Title:
I want to break free: an analysis of de facto-states¹ and their paths towards success and failure between 1945 and 2012.

Research question: « Why do some non-recognised de facto-states become internationally recognised through United Nations membership status, while others fail and are reintegrated into their parent state? »

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¹ Disclaimer: Though discussing de facto-states, this thesis holds no opinions on the legitimacy of their existence nor on their present, future or past status. Names of entities may vary elsewhere. For example, Transnistria is also known as Trans-Dniester, and Northern Cyprus as TRNC. Here, the most common names from English and Norwegian literature are used.
Abstract

The thesis analyses *de facto*-states from the creation of the United Nation in 1945 until and including 2012. Twenty-three entities are identified, of which four have had success and become UN members, and ten have failed and become reintegrated into their parent state. Nine are still incomplete and have uncertain outcomes. Crisp set QCA and descriptive analyses are applied to investigate first which causal combinations lead to success or failure. These results are then used to analyse the entities without clear outcomes to identify which could be expected to succeed and fail. The causal conditions included are A: Ethnicity as state foundation, B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state, C: UN veto power opposition, D: UN veto power support, and E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state.

Only weak combinational connections have been found though cs/QCA, but the descriptive analysis have identified three patterns. First, that the conflicts where economy have been an important factor tend to become resolved to a larger extent than those where this is not perceived as important. Second, that all the recognised entities are created outside of the two major state creation waves of decolonisation and the fall of the communist unions. Third, that which UN veto power that gets involved appears to be of importance. None of the entities Russia has supported have neither failed nor succeeded, but remain in a state of limbo. The reasons for this are unknown, but suggestions regarding realpolitical considerations are made. The three analyses combined indicate that Somaliland and Puntland are the two entities in the strongest position to be recognised per 2012.
Acknowledgements

Praise is due to the many who have aided in the writing of this thesis. Obviously, my supervisor, Associate Professor Jan Oskar Engene, has been of great and invaluable help. In addition, Professor Gunnar Grendstad has also been so kind as to guide me. The same goes to Timo Lochocki, who has taken the time to aid me around the man pitfalls of crisp set QCA, and Post Doctor Ragnhild Louise Muriaas, who has presented me with many useful ideas for methods literature and sources. I am also grateful to Professors Pål Kolstø and Scott Pegg for encouraging words and permissions to use their work.

Many more have given great support throughout the process, but I cannot name all. Particular thanks are due to Kurt, for all reasons imaginable. To Terje, Vegard, Lasse and Dina for making the study hall a good place to be. To Alfhild, Johanne, and Kristin for doing the same with the world outside of the study hall. To Johannes, for constantly being better than me at QCA. In addition, of course, comes all the rest of you. I am sure you know who you are.
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1. Introduction

The United Nations originally had 51 members at its creation in 1945. Per 2012, it had 193 full members. In addition to these, there are 23 entities that have attempted to be recognized as states and become UN members, but without success for an elongated period of time. Some of them have become recognised after a while, some have disappeared into their parent state and around half of them still exist. The term \textit{de facto}-state includes both those still present and those that have later disappeared. But, the entities are only analysed with data from their time as such an entity. They are more or less functioning state-like entities with at best limited recognition by the international society. What is interesting for this paper is to find out what leads to the different outcomes these non-recognised \textit{de facto}-states face. The results from the analyses of the entities that have either succeeded or failed are used on the entities still existing as \textit{de facto}-states per 2012. This is done to explore which of them are to be expected to succeed and fail.

The research question is as follows: \textit{Why do some non-recognised \textit{de facto}-states become internationally recognised through United Nations membership status, while others fail and are reintegrated into their parent state?}

Some of these entities receive much international attention. The declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008 placed \textit{de facto}-states on the agenda for many. The effect was not lessened by the soon following Russian-Georgian war taking place in the two Georgian \textit{de facto}-states Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Others are nearly invisible in international debate. Both Somaliland and Puntland have functioned more or less independently from Somalia for about two decades, yet they are largely ignored by the international society. As will be shown in this thesis, they perform most state capacities better than Somalia. Yet the latter is recognised while they are not. This kind of contrast makes \textit{de facto}-states a particularly interesting juridical and political conundrum.

1.2 Rationale for the thesis

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 15-19) argues that it is important for social research to contribute both to theory and to the real world. This thesis answers the claim. The investigation of which causal combinations lead to which outcomes is theoretically interesting.
for the following reasons: *De facto*-states have been largely ignored in political research until lately. After the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 the interest has greatly increased from politicians and academics alike. Analyses of singular entities or groups based on time or geography have been performed, seeking answers to the conundrum of why some of the *de facto*-states fail while others succeed. However, no analysis of all the entities together has yet been done. This analysis attempt to rectify this, by including all identified *de facto*-states who have existed in the time span between the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and 2012.

The topic is interesting to the world for at least three reasons. Politically, because a deeper understanding of these entities could improve relations between them and the outside world. It can create a deeper understanding of the situations in which the *de facto*-states’ inhabitants and political leaders live and operate. And, last but not least, the results might lay the foundation for understanding or predicting the developments of the frozen conflicts that often correspond with *de facto*-states.

1.3 Chapter overview

*Chapter two: Theory*, defines and discusses recognised and non-recognised *de facto*-states. It defines the state in international law through declarative and constitutive theory. A state’s legitimacy can come in two forms: internal and external. *De facto*-states are states by function, but they are not recognised as such and are thus excluded from the international society. Where the *de facto*-state originates and how it survives is analysed in the second half of the chapter. Lastly, the different ends of the entities are discussed, and the hypotheses and causal conditions are identified.

*Chapter three: Data*, clarifies the data selection criteria, and presents the included entities. It continues with closer descriptive attention to the entities, seeking the most obvious patterns.

*Chapter four: Methods*, presents and argues for the choice of Crisp Set QCA as the method to be used in this study. It is the logical method for medium-N analyses, but is also particularly suited for analyses of causal combinations. In addition to cs/QCA, descriptive analyses will be

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2 The first major work on investigating this as a concept rather than individual singularities is Pegg (1998). Other notable researchers include Silvia von Steinsdorff, Dov Lynch, Pål Kolstø and Nina Caspersen, who have performed thorough investigations on *de facto*-states, particularly after 2008, but also before.
used to provide a further elaboration of the combined effects of the causal conditions. The chapter then provides the operationalization of the causal conditions.

Chapter five: Analysis, has three main parts. One is the cs/QCA-analysis which finds the logical formulas for success and failure. The second is the descriptive analysis, seeking the same through description. Thirdly, the identified causal combinations leading to the different outcomes are applied to the entities still in progress, to identify which of them one could expect which outcomes for.

Chapter six: Conclusion, summarises and discusses the results of the analysis, and brings suggestions to further research.

The Appendices one to four presents the tables forming the basis for this thesis.
2. Theory chapter: recognised and non-recognised de facto-states

This chapter sets the stage for the thesis and describes and explains what is going to be investigated. It is constructed by two main parts, going from a broad description of the concept of states and state recognition to the more specified outcomes for the non-recognised states. Part 2.1 focuses on recognised states and starts by discussing the juridical concept of the state before moving to how states are created and why their recognition is a problematic issue. United Nation membership is used as a proxy for international recognition, so the UN admittance process is clarified and its development discussed.

Part 2.2 focuses on non-recognised states: Where they come from, how they are met, how they survive and what ends they can meet. After a debate on the different theoretical perspectives regarding what causes recognition, five hypotheses are established. They seek patterns in the development trajectory of non-recognised states by investigating their resources, ethnic composition, the involvement of other actors, and the level of democratic institutions in the entity.

2.1 Defining the state

In order to examine non-recognised states, it is necessary to first illuminate its contrast - the recognized state. What the state is and how it is created, recognized and admitted to the United Nations will be examined in the first half of the theory chapter. The concept of what constitutes a state is multi-faceted. Here, I shall elaborate on the juridical and political perspectives on recognised states. After that, I will describe the requirements for admittance in the United Nations and how they have evolved since the organisation’s creation.

2.1.1 Defining the state in international law: declarative and constitutive theory

In this thesis, International law is loosely defined as regulating the legal positions or res judicata between states in their position as such (Fleischer 1994, 17) and is generally seen as valid through common law and norms rather that supranational legal institutions (Fleischer 1994, 21-22). A state in international law is assumed to be the highest authority over a given area (Fleischer 1994, 49). The precise definition as to exactly what it constitutes is unclear, and at what point each definitional criteria is fulfilled. In addition, there are several instances that can offer or deny recognition of the aspiring state. Acceptance by the international
community\textsuperscript{3} grants states the opportunity of pursuing political, economic and other activities closed to non-recognised entities. There are nuances to this recognition, but it is here interpreted in the following manner: a state is recognised by the international community fully and wholly if it is a UN member state.

Here it is assumed that United Nations membership\textsuperscript{4} can serve as a proxy for international recognition as acceptance would by definition mean that the state is acknowledged by not only the veto powers but also the majority of the other member states (The United Nations General Assembly 1945 Rule 136). This would thus mean that there is a general acceptance for the entity’s status amongst the other recognised states in the international community and that it is both \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} recognised.

That an area is defined as a state in international law generally means that it fulfils four criteria and that it thus has the rights and duties in accordance with this. These criteria\textsuperscript{5}, as summarised by Fleischer (1994, 49 Italics in the original. Author’s translation. ), are:

1. A state must have a \textit{stable population} that can renew itself and maintain the duties of the state over time.
2. A state must have a \textit{fixed territory}.
3. A state must have an \textit{organised, central government}, capable of securing \textit{rule of law}.
4. A state must have a certain level of \textit{sovereignty}. It is, however, not necessary for the state to be completely independent.

5. Fleischer also pointed out the need for stability, demonstrating that the state can survive and that the organisation and government are indeed functional.

International law presents two points of view regarding state recognition (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2013, Hillier 1998, Fleischer 1994, Boczek 2005). The first is \textit{declarative theory}, in which a geographical entity is a state as long as it fulfils the necessary criterions stated above. In this perspective, recognition is seen as a mere political factor \textit{ipso post facto}, and it

\textsuperscript{3} Jackson and Rosenberg (1982, 12) describes this as “a community composed solely of states and the international organizations formed by states”.

\textsuperscript{4} The fact that Switzerland became a member as late as 2002 does not indicate it was not recognised before that point. (The United Nations General Assembly 2002a).

\textsuperscript{5} The criteria can be seen as a somewhat expanded version of those known from the Montevideo convention (1933Article 1). In Fleischer (1994), criteria 1 also included the point that “a random group of bandits settling in an area does not make a state” and criteria 4 that there is in effect a gliding scale of sovereignty.
does not influence the states existence as such. This is contrasted by the second viewpoint, known as constitutive theory. Here, the acceptance of others is the defining factor. Who is a state therefore hinges on who is recognised as one, not on what technical criteria are fulfilled. In practice, these definitions often overlap. Only a few recognised states are not recognised in both manners. As these criteria are open for interpretation, some countries recognise states that others do not.

For this thesis, it is the entities that are states by declarative theory without being so when utilising the constitutive viewpoint that are interesting. These are known as non-recognised or *de facto*-states (Kolstø 2006).

### 2.1.2 Internal and external state legitimacy

The distinction from declarative and constitutive theory is also visible when discussing state legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy will in this text be conceptualised as two functions. These are 1) internal and 2) external legitimacy. The first, internal legitimacy refers to the belief of its citizens in the viability and justification of its existence as a separate entity independent from the parent state. The second, external legitimacy, concerns what status already recognised states gives the entity. If an area is accepted by others as a state, it holds external legitimacy. (Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2011, 6, Kolstø 2006, 724, von Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer 2012, von Steinsdorff 2012).

Kolstø (2006, 724) explains how most states enjoy double legitimacy, meaning that it is accepted as such by both its inhabitants and other states. But, entities can have one without the other. Entities with only external legitimacy are known as failed states (Krasner 2004, 84-85, Kolstø 2006, 724-725) and are seen as *de jure* states though not *de facto*. Contrastingly, entities with internal legitimacy only are *de facto* but not *de jure* states. The latter are the ones who are interesting for this thesis.

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6 These recognised states who fail to comply with Fleischer’s criteria one to three are known as failed states. An example is Somalia, who is a recognised state lacking both territorial control and a stable, organised central government (Failed States Index 2012). Entities that generally fulfil said criterions one to three but not number four are not externally recognised and are described as *de facto* states (Kolstø 2006).

7 Kosovo is, for instance, per December 2012 recognized by 95 UN member states (Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs 04.12.2012).

8 Examples externally recognised states with debateable internal legitimacy per 2012 can include Somalia, who is the home of between two and four secessionist areas (Mesfin 2009) and Georgia, being in a similar position (Ciobanu 2008).
2.1.3 State success defined as United Nations membership

To be able to discuss the outcomes of *de facto* -states, it is necessary to define what constitutes success and failure. The potential outcomes for this type of entity will be more closely debated later in this chapter. United Nations membership will be used as a proxy measurement for international recognition, because acceptance into the union means recognition by all its member states. I argue that this is a practical way of separating complete from partial success, and thus making a distinction between entities accepted by many states and those accepted by all.

*United Nations membership criteria and admission procedures*

UN membership is not the only measurement of statehood, and can be claimed to be a conservative measurement\(^9\). Though other alternative measurements are possible, UN membership is here considered the most practical proxy available. Seeing that the membership application evaluation is a two-step process demanding acceptance both from the veto states in the Security Council and two thirds of the member states in the General Assembly (The United Nations 07.12.2012b), any opposition to the existence of the state will by definition be by a small minority and not by a veto power. UN membership includes that all member states must relate to the new member as a state, regardless of whether or not they voted in favour of the inclusion (Fleischer 1994, 57-58). While other states might also be major international players, the veto states are the most powerful single members in the UN. UN membership does not make an entity a state, but it most certainly indicates the acceptance of it.

In order for a political entity to be accepted as a member state in the United Nations, the following criteria must be fulfilled. First, a formal application must be submitted to the Secretary-General. Second, it will be given to the Security Council for consideration. If the Security Council recommends membership, the General Assembly will vote on the inclusion of the new member (The United Nations General Assembly Chapter 14, Articles 134-138, The United Nations 07.12.2012b). To be accepted, a positive vote from a two-thirds majority of the present states is required. The charter of the United Nations states that hopeful states *in spe* can be accepted for full membership if they accept the obligations declared in the Charter,

\(^9\) Two other manners of counting states springs to mind, but they do not allow for the same level of self-determination for its entities as a full UN membership does nor are they as accepted as statehood indicators: 1) The United Nations also operates with a kind of semi-membership which allows for entities being Permanent Observers, but it does not constitute full membership and they do not hold the same rights as complete members (The United Nations 2013a, b). 2) ISO 3166-1 lists 249 entities and includes autonomous areas as well as independent states (ISO 2013).
and if they “in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations” (The United Nations 1945 Article 4, section 1). Acceptance is thus not an automatic procedure, and each hopeful member must apply before it is to be considered.

The United Nations can also hinder recognition. Dugard and Raic (2006, 101) shows how the organization has directed non-recognition from its members in cases of claims being based on aggression\textsuperscript{10}, systematic, racial discrimination or human right-abuse\textsuperscript{11} or denying self-determination\textsuperscript{12} even in cases where the declaration of independence did not lead to the entity applying for membership status.

The United Nations does not endorse unilateral territorial changes to existing states. Territorial integrity of member states is protected by the declaration that they “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (The United Nations 1945 Article 2, section 4). The Declaration on friendly relations (1970) attempts to reconcile the right of self-determination and the right of territorial integrity. It states that the state must not discriminate against or engage in oppressive behaviour towards any groups and that the state’s integrity is only assured under certain obligations. Buchanan (1995, 1997) demonstrates that the most common argument for secession by those attempting it is a breach on these principles. Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 23) argues that while it could appear that the UN prohibits secession this declaration makes room for a discussion on whether oppressive and exclusive behaviour from the state opens for self-determination triumphing territorial integrity. Exactly when, why and how this can happen remains an open question, despite being much debated\textsuperscript{13}. Being vague, the suggestions for narrowing down the criteria are many and differing, and no final answer has been identified (Hannum 1998, Birch 1984, Beran 1984).

2.1.4 Creating new states: a terminology of secession

The changing of borders on the geopolitical map of the world is a complex matter. Investigating how states are created and how they disappear is important for understanding

\textsuperscript{10} For instance, The Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus, see UN Security Council resolution 541 (1983).
the discussion of non-recognised states. New states are created on territory formerly
controlled by another entity. In other words, by some form of secession\textsuperscript{14}. Though fully
recognising the importance of specificity, the concept “secession” will be used as signifying
the creating of a new state from parts of the territory of another throughout this thesis unless
otherwise stated. The focus will be on unilateral secessions that are not accepted by the parent
state.

Wood (1981) highlights the importance of a clear set of terminology when dealing with
secessionism\textsuperscript{15}. The exact meaning of the word “secession” is requested. He distinguishes
between “separatism” and “secession” by the degree of their desire to be independent from
the state centre. Separatism is here seen as the desire not to be further incorporated, whereas
secessionism describes the wish for less incorporation (Wood 1981, 109-110, Hechter 1992,
267). Both subcategories will be included here.

Secession, in whatever form it shows itself, includes claims of a justifiable right of self-
determination. The entity in question argues for the power of deciding for itself whether it
wishes to remain part of the parent state or not. Understanding the rationale behind a decision
to leave is important in order to be able to evaluate the righteousness of the cause. Lloyd
(1994-1995, 432-433) discusses four criteria for credible secessionist claims. These are: 1)
systematic discrimination or exploitation against a sizeable, self-determined minority; 2) the
existence of a distinct, self-defined community or society within a state, compactly inhabiting
a region, which overwhelmingly supports separatism; 3) a realistic prospect of conflict
resolution and peace within and between the new and old state as a result of the envisaged
self-rule or partition; and 4) the rejection of compromise solutions on the part of the central
government (see also Dugard and Raic 2006, 106). While these arguments are used by the
vast majority of non-recognised states to explain why they ought to be recognised, it is not
necessarily clear what is meant by them. What, for instance, is a “sizeable” minority, “realistic
prospects” and “overwhelming” support? The seeming impossibility of creating clear-cut
answers to in what situations an area can secede has led to a general fear of a so-called
domino-effect in which progressively smaller and smaller areas create their own states (Beran
1984).

\textsuperscript{14}As Beary (2008) shows, there is no shortage of areas with separatist murmurings. Only few of them manage to
become sufficiently strong to be classified as a de facto-state. Table 9on page 100 gives a list of considered but
excluded entities.
\textsuperscript{15}See Pfrirter and Napolitano (2006, 375-377) for a more detailed elaboration of different kinds of secession.
The purpose of the *de facto*-states examined here is assumed to be recognition of statehood, which means splitting from their parent state and succeeding despite the opposition from the latter. The exact manner in which they separated is not the most interesting point here. Regardless of their specific type of secession, non-recognised states are here seen as frozen or unsettled conflicts where the secessionists have won the territorial but not political struggle (von Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer 2012, Simão 2012, Smolnik 2012, Fawn 2008, 269). Similarly, it is not interesting per se whether the *de facto*-state leaders have credible claims to their secession. Their reasons for seceding are not as interesting as their ability, and no discrimination based on intent will be done. The inherent unclarity of Lloyd’s (1994-1995, 432-433) criteria opens for claiming them as fulfilled in very differing situations. The interesting point here is not the arguments but the manifest factors contributing to recognition.

### 2.1.5 State creation: a history in three waves

In their book *Creating new states*, Pavkovic and Radan (2007) identify two waves in state-creation taking place after the creation of the United Nations. Firstly, and largest, the wave connected to the end of colonialism. Second, the wave connected to the dissolution of the communist unions. The growth of members in the United Nations from the original 51 in 1945 to 193 in 2012 is largely due to decolonization (Kohen 2006, 2). This illustrates the developments in which entities are admitted as UN member states.

#### The first wave: decolonisation

Decolonisation was facilitated by the UN Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960). A key feature in this process was the notion of *uti possidetis juris*, where the borders of the colonial entities would be maintained as the borders of the new state (Pavkovic and Radan 2007). Some regions in former colonies attempted secession from the newly independent colony in which they were placed, but these were not accepted by the United Nations. In total, 80 UN member states and three *de facto*-states were created during this wave (The United Nations General Assembly 1955, The United Nations 24.03.2013a, b).

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16 This wave structure is also seen in Kolstø (2006, 736).
17 For a list of UN members and acceptance year, see The United Nations (07.12.2012a).
19 As you legally possess.
20 Biafra is an example of such (Pavkovic and Radan 2007, 22).
21 The de facto-states created in the first, decolonisation wave are Katanga, Biafra and Rhodesia.
After this decolonization wave the creation of new states has become more difficult. Most of the UN member states admitted after 1990 were created due to the collapsing of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Kohen 2006, 2). While The United Nations (1945) charter expresses support for the right of self-determination it is at the same time negative to secession from independent states outside of this framework. Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 23) argue that while decolonization is the withdrawal of a territory controlled by another state but not part of it, post-decolonisational state creation is another story. Here, the territorial integrity of the existing state is seen as clashing with the right of self-determination of the peoples living in the potential state.

As the debate on who should be considered as having a right to secede developed, the need to specify arose. While the colonies had this right, they were not allowed to change the existing borders. Nor was colonial domination an accepted reason to secede for any and all regions. The United Nations adopted the so-called salt-water criterion, signifying that only territories that were “geographically separate” and “distinct ethnically or culturally from the country administering it” were defined as non-self-governing territories with the right to secede (General Assembly Resolution 1541 of The United Nations General Assembly, quoted in Pegg 1998, 139, see also Brilmayer 1991, 182, Lloyd 1994-1995, 425, Österlund 1997, 181).

**The second wave: communist union dissolution**

The break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to a multitude of new states being accepted as UN member states. That their acceptances were generally unproblematic demonstrates that the UN now operates with two situations where the question of admittance is fairly obvious: former colonies - with a body of sea water between them and the centre - and federal entities in collapsed unions. In total, nineteen UN members and nine de facto-states were created in this period (The United Nations 07.12.2012a, Pellet 1992, Council 1993b, Hilde 1999, Council 1993a).

The discussions arising after the decolonization and expanded during the second wave were

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22 Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a plethora of complications after their application for independence, but at a structural level the case was fairly clear. They were accepted as a state by the Badinter committee and swiftly incorporated as a UN member state in 1992 within months of their declaration of independence (The United Nations 07.12.2012a, Rich 1993, 48-50, OSCE). The Greece - Former Yugoslavian Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM) name dispute (see The Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has also not hindered FYROM’s UN membership status and general recognition. Sub-federal units like Vojvodina, Kosovo and Chechnya were rejected in their application for state status.

23 The de facto-states created in the second, union dissolution wave are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Gagauzia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska Krajina, Republika Srpska, South-Ossetia and Transnistria.
still valid. Despite the existence of the UN Declaration on friendly relations (1970) the question was still open as to who holds the right to separating from the territory of the state they originated in, and for what reasons. Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 23-24) point out that the UN does not define what constitutes a people or how to distinguish between groups. Creating a new state is further complicated by the fact that only very few states\textsuperscript{24} have constitutional secession clauses, and those that have them tend to not be very specific as to when it is legitimate to secede and who is allowed to do so (Bordignon and Brusco 2001, 1812). Chen and Ordeshook (1994) argues that a reason for this is that including such a clause is believed to lead to increased risk of fractional struggles. By having the option to opt out from the state if only the protest is large enough, small, regional frustrations might be cajoled into larger events causing much distress from the inhabitants of the area.

\textit{A third wave?}

In the years after the publication of Pavkovic and Radan (2007) there appears to be a new trend manifesting itself in the relationship between non-recognised states and international actors. This could indicate that one is approaching a different, more pragmatic attitude towards these entities\textsuperscript{25}. With the decolonisation and union dissolution periods generally over, the fear of a domino-effect might be less justifiable. A total of five UN member states and eleven \textit{de facto}-states fit into this category\textsuperscript{26}.

Since the creation of the \textit{de facto}-state in Taiwan after the Communist takeover of China in 1949, there has been a small but steady stream of \textit{de facto}-states created outside of the two scenarios presented by Pavkovic and Radan (2007). These are not related to communist union dissolution or to decolonisation as such. Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, Somaliland and South Sudan are in areas that have a colonial history, but their two-step process of secession does not fit with the concept of decolonisation. They have seceded from areas that have themselves seceded\textsuperscript{27}, or have split from an entity created by the merge of two or more former

\textsuperscript{24} Bordignon and Brusco (2001, 1812) identify Yugoslavia and Ethiopia - both of which have experienced attempted secession.

\textsuperscript{25} The \textit{de facto}-states created in the third ware are Anjouan, Bangladesh, East Timor, Puntland, South Sudan, Eritrea, Iraqi-Kurdistan, North Cyprus, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam and Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{26} The five recognised are: Bangladesh (1974), East Timor (2002), Eritrea (1993), Montenegro (2006), and South Sudan (2011) (The United Nations 07.12.2012a). Note that Montenegro’s admission can be considered a continuation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia though happening over a decade after the rest. Switzerland became a member of the UN in 2002, but the statehood of that particular state has not been subject to question here.

\textsuperscript{27} Bangladesh broke loose from Pakistan, who itself seceded from the English colony of India. For a timeline, see for instance BBC (2013a) and Encyclopædia Britannica (2013c).
The creation of North Cyprus has nothing to do with decolonisation or union dissolution, and the same holds true for Iraqi-Kurdistan and several other entities. Tamil Eelam is not in this wave as they broke loose nearly forty years after Sri Lanka’s independence. This is so long that it appears obvious there must be something else going on than mere decolonisation. What is new is therefore not the existence of these entities, but the treatment of them by the international society. Falling outside of the other two waves, these are special cases and it appears that in the later years they have become to a larger and larger extent treated as such.

The consequences of this are twofold. First, there is the actions and attitudes of international society. Second, there is the behaviour and rhetoric of the states-in-spe themselves. From the first, international perspective, Hoch (2011, 81-82) investigates trends in the development of the European Union (EU), and notes a general moving away from the dichotomous notion of either full recognition or full rejection of state status. After 2010, the EU seems to have adopted the strategy of “engagement without recognition”, indicating more and closer connections with the relevant entities. Hoch (2011) further claims there is a changing rhetoric from the EU, based in the idea that they would rather influence and ameliorate the situation on the ground in these areas than firmly stand by their principles of non-recognition and contribute to harsh living conditions within the non-recognised state’s borders. If this is the case for other states then only the EU member states, it would mean an interesting change in the international climate regarding state recognition.

From the perspective of the non-recognised state leaders, we also see a change in debate tactics and development focus. The latter is to a large extent based on the international response to Kosovo’s struggle towards their declaration of independence in 2008. The “standards before status” policy introduced by The United Nation Interim Administration in

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28 East Timor, Eritrea, Somaliland, and South Sudan merged with other former colonies to form the entities they eventually seceded from. See for instance BBC (04.07.2011, 2012c, 2013c, f), Lloyd (1994-1995), BBC (2013b), Encyclopedia Britannica (2013g, k, h).


30 Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, became independent from the United Kingdom in 1948 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013l). It was admitted to the UN as a member state in 1955 (The United Nations General Assembly 1955). Pegg (1998, 77) claims that Tamil Eelam was a de facto-state from 1986 onwards.

31 For example unofficial meetings with leaders of civil society organisations, supporting said organisations, aiding humanitarian work et cetera. See for instance (Civil Georgia 2010, ISS 2010).

Kosovo (UNMIK) (2003) formalized the then new notion that Kosovo could be recognised if it proved to have fulfilled certain democratic criteria and upheld democratic standards. Its subsequent recognition by several states in 2008 has led to an increased focus on structural and organisational development in the post-Soviet non-recognized states (see for instance Caspersen 2008b, c), and there is no reason to believe it will not be affecting leaders of other such entities as well. However, as Caspersen (2008b) points out, the recognition of Kosovo is intended as a *sui generis* and thus not as a precedent for other, similar reactions regarding the other non-recognized states of the world.

### 2.1.6 Responses to state declaration

When a territory declares itself independent, the international society will have to react. The hoped reaction is naturally recognition and acceptance, but this is by no means assured. The international society is conservative regarding borders, and particularly so for unilateral secessions (Fawn 2008, Kolstø 2006, 736, Hoch 2011, Pavkovic and Radan 2007, 23). If the declaration is made by an application for UN membership, the process is theoretically fairly straight-forward. All applications for full membership is evaluated by the Security Council, and if they can support the request, it is sent to the General Assembly for consideration (The United Nations General Assembly Chapter 14, Articles 134-138, The United Nations 07.12.2012b).

This is not the only way of proceeding. Independence can be declared without directly applying to the UN. Examples include referenda, unilateral declaration, or simply making it clear in some manner that the region in question operates separately from the state it used to be part of. If the declaration initially is bilateral, meaning that both the original and new state agrees to it beforehand, there is no perceived problem with recognition\(^{33}\). Relatively uncontroversial events of this type will not be included here. It is the more problematic unilateral declarations that are in focus here, including those that eventually became bilaterally accepted.

**Responses from the UN and regional organisations**

Should a secessionist area break loose from its mother state, even without applying to the UN for membership, the Security Council will evaluate whether they perceive the event a threat to international peace. If that is the case they can decide to discuss an appropriate response, up to

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\(^{33}\) For instance, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a relatively problem-free bilateral division, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia gained membership in the UN without delay (Hilde 1999, Council 1993a, Council 1993b).
and including armed military action, though peaceful means are favoured (The United Nations 1945Chapters 5-9). In addition, regional organisations such as the African Union 34, may express opinions on the legitimacy of the proposed state. As mentioned above, UN membership is used as a proxy for status as a recognised state, but this neither means that the UN is the only organisation that entities can become members of nor that states cannot recognise entities without UN approval. Indeed, some de facto-states are recognised by several UN member states, though this is only the case for a small minority of them 35.

**Responses from the individual UN member states**

Having territorial control over an area indicates the lack of armed forces there from the parent-state. Anderson (2011) describes the situation as one where the war over the territory is over, and the conflict moves to frozen stability. In other words, the conflict is not solved, yet not actively fought over. Though the constant fear of military attacks often leads to militarised societies and an official rhetoric focused on this (Byman and King 2012, 54), the de facto states are on a rule ignored by international society. Their declarations of independence 36 normally create little more than small ripples in the international, political climate. This means that trade, political cooperation or any other activity lending legitimacy to the leaders is minimal (Caspersen 2008b, 13).

Wood (1981, 125-128) claims that contrary to what one might believe, the parent state normally reacts peacefully to declarations of independence from secessionist areas. He presents two options for the parent state in such situations: Either forceful repression or attempting to incorporate the region by giving it a stronger autonomy. The first is very costly, and carries with it only a small chance of success in the long run, though it can subdue the conflict for a time. Wood (1981, 126) argues that aggressive reactions from the central government carries with it a high risk of increasing the feeling of separateness amongst the inhabitants of the secessionist area. To avoid a long-lasting conflict, he finds it is logical for most governments to go for the second option. Constitutional reform increasing cooperation and acceptance of divisions are seen as the most efficient way of reacting to secession 37.

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34 As it did when rejecting the proposed Azawad in the northern regions of Mali (The African Union 2012).
35 Anderson (2011, 185) shows that the de facto-states which have been recognised by UN member states but are not themselves members are: Abkhazia (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru), Biafra (Gabon, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Zambia), Chechnya (Georgia), Kosovo (95 states) 35, Northern Cyprus (Turkey), South Ossetia (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru), Taiwan (22 states) 35.
36 Declaration of independence is here considered a step in the process as it is assumed they do not declare it if they believe the possibility of obtaining it as completely unfeasible or dangerous. For a list of which entities have declared independence, see footnote 86 on page 42.
37 Brancati (2006) argues that regional autonomy can increase conflict by facilitating participation in regional
Each state can decide whether or not to acknowledge the independence of new states. Acknowledgement can take the form of *de jure* official recognition, or *de facto* by practical actions making it clear that the state is assumed to be legitimate and valid by for instance commencing trade relations or talks with the entity’s political leaders. Often states offer *de facto* recognition first, while they wait to see if the new state is actually viable before *de jure* recognising it (Fleischer 1994, 55-57). In cases where the separating region does not belong to the two abovementioned categories of being either a former colony or having status as a republic in a union that is dissolving, the most common response is that of ignoring. Not having trade partners or others to lean on makes the survival of the non-recognised state difficult and it can be problematic to imagine how they manage to keep their internal legitimacy for a long period of time facing such little aid and having only few political connections.

2.1.7 Summarising state creation
The first section of this chapter has defined the state. In international law, the state must have a stable population, a fixed territory, a government and sovereignty. In declarative theory, an entity is a state if it fulfils these criteria. In constitutive theory, an entity is a state if it is recognised as such by other states. A state can have internal and external legitimacy. External means that it is accepted as a state by other states, while internal indicates it is accepted as such by its population. These two are, as demonstrated, not always present at the same time. For this thesis, state success is defined as being a UN member state. New states are created through secession, a concept which here envelopes all subcategories of the concept as long as the separation is unilateral and not accepted by the parent state. The UN is not in favour of altering the borders of existing member states, except for through decolonisation. They have also opened for new states created after the dissolution of the communist unions. These two constitute the two largest waves of state creation. In addition, there has been identified a third wave, unconnected with any major international change of the aforementioned type.

2.2 Non-recognised states and the world - the *de facto* state
The second half of this chapter describes those areas that have failed at gaining international recognition but still manage to continue existing for at least two years. This section describes the concept of the *de facto*-state, developments leading up to their creation, how they manage politics and thus strengthen the feeling of distance to the centre. Flamand (2013) finds that decentralisation cannot prevent secessionist conflict.
to continue existing for years despite being outside of international society and what ends they meet. Based on this information, I seek to identify what can explain the development of non-recognised states. Four factors are found, namely their resources, their ethnic composition, the involvement of other actors and the level of democratic institutions within the entity.

2.2.1 The de facto-state

Before discussing de facto-states, a clarification of what they are is necessary. Kolstø (2006) defines it in the following manner.

“To be classified as a [de facto-state], a political entity must fulfill three criteria. Its leadership must be in control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to, and it must have sought but not achieved international recognition as an independent state. Finally, to eliminate a whole spate of ephemeral political contraptions, I exclude those that have persisted in this state of non-recognition for less than two years.” (Kolstø 2006, 724-725)

This definition is widely accepted and forms the basis for the selection of entities in this thesis. A de facto-state is thus an entity fulfilling the first three of the state criteria set forth by Fleischer (1994, 49). It is a state by declarative, but not by constitutive theory. Likewise, it has internal legitimacy, but not external. It is important to note that the concept does not only apply to entities without clear outcomes. A de facto-state stops existing when it is admitted as a UN member or reintegrated into its parent. But, between its creation and its disappearance all entities included here are de facto-states. In other words, “de facto-state” applies to both present and past entities included in this thesis.

The definition of a state in international law as summarised by Fleischer (1994, 49) defines a state as a territory having a stable population, a fixed territory, an organised, central government, capable of securing rule of law and a certain level of sovereignty. In order to be defined as a non-recognised state in this thesis, the territory in question will have fulfilled these claims without achieving international recognition as a state. As previously mentioned, unproblematic secessions accepted without major delay by the parent state are not included here. The focus is on those entities that are in limbo, that are not accepted as fully-fledged de jure states while at the same time not being de facto part of their parent. The large number of entities claiming, exercising or desiring self-determination outside of their parent state means the data selection will have to come as a result of close evaluation of several more criteria.


39 Another concept that signifies the same can be non-recognised state.
Surviving as a de facto-state

Surviving as a de facto-state is complicated. Having none or little recognition, they have very few options for international cooperation, they have a minimum of political contact with others, and international trade, export and import is logically difficult to organise. Caspersen (2008c), Lynch (2002) and Hoch (2011) details how the non-recognised states are often thought of as criminal havens, ripe with organised crime, human trafficking and smuggling. The claims are frequently repeated by parent states attempting to stop external interaction with these entities. While such accusations are found to be overplayed, they still have elements of truth to them. Non-recognised states are often “built on shaky economic foundations” and may not see other alternatives than having a shady economy (Byman and King 2012, 51). Often, non-recognised states are indeed “weak, poor and corrupt” (Caspersen 2008c, 117), but not uniformly so. Indeed, Kolstø (2006) and von Steinsdorff (2012, 204) finds that some perform better at several democratic and institutional indicators than their parent states. Often themselves emerging from war and weak states, the non-recognised states generally have a poor starting point for their development of stable institutions and economic growth (see for instance Mazrui 1995, Caspersen 2011). Having a reputation as a criminal region will necessarily make it even more difficult to engage in cooperation with other states.

After the introduction of the “standards before status” policy in Kosovo by the The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (2003), democracy and democratisation have become focal points for many non-recognised state leaders (Caspersen 2010a, 2, 2008c) and some are indeed scoring higher on democratic measurements than their parent states (von Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer 2012, 204). Kosovo’s declaration of independence and its subsequent recognition by multiple major states has caused many a non-recognised state leader and patron state leader alike to argue that there is no reason why recognition of other entities should be withheld (see for instance Caspersen 2008c, b).

Kolstø (2006, 2008) identifies five factors that aid the survival of non-recognise states. The most important is the process of nation building. Here, the leaders of the entity attempt to

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40 Non-recognised states are not alone in this. Recognised states can also be weak (Failed States Index 2012), poor (UNDP 2013) and corrupt (Transparency International 2012). Taiwan is an example of a de facto-state that is neither of the three (Freedomhouse 2012m, Nation Master 25.02.2013). Both Somaliland and Puntland, though themselves troubled, scored better than their parent state Somalia on these indicators (Arieff 2008, Freedomhouse 2012h, i, Mesfin 2009, BBC 2012c).

41 Scheindlin (2012) questions the validity of certain so-called democratic indicators, particularly referenda, in non-recognised states.
create a shared identity among the inhabitants to ensure backing from within (see also Scheindlin 2012). Developing common points of reference and identity markers can be and are done by for instance using propaganda, writing and teaching the history of the area and cultivating traditions and national customs. This is frequently done through upholding the memory of the civil war that preceded the birth of the non-recognised state. Thus, a clear image of us-versus-them can be maintained. Honour is given to those that fought on the right side, while the image of the enemy seeking their obliteration is kept in focus.

Kolstø (2006, 730-731) points out that the population of de facto-states normally supports the cause for independence. He argues this is because those opposing it are likely to have left during the process of independence and supporters from the outside are likely to have immigrated. But a focus on soft power is not the only way to keep the public on your side. A militarization of society is also a common manner of upholding the existence of a non-recognised state, creating what Caspersen (2012a, 133) calls frozen situations of “no peace, no war”. Relative to the size of the population, the military normally constitutes a formidable force (King 2001, 535, Kolstø 2006, 731-732). In addition, the parent state is by necessity sufficiently weak - militarily, institutionally, politically or otherwise - to not being able to regain control over the territory. As long as chaos continues, the parent state is thus prevented from launching full strength-campaigns to reintegrate its lost land. However, not all parent states remain weak. Both China and Russia are strong states, both militarily and economically, yet they have not completely regained control of respectively Taiwan and Chechnya.

Powerful patrons can play a large part in the development of non-recognised states, both if the relationship is officially acknowledged or simply implied\(^\text{42}\). The support may reach such a high level that a master/puppet-relationship is born. Here, the entity is so dependent on external support from its patron that the latter completely dominates the aspiring state. A symbiosis between the two might, however, be desired in irredentist secession\(^\text{43}\). Caspersen (2010b) finds that this situation is less frequent than might be expected, and often exaggerated. Indeed, the tables are sometimes turned completely\(^\text{44}\). Though non-recognised

\(^{42}\) For example, Caspersen (2010b) points out the clear support of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia by Russia in 2008, Byman and King (2012, 48) further mention Russia’s aid to Transnistria, Armenia’s help to Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey’s support of Northern Cyprus.

\(^{43}\) Such as Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska’s desire to maintain and cultivate their Serb identities (Caspersen 2010b, 50).

\(^{44}\) For instance, the Armenian president Robert Kocharian is originally from Nagorno-Karabakh and has twice been the president there as well (The Republic of Armenia 2013).
states are often dependent on external patrons, the degrees of subordination are highly varying (Caspersen 2008a, 2007). External support need not only come from other states. International organisations can likewise play important roles in the survival or disappearance of seceded states through for instance taking over some of the basic functions of the state (Kolstø 2006, 734-735).

The importance of geographical and political positions in the world is highlighted by Levitsky and Way (2006) in their article “Linkage and Leverage”. They claim that where a country is situated and who it has relations with has a strong effect on how it develops. The argument is supported by Doorenspleet (2004) who finds a clear effect of a country’s role in the world system having an “unexpected impact” on structural development. Though not originally discussing state recognition, the articles illustrate the potential in having friends in positions that can influence the opinions of other states. Byman and King (2012, 47) claim that it is indeed the case that geopolitical positioning is important for the probability of the disputed state being recognised.

2.2.3 De facto-state status: independence, limbo and reintegration

Non-recognised states exist because their strive for recognition is not obtained for an elongated period of time. While some of them float in undefined positions for several years, most of the entities that have come into existence since the creation of the United Nations have reached an end. A few have been recognised as states and have received UN membership. For most of them, the end result is different. They either become reabsorbed into the parent state with no special status, they reach a compromise with the parent state securing increased autonomy, or they are integrated in their patron state (Kolstø 2006, 735). Seeing as none of the entities identified in this thesis have become part of their patron state, it will not be possible to analyse this specific type of events. That gives three categories: independence, limbo and reintegration.

Independence is a rare outcome. Only four of the twenty-three de facto-states included in this thesis have reached independence: Bangladesh, Eritrea, South Sudan and East-Timor. That the number is so low is not surprising, since cases where independence is expected and easily

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45 The EU has taken an active interest in promoting democracy in Nagorno-Karabakh (Simão 2012). Kosovo sees a high level of positive involvement by the international society via EULEX (23.01.2013) and NATO KFOR (2013) while Katanga was brought to its knees partly by a UN intervention (The United Nations Security Council 1961a).

46 A discussion of the data selection and included entities is found in the Data chapter.
juridically defendable are not expected to have a protracted period of non-recognition before they are included as UN members. In addition, as Pegg (1998, 220) points out, there are many organisational and normative obstacles potential states have to overcome.

Being in limbo means having an undetermined outcome. The process is yet unfinished. These entities vary in their degree of recognition (Pegg 1998, 209-220). Some are accepted by multiple states, while others are merely ignored by almost everyone. Their undecided position does not mean that their development is frozen. They are constantly attempting to reach their goal of independence, be it via extortion-like techniques or institutional restructuring (Byman and King 2012, 51). Evolutions in degree of recognition can be difficult to spot, and may come in different forms. Offering or retracting recognition is not the only way of showing support and acceptance of a non-recognised state. Development in trade and political contact might be indicators of change in status, even though no official proclamations are made.

Failing as a non-recognised state can have different outcomes, namely an increase or decrease of self-government, or maintaining the *status quo ante* (Kolstø 2006, 764-738, Pegg 1998, 209-220). In practice, this has two outcomes: Some kind of federal agreement can be reached with the central government, allowing an autonomous status to the secessionist area. Otherwise, the formerly non-recognised state becomes fully absorbed into the parent state and functions as any other part of the country. In this case it might keep its old form or have its borders redrawn.

### 2.2.4 Identifying causal conditions and hypotheses

Here, theories on what causes which outcomes for *de facto*-states are discussed. Four topics are presented, and from them five hypotheses regarding influence on the outcomes of the included *de facto*-states are formed. The topics are 1) Economic situation, 2) Involvement of international actors, 3) Ethnicity as a state foundation, and 4) Democratic institutions. From these four, five hypotheses are extracted. They are operationalized in the Methods chapter, after having discussed the method of choice.

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47 A list of entities in limbo and their recognisers can be seen in footnote 35 on page 17.
48 That is, the level of autonomy they had before the secessionist conflict erupted.
49 For example, partial autonomy was granted Republika Srpska (Kolstø 2006, 738).
50 As an example, Chechnya still has its old borders (Kolstø 2006, 738).
51 For instance: Biafra’s borders were completely altered after the conflict ended (Commision 2013, Cahoon 2002, The Robinson Library 2012).
The hypotheses are presented individually, but in the analyses the focus will be on seeking effects of their combinations. They are presented individually because the theoretical background to the hypotheses all focuses on the influence of the specific, discussed factor. No combined hypotheses have been possible to discern from the literature included here, and they are thus kept in their single form to provide the chance of testing them as they are presented. The hypotheses below present the direction in which each one is expected to influence the outcome. They are assumed to work together, but it what manners are yet unclear.

Seeking patterns in the development of non-recognised states is a complicated project. The difference in the background of these regions might be too great for any meaningful interpretation to be made. They come from different times and situations. They have high variations in resources and political systems and are spread over several continents. The factors ultimately determining\(^ {52}\) their outcomes is, according to Pegg (1998, 224), not in their control. Still, they often look to each other for inspiration and information (Pegg 1998, 167-170, Caspersen 2008b, Fawn 2008, Charney 2001). The recognition of one non-recognised state by a UN member leads to reactions from the others and possible parent and patron states as well with demands for equal treatment. Still, investigating whether such patterns exist is important. The findings can indicate directions for future research regardless of whether any pattern is found or not. Likewise, the energy of the non-recognised states could be more effectively spent if effects of the included factors can be discerned.

The following topics and causal conditions are found by studying articles on single cases or small groups of \textit{de facto} -states singling out what appears to be the most prominent factors. It is not intended to be an exclusive list. It is made after assessing both credibility and frequency of the arguments made by other researchers. This means that it is researcher-dependent and its explanatory strength potentially weakened by omission of important factors. In order to avoid this as much as possible, it is important to use a multitude of sources. If the analysis chapter reveals contradictory outcomes for entities with the same developmental trajectory and matching causal combinations, a further discussion of potentially missing factors must be included. Some arguments have been considered, but excluded. Reasons for this include being

\(^{52}\) Pegg (1998, 224) identifies three main factors influencing the outcomes of the non-recognised state’s struggle for recognition: 1) acceptance by the parent state, 2) massive and prolonged human rights violations, and 3) force. Factor one is irrelevant here, as only problematic secessions will be included. Factor two is seen again in the search for omitted causal conditions in the analysis chapter. Factor three has not been examined.
1) mentioned only by one or few authors, 2) receiving the same value on all or nearly all of the data, or 3) being used to explain the outcome of only one or few entities.

**Topic 1: Ethnicity as a state foundation**

**Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation**

H1: Having an ethnic base increases the chances of international recognition

The causal condition and hypotheses presented here are based on discussions regarding the importance of ethnicity as an identity marker and its effect on the development of the de facto-state. This involves point one in Fleischer’s (1994, 49) criteria for statehood in international law, namely the need for a stable population. It examines the population of the non-recognised state and compares it with that of its parent.

The principle to self-determination is described in the Charter of the United Nations (The United Nations 1945) Articles 1(2) and 55, and in Article 2 of (The United Nations General Assembly 1960) is described as a right all peoples have. On the surface this might seem straightforward, as one might simply ask the people whether they wish independence. But, as (Pegg 1998, 138) illustrates, the complications are many. For who are the people? And what about the territorial integrity of the parent state?

Both the UN charter and Resolution 1541 come with modifications, attempting to narrow down the number of groups being entitled to self-determination (see a discussion in Pegg 1998, 136-142). This is also strengthened in practice by generally only allowing statehood to post-colonial entities and federal units after union collapse. The perceived discrepancies found between the articles granting the right to self-determination and those rejecting it are at the core of many fights for independence. One reason for this is that the main distinction between decolonisation and secession can be said to be simply geographical distance, and that there are thus inconsistencies in the application of the norms (Pegg 1998, 140, Buchheit).

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53 Islam (1985, 212) argues that one of the reasons why Bangladesh was recognised is its geographical separation from its parent state. This is ignored here, as it is not a repeated claim by others or in other situations and only can be used to describe Anjouan, Bangladesh, Rhodesia, Taiwan and Transnistria.

54 Both (Haugland 2008, 70-75) and (Islam 1985) find that the level of human rights violations prior to the attempt at being accepted as a state has an impact. However, the causal condition is not translatable. All of the entities included have a violent background. That some of them suffered long bouts of violence from their parent state before the war that led to secession is not considered interesting here.

55 Haugland (2008, 70-75) find that the status as federal entity contributes to the likelihood of being recognised. As Eritrea is the only former federal entity in my data set, this variable is excluded.

56 See Kamanu (1974) for a discussion on territorial integrity versus the right of self-determination in post-colonial Africa.
1978, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Demissie 1996-1997). The potential for secessionist conflicts are more strongly illuminated when one considers that the majority of states are in fact comprised of a multitude of ethnic groups (CIA World Factbook 12.02.2013).

Wood (1981, 112-116) analyses preconditions for successful secession, and finds that a concentration of one main ethnic group appears to increase the de facto-state’s chances. Similarly, both Hroch (1998), and Guiberneau and Rex (2012) illustrate the power of ethnicity as a rallying point. Several of the de facto states that have existed since the creation of the United Nations have come in the form of an ethnical group that wishes to separate from the other ethnicity of the parent state and go from being a minority in one state to a majority in their own\(^{57}\).

Summarising, it is clear that the theories argue that having a distinct ethnicity different from the population in the rest of the parent is assumed to be positive for the chances of recognition.

**Topic 2: Democratic institutions**

Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state

H2: Having a higher level of democratic institutions than the parent state increases the chances of international recognition

This argument revolves around the abilities of the administrative organization of the de facto-state in comparison to that of its parent. During the last ten years or so, a new discourse regarding non-recognized states has arrived\(^{58}\). It can be seen particularly in the international society’s reactions to the situation in Kosovo Here, the states who recognized\(^{59}\) Kosovo argued this was possible due to its strong level of democracy\(^{60}\). This line of arguments have also been seen in the contact recognized states have with entities such as the present-day post-Soviet ones and Taiwan (Hoch 2011). The argument that democratic institutions improve a de facto state’s chances of obtaining recognition is also put forwards by Pegg (1998, 42).

Caspersen (2008b) argues that though both the US and the EU refuse that the recognition of Kosovo should set precedence for what is required for other states to be accepted, it could still

\(^{57}\) Abkhazia, South-Sudan and Biafra are examples of de facto-states with an ethnic foundation. Entities such as for instance Eritrea and Transnistria are examples of the contrary.
\(^{58}\) This is described in the section A third wave? on page 14.
\(^{59}\) A list of who recognises Kosovo is seen in through the Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs (04.12.2012).
Several non-recognised state leaders argue that if Kosovo could be recognized due to its democratic institutions, they should too. After the introduction of «standards before status» for Kosovo in 2003, the focus of many leaders of Post-Soviet non-recognized states has been on strengthening and putting the limelight on already existing democratic and institutional credentials. They argue that they ought to be recognized, particularly seeing that they have a higher level of democracy than their parent states (Caspersen 2011, 338, 2008b, 2012a).

The claim of an influence of democratic level compared to the parent state can also be seen in the evaluations of de facto-states in the literature. For example: In her analysis of Nagorno-Karabakh and its parent and patron, Caspersen (2012a) concludes that the lack of stable, democratic institutions has checked Nagorno-Karabakh’s development towards a solution and kept it existing as a non-recognised state.

This corresponds to part three of the criterions of statehood in international law, namely having “an organised, central government, capable of securing rule of law” (Fleischer 1994, 49). The arguments presented here indicate that if the de facto-state is more successful than its parent in this, it is more likely to be recognised as a UN member state.

While non-recognised state leaders argues that accepting Kosovo should lead to an acceptance of the post-Soviet satellites, the EU claims Kosovo is a one-off situation (Caspersen 2008b). But structural stability and democracy - particularly in otherwise unstable or closed regions - has shown to be beneficial for the recognition of for instance Somaliland (Arieff 2008, 67-70) - at least in practice if not officially. However, how democratic institutions affect state recognition is unclear. Haugland (2008, 68) finds there to be no correlation between institutions and international accept.

This hypothesis is thus meant to test the claims that the democratic level of the de facto-state

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61 See for instance (Smolnik 2012) and (Caspersen 2012b, 1-3).

62 «Standards before status» refers to the Standards for Kosovo and how the entity would have to fulfil these criteria before being able to be considered as a state (The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 2003).
matters for its recognition - particularly in relation to its parent.

**Topic 3: Involvement of international actors**

**Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition**

**H3: Opposition from a UN veto power decreases the chances of recognition**

**Causal condition D: UN veto power support**

**H4: Support from a UN veto power increases the chances of recognition**

The hypotheses presented here are founded on arguments regarding support or opposition by UN veto holders. The underlying reasons for their involvement is not evaluated, nor is it possible to discern them from the data collected. What is investigated here is not why these states involve themselves, but what the effect of it is.

That international support is important for the for the survival of de facto-states is argued by both Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008), Kolstø (2006), Ishiyama and Batta (2012) and Hoch (2011, 74). This is both because contact with others can help economically and militarily, but also because the recognised friend might convince others to support the de facto-state as well. Similarly, opposition can prove fatal.

Though UN membership admissions are few and far between for entities not part of the decolonisation or post-union dissolution waves, this rule is not set in stone. Wood (1981, 130-133) explains that exceptions might happen in a small number of cases where “strategic, economic, or ideological motives override the more conservative tendency” of not supporting secessionist claims. His example is Bangladesh, whose recognition was aided by India’s intervention. But, as Wood (1981, 133) stresses, having external support is not the same as a guarantee of eventual acceptance by others. Nor does support for one non-recognised state mean that the big power will be generally supportive of all such claims. UN veto power support is not synonymous to UN membership acceptance. UN veto opposition and support is changeable, and initial rejection does not indicate permanent exclusion.

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63 Katanga is a good example of a de facto-state stopped in its tracks by international involvement (Hughes 2010, Islam 1985).
64 Another example is Taiwan, who is protected from China by the USA (Kolstø 2006, 733).
65 As seen with the USSR, who supported Bangladesh but went against both Katanga and Biafra (Pegg 1998, 131). A contemporary example is Russia, who is in opposition to Kosovo while supporting several of the post-USSR-entities (Fawn 2008, 274, UNPO 2009, Ciobanu 2008, 121, Caspersen 2008b, 1, BBC 2010).
66 This can be seen in for instance South-Ossetia, who is supported by Russia but is not a UN member state (Slomanson 2009, Nichol 2008, Global Security 2011b).
67 The changeability of UN veto power opposition is well illustrated by Bangladesh who was initially opposed by
The potential power of big actors is underlined when considering how the veto powers can block application processes in the UN Security Council\textsuperscript{68}. International actors going against the desire of independence of secessionist areas is found to decrease the area’s chances of recognition (Haugland 2008, 68). This position is mirrored in the realist paradigm which states that power is the currency of international relations (Slaughter 1995, 507, Haugland 2008, 26) which leads to the assumption that an already strong and recognised state will hold great sway over others and can retard or even stop an aspiring state in its attempts at becoming an included member of the international society. Lack of opposition from an international power is found to be important for the chances of international recognition (Haugland 2008, 73).

UN veto holders are the most powerful single states in discussions of admittance of new member states, as they can stop the entire process by laying down vetoes\textsuperscript{69} (The United Nations 07.12.2012b). One can assume that this power can be extended to also include relations with other member states. Thus, if one of them is positive to the recognition of one \textit{de facto}-state it might be able to convince others that they should be so too. Due to their veto position, and their generally strong position in economic, military and other questions\textsuperscript{70}, they are here assumed to hold potentially leading roles in the process towards recognition or rejection.

Summarising, it is assumed that being opposed or supported by a UN veto holder can potentially be very important for the success or failure of non-recognised states.

\textbf{Topic 4: Economic situation significantly different from the parent state}

\textbf{Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state}

\textbf{H5: A different economic level than the parent state increases the chances of recognition}


\textsuperscript{69} Of course, UN veto states are not the only ones that can influence the future of these entities. Bangladesh, as previously mentioned, was strongly aided by India (Islam 1985, 218, Akram 2006, 29, The United Nations General Assembly 2004, 15, USUN 13.05.2013). Similarly, Armenia has been vitally important for Nagorno-Karabakh (Hughes 2001, 14, BBC 2012e, Caspersen 2008a, 367-368). For a list of states supporting or opposing \textit{de facto}-state see Appendix 4.

\textsuperscript{70} Levitsky and Way (2006) discusses the powers of states in international relations, and argue that some states are more powerful than others. Veto states are assumed in this thesis to be part of the category for the very influential.
For most secessionist areas, economy is an important factor (Buchanan 1995, 58-60). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and King (2001) all argue from different perspectives how secessionist entities with a significantly different economic position are likely to attempt divorcing completely from their parent state. Further, the international society is also apt to react to conflicts if economy is an important manifest political cleavage. This is supported by Islam (1985, 213), who claims that one of the reasons the Katanga conflict faced such a harsh international reaction was its obvious economical aspect. The Biafra conflict, on the other hand, had a lower economic foundation and is claimed to therefore face a lower level of international reactions.

Anesi (2011) investigates the role of economy on secession development and finds that what matters is not which party of the conflict has the most resources, but whether economy plays a central role (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 319, and Ziblatt 2006). Entities where economy plays an important role for the desire for secession are argued to be more likely to achieve success than entities without an obvious economical aspect. Should the resources be evenly spread, Anesi (2011) finds that the correlation disappears. Hence, conflicts in which an economic cleavage is important are expected to have increased chances for success.

To summarise, the argument claims that de facto-states with a significantly different economic level from their parent - in either direction - are more likely to succeed in gaining UN membership than those with roughly the same level.

2.3 Chapter summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a background for understanding de facto-states. The concept of state is described via international law and internal and external legitimacy. UN membership status has been chosen as a proxy for recognition. Two state creation waves are results of official UN policy changes: the decolonisation and communist union dissolution waves. A third, potential wave was claimed, consisting of those new states that do not fit into the two previous categories. It was argued that recognition of these entities was becoming more frequent as the distance to the two other categories increased.

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71 That is not to say the conflict was ignored by the international society. See for example The Robinson Library (2012), Nafziger and Richter (1976), and Post (1968).
The second section turned to *de facto*-states and their existence. They are found to have highly heterogeneous backgrounds, but have in common that they are born through war. Though often considered as weak, poor and corrupt, some of them display higher levels of democracy than their parents. They often depend on patrons to survive, but many stand alone. The entities can face two kinds of ends: success via recognition as a UN member state and failure through some form of reintegration into their parent. Entities without clear outcomes are still in limbo. Much internal variation exists.

Using existing theory, five causal conditions with pertaining hypotheses were identified. These are as follows: *Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation; B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state; C: UN veto power opposition; D: UN veto power support and E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state.*
3. Data chapter: on *de facto*-states

This chapter will provide a more close discussion of the criteria needed to be included in this analysis. There will be two main parts. The first part consists of an attempt to give an operational definition of the non-recognised state using both a negative and a positive description and will end by providing a list of the identified entities from the creation of the United Nations until 2012. The scope and purpose of the thesis is defined, and the case selection criteria are developed.

The second part seeks to illuminate the diverse history and development of the *de facto*-states and contains descriptive analyses of the entities. The latter investigates whether there are any obvious patterns that can aid in understanding the outcomes of the non-recognised states, and focuses on the four topics presented in the theory chapter. These are 1) State foundation: ethnicity or geography 2) Democratic institutions, 3) Involvement of international actors, and 4) Economic situation significantly different from the parent state.

3.1 The scope and purpose of the thesis

The scope of the thesis has been set as from the creation of the United Nations in 1945 up until and including 2012. If any entities had been created before 1945 or was nearing fulfilment of the criteria immediately after 2012, this could have caused a dilemma regarding whether or not to include them after all. This has not been a problem, as no *de facto*-states existing immediately before 1945 have been found, and no entity existing in 2012 has existed for only a little less than two years. The included entities stem from all continents and all backgrounds, and are elected based on the criteria discussed below.

The purpose of this thesis is to seek patterns and identify which *de facto*-states achieve recognition and UN membership status, and who fail and are reintegrated into their parent state. In other words, which factors lead to which outcomes? This includes seeking the causal combinations behind both success and failure, in order to examine whether any common patterns exist, or whether their developments are purely individual and non-generalizable. In

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72 Manchukuo could have been relevant, as it existed from 1932-1945. Its break-down in 1945 makes it simple to reject, as it existed for no more than one year during the time investigated here and thus misses the two-year criterion. In addition, it is described as a Japanese puppet-state and would have been dismissed on that ground alone anyway. For information on Manchukuo, see for instance *Encyclopedia Britannica* (2013) and Duara (2004).

73 The identified entity closest to reaching the two-year mark is Azawad, which was created in the spring of 2012 and declared independent on April 6th that year. For more information, see Acherif (2012) and Morgan (2012).
addition, it applies the knowledge from the completed \textit{de facto}-states to those still existing. The purpose of that is to see which of the latter match their trajectories and thus can be expected to have the same outcomes. It follows the logic of Lijphart’s (1971) hypothesis-generating category. According to Van Evera’s (1997, 55) definition, it could be called a theory- generating study. Using Yin’s (2008) classifications would place it in the exploratory category. Though the categories are different, they all describe the purpose of the investigation: seeking to find out what causes which outcomes for \textit{de facto}-states.

No corresponding meta-analysis has been performed of all \textit{de facto}-states existing after the creation of the UN before now\textsuperscript{74}. While several studies of single cases and groups of cases exist, there is a distinct lack of comparative analysis of non-recognised states and how they develop. This means that while the selection of cases will have to be restrictive in which entities it includes, the analysis in itself should be open and inclusive in order to discover as many patterns as possible. In other words, the selection must follow a clearly stated list of criteria\textsuperscript{75}. The analysis, as will be described in the Methods and Analysis chapter, will be very open to varying interpretations of developments and will make use of descriptive analyses in addition to the main QCA-investigation.

How the cases for analysis are selected can, as Geddes (1990) shows, have an impact on the end result of the analysis. One particular point, which is supported by Mahoney and Goertz (2004), Ragin (1997) and Ragin (2000), is that of the importance of negative cases. Mahoney and Goertz (2004) introduce the \textit{Possibility Principle}. This states that negative cases should be chosen if it is possible that the outcome of interest could have appeared there. If it, on the other hand, is impossible that the outcome should appear, the case should be considered irrelevant and thus not included in the examination. This is done so as to maximise the validity of causal inferences and is particularly relevant for exploratory research such as this thesis (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 653). It is seen as uninteresting for the case selection process which outcome the entity has had, or even whether it is still without a clear conclusion. The cases are not chosen due to their success or failure in obtaining statehood, but because they are or have been \textit{de facto}-states in the specified time period.

\textsuperscript{74} Pegg (1998), Kolstø (2006), Haugland (2008) and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) provide notable exceptions, but their work is either too old to include all entities anno 2012, focus on the creation and sustenance of the entities rather than on their outcomes or examine different variables with a different scope and purpose than this thesis.

\textsuperscript{75} For a discussion on the perils of concept stretching and the watering out of concepts, see Sartori (1970). For more inclusive selection designs than the stringent one used here, see Collier and Mahon Junior (1993).
3.2 The selection of data

The cases are selected on the basis of a set list based on the criteria developed by Pegg (1998) and Kolstø (2006). Potential cases failing to fulfil all the positive criteria are excluded. Likewise, cases demonstrating any one of the criteria listed in the negative list by Pegg (1998) are not included. Excluded entities can be seen in Table 9 on page iii in Appendix 2.

3.2.1 Case selection criteria

As already stated, the basic description of what a non-recognised state is, comes from Kolstø (2006, 724-725), who defines a non-recognized state as a political entity that has 1) control over most of the territory it claims, 2) has sought recognition as a state without receiving it and 3) have existed for more than two years. The entities analysed in this thesis will be chosen on a basis of this description. However, some specification and additional discussion is necessary. The specifications following each of the listed criterions will generally lead to specified exclusion of potential entities, but not to discussions on who are included unless they are cases of potential doubt that require particular attention and justification. This is simply because all of the entities fulfil all of the requirements. After the case selection criteria have been evaluated, the complete list over entities will be presented in Table 1 on page 41. The end selection is not assumed to be exhaustive nor is it expected to be taken as undebatable, due to the necessarily unclear status and trajectory of this kind of entity.

Byman and King (2012, 46) specify that there must be conflicting claim to sovereignty over the territories. This claim is naturally part of the selection tools as areas with only one claimant cannot be contested. There is no limit to geographical location. The included states must have come into existence after the creation of the UN, meaning after 1945. The upper year limit for inclusion is 2012.

Based on the criteria set forth by Fleischcr (1994) and Kolstø (2006), the basic structure for the selection is therefore as follows:

1) Population
2) Fixed territory/ territorial control
3) Government
4) Having sought recognition
5) Length of existence
6) Discussion of cases of doubt
Pegg (1998, 28-42) identifies a negative set of criteria, meant to exclude those territories not fitting in the category of *de facto*-states. These are:

- **a) Power vacuum**
- **b) Terrorist groups**
- **c) Entities that do not seek international recognition**
- **d) Puppet states**
- **e) Peaceful secessionist regions**
- **f) States internationally recognised by a minimum of two permanent UN Security Members or by a majority of the members in the General Assembly**
- **g) Short term entities lasting fewer than two years**

Pegg’s negative criteria **a)-d)** and **g)** will be discussed under the appropriate headings **1)-6)** and will be represented by cursive writing. His exclusion of *peaceful secessionist regions* is here seen as a matter of course, as such an entity is assumed to cooperate with the central power of the parent state in lieu of existing outside of it as the *de facto* states included here\(^{76}\).

Seeing as UN membership is used as a proxy for international recognition, the precise number of member states recognising an entity is not considered relevant. The point of interest is first and foremost whether or not it is a full UN member. The number of states offering recognition is potentially interesting if analysing the development of the level of recognition of the *de facto*-state and its potential support or opposition from international powers. Here, there is no fixed upper limit for inclusion\(^{77}\).

**1) Population**

The criterion of having a population is here seen as straight forward. A group cannot claim a territory for itself if none of the people of the group live there. Naturally, this does not mean that it is necessary for each and every member of any potential ethnic majority or generally interested group to be living on the territory. The population numbers of the UN member states vary from nearly one and a half billion in China to less than ten thousand in Nauru (CIA World Factbook 22.02.2013), so the size of the population does not appear to be of high importance for recognition.

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\(^{76}\) Peaceful secessionist entities are for instance be Scotland and Catalonia. See Barnes (2012) or Carrell (2013).

\(^{77}\) A list of which of the still existing entities are recognised and by whom can be seen in footnote 35 on page 16.
2) **Fixed territory/ territorial control**

Controlling “most of the territory” will be defined on a gliding scale. Both Pegg (1998, 47) and Dugard and Raic (2006, 60) point out that some already recognised states are without a clearly defined border\(^{78}\), so a too stringent requirement would mean running the risk of making the selected data worthless. Therefore, the limit is being set at holding at least the majority of the claimed area\(^{79}\). It can be difficult determining what the claimed area actually is, depending on who made the statements and in what fora. There will necessarily have to be a certain degree of ad hoc evaluations in determining this. Polisario\(^{80}\) controlling as little as one third of Western Sahara (Kolstø 2006, 726)\(^{81}\) means that the entity cannot be included. Tibet controls none of its claimed area despite having had a long-living government, and is excluded. The Palestinian Authority is also excluded as it controls only little of the West Bank\(^{82}\), and in 2007 this level became even smaller, when Hamas split from the organisation and claiming control over Gaza (Black and Tran 2007).

Seeing as no state controls an area mired in long-lasting civil war (McNemar 1967, 14-16), areas who have succeeded in removing the central power of the parent state without managing to implement its own will be excluded\(^{83}\). This last criterion is based on the idea that actual territorial control is not present during war. This will also mean that any de facto state falling into all-out war with itself, its parent state or any other will have the start of the war as a cut-off point.

3) **Government**

Having a government does not signify having a democratic leadership (Raic 2002, 62), nor does it signify any particular set of government institutions. Seeing as a number\(^{84}\) of recognised states have experienced having weak or no central authority while still remaining part of the international society of states and being treated as such by other states, this is not a

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\(^{78}\) Their example is Israel, but also Sudan and South Sudan are in this situation (Lloyd 1994-1995, Dagne 2011).

\(^{79}\) Caspersen (2012b, 11) uses two-thirds as a benchmark for how much of the area claimed the *de facto*-state must control.

\(^{80}\) Polisario, or Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, is recognised by the UN as the representatives for the Saharawi people and Western Sahara (The United Nations General Assembly 1979).

\(^{81}\) A share made even smaller due to the extensive placement of Moroccan mines along the separating wall (Gegic and Harutyunyan 2008).

\(^{82}\) The West Bank is divided into three kinds of sections, each governed to a specific degree by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. See Oslo II (1995). For a list of sovereign states recognising Palestine, see The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (2011).


\(^{84}\) The Failed States Index (2012) provides a list of examples.
clear-cut concept (Pegg 1998, 47-49). However, to exclude areas that are mainly a result of power vacuum or that are best defined as a territorially based terrorist group, it is clearly important with some form of central power in place. In this thesis, it will entail having a clear authority that generally is able to demonstrate its governance throughout the area. But, that does not mean other forces cannot be in play. It will only signify that one of these forces is by far the most prominent. This is to avoid situations where smaller groups form clan-like structures controlling small fractions of the area without an overarching power base (Fleischer 1994, 49).

Areas under international administration do not have an independently functioning government. East-Timor, for example, was partly governed by UN missions during its spat as non-recognised state with territorial control (The United Nations 10.02.2013). However, these missions are normally initiated when it is clear that the entity will be recognised to facilitate its future as a well-governed state. Areas clearly not under the control of the patron state power centre will be included even if the regional government is propped up by international agents attempting to guide its already present administrative structure towards successful state governance.

4) Having sought recognition

Seeking international recognition will also be treated as a plastic criterion. A formal application to join the UN need not be present as long as the intention of being or remaining a sovereign state is clear. It can be complicated distinguishing those entities that seek independence from those that do not seek international recognition, for a number of reasons. Many contrasting versions of what the desired outcome for the area is can exist. Reasons for this can be that there is a discrepancy between what is wished as an end-result and what is deemed practical and realistic at the time (Caspersen and Stansfield 2011, 3).

A gradual increase in what is hoped for as the entity proves its survivability is not unexpected, but can lead to troubles for outside observers finding out what is actually the case. The entities must rely on their skills in realpolitik to survive, and may realize that not formally declaring independence might be one of the things ensuring their continued existence. Entities biding their time while waiting for a more favourable international climate can still be analysed, seeing as UN membership is dependent on recognition by most of the world’s other states.

As is claimed to be the case for Taiwan (Byman and King 2012, 50, DeLisle 2011, 2). Footnote 86 on page 42 demonstrates which of the included de facto-states that have declared independence and which have not.
Similarly, the non-recognised states are expected to attempt testing the waters for their level of acceptance before applying to the UN. Declaring independence is thus seen as one step of a long process that begins long before the point of announcement, and Puntland and Iraqi-Kurdistan both demonstrate that it is possible to function as a state without claiming to be one\(^86\). Therefore, a minimal criterion of existing outside the central control of the parent state, with a common sense of identity in the population as other than that of the patron state is required, but an actual declaration of independence or a UN application is not.

To exclude *puppet states*, it is required that the area must have attempted secession by own initiative. This signifies that areas having been created by the initiative of other states for whatever purpose will not be included here\(^87\). This is for the reason that such an entity would clearly diverge from the others and thus decrease the analytical validity of the findings.

5) *Length of existence*

The exclusion of *short-term entities* by fixing a two-year limit might seem arbitrary, and it is. It is kept for the same reason it was created: to avoid befuddling the worth of the analysis by including short-lived entities incapable of surviving and thus uninteresting for this examination\(^88\). Having existed for precisely two calendar years is, however, not necessary. Some *ad hoc*-evaluation will be necessary, guided for instance by what happened with the region after disappearance. Should it, like Iraqi-Kurdistan does\(^89\), still attempt self-government after its reincorporation, it will count towards inclusion though the precise length


\(^{87}\) This excludes the South African Bantustans (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2013d).

\(^{88}\) Some entities, like Herzeg-Bosna and Western Bosnia survived for nearly two calendar years, but are excluded.

\(^{89}\) For more on Iraqi-Kurdistan after its reintegration in Iraq, see for instance (Olson 2006).
of time borderlines too short. It can be difficult to determine exactly when *de facto*-states are created and when they disappear.\footnote{For instance, it is difficult to determine precisely Iraqi-Kurdistan time of existence as a *de facto*-state, but Gunter (1993) describes it as so near to two years of existence in 1991-1992 that it will be included. For the time span of the existence of the included entities, see Table 1 on page 45.}

**6) Discussion of cases of doubt**

Though this thesis evaluates the development of unilaterally declared non-recognised states, one of the areas included is special. South Sudan had gained a permission from Sudan to manage itself, the two entered a cease-fire and a referendum regarding the future of South Sudan was planned. Can South Sudan be said to have been a *de facto*-state during that period when it existed as part of an agreement with its parent? Yes, it can. Sudan and South Sudan entered the agreement to end a long lasting war\footnote{Bougainville and Papua New Guinea also entered such an agreement, but Bougainville did not succeed in keeping territorial control for a full two years before the Papua New Guinean central powers returned and retook too large a part of the island for the territorial control-criterion to be fulfilled (Ghai and Regan 2006). Had the Bougainville secessionist leaders been more organised, it is claimed that independence would have been likely achieved due to the island’s cultural, economic and historical separateness from the rest of Papua New Guinea and the long period of time this desire had been professed (Ghai and Regan 2006, Regan 2008).} in which the north had not had more than a porous grip on the south for several years. South Sudan fulfilled the rest of the criteria at the point of signing, and can be considered the winner of that particular war. That the north had formally agreed to stay out between the signing and the referenda is not so different from for instance Georgia’s informally staying out of Abkhazia that it can lead to South Sudan being excluded.

Pegg (1998) points out that there is a difference between a non-recognised regime and a non-recognised state. The first entails an unaccepted government, whereas the second focuses on the existence of the state as a polity separate from other states. In other words: it is possible to not accept those who govern a state while at the same time accepting that the state as a political actor exists. As Owtram (2011, 130) illustrates: the non-recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan did not signify that the state of Afghanistan disappeared. This was a matter of a disputed leadership secession (Bajoria 2011). In the case of Rhodesia, it can seem difficult distinguishing between the two since the state and the government were created more or less simultaneously. In fact, it might be a situation of both at the same time. When it declared independence, the United Nations called for non-recognition\footnote{See The United Nations Security Council (1965a).} from its member states, based on the principle of *ex injuria non oritur*.\footnote{A right cannot originate in a wrong.} This was because of Rhodesia’s
segregation. However, these policies alone are not enough to negate status as a non-recognised state, as already recognised states followed a similar political line\textsuperscript{94}. It is included here due to the fact that it declared independence from its colonial master the United Kingdom and sought status as a fully-fledged state (Smith 1965)\textsuperscript{95}. The regime existed separately from the central power of its former colonial masters in the United Kingdom and controlled all the territory the rest of the world recognised as South-Rhodesia until 1979, despite Great Britain’s lacking accept and the UN’s discouragement of interaction from other states (McDougal and Reisman 1968, Cockram 1966). It is not merely a question of recognising a state’s new leadership in this case, as it was not a state to begin with.

When discussing the case of Northern Cyprus, it can be argued that the \textit{de facto}-state was created by an external force - in this case Turkey - and that it thus should be excluded for not coming into existence by its own initiative. However, I will argue that Turkey’s intervention can be seen as an answer to the Greek Cypriots goal of union with Greece (\textit{eniosis}) and the perceived threat of removal of the Turkish Cypriots from the island. The Cypriote Constitution provided a certain degree of autonomy to the two communities, and the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee between the UK, Turkey and Greece were seen by Turkey as giving them reason to intervene in protection of the Turkish Cypriots after the proposal of Greek-benefiting new constitutional amendments (Pegg 1998, 99-107). These amendments would threaten the Turkish Cypriot political status, and they protested. Thus, I propose that the Turkish Cypriots though greatly aided by Turkey, started the movement themselves. Being dependent on Turkey for the success of the entity is therefore not necessarily relevant (see also Berg 2005, 223). Another interesting point is whether Northern Cyprus should be considered a Turkish puppet state and therefore excluded from the data here. Again, applying Pegg’s (1998, 112-113) definitions, it is claimed that Northern Cyprus does not fall into the puppet-category for two reasons. Firstly, it was not imposed from the outside on an unwilling population. Secondly, the national administrative staff is Cypriote and the state apparatus independent of the Turkish, even though they closely cooperate.

\textsuperscript{94} South Africa is an obvious example, but also the US has had a similar system. See for instance Encyclopædia Britannica (2013b) and Encyclopædia Britannica (2013a).

\textsuperscript{95} Rhodesia was declared independent of Great Britain in 1965, and was pronounced a republic in 1970 (BBC 1970). The non-recognised state lasted until 1979, when it returned to UK control with the Lancaster house Agreement and subsequently became Zimbabwe in 1980 (Sibanda 1991).
3.2.2 Selected cases

Based on the discussions in the first section of this chapter, the entities shown in Table 1 below are selected to be analysed. They are sorted by political status as of December 2012, and placed in three main groups. The first, success, contains those former de facto states now members of the United Nations. The category undecided shows a list of those non-recognised states who still exist in a state of limbo at the time of writing. These have no clear political status, and are greatly differing in their degrees of recognition. The last category, failure, shows the former non-recognised entities who did not succeed in surviving as a de facto-state. The first category is by far the clearest cut, as the conclusion to their struggle by a UN membership is obvious. For the other entities, it can be complicated evaluating which entities still fulfil the selection criteria and which have evolved into a different type of unit. For example, it can be argued that Iraqi-Kurdistan still exists. This case has been placed in the category for failed entities due to its cease fire and acceptance of autonomous status in Iraq (Constitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005).

Table 1- List of entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success N = 4</th>
<th>Undecided N = 9</th>
<th>Failure N = 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somaliland (1991-)</td>
<td>Katanga (1960-1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tamil Eelam (1986-2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 23. Years as de facto-state in parentheses. Source for year; see Table 10 on page iv in Appendix 2. All dates are subject to discussion, as seen for instance by the alternative starting points presented in (Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2011, 5)

3.3 Case description: about the included de facto-states

In order to be able to seek patterns in the development of the level of recognition of de facto-states, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the entities. Though a multitude of case studies of single territories and grouped analyses exist, it is still relevant to attempt creating an overview of the entities presented in Table 1 above. The tables in this chapter are based on the Raw tables in appendices 3 and 4.

96 Footnote 35 on page 16 lists the entities and their recognisers.
De facto-states generally have a background of war with the mother state, which they won\textsuperscript{97}. Territorial control and political institutions necessarily means sufficient force to remain in position - at least for a time. They are strong enough to survive, but not to be recognised (Byman and King 2012, 46). Though coming from very different backgrounds and existing in a multitude of situations during a time-span of nearly 70 years, all the participant on the list of non-recognised states have one thing in common: they do not wish to continue being there. Recognition is the ultimate goal, continued existence second best, with increased autonomy in the mother state normally at a grudging third place (Kolstø 2006, Pegg 1998, 204). They initially have a strong card in negotiating with the mother state, for simply by existing they control parts of the original state’s territory, they have internal legitimacy from a people not wishing to lose their rights\textsuperscript{98}. And, for every year they continue existing, the international society grows more accustomed to their presence. This is not to say that merely being present will ensure a future recognition by international society and an eventual UN membership, as the fate of Tamil Eelam can illustrate\textsuperscript{99}.

3.3.1 De-facto state origins
Unrecognised states generally find their roots in one of two political situations. They are either the result of 1) displeasedness with the existing borders of the countries emerging after the end of colonialism. Alternatively, they were under a different colonial power but became absorbed into another colony before independence\textsuperscript{100}. Or, 2) they are the result of the same sentiments after a union dissolution. In both these situations, the already existing borders are generally kept and the discussion is not necessarily about border placement but border status. Only three have other origins.

\textsuperscript{97}Winning a war is a relative concept. Ciobanu (2008), and Anderson (2011) use the term «frozen conflict», which indicates that the central power of the parent state has left the territory and that active warfare is over, but that it is not officially peace in the region. More on the general background of de facto-states can be seen in works such as Kolstø (2006), Pegg (1998), Caspersen (2012b) and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011)

\textsuperscript{98}Internal legitimacy in de facto-states does of course not always hold the same level. Islam (1985) demonstrates the differing levels of support from the population in the cases of Biafra, Katanga and Bangladesh.

\textsuperscript{99}Tamil Eelam disappeared as a de facto-state in 2009, after having existed for two and a half decade (Stokke 2006, Freedomhouse 2009c).

\textsuperscript{100}For example, East Timor was a Portuguese colony, while Indonesia was Dutch (CIA World Factbook 16.04.2013a, Encyclopædia Britannica 2013g, BBC 2013b).
Table 2: The origins of de facto-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political origins</th>
<th>Former colonial history</th>
<th>N = 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anjouan⁰, Bangladesh, Biafra⁰, East-Timor, Eritrea, Katanga⁰, Puntland⁰, Rhodesia, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam⁰, South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union break-up</td>
<td>N = 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abkhazia, Chechnya, Gagauzia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, South-Ossetia, Transnistria,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>N = 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraqi-Kurdistan, North Cyprus, Taiwan,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographical origins

| Europe N = 6 | Gagauzia, Kosovo, North-Cyprus, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, Transnistria |
| Asia N = 9   | Abkhazia, Bangladesh, Chechnya, East-Timor, Iraqi-Kurdistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia, Taiwan, Tamil Eelam |
| Africa N = 8 | Anjouan, Biafra, Eritrea, Katanga, Puntland, Rhodesia, Somaliland, South Sudan |

⁰= not existing political entity in former colony. N= 23

Despite these initial similarities, the entities have very differing backgrounds. Their emergence is highly heterogeneous, and one must be aware of the wide variety existing when analysing. Simply having formerly been a part of the Soviet Union, for instance, does not necessarily indicate many similarities with other ex-USSR-entities. Nor does being a former colony make a region the same as any other that happens to have been one. Similarly, geographical origins, as shown in Table 2 above, do not indicate having the same outcome. On the contrary, there is an almost even spread of successful, undecided and failed non-recognised states over the three continents afflicted.

Communist union break-up

The dissolution of the two communist unions of USSR and Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s led to a number of new sates in the world, and most of the present-day non-recognised states¹⁰¹. None of them have succeeded in becoming UN members. Most are still undecided cases.

Though the recognition of Bangladesh had led to hopes among these entities that the denial from the parent state of basic state functions such as civil and political rights could strengthen their case, this was generally not the outcome. The precedence of maintaining already existing borders was continued, and only former republics within the unions were to be recognised (Caspersen 2008b, 4).

The dissolution of the USSR has produced six non-recognised states, none of which have moved on to be recognised. None of them were federal entities on the highest level in the Soviet Union, though most of them were so on lower levels. Every entity has been met by

¹⁰¹ The entities in question are these. From the former USSR: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Gagauzia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia, and Transnistria. From the former Yugoslavia: Kosovo, Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina.
opposition from their mother state, but only two have since disappeared. It’s worth noting that all non-recognised states either supported or recognised by Russia have survived for several years, while Chechnya, opposed by Russia, has met its end. Their levels of resources, ethnic compositions and level of development of political institutions are also highly varying.

The outcomes for the three post-Yugoslavian entities in the same table, is equally unclear, though also here none have been recognised. Kosovo is by far the one entity that is closest to obtaining its goal of recognition of the de facto- states presented in this category, but it is still not internationally recognised nor a UN member. Though all of them are similar in that they are based on ethnic identity and with low levels of resources, they differ in their level governmental structures and the involvement of external forces. Although present-day Serbia clearly is and has been an important player for all of them, this cannot be said to be enough to explain their outcomes - particularly since their status per 2012 are not in accordance with Serbia’s desires. Both the NATO\(^{102}\) and the EU\(^{103}\) have more leeway for action in this area than in former USSR territory, and they have been actively interested. This has among other things led to strong international involvement in Kosovo, something without a comparable parallel in the former Soviet area.

Former colonial history

The entities coming from former colonies share little save exactly that. As colonial borders were apt to change with time, one cannot expect fully stable historical identities in these regions. However, the states they were under and the status they had shortly before independence can be believed to be important for the formation on identity in the inhabitants. By this it is not believed that there is a difference in which country had the colony other than as a part of many in the creation of identity amongst the inhabitants of the area. Table 2 on page 43 lists the relevant entities. Comparing these with the information on present political situation in Table 1 on page 41 shows how the majority of cases of breakaway states amongst the former colonies have been settled and are either fully-fledged UN member states or have disappeared.

All the entities with colonial pasts differ in degrees of ethnic homogeneity, levels of resources,
and democratic institutions\textsuperscript{104}. However, those of them that have succeeded in becoming UN member states have received support from international actors\textsuperscript{105}. Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 22) explain how the UN resolution 1514 (1960) facilitated independence only while maintaining the colonial border present at the time. We see that those entities that had the same colonial master as their parent state have nearly all failed. The only exception is South Sudan, which in practice was governed differently from the rest of Sudan (Belloni 2011, 412).

East-Timor, Eritrea, Puntland and Somaliland are areas that were merged with other entities in connection with the decolonisation process. For these, the outcomes are very different. Not one of them has disappeared, and half of them have been recognised. The reasons for this are not obvious. Though it is possible to speculate that the international reaction might be less negative in a situation where the borders are recent, this idea is not verified. Both East-Timor and Eritrea did, however, receive international assistance in their process towards independence, and Somaliland is generally ignored rather than opposed. That Puntland’s situation should be undecided is not too surprising, as the entity’s desired goal varies between federal region in Somalia and separate state\textsuperscript{106}.

\textit{Other backgrounds}  
Three events can be identified that have neither colonial nor communist union history: Taiwan, North Cyprus and Iraqi-Kurdistan. Taiwan and North Cyprus are still in limbo per 2012. Iraqi-Kurdistan has disappeared.

The three entities differ in their ethnic composition. Taiwan’s population is diverse, and the entity was not created in order to gain a homeland for a distinct ethnic group. Though mostly Han Chinese, it includes at least three other groups. According to Harrell and Huang (1994, 14-15) and DeLisle (2011, 1), this might be changing as the Taiwanese identity appears to be taking over from other ethnical groups. Iraqi-Kurdistan, on the other hand, has an ethnic foundation in the Kurdish people’s long wish for self-determination (Naamani 1966). North Cyprus was also created with the purpose of creating a territory for the Turk Cypriots (Freedomhouse 1998n, 1999a, Berg 2005, Dodd 2009).

\textsuperscript{104} Sources: see Raw Table 12 on page 105 in Appendix 2.  
\textsuperscript{105} The independence of East-Timor by Indonesia was originally supported by Australia. For a discussion on the Australia-East-Timor-relationship, see (Pietsch 2010).  
\textsuperscript{106} Both Mesfin (2009), Gikes (1999) describe Puntland as non-independence-seeking, but according to Hesse (2010, 77, 81) the reality of the hopes for Puntland’s future political status is more complex.
Their economical and resource level differ as well. Iraqi-Kurdistan has a large oil reserve, but has had trouble in utilising it (Olson 2006). North Cyprus, despite previously being fairly equal with the southern part of the island, is more economically challenged and underdeveloped than its neighbour (Gosh and Aker 2006, Bahcheli 2004). Taiwan has a strong and growing economy (Freedomhouse 2012m, Harrell and Huang 1994, CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, Nation Master 25.02.2013).

The placement of the three de facto-states in international society also differ greatly. Taiwan is claimed to be kept from reintegration into China by its relationship with the US (Kolstø 2006, 733). North Cyprus has a strong ally in Turkey, but is otherwise generally ignored by other states(Atasoy 2003, Bahcheli 2004). Iraqi-Kurdistan appears to have neither strong sympathies nor antipathies from recognised states. Turkey, a regionally important state, is claimed by Olson (2006) to have had a chilly relationship with the de facto state at the time in question, but that the relationship was thawing at the time of writing (see also Wolff 2010).

Regarding democratic institutions, the situations in the three entities also vary. Iraqi-Kurdistan is described by Gunter (1993, 297) as anarchistic and corrupt, despite holding elections for government. DeLisle (2011, 1-2) argues that Taiwan has well-functioning, consolidated governmental institutions. North Cyprus has obtained a slightly lower Freedomhouse (1998n, 1999a, 2012c, g) score throughout its existence, but still holds a generally high level.

**Timing**

The time and setting in which an entity was created is not an aspect of the entity in the same way its geographical placement and demographical pattern is, but it is still interesting to investigate whether the waves identified in the Theory chapter are identifiable for the de facto- states as well as the recognised ones.

**Table 3- De facto-states and their outcomes by state creation wave**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State creation wave</th>
<th>De facto-state with outcome</th>
<th>Number of entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First: Decolonisation N = 3</td>
<td>Biafra*, Katanga*, Rhodesia*</td>
<td>Failures: 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looking at Table 3 above it does indeed appear that this could be of some importance. The
first wave brought the lowest number of entities, all of which are in Africa and at present disappeared. This, coupled with the observation that all the recognised entities are from the third wave, makes this factor sufficiently interesting to be brought to the main analysis.

3.4 Chapter summary
After discussing the definitions of the de facto-state, 23 entities were chosen for the analysis and presented in Table 1 on page 41. These underwent a series of descriptive analyses, seeking development patterns based on geography, colonial or post-union history and support by regional or international powers. The four topics discussed in the theory chapter leading up to the thesis’ hypotheses (resources, ethnic composition, external involvement and democratic institutions), were also investigated. It is shown that the entities are very heterogeneous. The timing and situation of the creation of the entity and which wave it belong to will be further investigated in the Analysis chapter.
4. Methods Chapter: Crisp set QCA and description

The methods chapter shows how the development trajectory of de facto states will be analysed and presents the research design. The successful and failed entities will be analysed, and the results will be applied to those de facto-states yet uncompleted. The method utilised is the Crisp Set version of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (cs/QCA). Since data selection is covered in the Data chapter, two main parts exist here. First, I will argue the choice of method and describe what it is and how to utilise it. The chapter will discuss the strengths and weaknesses QCA crisp set can present for this analysis. Second, I will discuss and describe the specific analysis in this thesis and present the data set. The operationalization of the outcome and each causal condition will be specified, along with the measurements and coding for the respective values.

In addition to QCA, simple descriptive analysis will be utilised as supplements to the main analysis throughout the process. Ragin (1987, 98) states that investigator input is important, so combining cs/QCA with descriptive analyses seems logical. This includes for instance cross tables, matrixes sorting information by category and more. QCA provides the main structure for the investigation, but it is constantly supplemented by additional examinations. These simple descriptions will not be evaluated in the Methods chapter, but described when appropriate in during the analyses.

4.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis - what, why and how

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was introduced by Charles Ragin (1987) as a tool to be used when analysing set-oriented, complex causalities and asymmetrical influences. It is based on Boolean algebra and has three main sub-types, namely crisp, fuzzy and multivalue (mv) sets. This section provides a short introduction to the method and the arguments for utilising crisp rather than the other sets in this thesis. The application of the method will be further elaborated during the analysis. This chapter argues for the choice of method and serves as an introduction to cs/QCA.

4.1.1 Introducing QCA

QCA is based on Boolean algebra (see Boole 1854) and Mills methods of logic (see Mill 1843), and was introduced as a social-scientific method by Ragin (1987). It is particularly

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107 The software used for the analyses can be found at online at the Arizona University Website (Ragin 15.03.2013).
useful for medium-N-analysis (Ragin 2007), such as this thesis. It embraces both case- and value-oriented analysis, and presents a middle path between them: seeing cases as configurations of attributes. It’s main focus is on single or combined causal conditions rather than the entities themselves, but it benefits from constant supplementary attention to empirical observations (Ragin 1987, 166-168).

QCA’s set-orientation contrasts with the two most common approaches in social science, namely case- and variable-oriented comparative methods. While case-oriented methods often focus on interpreting historical trajectories or complex, multi-faceted wholes across a small-N number of cases (Ragin 1987, 34-52, Ragin 2000, 67-70), variable-oriented methods investigate large-N data seeking generalizable findings (Ragin 1987, 52-68). Set-orientation allows for asymmetrical connections and focus on combinations rather than addition, something Ragin (2008, 14-25) argues makes it a valuable tool for seeing patterns missed in case-analysis while identifying connections missed by correlational methods.

Using a truth table to display all potential logical combinations of outcomes, QCA examines both combinations of factors and isolated effects and attempts to isolate which factors are necessary (AND) and which are sufficient (OR) for an outcome (Goertz 2006b, 39-46, Ragin 2000, 88-95, Rihoux and De Meur 2009). The causal conditions are listed horizontally in a truth table, with each horizontal row representing one possible outcome. With $n$ conditions, the table will contain $2^n$ rows. Each case will then be placed in the corresponding row, depending on their combination of values on the causal conditions. Thus, it is the combinations that are analysed, and not the cases themselves (Ragin 2000, Ragin and Sonnett 2004, Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995, 334-335). The collected combinations are known as the property space of the analysis (Ragin 1999, 1230, 2000, 76-82). Limited diversity of naturally occurring cases is thus not a problem for the analysis (Ragin 1987, 85-102, Ragin and Sonnett 2004, 4-6).

The most obvious difference between crisp, fuzzy and multivalue sets lies in the coding of the causal conditions. Cs/QCA is the method chosen for this essay and uses dichotomous

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108 For a closer discussion on the differences between case- and variable-oriented research design and methods, see Ragin (2007).
109 Fs/QCA and mv/QCA will not be further discussed here, but more information can be found in the following. For Fs/QCA: Stockemer (2012), Ragin (2000, 2008). For mv/QCA: Cronqvist (2005, 2004, 2003), Vink and van Vliet (2009).
causal conditions\(^\text{110}\), allotting a value of either 0, indicating absence, or 1, indicating presence of each causal condition (Ragin 2000, 120-145, Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 33-67). This dichotomisation is by necessity based on thick knowledge of the cases in question, and with a basis in theory, previous research and empirical knowledge (Grendstad 2007, 125).

4.1.2 Why QCA: seeking combinations
Arguments for and against the use of QCA in this type of analysis is discussed and it is concluded that the method is suitable for more reasons than the number of entities examined.

**Strengths of QCA**
The number of entities analysed makes selecting QCA a simple choice, as it is highly suitable for medium-N analysis (Ragin 1987, Grendstad 2007, 122, Haugland 2008). Thirteen entities with clear outcomes - success or failure - is too little to utilize the most logical quantitative alternative of logistical analysis with interaction effect. At the same time, it is too many for a normal qualitative case-study\(^\text{111}\). But numbers alone is not the only reason. QCA is able to handle high levels of causal heterogeneity and social diversity. It does not assume additive causality, but rather on a complex combination of causal factors (Ragin 2000, 88-119, Grendstad 2007, 124, Ragin and Sonnett 2004, 4-7). As pointed out by Haugland (2008, 35), it is highly plausible that there is more than one path to recognition. Additionally, it is possible that the effect of one causal condition might depend on the presence or absence of another. QCA is suitable for an evaluation of entities as diverse as de facto-states.

Ragin (2000, 88-119) argues that there is an underlying assumption of causal additivity in quantitative methods that makes statistical analysis unable to present high levels of diversity\(^\text{112}\). Some outcomes are not a result of one factor, but a multitude of causes at the same time. Some can even be argued to be a result of an absence of a specific factor. QCA can identify heterogeneity, and focuses on the internal complexities of cases.

While qualitative case-studies is able to handle multiple trajectories and internal complexity, Ragin (2000, 90) claims that these methods do not provide tools for assessing neither generalizability nor the nature of the causation. It is further argued that it is impossible

\(^{110}\) The concept of “outcome” is similar to what in quantitative methods is known as “dependent variable”. Similarly, “causal condition” could be roughly translated as “independent variable”. Another word used in this thesis for describing the latter is “factor”. Ragin (1987, 87) uses “binary variables”.

\(^{111}\) For a further elaboration on QCA compared with other methods, see Ragin (1987, 89-91) and Grendstad (2007).

\(^{112}\) See Grendstad (2007), Stockemer (2012) and Grofman and Schneider (2009) for a discussion of the merits of quantitative logistical analysis as compared to cs/QCA.
through qualitative analysis to differentiate between necessary and sufficient causes (see Ragin 1997, Grendstad 2007)\textsuperscript{113}. QCA, on the other hand, holds the distinction between the two to be very important (Grofman and Schneider 2009, Ragin 2000, 99-101). A cause is defined as necessary if it must be present for an outcome to occur, and sufficient if it by itself can produce an outcome\textsuperscript{114}. In studying entities as heterogeneous as de facto-states, this perspective can greatly add to the understanding of the development trajectories at hand.

Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 8-12) demonstrate how the use of QCA is beneficial for the clarity of the investigation, as the thorough description needed both for the process of coding and analysing gives the reader and the researcher a detailed and structured view of the assumptions behind each action. They claim the systematic, logical approach needed for using QCA ensures the rigorous system of qualitative methods while maintaining the descriptive and explanatory transparency in qualitative research. Maintaining a structural approach while opening for empirical discussions is of the highest importance when dealing with entities as heterogeneous as de facto-states.

The focus on potential dependency between factors in order to bring forth an outcome might lead the statistician to wonder why a statistical analysis - logistical regression for cs/QCA - with interaction effects is not applied in lieu of QCA. In this analysis, the number of entities eliminates this option. But even with a sufficient number, QCA could have proven a good choice for this type of entities. Grendstad (2007) points out two reasons why the causal logic of QCA and quantitative methods are very different. First, he argues that QCA follows a contextual logic of combinations and substitutionability of its factors. The effects of independent factors are seen as impossible to add or average. Logistic regression, on the other hand, follows an additive and multiplicative logic (Stockemer 2012, 87). Grofman and Schneider (2009, 663) states that while standard statistical methods are good at assessing the net effect of single variables, QCA excels in in detecting different conjunctions that lead to the same outcome. Second, logistic regression offers one non-substitutable set of conditions while QCA explores the full range of complementation and co-varying causal paths at hand. Grendstad (2007) argues that QCA has a deterministic causal epistemology, while logistic regression focuses on probability. In other words: QCA offers a pattern-seeking procedure

\textsuperscript{113} For a further discussion on necessity and sufficiency, see (Ragin 1997). For more on how to separate between trivial and relevant necessary conditions, see (Goertz 2006a).

\textsuperscript{114} A single cause might be necessary and sufficient, necessary but not sufficient, sufficient but not necessary and neither necessary nor sufficient. See Ragin (2000, 99-101) for an elaboration of the differences.
while logistic regression confirms and disconfirms existing hypotheses.

**Weaknesses of QCA**

Naturally, QCA has its weaknesses (see Ragin 1987, 103-118 for a more detailed elaboration). One obvious complaint is the potential loss of information when dichotomising data in cs/QCA and when assessing scores in fuzzy and mv/QCA (see for instance Grendstad 2007, 125-126, Braumoeller 1999, 13, Kangas 1994, 361, Herrmann and Cronquist 2009). Another critique is the high degree to which the method relies on the researcher’s ability to maintain control over large amounts of information and correctly assessing value scores making the results potentially difficult to verify and replicate. In this thesis, these complaints are attempted met by the expansive descriptive analyses provided, in addition to tables with sources for all data coding and a replication the coding process of randomly selected entities performed by others.

Grendstad (2007, 124-125) also points out that as QCA has for the most part been applied to extant cases only and thus has accepted determinism at the cost of probability (see also Lieberson 1992, Herrmann and Cronquist 2009, 38-40). In other words, that QCA can be used to describe but not predict. Lieberson (1992) argues that this distinction between deterministic and probabilistic perspectives is particularly important in small-and medium N-investigations.

As other generalising methods, QCA is dependent on all relevant causal conditions being identified if it is to be used to predict outcomes outside of its included entities. Should some be lacking, the results cannot realistically be expected to be fully generalizable. Therefore, the results found can only be understood as valid for the causal conditions included (Wickham-Crowley 1991, 102, in Haugland 2008, 36). As Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 8-15) argue, this problem is not necessarily relevant if QCA is used in order to understand the underlying processes taking place in the selected entities. This is not a generalising method, but one used to provide a deeper understanding of the entities present.

Should using the results of the investigation to assess other entities be desired, the point discussed above could potentially become problematic. One could think that a solution to this could be to increase the number of causal conditions. But, as Grendstad (2007, 125-127) and Ragin and Sonnett (2004) points out, limited empirical diversity in naturally occurring social phenomena means that the number of causal conditions must be limited. As $n$ causal conditions leads to $2^n$ rows in the truth table, an increased amount of causal conditions leads
to an exponentially larger set of rows to be filled. Too many causal conditions might lead to the analysis turning into a description of each combination rather than providing the grounds for a fruitful analysis.

Additionally, QCA has been criticised for not being able to identify the strength of each causal condition (Grendstad 2007, 127, Haugland 2008, 36-37). Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 13-14) argues that this is not necessarily a problem but rather a strength of the method, as social phenomena are not uniform in their distribution. Occurrences of events outside of the typical distribution do not indicate that the event itself is less interesting. Since QCA gives equal weight to causal combinations regardless of their frequency, cases that would typically be ignored with statistical methods are here included. For an investigation of a highly heterogeneous set of rarely occurring events such as *de facto*-states, this is a benefit.

The *problem on limited diversity* reducing the validity of the investigation is also relevant (Ragin 1987, 13). This can happen when a combination of two events occurs. The first is having too many explanatory factors. The second is the limited availability of naturally occurring events. To avoid this, the number of causal conditions in this thesis is kept to a minimum.

**4.1.3 The method of choice: cs/QCA**

Cs/QCA has been chosen as the tool for examining and analysing the development trajectories of the non-recognised *de facto*-states identifies in this thesis. The method offers fewer nuances than the other two QCA-alternatives, as it is the only one of the three which uses only dichotomous codes. There are three reasons why it has been chosen:

The first relates to the external outcome of the analysis. Though it is possible to expect that different degrees of presence by each causal condition can be found to have different effects on the outcomes, that is strictly speaking not the point of interest. It is interesting to see if an effect can be found, not whether or not it is of a higher or lower intensity. This is rather an examination of whether the presence or absence of the causal conditions has an effect at all.

The second reason relates to the internal process of evaluation. Clarity is of the utmost importance in a work seeking to compile new data and evaluate processes that have yet to be

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115 For more on Fuzzy and Multivariate QCA, see footnotes 109 on page 50.
done elsewhere. By using dichotomous than multi-valued data I hope to strengthen the visibility of potential patterns. One could argue that the possibility of allowing some conditions to be dichotomous while others could be trichotomous could increase the transparency of this investigation\textsuperscript{116}. However, lack of theoretical justification for such an action leads to this not being done in this text.

Third lays a matter of practicality. Evaluating the strength of influence by potential actors for every entity is simply not feasible at the moment. Too much data would have to be collected.

4.2 \textbf{Research design: structure and calibration}

This second part of the methods chapter will show the application of cs/QCA for this particular investigation. QCA has four stages, each of which will be presented and used to build the analysis. The causal conditions will be operationalized and the values coded as 0 or 1, and the data set will be presented. The application of the method will be further detailed in the Analysis chapter.

In addition to the steps included in the QCA-analysis process, descriptive analyses will be made in order to have as thorough an analysis as possible. Cs/QCA is not expected to provide all the answers needed to have a foundation for creating clear conclusions as to which entities face which destinies. By following Ragin’s (1987) recommendations that the researcher should be an active participant in the analysis, constant attention to patterns will be paid. The cs/QCA will be supplemented by simple descriptive analysis whenever necessary in order to add more depth to the investigation and to present a more well-founded conclusion.

4.2.1 \textbf{Step by step cs/QCA}

There are four stages to applying QCA (Coverdill and Finlay 1995, 461). These are as follows:

1) \textit{Pre-QCA work}
2) \textit{Coding data and constructing the data matrix}
3) \textit{Constructing the truth table}
4) \textit{Causal identification and minimization}

Researcher interaction is relevant at all points. For example, through readjustment and

\textsuperscript{116} Particularly for causal conditions C and D: \textit{Involvement of international actors} and E: \textit{Economy}. 
reformulation of the causal conditions and data codes to ensure a correspondence between the analysis and the empirical observations. This is particularly relevant in moving from state three to four. Additionally, the analysis of the findings in point four can be usefully elaborated through description.

1) Pre-QCA work
In this stage, the causal conditions and data are identified and retrieved (Coverdill and Finlay 1995, 461, Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 39-44). This process is largely covered in the theory and data chapter. It consisted of inductive and deductive strategies. Deductive, because it assessed and evaluated theories and concepts presented by other scholars. Inductive, in that it also considered what factors empirically seemed to be the most important. Since no other collective meta-analysis has been made of the general development of *de facto*-states, this has been an important part of the preparations.

Collecting the data for the analysis has proven complicated. One reason for this is that the *de facto*-states are rarely considered a separate entity by those compiling data-sets. Consequently, a variety of sources has been used in order to illuminate each causal condition from different perspectives, hoping to properly being able to identify what value each should obtain. The sources and discussions of the coding can be seen in the Raw table in Appendix 3 and 4 but will not be included in the main text.

Collecting data for *Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation (Hypothesis H1)*, distinguishing whether or not the entity holds a distinct ethnic group, has shown to be more accessible information. Either because it is normally discussed in articles about the region, or because demographic distribution has been detailed by others. *Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state (Hypothesis H2)* has been somewhat difficult to collect information on. Finding information on the *de facto*-state’s institutions is fairly straightforward when reading articles about the region, but being able to compare it with that of the parent state can be more complicated. When possible, both the situation at the time of seceding and per 2012 has been included for both *de facto*-state and parent. If this has not been possible, the information for the closest possible time has been included. Collecting data for *Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition and Causal condition D: UN veto power support (Hypotheses H3 and H4)*, has proven itself to be a varied experience. Finding official statements and involvement is not complicated, but assessing informal leverage most certainly is. For this reason, mostly official relations have been
included. Informal connections are ignored unless they are frequently discussed in the literature and claimed to be of utmost importance for the de facto-state. Information for Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state (Hypothesis H5), has proven to be particularly difficult to obtain information for, but it has been possible to cover all of the entities. The evaluations of the Serb Republics are the most uncertain. Since none of the sources discussing resource distribution in the former Yugoslavia in general or the two entities in particular claimed that economy or resources were at any time a topic, they have been considered as having a similar niveau as their parents.

2) Coding data and constructing the data matrix
This step produces the foundations for the upcoming Raw data table and the Truth table. The operationalization and coding required for the creation of the table will be further described in section 4.3 below. The causal conditions are created by the researcher and based on previous analyses. The logic is that if something repeatedly is seen as important for different non-recognised states, it is interesting to explore whether this will turn out to be generally influential as well. What has been identified in the majority of case- and regional studies is mostly overlapping with the causal conditions identified by both Pegg (1998) and Kolstø (2006). Seeing as both these studies took place before the declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008, gathering input from articles written after that has been valuable.

Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 461-463) identify three problems during the coding process. The first is the need for comparable data on every case. Since QCA is dependent on the researcher’s ability to correctly assess the information and code it thereafter, perfect comparability on all data is difficult to obtain. To obtain the highest level of comparability possible and minimise the risk of human error by the researcher, there are multiple sources behind each allotted value in the Raw table. Due to the sometimes sparse information available, the data obtaining and coding process has proven to be extremely time consuming. It has taken a full half of the time that has been required to complete this thesis. The second problem identified by Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 461-463) is that of correctly coding each causal condition for each entity without tweaking the results in the expected direction based on holistic impressions. Third comes the potential problem of finding the best cut-off point.

\[\text{Caspersen (2008c, 2010a, 2008b, 2010b, 2008a, 2007, 2011, 2012a), and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) have been particularly useful for identifying the potential effects of democratic institutions and the apparent change in discourse by the international community, as also discussed in the Theory chapter.}\]
between the value 1 and 0 on the outcome when no natural break-off points are present\textsuperscript{118}. Any cases where this has proven problematic are elaborated upon in the Raw table in Appendix 3.

In order to minimize the risk of the researcher mistakes, as explained by Coverdill and Finlay (1995), the coding of parts of the raw table will be replicated by externals. Three de facto-states are chosen randomly from the sample, and were given to volunteers\textsuperscript{119} together with the original sources and the operationalization of the causal conditions. Should their coding give a different result, the operationalization would be improved and the coded values re-evaluated. This has not proven to be the case, which means that the construction of the Truth table can commence.

3) Constructing the truth table
Here, the Truth table is constructed (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 44-47). Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 464) describes the process as follows: First, a Raw data matrix\textsuperscript{120} should be constructed, listing all the entities, with their respective values on each causal condition. This case-oriented table sets the ground for the configuration-focused Truth table that is to follow. In the latter, all logically possible outcomes are listed, and the cases are placed in their corresponding rows. The operationalizations that the codes are based on are presented below.

Between steps three and four, the researcher must evaluate whether the operationalization and coding has been good enough. Cs/QCA does not have a way to handle contradicting outcomes with the same attributes.

4) Causal identification and minimization
QCA is not concerned with the individual effects of causal conditions, but rather the configurations of them. It is fully possible that one factor proves important in collaboration with another despite not having any obvious effects by itself. For this reason, all the causal conditions will be added before the analysis can begin. If any of them prove to be irrelevant for the outcome, it will be removed from the investigation as part of the minimisation process.

\textsuperscript{118} The sources and reasons behind each value will be displayed in Appendix 3 instead of in the main text, so as to maintain a clear and easily followable text in the thesis.

\textsuperscript{119} All the volunteers have a master’s degree or higher in either social sciences or the humanities, and were recruited amongst people from the researcher’s own social circle. After being given the sources and the coding operationalizations for their entity, they worked solo. This tests whether the original coding is replicable, and if the operationalizations are clear and logical. This evaluation was identical to the original, indicating that researcher bias and unjustified coding is not a big problem here. The recoded entities are Anjouan, Gagauzia and Somaliland.

\textsuperscript{120} A full version with sources is found in Appendix 3 and 4, and Table 11 and Table 12 in Appendix 2.
The last stage before the analysis can begin in earnest is the minimisation of the truth table (see for instance Ragin and Sonnett 2004, Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 56-59). The causal combinations will be sorted by their outcome into 0 and 1-configurations and analysed separately. The formulas for success and failure are identified. Then the results of those analyses will be used on the de facto-states with no clear outcomes, to investigate whether it is possible to evaluate the strength of the position of the different uncompleted entities based on the results of this analysis. The specificities of this will be further commented in the Analysis chapter.

Ragin (1987, 95-99) describes that Boolean implicators - that is, the reduced causal combinations - can be further minimised through reduction to prime implicants. Though this could contribute to an increased parsimony, it will not be done here. Considering the low number of included entities, reducing too much might obfuscate as much as it clarifies.

In addition to the four first steps, Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 59-65) proposes a fifth: bringing in the “logical remainders” cases - that is, logical combinations with no empirical matches. This is meant as a means to achieve more parsimony, and is done by including non-observed logical remainders. This is not done here, for reasons further discussed in the Analysis chapter.

Necessary and sufficient causes and combinations thereof will be identified for the successful de facto-states and for the failures. Ragin (1987, 99-100) defines a condition as necessary if it “must be present for an outcome to occur”, and sufficient if it “by itself can produce a certain outcome”.

4.3 Operationalization of the outcome and causal conditions
To properly code the data and construct the relevant tables, the operationalization of the causal conditions and outcome will be explained. The information used for the analysis is compiled by the researcher, using a multitude of sources like quantitative data-sets, news-articles and scientific articles. Data on non-recognised states can be both difficult to find and trust, so it is important in all the causal conditions to ensure credibility by gathering information from various sources. Where the sources contradict each other, there will by necessity be an evaluation of trustworthiness and quantity that decides the allotted value. For
instance, if several researchers argue one point, and only one or a few contradict it, the many will win over the few, given equal trustworthiness.

It is not expected that the included entities will be universally accepted as the ultimate selection. Although the definition of *de facto*-states by Kolstø (2006, 724-725) is widely used, the selections based on it are not always completely overlapping121. Considering the highly diverse nature of these entities, disagreement on which entities are to be included must be expected. The same goes for the operationalization of the causal conditions and the coding of the different values. The coding of all causal conditions will entail measuring and evaluating approximates, as the relevant information in most cases is general and unclear. In addition there is the problem of the credibility of the data. Being conflict zones - though frozen - it is expected that differing accounts of these entities may exist due to propaganda or misinformation of other sorts122. To ensure that any potential damages by this on the validity and quality of the analysis are kept to a minimum, the coded data is based on multiple sources and any disagreements between them are pointed out in the Raw data table in Appendix 3.

In order to maintain transparency, the operationalization and coding will be discussed in this section. Starting with the outcome and continuing with the causal conditions, each point will be discussed in order chronologically from the theory chapter. Special attention is given to coding that is particularly debatable or difficult to pin down.

4.3.1 The outcome: state recognition
State recognition will here be defined as UN membership. As previously mentioned, this does not entail full acceptance by all other UN member states. It does, however, mean that the area in question has been recognised both by the major veto powers in the Security Council and the majority of other states in the General Assembly, and that all the other members must relate to it as a state (The United Nations 07.12.2012b). As the outcome here is dichotomous by nature, this coding is not expected to pose any problems.

UN membership is given the value 1, non-membership is given the value 0.

\[121\] As an example, note how the compilations of *de facto*-states since the second world war made by Caspersen (2012b, 4) and Anderson (2011, 185) differ both in what entities are included and their time of existence even though they are sections in the same work.

\[122\] Of the five steps Kolstø (2006) presents from the process of *de facto*-state building, information and other “soft power” is seen as the most important. This also includes the possibility of a certain bias in the information spread about the entity.
4.3.2 Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation

This causal condition reports whether the de facto-state was founded on the concept of ethnicity. Though the concept of ethnicity is a contested one\textsuperscript{123}, it is not the goal of this thesis to give evaluations regarding the legitimacy of claims of being an ethnic group or membership in one. Here, I will examine what others have considered as constituting ethnic groups.

The basis for the de facto state is considered to be ethnicity if the de facto-state was founded as a homeland for an ethnic group which is distinct from the population in the mother state. This would also include cases such as Abkhazia, where the purpose clearly was creating an Abkhaz state despite the fact that the Abkhaz were initially a minority in the region\textsuperscript{124}. Any entity where ethnicity was an important part of the discourse of creation is placed in this category. It is not the specific size of the ethnic group that is the most important, but whether the entity was created with the ethnic group in mind.

Entities not considered as having ethnicity as a base includes situations when the ethnic composition is the same - mixed\textsuperscript{125} or homogeneous\textsuperscript{126} - in the two entities. If ethnic composition was not seen as important during the creation of the de facto-state, it is included in this category.

If the state foundation is considered as ethnic, the de facto-state is coded 1. Otherwise, it is coded 0.

4.3.3 Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state

This causal condition measures the level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state. What is interesting is seeing if the de facto-state holds a higher level of democracy than its parent. In situations where this is not the case, it is seen as irrelevant to distinguish whether the parent is at the same level or above\textsuperscript{127}.

\textsuperscript{123} See for instance Baumann (2004) for a discussion on the concept.
\textsuperscript{124} For more on how the ethnic composition in Abkhazia has changed over the years, see (UNPO 2009, Clogg 2001, Ciobanu 2008, 118-121, Beachain 2012).
\textsuperscript{126} Somaliland and Puntland are examples of de facto-states with a homogeneous population splitting from a homogeneous parent (Gikes 1999, Mesfin 2009, UNHCR 1999, Huliaras 2010).
\textsuperscript{127} These distinctions can be seen in the Raw table in Appendix 3.
Having “democratic institutions” does not mean that there is a fixed set of criteria the entity must fulfil. Being a democratic entity as such is therefore less important than being more democratic than the parent. The focus is on organisational abilities. This includes elections, governmental turnover, citizen participation, welfare systems, level of electoral violence, creating and maintaining infrastructure, and so on. Being a democratic polity first requires there to be an organised government. This means that there are no universal criteria being applied here, since the situation is expected to be different in each case. The entities need not, for instance, hold democratic elections in consolidated democratic regimes.

To measure this, report from Freedomhouse and CIA World Factbook is used in tandem with analyses of case and regional studies. The numeric codes in the former are considered unproblematic to compare for the parent and the de facto-state, for they are each evaluated using the same mechanisms. Analysis from the literature is more complex, but it is assumed to be valid if the entity is portrayed as more democratic than its parent in multiple sources.

Institutional strength and democratic level is measured in comparison with the parent state due to the arguments presented in the Theory chapter. This distinction is thus common in the theory on the field. Testing for the presence of democratic institutions in general is not seen as making sense in this case as the arguments are relational. Having a higher level of democratic institutions will be coded as 1, otherwise the value given is 0.

4.3.4 Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition and Causal condition D: UN veto power support

These conditions report whether the de facto-state has faced international involvement by UN veto holders or whether it has not. The Theory chapter presents hypotheses that go in opposite directions, and gauges that involvement can be of both a positive and negative kind. UN veto powers are the most mighty single states when determining membership in the UN, so the focus will be on the actions of these states. Naturally, they are not the only states capable of aiding or harming de facto-states, but in this specific situation they do hold enormous power.

“Involvement” implies several things, the three most important of which here are diplomatic, diplomatic, and diplomatic.

---

128 Haugland (2008) analyses the presence or absence of democratic institutions per se in her included states-in-scope, and finds no connection between the causal condition and UN recognition.
military and economic intervention. The first, diplomatic intervention, involves active support or opposition of the state-status of the entity. Recognising the entity entails supporting it, as does arguing its case in important fora\textsuperscript{129} or providing help in developing state institutions\textsuperscript{130}. Diplomatic opposition could be laying down a veto, or strongly arguing in favour of the parent state or the value of territorial sovereignty\textsuperscript{131}.

Military intervention with the goal of supporting or opposing\textsuperscript{132} the entity counts, but not cases where the purpose is simply resolving the conflict. For example: International intervention in North Cyprus is nearly exclusively done to promote diplomatic relations and conflict resolution - not to support or oppose the de facto-state (Sonmez and Apostolopoulos 2008, Atasoy 2003, Ioannides and Apostolopoulos 1999, Dodd 2009). This kind of activity does not count here.

Economic intervention can come in many forms, but is here generally seen as trade - including blockades - and economic aid to the regime\textsuperscript{133}.

A veto power can, like other states, change its opinion on international matters and vote differently in different UN Security Council meetings regarding the de facto-state. This has indeed been the case for Bangladesh, but not for the other successful entities\textsuperscript{134}. For this reason the focus is on data from as close to the time directly after the de facto-state was created as possible.

For causal condition C, having UN veto power opposition will be coded as 1; otherwise it will be coded as 0. For causal condition D, having UN veto power support will be coded as 1; the lack thereof will be coded as 0.

\textsuperscript{129} Russia argues in favour of the recognition of, amongst others, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Fawn 2008, 273, UNPO 2009, Ciobanu 2008, 121).
\textsuperscript{130} Both Kosovo and East Timor have received important international aid to develop their political institutions (K-FOR 2013, EULEX 23.01.2013, The United Nations Security Council 1999).
\textsuperscript{131} Russia opposes the recognition of Kosovo, arguing amongst other points that the territorial integrity of Serbia is important (Caspersen 2008b, 1, Fawn 2008, 270, 290, BBC 2010, Ciobanu 2008, 159).
\textsuperscript{132} Both the UK, the USSR and USA were militarily involved against Biafra (Berg 2005, 228, Ciobanu 2008, 71-72, 84).

\textsuperscript{133} The United Kingdom imposed blockades on de facto-state Rhodesia (Pinkston 2005, 7).
4.3.5 Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state
This causal condition reports whether the economic situation in the de facto-state is similar to or disproportionally different from the rest of its parent. In other words, it measures whether the parent state faces 1) no significant and unproportional economic changes by the disappearance of its rebel entity or 2) an economic loss or gain by losing the secessionist entity. This is done to find out whether economy has played an important role for the secessionist conflict.

Economy and natural resources are hard to measure, so the focus is on relative terms. Will the parent state be economically wounded through the loss of the de facto-state? Will it benefit? The answer “yes” to any of those two questions are here seen to indicate that when considering resources, the region is significantly different from the rest of the state it is attempting to split from. And thus, that economy can be expected to have been an important factor. In situation where both have more or less the same level, it is logical that this cannot have been of a high importance. If the parent does not face significant losses or gains, the economic situation in the de facto-state is not considered to be sufficiently different for economy to matter largely.

By “economic level” it is not meant only money or Gross Domestic Products. Also included are resources such as for instance oil or minerals, even if they are or were not extracted and taken full advantage of during the de facto-state’s existence. This includes having proportionally more or less of the state’s industry\(^\text{135}\), holding important harbours\(^\text{136}\) or oil deposits\(^\text{137}\) et cetera.

What is meant by a “significant” loss or gain is impossible to numerize, as it is a matter of relative proportions. What matters the most is that it is perceived as important\(^\text{138}\). It is unrealistic to expect the potential in natural resources or lack thereof to be assessed in detail. Central banks and detailed budgets are not necessarily existing or trustworthy for these types of entities. It is therefore impossible to set numerical thresholds. The belief of loss or gain can

\(^{135}\) For example, Transnistria has un-proportionally much of Moldova’s industrial factories on its territory (Berg 2005, 228, Ciobanu 2008, 71-72, 84).

\(^{136}\) The main harbour in the Comoros was in Anjouan at the time of the conflict (Ayangafac 2008, 3-5, Cornwell 2010, 55-56).

\(^{137}\) South Sudan has nearly all of the oil previously owned by Sudan (Ross 08.07.2011).

\(^{138}\) The focus on perceived resources and their distribution is supported by Wood (1981, 116-117) Laracy (1991), Ghai and Regan (2006), and Cornish (2010).
be interesting here. If it is claimed that the parent state stands to lose or gain much by the loss of its unruly region, it is counted as relevant. If scientific articles on the entity claim that there is a resource distribution discrepancy, this is also understood to be relevant.

If the parent state stands to lose or gain economically by the loss of the de facto-state, the code will be 1. Otherwise, the value is 0.

4.4 Chapter summary

Crisp set QCA has been chosen as the method for this thesis. Partly because it is well suited for medium-N-analyses. Also because it is well-suited for assessment of causal combinations. QCA-analysis has four steps, namely 1) Pre-QCA work, 2) Coding data and constructing the data matrix, 3) Constructing the Truth table and 4) Causal identification and minimization. To add more depth, descriptive analysis will be used as an analytic tool.

Then, the operationalization of the causal condition was performed and is summarised as follows. Outcome: UN membership is given the value 1; non-membership is given the value 0. A: If the state foundation is considered as ethnic, the de facto-state is coded 1. Otherwise, it is coded 0. B: Having a higher level of democratic institutions will be coded as 1; otherwise the value given is 0. C: having UN veto power opposition will be coded as 1; otherwise it will be coded as 0. D: having UN veto power support will be coded as 1; the lack thereof will be coded as 0. E: If the parent state stands to lose or gain economically by the loss of the de facto-state, the code will be 1. Otherwise, the value is 0.
5. Analysis Chapter: seeking patterns

In this chapter, the main analysis takes part. The chapter starts with a presentation of the strategy of the investigation, presenting what will be done how and why. Then the actual analysis will be performed and the results discussed in relation to the thesis’ research question. Further, the potential patterns for the successful and failed state-creation attempts will be used to try to give an evaluation of the de facto-states whose status is not yet decided. All configurations will have the values 1 or 0, meaning that “don’t care”- outcomes and logical remainders will be avoided (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 44). Though utilising the QCA-software\(^{139}\) in the analyses, it is important to note that cs/QCA is a process open for researcher input at every stage of the procedure. Following the recommendations by Ragin (1987, 164-171), descriptive analyses and evaluations will be included throughout the process as supplements to the main analysis. Only the Truth tables are presented in the text. The Raw table with sources can be found in Appendices 3 and 4.

5.1 Strategy of analysis: how the investigation will be performed

First analysis: Crisp set QCA

The cs/QCA-analysis will be presented first, identifying the logical formulas for successful and failed de facto-states. The entities with no clear outcome will not be included in this part of the investigation.

*Step one - The Truth table and preliminary results.*

The entities and causal conditions will be transformed into configurations of cases. They will be sorted into 1/0-configurations for success and failure respectively. The analyses of the two will proceed in tandem. The most obvious findings will be identified and collected immediately.

*Step two - Creating a model: Minimisation, and the minimal formulas.*

This section creates the Truth table and identifies the formulas (or simplified Boolean equations) for success and failure. This creates a model for evaluation of de facto-states. The unreduced, primitive causal terms will be reduced using Boolean minimization and the process behind them is discussed (Haugland 2008, 52-53, Ragin 1987, 85-101).

\(^{139}\) The Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis Software by Ragin (15.03.2013) can be used for both crisp and fuzzy set analyses.
**Second analysis: Descriptive analyses**

The cs/QCA-analysis will be further complemented by a descriptive analysis based on the same data as collected for the QCA-analysis, seeking to present a deeper understanding of the outcomes experienced by the *de facto*-states included.

*Step three - Distribution: identifying the typical causal combination for success and failure*

By evaluating the distribution of the presence and absence of the different causal conditions the typical formula is identified. Due to the low number of entities in each of the two categories, it is possible that some important knowledge is missed. Identifying the typical combination could add robustness to the assessments of what leads to which outcomes.

*Step four - Including the time aspect*

As could be seen in the introducing descriptions in the Data chapter, the setting in which an entity was created is potentially important for its outcome. A closer analysis of the entities in light of which wave they belong to is performed.

*Step five - A closer look at particular patterns identified through analysis*

This section presents a closer look at patterns becoming apparent through the analyses, but which are not covered in the Truth table.

**Third analysis: Using analyses one and two to evaluate the undetermined entities**

This section takes the analysis one step further and attempts using the knowledge of the successes and failures to analyse the entities with no clear outcome.

*Step six - Analyses one and two applied to the entities with undetermined outcomes*

This section evaluates the potential outcomes of yet undetermined entities in light of the causal combinations identified in analyses one and two.

*Step seven - Adding extra causal conditions*

Causal conditions identified by other researchers are applied to the identified data in order to evaluate their positions more precisely.
5.2 First analysis: Crisp set QCA

The following is the cs/QCA-analysis, applied to the successful and failed entities separately.

5.2.1 - Step one - The Truth table and preliminary results.

In the Truth table, each logically possible combination of the causal conditions is listed as rows. As explained above, $N$ causal conditions create $2^N$ rows. Each entity is placed in the appropriate row sorted by the values of the different causal conditions. Seeing as this analysis has five causal conditions, there are 32 possible logical combinations. Table 4 below shows the truth table sorted into one group for those entities who have achieved UN membership and one for those who have become reintegrated into their parent states.

Table 4- Truth table for the first analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto-state</th>
<th>A Ethnicity</th>
<th>B Democracy</th>
<th>C Veto opposition</th>
<th>D Veto support</th>
<th>E Economy</th>
<th>Formula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUCESSES (N = 4)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ABCdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Timor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AbcDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>aBcdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>aBcDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAILURES (N = 7)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjouan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>abcdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biafra, Chechnya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AbCdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagauzia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ABcdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi-Kurdistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ABcDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>abCdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, Rhodesia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Abcde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Eelam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>abcDe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$N = 11$. Sources: see Appendix 3.

Each row in the Truth table represents one causal combination and includes all entities with matching combinations. One causal combination can include many de facto-states. For the causal terms, majuscules represent presence and minuscule absence of a causal condition, like the numerical values 1 and 0. There are no contradictory cases, making recoding or adding

140 Or «primitive causal term» (Haugland 2008, 52).
causal conditions seem superfluous (Coverdill and Finlay 1995, 466), Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 48-56), Ragin (1987, 113-118). Eleven of the 32 possible logical combinations have corresponding empirical cases. There are only two sets of combinations with more than one matching case, none of which have succeeded in achieving statehood. They are 1) the Serb Republics and Rhodesia, and 2) Biafra and Chechnya. No causal combination has more than three matching entities. This might serve as a reminder of the heterogeneous nature of these entities, as is already discussed in the Data chapter.

Is it possible to make a general analysis based on combinations with such a low frequency as this? Haugland (2008, 49) points out the potential loss of reliability in analyses with low frequency. The logic is that an analysis which only identifies that entities are different does not really explain much. Should only the combinations with the most corresponding cases be analysed further? Ragin (1987, 46) recommends setting the frequency threshold for inclusion to one or two corresponding cases when performing small and medium-N analyses. This is in part based on a practical evaluation: specific social phenomena do only rarely occur in large quantities. Having a high threshold might lead to a more generalizable outcome, but only if there are sufficient cases to perform the analysis. Due to the limited number of cases, the frequency threshold is here set to one and all existing cases are brought on to the further analysis. The undetermined cases are kept out of the analysis for now. Only logical remainders with no corresponding cases are excluded.

Ragin (1987, 109) points out that ignoring the lacking empirical cases is not a matter of course. Another procedure is to assume that the non-existing combinations would lead to failures and code them as such. It is also possible to use the existing theory and place them based on assumed outcomes. The conservative option of excluding them was deemed as most appropriate for this thesis for two reasons. The first is that coding the non-existent combinations as failures would ultimately limit the credibility of the analysis of that category. The second is to maintain the focus on empirical evidence rather than on theoretical evaluations. This thesis is written in the hope of finding patterns in existing de facto-states and their development pathways, and a focus on occurring events is therefore necessary.

Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 57) recommends minimizing the 1 and 0-configurations separately seeing that perfect causal symmetry is not to be expected in social sciences. In other words, the minimal formula for the 0-configurations is not necessarily the opposite of
the one for the \( I \)-configurations and the one can thus not be deduced from the other. For this reason, the two will be considered separately. The cases falling into the “Undecided”-category will be left out of this part of the analysis, since it is not yet clear whether they will succeed in becoming a state or fail and reintegrate into their parent. This is to avoid comparing same with same and muddling the value of the analysis. The cases with undecided outcomes will be brought in to the analysis after the investigations of the successes and failures, and an evaluation of them based on the findings from the two other categories will be attempted.

It is possible to discern patterns already at this stage. The successful \textit{de facto}-states have in common that they all had a different economic level than their parent state at the time of the split. Only Bangladesh was opposed by a UN veto power when they first came into existence. None of them had both an ethnically homogeneous population and a higher level of democracy than their parent. That the failures are a more heterogeneous set is not surprising, considering that there are more than twice as many cases and causal combinations. Despite this, some impressions are possible. Most of them had a different economic level than their parent, and a similar or lower level of democracy. Nearly all entities with veto opposition are found in this category, and the same is the case for those with the same economic level as their parent.

\textbf{5.2.2 - Step two - Creating a model: Minimisation, and the minimal formulas.}

The unreduced causal terms as shown in the Truth table can be minimised and shown as a minimal formula and are represented in the text on bold letters. There will be one formula for success and one for failure. This is done by comparing the causal combinations and identifying those that are similar in all but one aspect. Logically, that particular aspect is not relevant for the outcome, and can be eliminated from the equation. This is repeated until all the remaining formulas differ from each other in two or more aspects. The remainders are known as minimal formulas and form the basis for discerning which causal conditions are necessary and which are sufficient for the respective outcome. Note that logical algebra does not strictly follow arithmetic patterns (Ragin 1987, 92). Sufficient conditions are represented by the logical AND, or \(*\). Logically necessary conditions, OR, are presented as \(+\). Thus, as an example, the minimal formula \( ab \) indicates the combination of \( a \) and \( b \), \( a+b \) signals either \( a \) or \( b \) and \( a(b+c) \) \( a \) combined with either \( b \) or \( c \).

The heterogeneity of the examined entities does, as is apparent from the Truth table, not bring
to light any obvious common patterns for neither success nor failure of obtaining UN membership. That leads to a necessity of a discussion on thresholds for inclusion in the further analysis. Two possible paths are 1) exclusion of combinations and 2) exclusion of causal conditions. First: It could be possible to obtain a more parsimonious minimal formula if some of the entities are kept out of the equation. For instance, accepting that the formula covers a general or qualified majority of the combinations, could contribute to a clearer answer to the question on what entities or causal combinations gain UN membership. This will not be done here, for fear of choosing the wrong combination to exclude. One of the most important purposes for this thesis is to seek patterns for all of the de facto-states, and exclusion of those that do not fit seem a poor manner of achieving this goal - particularly so when considering the low number of combinations in each category. The second suggestion of treating as irrelevant those causal conditions not displaying any apparent effect is more relevant. If a fifty-fifty spread of a condition it is found where the outcomes 1 and 0 are not corresponding with the spread of any other causal condition it is logical that this condition has not had an effect on the outcome. Any such conditions will thus be removed from the analysis.

Table 5- Minimal formulas of reduced causal terms - a model for success and failure for de facto-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success (O)</th>
<th>Failure (o)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O = ABCdE+ AbcDE+ aBcdE+ aBcDE</td>
<td>o = abcdE+ AbCdE+ ABcdE+ ABcDE+ abCdE+ Abcde+ abcDe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factored terms:

Including all causal conditions:

- O = aBcE+AE(BCd+bcD)
- After removing conditions D and A:
  - O = BCE+bcE+BcE → O = E(BC+bc+Bc)

Including all causal conditions:

- o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD)
- No removal of conditions is possible.

A: Ethnicity, B: Democracy, C: Veto opposition, D: Veto support, E: Economy, O: Outcome
Analysis of the formula for Success: $O = E(BC+bc+Bc)$

After having removed as irrelevant D: UN veto power support and A: Ethnicity as state foundation, the reduced formula is $O = E(BC+bc+Bc)$. There are thus three main types of successful de facto-states. The formula shows condition $E$ as necessary, but is not by itself sufficient for the outcome. In other words, the entity must have a different level of economy than its parent, but this is not by itself enough to create the outcome success.

The formula indicates that all successful de facto-states have had a score of 1 on causal condition E, or a different level of economy from its parent state at the time of secession. This corresponds with the expectations presented by $H5$: A different economic level than the parent state increases the chances of recognition. Though this seems like a clear finding, it is worth keeping in mind that it is fully possible that what is found is more an indication that entities with a different level of economy more frequently attempts secession than others. It is also unclear whether it is the kind of resources, the level of difference or the net value that is behind this effect. Similarly, it is impossible to read from this analysis what lies behind this finding. Is it an endogenous or exogenous effect, or maybe both? Regardless, it is the single causal condition with a clear presence in all successful de facto-states and it supports previous literature on the field.

The values $BC+bc+Bc$ show the different combinations of causal conditions B, Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state, and C, or UN veto power opposition. The results shown are partly contradictory, but still have some things in common. The most striking is that none of the three shows UN veto opposition coupled with a lower level of democracy than the parent. It is more common to have than to lack a higher level of democracy, supporting the assumed effect presented in $H5$: A different economic level than the parent state increases the chances of recognition. Two of the three combinations show an absence of veto opposition. This is in accordance with the assumptions $H3$: Opposition from a UN veto power decreases the chances of recognition, but no combinatory causality is clear. Any consistent combination of the two factors is not discernible. More of the entities show a presence of a higher level of democracy coupled with a lack of veto opposition.

A summary could therefore be: the successful de facto-states who have become UN members have differing levels of resources from their parents. Generally, they exhibit a higher level of democracy than them, and they are not opposed by UN veto holders. Removing causal
conditions A and D has weakened hypotheses $H1$ and $H4$. The hypothesis $H5$ has been strengthened, whereas $H2$ and $H3$ are unafflicted by the results.

*Analysis of the formula for Failure: $o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD)$*

For the failed de facto-states, it is not possible to remove any causal conditions as irrelevant, since the spread is never evenly split in any direction. The reduced formula created after analysing the failed attempts at secession is $o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD)$. No conditions are found to be necessary or sufficient by themselves and there are no less than five different pathways to failure represented here.

That there are five main types of failed *de facto*-states identified shows that these entities are more heterogeneous than the successful ones. This is not surprising, as it has been shown multiple times throughout this analysis that de facto-states come from a vast variety of backgrounds and have had diverging developments since their creation. But despite their particularities, there are still some commonalities that can be identified.

The most frequent causal condition to have, is $E$, different economic level than the parent state. Hypothesis $H5$ is apparently weakened. Its near constant presence is similar to the successful entities, but this category also includes combinations where this condition is absent. Having the presence of the condition in both the category for successful and failed de facto-states indicate that merely being economically different is not enough to predict the direction of the outcome. If anything is to be deduced, it is thus that economic difference is not by itself enough to predict the outcomes.

The presence of an economically different level is here combined with any of the causal conditions except $D$, support from a UN veto holder. The one incident where veto support is coupled with a different level of economy, experienced by Iraqi-Kurdistan, has been logically reduced from the final equation. This is interesting, considering the fifty-fifty spread of support present in the successful group. However, it is important not to draw hasted conclusions regarding the effects of external aid. Veto support was one of the conditions removed from the analysis of successes, as it was deemed logically irrelevant. What appears to be the case is that for failed *de facto*-states, international support has been absent. This, combined with a different economic level, is common for the combinations in this category except for the one where veto support was removed. Hence, hypothesis $H4$ can be argued to be strengthened, as UN veto support has been absent for the failing entities.
For the other causal conditions, patterns are harder to come by. Neither A, an ethnically distinct base, B, higher level of democracy, or C, veto opposition, display any clear trends and the variety shown by the causal combinations present makes it near impossible to give any clear conclusions as to which entities fail. Thus, hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are neither weakened nor strengthened.

To summarise, failed de facto-states portray a wide range of different traits, but they generally have a different level of economy than their parent and they are not supported by a UN veto holder. Hypothesis H5 is somewhat weakened as three of the five causal trajectories display having a different level of economy than the parent state. Hypothesis H4 is strengthened, as UN veto support has not been given to these entities. Hypotheses 1-3 are not supported or weakened to any large degree. It thus appears that while they might provide an aid for understanding success they contribute little to grasping what lies behind failure. It is clear that here, the path to failure is not the opposite of the path to success.

5.3 Second analysis: Descriptive analyses

After having utilised cs/QCA to identify the causal combinations leading to success and failure, two formulas have been identified. Successful entities follow the trajectory \( O = E(BC+bc+Bc) \) and failures follow \( o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD) \). Those are the logical formulas, and were found through Boolean minimisation. They describe what logical combinations are found within the different entities leading up to the two different outcomes success and failure. This section will examine the distribution of the causal conditions. It is done to seek the typical success and failure. This part of the analysis is descriptive, and examines the distribution of the different causal conditions. Having so few of them in each category, one diverging entity could influence the resulting logical combination greatly. This additional analysis is included to support the results of the cs/QCA-based main analysis by providing an extra layer to the model. Including researcher evaluations follows the recommendations made by Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 461-466) and Ragin (1987).

5.3.1 - Step three - Distribution: identifying the typical causal combination for success and failure

In order to evaluate the future of those de facto-states whose final outcomes are still unknown, it would be practical having a more clear foundation for the analysis than what is possible now. Since the different combinations are discussed in the previous section, this will
focus on the distribution of single causal conditions in order to gauge whether there are
factors that are more common in each category despite there being little consistency in the
combinations discovered. This section will point out major differences and similarities
between the two categories, and try making the results more comprehensive.

Causal condition A, having a distinct ethnic base, does not show any clear tendencies. Half of
the successful combinations have this condition present, as do two-thirds of the failed ones.
This is in contrast with the expected effect stated in hypothesis H1. What appears to be the
case is that the ethnic foundation for secession does not have any clear effect on the outcome,
as the spread is fairly equal. But this picture is not necessarily that clear. As shown in Table 4
on page 67, the vast majority of de facto-states have had a distinct ethnic foundation. When
evaluation the combinations leading up to recognition, it is notable that there is a
disproportionally large amount of those who have become UN members who do not fit into
this category. This discrepancy corresponds with the conservative attitude of the UN
discussed in the Theory chapter, discouraging the creation of new states apart from the periods
of decolonisation and the break-down of the communist unions USSR and Yugoslavia. It
might seem that while it is more likely that de facto-states have distinct ethnic concentrations
than not, they do not succeed. Thus, hypothesis H1 is neither supported nor weakened.

For those combinations that have led to UN membership, causal conditions B, a higher level
of democracy, and C, UN veto opposition, are identical in three of the four possible cases.
Having a higher level of democracy and lacking veto opposition is the most common
combination, but it only holds true for two of the four combinations. The other two have
contrasting scores. Still, there are contrasts between the two groups. For the failed
combinations, a higher level of democracy is only present in two of six, indicating that similar
or lower democratic levels can be associated with failure. This supports hypothesis H2 and
can serve as a nod to the statements from the president of Nagorno-Karabakh who argued that
those states recognising Kosovo would find it hard to explain why they do not recognise
Nagorno-Karabakh (Caspersen 2012b, 2). The distribution of UN veto opposition is nearly
identical for both the failed and the successful de facto-states, but the successes have faced
this hinder most rarely. H3 therefore appears supported. What lies behind the decision to
discourage the creation of new states by the veto powers is unclear141, but it appears that when

141 See a discussion in Haugland (2008, 61-62) on intervening causes on the many reasons behind states’
decisions in these manners.
these decisions have been made it has the desired effect of denying statehood to the hopeful entity.

Though D, veto support, was removed from the analysis of the successful combinations, it is apparent that having such support is far more common for those who succeed than for those who fail. This supports H4 and indicates that while de facto-states might survive by themselves, they seem more likely to be unable to gain acceptance without a powerful friend. An absence of this is one of the most visible factors the failed de facto-states have in common, combined with a different level of economy. Seeing that half the successful combinations also lack this support, this is not enough to explain the outcomes by itself.

As stated above, both categories show that having a different economical level from your parent is beneficial in order to gain both outcomes, as seen by analysing causal condition E. This can indicate a number of things. Firstly, it supports the choice of cs/QCA as the correct method to use for this type of analysis, since it appears that there are more factors working together for the different outcomes. Secondly, it opens for a further refinement of the operationalization. Though the theories that created the basis for H5 do not point in any clear direction, the best understanding of this might be different from the one analysed here. It appears that the existence of economic differences matters. However, a further analysis could prove interesting in later works. H5 is unaffected by this analysis.

Despite the heterogeneity of the analysed entities being clearly visible in the causal combinations, the descriptive analysis has shown that some indicators of what typically has led to success and failure can be found. The typical successful de facto-state does not have A, a distinct ethnic population, nor is it C, opposed by a UN veto power. It has B, a higher level of democracy than its parent, and is often D, supported by a UN veto holder. Its economic situation, E, is different from its parent. The causal combination would be aBcDE, which corresponds to that of South Sudan. If the previous discussion is considered and the conditions A and D are removed, it is found that Eritrea (aBcdE) also matches this category.

The typical failed de facto-state has a distinct ethnic population, A, but a similar or lower level of democracy, B, than its parent. It is generally opposed by a UN veto power, C, and lacks veto support, D. It also has a different economic level, E, than its parent. The typical combination for failed entities is, apart from for the economic indicator, diametrically
contrasting with that for success. It reads AbCdE, which corresponds to both Biafra and Chechnya.

5.3.2 - Step four - Including the time aspect
Since the entities examined are very different from one another in both origins, outcome and development trajectories, examining them using more factors than only those that become clear in the first Truth table can be useful. It is clear that combinations of causal conditions matter for their developmental trajectories, but it is equally clear that there are more factors influencing the outcomes than what is found so far. When studying the descriptive tables in the first section of this investigation, as presented in the Theory and Data chapters, one pattern stands out from the rest. Table 6 below presents what appears to be a correlation between the wave of state creation the entity corresponds to and its outcome.

Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 20-22) demonstrate the difficulties of including temporal aspects when using QCA. Here, the time aspect will not form part of the QCA-analysis as such, but will serve as part of a descriptive analysis complimenting the main investigation. A cross table is created, displaying the *de facto*-states by outcome and creation wave. For illustrative purposes, this table will also include the entities whose end has yet to be determined. A time dimension is a kind of condition which is bound to have other, underlying factors influencing the outcomes. For that reason, the discussion will include attempts at analysing developments in the political climate regarding state creation in each wave.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recognised</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Disappeared</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First wave</strong></td>
<td>0 (-/-)</td>
<td>0 (-/-)</td>
<td>3 (30/100)</td>
<td>N = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Wave</strong></td>
<td>0 (-/-)</td>
<td>5 (55/55)</td>
<td>4 (40/45)</td>
<td>N = 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third Wave</strong></td>
<td>4 (100/36)</td>
<td>4 (45/36)</td>
<td>3 (30/27)</td>
<td>N =11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 4</td>
<td>N = 9</td>
<td>N = 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 23. Percentage of total for each outcome category in parentheses. Right side = share in outcome category, left side = share in wave category.

The cross table shows the point of creation and end result for the *de facto*-states with clear outcomes. It serves as a clear indication that there is more behind state recognition than merely endogenous factors within each entity. The most obvious one regards those *de facto*-states that have become UN members. Not a single one of these has come from the first or second state creation wave. Every entity from the first wave has disappeared. This very clear-cut distribution corresponds with the expressed desire of the UN to not accept state creation.
outside of the specified allowance for decolonisation. The entities with undetermined status are more or less evenly shared between the first and second wave. A less strict application of the discouragement of new state creation could lead to this outcome. Similarly, the disappeared de facto-states are distributed nearly equally between the three waves. This could indicate that failure is not reliant on timing.

The second wave presents a less clear result. Out of nine entities created, five are without a conclusion per 2013, and four have disappeared. Of the five incomplete, three are supported by Russia and one by the European Union. It thus appears that it is not necessarily so that these have managed to survive simply by their own abilities. Nagorno-Karabakh, the only one not receiving support by the EU and being the least connected with Russia of all entities supported by the latter, has a strong and close relationship with Armenia and can thus also be claimed to not necessarily manage by itself. The status of the second wave-entities indicate a potential change in the international climate after the fall of the communist unions, where other states apparently felt able to support entities whose dreams of sovereignty were benefitting themselves.

The third wave, including entities that are neither of the decolonisation or post-union group, is even less clear-cut in its outcomes. All the recognised entities are found here. Of the remaining seven, only three of the de facto-states have disappeared. Of those yet to be completed everyone but Northern Cyprus are without significant aid from other states. They are thus believed to being able to support themselves to a higher degree than those of the same status from the second wave, and further analysis could prove interesting though this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

It is clear that there is a pattern discernible from the cross table. All the successful entities are neither from the decolonisation nor post-communist union waves. Rather, they are distinct entities who have managed to gain acceptance independently. The undetermined entities were created in the second and third wave, with no major distribution difference. The creation of the failures is evenly spread between the waves. The scope of action appears changed, and over time a broader range of outcomes has developed. Therefore, it seems that something has happened over time that has led to a change in the international reaction to these entities.

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142 See the Raw data table in Appendix 4.
143 For more on this, see the Raw Table in appendix 4.
What that is cannot be thoroughly examined here, but one potential reason does present itself: less perceived reason to fear a domino-effect.

As is discussed in the theory chapter, the UN does not in general encourage the creation of new states except from when it is part of decolonisation or the dissolution of unions. Even then, the new states should maintain its original borders. One argument for this has been the desire to avoid a domino-effect. The fear is that secessionist ideas should spread and create aggressive separatism in many new areas. At the time of decolonisation and directly after the fall of the communist unions, this fear was arguably much more legit than per 2012. The sudden independence of many states, with many political entities holding several ethnic groups that potentially were or could become secessionist, provides good reason to wish to hold the reins and not allow more break ups than are absolutely necessary.

This fear is less relevant now, seeing as there are no similar dissolutions taking place. Similarly, the end of the Cold War might have contributed to a diminishment of international tension so that it is now possible to alter borders and other international questions without considering its effects on the relationship between the sides in the conflict. It therefore seems understandable that de facto-states are received differently now than before. This is also apparent when examining those entities that were created more or less at the same time as the first and second waves, but are not part of them. An example of this can be Taiwan. The entity was created as a de facto-state more or less in parallel with the decolonisation wave, but it is not the same type of entity nor has it faced the same kinds of reactions from the international society as those forming part of the waves 144.

Summarising the discussion, it is clear that the timing of the creation of de facto-states matters. The three state creation waves discussed in the theory chapter displays three different distributions of outcomes. Though impossible to verify through this analysis, it can seem logical that de facto-states created with no or only a time relation to the two first waves are received and treated differently from the others as a result of a diminished fear of a domino-effect. The timing element will have to be brought into the analysis of the undetermined cases along with the results of the discussions of the successful and failed entities.

144 More information about Taiwan can be found here: Roberge and Lee (2009), Freedomhouse (2012m), Chiang (1999).
5.3.3 Step five- A closer look at particular patterns identified through analysis

As has already been mentioned, there appears to be certain particularities with the entities supported by Russia. None of them have been recognised as UN member states, yet none of them have disappeared. No other patterns between specific veto power support and outcome is this clear. This section aims to take a closer look at what the reasons for this might be.

The *de facto*-states supported by Russia are Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia has also been involved as an opposing part in in Chechnya, which has later disappeared, and Kosovo, which still exists but is not a UN member. They have not been opposing any of the recognised entities\textsuperscript{145}. As the USSR\textsuperscript{146}, it opposed Biafra, and followed the UN recommendations of denying recognition to the now disappeared *de facto*-states Katanga and Rhodesia\textsuperscript{147}. Lynch (2002, 843-846) states that Russian support has played a vital role in the survival of the Caucasus *de facto*-states. It appears that while negative Russian involvement can coincide with failure, positive involvement does not lead to recognition. That *de facto*-states opposed by a veto power are not recognised is not surprising. But it is interesting to note that none of the supported entities are recognised in the UN.

The Cold War is distinguished by a tense relationship between USA and the Soviet Union. One potential reason for the lack of acceptance or Russia’s favourites could be that there is some spill-over effect still in place. Babynina (2013) describes a conflict of interest between the EU and Russia regarding the Post-Soviet territory. Similarly Trenin (2006) describes the weakening ties between Russia and the West. Tsygankov (2003) provides a comprehensive systematisation of the different relations between Russia and its various neighbours, demonstrating an all generally tense status. When considering the *de facto*-states investigated, it is noticeable the two have never supported the same *de facto*-states. In fact, apart from Nagorno-Karabakh, entities supported by Russia are not supported by anyone else. If some level of distrust till exists between the USA and the West one the one hand and Russia on the other, this could help explain the constant limbo these particular entities are in. It could be possible to believe that the Western states do not wish that Russia should become more powerful than it is, and thus declines to accept Russian-supported new states for fear that it

\textsuperscript{145} For more on which states support or oppose which entities, see the Raw tables in Appendices 3 and 4.
\textsuperscript{146} The membership of the Soviet Union in the United Nations was continued by the Russian Federation in 1991(The United Nations 07.12.2012a). It is thus assumed to also continue the relations, though potentially modified, that the USSR had with the other members.
\textsuperscript{147} Sources for the involvement in each one can be seen in Appendix 3.
might increase Russian leverage on its neighbours. Similarly, one might expect the US-supported entities to be opposed by Russia. This is not the case. The USA supports Taiwan, South Sudan and Iraqi-Kurdistan, none of which Russia was involved in. However, it does appear that realpolitical issues play a definite role in the handling of these entities.

Another possible reason why the entities supported by Russia do not get recognised is the manner in which Russia relates to its neighbours. While the previous discussion demonstrates that the tension between Russia and the West has been noticeable ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian--Georgian war\textsuperscript{148} in 2008 has not calmed the situation. This is particularly interesting, considering Georgia’s status as an aspiring NATO-member (NATO 2013). Markedonov (2007) argues that the relations with Georgia were tense even before the war. Mikhelidze (2009) describes how this event has demonstrated not only that the conflicts in the Caucasus are far from frozen, but that the West could not act when Russia asserted its dominance in the post-Soviet sphere. The tensions in the neighbouring areas is reported to have increased (Mikhelidze 2009, 30-32). This could have an effect on Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh as well, despite them not being directly involved in this particular situation. Pashayeva (2009, 68-69) claims that the Russia-Georgia conflict has led to a favourable situation for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh question. But, this does not necessarily entail recognition - any solution argued to be better than a continuation of the present situation.

Summarising the discussion, two things are clear. The first is that realpolitical situations appear to influence the reception and treatment of the \textit{de facto}-states. The second is that it does indeed appear that there is something particular with Russia. The entities they support do not become recognised nor do they disappear. While no clear reason for this has been identified here, two potential contributing factors are shown. The first is a possible spill-over from the Cold War, where Russia and the Westerns states compete for influence in the Caucasus region. The specificities of this situation are impossible to discern here, and the reasons behind each action is unclear. The second relates to the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, and the consequences of it. An intensification of the conflict has not generated support for the state status claims of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. There is no apparent reason to believe the outcome to be different for Transnistria. It has, however, seemingly led to an increase in the diplomatic work of finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh situation.

\textsuperscript{148} For more about the war, see Mikhelidze (2009), Economist (2008), BBC (2009) and Nichol (2008).
5.4 Third analysis: Using analyses one and two to evaluate the undetermined entities

In this section, the results identified through cs/QCA and descriptive analyses will be discussed and compared.

5.4.1 Step six - Analyses one and two applied to the entities with undetermined outcomes

An attempt at analysing the positions of the entities with undetermined outcomes will be performed based on the analyses of the successful and failed de facto-states. The time aspect discussed above will be used as a complimentary factor in the analyses. The purpose is to use the information gathered in the examinations of which causal combinations lead to which outcomes and attempting to discover which of the still incomplete entities that matches. If they match the developmental trajectories identified as leading to success or failure, it could be logically expected that they will experience the same outcome.

The same truth table used in the main analysis will be used in this section. The combinations will be sorted into the categories “strong” for those matching the successes, and “weak” for those matching the failures. Those entities with causal combinations not matching the reduced formula from the main analysis will be evaluated with the knowledge from the expanded discussion of the typical success and failure.

Table 7- Truth table with the original causal conditions for the entities with undetermined outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto-state</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>tD</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Formula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>AbcD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AbCDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ABCDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Cyprus</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AbcDe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland, Somaliland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>aBcdE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>aBCDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnistria</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>abcDE</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AbcDE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 8. Sources: see Appendix 3.

The de facto-states with no clear outcome match their finished brethren by virtue of being
very heterogeneous. Only one of the causal combinations displays more than one matching entity, namely Somaliland and Puntland. This part of the analysis is descriptive. It does not have as its purpose finding a typical causal combination, so a reduction of the terms into a minimal formula is not necessary. Likewise, no consideration of relevant and irrelevant causal conditions or thresholds need be considered. Still, a brief discussion of commonalities can be fruitful for the evaluation of their standing further down the line.

An overview of the de facto-states with undetermined outcomes
Most of the causal combinations display entities with a distinct ethnic foundation, A. Comparing them with those with final outcomes, it is clear that most of the ethnically heterogeneous entities are found here.

Causal condition B, democratic level, shows that only slightly more than a third of the combinations display a higher level of democracy than the parent state. This is much lower than the corresponding frequency amongst successful combinations, but holds an identical level as the failures.

C, veto opposition, is present in only two combinations and not by the same power. China is against Taiwan, and Russia is negative to Kosovo’s independence.\(^\text{149}\)

Causal condition D, veto support, is particularly fascinating. Nearly all combinations include this, with only two missing. Compared with the successful and failed combinations, this is very much. Only one of the failures - Iraqi-Kurdistan - has had veto support. Even amongst the successful entities the level does not reach more than half, and the causal condition has been excluded due to irrelevance for the outcome. The Raw table in Appendix 3 demonstrates that this is due to Russia supporting nearly every post-USSR-entity. This particular kind of de facto-state is overrepresented in the category without clear outcomes. Apart from these entities, only Taiwan and Kosovo receives veto support, from USA, and the NATO- and EU-member states, respectively. Whether this is due to a large number of post-USSR de facto-states, or a disability of resolving this particular type of entity is unclear.

The economic factor, E, is more evenly distributed and has a near fifty-fifty-spread. Comparing with the resolved secessionist conflicts, it is notable that the majority of the

\(^{149}\) The details can be seen in Appendix 3.
combinations including entities with a similar economic level as its parent are found here. In fact, only one other example can be found: the failed combination including the two Serb republics and Rhodesia.

Table 6 on page 76 demonstrate that all of the entities are from either the second or third state creation wave, with five from the former and four from the latter. None of the combinations include entities from both waves.

**Identifying de facto-states in weak positions.**

The logical formula identified through Boolean minimisation for failure is demonstrated above to be \( E(abcd+bCd+ABc) + bce(Ad+aD) \). None of the undetermined combinations display any of these trajectories. Seeing that the failed entities have shown themselves even more heterogeneous than the successes, it is not surprising to experience this kind of situation. The same is the result for normal formula \( AbCdE \), which was found after analysing the distribution of causal conditions in general rather than case by case. This formula does not correspond to any of the combinations.

None of the entities who have been recognised have been post-USSR-entities, and only two of the failed ones have been. This indicates that there is something about them that makes their situations difficult to resolve. What that is, is unfeasible to identify here\(^{150}\), but it appears that it matters for the outcome which UN veto power that gets involved in the de facto-states.

The fact that all accepted UN members stem from the third wave makes it tempting to assume that those belonging to the same group are in a stronger position than the others. Whereas that might be true, such an assumption is not supported by any other trends, and should not be too heavily relied on in this case. As has been discussed in the theory chapter, the UN is generally not in favour of creating new states. Hence, it is highly unlikely for any entity to become a member. One must therefore assume that all de facto-states are in a weak position until proven otherwise.

**Identifying de facto-states in strong positions.**

As discussed above, the formula for successful de facto-states is found through Boolean minimisation to be \( O = E(BC+bc+Bc) \). This reads as a combination of \( E \), different economic level, and one of the three following combinations: either the presence or absence of \( BC \),

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\(^{150}\) To learn more on the second wave de facto-states, a good starting point is the works by Caspersen (2007, 2008a, 2011, 2003a, 2008b, 2010a, b, 2012a, 2008c, 2003b, 2012b) and Kolstø (2012, 2006).
higher level of democracy than the parent and veto opposition, or the combination higher level of economy and no veto opposition. In addition, the typical success was identified after a discussion on the distribution of causal conditions. The normal successful de facto-state has the combination aBcDE, which does not have any matching entities in this category. The formula becomes BcE after allowing for the removal of the logically irrelevant conditions A and D, but it is assumed that any evaluations of entities only matching the smaller formula will be more difficult to make with certainty. In this case, the typical formula is the same as one of the three logical ones.

While it could be possible to include partially matching combinations into this evaluation, this is not done. What is theoretically interesting is first and foremost the effects of combinations of causal conditions. In addition, it is clear from the Truth table above that the empirical evidence supports this logic. Partial combinations are found in entities with different outcomes, and it is therefore not logical to assume that a mere addition of conditions will lead only one direction here either.

When applying the minimised formula, the following combinations and entities are identified. The combination BCE is not present, but three entities have the causal combination bcE. These are South-Ossetia (A_bcDE), Transnistria (abcDE) and North-Cyprus (AbcdE). The causal conditions A and D are evenly distributed amongst the three, thus matching the trajectory forming the logic behind the removal of these as irrelevant for success as the final outcome. These three match those entities that have been recognised, and it could be logical to therefore assume that they are in a strong position to be recognised themselves. Whether this theoretical evaluation is mirrored empirically is another matter. The three conflicts have lasted for decades, and no articles or comments on a thawing between them and their parents have been found. Similarly, no other states have shown an interest in increased cooperation or recognition. North-Cyprus is potentially different in this aspect, but apparently not to a large degree\textsuperscript{151}. Again, the entities are dissimilar to each other and general trends are hard to find.

When applying the last logical formula - which is also the normal formula - it is found that the combination BcE is only present once, and is matching the two entities Puntland and Somaliland (aBcdE). Because of the removal of two of the causal conditions due to

\textsuperscript{151} See for instance Gosh and Aker (2006), Altinay (2000), and Bahcheli (2004) for a discussion on North Cyprus’ international contact.
irrelevance, this could seem as a weaker find. However, them being identified as strong by both the cs/QCA and the descriptive normal analysis, is seen as confirming that their position is indeed well supported. In contrast with the three former entities, these two enjoy a certain level of involvement and support from other states\textsuperscript{152}. That is not to say that the contact is done with the hopes of the two gaining independence, but it can be seen as participating in the normalisation of their existence.

As mentioned above, South-Ossetia and Transnistria were created through the dissolution of the communist unions and thus belong in the second state creation wave. North-Cyprus, Somaliland and Puntland all stem from the third wave. When considering how every successful entity has been part of the third wave, it appears more probable that the latter three holds a strong position and are likely to be recognised than the first two. Why is it that some entities have been recognised while others have not, even when they share the same developmental trajectory? This contradiction is a clear hint to an omission of important factors.

**Step seven - Adding extra causal conditions**

This section will provide a further discussion of the five *de facto*-states that match the combination identified as fitting those with success. Since some of the unresolved cases share this trajectory without receiving recognition, it could appear that some important factors have been omitted. In order to identify what causes recognition in some entities but not others, the five entities will be more closely examined and compared with the four successful entities. A Raw table consisting of the successful entities and the five identified as in a strong position will be presented, in hope of finding a cause for the different outcomes. This part of the investigation will not develop a minimal formula, but rather seek to identify differences and similarities of distributions by descriptive analysis.

The second truth table, **Error! Reference source not found.** below, for the additional causal conditions includes both the causal conditions from the main analysis and factors that are identified in the literature by others but that has not been included until now\textsuperscript{153}. This is done in the hope of finding results that can help shed light on why some entities with the same causal combination as the successes has not been recognised and further elaborate on them. In

\textsuperscript{152} For more on Somaliland and Puntland’s international contact, see for instance Arief (2008), Mesfin (2009), UNHCR (1999), and Huliaras (2010).

\textsuperscript{153} A complete oversight of these factors for all of the 23 *de facto*-states can be found Appendix 4.
total, thirteen factors are considered. They are:

- **Support (F)** and **opposition (G)** by any recognised state, not only UN veto powers. This is done because other states than only veto states can hold important sway over the international climate. As such, the two are expansions of the logic underlying hypotheses H3 and H4. By this is meant active involvement, such as for instance military intervention, economic aid, having diplomatic relations, et cetera.

- The original economic causal condition (E) has been split in two, showing those entities with a higher (H) and lower (I) economic level than their parent.

- **Gross human rights violations (J)** has been included, based on the arguments presented in Islam (1985) and Haugland (2008) and discussed previously in this chapter. The violence must be done by the parent state to the secessionist entity, but it may also be returned. Non-state-abuse by civilian groups is not included, though the state can be seen as a part in this by not stopping it.

- **Federal status (K)** has been found to be important for recognition of new states by Haugland (2008) and is thus included here. Other types of polities are ignored.

- Islam (1985) argues that one of the factors important for the recognition of Bangladesh is its *geographical separateness from its parent (L)*. The lack of difficulty in drawing the new border is seen as important. This means that there is something separating the entity from its parent, be it another state, a large river, or similar. That the *de facto*-state is placed by the parent’s border is not sufficient.

- Lastly, whether or not the entity is part of the *third wave (M)* is included. This is based on the arguments above.

Causal conditions displaying the same values for both the successful and the undetermined conditions are removed from the table. The following are excluded: C, UN veto power opposition, has the value 0 for all combinations but the one describing Bangladesh. Different economic level, E, shows the value 1 for every combination. Every entity but Somaliland has support by at least one state (F). Only Eritrea has been a federal unit (K). Only Bangladesh and - arguably - Transnistria\(^{154}\) are geographically separate from their parents (L), and they diverge in outcome. After removing these, eight causal conditions are left, namely A, B, D, G, H, I, J and M.

\(^{154}\) Transnistria is on the other side of the river Dniester from the rest of Moldova. This is far from the same degree of geographical separateness as was between East- and West-Pakistan.
None of the entities have the same causal combination, which is to be expected when including such a high amount of causal conditions in relation to entities as is done here. No clear pattern is found for A, ethnic composition. There is a nearly equal spread for both the successes and undetermined entities. What is worth noting, however, is the perfect fit for the undetermined entities between A, H and I. There is no apparent connection between these three and the outcomes, but it is a hint that there is a link between ethnicity and economy that could prove interesting to analyse further. In addition, no entity with the score 1 for condition A has a higher level of democracy than its parent (B).

Condition B, level of democracy, shows a higher level in all recognised entities but East-Timor. For the yet undecided, the pattern is nearly the opposite. Only Somaliland and Puntland shows a higher level of democracy than their parent. Considering that Somalia itself shows only weak governmental control of its territory155, this is not surprising. Seeing that having a higher level of democracy appears to be beneficial in the discussion above, this could show beneficial for the two.

Veto support, D, has earlier been removed for irrelevance for successful outcomes, but a pattern is clear for the yet undecided. Only the post-USSR-entities have veto support, both by Russia. As is discussed above, nearly all the entities without a conclusion are supported by Russia, yet none of the now recognised states are. It could turn out that there is something special with these entities preventing their recognition, but exactly what is unclear.

The distribution of opposition (G) is nearly identical between the recognised and unfinished

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entities, and this condition does not correspond with others. By reviewing conditions H and I, it is noticeable that no entity is at a similar economic level as its parent despite the Raw table demonstrating that nearly one third of the included entities are in this situation. This could implicate a connection between a difference in resources and the likelihood of gaining recognition and would be worthwhile analysing further. The perfect correspondence between ethnicity (A) and having less resources than the parent (I) is interesting, but does not appear to have any connection with the patterns for the successful entities.

Gross human rights violations (J), is present in all the recognised states and in the majority of the undecided included here. Two of them, namely South-Ossetia and Transnistria, are the only ones scoring 0. That every single recognised entity scores 1 makes it appear that this could be important. This is in line with the arguments by Islam (1985) and Haugland (2008), and would indicate that South Ossetia and Transnistria are in a weaker position than the others. The idea that these two are less likely to be recognised is further strengthened when realising that they are the only ones of both the recognised and undecided entities that are not part of the third wave (M).

Summing up, there are no obvious differences between those entities that have been recognised and the five entities that match their developmental trajectories. This indicates that whatever is influencing the development of the entities, giving some recognition and others not, the omitted factors have not been identified here. Still, some weak connections have been identified. The level of democracy in comparison with the parent is markedly higher for the recognised entities, placing Puntland and Somaliland in a strong position. No recognised entity has been supported by Russia, like South Ossetia and Transnistria are. This in itself is interesting. Considering that these two are the only ones without gross human rights violations and the only ones formed outside of the third wave, a trend is spotted. It appears that Puntland and Somaliland have the strongest positions, and south Ossetia and Transnistria the weakest of the strong. North Cyprus displays no particular reason for it to be considered either one of the two.
6. Conclusion

The purpose of this analysis has been to seek patterns in which *de facto*-states who gain recognition through UN membership and which do not. These entities constitute a rare juridical and political anomaly as they are states in all but recognition. This is particularly fascinating when considering that some UN members are not states in anything but precisely name. The conclusion provides a summary and evaluation of the analyses. Caveats to the results are explained, together with suggestions to further research.

The research question was «*Why are some secessionist entities successful in becoming recognised as states though United Nations membership status while others fail?* » . As no corresponding analysis of all the *de facto*-states that have existed during this period of time has been made, this is an explorative study.\(^{156}\)

The included entities are all that fit the list of criteria as specified in the data chapter, from the creation of the UN until and including 2012. In total, twenty-three entities were analysed through crisp set QCA and descriptive analyses.

The causal conditions were:

Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation; B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state; C: UN veto power opposition; D: UN veto power support and E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state.

The hypotheses have been as follows:

\[ H1: \text{Having an ethnic base increases the chances of international recognition} \]
\[ H2: \text{Having a higher level of democratic institutions than the parent state increases the} \]
\[ H3: \text{Opposition from a UN veto power decreases the chances of recognition} \]
\[ H4: \text{Support from a UN veto power increases the chances of recognition} \]
\[ H5: \text{A different economic level than the parent state increases the chances of recognition} \]

\(^{156}\) A closer description of explorative studies can be found in Yin (2008).
6. 1- Evaluating the analyses

Two analyses of the entities with clear outcomes as either success or failure have been performed. Then, the results of these analyses have been compared and applied to the yet uncompleted de facto-states. The purpose has been twofold. First, developmental trajectories leading to the different outcomes have been sought. Second, the knowledge from the first analyses has been applied to the remaining entities in order to evaluate them and attempt discovering if anyone can be considered as theoretically more likely to become recognised or disappear than the rest. Despite the high level of diversity in both origin, history, reception et cetera for the included de facto-states, it has proven possible to identify patterns.

First analysis: cs/QCA

The formula for successful entities is \( O = E(BC + bc + Bc) \) and for failures it is \( o = E(abcd + bCd + ABc) + bce(Ad + aD) \). This model has been further detailed by a descriptive analysis of the typical causal distribution for the two categories. The result of this shows that \( aBcDE \) or \( BcE \) is the most typical distribution of the causal conditions for successful entities. \( BcE \) also matches one of the logical formulas identified, providing this with added empirical strength. \( AbCdE \) described the typical failure and does not correspond with any of the logical formulas.

Using cs/QCA, the hypotheses are seen to be influenced in the following manner: The successful entities demonstrate support for hypothesis \( H5 \), while \( H1 \) and \( H4 \) are weakened. \( H2 \) and \( H3 \) are unaffected. Successful entities display the combination of having a different level of economy than their parents, combined with a higher level of democracy and lack of UN veto opposition. The failed entities do not provide a corresponding pattern, demonstrating that these entities are more than merely the direct opposites of their successful counterparts. In these situations, \( H4 \) is strengthened while \( H5 \) is weakened. For \( H 1-3 \), no influence is found. Failed entities display the combination of having a different level of economy than their parents and lacking UN veto support.

Second analysis: Description

There were three joints in the descriptive link: analysing the distribution of the values, and investigating the effects of waves and Russian support.

In the distributional analysis, the following was discovered. Support for hypotheses \( H2-4 \) is shown, while \( H1 \) and \( H5 \) are unaffected. Thus this and the cs/QCA-results do not provide
similar results for any of the five hypotheses. Here, the typical success is mirrored in South Sudan (aBcDE) and displays the combination of having B, a higher level of democracy than the parent, D, UN veto support and E, a different level of economy while lacking A, a distinct ethnic foundation and C, UN veto opposition. If allowing for the removal of conditions A and D, the resulting formula reflects that of Eritrea (BcE). The typical failure reads AbCdE, represented by Biafra and Chechnya. They have A, a distinct ethnic foundation, , UN veto opposition and E, a different level of economy while lacking B, a higher level of democracy and D, UN veto support.

Including the analysis of waves demonstrates that none of the entities created as parts of the decolonisation or post-union waves are recognised. All de facto-states becoming UN member states have other backgrounds, and thus belong to the third wave. Though these entities have been present from the earliest part of the analysed time period, their recognition frequency appears to be accelerating as the distance to the two main state creation periods is increasing. It seems clear that something is changing as regarding state recognition, but this analysis cannot identify what it is. A factor that seems likely is that the fear of a domino-effect weakens when there is little realistic need to fear a landslide of new secessions - as was arguably the situation at the time of decolonisation and the fall of the communist unions.

It has been found that there is something special with the entities supported by Russia. None of them have become recognised or disappeared. Thus, Russian support seems to stop the entities from failing, but it cannot bring them further than a situation of limbo. It has not been possible to assess why this is the case, but two suggestions have been made. The first is that there is some kind of spill-over effect from the Cold War making Russia and the Western states competing for influence in the afflicted regions. Second, that the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 has contributed to a disinterest in recognising the Russian-favoured entities - particularly amongst the NATO member states.

Third analysis: assessing the entities still in limbo
Utilising the formulas to evaluate the entities with no clear outcome as of 2012, the following was found. None of the failed de facto-states had matching causal combinations with any of the undetermined. This was the case for both the formula identifies through cs/QCA and the one found by descriptive analysis. For the successful entities, the picture was slightly different. The logical formula bcE identified three entities with no clear outcome. These are South-Ossetia (AbcDE), Transnistria (abcDE) and North-Cyprus (AbcdE). The formula
**BcE**, which is identified in both the cs/QCA and the descriptive analysis, identifies two entities: Puntland and Somaliland (aBcdE). The position of the latter two as likely candidates for recognition seems strengthened by the fact that they are both from the third wave and that Russia is not involved in them.

A large number of potentially important yet omitted causal conditions were considered through descriptive analysis. The hope was to identify whether any single or combination of them could explain why the de facto-states in limbo with matching causal combinations as the now UN member states were not recognised. A total of thirteen causal conditions were used to find the difference between the recognised and undetermined entities. None were found, neither for one single nor combinations of factors. Despite no clear solution, some trends were identified, further adding to the analyses of the selected entities. The analyses collectively demonstrate that Puntland and Somaliland stand out as those de facto-states with the strongest likelihood for future success.

**Summarising the analyses**

Summarising, the following can be stated. The included *de facto*-states have consistently demonstrated their heterogeneous nature and consistent patterns have thus been hard to come by. The cs/QCA-analysis has been improved by adding descriptive analyses, as it has been demonstrated that the results of the two sets of analyses do not show as thorough or consistent results by themselves as they do collectively.

There are two clear findings. The first is that which wave the entity belongs to is more important than the presence or absence of any of the causal conditions or combinations thereof that are identified. Why this is so has not been possible to point out, other than by hinting at a decrease in the fear of domino-effects. Using the analysis of the entities with determined outcomes to evaluate those still unclear has demonstrated Somaliland and Puntland to be the strongest candidates for success. Of these two, Somaliland is the only one having declared independence, as is thus assumed to have come further in the process than Puntland.

The second is that it appears that which UN veto power that supports or opposes the *de facto*-state can matter. As is shown, entities supported by Russia neither fail nor succeed. This is a clear indication that it is not necessarily whether the entity meets involvement, but by whom that matters.
6.2- Caveats to the results

Haugland (2008, 69-71) discusses two main caveats that are also important for this analysis. The first is that of 1) limited generalizability. The limited number of entities and empirical variation included means that the results are only applicable to the analyses entities. Generalizability can thus not be assumed, and it is by no means certain that these results can be used to for instance predict the outcome of the newest bud on the secession tree: Azawad. Still, this is the most extensive study performed, and it has shown interesting results that might be usable for further analysis.

Haugland further points out that Boolean analysis is vulnerable due to the potentially large output-effects of small variations on the input-side. This is a point recognised from the debate on the potential data loss and misinterpretation resulting from data loss when utilising dichotomous data. This particular problem is countered in the re-coding by externals of three random entities. Clearly, this is no guarantee that all the data is correctly coded. But the perfect correspondence between these codes and the researcher’s imply a general trustworthiness in the evaluations behind the different codes.

The second caveat is that of 2) context. The results can only be seen as valid for the included entities and causal conditions. Changing them in any manner, whether to add, remove or replace them could lead to changes in the results.

Additionally, a third caveat ought to be addressed. The causal conditions included might themselves be dependent on other, background factors that are not identified. The decisions of UN veto powers to get actively involved in any way in the struggle for recognition by a de facto-state is assumed to hinge on factors not detected here. Similarly, having a higher level of democracy than the parent is by needs dependent on a plethora of causes, none of which are clarified here. For example, the question regarding what promotes high levels of democracy is still unclear. The strongest finding is that which wave the entity belongs to correlates with its outcome. This is obviously dependent on factors unidentified in this analysis.

157 The recoded entities are Anjouan, Gagauzia and Somaliland.
6.3- Implications for further research

This analysis provides both theoretical and methodological implications for further development.

Theoretically, as the third caveat above implies, there is much potential for further analysis. Three things seem particularly relevant to mention. First comes the matter of money and resources. This has proved to be largely present for both the successes and failures. It thus appears that conflicts where economy is an important factor tend to be resolved. Most of the situations where resources did not play an important role are still undetermined. It is thus interesting to elaborate on what kinds of specific resources and resource levels that matter.

Second is the aspect of timing. Though it is clear that all the recognised entities come from the third wave, it is not so obvious why this is so. It could be imagined that the end of the Cold war might have made it less complicated to alter existing borders. Similarly, that the UN does not now face the same legitimate fear of a domino effect could potentially contribute to the entities being considered in a different light from before. However, more precise investigation is clearly desirable.

Third is the matter of which recognised state involves itself in the de facto-state. The analysis demonstrates that here is indeed an aspect of realpolitik that needs to be considered to understand which entities become recognised. All the entities Russia support remains in limbo, but why is unclear. The two undetermined entities found to be the most likely to be recognised (Somaliland and Puntland) are situations in which no UN veto power has been involved. It might seem counter-intuitive that Kosovo is not even on the list of those that could be expected to be recognised. Particularly when considering the agreement between the two on April 19th 2013(The Economist 2013, Smolar 2013, BBC 2013h, UN News Centre 2013). This can serve as a good illustration that who are involved might have as much if not more of an effect than why and where. Clearly, it could prove interesting to analyse the de facto-states by which external actors that are involved. Kosovo and Serbia are encouraged to find a solution to their conflict via the possibility of European Union membership, but nothing of the sort exists for Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia. It could be interesting to perform an analysis of which metaphorical carrots the entities and their parent could gain by solving their dispute, and whether they resolve it or not.
Methodologically, much can be done. QCA has proven itself a suitable method for this analysis, but it is not the only alternative. The benefits gained by the large level of descriptive analysis imply that this is a strategy that holds much potential. Closer analyses of groups of entities seem like a fruitful way forward. A suggestion could be to analyse entities by geography, year of creation or length of existence. Analysing the entities in light of one or a select few of the causal conditions could shed light on the contributing factors behind their presence or absence. A closer look on the details of specific causal conditions could bring much to this field of analysis. Similarly, a larger study using more detailed data through fs/QCA or mv/QCA could identify a more nuanced picture of the effects of the different conditions.
Appendix 1: Permissions from Pål Kolstø and Scott Pegg to quote their works

Figure 1 - Permission from Pål Kolstø

On 27.04.2012 17:10, Elin Monsstad wrote:

God dag Pål,

Eg er ein masterstudent i Samanikkande politikk ved Universitetet i Bergen (førdig mai 2013) og eg skriv om kvifor nokre statar blir anerkjende mens andre ikkje blir det. I den samanheng vi eg først få uttrykke kor glad eg er for alle artiklane du har skrev om emnet, for det har vist seg vanskeleg å finne god teori på området. Spesielt om ein, som eg, er interesserert i kor dei kjem frå og kva som påverkar kor dei ender opp heller enn kasusstudier av kvar region for sag.


Hei Elin, jasså skrver jeg det? Det pleier jeg ikkje gjøre, det må ha vært fordi jeg ikkje var helt tilfreds med det, men værsågod, siter vei.

du fikk sikkert med dag at nina caspersne er kommet med en ny flott bok om emnet? Ellers kommer det tre nye artikler av helge blakksrud og meg i vårt, i hhv. Ethnic and racial studies, communist and post-communist studies og journal and caucasian and black sea studies, men som vanlig diskuterer vi mest indre forhold mer enn det du primært er interessert i, kvifor nokre statar blir anerkjende mens andre ikkje blir det.

Hilsen på

Lykke til med oppgaven

Artikkelen erklarer du at du ønsker å bli spurt om lov før du blir sitert, og nå gjer og det. Kan eg få nytt om denne artikken i min masteroppgave? Og om situasjonen skulle dukke opp igjen, kan eg få nytt om dei andre artiklane du har produsert om emnet?

Mvh,

Elin Monsstad
Appendix 2: Small tables

Table 9- Entities considered but dismissed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>(stopped at limited autonomy) (Hillman 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjaria</td>
<td>(lacks government) (Ciobanu 2008, 128-131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan under Taliban</td>
<td>(a matter of leadership succession, not a new political entity) (Bajoria 2011, Owrtram 2011, 120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azawad</td>
<td>(does not yet meet the time criterion) (Acherif 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>(stopped at limited autonomy) (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (the People's Republic)</td>
<td>(a matter of leadership succession, not a new political entity) (The United Nations General Assembly 1971, Encyclopædia Britannica 2013e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>(stopped at limited autonomy) (Xunta de Galicia 1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorno-Badakhshan</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control) (Davlatshoev 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herzeg-Bosna and Western Bosnia</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control and too ephemeral) (ICTY 05.05.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo</td>
<td>(too early and a puppet-state) (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013j, Duara 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moheli</td>
<td>(too ephemeral) (Cornwell 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>(if considering PR China a matter of succession, Mongolia is eliminated as it was recognised by its potential parent PR China without delay in 1945 though not joining the UN until 1961) (The United Nations Security Council 1961b, BBC 2013e, Factbook 02.06.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>(peaceful separation rather than conflicted secession) (Caspersen 2003a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>(too dependent on USSR) (Global Security 2011a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control) (Black and Tran 2007),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>(has not broken loose from the United Kingdom) (Carrell 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Bantustans</td>
<td>(not by own initiative) (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>(its statehood was not contested, it did not secede from anyone and it was by its own choice it did not join the UN until 2002) (The Swiss Confederation Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2012, Swiss Info 2007, The United Nations General Assembly 2002a, b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Basque Republic</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control in Spain and France) (section 169 Gobierno de España 1978)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control) (Kolstø 2006, 726),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Papua</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control) (Scott and Tebay 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>(lack of territorial control) (Kolstø 2006, 726)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This is not a complete list of all potential entities, but those that were considered and rejected for this particular thesis.
# Table 10- List of entities with sources and reasons for time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognised</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disappeared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-Cyprus (1983 -)</td>
<td>Taiwan (1949 -)</td>
<td>Republika Srpska Krajina (1991-1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Ossetia (1992-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 4 N = 9 N = 10

N = 23. Years as de facto-state in parentheses. Source for year (Anderson 2011, 185) unless otherwise stated. All dates are subject to discussion, as seen for instance by the alternative starting points presented in (Bakke, 158 East Timor first declared independence from Portugal on November 28th 1975, but lost its self-determination and territorial control after it was invaded by Indonesia in Operation Komodo shortly afterwards (CIA 16.04.2013). For this reason, I consider the beginning of East Timor’s existence as a non-recognized state to be its independence referendum (WIPO 2002). The end of East Timor’s de facto-state status is its accession date the 27.09.2002 as a member of the UN (The United Nations Security Council 2002).


160 It can be difficult to discern when South Sudan functioned as a de facto-state as it never unanimously declared independence until it was recognised in 2011. (Freedomhouse 2012k) Freedomhouse (2012k)and Global Security (07.04.2013) points out its high degree of autonomy in the hiatus (1972-'83) between its two civil wars. Additionally, the political centre in Khartoum cannot be said to have held control over the South for much of the existence of Sudan, due to the frequent outbreaks of war and rebel fighting. Dean (2007) describes the SPLA as the de facto-government of South Sudan even before 2005. However, to maintain strictness in the data selection, I have chosen to treat South Sudan as a de facto-state during its period of autonomous rule between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA 2005) and the admittance as a UN member state in 2011 (The United Nations General Assembly 2011, The United Nations Security Council 2011).

161 Anderson (2011, 185) states 1990 as the starting year, while Freedomhouse (1998a) uses 1992. I have chosen the more conservative view.

162 The Turkish Federate State of Cyprus was declared February 13th 1975, and the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus on November 15th, 1983 (Cyprus History 15.04.2013, TRNC 1983).

163 It is difficult to establish when Puntland slipped away from Mogadishu’s control, but I have chosen to use 1998 as a starting point because it appears accepted in the literature and is the year mentioned in their constitution (BBC 2012b, Mesfin 2009, The House of Representatives 2001).

164 Anderson (2011, 185) claims their starting year is 1990, but I argue that they got full territorial control with the June 24, 1992, Sochi Agreement (Global Security 2011b, The United Nations Peacemaker 1992). Regardless of which of these start dates are used, the entity falls within the two-year criterion for inclusion.

165 Since the creation of People’s Republic of China (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013a, Encyclopædia Britannica 2013e).

166 Though Anderson (2011, 185) claims that Iraqi-Kurdistan still was a de facto-state in 2011, I argue that Iraqi-Kurdistan as a de facto state ended in 1994 due to a loss of territorial control after the commencement of the civil war between PUK and KDP (Lortz 2005, 63-64, Minorities at Risk (MAR) 01.04.2013, Gunter 1996). §141 in the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005) states Kurdistan as an autonomous region, signifying - for now - the end of the road for the fight for recognition of the entity (Minorities at Risk (MAR) 01.04.2013). 167 Though the Rhodesian UDI was proclaimed in 1965, it was in 1970 they declared themselves an independent state. In 1979, they again became a British territory, until the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 (BBC 1970, The United Nations General Assembly 1968, Harris 1969, Hergum 22.04.2013).

168 See Pegg (1998, 77).Anderson (2011, 185) claims the de facto-state came into existence in 1975, but I use Pegg’s starting point as this is when they announced their ruling of the Jaffna Peninsula and had an effective administration in place. These dates are clearly debatable, as is for how long the entity maintained territorial control. However, whether the de facto-state lasted until 1995, as can be read from Pegg (1998, 77-78) or to 2009 as Anderson (2011, 182) claims, it still fulfils the two-year criterion for inclusion.
O’Loughlin, and Ward 2011, 5).

Table 11- Raw data table without sources for causal conditions A-E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto-state</th>
<th>A Ethnicity</th>
<th>B Democracy</th>
<th>C Veto opposition</th>
<th>D Veto support</th>
<th>E Economy</th>
<th>O Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
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Sources: See Appendices 3 and 4. Operationalization, see 4.3 on page 58
Table 12- Raw data table without sources for causal conditions F-M

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto-state</th>
<th>F Support</th>
<th>G Opposition</th>
<th>H + Economy</th>
<th>I - Economy</th>
<th>J HR-violation</th>
<th>K Federal</th>
<th>L Geography</th>
<th>M 3rd wave</th>
<th>O Outcome</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Appendices 3 and 4. Operationalization, see 4.3 on page 58
Appendix 3: Raw table with sources for causal conditions A-E

Outcome (O): UN members hold the value 1, non-members hold 0.

Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation
If the de facto-state is ethnically homogenous, it will be coded 1, if it is heterogeneous, it will be coded 0.

Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state
Having a higher level of democratic institutions will be coded as 1, otherwise the value given is 0.

Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition
Having UN veto power opposition will be coded as 1, not having international opposition will be coded as 0.

Causal condition D: UN veto power support
Having UN veto power support will be coded as 1, the lack thereof will be coded as 0.

Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state
Having either a higher or lower level or resources than the parent state will be coded as 1. Having approximately the same level gives the value 0.

Entities with support or opposition from non-veto-states can be seen in Appendix 4.

Table 13- Raw table with sources and explanations for causal conditions A-E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto-state</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anjouan</td>
<td>0 (AYANGAFAC 2008, 4, OTTENHEIMER and OTTENHEIMER 1976, 408-)</td>
<td>0 (chaotic management in both entities) (AYANGAFAC 2008, 2, CORNWELL 2010, 171)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;170&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;171&lt;/sup&gt; (higher) (AYANGAFAC 2008, 3-5, CORNWELL 2010, 55-56)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>169</sup> The size of the Abkhaz population in the area has differed with time. I include them in the category for ethnically based de facto-states because it is clear that the matter is one of ethnicity rather than geography. For example, the Abkhaz have attempted removing the other ethnic groups in the area. See for instance (UNPO 2009, Clogg 2001, CIOBANU 2008, 118-121, Beachain 2012).

<sup>170</sup> France has been accused of supporting Anjouan’s bid for independence, but the relationship between the two is unclear. See for instance CORNWELL (2010, 51), AYANGAFAC (2008, 7-8), IRIN (05.04.2013), SVENSSON (2008, 15).

<sup>171</sup> The reports on Anjouan’s relative economic strength as compared to the rest of Comoros is varying, but as it seems to be that while Anjouan suffers from an uneven redistribution of values by the political centre in Grand Comore, it holds the most natural resources and is thus considered in a (marginally) superior situation regarding resource level. NALDI (1998, 248), claims that Anjouan complained of unjust distribution of aid in the Comoros and that they received less that the political centre in Grand Comore.
172 (Nafziger and Richter 1976, 97) claims the US supported West Pakistan (now Pakistan) in the beginning of the secessionist conflict. This is supported by (Akram 2006, 23), who points out that the U.S. did not involve itself otherwise. Similarly, China vetoed Bangladesh’s admission to the UN in 1972, but later changed its stand (USUN 13.05.2013, The United Nations General Assembly 1974).

173 Though the region of Biafra is described as «well off economically» (Pegg 1998, 239), Islam (1985, 217) claims that Nigeria has a so high level of natural resources even without Biafra that one should not consider the situation as very uneven. During the Nigerian blockade, Biafra was unable to utilize these resources, and the inhabitants starved. Nayar (1975, 325) describes the Eastern region (i.e. Biafra) as Nigeria’s most prosperous and Post (1968, 26) claims that two-thirds of Nigeria’s natural resources are to be found there.s.

174 Hughes (2001, 24-25) points out that though Chechnya does not have large oil reserves per se in comparison with Russia, a large part of Russian oil goes through the region.

175 East Timor continued with the same governmental organisational structure as it had had under Indonesia, and tried to evolve their own system from there (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999b, 116-118). Hence, though the UN assisted in the matter, East Timor will be assumed to have had a similar level of democratic organisations as Indonesia at the time of its de facto independence in 1999.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi-Kurdistan</td>
<td>1 (Harvey and Stansfield 2011, 18, Carver 2002)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(higher) (Harvey and Stansfield 2011, 18, Olson 2006, 22, Economist 2012, NBC 2009)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

176 Though East Timor’s oil and gas-resources were undeveloped and untapped, (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 19-20) claims that the potential riches were enough for East Timor to be classified as being better off than Indonesia.  
177 This has changed post-1993 (CIA World Factbook 03.05.2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Katanga</td>
<td>0 (Islam 1985, 215, Lemarchand 1962, 406-412, Crowley 1963, 69)</td>
<td>0 (in both cases, many ran for office and both elections were chaotic) (Lemarchand 1962, 415-416, Crowley 1963, 72-77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 (higher) (Islam 1985, 213, Post 1968, 32-33, Crowley 1963, 68, Everwyn 1962, 150, Lemarchand 1962, 405)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1 (Charney 2001, 460, Slomanson 2009, 5-6)</td>
<td>0(^7) (Freedomhouse 1998l, 2008b, 2007a, 2008c, 1999g, The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 2003, Caspersen 2008c, 123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (lägare) (BBC 2013d, Friedhaber et al. 2000, CIA World Factbook 30.04.2013b, a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 (Russia, Armenia) (Hughes 2001, 14, BBC 2012e, Caspersen 2008a, 367-368)</td>
<td>0 (highly dependent on support from diaspora and Armenia) (Caspersen 2008a, 367-368, Kolsø and Blakkisrud 2008, 495-496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Cyprus</td>
<td>1(^7) (Altinay 2000, 298, Ioannides and Apostolopoulos 1999, 52, Feridun, Sawhney, and Shahbaz 2011, 556, Gosh and Aker 2006, 1090)</td>
<td>0 (slightly worse in North Cyprus) (Freedomhouse 1998n, 1999a, 2012e, g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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178 Though Kosovo was hailed for having achieved the standards set out by The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (2003), their level of democracy was - at the time of their independence declaration in 2008 - lower than in Serbia.

179 The island of Cyprus did not have such a sharply separated geographical ethnic division as it does in 2013 before the Greek Cypriots moved south and the Turkish Cypriots moved north after the war in 1974. That the matter has an ethnical background seems to be clear (Feridun, Sawhney, and Shahbaz 2011, 556, Bahcheli 2004, 168).

180 Ioannides and Apostolopoulos (1999, 54) argues that the northern parts of the island held most of the tourist facilities at the time of the commencement of the war in 1974. However, Northern Cyprus is here evaluated as having fewer resources because many of these facilities were destroyed without being rebuilt. In addition, the international sanctions imposed of the region has led to a rapid economic deterioration (see for instance Sonmez and Apostolopoulos 2008, 40).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Homogeneity</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>0(^{181})</td>
<td>(CIA World Factbook 04.04.2013, Mesfin 2009, 1, Gikes 1999, 571, Huliaras 2010, 1-2, Hesse 2010, 81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1(^{182})</td>
<td>(CIA World Factbook 04.04.2013, Gikes 1999, 571, UNHCR 1999, Hesse 2010, 81, Freedomhouse 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>0(^{(Caspersen 2008b, 5, The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1992, Caspersen 2007, 621)})</td>
<td>0(^{(Caspersen 2008b, 11)})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska Krajina</td>
<td>0(^{(uncertainty regarding who should lead RSK) (Caspersen 2008b, 11, 2003b, 12-14)})</td>
<td>0(^{(similar) (CIA World Factbook 1992, The World Bank 2012b)})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>0(^{183})</td>
<td>(Global Edge 05.04.2013, State 05.04.2013, McDougal and Reisman 1968, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0(^{184})</td>
<td>(lower) (Pinkston 2005, 1-7, The United Nations Security Council 1965a, b, Fraser 1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>0(^{186})</td>
<td>(Arieff 2008, 65, CIA World Factbook)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1(^{(higher)})</td>
<td>(Freedomhouse 2012i, h, CIA World)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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181 Somalia, including both Somaliland, Puntland, has a multitude of clans, but they are considered as part of the overarching group “Somali”. Thus, the same ethnic group dominates in all three entities, however their borders are defined. A potential reason to evaluate the regions as homogenous is that in both Somaliland and Puntland, one clan dominates (Mesfin 2009, 10, Arieff 2008, 65, CIA World Factbook 12.02.2013).

182 Hesse (2010, 78-80) points our attention towards rampant corruption and Puntland, and an unfortunate development of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The region is, nevertheless, still considered more democratically and institutionally stable than the republic of Somalia, though how the development evolves is difficult to predict.

183 Though Rhodesia did in fact have a clear majority of Bantu Mashona (Global Edge 05.04.2013, McDougal and Reisman 1968, 1), the institutionalising of the gross disproportion of power between the groups and hence an increased focus on the differences between groups has here led to it being considered a non-homogenous society.

184 I consider the UK as a democracy from 1918 onwards, after the introduction on universal suffrage (Fraser 1918).

185 Even without adding the revenue from the British Commonwealth, Great Britain had a vastly stronger economy than Rhodesia for all the years of its existence (1970-1989), regardless of how the economic situation in Rhodesia developed (Ramsay 1978).

186 See footnote 170 on page 1.

187 Huliaras (2010, 6) describes the fall in revenue in the late nineties and early 2000’s after Saudi-Arabia’s ban on livestock import, and concludes that the economy did surprisingly well and that the ban is not expected to last long. More information on the economy of Somaliland and Puntland can be found at The World Bank (2002) - report in Somali.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Economic Level</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>0 (diverse, but clearly different from Sudan) (Ross 08.07.2011, BBC 04.07.2011, Dagne 2011, 15, Dean 2007, 72-80, Christopher 2011, 127)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (USA) (Dean 2007, 82)</td>
<td>1 (Freedomhouse 2012l, k)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0 (DeLisle 2011, 1, CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b)</td>
<td>1 (DeLisle 2011, 4-5, CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, a, Freedomhouse 2012m, 2013, Zabarah 2012, 188-189)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (USA) (DeLisle 2011, 1, Chiang 1999, 977)</td>
<td>0.189 (same) (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Eelam</td>
<td>1(^{138}) (Pegg 1998, 67-69, 0 (both had institutions, but</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.187 (same) (Jayasinghe)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{138}\) Though (The World Bank 07.04.2013a, b) lists Sudan as having a higher GDP, South Sudan holds most of the natural resources and is therefore given the value \(I\).  

\(^{139}\) Note: Taiwan and China are not on identical economic levels, but both are very rich (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, a).  

\(^{140}\) Taiwan was a UN member until 1971, when the seat was transferred to the People’s Republic of China (The United Nations General Assembly 1971).  

\(^{141}\) Though the Tamil group on Sri Lanka includes many subgroups, it is different from the Sinhalese group that constitutes the majority on the island (Pegg 1998, 67-71).  

\(^{142}\) Tamil Eelam constitutes most of the Sri Lankan coastline, but has not by itself been able to accumulate or
access revenue to any large degree. I therefore argue that it evens out: Tamil Eelam had the coast, but the interior was similar to that of the rest of Sri Lanka. The latter had the least of the coast, but the most of the other territory. In addition, Sri Lanka, while itself poor, could do trade with other states, whereas Tamil Eelam were dependent on subsidies (Jayasinghe 2006, Pegg 1998, 80-81).

Appendix 4: Raw table with sources and for causal conditions F-M

F: Support by any recognised state. Support gives that value 1, no support gives 0.

G: Opposition by any recognised state. Opposition gives that value 1, none give 0.

H: Higher economic level than the parent. Higher level gives 1, not higher level gives 0.

I: Lower economic level than the parent. Lower level gives 1. Not lower level gives 0. Note: the sources for H and I are the same and only mentioned in one of them.

J: Gross human rights violations. Gross violations by the parent state to the de facto-state shortly before secession gives 1, otherwise the result is 0.

K: Federal status. De facto-states that were federal entities within their parent gets 1, the rest gets 0.

L: Geographical separateness from its parent. Entities geographically separated from their parent scores 1, the rest scores 0.

M: Third wave. Entities in the third wave score 1, the rest score 0. Sources: see Table 2.5

O: Outcome. UN member states are coded as 1, the rest as 0.

Table 14: Raw table with sources and explanations for causal conditions F-M

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto-state</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
<td>1 (Russia) (Fawn 2008, 274, UNPO 2009, Ciobanu 2008, 121)</td>
<td>0 (Fawn 2008, 284-286)</td>
<td>0 (A suffer from destruction of infrastructure and an embargo, but is supported by Russia. Georgia is poor, but has relations with others. Abkhazia contributed average to Georgia’s economy) (Clogg 2001, 193)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0194 (Fawn 2008, 274, Pavkovic 2011, 313-315, Haugland 2008, 75)</td>
<td>0 (autonomous region) (Global Security 2011b, BBC 2012a, Haugland 2008)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

193 The concept of human rights violations is based on the definition and discussion as presented in (Chernichenko 1999).

194 Georgia accuses Abkhazia of ethnic cleansing (Fawn 2008, 274), but it does not appear that that Abkhaz were the victims of gross human rights violations leading up to their declaration of independence and they are thus given the value 0.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biafra</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Portugal) (Islam 1985, 212)</td>
<td>1 (UK, USSR, USA) (Islam 1985)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (Islam 1985, 217)</td>
<td>0 (the eastern region)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

195 See Footnote 170 on page vii for an elaboration on France’s relationship with Anjouan.
197 The reports on Anjouan’s relative economic strength as compared to the rest of Comoros is varying, but as it seems to be that while Anjouan suffers from an uneven redistribution of values by the political centre in Grand Comore, it holds the most natural resources and is thus considered in a (marginally) superior situation regarding resource level. Naldi (1998, 248), claims that Anjouan complained of unjust distribution of aid in the Comoros and that they received less that the political centre in Grand Comore.
198 Though some violence has occurred, it appears in the literature that this is not from the state of Comoros itself, nor sufficiently serious as to constitute gross human rights violations (Ayangafac 2008, 10, U.S. Department of State 2000). The conflict is classified as “minor armed conflict” by (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1999, 602).
199 (Nafziger and Richter 1976, 97) claims the US supported West Pakistan (now Pakistan) in the beginning of the secessionist conflict. This is supported by (Akram 2006, 23), who points out that the U.S. did not involve itself otherwise. Similarly, China vetoed Bangladesh’s admission to the UN in 1972, but later changed its stand (USUN 13.05.2013, The United Nations General Assembly 1974).
200 The separation process of Bangladesh was a bloody one, but it appears that the situation has been calm after that. It is potentially difficult to determine the level of human rights violations that occurred before the war of separation, but I have chosen to give Bangladesh the value 1 following the explicit argument in (Islam 1985, 217) and the general claims made by for instance (Brown 2012).
201 The support of Portugal is described by Islam (1985, 217) as ineffective and wavering. Pegg (1998, 218, 226) and (Islam 1985, 212) discusses whether France supported
Biafra’s case but appear to not have a clear conclusion. As an example, Pegg (1998, 218, 226) claims first that France’s support was important for Biafra, but then later states that Biafra had no significant support from other states.

Though the region of Biafra is described as «well off economically» (Pegg 1998, 239), Islam (1985, 217) claims that Nigeria has a so high level of natural resources even without Biafra that one should not consider the situation as very uneven. During the Nigerian blockade, Biafra was unable to utilize these resources, and the inhabitants starved. Nayar (1975, 325) describes the Eastern region (i.e. Biafra) as Nigeria’s most prosperous and Post (1968, 26) claims that two-thirds of Nigeria’s natural resources are to be found there.

Georgia recognised Chechnya and was friendly to their aspirations, but whether this was noted within Chechnya is an open question (Hughes 2001, 15).

Hughes (2001, 24-25) points out that though Chechnya does not have large oil reserves per se in comparison with Russia, a large part of Russian oil goes through the region.

Though not actively opposing the independence of East Timor, Australia has been involved in a dispute over the petroleum resources of the area and appears to have an inconsistent relationship to the issue. For more on this, see e.g. Marks (2004) and ICJ (1995). Opposition and support of the independence declaration in 1975 I not considered here.

Though East Timor’s oil and gas-resources were undeveloped and untapped, (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 19-20) claims that the potential riches were enough for East Timor to be classified as being better off than Indonesia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Current Control</th>
<th>Current Control Reference</th>
<th>Previous Control</th>
<th>Previous Control Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>0 (Hughes 2010, 601, McNemar)</td>
<td>1 (USA, UN) (Islam 1985, 217, The</td>
<td>1 (higher) (Islam 1985, 213, Post</td>
<td>0 (province) (Islam 1985, 213, Crowley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

207 Belgium initially aided by sending troops to support Katanga, but withdrew them at the insistence of the UN (The United Nations Security Council 1960, Council 1960, McNemar 1967, 14). In addition, there were a number of Belgian mercenaries present, fighting for the Katangan side (Hughes 2010, 603). The Central African Federation and Rhodesia are described by Hughes (2010, 611-613) as willing but unable to assist Katanga.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>1 (Russia, Armenia) (Hughes 2001, 14, BBC 2012e, Caspersen 2008a, 367-368)</td>
<td>0 (Fawn 2008, 284-286)</td>
<td>0 (same: highly dependent on support from diaspora and Armenia) (Caspersen 2008a, 367-368, Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008, 495-496)</td>
<td>0 (autonomous region) (BBC 2013g, Freedomhouse 1998m, 2012f, Caspersen 2008a, 365, Haugland 2008, 77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

208 Violence occurred in the process of separation, but the situation was fairly calm before that point. Since then it appears that the region’s conflict has become frozen (Ciobanu 2008, 104-106) (BBC 2013g).
### North-Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Altinay 2000, 298, Gosh and Aker 2006, 1094, Anderson 2011, 201)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Atasoy 2003, 257-258, Dodd, 5-7)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Altinay 2000, 298, Dodd 2009, 8, Pegg 1998, 107)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Puntland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Ethiopia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Mesfin 2009, 9)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Gikes 1999, 571, UNHCR 1999)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Huliaras 2010, 3, Amnesty International 2012a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Republika Srpska

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Serbia^211</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Caspersen 2008b, 8-10)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(0) similar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(The World Bank 2012a)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(0) gross human rights violations occurred, but Republika Srpska is not considered as victim of such by their parent state Bosnia-Herzegovina)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Caspersen 2008b, 8-10, Holthuis 2007, Holthuis 2003)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Altinay 2000, 298, Dodd 2009, 8, Pegg 1998, 107)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

^209 (Ioannides and Apostolopoulos 1999, 54) argues that the northern parts of the island held most of the tourist facilities at the time of the commencement of the war in 1974. However, Northern Cyprus is here evaluated as having fewer resources because many of these facilities were destroyed without being rebuilt. In addition, the international sanctions imposed of the region has led to a rapid economic deterioration (see for instance Sonmez and Apostolopoulos 2008, 40).

^210 Though the Greek Cypriots committed human rights violations against the Turkish Cypriots, the latter responded with breaches of their own (The European Commission of Human Rights 1976, 160-163).

^211 For a discussion of the relationship between Serbia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, see Caspersen (2007).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republika Srpska Krajina</strong></td>
<td>1 (Serbia\textsuperscript{112}) (Caspersen 2008b, 8-10, 2007, 622)</td>
<td>0 (Caspersen 2008b, 8-10) (generally shunned at least initially, but not actively opposed)</td>
<td>0 (The United Nations 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 (similar) (CIA World Factbook 1992, The World Bank 2012b)</td>
<td>0\textsuperscript{113} (gross human rights violations occurred, but Republika Srpska Krajina is not considered as victim of such by their parent state Croatia)(Caspersen 2008b, 8-10, Freedomhouse 1998f, Caspersen 2003b, 1-8, Pavkovic 2011, 313-315)</td>
<td>0 (The United Nations 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rhodesia</strong></td>
<td>1 (South Africa\textsuperscript{114})</td>
<td>1 (UK, UN Security)</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{115} (lower) (USDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 (the self-governing)</td>
<td>0 (the self-governing)</td>
<td>0 (the self-governing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{112} For a discussion of the relationship between Serbia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, see Caspersen (2007).

\textsuperscript{113} Though the Serbs in Croatia were the victims of harsh human rights violation by the state during WW2, I consider this to be too far removed in time from the secession to give the value 1. This judgement is of course debatable. For more information, see Jasenovac Memorial Site (29.04.2013), Jasenovac Reasearch Institute (29.04.2013). They were also discriminated against after the reintegraion of RSK (Caspersen 2003b, 19).

\textsuperscript{114} Until 1975 (Pinkston 2005, 5).

\textsuperscript{115} Even without adding the revenue from the British Commonwealth, Great Britain had a vastly stronger economy than Rhodesia for all the years of its existence (1970-1989), regardless of how the economic situation in Rhodesia developed (Ramsay 1978).

\textsuperscript{116} There might not have been the same level of active abuse in Rhodesia as in for instance Bangladesh, the near complete lack of human rights for the vast majority of the population gives the value of 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Status Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Somaliland  | 0$^a$ (Arieff 2008, 68-74)
1 (Egypt, Eritrea)
(Arieff 2008, 71, Huliaras 2010, 13)
1$^b$ (higher)
(Government of Somaliland 2011, 33,
| South Sudan | 1 (USA)
(Dean 2007, 82)
1$^c$ (oil)
(Ross 08.07.2011, BBC 04.07.2011,
CIA World Factbook 07.04.2013a,
Belloni 2011, 417-418)  |

$^a$ Ethiopia is "in favour of" Somaliland state status, but does not grant recognition (Arieff 2008, 70-71).

$^b$ Huliaras (2010, 6) describes the fall in revenue in the late nineties and early 2000's after Saudi-Arabia's ban on livestock import, and concludes that the economy did surprisingly well and that the ban is not expected to last long. More information on the economy of Somaliland and Puntland can be found at The World Bank (2002) report in Somali.

$^c$ Though (The World Bank 07.04.2013a, b) lists Sudan as having a higher GDP, South Sudan holds most of the natural resources and is therefore given the value 1.
### South-Ossetia
| 1 (Russia) (Fawn 2008, 273, UNPO 2009) | 0 (Fawn 2008, 284-286) | 0 | 1 (poorer) (Ciobanu 2008, 128) | 0 (Freedomhouse 2009b, 2012j, Ciobanu 2008, 126-128, Haugland 2008, 77) | 0 (ethno-territorial region, lower than autonomous oblast) (Global Security 2011b, Freedomhouse 2009b, Haugland 2008, 77) | 0 | 0 | 0 |

### Taiwan
| 1 (USA) (DeLisle 2011, 1, Chiang 1999, 976, Kolstø 2006) | 1 (China) (DeLisle 2011, 1, Chiang 1999, 977) | 0 (same) (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, a) | 0 | 0 (Amnesty International 2012c) | 0 (province) (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013m) | 1 | 1 | 0 |

### Tamil Eelam
| 0 (Pegg 1998, 80-81) | 0 (Pegg 1998, 80-81) | 0 (same) (Jayasinghe 2006, Pegg 1998, 80-81, Pfaffenerger 1987, 115, 161-162, Bandara 2007, 0 | 1 (Pegg 1998, 72-74, Freedomhouse 1999b, 2009c, Rogers, Spencer, and Uyangoda 1998, 774- | 0 (Northern and Southern Provinces) (Pegg 1998, 71, 75) | 0 | 1 | 0 |

---

220 The Russian intervention and subsequent war in 2008 is not here seen as gross human rights violations instigated by Georgia, however turbulent the experience was. After the war in 2008, the human rights situation has worsened, both from Russian and Georgian side(Freedomhouse 2009b, 2012j).

221 Note: Taiwan and China are not on identical economic levels, but both are very rich (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, a).

222 Taiwan is a special case, and its status as a de facto-state has followed a unique trajectory. Though no gross human rights violations occurred in Taiwan proper, the war in mainland China was intense. Read more about in Roberge and Lee (2009), Freedomhouse (2012m), Harrell and Huang (1994), Chiang (1999), CIA World Factbook (26.03.2013b) and DeLisle (2011).

223 Between 1983 and 1986, India unofficially aided the Tamils, but the tigers are seen as having relied primarily on the Tamil community for sustenance(Pegg 1998, 80).

224 Tamil Eelam constitutes most of the Sri Lankan coastline, but has not by itself been able to accumulate or access revenue to any large degree. I therefore argue that it evens out: Tamil Eelam had the coast, but the interior was similar to that of the rest of Sri Lanka. The latter had the least of the coast, but the most of the other territory. In addition, Sri Lanka, while itself poor could do trade with other states, whereas Tamil Eelam were dependent on subsidies (Jayasinghe 2006, Pegg 1998, 80-81).

225 The Tamil Tigers are themselves accused of human rights violations (Pegg 1998, 73, Freedomhouse 1999h).
Apart from the violence happening during the separation, the region appears to have avoided serious human rights violations (BBC 2012c).

Some Transnistrians live on the right bank, but the overwhelming majority reside on the left bank of the Dniester river (Kolstø and Malgin 2007, 104).
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