of
scientist within the field, and must as such be deemed a work of scientific quality and relevance.

2.7. Conclusion

We have in this chapter gone through the analytic tools we need to both make a foundation for discussion and a more extensive discourse of comparison. We have also gone through the source material in use in the thesis, looking out for apparent strengths or weaknesses.

It is important to outline the links and red threads extending from each of the articles described in this chapter of methodology. We can see how Ekeh’s point is connected to the works of Nettl and Putnam in his description of a divided public like Putnam’s institutionalized corruption in southern Italy, and the fragmented federation and its inherent problems connected to Nettl’s theory. Ekeh is also a cornerstone in Hyden’s Economy of affection, and both authors use Nigeria as an important case for their conclusions. We have therefore already set up a framework to use in the comparison of Nigerian and other forms of organized criminal networks through Nettl, Putnam, Ekeh and Hyden.

JSS Mill gives us the basic comparative tools to achieve an adequate level of comparative analysis. Through method of agreement we will try to procure a set of factors that seems to be connected in other forms of organized crime than the Nigerian type. After establishing this given set of factors we will compare these against indicators describing the Nigerian form. Through the method of difference we will then try to isolate the particular factors setting the Nigerian brand aside from other forms of organized crime. We will then try to find plausible causal explanations to why these particular factors have occurred in the first place.

The chain of theoretic support is important to underline regarding the structure of methodology in this thesis. First of all Nettl establishes a foundation for discussing the inherent problems in the concept of state, and the particular fragmentation in place in third world countries. Nettl’s three perspectives shed a particular light on the fundamental problems of a Nigerian Federation. Putnam shows us the forms this fragmentation can take in his example in the divided Italy. Both of these authors build a foundation for Ekeh’s specific theory regarding the two publics in place in Africa and Nigeria. When we put these three
authors theory and case-specific problems together, we have a sound foundation under Hyden’s Economy of Affection, and strengthens it plausibility and causal significance for its use to analyse Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks.
CHAPTER THREE

3. COMPARATIVE FORMS OF ORGANIZED CRIME

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter we will describe the more well known forms of organized crime to prepare for a possible comparative analysis against the Nigerian form. The best described is the Italian brand. A further supportive basis for the assumptions and conclusions made around the Italian brand of organized crime (OC) can be found in part 2.2 of the Thesis. We will also describe a selection of other types like the Chinese, Russian and Japanese. After describing these modes of organized crime we will attempt to find the common factors that can be found in all the abovementioned forms of OC. This will be done by using JSS Mill’s method of agreement described in part 2.3.2. Having established some common factors that explain some of the underlying mechanics forming organized crime, we will then attempt to draw up a chart of possible causal connections in the last part of this chapter. The theory used in describing the forms of organized crime will be divided between social network theory, trust-theory and an economic perspective to get a broader academic input on the cases. The chronological order of the chapter will follow social networks, Guanxi networks, trust-theory and an economic perspective because we are out to try explaining some of the mechanics behind other forms of Organized crime rather than the national-type of OC groups themselves.

3.2. Organized crime: A social network approach.

Within organized crime we find three major paradigms in modern criminology: the first assumes that organized crime is best understood as a functional organization, a reflection of institutional approaches of the 1960s, as well as the government hearings that gave the first glimpse into the organized crime world with the Kefauver and McClelland committees (Mcillwain1999: 303). The second discards the formality of the institutional approach and focuses on exchange relationship between those with power and those who need access to the
very same power. This paradigm originated during the 1970s. It is connected to the fields of anthropology and, in a smaller sense, political science that focuses on patron client relationships. The third paradigm, moves away from both the institutional approach and the exchange relationship perspective moving in the direction of the economic sciences established in the 1980s. This paradigm focuses on the business model of organized crime in itself, rather than the internal mechanics forming it (Ibidem).

Mcillwain, in his article, proposes a common denominator for all three is human relationships; particular the human process of social networking (Mcillwain1999: 304).

3.2.1. Social networking

In the 1950s anthropologists found it necessary to find a further explanation to peoples social patterns in urban settings. Social organization could not be explained by economics, religion, politics, kinship etc. alone. Another common denominator was found; the very basic social level of formation of relationships. Looking at individual’s social role, status and position together with the inevitability of formation of relationships among these actors, one could conclude that the basic foundation of relationship-forming formed gateways to political and economic power for all involved. An important part of an actors tools of achieving his goals will therefore be the social network itself (Ibidem).

Social networks can be explained as:

“The relational structure of a group or larger social system consisting of the pattern of relationships among the collection of actors”
(Mcillwain 1999:304-305)

Actors and actions are therefore not singular objects, but inherently dependent on each other through linkage or relational ties, which in itself forms the channel of constraint and opportunity of individual action (Mcillwain1999:305). We can hardly maintain the notion that social networks are exclusive to the upper society; it must also be manifested in the underworld in some degree.
3.2.2. **Criminal networks, social networks**

Alan Block termed the view on organized crime as “The social system of organized crime” (Mcillwain1999: 307). He founded the idea on his historical research into the organized crime groups in New York city;

“…Organized crime is a phenomenon recognizable by reciprocal services performed by professional criminals, politicians, and clients. Organized crime is thus understood to lie in the relationships binding members of the underworld to upperworld institutions and individuals…” Alan Block, 1994:10.

Block also saw the loose connections that protected one of the three elements – criminal, clients or politicians – to be away from criminal conspiracy or some variant of corruption. Block used the term “organized criminality” to discern these specific cases. This allows a differentiation between the system in itself and the innumerable possibilities in such a system (Mcillwain1999: 307).

3.2.3. **Sicily; ethnicity and culture**

Ethnicity has always been an important aspect in the study of organized crime. When an discussion or analysis of organized crime takes place, it is always an issue to brand the subject with some ethnic pointer like “Russian” or “Italian” (Mcillwain1999: 308). Jay Albanese terms this construction as the ethnicity trap. This trap is sprung when organized crime is described “in terms of the nature of the groups that engage in it”, instead of the very substance of the organized crime itself. The question regarding how the substance or nature of the organized criminal groups influence the activity of the group itself, may be a good place to use social networking analysis as a tool to get an answer (Ibidem). Mcillwain here uses the theory of Anton Blok’s¹ book “the Mafia of a Sicilian village, 1860 -1960” 1975. Blok living in a Sicilian village called Genuardo proposes an answer to the conditions that Mafiosi became a powerful force in the west Sicilian hinterlands (Mcillwain1999: 308).

¹ Not to be mixed with Alan Block
The private use of unlicensed violence is the core tool and means of control in the public arena:

“The mafia supergang is a simplifying fiction, invented by publicists and by fascist officials charged with eliminating southern lawlessness. On the other hand, there really are Mafiosi – men wielding power through the systematic use of private violence. The sum of their actions makes up the phenomenon called mafia.”

(Mcillwain1999: 309)

Mcillwain therefore states that the Mafia depends on a certain set of connected economic and political factors. Who and where the mafia is, are then not the important question, but rather the connections between private violence and the political-economic life (Mcillwain1999: 309). The connections between Mafiosi, landlords, bandits, peasants and many other individuals, forms the horizon which the Mafia is constrained in action. These interdependencies cannot be disassociated from the individuals forming them. Instead of freezing the villages sociological context in a specific point in time, one tries to use a broader historical axis to better point out the specific factors underlying the Mafia concept, and therefore look at the long-term process of origin and waning from the village, the growing impact of economic factors, the increase of population, the proletarization of large sectors of the peasantry, upward and downward social movement, urbanization, diaspora and state formation. (Mcillwain1999: 310-311).

One result of historical analysis is the notion of the Mafiosi as a “political middleman” (Mcillwain1999:311). He concludes that the Mafiosi differ in at least two aspects; they exploit the loose couplings between the rural community and society rather then stop the pipelines of information. They exploit these venues of communication, and block other attempts at making the same connections. Secondly, the Mafiosi use threat and violence to cement their position (Ibidem). This allows them to serve as brokers of information and services between the various community groups and other groups at the Italian national level. In other words, the mafia inserts itself into the strata of society as a broker of information, defending this position through means of violence and powerbroking (Ibidem).
3.2.4. From nations to globalism

It would be problematic to say the least to suggest that only Western society was home to the fabric of social networks. One constant hypothesis regarding the dynamic relationship between the state and organized crime is that the level of strength and penetration of the state institutions will determine the level of organized crime. A weak state opens for alternative systems of power, or a local organization of society that stands on the outside of the state (Sung 2004:112, Gambetta 1996:4, Rabasa and Chalk 2001:(1, 65), Varese 1997:594, Bandiera 2003:222). However in the contemporary context, the global arena of transnational crime becomes more and more important because of another power-vacuum; the process of globalization. The very same networks of communication coupled with an increasing level of international trade, communication and travel gives the organized crime a new dimension to revel in. The global arena is somewhat new\(^1\), but most importantly not set under a single constricting set of rules or scrutiny by any single global institution. The global arena still works as a conglomerate of nation actors that constantly brokers for position and power. Just as the mafia in a Sicilian village puts itself into particular channels of communication and exploits these, the very same channels are ready for the taking on the global arena in a vacuum of global power (Myers 1996:182).

3.2.5. Global social networks

Social networking goes hand in hand with the understanding of cultures codes and norms, therefore building up a mutual trust that is needed in a criminal franchise (Mcillwain1999:316-317). Cross-cultured criminal networks are also a viable model. The Cairo based Zakarian organisation of the late-1920s is an example of this. An organisation that changed and intermingled cultures with a diversity spanning French, Austrian, Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, Armenian, Polish and Swiss (Mcillwain1999:317).

Another example could be the U.S. senates subcommittee on Investigations scrutinized the role of organized crime on the international drug trade. They found a network spanning 400 actors:

\(^1\) At least as academic concept
“Marseilles (20), Le Havre (4), Paris (21), Milan (8), Genoa (2), Naples (4), Rome (4), Sicily (23), Turkey (13), Beirut (11), Montreal (25), Toronto (10), Buffalo (8), Boston (9), New York City (86), Connecticut (6), Philadelphia/Camden (4), Baltimore (3), Washington, D.C./Fairfax County (9), Miami (12), Atlanta (4), New Orleans (6), St. Louis (3), Cleveland (5), Detroit (6), Chicago (36), Omaha (3), Kansas City (11), Tulsa (1), Dallas (5), Houston (8), Brownsville (1), San Antonio (1), El Paso (1), Denver (4), Seattle (4), Portland (4), San Francisco (15) and Los Angeles (13).” (Mcallwain1999:318-319).

What social dynamic could contrive to bring such a broad expanse of cultures together in a trust-dominated franchise like organized crime? Spanning roles like producers, refiners, importers, exporters and enforcers tied together in an complex web of relational ties further based in an extensive social system of organized crime (Mcallwain1999:319).

3.2.6. Concluding on Mcallwain's social networks

Mcallwain agrees that patron-client relations perspective and the formation of informal and formal criminal organization, are useful tools in the analytics of organized crime or criminal networks. He however implies that the social networking perspective may be a more fruitful lens to view and understand the phenomenon Human relations form the least common denominator of organized crime (Ibidem). Social networking becomes the cornerstone in the dynamics of contriving to achieve resource through criminal means. The network spans the “upperworld” and “underworld” arenas, and put both official and criminal elements together in a mutual pursue of financial benefit through illegal means. The networks are never static, but change constantly, adapting and expanding due to internal and external pressure or change. The networks appear in different dynamics and postures in different cultures. Time and space are also spanned by the networks, giving the means to work the criminal methods in a global sphere (Mcallwain1999:319-320).
3.3. The Guanxi connection

The peoples republic of China do not appear to be a weak state, however the Chinese organized crime groups may be the most potent organization on the global arena (Myers 1996:183). Some estimates over the fiscal scale on Chinese organized criminal networks, through the traditional Guanxi networks\(^1\), show an economic turnover around $320 billion dollars per annum (Ibidem). This is probably unparalleled in the global organized crime arena today. Why are the Chinese criminal networks so dominating globally and financially when at the same time origins from a seemingly strong state? Evidence even suggests that the Russian Mafia and Colombian cartels have used the Chinese global transportation and distribution networks (Myers 1996:185). There are 3 factors that possibly constitute the fundament of Chinese organized crime; firstly the guanxi networks and the social implications this implies itself, second the history of Chinese migration and diaspora together with the trade networks this has created, finally the recent development in globalizational economics and the problematic relation to Taiwan.

3.3.1. Guanxi networks

Chinese are brought up in a hierarchically based society that emphasizes the importance of the network or connections to other people instead of using the individual as the smallest common denominator. The network functions as an ever-expanding web of relations consisting of mutual obligate bonds of varying strength (Ibidem). The Chinese term for this concept is Guanxi, which is built on inter-personal relationships that are naturally present and others must be acquired, maintained and built upon. The dynamics of this bond is then placed between the favor that is carried out by either party (renquing) and the repayment for this favor (bao), these two factors must then be balanced. The favors rendered do not alone signify the entire dynamic. The strength and size of each interacting persons guanxi-network also plays into the dynamic, giving a total picture for each actor to what he may pay and what he may get back from the transaction. All these considerations will then tell an actor if the bond of guanxi will be mutually beneficial or not (Myers 1996:185-186).

\(^1\) An ancient form of Chinese social networking, also manifested globally today.
3.3.2. **Guanxi origins**

One plausible reason for informal networks dominating the Chinese cultural sphere in an apparent strong state context is the communist centralized government largely recent appearance through the Republic of China in 1912, and most important the social state of China in 1949. Guanxi networks seem to only in part to have been exacerbated by the centralized government, and in some instances involving senior officials not at all (Myers 1996:190).

The family is the nexus and origin of the guanxi. In Chinese families all resources are shared according to needs. Each family’s individual is therefore required to contribute to the shared pool in his or her means, and given back according to need (Myers 1996:186). For example, when one family member gets to old to contribute, the male children take on the burden of supporting them. The inherent strength of these family bonds gives us an understanding why Chinese criminal networks emulate these (Ibidem). Guangdong and Fujian, southeast China, is the origin of the bulk of the Chinese global diaspora. Single surname-villages and lineage villages are common, making a powerful incentive for Global Guanxi relations (Ibidem).

Western influence does not seem to displace or change the workings of the Guanxi, but instead seems adamant in its structure and functionality. This also gives an insight into the deep-rootedness of the Guanxi networks, and the power of influence it has had over Chinese society through times (Myers 1996:187). One apparent difference between the east west spheres in this regard is the position of the rule of law. In the west, the rule of law is the very arbiter between individuals in most conflict situations, maybe even a fundamental expression of moral values. In China the Guanxi network among, other factors, serves as the same arbiter, marginalizing the legal system, and even influencing its decisions in ways that in the west would be looked upon as a corruption of the legal system (Myers 1996:188). This Chinese dynamic between the legal sphere and the informal sphere blurs the boarders between what is criminal and what is legal (Ibidem). For example if a criminal group provides resources not otherwise obtainable they become institutionalized into society. Further, in the Global arena, the state may utilize criminal networks as a cover for maintaining national interests abroad (Ibidem).
To draw a broad sketch of the Guanxi networks level of involvement one may look at it as a nexus that permeates the family, social, commercial, governmental, military or criminal in mutual bonds of trust and service. As such, tongs, lineage, guilds, associations, partnerships and conspiracies are constant in social, commercial, familial and criminal context (Ibidem).

The Guanxi effect is also a stabilizing factor between diaspora criminal groups and Chinese based groups, serving as a line of communication and equalizer between these that in a western law perspective should be in a competitive stance against each other. This is the main factor why Chinese criminal networks are potentially the greatest threat to global security and law enforcement. The Russian, Colombian, Italian organized criminal groups are all splintered in competition through different cartels and groupings, making it easier for law enforcements to suppress these threats than the Chinese (Myers 1996:189).

3.3.3. The Chinese diaspora

The Chinese ethnic groups is one of the most widely spread groups today, if not the most (Ibidem). There are 55 million based in most countries, with a GNP close to $450 billion. The great dispersal took place in the colonial times that divided China, and as mentioned before, the majority of these migrants came from Chinas south coast; Fujian and Guangdong (Ibidem).

Fujian, which is one of the smaller Han-provinces the size of Nicuragua, has historically strong ties with the seas and international trade through times (Myers 1996: 189-190). Contrary to the long separation between the overseas Fukinese and their ancestral kin on mainland China, the ties are powerful and unbroken to this day (Myers 1996:190). Under the cultural revolution, areas with such ties where singled out for an especial harsh treatment and confiscation of resource. This led for example to the migration of the people who formed the 14k triad\(^1\) in Hong Kong (Ibidem).

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\(^1\) The 14k Triad group is based in Hong Kong but active internationally. It is the second largest Triad group in the world with around 20,000 members split into thirty subgroups (Gastrow 2003, Chu 1997).
The Cantonese from the Guangdong province went or were transported around the world (Myers 1996:191). While the Fukinese dominate the southeast Asian sphere, the Cantonese and Yun speaking Chinese dominate United States and Canada. They were forced by law and circumstance to live in closed societies\(^1\) working in mines and railroad construction later to become entrepreneurs much like the Fukinese in Southeast Asia (Ibidem).

The same patterns of discrimination and geographical enclosure that riddled both ethnic groups lead to a general practice of Guanxi by the overseas Chinese as the tool to obtain access to resource in a vertically structured society (Myers 1996:192). With this practice came the same bonds of mutual obligation, marginalization of the legal sphere, and the connection between the legal and illegal dimension. Through recent events the pattern and implication of the global Guanxi network is formed:

“With the joinder of these globally distributed Chinese societies and the replacement of political barriers with open trade, investment and communication, the opportunistic criminal groups institutionalized within each individual society possessed the conditions necessary to become transnational in scope and to engage in activities requiring globally distributed resources.” (Myers 1996:193)

3.3.4. **Hei Shehui**

Roughly translated, Hei Shehui means “Black Society”. It is generally applied to the groups or people that operate in the obscure line between legal and illegal. One may divide these groups into two main categories according to focus and nature. Some groups/networks may of course be involved in activities at the same time on a local, regional and global scale. The first category involves groups that mainly criminal activity such as: manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs, kidnapping and sale of women and children for the sex trade, extortion, armed robbery, and contract murder (Myers 1996:193). The second category is the economic gangs which involve themselves in the monetary exchange market, goods and services through the tool of public corruption. Within and working across these categories are

\(^1\) The cultural and symbolic concept of "China Towns" in the USA.
the Triads. Triads may be defined as connections within large or small Guanxi networks, and the convergence of these (Ibidem).

3.3.5. Concluding on Myers

While the very numbers being thrown around can be questioned, and scales on organized crime that lack any solid basis but approximations, the very notion around Guanxi networks are an interesting factor to connect to Mcillwains hypothesis, which he does in his 1999 article. Putting numbers and quantification aside, the important part the Guanxi networks plays, both as lines of communication and premise for mutual obligation, fits the picture when one tries to see some of the fundamental dynamics of organized crime. We also perhaps have to dispel the notion that the Chinese socialist state is a strong one taking into account the arguments around corruption and the way Guanxi networks permeates the government administration. Perhaps China suffers from the same symptoms the Soviet state did. The old feudal structures were co-opted into the new structures forming the central party, which appeared as a new form of nobility, de facto changing society’s power structure in a limited way.

3.4. Public distrust: Mafia

3.4.1. Origins of Mafia

“In addition, the mafia is exemplary of those cases where the public interest lies in collapsing rather than building internal trust and cooperation.” (Gambetta 2000:158).

In the Italian period of the 16th and 17th century the Habsburg Spanish dominion exerted a “divide and conquer” policy involving marginalizing commerce and production, manipulation of information, igniting religious superstition and establishing vertical bonds of submission and exploitation (Ibidem.) The destruction of legal principles of equality and overturning the relationships between sexes may be viewed as a concerted promotion of distrust (Gambetta 2000:158-159).
If the former Aragonese rule should be viewed as a more trust-based or ideal, is questionable. Alexis de Toqueville's journey from Naples to Sicily sketches an apparent adjustment instead of rebellion against the system of Habsburg-Spain (Gambetta 2000:159).

The Bourbon Spanish period from 1724 to the unification of Italy in 1861 continued in the same tracks as the Habsburg regime, fostering a split between the Sicilians and Neapolitans. Why this system prevailed in a hybrid form so long afterwards is difficult to ascertain, however its interesting to note that only 11 years after Toqueville's partial narrative is written an official report mentions for the first time the term “Mafia” as an established social force (Gambetta 2000:160). A Tuscan landowner, Leopoldo Franchetti, implies in a political administrative analysis in 1876, that the mafia in the 19th century has characteristics that reminds strongly of the dynamics of the mafia today, and implies the same patterns spanning over 100 years (Ibidem). He identifies two main sets of factors for the formation of the mafia:

“The first is eminently political and has to do with the absence of credible or effective systems of justice and law enforcement. From at least the time of the sixteenth century (Cancila 1984), Sicilians were able to trust neither the fairness nor the protection of the law. This pre-existing state of affairs caused considerable difficulties to the newly formed Italian state, which, in spite of its weakness and its mistakes, might otherwise have claimed the right to a far higher degree of legitimation than any of the previous regimes.”

(Gambetta 2000:160)

The second set focuses on economic instead of political trust. The distrust of the state, with its involvement in economic affairs, achieves to close of the vent that private entrepreneurship may produce (Gambetta 2000:161). A possible third factor in play may be the opportunities in social mobility.

The public perception of the mafia maintains the view that the Mafiosi gives out the very same order and justice that the Spanish eroded (Ibidem). The mafia also focuses in the premise of exclusivity; the term “Cosa Nostra” means “our thing” not yours. The enforcements on monopolies and tolerate no competition and insert themselves into segments of society that most easily are open for the opportunity of monopolization like land, cattle,

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1 Alexis-Charles-Henri Clérel de Tocqueville (1805-1859)

The very action that is most commonly associated to the mafia is enforcements of monopolies of legal goods through violence. The boundary between protection from real or fictitious threats is a blurred and undefined one, as such it is difficult to put ones finger on the actions as purely criminal, but rather in between in a grey zone (Ibidem).

The mafia is far from a rural concept. The urban sphere has also been the arena of mafia-based criminal activity. In this bourgeoisie setting, the line between private and public interest becomes unclear, and the middle class find themselves in close connection to the criminal element, and favours or services are exchanged (Ibidem).

The formation of a formal mafia organization is a recent event, but originally the connections were probably uncertain and erratic between monopolies, which at times were in conflict to each other, ignored the other mafia-groups or cooperated. The limitation to the monopoly in itself was another, equally or more strong or determined. One reason for a more strongly organized mafia-system is probably the effects of competition pushing out the smaller and weaker monopolies, leading to a more strongly organized and widespread mafia. Even though these organizations have achieved a higher level of streamlined franchise, it has never reached a stage of healthy cooperation over longer period of time (Ibidem). No single super-monopoly has been formed, nor has the mafia dissolved wholesale, but only sustained a chaotic balance of force (Gambetta 2000:163).

The inherent tool of the mafia is then of the concept trust, or rather the apparent guile of trust in a background of distrust. Trust in mafia-systems then seems fruitful for the individual but in a collective scale becomes a negative factor when looking at the society as a whole. The trust becomes a commodity of scarcity because as one trust a given set of people, the distrust of others is subtracted in the mafia-based system of trust-relations (Ibidem).

The mechanisms that have sustained the mafia over longer periods of time are both intended and unintended. The latter involves the context of a legitimate authority that is not there. In such a context, the choice of the individual when trying to stay out of the mafia-system is limited to lying low or migrating all together, forming a further background of distrust. As
mafia opposed individuals depart the scene, the strength of the mafia grows further. This effect is undoubtedly unintended, because the mafia-individuals goals when they depart, is surely not to enforce the mafia’s strength (Ibidem).

Another more partially unintentional factor, is the democratic state in itself, which is of course hostile to such an alternative power to itself, the mafia sustains itself in such a system by mobilizing votes. One possible way to break the mafia-system is to deliver a stable economic arena of credit and produce, this is however utopian in an economic setting based on monopolies (Gambetta 2000: 163-164).

The example of the authoritarian South Korean rule that would not allow local monopolies to exist could be compared to the fascist period of Italy. Simply put, a bigger and more independent mafia that marginalizes the smaller. In contrast democracy has to rely on consensus to rule. One effect of this period could be the further distrust of centralized governments suddenly poaching in on the local arena. Connecting this with the rise of democracy, the majority of Italians could agree that it was at least better with mafia than fascism. At any level the attempts at dissolving the mafia is therefore caught between two opposing poles, that of using too little force, or too much, and by that limiting civil liberties (Gambetta 2000:164).

3.4.2. **Cooperation or distrust**

“The mechanisms which motivate cooperation in any form of human endeavour, as Bernard Williams explains elsewhere in this volume, comprise four basic elements: coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds. People, that is, may decide to cooperate (1) for fear of sanctions; (2) because cooperation enhances their mutual economic interests; (3) because they have general reasons, whether cultural, moral or religious, to believe that cooperation is good irrespective of sanctions and rewards; and finally (4) because they are related to one another by bonds of kin or friendship.” (Gambetta 2000:164)

The mafia learnt their lesson well and use all four elements in their criminal and semi-criminal systems (Ibidem).
Gambetta limits himself to the first to elements in his article: coercion and mutual economic interest.

“It so happens that a person who would be prepared to make very great sacrifices in order to stop the domination of violence, is compelled to support it, strengthen it and associate with it. … He cannot think to resort to the law, because the probability of being shot for those who do so is far too high for him to expose himself lightly … External circumstances impose themselves on everyone, irrespective of the inclinations of his mind (Franchetti 1974: 106-7).” (Gambetta 2000: 165)

The opportunity in using violence direct or perceived, is a form of mafia behaviour that is well known. It may be the very factor that splinters the mafia from other similar quasi-criminal systems, using it outside to take care of “business” and inside to keep the level of disruption and disloyalty at a minimum. The very act of violence does not have to go any further than an initial act, as the very reputation or “basta la fama”, sustains the criminal onwards as a perceived threat by posturing as a violent actor (Ibidem).

The connection between violence and other mechanisms suitable for inducing cooperation is threefold. Firstly the very factors that can be substituted by violence, or traded for violence; (1) values – larger quantities of “omerta” ensure lesser ones for violence; (2) interests – which can be cultivated by cooperation and take away the need for violence; (3) personal bonds – relatives and friends are more likely to cooperate and takes away some demands on violence to keep them under control. The relationship of mutual reinforcement: greater levels of “omerta” take away the risk in using violence, strengthening both omerta and the ability to use violence in a reinforcing spiral. Also, when higher levels of violence is expected, the more likely “omerta” will be followed to the point where the “omerta” becomes unclear if it is followed in faith or fear. At the same time, fulfilling common economic interests are connected to the level of possible violence which can be distributed, therefore strengthening the coopting economic bonds at the same time (Ibidem).

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1 Roughly translated as ”code of silence”, (Gardaphe, 1997)
There is also a third contradictory relationship between coercion and cooperation. When levels of violence gets to high, while still imposing paranoia in some, others who are the recipients of a saturated level of violence, can lead to revenge and a total breach of “omerta”. One case could be that of Tommaso Buscetta, who in 1983, decided to give all information he had on the mafia-system, after half his family was murdered. His confession led to a trial of nearly 500 persons (Ibidem).

Violence in itself will therefore never be enough to sustain a mafia-based criminal system or organization. Explaining the mafia through that factor alone is unsatisfactory (Gambetta 2000:165-166). Cooperation must be based on further sets of factors, for example economic interests. The connections between the mafia-systems and the public sphere are broad: corruption of civil servants, exchange of favours for electoral support or the handling of labour disputes for the benefit of entrepreneurs and landowners. But they may also be remote and form lose couplings to the core of the violence-based mafia system; when private citizens are offered good terms for interest rates to invest in informal banking systems in a information-weak context. Thus the complexity of the mafia network spans the direct violence connected crime to rational opportunities for private citizens (Gambetta 2000:166).

3.4.3. The importance of trust-relations

The role of the “victim” also becomes unclear as some benefits can be discerned in the mafia – citizen relationship. Even as an individual suffer extortion or other non-benefactory conditions in a mafia system, he may get advantages through the mafias handling of information. As a “friend” of the mafia in an economic-market sphere with low capacity for information, the risk for being cheated in business deals lowers. The absence of information in a business field diminish the level of trust between actors, seriously hampering level of produce and exchange in the market. The mafia is then a possible solution for the market to meet some of the actor’s expectations:

“I bought a dead horse who does not know his way around, wants to follow only the roads he likes, slips and falls on slopes, fears squibs and bells, and yesterday he fledged and crashed into a flock of sheep that was barring the way. A camorrista [the Neapolitan version of a mafioso] who protects me and used to control the horse market, would have spared me from
this theft. He used to check on the sales and get his tip from both buyers and sellers. Last year I wanted to get rid of a blind horse and he helped me to sell it as a good one, for he protected me. Now he is in jail and I was forced to buy this bad horse without him. He was a great gentleman! (quoted by Monnier [1863]1965: 73-4)” (Gambetta 2000:166).

In the absence of the mafia-connection the coachman’s business suffers, as he is literary saddled with a bad horse. It is interesting to see the role of the Mafioso in this particular context as his position as a guarantor the exchange would probably never take place at all. In a situation with only these three actors; Mafioso, seller and buyer, paradoxically the transaction would leave every party better off. There is however rarely only one seller in a market, and the Mafioso picks out a particular set of vendors for his guarantee. Why does not the Mafioso extend his guarantee and connections of trust to every vendor on the market? One probable reason may be that the Mafioso then becomes much more visible to the public scrutiny, making him more vulnerable and breaking some of the tenets of the omerta. The implications of the select few who benefits from the mafia connections does have a detrimental effect on the market as actor need to put more time on finding possible mafia-connections or even become a mafia-cluster by themselves (Gambetta 2000:166-167).

3.4.4. Concluding on trust

The instance with the coachman and his horse may give us the picture to draw the assumption that a subtle message from the mafia is also at play. Whoever is not under the mafia’s protection is in risk of getting bad deals. The Mafioso can then be said to have an interesting in regulated injections of distrust into the market to foster a demand for the very product he sells: protection. If actors could trust each other contrary to the mafia’s involvement the middleman role of the mafia would be superfluous. The context of distrust is then the mafia’s biosphere in which they thrive (Gambetta 2000:167).

Thus injecting and fermenting distrust is the very factor that has empowered the Italian mafia over such lengths of time. Pushing aside why distrust is generated, as soon as it comes into play, every buyer in the market seeks ways and opportunities to get past it, and riding away on a good horse instead of a bad one. The seller then priorities selling the horse, and even better: selling a bad one. To seek connections to the Mafioso and by that getting clear of distrust can
then hardly be called an irrational action. The implications of such a system is however severe: high murder rates, higher costs of transactions, lower levels of technological innovation other than “military” innovation, migration of the best human capital, higher rates of cheating, low quality of goods and services, and this concoction of distrust and trust-based mafia brokering is the reason why southern Italy has been kept the way it is (Gambetta 2000:167).

3.5. The economic view: mafia through land reform

“The mafia is, essentially, nothing but the expression of a need for order, for the control of a State.” Giovanni Falcone
(Bandiera 2003:218)

The Sicilian mafia seems to have merged in during the 19th century in period of predatory attacks on private property together with the lack of public security. The mafia then sold what the state could not provide: Protection and enforcement of property rights. One of the more important events taking place before the emergence of the mafia was the termination of feudalism and the splintering of large feudal estates that lead to the establishment of modern property rights and a vast increase of landholders (Bandiera 2003:219).

When the expansion of actors in the land and agricultural sphere increased, the opportunities for a mafia-system rose exponentially;

“The theoretical argument rests on the fact that protection involves an externality, because by buying protection, each landowner deflects thieves on others’ properties. For each landlord, protection is therefore more valuable if he is one of the few to receive it, which implies that each landlord is willing to pay more if only a few receive protection. As the number of landlords increases, there are more landlords who would pay to keep some out, which imply that the surplus received by the mafia increases with the degree of land fragmentation.”
(Bandiera 2003:219)

Even though the very product (agricultural land) that is the basis for protection is unchanged, the competition rises steadily as more landowners seek to protect their particular interest. By seeking protection for their assets, the thieves are further pushed into new unguarded land
parcels, creating a steady rise in demand for protection. The mafia will also leave “open” some possibilities of exploitation of the lands they protect, and by that not deliver a “total” security to their clients. As such the landowners get stuck in a classical prisoners dilemma, were everybody would be better off if no one sought protection in the first place, and yet seeking protection was the common solution for most landowners (Bandiera 2003:220).

Land protection is of course only one of the schemes of the mafia. Cartel protection (a relevant example could be protection of miller cartels) is an activity that has been enforced steadily from the mafia’s origins to this day (Bandiera 2003:219-220).

3.5.1. Russian mafia and yakuza comparisons

The yakuza probably developed in post-feudal Japan, which just as Russia and Sicily had a dramatic increase in private property rights not followed by a strengthening of the states security capacity to enforce such a expansion of property rights. This is also discussed in the article by Millhaupt and West (Millhaupt 2000: 44-46), and Varese (Varese 2001: 188-189). And as in other similar instances, there were groups of hoodlums and unemployed samurai capable of supplying the vacuum of security (Bandiera 2003:221).

Even today, the states lack of proper security in some instances lead the yakuza to provide enforcement in categories such as; dispute mediation, real estate foreclosure, corporate monitoring, lending, and crime control. Millhaupt and west made a data collection to try to show the strength of their hypothesis. Their result may indicate that through 25 years, yakuza membership is negatively related to the quantity of civil cases filed in district court, thus giving some strength to the hypothesis of the yakuza providing some substitute for state enforcement (Bandiera 2003:221-222)

The Russian mafia probably started during the transition from a planned communist economy to a free market structure according to Varese (Varese 2001:186-188). Institutional reforms created a diffusion of private property without the state providing the necessary follow up security capacity, thus creating a strong demand for private security. Much like the Sicilian feudal guards, ex-KGB officers and unemployed soldiers were available and in position to meet such demands. A survey form 2001 shows the general acceptance by Russian
shopkeeper that protection rackets are substitutes for the lack of proper policing (Bandiera 2003:222).

3.5.2. What is the difference between a state and a mafia?

“Without love and justice, governments become a magnum latrocinium – a band of robbers (Mans 1962: 95; De Civitate Dei IV.4). For Augustine justice is the essence of the State, and the essence of justice is the amor Dei.” (Dreyer 2005: 885).

Considering that the mafia had a monopoly on violence and its origins stems from the franchise of private property protection, the analysis of the start of the mafia resonates with the origins of state, how many positive comparisons could be made? Two key issues should be scrutinized in view of the question; the origins of the state and the start of the mafia differs in one important factor. Firstly, the state is linked to the origins of the rights the very same state is meant to enforce. The mafia, on the other hand developed to enforce already existing rights simplifies the comparison. Secondly, in recent literature, most assumptions point to the direction that the mafia will always try to maximize its own welfare. One can then probably rightly assume that the stability of such regimes is a more beneficial solution than anarchy (Bandiera 2003:222).

“Rulers negotiate contracts with their agents and constituents and each set of actors attempts to attain the best possible terms. Contracts are possible only if they make each party better off” (Bandiera 2003:222).

Economic literature has a similar direction. In his text Bandiera mentions Grossman who try to provide a justification why society may prefer protection from a “king” to decentralized protection, even if the king is a “predatory” one. Through a model of general equilibrium, in which the predators success depends on the total resources used for protection. Individual producers do not then internalize this positive externality, but the king will. Bandiera argues that a predatory king will provide public goods that increase national output, if he in the long term will benefit from an increase in general production and more revenue. The thesis of Bandiera however shows us that a predatory regime, like the mafia, can emerge and sustain itself even though all actors would be better of in an anarchy. By getting protection, each agent ignores the negative externality he pushes on to others, and they cannot coordinate to
play the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Landlords face the standard prisoners dilemma, everyone would be better off if nobody hired the mafia for protection (Bandiera 2003: 222-223).

Game mechanics looking at group dynamics can also contribute to the analysis of the mafia. Firstly comes the balance of benefits. There is a stronger likelihood of one member of a smaller group to be privileged, where this member seeks cooperation as its most important strategy and by this delivers a public good (which could for example be an army enforcing security, substituting the mafia). Punishment schemes are the second important factor. Enforcing sanctions in a small group of actors is difficult when the actors will probably receive a larger “dose” of sanctions and at the same time have an easier opportunity to communicate and cooperate. Large groups will on the other hand have problems communicating since the costs will be greater, and the sanctions probably will be more distributed evenly over a larger selection of recipients of sanctions, thereby making the frequenz of sanctions for each actor lower (Bandiera 2003:223).

In Bandieras example with the mafia, group size matters because of the very specific nature of the protection. It determines the equilibrium price the landlords are willing to pay for protection. As such, group size’s effects and other variables are not the important factor, but rather the intrinsic value of the group size itself (Bandiera 2003:224).

3.5.3.  **Concluding on the economic view**

The mafia was created by the institutional change from feudalism to the establishment of private property rights, and the parcelling and splintering of the larger estates. It found its place in the vacuum of security where predatory attacks where frequent. The mafia groups then gain legitimacy, power and reputation from the services they provide, and through innovation find other illegal niches to exploit further on. It is interesting to note the similarities in the emergence of the Russian and Japanese mafias. To understand the role of mafias in the crevices of society is important to devise effective policies, both in prevention and facing the mafia directly (Bandiera 2003:239-240). Judge Giovanni Falcone, devoted opponent of the mafia once aptly gave an insight into his thoughts of the mafia-system:
“Sicily is a land where unfortunately the structures of the State are very deficient. The mafia has worked out how to fill this void in its own way …. On exchange for the services it has offered (in its own interest of course) it has continued to increase its own power. To deny this reality only makes the fight more difficult. (Falcone, 1991)” (Bandiera 2003: 240).

3.6. Finding the connective factors

3.6.1. Criminal networks or organized crime?

When trying to come to terms with the nuances of these slightly different definitions, one can perhaps vaguely perceive a division between the underlying terms in criminal networks and organized crime, where for example we could use criminal networks as a definition explaining criminal conspiracy without a clear nexus of power or administration, while organized crime seems to be more hierarchical and top-down oriented. One problem immediately arises if we agree to both of the definitions; that the definitions are widely different from article to article when looking at the literature in general. Frank Hagan tries, in an attempt to come to grips with the varying definitions of organized crime, to air some complementary definitions that may perhaps be a better candidate for the task. Spanning from avocational crime, corporate crime, economic crime, elite crime, elite deviance, occupational crime, organizational crime, professional crime, upperworld crime, or white collar deviance his suggestions are as varied as the definitions of organized crime (Hagan 2006:128). The definitions are however all too specific, narrowing the playing field so far down that many forms of criminal activities that shows clear signs of being part of the same problem is left on the outside. Most important is the fact that all of these definitions rules out the prime factor that Alan Block (Block 1994:239-240) advocates as a “concept of organized crime”; the connection between upperworld and underworld agents in a criminal franchise. There are of course many lines of arguments and opinions that differs from Block, but his general but still very specific definition shows us what I also concur as the most important connection and basic element that gives an indicator regarding organized crime (and criminal networks as I will explain in the following text). For me the connection between agents on the official or “upperside” and the criminal or “downside” of society, can vary from an official turning a “blind eye” or actively participating in some sort of crime, but he must be a partner in some degree, either silent or vocal.
My solution will therefore be to put the term organized crime in Blocks definition as the concept that stands above both the definition of criminal networks and organized crime. When I use both these definitions Block’s concept is still in play as an absolute, connected to both terms. The terms in this thesis is rather a further specification of Block’s concept; if the concept of Block is connected to a loosely based network without a clear nexus, it will be defined as a criminal network. If the concept is connected to a criminal administration showing some degree of centralized leadership, it will be defined as organized crime. The bottom line is Block’s concept being the important definition that overrules both the specifics of organized crime and criminal networks, and the foundation for dividing these two from general mundane crime. A general description of his concept will therefore be organized criminal networks.

To actually ascertain that an involvement between a criminal actor and an “official” actor has taken place is of course problematic. We therefore have to implement a large degree of slack regarding this factor. If direct evidence of “upper” and “lower” is not obtainable, we still have to accept instances of this being likely, but not proven in an empirical way. We must however underline the fact that this only seems likely, and no direct evidence of the issue has currently been found.


“As from the very second that two people sat together round a fire in the forest, there was another human out there who felt better in the dark”
Andrew Wachss¹.

As underlined in the initial metaphoric paraphrase, the red thread that runs through all arguments explaining this problem, is the power-vacuum that was left behind, in certain arenas, through mankind’s civilizational progress. This absence of power can be traced to the failed or weak state that did not have the means to adequately penetrate the socioeconomic sphere with institutions of security.

¹ This citation from Mr. Wachss is not in the thesis Reference part, as its only meant to convey a poetic metaphor rather than a scientific contribution.
This “hole” in security in a given society is an independent variable that stands as the very basis for any form of criminal network or organized crime entrepreneurship. The following factors being described are the very tools or dependent variables that are used to successfully exploit the very same “hole” or vacuum in a state’s socioeconomic arena;

3.6.3. Social networks

In the case of the Italian Mafioso we see an ethnical connected social network, partly created by a former imperial “divide and conquer” policy fragmenting the north – south sphere of Italy.

The Russian social networks are perhaps singular in their process of first manifesting a level of organized crime only after co-opting into the black market of the 60s and 70s. A code of conduct seems to be a factor forming the Russian networks, but in a hybrid form after the collusion with the black economy sector.

The Chinese networks are cemented into the basic block of family ties, expanding into lines of meeting interest with the family core as an anchor. Coupled together with the diaspora that stands as a factor alone, we see that the ties are strengthened in a context of multi-cultural society.

The Japanese social networks are perhaps most similar to the Italian, giving us a clear connection between to different cultural and geographical spheres. That the land-reform factor has been a important part of the formation of both the Japanese and Italian organized criminal networks, is a good indicator that social network theory together with broad economic change is a significant factor, since the cultural values is divergent.

Trust is the basic formula that works as a social contract between members of the criminal franchise and the prime motor in the social networks. It has to be a given that some level of trust exists in the Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese organized networks of crime. As trust comes into play, organized criminal networks will benefit from attempts to monopolize trust, thereby making attempts to sow distrust in social connections they are not a part of.
3.6.4. Economic collapse / economic change.

The land reforms of Japan and Italia, the economic 180 degree turn in Russia, and the Chinese communist project have all been trigger factors in both creating the space for organized criminal networks and heralding the start of these organizations as full fledged criminal actors. This is also connected to the diaspora effect. Economic collapses especially can be seen as factors for larger diasporic events. However we have to take into account the special circumstances around Japan which do not seem to have any larger diasporas, or diasporas connected to Organized Crime.

3.6.5. Global organized criminal networks; The diaspora.

The diaspora effect as such can not be included as a general factor for organized criminal networks in itself. We can on the other hand include is as a general factor in Global organized criminal networks. Japan has historically and contemporary been an introverted society. Even today migration laws are severely restricted. No clear large economic collapse together with a diaspora can historically be found. If this is because of Japans’ culture for closing in on itself, is difficult to conclude on. We may however argument that it has at least played some part.

Looking at the Chinese and Italian diasporas, we find a weak link back to their origins. Especially the Italian mafia in the United States. The American italian-ethnic organized criminal networks have largely functioned as american organizations, not Italian. However the more recent diaspora in Russia shows much clearer lines of communications back to their home country. It is hard to not include modern communications technology as a factor in this argument.

3.7. Conclusion

Besides further cementing the point around the state level of weakness being imperative to the level of organized crime we have found three main factors colluding through method of agreement. We have established these main forms of complimentary factors through analysing the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of organized crime. Through the lenses of social network theory, trust-theory and an economic perspective, we have found the
following three analytic factors, which we must use in the next chapter looking on the Nigerian form of Organized Criminal Networks:

1. Social networks
   How strong or weak are the social networks impact on organized criminal networks?

2. Economic collapse/Economic change
   What impact did the oil-boom collapse have in Nigeria?

3. Diaspora
   Which role does the Nigerian diaspora play in the organized criminal networks?

These three main directions will form the basis for the coming analysis of Nigerian organized criminal networks. If we find discrepancies from the way these factors impact on Nigerian OCN’s from the forms of organized crime already described, we may have found singular indicators on how Nigerian OCN’s work through method of difference.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. NIGERIAN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL NETWORKS

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. Nigerian organized crime or criminal networks?

As discussed in part 3.6.1 the typological definitions regarding organized crime can be divided into a hierarchic based organized crime structure and a more loosely based criminal network definition, both coming under Alan Block’s definition of factors necessary to conclude that organized crime is in play. We will in this part of the chapter try to determine which category Nigerian organized crime broadly falls under.

Nigerian organized criminal networks, are in the drug trade, based on well-established local trafficking networks that are either contracted by foreign operators for their logistical services or direct purchasement from foreign traffickers. The product is then distributed in the local market or shipped further on to other markets (Mazzitelli 2007:1075-1076). The networks appear to have evolved from local drug-trafficking entrepreneurs who began their franchise in the late 1980s and 1990s that developed from small subcontractors to large regional entrepreneurs. As the availability and scale of the trade escalated a new type of agents, the “freelancers”, appeared. These agents are both European citizens and West Africans with resident permits in Europe, who smuggle the product to their current European country (Mazzitelli 2007:1076).

When it comes to trafficking of women for commercial sexual exploitation a recruiter and transporter, who’s goal is to access the prostitution markets of Europe, may spend about $2000 for bribing officials, get travel documents and safe houses, and the transportation itself to a “madam”, who pays approx. $12,000 for the victim. These networks appear to be well developed and involve themselves all the way from recruitment to the victims’ final
destination. Threats of violence, psychological pressure achieved by traditional rituals and the threat of turning the victim over to the police as undocumented migrants are used to achieve control over the victims (Mazzitelli 2007:1078-1079).

“By employing modern transport links in present day Nigeria, traffickers are very effective because they “combine the best of both modern and older worlds by allying sophisticated forms of modern technology to tribal customs”.

(Shelley 2003:127)

The Nigerian “network” type has been copied and is currently being developed in Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. This “network type” is based on a loose and fragmented business-oriented form, which may be the reason why they are successful in the arena of global modern “disorganized” crime (Mazzitelli 2007:1084). More traditional organized criminal models, which is connected to the Sicilian mafia, the American Cosa Nostra or the Japanese Yakuza do not harmonize with the conditions that are in play in the African context. It is evident that project based, business-oriented structures are best fitted to this particular context (Ibidem).

“African criminal networks (ACNs) have certain prime characteristics. Typically, such a network:

• is made of small, compartmentalized cells of between two and ten members;
• consists mostly of kinsmen from the same ethnic group or clan;
• communicates mostly in the local language;
• shares some confidence, but with minimal trust among members;
• makes deals and then disperses, regrouping only at a later date;
• is highly mobile;
• adopts false or protected identities for its members, including changing their nationality;
• adapts readily to any new environment;
• is ready to bribe and corrupt government officials;
• refrains from the use of violence in order not to attract the attention of law enforcement operators”.

(Mazzitelli 2007:1084)
The distribution of payment among members is broadly based on an egalitarian partnership. Scale of payment is then estimated out of how much of a special skill members contribute. Interestingly, there is not a high degree of trust at play in these connections, information sharing is for example limited only to what each member needs to know to perform his task. Further, a member of an “ACN” can be a part of more than one network. Secrecy and individuals loyalty is further strengthened by cultural pressure and by the use of religious and occult rituals (Mazzitelli 2007:1085). This may be in accordance with similar rituals taking place in Japanese, Italian and Mexican criminal groups to strengthen loyalty.

These African Criminal Networks may be considered as project based short-term groups/networks, rather than long-term enterprises specialising in particular brands of crime (Ibidem).

“…the organizational structure [of criminal groups in West Africa] may be similar to [that] employed by legitimate small scale enterprises found [among] ethno-cultural groups disproportionately arrested for drug trafficking. First the enterprises usually involve masters (entrepreneurs) and apprentices (those training to become traders or suppliers in particular goods and services). Second, there is cooperation among the enterprises/entrepreneurs, such that if goods are not available in a given shop it is collected and supplied from another entrepreneur. Third, many of the entrepreneurs have relations or acquaintances abroad that facilitate payment for the imported goods, usually for a commission.” (UNODC Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region 2005: 15-16)

One should always consider the implications of this mode of operation. The very ad hoc and casual network approach makes detection and investigation extremely difficult, and then we have yet to take into account the effects of ethnic rituals to bind the few connections that exist in tighter (UNDOC TOCWAR 2005:16). Further it gives an insight into the methodological problems involving west-African organized criminal networks.

Howard Abadinsky, a dissident voice in the analysis of Nigerian Organized Crime mode of operation, claims to have found evidence of a hierarchical structure where drug barons rule vast organizations through top down organization (Allum 2004:143).
4.1.2. Concluding on definition

Taking Abadinsky’s point into consideration, the majority of voices focusing on the very form of Nigerian organized crime are in general agreement that the form leans toward a network based, project-oriented mode of operation with frequent change of actors. It is however interesting to note Mazzitelli’s point on the minimal trust existing between actors in the Nigerian networks. If there is a significant lack of trust between actors one should expect a higher level of cooperation towards law enforcement in situations where actors become arrested. However the minimal information that is on a need-to-know basis only, buffers the impact of any cooperation taking place. Further, the ethnic rituals must segment some level of trust, or perhaps fear, that discourages cooperation toward law-enforcement. Maybe a better way of looking at the level of trust in Nigerian Networks is to point out that its on a minimal level, but minimal in the sense that its a level that still gives the networks a level of functionality and buffering against law enforcement agencies. Further, its not a formalized trust through hierarchal structures from top to bottom, but a loosely based face-value trust that fits in with the modes of operation in Nigerian or African criminal networks.

The conclusion on the terminology regarding Nigerian organized criminal networks is therefore to define them as Nigerian Criminal networks in a looser non-hierarchical mode of operation. Alan Blocks overhanging definition on organized crime, the connection between upper word and lower world agents, is still in play, and will be scrutinized more thorough in the next chapter that discuss the social network approach in view of Nigerian criminal networks together with how these evolved into their particular brand of organized criminal networks.

4.2. Social Networks

4.2.1. Introduction

As argued in part 3.2 and 3.3 of the thesis, social networks are the backbone of all attempts at organized crime. When at one hand it forms a cornerstone of mankind’s “pack-mentality” or “social-animal” way of approaching its surroundings it is on the other hand in direct opposition to rational professional bureaucratic oriented forms of organization. That
organized crime, which dips into both the formal and informal spheres, is in existence, is an indicator that this friction between social networking and formal professionalism is at play. Further on, one may suggest that the level of organized crime will therefore tell us something about the level of “social-professional” friction is going on in any given region if we are supplied with the relevant data. This friction can be viewed as the opposing interest of the formal and informal structures.

Nigeria is perhaps one of the world’s regions with the highest level of socio-professional friction, stemming from its colonial past, and neo-colonial present.

Mazzitelli’s argument regarding African criminal networks considering its apparent “softer” approach when contemplating the inherent level of violence, also raises some fundamental questions. It seems that refraining from the use of violence to avoid attracting attention from law enforcement is not a dominant trait in other cultural related forms of organized crime. Social networking theory, and especially the African high level of informal connections permeating the society, may partly explain this particular aspect of African and Nigerian organized criminal networks.

4.2.2. Political criminal nexus

"Nigerian Law does not conceptualize crime”
(Ebbe 1997:1)

Obi N. Ebbe states in his 1999 paper “The Political-Criminal Nexus: The Nigerian Case.” That the predatory Nigerian state head of state has much in common with a head of an organized crime “family, using criminal individuals and syndicates to exploit his country (Ebbe 1999:29). Much like Mahmoud Mamdani argues that most sub-Saharan states only gives the impression of democracy, while centralized despotic rule more often then not is the basis for government (Mamdani 1996:25), Ebbe argues that the Nigerian states lacks the checks and balances found in a democracy (Ebbe 1999:29). Ebbe’s insight in the duality of the Nigerian state is significant because the problem is then studied by an actor who is born and bred under this system. His study spans over a thirty-year period, from January 1966 until March 1999. Ebbe has analyzed both personal and telephone interviews and performed
content analysis of newspapers and magazines (ibid.). Personal interviews were done with former cabinet ministers, senior military bureaucratic personnel, and civil servants among others. Ebbe has also interviewed 28 area boys, a Nigerian generic term describing unemployed youth\(^1\), who according to Ebbe watched the young members of the “419” organized crime syndicates (Ebbe 1999:30). 419 refer to a Nigerian penal code that touches upon fraud through various means (Ebbe 1997:74, Peel 2006:4-5). Ebbe focuses mainly on the symbiosis between the political arena and the criminal. The problematic use of the term organized crime has been under controversy for some time. Ebbe also goes through a clarification where he tries to define the “right” definitional term for criminal networks or organized crime.

The Nigerian law however has no concept of organized crime, rather a law against conspiracy which overreach the subject in a multitude of ways (Ebbe1999:31).

4.2.3. Emerging nexus

Nigeria is a fragmented puzzle of different nations designed by colonial powers to serve its own interest. Disregarding former set boundaries between the three major Nigerian ethnic groups, the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, there was no strong regional will to follow the colonials projects suit (Ibidem).

Nigerias natural resources are often called the “national cake”. Even in colonial times the three ethnic groups strived for control over the resources. The following independence and democratic project intensified the struggle. Embezzlement of federal property by regional politicians became more and more common. Civil servants followed after with their own brand of corruption. Law enforcement was at the same time having their difficulties with their own ethnic-divide. Dissatisfaction over this state of affair led up to the military coup of 1966. The military regimes however, did not differ in the corruption factor, widespread embezzlement was still rampant (Ebbe 1999:31-32).

In the period August 1966 through December 1998, Nigeria went through seven military regimes and only one democratically elected civilian regime. Every one of the six military

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\(^1\) For a more specific and sociological insight in the area boys phenomenon look up “identity transformation and identity politics under structural adjustment in Nigeria” 2000 edit. Jega, Chapter 9 Abubakar Momoh, “Youth culture and area boys in Lagos”.

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regimes functioned like an organized crime family (Ebbe 1999:32-33). They marginalized the role of Nigerian Police, ruled by martial law, and effectively destabilized the rule of law. Each regime had its own Inspector General of Police whose job unofficially was to turn a blind eye to malfeasances and criminal connections in the government (Ebbe 1999:33).

The “national cake” was fair game. Every politician and top civil servant looked upon Nigeria’s natural resources as something “up for grabs”. Criminal techniques were developed by different ethnic groups to secure their share. The head of the military regime represented only his very own interests, and that of his ethnic foundation. The short-lived democracy that spanned from 1960 to 1964 may imply a weakening in the political-criminal nexus according to Ebbe (Ibidem).

“Every military regime in Nigeria suspended the Constitution and ruled by martial law. The first six Nigerian military regimes also suspended the rule of law. In other words, martial power was used to overthrow the rule of law. Like an organized crime family, each regime ruled by intimidation, threats, and murder. Journalists and politicians who criticized the military leaders’ policies and flagrant criminal activities were either assassinated, detained, imprisoned after trial on trumped-up charges, or driven to self-exile.”
(Ebbe 1999:33)

One may divide Nigeria’s organized criminal networks into 3 main types: The traditional criminal syndicates of the 1960s to the present, the “419” syndicates of the 1980s to present, and the secret societies of past and present. Each type of organized crime body has its own specialty. Unlike, for example the United States, there is no division of territory, nor is there a common bond between organized crime syndicate (Ebbe 1999:40).

“In the wake of the oil boom, organized crime activities developed in the context of various relationships and enterprises that can be summarized as follows:

1. Governor/Minister--Domestic contractors, and organized crime.
2. Governor/Minister--Foreign contractors, and organized crime.


5. Illegitimate Enterprises: Child trafficking and slave labor, trading body parts, narcotics trafficking, illegal importation of certain goods, counterfeit currency dealing.


(Ebbe 199:35-36)

These links between the informal and formal stem from the inherent effects of widespread endemic corruption. However, to see Nigeria and south Sahara as exclusive when it comes to corruption is of course a mistake. One can find corruption in developed countries like United States, Britain, France, Greece, Japan and Italy. Types of corruption differ, and we have to use some typologies to expand upon the subject. One possibility is to span corruption from the petty type onward to a more serious political corruption. Political corruption is a very dangerous type as it transforms the drive to achieve power not as means to govern for the common good, but as a means to achieve personal riches, and spread the benefits of corruption onward to supporters. Nigeria may even be said to have a vast system of institutionalized political corruption sometimes stemming from the very top and pervading all governmental institutions with broad links to the rest of society (Agbu 2003:3-4).

4.2.4. Sociocultural factors

Ebbe brings forward three factors that are important in connection to the political-criminal nexus. First of all: the interethnic scramble to secure the bigger slice of Nigeria’s (National Cake). Second, the concept of extended families, of being a brother’s keeper and the dependent connections this makes, and finally a culture that honor conspicuous consumption (Ebbe 1999:42).

The expectations of the extended family system and sons cultural requirement to take care of aged parents create a high level of pressure. As public opinion tend to think “what belongs to the government also belongs to everybody”, stealing from the government is a minor fault at
best. A son with a government position that do not embezzle and exploit his position is actually frowned upon as weak and ill-willed. “Clean” government officials are viewed as worthless. They may be called “Holy Nweje”, a “slang”-type word that means a false holy person in the eyes of God. Similar views and expectations can be found in all ethnic groups in Nigeria, and in all African societies south of the Sahara (Ebbe 1999:43).

The strive to achieve economical success can even lead people to join secret societies that may or may not involve occult rituals to cement trust and bonds. These societies fall into a whole new category that takes their places in the political criminal nexus. These cults are well documented in African law and literature about Nigerian customs (Ebbe 1999:43-44).

4.2.5. 419 political connection

Through his interviews with “area boys” Ebbe also establishes a clear 419-syndicate connection to participants in Nigeria’s political system (Ebbe 1999:46).

This connection involves defrauding national and foreign governments, banks and businesses, money laundering and running illegal businesses such as brothels and casinos for the politicians. The 419 groups on one hand establishes hotels and other businesses under fictitious names for the politicians and the they on the other hand provide immunity from police harassment and prosecution by law enforcement (Ibidem).

Even providing personal security for politicians are an franchise for some 419-groups. In all cases, a mutual bond of respect coupled with financial and nonfinancial favors are exchanged. An example may be the case of a body-parts business run by a Mr. Otokoto that never went to trial because it was alleged that a top Nigerian politician was involved in the franchise (Ibidem).

The case is luckily not entirely one sided. Some custom officials and police officers arrest smugglers and other criminals whenever they can catch them. Soldiers that are not involved in criminal franchise have become whistle blowers and testified against their superiors. International organizations such as the Commonwealth of Nations, OPEC, and foreign organizations exert pressure on the wholesale political corruption. World opinion that frowns
upon corruption is another factor that hinders a rampant open state of the political criminal nexus. Lastly the possibility of political reshuffle after electoral periods is also a threat for the criminal connection. All these factors perform at least some dampening effect on the scale of the problem (Ebbe 1999:46)

“The validity of the data on the political-criminal nexus in Nigeria presented here is supported by the fact that in 1996, the present Head of state of Nigeria, General Abacha, gave back to the Nigerian people and government all money and properties he acquired illegally and ordered all members of his cabinet, other politicians, and directors of statutory corporations to do the same. Also in 1996, General Abacha's government mounted a thorough investigation into the operations of "419" organized crime syndicates and the activities of senior bank officials while he was a participant in "419" enterprises. The result was the arrest of over 2,000 bank managers and bank accountants on charges of fraud, embezzlement, and illegal financial manipulation.” (Ebbe 1999:49)

4.2.6. Concluding on social networks

Starting our social networks comparative analysis of Nigerian and organized criminal networks globally we can draw some immediate assumptions connected to similarities. Gambetta’s point when reflecting upon the system of Habsburg-Spain to divide Italy in two antagonistic areas that where put against each other, strikes a certain chord when looking upon Ekeh’s argument of colonial socio-constructive projects. It also resonates with Mahmood Mamdani’s views on colonial power; loosely affiliated autonomous social domains suddenly found themselves bound together toward a nexus of native power, where none before had existed (Mamdani 1996:110). These different native nexuses that today may be claimed to form the “new” ethnic geographical areas, where used as pieces on a board, putting one against another in instances where it met the colonial powers interest, strengthening some weak pieces by putting them on top of each other, and thereby creating new native nexuses. Here is probably a significant factor in the divide between state and public, the same divide or “hole” that gives the possibility to form networks of organized crime. It is also a factor in the level of socio-professional friction that exists between the bureaucratic sphere and the informal.
The basis of divide and distrust between the public and state is present, but why in such a high degree in Nigeria in contrast to all other global organized crime ventures? How can a political-criminal nexus form, where the difference between criminal and politician starts to blur?

Looking on Mazzitelli’s particulars of African criminal networks two factors stands out:

1. African criminal networks are loosely based and undergoing a large degree of interchange of manpower in a continual process. There is no clear hierarchical structure. No African “Toto Riina, capo dei capi” that clearly symbolise some form of centralized power. Is highly mobile and shows an uncanny ability to adjust to new forms of environment.

2. Refrains from violence in order to avoid attention from law-enforcement.

The last of these factors are perhaps the most striking. It is not often that organized crime is connected to non-violence. However we must assume that some level of violent posture must be at play to strengthen opportunities of sanction. Africa’s affinity toward occult rituals is also a factor here that acts as a partial substitute for violence. Still, we have not yet uncovered the whole picture. There must be more factors at play, some which we, of course, will not discover in the near future.

Looking at China we may also see some level of loose networking. However the emphasis should here be on network rather than loose network, which may be better for the African concept. Seeing that Chinese organized criminal networks appear to be the closest in social network perspective to Nigerian criminal networks makes us possible to connect some cultural concepts;

*That Guanxi networks use much of the same social mechanics as the African economy of affection.*

As both of these cultural processes are related to kin or family we can without severe contradictions allow for a basic similarity. Both concepts exists on a informal plane outside
the formal-bureaucratic sphere, and both concepts branches out overseas to diasporas that are connected perhaps in a weak degree when it comes to the Chinese, and more strongly in the Nigerian sense. Diaspora’s are a concept related to a migrated segment of population from a specific country. Examples are the Irish and Italian diasporas in the USA and the Turkish diaspora in Germany.

This is however not enough to explain all the characteristics of African or Nigerian criminal networks. Contrary to the Chinese that involve a much higher degree of organizational level, Nigerian networks are more loosely based, is made of small compartmentalized cells of between two and ten members, shares some confidence, but with minimal trust among members and makes deals and then disperses, regrouping only at a later date. Hyden describes the economy of affection in a striking similar way:

“Sought-after goods – whether material or symbolic such as prestige and status – have a scarcity value, that is, they may be physically available, but not accessible to all, so people invest in relations with others to obtain them.”
(Hyden 2006:76)

Comparing it with Aning’s more specific definition on African criminal networks we see clear similarities:

“West Africans, . . ., have become significant players in the international trade in illicit drugs. Yet it is hardly possible to identify structured, hierarchical groups staffed by West Africans in this particular field of activity. Successful West African drug trade[rs] appear to be overwhelmingly individuals who recruit associates only where necessary and generally on an ad hoc basis. They may also be active in other fields of criminal activity, as well as in legitimate business. These characteristics, which are to some extent traditional among West African traders, can be turned to great advantage in modern, globalized markets, including illegal ones.” (Aning 2007:195)

Looking upon these factors together with Mazzitelli’s description of African criminal networks a question has to be asked:

1 Cambridge advanced learner’s dictionary.
Is the Nigerian criminal networks integrated into Nigerian society in the same degree as Hydens economy of affection. Or to put it more bluntly; is Nigerian criminal networks the very same conceptual socio-mechanism as the economy of affection?

The implications of this question are striking; How else can we reasonably explain Ebbe’s nexus of politics and crime? The very factors that comes into the equation, the loose interchangeable networking, strikes a much similar chord to the way the economy of affection works. Why, for example, is it so hard to conceptualize Nigerian Criminal Networks as an entity or sphere in a Nigerian context, when the same Criminal Networks stands clearly out in a overseas western context? As Ekeh pointed out; getting resource and advantage from the state, or the mother country in the former colonial context, is perfectly plausible, even a demand that is inherent in society.

“It is worth noting in the context of this discussion that many Nigerians hold the West responsible for the country’s decline. For many this has provided justification for their involvement in criminal activities. Engagement in crime is considered justifiable in order to redistribute wealth back from those who have ‘stolen’ it.”
(Shaw 2002:295)

The same arguments are used in connection to defend the actions of participants in Nigerian criminal networks. And why even defend the actions, if the actions themselves where not viewed as crime by the actors themselves?

Another important question that arises is Ebbe’s seemingly contrary statement that Nigerian organized crime is a hierarchical nexus with a family head. Here we have to look closer on Ebbe’s political-criminal relationship; there is in Ebbe’s article a clear distinction between the upper-level political structure, that at some level needs to be in a formal hierarchy, and the lower level crime groups that is not specifically structurally described. It remind us of the general definition that Block uses on organized crime, with a connection between upper and lower class society. Ebbe’s nexus rather describe the connection between a hierarchical political sphere and a criminal one, rather than explaining Nigerian OCN as hierarchical themselves.
The friction between social-networks and the ideal of professional bureaucracy in Italy, China, Japan and Russia leads to the living-space that has to be present for organized criminal networks to exist. It is however probable that the very social networking dynamics that stems from man being a social-animal and not a solitary one, is the same dynamics that motor organized criminal networks to some degree. This is especially clear looking at the way Nigerian crime stands out in a “western” context, but seems to dissolve into society and the economy of affection in the Nigerian context. According to Ebbe, it is difficult to see where the crime starts and where the politics end and visa versa. In part 4.4 “Diaspora” and part 4.5 “The technology factor” we will attempt to look even closer upon the implications of Nigerian criminal networks in an overseas context.

4.3. Economic collapse

Harsh periods of military dictatorships, a failed structural adjustment programme, economic mismanagement and continuous political conflict are factors that lead up to the decline and economic crisis of the Nigerian state in the 1980s (Shaw 2002: 294). Perhaps the most important factor however was the collapse of the Oil Boom in the same period (Wannenburg 2002:6).

In the early 1970s discovery of oil had brought great affluence in Nigeria, and its importance made the oil prices up’s and down’s proportional to Nigeria’s economic health (Shaw 2002:295). Patronage and alliances with multinational corporations developed as a strategy of economic and political security. By co-opting and emasculate dissenters, patronage was achieved by getting control over natural resources or the agricultural sector. By giving the corporations political protection, enormous profits were generated and enriched a small indigenous elite (Wannenburg 2002:7).

The economic collapse led to processes of criminalization, for example the consumer goods market; Price controls on agricultural products where enforced to stem political unrest in the urban areas. Rural producers who experienced a very low price on their products either cut their output or smuggled their goods to more attractive markets. Even though governments tried hard to control markets, informal black markets appeared (Ibidem).
The informal sector and the economy of affection got more and more important in the face of collapse:

“Small and medium businesses and traders found it difficult to compete in an environment where inflation was high and their prices were undercut by competitors from the informal sector. Most informal traders, on the other hand, eked out a subsistence livelihood. To give an indication of this trend, the informal economy currently employs 65 per cent of the population and contributes 60 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries. It makes up 50 per cent of all intra-regional trade.”
(Ibidem).

4.3.1. Reflecting on collapse.

It is important to underline that the collapse and change in the Nigerian context was a purely economical one. Japan and Italy both had reforms changing the socio-economic order in a political context. The cultural revolution in China was one of the more important factors for its Diaspora and Russia, though directly an economical change, it was first and foremost a political-economical change from the far left to the mainstay right. This raises the question why an economic collapse alone strengthens the informal and thereby the economy of affection. Perhaps we need to view the collapse as the spark that lights the powder-keg? Maybe this potential for a fast regress toward the informal in view of any crisis, stems from the extraordinary historical context southern-Sahara experienced in the last approx. 100 years as we discussed in part 2.5.5?

In a period close to a century, the continent goes from a largely primordial society, to colonial, and lastly to a “democratic free state” period. The socio-economic implications of fundamental changes in every level of a society’s institutions, over such a short period of time, seems to be unprecedented in modern history. This is probably one major factor why the informal sector and the economy of affection are predominant, and why an economic collapse throws a country even deeper into the informal direction.
4.4. Diaspora or globalization?

Diaspora: noun
“the spreading of people from one original country to other countries.”

As the Chinese diaspora was connected to the cultural revolutions marginalization of certain ethnic groups, the economic collapse in Nigeria also prompted a migration of Nigerian nationals. The problem of “brain-drain” in the African context has always been a valid and apparent issue. It is however unlikely to find a connection between high-education and crime in a general sense.

Some level of monetary funds has to be available to reach the “western” sphere of the world. Is it therefore possible that the Nigerian diaspora is divided into two main categories of migrants? Firstly, Nigerians with a higher level of education seeking job opportunities in other countries that are otherwise lacking at home. Secondly, crime financed travel connected to the criminal franchises of the Nigerian criminal networks?

Ethnic fragmented diaspora.

“The chronicles of diasporas—those of the black Atlantic, of metropolitan Jewry, of mass rural displacement—constitute the ground swell of modernity.”
(Chambers 1994:16)

When discussing an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria its important to further discuss the inherent problems this raises. As opposed to Chinese migration toward the US, Nigerian migration is both diverse and multi-cultural.

In her article; West Africa Review (1999), Nationalism in a Virtual Space: Immigrant Nigerians on the Internet, Misty L. Bastian discussed the implications of Nigerian diaspora Internet communities. She claims to find evidence that different ethnic groups like Obi and Yoruba, come together in mutual discussion both also form their own ethnic forums with mutual accusation of Tribalism on the internet.

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1 Cambridge advanced learner’s dictionary.
This form of “Tribalism” or perhaps ethnic specialization is important when discussing the Nigerian criminal networks impact on “western” society because in many instances it is ethnically specialized. In South Africa the Ibo group seems to have taken the lead with the Biafran war and the oil boom-crisis as the major factors for their migration (Legget 2001: 40, Shaw 2002:295-296).

In Britain and specific London the Yoruba group is dominant. For example in a survey of schoolchildren in London approx. 10 000 spoke Yoruba while only 2000 spoke Ibo. The Yoruba group in Nigeria is connected to accounting, banking and legal scams, further implying an ethnic specific crime diversification (Peel 2006:22). However, it is important to underline that the Yoruba group in Britain is both economically successful and has maintained a low criminal profile (Klein 2009:391)

The Nigerian trafficking and sex-Industry is connected to an even smaller geographically and demographic ethnic group, the Edo. In the “journal of culture and African women studies”, Oluwakemi A. Adesina sheds some light on the connection between Edo state and Nigerian trafficking. In the light of the economical crisis of the 1980s, the sex industry became the only economical solution for many Edo women both in Nigeria and abroad.

4.4.1. Concluding on the ethnic connections

There is the inherent problem of generalizing people out of their ethnic context to this chain of discussion. On the one hand one has to take account of some level of discrepancy, as it is easy to link one group to one set of crime. It is a well-established human condition to compartmentalize and categorize to make understanding easier on the whole. On the other hand, if we went in the direction to disregard the ethnic dimension, and label all forms of Nigerian related crime as exactly “Nigerian” wouldn’t we loose a important factor to explain the specific brand of criminal networking? We have to take into account some level of generalization while we at the same time see a cultural connection to specific types of Nigerian criminal networks.

It is however apparent that the Ibo connection of South Africa is empirically much weaker than the Edo connection to trafficking. The social and cultural background for Edo
predominance in the Nigerian sex industry seems to firstly stem from a diaspora that was displaced from more mundane work like farming in Italy to the sex industry. Later the sex-industry in Edo state has been largely accepted as “normal” work where a bill that tried to criminalize sex-traffickers where actually met with public outcry (Adesina, 2006).

The Ibo connection is on the other hand is much weaker. We can see some plausible causality in the Biafran war and the economic crisis as Shaw and Legget underlines, but the empirical data or the effect is spurious at best.

All three ethnic connections need more qualitative and quantitative research before we can reach any significant ethnic network-criminal conclusions, and the object of study is better described as Nigerian criminal networks, for now.

4.5. The technology factor

4.5.1. Introduction

“The infamous ‘419’ advance fee fraud scam is a major source of spam which takes its victims for hundreds of millions of dollars yearly. Email headers confirm that much of this traffic currently comes out of Lagos and Amsterdam.”
(Edelson 2003:392)

Firstly we will look upon the direct consequences of the 419 industry, its impact both locally and international, and lastly, upon the technological factor.

4.5.2. Code: 419

The code “419” has perhaps today progressed into the most well-known phrase connected to Nigerian criminal networks. It has taken its name from a statute in the Nigerian criminal code. The scam itself always use dynamics where the recipient end has to take the fraudulent offer on a face value, however, the end-benefits drawn up by the “yahoozie” or fraudster, are always at such a scale that some disregard the apparent lacking in security, and forward a set
amount of money which will “set free” the much larger amount. The end-benefit monetary goal is usually between 35 and 75 million American dollars (Buchanan 2001 39-40).

Why then, does these propositions that appears as somewhat comic additions to your mailbox, net in hundred of millions of dollars\(^1\) in some estimates? Most of these mails are promptly discarded or already caught in some spam-filters net. However, just a tiny nibble on the bait sets in motion a well oiled machine that seems to master the art of social discourse and persuasion. Great lengths of convincing and deliberation take place. Disinterested parties from an European country is suddenly introduced, to make the suggestion more sound. An important sounding institution\(^2\) appears to lend its weight to the proposal. The number of persuasion techniques is many and resourceful. The end scenario too often involves the coercion and defrauding of the recipient victim. When the first payment has arrived, roadblocks suddenly occur; the proposition has been discovered and bribe money is needed, shipping fees or insurance are needed etc. The victim continues paying until he realizes the fraud or he is out of monetary funds (Buchanan 2001:40, Smith 1999: 3-4).

4.5.3. **The people behind 419**

“The Kakadu group;

A Nigerian, Raphael Ajukwara, alias James Kakudu, lived in Sierra Leone and worked as a dealer in car spares. He owned a personal computer and had a good knowledge of information technology having completed at least one college course in computer studies. Ajukwara/Kakudu was also a business associate of three other Nigerians, Uche Okafor, Richard Ekechukwu, and another known only as Alex, plus a Ghanaian, Charles Doe. Also connected with the gang was Ajukwara’s Sierra Leonean girlfriend, Isatu Bah. All of the group were well educated, enabling them to operate a series of typical “419” frauds—although Isatu Bah was only a schoolgirl at the time of her arrest. In a number of cases they successfully defrauded substantial sums of money from their victims. With the profits they were able to invest in legitimate merchandise imported from Nigeria, which they sold in Freetown.” (ODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005:14).

\(^1\) Edelson, 2003:392  
\(^2\) Institutions that in most cases never existed, but have similar name-sakes that seems familiar for the recipient.
As our example sketches, most of the fraudsters seem to be Nigerians abroad and at home. The groups or networks, as in accordance to Mazzitelli’s view on African criminal networks, are ad hoc, run along ethnic lines in some degree and in some instances involves family ties. The members of 419 groups do not seem to try to keep themselves out of public view. In Amsterdam for example, the fraudsters are so well known that policemen amuse themselves with SMS telling them that they “know what they are up to”. The 419 industry are neither compartmentalized against other forms of crime. Nigerian drug dealers have been known to shift their field of interest onward to 419 scams as this is looked upon as cheaper and safer, and 419ers are said to invest their earnings into importing drugs among other things (Edelson 2003:394-395).

As we have discussed before, when provoked or tempted into explaining their motivations, arguments around payback for colonialism are forwarded, or resentment of official corruption (Ibidem).

The geographical spread of origin when it comes to 419 scams seems to have the following pattern:

“
(37%) Specific Nigerian ISPs
(30%) Satellite providers to Nigerian ISPs
(9%) Cote d'Ivoire and other West African countries
(3%) South Africa
(15%) Netherlands
(3%) Elsewhere in Europe (mostly UK and France)
(4%) USA”
(Edelson 2003:396)

Edelson used relationship mapping, a technique used to map the strengths and relationships between the terrorists involved in the World Trade Centre attack. It looks upon shared addresses and travel patterns in order to view nodes of influence. Internet Service Providers and e-mail headers where used in the collection of data (Edelson 2003:395).
Approximately 70% percent of the traceable traffic seems to originate from west Africa, mainly Nigeria (Edelson 2003:396). The scammers also construct online web sites that mimic “financial management” firms, official lotto schemes or real Banks. At first, shoddily and amateurishly made, later attempts at web design have been more advanced even with PHP scripts checking for “mock” authorization. In 2002, a group of Nigerians in Johannesburg were arrested for making a website that had stolen content from legitimate banks (Ibidem). In the aftermath of the Tahiti earthquake scam mails with genuine Red Cross or Unicef logos appeared\(^1\). Atleast one of these were traced to a computer in Nigeria.

Popular-culture even uses 419 scam as a source of entertainment. Cruder ideas can involve something as simple as providing the scammer with the phone number of the local police department and the suggestion that the scammer call as soon as possible. Elaborate Web-pages exists that celebrate the 419 mails hilarity and sometimes hidden pop culture references\(^2\)

Some analysts trace the origins of the 419 scam back to the 1970s and 1980s in Nigeria. This was the period of the oil boom that created opportunities for Nigerians with access to government contacts and foreign actors with the ability to provide goods and services. The imported goods where then over-invoiced, resulting in a huge imbalance in the funds made available in contrast to the goods actually delivered. Today, the connection to government officials are not needed, and actually very little funds are required to set up and carry out the 419 scams (ODC, TOCWAR, 2005:24)

4.5.4. Internet access

“The more one learns about Internet access in West Africa, the more impressive the level of activity seems. Nigeria, with the continent’s largest population (over 120 million\(^3\) — half under the age of 18), has the fewest Internet connections. Africa as a whole has the world’s lowest fiber optic coverage — almost all international bandwidth is provided by satellite - and the lowest telephone (and by extension) internet density, something under 1%.” (Edelson 2003:397).

\(^1\) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8517243.stm
\(^2\) www.scamorama.com , “Presents: The lads from Lagos.”
\(^3\) In 2010 the estimate lies around 150 million.
Cybercafés, an important institution connected to 419, use satellite services rather than dial up, as the latter is more expensive relative to income than anywhere else in the world. This is not because of the Nigerian government; they have actually worked toward expanding land lines, satellite communication and cellular telephony. Mobile phones have for example become more dominant than main telephone lines (Ibidem).

One could argue that 419 spam is helping this development onward. But on the other hand cybercafés are in risk of disconnect from the ISP (Internet Service Provider) if the spam emanating from one café is too flagrant. Internet access through mobile phones is appearing as alternatives to cybercafés (Ibidem). In fact cybercafés are known to post notes on the walls warning of possible arrests for people partaking in 419 scams (Longe 2008:135).

Especially today with the current development in cellular Internet access, it is likely that this sphere will be more dominant in the 419 industry in the future. Mobility and the problem of easily pinpoint the origin of spam-mails will make the situation even more chaotic for law enforcement agencies.

4.5.5. Internet infrastructure in Africa

Development of Internet infrastructure differs in each country because of the States current policy on e-infrastructure. Regulatory frameworks and competition between Internet Service Providers all play in into the final equation that lays the foundation for Internet infrastructure (Mutula 2003:489).

In Chinn and Fairlie’s article from 2006 they analyze the “digital divide” between industrialised and under developed countries (Chinn 2006:17-18). They used a data set from the International Telecommunication’s Union (World Telecommunication Indicators Database), which is collected through annual questionnaires by the ITU. The rates indication computer and Internet penetration are connected to number of personal computers and internet users per 100 people. The dataset have some inherent weaknesses. Firstly, the number of computers may understate the total use of computers in countries where mainframe computers or Internet nexuses are prevalent. Second, the data gives us no indication upon
which level of quality the computers in use actually have. The quality of an area’s computer
park will have some implications that are not shown in the direct counting of computers.
Finally, the number of internet users are based on estimates from ISP subscribers, thus internet
use may be understated, especially in development countries where internet access is
connected to rent-for-period schemes instead of monthly home-computer internet access
subscription to a particular ISP (Chinn 2006:21). In sub-Saharan Africa, where cybercafés are an
important institution when it comes to Internet access, an understatement of numbers will take
place in a higher degree.

“Figure 4.5.5 Computer and Internet penetration rates for highest, lowest and largest
countries international telecommunications union (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Computers per 100</th>
<th>Internet Users per 100</th>
<th>Population (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>50.15</td>
<td>284,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>56.12</td>
<td>51.63</td>
<td>8,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>54.15</td>
<td>42.95</td>
<td>5,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>53.83</td>
<td>30.70</td>
<td>7,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>51.58</td>
<td>37.14</td>
<td>19,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>50.83</td>
<td>41.15</td>
<td>4,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>50.80</td>
<td>46.38</td>
<td>4,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (Rep. of)</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>48.08</td>
<td>52.11</td>
<td>46,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>46.66</td>
<td>30,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>42.84</td>
<td>49.05</td>
<td>16,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>35.82</td>
<td>38.42</td>
<td>127,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>100,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>171,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>146,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1,312,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>209,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>116,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1,027,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>144,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>131,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>7,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>13,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>11,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>10,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>13,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>10,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>65,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>48,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>11,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chinn 2006:24)
If we look comparatively on the Sub-Saharan region, Nigeria has a larger value than corresponding countries in the selection, for example Benin with only 0.17 computers per 100 person and Niger in the bottom with only 0.05. Nigeria tops out in the region with 0.68, but there is a vast gap to the developed countries values. Interestingly enough, Russia comes out with a relatively low value of 4.97 and 2.93 when it comes to Internet users per 100. Russia is often connected to cyber-criminality and hacking, so their level of internet access can not really be a significant factor looking upon that implication, other factors has to be more dominant. Further, Nigeria seems to have a slightly higher level of home computers in view of Internet users per 100 person, which is only a value of 0.10. Here we have to take into account the significance of cybercafés and the renting of Internet access as a factor that draws the value somewhat down.

Still an important question rises looking upon the statistical data on Nigerian Internet access: Why is Nigeria so dominant in the 419 industry, as Edelson stated, when their level of internet access is so apparently low?

4.5.6. Concluding on the Technology Factor.

In the 419 industry Nigeria stands out as a shining beacon in comparison to other west African countries involved in the franchise. Further, it seems that only west-African diaspora is involved overseas, and apparently no other cultures can be said to have any particular or significant involvement. That Nigeria is dominant can partly be explained by its population factor, but can the fact that the overinvoicing of the oil-boom era in Nigeria be a significant factor, as mentioned in the report from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime? It is plausible, oil economy based underdeveloped countries has always been connected to a particular high degree of corruption, for example RA Joseph’s article of 1978 in the journal of modern African studies uses Nigeria as case; “Affluence and underdevelopment: the Nigerian experience”.

We may have given some indicators on why the 419 industry is dominated by Nigeria, but we have not given any clues to why west-Africa as region is the breeding ground for this particular brand of criminal networks. In light of the apparently low level of Internet infrastructure and Internet access, this shines out as a particular question that we in some way
need to answer. That cybercafés are as important as home computers in this instance, gives us some indicator that the statistical values needs to be taken with a grain of salt, however this cannot be a significant factor in itself.

Buchanan describes the 419 scam as an attempt to achieve some level of face value trust. We have to remember that face value trust or; “personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain” as Hyden describes the economy of affection. Hyden’s statement involuntarily strike a comical chord as the bait in the 419 scams, often suggested in the tens of millions of dollars, can hardly be any more impossible to attain. But joke aside, can we also here connect the foundations of the 419 industry to the economy of affection? It certainly stands out as a possible solution why Nigeria firstly and West Africa secondly has close to a monopoly when it comes to the 419 industry. What better qualifications is there for a scam artist, than growing up in an economy of affection where the social skills are the most important for security, as the states failure to provide it forces people to form networks of exactly face value trust relations? It is likely then, that the same skills that has been constantly honed in a Nigerian or west-African upbringing, is the same that gives them their particular edge in electronic-social 419 scams. Further, as it is connected to the value that gives individuals their unofficial social “security-net”, it is also more likely that only this particular group should be involved. On the one side one has the “casus belli” payback for colonization or other reasons, on the other the means; the very social mechanic that has driven their society from upbringing: Internet Economy of Affection.

4.6. Population Factor

Nigeria’s relative high population toward other countries within the southern – Saharan sphere may give us some causal explanation to why exactly Nigeria stands out among these states, when it comes to Criminal Networks and internet fraud. In Bloom’s analysis of population connected to economic development he found the following demographics data for the area. The data stems from 2001.
### Figure 4.6 African Demographics 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Region, Subregion, or Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Share of World Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
<td>812,603</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>6,502</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>64,459</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>31,293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>16,437</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>11,572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>18,644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réunion</td>
<td>732</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7,949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>9,157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>24,023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>35,965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>10,649</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>12,852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Africa</strong></td>
<td>98,151</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>13,527</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>15,203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>8,135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>3,110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>52,522</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Africa</strong></td>
<td>177,391</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>30,841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>69,080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>30,430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>31,809</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9,562</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the data stems from 2001 we may expect a significant rise of Nigeria approx. 120 million inhabitants. Some sources that try to take into account estimates of non-registered citizens even use numbers as high as 160 million. We therefore have to accept that any number used to describe Nigeria’s current population will always be speculative at best. However, there is a clear gap between Nigeria and the next country on the list that is hard to overlook. Congo only boasts a population of approx. 60 million, half the population of Nigeria. Northern Africa falls outside the southern-Saharan economic and cultural region and is not counted.

We may therefore conclude that Nigeria’s population factor has some causal effect on why it dominates African criminal networks.
4.7. Conclusion

We have through method of difference tried to establish connections between the main factors driving other forms of organized crime described in this thesis against the type of Nigerian Criminal Networks. Two of the three established main factors do not show any clear signs of difference and must therefore be deemed insignificant when it comes to explaining Nigerian Criminal Networks:

1. Economic collapse
   Stands out as perhaps the weakest link when attempting to find a difference. Appears to support the Economy of Affection link by showing how fragile the Nigerian state appears in face of a purely economic crisis and the following emphasis on informal structures after the collapse.

2. Diaspora / Migration
   This part of the discussion is a potential difference, but with the level of empirical data in place at the time, drawing any significant conclusions is speculative at best. However, especially the Edo-ethnic connection seems to be a particular fruitful venue for further study. The Edo-Nigerian state is a small geographic area, and the Edo-ethnic group is not part of the three major groups (Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani), why such a high level of involvement in trafficking?

We now have to underline the significance of the social network factor. At one hand we can disregard it as being similar to for example the Guanxi-networks in China and southern Italy’s institutionalized corruption. This is a far too general a conclusion to draw; Ebbe’s political criminal nexus shows us a degree of both upper and lower level society integration that surpasses any State-Organized Crime connection both in China and southern Italy. That it is difficult in itself to draw a clear line between Criminal Networks and society in itself, shows a difference between the Nigerian against the Chinese and southern Italian type.

Nigeria’s population may have some causality in why Nigeria dominates the African and particular west African criminal network sphere. It is a general and logical factor, which may give us a pointer to why Nigeria particularly stands out globally when it comes to African Criminal Networks.
Lastly, we have to mention the wildcard, that metaphorically speaking, comes in from the outside. The 419-connection is perhaps the best described element of mainly Nigerian Criminal Networks in contemporary literature. At the same time a similar relevant case in Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese forms of organized crime is not described in a comprehensive way. There are no particular connections of E-mail fraud drawn to other forms of Organized Criminal Networks than the West African in general and Nigerian in particular. Using the method of difference, this has to have some significance for Nigerian Criminal Networks. A possible causal explanation will be expressed in the next conclusive and final chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

We will in this chapter first draw up a broad sketch of the steps taken to reach this point in the thesis before we start a discussion around some of the findings. The discussion will be divided chronologically into firstly a more general discussion around the type of Nigerian Criminal networks. Afterwards we will perform a more comprehensive walkthrough of the particulars of Nigerian Criminal Networks through: Social network theory and the 419-industry. Lastly in the discussion we will attempt to use the Economy of Affection to explain the indicated particulars. We will in the end try to summarize some main conclusions.

5.2. Preliminary summary

In chapter two we established basic links of support leading up to the Economy of affection as analytic tool to perhaps describe some causal explanations regarding Nigerian Criminal Networks. By first using Nettl as a critique around the concept and understanding of the State, and the especially problematic shape this concept takes in third world countries. The very shape this fragmentation appears in, can be found in Putnam’s text regarding Italy’s divided north and south. Here he shows us a possible comparative case of fragmented state to use against the Nigerian. Both of these authors cement Ekeh’s basic point of the two publics in Africa further. When put together we have a good foundation to base Hyden’s Economy of upon as a possible framework for causal factors connected to Nigerian Criminal Networks. It is perhaps important to note that at this stage in the thesis we where somewhat unsure if any difference between Nigerian and Other forms of Organized Criminal Networks where to be found. We may use the analogy that we had the toolbox ready, but were not entirely sure which way we had to use it, but knew it was relevant and was to be used in some way.
In chapter three we first of all put down a definition on Organized Crime from Alan Block’s theory. This definition was found to be both comprehensive and specific to the problem of the thesis. Further, we drew together 3 factors that seemed to span all described forms of organized crime through method of agreement. The nation specific cases of Organized Crime in use were Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese. The Italian type was the best described. The following comparative factors that were used were social networks, economic collapse/economic change and diaspora/migration.

In chapter four we used the factors found in chapter three, through method of agreement, in a comparative analysis against the current literature on Nigerian Criminal Networks, through method of difference. Two of the factors seemed to be similar in a broad sense, though not of course without some minor discrepancies. The economic collapse factor stands slightly out in regards to being a purely economical crisis instead of a fundamental political change like the land reforms of Italy and Japan, or fundamental political economic change in Russia and China. The diaspora/migration factor stands slightly more out by implying some level of ethnic based relationship to particular spheres of Nigerian Criminal Networks. However, this discrepancy can also be explained by the fragmented ethnic Nigerian federation and its inherent local differences as sketched in both Nettl and Putnam’s theory. We therefore disregarded these factors as significant to find any particularisms through method of difference. Social Network theory however stands more clearly out than the other two mentioned. Not that it is isolated solely to the sphere of Nigerian Criminal Networks Franchise, but rather in the level and importance it plays in Nigerian society. Finally the 419-industry and its particular connection to Nigeria comes into the equation as somewhat of a wildcard. Firstly, because it is not described as significant for any other form of Organized Criminal Networks, secondly because it is the empirically best described part of the Nigerian Criminal Networks. The work through the former chapters will form the basis for our further discussion in this chapter.
5.3. Discussion

5.3.1. The general brand of Nigerian Criminal Networks

Antonio Mazzitelli\(^1\) together with Obi N. Ebbe gives us the most important insights in the fundamental logic and dynamics regarding Nigerian Networks. Mazzitelli in a broader sense, since he is describing West African Criminal Networks where Nigeria is an important part. Ebbe in a more direct sense since his political-criminal nexus gives us an insight in the apparent integration between upper level and lower level of society, or more specific; an integration between Criminal Networks and the Nigerian sphere of Politics.

If we look upon Mazzitelli’s sketch upon African Criminal Networks indicators we get the following factors;

“African criminal networks (ACNs) have certain prime characteristics. Typically, such a network:

• is made of small, compartmentalized cells of between two and ten members;
• consists mostly of kinsmen from the same ethnic group or clan;
• communicates mostly in the local language;
• shares some confidence, but with minimal trust among members;
• makes deals and then disperses, regrouping only at a later date;
• is highly mobile;
• adopts false or protected identities for its members, including changing their nationality;
• adapts readily to any new environment;
• is ready to bribe and corrupt government officials;
• refrains from the use of violence in order not to attract the attention of law enforcement operators”.

(Mazzitelli 2007:1084)

\(^1\) Head of the Regional Office for Central and West Africa of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Dakar, Senegal.
Looking upon these indicators of African Criminal Networks we have to expect the same indicators to form a super-structure for the type of Nigerian criminal networks.

The point of minimal trust is one that needs to be scrutinized. We should expect some higher level of cooperation toward law enforcement if trust is at such a low level. This scenario of law enforcement cooperation is not particularly described in the current literature regarding Nigerian Criminal Networks. We must therefore look elsewhere for an explanation. Still, the fact that the networks consist of mostly kinsmen from the same ethnic group or clan must infer some basic level of trust. Perhaps we can talk about a particular ethnic-trust. This mode of trust needs not to be continually renewed or strengthened as the basis of trust is already in place through mutual ethnic bonds. The ethnic specific rituals that seem to be a part of Nigerian Criminal Networks must therefore be the tool of strengthening bonds of trust where this is needed.

The notion of “adapting readily to any new environment” is also interesting. Can we also here sketch some basic connection to the Economy of Affection? Nigerian citizens are broadly dependent on creating social networks for higher life-quality security. This is because of a failed state environment where rudimentary demands like security, social-care, health concerns and education is not met in an adequate level by the Nigerian federation. The social “intelligence” or mechanics of social networking may give Nigerians abroad a higher capacity of adapting to local society. This is of course dependent on which way we define “adapting to society” in the first place. We may talk about some basic level of social-logic that spans ethnicity, but the empiric material regarding the way abroad Nigerian Criminal Network’s adapt into foreign society in this thesis, is not broad enough to present anything but a general discussion.

5.3.2. Social networks

As both Mcillwain and Block identify social networks as an important part of both upper world relations and the lower-world, where the mafia is thought to exist, this became one of the factors that were found to be consistent within Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese types of organized crime.
The social networking factor resonates in the southern Italy region as we can find in Putnam, McIlwain and Gambetta’s literature, but is perhaps even stronger in the Chinese form of organized crime, where the Guanxi-networks seems to be an institutionalized part of the Chinese society. As such, this may even be a serious obstacle to overcome for future Chinese economic development.

However, when looking at Nigerian Criminal Networks through the lens of social networking theory we see even further implications than the Chinese scenario. The historical context of a divided Italy through Habsburg-Spain dominance, as sketched by Gambetta, have certain points of similarity when looking on Ekeh and Mamdani’s arguments around colonization, and the implications this have for the current southern Saharan “democratic” states. Both are instances of an external force dominating an area through the means of setting internal factions against each other. But this is also the place where the similarities stop.

Southern Italy and China can under no circumstance be said to have achieved the same level of integration between Criminal Networks and upper-level political spheres as Ebbe argues in his text. Neither do they seem to have the same level of “loose” or non-hierarchical networks as the Nigerian type. The Chinese form appear to come the closest, but also here there is no political criminal-nexus as Ebbe claims in the Nigerian context.

There is perhaps some non-criminal factors connected to the ad-hoc based small loose type of Nigerian Criminal Networks. Aning argues, for example, that these particular characteristics can be turned to advantage in modern Globalized markets. That modern Technology both in electronics and travel infrastructure is particular well suited to the Nigerian type of networks, also the non-criminals. There may be some basis to argue that this form of structure is traditional in west-African traders. However, Aning, does not touch upon why these forms are traditional in the first place. Both Ekeh’s two publics and Hyden’s economy of affection may give some clues to why this tradition has appeared in the first place, based in southern-Sahara’s rather unique modern History.
5.3.3. The 419-Industry

The 419 factor or e-mail fraud factor, did not appear in our attempt to isolate some common indicators between our selected types of Organized Crime other than Nigerian Criminal Networks through the method of agreement. Using the basics of method of difference, this tells us that the e-mail fraud factor stands even further out than Ebbe’s political criminal nexus. The 419 factor did of course not appear out of the blue. It has been implicated throughout the thesis. But after partly analysing the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of Organized Crime, the indicator did not appear in any of these forms at all. If this was only a small part of NCNs this would of course make the indicator less significant. But it is hard to ignore the role the 419-industry has in Nigerian Criminal Networks, both in Nigeria itself and abroad, as Nigerians are the most dominant actors according to Edelson. Almost all literature describing some level of NCN’s takes the factor into account. It would therefore be negligence on the thesis part not to give it some importance. This, together with the apparent unique role 419 factor, makes it perhaps the most significant divergent factor explaining Nigerian Criminal Networks particular brand in the thesis.

Ebbe also mentions the importance of 419 networks in Nigeria internally through his research. He does not connect 419 isolated to e-mail fraud, various other forms of fraud is also in play according to him. But it is probably still a significant part of the fraud-scheme. It is only logical that Criminal Networks spread their resources into several types of franchise to maximized returns and minimize economic risk. This does not make e-mail fraud any less significant as such.

It is important to underline the very mechanics involved in a 419 or e-mail fraud. The magnitude of spam bombarding the world’s collective mailboxes is of course important. But the way these frauds are done, through benevolent persuasion and social bonding, must imply some level or particular skill of social intelligence.

Finally we must mention the weak level of Internet-infrastructure in Nigeria. How can it be dominant in e-mail fraud franchises when it has one of the worlds less developed Internet infrastructure? There has to be some further explanation to why this brand of Criminal Networks emanates mainly from here.
5.3.4. **Economy of affection**

Though Hyden’s economy of affection is a theory that is meant to span Africa as a whole, it shares especial connotations with Nigeria. On the one hand is has to be significant for Nigeria as it is simply a part of Africa. On the other hand Hyden uses Ekeh’s theory and many examples from Nigeria to underline his hypothesis. Ekeh can also be said to use his cases of example mainly from the Nigerian sphere. There should therefore be no doubt to the significance of the Economy of Affection on the Nigerian sphere, but what impact can it have on the Criminal Networks?

Through Nettl and Putnam, we have with the first established a complementary basis for the economy of affection, as Nettl gives a general insight in the inherent problem of concepts of state, which Hyden also uses as an important factor to explaining the mechanics behind economy of affection. Putnam shows us some signs of economy of affection not being singular to Africa, but also in existence in Europe, perhaps particularly in the southern part.

Why do participants in Nigerian Criminal Networks try to justify their actions? To justify crime for personal benefit is not uncommon in itself, but the particular arguments used in this instance is more connected to political statements, rather than personal tragedy. Both Shaw describing Nigerian drug-dealers in South-Africa, and Edelson describing participants in 419-frauds, have found this idiosyncrasy. Remembering Ekeh’s point around why the state is prey and informal networks the security-net, this factor becomes even more suggestive. Much of the same dynamics in the economy of affection, the particularisms of colonialism, the movement legacy where the former imperial states are the African political spheres “enemy”, seems to be represented in the very defence of Nigerian Criminal Networks actions. It is of course not very surprising taking into account the political environment, but still gives a connection between Economy of Affection and Nigerian Criminal Networks.

There is also the historic context to take into account. Aning argues that the way the Criminal Networks functions is especially streamlined to the reality of a modern global economy through the “traditional” ways of trade. This also resonates with Economy of Affection emphasis on the colonial period, the about 100 years where the continent went through significant basic institutional changes and the way the state were anything but a accepted means of organizing society. Ekeh also argues in the direction that the traditional informal
system is still the most important through his two publics. This also lends some credibility that the Economy of Affection forms the way Nigerian Criminal Networks works to some degree.

Even though the economic collapse/change factor did not give us any direct difference from Nigerian Criminal Networks toward other forms, it may have indirectly given us a further pointer toward the fragility of the Nigerian federation versus the informal. It is suggestive the way the oil-boom collapse resulted in higher levels of corruption and at the same time higher level of Criminal Networks, both at home and abroad.

We must also look upon the factor of 419 e-mail fraud against the economy of affection. Is it not plausible that individuals brought up in a society where the informal is more important than the informal, where social networking and the people you know gives the security on most areas rather than the state, shows us some of the dynamics in Economy of Affection implied in 419 fraud? Can it not give individuals a higher potential for social networking skills when their most important day-to-day skills are navigating the social ladders and networks rather than finding their way through a bureaucratic states maze of services? Is it not then possible that the somewhat unique dynamic of 419 fraud in the Nigerian Criminal Networks has evolved partly because of this affinity toward social networking? It is not the sole explanatory factor, but the Economy of Affection (EoA) must have some significance upon the particular way 419 e-mail fraud is connected to Nigerian Criminal Networks.

Finally, Ebbe’s political criminal nexus also have some connections to EoA. This is perhaps the most clear link since its inherent dynamic involve Ekeh’s two publics that both Hyden and Ebbe uses in their arguments. That Criminal Networks seems to be so integrated in politics may just be another aspect of the informal dictating the way formal institutions work as Hyden uses in his very definition of Economy of Affection.

We can than see parts of a picture, showing us the way traditional dynamics have dominated society, were the informal has been the significant factor rather than a state structure, as means of achieving progress for individuals. This seems also to have played a part in the way Nigerian Criminal Networks functions both internally in Nigeria and externally through 419 e-mail fraud, and the way the very Networks are organized through loose ad-hoc based continuously changing relations.
5.3.5. Population factor

We have in the preceding text found some indicators upon why Nigerian Criminal networks have their specific indicators through theory that is after all not attempting to describe Nigeria in particular. However, it is hard to disregard the fact that much of the empiric cases that both Ekeh and Hyden use are Nigerian. Still a further possible factor for why Nigerian Criminal Networks are more prominent than other west-African or African criminal networks may lie in the simple logic that it is by far the most populous area in Africa. This is also mentioned by Edelson. It is current count lies around 130 million citizens, but unregistered population may drive it into an estimate of 160 million. The next south-Saharan country is the Democratic republic of Congo with 55 million. This causal explanation is not comprehensively described in the text because of its simple logic in the first place, though it may indirectly give the diaspora factor some higher level of importance, but not in the way that the Nigerian diaspora is unique when set up against the Chinese for example. Both the diaspora factor, and economic collapse factor may therefore indirectly have influenced the causal reasons why Nigerian Criminal Networks are dominating other forms, but perhaps only through the population factor. The diaspora and collapse factor must therefore still be deemed insignificant as direct causal explanations to why Nigerian Criminal Networks appear in its particular form.

5.4. Main conclusions

We have in the thesis first established 3 factors that seemed to have similar foundations in Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of Organized Crime. Having put these factors comparatively against the indicators and current literature on Nigerian Criminal Networks we had to disregard two of these as insignificant: migration / diaspora and economic collapse / economic change. Social networking however seemed to play a more special role in Nigeria and was deemed significant. It was not significant in the way it was unique to Nigerian Criminal Networks, but rather in the strength the social network factor played in the Nigerian society. The 419 industry was also found to be important to explain the particular brand of Nigerian Criminal networks as this indicator was not originally in the equation as it was not described in the other forms of Organized Crime. This factor was then deemed even more significant to describe the special brand of Nigerian Criminal Networks.
The thesis also attempted to find some of the explanations to why Nigerian Criminal Networks stands out with these factors. By using the Economy of Affection as analytic tool, we may have found some causal explanations. The particular colonial history of southern-Sahara together with the way the informal dictates the formal gives us some insight into way social networks dominate both society and Criminal Networks to a particular degree. It also partly explains the way 419-industry is mostly dominated by Nigerians. It does not clearly gives us a causal explanation why Nigeria is dominant, since other African countries should at least have some higher level of involvement in 419 industry since they also are a part of the Economy of Affection, but this may be partly explained by Nigeria’s much higher population and indirectly diaspora.

Individuals growing up in the Nigerian federation seem to have a higher potential for social networking since their weak state gives them little protection in economic, welfare, security and education spheres. This may be an explanation how the dynamics of Nigerian Criminal Networks works at present. This is not the only factor in why they work in their particular fashion, but the thesis gives, hopefully, some insights to why Nigerian Criminal Networks has it is particular idiosyncrasies.
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