CROSS-NATIONAL SOCIAL RESEARCH

1. A Preliminary Frame of Reference

2. A Supplement to the Preliminary Frame of References

by

Bjørn Christiansen, Herbert Hyman, and Ragnar Rommetveit.

- INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR -

Institute for Social Research
Oslo, May 1951.
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The Purpose of this Monograph.

Research is always an adventure. Inquiries into the most classic fields confront the researcher with problems for which he is somewhat unprepared. But the adventure is even more hazardous when entering a field as new as cross-national research. We have too little past experience to guide us and there is too little in the way of established theory and method for cross-national social research.

Despite the risk, the formation of the Oslo International Seminar represents a decision to undertake the adventure. A group of European scholars will meet to plan a cross-national research project. In the hope that we will all be better equipped for the undertaking, the writers acting as a small working committee in Oslo have been considering some of the problems of planning and conducting such a novel research inquiry and have set down their thoughts in this brief monograph.

We realize that this is only a beginning, and that the group will have to devote long and careful future study to the problems involved, but we hope that our thoughts will at least make some modest contribution -- even if it only be to make explicit what some of the problems are. Each section of this monograph concentrates on some specialized aspect of the total problem.

Section I raises the fundamental question of Cross-National Research For What Purpose and on what problems. The phase of research inquiry that it deals with is the selection of the problem especially suited to comparative study among nations. Since the choice of problem will be made by the seminar group on the basis of its discussions, we felt it important to stress that the choice of problem should be made not merely on grounds of personal preference and interest, not merely in terms of the intrinsic importance of the problem, but in terms of the explicit principle that some real gain shall come about by studying that particular problem via cross-national research. Our preliminary thinking was directed at discovering what specific gains can be derived from cross-national research, and whether each of these gains can only be derived if the problem selected is of a certain type. We have not ranked the different classes of gains, and leave it to the group to make such calculations. But we stress the importance of considering such calculations in choosing any problem for cross-national study.

In Section II we raise questions about a more advanced stage of inquiry. Granted the selection of some problem, it may be conceptualized in a variety of ways. Here too we suggest the explicit principle that the
choice of a conceptual system - a model - shall be in terms of the suitability of that model for a cross-national research. Again the choice of a model is seen not in terms of personal preference or systematic background of the individual, but in terms of the differential gain to be derived from cross-national research when a given model is employed.

The discussion of conceptual systems leads directly to methodological problems. Theory is followed by method - method permitting the translation of the theory into actual research. Therefore we set down some preliminary views of what methodology is most appropriate to yield the benefits potential in cross-national research.

Sections I and II raise these problems essentially in abstract terms. We felt that these principles required illustration if they were to be easily understood. We also felt that we could induce principles by the examination of concrete research inquiries. By examining a given research plan in relation to the hypothetical opportunity to carry it out on a cross-national basis, we felt that we might become sensitive to specific aspects of theory and method needing special consideration in cross-national research. From such case studies of modified actual research designs we would hope ultimately to expand and improve our initial principles. Only one such case study is presented and we hope that the Seminar may consider it worthwhile to add other cases to form a series from which more definitive principles could be induced. Section III presents this case study in detail.

Finally in Section IV we list selected literature that has been of help in developing our point of view, and which will provide useful background for the discussions of the Seminar. The study of the concrete case is one source of principles and guidance - the study of the accumulated literature and wisdom of the past is another.

Out of such small beginnings may ultimately come the definitive THEORY AND METHOD OF CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH. To the task of developing such a theory we commend the International Seminar Participants.
Section I.

THE CONDITIONS WARRANTING CROSS-NATIONAL SOCIAL RESEARCH.

By Herbert Hyman

The difficulties involved in planning and execution of a common research project in several nations are many. The likelihood of error is increased due to the fragmenting of authority among participants in the different countries with a consequent reduction in uniformity of procedure. In addition, the increased size of the project necessitates increased staff with inevitable reduction in the quality of that staff. Unknown variables present in one country and not another are confounded with the independent variables of central interest and may obscure the findings. If the nations as such are to be compared, new technical tools may have to be developed to bridge the gap between a level of description which characterizes individuals as in the usual research, and the level needed to describe an entire nation in the aggregate. Finally, there is an inevitable increase in costs due to the geographical spread and unwieldiness of administration.

Given these drawbacks, it behooves us to consider carefully the wisdom of undertaking any particular comparative research project. Such research would only be justified when certain unique gains are derived.

These gains are of four types:

a. Non-Scientific Gains,

b. Applied Social Science Gains,

c. Instrumental Gains, i.e., Methodological and Substantive Findings Essential to the Solution of Other Scientific Problems,

d. Fundamental Social Science Gains.

1. Non-Scientific Gains.

Any research in a number of nations may lead to no increase whatsoever in fundamental knowledge, but may provide training for the scientists of the future in that country. Or it may lay the groundwork for future cooperation among intellectuals across national barriers. Such gains, by definition can only be secured through comparative research, and provide one important justification.
In assessing any comparative research project for its contribution towards this end, it would seem that the good project would be one in which large numbers of individuals receive training and become involved in international cooperation, and one in which the techniques learned are not limited in applicability to a narrow range of problems. Projects involving too few participants and techniques that are esoteric or of limited usefulness cannot be justified for comparative research under this criterion.


One of the responsibilities of social science is to apply its general methods and theories to the improvement of human life. Applied social science has always regarded problems of intergroup conflict, and ultimately international conflict, as central. Any applications in the area of international relations, e.g., British-American conflict, can be effective only if there is knowledge about people of both countries. All substantive studies in international relations, call for comparative studies of nations if they are really to be useful. Any substantive problems on the periphery of this area also call for comparative research. Studies of aggression, of beliefs and attitudes about war etc. insofar as they are intended for applied social science, call for knowledge of the problem in many countries. A variety of purely descriptive studies come under this heading and can be justified:

For example, the beliefs and attitudes of people in one nation towards peoples of other nations, and the complementary beliefs of people in other nations towards the population of the first nation would seem to be legitimate in terms of obvious relevance to hostilities.

Studies of the value systems of peoples in many nations would seem to be justified, in terms of the logic of finding common grounds for unity or cross-national loyalties. Studies of the multiple group memberships of individuals and their loyalties to various groups, subcultural, national, etc. would seem to be relevant in terms of the growth of extra-national sentiments.

However, it would seem that such studies should be more pointed to be of real value. For example, any studies of mutual beliefs and attitudes should over-sample leadership levels of opinion because of the greater relevance of such groups to international events. Studies of value systems should go beyond enumeration of common values, to the establishment of the hierarchy of values, since values low in the person's hierarchy even though held in common with people of other nations will be overridden by other
unique values higher in the person's hierarchy. Similarly, the hierarchy of group memberships must be established and not merely the presence of some loyalty.

Furthermore, if the aim of comparative research is application, such projects can be justified only where there is at least some small likelihood that the findings can be acted upon by some action agency. Otherwise, the so-called applied social science gain is purely academic.

3. Instrumental Gains.

In the long run the power of science is dependent not only on the creativeness of the scientist in developing hypotheses, but on his ability to obtain precise empirical results. This is dependent on methodological research leading to the development of new technique for testing hypotheses. Comparative research of a substantive sort may not only require the development of some brand new technique, but also that a given technique be applicable in all the countries being studied. Any methodological research conducted on a comparative basis, either to develop new techniques or to establish their applicability in a group of countries can be justified.

In planning fundamental projects in many countries, it may be necessary not only to develop or validate special techniques, but also to collect a certain amount of information as a preliminary to detailed planning. Or, on occasion it may be that exploratory study, or "case study" in a number of countries may reveal a problem or variable hitherto neglected in the original planning.

All such work, methodological or substantive, is thoroughly justified as an essential preliminary to systematic comparative research. However, one would attempt to do such work on limited funds, and only where it is focussed on some definite larger project.

4. Fundamental Social Science Gains.

Under certain conditions, comparative research provides the basis for increased knowledge of a fundamental theoretical sort. Gains in fundamental knowledge, of course, come about when precise functional relations between variables are established. Following the initial hypothesis, one must find the appropriate situation or experiment in which to test it. In so far as conditions within any single country permit such a test, comparative research across nations should normally not be attempted, because of the special difficulties mentioned initially in this memorandum. However, there
may be hypotheses which can only be tested by comparing different countries. Before considering the nature of such hypotheses we should consider one other feature of the research process which ultimately leads to increased knowledge and which may be aided by comparative research.

The scientist is concerned not only with testing his hypotheses, but with establishing their generality. He hopes to establish that such relationships between variables apply to a wide range of people and situations, or at least that the limited finding isn't a sheer product of accidental technical features of the particular experiment or research he conducted. Normally, by replicating the experiment and establishing the same finding again, he demonstrates that it was not an "accidental" finding, and by testing it over a wide range of conditions, he establishes its generality. Comparative research in two or more nations clearly does not serve the usual functions of a replication.

By definition, replication means that two experiments are identical, and by definition, this cannot be the case when the two studies are conducted in different countries, on different populations, under different social conditions. If the results in the two countries are different, one cannot conclude that there is no validity whatsoever to the hypothesis. It may mean that both findings are correct, that some systematic variable operating in one country accounts for the difference and that the hypothesis has merit but needs to include auxiliary principles. In order for one to be able to resolve this dilemma of interpretation one must have initially incorporated into the theoretical structure of the research, a statement of those additional variables that may cause the difference so that one can measure this variable, and establish empirically that the relationship of X and Y is in turn a function of Z. However, if the results in the two countries are alike, it does increase the generality of the finding, and nets a considerable scientific gain.

To undertake comparative research, without incorporating into the theory just such hypotheses about the possible different findings, and merely to hope that a general or universal law will be established is a most hazardous undertaking. All past knowledge would suggest that social psychological phenomena would vary in different settings. And merely to establish different phenomena in the different countries without being able to explain them to some degree would be a most abortive finding.

Apart from the possible gains in the generality of our finding, comparative research may provide the unique opportunity for testing certain
hypotheses. What differentiates these hypotheses from hypotheses testable within one national boundary. It is obviously not the nature of the dependent variables, since dependent variables of every psychological sort might well be affected by factors present in one nation and not another. There is no basis for excluding from comparative research phenomena of any type. Even the most basic categories of systematic psychology—perception of time, of causality, so-called fundamental needs, problem solving, concept formation and other intellectual and cognitive entities have been found to be a function of social or cultural conditions. It is on the side of the independent variables that the basis for exclusion from comparative research occurs. To establish the influence of an independent variable on some phenomenon, different values of it must be available. If particular values of a given variable cannot be found within a given nation, but can be found in the contrasting conditions of two or more countries, this provides the instance in which comparative national research serves a unique scientific function. Unless there is at least one independent variable of this type in the schema, the project cannot be justified on the grounds of gains in fundamental knowledge. Note that this criterion is not that the entire project shall concentrate on such variables, but only that some part of it find the unique testing ground in the study of several nations.

It is clear that independent variables of a purely psychological sort can be represented in experiments or studies within one nation. There is every reason to believe that within large complex nations one can find a wide distribution of values of such variables. True there may be a higher proportion of given psychological characteristics in a given national population (since such factors in turn derive from other environmental factors), but for purposes of experimental comparisons, the number is irrelevant. For example, the relation of deep personality factors to social attitudes, or the effect of early childhood experience, to cite a current vogue in social psychology, could easily be observed within one nation. Unless such studies also incorporate into the theoretical structure additional features, they are not appropriate.

In addition to "uniqueness", the variable should have some aggregate character. In order to design a cross-national study effectively, one must have some basis of knowledge for picking the countries to be studied. Ideally, one should be able to pick countries which are contrasted with respect to the given variable. Variables that are "individualistic concepts" cannot easily be used to label a given country, unless there is some prior enumeration of the population on the basis of which the country can be
described in some statistical sense. With respect to most sophisticated psychological concepts of an "individualistic" sort, there is no ready statistical knowledge for characterizing an entire nation (or a large portion of the population) as typifying that value of the variable. *)

Obviously, variables of an "aggregate character" for which many unique values exist only in comparisons of nations would be historical, geographical, economic, political, sociological and cultural. Such factors would be introduced into the conceptual framework of a study in one of two ways. Either they would be studied as factors initiating some phenomenon, or as factors intervening between some independent variable of a psychological sort and some behavioral consequence. Thus, for example, one might study two nations with contrasted educational systems and observe the difference in aggressive attitudes, or one might study the channeling of aggressive behavior in particular directions as a function of education or propaganda about certain sub-groups. In the latter case one would not think of the educational practices as initiating the aggressive tendencies but as mediating between two psychological variables.

Apart from such independent variables, there would seem to be a number of social psychological variables that would lend themselves uniquely to comparative research. Variables having to do with the nature of leadership have what we have labelled "aggregate" character, and seem potentially very fruitful explanatory concepts as witnessed by the work of Lewin**) on leadership and group atmosphere as influences on behavior.

There are obviously many projects which would satisfy these formal criteria. In deciding among them, auxiliary principles might be invoked. For example, where two projects lead to increases in fundamental knowledge, and both find unique tests in comparative research, one should select on "economic" grounds. Such factors at ease of completion, costs of research, and availability of personnel should be considered.

*) R.B. Cattell's recent paper involving an exhaustive attempt to characterize nations on the basis of existing statistical and historical data shows what exotic, tangential indices must be used as approximations to psychological concepts, because of the lack of more relevant information. See "The Dimensions of Culture Patterns by Factorization of National Characters" the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 44, 1949, 443-469.

**) See for example, Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally created "Social climates". J. Soc. Psychol., 1939, 10, 291-299.
Section II.

SOME GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH ON TENSIONS. A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF RESEARCH MODELS.

By Ragnar Rommetveit.

1. Research model and research field.

Students of social science, when reading research reports of various kinds, may sometimes be struck with a feeling of curiosity as to "what is behind" the plan of research reported.

Frequently the researcher has started out with an implicit model, an unverbalized point of view. His model - whether it upon careful inspection and analysis be termed "biological", "Freudian", "functional" or something else - may determine his total research approach to a degree of which he may not be aware himself. Sometimes the reader's curiosity, if adequately expressed, may force the writer to make explicit his "meta-theory" and basic theoretical framework.

This "what is behind-phenomenon" is in itself a fascinating problem of special interest for the psychology of research and the sociology of knowledge. Its relevance to a discussion of cross-national comparative research, while not obvious, is considerable. We may try to justify it as follows:

Functionally, the research model is systematic and integrative. It is systematic from the point of view of the specific research field to be explored and integrative from the point of view of general theory. It systematizes the data from the specific field by serving as a skeleton to be covered by the body of research material. At the same time - in so far as it is rooted in general social theory - it makes the specific knowledge obtained an integral part of the general social theory from which the model stems.

By "research model" is here roughly meant "types of hypotheses and conceptual framework". Suppose that a body of research material relevant to psychological tension is so collected that it readily lends itself to various methods of analysis. One alternative of analysis may be to start
out with a "cognitive map model" of tension phenomena as suggested by Tolman (19). Then our primary skeleton of hypotheses (arrow C.M.) and concepts (rings) would center on perception and cognition. Non-perceptual and non-cognitive concepts (circles) would enter as auxiliary hypotheses (broken arrows). That implies that coding and conceptualization procedures would differ in many respects from those required by a skeleton of hypotheses and concepts (C.A.) growing out of general theoretical considerations concerning conditioning of aggressive modes of behavior. In this specific case central concepts in the C.M. approach coincide with auxiliary concepts in the C.A. approach, and vice versa. In both instances attempts are made at making the specific knowledge an integrated part of general psychological theory. In all instances of social scientific analysis of data and planning of research - in so far as planning and analysis aim at conclusions having some validity beyond the specific field explored - research models are needed.

If then a cross-national research project within the area of tension is to be more than mere fact-finding and "empty correlations", some sort of a research model is needed. It would be mere stupidity to start from scratch without any theoretical framework of research. Furthermore, when we take into consideration the theoretical background of the participants in the planning, we must recognize that such a start from scratch is a pure impossibility.

Granted, then, that some sort of a research model is required, we may proceed to state the following propositions:

I. The model should be explicit rather than implicit.

II. There already exist a series of more or less explicitly expressed models in social science, growing out of the various branches ranging from experimental psychology to cultural anthropology.
III. There is an interrelationship between research model and field of research in the way that (a) originally the model is in part a product of the field of research, but (b) at the same time a given model structures the field and determines to a certain extent what phenomena within the field will be chosen as subjects of research.

IV. In so far as the field of cross-national comparative research within the area of tension is a new one and has its unique characteristics as a research field, we cannot expect models from other research areas to fit without modifications and/or compromises.

Comments:

Proposition I rests upon the assumption that research within social science is a continuous process and the degree of profit from any research project in the long run is closely dependent upon the communication of knowledge to future readers and therefore upon the explicitness of the basic theoretical framework of the given project. Furthermore, if we assume that proposition III is sound, we may argue for choice of subject for research in terms of research models. Subject A may be preferred to subject B because the model appropriate for A is superior to the model required by B. Such arguments presuppose explicitly stated models.

As to proposition II it should be mentioned that the alternative models referred to here are not methodologically different approaches, but conceptually different ones. (Stated in another way: The model categories are defined not by methodological but by conceptual differences in approach.) Thus we shall not talk of operational vs. non-operational models. A "cognitive map model" as roughly indicated in Fig. 1, may be either operational or non-operational in its elaboration into a research plan, and so may the C.A. model. Furthermore: It seems reasonable to speak of broad types or categories of models like "personality-centered" and "society-centered". A psychoanalytic model thus may be subsumed under the "personality-centered" category.

Proposition III a. is almost self evident. We can hardly think of a sociologist stating his basic theoretical framework in terms of just noticeable sensational differences or a student of sensation with a research model the core of which is the concept of social role. However, models originating in one (narrow) field of research may be elaborated for the purpose of application in other (wider) fields of research. Thus Gestalt models, growing out of the psychology of perception, have been modified and extended
to a series of other research fields. Illustrative of proposition III b. are the experimental reports from learning theorists representing "cognitive map" or "Gestalt" models on the one hand and those representing "drive reduction" or "stimulus-response" models on the other. Whereas the favorite phenomena of research of the former group is problem-solving, the latter group has as its favorite field habit formation.

Proposition IV will be discussed more in detail throughout the rest of this paper. The purpose is - by abstraction, simplification and schematization - to try to bring into focus some basic theoretical problems implicitly facing the planners of a cross-national comparative research. If this preliminary attempt at an analysis in terms of appropriate models and levels of analysis may contribute toward a fruitful discussion it will serve its purpose - even though its suggestions are ultimately rejected by the group of planners. Our sole excuse for presenting the subtle theoretical issues involved in terms of an oversimplified contrast between models is to dramatize the problem. The first step will be a sketchy description of two categories of research models labelled "personality-centered" and "society-centered".

2. "Personality-centered" models.

By a personality-centered model of research is meant a model at the core of which are personality variables more or less systematically conceptualized into a functionally integrated personality system. Such models have their roots in psychiatry, psycho-analysis or more academic psychology of personality. In spite of the heterogeneity of this category, it seems safe to say that it has certain unique characteristics. First of all: The personality-centered model has as its genuine unit of research the individual personality. The ideal model of this type should be elaborated so as to reveal "the laws of personality" and the central constructs are by and large motivational. The conceptual framework fits the problems of personal adjustment. If applied to problems of group tensions, the personality variables are still the primary ones.

Fairly representative of this model is the longitudinal psycho-analytic approach described by Klineberg (8, pp. 40). Ideally, the personality-centered model should be applicable to research within any given social structure. In the prediction of group tensions, social structure may enter the conceptual framework to modify personality laws, but seldom
in any systematic way. Aggregate phenomena (like "national character", "group aggressiveness" etc.) may be described in terms of personality, for instance in terms of dominant personality type grown out of prevailing type of child-rearing.

The personality-centered approach to the field of aggression is described by Klineberg (8, p. 188) as follows: "A .... major approach to the problem sees the explanation of aggression in terms of the psychology of the individuals making up a particular society. From this view, the "social influences throughout life" are mainly the actual experiences of individuals, usually in early life, which create a need for, or at least a tendency toward, aggressive behavior. This approach leans heavily on psycho-analytic theory and on clinical experience, which throw light on the way in which aggression enters into individual behavior. By a sort of extrapolation such individual aggressiveness and the factors for it are used as an explanation for group aggression as well.

The material illustrating this point of view is found mainly the writings of psychoanalysis and secondarily in those of psychologists interested in exploring the validity of the psychoanalytic hypotheses." (Italics ours).


The society-centered model, stemming from cultural anthropology and sociology, has as its genuine unit of research "society" or "sub-society" variables, i.e. institutional features and characteristics of the social structure. (For instance social status, political apparatus, economic system etc). If personality variables should enter the scheme, they do so only qua auxiliary variables modifying to some extent the predictions based upon social structure and "laws of society".

Klineberg's description of the society-centered approach to the field of aggression runs as follows (8, p. 188): "On the one hand there are the attempts to explain aggression by describing the patterns of culture and the social organization which predispose toward aggressive action against a presumed enemy. Stress is then laid on the extent to which aggression is accepted or rejected through the mores or folkways of a community. In this sense aggression, including the form of group aggression known as warfare, is a social institution. It is developed in certain communities more than in others. It is to be explained partly by historical and partly by economic factors, but it exists in a community because it has been accepted by that
community as a sanctioned form of behavior. From this view a society can be described as having a greater or lesser "aggressiveness" as indicated by its readiness to embark upon this particular activity. On the variations among societies in this respect, the richest sources of material are cultural anthropology and history."

This description can be supplemented by a few statements fairly representative of Merton's functional analysis (15, p. 25): "Social function refers to observable objective consequences of patterns of punishment, and not to subjective dispositions (aims, motives, purposes.)" And (15, p. 27): "There will plainly be occasion to limit the use of the sociological concept of function, and there will be need to distinguish clearly between subjective categories of disposition and objective categories of observed consequences. Else the substance of functional approach may become lost in a cloud of hazy definitions." Furthermore (3, p. 32): "The theoretical framework of functional analysis must expressly require that there be specification of the units for which a given social or cultural item is functional. It must expressly allow for a given item having diverse consequences, functional and disfunctional, for individuals, for subgroups, and for the more inclusive social structure and culture." (Italics ours) - The choice of "a given social or cultural item" as the unit for research and the rejection of "subjective categories of disposition" - from his functional analysis make Merton's theoretical framework decidedly society-centered. The items to which functions are imputed (the units of research) are social roles, institutional patterns, devices for social control etc. having certain consequences for the total society and/or "subsocieties". A purely society-centered research model is also to be found in Linton's writings (13).

The difference between the society-centered model and the personality-centered one may be roughly illustrated by their hypothetical application to the same field of research. Suppose we were to explore the relationship between childhood influences and adult aggressiveness. The society centered model would lead to an exploration of the institutional aspects of child rearing and education, sanctioned ways of child-rearing and cultural norms surrounding the child. The dependent variable might be stated in terms of group characteristics or institutions, especially hostility and institutionalized channels of aggression between subgroups of the given society and hostility toward outgroups, partially as expressed in mass media, etc. The researcher favoring a personality centered model, on the other hand, would
primarily concentrate upon intimate face-to-face relationships as his independent variable and state his dependent variable in terms of aggressiveness as a personality trait.

4. Should cross-national research within the area of tension be "personality-centered" or "society-centered"?

This question, it may be argued, has implicitly been answered by the very descriptions of the two types of models just given. As Hyman (5) has pointed out, certain "aggregate variables" should be central in the cross-national comparative research. If not, the cross-national comparison will turn into an expensive luxury. This implies that the personality-centered model must be rejected unless the purpose of the research is to test the validity and universality of specific hypotheses advanced by psychoanalysts, psychiatrists or students of personality. Furthermore, results stated in terms of a personality-centered model would imply minimal applied social science gain (5) in so far as manipulable institutional factors were left unexplored.

The rejection of the personality-centered model does not, however, necessarily imply that personality variables should be neglected. The latter procedure might turn out a rather dangerous one for two reasons:

I. It might lead to a superficial analysis in the sense that "deep" and latent aggressiveness would not be detected. We might get at salient, but superficial and temporary attitudes determined to a large extent by casual "historical" factors like an emergent political crisis etc.

II. In so far as the majority of hypotheses concerning the origin of tension stem from purely personality centered research, the neglect of personality variables would imply that the hypotheses mentioned (like the frustration-aggression hypotheses etc.) must be excluded from the research model.

It should be mentioned here that some researchers believe that the basic tension mechanisms hold for the group in much the same way as for the individual (8, p. 208) and that we therefore might relatively safely extend the personality-centered hypotheses to groups and societies without including in our research model the personality variables. Klineberg questions the safety of such an extension (8, p. 209): "A student of group relations is continually impressed by the fact that the aggressive tendencies
of a nation are not always identical with the aggressive tendencies of individuals within it. The fact that these two kinds of aggression are interrelated is undeniable, the assumption that they are identical must be questioned". - Hypotheses concerning the socially determined channeling of individual tension are needed in addition to the personality-centered hypotheses concerning its origin.

The impossibility of extending the hypotheses derived from personality-centered research to group relations is also stressed by Landecker in his analysis of international relations as intergroup relations (10, p. 335): "A group can be an object of behavior, but it cannot be a subject of behavior." Because hypotheses like the frustration-aggression hypotheses are derived from and stated in terms of individual behavior, they cannot be directly applied to intergroup relations.

The discussion up to this point seems to lead to the conclusion that either type of research model has certain advantages and neither of them should be completely rejected. The problem seems to be how to profit from personality-centered hypotheses in connection with a society-centered research approach.

One possible solution to this dilemma might be that both models should be applied. This solution implies that the research must be planned in terms of two different levels of analysis, one societal level and one individual. A research field like that mentioned at the end of chapter 3 might thus be explored relatively independently on two levels.

Another possible solution is an attempt at integrating the two models into a "personality-within-a-social-system" type of approach. The resultant integrated model would be of a field-theoretical character. The conceptualization of tension-inducing forces would be society-centered in the sense that we would think of them not so much in terms of (idiosyncratic) personal experiences as in terms of "objective" barriers or sources of frustration inherent in and determined by the given social system. This would allow for a variety of aggregate characteristics unique for a given society (like characteristics of political apparatus, educational system etc.) to be made central independent variables without neglecting the personality variables and the hypotheses concerning the origin of individual tension. A careful analysis should be made both of:

(A) possible socially determined barriers in each given society determining individual experiences of frustration etc. and (b) socially determined channels of tension. - This type of "personality-within-the-social-system" model is nicely demonstrated by Hyman in his tentative scheme of nationalism (4).
To illustrate further certain advantages of such a model we'll try to demonstrate its application to the longitudinal research project mentioned before. (The relationship between childhood influences and adult aggressiveness).

Let us start with the analysis of an individual case and, for the sake of simplification, reduce the "project" to an analysis of the relationship between influences at a given time $t_1$ in early childhood and aggressiveness at time $t_2$ in adulthood.

![Levels of analysis diagram](image)

**Fig. 2.** Levels of analysis.

On an individual level of analysis (I.L. in fig. 2) we may trace the consequences of intimate personal experiences (P) at $t_1$ on aggressiveness as a "deep" personality trait (A). On the sociological level we may trace the consequences of certain characteristics of the social system, f.i. a sociological variable like parents' social status (S), on P. (Social status is of course only one of many alternatives here, and is chosen primarily because a fruitful analysis of the S-P relationship already has been made by Ericson (2) on a national basis). We may further trace the channeling of A on the sociological level (by the introduction into the scheme of sociological variables like membership in political party, educational status etc.) to "high level" aspects of aggressiveness (H) like attitudes of hostility toward specific subgroups within the total social system or toward specific outgroups. "Deep" (personality) aspects (A) and "high level" (social) aspects (H) of aggressiveness may be detected resp. by projective tests and attitude scales (Cfr. 7).

On the collective (or cultural anthropological) level, C. L. we may try to trace the consequences of some defined feature of the specific culture as an entity (C) like economic system etc. on the S-variables. The arrows at the bottom of the diagram may then be read as follows: To what extent are the individual child's experiences at $t_1$ determined by the status
of his parents, and to what extent are the status categories determined by aggregate characteristics like economic competition etc. unique for the social system (nation)? As to the dependent variable top of the diagram the high level aspects of aggressiveness may be traced further to aggressiveness toward specific groups (M) as channelled by political apparatus, propaganda agencies etc. and expressed in mass media. The arrows at the top of the diagram may thus be read as follows: How and toward what groups is "deep aggressiveness" channelled in the given society and how does it function within the social system and in relation to other social systems?

This model thus stresses the analysis of social channelling and at the same time (as indicated by broken arrows) make possible three levels of analysis, resp. the psychological, the sociological and the cultural anthropological. (Cfr. Krech and Crutchfield's discussion of levels of social analysis, 9 p. 13). The advantage of this type of model should be the integration of personality variables and sociological variables. On both the independent variable and the dependent variable side it presents explicitly stated hypotheses concerning social channelling i.e. concerning the relationship between personality variables, sociological variables and aggregate or cultural anthropological variables.

5. The phenomenon to be compared. "Nominal sameness"
   vs. "Functional equivalence".

The kind of model thinking presented hitherto suggests that one more important problem crucial to comparative social research should be brought into focus. This problem refers to the choice of subject of research and may be stated as follows: What is meant by the phrase that we are to study "the same phenomenon within different societies"? In so far as a phrase of this type is included in a program for cross-national comparative research, an answer to the problem stated above is a prerequisite for choice of subject (Cfr. 6 and 17).

Suppose that we started out with an unsophisticated concept of sameness ("nominal sameness") in the sense that we chose as our subject a phenomenon labelled by the same term in the different countries where it occurs. (Examples: Attitude toward U.S.A., the Communist Party). To what extent does the sameness expand beyond mere terminology, to "psychological" or "sociological" sameness?

In principle the concept of sameness may be defined in a variety of ways. In the following discussion it will be replaced by the concept of
functional equivalence, preliminarily defined as follows: A given item, X, in an integrated system, A, is equivalent to a given item, Y, in a system of the same kind, B, if and only if item X influences the other items in A (except the one under study) and the total system A in the same way as does item Y in system B. Some of the terms here and, in particular, the phrase "influences in the same way as" evidently are in need of further definition. For the present purpose, however, they may be left in their vague form.

Let us then again resort to model-thinking by referring to two types of functional equivalence, resp. functional equivalence from the point of view of the personality centered model ("psychological equivalence") and functional equivalence from the point of view of the society centered model ("sociological equivalence"). Psychologically equivalent phenomena should have identical influences on a given personality system, irrespective of their social influences or, in Merton's terms, social function. Thus religious and political affiliations may be psychologically functionally equivalent within different social settings, as suggested by writers like Counts and Lodge, stressing the essentially religious quality of the Soviet outlook on the world, in which "I want to be like Stalin" is the equivalent of "I want to be like Jesus" in the Christian community. (8, p. 88).

Sociological equivalence, on the other hand, implies identical social functions. Thus military propaganda leading to volunteering and enacted enrollment may in a given case be sociologically equivalent in the sense that both procedures lead to military organization and similar changes in economic and working conditions. Somewhat similarly, two quite different religious sects may show some sort of sociological equivalence in two countries in the sense that they represent "the same type of deviation" and similar functions within the total patterns of religious institutions of the resp. countries.

Furthermore, from the point of view of the society centered model a variety of individual motives (hostility toward enemy, fear of deviation from group of comrades etc.) are equivalent in so far as they all lead to the acceptance of a given social role (like a soldier's role). In this case sociological equivalence clearly runs contrary to psychological equivalence, and within the area of tension we will probably find a variety of similar instances. Psychological and sociological equivalence will coincide only to the extent that social channelling is identical in different societies. The problem is then which type of "equivalence within different countries" the subject of research should represent.
This problem may seem rather academic when we consider how little is known about functional equivalence, whether psychological or sociological, of social phenomena. Obviously relevant research data are scarce and the very testing of some functional equivalence hypotheses may well be made an important part of the purpose and plan of a comparative research. As far as we can see, however, some functional equivalence decisions must be made a priori in the planning of a cross-national research project. Unless some sort of criteria of "sameness within different countries" other than those of nominal sameness are applied in the choice of a research subject the comparative value of the project may turn out to be lower than expected.

6. The importance of multivariate design in cross-national research.

The fact that so little is known about functional equivalence of social phenomena within different social structures must partially be explained in terms of theoretical heterogeneity and lack of systematic conceptualization. The cultural anthropologist is inclined to describe each (primitive) society in terms of concepts unique for the particular society studied (18). Systems of description and conceptual frameworks suitable to any given society, including highly civilized ones, cannot be found at the present stage of social science (except by content analysis of social scientists' wishes). The need for such systems of description is obvious and has recently resulted in promising but long-range programs like the Yale Cross Cultural Survey (16).

Planners of cross-national comparative research are therefore at present facing severe difficulties in their attempts at getting at variables adequacy expressing significant differences in culture and social structure between highly civilized societies. By following suggestions from comparative sociological research performed within single but culturally heterogeneous societies and from cultural anthropological research, they may be able to make guesses at crucial aggregate variables. Furthermore, attempts may be made in advance at empirically checking such guesses, for instance by pilot studies of a semantic character where already existing bodies of relevant data are available (8, p. 84). Mc Granahan and Wayne's attempt to compare German and American traits reflected in the 45 most popular plays in each country in 1927 (14) is representative of this type of study. A significant point in this connection is that the ultimate plan of research should allow for a multitude of such guesses to be checked simultaneously. This may be obtained by a multivariate research design, whereas the classical univariate design makes the success of our project depend upon one single guess.
The importance of multivariate design in social science is brilliantly stressed by Fisher (3) and by Brunswik (1). The latter points to the failure of the classical univariate design in experimental psychology to do justice to interaction and ecological representativeness of stimulus variables. By isolating and trying out a series of independent variables one by one ("holding all other conditions constant") one cannot get at an adequate analysis of their interaction. Representative variation and co-variation of independent variables are needed.

In social surveys we are studying variables interacting in their "natural setting", but often legitimate interaction effects of two social phenomena are rejected, controlled by higher order breakdowns and analysed in terms of the logic of spuriousness. In so far as the confluence of the two phenomena is representative of the social system studied and neither of them can be said to be cause of the other they should be studied in terms of representative interaction rather than in terms of spuriousness.

The implications of Brunswik's point of view for comparative research of a cross-national nature, however, go beyond the mere demonstration of the fact that it is, like most nonlaboratory social research, inherently multivariate and thus readily lends itself to fruitful analyses of interaction. They may be elaborated as follows (as suggestions relevant to choice of subject and research plan):

I. On each level of analysis data on a series of variables relevant to the skeleton of general hypotheses may be collected.

II. Each variable may be measured in terms of a series of dimensions so that a series of relatively independently obtained indices should be available.

Suppose we are to choose some independent variable(s) representing socially determined barrier(s) or source(s) of frustration in a broadly stated "frustration-aggression" model of research. If the classical univariate experimental design is our ideal, we should search for one single variable fulfilling some criteria of "pure frustration". On the other hand, a multivariate design implies that we should introduce into our model a series of variables representing social barriers even though none of them can be said to fulfill the criteria of a "pure" or "isolated" variable in the sense suggested above. Thus we may attempt to trace the consequences of economic institutions, educational institutions etc. simultaneously. Furthermore, each of these complex "variables" may be broken down into
several dimensions relevant to our hypothesis concerning the origin of tension. Thus educational systems within different countries may be compared with respect to (1) authoritarian pedagogy and (2) degree of independence between economic status and opportunity for education. The "liberal-authoritarian pedagogy" continuum and the "independence..." continuum may then be studied as important dimensions or attributes of the same complex variable. Perhaps both of them will show interesting interaction effects with other aggregate variables.

By a procedure as indicated above we shall thus arrive at a refined analysis of interaction in terms of the interaction of each dimension of a given variable X with each dimension of variable Y.

What, then, is the relevance of these multivariate design considerations to the guesses at crucial aggregate variables? First of all: The series of variables (and of dimensions of each single variable) on the collective (or cultural anthropological) level (Cfr. fig. 2) represent guesses per se and also permit guesses at variables to be described as combinations of (dimensions of) two or more of the variables. Suppose that the crucial aggregate variable we are searching for finally (after 100 years of research activities) turns out to be a complex and multidimensional variable most adequately described as a combination of a series of variables on the collective level. Then we shall recognize that the univariate design has offered no means of detecting it.

In addition, our tentative answer is that a deliberate multivariate analysis of phenomena on the sociological level (cfr. fig. 2) may contribute toward the isolation of a single aggregate variable that is crucial. Even if the crucial aggregate variable finally turns out to be a single variable in the sense that it cannot be described as a combination of variables on the collective level, that does not imply that it can be detected by a univariate research design. The crucial aggregate variable may turn out to be what the statistician labels a complex, multivariate "characteristic" such as a relation between or a pattern of variables on the sociological level.

For example, an exploration of the subdivisions of a given society as compared with other societies (of the frequency of overlapping of numbers of social categories, numbers of institutions etc.) may reveal aggregate attributes not clearly recognized before as national characteristics on the cultural anthropological level because they can only be detected by a multivariate analysis on the sociological level. The substructure of a society determines to a large extent the incidence of multiple group memberships
in the society. - Effects of multiple group memberships in terms of interaction have been studied by Lazarsfeld et al. (11). Lewin (12) makes an attempt at analysing resp. the German and the American "style of life" in terms of differences in the "general" or "typical" group membership. He suggests (12, p. 18): "The average "social distance" (the term used as in sociology) between different individuals seems to be smaller in the United States so far as the surface regions, or as one may say, the "peripheral regions" of personality are concerned". From the assumed differences in social relations (group memberships) he then tries to deduce differences with respect to inter-personal friction, thus suggesting a method of tracing the origin of individual tension from an hypothetical aggregate variable inferred from an analysis of group memberships.

How can we get at the appropriate empirical data for such a kind of inference? Suppose that the procedures indicated above (I and II) were performed and the kinds of indices of (each dimension of) each sociological (or social psychological) variable obtained in all countries studied. Confluence and interaction of couples of "variables" like social class - informational level, vocational status - membership in political party, (regardless of which party) etc. in a given society may then suggest aggregate qualities unique for that given country. Is it possible that such coincidence and interaction may reveal really significant characteristics of the aggregate structure like Lewin's hypothetical G-types and U.S.-types of group membership? If so, differences in social structure between highly civilized societies (national characteristics) may in the future be described in terms of differences as to confluence and interaction of variables on the sociological (non-collective) level.

In a cross-national research project within the area of tension this fundamental theoretical issue should not be neglected. Such a project offers an opportunity to check the scientific value of the aggregate variables chosen that is non-existent in any purely formal and descriptive study of social structures in different countries.

The point seems both worthy and in need of attempts at further clarification.
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Section III.

THE MODIFICATION OF A PERSONALITY-CENTERED CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM WHEN THE PROJECT IS TRANSLATED FROM A NATIONAL TO A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY.

A Case Study.

By Herbert Hyman.

1. Original project. Summary for a one-country study:

A group within the Oslo Institute has been engaged in planning a social survey research into the origins of nationalistic attitudes. The conceptual system may best be described as a "personality-centered system" for the understanding of social attitudes. In summary these adult attitudes are seen as imbedded in a certain type of personality structure - emerging because of dynamic considerations out of this personality structure, and the personality structure is seen as essentially determined by infantile experience of a certain sort. For detailed examination of an elaborate system of such a sort and the empirical project growing out of such a theory, the reader is referred to "The Authoritarian Personality" by Adorno, et al. (2). For the actual case under consideration, the reader is referred to the Memorandum by the Oslo Group, "Nationalism, A Study of Identifications with people and power" (in mimeo - Institute for Social Research, 1950.)

2. Modification of the project for a cross-national study:

While this project design is a most interesting and sophisticated one, it was planned in relation to opportunities to test it empirically only within one country, Norway. No opportunity to expand the project into a cross-national comparative study was available at the time of the design. Now that this opportunity presents itself (at least theoretically) the design can be re-examined, modified and extended so that the study can truly benefit from data of a comparative sort.

Within this frame of reference, the conceptual system lacks emphasis on independent variables of a social sort.

Obviously there is no reason to feel that one can not test hypotheses about the effect of such variables as nature of infantile experience
on adult social attitudes, or the effect of intra-psychic factors on the organization of attitudes in any single country. Thus basically the project gains nothing from simultaneous study in many countries, except a series of replications. The gain from so-called replications seem dubious, as indicated in the attached memo "The conditions warranting cross-national social research".

The real gain through comparative research would come only if we added variables and hypotheses about the way in which social factors, distributed unequally in the different countries, intervened to affect the processes hypothesized. For example, we might argue that the dynamic factor in the development of such adult attitudes was the hypothesized child influences, but that the specific manifestations of these attitudes was a function of given social and historical factors in the different countries. Or we might argue that the potential for anti-social behavior came from these early influences, but that the actual liberation of these tendencies into behavior is dependent on field forces acting as barriers to expression in the given countries. Or we might argue that the hypothesized dynamic factors influence any given individual's ideology, but that the over-all state of aggressive nationalism as expressed in the policies of a country are a function of structural factors working in such fashion that the influential policy-making segments of the population are the very groups whose child-rearing led them into nationalist ideologies.

Hypotheses of this sort would broaden the conceptual system, and knit it together. They would also represent hypotheses that could only be tested in a cross-national study; thus exploiting the opportunity at our disposal.

This kind of consideration of the conceptual system led to many additions. These are tentative and are graphically described in a diagram attached to the end of this memorandum which shows the various classes of variables. This diagram would now provide a basis for more detailed planning of an actual cross-national comparative research.

The incorporation of "social variables" might be rejected by "personality-centered" theorists on the false ground that such an approach is a hostile one, and that it draws attention away from the personality factors. Such theorists might feel that these two types of studies - of the personality determinants and the social determinants are somewhat separate additive features of the total problem, and that they can best be studied serially and separately. However, it should be realized that these
two classes of factors are not merely additive parts, but integral, interacting parts of a total process, both needing to be studied in an integrated project in order to insure a crucial study.

The consideration of such social variables for incorporation into the conceptual system of a comparative study also leads to more critical appraisal of the original personality-centered schema. Not only does one consider social factors operating across national boundaries, but one's attention is re-directed to social factors operating within the environment of any single country. This increased attention to the environmental field as such makes one question whether the original hypotheses will be borne out, since many variables may have been ignored which might obscure the anticipated relationships.

For example a man exposed to an objective threat in the environment from Russia would certainly appear oriented in the direction of power-nationalism, even if his childhood training were non-disciplinarian. If one had no measure (and thereby no analytic control) of such a variable as presence of threat, or belief about threat, the comparisons of disciplinarian vs. libertarian rearing might show nothing — if let us say, the disciplinarian-reared individual were exposed to less objective threat than the libertarian-reared individual. In other words, there were classes of variables which had to be incorporated into the conceptual system — not merely because they varied between countries — but because they provided the only insurance of a crucial test of the original hypotheses within a single country.

Variables of a cognitive sort bearing (at least) some relation to the objective features of the contemporary environment can of course be rejected on the basis of a kind of "subjectivist-personality" approach, and this is the common tendency of a personality-centered theorist. He would tend to regard these realities of the environment as unimportant and say that only the individual of personality-type "X" sees the threats when they are present, or he sees them when they are not even present. By this logic, one can say that all such variables are indignant in their influence on the development of attitudes. The absurdity of this view seems obvious when pushed to its extreme. To think that the threat of Russia (or America) is only the product of paranoidal personality types seems patently inadequate.

Other variables besides cognitions and perceptions about the environment immediately suggest themselves. Extensions and refinements of
the basic personality-dynamic orientation in the schema come to mind, as one considers whether these dynamics really are sufficient to explain the variety of behaviors observed for different individuals and groups. For example, it seems inadequate to assume that all individuals will operate according to the same dynamisms (e.g. projectivity), which is often implicit in the thinking of such theorists. There is considerable evidence from Rosenzweig (9) and Brewster Smith (10, 11) and Ackerman-Jahoda (1) that there are formal individual differences in the susceptibility to such dynamisms. Consequently, the relations hypothesized may, in the aggregate, wash out completely or only be moderate in magnitude. These differences might be conceptualized as "formal Motivational Structures", and if measures of these structures were incorporated into the system, we might then find that the hypotheses had great predictive power, for given sub-groups.

Similarly, the view that, somehow pervades the thinking of such theorists that all individuals catchet the political and social world with energies derived from basic intra-psychic levels is to ignore the fact (documented a hundred times) that for great masses of people the political world is too peripheral (perhaps even completely outside the psychological field) for it to engage the individual's deeper levels of personality. Goldhamer (3) and Brewster Smith (10, 11) make this point persuasively. Here again we wish to incorporate measures of the individual's remoteness from such areas of life, so that we can see if the hypotheses hold for certain sub-classes of individuals, but not for others. We fear that in the aggregate, the hypotheses may wash out.

3. The details of the tentative new conceptual system:

Each class of new factors is placed in the diagram in such a way as to give some sense of where in the process it intervenes. Some of these classes of factors - less self-explanatory than others - will be discussed here.

A. "Intended or Real Actions".

One of the limitations of the "Authoritarian Personality", and the nationalism project is to stop at the "attitude level". How do we know that the "fascist-potential" is really even a potential, or that it
will become actual at all. It is easy to see these verbalizations or sentiments as important, when you have no description of any fascistlike behavior.

Consequently, we have added sequentially at the far right of the diagram a further level of description of the dependent variable. From attitudes, we go to "intended or real actions". Naturally, we wish to incorporate into the interview or questionnaire, a measure for each individual of any of his actions that will be close to real behavior, or ideally would constitute real behavior, presumably flowing from his attitudes. In this way we see whether we really have anything that we can talk about as socially dangerous tendencies.

B. "Field Forces Acting as Barriers."

The more important gain by far from adding "Actions" is not merely in "validating" the attitude findings, but in giving us a test of certain hypotheses, ultimately leading to social control over horrible people. These bad attitudes are likely to flow into behavior, providing there are no barriers to the expression of them. Now if we can measure the attitude level, plus the behavioral level, plus the class of factors, next to the far right of the page, labelled "field forces" (a loose term for the class), we may be able to find that the potential never gets actualized if field force Z is present. This seems far better practically than the utopian program implicit in the personality-centered approach, that you control such phenomena by revolutionary changes in the controls that free, private families exercise over their children. Theoretically, it also increases the comprehensiveness of the project.

As well, it seems likely that the class of factors, field forces, would probably vary in the different countries, and we could then show that while the dynamic process behind nationalism is universal, the differences between countries derive from the methods of control (the field forces) over such potential for bad. Here, you begin to exploit the possibilities of the comparative design.

Lewin's (6) writings are full of suggestions for specific variables in this class, e.g. his papers where he notes that aggression (actions in the diagram) are a function of "degree of mobility or rigidity in the group structure".
C. "Collective Nationalistic Actions".

Diagrammatically, we have added at the lower right hand corner a class of factors which are regarded as the final level of description to which we carry the dependent variables. Even if a man's potential for power-nationalism does eventuate in his own behavior, the collective behavior of his nation may be quite different. The behavior of the nation is obviously not the mere sum of the behaviors or potentials of the individuals. A still rudimentary, but better, model for our study is that the nation's behavior is the weighted sum - in which each individual's behavior or attitudes is multiplied by some value for his structural position in relation to the policy-making of that country. Consequently, we would like, if we do a comparative study, to describe the collective level of nationalism. This collective level does not have to be the total nation. It simply has to be the collectivity that corresponds best to the types of sample of individuals we study (e.g., a given city, county, region, bloc of countries, etc.). We would also like to incorporate into the questionnaire the class of factors - .

D. "Structural Variables III".

These are indicated in the lower right hand corner, adjacent to "collective nationalistic actions". For each individual, we want some measure of his structural position relative to power. Then we, loosely speaking, compute the weighted sum, and the unweighted sum of power nationalism from the study of individuals, and we have from other sources, the description of collective behavior. This will prevent the results of such a project where the unit of study is the individual from appearing absurd due to a confusion of different levels of description. Krech and Crutchfield (5) clearly point up this distinction between levels of description characterizing individuals and those characterizing organizations of people such as a group or nation. For example, let us say we found the results of a survey showed that there were more power nationalists in the aggregate in Norway than in Germany. Everyone would say the results are nonsense, since Norway as a country is less nationalist than Germany. But the results would not appear nonsense, if we could show that both facts are true - namely that the aggregate is higher in Norway, but the nationalism less - and that the paradox is explained by the distribution of these types in the society. The first result simply is a characterization of individuals, and to characterize the nation as an aggregate one
must do more than merely take the sum of the individual units (people) who have been described.

E. "Structural Considerations about Individuals II".

We have already mentioned the reason for adding what is labelled in the diagram "formal motivational structures", (see p. 29). But we have not mentioned a class of real factors which may account for some of these motivational structures. We have listed in the middle of the diagram, bottom layer, "structural considerations about the individual" and have attached this by an arrow to formal motivational structures. Our thinking is simple. Whether an individual cathects these social and political entities, like Jews and Russia, with the energies derived from childhood (childhood attached by arrows at the far left of the diagram), seems to be, in part, simply, a product of whether his life situation is such that these big events impinge on him frequently and closely. For example, you couldn't expect a Guatemalan aborigine to take out his castration complex on Jews (they don't exist in Guatemala).

We have listed here "leadership status" since one of its essential features is that the very conditions of leadership necessarily bring politics close to the man every minute of the day, and it is quite likely that leaders can therefore cathect these areas, or use these areas as tension reducing. That is why Lasswell's early work on agitators, or psychoanalytic descriptions of political personages, may have little relevance in explaining the politics of ordinary people. As Riesman (8) puts it, the Lasswell type of studies may describe the laws of behavior of the "political actor" which may differ from the laws for the "political audience".

F. "Structural Factors I".

These are listed in the middle of the diagram, top level. The reason for adding them is in part obvious — namely — the direction of nationalism sentiments is obviously a function of what objects exist in the field. However, putting it more broadly, we added them in relation to what seems to be the implicit position of the "personality-centered" approach on the problem of mental organization. When social attitudes are seen as going with a certain personality structure (and the very essence of personality is a high degree of organization or unity), it is natural to proceed on the simple notion that the organization of social attitudes is also of a highly generalized character. The same notion pervades the
"Authoritarian Personality" (although the inter-correlations in the Berkeley study are hardly high enough to be interpreted as they do). Generality is probably the rule, but the hypotheses of personality-centered theorists about generality, e.g., "a power-nationalist type" may be proven wrong, if certain structural considerations operate in such fashion that nationalist sentiments get highly focussed in only one area.

Generality would appear, in this "society-centered" conceptual system to be not only a product of the rooting in the deeper level of personality but also the function of whether or not the social forces channel sentiments into a highly generalized ideology or focus sentiments onto discrete specific groups. To test such hypotheses about the factors making for generality, we need to measure the factors in the different countries that would lead sentiments into diffuse or focussed directions, and to correlate this with the actual extent of generality found in the individuals studied.

Consideration of this phenomenon of generality also leads one to think again about, the view that generality would be expected if social attitudes derive from dynamic trends in the personality. There would seem to be some suggestions that personality structures themselves may vary in the degree to which the dynamism of projectivity can operate diffusely. Thus, the "Authoritarian Personality" finds generality, and the sister book by Ackerman-Jahoda "Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder" (1) does not in certain clinical cases in the series, suggesting that there may not always be generality since some people are of a "specific projective type".

We have therefore added under the class of variables "formal motivational structures", an intervening variable labelled "diffuse vs. specific projectivity", for which we would need to invent measuring devices.

Such considerations in turn lead to a variety of new hypotheses for future study. For example, it may be that narrow prejudice against one group, with no correlative prejudices against other groups, is attached to deep personality levels of hostility. Broad ethnocentrism of the type found by Hartley (9) and many others over the years (7, p. 580) - yielding a highly stable and general hierarchy over historical eras and many sub-groups in the population probably hasn't got anything to do with deep hostilities and simply expresses a somewhat verbal, more peripheral culturally determined pattern of sentiments. This might well permit reconciling the relatively recent work on personality determinants of prejudice and older work on social determinants by the clarification of the concept of prejudice into many sub-types of prejudice.
REFERENCES.


Section IV.

SELECTED REFERENCES.

by Bjørn Christensen.

1. Introduction.

Scientific research as a human endeavour is a continuous process. As our amount of scientific knowledge increases, the number of unanswered questions and problems increases in an accelerated ratio. This phenomenon may be illustrated by the effect of illuminating a candle in a dark, unbounded room. It is surrounded by a sphere of illuminated space. This sphere is comparable to the existing amount of knowledge. Imagine that we are increasing the intensity of the light. The brighter the light, the wider the boundary zone between the light and darkness (the sphere surface). We will be aware of more and more darkness. In other words: we will be able to discover a variety of new unsolved problems and areas of research.

This accelerating effect of scientific knowledge upon the number of unanswered problems detected, is also felt in social science. In our continuous attempts to break through the boundaries, however, the already existing knowledge can only be utilised to the extent that efficient channels of communication exist between the scientists.

One purpose of our Seminar is to establish and expand channels of communication in relation to the Social Scientific Study of tension-problems in Europe. When planning comprehensive cross-national studies we have to build upon past work. In particular will this be the case with respect to methods.

This section presents a tentative guide to the existing, relevant literature in the field. It is a more concrete endeavour than the previous parts of this monograph. But it should be viewed as supplementary, to be subsumed under the general frame of reference outlined above.

"Since the 1935 bibliography listed about 4 500 titles, and the present one almost 3 000, it is felt that the interests of the average reader and the less specialized student of public opinion may be served best by a relatively brief list of major titles."

This is a quotation from "Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion" by E. L. Smith, H. L. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey published in
1946. It gives you some hints about the enormous amount of work that has been published merely in the field of public opinion. In the narrower field of measuring opinions you may consult such a book as M. Parten: "Surveys, Polls, and Samples" (1950). There you will find a bibliography containing 1145 titles on that topic. But these fields represent only small parts of the broader one, out of which our detailed discussions at the Seminar will grow.

As you know, the purpose of the Seminar is partly to plan and establish a foundation for the execution of cross-national research in the problem area vaguely called "the social psychology of international tensions". To prepare a bibliography for such a research field involves considerable judgment. Inevitably, the selections are arbitrary. To some our choices of titles may seem biased, and of course they are. The items represented in the bibliography are all printed in English (the language to be used for the Seminar), they are all from a relatively recent date, covering mainly the last ten years, and the topical classification is also naturally a matter of arbitrariness and personal preference.

It has been attempted to select a limited number of titles that would represent the different aspects of our problem area in a more or less balanced way. In some cases, therefore, a number of worthy titles have been omitted because other equally worthy ones have appeared (in our judgment) to give adequate coverage of that aspect.

Some limitations have also been made in order to make the underlying principles of selection as easily apprehended as possible. As you will see from the introductory table of contents, we have listed the items under three main headings, namely, content, methods and materials. Some items do not lend themselves easily to classification. We have generally tried to subsume the items under that topic for which they are most informative and valuable as references. In a very few instances we have found it desirable to refer to the same book under different categories. This is only the case, however, when we are dealing with books containing a collection of papers or a symposium.

One of our aims with this bibliography is to give you some very general ideas about our own thinking on what we regard as important and valuable references in relation to our present purposes.

The bibliography has been shortened down several times in order to include only books and articles which (probably) will be available at
the Institute during the Seminar, and which we think will be relevant to
the Seminar discussions.

We hope that by stating this in a frank and explicit way, we
will encourage you to present your own point of view. In the personal
data sheet sent to tentative participants we asked every one of you to
suggest materials and books that you regard as desirable for the Seminar.
All these suggestions will be seriously considered for inclusion in our
library.

You have the continuing opportunity to make further suggestions
at any time. As you will note in the tentative program for the Prelimi-
nary Meeting - time has been scheduled for a more formal discussion of
past literature. In order for you to contribute most efficiently during
that meeting you should study this bibliography for any omissions. In
particular we would be grateful for additional materials under part III
(see Preliminary Classification). Concrete research studies under-
taken in your own country in manuscript or in any other form, may be
more than illustrative in pointing out some of the problems involved in
the applications of modern methods on a cross-national basis. Such
writings may raise a whole series of questions about the possibilities of
methodological standardization.

If the seminar is to achieve its high aspirations, it must be a
really cooperative undertaking. It is a prerequisite therefore that you
will present your individual suggestions and frank criticism.
2. Preliminary Classification of Literature.

Part I: Content.

1. General textbooks in:
   A. social psychology (p. 40)
   B. sociology (p. 40)
   C. personality and psychological dynamics (p. 40)
   D. political science (p. 41)

2. Books and articles with more specific content, dealing with theories and research about:
   A. international and intergroup tensions (p. 41)
   B. nationalism and national character (p. 43)
   C. communication and opinions (p. 45)
   D. personal and interpersonal tensions (p. 46)

Part II: Methods.

1. General textbooks in background methodology (p. 50)

2. Books and articles with specialized methodological content and orientation about:
   A. the survey method
      a. general (p. 51)
      b. research design (p. 51)
      c. methods of analysis (p. 52)
      d. scaling methods for attitude and opinion measurement (p. 53)
      e. methods for training, control, and selection of interviewers (p. 53)
   B. methods for content-analysis and communication research (p. 53)
   C. observational and group-experimental methods (p. 54)
   D. methods specially designed for comparative research (p. 55)
   E. statistical methods
      a. general (p. 55)
      b. sampling methods (p. 55)

Part III: Materials.

1. Materials for use in research work (p. 56)

2. Materials illustrating past research in various fields (p. 58)
I.1.A. General Textbooks in Social Psychology:


I.1.B. General Textbooks in Sociology:


I.1.C. General Books in Personality and Psychological Dynamics:


I.1.D. General Books in Political Science:


I.2.A. Books and Articles about International and Intergroup Tensions:


Cantril, Hadley: Tension that Cause Wars, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1950.


Chein, Isidor: Discrimination and Prejudice. (In mimeo)


Kriesberg, Martin: Cross-pressures and attitudes, a study of the influence of conflicting propaganda on opinions regarding American-Soviet relations. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1949, 3, 5-16.


Wright, Quincy: A Study of War (two vols), University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1942.

I.2.B. Books and Articles about Nationalism and National Character:


McGranahan, Donald V.: Analysis of National Images in the Mass Media of Communication. (In mimeo)


Queener, Llewellyn: The development of internationalist attitudes:


Books and Articles about Communication and Opinions.


I.2.D. Books and Articles about Personal and Interpersonal Tensions.


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II.2.A.b. Research design:


Lazarsfeld, Paul F. et al.: The Panel Study. (In mimeo)


II.2.A.c. Methods of analysis.


II.2.A.d. Scaling methods for attitude and opinion measurement.


Rossi, Peter: Introduction to latent structure analysis. (In mimeo).


II.2.A.e. Methods for training, control and selection of interviewers.


II.2.B. Books and Articles about the Method for Content-Analysis and Communications Research.


II.2.C. Books and Articles about Observational and Group-Experimental Methods.


Newcomb, T.: Role behaviors in the study of individual personality and of groups. J. of Personality, 1950, 18.3.


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tive Research:

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York, 1947.

II.2.E.b. Sampling Methods:

Cochran, W.G.: Sample Survey Techniques. (In mimeo), 

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INTRODUCTION

By Herbert Hyman.

In a recent monograph, Cross-National Social Research, certain basic principles bearing on the theory and method appropriate to comparative social research among nations were formulated. This formulation was to provide a sound framework for planning the first of a series of researches to be conducted by a group of cooperating scholars representing many Northern European countries; the projects to be coordinated through the agency of the Oslo Institute and undertaken simultaneously in the respective countries with uniform procedures.

While the completion of such a research program would do much towards the solution of pressing social problems, many hazards will have to be surmounted before successful completion. The novelty of the approach means that we may be unprepared for many of the problems which will arise. The earlier monograph was an initial attempt to think through some of the problems so as to prepare ourselves better to face them. However, we all realized the fragmentary character of the principles developed, and have continued to work in the direction of a more definitive formulation. The two papers presented in this monograph represent contributions towards this ultimate goal of a definitive Theory and Method of Cross-National Research. These papers should be read in conjunction with the original monograph and specifically in relation to Section II, since they are an extended analysis of the problem of the research model and nature of concepts most desirable for cross-national research. No attempt has been made to rewrite the original monograph and integrate these contributions into a new and consistent treatment of the problem. It is too early for systematization, and we preferred to work on the many special problems still unsolved.

Despite the present supplement to the original monograph, our work is far from complete. We still have only the beginnings of a thorough treatment of the problem. But that this work will be given continuity in the future is now beyond doubt. At the writing of the earlier monograph, cross-national social research was still only an idea without substance. The publication of this supplement, however, coincides with the completion of the initial meeting of a group of scholars from seven countries who have now embarked on the actual planning of their research. Out of this research will come the additions to the theoretical framework and also a body of significant findings.

It is to this adventurous group that the writers address this supplement.

FURTHER THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CONCERNING CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

By Ragnar Rommetveit.


It is generally assumed that systematic theory is of fundamental importance to any science. This assumption seems widely accepted in branches of natural sciences like physics and chemistry, whereas the development of systematic theory within the various branches of social sciences is somewhat less advanced. Thus R. K. Merton (8, p. 166) states that "-- it must be admitted that a large part of what now is called "sociological theory" consists of general orientations toward data, suggesting types of variables which need somehow to be taken into account, rather than clear, verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables."

The same holds true for psychology. As K. W. Spence points out (11, p. 66): "-- theory is still at a very primitive level --". In evaluating various approaches of models one may use a series of criteria like "testability", "extent of field covered" etc. simultaneously as has been suggested by A. Nass (7, p. 49). Then we may find that among theorists excellence in one respect is apt to be connected with weakness in other respects.

Questions then necessarily arise as to which criteria are the most important in evaluating and choosing among competing orientations or research models. Should a very comprehensive theory with a low degree of testability be preferred to a narrow theory with a high degree of testability? Inevitably questions of this type also arise in our attempts at building up a theoretical framework or research model appropriate for a cross-national project on tensions.

As pointed out elsewhere (9) my point of view is that alternative "models" or "general orientations" should in advance be as explicitly stated and as thoroughly discussed as possible. Then any proposed project may be discussed in terms of the appropriate model, i.e. in terms of the procedures of conceptualization and analysis involved. The desirability of improving our ultimate project through a logical analysis
at this point seems especially important in relation to the unique opportunities offered by the intended cross-national research project. Three of these opportunities may be listed as follows:

a) An opportunity to attempt a synthesis of at least three branches of social science in empirical research. (A synthesis of resp. psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology).

b) An opportunity to make guesses at crucial aggregate variables (national characteristics) and thereby contribute toward a future classificatory scheme applicable to social structure within different societies.

c) An opportunity to influence the course of future research of the same kind to a larger extent than usual because the intended project, we hope, will be only the first in a program of coordinated projects.

In light of these considerations the most strenuous efforts at clarifying the conceptual scheme are fully justified.

2. Comprehensiveness vs. Testability of Hypotheses.

We shall now proceed to aspects of the cross-national research model previously (in 9) somewhat overshadowed by the contrast between the "personality-centered" and the "society-centered" approaches. At first we shall pay attention to "comprehensiveness" and "testability" of social theories. As already suggested these aspects seem to be negatively correlated. Suppose this negative correlation was perfect. Then every social theory might be placed on a continuum as in fig. 1. And the question naturally arises:

Fig. 1

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hull's approach Parson's approach
```
At what point on the continuum should our model lie?

The maximum testability - zero comprehensiveness point of the continuum may be illustrated fairly well by Skinner's approach to learning theory, resulting in highly testable theories applicable to rat behaviour in the Skinner box. (5) The other extreme is illustrated by very comprehensive but scientifically sterile philosophical systems like Spencer's theory of social evolution. It is sterile in the sense that it is not testable at all. An approach like Hull's approach to habit formation (3) may be placed close to Skinner's. A sociological research model like that suggested by Parson's(6), with "structure of situation", "cultural tradition", "institutional structure" etc. as main conceptual components would probably fall rather close to the maximum comprehensiveness - zero testability end of the continuum.

Suppose that the relationship between testability and comprehensiveness of theories within social science is as indicated in figure 1. and furthermore: that high testability is primarily to be found in laboratory experimental research. In order to build up an adequate research model (with comprehensive and at the same time highly testable hypotheses) one may then be tempted to borrow concepts from past research approaches in the left part of the continuum and extend their application to a more comprehensive field. We may think, for instance, of taking over the concept of frustration as derived from laboratory experiments and trying to apply it in a hypothesis concerning frustration in complex social situations. The resultant hypothesis would be of a hybrid character, however, and the problem is how much would be gained in testability by such a procedure.

One of the dangers inherent in such hybrid hypotheses may be illustrated by a small hypothetical project. Suppose we are to study the effect of fatigue in a complex social situation, e.g. the husband's fatigue in the family situation after he has withdrawn from the work of the day. We may then explore a series of experimental reports on the effect of fatigue. All of these reports have in common (in so far as all of them are reports on classical univariate experiments) a definition of "pure" fatigue and some conclusions concerning the effect of "pure" fatigue on behaviour. This concept of fatigue covers the phenomenon in the laboratory.
"Social world" → Family situation → $F'$

$F'$ ← Exp. situation

(Cf. fig. 2). In the complex social situation mentioned above the phenomenon "fatigue" ($F'$) shows covariation and interaction with other phenomena. Thus the husband's fatigue is accompanied by certain expectancies and attitudes of awe from wife and children. ("Don't disturb father! You know he is tired.") It is further accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction. ("I have done a good job today.") This makes his fatigue a psychological phenomenon rather different from the "pure" fatigue studied in the laboratory. Accordingly we must question the fruitfulness of applying the laboratory concept of fatigue to the social situation altogether.

The implications of this point of view for a theoretical framework for cross-national social research may be elaborated as follows:

By borrowing concepts from testable but narrow theories and implanting them in comprehensive hypotheses concerning complex social phenomena, we run the risk of establishing a "hybrid" conceptual scheme with a very low degree of testability. An extreme instance of such a hybrid conceptual scheme would be the application of experimental frustration-aggression concepts derived from rat behaviour to tensions within and between social groups. It is evident to every one that tension within a nation is a phenomenon quite different from a rat's tension in a discrimination box. As V. F. Lenzen (5) puts it, testability ultimately rests upon the possibility of occurrence of predicted perceptions to a society of observers, and no one is able to perceive rat phenomena on a "social group" level. By defining complex social tension phenomena in
terms of "rat concepts" we would thus arrive at a research model with an appearance of exactness but totally unsuitable to the complex social phenomena we are to study.


A specific category of "hybrid" hypotheses is the kind of hypotheses describing and explaining group tensions exclusively in terms of personality traits or personal experiences. This category has been discussed before (9). I now want to return to the problem and at the same time try to clarify what is meant by hypotheses concerning social channeling.

A hybrid hypothesis on group tension would be e.g. a hypothesis stating a relationship between frustration as measured and conceptualized in terms of individual experiences, and group tension without any intervening variables. A hypothesis of this kind would read as follows:

In a given group we shall find such and such high degree of tension because group members are exposed to certain personal frustrating experiences.

A non-hybrid conceptual scheme, taking into account social channeling, might be elaborated as in fig. 3. Here the group structure

**Fig. 3**

(a) Group level:

Structure

Personality structure

→

(b) Individual level:

Frustration

→

Aggression

Group actions, manifestations of hostility etc.
enters as an intervening variable between individual aggression and group tension. Thus the contribution toward group tension of any given aggressive individual is in part a function of his position within the group, as described by Hyman in (4). Furthermore, the direction of group aggression is determined by the position (geographical and other) of the given group within the pattern of similar groups.

A final advantage of this type of conceptual scheme is that it makes possible an analysis of the effect of group structure upon individual tension. Such an analysis is suggested by Lewin (6). His hypothesis, somewhat modified and simplified, reads as follows: In a society where multiple and overlapping group memberships are the rule, the "private part" of the average individual personality will be smaller than in a society with few and isolated sub-groups. In so far as individual tension primarily rises out of interpersonal friction between "private parts" of two or more personalities the average individual of the multiple sub-groups-society will develop less tension than the average individual of the few sub-groups-society.

Lewin makes an attempt at illustrating his hypothesis as suggested in fig. 4.

Fig. 4
As a consequence of multiple group memberships the individual A's "private" regions of personality are small (only the most central ones). The peripheral layers are all accessible to group influences. As a consequence of few group memberships B's "private" regions are large. Only a few of the peripheral layers are "socialized" in the sense that they are open to communication in group life. An intrusion into the other layers is regarded as an intrusion into his private life. Accordingly the probability for tension-creating friction between personality structures of the B-type is greater than is the case in interpersonal relationships between personality structures of the A-type.

By introducing another intervening variable like Lewin's concept of "personality layers" we may thus arrive at an analysis of the effect of group structure upon individual tension. (Cfr. fig. 3).

It is of importance that our research model for a cross-national research project on tensions is so constructed that it offers an opportunity to make an analysis of this kind. In my opinion one of the most severe disadvantages of many past projects on tensions is their exclusive focus upon personal, idiosyncratic experiences as the sources of individual tension. A central concept in our scheme should therefore be the concept of social channeling as a two-way process in the sense that we continually keep in mind both

a) the social structure channeling and determining the manifestations of individual tensions.

b) the social structure's contribution to the rise of individual tensions.

4. The Analysis of Interaction.

Finally I want to stress once more the importance of multivariate design (cfr. 9, p. 20) and try to clarify its relevance to a research project on tensions by a very simple illustration.

Suppose that our hypothesis is that groups or organizations within a country have different channeling effects upon individual tensions. Suppose further that we find by empirical research and ordinary correlational analysis the average channeling effect (x) of a given organization A (other things being equal) and the average channeling effect (y) of another organization B. Then we want to predict the direction of tension manifested by a person who is a member of both organizations.
If we have not taken into account in our previous analysis of channeling the possibility of significant interaction effect between membership in A and membership in B, our prediction is bound to be of the type described in Fig. 1. The validity of such a prediction rests upon the assumption that the interaction effect is insignificant, i.e. that a given factor has the same effect whether operating alone or within any complex constellation of factors. Put to the extreme, this univariate design point of view implies that we assume membership in a pacificistic organization to have the same channeling effect upon the individual tension of a person without any political affiliations as upon the individual tension of an ardent Communist.

The logic of analysis of interaction should not be confined to the specific statistical devices labeled analysis of variance and factor analysis. It should be incorporated in our research model for cross-national social research in order that our model may take into account the complexity of the field and the interaction of phenomena on each level of social analysis. R. S. Crutchfield (1, p. 341) states that "Wherever in experimental, comparative, or social psychology, a systematic investigation of the primary effects and the interacting effects of a number of experimentally controllable factors is being conducted, the principles of efficient factorial design can be involved with estimable benefit". (Italic ours). In so far as factors can be experimentally controlled also in social ex post facto experiments the application of interaction analysis should be extended to these fields as well. Thus an interesting and illustrative analysis of variance of data from social surveys has already been made by Durbin and Stuart. (2)

The nature of the "facts" detected in a cross-national research project will be partially a function of the theoretical framework and the methods applied. Perhaps parts of the data obtained in such a project might lend themselves to analysis of interaction even though the logic of interaction analysis had not been initially incorporated in the research model. However, by incorporating the logic of interaction analysis in our original research plan we may secure the appropriate data for a systematic analysis of interaction, by far superior to an accidental and unexpected one.
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SOME COMMENTS ON PAST AND FUTURE CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH ON TENSION IN
TERMS OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL PREFERENCES.

By Bjørn Christiansen.

1. Past Research.

This paper was first intended to serve as an introduction to past cross-national research on tension. It was felt by the planning group that past literature which had some bearing on our present research framework had to be summarized and evaluated in terms of completeness and adequacy so as to provide suggestions for our future work.

Going through the available, published literature has indicated an almost unbelievable lack of directly relevant studies. This conclusion may also be arrived at relatively fast, by reading Dr. Klineberg's book: Tension Affecting International Understanding (2) a comprehensive summary of existing research. You may of course, consult such studies as Dr. McGranahan's: German and American Traits Reflected in Popular Drama (together with Wayne) (6). A comparative study of the German and American traits reflected in the 45 most popular plays in each country in 1927, by means of content-analytical methods. Or Dr. McGranahan's: A Comparison of Social Attitudes among American and German Youth (5). Or Dr. H.S. Lewin's: A Comparison of the Aims of the Hitler Youth and the Boy Scouts of America (3). However, if you are hoping to find cross-national research in the sense of international coordinated research you will be disappointed.

To cite a quotation from an article by Gardner Murphy, D. Cartwright and J. S. Bruner: Resources for World-Wide Research in the Human Sciences (7):

"...as for examples of jointly planned and communally executed international social or psychological research projects, the authors are hard put to find a single instance. Up to now we have gone little beyond the traditional reliance upon informal mechanisms of international scientific interchange."

This quotation is from the winter 1947. Since then some projects on international tensions have been started. Two of these will be introduced later on during this meeting -- -- the UNESCO projects and the NATIONALISM project going on here at the Institute. But this hardly changes the basic fact that this group will be doing a pioneering job if they execute a cross-national project. -- With respect to studies that have a background relevance to our topic there is a large literature but these are adequately
listed in our blue Memorandum for the attention of the group. I will omit
discussing them here.

With these brief remarks I will leave the discussion of past
crudest studies and turn to some more theoretical aspects of international
research on tension, attempting to point out some very general features in
this area of study, which I personally feel ought to be stressed and further
worked out.

2. Tension Creation vs. Tension Reduction.

One of the greatest problems of our time is the development and
manifestations of conflicts between nations. Conflicts might be of many
kinds, but a common feature seems always to be the perception of others as
threats to the achievements of one's own goals. It is the threat-dimensions
in the perceptions of international relations that justify the use of
such words and expressions as international tensions.

International tension as an inter-personal problem implies that
people perceive the world as consisting of unique and separated nations, -
as "units of behavior", and with potentialities of behavior that may affect
- impinge on other nations. It also implies a certain degree of personal
identification with (two or more) nations on a positive or negative basis,
as a necessary condition for the perception of in- and out-groups, and as
a background for the perception of personal threats when international
conflicts exist.

International tension might be reduced in different ways. This
might be done by the creation of isolationism, intra-national stress and
changes, international psychological war-fare, and - what seems to be the
absolutely most feared mechanism - open military war-fare. This alternative
is in our days perceived as extremely dreadful, and might by its mere anti-
cipation in the minds of people contribute to the increase of tensions.

If you look at the world of to-day, you will find all the above-
mentioned mechanisms in operation. And not only these, but also a number
of others. It is not my intention here, however, to give an exhaustive
description of the different types of tension-reducing mechanisms on the
international level of analysis. It is a task much too complicated and
extensive for a single person to overcome. But it is a task which ought
to be done in a similar way to Freud's description of dynamisms in indi-
vidual behavior more than thirty years ago.
Summary:

I am not trying to suggest that we should neglect the study of tension-creation, but I think we should just as well concentrate upon the mechanism for tension reduction. This has been a quite neglected aspect so far in social scientific theorizing about tensions.

3. A Research Approach in terms of "Why" vs. "How".

Having formulated this problem of description and discovery I feel permitted to take a further step on the scientific ladder, which I think will be the most promising one in the long run.

That is the analysis of the most fruitful way of framing further research inquiries in this field. Given a description of the variety of tension reducing mechanisms, I wish to proceed beyond this point. Actually, this may be done in at least three different ways. We may start by asking why tension reductive mechanisms occur. This may ultimately lead us into a type of functional theorizing, similar to that which is prevalent in psychoanalysis and which was also the case in the mass-psychology of McDougall and LeBon. By inferring a causal relationship which is not stated in terms of observational and measurable conditions, we do not gain very much in terms of scientific explanation, and it is a real question whether the introduction of such concepts as needs, motives, wishes, and group-minds do any more good than harm for the development of scientific research about causal relations.

Another way of framing our research inquiries that aim at dynamic and explanatory principles is to start out by asking how do the tension-reductive mechanisms work in relation to some initial conditions. On the national level of description this frame-work would involve the tracing of a chain of cause and effect through the intermediate stages that lie between the observed coexistence or succession of facts, in terms of individual behavioral principles of a rather high degree of generality. This approach, often called the mediational approach, has been extensively used in psychological learning theories, and is also prevalent in the group-dynamic approach, which has evolved in the U.S. during the last ten years.

It is the ultimate hope and aim of researchers using this approach, that their present unit of study should be relegated to more "fundamental" sciences. (These do not necessarily represent more molecular approaches, but often they do so.) This is done programmatically by the
use of a certain kind of auxiliary variable, hypothesized as intervening between observations made on the particular level of analysis under study.

Both the above mentioned theoretical frameworks are aiming at causal explanations, and as such represent types of models for going beyond mere description. A real difference between them exists however, in their capacity for predictions. Prediction, would be quite meaningless in terms of the functional approach outlined above. The mediational model will satisfy the necessary conditions, but it would possibly have to enclose such a degree of complexity that its application to the matters of every day life has to wait until sometime in the far future.

In relation to predictions about a certain "unit of analysis", whether it is an individual, a group, an institutional system, or a nation, - the mediational aspects seem to be of little value, leaving the place to a purely statistical theory.

The question may be raised: why we should engage ourselves in causal, genotypical, conditional-genetic approaches altogether? Relatively stable long-distance relations, in spite of variable mediation, seem to be one of the major features of life, and it has been empirically demonstrated both in the psychology of perception (Brunswik), the psychology of learning, (Hunter), in neurology (Iashley) and in physiology (Cannon), and in many other fields, (e.g. genetics).

The assumption that such invariant relations also are detectable on the national level of analysis is thus justified as a theoretical framework. It involves the possibility of framing our research inquiries in terms of how mechanisms are functioning, without taking mediational processes into account. The application of such a phenotypical or surface theoretical approach to the problems of international tensions, might be exemplified by the following lines of research inquiries:

Given a number of nations with different degrees of isolationism (or any other tension-reductive mechanism mentioned above); what structural variables do show concomitant variation with this phenomenon? Or, how do different types of mechanisms function in relation to structural features of nations?

By emphasising this question in terms of how, I want to point out the desirability of framing our research inquiries on an observational level of complexity.

In our search for crucial variables all available statistical method has to be taken into account. In his paper, Rommetveit, has previously
discussed the importance of a multivariate design in cross-national research. Under specified conditions the most fruitful handling of such design can be achieved by means of the statistical method: analysis of variance. In passing I would like to call your attention to a study by Raymond B. Cattell and associates. (1)

It is an attempt to discover the dimensions of culture patterns - or in our terminology - national structures and behaviors by means of the factorization of national characteristics. By using the factor analytical method as developed in the study of individual mental abilities and personalities, - on nations - as "units of analysis", he has provided a first approximation of a delineation of functional unities upon which hypotheses of nations could be profitably ventured, and also provided a statistical basis on which predictions of group behaviors should be possible in the future.

The use of such a method as factor analysis on groups needs, of course, careful examination in terms of theoretical implications. That can not, however, be elaborated here. But I personally think it should be justified to that extent that all the variables introduced do have some general bearing on the unit being studied.

In Cattell's study, a factor analysis of 72 widely different variables on 69 nations yielded a basic set of 12 dimensions for the measurement of national culture patterns. As far as his 72 independent variables are concerned, he has made an exhaustive attempt to characterize nations on the basis of existing (available) statistical and historical data. Some criticism of Cattell's study might perhaps be raised in respect to his inclusion of variables. But this is a minor aspect. The real significance of Cattell's study is the introduction of a new methodological model, maintaining the observational level of complexity, and applicable in cross-national research programs.

Summary:

Whatever you are going to study it is valuable to pick the model that has the best formal features for our purposes. I have here stressed what I think is the most valuable one. Namely a phenotypical approach, utilizing statistical devices of correlational measures.
4. Intergroup Tensions vs. Interpersonal Tensions.

As previously pointed out I would theoretically prefer to keep the problems of tension creation and tension-reduction separated. That implies, f.i., that tension might be reduced through different means, and that wars, whether psychological or military, are not to be perceived as an inevitable consequence of tension reaching a certain amount of intensity.

Tension as a psychological and sociological concept is vague indeed. Entering into research hypotheses it has to be defined in a precise way.

The concept of tension is too complicated to be elaborated here. But I think this is an urgent task which must be done in the nearest future. However, I shall make a few remarks on the problem:

a. In the very beginning of these comments I pointed out some rather general conditions characterizing international tensions as an interpersonal problem. By emphasizing the perceptual dimensions involved - that is threat orientation - I tried to link this type of tension to the phenomena of interpersonal relations. On this level of analysis some valuable suggestions have recently been offered by N.R.F. Maier (4) and T. M. Newcomb (8) as to the definition of personal tension. According to their point of view, tension might be characterized as the degree of threat - vs. goal-orientation, that dominates (determines) the perceptual behavior of individuals. It does not seem impossible to characterize nations according to the same continuum. A nation spending "all" her money (or resources) on military defence programs can hardly feel secure. The same is probably the case of a nation using the most severe and violent sanctions against deviant behaviors.

By thinking about (international) tensions as tolerance of threat, or if you prefer - a frustration-tolerance, operating on a national level, it should be measurable in terms of national (or public) opinion.

b. By national (or public) opinion in this context I do not mean the mere summation of opinions of individuals living in the same country. A nation is far from an aggregation of separate individuals. It has an internal organization. This organization may be viewed from different angles. One point of view is to look at it as organized in terms of institutions or
institutional systems. That is what is usually called the sociological approach. But this is far from being the only one available. Another frame of reference, is to look at nations, as functional groups, composing functional subgroups. This approach has not yet received an established and recognized name. Its "unit of analysis" is different from the sociological one, and its theoretical framework does not have very much in common with the group-dynamic approach, mentioned earlier in this paper. For lack of a better concept we may reintroduce the term group-psychology, or we may create a new one: the groupological approach.

It is outside the scope of this paper to outline a workable definition of groups. I should, however, like to point out some features of this approach.

In our societies it is quite easy to give illustrative examples of functional groups. We have political parties, trade associations, labor unions, farmers organizations, different kinds of religious, educational and recreational corporations, clubs, more or less secret societies, university boards, students' unions, and so on and so forth. To a large extent, the behavior and changes of nations are made up of the actions and acts of such groups. In relation to nations they are all subgroups, but in relation to themselves they do have many of the same features as nations. They do themselves comprise subgroups. They do act according to some principles, "ideologies", or interests. They have all a certain degree of cohesion, which makes the use of internal power possible. According to these dimensions they might all be described in relation to internal pressures, compulsions, etc. They may loose "energetic" support, in the form of taxes, subscriptions, membership fees, unpaid work, or attitudinal identifications. They may disintegrate or isolate.

Just as nations, national subgroups differ in terms of their strategic position, their opportunities for actions, - in their prestige and power, and in their leadership organizations. It is in relation to these last phenomena that workable measures of national opinion and tension possibly could be worked out. It implies a new type of research design in opinion-surveys which has to be done either after the fact by weighing the individual opinions collected according to the position of their membership-groups, or by sampling individuals as subgroup-
members according to some theoretical (or empirically verified) assumptions about the importance of different subgroups relative to the question being studied.

In studying organized actions of groups in contrast to mass action of individuals, the ordinary cross-national survey approach, used by Gallup and other organizations, has severe limitations and is of doubtful value in predicting group behavior and changes.

To analyse a nation in terms of functional subgroups, some criteria have to be established in terms of which it could be possible to select the subgroups varying in degree of influence over the phenomenon being studied on the national level.

In pointing out similarities between nations and their subgroups it was not intended to assert that intranational conflicts are identical to international ones. What was intended, was to bring some common features into focus, and by that anticipate the possibilities of an unique theoretical treatment for the study of group-conflicts, allowing for experimental verifications on smallscale models. Of course, nations do have features not commonly shared by other groups, e.g. by not permitting overlapping group-membership. But also in this case I think it is more a matter of degree than kind. (Cfr. political parties, an army organization, church societies, etc.)

Summary:

I am stressing the point that a conceptual clarification of tensions ought to be made, and I am suggesting that both the perceptual aspects of threat and the aspects of national subgroups ought to be incorporated in such a concept, if it is to be useful in description of conflicts between nations.

5. Implications for Future Research.

What sort of research approach follows from my main points: the conceptual clarification of tension into tension creation vs. tension reduction, - the examination of long-distance functional relations, - the "unit of analysis" at the functional group level. Research and theorizing about "international tensions" based on such an approach might ultimately give answer to the following types of questions:

1. How do tension and the occurrence of different tension-reductive
mechanisms covary in relation to structural features of nations?

This problem has previously got a tentative elaboration. Here I only want to stress the applicational aspects involved. This may also be done by putting it into a question: Given a nation with a certain degree of tension, what structural changes have to be made in order to reduce the possibilities for certain undesirable ways of tension reduction?

2. How do national ideology and the amount of tension covary in relation to structural features of nations?

Also with respect to this problem applicational aspects are involved. It may be framed thus: Given a nation with a certain ideology, what structural features have to be changed in order to reduce the level of tension? Or the other way around: What ideological changes would have to be made to reduce the level of tension? How do ideology and structural features interact?

To exemplify the problems stated above a preliminary conceptual system for the study of international tension has been worked out. As you will see from the table - the behavior of foreign nations has been included as a separate category. By following the lines linking the different categories together you may get some general hints about the application of a certain type of theoretical approach to the problem-area of international tensions. Its "unit of analysis" is nations (or groups), and with respect to level of description it might fit best under what has been labelled the phenotypical approach. It is presented here as a special case of what Rommetveit has called a society-centered research approach. I do believe it represents the most direct approach to international tensions, and that it incorporates features which makes practical applications of results possible, in relation to one of the greatest problems of our time.
A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

IN TERMS OF A PHENOTYPICAL APPROACH.

NATIONAL IDEOLOGY  STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF  TENSION  STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF NATION  MECHANISMS FOR TENSION

NATION  FOREIGN NATIONS

(tension creation)

Ultimate ends and means-end relations perceived with the character of goals. Dimensions of ideological convictions, etc. x)

Resources, internal relationships between sub-groups, and channels for intercommunication etc.

External and internal policy and actions, resources, etc.

National opinion with respect to international threat-tolerance.

Patterns of sub-groups relative to power, national resources, internal relationships between sub-groups etc.

National policy and action with respect to isolationism, internal stress and changes etc.

References.


