State Capacity, Internal Conflict and Democratic Breakdown

- A Comparative Study of Mali and Ghana.

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Abstract
The two underdeveloped, West-African states, Mali and Ghana, have been praised for their well-established democratic institutions, and have been said to be good role models when it comes to democracy in an African context. However, Mail experienced a sudden democratic breakdown in 2012, after violent rebellion and a military coup. This “puzzle” is what this thesis is about, and to unravel the underlying structures and causes, a qualitative case study is conducted to investigate how variations in state capacity and internal conflict can help explain the difference in outcome in Mali and Ghana. There is a clear pattern showing in Mali, where incapacity on a range of indicators of state capacity, and an unresolved conflict in the northern region can be said to have caused the democratic breakdown. A more muted conflict level and a higher degree of state capacity is the trend in Ghana, and stands as the reason for why the breakdown happened in Mali, and not in Ghana.
Acknowledgments

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Ingvild Thue Hvattum

Bergen 20. November 2014
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1. Introduction

"If democracy can emerge and persist (now so far for a decade) in an extremely poor, landlocked, overwhelmingly Muslim country like Mali - in which the majority of adults are illiterate and live in absolute poverty, and the life expectancy is 44 years - then there is no reason in principle why democracy cannot develop in most other very poor countries" (Diamond et al., 2003: 6).

1.1 The Issue

This quote reflects the view academics all over the world had on Mali – it was almost unbelievable that democracy could develop and persist in a country like Mali. Despite this fact, democracy did develop and persist for over 20 years. The formal democratic institutions worked relatively well and, in the view of many academics and international donors, the future looked bright. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held and considered to be free and fair. Throughout the years political power was won by different competing parties, and peaceful turnover of political power became the norm. Good governance, peace and reconciliation were highlighted as the typical features of Mali. However, within a few months in 2012, Mali experienced democratic breakdown, with breakdown of state institutions, overthrowing of a president, rebellion and violence. Mali was no longer considered to be a democratic state. This is an intriguing puzzle. How can a country, which is perceived to be a stable, democratic state with both economic growth and good governance, suddenly breakdown? With this in mind, it is obvious something more to the story, which should be studied to be able to explain the sudden shift in the democratic era of Mali.

Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world and has been for a long time. Yet they still managed to reform their politics and regime system in 1991 to become a democratic state (Smith, 2001). For 20 years Mali was considered to be one of Africa’s few democratic states, until 2012 when a military coup removed the democratic elected government from office
Mali’s history and culture is complex and varied, with colonial rule until 1960 when Mali achieved independence from France (Smith, 2001). Until democratization started in 1991, Mali was ruled by a highly corrupt and repressive authoritarian military regime.

Another democratic country on the west coast of Africa is Ghana. Ghana, which began the democratization process approximately at the same time as Mali, developed a stable and fair democracy over time and is to this day considered democratic. Ghana is similar to Mali in many aspects; both are poor, West African states with colonial history and with little prior democratic experience. Mali and Ghana may not be the two most likely countries to experience democracy. Though, Ghana continues on the democratic path and is still a democratic state after over 20 years with democratic institutions. Nevertheless, Ghana has experienced some challenges to their democracy over the past 20 years. Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012) are among those who question Ghana’s ability to handle the predicted “oil-curse”, with the discovery of oil reserves in 2007. Another concern is the degree of power and influence of the president in Ghana’s politics and society, and dysfunctions between legislative and institutional framework (Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). But in the end Ghana is considered to be a democratic state and have not experienced breakdown like Mali.

However, there are several oversimplified and glorified notions about Mali and its democracy. Lindberg (2013) points to several authors that describe democracy and the democratic state of Mali as a myth, where the actual political regime has been far from democratic values. In addition, several scholars and articles have argued that the Malian conflict have been oversimplified and that there is an vast array of factors, causes and actors intertwined in the conflict (Lindberg, 2013). Ethnicity, state capacity and the internal conflict is three of the most highlighted factors in the conflict dynamic and will be given great attention in this thesis. There is clearly a vast and divergent literature on Mali regards to its political regime and ongoing conflict, and it will be fruitful to study the underlying factors and highlight the most important causes.
Why did Mali and not Ghana experience democratic breakdown? This question triggered my interest for the field and leads me to my research question for this thesis; to what extent does variation in state capacity and internal conflict help explain why Mali experienced a democratic breakdown, and not Ghana?

I have chosen this research question because it is important to look at what went wrong in the case of Mali, to identify what factors considered to be important for the breakdown of the democratic regime in Mali, both historical and present. In addition I hope to contribute to the field of democratic breakdowns in Africa. I want to compare Mali and Ghana in order to investigate whether Ghana demonstrates some positive features that could have been useful in Mali’s case and if Ghana is showing signs of weakness, similar to the Malian case. Much have been said and written about Africa’s failed, weak and authoritarian states. Less focus has been devoted to the success of the few democracies in the region. And when a perceived successful democracy like Mali breaks down, I find it important to study the causes of this. The main findings in this thesis are that due to incapacity in the state and the presence of a higher level of internal conflict, the democracy broke down in Mali and not Ghana. Especially important is the link between the two variables, where the Malian state incapacity over time have been unable to address the grievances of the north and through this fueled the conflict level that mounted in the 2012 rebellion. In figure 1, the main components of my thesis is displayed, where the two countries at one point both are democratic before variation on my two chosen variables is hypothesized to have led to difference in democratic outcome.
1.2 The Methodological approach

My initial theme for the thesis was democratic states in Africa. When it came to choosing the cases for this thesis, it was soon clear that it was few democratic states to choose between in Africa. It was initially Mali that triggered my interest, with the success-story of a underdeveloped, poor African country with 20 years of democratic regime, before it suddenly broke down. Both Mali and Ghana was previously perceived to be two of the most successful democracies in Africa. The choice of Ghana was more strategically – I wanted a somewhat similar country to Mali, with democratic experience, former colony, same region in Africa, similar experience with military rule and several coups over the years. This, because then I could use the method of Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)$^1$, where one can control for endogenous factors – political institutions (presidentialism and electoral system) - that are similar in both countries, while studying a few chosen exogenous (systemic) factors that can have an effect on the outcome. Historical and institutional factors will through this method be held constant because it is similar in both countries – this is important since theory on democratic breakdown from Latin America focuses on institutional- and actor-variables. The two chosen variables are state capacity and internal conflict. These two variables were chosen

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$^1$ See Chapter 4.2
after a literature review where they stood out as seemingly important in regard to democratic breakdown, and where they are highly debated and possibly relevant for the two chosen cases. In addition I have chosen to study structural indicators, and thereby opted out the actor and institutional perspective that have been important factors in other studies of democratic breakdowns, like Juan Linz (1978) extensive work on the field and the more recent work of Kapstein and Converse (2008). Still there are many other structural factors that could have been chosen for this thesis, like religion or non-tax revenue, which can offer insight and help explain the outcome\(^2\). But due to a case selection of only two countries in a qualitative research paper, few variables are considered to be the most suitable method for explaining the outcome.

1.3 The Context – Democracies in Africa

In the early 1990s, many African countries experienced political liberalization and opening, and began a process of democratization (Lynch & Crawford, 2011). This has been known as a part of the “third wave” of democratization, where many one-party or military regimes started a transition to become multiparty systems. Not all cases of democratization have been successful though, and most of the regimes can be called “democracies with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The military is still a part of politics in many African states and over 50 coups have been attempted since the early 1990s, with 13 successful by 2010 (Lynch & Crawford, 2011). However, progress and positive democratic aspects can be found. Before 1990 only two countries elected their officials, by 2007 21 countries had held four subsequent sets of legislative elections. Still, many regimes use elections to stay in power with undemocratic features like electoral manipulation, political violence, ballot stuffing and corruption, and many elections does not automatically imply democracy (Lynch & Crawford, 2011). In addition, violence and turmoil in neighboring countries can pose as a threat to successful democracy and stable countries. Both Mali and Ghana is situated in a region where authoritarian rule and military invention in politics have a long tradition, and where there are still today many authoritarian regimes with widespread use of violence (Smith, 2001).

\(^2\) See Chapter 3.6
1.3.1 The Case - Mali

Mali is a vast country where most of Mali lies within the Saharan Desert. Still, 90% of Mali’s population of 15 million lives in the much smaller southern part of the country (Pringle, 2006). The Malian population is heterogeneous with many ethnic groups where no one has a majority (Smith, 2001). The main religion in the country is Islam, which about 90% of the population belongs to. Radical Islam has not been prominent until the last decade, and was viewed by the people as not posing as a threat to Malian democracy (Pringle, 2006). The northern region of Mali has three important cities, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, and there are mainly three different groups that inhabit the north; Tuareg, Songhay and Arabs (Pringle, 2006). It is especially the Tuareg group that has been the main problem and source of conflict throughout Mali’s history (Gates & Justesen, 2013). The Tuareg is a nomadic Berber people, located both in Niger and northern Mali. Ever since Mali achieved independence, the Tuareg people wanted sovereignty and autonomy for their own state “Azawad”. During the 1990s the situation worsened and multiple conflicts arose and attempts to solve the situation have been tried but to a large degree failed (Gates & Justesen, 2013). Malian culture is said to be diverse and plural, and at the same time as each ethnic groups have their own identity, there is a common identity among most Malians with shared values, history and characteristics (Konarè, 2000). Mali gained its independence from France in 1960 and an authoritarian regime was developed and persisted until 1991, when a military coup ended in a transition to democracy (CIA World Factbook, 2013b). Colonial heritage is maybe the one factor that has had the most influence on today’s Mali. The road from a colonial state to a democracy was long, and old institutions were hard to change. According to Freedom House (2014), Mali had a score of 2 on political rights and 3 on civil liberties in 2009 and was considered to be free. These scores change drastically for 2012, when political rights is down to 7 and civil liberties 5 and overall classified as not free. Mali is a relatively poor and underdeveloped country with a general life expectancy of 54, and 50 per cent of the population was living below 1, 25 dollar a day in 2010 (Teorell et al., 2013). GDP per capita PPP in 2011 was 963USD, and GDP growth in 2011 was 2, 7%. These figures indicate a country in bad shape with a poor population.
1.3.2 The Case - Ghana

Ghana was in 1957 the first sub-Saharan country that gained independence after many years of colonial rule by Great Britain (CIA World Factbook, 2013a). In the subsequent years Ghana experienced many coups and disorder, until 1981 when Rawlings came to power and created a stable political regime. Unlike in Mali, most of the population in Ghana is Christian, which makes up about 70 % of the population; the Muslim population comprises approximately 17 %. The population is estimated to be 25 million in 2013 and life expectancy at birth is 65 (CIA World Factbook, 2013a). There are two main ethnic groups, consisting of Akan, a group based in the south, and Mole-Dagbani, which is a northern group. In addition there are multiple leaderless ethnic groups in the north, which accounts for most of the violent conflicts in the north throughout the last decades (Shepherd et al., 2006). In colonial times, the north was threatened subordinate in regards to both economics and politics, and this pattern has persisted. There have been multiple attempts to help the northern region to develop, both by the government itself but also by donor countries, NGOs and investors. The 1980s focus on structural adjustment and liberalization brought a process of decentralization of power, and thereby more political power to the north. But the economic consequences of structural adjustment hit the northern region hard and the region can be said to have been worse off than before (Shepherd et al., 2006). Ghana is a much smaller country than Mali in size and has a costal line unlike Mali, which is landlocked. A new constitution and multiparty politics was approved in 1992 and has since then experienced four successful presidential and parliamentary elections, and Ghana is still a stable country (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). Freedom House (2014) classified Ghana as free in 2009 with a score on political rights and civil liberties of 1 and 2 respectively. Ghana was thereby classified according to Freedom House somewhat “better” or freer than Mali. Ghana had no change in classification or scores between 2009 and 2012, unlike Mali. Ghana is an underdeveloped country, but indicators show a slightly more positive picture compared to Mali. GDP per capita PPP in 2011 was 1652 USD, GDP growth in 2011 was 14, 4 % and population living on below 1, 25 dollar a day in 2006 was 28 % (Teorell et al., 2013). This indicates a brighter picture than Mali, with higher economic growth and better prospects for the population.
1.4 The Phenomenon – Democratic breakdown

The term democratic breakdown has a dramatic sound to it. Yet, it consist of political change that is the culmination of a longer process of regime change (Linz, 1978: 3). Democratic breakdowns are often military coup d’état, sometimes claiming to be revolutions, and political violence is often both an important indicator and contributing cause of breakdowns. Linz (1978: 5) sets out a list that a democracy has to fulfil to be considered as a competitive democracy and applicable to the analyzing tools. This includes freedom to formulate political alternatives, free speech, rights to free association, universal suffrage, free and fair political competition and elections, with regular intervals. Linz (1978: 45) argues that legitimacy of democratic institutions is essential to stable democracies, and when legitimacy is reduced, the likelihood of a breakdown increases. A democratic government has to be responsive to a broad set of key demands in the electorate, and not ignore demands from a minority since this can create a serious threat (Linz, 1978: 20). The government’s incapability to solve a problem can result in a breakdown, and questions the states capacity to govern. This is usually not the visible cause when the breakdown happens, but represents the underlying structural difficulties that reduce the regimes legitimacy (Linz, 1978: 54). Although existing research emphasizes the importance of legitimacy when discussing democratic breakdown, this study shows that capacity and conflict can be important factors in a country’s democratic breakdown because of their destabilizing effects on society.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The thesis starts off with an introduction to the context and history more generally on political liberalization in Africa. More specific, chapter 2 comprises of more general theories about weak states in an African context, followed by a short introduction to the political history post-independence in the two cases, before political liberalization on the African continent since the 1990s will be outlined. At the end of chapter 2 a short review of the political history and liberalization process will be given on Mali and Ghana since the 1990s. In chapter 3, I will develop the theoretical framework for this thesis. Defining democracy, consolidated democracy and democratic breakdown is essential and will be outlined in chapter 3. Further on, democratic breakdown will be compared to other similar concepts to highlight the
differences and clarify exactly what the concept democratic breakdown is. Lastly in chapter 3 an in-depth examination of the two variables will be done. Variables in focus are state capacity and internal conflict, and definition, operationalization and area of focus will be determined here. This is followed by chapter 4, which will contain an outlining of the methodological considerations and implications. In addition I explain my choice of method and the potential challenges connected to this way of conducting a case study. Chapter 5 will comprise of an empirical analysis of the two cases in this thesis, Mali and Ghana, based on the operationalization of the independent variables. State capacity is the first variable that is studied, which have been operationalized through military capacity, effective tax collection, GDP and neopatrimonialism. The second variable will then be presented and analyzed through fractionalization and ethnical diversity, and rebellion, conflict and armed uprisings. Chapter 6, the last chapter, concluding remarks will be given together with a summary of the central findings of the thesis. Further research and the way forward for Mali and Ghana will in addition be mentioned.
2. Political Liberalization in Weak States

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the context which Mali and Ghana is set in. The chapter starts out with an introduction to more general theory on weak states in Africa, before continuing on with a short introduction to history in Mali and Ghana from the 1960s up until the 1990s. The last part of this chapter deals with the political liberalization that took place in many African states in the 1990s, before looking more specific at Mali and Ghana after 1990. In the last section I outline briefly what happened in Mali in the months leading up to the military coup in 2012 and a few months after.

2.1 The African Context: Weak states

The modern state in Africa was created largely by European colonial powers in the late 19th and early 20th century, and had an absolutist and coercive character in complex and multicultural areas (Young & Beissinger, 2002: 20). The foreign colonial power in Africa in the 19th century introduced a new social order with the modern state through force within a short period of time. In Europe on the other hand, the state formation evolved over centuries. These new practices were largely carried on after most of the African states achieved independence, and are influencing the present states and regimes in Africa. The colonial power decided and controlled every aspect of the political economy in its colonies and through this maintained power and domination (Young & Beissinger, 2002: 25). After World War II and up until independence, African economies prospered, prices on exported agricultural goods went up along with wages, and schools were built. This era serves today as the historical memory from the colonial period and today’s poor situation is measured up against the glory age of the 1950s (Young & Beissinger, 2002: 25). State-sponsored violence and highly competitive autocracy was a part of the colonial heritage of African states. One of the most enduring elements from the colonial period in Africa is the colonial partition and the country borders, which influenced the political landscape dramatically. Even when no official government, state power or institutions controls and govern the land, the borders and state prevails as an imagined state, like the case in Somalia. Most states in Africa are multi-ethnic and in the postcolonial era, the notion of “nation” was merely territorial and not ethnic. This illustrates how resilient African states can be. Post-independence, African states were the
African states` weak capacity can explain why most African states have experienced almost five decades with hardship (Englebert, 2002: 1). Other regions in the world have experienced setbacks as well, like droughts, economic crisis, and civil war - still Africa is the region that seems to not be able to develop. Between 1960 and 2004 there were 46 cases of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, and 17 of these where sustained while the remaining 29 cases ended in reversal (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 60). Poor policies and weak institutions are claimed to be rooted in the lack of trust and civic participation that makes the state accountable to the society (Englebert, 2002: 1). Some say it is a lack of social capital, or the ethnic heterogeneity, which creates a polarized political system. But the states in Africa are not all the same, as these theories imply. Botswana for instance, has experienced an enormous economic growth in the last decades. The effect of the preexisting institutions from the colonial period on the postcolonial regime is a theory that Englebert (2002) introduces. When there exists a conflict between precolonial and postcolonial political structures, politicians use the state as an instrument to build political hegemony. Here institutions are in conflict with existing institutions and have no legitimacy. Where there is no conflict or where the colonial power never actually colonized, the political elite already have legitimacy and have most to win to choose developmental politics and the efficiency of their politics. This is about power and what the elites need to do to secure power, influence and their position in the best way, and rational responses to the historical preconditions play a part here. One aspect of legitimacy that is of importance is the vertical dimension, the relation between the state with
its political institutions and the society. Another aspect is agreement about what constitutes the state – or the borders of the state. This represents a horizontal dimension. There are examples from all over the world of conflicts over borders, but in Africa it is a part of the colonial legacy and is especially arbitrary. The borders where drawn with no thought of political or social conditions and are in conflict with preexisting institutions (Englebert, 2002: 9).

2.2 A brief overview of key aspects of Mali and Ghana 1960-1990

*Mali*

Mali’s history after receiving independence from France is a traumatic one, in which France left a underdeveloped country with few bright hopes for the future (Keita, 1998). The infrastructure was poorly developed, life expectancy was low with an average around 45 years and the majority of Malians earned their living by being farmers or nomads. The economic opportunities were few, education was not common and the ones who were able to go to school often migrated to Europe for a better future (Keita, 1998). Post-independence, Mali had a civilian government with strong socialist leanings (Smith, 2001). This led Mali to turn to the communist countries of China and the Soviet Union for support, who provided loans, aid and military equipment. State socialism, a centralized economy and one-party state was implemented in Mali (Clark, 2000: 251). After only a few years of independence and civilian government, a military coup was initiated in 1968 and brought Moussa Traorè to power (Smith, 2001). His military rule and leadership was highly corrupt and unpopular. Still, Traorè and the military regime remained in power until democratic elections were initiated in 1992. During the 1980s, neoliberal economic policy became the dominant idea of economic management in most of the world, with “Reaganism” and “Thatcherism” as big promoters (Clark, 2000). In addition, foreign aid was restricted and dictatorial regimes risked losing funding while poor democratic regimes was favored and could receive more aid. This made many countries adapt to more market friendly neoliberal economic policies. This was the case in Mali as well.
Ghana

Ghana has a turbulent history, as Mali and many other African countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, Ghana experienced great hardship and was on the edge of collapse, and prone to violent conflict (Hutchful, 2003). A collapsing state with a crisis of legitimacy, economic crisis, several coups, militarization of the state and politics together with little control over institutional instruments of violence, made Ghana’s situation severely unstable and on the brink of collapsing. Ghana was plagued with multiple military coups, political conflict and difficulties with civilian control over the military (Dzorgbo, 2001: 265). It was through a military uprising in 1981 Rawlings first obtained political power in Ghana, which lasted for decades, even after Ghana was democratized. Before 1993 Ghana was plagued by several economic crises, much due to the evolution of a hybrid political economy through different economic management practices (Boafo-Arthur, 2007: 2). Both a Marxist-Leninist agenda and a neoliberal free market economy were pursued in the decades between independence and the start of the democratic era. Radical measures had to be implemented to prevent total collapse of the economy. The economic situation can be said to be a part of why the military regime had to give in for democratic forces in the early 1990s (Boafo-Arthur, 2007: 2). The first democratic election was held in 1992 after a short transition period, and international observers deemed the election as free and fair (Dzorgbo, 2001: 299).

2.3 Political Liberalization in the 1990s

African states before 1990 were typically either ruled by the military, one party state or socialism (Herbst, 2001: 360). Coups and military rule was especially common and many states experienced high regime stability. However, the authoritarian systems eventually started failing, with worsening economies, less tax revenue, and salaries to the police and military personnel where stopped. The loyalty from previous supporters to their leaders was no longer there and even the patronage system crumbled. The final push to regime collapse in African states is claimed to be the breakdown of Soviet hegemony in Central Europe and the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Regime reform seemed plausible to the population and democratic protests spread across the continent (Herbst, 2001: 361). These political protests ended for many states in transitions away from undemocratic regimes like one-party or military regimes (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 3). For a long period of time
one could not know what would come of these uprisings and protests, if it only meant political liberalization in undemocratic regimes or the start of a democratic process (Bratton, 1993: 2). This is an important distinction and can easily be mixed up. Political liberalization is when a government reduces its involvement and intervention in the political market and allows greater pluralism. Increased civil and political rights and permitting the existence of more than one political party are examples of political liberalization. Democratization is on the other hand more about establishing new political institutions and political culture by enhancing people’s opportunity to participate through elections. The minimal condition for democracy is free and fair elections (Bratton, 1993: 2).

Elections had been held in African countries before 1990, but then mostly uncompetitive with the ruling, dominant party always winning (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 8). After 1990 this changed dramatically with 38 of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries holding competitive elections, and change in leadership became more common after a long period where single party-constitutions and personal rule where the norm in African states. New constitutions guaranteeing political liberties, allowing multiple parties to compete and tenure limits, was some of the changes that were implemented in the early 1990s. The changes happened particularly fast, and not all was well in the regimes in transition. Many long standing leaders were re-elected when elections were introduced, and recycling of political leaders was common. The regime transition did not do much for the state’s ability to respond to its citizen’s needs, and institutions remained weak and ineffective, with corruption and clientelism as serious problems (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 8). International aid donors started rewarding democratic regimes and punishing the undemocratic states. Even military leaders had to start legitimize their power through elections, even though elections may have been farcical. This shows that the idea of democracy and democratic institutions started to gain support (Herbst, 2001: 362). Civil society was relatively weak in most African countries, and lack of economic resources is a contributing factor to why this is persistent.
Below, Table 1 - Changes in Freedom House Score displays all African states and their Freedom House scores in 1989, 1999 and 2009. This table is included to show how big changes there have been on democratic freedoms on the whole continent in just 20 years. The trend is that more and more countries achieve a higher degree of political rights and civil liberties. In 1989 there are only three countries that are classified as free of Freedom House, Mauritius, Botswana and The Gambia. In 2009 9 countries are classified as free. An even larger change is the number of states that are classified as partly free; in 1989 there were 11 states compared to 24 in 1999 and 23 in 2009. 34 states were classified as not free in 1989 compared to 16 in 1999 and 2009. It is clear from this table that most transitions took place in the 1990s, the number of transitions changes minimal from 1999 to 2009. Most African states are thereby classified as partly free in 2009, and have at least some freedoms available to them.

Table 1 - Changes in Freedom House Score
- All African states. States experiencing changes in Freedom House scores is marked (Freedom House, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom House Score</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
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Other positive trends can also be found in African states on democratic improvements. In table 2 and in table 3, the distribution of a number of African countries on a free – not free scale is displayed and whether or not they have undergone alternation of power, in 1999 and 2009. During the 00s several countries have changed status as one can see from table 2 and 3. In the 1990s most of the African states included here had held elections, only three had experienced an alternation of power, as table 2 shows. Alternation of power has in these tables been defined as a power shift between parties and their candidates from one presidential election to another. Alternation of power can be used as a measure of stability and matureness of the democratic regime. Table 3 shows that there have been changes in the last decade, now half of the states have gone through at least one alternation of power. Among the chosen countries, it is the same nine states that was democracies in 2009 as in 1999, but three more have experienced alternation of power, among them Mali and Ghana. States that were classified in 1999 as not free were in 2009 classified as partly free, only Chad remained not free without experience with alternation of power. Among these few countries, a trend can be said to go towards democratization and strengthening of the democratic regimes, even though Freedom House scores and alternation of power not can give us the whole picture. Still it gives a more nuanced debate on democracies in Africa – democratization did not stop in the 90s, but was carried on in several countries through the 00s as well.
Table 2 - African countries, civil liberties and transitions 1999
- A selection of African Countries categorized by civil liberties ranking (Freedom House, 2014) [Accessed 2014] and alternation of power by 1999

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<th>Freedom House Score</th>
<th>Multiparty elections, alternation of power</th>
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<td>Free</td>
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Table 3 - African countries, civil liberties and transitions 2009

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<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Mali, Ghana, Benin, Mauritius, Cape Verde</td>
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<td>Partly free</td>
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2.4 A short review of political history in Mali and Ghana from 1990 to 2009

Mali

The democratization process in Mali is described by many as successful and mostly peaceful, by holding a national conference, writing the constitution and announcing elections for national assembly and president (Clark, 2000: 251). March 1991 can be seen as a turning point in Mali’s road to democracy. A military coup d’état overthrew President Moussa Traorè, who had been the leader of the republic since 1979 (EISA, 2013c). At the same time the parliament from 1988 was dissolved and the 1979 constitution was suspended. A new constitution was written and designed on the idea that the new regime would be a civilian multiparty political system, and after some delay due to Tuareg rebellions, the first presidential election was held on February 23rd 1992, with 22 contesting parties. Alpha Oumar Konarè representing the party Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) was the first elected president of Mali (EISA, 2013c). He led the pro-democratization movement before the coup, which agitated for a multiparty political system (Pringle, 2006). The former president Traorè tried to suggest a democratic reform of the single-party regime but was not successful. Konarè was reelected as president in the 1997 election with 95 % of the votes (EISA, 2013c). In the 2002 presidential election however, ADEMA and their candidate Cissè lost for an independent candidate Amadou Toumani Tourè, which was reelected in 2007. Mali went by this through a peaceful transition of power. Up until 2012, Mali was able to preserve democratic institutions, despite massive obstacles such as poor economy and development, social protest and a violent separatist movement in the Tuareg minority (Smith, 2001). Still, the economy and GDP growth was better through the 90s compared to the 80s, with -1.5 % growth in the 1980s compared to 4.8 % growth through the 1990s, much due to investor’s belief in the democratic reforms and new transparency in Mali. Despite this, the economic situation in Mali was disastrous, even for an African country. The Malian state have an enormous international debt and heavily dependent on foreign aid, (Clark, 2000: 254).
Ghana

Jerry Rawlings was Ghana’s national leader from 1981 to 2000, and he came to power by a military coup and abolished a short-lived democratic regime (EISA, 2013b). Rawlings led the Provisional National Defense Council from 1981 to 1992, and managed to establish a monopoly of organized violence and fought off several coup attempts (Joseph, 2002: 251). After a decade where the military controlled the state, Ghana pursued a democratic regime from 1992 where political liberalism and democratic institutions were implemented and a long road to stable and consolidated democracy started (Boafo-Arthur, 2007: 1). Due to international pressure for democratic reform in the 1990s, Ghana’s democratic era started with a referendum in April 1992 and a presidential election in November the same year (EISA, 2013a). Rawlings was allowed to run for president and became Ghana’s first elected president as a candidate for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), while the opposition claimed the election to be rigged and boycotted the parliamentary election. Rawlings was re-elected president four years later in 1996. Ghana is by this the only state in the region where the military regime more or less willingly transitioned to a democratic system under the same leadership as in the authoritarian regime (Joseph, 2002: 251). NDC had a new candidate in the presidential election in 2000, John Atta Mills, since Rawlings had finished his legal two terms presidency (EISA, 2013a). The opposition party NPP, with John Kufuor as the candidate, won the election and a peaceful alternation of power was a reality. Kufuor was re-elected in 2004, while in the presidential election in 2008, the NDC won with John Atta Mills and with this Ghana had gone through a second peaceful alternation of power. Ghana’s democracy seems to have moved from an unstable and fragile situation in the 1990s, to a stable and firmly established African democracy (EISA, 2013a). The democratic institutions can be said to have been consolidated and a two-party system has evolved. The economic development in this time period went from slow in the beginning of the 90s to a GDP growth in 2006 at 6.4 % and still growing. Gold, coca and other minerals for international trade have made Ghana into a middle income country, and recently discovered oil reserves can improve Ghana’s economy further (EISA, 2013b). Ghana is today an integrated polity, after containing conflict both in the northern and southern region. Today, civil society is considered to be vigorous and healthy (Joseph, 2002: 251). The electoral system was previously considered to be particularly undemocratic with manipulations and flaws, but have now become fair and efficient and are among the best in Africa. Ghana has seen great changes since the late 1970s when Ghana was near being classified as a “failed state” (Joseph, 2002: 251).
2.5 What happened in Mali March 21, 2012?

Before I continue on with the study of what factors contributed to the Malian democracy to break down, it is important to know what actually happened in Mali spring of 2012, which is at center in this conflict. Mali experienced a democratic breakdown in 2012. Like other states, as shown in table 2 and table 3, Mali have had several multiparty elections, and experienced peaceful alternation of power. Mali had a stable democratic regime for 20 years, for a slightly longer period of time than Ghana, and was moving in the “right” direction. Ghana is said to be a stable and consolidated democracy, especially because of their experience with alternation of power, and the same argument was used about Mali up until recently. Why Mali have experienced breakdown, despite an apparently promising future, is the main theme of this thesis and the goal is to clarify the causes. But first, a short introduction to the actual events that took place in the spring of 2012 in Mali will be given in order to clarify what actually went down in the dramatic and historical months.

As mentioned previously, Mali was a French colony for nearly 70 years. Mali is a vast country, with large regions where few people live, especially in the northern region. Much due to this, the northern region of Mali was never fully integrated and controlled by the Malian authority (Pringle, 2006). Right before Mali was given its independence in 1960, the north tried to establish an autonomous region, but failed. Since then, numerous rebellions and uprisings from northern groups have never really led to change, and multiple promises from different governments in the south to decentralize power to local authorities in the north have in the end never been initiated (Pringle, 2006). During the 1990s, integration of Tuareg officers into the army stationed in the north was launched to prevent increasing discrimination and abuse from military personnel from the south (Wing, 2012).
The first signs of unrest started already in November and December 2011, when demonstrations in the northern town Menaka demanded independence for the northern region “Azawad” (Kone, 2012). Figure 2 on page 28 shows a map of Mali and the vast amount of land claimed and controlled by the rebels in the northern region. An alliance of rebel groups joined forces in January, and the Malian armed forces lost control over the towns of Menaka and Anderamboukane. An important event leading up to the March 21st Coup was the rebel forces, MNLA, killings of 100 soldiers on January 24th, 2012 (Wing, 2012). The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is an ethnic Tuareg nationalist group, formed November 2011. Multiple Tuareg leaders had been fighting for Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 and were well armed. The war ended in Libya in October 2011 and the Tuareg soldiers returned to Mali, with military skills, weapons and were unemployed. The 100 soldiers that was killed were captives of MNLA and were brutally executed (Wing, 2013). On 4 February, rebels captured two military camps and controlled the northern town of Kidal (Kone, 2012). Nearly 60,000 people fled their homes shortly after, crossing the border into neighboring countries of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. Mali’s military suffered multiple setbacks and defeats, and at one point a division had to retreat across the border into Algeria. President Tourè was accused of handling the rebellion and killings of soldiers poorly by not informing the people properly, and meeting the demands of the soldiers relatives (Pringle, 2006; Wing, 2013). President Tourè underestimated the anger in the population, and on March 21st hundreds of soldiers mutinied and attacked the president’s residence. Tourè and his family managed to escape, but as a consequence of the rebellion from the MNLA, the soldiers managed to overthrow the president, only five weeks before the next scheduled election, where Tourè would have been forced to step down after already serving the two terms as president. Malian government and military was humiliated, and 1600 soldiers started fighting for MNLA instead (Wing, 2013). The collapse of state control in the northern region together with the military coup in the capital Bamako was a serious setback for the once political stable country, and the two decades of development and democracy seemed to have been reversed in only a few months (Kone, 2012). A civilian government was returned to power in April, with Dioncounda Traore as interim president after successful negotiations, led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Wing, 2012).
In the confusion after the coup, MNLA declared independence for “Azawad”, which is the Tuareg homeland in northern Mali (Wing, 2012). Ansar Dine, an Islamist group, took advantage of the turmoil as well and made sharia the official law in the three important cities of northern Mali; Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Mali’s tradition of tolerant Islam could now be threatened. Al Qaeda activity in the area was reported to be increasing in the years before 2012, and with many kidnappings, tourism dropped and important income was lost for many locals (Wing, 2012). The Malian military was expelled from the northern region by rebel forces and much violence drove hundreds of thousands to flee to southern Mali and neighboring countries (CIA World Factbook, 2013b). The newly declared state in the north did not last for long as a military intervention led by the French was launched January 2013 and reclaimed most of the north within a month. Elections for a new president was held in July and August 2013 and made Ibrahim Boubacar Keita the new president (CIA World Factbook, 2013b).
Figure 2 - Overview of the Tuareg rebellion 2012

Source: Kone (2012).
3. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the thesis will be outlined. This includes defining important and much used concepts like democracy, consolidated democracy, breakdown of democracy, and a comparison and contrasting of democratic breakdown and state collapse. Lastly the two variables state capacity and internal conflict will be handled together with their respectively operationalization, and the possible relationship between the two variables will be discussed.

3.1 Defining Democracy

To understand what democratic breakdown is, which is central to this thesis, one first has to understand and define democracy. There are a substantial amount of literature and debate on the field of democracy (Linde & Ekman, 2006: 22). As a consequence there are many different definitions of democracy published by different authors with varying content, and one can argue that some definitions are better suited to a specific purpose than others. In addition it is a challenge to classify different regimes. Robert A. Dahl has one of the more famous and highly accepted definitions of democracy, presented in his book “Polyarchy” (1971). Dahl presents two broad indicators of democracy; participation and public contestation. Participation is when the citizens have the right to participate in elections and for office, and public contestation means that the regime has public competition for office and political support. Dahl argues that a non-democratic regime can hold elements of all of these factors, but it is only when both political competition and participation are present in a regime one can talk about a democratic regime (Dahl, 1971). Adam Przeworski (1991) is also a renowned scholar in political science and has presented a definition on democracy, which is well renowned and used: “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections” (Przeworski, 1991: 10). It is a minimalist one, but covers the most basic features with a democracy. Parties compete over power within a certain set of rules where the winners and losers of elections change over time, and parties are divided between different interest, values and opinions. The people decide the outcome, and the outcome of this democratic process is uncertain. There are different variations between democracies regarding the institutional design, but to define a political system as democratic, Przeworski (1991: 10) argue that “contestation open to participation” is sufficient. I have chosen this narrow definition because the two cases in this thesis are a part of the third wave of democratization, and they are not
well established and consolidated democracies. According to democratic theory, such regimes are vulnerable and are prone to reversal more easily than an established and old democracy (Linde & Ekman, 2006: 24). A minimalist definition of democracy is therefore necessary in this thesis. In addition, social science has established that there is a positive relationship between economic wealth and democracy, although the modernization theory is not as valid as it was thought to be earlier (Smith, 2001). The theory is about that a certain level of economic development must be achieved before democracy is likely to persist. Nevertheless, there are multiple examples from around the world where poor, underdeveloped states have democratized and have experienced democracy for years. Two of these examples can be said to be Mali and Ghana in 2009, which was classified by Freedom House (2014) as free, democratic states.

3.2 Consolidating Democracy

The field of democratic consolidation is highly debated among scholars and was one of the most frequently used concepts in comparative politics in the 1990s (Schedler, 2001). The main idea is that when a democratic regime has persisted in a state for a substantial amount of years, it should be consolidated (Linde & Ekman, 2006: 24). This means that the democratic regime is stable and not likely to collapse into a hybrid or another non-democratic regime. But a more complex process is involved when a regime is to be consolidated, because a stable and prolonged democracy is not necessarily consolidated. A country can experience democracy for many years and have a stable political system without the democracy being consolidated (Linde & Ekman, 2006: 24). Andreas Schedler (2001) is a well renowned scholar on the field of democratic consolidation and has written a lot on this concept. He formulates his definition of a consolidated democracy as when a democratic regime is likely to endure and one can expect it to last well into the future. The process of democratization can be seen as two phases, where the first phase comprises of transition from an undemocratic regime to a democratic regime, and the second phase is the transition from a vulnerable democracy to an institutionalized and effective democracy (Mainwaring et al., 1992: 18). Consolidating a democracy can therefore be said to be the institutionalizing of the democratic regime. Democratic rules are well known among the political actors, and political decisions have gone from being about the system, institutions or the constitution, to decisions within the system.
The quality of the democracy can be said to have increased, and it is not enough to have had democracy over a long period of time. In addition to stability and institutionalizing of the democratic regime, the legitimacy of the regime is important. When different political actors accept the democratic rules and institutions, one can talk of a democratic regime being consolidated. Samuel Huntington’s definition of a consolidated democracy is well known, but controversial. The “two –turnover test” focus on the importance of elections and the respect of the outcome of an election. According to this definition, a democracy is consolidated when a governing party loose an election and hands over the power to the winning party, and this must happen two times to pass Huntington’s “test” (Linde & Ekman, 2006: 27). There are multiple aspects to criticize here, such as the sole focus on elections and the favoring of a majority election system. Guillermo O'Donnell (1996) are one of the scholars who have criticized the massive and wide use of the concept of consolidation, which he argues have become an empty and confusing concept. Even though this discussion is interesting, I will not go further into this here in this thesis.

3.3 Defining Democratic Breakdown: the Dependent Variable

The study of the transition from democracy has largely been ignored the last decades (Erdmann & Kneuer, 2011: 9). The focus has been on authoritarian states transitioning to democracy, preconditions for democracy and consolidating democracy. Breakdown of democracy have been given much less focus. Breakdowns often take one of two paths, where the first is a sudden breakdown, instigated by i.e. civil war or a military coup, and the second version is a slower type where democracy decays with gradual erosion of important democratic institutions (Erdmann & Kneuer, 2011: 12). Freedom and equality, and control of power can be said to be the most important aspects of a democracy and loss of quality in one of these two can be the starting point of democratic breakdown. The result of this process can be one of three: hybrid regime, authoritarian regime or totalitarian regime (Erdmann & Kneuer, 2011: 24).

When one talks of the breakdown of a democratic regime it is in most cases mentioned a specific date and event that is said to have led to the breakdown. Linz (1978: 80) points out
however, that this date and event only represent the culmination of a process, which could be both long and complex. This means that one have to study not only the actual events right before a breakdown, but also events and the hidden structures that lies in the past, which can be factors leading up to the breakdown. When these hidden events happen, the actors may not have recognized them as important, but in retrospect one can identify points that were important to the regimes fall and increased the likelihood of the regimes fall (Linz, 1978: 81).

Linz (1978: 81) presents five actor-oriented models that can represent patterns typical for the end of a democracy. The first model Linz presents is when a democratic elected government is unconstitutionally displaced by a group who are ready to use violence. Their actions are legitimated by institutional mechanisms meant for emergency situations, and an interim rule is set up. This is a traditional model for military intervention. The second model is when power is overtaken by undemocratic forces and co-opt politicians from the democratic regime, but only limited social changes are instigated. Semidemocratic mechanisms can be maintained. The third model Linz presents is when a new authoritarian regime is established without creating new political institutions. All previous politicians are excluded and the new regime is based on new social forces. In the fourth model, power is overtaken by disloyal opposition that is well-organized and has support in the society. A new political and social order is the goal and no previous politicians are included in the new regime. In the last and fifth model the case is a failed attempt to overtake power and the situation escalates into civil war. The democratic regime is able to resist pressure, but not able to defeat their opponents and there is a high level of political and social mobilization (Linz, 1978: 81).

Breakdown of democracy is according to theories presented by Linz (1978: 50) a result of the governments lacking capacity to resolve problems, which the opposition offers a solution for. In addition to incapacity, Linz highlights structural problems as a possible reason for a government’s inability to act on pressing problems. I find these two possible causes for a breakdown of democracy highly relevant and interesting for the situation in Mali, and I will therefore try to identify the underlying structures that can cause a government to lose control and be incapacitated. However, Linz argues that structural problems are hard to resolve fast enough for a government in a crisis situation. Unsolvable problems can also be a result of the regime elites, with their lacking ability to implement and formulating policy.
The literature on democratic breakdown is more extensive in the Latin American case, than for the African context. But the two regions are quite different and therefore it is questionable to compare them and apply the same literature to a democratic breakdown in Latin America as Africa. The states in Latin America have had their independence from colonial power longer, historical and institutional factors are far apart, as is the external influence on the countries. In addition, the literature on democratic breakdown in Latin America have had a heavy focus on institutions and actors, while this thesis will take on a structural focus on democratic breakdown in Mali. Still, it can be fruitful to review the literature on democratic breakdowns in Latin America.

The wave of democratization in Latin America began in 1978 (Mainwaring & Hagopian, 2005). The region was until this point known for their many authoritarian regimes and had had some, but little experience with democracy. Between 1978 and 1990 almost all states in Latin America had elected governments and democracy was stable and durable despite poor economic performance. There has not been a breakdown of democracy since the wave started in 1978 (Mainwaring & Hagopian, 2005). But in the first half of the 19th century, multiple countries in Latin America experienced periods with democracy, before it eventually broke down. Juan J. Linz in his classical book “The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes”, emphasize the role and behavior of different actors in the process of breakdown, both the opposition and the political leaders of the regime (Linz, 1978: 93). Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) have studied democratic breakdown in Latin America with a large scale actor-based approach, and finds that the actor-perspective can contribute to the field. They highlight the importance of the actors’ normative attitudes towards democracy: democracy is more likely to break down if the actors involved are indifferent to the democratic values, and more likely to survive crisis if the actors hold democratic values high (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013). In addition, level of development did not influence the likelihood for breakdown or survival of democracies in Latin America, as other scholars have found in other regions. A third finding by Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, is the impact of policy radicalism, where strong radical forces make democracy harder to sustain, while policy moderation makes the cost of tolerating policies easier.
3.4 Comparing Democratic Breakdown and State Collapse

In this thesis I use the term democratic breakdown on Mali and the changes that underwent the democratic regime. In the political science literature, there are many terms and definitions that can be similar and therefore easily used wrongly interchangeably. This is why it is important to show what the term democratic breakdown does not include, like state collapse, state crisis and weak state, as I am about to do in this section.

Breakdown of democracy has been very rare the last 30 years; a more common form of regression of democracy is loss of democratic quality and hybridization (Erdmann & Kneuer, 2011: 21). The cases of regression are mostly states with young and poor democracies that were established during the third wave. Erdmann and Kneuer (2011: 28) finds that the older a democratic regime are, the more likely it is to not break down or decline to a hybrid regime. However, state collapse and crisis have been a more common form of political unrest. Crisis in African States often relates to the state institutions and are visible through situations of state weakness or state collapse (Young & Beissinger, 2002: 3). Countries that can be said to have experienced/experiencing state collapse are i.e. Afghanistan and Somalia. State collapse can easily be mistaken for democratic breakdown since one have a clear break in both cases, but the scope and result is usually quite different in these two cases. Weak state is another similar form of crisis in a state. This is a more permanent situation then the other mentioned forms of crisis, and not a clear break from one situation to the next. Criminalization of the state and economy, corruption, lack of basic services from the state and high tension between different cultural groups are typical symptoms of state crisis. State crisis is not a clear set of situations or events, but rather more of a category that multiple serious events fall into, which affect the state negatively and can vary from case to case (Young & Beissinger, 2002: 11). A weak state can be troubled with collapsing economies, uncertainty and incoherence in administrative sector, which in a few cases can escalate into civil war and genocide (Rothchild, 2002: 192). Weak states lack legitimacy, and the states inability to protect its citizens from both local or cross-border unrest and violence can be some of the reasons why the state became weak. In some cases in Africa, the state itself is the source of violence as in
Somalia and Sudan. A weak state can in addition become the source of weakness in the region or other neighboring states. Lack of legitimacy is when the state fails to get the public’s acceptance of an effective political order and enabling the state leaders to make difficult choices in the best interest of the state (Rothchild, 2002: 194). Military coups, growth of informal economy, extreme corruption, emergence of powerful militia can all be signs of a state with weak legitimacy. Ineffective public institutions that are overcentralized and overstuffed is a common sight in post-colonial African countries, which consume large parts of scarce resources (Rothchild, 2002: 197). These institutions is part of why states lack legitimacy since the people expects public services but meet highly bureaucratized and ineffective institutions.
3.5 State capacity and Internal Conflict: the Independent Variables

In this section I will present and outline the two different independent variables chosen for this thesis. Based on studies of existing literature on democratic breakdown, multiple scholars pointed to the close connection between democratic breakdown, internal conflict and state capacity. This is why I chose to include state capacity and internal conflict as my independent variables in this thesis. Further on in this section, literature and definitions on the two concepts will be presented and different views on state capacity and internal conflict will be handled. How I have chosen to operationalize the variables will in addition be presented at the end of each section.

3.5.1 State capacity

“The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government” (Huntington, 1968).

The quotation is taken from the well renowned book “Political order in changing societies” by Huntington (1968) and highlight the importance of studying governments and their capacity to govern, rather than solely focus on the institutions and the surrounding formal arrangements of the state. A large amount of literature in political science published in the last decades have devoted much focus on institutions, and which institutions serves as the best for democracy and consolidation of democracy (Sobek, 2010). But based on Huntington and his point of view it can be interesting to compare Mali and Ghana on their degree of capacity to govern, rather than comparing institutions and study if this capacity has an effect on democratic survival or breakdown. Huntington (1968) found in his study of developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s the incapacity of the state to address the demands from their populations, which in turn led to a rise in political violence and unrest.

State capacity can be quite difficult to define and there are much debate about what to include in a definition of state capacity (Hendrix, 2010). As a consequence, measuring state capacity is a challenge. In a study of conflict, state capacity is an important concept to include and
therefor important to define. There are three main categories one can define state capacity in: Military capacity, administrative capacity and political institutional quality. Military capacity is typically the state’s capability to repress rebellions, and is often operationalized as military personnel per capita or military spending per capita (Hendrix, 2010: 274). Administrative capacity can be measured in multiple ways, among them quality of the service provided by the state during a government change, ability to commit to private investors, the state’s ability to collect revenue from the society, monitor the population, identify and find potential rebels together with collecting information (Hendrix, 2010: 275). Political institutional quality defines state capacity as of which democratic and non-democratic institutions that is present in the political system. Economic indicators can in addition be useful in the study of state capacity (Arriola, 2009). If a state lacks funding, it can be an unsurmountable challenge to provide the population with their basic needs and demands. Administration of the state is difficult when resources are scarce, and it becomes a vicious circle when revenue from tax plummets as a consequence of bad management. Neopatrimonialism is also a part of the economic perspective, since leaders through patronage uses state resources as a cooptation method and to increase personal wealth and power (Arriola, 2009).

Besley and Persson (2010) define state capacity as a state’s ability to effectively implement policies. Earlier research on state capacity focus solely on the state’s power and ability to raising revenue, but in today’s complex societies the state have more demanding responsibilities than just revenue. State capacity have close relations to the concept weak state, where the state often is poor and are not able to conduct basic economic and social functions that a state normally undertakes. Conflict and instability is a common feature as well among weak states, as is weak government institutions that experiences stagnation and hopelessness (Besley & Persson, 2010). Theory of weak and strong state is closely linked to the concept of state capacity. One of the consequences of the colonial period, which had a long lasting effect, was that the colonial powers hired mostly Europeans to bureaucratic positions to run the colonies (Van de Walle, 2001: 129). When independence came to African countries between 1950 and 1970, few natives had any experience or training in running a state, or even a university degree. This changed drastically through the next decades, but still scholars claim that state capacity actually have decreased since the independence of African countries (Van de Walle, 2001: 130). Corruption, low morale and legitimacy problems together with shortage and outdated equipment and technology is part of the picture. Brain
drain and better paid jobs in the private sector leaves the public sector without enough qualified candidates, and normal government tasks like tax collection and statistical service barely functions. Basic services like communications and transportation are much neglected where state capacity is weak. This situation is not present in all states in Africa, and there are degrees of weak states. Van de Walle (2001: 133) suggests that it is not lack of funding or training of civil servants, but instead consequences of formal and informal policies and practices of government.

In case of internal conflict, which is a prominent part of this thesis, state capacity is often linked to the theory of “the Political Opportunity Model” presented by Charles Tilly (1978). This model uses state capacity as the main explanatory factor, in which a state’s capacity to repress or accommodate a rebellion is at the center. An important condition for this model is Weber's definition of the state, which are the only entities that can legitimate make use of violence in a given territory. If the rebels know that the state is capable to repress their planned rebellion, they are less likely to rebel. Or if the state have the capacity to accommodate different interests and grievances through institutionalized channels like party systems, the motivation for conflict and rebellion will be lessened (Tilly, 1978). If a state chooses to repress a rebellion, the state must have the capacity to identify the rebels and what kind of coercion to apply. In case of accommodation of interests, the state must have the capacity to redistribute power and resources (Hendrix, 2010).

How to operationalize the variable
State capacity will in this thesis be operationalized through military and administrative capacity, two of Hendrix (2010) threefold division of capacity. As Hendrix (2010) argue, state capacity is an highly complex concept, and finds no single indicator that can measure state capacity alone. A selection of indicators will therefore be selected on theoretical grounds.

Administrative and military capacity can include many different variables. One of the variables I have chosen to include in state capacity is the state’s ability to effective collect
taxes, which according to the theory of Tilly (1978) can indicate a state’s degree of capacity in case of redistribution of resources. Hendrix (2010) argue that tax as an indicator of capacity involves state capacity in form of both policy making, administration of complex laws, and enforcement of the system. A second indicator of state capacity included in this thesis is the ability of a state to repress and use force when a non-state actor rebel, also according to Tilly’s theory of political opportunity model. I have named this as military capacity. This means the states use and control over the armed forces, and the rebels use of force and violence in a rebellion (Hutchful, 2003: 81). The next indicator I have chosen to study is GDP. The level of GDP per capita and the economic development of a country are often found to correlate with states bureaucratic capacity and is therefore included here (Hendrix, 2010). A predictable socioeconomic environment is a basic requirement for sustained development. A problem with including GDP per capita as a measurement of state capacity is that the indicator can be said to measure multiple other variables as well. However, together with the other chosen indicators, the problem will be reduced. Neopatrimonialism is the fourth and last indicator that will be included in the operationalization of the variable state capacity. Political conflict is often linked to the use of patronage in retaining control over the state and patronage is a common method among many African leaders to extend their tenure in office (Arriola, 2009). There is no consensus among scholars how to best measure the phenomenon, since it is an unclear and difficult variable to measure.
3.5.2 Internal conflict

The slow social and economic development on the African continent can be linked to violent conflicts and the failure to manage and resolve the conflicts (Jackson, 2002). Africa is the continent with most ongoing conflicts and represents a huge problem in many aspects. One of them is the vast amount of internal displacement and refugees in addition to the many millions of civilians who have been killed. Internal conflicts most often originate from domestic factors, and politically motivated violence is involved, and can manifest as everything from large-scale warfare to guerrilla war to genocide. The international community can become involved in the conflict in many ways, by supporting one of the sides in the conflict; give training or other forms of aid, or sending peacekeeping forces to the area (Jackson, 2002).

Jackson (2002: 35) argues that internal conflict can be viewed as “rational policy within a constrained political space”, because internal conflict is a direct result of politics, structures and processes in weak states. Internal conflicts can be the result of a deliberate creation of war economies, which is beneficial for both local and external actors (Jackson, 2002). Ethnicity can be a part of the explanation of why internal conflict arises and who the actors are, but does not complete the picture.

The short time used to create and forming the state in Africa has an impact on the high level of internal conflict (Jackson, 2002). State building is a long process, and took quite some time in Europe, with many wars as a result, while in Africa, state building was done in a couple of decades and suffers now from underdevelopment, weak institutions and irrational state boundaries. Internal conflict and wars are even more likely in Africa in this situation than it was in Europe during its state building process (Jackson, 2002: 37). Globalization is another factor that can help explain the many internal conflicts. Many different actors are involved in Africa today with economic interests in the area, in form of profiting on war, uncertainty, and desperation. In addition, other actors like the United Nations are heavily invested in the region with their own interests and goals, which are good on paper, but add up to the large sum of actors and influencers in Africa (Jackson, 2002).
Internal conflicts in Africa have many consequences and the state itself is widely affected. Regime change, secession, state collapse or never ending cycle of ceasefire and war are some of the situations the African states faces after an internal conflict. Africa's weak states biggest problem is underdevelopment and ongoing economic crisis, which leads to political instability (Jackson, 2002: 48).

Ethnic polarization and fractionalization is a highly debated subject in the scholarly debate in comparative politics, and several scholars are disagreeing on the relationship and consequences of and between a heterogeneous society and internal conflict. An influencing article on the matter is the one written by Easterly and Levine (1997), claiming that ethnic heterogeneity in African states can explain much of the underdevelopment and instability in the region. The argument set forward in the article is that ethnic heterogeneity is one of the causes of poor government policies, which in turn lead to a negative development both economically, but also structural policies like education and infrastructure (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Social conflict and social polarization is underlying factors when political decisions are being made. A higher degree of ethnic polarization can by this mean implementing growth-reducing policies and increase political instability. A higher degree of ethnic diversity leads to adoption of different public policies and thereby different outcome than of a society with a more ethnic homogeneity (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) stresses the fact that it is the probability of conflict in an ethnic heterogeneous state that constitute the main problem and the poor governmental and thereby economic performance is caused by this. Another influencing article written on the subject is the one by Alesina et al. (1997) where the authors comes to the conclusion that ethnic conflict determine the outcome of public finances. In the case of Mali, several scholars points to the important role ethnicity plays in the conflict dynamic (Lindberg, 2013). The different ethnic groups, especially in the northern region are often used in the political game, and are played up against each other to create conflict and more power in the hands of the southern power elite. The government bargain and ally themselves with different ethnic groups as it suits the topic in question, and this contributes to an increased conflict level and unpredictability (Lindberg, 2013).
**How to operationalize the variable**

A country can consist of many different ethnic or religious groups and societies; this is especially true in Africa where the colonial superpowers divided Africa between them with no respect to the distribution of the groups. It can therefore be fruitful to look at fractionalization and ethnic diversity as an indicator for internal conflict. The second set of operationalization of the variable internal conflict is the actual degree and presence of rebellion and conflict in the two chosen cases. An introduction to the conflict in the two countries will be given with important details about the nature of the conflict and statistical figures on how prominent the conflict is to support the qualitative data. The presence of the threat or the actual happening of rebellion and armed uprising can serve as a destabilizing factor in a regime, and the situation worsen when a group seeks and are able to threat the governments hold on administrative positions (Jackson, 2002).
3.5.3 The two independent variables and their relationship

Weak states are more likely to experience internal conflict than strong states (Jackson, 2002: 39). There are many reasons for this, and this is closely connected to the other variables in this thesis, namely state capacity. Weak states are characterized by a number of factors, and manifest as problems of legitimacy, unstable politics, social cleavages, lack of national identity, lack of state and institutional capacity, economic crisis and external vulnerability to international actors. Despite all these serious issues, a state can remain stable over a long period of time, but are prone to experience internal or external shocks, which then can easily destabilize the state. In such a state, the political elite will be dealing continuously with crisis management (Jackson, 2002: 39). When a group wants to rebel, one must consider the states capacity to either repress the rebellion and capture the rebels, or whether the state has the capacity to accommodate the groups demands through political and social institutions (Hendrix, 2010). This is called the political opportunity model.

Highly authoritarian regimes are found to be the type of regime to have fewest internal conflicts (Hendrix, 2010: 276). The argument for this is that the rebels view the repressive force of the state as high, and therefore the cost of rebellion is high. In democracies, one has an additional channel of organizing through the political system, and disputes can be solved in these institutions. Mixed regimes (neither fully democratic nor autocratic) are thought to be the type of regime to experience the highest level of internal conflict, due to lack of enough repression-force and missing political institutional channels (Hendrix, 2010: 276).

The relationship between capacity and social conflict is a complex one, and causality between the two is unclear (Hameiri, 2007: 123). State capacity can shape social conflict as well as social conflict can shape institutional capacity. Hameiri (2007: 124) argues that capacity is a dynamic power and reflects current socio-political relationships, and capacity can reside in different institutions and with different individuals at different points in time. This is shaped by class and ethnicity, which then again shapes institutions. Even if state capacity is improved, with enhanced and more efficient policy implementation, social conflict can be just as prominent in the society as before the changes. This is not the case for every state, but shows the unclear relationship between the two variables (Hameiri, 2007: 132).
3.6 Other possible variables for explaining democratic breakdown

There are many variables and perspectives that are used to explain why democracies break down in the literature on political theory. However, it is not fruitful to include every possible variable that may be relevant to a case. This would imply an enormous amount of different variables that may or may not be relevant to the cases of Mali and Ghana, and could lead to more confusion than enlightenment. This is in addition a methodological question, since I only have two cases to study, there should be a limited number of variables included in the study of these two cases. This is why I have limited my thesis to cover two well-known and debated variables from the literature on democratic breakdown, that I argue is of significance in the two cases I have chosen. In this thesis I will test this hypothesis and study if there are any relationships here. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge and be open about other important variables other scholars often use in explaining democratic breakdown. Therefore, in the forthcoming section, I will present a couple of the most common variables that I do not include in my hypothesis, and shortly explain why I do not include them.

Institutions

Certain institutional arrangements and constrains is a potential threat which can lead to democratic breakdown. Especially the role of the presidential system and two-party system can have a potential destabilizing effect (Linz, 1978: 71). Much debate in the political literature has been on which institutional arrangements are the best, parliamentary or a presidential system. A presidential system involves an elected president for a fixed term, and if the president leaves his office before the term is over, a constitutional crisis occurs. Linz highlight the lack of a moderating power in presidential systems, and when a crisis occur the military have a tendency to fill this function in many countries (Linz, 1978: 71). New democracies are mostly recommended to choose a parliamentary system because of its history of greater survival rate, compared to a presidential system (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002). One factor that are said to be the parliamentary systems advantage, is the governments “guarantee” of support and majority in the parliament, since the government is formed after the parties majority here. There are a greater focus on consensus politics and broader agreement in a parliamentary system than in a presidential one. Nevertheless, a country with a highly
fragmented party system can have difficulties forming a government based on a parliament comprising of numerous different parties representing different social, ethnic and/or religious groups in the society (Cheibub & Limongi, 2002). Kapstein and Converse (2008) is skeptical to the extensive focus on economic variables in the democratization literature as a predictor of democratic breakdown or democratic survival. They highlight multiple cases where economic factors have not played a role, like Eastern Europe during the 1990s, where democracy endured while experiencing economic crisis and Thailand after years with economic growth experienced a military coup in 2006. Kapstein & Converse argues that political institutions are the most important factor in democratic consolidation, and consequently the prevention of democratic breakdown. The role of institutions placing constrains on executive power is according to Kapstein and Converse (2008) of special importance. A common perception is that a parliamentary system more effectively hinders abuse of power by the executive branch, since the government is dependent on the parliament. However, without a strong opposition, free press and an independent judiciary, the parliamentary system can just as easily as a presidential system witness executive power abuse (Kapstein & Converse, 2008: 63). Kapstein & Converse argues that a better measurement is to look at the constraints on executive power regardless of whether it is a president or a prime minister, and divide it into weak and strong constraints. Democratic regimes with weak constraints on executive power are found to be more likely to break down than others (Kapstein & Converse, 2008).

Due to my methodological choice of most similar systems design, I argue that I have controlled for many variables that are similar in both countries. This means that even though a variable may be important to democratic survival or breakdown in one case, it doesn’t need to be the explanatory variable in another case, because the compared countries are similar on this particular variable. The situation in Mali and Ghana regarding institutions is that both have similar democratic institutions, with a presidential system, and I argue that because of this similarity, the variable institutions is not likely to be the most important explanatory variable to why Mali’s democracy broke down and not Ghana’s.
Michael Ross (2012) is among the many scholars who argue that the “resource-curse”, or more specific the “oil-curse”, is one of the largest obstacles for democracy to flourish in multiple countries. Many conflicts across the world are rooted in disputes over oil-reserves, thus hindering development (Ross, 2012: 2). The resource curse seems to only affect the poorest and middle income countries with oil-reserves. Rich and established countries, like Canada, USA, Great Britain and Norway, all have large income from the petroleum sector, but are handling the wealth better than the worse off states that could really need some development, both socially and economically. Still, some countries have managed the transition to democracy despite large oil reserves, Mexico and Nigeria underwent recently a transition towards democracy, although they represent the exception (Ross, 2012: 86).

Explanations to why petroleum revenue supposedly are bad for democracy presented by Ross are multiple; links to corruption, rent seeking, inequality, international oil companies, short sighted politics, nationalization of oil companies and weak state institutions. The wealth accumulated by petroleum is often a source for the rich to get richer and not used to redistribute throughout the community to help the poorest. Secrecy and lack of transparency is a common feature in this type of states, and more so in autocratic states with oil resources than other autocratic states (Ross, 2012: 4). Budgets are held secret and hidden, not open for public insight, and in this way the citizens do not know how large the incomes are or how greedy the oil companies and national leaders are being. One aspect of the coinciding case with lack of democracy and large oil revenue is the fact that citizens do not pay taxes; the state is solely financed by oil revenue. The state is thereby not depending on its citizens to finance state activities and will therefore not give in to public pressure for regime changes (Ross, 2012: 4).

So why do I not focus on this variable in my thesis? Mali has not discovered any petroleum resources yet, while Ghana quite recently discovered occurrence of petroleum. Mali has a considerable mining industry, there are especially large reserves of gold in Mali, but historically petroleum have a more negative effect on democracy than minerals (Smith, 2001). According to the theory of “the resource curse”, it is Ghana who should experience democratic erosion and not Mali. However, the discovery of the “black gold” in Ghana is as mentioned very recent and the full effect of a possible resource crisis may be too soon to spot.
And since it is the petroleum lacking Mali, and not Ghana who have experienced democratic breakdown, this variable is not plausible to help explain my research question.

**Religion**

Religion is an often used variable when studying democracy and democratic breakdown, and in this thesis it could have been relevant to include theory about religion and its effects on democratic breakdown. Mali and Ghana is dominated by two different religions, Islam in Mali and Christianity in Ghana, although both Islam and Christianity in addition constitute a minority in both countries (CIA World Factbook, 2013a; Pringle, 2006). Ghana is especially divided geographically, with Islam dominating in the northern regions, while Christianity is the main religion in the south. According to Stepan and Robertson (2003), there are very few democratic majority Muslim countries in the world, although the few majority Muslim democratic countries that exists “overachieve” in terms of socioeconomically factors. The Muslim countries have a undeserved bad reputation for democratic quality, where it is more the Arab countries that “underachieve” when it comes to democracy, as these regimes are well developed and have high GDP per capita (Karatnycky, 2002). At first glance, it is easy to assume that Mali may have worse conditions than Ghana in developing and consolidating democracy due to the Muslim majority. However, according to this theory, there is not necessarily anything in the religion Islam that would predict undemocratic regime. Therefore, even though Ghana and Mali predominantly are Christian and Muslim respectively, I do not include this as a variable in my hypothesis on democratic breakdown in Mali. As mentioned above, it definitely could be a relevant and interesting variable to look at, but according to literature on the field, it is not likely to be the most important variable to include in this analysis.
4. Methodological considerations

In this chapter, methodological considerations will be dealt with. The type of methodological approach a researcher chooses can have great impact on the study and its results. It is therefore important to explicitly state how and why the researcher have chosen the specific method and carried out the research. In this chapter I begin with a discussion of why I have chosen the method of qualitative case study, followed by a discussion about the chosen method of case selection. Chapter 4 continues on with an examination of the data used in the thesis, before I end the chapter with highlighting a few critical considerations that is important to have in mind while conducting a case study.

4.1 Why comparative method?

This thesis uses the method of comparative case study research, which can be described as a qualitative study with few cases that allows the researcher to study the selected cases in-depth (Gerring, 2007: 17). The choice of case study research is based on the need to understand a complex social phenomenon. There are multiple ways to define a case study, which can be a source for confusion. To be clear and avoid confusion, some definitions of critical terms will be given. A case refers to a phenomenon observed at a point in time or over some period of time. Within the field of comparative politics a nation-state is often, but not necessarily, the studied object and thereby the case. Mali and Ghana represent the cases in this thesis. A case study research is an intensive study of one or more cases, but shifts to a cross-case study when there are several cases that are less intensively studied. The distinction between (and number of cases) case study and cross-case study is not set and is up for debate (Gerring, 2007: 20). Multiple sources of data can be used, like interviews, documents, observation or reports, in which the case is studied in detail over time (Creswell, 2013: 97). When studying a case, one uses different variables as a means to measure different dimensions in an observation. Variables are divided into a dependent variable, which refers to the outcome of the study, and independent variables, which are supposed to explain the outcome and causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Gerring, 2007: 20).
Using qualitative comparative method has many positive aspects. There are a wide variety of techniques that can be used, both qualitative and quantitative or a mixed version and gives the researcher flexibility in both gathering and analyzing the data (Gerring, 2007: 32). When choosing a research method, it is essential to consider the best way to gather information about the specific topic and hypothesis. Measuring a social phenomenon, like breakdown of democracy, is difficult since it is a complex one, and observations and empirical data can only cover a selected part of the phenomenon (Beach et al., 2013: 68).

The primary source of information used in my research is documents, in addition to some quantitative descriptive data. There are several advantages and disadvantages with this choice of sources. One could claim that in addition to documents, I should have conducted interviews with relevant informants in both Mali and Ghana, and with this information have a better understanding of the situation and the causes of the democratic breakdown in Mali. My argument for only studying and analyzing documents in this thesis is the fact that the main variables in focus are structural ones, and it could be difficult to discover clear patterns and evidence of this by interviewing a handful of informants. It would clearly be useful to gather this kind of first handed information, but I think interesting and useful knowledge can be found in analyzing only documents as well. Some of the advantages with this kind of information-gathering, is that it is a stable source of information and other researchers can easily check if the facts one presents are right and replicate the study (Yin, 2009: 102).

4.2 MSSD and the comparison of Mali and Ghana

In this thesis I applied most similar systems design (MSSD) as the method for selecting cases. MSSD is a non-random selection procedure for selecting cases for research (Gerring, 2007: 88). The method is common, especially in qualitative case studies in social science. The aim is to identify cases that can reproduce causal features and vary along theoretical considerations within an area of interest. With an exploratory research design, two or more
cases are compared, which are similar on specified variables, while the outcome is different. The idea with this method is to control for and hold constant some variables, meaning that these variables are considered not to be the main explanation for the outcome, while testing a few variables that varies between the cases, to see if these are the ones causing the difference in the outcome (Gerring, 2007: 131). In this thesis, two similar states is used as cases, where Mali experiences a different outcome than Ghana.

The first thing I as a researcher did was to decide the topic of the study. The topic chosen was democratic breakdown, and I chose this because of my interest in African democracies and related directions within the field on democracy. Then I started to look at possible cases, and it soon became clear that Mali was the most interesting case, both because of the breakdown just had occurred, but also because of the literature on Mali from late 1990s, where Mali was praised for its exemplary African democracy that other African states should copy. The next difficult choice was to decide which country to compare Mali to and using MSSD, I needed to find a similar state to compare with Mali. No state would be perfect, as every state has its own individual history and institutions. But after some research, Ghana seemed like the best choice, despite differences on aspects like religion and colonial heritage. They are far from identical states, but they share some important features that make them meaningful to compare. Case specific analysis is not always the best method for studying a case; sometimes a comparison and a contrasting case can be fruitful. By this I mean to say that many good arguments can be made for why I should have chosen a different case to compare Mali to or only study Mali. But I think that the case of Ghana can bring a lot of interesting knowledge to the field of democratic breakdown in Africa. There are many differences and similarities in patterns of politics in the two countries. But in the desire of generalization one can falsely assume that unites are alike, when they are in fact dissimilar.
4.3 Applied data and its availability, validity and reliability

The importance of correct measurement of information and data cannot be underestimated, at least one should be aware of the many and common mistakes researchers do when collecting and analyzing data. In this section I will try to elaborate and assess the data used in this thesis, and have a critical view on my data’s availability.

The results one might find when doing research can be misleading because of the information and knowledge used (Gerring, 2007: 57). At the point in time when the research is conducted, all information about the subject is not necessarily available, due to different causes. Other concerns can be the data’s preciseness and relevance to the question of interest. Where data is missing or is poorly collected, one cannot have confidence in the results the analysis produces. The actual choice of theme and case can also be done based on information availability and scope, but in reality not be a representative case of the specific universe. The researcher risks posing a conclusion based on information that was easily available or widely elaborated, but which in reality is a deviant case and not representative (Gerring, 2007: 57). Comparing data from difference sources can also be an issue, due to possible differences in criteria’s applied for collecting the data or collections methods. This is especially relevant in this thesis, where I have applied both descriptive qualitative and quantitative data from a range of different sources. Another crucial issue is the collection of already existing data and the reanalysis of this data. The researcher who collected the data could have biases and affected the reported data in multiple ways. When a different researcher reanalyzing the existing data, it is possible that conclusions do not match the actual reality and wrongly concludes (Gerring, 2007: 58).

One of the sources used in this thesis is descriptive statistics from the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset (Teorell et al., 2013). This dataset is based on many different sources and is widely used and recognized, which can, but not necessarily, indicate good quality of the data. The specific data I used from QoG is originally collected from the World Bank. This is a well renowned institution with data material from all over the world over a wide time span. Data collected from this source is perceived to be reliable. A second source of data used in this
thesis is the Institutional Profiles Database (2012), which is not as widely used as the Quality of Government dataset. Still, it provides original measures on a range of different indicators, and is conducted by researchers from different institutions. Both of these sources of data are freely available online. Nevertheless, a critical view should be maintained while using data from these sources, since faults or different methods for measurement can be used when collecting the data. The main type of data used in this thesis is qualitative and descriptive works, in the form of books, articles and journals collected from multiple sources. Most of the authors used in this thesis are renowned, and I often found their work through literary studies done on a specific theme. In addition, I tried to a large extent to find several sources on the same subject, with the aim to secure that the information gathered was coinciding and that the author used did not have a deviant view of the situation. These sources of information were available through the university library and online published scholarly articles.

One advantage with the chosen method in this thesis is the joint usage of both quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell, 2013). This method is often called triangulation, which make use of different evidences from multiple sources, with the aim to shed light on a theme or perspective. In case of major variations between the reported qualitative findings and the quantitative statistics, one should take a closer look at the sources and where the possible mistake can be. However, when the results from both methods coincide, at least to some extent, the results will be more trustworthy. The triangulation and the usage of multiple sources can contribute to enhance the validity of the findings (Creswell, 2013: 251). Validity refers to the materials relevance to the study, which includes operationalization and choice of cases (Grønmo, 2004: 221). It is of importance that these choices reflect the concepts adequately to ensure that the researcher measures the intended concept. This study’s aim is to take a closer look at the concept of democratic breakdown and how the variables state capacity and internal conflict can have an effect on democratic breakdown in Mali. A thorough review of these three concepts is essential to ensure a correct measurement of the phenomenon, and this is the reason for why I have chosen to devote much of the thesis to this clarification, which is the whole theme of chapter 3. Another important aspect of conducting a case study is to ensure reliability of the research design (Yin, 2009: 45). Reliability strive replicability of the conducted study, which implies that other researchers conducting the same
type of study with the same procedures will find coinciding results and conclusions. Hence, errors and biases are important to minimize to ensure reliability (Yin, 2009: 45). In this thesis, errors can occur both when reporting qualitative and quantitative data, and biased conclusions can be drawn especially when dealing with qualitative material. It is of importance to avoid ascribing an author a different meaning or argument after interpreting the text wrongly. With the usage of several different authors on most parts of the thesis, I am trying to avoid this type of error.

4.4 Critical considerations of the methodological approach

The choice of method poses several challenges that are important to have in mind while conducting this kind of research. Among these are the selections of cases that are to be studied in this thesis. It is important to not be biased when choosing the cases, for example choosing a case based on what one might think would fit best with your own conclusions, drawn beforehand of the study (Yin, 2009: 72). In addition one should avoid conducting research based on a wish to pursue and advocate a particular cause.

One of the main aspects with case study that have been criticized is the lack of a clear recipe of how to go about and conduct a case study (Yin, 2009: 14). It is easy for a researcher to be careless and not be systematic enough regarding gathering data or biased view when analyzing the material and giving concluding remarks. In addition, critics claim that case study is not the best way to develop and test scientifically generalizable theories. But the aim with this thesis is not to conclude with anything general on the field of democratic breakdown, rather bring more knowledge about democratic breakdown through studying one case of the phenomenon.
5. Empirical analysis

This chapter will present and analyze empirical evidence on Mali and Ghana concerning the independent variables internal conflict and state capacity and their effect on the dependent variable democratic breakdown. To shed light on the relationship between these variables, both qualitative and quantitative data has been chosen to operationalize the two variables. First, I will present empirical findings on both Mali and Ghana on the operationalization of state capacity and internal conflict. At the end of every section, I take a look at the situation in both Mali and Ghana and compare and analyze the two cases on the indicator. Summary and conclusions will be presented in the next chapter, chapter 6.

5.1 State capacity

State capacity is a highly debated concept and numerous definitions and operationalization exists. This means that I had to choose which indicators to focus on, as presented in chapter 3.5.1 under how to operationalize the variable. Here, empirical findings concerning the indicators and their role in Mali and Ghana will be presented and discussed. The indicators that will be presented in the following sections are: the military`s role and capacity, effective tax collection, GDP and neopatrimonialism.

5.1.1 Military capacity

As I pointed out previously in chapter 3.5.1, a state and its military power can be a good indicator on state capacity, at least as a part of the concept state capacity (Hendrix, 2010). In the case of Mali and Ghana, the military has a long tradition of being a part of the political life in both countries, with many years of military regime and intervention. According to literature on the field, in cases of high military capacity, this high capacity should help contribute to

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3 See Chapter 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 for more details.
deter rebellion and armed uprisings, while an already ongoing conflict is likely to reduce state capacity (Thies, 2010).

Military capacity in Mali

After achieving independence from France in 1960, Mali have had an relatively unstable political history with several coups and attempted coups (Smith, 2001). For example, in 1968, a military coup brought lieutenant Moussa Traorè to power, and up until 1991, with the democratization of Mali, the state was governed by a military regime.

As previously mentioned, several rebellions from the Tuaregs have taken place over the years and the Tuaregs` grievances have never been dealt with properly. The rebellion of 1962 was beaten down harshly by Malian armed forces, with the order of Malian government to kill over 1000 people of the Tuareg community, forcing thousands to flee to neighboring countries, which in the end led to the implementation of military rule in the northern region (Humphreys & ag Mohamed, 2005). The brutal ways of the Malian government was never forgotten by the Tuaregs and serves as an important factor in the more recent rebellions. The second Tuareg rebellion started in 1990. This rebellion was to be especially long and hard to resolve, where peace was not completely restored until 1994 when the Tuaregs lay down their weapons after negotiating a deal with the central government (Humphreys & ag Mohamed, 2005). The 1990 rebellion grew from a small group of fighters from Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) who attacked a small government position in the northeast of Mali. After gaining control there, they moved southwest attacking more government positions and controlling more and better weapons. The attacks were well planned, and had a political agenda. Many of the fighters were Tuaregs returning from combat in Libya. The Malian government tried to respond to the attacks the same way as in 1962 – with brute force. But the MPLA was strong and was able to fight back when Malian soldiers tried to squash the rebellion (Humphreys & ag Mohamed, 2005). Instead, negotiations were initiated and multiple positive solutions were proposed, as demilitarization of the north, replacing military
personnel with civilians in the regional administration, and mixed military patrols with both Malian and Tuareg soldiers. In the middle of this conflict, Mali experienced a regime change with democratic institutions as a result, together with the election of Mali’s first president. After numerous setbacks, escalation of violence and further negotiations, peace was finally restored, bringing hope of a better future for the people in the north (Humphreys & ag Mohamed, 2005). The rebellion led to more than new rights for the northerners, it also gave the civilian government tighter control over the army, hence strengthening Mali’s state capacity.

Despite the efforts from both sides of the conflict to negotiate and create a better future for the whole of Mali, the situation in the northern region did not improve much after the turmoil in the 1990s. Grievances from previous rebellions was never properly solved, for instance neglecting military wage payments and the poorly handled peace settlement with the Tuaregs (Marchal, 2012). The strengthened state capacity in the 1990s soon deteriorated with the neglect of military personnel and supply of material. Agreements and promises from the central government of a better integrated northern society never materialized. The third main Tuareg rebellion started in 2012 and was much shorter than the previous rebellion. Nevertheless, the consequences were to be much greater. The Tuaregs who started the rebellion in January 2012 had military training from the Libyan civil war, and was well equipped and organized before starting the uprising (Kone, 2012). When the Tuaregs returned to Mali after the Libyan civil war, the government was well aware of the amount of weapons the Tuaregs possessed, but no measures to disarm the group was taken, despite warning from multiple instances and neighboring states. This indicates deliberate neglect and abandonment of the northern region by the Malian government. In addition, the Malian armed forces mainly consisted of soldiers from the southern part of the country. This led to harassment of the population in the northern region by southern soldiers, in addition to lack of knowledge about the harsh nature of the northern region, which gave the Tuaregs a huge advantage over the Malian armed forces (Kone, 2012)
The Malian government’s failure to solve the Tuareg problem can be said to directly have caused the newest Tuareg rebellion of 2012 (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). However, the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 and the following coup was something the armed forces should have been able to handle and contain, had the military capacity been higher. This incapacity was exploited by the rebels, following much of “The Political opportunity Model” by Tilly (1978) presented in chapter 3.5.1 With the lack of presence by the central government in the northern region, and the newly massive acquired stock of weapons, the Tuaregs seized the opportunity of acquire power. Mali is, and has been for a long time, a poor state with few resources. This in turn causes the personnel in the armed forces to not receive their paycheck together with being treated badly, their loyalty and ability to protect the states interest becomes weakened (Marchal, 2012). Despite this fact, Mali received international aid to train military personnel and strengthen the Malian military’s capacity. Nevertheless, maintaining law and order in the northern region showed to be difficult for the Malian armed forces. The lack of ammunition and fuel and non-existent support from the central government, made many soldiers and officers mutinied (Marchal, 2012).

Military capacity in Ghana

Ever since the 1970s, the military has had great influence on Ghana’s politics (Hutchful, 2003). A cycle of military coup is one way of describing the situation in post-independence Ghana, where one military regime overtook leadership after another military regime through coups. Since gaining its independence, Ghana has also had short periods of civilian governance in-between the military regimes. The longest reigning president in Ghana’s history, flight lieutenant Rawlings, was one of the many coup makers. He first gained power through a military coup in 1979 before handing it over to civilian politicians after a short period (Dzorgbo, 2001: 256). Rawlings initiated a military coup again in 1981, and had by the time of the new coup become highly popular among the people of Ghana. This military regime persisted until democratic reform was initiated in 1991-1992. The military’s heavy role in politics in this period made many of the most capable officers transfer to civilian government positions (Hutchful, 2003). Because of this, the professionalism and capacity of the Ghanaian military were drastically reduced and civilian control almost nonexistent. At the same time, since then, violence has occurred in relatively contained forms and mostly among
fractions of the army. It was particularly during the transitions and threats of being overthrown by new regimes that waves of violence occurred in Ghana. After Rawlings took power and initiated reforms, popular resistance was incorporated into the regimes security system (Hutchful, 2003: 85). Discipline, order and professionalism were reintroduced in the armed forces, restoring important military governance institutions and deradicalizing soldiers through improved conditions. An increased participation in peacekeeping operations stood out as an especially important task for the military, both as training exercise for the military, but also for stabilizing the civil-military relations in the state. The reformed armed forces gave a more effective military, with higher capacity than before, exemplified with the capture of a CIA spy in 1999, and later also avoiding a terrorist attack on the American embassy in Accra (Hutchful, 2003: 88). According to the model presented by Tilly (1978), potential rebels in Ghana would fear the military might of the Ghanaian armed forces, at the same time as the military have the capacity to monitor and capture potential threats to the society in Ghana. These factors indicate high military capacity in Ghana.

*Mali and Ghana compared*

In both Ghana and Mali, the military has had a great influence on politics historically, which represented a challenge for both countries, as they underwent a transition to a democratic regime. This has for the most part gone smoothly as the military have not had a prominent role in the two countries official politics in the last 20 years. However, in Ghana’s case, it seems as if the military have been able to build a stronger capacity and reformed itself into an effective military force, instead of playing the political game (Hutchful, 2003). Soldiers get their paychecks and military training, and the armed forces have a clear role in the society with the task of peacekeeping operations and not involvement in politics. The armed forces in Mali on the other hand, have not been as successful in reforming as their neighbor in the south. The armed forces capacity seems to have increased in the beginning of the 1990s with the successful termination of the Tuareg rebellion that lasted for years. This capacity though, has deteriorated since, with the neglect of the armed forces by the government.

Consequently, the military was not successful in effective terminate the 2012 rebellion before it escalated, and had to accept help from the French government in order to retain peace in the
northern region (Wing, 2012). As shown in Table 4 - Military Capacity, the military is still found to have a significant involvement in politics in Mali, where Mali score 3 out of the maximum of 4. Ghana’s military, on the other hand, is reported to be less involved in politics with a score of 1 where 0 represent no military involvement in politics. Furthermore, Ghana is reported to have full control over both the army and the police, where Ghana scores 4 on both indicators. Mali on the other hand, has a score of 1 and 2 on control over the army and police respectively, indicating almost no control over the armed forces and the police. The last statistical figures presented in table 4 shows how much military expenditure is as a percentage of the country’s GDP. The numbers presented would seem as though Mali is spending significantly more on the military than Ghana, since the percentage is reported higher. However, Mali’s GDP is lower than Ghana’s, with 9 billion USD in 2009 compared to Ghana’s 26 billion USD (World Bank, 2014a). Therefore, Mali only spent 23 million USD more than Ghana in 2009 on the military, even though Mali is a much larger country with several security threats.

Table 4 - Military Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of the military in politics*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over the army*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over the police*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure % of GDP (constant USD), 2009**</td>
<td>1,6  (150m)</td>
<td>0,4  (127m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scoring-system: 0 = minimum, 4 = max.
Source: Institutional Profiles Database (2012) *
World Bank (2014b)**

These indicators show a large difference between the two states when it comes to the involvement and control over the institutions of violence. Mali’s scores indicate a serious situation, which can be of significance to the causes for democratic breakdown. The fact that the armed forces collapsed at the outbreak of rebellion is a clear sign of the lack of military capacity and supports the statistical data presented. Because of the incapacity of the military, the Tuaregs took advantage of the opportunity and managed to outmaneuver the Malian armed forces quite easily.
5.1.2 Effective tax collection as state capacity

A common method for measuring state capacity is to assess to what degree a state is able to collect revenue from its population and business sector (Besley & Persson, 2010). In more recent literature on state capacity and tax collection, it is in addition common to include the state’s power to enforce contracts and support markets through regulations. In developing states with poor economies, the state often lack the capacity to maintain basic functions, like economic functions and raising revenue required to deliver basic services. This lacking capacity make the government unable to govern effectively and can be a source for uprisings and rebellions, at the same time as conflict in a country can cause the states inability to raise revenue (Besley & Persson, 2010). Tilly (1978) sees this part of the concept of state capacity as an indicator of the state’s ability to redistribute resources.

Mali

Mali is heavily dependent on aid from international donors, in addition to grants from the World Bank and the IMF (Pringle, 2006). Further on, the Malian economic policy is highly developed by the aid donors, leaving Malian government with low capacity to implement policy choices of their own. Local government has been given the task to collect some of the taxes in Mali to finance their local government. The problem is that many Malians hesitate with paying their taxes, much due to President Konarè and his abolishment of the old colonial head tax in the beginning of the 1990s, which he claimed to be a victory for the newly established democracy. A new local development tax was then implemented, quite similar to the old tax system, based on the number of heads in a household. Though now, many associated democracy with no taxes and thereby were unwilling to pay. In 2002 39 % of the population paid their taxes, and although the local authority has the power to call in the police to compel the villagers to pay their taxes, this rarely happens (Pringle, 2006). In addition to local taxes, national taxes like value added tax (VAT) was implemented in 1991 on a 18 % level, much due to pressure from the IMF (Riswold, 2004). However, there is limited possible revenue coming from VAT because of the small economy and people having low income and thus lacking resources to buy commodities. Between 1987- 1993, Mali had an overall tax rate of 10.3 % of their GDP, with an increase between 1994- 1999 to 12.8 %. One of IMFs aims
by promoting the implementation of VAT was the spillover effect this was thought to have on the efficiency in administrating other taxes in a state. There is in addition a large informal economic sector that is difficult to tax. The bureaucracy in Mali has several challenges and corruption is a part of these challenges. Corruption is a part of the reasons for the lacking capacity to implement and execute policy and the low efficiency in tax administration (Van de Walle, 2012).

Ghana

During the 1960s and 1970s, Ghana experienced a severe economic crisis, where serious structural misalignments emerged in Ghana’s political economy and several internal and external shocks occurred (Hutchful, 2003). The tax system was especially inefficient, with fiscal policy measures taken on ad hoc basis, and the implementation and administration of the tax system was uncoordinated (Kusi & Consortium, 1998). This caused the state finances to drop radically and leaving Ghana in a severe economic situation. Government institutions were increasingly unable to perform basic functions, including tax collection (Hutchful, 2003). The state expanded spending radically at the same time as its capacity to collect taxes was almost entirely lost. Rawlings coup in 1981 proved to be a turning point in Ghana’s development, with the start of reforming state institutions and muted the level of conflict. Socialistic and nationalistic policies were abandoned, and with the help of IMF and the World Bank, structural adjustment program were negotiated and administrative control was restored. Disciplined fiscal practices was introduced, and equipped the public and development administration to better handle tax policies among other (Hutchful, 2003). Attempts have been made to enhance the efficiency of the tax system and it seems to have worked to a certain degree (Kusi & Consortium, 1998). However, the tax administration continued to struggle with inefficiency, much due to hardship gaining competent employees and handling corruption. Between 1980-1986 Ghana had a total tax rate of 7.3 % of GDP, while it increased in the period 1987-1993 to 12.3 % and yet again between 1994-1999 to 14.5 % of GDP (Riswold, 2004). One of the steps Ghana took to increase the tax revenue was to implement VAT in 1999 at a 12 % level.
Mali and Ghana compared

The efficiency of tax administration is reported to be somewhat different in the two cases. In Table 5 - Tax Collection, Mali is reported to have a score of 1.75 on how effective the state administers tax collection. This score indicates that the efficiency of the tax administration is not optimal, but still functioning. Ghana scores 3 on the indicator and the efficiency is thereby perceived as better in Ghana than in Mali, still with some room for improvement.

Table 5 - Tax Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency of Tax admin.</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scoring-system: 0 = minimum, 4 = max.  

State capacity measured by efficiency of the tax administration can thereby be said to of a higher degree in Ghana than in Mali, due to the large difference in score in table 5, together with the qualitative reported differences in tax administration above. Nevertheless, the efficiency has improved in both countries since the 1980s through multiple reforms and help from the international community. Still, both states struggle with the extensive presence of corruption in the society, which does not improve the populations’ willingness to contribute through paying their taxes. It is quite crucial for a state to heighten the tax base and tax efficiency when an increase in revenue enables the state to deliver more and better services to the population. This means that an increase in state capacity on this indicator can potentially increase the states capacity in other areas too. In terms of avoiding democratic breakdown, better administration of different aspects of the state can be a large contribution to this. High efficiency in the tax administration can indicate a healthy civil service where institutional practices are good and the state have penetrated all part of the society (Hendrix, 2010).
5.1.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Young democracies are the most likely to break down, due to multiple causes (Kapstein & Converse, 2008). One of them are what Kapstein and Converse (2008: 60) calls initial conditions; socioeconomic factors that are present when a country were democratized and that are likely to determine how a country develops both politically and economically in the future. The classical citation from Lipset et al. (1992: 8) “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” is describing the modernization theory’s key point, all though much debate and different findings have been presented since Lipset first presented his article. Modernization theory explains the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy, where economic development promotes democracy through changing and improving political culture and social structure (Diamond, 1992: 128). Through socioeconomic development, democracy is sustained by contributing to stability and legitimacy, or in non-democratic countries it eventually will lead to successful democracy, according to some.

Economic conditions can be used as predictors of state capacity and political instability in Africa and other developing regions, and a common indicator is GDP per capita (Arriola, 2009). The government in a poor country is not likely to have the resources to pay military personnel for their services or to put down even small and local rebellions. Low levels of GDP per capita is also associated with bad infrastructure and low degree of penetration of the central government in the rural areas of the state (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In addition, low levels of GDP per capita often can imply low capacity level in both finance, administrative and the military. Further, recruiting men to rebel forces are easier when the economic prospects are bad. This lack of capacity can be devastating and the loyalty of the state employed can be up for sale. Arriola (2009) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) is among the many scholars who finds that higher income levels and growth rates reduces the risk for coups. This does not only covers the rich, western states but also former colonies in Africa (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Przeworski et al. (1996) finds that economic development has a strong effect on the survival of a democratic regime. Poor democracies with a GDP per capita of less than $1000 are more likely to collapse compared to democracies with an annual income of above $6000, when the regime can be expected to be sustained. With an annual income between
$1000 and $6000, Przeworski et al. (1996) finds that a democratic collapse can occur if the regime experiences an economic crisis. Together with a low growth rate, poor democracies are prone to break down.

**Mali**

Mali continuous to be one of the world’s poorest countries in terms of GDP per capita and was considered to be a highly unlikely state to democratize (Van de Walle, 2012). Aid dependency is high and Mali is the state which receives the most foreign aid in the region, with foreign aid accounting for more than 50 % of the government’s annual budget. Nevertheless, a steady annual economic growth of 5.8 % has taken place from 1995 to 2005. The reasons for this growth can be found in economic policy reforms implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s together with higher global gold prices and devaluation of the CFA Franc (Van de Walle, 2012). Gold mining and cotton production represent the main industry in Mali (Kone, 2012). Much of the growth in GDP seen in Error! Reference source not found. stems from cotton exports and gold mining, with a favorable global marked and good rainfall for the agricultural production (Smith, 2001). This dependency on good conditions for agricultural production and global markets makes Mali’s economy especially fragile and changes in these uncontrollable variables can be devastating. The severe draughts in the 1970s and 1980s serves as an example of this, where Mali’s economy was in a serious crisis (Smith, 2001). Aid dependency implies little control over how to spend the resources, and with little central control and long term strategy of the economy, further growth can be difficult to achieve (Pringle, 2006).

The lack of economic opportunity is in general destabilizing and serves as a cause in Mali’s case to why both the second and third Tuareg rebellion was initiated (Keita, 1998). Weak economy often implies few employment possibilities, and the possibility for economic reward by joining the rebel forces will be preferred by many. The economy in Mali is general in a bad state, despite the upward trend during the last decade (Van de Walle, 2012). Higher levels of
income and a more stable economic environment have been achieved. However, the situation in the northern region is in even worse condition, with few investments from both the central government and foreign donors (Van de Walle, 2012). Development and progress in the south does not do the Tuaregs any good when the region is neglected and overlooked by the central government in Bamako for decades. The reported economic growth in Mali should have improved Mali’s ability to sustain democracy, but when the improvements are unevenly distributed and the Tuaregs and the rest of the northern region is held on the sideline, uprisings and violence may be an understandable reaction.

**Ghana**

From Rawlings first coup in 1979 and until 1983, drastic and revolutionary reforms was attempted implemented in both Ghana’s political and economic policies (Dzorgbo, 2001: 256). Ghana continued to struggle with the economic legacy from the 70s, where the Ghanaian economy became increasingly bankrupt and international financial institutions refused to give further loans due to the already exceptional high levels of loans. An economic crisis was already imminent and the regimes policies were both incoherent and destructive to the socioeconomic environment for investors. The regime intervened in the marked and imposed price controls on important commodities. However, from 1983 and onwards a much more conservative path in economic matters was chosen, and Ghana was able to achieve a more predictable environment in both politics and economics. One of Rawlings reforms was the implementation of the IMF and the World Banks structural adjustment program, and after some time, the environment for investments and production was improved and Ghana started experiencing economic growth again. Especially important for the improvement in economic growth was to attract foreign investors to Ghana again, through building a better image (Dzorgbo, 2001: 261). Ghana has experienced exceptional growth in the latter half of 00s. Significant increase in aid, capital flow and commodity prices have all contributed to the economic boost, where Ghana had an average economic growth from 1983 through 2000 at 4.5 per cent, peaking in 2011 with 15 per cent growth (Addai & Pokimica, 2010; World Bank, 2014a). This development is presented in figure 3.
GDP per capita is one of the most common ways to operationalize and measure the economic level of a country. In addition I assess the percentage GDP growth and constant GDP to get a more complete picture of the economic situation in the two cases. Figure 3 shows the changes in GDP per capita in Ghana and Mali from 1980 to 2011. In 1980 Ghana had a GDP per capita of 992 USD, Mali 750 USD. Both countries experiences an economic downturn during the 1980s, Ghana’s low point occurs in 1983 with 772 USD GDP, Mali hits bottom in 1985 with 599 USD GDP. Slowly and gradually, both countries GDP per capita increases during the 90s-00s. However, the similar trend in the two countries shifts halfway into the 00s, with increasing growth in Ghana, ending in 2011 on 1652 USD GDP, while GDP per capita in Mali seems to level out with 963 USD in 2011. It is important to comment the context here; 2008-2009 a serious financial crisis hit many of the world’s countries. But other than less growth in Ghana between 2008 and 2009, it doesn’t seem to have had a great impact on the economic sector in the two countries. Between 2010 and 2011, Ghana went from a GDP per capita of 1472 USD to 1594USD, which is a huge leap. GDP per capita is by definition affected of the population growth in the country, which have been relatively stable in the 00s (World Bank, 2014a).

In the case of Mali and Ghana, GDP per capita when democratized was below $1000 dollars (Teorell et al., 2013). In 2011, the year before Mali experienced a democratic breakdown, Mali were still below an annual income of $1000, while Ghana had increased its GDP per capita to $1594 together with a positive growth rate on 15%, as showed in Table 6 - Economic variables. Modernization theory and Przeworski et al. (1996) claims that a country’s economic level and democratic status are closely linked, and rapid change in the economic situation can cause serious effects on the country’s regime, as have been discussed in the beginning of this section. In addition, Przeworski et al. (1996) find that states with a GDP per capita below $1000 are more prone to collapse than other states with a higher level of economic development. Based on this argument, the differences in economic development can serve as part of the reason for why the democracy broke down in Mali and not Ghana. In Ghana’s case, which has a GDP per capita just above the $1000 limit, democracy is prone to
break down if an economic crisis occurs, according to Przeworski et al. (1996). This have Ghana not experienced the last couple of years.

**Figure 3 - GDP per capita**

![GDP per capita graph](image)

*Source: Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 2013).*

**Table 6 - Economic variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita USD 2011</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>1594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP constant USD 2011</td>
<td>10 647 545 670</td>
<td>39 564 970 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP % growth 2011</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2014a).*
5.1.4 Neopatrimonialism

Neopatrimonialism is the main strategy used by most African leaders to buy off rivals and their followers, and is a way of state abuse (Arriola, 2009). This kind of systems has some common characteristics, where power is based on personalized rule, which is organized in clientelistic networks where patronage, loyalty and coercion are important. One way to buy off rivals is to offer them ministerial posts in the government and through this increase the size of the cabinet. This is a method to stabilize the political environment in a regime and to prevent coups or rebellion. According to Arriola (2009) this form for patronage does prevent rebellions and coups, but only up until a specific point where it almost tempt a coup. There are only so many ministerial posts one can create, and there is usually a limit on how much resources one can exploit to this purpose, most African states are inevitably poor. Violence erupt when elites demand more of the advantages controlled by the leader, or an outsider of the patronage coalition wants access to the resources they have been denied (Arriola, 2009).

The exceptional durability of many African regimes is often explained by patronage relationships where the leaders use state resources to remain in power. It is difficult to measure patronage and there are little direct or systematic measures of neopatrimonialism in Africa (Arriola, 2009).

Mali

State incapacity is among the variables that scholars argue is the cause of the Malian conflict and democratic breakdown (Lindberg, 2013). One aspect of this is the tradition for usage of neopatrimonialism in Mali, where the elites in the south cooperate with ruling elites in the north, depending on shifting causes and depending on what is most beneficial, in return for stability. Cooperation with terrorist and extremists is a part of this system and this informal network can be said to have a large part in the Malian troubles and instability. The nationalist Tuareg group MNLA rebelled largely because they were excluded from deals with president Tourè and the southern power elite (Lindberg, 2013). And with shifting priorities and politics, alliances thus shifted, creating an unstable and unpredictable system of support and loyalty. Through patronage, president Tourè and his government could co-opt the opposition parties and put an efficient lid on all critical voices (Marchal, 2012). This was long viewed by academic writers as a consensus way of doing politics and a showcase for democratic
development in Africa. Instead it seems like a way of getting away with corruption and power abuse and one may need to reconsider how democratic the regime in Mali actually was before the military coup and democratic breakdown in 2012 (Marchal, 2012).

Ghana

Ghana has experienced great progress in terms of democratic development, with regular elections and peaceful political alternation of power (Lindberg, 2003). At the same time, outside the electoral channel, neopatrimonialism is a common strategy used also in Ghana as in many other African states. The way leaders are elected is following the democratic norm; however, the way leaders get elected and how they govern when elected can often be another story. This way, the sole fact that free and fair elections are being held do not tell the whole story of “how democratic” Ghana is, because there are more to the story. In Ghana’s case, patronage was present before democratization and prevailed after the regime change in the beginning of the 1990s, and continues to exits in the Ghanaian society today. Lindberg (2003) argues that neopatrimonialism actually increased in strength and intensity after the establishment of multiparty democracy. To get reelected, MPs in Ghana have to spend enormous amount of time and money on individuals needs from their respective constituencies. Spending the states resources on an individual’s funeral, social events or other personal expenditures in order to be reelected is not in the best interest of the whole population in Ghana, and individual’s demands over the MPs are reported to be increasing drastically. In a liberal democracy this individualistic way of conducting politics is not ideal, and can be a source of deteriorating the democratic regimes values and functions (Lindberg, 2003).

Mali and Ghana compared

There is a high degree of reported neopatrimonialism in both Mali and Ghana, and that can serve as a threat to the democratic norms and values in both countries. As mention previously, patronage is difficult to measure since it is a wide concept and thereby the data should be
handled thereafter. However, the reported results in the two cases can at least be seen as indicators on the situation of the system of neopatrimonialism in Mali and Ghana. From the data presented, it seems that the patronage system in Mali, where the different interests of the northern groups is almost played up against each other, and the government is using this situation to their benefit, which is especially damaging and almost encourages conflict. The Ghanaian situation is not ideal either, with the patronage system serving as a possible threat to the sustainment and consolidation of democracy. By using state resources to accumulate personal wealth, state capacity is drained, which instead could have been used to perform public services. This is a serious deficiency in the democratic regimes of Mali and Ghana, and is making the state in a large extent incapable to function properly.
5.2 Internal conflict

There are several aspects that are worth highlighting when it comes to internal conflict in Mali and Ghana. Firstly, evidence of fractionalization and ethnic diversity will be presented, and secondly, the presence of rebellion and conflict in the two countries will be handled in depth.

5.2.1 Fractionalization and ethnical diversity

There is a long tradition in comparative politics to explain conflict with the presence of ethnic diversity and a fractionalized society (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Ethnic nationalism and cultural differences are claimed to promote conflict and unrest in a heterogeneous country, and the risk of conflict and violence is said to be much greater than in a more homogenous society. The ethnic and cultural differences are supposed to nurture grievances and discrimination, which in turn can lead to conflict, rebellion and violence (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Linz (1978: 20) is among the scholars who argue that it poses a serious threat to the democracy if the government does not address the populations’ demands, especially in an ethnical diverse society.

Ethnic diversity in Mali

One of the main features of Mali is the diversity that exists in the state (Humphreys & ag Mohamed, 2005). It is common knowledge that the European colonial powers divided Africa between themselves in the late 1800s, and through this created unnatural entities that divided ethnic groups between states, comprising of many different ethnic groups or unnatural geographical entities. This is the case in Mali as well, and today, Mali consists of many ethnic groups that use different languages, have different religion, culture and beliefs, and are spread throughout the vast state called Mali. However, one often talk about two different groups in Mali, divided by race, the white living in the north, consisting of Tuaregs and Arabs, and the black population of the south. According to several scholars theorizing about the relationship
between ethnic diversity and internal conflict there is a pattern of higher conflict level in more ethnic diverse states (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). At the same time, conflict can be present in a state without ethnic diversity. Somalia, which represents one of the states with the highest degree of civil unrest in the world, have a population that are ethnic homogeneous in addition to having the same religion and language. A high degree of ethnic heterogeneity is linked to many different theoretical variables, one of them economic performance. The argument is that polarized societies lead to poor policy performance at the government level and in the long run negative economic growth is the result. This involves mishandling of structural policies like infrastructure and educations, alongside general low efficiency of the government. Political instability can theoretical be one of the consequences of an ethnic fractionalized society (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). However, northern Mali does not comprise of one dominant ethnic group who is in opposition to an ethnic group in the south (Humphreys & ag Mohamed, 2005). Rather, the situation is that Mali constitutes of multiple ethnic groups in both the north and the south, and it is more common to talk about two different “races” in Mali, the white in the north and the black in the south. At the same time as the ethnic fractionalization is high in Mali, religious fractionalization is quite low, with most of Malians being Muslim (Smith, 2001). Songhai, Fulani, Arab Berabiches, and Moors is some of the different groups that inhabit the northern region of Mali, or “Azawad”, in addition to the Tuaregs (Marchal, 2012). These minority groups largely organize themselves and many are in opposition to the Tuaregs and their rebellion, due to fear of a Tuareg-controlled state in the future. At the same time, some have joined the insurgency and are making the picture of the rebels more complex. Due to this, it may be wrong to only refer to the conflict as a Tuareg rebellion, when there is multiple minority groups who are participating based on conflicting causes. Nevertheless, the Tuaregs is the largest group in the northern region and stands as the main actor in the rebellion (Marchal, 2012).

*Ethnic diversity in Ghana*

A north-south division is also present in Ghana, with differences in both ethnicity, average income, and human development (Shepherd et al., 2006). The southern regions of Ghana are populated by the groups Akan (50% of the national population), Ewe (13%), and Ga Adangbe (8%), while the northern region is mostly populated by the Mole-Dagbani (15%). When it
comes to religion, Christianity is the dominant religion in the south with 70% of the national population belonging to the religion, while Islam is the more dominant religion in the north and constitutes 16% of the national population. The average per capita income is 2-4 times lower in the northern region of Ghana than in the south, and inequality rose through the 1990s. Few investments and an economy mostly based on farming is part of the reasons why the north is behind when it comes to economic development, and it is especially the rural areas that are worst off – urban areas in the north are more similar to their counterparts in the south. Historical factors are also important when dealing with fractionalization and ethnic diversity in Ghana (Shepherd et al., 2006). Ethnic polarization in Ghana is mainly a north-south divide, where the north was long neglected and underdeveloped (Addai & Pokimica, 2010). During colonial rule this pattern started, and continued on after independence. During the colonial period the government actively ensured that the north was subordinate in matters of politics and economics, and hindered investments and development of infrastructure. Colonial policy ensured that the north served as a labor reserve function for the southern part of the country and this was actively promoted. This pattern continued after independence, largely because of the lack of infrastructure and the strongly established hierarchical system, where the ethnic group of the south, Akan serves as the rulers, and the groups in the north, Mole-Dagbani and other acephalous (king-less) ethnic groups are ranged lower in the society (Shepherd et al., 2006). The inequality and division between the different ethnic groups can lead to a higher conflict level and worsening the situation regarding investments and development.

**Mali and Ghana compared**

In the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 2013), there are two different measures on fractionalizing in Mali and Ghana – Religious and ethnic, as shown in Table 7 - Fractionalization index. Of the data displayed in the table below, one can see that the two countries are quite different when it comes to religion, where Mali is not very fractionalized with a score of 0,18 and Ghana a score of 0,79. This is rooted in the fact that most Malians belong to religion of Islam, and Ghana, though mostly Christian, have a more diverse religious community then Mali. The two countries have almost identical results when it comes to ethnic fractionalization, with a score of 0,69 and 0,67 Mali and Ghana respectively. This
indicates that ethnic fractionalization as a measurement on internal conflict cannot explain the differences between Mali and Ghana when it comes to its effect on democratic breakdown. Still, it can be an important cause to the democratic breakdown in Mali, though it cannot explain why Ghana did not experience a democratic breakdown as well. It could be argued that ethnic heterogeneity is a contributing factor to Mali’s breakdown, but not the main and decisive cause.

Table 7 - Fractionalization index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>0,18</td>
<td>0,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>0,67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al., 2013).*

When Ghana only has a slightly less reported ethnic fractionalization, almost non-existent difference, one cannot rely on this as the important variable to explain the differences between Mali and Ghana regarding democratic breakdown. These findings are supported by the findings in Fearon and Laitin (2003) paper, where they argue that there are other more important variables that explains the outbreak of conflict, rebellion and violence. Ethnic fractionalization is in their analysis not correlated with the onset of conflict. This leads me to the next variable I have chosen to include in my thesis, the actual presence of internal conflict.
5.2.2 The presence of rebellion, conflict and armed uprisings

Both cases in this thesis have undergone a democratization process, and through these newly established democratic channels citizens should be able to express their opinions and grievances (Sobek, 2010). At the same time the state should have the ability to address the populations’ demands. In this way the responsiveness of the state can help reduce the incentives for political violence. Not all states have the capacity to follow this and thereby struggle with uprisings and violence. Linz (1978) is among the scholars arguing that violence can both be an indicator, but also a cause of democratic breakdowns. Political instability and conflicts in Africa often stems from the national elites failure to respond to their populations demands, which often are ethnic representation in government or redistributions of other goods (Arriola, 2009). Other reasons for conflict can be ethnic, cultural, economic or other grievances. In this section, the actual presence of conflict in the two cases will be presented and outlined, before a comparison of the two countries will be given at the end.

Mali

Throughout Mali’s history the Tuareg group have been the main source of internal conflict and unrest (Gates & Justesen, 2013). The Tuareg conflict was by some viewed as a solved problem until recently (Keita, 1998). Others have claimed that northern Mali was calm and peaceful before the rebels and Islamic extremist arrived (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). The fact is that the northern region have been plagued by sporadic violent uprisings for at least the last three decades, and have a long history of underdevelopment and marginalization (Keita, 1998). Northern Mali was neglected and had few rights under colonial rule, and it did not improve much after independence. The Tuaregs rebelled in 1962-64 and again in 1990-94, before the Malian government took action and tried to a greater extent to integrate the group in the Malian society. The first Tuareg rebellion was suppressed with harsh methods and brutal violence and the end of the rebellion did not solve the Tuaregs grievances, only put the rebellion down. When the peace was restored, a heavy military presence was maintained in the region to prevent further rebellions. At the second big Tuareg rebellion the Malian government tried to solve the problem with brutal methods again. However, when the
rebellion only escalated as a reaction to the government brutal force, negotiations and more peaceful methods was adopted. One of the solutions of the conflict was to a greater extend to incorporate the Tuaregs into the security forces as a mean to integrate them into an armed force dominated by southern soldiers (Keita, 1998). This solution did not last for long, when the soldiers from the north felt mistreated and mutinied.

For the Tuaregs, like many other ethnic groups in Africa, the colonial division of Africa was to be of major significance for their future (Keita, 1998). The ethnic groups was dispersed and divided by several country borders. Together with neglect from the central government, both during colonial period and after, economic hardship and large recruitment to extremist Islamic groups, the Tuareg have definitely had grievances and challenges over the years. Motivation for insurgency is easy to spot and justify. The Tuareg was in addition severely underrepresented in both the civil administration and in the military with no mechanism for channeling Tuareg opinions. In the third rebellion, as in the second main Tuareg rebellion, a heavy presence of young and unemployed Tuareg men with access to a lot of weapons set the conflict in motion (Van de Walle, 2012).

A typical feature of the Tuaregs armed conflict throughout history is the low-scale and low intensity of the conflict (Gates & Justesen, 2013). However, what was unusual with the rebellion of 2012 was that the Tuaregs were able to defeat key Malian military installations relatively easy and without much resistance (Van de Walle, 2012). The previous rebellions by the Tuaregs have been settled relatively fast after military might and negotiations. In addition the rebels did not achieve much or controlled important areas or institutions. With the 2012 rebellion, the rebels claimed and controlled 2/3 of Malian territory and a coup was conducted in the capital against the Malian president by Malian soldiers. This civil and military defeat was severe and indicates serious structural problems in today’s Mali (Van de Walle, 2012). Despite this seemingly obvious problem with the northern groups, the international community and academia devoted little attention to the Tuareg problem and the potential threat to Malian democracy before the 2012 rebellion. Since Mali gained independence in
1960 little have been done by the central government in Bamako to solve the grievances of the north and to include the region in the development of the south (Van de Walle, 2012).

**Ghana**

In the 1970s, Ghana had many attributes that is typical for a state in crisis and with a big potential for violent internal conflict (Hutchful, 2003: 78). The state lacked legitimacy, capacity and experienced a severe economic crisis. In addition a militarization of the state was prominent together with the increasing loss of civilian control over the army and police and a threat of national disintegration. The image of the “sick man of West Africa” is suitable when describing Ghana in this period (Hutchful, 2003).

The north-south divide in Ghana is prominent and have been for many years, especially during the colonial period (Shepherd et al., 2006). Since the 1980s a few unresolved conflicts have emerged, and it is often the youth that is at the center of the turmoil. The reasons for why it is the youth in particular are often explained by pointing to the lack of economic prospects and the high level of unemployment. With no hope for the future it can be easy to take to the streets and rebel against the government that they feel are failing them. When conflicts have arisen, the government has been able to contain the uprisings to a large extent. However, the underlying reason for these conflicts has not been properly resolved, and the risk concerning the insecurity in the northern area is a part of why investors and the government hesitate to invest in further development (Shepherd et al., 2006).

The biggest source of conflict in Ghana the last few decades can be said to be the armed forces itself, and not the north-south conflict as have been the case in Mali (Dzorgbo, 2001: 256). As mentioned multiple times in this thesis, Ghana have experienced a fair share of turmoil since their independence from Britain, and coups initiated by the military have played
a prominent role in this (Dzorgbo, 2001: 256). However, despite multiple threats, the state never completely lost control over institutions and the instruments of violence (Hutchful, 2003: 81). Previous soldiers, who were allied with Rawlings, tried to overthrow Rawlings regime several times without succeeding. Their strategy was to use quick and brutal force and seize control over key installations. In addition they hoped that unrest and overthrowing of regimes in neighboring countries would develop into a domino effect and topple Ghana`s regime as well. As an answer to these actions, Ghana took an active role in coordinating national and regional security concerns (Hutchful, 2003).

However, Ghana was able to reverse the conflict trends that plagued the country in the previous years, especially all the military coups and turmoil (Hutchful, 2003: 90). Much attention has been given in the political science literature to all the African states that have experienced and is experiencing violence and internal conflict. Less focus have been given to for example Ghana, who have been one of the states that have gone through periods with a high conflict level, but was able to change this feature and today the conflict level is much lower and under control. Rawlings last military coup stands as a turning point in the changing of the conflict level in Ghana, and further conflicts were effectively muted, especially after 1985. Political order and stability was restored together with improvements economically. The cycle of military coups was stopped and democratic institutions were implemented during the 1990s. In only a few years, Ghana changed its image and became one of the region’s most stable and credible states (Hutchful, 2003: 79).

Mali and Ghana compared

As shown in Table 8 - Presence of Conflict, Mali is on both indicators reported to have a higher presence of conflict. The scoring-system used in this table is 0 for no internal conflict and 4 represent full internal conflict. On the indicator for general presence of internal conflict in the state, Mali scores 2.5 compared to Ghana with 1.75, which only represent 0.75 differences on the score. Nevertheless, Mali is reported to have a higher degree of conflict and
this finding is supported by the empirical study presented in the text above. The next indicator in table 8 is about what type of conflict that is prominent, where Mali gets maximum score for having an ethnic, religious and/or regional type of conflict. Ghana is ranged much lower on this indicator with a score of 2. However, to include three types of conflict in one variable may be problematic, as it captures a broad range of conflicts. Still, the three types of conflict that is included can often be present at the same time in a country with the divisions being ethnic, regional and religious. Of the empirical knowledge presented, the main conflict is ethnic and regional in Mali with the Tuareg and the north-south issue as a continuous conflict, while religion is much less important with most of Malians being Muslim. Ghana has had a conflict level based much more on regional and to some degree ethnic character, accompanied by a north-south conflict. Although, the most prominent conflict in Ghana’s case is in my view not included in the data in table 8, namely the military. Historically, Ghana’s military represented the main source of conflict with continuous coups and uprisings. In Table 4 - Military Capacity the military is reported to no longer having heavy involvement in politics, with a score of 1. This is consistent with the empirical findings, where the military were reported to be better organized and not a part of the politics, when Rawlings started reforming the system after 1985. According to literature on the field of democratic breakdown, the presence of violent internal conflict can have a great impact whether or not democracy persists (Jackson, 2002).

Table 8 - Presence of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Conflict</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Conflict: ethnic, religious, regional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Scoring-system: 0 = minimum, 4 = max.*  
*Source: Institutional Profiles Database (2012).*
6. Concluding remarks

The first words in this thesis were about how unbelievable it was that democracy emerged and persisted in Mali in the first place. Academics should perhaps have expected and foreseen the democratic breakdown earlier based on signs and the situation Mali was in. Though, it is easy to claim this in hindsight, and the focus of this thesis is to analyze the causes of the breakdown. I will in this chapter present a summary of my thesis, my conclusions and some of the solutions offered by different scholars, together with proposal for further research. The main finding in this thesis is that due to incapacity in the state and the presence of a higher level of internal conflict, the democracy broke down in Mali and not Ghana. Especially important is the link between the two variables, where the Malian state incapacity over time have been unable to address the grievances of the north and through this fueled the conflict level that mounted in the 2012 rebellion.

6.1 Summary and conclusions

Mali and Ghana is two underdeveloped West-African states, which underwent political liberalization and democratization in the early 1990s. After 20 years of experiencing functioning democratic institutions with free and fair elections and alternation of power, Mali suffered from rebellion and a military coup yet again and breakdown of democracy was the consequence. How this could happen in a praised democracy such as Mali is the puzzle of this thesis, and state capacity and internal conflict serves as the main explanatory variables. The method used to conduct this thesis is comparative case study where I apply qualitative data and supplement with some quantitative data. I chose four different indicators to operationalize the variable state capacity and two indicators for internal conflict to examine the relationship between democratic breakdown, state capacity and internal conflict. This way I could highlight different aspects of both internal conflict and state capacity and consider which one explained the outcome better.
State capacity

Military capacity, which was the first presented indicator on state capacity, I found to have much impact on the breakdown of democracy in Mali, and to why it did not break down in Ghana. Despite previously high military capacity and international aid to help increase the capacity, Mali is showing evidence of low military capacity. Low degree of civilian control over military institutions, lack of payments of the soldiers, and scarcity of resources and materials to supply the armed forces, led to the incapacity to contain the Tuareg rebellion of 2012 and the following mutiny and military coup against President Tourè. Ghana have a different story, where military incapacity with little civilian control and continuous military coups was terminated when Rawlings became president and introduced a range of different reforms in the 1980s. Since then, civilian control has been restored, no coups have been successful and the military has a clear role in the society with international peacekeeping operations. Through these measures military capacity have increased in Ghana, and by this also the general state capacity.

The second indicator of state capacity, effective tax collection, does not have a similar direct and clear relationship to the breakdown of democracy as military capacity. Nevertheless, this indicator can be interpreted as an indicator for the functioning of the administration of the state bureaucracy, as Linz (1978) also argues, even though there can be difference between the many state institutions and their efficiency and functioning. Both Mali and Ghana is found to have challenges when it comes to effective administer tax collection, though Ghana scores slightly better on the quantitative indicator of effective administration. The tendency is that state capacity, measured through this indicator, is lower in Mali than Ghana.

Economic conditions and its effect on democracy is a common theme in political science. The third indicator of state capacity used is gross domestic product (GDP). According to Przeworski et al. (1996) a democracy is more likely to break down if the states GDP per capita is below $1000. This is the case for Mali in the years before the breakdown together with moderate economic growth, while Ghana exceeded the $1000 threshold already in the late 1990s and experienced a tremendous economic growth in the 00s. Ghana is by this perceived to have higher degree of state capacity than Mali on this indicator.
There is a high presence of the last indicator of state capacity, neopatrimonialism, in both Mali and Ghana. The usage of state resources to improve private economy and status is a severe offence, when the state resources could have been used on public interests. The shifting patterns in patronage between the southern and northern leader creates in addition an unstable and unpredictable situation in Mali. The ones standing outside a patrimonial network will want to get on the inside of the resource-flow; if not they can threaten with uprisings. State capacity will in this respect be lowered, through the state resource abuse and the unstable power relationships. It is difficult to assess if Ghana or Mali’s state capacity is different in this respect.

Huntington (1968) highlighted state capacity in his work because of what he saw happen in the developing world. The lack of state capacity and the governments’ lacking ability to address the demands from the population led in many cases to a rise in political violence and unrest in the developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s. This seems to still be valid in the case of Mali based on the reported findings in this thesis, where the lack of state capacity in different forms have, if not initiated internal conflict, not helped after the conflict have been set off. The absence of solutions offered by the state concerning the grievances of the northern region in the years leading up to the third big Tuareg rebellion, serves as an evidence of the low state capacity. Although, one could claim that this absence of solution is rooted more in a lack of willingness to solve the problem, and not the capacity.

**Internal conflict**

Internal conflict is operationalized twofold; the first presented being fractionalization and ethnic diversity. I found a tendency of high degree of this indicator in both countries, and it can be said to have influenced the offset of the rebellion and the democratic breakdown in Mali. However, since it is highly present in the Ghanaian society as well, without leading to democratic breakdown, this indicator cannot be thought of as the main cause of the breakdown in Mali.
The second internal conflict indicator is the presence of rebellion, conflict and armed uprisings. There is a clear north-south conflict in both cases, where Mali has a reoccurring pattern of violent rebellion from the Tuaregs, while Ghana have been able to mute most of the violent conflicts. The government in Bamako’s incapacity to offer a long-term solution to the Tuareg conflict and their grievances can be said to have sparked the 2012 rebellion and thus the breakdown of democracy.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) find in their study that rebellions and onset of civil war cannot be predicted by ethnic or cultural fractionalizing. Instead they argue that it is rather the presence of conditions that favors insurgencies that are the main cause for unrest. Organizationally, financial and political weak central governments are perfect conditions for rebels, due to weak local policies and corruption. Brutal retaliation often makes the situation worse with driving noncombatant locals into the rebel forces. The findings in my thesis are to a large part much of the same that Fearon and Laitin (2003) presents in their paper. In Mali’s case it is more relevant to assess the incapacity of the central government to accommodate the northern regions grievances and to the military’s lack of ability to contain the uprisings when these were set in motion. The lack of capacity was exploited by the rebels, following much of “the Political opportunity Model” by Tilly (1978) presented in chapter 3.5.1 The lack of presence by the central government in the northern region and the rebel forces newly massive acquired stock of weapons made the Tuaregs believe they had a chance of gaining power. Nevertheless, ethnicity is a central underlying factor for why the Tuaregs feels mistreated in the first place. Ethnic diversity is present in Ghana as well, without experiencing democratic breakdown. Because of this, the variable cannot explain why Mali and not Ghana experienced democratic breakdown.

Table 9 - The two variables compared tries to sum up the findings of this thesis. I have used a threefold division to assess the degree present of each variables presented, in each state. This division has clearly restrictions and it was difficult to assess if a variable should be low, medium, or high, due to many different viewpoints in each case. However, this table is meant
to be a tool to visually present the different variables and the operationalization, in a kind of overdramatized version. I must stress that there are nuances to this picture, which one can read about in each variables section. The scoring system is based on the different sections in chapter 5 and an assessment is done based on the two states and the presence of the different variables in both countries.

Table 9 - The two variables compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables and the operationalization</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective tax collection</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neopatrimonialism</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization and ethnic diversity</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellion, conflict and armed uprisings</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linking the two variables

There are several links between the two variables, and solutions to one problem may lay in improving conditions in the other variable. One example of this can be the regional differences in both countries. There are inequalities both economically and political between the northern and the southern part of both Ghana and Mali, and one way to reduce these inequalities can be to enhance the regional administrative capacity (Shepherd et al., 2006). This way, local governments can develop policies they deem more suitable for their region, because it is a fact that there is a long distance from the power center in the capital and to the northern region in both Mali and Ghana, and this is in particular relevant in Mali`s case. Most
of the included variables and operationalizing of the variables are interlinked and can have an
effect on each other. A state and its society is a complex phenomenon and in real life there are
no clear divisions of concepts as I have presented them in this thesis. The armed forces is
dependent on the government and resources delegated from there, which in turn is dependent
on the state’s economic situation, included the capacity to collect these resources through tax
collection of the population. Conflict can hinder this capacity, but also be fueled by it. This is
an oversimplified way of describing that all of the chosen variables and indicators are in some
way connected and is dependent or affected by other variables. As mentioned previously, the
aim of this thesis is not to conclude with anything general on the field of democratic
breakdown. Rather, I see this as a contribution to the field of democratic breakdown, through
a study and comparison of the cases Mali and Ghana.

6.2 Mali: from conflict to democracy, again?

Mali has done it before. In the midst of the transition to democracy in the beginning of the
1990s, a serious violent conflict was ongoing. Tedious negotiations were in the end successful
in terminating the rebellion, and peace was restored. Today’s situation is perceived to be more
serious and difficult than in the 90s. Still, Whitehouse (2013) is hopeful and argues that Mali
will benefit from, and get through this though situation, with the “combination of strong
social capital, concern for dignity, national identity, and joking relations”. Many different
solutions is suggested by the different scholars, and they all agree on that the main solution
for the future is democracy (Lindberg, 2013). In addition, it is of importance to stress that the
case is highly multilayered and complex where no easy solutions exits. Improvements of
political institutions, together with negotiations with the population to address the many
grievances, are reasonable to suggest as the path ahead. The causes for conflict must be
attained to, to hinder future rebellions, and this can be done by enhancing state capacity, as I
argue in this thesis.
6.3 Ghana – the road ahead

Ghana is classified as a democratic country, and is by many praised for their positive development in both democratic institutions and economic development. However, there may be a need for conducting a more nuanced study of the democracy in Ghana and discuss the potential pitfalls of the future democratic Ghana. This way, by openly admitting and debating the current state of the regime, one can try to mend and reform the highlighted issues and threats, and move forward towards an even brighter democratic future. The case of Ghana as presented in this thesis shows us that a conflict trend can be reversed, and peace, stability and democracy is achievable through reforming state structures. This brings hope to the future of Mali, where conflict and continuous rebellion still is a large part of the country political and civil life.

6.4 Further research

This thesis has only touched upon a few sides to the highly complex nature of democratic breakdown in Mali. There are several other factors that could have had a great impact on the onset of the rebellion and the breakdown of democracy. This thesis have not studied institutions, which several scholars claim to have a large impact on democratic survival, among them Linz (1978). An interesting aspect concerning the legislative institution in Mali with the role of the members of parliament (MPs) in relations to the democratic survival is the article by Van Vliet (2014). He points to the presence of a weak legislature and failing MPs as one of the main causes for the democratic breakdown in Mali. International actors and neighboring states can be thought to have had an effect on the crisis in Mali, as Lindberg (2013) mentions. Further research on the theme of democratic breakdown is necessary.


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