"We are equal, we are different"
A social movements’ approach to the emergence of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru

Master thesis
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Abstract
This thesis discusses the emergence of ethnic, or indigenous, parties in Bolivia and Peru. More specifically, it seeks to explain why Bolivia has seen the emergence of indigenous-based political parties at the national level, while similar parties have so far only been successful at the local and regional levels in neighbouring Peru. The two cases share a number of attributes – most notably, both countries are Andean and they have large indigenous populations – but, significantly, differ on the dependent variable, emergence of indigenous parties.

Using social movement theory and theory linking parties and social movements, this thesis tries to unite three differing focuses, or approaches, to explain the variation on the dependent variable. First, the “framing processes” approach focuses on the symbolic aspects of collective action, and development of indigenous-based discourses and their relations with other discourses, most relevantly here, the anti-neoliberal discourse. Second, the “mobilising structures” approach focuses more specifically on the organisational infrastructure of indigenous movements, while third, the “political opportunity” approach focuses on how political and institutional factors external to the social movements may encourage, or hinder, the development of indigenous parties.

With this theoretical starting point, the thesis develops a model adapted to the Latin American context to explain the emergence of indigenous parties. The main variables that best explain the different development in the two cases are the following: First, in Bolivia, the ethnic discourse has prevailed within the indigenous movement, while, in Peru, the class-based discourse has been dominant. Second, the connection between indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourse has been highly successful in Bolivia implying the broadening of affiliates of the indigenous organisations as well as the broadening of the electorate for indigenous parties. Third, the higher territorial concentration of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, the fostering of a strong indigenous identity, and the ability of Bolivian indigenous movements to create alliances both with other indigenous organisations as well as with urban movements meant that it was easier for indigenous-based parties to succeed in Bolivia. In Peru, the large distances, the weakening of indigenous identities due to migration and assimilation, and the Peruvian movements’ failure to create lasting alliances, meant that it was less likely to see the development of indigenous parties. Fourth, organising and mobilising was made much more difficult in the Peruvian case due to the combined pressures of the Shining Path guerrilla movement and subsequent repression from the state’s military apparatus. Additionally, the softer party registration requirements in Bolivia as well as a successful and a significant decentralisation reform were important for the possibilities of new parties to emerge, making the formation and success of indigenous parties more likely.
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Abbreviations

Bolivia

ADN: Acción Democrática y Nacionalista/ Democratic and Nationalist Action
APG: Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní/ the Assembly of the Guaraní People
ASP: Asamblea de la Soberanía del Pueblo/ the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People
Bloque Oriente: Alliance of leftist organisations in the Bolivian lowlands
CIDOB: Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia/ the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia
CIPOAP: Central Indígena de Pueblos Originarios de la Amazonia de Pando/ the Indigenous Central for Native Peoples in the Amazonian Pando
CIRABO: Central Indígena de la Región Amazónica de Bolivia/ the Indigenous Central of the Amazonian region in Bolivia
CNTCB: Confederación Nacional de los Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia/ the National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers
Coca Trópico: Comité de Coordinación de las Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba/ the Coordination Committee for the Six Federations of Tropical Cochabamba
COB: Central Obrera Boliviana/ the Bolivian Workers Central
COMIBOL: Corporación Minera Boliviana/ the Bolivian Mining Corporation
CONAMAQ: Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu/ the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu
CPESC: Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz/ the Coordinator for the Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz
CPIB: Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni/ the Central of Indigenous Peoples in Beni
CSCB: Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia/ the Union Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers
CNTCB: Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia/ the National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers
CSUTCB: Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia/ the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers
EGTK: Ejército Guerillero Tupaj Katari/ the Tupaj Katari Guerrilla Army
FEJUVE: Federación de Juntas Vecinales/ the Federation of Neighbourhood Committees
FNMCB-BS: Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia –’Bartolina Sisa’/ the National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women –’Bartolina Sisa’
INRA: Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria/ The National Institute for Agrarian Reform
IPSP: Instrumento Político para la Soberanía del Pueblo/ the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People
LPP: Ley de Participación Popular/ the Law of Popular Participation
MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo/ the Movement toward Socialism
MBL: Movimiento Bolivia Libre/ the Free Bolivia Movement
MIP: Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti/ the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement
MIR: Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria/ the Movement of the Revolutionary Left
MITKA: Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari/ the Indian Tupaj Katari Movement
MNR: Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria/ the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
MRTKL: Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación/ the Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation
UCS: Unión Civica Solidaridad/ the Civic Solidarity Union

Peru

AIDESEP: Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana/ the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest
APRA: Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana/ the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
CCP: Confederación Campesina del Perú/ the Peruvian Peasant Confederation
CISA: Consejo Indio de Sudamérica/ the Indian Council of South America
CNA: Confederación Nacional Agraria/ the National Agrarian Confederation
CONACAMI: Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería/ the National Confederation for Communities Affected by Mining
CONAIP: Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Perú/ the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Peru
CONAP: Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Peru/ the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities in Peru
CONAPA: Comisión Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos/ the National Commission of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian peoples
CONPACCP: Confederación Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras del Peru/ the National Confederation of Land and Cattle Producers of the Coca-Growing Valleys of Peru
COPPIP: Coordinadora Permanente de los Pueblos Indígenas del Peru/ the Permanent Conference for the Indigenous Peoples in Peru
CVR: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación/ the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
IIP: Instituto Indigenista Peruano/ the Peruvian Indigenista Institute
MIAP: Movimiento Indígena de la Amazonía Peruana/ the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon
PCP-SL: Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso/ the Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path
UPP: Unión por el Perú/ the Union for Peru
Map 1: Bolivia - political map
Map 2: Peru - political map
Map 3: Bolivia- Municipalities with more than 50% indigenous population

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1.0 Introduction

In December 2005, Evo Morales Ayma was elected the first indigenous president in Bolivia backed by the indigenous-mobilising party Movement toward Socialism (MAS) with an overwhelming 54 percent of the vote. On the day of his inauguration at the end of January 2006, the Plaza Murillo in La Paz was covered with wiphalas1 and people celebrating the indigenous peoples’ long-awaited political victory. Six months later, in July 2006, the Peruvian indigenous Congress- women Maria Sumire and Hilaria Supe, who were elected from non-indigenous parties2, were denied to speak in their mother tongue Quechua at the Congress’ inauguration ceremony. These examples serve as illustrations of the different developments of indigenous political participation and representation in Bolivia and Peru since the transitions to democracy in 1982 and 19783, respectively. The emergence of successful indigenous parties in Bolivia since the mid- 1990s, and the lack of the same in Peru, is curious given the fact the large indigenous populations in neither country were properly represented by existing political parties nor had launched their own parties at the times of the transitions to democracy around three decades ago.

The principal question asked in this thesis is thus: Why has Bolivia experienced significant indigenous parties at the national level, whereas Peru to this date has no parallel experience?

1.1 Why study indigenous parties in Latin America?

One of the most enduring questions in political science is how social cleavages and collective interests are translated into party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, in most Latin American countries, the quality of representation secured through parties is poor. Many parties lack linkages to society, and many social cleavages are under-represented or poorly represented by parties (Roberts 2001:17). The assumption in the literature on social cleavages and political parties4 which states that ethnic cleavages are among those that most likely will

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1 The wiphala is the flag representing the indigenous peoples in the Central Andes.
2 Supe and Sumire were both elected from the highland region of Cusco on the Partido Nacionalista Peruno/Unión por Perú-list.
3 In the case of Peru, one speaks of two transitions. The first was in 1978, whereas the second transition took place in 2000, when authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori lost power.
4 The definition of a party in this thesis is equivalent to the minimalist definition of Giovanni Sartori (1976:63): “Any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office”.

1
generate political parties in multi-ethnic societies (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Horowitz 1985), has not been a valid one for the Latin American multi-ethnic societies. In Latin America, the indigenous population constitutes approximately forty million people, and in countries like Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru they form majorities or large minorities (Brysk 2000). Yet, until the 1990s, there were very few examples of Latin American political parties organised on the basis of an indigenous identity (Van Cott 2005), in spite of the politicisation of ethnicity in the region since the 1970s (Yashar 2005). During the most part of the 20th century, it was rather class, party, religious or revolutionary identities that served as the basis for political mobilisation of the region’s indigenous peoples (Yashar 1998:23). The prolonged lack of ethnic parties in Latin America is peculiar given the large indigenous population, and because ethnic movements have a long tradition of mobilising and creating parties in Africa, Asia, and parts of Europe (Yashar 2005:3). This deviation has led to Latin America being neglected in the literature on ethnic politics and political parties (Rice and Van Cott 2006:711). Rather, political comparativists working on Latin America have to a large degree focused on the weak representativity of the existent political parties, and the weak institutionalisation of the region’s party systems.

A peculiar characteristic of the new indigenous parties in Latin America is that they all have originated in indigenous social movement organisations (SMOs) (Van Cott 2005). The decision of indigenous SMOs to form parties is an innovation in Latin America, where historically it has been more common to see political parties forming SMOs. Traditionally, political parties and leftist movements formed dependent peasant organisations in order to co-opt and control indigenous voters and rural workers. The nature and scope of these organisations, changed in the 1960s and 1970s, however (Yashar 2005). Many organisations that had been subordinated to political parties, labour unions, and the Church asserted their autonomy, and independent indigenous organisations were formed. They were defending cultural and ethnic rights in opposition to the limited set of socioeconomic claims that the left promoted (Van Cott 2005). A large body of empirical work has analysed the emergence of

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5 Prior to the 1990s, smaller parties organised around ethnic identity existed, but they did not achieve enduring electoral success and had little impact on the party system (Stavenhagen 1992:434).

6 See for example: (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Coppedge 1999; Mainwaring, Bejano et al. 2006)
indigenous movements in the region which occurred particularly in the 1980s and 1990s\textsuperscript{7}. However, the literature on ethnic politics in Latin America has not sufficiently explained why some of these movements have transformed themselves into parties or achieved electoral success (Madrid 2008:476).

1.1.1 Why focus on Bolivia and Peru?

The interest in focusing on Bolivia and Peru stems from the very different trajectories of indigenous participation in the two countries. In terms of electoral participation, Bolivia is a highly successful case, whilst Peru is widely considered a deviant case (Van Cott 2005; Martí i Puig 2008). Moreover, in Peru, indigenous mobilisation in general has been characterised as “marginal” (Albó 1991), “largely non-existent” (Yashar 1998), and “a profound failure” (Mayer, cited in Yashar 1998). This thesis, however, does not subscribe to the established truth that Peruvian indigenous peoples do not mobilise on the basis of indigenous identities. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, a politicisation of indigenous identities has given rise to movements and a few parties that identify as indigenous and include ethnic demands on their political agendas (Pajuelo Teves 2005; Albó 2008a). However, there are still no indigenous parties at the national level in Peru, as compared to Bolivia and other countries in the region\textsuperscript{8}.

1.1.2 Theoretical starting point

To be able to understand why successful indigenous parties have emerged at a national level in Bolivia, whereas parties based on indigenous identities have only appeared at the local and regional levels in Peru, this thesis makes use of insights from social movement theory and theory linking social movements and political parties. The reason behind this theoretical starting point is precisely the fact that all of the new successful indigenous parties in Latin America have been created by indigenous movements (Van Cott 2005). There are three main approaches within the social movement paradigm: 1) Framing processes, which focus on cultural dimensions of mobilisations; 2) mobilising structures, which treat the organisational infrastructure of the organisations; and 3) political opportunities which refers to political factors that are external to groups that may attempt to mobilise.

This thesis merges these three theoretical approaches in a manner that to the author’s knowledge has only been carried out by Martí i Puig (2008) in the Latin American context.

\textsuperscript{7} See for example Albó (1991; 2008a); Alvarez et al. (1998a); Lucero (2002); Jackson and Warren (2003; 2005); Van Cott (1994); Yashar (1998; 2005), and Postero and Zamosc (2004).

\textsuperscript{8} Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela.
However, Martí y Puig makes use of a Boolean approach in the study of six Latin American countries, which does not allow for an in-depth analysis of each case. The political opportunity approach has to a large degree dominated the studies on Latin American social movements, whereas the resource mobilisation approach, also called mobilising structures, has been almost entirely ignored (Trejo 2000: 206).

1.1.3 Methodological considerations
This thesis takes a qualitative approach to explain why Bolivia has experienced indigenous parties at the national level, whilst there is no parallel development in Peru. A main reason why a qualitative approach is considered to be the most appropriate to answer the research question, is because many of the concepts derived from social movement theory are difficult to apply within a quantitative study with a high degree of conceptual validity (Rice and Van Cott 2006). The applied methodological design is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). MSSD is particularly suited for the comparison of cases that differ on the dependent variable, in this case the emergence of indigenous parties, but are similar regarding as many characteristics as possible, to be able to control for common characteristics. Even though the findings cannot be made generalised to broad populations, the aims of high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases” (George and Bennett 2005:22), have justified the methodological choice. Moreover, the approach is explorative and can be tested on other countries in the region with large indigenous populations.

1.2 The dependent variable
The dependent variable is emergence of indigenous parties. There are different understandings among scholars of how to define ethnicity and ethnic identification, a fact that accordingly has implications for the definition of ethnic mobilisation and ethnic parties, or in my case, the indigenous category. In order to define an ethnic party that is appropriate for and sensitive to the Latin American context, the following sections will present different theoretical approaches to ethnic identification, then turn to a brief discussion of how ethnicity in Latin America diverges from other parts of the world, before presenting the two cases’ value on the dependent variable.

1.2.1 Different approaches to ethnic identification
In ethnicity theory primordialism and instrumentalism are often treated as the two main opposing theoretical approaches, whereas the constructivist approach reconciles the contradictions between the first two. Primordialism refers to ethnic identities as “natural”, “ineffable” or primary (Tilley 1998:501). According to primordialists, individuals feel a
natural attachment to members of their own ethnic groups and these attachments are older than the nation-states (Calhoun 1997:31). The emergence of indigenous protest and organising is understood as a natural expression of integral ethnic identities (Yashar 2005:9). According to Degregori (1993:116), a danger of this approach is the “exotification” of the ethnic “other” and a view of ethnicity as static. Furthermore, if one assumes that individuals have one single identity, one cannot explain why ethnic identities serve as a basis for political action and mobilisation in some cases and not in others (Yashar 2005; Madrid 2008).

On the other hand, instrumentalist approaches, also labelled rational choice analyses, argue that ethnic identity is the result of political mobilisation, and not a prerequisite or a motivation per se. Instead, instrumentalists stress the individual intentionality and its collective consequences. In other words, individuals are assumed to have fixed preferences, clear goals and act in a utility-maximising way (Yashar 2005:9-11). It is suggested that ethnic identity is not primary, as it may be changed according to particular interests (Lindblom 1993:9). In this perspective, the main question deals with how to maximise a particular goal rather than to discuss why ethnicity becomes politicised.

However, work in ethnic politics over the past thirty years is leaning on the reconciling constructivist approach to ethnicity (see for example: Barth 1969/1998; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Banton 1997). This approach recognises that ethnic mobilisation involves the construction of identities under changing circumstances. Constructivists do not take ethnic groups as given, natural entities, nor as the arrangement of political elites, as do the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches (Yashar 1998:29). Rather, it is assumed that individuals can construct or reconstitute their identities. Ethnic boundaries may shift, groups may combine or divide, and the same individuals may identify or be identified by others in multiple ways depending on the context of their interactions, their intellectual ethnic discourse, lived social experience, and individual choice (Gisselquist 2005; Yashar 2005). To make the point even clearer, a constructivist approach is most appropriate because “ethnic identities can best be understood as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on national, cultural-linguistic, racial, or religious backgrounds (Norris 2004:209). The constructivist approach presented this far can be considered part of the postmodernist paradigm (Yashar 1998; Trejo 2000). A second approach within the constructivist approximation to ethnicity is the analysis of game theory (Hardin 1995). This theory considers the formation of collective identities a coordination game in which a group of individuals with multiple identities decides to act collectively and frequently encounters an
identity dilemma (Trejo 2000:213). The next section will show why the constructivist approach is the best suited to the Latin America context.

1.2.2 Ethnicity in Latin America
Ethnic identification in Latin America is characterised by a lower level of polarisation compared to other regions of the world. In fact, Latin America is not even included\(^9\) in Donald L. Horowitz’ significant book “Ethnic Groups in Conflict” (1985) because class conflict is considered to be more prominent than ethnic cleavages. Also, levels of ethnic violence are comparatively very low in Latin America (Trejo 2000:230). According to Raúl L. Madrid (2008:477) the class cleavage’s preponderance may be accounted for by the fluidity of ethnic identification in Latin America whereby people often identify with multiple, intersecting groups. Some of this fluidity may be connected to the process of assimilation with the goal of \textit{mestizaje}\(^10\) which has blurred the lines between different ethnic or racial groups. Also, corporatist regimes in the Andean countries imposed a peasant identification on the indigenous communities which prevailed for decades and blurred indigenous identities (Albó 2008a). Another important explanatory factor for the less salient ethnic identification in Latin America is prejudice and discrimination. Those factors have led many individuals to identify with ethnic groups that are accorded higher social status (Madrid 2008:480). Moreover, ethnic conflicts in Latin America are not principally between groups, as in many Asian and African countries. Indigenous peoples have mobilised against the state rather than against \textit{mestizos} (Trejo 2000:226). Another difference from African countries is that the indigenous populations in Latin America tend to be more dispersed and not concentrated to one administrative unit (Fearon and Laitin 1997). According to Trejo (2000:208), the culminations and declines of the waves of indigenous mobilisations throughout history clearly illustrates that the constructivist approach is the best suited to the Latin American context as identities appear and reappear in concordance with changing circumstances and interests.

A certain degree of conceptual confusion is present in the discussion of ethnic identities in Latin America, as numerous scholars juxtapose the concepts of “indigenous” and “ethnic”. The definition of “indigenous” applied in this thesis is broadly used by indigenous movements and international agreements: Indigenous peoples are the “descendants of the original inhabitants of a geographical region prior to colonisation who have maintained some or all of

\(9\) With the exception of Guyana.
\(10\) \textit{Mestizaje} is the process of national homogenisation, essentially the notion of racial and cultural mixture (Wade 2005).
their linguistic, cultural and organizational characteristics. In addition, self-identification is a fundamental criterion to determine who is considered indigenous” (Deruyttere 1997:2). However, Rachel M. Gisselquist (2005) warns that such a juxtaposition of the concepts could be a dangerous manoeuvre in that it excludes other salient ethnic identities than the indigenous/non-indigenous. One problem is that many theories about indigenous populations assume them to be small minorities, which is not the case in Bolivia, for example. Moreover, there are many ethnic cleavages that go beyond the indigenous/non-indigenous divide. For instance, the Afro-Latin communities that exist in a number of Latin American countries do not fit this categorisation. Moreover, Jackson and Warren (2005:557) argue that recent scholarship demonstrates why certain dichotomies and concepts that were conveniently employed in earlier analyses now hinder more than help. An example of such a dichotomy is precisely the hegemonic indigenous/non-indigenous division. “Indigenous” is a historical product of European colonialism that masks enormous variations in history, culture, community, and relations with those who are considered non-indigenous (Jackson and Warren 2003).

Also, the concept of “Indian”, similarly to “indigenous”, is a concept that does not take into account the historical diversity of ethnic populations before the Spanish colonisation (Gisselquist 2005). However, Jackson and Warren (2005:557) do not dismiss this dichotomy, but rather recommend a cautious approach that recognises that such dichotomies are complex, nuanced and inhibit dynamic meaning structures. Other overly simple dichotomies that have been applied to the Latin American context have been “authentic” vs. “inauthentic” and “modern” vs. “traditional”. These polarities play on a Western concept, “authentic” as opposed to fake, invented, new, modern, Western, etc. Both indigenous groups and their opponents use the “authenticity” card in their external and internal politics through which they claim that some groups are “no longer indigenous” because of their “untraditional behaviour” (Turner 2002) (Turner 2002). A last point to be made is that the indigenous organisations and parties have different preferences as to which term they use to define themselves. While “indigenous” seems to be the preferred term when referring to the original inhabitants of Latin America, some indigenous movements also refer to themselves as “Indian” or “native” movements (Albó 1991:301).

The definition of ethnic identity and ethnic parties in the remainder of this thesis is equivalent to “indigenous” identity and “indigenous” parties, unless interviewees or names of organisations or parties use “Indian”. Both Van Cott (2005) and Birnir (2004) use the broader
term “ethnic party” in order to relate their research to the literature on ethnic parties, but their understanding of ethnic identity is equivalent to “indigenous” identity. This choice implies that I do not look into the mobilisation based on other salient ethnic identities, for example the Afro-Latin. However, well aware of the nuances and dangers that are inherited in such juxtapositions, the different indigenous groups will be referred to throughout the analytical chapters. Moreover, even though Gisselquist (2005) argues that the theories on indigenous populations assume that they are minorities and this is not the case in Bolivia, the indigenous groups could still be regarded as politically non-dominant by the time of transition to democracy (Van Cott 2005). Finally, the indigenous identity will be considered a fluid, dynamic and always relational process consistent with the constructivist understanding of ethnicity.

1.2.3 Specification of the dependent variable
A classic understanding of ethnic parties is that the party must serve the interests of one single ethnic group that supports the party overwhelmingly (Horowitz 1985:291-292). However, the static view that individuals have one single identity and that the boundaries dividing ethnic groups are clear and relatively stable is not appropriate for the analysis of the emergence of ethnic parties in Latin America (Madrid 2008:479). Latin American ethnic parties are distinct from similar parties in other parts of the world, as they usually represent more than one ethnic group (Van Cott 2005; Madrid 2008). Furthermore, the indigenous peoples often constitute a minority of the registered voters, and a large share of the votes may come from non-indigenous voters that consider the candidates from indigenous parties a better alternative than the traditional politicians that are often considered to be corrupt (Van Cott 2005:17).

I will rely on Donna Lee Van Cott’s broadly recognised definition of ethnic parties:

“[an] organization authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic or cultural nature” (Van Cott 2005:3)\(^{11}\).

This definition also includes parties that incorporate non-indigenous candidates and form electoral alliances with non-indigenous parties and movements, provided that ethnic rights

\(^{11}\) This definition also includes entities that call themselves “political movements” in order to distance themselves from the negative connotations associated with political parties.
and recognition are central to the party’s platform (Van Cott 2005:3). Moreover, in this thesis this definition covers both exclusionary and inclusive or ethnopopulist parties. Leaders of exclusionary ethnic parties mobilise members of their own group by exaggerating the threat posed by members of other ethnic groups and adopting exclusionary rhetoric and platforms, and are thus more in the line of Horowitz’ definition of an ethnic party (Madrid 2008:479).

On the other hand, an inclusive or ethnopopulist party is ethnically based and adopts classical populist electoral strategies and is defined as “[a party which] recruits members of various ethnic groups for the top leadership positions of the party, forms alliances with organization that represent a diversity of ethnic groups, eschews exclusionary rhetoric, and emphasizes that it seeks to represent all members of the nation” (Madrid 2008:475). This thesis follows Van Cott’ (2005:18) definition of a formally established party, in that the party must have participated in at least two successive elections at the municipal, regional or national level to be considered formally established. An overview of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru, 1980-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>First election</th>
<th>Level of representation</th>
<th>Highest electoral achievement</th>
<th>Ethnic composition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1980: Two deputies in the lower chamber</td>
<td>Indigenous only</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación Nacional (MRTKL)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1985: Two deputies in the lower chamber</td>
<td>Indigenous only</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Asamblea de la Soberanía del Pueblo (ASP)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1997: 4 uninominal seats in the lower chamber</td>
<td>Indigenous only</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>2002: 6 deputies in the lower chamber</td>
<td>Mono-ethnic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Movimiento Indígena de la Amazonia Peruana (MIAP)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>2000: 12 mayoralties</td>
<td>Indigenous only</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Frente Popular Llapanchik</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>2002: Regional president</td>
<td>Indigenous-based</td>
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Source: (Van Cott 2003a; Van Cott 2005; Pajuelo Teves 2006)
1.3 Structure of thesis
The remainder of this thesis will consist of the following chapters: Chapter 2 presents social movement theories that may shed light on the empirical explanations of differences in the dependent variable, and concludes with the presentation of an analytical framework. Chapter 3 is concerned with the methodological considerations, such as the choice of methodological design and the countries under study, the sources, and the question of reliability. The three main currents within social movement theory, framing processes, mobilising structures and political opportunity structures, serve as headings of the analysis chapters 4, 5 and 6. Finally, chapter 7 will discuss the main findings of each analysis chapter in order to make concluding remarks. The analysis of the emergence of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru is limited to the period after the transitions to democracy in 1982 and 1978, respectively. However, the first analytical chapter, which analyses the discourses that have served to mobilise indigenous organisations and parties, necessarily needs to take into account earlier developments of indigenous discourses (Maíz 2004).

2.0 Theories that can explain variation in the emergence of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru

2.1 Linkages between social movement organisations and political parties
Social movement organisations (SMOs) and political parties are usually analysed in separate literatures, and there are few analyses of why social movement organisations decide to form electoral vehicles or political parties. According to Charles Tilly (2003:255), this is a research programme that merits further attention. One reason for the lack of literature connecting social movement organisations and parties, is that movement politics for a long time were considered extra-institutional, as social movement theorists associated institutionalisation with demobilisation (Katzenstein 1998:195). The argument was that as social movement actors gained institutionalised access to the political system, the protest action would fade away. Goldstone (2003b:2), however, argues that “state institutions and parties are interpenetrated by social movements, often developing out of movements, in response to movements, or in close association with movements”. The repertoire of contentious action has not shifted from protest to politics, but rather includes both. According to Tarrow (1998:2),

“Collective action (...) becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others”.

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Social movements are thus part of “normal politics”, and not only in the Western world, as found by Meyer and Tarrow (1998), but also in emerging democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and South-East Asia (Cadena-Roa 2003; Glenn 2003; Goldstone 2003b). In all these regions, citizenship rights and political party systems are developing out of social movements. Currently, then, leading social movement scholars have recognised that the split between institutionalised and non-institutionalised politics must be challenged (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001). The comprehension of how social movements give rise to parties has become essential to comprehend political dynamics (Goldstone 2003b:12).

Goldstone delineates various ways in which states may respond to social movements and stresses the fact that the relationship between parties and movements are not “reducible simply to action and response, opportunity and repression” (2003b:24). Even though repression and open protest are most visible and have been the focus of most social movement literature, movements shape and sometimes produce spin-off parties that may remain allied with the movement or become independent (Garner and Zald 1987; Goldstone 2003b). Examples of such spin-off parties are the Labour and Socialist parties that grew out of the labour movement in Europe, and more recently, the Green parties that developed from ecology movements (Inglehart 1977; Kitschelt 1989). Even though social movements and interest groups are different, Clive S. Thomas (2001b) has provided a typology of various relationships between interest groups and political parties in traditional post-World War II and transitional democracies that is useful for the purpose of this thesis. Thomas’ “integration model” illustrates a relationship in which a political party and the interest group are practically identical or at a minimum very close organisationally, since one usually creates the other. These entities approximate what Maguire (1995:201-5) calls “parties of movement”, and such parties are more likely to be formed by strong organisational, cultural, and policy resources in electoral systems with low barriers to entry. Herbert Kitschelt’s work on the emergence of ecology parties and left-libertarian parties in Western Europe is also relevant for this thesis. He applies a combination of theories of structural changes, and resource

12 Repression with institutional change; repression with no institutional change; toleration or encouragement; influence with no institutional change; influence with institutional change; influence through ongoing alliances; and influence through movement spin-off of political parties (Goldstone 2003:20-24).
13 Zeigler (1992) defines an interest group as: “a formal organization seeking to influence public policy in democratic politics”.
14 The structural changes were: Economic growth; transformation in a society’s occupational profile; and changes in values and lifestyles.
mobilisation and political opportunity structure approaches to explain the emergence of these parties (1989:14-15). Kitschelt explains various social movements’ decisions to form political parties by the unresponsiveness of existing political institutions or the failure of the existing parties to respond to the claims of new groups, as well as propitious political opportunities to displace existing parties (Kitschelt 1989:19). These insights prove useful for this thesis, because established social movement organisations created all of the new successful indigenous parties in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, ethnic elites lacking the support of a well-rooted and institutionalised organisation failed in their attempts to form indigenous parties (Van Cott 2005:9).

2.2 Defining an indigenous social movement organisation

Social movement theorists have identified a set of variables that create conditions for social movement formation and mobilisation. Following the logic of Kitschelt (1989) as well as Van Cott (2005), these conditions can also explain the strategic decisions of social movements to form political parties. There is still no integrated theory of social movements, but social movement theorists generally agree on three different approaches, or groups of factors, that influence social movement emergence and persistence: Political opportunity structures, mobilising structures, and framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996). However, before turning to these approaches and the presentation of the independent variables, it is necessary to define a social movement organisation (SMO), explain how it differs from the analytically distinct concept of social movement, and define an indigenous organisation in the Latin American context.

Many collective action scholars do not distinguish between social movements and SMOs. Della Porta and Diani (2006:20-21) define social movements as a distinct social process consisting of the following mechanisms through which actors engage in collective action: Involvement in conflictive relations with clearly identified opponents in order to promote or oppose social change; linkages by dense informal networks, which distinguish social movements from other innumerable instances of collective action; and sharing and development of a distinct collective identity. Social movements are not organisations, not even of a peculiar kind. Rather, they are networks that may include formal organisations or not, and as a consequence, a single organisation can never constitute a social movement for itself (Tilly 1988; Della Porta and Diani 2006). However, organisations often play a very important role within the social movements. The indigenous movements in Latin America that
have created political parties are better defined as SMOs. An SMO is “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement these goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1987:20). However, the SMOs vary considerably with regard to formal structure and rules. Some are very hierarchical, while others are highly decentralised or egalitarian (Goodwin and Jasper 2003:165-66). Another difference from social movements is that the latter have adherents, while the SMOs have constituents who provide the organisation with resources. Each SMO has a set of target goals which link them with particular social movements (McCarthy and Zald 2003:174). The indigenous SMOs in Latin America have participated collectively in various demonstrations, uprisings and marches based on wider informal networks constituting part of a broader global indigenous rights movement (Brysk 2000). Moreover, as will be seen shortly, in Bolivia, since 2000, various indigenous movements and popular fronts have participated collectively in what could be called a national social movement, or even a “society movement” (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). The definition of an indigenous movement in this thesis is equivalent to that of Albó (2008a:13, my translation): “[they are] social movements [organisations] whose actors are and consider themselves to be indigenous or, as a minimum, have sufficient historical and cultural elements to be able to consider themselves as such”. This definition is thus able to grasp the changing salience of identities, and avoid the clear demarcation between indigenous, peasant, and other popular movements that are commonly distinguished between.

2.3 Applicability to Latin America

It is challenging to analyse the emergence of indigenous parties in Latin America, because both the social movement literature and the literature linking social movement organisations to political parties are primarily developed in Western Europe and the United States (Foweraker 1995; Gunther and Montero 2002; Goldstone 2003a). It is paradoxical that theories are generated where social movements are in decline, whereas social movement activity has increased in Latin America and in other parts of the world. Foweraker (1995) questions whether social movement theory can grasp the characteristics of social mobilisation in very different political and cultural contexts. In a similar vein, Jackson and Warren (2003) stress that the Latin American indigenous movements rarely emerge in the singular, but most often come in the highly contested plural, and the indigenous movements rarely have standardised visions or are as organisationally coherent as their supporters suggest. Thus, the Latin America indigenous movements challenge political scientists’ attempts to categorise
them into neat typologies, such as “resource focused” or “culturally focused” (McAdam 1996), because they clearly do both (Warren 1998; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998b). The political opportunity approach and the new social movement perspective have to a large degree dominated the studies of social movements in Latin America. The new social movements approach was developed to account for the structural changes in society that gave rise to movements with new constituencies, values and forms of action in advanced industrial societies since the 1960s (Inglehart 1977; Foweraker 1995:15). Social movement activity was described as the mobilisation of identity rather than objective material position (Melucci 1989; Escobar and Alvarez 1992). On the other hand, the resource mobilisation perspective which focuses on organisational infrastructure, and the theory of framing processes, with its focus on construction of identities, have been almost entirely ignored (Foweraker 1995; Revilla Blanco 2005). In fact, Van Cott, in her book on the emergence of ethnic parties in South America, leaves it to the anthropologists and historians to deal with the question of identity (2005:47-48). According to Escobar and Alvarez (1992), a “cross-pollination” of research between identity-centred and resource mobilisation approaches is needed to understand social movements dynamics in Latin America. Tilly and Tarrow (2006) opt for a dual analysis of the construction of political identities and political structures and processes, because they are inseparable. On the one hand, political processes and institutions constrain and empower the construction of political identities and the culture of the movements. On the other hand, the way in which political identity is activated influences how actors face political processes both in terms of opportunities and constraints. According to Foweraker (1995:3), the different approaches might best be applied to the Latin American context in a pragmatic and selective fashion, and this is what the remainder of this chapter is concerned with.

2.4 Analytical framework- presentation of independent variables

Combining the recommendations of Escobar and Alvarez (1992), as well as Tilly and Tarrow (2006), the analytical framework which is delineated in the next sections will draw on insights from the three main approaches within social movement theory - framing processes, mobilising structures, and political opportunity structure - in order to present a comprehensive understanding of the formation of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru. The presented variables are based on the work of Van Cott (2005), Yashar (2005), and Martí i Puig (2008), who have all tried to explain the emergence of indigenous organisations and/or political parties in Latin America.
2.4.1 Framing processes

The proponents of the theory of framing processes argue that cognitive, cultural and ideational dimensions of collective action were missing in the work on social movements: “Mediating between opportunity, organization, and action, are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation” (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996:5). Snow et al. (1986, cited in McAdam et al. 1996: 5) define framing processes as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”. For people to mobilise when they have an opportunity to do so, people must feel part of a larger group and consider their own contribution valuable. However, the creation of framing processes does not start from scratch, but is the aggregated result of personal experience, collective memory, and the objective practices that are associated with culture (Martí i Puig 2008:705). This leads us to the concept of collective identity (Melucci 1996), which has been crucial in the reconstruction of indigenous identities in Latin America. Frames, such as discourses, symbols, slogans, or attributions of blame for social problems, can contribute to the creation of a collective identity (Zald 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 2003:52). All social movements need a political consciousness or an explicit identity to translate individual to collective action, and to create and mobilise a constituency (Bernstein 2003:237). The framing processes approach yields one main variable - mobilising discourses, which is operationalised into the following three indicators: (1) Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse; (2) Inclusive indigenous discourse; and (3) Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse.

1. Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse

Various scholars speak of an astonishing process of re-indianisation in Latin America that has given rise to indigenous movements all over the continent in the 1990s (Albó 1991; de la Cadena 2000; Plant 2002). The concepts of de-indianisation and re-indianisation are examples of what Jackson and Warren (2005) refer to as a problematic approach to identity processes that are flexible and fluid. Still, the concepts do grasp the increasing salience of indigenous identities that have been a result of discourse changes that have taken place at the local, national, and transnational levels, and that have served to back indigenous mobilising in the past two decades (Jackson and Warren 2005). The national and transnational levels will only be mentioned briefly here, both due to the scope of this thesis and the larger body of work that...
already exists covering these levels\textsuperscript{15}. The focus is rather on the indigenous peoples own change of discourses that have served to create collective identities.

The elaboration of a complex identity discourse over time has contributed to an ethnification of political claims and the construction of a collective indigenous identity on the basis of heterogeneous peasant and communitarian identities, and in some cases a national generic indigenous identity has appeared (Maíz 2004). According to Taylor (1994), the indigenous peoples have turned indigenous identity into a strategy or a political opportunity structure. The creation of an indigenous discourse and collective identity can be seen as a coordination game, because individuals within a SMO frequently have to decide on which identity to adopt. An example of such a dilemma is whether an organisation should principally promote an indigenous or a peasant discourse. There are two solutions to this dilemma: A powerful political leader may suggest a focal point that can work as an equilibrium, or, alternatively, elite conflicts lead to some consentient equilibrium (Trejo 2000). However, one should be aware that it often is impossible to forge one single voice of a movement:

\begin{quote}
“The degree to which there are unified and consensual frames within a movement is variable, and it is comparatively rare that we can speak sensibly of the movement framing. It is more useful to think of framing as an internal process of contention within movements with different actors taking different positions” (Gamson and Meyer 1996:283, emphasis in original).
\end{quote}

The variable is operationalised as salience of ethnic identity. \textit{The assumption is that dominance of ethnic discourses increases the probability of indigenous party emergence.}

\section*{2. Inclusive indigenous discourse}

According to Martí y Puig (2008:705-8), for an identity to be a successful framing for indigenous movements and parties, an inclusive “indigeneity” must be created. A discourse which can serve as an integrating tool for the diverse people in a territory must be developed. In a similar vein, Madrid (2008:475-9) discusses the differences between exclusionary and inclusive indigenous parties in the region. He argues that leaders of exclusionary ethnic parties mobilise members of their own group by exaggerating the threat posed by members of other ethnic groups and adopting exclusionary rhetoric and platforms, and is thus in line with

\footnote{See, for example Brysk (2000), and Keck and Sikkink (1998).}
Horowitz’ definition of an ethnic party. The more successful inclusive or ethno-populist parties, on the other hand, have adopted classical populist electoral strategies, and recruit leaders from various ethnic groups, form alliances with organisations that represent a diversity of ethnic groups, and stress the wish to represent all members of a nation. The operationalisation of this variable is the presence of an inclusive indigenous discourse. The assumption is that a more inclusive discourse reaches out to a broader segment of the electorate and yields a higher probability of party emergence and success.

3. Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse

Another way to evaluate the success of discourses of indigenous organisations is whether their discourses are connected to the fight against neoliberal reforms that were imposed by the majority of Latin American governments in the 1980s and 1990s (Martí i Puig 2008:705-708). Similarly, Brysk and Wise (1995) and Yashar (2005) stress the importance of the fight against neo-liberalism in the construction of an ethnic discourse where large indigenous mobilisations have taken place. Moreover, the opposition to neoliberal reforms has attracted many non-indigenous supporters to the indigenous organisations (Van Cott 2005:10), as well as broadened the electorate for indigenous parties, particularly from the middle classes (Madrid 2008).

Even though neo-liberalism is largely uncontested in current development practice and discourse, the governments have been less successful in convincing their citizens of the benefits of neo-liberalism (Arce 2008). Gill (2003) argues that because neo-liberalism lacks the support from civil society for creating a hegemonic system, governments are vulnerable to attacks from counter-movements that may be organised on combinations of class, gender, ethnicity, or religious, territorial, or identity interests. There are two main currents that deal with how economic liberalisation affects collective political activity. The first and dominant perspective is the atomisation approach (Kurtz 2004; Wolff 2005) which suggests that economic liberalisation is the cause and consequence of widespread de-politicisation and demobilisation of civil society, and does not predict that political liberalisation will renew collective political action. Neo-liberalism’s economic consequences are considered to be detrimental to the collective capacity of civil society and thus weaken societal organisation. The other current, the re-politicisation approach, predict that mobilisation reappears as a

16 The combination of neoliberal reforms and liberal democracy is known as “market democracy”, and implies policies such as the reduction of government deficits, the privatization of state-owned companies, and the opening of countries to international capital (Kohl 2006).
consequence of economic liberalisation, especially in the context of political liberalisation, and is the approach adopted in this thesis. Indeed, protests against neoliberal reforms have been seen all over the world, not least in Latin America where unemployed, rural workers and indigenous peoples have been important actors in the protests (Arce 2008:38).

One reason why indigenous peoples protest is that a free market harms indigenous ways of life, and thus politicised indigenous communities take action (Yashar 2005:16). The consequences of the neoliberal reforms for indigenous peasants have been dramatic: Cuts in the budget for the ministries of agriculture and social services; as well as cuts in economic programmes, such as agricultural subsidies, access to credit, and protection of peasant land (Yashar 2005:67). Particularly reforms that have threatened the inalienability of communally held land have challenged the indigenous concept of territoriality and given impetus to the fight against neo-liberalism (Yashar 2005:68).

However, increasing poverty rates among many sectors of the population, including indigenous peoples, have also sparked mobilisations that have been more material-oriented. This variable is operationalised as presence of a discourse that is opposing neoliberal reforms. The assumption is that connection with opposition to neoliberal reforms contributes to the reaching out to a broader constituency than the indigenous population, which will create a higher probability of party formation and success.

2.4.2 Mobilising structures
The resource mobilisation approach, also labelled mobilising structures, broke with the grievance-based conceptions of social movements as expressed by the relative deprivation theory that predicted collective mobilisation by people who feel deprived of some goods or resources (Gurr 1970). Subordination and marginalisation of ethnic groups cannot solely predict social or political mobilisation (Yashar 2005; Martí i Puig 2008). Instead, the mobilising structures approach focuses on mobilisation processes and the formal organisational manifestations of these processes (Zald and McCarthy 1979). McAdam et al. (1996:3) define mobilising structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”. This approach assumes that successful movements are dependent on financial, organisational, cultural and human resources to form, endure, and achieve political effectiveness (Foweraker 1995:15-16). Three

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17 Territoriality is a concept that includes more than land, as it also covers the indigenous ways of life and political organising (Yashar 2005: 68).
main variables from the mobilising structures approach will be applied: (1) Territorial concentration of affiliates; (2) Maturity of the SMO, and; (3) Brokerage mechanism.

1. Territorial concentration of affiliates

The territorial concentration of indigenous peoples is an important mobilising factor, because in particular areas where indigenous peoples are concentrated, it will be easier for them to promote their demands and be heard through organisations or the launching of political parties (Wessendorf 2001:16). In fact, most of the successful indigenous parties in South America have emerged in an electoral district where the indigenous proportion of the population was high (Van Cott 2005:46). Furthermore, the indigenous parties that have succeeded at the national electoral level tend to attain more votes from certain regions, whereas they have remained relatively weak in others (Rice and Van Cott 2006:713). Where indigenous peoples are concentrated, interaction may increase, and networks are more easily constructed. Due to migration and urbanisation processes, the territorial concentration of indigenous peoples has changed in many countries since the mid-1950s. The cohesion of a group, indigenous or any other identity, requires high levels of interaction among the group members. Sharing a home ground promotes interaction (Gurr 2000), and migration of indigenous people is thus likely to weaken group identities. The variable will be operationalised into the following two indicators: (1) Territorial concentration of indigenous people; and (2) migration and urbanisation of indigenous people. The assumptions are that territorial concentration of indigenous groups is positively related to the formation of indigenous parties, and that processes of migration and urbanisation will lead to a weaker indigenous identity and is thus negatively related to the creation of indigenous parties.

2. Maturity of the SMO

The maturity of indigenous organisations is an important factor for the launching of parties. One evident method of measuring the maturity of an organisation is to look at the years in existence of the highest level of an organisation: “The longer a social movement organisation has been in existence and the more political experience its leaders and members have, the more its members will feel a sense of loyalty to and collective identification with the organization” (Van Cott 2005:43). Levels of prior social organising can have an impact on the

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18 The concentration of indigenous peoples is also important in relation to the institutional surroundings. Electoral rules, such as spatial registration requirements, may hinder groups from launching a political party (Birnir 2004). The latter factor will be dealt with in section 2.4.3.
degree and type of social mobilisation, as a history of former activism make people more likely to be recruited to a SMO (McAdam 1988; Foweraker 1995:16). Another way to measure organisational maturity is through the unity of organisations (Van Cott 2005:46). Many indigenous organisations are characterised by regional and interethnic differences and rivalries, ideological differences particularly stemming from disagreements regarding the focus of class versus ethnicity, as well as conflicts originating from access to resources and leadership positions. With regard to the latter factor, many of the leaders of indigenous social movements and federations have been highly vulnerable, as the entrance into the political arena put a strong pressure on them to solve the problems of the members of the organisations (Ruiz Hernández 2001). Because of the interethnic composition of many indigenous organisations, the task of designing leaders is complicated as leaders have to be both representative of the group’s values and effective in the political arena. This will frequently lead to splits within the organisations and to the development of parallel organisations. The higher the degree of maturity, unity, and organisation of indigenous movements in particular districts, the more likely it is that a movement will “(a) seek to participate in elections, (b) will have the organizational resources to surmount registration barriers; and (c) will be able to convert its social movement ties into votes on election day” (Rice and Van Cott 2006:723). The maturity of indigenous organisations will be operationalised as follows: (1) Years in existence of the SMO: and (2) unity of the SMO. The assumptions are, firstly, that the older the organisation, the more experience is acquired, which leads to a higher probability of the launching of indigenous parties. Secondly, indigenous organisations that remain united are more likely to launch political parties.

3. Brokerage mechanism

The configuration of social movement networks or webs is considered crucial within the mobilising structures approach (Melucci 1988; Foweraker 1995; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998a), as dense networks of affiliates make mobilisation more likely (Foweraker 1995:16). The brokerage mechanism (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001) refers to the capacity of the core activists of the movement to make connections between two or more groups that have previously been disconnected. Yashar (2005:71) refers to such networks as transcommunity networks, and argues that organisational capacity must be demonstrated, not just assumed, by

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19 The question of the dominance of “ethnicity” vs. “class” as mobilising factors within the movements will be treated in chapter 4.
indigenous communities that are often separated by great distances, and cultural and linguistic differences, as well as for indigenous identities that have historically been embedded in local communities. Networks provide spaces where indigenous leaders can build ties, develop trust, gain leadership experience, as well as forge new and common ideas. Without such networks between and among communities it is an extremely difficult task to organise successfully and build significant indigenous movements Yashar (2005). This thesis takes this argument one step further, and argues that the presence of the brokerage mechanism through cooperation between different indigenous groups and organisations both inter- and intra regions (highlands and the Amazonian area) are necessary for the creation and success of indigenous political parties. This variable is operationalised as: Intra- and inter-regional cooperation between indigenous SMOs. *The assumption is that inter- and intra- region cooperation among indigenous organisations increases the probability of the emergence of indigenous parties.*

### 2.4.3 Political opportunities

The political opportunity structure approach refers to political factors that are external to groups that may attempt to mobilise, factors that will influence the form, content and possibility of mobilisation (McAdam 1996:3). The political structure can both imply opportunities and constraints, and the challenge for SMOs is to identify and seize the possible opportunities for action (Canel 2005). Political opportunities is currently the hegemonic paradigm among social movement scholars and is criticised for labelling a political opportunity “virtually anything that, in retrospect, can be seen as having helped a movement mobilise or attain its goals” (Goodwin and Jasper 2004:11). However, in spite of a myriad of variables being added to the concept of political opportunity, scholars have agreed to a large degree on four dimensions of a political system that impacts the structuring of collective action (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996:10): The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; the presence of elite allies; splits within and fragmentation of the ruling elite and the stability of its internal alignments; and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. However, as elite alignments and the access to elite allies do not uniformly contribute to movement formation in Latin American (Yashar 2005:75, footnote 34), this thesis will employ the following variables: (1) State’s capacity and propensity to use repression”, adapted as “political associational space (Yashar 2005)”, as well as (2) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system.
1. Political associational space

Yashar (2005:76) defines political associational space as “the de facto existence of freedom of association and expression”. It cannot be reduced to a question of regime type or democracy vs. dictatorship. Furthermore, it is not equivalent to networks, as political associational space refers to a political opportunity to organise, whereas networks refer to the existing capacity to mobilise (Yashar 2005). However, the factors mutually influence each other, as associational space can lead to the creation of networks. Political associational space can exist in varying degrees. It can be present due to state absence, like in the Bolivian and Peruvian Amazon until the second half of the 20th century, or in the context of political liberalisation regimes in transition (Yashar 1998:32; Yashar 2005). On the other hand, it can be absent due to military regimes and the state’s penetration into certain areas. The presence of political associational space has varied considerably in the Bolivian and Peruvian highlands. However, as both Bolivia and Peru experienced military regimes until the transitions to democracy, the analysis is limited to the democratic period, from 1982 and 1978, respectively. The variable is operationalised as the existence of freedom of association and expression. The assumption is that an open political associational space increases the opportunities for indigenous mobilisation and creation of networks, which ultimately leads to a greater probability of the formation of indigenous parties.

2. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system

Many scholars support a determined “crisis of representation” in Latin America generally, and in the Andes particularly (Hagopian 1993; Di Tella 1998; Mainwaring, Bejano et al. 2006; Luna 2007). This crisis encapsulates a severe erosion of linkages between voters and parties because of socio-economic, political, and technological changes (Roberts 2001). When linkages between parties and voters are eroded, space may be opened to political challengers (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:18). Tanaka (interview 2007) argues that the demise of leftist parties throughout Latin America opened a political opportunity space that was favourable to the emergence of indigenous parties, as leftist parties traditionally have attracted indigenous voters. In a similar vein, Rice and Van Cott (2006:721) claim that “the disarticulation of traditional class-based collective action and the crisis of the political (...) parties have created a void in popular sector interest representation”.

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Another way to assess the openness or closure of the institutionalised political system is through the analysis of electoral institutions, which create an underlying structure that can both support and impede the development of party systems (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). With regard to the political participation of ethnic groups, there is a large body of work on how institutional changes create new electoral incentives and/or facilitate the participation of such groups\(^\text{20}\). An open institutional environment as well as laws and rules that structure the electoral competition shape the incentives that face political actors and may facilitate the emergence of ethnic parties (Norris 2004; Van Cott 2005). There is, however, much debate surrounding the work on electoral systems in plural societies within established democracies and its transferability to contexts of ethnic tensions in new democracies (Norris 2004:212). As mentioned earlier, Latin America has been neglected in the literature on ethnicity and ethnic tensions as well as in studies on how institutions may contribute to stable governments in spite of ethnic plurality. Thus, this thesis borrows from the work of scholars that have identified electoral rules and institutions that tend to permit the emergence of new political parties representing under-represented groups in the Latin American context (Van Cott 2003a; Birnr 2004; Van Cott 2005; Martí i Puig 2008). “The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system” is thus operationalised into the following indicators: (1) Weakening of leftist parties; (2) Softer party registration requirements; (3) Shift to proportional representation electoral system and low threshold of representation; (4) Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities; and (5) decentralisation.

1) **Weakening of leftist parties**

Because the majority of indigenous people are poor and belong to the lower social strata (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994), minor leftist parties and populist parties have traditionally attracted indigenous voters. The leftist parties in Latin America were of a different nature than in Western Europe. The latter saw the emergence of class-mass parties, whereas in Latin America, a version of the catch-all party emerged\(^\text{21}\). These types of parties have dominated the party systems in the region ever since. The catch-all parties blurred dogmatic ideology in the interests of pragmatism, and the aim was to reach the electorate

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\(^{20}\) See for example: (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985; Horowitz 1991; Laydeyret 1993; Cox 1997)

\(^{21}\) Some of them were mainly instruments of caudillos, some were based on the middle class, and a latter version was more structured and enduring and had pragmatic programs to attract broad multiclass support (Dix 1989). Examples of this latter version of the catch-all party are APRA in Peru, PRI in Mexico, AD in Venezuela, and the Bolivian MNR. It is important to stress that in the Latin American context, it was the catch-all parties, rather than the European class-mass parties, that were the successors to the traditional elite-centred parties.
beyond social class or religious denomination (Dix 1989:27). On the other hand, the leftist parties that emerged have leant on a Marxist ideology that demanded that indigenous identities be subordinated to class identity for socialism to succeed (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Ethnic demands were rejected as counter-revolutionary, and as a result of the underlying racism which dominated the leftist parties, indigenous and peasant movements never became equal partners (Van Cott 2005:27). However, leftist parties in Latin America weakened in the 1960s and 1970s following the repression during the dictatorship, and furthermore in the 1980s and 1990s in the wake of economic austerity measures and neoliberal reforms that eroded the linkages between many of the unions and the leftist parties. This impairment implied that the groups that had voiced greater political participation and social equality disappeared. Ever since the neoliberal reforms were implemented, indigenous movements have been at the forefront demanding greater social redistribution (Van Cott 2005; Kohl 2006). According to Tanaka (interview 2007) and Van Cott (2005), the weakening of leftist parties is crucial to understand the emergence of indigenous parties in Latin America. The assumption is this that the electoral weakening of leftist parties is favourable to the emergence of indigenous parties.

2) *Softer party registration requirements*

The costs of party registration are decisive in the context of new democracies, as they can potentially change representation even before allocation rules come into play (Birnir 2004). Both pre-election and post-election requirements may hinder the emergence of new parties. The pre-election requirements may include popular support, in the form of signatures or the attainment of a specified number of votes in a lower-level election; spatially distributed popular support; and financial viability, whereas the post-election rules may cover both popular support and financial viability (Birnir 2004). Formation rules interact with demographic and social conditions, and can thus have a different effect than other electoral institutions. Rigid spatial rules may be negative to the launching of indigenous parties, as the indigenous peoples are generally geographically concentrated (Van Cott 2005:27). Financial requirements may also imply difficulties for the launching of parties in constituencies where indigenous groups are economically disadvantaged. It is probable that a financial requirement is a heavier burden for indigenous parties than for small parties in general in Latin America (Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2005). Post-election requirements are theoretically different from pre-election barriers in that they do not bar parties from legislative representation in the first place, but they can deprive a party of its registration for the subsequent elections. Post-
election rules requirements that are higher than a possible election threshold or more stringent than the district magnitude, may force a party that has achieved legislative representation to concentrate on re-registering or gather funds to pay the fine. Particularly, this can constitute a problem for smaller parties with few financial resources and a limited organisational staff (Birnir 2004:7). *The assumption is that the withdrawal of rigid or the implementation of ‘softer’ registration rules pre-election and post-election increases the probability of the emergence of indigenous parties.*

3) **Shift to PR-system or a mixed PR-SMD system, and a low threshold of representation**

The literature on parties agrees upon the view that proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are more likely to encourage the formation and endurance of new parties than are majoritarian systems. The basic principle of PR systems is that parliamentary seats are allocated according to the proportion of votes cast for each party, and thus lowering barriers to party system entry (Sartori 1986:58; Norris 2004:50). Majoritarian systems, in contrast, tend to produce a two-party system and make it more difficult for new parties to enter the political system. Proportionality is of particular importance to minorities because other types of electoral systems tend to under-represent or exclude them (Lijphart 1986:113). However, the literature on newer democracies consider PR systems’ effectiveness in including minorities in parliament as contingent upon different factors, such as the stage of democratisation, the possible application of affirmative action strategies, and the concentration of ethnic groups (Sisk and Reynolds 1998). Van Cott stresses precisely the distribution of ethnic groups in the Latin American context, and argues that where groups are geographically concentrated, a mixed single-member district (SMD) system and PR-system may be more favourable to than a pure PR system (2005:29). Moreover, the election through single member districts tend to facilitate a stronger link between representatives and voters (Payne, Zovatto G. et al. 2002). For a threshold of representation to be categorised as low, the electoral formula must be proportional\(^{22}\), the electoral district magnitude must be relatively large, and a low threshold for gaining seats must exist (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox 1997). However, former work (Van Cott 2005) has shown no significant effect of the electoral formula on party emergence the two cases under study, and the factor is thus excluded from the analysis. The election threshold refers to the minimum share of vote that leads to winning at least one seat, and can have an important impact on the proportionality and the chances for

\(^{22}\) The more proportional the electoral formula, the more likely it is that new parties gaining few votes will gain representation (Taagepera 1989:133).
smaller parties (Norris 2004:51-55). Both Bolivia and Peru have applied formal thresholds\(^{23}\), and thresholds will consequently be dealt with in the analysis. The district magnitude (DM) mediates the impact of seat allocation formulas and thresholds, and may be especially important in explaining the formation of indigenous parties. However, where larger ethnic groups are concentrated geographically, neither thresholds nor district magnitude may exclude them from political representation. Nonetheless, it is a difficult task to observe the full impact of DM in my cases as the DM may vary in different districts throughout the countries. Therefore, the focus is on the district magnitude in national elections. The assumptions are that a shift to a PR system or a mixed SMD/PR system may be propitious to the formation of indigenous parties, and that a shift to an increased district magnitude under a proportional representation electoral system as well as a non-existent or low election threshold increase the probability of emergence of indigenous parties.

4) Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities
Lijphart (1986) argues that the easiest way to guarantee ethnic representation is through the creation of electoral districts along ethnic rather than geographic criteria. Arrangements that can secure greater political participation of ethnic minorities, or in this case, indigenous groups, are the establishment of reserved seats for ethnic minorities, special circumscriptions for indigenous candidates, or requiring that political parties include them on their lists (Van Cott 2005:27). As previously mentioned, even though the Bolivian indigenous population constitute a majority of the population, they could still be regarded as non-dominant at the start of the analysis period. The assumption is that the presence of electoral arrangements that strengthen the participation of ethnic minorities increases the probability of the emergence of indigenous parties.

5) Decentralisation
Federal political systems that have local and/or regional elections are more conducive to the appearance of new parties than are centralised or unitary systems. When a political movement wins elections at a lower level, it may then step on to the regional or national level (Dalton, Flanagan et al. 1984:467). However, until the 1990s, the federal status only existed in the larger countries of the region, namely Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil (O'Neill

\(^{23}\) In Latin America only a few countries have applied formal thresholds. However, countries may have practical thresholds as a consequence of the combined effect of the district magnitude, the number of parties competing, and the seat allocation formula (Payne, Zovatto G. et al. 2002:93).
Both unitary and federal forms of the state were established as forms of territorial organisation unrelated to the presence or absence of specific indigenous communities (Gibson 2004). Moreover, Latin America was characterised by centralised party systems dominated by urban elites and a general populace that was not included in political decisions (Grindle 2000:4-7). Changes in the territorial organisation of the unitary systems of countries in the region were carried out in the 1980s and primarily in the 1990s. According to O’Neill, this decentralisation trend has reshaped the political landscape dramatically in Latin America (2005:3).

In terms of democratic practice, Diamond and Tsalik argue that decentralisation “provides additional channels of access to power for historically marginalised groups and thus improves the representativeness of democracy” (1999:121-122). However, the focus here is on the possibilities for smaller parties to build a party organisation at the lower levels before competing in national elections. At the lower levels, the logistical and economic costs are lower and a smaller organisation is sufficient to carry out an electoral campaign (Van Cott 2005:25). Local and regional elections are thus particularly favourable to ethnic minorities, as these groups are often concentrated demographically and because they generally count on less financial resources (Van Cott 2005:8). The decentralising reforms that swept Latin American countries provided a double opportunity for indigenous party emergence. First, because in the process of redefinition of the territorial design, specific claims of indigenous rights surged, and second, the possibility to elect representatives in the local institutional spaces could imply the appearance for the first time of elected posts in the indigenous communities (Martí i Puig 2008:689-90). The assumption is that decentralisation at the municipal and regional levels are conducive to the emergence of indigenous parties.

2.4.4 Model of analytical framework

A model of the analytical framework is presented below. The theoretical approaches, variables, indicators and assumptions are summarised in this model. All the indicators, except “Migration and urbanisation of indigenous people” are expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable - “indigenous party formation”. The fundamental argument is that mobilising structures and framing processes determine the scale and duration of collective action (Tarrow 1998:6). Thereafter, changes in factors related to the political opportunity structure create incentives for the formation of political parties.
Model 1: Analytical framework

**Independent variables**

1. **Framing processes**
   - a) Mobilising discourses
     - Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse
     - Inclusive indigenous discourse

2. **Mobilising structures**
   - a) Territorial concentration of affiliates
     - Territorial concentration of indigenous people
     - Migration and urbanisation of indigenous people
   - b) Maturity of the SMO
     - Years in existence of the SMO
     - Unity of the SMO
   - c) Brokerage mechanism
     - Intra- and interregional cooperation between indigenous SMOs

3. **Political opportunities**
   - a) Political associational
     - Freedom of association and expression
     - Weakening of leftist parties
     - Softer party registration requirements
   - b) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system
     - Shift to PR-system or a mixed PR-SMD system, and low threshold of representation
     - Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities
     - Decentralisation

**Dependent variable**

Formation of indigenous party
3.0 Methodological considerations

This thesis uses a qualitative approach to explain why Bolivia has experienced indigenous parties at the national level, whilst there is no parallel experience in Peru. The main reason why a qualitative approach is considered to be the best suited is because the point of departure is an interest in “specific historical processes and structures”, a characteristic of the case-oriented approach (Ragin and Zaret 1983:741). Thus, this thesis trades making generalisations that apply to broad populations for the aim of “high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases” (George and Bennett 2005:22), in this case the detailed expression of indigenous mobilisation and, specifically, the launching of indigenous parties. This chapter will first proceed to present the advantages of using a qualitative comparative approach to explain the research question. Then, the benefits and disadvantages of applying a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) as a research design is discussed, the case selection is justified, and the similarities between the two cases are presented. Finally, the collection of data will be presented and assessed on the basis of its reliability.

3.1 The advantages of a case-oriented approach

This thesis follows George and Bennett (2005:18) in their definition of case study methods. This definition includes both case studies, which are limited to the examination of single cases, and the comparative method, which compares among a small number of cases. According to Lijphart (1971:683), the comparative (case-oriented), experimental, and statistical methods all establish “general empirical relationships among two or more variables, while all other variables are controlled”. However, Lijphart argues that the comparative method has major weaknesses compared to statistical methods particularly with regard to problems connected with “small-N” and a large number of variables. Thus, one should generally resort to the statistical method rather than the “weaker comparative method” (Lijphart 1971:685). However, the limitations referred to may be mitigated, and are better considered as trade-offs than problems. The case study methods have several advantages compared to statistical methods (George and Bennett 2005:19-22).

Firstly, researchers who use case study methods achieve higher levels of conceptual validity than do researchers of statistical methods (George and Bennett 2005:19). A recurrent difficulty within the statistical methods is that of “conceptual stretching”, which leaves concepts too vague or amorphous (Sartori 1970:1036), and ultimately lumps together

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24 It is more difficult to draw strong inferences from a “small-N” analysis because of the problem of selection bias (Landman 2003).
“dissimilar cases to get a larger sample” (George and Bennett 2005:19). Case studies, by contrast, allow for detail-attentive analysis and conceptual refinements that may identify and measure indicators that more accurately measure the theoretical concepts (Ragin 1987; George and Bennett 2005:18-9). In the same vein, Mahoney (2007:128) argues that qualitative researchers who engage in detail-focused analyses, “tend to avoid simple coding errors that may be common in some large-N, statistical databases.” One reason why a statistical approach was ruled out in the analysis of ethnic party emergence in Latin America, was precisely that a number of important concepts and independent variables are difficult to measure adequately. Particularly, strength and cohesion of indigenous identities and the subgroups within the indigenous category, the maturity of and the cooperation between indigenous organisations, as well as the complex and fluctuant electoral alliances that indigenous-movement-based parties are forming with leftist and populist parties, are variables that are hard to measure with a high level of conceptual validity within a statistical approach (Rice and Van Cott 2006:728). Furthermore, as stated in the theory chapter, this thesis follows the middle position of Foweraker (1995) in the specification of concepts and indicators from social movement theory that are adapted to the Latin American context, yet without abandoning all the concepts that have been developed in the European and North American contexts. Thus, the conceptual validity is higher than when a universalist position, which holds that concepts must be able to “travel to all parts of the globe” to have explanatory power, had been followed (Landman 2003:44).

Secondly, in-depth case studies are able to study how causal mechanisms in individual cases operate in detail (George and Bennett 2005:18-9). Thus, the case-oriented comparative method stands out from the statistical method as cases are considered as configurations or combinations of characteristics, rather than based on the analysis of separate variables (Ragin 1987:3,32). Within the field of social movement research, few studies compare many countries (large-N). This is because “controlled comparison of few countries yields important insights into the origins, shape, and impact of social movements” (Landman 2003:130). Controlled comparison allows the researcher to have a more detailed look at the dynamics of mobilisation and the political context in which a SMO emerges and protests (Landman 2003:130). Such an analysis of the combinations of characteristics is a difficult task to carry out within a statistical approach, due to the large number of cases (Ragin 1987).

According to Lijphart (1971:684), the crucial difference between the comparative or case-oriented method and the statistical method is that the number of cases that the case-oriented
approach deals with “is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations”. Yet, when applied in such a way that the method minimises the limitations and takes advantage of its strengths, “they can be highly useful instruments in scientific political inquiry” (Lijphart 1971:693). Possible solutions to the short-comings of the comparative method will be presented in the following section, concluding in the choice of the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) as a research design, and the case selection.

3.2 Methodological design- Comparing similar countries
One way to limit the weaknesses connected with “small- N” is to focus on cases that are comparable. When such comparable cases are found, they constitute a good starting-point for the application of the comparative method “because they allow the establishment of relationships among a few variables while many other variables are controlled” (Lijphart 1971:687). Bolivia and Peru are undoubtedly comparable cases, and these similarities will be dealt with shortly. Furthermore, the problem of “many variables” may be mitigated through the use of comparable cases where one “can reduce considerably the number of operative variables and study their relationships under controlled conditions without the problem of running out of cases” (Lijphart 1971:687). John Stuart Mill developed the “method of difference” to approach this problem. This method consists of comparing cases where a phenomenon occurs with cases which are similar in other respects, but where the same phenomenon does not occur (J.S. Mill, cited in Lijphart 1971:687).

MSSD precisely compares cases or systems that differ on the dependent variable, in this case the emergence of indigenous parties, but are similar regarding as many characteristics as possible to be able to control for common characteristics and thus allowing a large number of variables to be ignored (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Sartori 1994). Thus, MSSD limits the problem of “small-N” as many variables may be held as constants. According to Martz (1966), MSSD is especially suited for area studies, including Latin America, as the countries share a common background. Similarly, Landman (2003:30) argues that “there is something inherently similar about countries that make up a particular geographical region of the world (…) whether it is common history, language, religion, politics or culture”. Even though comparability is not necessarily inherent in a given area, it is more likely achieved within an area, than in set of countries selected randomly (Lijphart 1971:681). The problem of “many variables” is dealt with as the similar features of Bolivia and Peru, which are presented shortly, reduce the number of operative variables.
MSSD assumes that preferably one key explanatory variable (x) should be able to predict the different outcome on the dependent variable (y) (Landman 2003:29). Yet, as we have seen, a feature of the comparative method is that it analyses cases as configurations of characteristics (Ragin 1987:3), precluding the possibility of examining the explanatory effect of each independent variable. Thus, it is impossible to rule out that the dependent variable is not “over-determined”, which means that two independent variables contribute to the same explanation of the variation of the dependent variable. Nor is it possible to treat the explanatory variables as “isolated”, meaning that “the explanatory pattern does not change when new variables are added” (Przeworski and Teune 1970:23). Moreover, the MSSD risks attaching too much significance to negative findings (Lijphart 1971:686), as a study may neglect the importance of explanatory variables as they deviate from a predicted pattern of necessary and sufficient causation (Landman 2003; Mahoney 2007:134).

However, in spite of the shortcomings of the MSSD approach, they should be considered as trade-offs in the choice between parsimony and richness, as well as detailed-attentive analysis and high internal validity, versus making broader generalisations (George and Bennett 2005:22). The focus is on similarities and differences between Bolivia and Peru, rather than the analytical relationship between the independent variables in the two cases (Landman 2003:29).

3.2.1 Case selection
This thesis started off with an aim of comparing the five Latin American countries with the largest indigenous populations - Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru (Brysk 2000). However, during the process of a systematic dialogue of ideas and evidence (Ragin 2004:127), as well as time delimitations on the master thesis and fieldwork (Landman 2003:24), the cases were limited to two. Another reason for this decision, is that the fewer cases studied, the more intensive the study may be (Eckstein 1975:83). Furthermore, the decision to study two cases rather than one was made because until recently most of the studies on ethnic mobilisation in Latin America were limited to the study of specific communities or countries (Martí i Puig 2008). However, there have been increasing attempts at developing general explications of the resurgence of indigenous identities in Latin America25. Yet, the relatively recent phenomenon of indigenous identities’ translation into political parties, has to the author’s knowledge only been treated comparatively by Van Cott

(2003a), Van Cott (2005), Rice and Van Cott (2006), and Martí y Puig (2008). However, Van Cott (2003a) limits her analysis to institutional variables, Van Cott (2005) leaves out the question of indigenous parties and admit the shortcomings of quantitative analysis particularly in terms of conceptual validity, whilst Martí y Puig (2008) resorts to a Boolean analysis of six Latin American countries\textsuperscript{26} which does not include in-depth analyses of each country.

Bolivia and Peru were selected because the value of the dependent variable varies substantially between the two cases (Ragin 2004:128), in spite of the cultural, political, and social proximity of the countries. Clearly, Ecuador could have been analysed in comparison with Peru, as Ecuador and Bolivia are the most successful cases in the region\textsuperscript{27} in terms of indigenous’ electoral participation (Rice and Van Cott 2006:715). However, existent work compares indigenous mobilisation in Peru and Ecuador (Sánchez 1994; Sánchez 1996; Kilander 2001). Mexico and Guatemala were ruled out because of their negative value on the dependent variable (Martí i Puig 2008:711), as well as the geographical distance to Peru which would have complicated the task of neutralising differences and highlighting others (Landman 2003:29).

\subsection*{3.2.2 Common characteristics of Bolivia and Peru}

Bolivia and Peru share a number of common characteristics that may hold all other than the independent variables constant, as far as this is possible (Landman 2003:29). Firstly, both Bolivia and Peru have a diverse indigenous population which is spread into two ecological and geographical zones, the Andean highlands, which are elevated, cold, and dry, and an Amazonian region (Montoya 1998). Furthermore, the indigenous populations have been systematically excluded due to a history of prolonged colonial rule, and the maintenance of the exclusionary character of the state after the independence from Spain in 1821 (Peru) and 1825 (Bolivia) (Pajuelo Teves 2005:111). Both states have since independence continuously struggled with the incorporation of the indigenous masses into the nation-state, the so-called “Indian Question”. At the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the indigenous populations were neither totally assimilated nor autonomous (Yashar 2005:239).

\textsuperscript{26} Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru.
\textsuperscript{27} On comparisons of Bolivia and Ecuador, see for example Andolina (1999) and Lucero (2002).
Poverty rates are higher among the indigenous population than the rest of the populace. Peru is a country characterised by enormous social inequality (Defensoría del Pueblo 2007). The percentage of the indigenous population living in poverty is 63.8 percent compared to 46.8 percent in the total population. Moreover, the extreme poverty ratio among indigenous people is 26.2 compared to 20.1 percent among the total population (Sánchez-Páramo 2006:550)\textsuperscript{28}. In Bolivia, 65 percent of the indigenous population is poor, whereas the poverty-rate among non-indigenous is 48 percent (Sánchez-García 2007:2).

With regard to economic structures, both Peru and Bolivia suffered from acute economic crises in the 1980s, a decade often referred to as Latin America’s “lost decade”. In both countries, the crisis led to the implementation of neoliberal reforms (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kohl 2006).

In terms of regime type, both Bolivia and Peru experienced almost continuous military regimes until the transitions in 1982 and 1978, respectively (Cotler 1995; Gamarra and Malloy 1995). In Peru, the period from independence in 1821 until the transition to democracy in 1978 was characterised by oligarchic and military rule and political instability (Cotler 1995). The new Constitution, which was approved in 1979, established the right to vote for all Peruvians through the removal of the literacy requirement. Thus, the indigenous people could participate in the elections in 1980 for the first time (Cotler 1995). In Bolivia, on the other hand, universal suffrage was instituted after the revolution led by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) in 1952. However, the MNR regime was inherently undemocratic and a de facto single-party system which channelled and supported the peasant-indigenous vote through the development of partisan structures outside the urban centres, as well as through corporatist structures\textsuperscript{29} and clientelism\textsuperscript{30}. MNR was overthrown in 1964, and from that year until the transition to democracy in 1982, Bolivia was led by a series of military governments which consequently hindered free elections (Gamarra and Malloy 1995:403-04).

With regard to party systems, both the Bolivian and the Peruvian party systems have been categorised as “inchoate” as opposed to “institutionalised” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

\textsuperscript{28} The numbers are based on the data from ENAHO (2001).

\textsuperscript{29} The most important corporatist organisations were the Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB) and the National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CNTCB), through which the MNR leadership tried to co-opt popular sectors (Gamarra and Malloy 1995).

\textsuperscript{30} Clientelism can be defined as “a two-way relation between unequal actors in which the trade occurring between the two benefits both but does not alter the power differential between them” (Stokes 1995: 55).
The bonding between voters and parties is weak, and the party systems have traditionally not reflected the social cleavages in the countries (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). One way to measure the degree of institutionalisation of party systems is through electoral volatility, which reflects changes in voters’ electoral preferences and elite-driven changes such as party mergers and party-switching by individual politicians (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Both Peru and Bolivia score high on volatility throughout the period of analysis. In Peru, the party system even “collapsed” in the wake of a dramatic decline of the four dominant parties from 1987 to 2000 (Tanaka and Trivelli 2002; Kenney 2003). Another way to evaluate the institutionalisation of a party system is through fragmentation, which is measured by the effective number of parties. Party system fragmentation is related to weakened governability, populism, executive-legislative deadlock, and democratic breakdown (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Both countries experienced a marked increase of political parties since the mid-1990s, and Peru now experiences the highest effective number of parties ever (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006:318-9).

3.4 Data collection

This thesis is based on a large amount of secondary sources, such as books, articles, statistical databases, as well as primary data from interviews conducted in Bolivia and Peru in 2007. A primary aim of the fieldwork was to gather secondary sources published in Latin American institutions by Latin American researchers. Many of these sources were inaccessible from Norway. Moreover, the literature in English which discusses ethnic politics and ethnic cleavages in Latin America generally is relatively scarce. Particularly information on Peru, considered a deviant case, was difficult to find in the English scholarly literature. However, this thesis also draws on relevant books published in English as well as articles from recognised journals, such as Comparative Political Studies, the Latin American Research Review, and the Journal of Latin American studies.

A six weeks’ fieldwork was carried out in Bolivia and Peru in January and February 2007. In Peru, the interviews were geographically limited to Lima, while in Bolivia interviews were carried out in La Paz, Sucre, and Santa Cruz. The large distances and the limited time scope

31 The mean electoral volatility to lower chamber seats in Bolivia from 1980 to 1997 was 28.65. Peru, on the other hand, had the highest electoral volatility in Latin America from 1980 to 2000 with 49.58 (Payne, Zovatto G. et al. 2002).
32 The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Popular Action (AP), Christian People’s Party (PPC) and United Left (IU).
33 See Table 3 in the appendix.
prevented the realisation of interviews in the Peruvian and Bolivian Amazon. The principal aim of the fieldwork was to carry out interviews with recognised academics working within the field of indigenous politics, as well as leaders and members of indigenous organisations. To be able to do so, the snowball sampling approach was utilised in both countries to get relevant interview objects. The interviews were unstructured and were used to discuss the research question and possible theoretical foundations, as well as to obtain in-depth knowledge of the cases. These insights subsequently contributed to the structure of the thesis. All the interviews were carried out in Spanish, a point which was important for the accuracy of the information gathered. Because three years have passed since the fieldwork, e-mail communication with researchers in Peru and Bolivia, as well as an SMO activist in Bolivia, has supplied additional updated information on the research question. A list of the interviewees cited in this thesis, as well as those persons who have provided updated information, is presented in the preface to this thesis.

3.4.1 Review of the data
The quality of the gathered data is crucial in order to present unbiased answers to the research question. With regard to secondary sources, the theoretical fundament of this thesis, social movement theory, has been developed in North America and in Europe. Yet, after having adapted the theoretical concepts to be more sensitive to the cultural specificities of Latin America (Landman 2003:44), a large selection of sources from recognised research institutions in Bolivia and Peru, as well as books and articles in English, when found relevant, have been utilised to collect appropriate data. In terms of the reliability of the interview objects, it is difficult to assess as one cannot be certain that different answers would not have been given to a different researcher at another point. However, most of the interviewees are recognised researchers who have published broadly in Latin America, which has made it possible to control their sources.

Reliability refers to the accuracy of the data gathered, and the degree of consistency between the coding of units from one study to another at different points (Grønmo 2004:220). According to Molina and Albó (2006:36), “quantifying the indigenous [people] in all the continent [Latin America] is almost a gamble, and it is the motive of specific essays and work that show notable discrepancies” (my translation). In Bolivia and Peru, the quantification is

34 All the interviews were recorded, and transcriptions are available upon request.
35 Due to a situation of prolonged illness.
The most common method to quantify the indigenous population in the region has been through the language criterion. However, the linguistic denominator has been removed from national censuses in Peru since 1993 (Pajuelo Teves 2006:37). Furthermore, a problem with the language criterion is that it in all likelihood yields a lower percentage of indigenous people of the total population, as many indigenous people, due to processes of migration or lack of bilingual education, have lost their language, but still identify as indigenous (Van Cott 2005:142). The Bolivian National Institute for Statistics (INE), on the other hand, has been a pioneer in the Latin American context in investigating both language and self-identification in the 2001 national census (Molina and Albó 2006:29). The census introduced the possibility of marking more than one language as well as specifying any other language apart from Quechua, Aymara, Spanish, Guaraní, and a foreign language. Moreover, the citizens were asked whether they consider themselves as belonging to a native or indigenous group (Molina and Albó 2006:33). In the case of Peru, indigenous self-identification has not been applied as a criterion in national censuses. If it had been, the numbers would possibly have been inaccurate because of the strong stigmatisation linked to the identification as indigenous in Peru, especially in the Andean region (Pajuelo Teves 2006:28). Only a partial study, the National Survey for Homes (ENAHO) from 2001, has contemplated indigenous self-identification at the national level, albeit on the basis of homes (Trivelli 2005). Thus, to be able to better compare the numbers and geographical concentration of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Peru, both numbers from ENAHO and the 1993 census have been included on Peru.

Another concern has been the reliability of the coding of the dependent variable. Which parties can be considered an ethnic party or have an electoral platform with clear ethnic contents? Different scholars working on indigenous movements and emergence of parties in Latin America generally, and Bolivia and Peru specifically, do not agree on the

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36 The 2001 census asked both about the spoken language and the language learnt in the childhood (Molina and Albó 2006).
37 A limitation to the census is that only people over age 15 were asked.
38 The possible answers were Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní, Chiquitano, Mojeño, other native, or none
39 In 2007, a survey that considered the linguistic criterion to determine belonging to indigenous groups was carried out, but this survey was limited to the Amazon (INEI 2009).
categorisations. Peru proved to be a particularly complicated case, as parties have only emerged at the local and regional levels, and often have names that reflect ethnic symbols or words (Van Cott 2005), which made the process of coding difficult. This thesis has had to rely on a large number of Peruvian secondary sources to determine which parties could be coded as indigenous or not. The definition of an ethnic party provided in chapter 2 proved crucial when deciding on which parties to be included or not. Thus, parties that are widely considered indigenous were included instantly, while other parties, particularly smaller Peruvian parties, have required the consideration of different scholars’ coding. A last point to be made, is that scholars and members of indigenous organisations and parties would probably in certain cases disagree on the coding due to questions of authenticity, such as which actors are representing the “real Indians” (Lucero 2006).

4.0 Framing processes: The creation of mobilising discourses

The framing processes approach is preoccupied with the symbolic aspects of collective action, and the development of a collective identity that makes people mobilise when they have an opportunity to do so. All social movements need a political consciousness or an explicit identity to translate individual to collective action, and to create and mobilise a constituency (Bernstein 2003:237). According to Pajuelo (2007:25), the Latin American indigenous movements have reinvented the ideas of community, fatherland, and nation. In the Andean countries, there is an intense process of redefinition of identities with a clear ethnic colouring underway. The capacity of indigenous movements to produce alternative representations of the nation is one of the most important factors of change. This strategic redefinition of identities have led to the emergence of indigenous movements that self-identify in ethnic terms and that have distanced themselves from the old peasant movements that were imposed on them by leftist parties (Pajuelo Teves 2007:25). Thus, the indigenous movements that have been created in several Latin American countries since the mid-1980s, do not only defend identities, but they develop them (Brysk 1996:50). This chapter will look precisely into these mobilising discourses that have been constructed or “re-invented” and that have served as mobilising factors for indigenous organisations in Bolivia and Peru. The discussion of the framing processes approach in the theory chapter concluded in the formulation of one main variable, viz. mobilising discourses. This variable was further

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40 For example, Madrid (2008) argues that only MIP and MAS can be characterised as indigenous parties in Bolivia, whereas Birnir (2004) characterises Condepa as an ethnic party, a categorisation which is rejected by Van Cott (2005) and Madrid (2008).
41 Understood by Pajuelo as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.
operationalised into three indicators: (1) Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse; (2) inclusive indigenous discourse; and (3) connection with anti-neoliberal discourse. The assumptions are that these indicators are positively related to the emergence of indigenous parties.

4.1. Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse

As previously mentioned, it is often difficult to forge one single voice of a movement (Gamson and Meyer 1996:238). Albó and Quispe clarify a point that is often not taken into account by researchers, and which is valid for both Bolivia and Peru:

“The most common thing, particularly in the Andean region, is that the people are both indigenous and peasant. In terms of their historical and socioeconomic identity they are indigenous (...). But, in socioeconomic terms (...) they are peasants” (2004a:18, my translation).

Thus, the indigenous and the peasant conditions cannot be seen as if they were degrees on one single dimension. Rather, they are two distinct dimensions that may, or may not, coincide (Albó and Quispe 2004a:18). Albó and Quispe’s point is thus in line with the constructivist approach to ethnic identity which was presented in the introduction to this thesis. One important dimension of this approach is that individuals may identify or be identified by others in multiple ways depending on the context. Moreover, leaders of indigenous organisations who strive to forge a collective identity and a dominant discourse in the organisations, may make strategic decisions to evaluate which identity and discourse is the most efficient to attract affiliates and supporters. However, less salient class cleavages are necessary for enhanced performance of indigenous parties (Van Cott and Rice 2006), and the following section will look into the dynamics of the salience of class versus ethnic identities within the Bolivian and Peruvian organisations created by people who are indigenous according to the definition presented in the introduction to this thesis.

4.1.1 Process of re-indianisation in Bolivia

Before the Bolivian revolution in 1952, there were strong rural indigenous movements in Bolivia that had gained strength in the decade prior to the revolution (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:34-7). The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), that led the revolution, made the mestizo - the synthesis of racial and cultural mixing of “Indians” and Spanish-descendants (Sanjines C. 2004) - a fundamental ideological support of the new consciousness of being a nation-state. The “Indian” was officially renamed peasant, the
indigenous and traditional peasant cultures were considered one of the main reasons of the country’s backwardness, and the state initiated an assimilation strategy and a populist ideology of the *mestizo* in order to control the indigenous elements of resistance and to make them more Western (Ströbele-Gregor 1994). The MNR set out to organise the indigenous peasant communities in the Bolivian highlands into agrarian unions through corporatist peasant union structures which were imposed on any pre-existing form of rural organisation (Ticona 2003:6). The state-created National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CNTCB) organised peasants at the provincial, departmental, and national level (Yashar 2005:160). However, a new type of autonomy appeared in the countryside, as a land reform42 freed peasants from working for a landlord through granting them resources to work for themselves (Albó 1983:34). According to Yashar (2005:162), “indigenous authority structures persisted to varying degrees behind the institutional shell of the peasant union federations”. Thus, even though the term “indigenous” disappeared from official language in the aftermath of the revolution, the wide-held argument that the indigenous identity was traded for a peasant identity after the Revolution of 1952 is not valid (Albó and Quispe 2004a; Molina and Albó 2006). There were always indigenous peoples, but there were times when the indigenous discourse was not a mobilising one. Rather, it was attached to stigmatisation (García Linera interview 2007).

In the 1960s and 1970s in the highland department of La Paz, a new generation of Aymara indigenous peasant leaders and intellectuals who called themselves *Indianistas* and *Kataristas*43 emerged from the traditional union sectors and bilingual schools which were both products of the MNR reforms (Rivera Cusicanqui 2003; García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:113). To be able to understand the rise of *Indianismo* and particularly *Katarismo* within the agrarian federations, one must remember that in spite of the 1952 revolution’s efforts to incorporate the indigenous masses into peasants in exchange for land and state subsidies, in reality they were starting to feel like “foreigners in their own homeland” and like objects of ethnic discrimination and political manipulation (Ticona Alejo 2003:7). The MNR had promised them that if they left their indigenous identity and converted themselves into peasants, they would become first class citizens. However, the indigenous people who came

42 Bolivia had the highest Gini Index for land concentration in Latin America prior to the revolution and the demands for a land reform had been strong (Eckstein 1983:108).

43 The Kataristas took their name from Tupac Katari, and indigenous leader in Bolivia in the 1780s. He led an army of 40 000 men against the Spaniards in the Bolivian department of La Paz, but he was killed in 1781. According to Garcia Linera (interview 2007), Katari is recognised as the first “Grand Indian leader”.  

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to the cities to study or find work were met with strong racism and discrimination (García Linera interview 2007).

The *Indianismo* ideology stresses precisely the ethnic basis for the repression of the indigenous peoples, is explicitly anti-Western and anti-white, and identifies the source of their subordination in racism. The *Katarismo* ideology, on the other hand, takes a more pragmatic stance and merges class consciousness and ethnic claims, and maintains a mixture of traditional ethnic and Western systems of government (Van Cott 2005:53). The reason why this thesis stresses the contribution of the *Indianista*, and particularly the *Katarista*, ideologies is because even though they did not maintain political unity, their organisational force has had a lasting impact on unions as well as electoral politics in Bolivia, and their ethnic discourse started the “re-indianisation” of the Bolivian peasants (Yashar 1998:25). The *Kataristas* were among the first to focus explicitly on the problems connected with the recognition of the indigenous peoples in the country (Ticona Alejo 2003), and they worked to become leaders of the corporatist unions in the countryside to strengthen local autonomy from state structures (Albó 2008a). Eventually they managed to take control of the CNTCB and renamed it the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers CSUTCB in 1979 (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).

In 1983, the *Kataristas* within the CSUTCB for the first time demanded the creation of a pluri-national state. According to García Linera (interview 2007), a pluri-national state is a “state which recognises various languages and various types of authority systems, including the traditional indigenous forms of direct communitarian participation, consensus democracy, and rotating representation”. A pluri-national state was thus a very different state from the continuous military regimes that dominated in Bolivia until 1982, and the eventually pacted and unrepresentative democracy where the dominant parties alternated in power until 2005 (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). The demand for a fundamental restructuring of the state, which was to be prominent among the demands of the indigenous movements in the 1990s and 2000s, was also articulated in this period (Ticona Alejo 2003:6). In Bolivia, an indigenous discourse was created with the help of Catholic clergy, who developed a theological discourse

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44 The Indian Tupak Katari Movement (MITKA) was the most successful Indianist party, whereas the Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL) was the most successful Katarista party. However, neither MITKA nor MRTKL managed to establish themselves in party politics (Van Cott 2005).

45 Of the two currents, the Katarista ideology became the more influential of the two, as it built on the unity of the union networks of the countryside. The Indianistas mainly organised in the city, and this urban focus prevented them from taking advantage of pre-existing transcommunity networks (Albó 2008a).
that reappraised the indigenous cultures and languages, as well as promoted the social organisation of the indigenous population (Trejo 2000:219). The Tiwanaku manifest, which was published by the Kataristas in 1973, asked the Catholic Church and other denominations to collaborate in the liberation of the Aymara and Quechua peoples (Montoya 1998). This first round of ethnic re-emergence was limited to the Bolivian highlands.

The fact that there was an ethnic awakening within the indigenous peasant movement from the end of the 1960s does not mean that Bolivian indigenous movements did not apply a class discourse, or that leftist parties have not tried to mobilise them. The long dominant Katarismo ideology analyses precisely the society with “two eyes”- class and nation: “We have to see reality with two eyes: With those of class, like exploited peasants, together with all the others who are exploited; and with those of ethnicity, together with all the oppressed nations” (Albó 2008a:242, my translation). However, leftist and Marxist parties never gained much strength in the Bolivian countryside, and did not manage to impose a class identity on the indigenous peasant as successfully as in Peru (Albó 2008a). The MNR government, in spite of its name which alludes to a revolutionary left, was nationalist (García Linera interview 2007). In spite of the influence and strength of indigenous discourses in the CSUTCB and in other incipient organisations, there was a type of state indigenismo that neutralised the autonomy and the emancipating project of the Katarismo and Indianismo-influenced indigenous movements until 2000, when the recent period of large indigenous mobilisations started (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:121). The implementation of neo-liberalism in Bolivia in 1985 displaced the unions as political and social protagonists, and indigenous movements and their ethnic discourse were weakened. Moreover, the dominant political parties that had implemented the neoliberal reforms were successful in co-opting numerous leaders of the indigenous movements. One example is that the Katarista party, the Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL) ran with the neoliberal party MNR in the 1993 elections in what appeared to be a very unlikely alliance (Albó 1994). However, as will be analysed in section 4.3, an indigenous discourse that had been weakened during the 1980s and 1990s regained strength from 2000, when a discourse that articulated opposition to the neoliberal policies intertwined with an indigenous discourse (Albó 2008a:242).

Indigenismo was a policy implemented by many Latin American countries from the beginning of the 20th century and until the mid-1950s. The states sought to solve the “Indian problem” through civilising and assimilation projects where the goal was to integrate the indigenous people into the various nations and into the markets. This state-led indigenismo was strongest in Mexico, but also in Peru it gained strength. The most important Peruvian indigenistas were Hildebrando Castro Pozo and Luis Valcárcel (Pajuelo 2005:112).
During this last round of indigenous mobilisations, several organisations have taken conscious decisions to assume a prominent indigenous identity as a mechanism of unity, differentiation, and mobilisation (García Linera interview 2007). According to Yashar (2005:187), the cocalero (coca-growers) movement, where current president Evo Morales received his political and organisational training, was initially defending the rights of the coca-farmers to cultivate their parcels of coca leaf\(^{47}\) and their discourse was classist. Eventually, they self-consciously started to refer to ethnicity as a key component of their political struggle. According to Zuazo (interview 2007), the discourse of Movement toward Socialism (MAS), an indigenous party that originated in the cocalero movement in 1995, was one of rupture of the model of the dominant and, for them, unrepresentative state. The discourse was not ethnic, but rather articulated popular demands. Similarly, Goedeking (interview 2007) finds the fact that Evo Morales is portrayed internationally as Latin America’s first indigenous president curious. He argues that Morales is a unionist, first and foremost, and that the MAS did not publicly articulate an ethnic discourse before after they had won the presidential elections in 2005. Albó (2008a), on the other hand, finds the MAS and the cocalero movement to be one of the best examples of the merging of class and ethnic discourses.

Moreover, as we will see in chapter 5, branches of the CSUTCB have been continuously ridden by internal rivalries that have included the discussion of whether to predominantly promote a classist or an indigenous mobilising discourse\(^{48}\). The highland organisation National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Quillasuyu (CONAMAQ), which was created in 1997, is explicitly indigenous with claims of a cultural character. They work to reconstitute the ayllu,\(^{49}\) the old communitarian organisational mode in the highlands. The CONAMAQ is very critical of the unionist structures and the class discourse which still influence many Bolivian organisations, and accuses particularly the CSUTSB of being unionists (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004; interview Williams Bascopé 2007). According to Lucero (2006:39), the efforts of the CSUTCB and the coca-growers to “indianise” their discourses have happened partly as a consequence of the emergence of CONAMAQ, as well as a result

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\(^{47}\) The coca bush is a traditional plant that has been cultivated in the Andean region for more than 4,000 years. The coca leaf has been used for medical purposes, to alleviate altitude sickness, hunger and thirst. It is a strong symbol for indigenous identity in the Andean countries. In the Western world, the leaf is mostly known for its use in the production of the drug cocaine. However, only one per cent of the leaf contains the substance used to produce cocaine (Berge 2008).

\(^{48}\) The branches of La Paz, Oruro and Potosi tend to assume an ethnic discourse, whereas Santa Cruz, Beni and Cochabamba to a larger degree maintain a peasant discourse (García Linera interview 2007).

\(^{49}\) An ayllu was the social core of the Andean culture that has survived colonisation and the republican time. Its organisation includes the family or the relatives (Montoya 1998).
of the explicit and successful indigenous discourse of the largest lowland organisation, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples in Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Stefanoni calls this process a “wiphalisation” of Bolivian social movement organisations (2004). According to Albó (2008a:243), it is likely that this process of “indianisation” of discourses can be explained by the efforts of the organisations to gain a larger presence and support. Moreover, these efforts could be situated within the game theory-oriented constructivist approach to ethnicity in which a group of individuals with multiple identities decide to act collectively and frequently encounter an identity dilemma (Trejo 2000:213).

In the Bolivian lowlands, which consist of the departments of Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Santa Cruz, an ethnic conscience and discourse emerged at a later stage than in the highlands. However, the subject of indigenous territoriality in general, and the rights of the indigenous peoples in the lowland, in particular, surfaced by the end of the 1970s, and particularly in the 1980s and 1990s (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:275). The CIDOB and other affiliated organisations launched a series of marches to claim their right to their ancestral territories during the 1990s. Following the success of these marches, the lowland indigenous peoples achieved a greater level of acceptance in the urban society, the NGOs were more sympathetic to their cause, and, most importantly, the indigenous identity became one of the principal components through which the indigenous peoples present themselves publically before the rest of society. The marches contributed to the symbolic transformation of the significance of the indigenous category. Before the marches, there was still a collective resistance among the members of various indigenous groups to self-identify as indigenous (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:230-43).

4.1.2 Long-term prevailing class discourse in Peru

A much-cited argument for the apparent lack of indigenous mobilisation in Peru is that the indigenous peoples have traded their indigenous identity for a class identity (Yashar 1998). This thesis argues that this line of argumentation is oversimplified. Firstly, it is only the indigenous population in the Peruvian highlands that has tended to identify as peasants rather than as indigenous. However, in line with the constructivist approach to identity which was exemplified by Albó and Quispe (2004a), their ethnic identity did not disappear. Rather, the peasant discourse overshadowed ethnic discourses for decades. The recuperation of an indigenous identity in the highlands has been slow and only partial, but an increasingly visible ethnic discourse has developed from the end of the 1990s (Pajuelo Teves 2006; Albó 2008a). Secondly, the Peruvian Amazonian population never suffered from the “peasant attack”,

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which will be presented shortly, and the indigenous identification has been much stronger there (Albó 2008a:181).

The currently largest Amazonian indigenous organisations, the Interethnic Association of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP) and the Confederation of Peruvian Amazonian Nationalities (CONAP), self-identify as indigenous, and more recently as native\textsuperscript{50}. The case of the Peruvian Amazon is peculiar compared to the highlands, because as the central state was virtually absent, the control of the area was broadly transferred to churches until the last third of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. For example, the Peruvian state signed a contract with the evangelical Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), which promoted assimilation through bible translations, bicultural education, and provided training of a new generation of indigenous professionals and intellectuals (Montoya 1998:160; Yashar 2005). Thus, future leaders were provided skills and networks that would later help them in the creation of indigenous movements from the end of the 1960s. Furthermore, native communities formed alliances with catholic and protestant churches to oppose the secular agendas of states, which ultimately led to their tribal or ethnic categories becoming frames to express their identities and demands without being assimilated into political parties, labour unions, or peasant organisations (Brown 1993:314-322). According to Vega (2010:3), the Amazonian indigenous population has gone through an intense process of change during the last part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, which has led to a search for new forms of expression of their identities, exercise of their citizenship, as well as the demand that the state offer them access to the benefits of modernity and construct a development which respects their cultural identity. However, the indigenous population in the Peruvian Amazon only constitutes 1.2 percent of the total population (INEI 2009).

The question is then why a class discourse overshadowed an ethnic discourse for decades in the Peruvian highlands. According to the anthropologists Albó, Montoya, and Diez (interviews 2007), one explanation lies in the defeat and execution of “the first indigenous intellectual”, Túpac Amaru\textsuperscript{51}, in 1781 in Cusco, the heart of the Peruvian indigenous highlands. This defeat had repercussions for indigenous mobilising that still are valid- the indigenous elites were literally wiped out. In fact, Peru still lacks an indigenous elite or indigenous intellectuals who can lead large mobilisations (Montoya 1998). According to Luis Vittor (2010a), there are people who speak about the indigenous movement, but not people

\textsuperscript{50} “\textit{Originario}” is the Spanish term for “native”.

\textsuperscript{51} Túpac Amaru II was the leader of an indigenous rebellion against the Spanish colonisers in the highland region of Cusco.
who speak from within the indigenous organisations. Secondly, the process of mestizaje was much stronger in Peru than in Bolivia. The state opened institutions directed at attending the “Indian Problem”. In 1946, the Peruvian Indigenista Institute (IIP) was created with the goal of integrating the “Indian” into the nation. These assimilation policies were promoted by the state over several decades (Pajuelo Teves 2005:112), and rejected the possibility of a complementary double identity - the Peruvian and the indigenous (Vittor 2010a). The Peruvian indigenistas often have a paternalist attitude to and a romantic vision of the indigenous movements, a vision which is often mixed with racism (Vittor 2010a). Moreover, the assimilationist ideology can be summarised as “Incas yes, Indians no” (Méndez 1996), which precisely refers to this rhetorical romanticised view of the Incas, and the ignorance of today’s indigenous populations (Greene 2005:34). In Bolivia, however, the elites’ attempts at forging a nation of Bolivian mestizos have been very weak (García Linera interview 2007).

A third explanation can be traced to the effects of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RGAF), which lasted from 1968 until 1975. General Velasco Alvarado took power through a coup in 1968 in a context of extreme land inequalities and peasant mobilisations (Yashar 2005:230). The regime opted for the construction of a unitary and culturally homogenous nation through reforms which introduced bilingualism, a land reform, and the recognition of Quechua as an official language (Pajuelo Teves 2005:113). Moreover, the regime changed the name of the officially recognised “Indian communities” in the highlands to “peasant communities”. The term “native communities” was introduced to refer to the indigenous communities in the Amazon (Yashar 2005:230-1). These statutes recognised the native communities’ internal laws, whereas the peasant communities were increasingly regulated by the state (Albó 2008a:179). The RGAF created corporatist structures to organise the newly “baptised peasants” (Albó 1991), and, like in Bolivia, adopted organising and mobilising methods from urban labour unions, which were imposed on the traditional Andean organisational structures (Peeler 2003:260). An important point is that these corporatist structures were not implemented in the Amazonian region. In 1971, the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) was created by the state to turn lands into cooperatives as well as counter the radical influence of the Peruvian Peasant Confederation

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52 Particularly the government of Leguía (1919-1930) was active in this regard. In 1920, it recognised the existence of indigenous communities, and the “Indian Day” was instituted (Pajuelo 2005:112).

53 The land reform was very radical in scope and had a stronger impact on large landowners than similar reforms in Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, or Venezuela (McClintock 1981:60-2).

54 While, the 1920 Constitution recognised the legal representation of indigenous communities, traditional forms of organisation were not recognised (Albó 2008:176).
The support for Velasco’s proposal of a peasant discourse was unexpectedly strong, as the CCP and CNA, and the Marxist left, adopted the peasant term (Montoya 1998). During the 1970s, the CNA and CCP were influenced by radical Marxists and Maoists who rejected an indigenous identity. The indigenous population and its forms of social organisation were considered as “remnants” and ethnic differences had to dilute to become integrated into the national proletariat (Ruiz Hernández 2001:24-5). Thus, the CCP and CNA never developed a discourse based on ethnic claims, but stuck to their imposed peasant identity and claims that were limited to the highlands (Remy 1994; Pajuelo Teves 2006). However, some attempts at following in the footsteps of the Bolivian Kataristas were sporadically seen⁵⁶, but they were not successful (Albó 2008a:183).

A fourth reason for the dominance of the class discourse in the highlands is that the influence of liberation theology in the Peruvian countryside has been weak. According to Tanaka (interview 2007), the Catholic Church in Peru has been dominated by a pure classist theology of liberation⁵⁷. Only a smaller part of the Peruvian clergy adopted the ideas of liberation theology, and those who did were likely to be replaced by more conservative priests. Moreover, the strength of the leftist organisations weakened the influence of liberation theology (Sánchez 1996:101). A fifth reason lies in the strong discrimination in Peruvian society and the subsequent reluctance of indigenous peoples to refer to themselves as indigenous. In the highland Quechua and Aymara communities the terms “Indian” and “indigenous” have been rejected to a very large degree. Their own designation would be Runa or Qaqi, which means human beings (Montoya 1998:150-2). In Peru, ideological differences between the traditional economic and political elites and the peasant and labour unions, including indigenous organisations, have become increasingly racialised. Peruvian author Mario Varga Llosa, who unsuccessfully ran for president in 1990, may serve as an illustration, as he stated that the indigenous movements in Peru and neighbouring countries promote social and political disorder, and constitute an obstacle to development (Felix 2008:311). Finally, an

⁵⁵ The CCP had been central in land invasions in the highlands in the 1960s, and was controlled by the Peruvian Maoist Communist Party, which made the CCP one of the most radical peasant organisations in the continent (Albó 2008a:179).

⁵⁶ At the CCP’s National Congress in 1978, a group of Aymaras from Puno who were inspired by the Bolivian Kataristas emerged waving the wiphala. Shortly after the congress, they created the Federation of Communities and Peasants of Aymara Nationality Tupac Katari. However, the CCP soon after excluded them for being divisive (Albó 2008a: 183).

⁵⁷ Liberation theology is “an interpretation of Christian faith through the poor's suffering, their struggle and hope, and a critique of society and the Catholic faith and Christianity through the eyes of the poor” (Berryman 1987).
important point is the presence of the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) guerrilla movement, which emerged in 1980 in the southern highland region of Ayacucho and gradually expanded to large parts of the Peruvian highlands as well as the Amazon. The Shining Path was Maoist and rejected an indigenous discourse. However, at the start of the rebellion it was considered to be an ethnic rebellion as the guerrilla originated in the indigenous highland region of Ayacucho (Starn, Degregori et al. 2005). Its influence in the Peruvian countryside did not fade away until its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was arrested in September 1992. Thus, Peru, unlike Bolivia and other Latin American countries, did not see large demonstrations to celebrate the 500 years of resistance to colonisation in October 1992. These mobilisations served as a mobilising energiser for ethnic movements and ethnic discourses throughout the continent. However, just a month after the capture of Guzmán, it was difficult to mobilise Peruvian indigenous peoples, from both the highlands and the Amazon, as the armed conflict reached both areas (Chirif and García 2009:3)58.

De la Cadena (2000) argues that even though ethnic social movements have been weak in Peru, this does not imply that indigenous involvement in politics has been absent. In the decades prior to the land reform under General Velasco, there was a movement of indigenous land seizures. However, the language of ethnicity was not the only one available to indigenous subjects, and the indigenous were trapped within “racialized, discriminatory practices” (de la Cadena 2008:343). The slow awakening of an explicit indigenous discourse and identity in the Peruvian highlands was not seen before the end of the 1990s (Pajuelo Teves 2006; Albó 2008a). Today, new organisations, intellectuals, and activists increasingly identify themselves as indigenous. This process has been particularly evident in the central and southern highlands (Felix 2008:312). According to Felix (2008), indigenous identities have been transformed from “archaic” to new ways of thinking about indigeneity to show that the indigenous peoples in the highlands “are here and are alive”. Several factors have contributed to the reappraisal of indigenous identities. Firstly, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, and Bolivian indigenous organisations59 started a program of exchange, where political and organisational experiences were shared (Felix 2008; Vittor 2010a). Furthermore, the diffusion or demonstration effect from Bolivian and Ecuadorian movements has been important. International NGOs and development agencies60 have also provided support and meeting

58 Other effects of the presence of Shining Path will be dealt with further in chapter 6.  
59 This program included particularly the Bolivian organisation CONAMAQ and the Ecuadorian organisation Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy (ECUARUNARI) (Vittor 2010a).  
60 Active NGOs include Oxfam America, IWGIA, and Ibis Denmark (Felix 2008).
spaces for dispersed communities (Felix 2008). Moreover, Chirif and García (2009) claim that the explicit indigenous identification among the Amazonian peoples have influenced the reconstruction of identities in the highlands.

One of the first signs of the revival of indigenous identities in the highlands was the creation of the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples in Peru (COPPIP) in 1997 in Cusco. COPPIP was the result of the First National Congress of Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples in Peru, which was organised by a group of intellectuals with links to some organisations (Pajuelo Teves 2005:127). Organisations from the highlands, CCP and CNA, and the Amazon, AIDESEP and CONAP, attended the founding meeting (Pajuelo Teves 2006:73-74). COPPIP will be dealt with further in chapter 5, when considering the brokerage mechanism, as the organisation must be considered an umbrella organisation.

The currently most important highland organisation which has made claims of a cultural or indigenous character is the National Confederation for Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) (Felix 2008:313). CONACAMI was created in 1999, and emerged in response to the conflicts between mining companies, whose presence are increasing in Peru following a boost in mining investments61, and nearby communities. Before the creation of CONACAMI, communities organised their isolated fights to defend their rights both because they do not benefit from the extractive industry’s enclave economy, and because their living conditions are harmed, not least by water pollution (Albó 2008a; Vittor 2009a). According to CONACAMI advisor Luis Vittor (interview 2007), the organisation self-identifies as indigenous-peasant, because “our composition is ancestral, but at the same time there are agricultural organisations within CONACAMI who have (...) a peasant identification”. Albó (2008a:209-10) argues that CONACAMI’s demand that the ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, is followed by the state, has contributed to the framing of their demands based on an indigenous identity. The ILO 169 recognises the collective rights of indigenous peoples over their traditional land, and includes a requirement that states consult these peoples about development initiatives that may affect their territories (Benavides 2000:65). The mobilising discourse of CONACAMI, which combines opposition to neoliberal reforms and indigenous claims, will be dealt with further in section 4.3. According to Montoya (interview 2007), CONACAMI is a possible foetus for significant indigenous mobilisation in the future. However, Vittor (2010a) claims that the government, media, and

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61 Between 1990 and 1997, mining investments in Peru increased with 2.000 percent, compared to 400 percent on average in the rest of Latin America (Albó 2008a: 206).
civil society do not perceive the organisation as “indigenous”. Rather, CONACAMI is referred to as an NGO or an anti-mining organisation. According to Paredes (2006), “the indigenous-mining discourse” within CONACAMI is based on stereotypes such as “indigenous territories” which do not reflect the reality of the affected communities. Vittor (2010a) denies these arguments, and claims that such misconceptions is part of the “invisibilisation of the Andean indigenous elements” in Peru, - the inexistence of the indigenous peoples before the government and the dominant society. Albó (2008a:211), again in the case of CONACAMI, refers to the dialectic relationship between ethnicity and class, which is a creative game “between reality, necessities, and immediate claims, and the recognition and recuperation of identities which give a deeper meaning to the claims”.

4.2 Inclusive indigenous discourse
The indigenous movements that have appeared throughout the Latin American continent have demanded that their right to be different is recognised: “We are equal, we are different”, has been the slogan (Brysk 2007:29). In other words, they want to be part of the national societies, but at the same time have the right to be different, which, consequently, leads to the demand for a more inclusive model of citizenship (Pajuelo Teves 2006:69). Movements have increasingly fought for a pluri-national re-construction of the state and of society, and this project is important in the current political actions of social movements in Bolivia, as well as in Peru (Pajuelo Teves 2007:26). According to Martí i Puig (2008), an inclusive indigenous discourse has been necessary for indigenous parties to become successful. However, not all indigenous organisations have used this discourse, but rather set the national and local identities against each other.

4.2.1 Bolivia- salient inclusive indigenous discourse
In the Bolivian lowlands, the demand to be recognised as different within the limits of the nation-state is the prevailing discourse. The lowland indigenous organisations demand that the state recognises their demands and access to resources like any Bolivian citizen (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:243).

In the Bolivian highlands, by contrast, there has been a stronger tendency of setting the local identity against the national, Bolivian identity. Particularly the Aymara, who is the dominant ethnic group in the highland departments of La Paz and Oruro, question the relevance of the Bolivian identity as the denomination of the population that inhabits the country. Thus, contrary to the lowland indigenous population, several highland indigenous organisations tend
to justify their claims to be seen as a separate nation by their historically differentiated existence prior to the formation of the Bolivian state.

One may speak of two different ways of organisation of collective identities, where the former emphasis prefers a dialogue in the broader context, whereas the latter is of a more disruptive kind (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:244). Felipe Quispe, leader of Indigenous Pachakutik Movement (MIP)\(^{62}\), is perhaps the most prominent voice of the radical Aymara discourse of “the two Bolivias”. This discourse holds that there are two Bolivian nations, viz. the indigenous nation, and the foreign nation composed of ‘qaras’- whites, and mestizos (Pajuelo Teves 2007:56). According to Quispe (interview 2007), MIP adheres to the Indianista current within the recent wave of Bolivian indigenous mobilisations. Even though he admits that classism exists, the most important battle is the fight for the Nación Kollasuyu, the Grand Aymara Nation, which should cover the Aymara-dominated part of Bolivia (primarily the departments of La Paz and Oruro), and parts of Peru, Chile and Argentina. A pertinent question to be asked is why the Aymara discourse is so much more radical than other Bolivian ethnic discourses. According to Moira Zuazo (interview 2007), the Quechua, which is the largest Bolivian indigenous group, is much more open to the “western” world than are the Aymaras. The Aymaras managed to maintain a high conscience of cultural identity throughout the Spanish rule. The history of the Aymaras since the Spanish conquest has been marked by fights for survival and resistance (Goedeking, interview 2007). This is a point that Felipe Quispe (interview 2007) emphasises:

“We have Quechua affiliates [in MIP]. They have always submitted themselves to us, never have they said that they want to take the lead (...). Because the Quechua is less rebellious than the Aymara. There is not much cultural difference between the Aymara and the Quechua, but the Aymaras have launched political parties, the Aymaras have made history”\(^{63}\).

Indeed, most of the large indigenous movements in the highlands have originated in the Aymara-dominated department of La Paz. However, according to Moira Zuazo (interview 2007), the exclusive ethnic identity promoted by Quispe and MIP has not been successful in attracting affiliates, not even in the Aymara-dominated areas. García Linera (interview 2007)

\(^{62}\) Quispe is also a former leader of the Tupaj Katari Guerilla Army (EGTK), and former secretary general of the CSUTCB.

\(^{63}\) Quispe principally refers to the before mentioned Indian Tupak Katari Movement (MITKA).
considers the radical discourse of Quispe to have been very effective with regard to the construction of discourses that served as the inspiration for large mobilisations in the Bolivian highlands from 2000 until 2005: “Felipe [Quispe] is able to make a speech and inflame a hundred thousand people”. However, his radical discourse did not manage to unify the indigenous organisations. According to García Linera (interview 2007), Quispe is a poor “weaver”, in the sense that his discourse is too radical to unite large numbers of affiliates and organisations. Evo Morales, by contrast, is an “excellent weaver, and holds outstanding capabilities to organise. Similarly, Madrid (2008:475), considers the more inclusive ethnic discourse of MAS a success, as it combines a populist appeal, which succeeded in forming alliances, with representation of a diversity of ethnic groups, approaching all members of the nation.

4.2.2 Peru- prevailing inclusive indigenous discourse

Roughly speaking, one could say that the Amazonian indigenous organisations in Peru maintain a relatively moderate indigenous discourse, working for the integration of their indigenous communities into the national society (Montoya 1998:154). The largest indigenous organisations are multi-ethnic, thus preventing the extremely exclusive discourse seen in some Bolivian highland organisations. Moreover, the political party the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon (MIAP), which was created by AIDESEP in 1996, aims to be a political alternative both for indigenous and non-indigenous (Van Cott 2005:171). The MIAP will be dealt with further in chapter 6.

In the Peruvian highlands, by contrast, more radical and ethno-exclusive discourses have erupted at intervals. In the 1980s, the Indian Tawantinsuyo Movement (MIT), the Inka Movement (MI), and the Ayllu Integration (IA) group emerged. A common denominator for all these organisations is that they reappraised the word “Indian”, claimed a war against the occident, and searched for a second Tawantinsuyo. In other words, their discourse was radical and ethno-exclusive, and they did not manage to reach out to the highland communities (Montoya 1998:138-9). Thus, these organisations’ success was marginal. Also more recently there have been attempts at creating radical and in certain ways exclusive indigenous discourses in the Peruvian highlands. The Cusco Declaration from 2006, which was formulated at the foundational congress of the Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations (CAOI) with the presence of CONACAMI, speaks of the expiration of mono-

64 Tawantinsuyo refers to “The Four Territories” of what today is best known as the “Inca Empire” (Huber 2008).
national and mono-cultural nation-states, demanding the foundation of a pluri-national state. More radical is the demand for a political reconstruction of the Tawantinsuyo and the Abya Yala65 (Huber 2008:8). According to Montoya (1998:154), the sporadic and more radical indigenous discourses of smaller highland organisations, can possibly be explained by the fact that the Peruvian Quechua, who constitute the largest indigenous group, do not feel that there is a “Peruvian identity”, and have thus not so far opted for a double citizenship. Yet, the inclusive indigenous discourse, like the one promoted by CONACAMI- an organisation which includes both indigenous and peasant identities - is the dominant discourse in the Peruvian highlands.

4.3 Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse
According to Martí i Puig (2008:705-8), indigenous organisations’ discourses are more likely to be successful when they are connected with opposition to the neoliberal reforms. The implementation of these reforms have generated an ethnic awakening in many Latin American countries (Yashar 2005; Pajuelo Teves 2007). Particularly, reforms that have threatened the inalienability of communally held land have challenged the indigenous concept of territoriality and given further impetus to the fight against neo-liberalism (Yashar 2005:68). The aim of this section is to evaluate the degree to which Bolivian and Peruvian indigenous organisations have linked their indigenous discourses to an anti-neoliberal discourse.

4.3.1 Bolivia- intertwining of ethnic and anti-neoliberal discourses
In Bolivia, the mobilisations against neoliberal reforms from 2000 marked a watershed for the social movements. These mobilisations joined together numerous SMOs and civil society groups, such as indigenous organisations, students, workers, neighbourhood associations, and sectors of the middle class (Arce 2008:41). However, the indigenous organisations were the protagonists of the protests (García Linera interview 2007). According to García Linera et al. (2004), the various Bolivian social movements were converted into a “societal movement” which forced two presidents, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa, to resign. To be able to understand the success of this combination of an indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourse, a brief background on the nature of the neoliberal reforms in Bolivia is required.

The neoliberal reforms in Bolivia were the most radical in Latin America, after Chile, and among the most innovative in the world. The process of neoliberal restructuring has gone through three phases (Kohl 2006:305). The first started in 1985 with the New Economic

65 Abya Yala refers to the Latin American continent and originated among the Kuna ethnic group of Panama. Currently, the term has been adopted by many Latin American indigenous organisations (Huber 2008).
Policy (NEP) and the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to halt the hyperinflation that was plaguing the country. The NEP stabilised the economy, but did not address the fundamental economic problems. Jobs within the mining and manufacturing industries were dramatically reduced, and by 1988, the informal economy included more than 70 percent of the urban workforce (Kohl 2006:311). The majority of the Bolivian indigenous population now lives in the cities (Albó 2008a:22), thus constituting a large part of the informal workforce.

The second phase was dominated by the Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997), which implemented the Plan for All, which among other things, but most importantly here, led to the privatisation of the largest state-owned companies of which the state-owned gas and oil company (YPFB) was the most important. The social movements considered the capitalisation to be a sell-out of Bolivian resources to transnational corporations (Kohl 2004; Kohl 2006). Furthermore, the National Agrarian Reform Institute Law (INRA), known as “the second land reform”, was implemented in 1996 and reversed the rights established by the 1953 land reform, viz. the recognition of the social function of land and land ownership to the tiller (Kohl 2006:315). Many indigenous organisations, particularly the lowland-based CIDOB, mobilised against this reform that contributed to the concentration of land ownership (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).

The third phase started with the Cochabamba Water War in 2000, which marked the first significant and successful popular battle against neo-liberalism. The municipal-owned water company in Cochabamba was sold to Agua del Tunari, a consortium owned by the US-based Bechtel, in late 1999. Shortly after the handover, water prices increased by as much as 400 percent in some areas (Finnegan 2002). The Committee to Defend Water and Life was created in the city of Cochabamba, federations within the cocalero movement and the CSUTCB joined the protests (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004), and finally the water privatisation was withdrawn (Arce 2008:47). The resistance among popular and indigenous sectors against the privatisation of the oil sector increased, and the protests became even more accentuated when the Sanchez de Lozada government wanted to export gas to the United States, of which the state-owned gas and oil company (YPFB) was the most important. The social movements considered the capitalisation to be a sell-out of Bolivian resources to transnational corporations (Kohl 2004; Kohl 2006). Furthermore, the National Agrarian Reform Institute Law (INRA), known as “the second land reform”, was implemented in 1996 and reversed the rights established by the 1953 land reform, viz. the recognition of the social function of land and land ownership to the tiller (Kohl 2006:315). Many indigenous organisations, particularly the lowland-based CIDOB, mobilised against this reform that contributed to the concentration of land ownership (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).

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66 The NEP was implemented by Victor Paz Estenssoro, one of the main leaders of the 1952 MNR-led revolution. One of the revolutionary government’s main achievements was the nationalisation of the mines, and it is thus ironical that Paz Estenssoro in 1985 privatised these state-owned mines and other enterprises.
67 ‘Plan de Todos’.
68 With the implementation of the Capitalisation Law, 50 percent of the shares in state industries that until then had provided 60 percent of all government revenues were sold to multinational companies (Kohl 2006).
States through a pipeline to a Chilean port in 2002. A National Coordinator for the Defence and Recovery of Gas - an unlikely coalition of cocaleros, union representatives, highland indigenous organisations, and military leaders - was established. In September 2003, the various organisations involved in this coordinator were able to carry out a series of nationwide violent actions, which ultimately led to the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada (Kohl 2006:320).

Both Evo Morales (MAS) and Felipe Quispe (MIP) were prominent in the mobilisations against neoliberal reforms, and they both “became household names throughout rural Bolivia” (Kohl 2006:318). Morales led many mobilisations and blockades both before and in support of the water protests. Resistance to the privatisation of water is a very strong and symbolic mobilising factor, as it illustrates the worst of neo-liberalism (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). At the time, the cocaleros were already highly mobilised because of the protests against the US-supported coca eradication policies in the Chapare region of Cochabamba. Even though the coca eradication cannot be considered part of the neoliberal programs, Morales succeeded in linking “a common nationalist thread” around the defense of coca-growing and the resistance to the privatisation of the hydrocarbon resources. After Morales was elected to Congress in 2002 and MAS formed the largest opposition party, he articulated an explicit anti-neoliberal stance both in Congress and in the streets (Kohl 2006:318-9).

Felipe Quispe also lent on an explicit anti-neoliberal discourse combined with Indianist nationalism, through which he mobilised indigenous peasants and urban inhabitants in the department of La Paz on the basis of resistance to the INRA law and a new water law (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). According to Quispe (interview 2007), he and his organisation, MIP, were the protagonists of the mobilisations against the neoliberal reforms: “We have fought against the neoliberal governments, because in our country we have had leaders who have sold our natural riches that Mother Nature gave us”. García Linera (interview 2007), agrees that Quispe’s mobilising discourse was highly successful in the protests and rebellions in the department of La Paz, particularly during the Gas War. Furthermore, Quispe (interview 2007) argues that this sell-out of resources is not new, but has been present since the arrival of the Spanish conquerors. However, the recent round of neoliberal reforms worsened the situation: “We have lost land and territory. We no longer have the control of the soil, the subsoil, and the air. That is where the natural riches are (...)

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69 Many Bolivians have a hostile relationship with Chile after the loss of Bolivia’s coastline to Chile in the Pacific War (1879-1883).
the iron, the gold, the plants, and especially the hydrocarbons. But we do not possess these natural resources”. According to Tanaka (interview 2007), the neoliberal reforms provided a fertile context for the ethnic discourse in Bolivia, as it gave more oxygen to the indigenous cause. Other authors point to the fact that the counter-movements that mobilised on the grounds of nationalist or indigenous discourses, managed to collectively identify neoliberalism as the root of Bolivia’s difficulties (Kohl 2006:321).

4.3.2 Peru- recent anti-neoliberal discourse
Mobilisations against neoliberal reforms have been much weaker and fragmented in Peru than in Bolivia, and started at a later stage. According to Martí i Puig (2008:708), Peruvian indigenous organisations have not applied an antagonistic discourse to neoliberal politics. However, in light of the past few years’ incidents, this observation does not present an accurate picture. AIDESEP and CONACAMI have increasingly articulated anti-neoliberal ideas. According to Greene (2005), the leaders of the Andean organisations have followed in the footsteps of the Amazonian organisations, who were the initiators of the combined indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourses. According to the Peruvian Ombudsman Office70 (2010:6), there are 260 active social conflicts in Peru, of which more than fifty percent are linked to socio-environmental issues (Defensoría del Pueblo 2010:6). These localised conflicts are driven by mineral extraction, oil exploration and production, and subsequent environmental contamination (Defensoría del Pueblo 2007). However, this thesis will only focus on the intertwining of ethnic and indigenous discourses related to mining extraction, which has given rise to CONACAMI, and the so-called “Jungle Laws”, which opened up the Amazon to foreign investments and led to large mobilisations led by AIDESEP in Bagua in June 2009. First, a backdrop for this recently developed discourse is required.

When Alberto Fujimori was elected president in 1990, he turned against his electoral promises and implemented a package of neoliberal reforms known as the “fujishock”. At first, the neoliberal restructuring was met with little societal resistance, as the reforms were implemented in a period of a “devastated” Peruvian society due the ongoing civil war, a collapse in the party system (Kenney 2003), and the economic crisis which had escalated under President García’s (1985-1990) disastrous economic policies (Pajuelo Teves 2005). Indigenous, as well as peasant sectors supported him initially. However, this support faded

70 Defensoría del Pueblo.
away over the course of his term, as communal land was liberalised\textsuperscript{71} through the implementation of a new land law in 1995, which removed the inalienability of community-held land. This law was designed to promote private investments both in the Amazon and in the highlands (Hughes 2010:88). Indigenous communities considered the law to be a serious threat to their existence, although all the administrations since the removal of Velasco (1975) had implemented policies that implied privatisation of land and cuts in agricultural subsidies\textsuperscript{72}. The implementation of neoliberal reforms gradually led to instability in the countryside as poverty rates increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s (Yashar 2005:67). Moreover, foreign investment, particularly mining and oil companies, were facilitated entrance into indigenous-populated areas in the highlands and the Amazon (Arce 2008; Albó 2008a:193-4). The mining industry is principally located in the Peruvian highlands, and the industry has given rise to conflicts\textsuperscript{73} related to contamination, land rights, water management, as well as the management of concessions (Arce 2008:53).

The mobilising discourse of the largest indigenous highland organisation, CONACAMI, is precisely a combination of “the right to land” in socio-economic terms, and a “concept of territory”, which reflects an indigenous discourse. In Peru, mining investments have increased five-fold during the 1990s due to the strong emphasis on foreign direct investment (Arce 2008:52). The fundamental problem is that mining corporations want mining concessions for land which is classified as allegedly empty land, whilst local communities claim that the land has a deeper meaning for them, - it is their territory (de la Cadena 2008). The increasing use and understanding of ILO 169 by CONACAMI has come as a consequence of exchanges with Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements (Vittor 2010b) and has contributed to the framing of demands based on an indigenous identity (Albó 2008a:209-10).

\textsuperscript{71} Fujimori liberalised land markets through giving the peasant communities the right to sell land that until then had been inalienable. Moreover, his administration eliminated the remnants of agricultural subsidies, allowed larger landholdings to be exempt from expropriation, and eliminated the Agrarian Bank (Yashar 2005).

\textsuperscript{72} At the transition to democracy, the state did not recognise the social rights from the Velasco period, and did not support the creation of corporatist peasant federations. Rather, the new democratically elected governments cut state-run programs as well as narrowed the spaces for class-based organising. Under the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985), the peasant communities were granted the right to sell or mortgage lands, and by 1986, close to sixty percent of the peasant cooperatives had been sold as individual parcels of land (Gonzales de Olarte 1994: 48). Alan García’s first administration (1985-1990) implemented economic policies that challenged indigenous collective rights (Yashar 2005).

\textsuperscript{73} Currently, the most common social conflicts in Peru are those related to the mining industry (Defensoría del Pueblo 2007).
AIDESEP’s claim to defend indigenous territories became more intense as the neoliberal processes intensified in the 1990s and 2000s, and it has concentrated around the defense of indigenous collective rights over natural resources in their territories (Pajuelo Teves 2006:69-70). Currently, there is oil production or prospecting in eighty percent of the indigenous territories in the Peruvian Amazon (Albó 2008a:227). However, AIDESEP and CONAP, who both organise indigenous communities in the Peruvian Amazon, have not agreed on a common stance against the neoliberal reforms. CONAP distinguishes itself from other Peruvian and Latin American indigenous movements in that it from its foundation made clear that land is not an exclusive right for the indigenous people- it should also be given to the colonisers. Furthermore, CONAP is supportive of the presence of private companies in the Amazon because it can generate profits to Amazonian communities (Chirif and García 2009:7). It was not until 2008, after the implementation of the so-called “Jungle Laws” by president García, that the combined indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourses of AIDESEP became visible for the rest of the Peruvian society. The “Jungle Laws” refer to a series of presidential decrees issued from 2007 to 2008 which opened up the Peruvian Amazon to increased foreign and private investment in the wake of the signing of a free trade agreement with the USA (Hughes 2010:86). According to de la Cadena (2008:348), a main distinction from former transfers of land in this area, is that the current neoliberal reforms threaten to destroy territories and destroy or evict the populations who claim it. The decrees are by many considered to be a sell-out of rainforest lands, trees, and water to capitalist investors against the will and livelihoods of local populations (Lévano 2008).

What sparked the mobilisations by AIDESEP in May and June 2009, was the fact that the Peruvian government did not carry out the consultations that it had committed itself to through the ratification of ILO 169 in 1993 (Vega 2010). Statements by president García where he accused the people of the Peruvian Amazon of ‘laziness and indolence’ further added fuel to the fire (Hughes 2010:86). AIDESEP had resorted to demonstrations, road and river blockades and the like before the issue of the decrees, but the most intense mobilisations against the neoliberal reforms took place in Bagua from April 2009, when AIDESEP declared a national strike against the decrees. As a consequence of the strike, the government imposed a state of emergency in the five affected regions, which ultimately led to the death of 33

74 The “colonisers” refer to the migrants that moved to the Peruvian Amazon in the second half of the 20th century (Yashar 2005).
75 99 legislative decrees were issued, of which No. 1090 was one of the most controversial. According to AIDESEP, a consequence of this decree could be that 45 million hectares could lose protected forestry status and be reversed to agricultural land and sold off for extractive use (Hughes 2010).
people on the 5th of June the same year (Hughes 2010:88-9). The leader of AIDESEP, Alberto Pizango, had claimed the right to insurgency of the indigenous communities against the provocation of the government, and the mobilisations have enjoyed support from both foreign and Peruvian social movements. As a result of the violence, Prime Minister Yelaunde Simón resigned because of his inability to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the situation and two of the decrees, which had been targeted by the protests, were repealed (Hughes 2010:90).

It remains to be seen whether AIDESEP’s political arm, MIAP, which has so far only had electoral success at the local level, can take advantage of the societal support for their mobilisations against the neoliberal reforms in terms of a broadened electorate. Hughes (2010:90) argues that Ollanta Humala may profit from this crisis as the indigenous people lack a party that unites highland and lowland indigenous people. Humala, who ran for president in 2006, initially wanted to hoist the indigenous flag, but he soon realised that it was contra-producing because the classist and socio-economic tradition is still very strong in Peru. Instead, he asserted a socioeconomic discourse which stresses exclusion and the effects of neoliberalism (Tanaka, interview 2007).

### 4.4 Main findings

**Table 2: Framing processes – main findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing processes</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse</td>
<td>Present. Strong ethnic discourse has developed since the end of the 1960s and 1970s in the highlands. Particularly strong from 2000. Present in the lowlands since 1980s.</td>
<td>Not present. Dominant class discourse, though incipient ethnic discourse in the Peruvian highlands since ultimo 1990s. In the Amazon, clear indigenous discourse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse</td>
<td>Present. Strong anti-neoliberal discourse connected with indigenous discourse from 2000. Gas War, Water War.</td>
<td>Present, but only recently combined indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourse against mining and oil-companies. Strongest in the Amazon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.0 Mobilising structures: Organisational infrastructure
The mobilising structures approach focuses on mobilisation processes, and the formal organisational manifestations of these processes, which in the combined analysis with framing processes and political opportunity structures may give us some answers to what factors have been present for indigenous organisations to launch political parties. This chapter will analyse to what degree the indigenous groups in Peru and Bolivia have developed sufficient organisational infrastructure to be able to launch political parties. The theory chapter yielded three main variables from the mobilising structures approach suitable to the Latin American context: (1) Territorial concentration of the indigenous population; (2) maturity of indigenous organisations; (3) and presence of brokerage mechanism.

5.1 Territorial concentration of affiliates
This section will look into demographic resources, or more specifically, the territorial concentration of indigenous groups, and the effects of migration and urbanisation on the mobilisation of indigenous people. Where indigenous groups are concentrated, interaction and the construction of networks and parties are easier and more feasible. Indeed, the majority of the successful indigenous parties in Latin America have emerged in electoral districts with a large indigenous proportion of the population (Van Cott 2005:46).

5.1.1 Territorial concentration of indigenous people
In Peru, the indigenous people constitute approximately 39 percent of the total population (Pajuelo Teves 2006:18), whereas the corresponding number for Bolivia is 62 percent (Molina and Albó 2006). Table 3 illustrates the concentration in percentage of the indigenous peoples across the Bolivian departments and the Peruvian regions. As can be seen, more than fifty percent of the departments in Bolivia have an indigenous majority, whilst only twenty percent of the Peruvian regions have such majority. However, when applying the numbers from the partial census, ENAHO 2001, which included the criterion of indigenous self-identification, the number of Peruvian regions with an indigenous majority increases from five to eleven.
Table 3: Dispersion and concentration of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent of subnational units with indigenous majority</th>
<th>Percent of subnational units 25-50% indigenous</th>
<th>Percent of subnational units 10-25% indigenous</th>
<th>Percent of subnational units less than 10% indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (INE 2001)</td>
<td>56.5% (5/9)</td>
<td>22.2% (2/9)</td>
<td>22.2% (2/9)</td>
<td>0% (0/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (INEI 1993)</td>
<td>20% (5/25)</td>
<td>8% (2/25)</td>
<td>36% (9/25)</td>
<td>36% (9/25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pajuelo (2006); Molina and Albó (2006)

Bolivia has 36 ethnic groups, of which 31 live in the lowlands in the east of the country (IWGIA 2009). The largest indigenous groups are Quechua (30.7% of the total population), followed by Aymara (25.2%). The Aymara and Quechua, who are principally concentrated in the highlands, constitute 90.1 percent of the total indigenous population. Of the lowland indigenous groups, the most numerous are Chiquitano (2.2 % of total population), Guarani (1.6 %), and Mojeño (0.9 %)(Molina and Albó 2006:70). Table 4 illustrates that the departments with an indigenous majority are concentrated in the Western highlands and valleys, and that either the Quechus or the Aymara constitute the largest indigenous group in all of the Bolivian departments. This is due to migration processes that will be looked into shortly. 237 of a total of 327 Bolivian municipalities have a majority who identify as indigenous. These municipalities are principally located in the highlands, but also Santa Cruz (37.5% of the total municipalities), and Bení (15.8%) have their share, whereas Bení and Pando have none (Albó 2008a:23).

Table 4: Indigenous concentration by department in Bolivia (over age 15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number of indigenous</th>
<th>Total percentage indigenous</th>
<th>Largest ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>347,847</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>1,163,418</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>669,261</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>185,474</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>202,204</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>456,102</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bení</td>
<td>66,217</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>47,175</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>4,939</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INE (2001); Molina and Albó (2006:70-71)

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76 Bolivian researchers and indigenous organisations primarily refer to 'tierras bajas’ (lowlands) and ‘tierras altas’ (highlands).
77 The rest, 1.4 percent, belong to other native groups.
78 See Map 3 in preface for a visualisation of the concentration of the Bolivian indigenous population.
Peru has 72 different ethnic groups, of which 65 are Amazonian and seven are located in the highlands (Van Cott 2005:143). Like in Bolivia, the highland indigenous population is much larger than the Amazonian. The latter consists of 332,000 persons, constituting solely 1.2 percent of the total population (INEI 2009). However, they are dispersed in eleven regions, including very small populations in the valleys of the highland regions of Cusco and Ayacucho (INEI 2009). The largest ethnic groups are the Quechua that constitute about four and a half million persons (11.4 % of the total population), and the Aymara that constitute approximately half a million persons (1.5 %). The largest Amazonian ethnic groups are the Arahucua (38.6 % of total Amazonian indigenous population), Jibaro (24%), and Quechua (10.9%) (INEI 2009). Table 5 illustrates that based on the results from the 1993 census, only five of the Peruvian regions have an indigenous majority.

Table 5: Indigenous concentration by region in Peru (over age 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage indigenous a</th>
<th>Percentage Indigenous homes b</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage indigenous a</th>
<th>Percentage Indigenous homes b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apurímac</td>
<td>76.95</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>Pasco</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>75.97</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>Ucayali</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>70.83</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cusco</td>
<td>64.37</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancash</td>
<td>36.35</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huánuco</td>
<td>30.78</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>Loreto</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madre de Dios</td>
<td>24.11</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>San Martin</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacna</td>
<td>24.38</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junín</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>Tumbes</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Based on INEI 1993 census; b Based on ENAHO 2001. “Indigenous” includes the following categories: Indigenous from the Amazon, Quechua and Aymara. Source: INEI (1993) and Pajuelo (2006:44).

These regions are all located in the Andean highlands: Apurímac, Puno, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Cusco. During the 20th century this area was referred to as “the Indian stain” in an evidently derogatory manner (Pajuelo Teves 2006), and more recently “the Andean trapezoid” (Van Cott 2005). However, when using the results from the ENAHO 2001

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79 Peruvian scholars and indigenous organisations primarily distinguish between the indigenous population of ‘la sierra’ (the highlands) and the Amazon.

80 The total of 332.975 Amazonian indigenous are native to the following regions: Loreto (31.8% of the total Amazonian indigenous population); Junín (22.1%); Amazonas (15.7 %); Ucayali (12.1%); San Martín (6.4%); Pasco (4.9%); Cusco (4.6%); Madre de Dios (1.2%); Huánuco (0.8%); Cajamarca (0.3%); and Ayacucho (0.1%) (INEI 2009).

81 See map 4 in the preface to this thesis for a map of the concentration of the indigenous population in Peru.
survey, four regions in the Central Jungle area² (Huánuco, Pasco, Junín and Ucayali), Madre de Dios (Southern Amazonian area), and Ancash (situated in the coast to the north of Lima) have an indigenous majority.

Peru covers a slightly larger territory than Bolivia: 1,285,216 km² compared to 1,098,581 km² (CIA 2009). However, the indigenous core areas are much more concentrated in Bolivia than in Peru. In Peru, very large distances separate the ethnic groups, and this is one of the reasons behind an identity linked to the local community and the limited contact between the communities (Montoya 1998:154-160). The geographical location of the capitals also plays an important role. Lima was the centre of the Viceroyalty of Peru, a Spanish colonial administrative district created in 1542 which for close to two centuries covered most parts of South America³. According to anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya (interview, 2007), the fact that Lima is a colonial city that was organised in opposition to the indigenous Andean area is a crucial difference from the administrative capital of Bolivia, La Paz, which is situated in the indigenous-dominated highlands. Montoya argues that if Cusco, the historical centre of the Peruvian indigenous highlands, had been the capital of Peru, one would see the same processes of indigenous politicisation as in the neighbouring country. Moreover, the fact that La Paz lies in the heart of the predominantly indigenous highlands and is ethnically marked, whereas Lima is situated in the coast and experienced a rapid mestizo homogenisation (García Linera interview 2007), is an important difference. Both the physical distance (1,155 kilometres) and the cultural differences between Cusco and Lima are important for understanding the variance in opportunities for collective action and alliance-building. A concrete example of the logistical and thus mobilising challenges in Peru is that it is much more complicated to organise marches to the government seat in Lima than in La Paz (Albó 2008a:231-2).

In addition to the geographical dispersion of Peruvian highland communities, another obstacle to organise across Quechua communities is the language barrier. According to Montoya (1998:159), there are eight dialectical varieties of Quechua in Peru, which complicates the communication between the communities. In Bolivia, on the other hand, Quechua does not have these dialectical difficulties. Moreover, in the region of Chapare, which is where the important cocalero movement was born, most of the meetings are bilingual, which means that

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² 'Selva Central' is the Spanish denomination.
³ The viceroyalty of New Spain was created in 1717 and mainly covered the current territories of Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was created in 1776, and roughly corresponded to the current territories of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Aymara or Quechua is spoken simultaneously as Spanish (Albó, personal communication 2010).

5.1.2 Migration and urbanisation of indigenous peoples
Both Peruvian and Bolivian highland indigenous peasants migrated to the cities in large numbers in the second half of the 20th century due to demographic growth and processes of modernisation. However, the migration processes as well as the degree of urbanisation and homogenisation were much stronger in Peru than in Bolivia (Montoya 1998:156, García Linera interview 2007). In the period from 1940 to 1981, Lima’s population grew from 645,000 to 4.6 million, and so hastily that it has been termed “the Andean reconquest” of the Spanish conquerors’ capital. Many of these migrants have ended up in slums on the outskirts of Lima (Stokes 1995). The indigenous population in Lima and other Peruvian cities constitutes more than one million people, representing approximately 30 percent of the total indigenous population. Numbers from 1993 show that 45 percent of the people born in the indigenous-dominant region of Ayacucho, now live in Lima (García, cited in Vittor 2010a). An important difference between Bolivian and Peruvian migrants is that in Bolivia the indigenous peasants to a larger degree reappraised their ethnic condition in the meeting with racism and stigmatisation in the cities. In Peru, the peasants found a way of affirmation through class or territorial identity, rather than ethnicity (Pajuelo Teves 2006:33). This latter point is confirmed by Vittor (interview 2007), who claims that Peruvian people more easily identify with their geographical location than with an “indigenous identity”. Furthermore, Vittor (2010a:5) claims that “[the indigenous people] abandon their mother tongue, their clothing, and are no longer dependent on the Pachamama84, but rather [have to struggle with] underemployment in the cities”. The Peruvian Amazon experienced a process of mass settlement from 1947 to 1990. The state considered the land to be unoccupied and thus state property. The migration to the Amazon was much more rapid than to the rest of the country, and from 1940 to 1981 the population quintupled. The higher jungle area was more heavily populated than the lower jungle arena85. Under general Velasco (1968-1975), a process of colonisation of the Amazon by Andean migrants was started. These migrants gained titles to land that had previously been used by indigenous peoples, but that was not protected (Yashar 2005:256-8). Today, Quechuas that have migrated from the highlands constitute the largest

84 “Mother Earth”.
85 The population in the higher Amazon increased more than sixfold, whereas the population in the lower Amazon increased more than threefold.
indigenous group in seven of the eleven regions that form part of the Peruvian Amazon (INEI 1993)\(^{86}\).

In Bolivia, there was a marked demographic imbalance at the time of the creation of the republic: 80 percent of the population occupied 400,000 km\(^2\) of the territory delimited to the highlands and valleys, whereas the remaining 20 percent occupied an area of 700,000 km\(^2\) in the eastern plains. Various government decrees, ministries, and national councils facilitated a process of migration, known as colonisation, from the most densely populated to the more remote areas (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:271). This process began in 1890, accelerated after the 1952 Revolution, and culminated in the creation of the Colonisation Institute in 1967. Initially, the migration processes were targeted at the tropical zones of Alto Beni in La Paz, Chimoré in Cochabamba, and Yapanchani in Santa Cruz. From the 1950s on, there was a massive migration from the highland departments to the lowland departments of the south, particularly to Santa Cruz, in a process that has been called “the march toward the Orient” (Albó 2008a:34). This process was encouraged by a “developmentalist” tendency within the nationalist state, whose aim was to incorporate the peasants into the market, substitute the imports of land and cattle and promote the diversification of exportations, populate the national territory with people who were unionised, as well as the movement of peasants from areas of traditional agriculture to areas with larger resources (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:271-4). The tropical region of the department of Cochabamba\(^{87}\), where the coca-growers movement emerged, was very scarcely populated until the beginning of the 20th century when large-scale migration started. At the beginning of the 1980s, the population had increased tremendously in the coca-growing province of Chapare. It was particularly landless Aymara and Quechua people from Potosí, La Paz, and Oruro that migrated here (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:383-5). Many of these migrants had organisational experience from the unions and organisations of the highlands, which contributed to the emergence of the coca-growers' movement in this region. According to Zuazo (interview, 2007), the region of Chapare is a peculiar case in the Bolivian context. It could be characterised as an ethnic melting pot as a result of the large-scale immigration, but simultaneously it shows a high degree of unionism. Currently, the Aymaras or the Quechus constitute the largest indigenous groups in all the Bolivian departments, including in the

\(^{86}\) The Quechuas are the largest indigenous group in Junín, San Martín, Pasco, Madre de Dios, and Huánuco, as well as in the lowland areas of the regions of Cusco and Ayacucho. The Aymaras are the largest group in Cajamarca, and “other” indigenous groups are the largest in Loreto, Amazonas, and Ucayali (INEI 1993).

\(^{87}\) This area includes the regions of Chapare, Carrasco and Tiraque (García Linera et al. 2004:383).
lowlands. Moreover, the majority of the persons who identify as indigenous now live in the cities. Especially in the highlands, this identification is maintained in the migration to the cities (Albó 2008a:22).

5.2 Maturity of the SMO
This section discusses the maturity of indigenous organisations. It will first look at the years in existence of the organisations, before turning to the unity of the organisations. The assumption is that the longer an organisation has been in existence, the more politically experienced will the leaders and members of the organisation be, and the more likely is it that a sense of belonging to the organisation will develop, possibly leading to the formation of a political party.

5.2.1 Years in existence of the SMO
In Bolivia, a new cycle of indigenous social mobilisations that involved both highland and lowland organisations started in 2000. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, the indigenous organisations in the highlands have mobilised on the basis of an indigenous identity since the end of the 1960s, and especially since the transition to democracy in 1982 (Albó 2008a:234). Lowland indigenous organisations appeared on the national stage during the 1990s, and have played an important role in demanding and negotiating territorial autonomy and land reform proposals (Yashar 1998:25). In Peru, the Amazonian indigenous groups started to organise as early as the end of the 1960s, and the currently largest organisation, the Interethnic Association of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP), was created in 1980. In the highlands, on the other hand, incipient organising based on an explicitly indigenous identity did not emerge until the end of the 1990s (Albó 2008a). Table 6 provides an overview of Peruvian and Bolivian indigenous/peasant organisations after the transition to democracy88, as well as party creations.

88 With the exception of the Bolivian CSUTCB, all the organisations appeared after the transitions to democracy.
Table 6: Significant Peruvian and Bolivian indigenous/peasant organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Year formed</th>
<th>Party creation</th>
<th>Geographical location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolivian organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB)</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lowland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Coordinadora de las seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba (Coca Trópico)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>ASP/IPS (MAS): 1995</td>
<td>Highland (lowland region in highland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lowland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Highland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peruvian organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asociación Interétnica de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>MIAP: 1998</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú (CONAP)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferencia Permanente de los Pueblos Indígenas del Perú (COPPIP)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Amazon + highland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Afectedas por la Minería (CONACAMI)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Highland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Van Cott 2005; Huber 2008; Yashar 2005*

As we can see, only one indigenous party has emerged out of a social movement in Peru - MIAP - while three parties have been created in Bolivia - ASP, MIP, and MAS. However, the Bolivian parties are the only ones that have had success at the national level, a fact that chapter 6 will analyse in detail.

5.2.2 Unity of the SMO

Due to the scope of the thesis, the analysis of the maturity of the indigenous organisations will be limited to the most influential organisations in both countries equivalent to those listed in Table 6. In both Bolivia and Peru, indigenous organisations have shown a systematic tendency towards disagreements which have culminated in rivalries and splits of the organisations.

**Bolivia- rivalries, splits and tensions within the largest organisations**

According to Garcia Linera et al. (2004:222), the Bolivian indigenous organisations show a systematic tendency of division because of leadership problems and conflicts over economic resources, but the most important are the ideological and political differences. In the Bolivian

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89 ‘MAS’ is the current name of the ‘IPSP’.

90 In the Bolivian case, it is difficult to establish the most important indigenous organisations, as many of them have created continuous alliances since 2000. Yet, due to the scope of the thesis, the number of organisations presented has been limited to the organisations that Van Cott (2005) lists as important.
highlands, the indisputably largest indigenous organisation is the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) with its 3.8 million affiliates. As mentioned, the Kataristas took over the CNTCB in 1979 and renamed it CSUTCB. Thus, even though the CSUTCB was built on the remnants of a former corporatist organisation, a new era was initiated within the peasant organisations: Communities elected their own representatives rather than accepting leaders imposed on them externally. The CSUTCB consists of nine departmental federations, four regional or intermediate federations, and a female branch, the National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women - Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS). Beneath are the provincial federations, the subcentrals, and the communities (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:213). However, due to the size of the CSUTCB and its presence in all the Bolivian departments, the organisation has inevitably been ridden by rivalries since its creation in 1979 (Van Cott 2005:57-9). Particularly, the question of whether to apply an ethnic or class discourse has been central. Indianista Aymaras from the radical Tupak Katari departmental branch of La Paz led by Quispe and more class-oriented federation leaders, particularly from the cocalero (coca-growers) movement, have fought over the leadership of the CSUTCB. Moreover, serious disagreements with regard to the launching of political parties have surfaced. However, this fractionalisation has been present since shortly after the constitution of the CSUTCB, as two very different currents of unionism were present in the organisation: The first was principally upheld by the Kataristas’ political arm, the Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL), which asserted ethnic pride, and claimed the necessity of the syndicate to express its autonomy and the diversity of the peasant-indigenous base of the country (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). The second current was supported by leftist parties, which tried to reshape the old clientelistic model of the MNR. From 1985 on, the labour movement declined due to economic restructuring and the closure of mines, whilst several political parties aggressively tried to influence the CSUTCB leadership (Van Cott 2005:56). Thus, the Katarismo influence was severely weakened (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).

In 1992, the Coordinator of the Six Federations of Tropical Cochabamba (Coca Trópico) was established. The movement’s initial claim was the defence of the coca leaf. The coca leaf was cultivated from the 1970s in Chapare, and the production increased during the 1980s in spite of falling prices and several governments’ coca eradication programs. After the signing

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91 The organisation had been planned as a project since 1988 (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).
of the Vienna Convention\textsuperscript{92} in 1961, all succeeding Bolivian governments worked to abolish coca cultivation. However, it was not until the “Dignity Plan” launched by president Bánzer (ADN) in 1997, which implied forced eradication of coca crops without compensation, that a series of violent clashes between \textit{cocaleros} and the eradication forces started (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:384-9). The appearance of Coca Trópico must be understood within the context of the introduction of the neoliberal New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1985. One of the main effects of the NEP was the closure of mines. Approximately 22,000 of 28,000-30,000 miners in the state mining corporation (COMIBOL) lost their jobs (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). Many of the ex-miners returned to their communities and tried to sustain themselves as peasants. However, as these communities were incapable of absorbing them due to a lack of land, many Quechua and Aymara ex-miners eventually moved to the coca-growing Chapare region. Many of the migrants had union experience, and in Chapare they became politically active and organised as coca farmers (Albó 2008a). By 1993, current Bolivian president Evo Morales was elected leader of the \textit{cocalero} movement, which promptly affiliated with the CSUTCB.

The incorporation of four of the branches of the Coca Trópico into the CSUTCB provoked even more serious rivalries within the CSUTCB (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:391). The \textit{cocaleros} became a driving force within the peasant movement, and by 1992 they had seized control of the CSUTCB, and Roman Loayza was elected executive secretary in 1996 (Van Cott 2003b). In 1995, the CSUTCB Assembly voted for the creation of its own political party, the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (ASP), of which the Cochabamba peasant leader Alejo Véliz was elected president (Stefanoni 2004). It was principally the \textit{cocalero} movement that provided the new political party with leaders. Thus, the ASP became the first political party to emerge from an indigenous movement (Van Cott 2005:70). However, what is central here, is that leadership disputes within the ASP between Evo Morales and Véliz led to a division of the ASP, and the creation of the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of Peoples (IPSP), which was led by Morales (Stefanoni 2004). IPSP was a coalition of various organisations- the CSUTCB, Bartolina Sisa, and the Coca Trópico (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:431).

\textsuperscript{92} The Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs.
Thus, to avoid a severe split within the CSUTCB, the radical Indianista Felipe Quispe was elected executive secretary of the CSUTCB in 1998 as a consensus agreement between the blocks supporting Evo Morales and Alejo Véliz. Quispe was primarily supported by the CSUTCB branch of La Paz, which defined a clear line of indigenous emancipation through the recuperation of power and territory through the re-emergence of the Aymara nation, as well as a clear indigenous discourse at the expense of class discourse (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). Thus, the election of Quispe implied the revival of Aymara leadership and the rejection of the more inclusive ethnic discourse of Morales and Véliz. Moreover, Quispe sought to distance the CSUTCB from the political project of MAS-IPSP, which many members of the organisation supported. After the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP) was launched as a new electoral vehicle by the CSUTCB in November 2000, tensions further increased (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). Even though the party was established by a personal decision of Quispe, ten thousand Aymaras attended the formation ceremony (Van Cott 2005). This decision provoked a stronger parallelism within the CSUTCB structure. The disputes between Quispe and Morales prevented CSUTCB from getting behind one single indigenous party that could have better chances for electoral success (Van Cott 2005:78, García Linera interview 2007).

CONAMAQ, which was established in 1997, is principally present in the highland department of Oruro, but it is also present in some areas of La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí, and Chuquisaca (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:323). As mentioned in chapter 4, its main goal is the reconstitution of the ayllu within the Bolivian state. Its organisational structure attempts to substitute the union names that are common in the CSUTCB, the Coca Trópico, and other Bolivian organisations. CONAMAQ demands that the indigenous, primarily Aymara and Quechua, identities are recognised by the state. These claims have been embedded in the local sphere, and the organisation has tended to take a negotiating stance towards the government in order to achieve this goal. CONAMAQ has, like other Bolivian organizations, suffered from disputes between its leaders, particularly with regard to the participation in mobilisations from 2002 (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:338-40). According to Lucero (2006), CONAMAQ is by many other organisations considered to be an outsider because of their

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93 The differences from other Bolivian indigenous organisations consist of another type of territorial organisation into the traditional ayllus, markas and suyus; and the application of the traditional names of the leaders, for example Mallkus (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004)
close ties with national and international NGOs. CONAMAQ has not launched its own political party, and has been very critical towards Evo Morales and MAS, as well as CSUTCB, for not representing the indigenous communities, but rather the “peasant workers” (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:336).

Unity of Bolivian lowland organisations
In the Bolivian lowlands, the organisations have also been ridden by rivalries, although to a much lesser degree than in the highlands. The largest lowland indigenous organisation, the CIDOB, was created in 1982. At the foundational meeting, representatives from 25 communities and five indigenous peoples, principally from the department of Santa Cruz, were present. By 1989, the organisation incorporated 80 percent of the nationalities inhabiting the Eastern, Chaco, and Amazonian regions of Bolivia (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:219). CIDOB serves as the national level of the organisation, whereas eight different regional organisations constitute the next organisational level. All of these regional organisations, with one exception, have a multiethnic character, linking together various ethnic groups. The most important of the regional organisations are the Assembly of the Guaraní People (APG) which covers the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca; the Coordinator of Ethnic Peoples in Santa Cruz (CPESC); and the Central of Indigenous Peoples in Beni (CPIB). The regional organisations are further linked to centrales, subcentrales or captaincies, which are ultimately linked to the communities through ethnic self-identification (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:267). Thus, the reaffirmation of ethnicities constitutes the social unification of the communities and the constituting elements of the organisation. CIDOB covers all the lowland departments, as well as Chuquisaca, the tropical north of the department of La Paz, and the tropical part of Cochabamba (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:221).

However, the CPESC split from CIDOB in 2002, an event that constituted one of the most critical moments in CIDOB’s history. The division of the CIDOB also led to further splits within the CPESC and CPIB, with some of the organisations choosing to stay within the organisational network of CIDOB and others choosing to become independent. The reason

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94 CONAMAQ was established with the help from NGOs, of which the most important was the Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA).
95 Izozéños, avas, ayoreos, guarayos, and chiquitanos (García Linera et al. 2004: 219).
96 The second level organisations are: APG (departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Chuquisaca); CPESC (Santa Cruz); CPIB (Beni); ORCAWETA (Tarijia); CIRABO (Pando); CPILAP (La Paz); CPITCO (Cochabamba); and CIPOAP (Pando).
why CPESC chose to leave CIDOB was that the former was more radical and more prone to confrontation than the latter, which is more pragmatic and negotiation-oriented (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). According to Jaime Casanova, spokesperson in CPESC (personal communication 2010), the CPESC considered CIDOB to be servile to, and dependent on, the rightist governments at the time. However, the CPESC rejoined CIDOB in 2006 to strengthen and unify the lowland indigenous movement. According to García Linera et al. (2004:223), the major problem for the Bolivian lowland organisations is that is that the various indigenous groups are divided at the ground level. As previously mentioned, there are 31 lowland indigenous groups, which complicate the task of forging a united movement. There has been a continuous transfer of forces, alliances, and strategies among the lowland indigenous peoples and organisations. During the 20 years of existence of the CIDOB, they have organised two large marches to press the government to recognise their demands. The first March for Territory and Dignity in 1990 was very successful, whereas the National March for Land and Territory in 1996 did not reach La Paz because of discrepancies between APG and the rest of CIDOB. In spite of the rivalries between the various organisations constituting CIDOB, the marches have served to increase the visibility of the lowland indigenous organisations (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).

The CIDOB has not launched its own political vehicle. The organisation’s statutes state clearly that leadership of the CIDOB or the regional organisations cannot form part of a political party. Individuals from the communities that constitute the lowest level of the organisation can be party members and activists, however (Casanova, personal communication 2010). In the 1990s, when the indigenous parties started to emerge in the Bolivian highlands, the lowland indigenous population did not have any strong ties to political parties, due to the parties’ lack of interest in them. From the middle of the 1990s and until today, CIDOB has allied with different established parties, particularly the Free Bolivia Movement (MBL), and recently with MAS (Van Cott 2005:71).

**Peru- stronger Amazonian than highland organisations**

The Peruvian Amazon has a longer history of mobilisation along ethnic lines than to do the indigenous peoples in the highlands. Facing threats by colonisers, timber merchants, and more recently oil workers and drug-dealers, numerous indigenous organisations like the Amuesha Congress (1969), and the Central of Native Communities of the Central Jungle, organised by
the Asháninka indigenous group (1970), were created. In the 1970s, indigenous federations\textsuperscript{97} started to form on the basis of the recognised native communities (Chirif and Garcia 2009), and by 1980, the currently largest Amazonian indigenous organisation was created, viz. the AIDESEP. The AIDESEP is constituted by six regional federations and dozens of local federations of different indigenous groups (Pajuelo Teves 2005:13). In 1987, a rupture within the AIDESEP due to internal conflicts led to the creation of the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities in Peru (CONAP) (Pajuelo Teves 2006:26). The fast organisational growth of AIDESEP meant that decisions were taken without properly consulting the bases, and that there were increasing discrepancies between the local, regional, and central levels. Thus, in 1989, measures were taken to come to grips with these problems, and a decentralised structure with regional offices in San Lorenzo, Iquitos, Pucallpa, Satipo, and later in Bagua and Madre de Dios, was implemented. Each of these headquarters has their own legal representation as a civil association\textsuperscript{98} and enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the central leadership (Chirif and García 2009). A particular feature of the AIDESEP is that it has promoted several development projects, such as bilingual education and health missions (Chirif and García 2009). According to Vega (2010), AIDESEP has experienced a strong incitement following the mobilisations against foreign investments in the Amazon in 2008 and 2009, as they have gained experience, achieved some of their goals, and have seen the appearance of new leaders with a professional background.

The CONAP has not achieved the same presence and influence as the AIDESEP, and has suffered from serious leadership problems lately (Albó 2008a:225). Still, it is present in certain areas in the Northern Amazon (Remy 1994; Pajuelo Teves 2006:26). The creation of CONAP sealed the division of the Amazonian indigenous movement which is still present. As we saw in the previous chapter, CONAP takes a different stance to the presence of oil companies in indigenous territories, and they have accused the AIDESEP of manipulating the Amazonian indigenous people (Chirif and García 2009:8). These discrepancies can partly explain why there is still no unified Amazonian indigenous organisation. However, CONAP and AIDESEP together represent practically all of the federations in the Peruvian Amazon (Yashar 2005:266). Currently, 85 percent of the indigenous population in the Amazon is...
affiliated with a local or regional organisation which is again affiliated with CONAP or AIDESEP (Huber 2008:6-7).

The Amazonian organisations, in spite of their smaller population and greater dispersion, are better organised than the Andean organisations (Albó 2008a:225). It was AIDESEP that launched the first Peruvian indigenous party after the transition to democracy (1978), the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon (MIAP) in 1996. In June 1998, representatives from the Asháninka indigenous group from the Amazonian region of Junín registered for the October municipal elections in the district of Perene the same year. In a document, MIAP states:

“MIAP emerged as a political alternative for the indigenous citizens as well as non-indigenous who identify with our proposals, in order that they [do] not be tricked or manipulated by parties and/or movements that lack a vision and a proposal of integral and sustainable development for the Amazon, and to fight in an organised manner for the application of their proposals” (MIAP 1998, cited in Van Cott 2005:171).

However, as we will see in chapter 6, the Peruvian institutional framework has hindered the MIAP from stepping up from the local level. Another plausible explanation is the recurrent problem of the Peruvian Amazonian indigenous organisations, namely the lack of training of their own leaders. Thus, they have to rely on external advisors that do not always have a concurrent view of decision-making and strategy in the indigenous organisations (Davila Puño 2005). As most of the organisations are composed of members from different indigenous groups, the task of electing leaders who are both representative of the group’s values and effective in the political arena is complicated (Davila Puño 2005). Moreover, there are disagreements over traditional and modern ways of organising and decision-making. There is often a divide in the indigenous organisations between skilled and educated leaders who are capable of understanding the mechanisms of the national society, on the one hand, and the majority of members of the organisation on the other (Benavides 2000:67-8).

**Peruvian highlands**

The most important highland organisation is CONACAMI. Its core areas are the Northern highland regions of Cajamarca and Ancash, and the Central Andean highlands (Vittor, interview 2007). Due to the large geographic dispersion of the communities that are affiliated with CONACAMI, the organisation has had to organise at the macro-regional level- north, centre, and south, and has established decentralised offices in the regions of Cusco,
Moquegua, and Apurímac. According to Vittor (2010a), the large distances and the diversity of the communities have implied organisational difficulties that have limited the strength of the organisation. CONACAMI has been strongly present in the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples in Peru (COPPIP), which was created in 1997.

5.3 Brokerage mechanism
The third variable, presence of brokerage mechanism, is operationalised as inter- and intraregional cooperation between indigenous organisations. The task of this section is to analyse the degree to which formerly disconnected groups have been able to cooperate in order to create dense organising networks that may be conducive to the launching of indigenous parties.

Intra- and inter-region cooperation between indigenous organisations in Bolivia
In Bolivia, the three largest indigenous organisations, CSUCB, Coca Trópico, and CIDOB, are situated in three distinct geographical and ecological zones of the country (Lucero 2006:38). However, collaborations between these organisations and other indigenous organisations have taken place at a large scale, although the alliances have been more of an ad hoc nature than through formalised networks (García Linera, interview 2007). The strong presence of cooperation across regional and ethnic divisions in Bolivia must be understood within the context of neoliberal reforms which were implemented from 1985. The Water War (2000) and the Gas War (2003) served to build alliances between the Coordinators of the Defence of Water and Gas, and various indigenous organisations. Particularly in the period from 2000 until 2004, indigenous organisations upheld constant mobilisations, strikes, and blockades (Kohl 2006). During the Water War, which García Linera et al. (2004) refer to as the most important indigenous uprising of the past decades, the main roads in the country as well as all the roads linking La Paz to the rest of the departments and provinces were blocked by tens of thousands of indigenous peoples for more than two weeks. The mobilisations were led by the Aymara sector in the highlands, while the coca-growers in Cochabamba and the Coordinator for the Defense of Water were protagonists in the mobilisations blocking the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz road and in the valley of Cochabamba (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:124). Thus, these mobilisations saw the joint efforts and participation of Morales, Oscar Olivera, leader of the Coordinator for Water, and Quispe and his radical faction of the CSUTCB (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).

However, even before 2000, there were examples of collaboration across regions in Bolivia. One important turning point was the 500 years of resistance to colonisation, which was
celebrated throughout the continent in 1992 (Molina and Albó 2006:29), with the notable exception of Peru (Albó 2008a:192). The 12\(^{th}\) of October 1992, hundreds of thousands of indigenous people and peasants marched in the principal cities in Bolivia, in a demonstration which was very important for the visibility of the various Bolivian indigenous movements. The \textit{wiphalas} dominated in the marches. Both CIDOB and the CSUTCB participated in the committee that organised the celebration (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:119). From 1995 on, two large marches were organised by CSUTCB and other organisations, and these marches served to strengthen the alliances that later led to the establishment of the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (IPSP/MAS), and the large uprisings in 2000 (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:120).

In 1996, CIDOB, in coordination with CSUTCB and the Union Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers (CSCB), organised a march from all the departments of the country to La Paz to pressure the government to modify the new INRA Land Law\(^99\), which as we saw, removed the recognition of the social function of land and land ownership to the tiller (Kohl 2006:315). Moreover, various national marches organised by CIDOB and CPESC have united indigenous organisations from the lowlands, highlands, and the valleys. CIDOB has also collaborated to a certain degree with the highland organisation CONAMAQ. The leaders of CONAMAQ were initially hostile to the cooperation with CSUTCB and the \textit{cocaleros} because they did not consider these organisations to be authentically “indigenous”. Collaboration with CIDOB and CPESC through marches have been considered more natural because the lowland organisations are “clearly indigenous” (CONAMAQ affiliate Gualberto Aguilar, cited in García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:335). Nevertheless, CONAMAQ has participated in mobilisations organised by the radical La Paz branch of the CSUTCB, and according to García Linera (interview 2007), the organisation has been an important actor in the dense networks who have carried out mobilisations in the highlands since 2000.

The cooperation between highland and lowland organisations has not been easily accomplished. One reason is the different mobilisation tactics of the lowland and highland organisations. In the highlands, there is a long tradition of disruptive activities. In 1979, the

\(^{99}\) Their claims included: Titling of indigenous, peasant and colonisers’ territories; consensual approval of the INRA law and “no” to the commercialisation of land; the incorporation of employed rural workers in the General Worker’s Law; the creation of indigenous municipalities; the nomination of election candidates without connections to political parties; and the establishment of national funds for indigenous, peasant and colonisers’ development (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).
CSUTCB organised a road blockade that paralysed the country for over a week. This was the largest mobilisation of Bolivian peasants since the 1952 revolution (Yashar 2005:178). Moreover, the mobilisations surrounding the Water War were characterised by blockades and strikes. The lowland indigenous organisations, on the other hand, have, due to the dispersion and low numbers of indigenous peoples, tended to rely on symbolic and negotiating strength in their mobilisations (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:230-1). According to Ever Aide from CIDOB (cited in García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:230), “above all we are a pacific people who know how to negotiate and reconcile” (my translation). According to García Linera et al. (2004), this statement summarises the general philosophy that characterises the collective behaviour of a large number of lowland indigenous organisations. More recently, however, indigenous organisations in the lowlands have resorted to more direct actions, such as road blockades. This development must be seen within the context of the more generalised social insurgency in the country. Particularly APG has been active in this regard and has blocked access to oilfields as well as closed gas valves (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:244).

However, even though the CIDOB and other lowland organisations have maintained certain connections with highland indigenous and peasant organisations, there have been few alliances to carry out collective action with organisations that are not located in the lowlands. According to García Linera et al. (2004:261), the highland and lowland indigenous organisations lack practical and efficient links to articulate efforts during mobilisations. The alliances that have worked have been of a more declarative nature, such as an act that was signed in 2000 by CSUTCB, the CSCB, and CIDOB to mobilise together in defence of the collective property of the hydrocarbons. Moreover, recently the distance between CIDOB and the highland indigenous organisations has increased because of political differences between the leadership of the organisations as well as the political growth of the highland indigenous organisations. This growth has given the highlands organisations more strength and autonomy in the meeting with political parties than what is the case for CIDOB (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:262).

In order to summarise, one could say that the brokerage mechanism has been highly present in the Bolivian case, although the cooperation between organisations have been more important within the highlands than between the highlands and the lowlands. The CSUTCB has been revitalised and other organisations, such as the Coca Trópico and the CIDOB, have gained strength. These movements have in alliance with other local organisations created larger
social movement networks which have reconstructed the social weaving while maintaining their autonomy from the state. Moreover, the movements have created flexible mechanisms of participation and affiliation that are adapted to the new and hybrid social identities and classes in Bolivia. The former workers’ movement had the union cohesion as its organisational centre. The current social movements, however, count with the broader popular-indigenous-peasant segment at the organisational core (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:13-7).

**Intra- and inter-region cooperation between indigenous organisations in Peru**

Until the end of the 1990s, cooperation between highland and lowland indigenous organisations in Peru has been scarce, and according to Albó (1991:326) it is as if they belong to two different worlds. Similarly, Mallon (1995) argues that there is a profound regional variation and fragmentation of the indigenous movement in Peru.

A first attempt at creating a Peruvian national indigenous organisation was the formation of The Indian Council of South America (CISA) in Cusco in 1980. CISA united the indigenous peoples of the coast, the Amazon and the highlands (Montoya 1998:136). However, in spite of the organisation’s influence on UN documents on indigenous peoples, as well as an important experience of visibilisation of ethnic claims before the state (Pajuelo Teves 2005:115), CISA never managed to achieve the same foundation as the peasant federations CCP and CNA. One reason why CISA failed was that the majority of the affiliates were radical Indianistas, intellectuals and activists, who were not able to relate to the already existing organisations (Albó 2008a:183-4). The organisation was finally dissolved due to internal divisions.

A second attempt at establishing a national indigenous organisation in Peru was the creation of the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples in Peru (COPPIP) in 1997. The most important Peruvian peasant and indigenous organisations - CCP, CNA, AIDESEP, CONAP, as well as other organisations - attended the COPPIP founding meeting (Pajuelo Teves 2006:73-74). At the time, the CCP and the CNA were in periods of organisational crisis. Another factor that may have facilitated the extensive participation in the call for a meeting was the fact that COPPIP was originally thought to be a permanent congress without strong organisational attachments. However, the interference of first lady Eliane Karp, president Toledo’s wife, in the second congress of COPPIP in 2001, led to serious disagreements within the organisation that ultimately led to the split of COPPIP in 2002 (Pajuelo Teves 2005:129).

Karp created the National Commission of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian peoples (CONAPA) by a decree in 2001. CONAPA should serve as a government-dependent
organism with the aim to promote development policies towards the indigenous population. The decree determined that CONAPA should be composed by 21 members: Eight of indigenous origin, and the rest were representatives of several ministries as well as academics. However, the creation of CONAPA led to serious rivalries within COPPIP. The main problem was the question of the presence of COPPIP leaders within CONAPA. Thus, in 2002, the COPPIP split into two separate organisations, and the attempt at uniting Peruvian peasant and indigenous organisations failed. The CNA, CCP, AIDESEP and CONACAMI decided to distance themselves from CONAPA, and created COPPIP-Coordinadora. On the other hand, the remaining organisations that supported Karp and CONAPA renamed their organisation COPPIP-Conferencia (Pajuelo Teves 2005:129).

For outside observers, the creation of CONAPA may have seemed like a state-led ‘ethnic opening’ in Peru. However, Pajuelo (2005:110-11) and Montoya (interview 2007) argue that, to the contrary, what happened was a failure of the state to co-opt indigenous organisations. The incipient processes of articulation of autonomous organisations and the cooperation between these organisations which had occurred since the end of the 1990s were cut short (Pajuelo Teves 2005:110-11). Only recently, there have been important developments towards more autonomous indigenous organisations, and AIDESEP and CONACAMI have been important in this respect. Jointly they have started a process of articulation that led to the organising of the First Summit of Indigenous Peoples in 2004 (Pajuelo Teves 2006:74-76). The collaboration of CONACAMI and AIDESEP has strengthened both organisations and the visibility of the Peruvian indigenous movement. However, it has not yet been converted into a project of launching a political party (Diez, personal communication 2010).

The recent protests in the Peruvian Amazon, led by AIDESEP, against the neoliberal reforms, have not scaled up and contributed to cooperation between indigenous organisations at the national level like in Bolivia. According to Chirif and García (2009), AIDESEP lacks the capacity of brokerage in that the organisation is isolated from, and has not entered into, alliances with other popular movements until recently. However, after the decrees issued by president García in 2007 and 2008, AIDESEP has positioned itself as the leader of indigenous mobilisations that have included numerous peasant and workers’ unions. Thus, the organisation has demonstrated that it keeps its doors open to create alliances with other organisations.
5.4 Main findings

Table 7: Mobilising structures – main findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilising structures</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial concentration of affiliates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maturity of SMO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Years in existence of SMO</td>
<td>No particular differences between the two cases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brokerage mechanism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inter-and intraregional cooperation between indigenous organizations</td>
<td>Strongly present through mobilisation in defense of natural resources. &quot;Societal movement&quot;</td>
<td>Not present. Weak in the highlands. Attempts at unifying various indigenous organisations in COPPIP failed. Last years, CONACAMI and AIDESEP cooperate.</td>
</tr>
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6.0 Political opportunities: External factors that may influence the emergence or lack of indigenous parties

Frames that construct a collective identity and discourse as well as significant mobilising networks are necessary for the emergence of indigenous organisations or larger social movement networks. However, the possibilities or constraints to launch a political party must be analysed according to political factors that are external to groups that may attempt to mobilise. These factors may influence the form, content and possibility of mobilisation, in this case the possibilities to launch political parties, when opportunities are seized. In this chapter, two variables from the political opportunities approach will be analysed: (1) Political associational space, and (2) the openness of the institutionalised political system.
6.1 Political associational space

The goal of this variable is to analyse the degree to which indigenous organisations in Bolivia and Peru enjoyed freedom of expression and association in the analysis period— from the transitions to democracy in 1982 and 1978, respectively, until today.

After the transition to democracy, Peru experienced a bloody civil war (1980-2000) which led to intense violence towards the indigenous population. In the Peruvian highland region of Ayacucho, the Maoist guerrilla movement Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) started a rebellion in 1980, which developed into a civil war. Particularly the central highlands and the central Amazonian area experienced intense violence (Yashar 2005). At the outset, the Shining Path was interpreted by many to be an Indian revolt to restore the Inca Empire, but it was later discovered that the guerrilla was more of an “ethnocidal guerrilla” than an “ethnic guerrilla” (Marti i Puig 2008). However, because the guerrilla actions initially were interpreted as an indigenous rebellion, the military started a strategy of repression in the highlands which hurt the indigenous population in particular (Remy 1994:124). 70 percent of the 70.000 victims of the warfare were indigenous people (CVR 2003). Shining Path experienced some early success in the recruiting of indigenous peasants for the revolutionary struggle. However, the guerrilla’s ideology which maintained that everything associated with the “old state”, such as peasant communities and local administrations, had to be eliminated, led to a series of ruthless violent actions and killings of community leaders associated with the system (Remy 1994:126; Starn 1995). Thus, not only were indigenous peasants in the southern highlands under attack from the army, but they were also suffering from attacks and forced recruitments by the guerrilla. This dynamic of violence reached new levels when the armed forces and the local self-defense squads entered the conflict. The squads organised to keep the guerrillas from entering the communities (Starn 1995:554). Peru became heavily militarised. In 1989, nine regions were in a state of emergency, and, in 1991, 16 of the 25 Peruvian regions, which included over half the total population of the country, were at least partially governed by the military (Roberts and Peceny 1997:198). The military displaced the elected local officials in these emergency zones. Civil liberties and human rights violations committed by the military, as well as insurgencies, drug traffickers, and civilian paramilitary

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100 According to Varese (2006:47), the atrocities committed against the Quechua, Asháninka, and Yanesha peoples in Peru are examples of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
101 “Rondas campesinas”.
102 The rondas were initially resisted by the army. Later on they were encouraged by president Garcia (1985-1990), and president Fujimori decreed a law in 1992 that recognised the rights of the squad members to arm (Starn 1995:554).
patrols were frequent (Yashar 2005:248). Thus, the opportunities for organising across communities were severely constrained, and existent networks that could have facilitated indigenous peoples’ mobilisation were destroyed (Yashar 2005:262-4).

The Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán, and the majority of the guerrilla’s leadership were arrested in 1992. President Fujimori used this victory, or the “strategic defeat” of Shining Path, for all it was worth. As the intensity of the conflict declined gradually after the capture of Guzmán, the regime’s primary concern was to maintain its own political power rather than to understand the roots of the insurgency or rebuild the democratic system. There were no attempts at finding sustainable ways of encouraging guerrilla fighters and their supporters to abandon their struggle and peacefully rejoin society. Thus, political outsider and populist Alberto Fujimori, who was president from 1990 until 2000, allowed the Shining Path to regroup and rebuild its organisation.\textsuperscript{103} Furthermore, in 1992, Fujimori carried out an institutional coup against his own government in which he closed the civilian courts and Congress, and undermined constitutional rights and protections. Moreover, during his term, press outlets were closed, political parties were weakened, and civil liberties were frequently violated (Yashar 2005:249). In 2000, Fujimori fled the country because of electoral fraud and allegations of corruption. During the subsequent government of Toledo (2001-2006), the political environment provided greater levels of mobilisation. Initially, Toledo attempted to relieve the dislocations caused by the neoliberal reforms through a “willingness to accommodate societal and regional demands” as well as a decentralising reform. With a more open access to power, opposition and civil sectors were able to mobilise freely (Arce 2008:43-4). However, the Toledo regime (2001-2006) frequently accused social protestors of being infiltrated by the Shining Path or of being linked to “terrorism” in order to harm their reputation both in negotiations and in the eyes of the public. During the Toledo administration, there was a process of change in the criminalisation of all types of social protest, especially the protests linked to mining activities (Burt 2005; Vittor interview 2007).

\textsuperscript{103} Currently, most analysts believe that the Shining Path is split into two factions: The pro-peace faction that follows Guzman’s pledge to end violent actions, and the Red Path/Proseguir faction that still follows the doctrine of popular revolutionary warfare. The latter faction funds itself by drug trade and trafficking and offers protection to the coca growers in the jungle regions. There is disagreement regarding the degree to which these different factions are united, but there is reason to believe that their actions mutually reinforce each other. Many military attacks have been carried out by the Proseguir faction in the 1990s and 2000s, however far fewer than before the imprisonment of Guzmán (Burt 2005: 32-7).
Moreover, during the mobilisations in Bagua in June 2009, the state imposed a state of emergency, and 33 people were killed, including 23 police officers and 10 civilians. According to Amnesty International (2009:14), the special operation units within the National Police use excessive force when they tried to disperse the indigenous protestors who were unarmed and peacefully blocking the street. Moreover, AIDESEP leaders have been intimidated and harassed since the events.

In Bolivia, on the other hand, the transition to democracy led to an increasing respect for both political and civil rights: The repression declined, and there were fewer constraints on organising across communities, expressing opinions publicly, and holding assemblies (Yashar 1998:31). However, the cocalero region of Chapare has been highly militarised because of the state-led coca-eradication policies. Particularly the period from 1994 until 2001 saw the strong presence of police and armed forces who confronted the “self-defence committees” of antagonistic organised cocaleros. Yet, even though the repression was hard, the cocaleros managed to maintain their high level of mobilisations through marches and strikes (Komalina and Geffroy 2007:40-1). Also the large mobilisations and rebellions in 2000 and 2005 led to violent clashes between protesters and armed forces. However, the level of repression cannot be compared to the intense violence during the Peruvian civil war.

6.2 Openness of the political system
A political system can be characterised as open when linkages between parties and voters are eroded. Then, space may be opened to political challengers (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:18). Tanaka (interview 2007) argues precisely that the demise of leftist parties throughout Latin America opened a political opportunity space that was favourable to the emergence of indigenous parties. Moreover, the institutional framework, including electoral institutions, create an underlying structure that can support or impede the development of party systems and that can partly explain the variation of party systems among countries (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). The formal electoral rules shape the incentives that face the political actors. Thus, changes that lower the barriers for participation in elections are essential for the entrance of challenger parties, among them indigenous parties.

6.2.1 Weakening of leftist parties
Because of the general economic marginalisation of the indigenous population in Bolivia and Peru, leftist organisations and parties have tended to see them as natural allies. Leftist political parties were the first to directly appeal to indigenous voters by addressing their needs as an exploited economic class both in Bolivia and Peru (Van Cott 2005), although the alliances
were characterised by racism (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Van Cott and Rice 2006). However, leftist parties all over the continent weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, and the aim of this section is to evaluate the degree to which leftist parties weakened in Bolivia and Peru and left a political space that indigenous parties could take advantage of in the electoral arena.

In Bolivia the majority of the left united behind Hernan Siles Zuazo and the moderate leftist Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP) coalition in the 1980 elections. The combined votes for the left reached 47 percent. However, the Siles Zuazo government maintained disastrous economic policies, which led to early elections in 1985 and a dramatic setback for the left (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). The support for the leftist parties decreased from 47.4 per cent in 1980 to 0.7 percent in 2002. The decline was particularly strong after the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) moved to the right in the political landscape in 1989, leaving a picture of a collapsed left (Van Cott 2005:757). Thus, with the UDP coalition down with a broken back and the dismantling of the syndical left due to the imposition of neoliberal reforms, which among other things led to the closing of mines and the weakening of the Bolivian Workers Central (COB), conservative and rightist parties monopolised the political representation in the country (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:13). However, as we shall see shortly, political parties with their roots in the indigenous movements were created from 1995, and eventually filled the vacuum left by the leftist parties.

Peru has traditionally had a very strong and radical political left, and the most prominent leftist parties were the APRA and the Peruvian Communist Party (Cotler 1995). Throughout the 20th century, Marxist parties maintained a very strong presence in the rural areas. However, the Peruvian leftist parties did not moderate themselves to the same degree as in other Latin American countries. Instead, the radical Marxist class-based discourse was upheld during the 1980s (Cotler 1995). When the leftist parties failed in the elections in 1980, many of them established an electoral coalition, viz. the United Left (IU). In spite of placing second in the 1985 presidential elections, IU never became an organised political party. It was

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104 A military coup prevented Congress from assembling to elect a new president. In 1982, the Congress elected in 1980 was convoked, and Hernan Siles Zuaso from the UDP was elected president (Gamarra and Malloy 1995).

105 APRA was created by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in 1928 and the Communist Party by José Carlos Mariátegui in 1929. Haya de la Torre emphasised an alliance of workers and the middles class, whereas Mariátegui’s aim was to create a broad front of workers and peasants (Stokes 1995:133-4).
constituted by fragmented parties and independent leaders. Tensions that erupted between the radical and moderate wings, led to the split into two alliances in 1989. One of the wings maintained the IU banner, whereas the other grouping was called the Socialist Left (IS) (Kenney 2003:1233). They both lost credibility as serious political alternatives to govern the country among their voters. Furthermore, in the 1990 elections, the two parties were considered to have positioned themselves too far to the left in the political spectrum and far away from the original IU and the political centre, and thus were not considered to be serious alternatives, thus experiencing catastrophic elections (Kenney 2003:1234). Moreover, an analysis of the demise of the Peruvian left is not complete without mentioning the role played by Shining Path in discrediting the political and peaceful left (García Linera interview 2007).

The political vacuum that emerged after the failure of the leftist parties was not filled with a coalition of smaller leftist parties or indigenous parties, but rather by authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori (Tanaka and Trivelli 2002; Kenney 2003). Fujimori dismissed both classist and ethnic discourses, and instead promoted clientelism through traditional populism. Thus, the space available due to the decline of the Left was eventually filled with new indigenous actors in Bolivia, while in Peru, Fujimori occupied this space. Social politics and investments helped Fujimori in achieving a solid base in rural indigenous areas (Tanaka interview 2007). Fujimori obtained overwhelmingly strong support from the indigenous core areas in the 1990 elections, but in the subsequent elections in 1993, 1995 and 2000, the votes for his electoral vehicles decreased dramatically (Pajuelo Teves 2006:30-40). When Ollanta Humala (The Peruvian Nationalist Party, PNP) ran for president in 2006 he was considered by many to be a new Evo Morales as his father and brother belong to the etnocacerismo ideology (Madrid 2008:506). He fared exceptionally well in the Andean highlands in the second round of the presidential elections, even though he did not count on an indigenous movement that could have provided him with organisational resources (Madrid 2008:506). Ultimately, Alan García of the Peruvian Aprista Party won the elections (Pajuelo Teves 2006:67). However, Humala’s electoral program did not stress ethnic revindications (Mäckelmann 2006:21), and according to Madrid (2008) the PNP is better defined as populist, rather than ethno-populist.

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106 Due to party registration requirements, the PNP was registered as Union for Peru (UPP).
107 The etnocacerismo is a Peruvian ethnic nationalist ideology which glorifies the Inca Empire. The term cacerismo refers to the Pacific War (1879-1993 between Chile and Bolivia/Peru) hero Andrés Avelino Cáceres. Ollanta Humala’s father Antauro Humala created the doctrine.
108 In the five Andean regions of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Puno, Humala received 75 % of the vote (Pajuelo Teves 2006:67).
109 Formerly known as Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA).
6.2.2 Party registration requirements

Bolivia and Peru, together with Ecuador, have had the highest level of barriers to party registration in Latin America (Van Cott 2005:27). These barriers have traditionally been applied to minimise the number of personalist and populist electoral vehicles, as well as to delimit the highest levels of party system fragmentation in Latin America (Van Cott 2003a; Lazarte 2008).

In Bolivia, a change from no pre-election signature requirements to 0.5 of registered voters before the 1989 elections, led to a striking decline from 72 parties registered for the 1985 elections to 15 in 1989 (Bimir 2004). The indigenous parties the Assembly for the People’s Sovereignty (ASP) and the Political Instrument for the People’s Sovereignty (IPSP) solved the registration problem by using the authorised registrations of defunct parties, Izquierda Unida (IU) and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), respectively. In 2004, social movements and civil society groups were authorised to compete in municipal elections for the first time through the law for “citizen groupings” and “indigenous peoples” (Ballivián 2005; Van Cott 2005:27). The indigenous groupings only had to be recognised as an indigenous group in the municipalities where they wanted to participate (Ballivián 2005:26).

In Peru, the most important requirement with regard to the possible launching of indigenous parties was the spatial requirement, effective until 1993, which said that each party had to register in at least half of Peru’s 25 regions. As we saw in chapter 5, only five Peruvian regions count with indigenous majorities. Moreover, given the difficulties of cooperation between lowland and highland organisations, as well as the record of rivalries and splits within the organisations and the broader federations or coordinators, a requirement of registering a party in thirteen regions was hard to overcome. However, the Law of Political Parties that was implemented in 2003 reinstituted geographical registration requirements for participation in national elections. The intention of the law was twofold - to delimit the participation of electoral vehicles that only lasted for one election and thus decrease party system fragmentation, as well as to promote internal democracy and transparency within the parties (Crabtree 2006; Tuesta Soldevilla 2008). However, the consequences for the indigenous political organisations are detrimental. Parties must present committees in at least 16, two-thirds, of the regions. If this requirement is not met, parties can only participate in regional or municipal elections (Davila Puño 2005). According to Davila-Puño (2005), the

110 The citizen groupings needed to collect signatures equivalent to two percent of the votes cast in the last municipal election in the municipalities where they wanted to participate (Ballivián 2005:26).

111 ‘Pueblo indígena’.
new geographical party registration requirements are a consequence of the Peruvian political elite’s fear of experiencing the successful indigenous political mobilisations that have taken place in Ecuador and Bolivia. Irrespective of the elites’ intentions, the emergence of a national indigenous party now faces more possible institutional barriers than in the 1990s. The MIAP, which was created by AIDESEP in 1996, has enjoyed success in local elections in the region of Junín. However, these geographical requirements have proven very hard to meet because the Amazonian indigenous population only has a very scattered population in nine of the Peruvian regions (INEI 2009). Thus, MIAP, or other incipient indigenous parties, must seek alliances with traditional parties that do not include indigenous demands on their political agenda in order to be represented at the national level. This harms their organisational maturity and their political proposals (Davila Puño 2005). Alliances could be forged with the indigenous population in the highlands, which is numerically much larger, to meet the requirement. However, as we have already seen, the highland organisations are much weaker, and the Amazonian and highland organisations have had difficulties in cooperating. Even though the spatial registration requirement was abolished in the period from 1993 to 2003, no indigenous party achieved electoral success at the national level. However, the effects of electoral rules need not necessarily be observed instantly (Crabtree 2006)\textsuperscript{112}.

\textit{Post-election requirements}

Until 2001, post-election vote requirement in Peru was at five percent, and thus higher than the registration requirement. Consistently, numerous parties lost their party registration even though they had achieved legislative representation\textsuperscript{113}. However, as indigenous parties did not participate in national elections, it did not affect them. Nevertheless, the requirement did add up to the high levels of party registration and a relatively closed nature of the institutional framework during large parts of the period under study. In Bolivia, a post-election requirement which was effective between 1979 and 1999 affected smaller parties. Parties that did not succeed in winning fifty thousand votes, or between two and three percent of the national vote, had to pay back the amount that it cost to include them on the ballot\textsuperscript{114} (CNE 1998). Thus, between 1979 and 1999, all parties except four had to pay fines for not reaching fifty thousand votes (Birnir 2004:20-21). Thus, the majority of smaller parties had to pay fines which hampered their continual organisational development. Local indigenous parties

\textsuperscript{112} In Ecuador and Colombia, however, indigenous parties emerged immediately after a spatial registration requirement was removed in 1995 and 1991, respectively (Birnir 2004).

\textsuperscript{113} In 1995, only 3 of the 13 parties that had achieved seats in the parliament maintained their party registration after the elections (Birnir 2004: 18).

\textsuperscript{114} In 1999, the requirement was set to 2\% (CNE 1999)
competing in the first municipal elections in 1995 formed pragmatic electoral alliances with major national parties in order to avoid the financial burden. Moreover, two indigenous parties were prevented from participating in elections because of post-election fines. Both the Indian Tupak Katari Movement (MITKA), which elected two representatives to Congress in 1980, and the Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL), which won two seats in the national legislature in 1985, lacked resources to pay the fines that were imposed on them by the National Electoral Court (Birnir 2004). Thus, MITKA was not able to run in the 1985 elections, and as MRTKL only received 1.63 percent of the national vote in 1989 and, subsequently, had to pay the fine. As a consequence, in 1993, MRTKL ran for elections in an alliance with the much larger and neoliberal party MNR.

6.2.3 Type of electoral system and threshold of representation

The following section analyses the type of electoral system, and whether the threshold of representation can be categorised as low, based on electoral district magnitude115 and the threshold for gaining seats. The district magnitude is considered to be the essential institutional variable explaining the emergence and maintenance of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994:105). Larger districts are favourable to challenger or new parties, as they need not win a plurality in a district in order to win mandates. However, the impact of district magnitude depends on whether the electoral systems are PR or plurality-based (Sartori 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989).

Peru began the democratic period with a PR- system and maintained it throughout the period under study. Bolivia, on the other hand, started out with a pure PR system that was changed in 1994 to a mixed PR- SMD system in which more than half the lower chamber of the bicameral legislature was elected by single member districts This change came as a result of popular pressure that surged by the end of the 1980s and was implemented by the political elites as a constitutional reform manoeuvre to litigate the crisis of representation that had been underway since the transition to democracy in 1982 (Lazarte 2008). Thus, district magnitude decreased in Bolivia, and generally small electoral districts are not favourable to smaller parties116. However, Van Cott (2003b:756) argues that the SMD system was favourable to regionally based indigenous parties like ASP. This is because parties that are weak nationally can win mandates in single-member districts if they succeed in presenting candidates that

115 As explained in the theory chapter, only the district magnitude at the national level will be treated.
116 Currently, 55 % of the total circumscriptions are defined as small with two to five seats (PNUD/IDEA 2007).
have strong local or regional credibility (Lazarte 2008:295). Muñoz-Pogossioan (2008:114) supports Van Cott’s argument in that the change to a mixed system helped electoral minorities like the ASP (which ran under IU’s party registration) to achieve representation in the 1997 general elections. However, Madrid (2008:483) argues that Van Cott’s explanation is “unconvincing” because the vote that ASP (IU) and IPSP (MAS) won in the 1997 elections would have been approximately the same under the old proportional representation system: Under the old system the party would have won three legislative seats, whereas the mixed system gave them four seats. Thus, one possible conclusion is that the introduction of the SMD system helped smaller parties because they were allowed to delimit their campaigns to the uninominal districts instead of campaigning extensively.

In terms of district magnitude, Peru had one single national district from 1992 until 2001 and differs from other countries with such an arrangement because of its comparatively much larger population (Tuesta Soldevilla 2008). Theoretically, increased district magnitude under a proportional representation electoral system should be favourable to the emergence of smaller parties, including indigenous parties. The fact that Fujimori introduced a single national district is paradoxical because Fujimori’s personalist party, Cambio 90, constituted a majority in the Congress and would have benefited more from a majoritarian system (Tanaka 2002:10). Tanaka (2002) argues that district magnitude was increased because of the extremely personalist nature of the Fujimori political project and Fujimori’s displeasure of negotiating with regional actors - a point that will be analysed in depth in the decentralisation section. The effective number of parties in Congress increased dramatically and created serious problems for representation and political dialogue (Van Cott 2003a; Tuesta Soldevilla 2008). In 2001, circumscriptions based on regions were reintroduced, and currently eighty-seven percent of the circumscriptions are defined as small (two to five seats) and thus theoretically disadvantageous for the electoral success of smaller parties (PNUD/IDEA 2007).

Peru and Bolivia are among only five Latin American countries that employ an electoral threshold (PNUD/IDEA 2007:22-23). In Bolivia, an election threshold of three percent of the total national vote to win seats in the multi-member districts was established in 1997. However, parties that obtain less than three percent may still have candidates elected in single-member districts (PNUD/IDEA 2007; Lazarte 2008:293-94). The threshold hindered

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117 This happened to Izquierda Unida (IU) and Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) (Lazarte 2008: 295).
118 The other countries are Israel, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Guyana, Liberia, Moldova, Namibia, and Sierra Leone (Tuesta Soldevilla 2008: 840).
119 The others are Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico (PNUD/IDEA 2007: 22-23).
the Indigenous Pachakutik Movement (MIP) that won six seats in the lower chamber in Congress in 2002 from achieving congressional representation in 2005, because they only won 2.16 percent of the vote (CNE 2007). According to Quispe (interview 2007), the loss of the party registration because they did not achieve congressional representation, constituted a hinder for the development of the political movement. Consequently, MIP did not run in the 2009 elections. In Peru, there was no election threshold to qualify for congressional representation before a four percent barrier of the national vote was introduced for the 2006 elections. This threshold will be further increased to five percent in the elections in 2011 (Schmidt 2007:815). According to Tuesta Soldevilla, this manoeuvre will be effective in dealing with the fragmented multiparty system (2008). Nevertheless, the new threshold may be hard to overcome for indigenous parties that seek to achieve congressional representation.

6.2.4 Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities

In Latin America, reserved seats for ethnic minorities in the National Legislature had only been established in Colombia and Venezuela (Van Cott 2005)\textsuperscript{120}, countries with minuscule indigenous populations, until the new Bolivian constitution, approved by referendum in 2009, opened for direct representation of indigenous groups that constitute minorities in their departments (Gustafson 2009:1005). The general elections in Bolivia in December 2009 counted with seven special circumscriptions for peasants, and indigenous and native peoples\textsuperscript{121}, which each got one seat in the lower house of the Congress\textsuperscript{122}. The electoral results showed that MAS won with at least 62.70 percent in all seven circumscriptions, except the one in Pando (CNE 2009b). This can be explained by the fact that many of the candidates who ran for indigenous organisations like the CIDOB registered for the elections in the name of MAS (Cambio 03.09.2009). However, this recent electoral arrangement cannot explain the emergence of the wave of new indigenous parties in Bolivia during the 1990s. What this arrangement can contribute with eventually, is the emergence of new indigenous parties in future elections that originate in other indigenous movements. Particularly the employment of

\textsuperscript{120} In Colombia, two seats in the Senate are reserved for indigenous candidates. Indigenous candidates in Venezuela compete for three seats in the national unicameral legislature and in municipal and state assemblies in regions where indigenous populations are concentrated (Van Cott 2005: 15).

\textsuperscript{121} The official name of the special circumscriptions is “circunscripciones especiales indígena originario campesinas” (CNE 2009a). The circumscriptions corresponded to the departments of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Tarija, Beni and Pando. However, the constituencies could not cross departmental borders and were only valid in the rural areas of the departments (CNE 2009a).

\textsuperscript{122} The Congress is now renamed the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (CNE 2009a).
special seats for indigenous candidates (CNE 2009a) in regional elections\textsuperscript{123}, may give rise to new indigenous parties in Bolivia that may later step up to the national level.

In Peru, a requirement of a fifteen percent quota of ethnic minorities on party lists was introduced in 2002 (Tuesta Soldevilla 2008:860). Ironically, this requirement was only valid in \textit{native communities} corresponding to the Peruvian Amazon where there was an incipient indigenous party, the already mentioned MIAP (Davila Puño 2005; Van Cott 2005). In the highlands, where a large proportion of the population is indigenous and where there was at the time no indigenous party, no such requirement was introduced. The consequences were detrimental, as many prominent indigenous leaders were persuaded to run with established non-indigenous parties which resulted in disappointing results for MIAP and the weakening of the AIDESEP (Davila Puño 2005; Van Cott 2005). According to Julio Davila Puño, this requirement is only one of many that illustrates that the indigenous peoples are not yet considered integrated into the national political agenda, and that the participation of this sector is sought to be minimised (2005:8).

\textbf{6.2.5 Political and administrative decentralisation}

Both Peru and Bolivia were centralised and unitary states at the time of the democratic transitions. The main task here is thus to investigate whether the decentralising, and in Peru’s case also recentralising reforms, constituted opportunities and/or constraints that hindered or fostered the emergence of indigenous parties. Firstly, the characteristics of decentralised political and administrative levels in both countries will be presented. Then, the degree to which decentralising reforms have provided opportunities for social movements to create electoral vehicles at the local or regional levels in Bolivia and Peru will be analysed. The aim is to evaluate whether elections held at decentralised levels have served to build a party organisation at the lower levels before stepping up to the national levels (Dalton, Flanaghan et al. 1984:467). Both countries hold local and regional elections separately from national elections, and one could thus assume that the advantage of larger parties may be reduced (Van Cott 2003a:11-12). A last point to be made is that the focus will be on the effects of the decentralisation, not the motivations behind the reforms\textsuperscript{124}.

\textsuperscript{123} In the regional elections in April of 2010, all departments except Potosí employed special seats for indigenous candidates. However, due to the lack of electoral data, indigenous groups’ electoral performance in these elections is excluded from the analysis.

\textsuperscript{124} For reasons behind the reforms, see for example O’Neill (2003; 2005); and Grindle (2000).
Bolivia - the implementation of the Popular Participation Law

Until 1995, Bolivia was a centralised, unitary system. The territorial structure consisted of departments, provinces, province sections and cantons. Local elections were only held in a dozen larger Bolivian cities and suburbs which made it difficult for the locally and regionally based and, at the time, organisationally weak social movements to compete in elections (Van Cott 2003a:755-56). This political structure had served to control political and economic resources from the governmental level and downwards (O'Neill 2005:124). However, by the mid-1990s, a series of political and legal reforms opened up for more direct forms of citizen participation. Following the implementation of the Popular Participation Law\textsuperscript{125} in 1994 and the 1995 Decentralisation Law\textsuperscript{126}, the province sections were converted into 311 municipalities that were constituted throughout the country. Currently, the number or municipalities is 327. As 237 of these municipalities have a majority who identify as indigenous (Albó 2008a:23), one could predict how radically the political landscape would change in the wake of these reforms. Currently, the decentralised structure of the state consists of nine departments, as well as provinces, and municipalities (O'Neill 2006). Until 2005, the Bolivian decentralisation reform was centred at the municipal level. The departmental prefects were appointed by the national government (Eaton 2007:81). However, the new Bolivian constitution, which was approved in Congress in 2008 and in a popular referendum in 2009, establishes four levels of administration, viz. departments, regions (provinces), municipalities, and indigenous aboriginal peasant territories\textsuperscript{127}. The new autonomy implies the direct election of authorities at all levels (Gustafson 2009). The departmental political structure consists of a departmental assembly and an executive that is led by a directly elected governor (Ministerio de Autonomía 2009). Martí i Puig (2008) argues that pressures to implement decentralising reforms were seen both from above through the regional elites in \textit{la Media Luna}\textsuperscript{128} (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando and Beni), and through demands from below, illustrated by the indigenous population. O’Neill (2005: Ch.5), on the other hand, claims that the incumbent party MNR took a strategic decision to carry through decentralisation reforms in the 1990s because of its strong and stable support throughout the country, particularly in the countryside, and its more volatile electoral success at the national

\textsuperscript{125} ‘Ley de Participación Popular’.

\textsuperscript{126} The Decentralisation Law guaranteed municipal governments 20 percent of the federal budget, and the decentralisation was particularly innovative in that it recognised grassroots civil organisations and encouraged members of these groups to form civic oversight committees (Grindle 2000; O’Neill 2006:177).

\textsuperscript{127} “Territorios indígena originarios campesinos”.

\textsuperscript{128} Media Luna (The Half Moon) is an informal denomination for the four departments in the Bolivian East that do not have an indigenous majority of the population.
level\textsuperscript{129}. As we will see shortly, this strategy seems to have backfired. Notwithstanding the reasons behind the decentralisation, the reforms were crafted by a team of technocrats that worked behind closed doors (O’Neill 2005), and the reforms were heavily criticised by powerful sectors of society (Grindle 2000:125). Critics saw the decentralisation as a deliberate attempt by the central government to fragment, localise and calm down popular social movements in order to facilitate the implementation of neoliberal reforms (Kohl 2002). The social movements were also sceptical to the introduction of decentralising reforms and called them “the damned laws” (Van Cott 2003b).

**Peru: Interrupted decentralisation processes**

Peru, like Bolivia, has traditionally been a very centralist state in which the political system has an elitist and exclusivist nature, and where a large segment of the population remains at the margins of the political system (Crabtree 2006). Currently, there are three levels of political decentralisation, viz. region, province and municipal district. Provinces and districts have municipal status and elect local officials\textsuperscript{130}(Albó 2008a:196). Municipal elections including direct elections of mayors were reintroduced in 1980\textsuperscript{131}. Authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori removed mayoral elections in 1992 and reinstituted them in 1993 (O’Neill 2005). However, one can hardly talk of representative democracy during Fujimori’s period. He instituted a strategy of total control of Congress, the judiciary, and the electoral institutions. The “direct democracy” that Fujimori promoted sought to minimise the parties’ mediating role between the state and civil society (Crabtree 2006).

The regional level was created in 1989, and in 1990 the first regional elections were held (O’Neill 2003:1072). This first round of regional decentralisation was a chaotic experience and did not include a clear transfer of fiscal resources to the regions (Tanaka 2002:8). Fujimori dissolved the elected regional assemblies in 1992. Such a recentralisation of power is very rare, and Peru is the only recent example in Latin America (O’Neill 2005:47). In 2002, regional elections were restored through a reform that was welcomed by political and social sectors. Decentralisation had appeared as a core issue in the 2001 election campaign inspired by civil society’s role and participation in the downfall of Fujimori in 2000. Elected president Alejandro Toledo fronted decentralisation as a main topic for his government. However, as in

\textsuperscript{129} In 2004, there were 194 provincial municipalities, 1,646 district municipalities, and 1,824 municipalities of populated centres. The latter must consist of at least 1,000 inhabitants (Albó 2008: 196).

\textsuperscript{130} Municipal elections were first introduced in 1963, but were interrupted by military regimes from 1968 until 1980 (Paredes 2008).
the first round of decentralisation, the allocation of functions and authority was unclear (Sabatini 2003)\textsuperscript{132}.

This quick review reveals two very different developments in Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia, on the one hand, experienced a continuous opening at the municipal level from 1995, albeit fifteen years into its democratic regime, but did not open up for direct elections at the departmental level before in 2010. In Peru, on the other hand, a very short-lived experience of regional decentralisation was cut short by a decade of recentralisation, before regional decentralisation again was implemented in 2002. The municipal level was only formally interrupted from 1992 until 1993, but some areas, particularly the civil war-torn region of Ayacucho, experienced difficulties of holding elections.

\textbf{Indigenous participation in municipal elections}

\textit{Bolivia and the “ruralisation” of politics}

Decentralisation led to major changes in the Bolivian party system. At the time of the implementation of the reform, Bolivia’s party system was strongly controlled by national elites who determined the candidates for closed party lists (O’Neill 2005:43). Until the municipal elections in 2004, candidates had to present their candidacies on behalf of a national party in order to minimise the number of local parties (Sabatini 2003:140-5). However, in spite of this restriction, many local indigenous movements forged electoral alliances with national parties or launched their own parties that had success from the first municipal elections in 1995 (Grindle 2000:126-9; Van Cott 2005). The local electoral campaigns shifted their focus to a more prominent local agenda, and the possibilities for political careers at the local level made local leaders less dependent on the party machines (Grindle 2000:129). In the first nation-wide municipal elections in 1995, many inhabitants in smaller towns and villages participated electorally for the first time (Grindle 2000:2). Peasant and indigenous organisations who allied with non-indigenous parties, most often MNR or The Free Bolivia Movement (MBL), won 28.6 percent of the total vote in these elections (Van Cott 2003b:756). Moreover, ASP, a new indigenous party with its base among the coca-growers in Cochabamba affiliated with the CSUTCB, won ten mayors and 49 municipal council seats in the department of Cochabamba.

\textsuperscript{132} The Toledo government did not have a coherent proposal for decentralisation and participation, and there was much bureaucratic resistance to the reforms, especially in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Crabtree 2006). This latter point is illustrated by the lack of significant advances in the transfer of responsibilities to the regional and local governments.
It is unclear whether the decentralising reforms were decisive for the coca-growers affiliated with the CSUTCB to launch ASP. Alejo Véliz, the ASP president at the time, assured that the reforms did not have any influence on the decision, as forming a party was the next logical step in the maturation of the movement (Véliz 2001, in Van Cott 2003a:22). However, Roman Loaza, ASP deputy elected in 1997 stressed the importance of the reforms in the creation of the first successful party based on the indigenous peasantry (Loaza 1997, in Van Cott 2003a:22). Albó and Quispe (2004a:15) share Loaza’s view: “The growth of indigenous and campesino power in the government structures (…) undoubtedly started in the years when the LPP was instituted” (my translation). After the electoral success in the municipal elections in 1995, ASP decided to move on the national level to execute real influence on political decision-making (Van Cott 2003a). In the 1997 general elections, the ASP, using the party registration of Izquierda Unida, won four seats in the lower chamber of Congress in uninominal districts in Cochabamba.

In the subsequent municipal elections in 1999, the IPSP, a splinter party from ASP, participated electorally for the first time under the party registration of MAS. As we saw in the party registration section, the MAS registration was used to solve the pre-election signature requirement. The IPSP won a total of 3.27 percent nationally, which corresponded to 79 municipal council seats. In contrast to the ASP, which won 28 council seats and five mayoralities in the same elections - but limited to the department of Cochabamba, the IPSP reached a broader geographical scope and gained seats in seven of the nine departments (Van Cott 2003a). A report on the municipal councillors elected in 1999, showed that almost two-thirds of the councillors self-identified as belonging to a indigenous group or an ayllu (Ballivián 2005:80). IPSP, which by the national elections in 2002 had adopted the MAS name, did extraordinarily well in the 2002 national election and won 20.94 percent of the vote, less than two percentage points behind MNR, the largest party at the national level. In the presidential elections in 2005, MAS won an overwhelming majority of 53.7 percent (CNE 2007), and it asserted its position with 64.2 percent of the vote in the national elections in 2009 (CNE 2009b). Thus, ASP and IPSP (MAS) started out with modest success in municipal elections, before competing successfully in national elections.

Until 2004, the traditional parties- MNR, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Democratic and Nationalist Action (ADN), and Civic Solidarity Union (UCS)- fared better in the municipal elections compared to the results in national elections. However, in the 2004 municipal elections, these parties only won a total of 17.4 percent of the vote compared to 59
percent in 1999 (Ballivián 2005:47). MAS won 17.1 percent of the vote, and was thus the largest party. MIP, on the other hand, won a total of 2.2 percent. The 2004 municipal elections were the first in which citizen and indigenous groupings were allowed to run in elections, which constituted a step forward for other indigenous organisations’ political participation. The electoral results showed extremely high levels of volatility: Eighty parties, citizen and indigenous groupings finished first in at least one municipality as compared to thirteen parties in 1999 (Ballivián 2005:40). However, the parties still won 76.8 of the vote at the expense of the other groupings. Indigenous groupings, on the other hand, gained a total of only 1.9 percent of the vote (Carvajal Donoso and Pérez Arnez 2005:167).

Ballivián (2005:81-82) links the relatively poor performance of the indigenous groupings beyond MAS and MIP to their failure to mobilise sympathisers and party activists that could be included on the lists of candidates, their limitation of political agendas to cultural demands, as well as the fragmented nature of the participation of indigenous groups. Another element that can explain the poor results of indigenous groups is their inability to create municipal dynamics because of their general concentration to a lower local level than the municipality (Ballivián 2005; Gustafson 2009). A last point to be made is that the new legislation was only implemented five months before the elections, and it was thus probable that the ‘non-parties’ would perform better in the 2010 municipal elections scheduled for April (Ballivián 2005:89). Due to a lack of access to the results, this election is not analysed in this thesis.

**Peru: Weak indigenous parties at the municipal level**

Compared to Bolivia, there have been few examples of Peruvian indigenous parties competing in municipal elections. Before the 1998 municipal election, the authoritarian Fujimori administration created the *Vamos Vecinos*134 movement whose aim was to control and co-opt the social and political elites at the municipal level (Tanaka 2002:14). This measure was taken because the electoral vehicles Fujimori created to win national elections were not successful at the municipal levels (O'Neill 2005:72). Rather, at the municipal level, the opposition was taking advantage of the political space available, and the traditional parties did considerably better in local than in national elections (Tanaka 2002:10). However, the *Vamos Vecinos* movement was successful, and won 25 percent of the total votes in the

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133 This fragmentation is illustrated by the Assembly of the Guaraní People (APG) that presented three different group lists in the departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz (Ballivián 2005:81).

134 Let’s Go Neighbours
Many peasant indigenous organisations were co-opted into this strongly controlled clientelistic network that weakened indigenous and peasant struggles for municipal power (Palmer 2004).

MIAP was the first indigenous party to win municipal elections, and paradoxically this happened in the Amazon (region of Junín), where relations with political parties started later than in the highlands, and where the indigenous population is numerically much smaller. MIAP was created at AIDESEP’s National Congress in 1996, and in 1998, the first native community registered a list for the municipal elections the same year. MIAP and its affiliated lists won thirteen indigenous mayors in various provinces in the region of Junin in the 1998 municipal elections. The MIAP leaders realised that they had to establish alliances with sympathetic social and political actors and at the same time remain independent from political parties. Prior to the creation of MIAP, indigenous mayors as well as municipal and regional councillors were elected in many Amazonian districts in the 1980 and 1990s, primarily through AIDESEP’s local alliances with political parties. CONAP also achieved representation at the local level through alliances with parties from 1987 on. However, as we saw in chapter 5, the lack of consensus, financial resources, and political experience among the Amazonian communities complicated the task of organising a political party. Moreover, as we saw in the section on electoral rules, registration requirements have complicated the task of running in elections at higher levels than the local (Van Cott 2005; Huber 2008). However, MIAP participated in the general elections in 2000 with Somos Perú, but failed to win any seats (Van Cott 2005).

The 2000s have witnessed some attempts at launching parties that stress ethnic or indigenous claims in the highlands. In 2002, the Regional Llapanchik Front135 won the elections in the municipal province of Andahuaylas in the region of Apurimac. According to Meléndez (2003), Llapanchik is not an indigenous party, but rather articulate regional and classist demands. However, Pajuelo (2006:104) argues that Llapanchik indeed is an incipient indigenous party and cites a document where the movement refers to the historical Andean project, as well as demands for a plurinational state. These elements are all central in the political project of MAS, and in fact it was not coincidental. Just a few weeks before the publishing of the document, representatives from the Llapanchik met with Ecuadorian and

135The Spanish name is “Frente Popular Llapanchik”. “Llapanchik” means “all of us” in the local Quechua (Albó 2008:197).
Bolivian politicians in an Indigenous Congress (Pajuelo Teves 2006:197). In 2006, the front won in four municipal provinces (Pajuelo Teves 2006).

The experience of regional elections
The first regional elections in Bolivia were held in April 2010, but will not be analysed in this thesis due to a lack of access to electoral results. In Peru, however, the new regional elections have contributed to increased political participation among the indigenous population in the highlands, albeit weak compared to the Bolivian experience at the municipal level. As we saw in chapters 4 and 5, a formation of discourses of ethnic demands by social leaders and new local organisations have taken place in the 2000s (Pajuelo Teves 2006; Albó 2008a). At least one indigenous party has had electoral success at the local and regional political scene. The already mentioned Popular Front Llapanchik’s candidate, David Salazar, was elected the new regional president of Apurímac. Given the rivalries within the leadership of the movement which erupted after the 2002 elections and the subsequent organisational weakening, this was a fairly good result, even though Salazar won with a small margin\(^{136}\) (Pajuelo Teves 2006:109). However, Pajuelo (2006:108) argues that the fact that Llapanchik did not win more municipal provinces than in 2002 illustrates the “limits of the construction of an ethno-cultural discourse” in Peru.

The Movement for Regional Quechua Aymara Autonomy (MARQA) won the regional elections in the region of Puno, which borders with the Bolivian department of La Paz, in 2002. Even though the roads in Puno have been filled with allusive Aymara propaganda since then, Albó (2008a:205) argues that this is rather a consequence of the contact with the Bolivian Aymaras than a sign that Puno is following in the footsteps of Bolivia. According to Meléndez (2003), MARQA cannot be characterised as an indigenous party, as class-based and regional demands are more prominent than are ethnic claims. Also, the Inka Pachacuteq Party in the department of Cusco which uses indigenous symbolism, is considered to be classist rather than indigenous (Meléndez 2003). The leader of the coca-growers movement (CONPACC), Nelson Palomina, has launched a political party, albeit unsuccessfully. However, several of the coca movements’ leaders represented Ollanta Humala’s Union for Peru (UPP) in the 2006 elections and were elected to Congress (Albó 2008a:216).

In addition to the already mentioned mobilising and logistical difficulties of the Peruvian indigenous movements, the poor presence and performance of indigenous parties at the

\(^{136}\) 26 % compared to number two: Agrupación Independiente Sí Cumple (23.4%) (Pajuelo Teves 2006).
regional level can be explained by the fact that the indigenous peoples are not integrated into the legal framework of the decentralisation process. The legislation lacks a contextual sensitivity to the local governments in indigenous territories. The laws are only adequate to urban realities and are not adjusted according to the multiculturalism of the constitution (Davila Puño 2005). The indigenous population has not been referred to as political subjects nor has there been any discussion of the need to create specific circumscriptions or municipal entities for the indigenous peoples (Martí i Puig 2008:693). The indigenous peoples' organisational models are not recognised, often leading to conflicts between the communities and their elected authorities in the Amazon (Davila Puño 2005:8-9). Conflicts with local authorities are also present in the highlands. Most of the conflicts have occurred because of dissatisfaction with the local governments, but also regional governments have been targeted (Pajuelo Teves 2006). Moreover, the lack of responsiveness of the central and regional governments induces social protests by groups that try to pressure the formal political system from the outside (Arce 2008:46).
6.3 Main findings

Table 8: Political opportunities – main findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political opportunities</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political associational space</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Freedom of association and expression</td>
<td>Present, although violence between <em>cocaleros</em> and armed forces, and</td>
<td>Not present. Civil war 1980-2000 severely constrained organizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violent actions against indigenous mobilisations in the Amazon in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. Softer party registration requirements                         | Mixed picture. Pre-election requirement (0.5% of reg. voters) in 1989.  | Pre-election:  
|                                                                  | Solved my incipient parties by running in elections on the registration of defunct parties. 2004: citizen groupings and indigenous groups allowed to run in municipal elections. | -1993: Spatial requirement to register in half of the 25 regions. 2003- geographical requirement:  |
| District magnitude                                                | 1994- Mixed PR/SMD  
|                                                                  | 1997- 3% of national vote in plurimember districts                      | 2005- 4% of national vote                                            |
| 4. Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities | Present from 2009: Not able to explain the emergence of indigenous parties from the 1990s. | Present from 2003: Requirement of at least 30% indigenous representatives on party lists in the Amazonian regions. However, opposite effect of what the theory predicts.  |

7.0 Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer why indigenous parties have emerged at the national level in Bolivia, while there is no parallel experience in Peru. It has applied the Most Similar Systems Design which has rendered possible the omission of common characteristics as operative independent variables. As all the successful indigenous parties in Latin America that have developed since the 1990s have emerged out of social movements, three main approaches
from social movement theory have served as foundations for the analysis. Firstly, the “framing processes” approach has focused on the symbolic aspects of collective action, and development of indigenous-based discourses and their relations with anti-neoliberal discourses. Secondly, the “mobilising structures” approach has focused on the organisational infrastructure of indigenous movements. In this thesis, is has looked into the territorial concentration of indigenous peoples, the migration and urbanisation of indigenous peoples, the maturity of the indigenous organisations, as well as the degree to which the indigenous organisations in the two cases have been able to cooperate inter- and intra-regionally with the aim to create dense networks and launch successful parties. Thirdly, the “political opportunity” approach has focused on the presence of political associational space, which is crucial for the possibilities to organise. Furthermore, it has looked into the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system, through the possible weakening of leftist parties in the two cases that could create political space for indigenous people who have traditionally voted for leftists parties. Finally, a series of institutional arrangements have served to analyse the degree to which they have constituted opportunities or constraints for the creation and success of indigenous parties. The rest of this thesis will summarise the main findings in each analytical chapter, before proceeding to an integrated model of explanation of the dependent variable, - the emergence of indigenous parties, and a comment on the validity of this study.

7.1 Framing processes
With regard to the first indicator, prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse, the two cases diverge. In Bolivia, a strong ethnic discourse has been present since the end of the 1960s, through the ethno-nationalist discourse developed by the Kataristas, who gained increasing influence in the largest peasant union in the years before the transition to democracy, culminating in the creation of the CSUTCB. However, the indigenous discourse has been particularly strong from 2000, and several scholars explain this strength through strategic decisions made by the organisations to attract more supporters and affiliates. In the case of the Peruvian highlands, the peasant or class identity has overshadowed an indigenous identity until the turn of the millennium. According to Pajuelo (2006:73), the main reason for the prolonged lack of ethnic organisations in the Peruvian highlands can be accounted for by the radicalisation under general Velasco, and the adoption of the peasant term by the largest peasant federations CNA and CCP. Moreover, the radical left, including the guerrilla group Shining Path, were influential in the Peruvian countryside, often intruding the unions, as well
as leaving a classist hegemony at the expense of the development of a more salient indigenous discourse. In the Peruvian Amazon, on the other hand, an indigenous discourse had developed since the end of the 1960s, giving rise to several organisations.

The second indicator, inclusive indigenous discourse, is present in both cases. Even though the radical exclusionary indigenous discourse of Quispe and his followers has been strong in Bolivia, it is the inclusive discourse that dominates both among the highland and lowland indigenous organisations. In Peru, the largest highland and lowland indigenous organisations, AIDESEP and CONACAMI both have an inclusive discourse, even though the highlands have seen some attempts at more exclusionary Aymara discourses.

With regard to the last indicator, in both countries, the neoliberal reforms left the rural and indigenous population “shocked”. However, the connection between indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourses has been more present in Bolivia than in Peru, and it surfaced at an earlier stage than in Peru. Both Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe were highly successful in articulating anti-neoliberal discourses which led to large mobilisations, particularly from 2000. These mobilisations led to the broadening of the constituencies of their parties, MIP and MAS, a fact that will be dealt with further in chapter 6. However, as the second indicator illustrated, Morales' inclusive discourse as opposed to Quispe’s ethno-exclusionary discourse proved to be more successful in attracting non-indigenous voters to his party. In Peru, this connection has not been present until recently. Mobilisations against foreign mining and oil companies have increased and particularly the protests led by AIDESEP in the Peruvian Amazon in 2009 have made visible the indigenous fight against neoliberal reforms that harm their territories. However, it remains to be seen whether AIDESEP or CONACAMI manage to take advantage of this combination of discourses in the general elections set for 2011.

7.2 Mobilising structures
With regard to territorial concentration of affiliates, the Bolivian indigenous population constitutes a larger segment of the population than in Peru. Moreover, more than fifty percent of the Bolivian departments have an indigenous majority, whereas the corresponding regions in Peru only reach twenty percent of the total. The processes of modernisation and urbanisation have been present in both countries. However, in Peru, the migration to the cities have implied a much stronger process of de-indianisation than in Bolivia (Montoya 1998:156; Pajuelo Teves 2006). In Peru, the distances between communities as well as Quechua linguistic variance has further complicated communication between Peruvian highland
communities and the formation of transcommunity networks. In Bolivia, particularly in the highlands, migration to the cities has not led to the abandoning of indigenous identities (Albó 2008a). Moreover, the fact that many Bolivian ex-miners with union experience of Aymara and Quechua origin migrated to the region of Chapare in the department of Cochabamba, contributed to the creation and strength of the cocalero movements. Thus, the expected outcome - that migration of indigenous people leads to the weakening of ethnic identities is not valid in Bolivia. The second variable, the maturity of SMO, was operationalised into two indicators. The first, years in existence of the SMO, does not vary substantially between the two cases. However, the oldest existing indigenous organization in Bolivia, the CSTUCB has been able to launch three different political parties. However, the most successful one, MAS, was principally created by the Coca Trópico organisation which is affiliated with the CSUTCB. In Peru, the Amazonian organisation AIDESEP is the oldest of the currently largest indigenous organisations, and it has gained sufficient organisational maturity to launch a political party, the MIAP. With regard to the second indicator, the unity of the SMO, the most important indigenous organisations in both countries have been characterised by continuous rivalries and splits, due to regional and inter-ethnic differences, and cannot explain any substantial variation between the two cases. In the Peruvian Amazon, particularly, leadership questions and diverging views of the presence of extractive industries on indigenous territory have proved divisive. In Bolivia, the largest organisation CSUTCB has been particularly plagued by conflicts regarding the dominance of indigenous or class discourses, which again hindered the launching of one single indigenous party.

The third variable, brokerage mechanism, has been clearly present in Bolivia and close to absent in Peru. However, Bolivia has still not experienced any successful attempts at creating an indigenous organisation which is completely national in the sense that it has a significant presence in all parts of the national territory. Even though the CTUSCB has branches in all of the Bolivia departments, it is much stronger in the highland departments, particularly in La Paz, and is commonly considered to be a highland organisation. However, strong regional federations have emerged, of which the CSTUCB, the Coca Trópico, and the CIDOB are the most significant. A peculiar characteristic of Bolivian indigenous organisations, is the extent to which various indigenous or peasant organisations, in spite of their rivalries and problems of cooperation, have united in a series of mobilisations, marches and other types of cooperation both inter- and intra- regions in ad hoc coordinators in the defence of diverse natural resources. Thus, the social movements in Bolivia constitute a new power bloc that
consists of diverse sectors of society, but which is dominated by indigenous peasants and urban indigenous people, as well sectors of the middle class. Together, this block, or this “societal movement” was able to neutralise the upper classes and reach the government (Garcia Linera interview 2007). In Peru, COPPIP has been an attempt at creating a national indigenous organisation as it linked the largest indigenous/peasant organisations in the Amazonian and the Andean regions. However, the interference of the state-initiated CONAPA led to rivalries, disagreements, and the separation into two separate organisations in 2002. However, the past few years have shown increased collaboration between CONACAMI and AIDESEP, and it remains to be seen whether this alliance will be strengthened further in the years to come, and what possible effects such an alliance may have for party formation and mobilisation.

7.3 Political opportunities
With regard to political associational space, the two cases diverge significantly. Peru experienced a strong political and social conflict with the presence of armed irregular groups from 1980 until 2000 (Martí i Puig 2008:700). The violence associated with the Shining Path, and the counteroffensive by self-defense squads and the Peruvian army, was particularly present in the indigenous-populated central highlands and central Amazonian area. The civil war developed into a dynamic of terror which severely constrained the possibilities to organise across communities and destroyed networks that could have facilitated indigenous peoples’ mobilisation. Furthermore, an institutional coup by Fujimori in 1992, led to the centralisation of power, and frequent violations of civil liberties. More recently, fights against foreign extractive companies led by CONACAMI and AIDESEP have been increasingly opposed and met with criminalisation by the state. In the case of AIDESEP, last year’s mobilisations led to excessive use of violence by the police, and in the aftermath, leaders have been harassed. In Bolivia, on the other hand, the violence experienced by the Cochabamba coca-growers and the violent actions against protestors in the 2000 and 2003 uprisings, are not comparable to the levels of violence experienced in Peru, particularly during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

Weakening of leftists parties has been present in both countries, and the collapse of these parties occurred at only one year interval. Yet, the vacuum left by these parties, was only filled by indigenous political parties in Bolivia. In Peru, on the other hand, the authoritarian president Fujimori filled this space. Thirdly, party registration requirements have been stricter in Peru than in Bolivia. Particularly the geographical registration requirement based on
regions has harmed a smaller Peruvian indigenous party, MIAP, from stepping up from the municipal level, and is a significant hinder to the launching of indigenous parties in the future. In Bolivia, the softening of party registration in 2004 which allowed indigenous groups to run in municipal elections has not yet led to the emergence of significant indigenous parties apart from MAS. With regard the type of electoral system and threshold of representation, Peru paradoxically experienced a low threshold of representation under authoritarian president Fujimori (1990-2000): There was one national electoral district combined with a PR electoral system. Furthermore, there was no election threshold, and the geographical registration requirement was removed. Yet, the context of extreme violence and centralisation of power was not propitious for the launching of indigenous parties. In Bolivia, the second largest indigenous party, MIP, lost its party registration after the 2006 elections because of its failure to reach the election threshold.

Electoral arrangement to enhance participation of ethnic minorities, proved to serve to the opposite of what the theory predicted in Peru. A requirement of a 15 percent quota of ethnic minorities on party list was introduced in 2002, but the condition was only valid in the Amazonian regions, where it led to disappointing results for the MIAP as many indigenous leaders ran with non-indigenous parties. In Bolivia, special circumscriptions for indigenous peoples were instituted in 2009, but it is too early to say whether this arrangement can lead to the emergence of new Bolivian indigenous parties originating in other indigenous organisations. With regard to decentralisation, the implementation of municipal decentralisation in Bolivia in 1995, led to a “ruralisation of politics” which ultimately resulted in the replacement of the traditional political elites by a new indigenous elite with its roots in the municipalities. In Peru, by contrast, the regional decentralisation was removed under Fujimori, and was not restored before in 2002. However, incipient indigenous parties have emerged in the Bolivian highlands, of which the most important has been the Frente Popular Llapanchik.

7.4 Integrating framings, mobilising structures, and political opportunities
To be able to answer the research question, - why has only Bolivia experienced indigenous parties at the national level -, the MSSD design has served to highlight the different values of the explanatory variables in the two cases. Firstly, in Bolivia, the ethnic discourse has been much stronger than in Peru. Secondly, the indigenous discourse in Bolivia has been highly successful in connecting with anti-neoliberal discourses, thus providing a broader popular constituency. Thirdly, in Bolivia, the indigenous groups are more concentrated than in Peru,
and the distances between communities are shorter. Furthermore, the predicted negative impact of migration of indigenous people, has instead, particularly in the region of Chapare, led to the maintenance of indigenous identities. The level of cooperation between formerly disconnected organisations has been much more present in Bolivia than in Peru. A crucial factor for the lack of indigenous parties in Peru is the absence of political associational space due to the civil war and the authoritarian president Fujimori. Finally, the presence of decentralising reforms in Bolivia from 1995 was very important for the stepping up of small indigenous organisations to the “whipalisation” of Bolivian politics experienced today.

This thesis has illustrated that Peru is a deviant case in terms of the creation of indigenous parties at the national level. Moreover, only a few parties have emerged at the regional and municipal levels. However, Peru can no longer be considered a failure with regard to indigenous mobilisation. Indigenous discourses are increasingly salient in Peru, and the successful combination of anti-neoliberal and indigenous discourses in recent years, may lead to the emergence of national indigenous parties in the near future. However, perhaps the Peruvian indigenous peoples need not follow in the footsteps of neighbouring Bolivia and Ecuador. Tanaka (interview 2007) argues that it is important that the indigenous peoples find ways to defend their rights, cultures and values, but an organisation which upholds a specific indigenous discourse, is just one of the possible roads. The Peruvian indigenous movement needs to mark out their own path.
Appendix

Table 1: Overview Bolivian presidents, 1982-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Head of Government</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>Hernán Siles Zuazo</td>
<td>IU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>Víctor Paz Estenssoro</td>
<td>ADN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>Jaime Paz Zamora</td>
<td>MIR (in alliance with ADN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada</td>
<td>MNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>Hugo Bánzer</td>
<td>ADN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Jorge Quiroga*</td>
<td>ADN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2003- June 2005</td>
<td>Carlos Mesa***</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2005- Jan. 2006</td>
<td>Eduardo Rodríguez-Veltzé*****</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>Evo Morales Ayma</td>
<td>MAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>Evo Morales Ayma</td>
<td>MAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Banzer was ill and replaced with vicepresident Jorge Quiroga

**Sanchez de Lozada resigned after pressure from protesters

***Carlos Mesa was Sanchez de Lozada’s vice-president

****President of the Supreme Court became president after Mesa’s resignation

Source: Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University; Gamarra and Malloy (1995).

Table 2: Overview Peruvian presidents, 1980-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Head of Government</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>Fernando Belaúnde</td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>Alan García</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Cambio’90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-2000</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Nueva Mayoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>Valentín Paniagua</td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-Nov. 2006</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>Perú Posible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2006-2011</td>
<td>Alan García</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University; Cotler (1995).
Table 3: Fragmentation in Bolivia 1980–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Effective number of parties at electoral level</th>
<th>Effective number of parties at the parliamentary/legislative level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Electoral systems website, Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin.

Table 4: Fragmentation in Peru 1980–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Effective number of parties at electoral level</th>
<th>Effective number of parties at the parliamentary/legislative level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a 1980-1990: Based on lower chamber in Congress, from 1995 based on Congress.
b My own calculations based at Gallagher’s system

Source: Electoral systems website, Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin.
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