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Chapter 3: Article 2

How and Why Parties Respond to Membership Decline: The Case of the SPD and the CDU

Abstract
A dominant assumption in the existing literature on party organisation in Western Europe holds that parties acquiesce in membership decline because modern campaigning is capital- rather than labour-intensive. This article studies eight reform attempts, from 1989 to 2011, by two paradigmatic membership parties, the German SPD and CDU. The examined party documents show that the two parties still value and seek mass membership. Indeed, most of the proposed reforms are not attempts at organisational innovation, but have the intention of consolidating the existing membership organisations. Surprisingly, the parties are concerned about membership decline not mainly for electoral reasons, but because they value and wish to preserve their legacy as membership organisations. Secondly, both the SPD and the CDU documents suggest that the legal-normative imperative of the German Basic Law requiring parties to sustain democratic linkage necessitates a membership organisation. Furthermore, the SPD views mass membership as inherent to social democratic ideology.

Introduction
Existing literature holds that modern political parties have little need for mass membership, which has fallen steeply across Western Europe in the last 40 – 50 years. Professionalised campaigning paid by public subsidies has allegedly reduced the electoral value of rank-and-file members. Accordingly, ‘the large majority of parties seem relatively unconcerned about their memberships and are instead much more focused on reaching out to the wider public through professional campaigning and marketing techniques’. Nevertheless, ‘the literature still lacks empirical validation of the theories’. As a consequence, we are led to assume that parties acquiesce in membership loss, when the case could be that they are trying unsuccessfully to halt it. While steady decline in figures may suggest the former, only by studying the parties’ internal assessments of their membership organisations can we gauge how they envision themselves in the future, and which particular organisational form they favour, are seeking to achieve, and why. Therefore, this article makes the parties’ own assessment the main object of empirical study. In order to analyse how and why parties respond to membership decline, then, this article analyses
eight membership reform reports and proposals, issued from 1989 to 2011, by the German SPD and CDU. This time period was chosen because both parties have seen substantial membership decline during those decades. The decision to focus on the two main German parties was made because the SPD is historically the paradigmatic case of a membership party in Western Europe, while the CDU is an equally influential and institutionalised, but historically less committed membership party from within the same political context. To structure the analysis, I introduce a theoretical framework with three available response options for parties to membership decline. In short, they may choose to do nothing about it (‘organisational inaction’), try to halt and/or reverse it (‘organisational consolidation’), or involve civil society in party affairs in new ways (‘organisational innovation’). Applying the analytical framework in a case study of the SPD and the CDU shows that these parties still seek mass membership by opting primarily for organisational consolidation, yet also introduce some innovative measures. Both reject the notion of relinquishing mass membership by stressing their organisational legacy as membership parties and a legal-normative imperative: in the post-war era, the two parties have honoured the democratic linkage mandate of the 1949 German Basic Law and the 1967 Party Law through mass membership. At a general level, these arguments form a path-dependent rationale for membership: preserving a tradition of mass membership begun by organisational choices made at a distant point in time. In addition, the SPD views mass membership as inherent to social democratic ideology.

The paper is divided into four sections: the first part of the theory section reviews the existing demand-side literature on party membership, while the second gives a framework for analysing parties’ response to membership decline. The second section presents the methodology. In the third and empirical part, I analyse the reform reports/proposals. The final and concluding section discusses the findings and their implications.

**Party membership – a ‘vestigial’ organ?**

Scholars have long since identified societal and technological processes allegedly making parties less interested in enrolling members. The nub of these arguments is the substitutability of members in modern campaigning. According to Kirchheimer, party leaders in post-class politics attempt to ‘catch all’ voters. Television became the dominant arena of electoral competition, in what Wiesendahl characterises as a ‘Copernican turn’ in
campaigning. Already in the 1950s, which is generally regarded as the ‘golden age’ of mass membership, McKenzie saw ample evidence in Britain of the new media rendering the traditional electioneering functions of members far less important. So, in what according to Epstein is a US-led development, medialisisation and professionalisation of West European politics in the post-war period are said to have caused a general downgrading of the conventional membership organisation, giving rise to the capital-intensive catch-all party. Subsequent case studies have identified these trends across the Western world.

Another key factor generally considered to have undermined the need for rank-and-file membership is the introduction of public subsidies. With a growing discrepancy between what members could chip in and party expenses, state subsidies were introduced in the 1950s to sustain extra-parliamentary party activities. Latin American countries (Costa Rica 1954, Argentina 1955) pioneered the practice, while West Germany, in 1959, was first in Western Europe. Public subventions have since been instituted worldwide. Furthermore, Ponce and Scarrow note that individual donors form a yet under-exploited source of funds for parties. Due to these changes, the costs of mass membership are now said to outweigh its benefits. Members are recruited through non-material and material incentives, for example the opportunity to influence party policy. But according to May and Katz, active members have more radical policy views than voters and the leadership, and may force their party to endorse vote-losing policies. Furthermore, it is costly to sustain a membership organisation. In sum, a rich tradition within membership research concludes that parties have lost interest in mass membership, as new electioneering resources gradually replace it. In the following, I put that claim to the test through the German case. For this purpose, I firstly develop an analytical framework.

**Analytical framework**

Facing membership decline, I conceptualise three possible response types available to parties: organisational inaction, organisational consolidation, and organisational innovation.

*Organisational inaction*

‘Organisational inaction’ is the option of not doing anything about the loss of members, either
by choice or failure to act. In case of the former, the party leadership concludes that electoral competitiveness is maintained in spite of a shrinking membership, in line with van Biezen et al.’s claim. Deliberate inaction is in line with Kirchheimer’s prediction that modern campaigning, media-centred and capital- rather than labour-intensive, leads to gradual abandonment of the grassroots organisation and decision-making according to the leadership’s discretion. \(^{20}\) Studies show that medialisiation and professionalisation have fundamentally changed campaigning. \(^{21}\) Consequently, the local, activist-based organisation branch now plays a subordinate role in campaigning, Mancini and Swanson find in their study of 11 democratic and democratising regimes. \(^{22}\) Especially the introduction of state subsidies has facilitated the transformation. \(^{23}\) Regarding the latter case, Harmel and Janda and Goodin argue that political parties are basically cumbersome institutions that change their behaviour only if jolted by some external event. \(^{24}\) Applied to membership figures, this could mean that parties fail to address decline systematically, as party organisers are accustomed to reading annual reports showing only marginally fewer members from year to year, perhaps believing an improved dues collection procedure the next year will turn the tide.

**Organisational consolidation**

The outset of the second response alternative is the party leadership’s intent to halt and/or reverse the loss of members. ‘Organisational consolidation’ denotes commitment to the concept of the membership party and a corresponding strategy of repairing and/or strengthening the membership organisation, relying on conventional means such as recruitment campaigns and improving membership maintenance procedures. In practice, this is the strategy of a general secretary alarmed by discovering that his/her party’s membership has shrunk markedly for years, regards the development as unacceptable and decides to better both recruitment and maintenance.

Parties choose this response option because members can perform a number of valuable functions. Firstly, they provide voluntary manpower in campaigns, spreading the message in social media, handing out flyers and electoral programmes, knocking on doors, representing the party at stands. \(^{25}\) Also, parties recruit members to internal and public offices. \(^{26}\) In most parliamentary democracies, party representatives control the access to
elected office. Moreover, parties perform this task more exclusively now than at any time in party history. Only in the USA and semi-presidential systems such as France and Finland are non-party ministers relatively frequent. Also, party appointments sometimes extend beyond the political to positions in the civil service or companies and corporations under political control. Thus, partisan patronage provides additional opportunities for the party faithful, despite efforts to reduce it in some countries. Thirdly, members provide valuable funds for parties. In a survey of party finance in Western Europe, Nassmacher shows that with the exception of Spain and France, members still provide a significant proportion of party income, especially so in Germany and the Netherlands. In the case of Germany, Detterbeck estimates membership fees to make up 40 to 50 per cent of total party revenue for the CDU and the SPD. Fourthly, members boost parties’ vote share. Studies find that members are likely to be their party’s most devout voters, voting more regularly and consistently than non-members, and that party membership correlates clearly with electoral stability. Furthermore, members provide their parties with outreach benefits. By being ‘party ambassadors’ to their communities, members work as ‘vote multipliers’. Matching social characteristics could also be a precondition for gaining additional support from certain segments of the electorate the party seeks to attract, for example ethnic minorities or women. Finally, members create linkage between rulers and the ruled. Beer and Katz see rank-and-file membership as proof of a party’s roots in civil society. Scarrow argues that a sizeable membership can convey a party’s broad popular support, and in the debate on the implications of mass membership decline, she identifies parties’ ability to generate linkage as the most central concern. In sum, organisational consolidation is the logical response choice for party leaders who see members as instrumental to electoral competitiveness in some or all of the ways above.

Organisational innovation

The third response option is to go new ways. ‘Organisational innovation’ is the introduction of new strategic policies to involve citizens in party work without enrolling them as members. It is an alternative for party organisers cognisant of the ongoing membership loss, who reason that the party needs to cooperate at some level with civil society in
policy-making and personnel recruitment, but does not need mass membership to do so. This response type is similar to organisational inaction in sharing the analysis that a large membership is no longer needed. However, it differs in the view that the party must replace members with alternative liaisons with the external environment.

Courting civil society, but turning away from membership as a means, could reflect the common supposition that policy-oriented members are a liability to vote-maximising leaders. But as that hypothesis has not been convincingly corroborated by empirical studies, party leaders are more likely responding to a presumed post-mass membership situation, reckoning citizens in general are not interested in enrolling in political parties. Against the latter backdrop, some evolutionary party model theorists argue that we are witnessing the emergence of a new party type, which combines features of both the mass and cadre models. Developed from Koole’s ‘modern cadre party’, Heidar proposes the model of the ‘network party’: a party based on a professional leadership which operates within the formal structure of a membership party. Members are still needed to uphold the organisational apparatus, but the member/voter ratio is smaller. A related yet the most novel attribute of the model is that policy development and leader recruitment increasingly take place in informal networks parallel to the membership organisation. In short, ‘organisational innovation’ means developing new arenas for interaction with civil society.

Response operationalisation

In the case of ‘organisational inaction’, no action is discernible on the part of the central party organisation. There should be plenty of empirical examples of this if van Biezen et al.’s statement cited in the introduction indeed is true. In such an apparent case, empirical inspection must identify no evident strategy by the central organisation to deal with the loss of members and subsequently uncover whether or not the inaction is deliberate or the result of negligence.

‘Organisational consolidation’ is operationalised as proposed recruitment measures or references to improving membership maintenance procedures/services, or the introduction of new material or non-material incentives to increase the attractiveness of membership. ‘Organisational innovation’ is measured as the introduction of strategies to involve non-party
actors in party work. Clearly, the three response options are ideal types. The empirical world does not usually offer clear-cut manifestations of theoretical constructs, although the latter are inspired by empirical observations. The model is thus first and foremost a heuristic device that guides the empirical analysis, with one qualification. The model implicitly distinguishes between ‘organisational inaction’ and two modes of action – ‘organisational consolidation’ and ‘organisational innovation’. These two, however, are poles on an action scale. Depending upon (the researcher’s assessment of) the quality and the quantity of the measures, the active responses of the parties will be located in greater or lesser proximity to one of the two ideal types, shown in Figure 1:

![Figure 1: Party response options](image)

**Method and case selection**

The reform efforts analysed comprise three reports by each party and two individual proposals by a former SPD party manager and a former SPD general secretary, issued from 1989 to 2011. The reports from each party were all released as official statements of the central office. While the individual proposals do not represent the consensus position of the leadership, they reflect the take of the primary organisational manager on party membership. Through qualitative content analysis, I synthesise the proposed
countermeasures along with the rationales behind them.

The SPD and the CDU were chosen for three reasons. Firstly, a study of response to membership decline must obviously include parties with a grassroots membership organisation, of which the SPD and the CDU are paradigmatic historical cases. The SPD, incidentally Europe’s oldest social democratic party, is a typical representative of the mass-based, branch structure organisation which Duverger ranked electorally the most competitive, and which inspired his prediction of a ‘contagion from the left’. The CDU was founded as a cadre party and a right-wing alternative to the SPD in 1945, but later adopted the branch structure, in line with Duverger’s prediction. In other words, both parties are historically typical membership parties, that is, parties that sought rank-and-file membership. As Scarrow makes explicit, this concept does not carry any implications about structure such as degree of centralisation or organisational apparatus. Consequently, the two German units are representative of the broader set of European (membership) parties losing members. Secondly, the interest of this article is general organisational developments within the party system, not within a single party or party family. I therefore include parties on each side of the political spectrum. With both a social democratic and a Christian democratic party genuinely committed to the membership model, the German case is appropriate for examining the response of parties to membership decline. Thirdly, the research puzzle requires that the case parties have experienced an enduring loss of members, which both the SPD and the CDU have. For these reasons, the German case is a natural selection for an in-depth inquiry, as in many of the classic works in the study of party organisation, for example Michels, Kirchheimer, Epstein, Panebianco, and Scarrow.

How do the SPD and the CDU respond to membership decline?
The SPD and the CDU’s proposed responses fit into four categories. The three first are geared towards organisational consolidation, the last represents organisational innovation:

**Organisational consolidation**

*Enhancing intra-party democracy.* Both the SPD and the CDU have opted for more direct democratic rights for the rank-and-file membership, responding to a perceived demand among members for more influence on party affairs. The CDU notes in its 1989 report that
‘[m]embers do not want simply to carry out decisions by the board; they want to partake in political decision-making processes’, 48 while SPD states in its 1995 report that ‘[t]he reason for becoming a party member . . . is changing: if it used to be primarily the agreement with the basic policy goals, it is now the possibilities for political influence’. 49 As of 1993, the SPD permitted the use of both consultative and binding membership ballots in selecting party policy and personnel. 50 Furthermore, General Secretary Müntefering also proposed the introduction of primaries in the selection of parliamentary candidates, albeit unsuccessfully. 51 The CDU introduced consultative membership balloting in the selection of personnel in 1995, and expanded it to include policy matters in 2003. The same year it also introduced a binding membership ballot in personnel and policy selection up to the highest local level. 52

**Traditional recruitment.** Conventional recruitment campaigns are a key remedy in both parties’ response to membership decline, emphasised in all their reports. The SPD lists member recruitment as a key outward activity for local branches in its 1993 report, 53 and the 1995 report identifies stabilisation of the membership figures and the recruitment of underrepresented demographics as the main goals of the commission. 54 Consequently, the commission devotes much space to preparation of a recruitment campaign, which it describes as central in making 1996 ‘the year of the organisation’. 55 The 2005 report similarly discusses refinement of recruiting techniques prior to a 2006 campaign. 56

In its 1989 report, the CDU characterises its shrinking membership as a key problem to address and expresses concern over the lopsided gender and age distribution in its ranks as well as underrepresentation of certain professional groups. Recruitment efforts are therefore supposed to target these groups particularly, 57 an instruction repeated in the 1995 and 2003 reports. 58 Moreover, the 2003 report introduces new suggestions for how to go about recruiting.

**Improving membership maintenance.** Acknowledging that many party members have only a tenuous relationship to their party in the post-industrial society, the SPD and the CDU stress the importance of proper integration of members. 59 In each publication, they place emphasis
on offering members substantive participatory opportunities. Accordingly, both parties repeatedly emphasise the importance of training members in preparation for candidacy. However, the SPD differs from the CDU in its generally more complete membership package: while the CDU also notes that the party has a responsibility to greet new members and stay in touch with them in its 1989 and 2003 reports, the SPD emphasises the social dimension in all its reports: membership must be fun and offer recreational activities beyond the political work. It elaborates at length – primarily in the 1995 report – the obligation it has in supporting contact with members, lest they feel alienated by the party. Relatedly, the CDU points out in all three reports that to involve more women in party affairs, the party needs to accommodate its schedule to the demands of family life.

Organisational innovation

Opening up the party. A key ambition in each party is to become the hub in a network of political activity, with the party cooperating on an ad hoc basis with non-party actors. These outsiders may be individuals or interest groups willing to cooperate with party activists in temporally and thematically fixed activities according to their particular interests. The 1993, 1995 and 2005 SPD reports welcome non-members to work with party activists in forums on specific subjects, for instance environmental protection and North/South relations. The CDU offers similar opportunities for party sympathisers in all its reports. Furthermore, the CDU began offering a cost-free temporary guest membership in 1995, while the SPD introduced temporary guest membership in 2005, but for a fee. In both parties, guest members were given speech and propositional rights at party meetings, but could not vote.

The most prominent, albeit most abstract, attempts at opening up the party to non-partisans, however, are former SPD party manager Matthias Machnig’s Netzwerkpartei (‘network party’) and the CDU’s Bürgerpartei (‘citizen party’). Essentially alike, both concepts take as given that the modern citizenry is heterogeneous and individualised and political loyalties are contingent. Accordingly, the two parties must adapt organisationally to accommodate a socially and geographically mobile citizenry willing to participate in politics predominantly on a short-term and substantially limited basis. Therefore, the party organisation functions as a centre of traditional membership party units: branches and activists. Yet encircling the party organisational core is a second tier of voluntary and
professional individuals and groups representing civil society, the corporate sector, academia, foreign sister parties. These secondary supporters and Dialogpartner are assets to be invoked for, and who themselves initiate, mutually beneficial cooperation to address specific political and societal issues. Central to the concept is the internet as a key means for enabling and facilitating cooperation, to make effective use of which the parties must master the modern information and communications paradigm.

Why do they respond to membership decline?

Arguments for organisational consolidation

The SPD and the CDU advance three arguments for seeking to remain membership parties: preserving an organisational legacy; complying with the legal-normative imperative; and maintaining electoral competitiveness. In addition, the SPD sees the membership model as the only organisational option for a social democratic party. The CDU does not make such a link between Christian democratic ideology and party organisation.

Preserving the organisational legacy. Both the SPD and the CDU contextualise their reforms by underlining an organisational legacy of being membership parties. In all three reports, the SPD points out at the beginning that it tout court is a membership party and that organisationally there exists no alternative to it. This is stressed several times in the lengthy 1993 report, most forcefully on page 1 of the preface by party manager Karlheinz Blessing: ‘The SPD is the oldest and largest membership party in Germany. This will remain the case. Therefore I would like to give a rejection to all those who want to turn it into simply an association releasing balloons during electoral campaigns’. The 1995 report states several times that the SPD is and will remain a membership party. The 2005 report explains that the SPD has often reformed organisationally in its 140-year history, but never strayed away from the ‘membership party philosophy’.

The CDU has a much shorter history than the SPD as a membership party, but highlights its post-war transformation into one. As its member loss did not begin until the mid-1980s, the 1989 report warns of what may be underway. Under the heading ‘Active and informed membership as basis for a people’s party’, the 1989 report notes the years of strong membership growth from 1969 to 1982, and characterises the downward trend.
starting in 1985 as worrying. In the 1995 report, the CDU links past and future: ‘The CDU has in the 50 years since its founding developed into a strong membership party . . . The CDU must also in the future be a strong membership party’. The 2003 report explicitly notes the CDU’s successful post-war transformation from a party of notables into a membership party, and the resulting mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of men and women for the common good. It then identifies as key the preservation of the CDU’s future as a large people’s party in the context of the ever-changing modern society.

Thus, the SPD and the CDU emphasise their organisational identity as parties of mass membership, albeit differently in one regard. The SPD was always a membership party, and perceives it as an intrinsic duty to remain one. Indeed, the repeated use of the verb ‘remain’ underlines the historic dimension. To transform the SPD into some sort of ‘empty vessel’ at sea only at election time would thus dishonour its legacy. The CDU, on the other hand, accentuates its post-war transformation into a membership party and fears regress.

The legal-normative imperative. The parameters of post-war German politics are the legal framework placing parties at the epicentre of democracy. Its backdrop is the democratic breakdown of the Weimar Republic, which grew in part from widespread popular discontent with political parties. The 1949 German Basic Law and the 1967 Party Law sought to address the ordeal with the role they assign to parties in structuring the government. The laws state explicitly the role of political parties in the ‘formation of the political will of the people’. The Party Law then specifies that this necessitates the active participation of citizens and fostering linkage between the people and the government. Accordingly, Scarrow notes that ‘Germans are particularly sensitive to the suggestion that parties might be losing the support of the citizens they are supposed to represent’.

While neither the Basic Law nor the Party Law stipulates that the parties must have a specific number or ratio of party members, Article 2 of the Party Law indirectly includes a large membership as an attribute in its definition of a party. Moreover, Article 21 of the Basic Law requires the parties to sustain intra-party democracy. Thirdly, they are legally required to acquire at least 50 per cent of their revenues from non-state sources, e.g. membership dues. Hence the SPD and the CDU conclude that a large membership organisation is necessary for the fulfilment of their constitutional mandate. In the 1993
The SPD, in accordance with its basic values, wishes to fulfil the Basic Law’s commission that the parties contribute to the ‘formation of the political will of the people’, realised with the active participation of the great majority of its members and leaders through an open and intensive cooperation between party and society.\(^{75}\)

Upon describing how parties generally are key actors in mediating between the government and the people, the 1995 report specifies that ‘[t]he democratic membership parties, particularly the large people’s parties, play a central role in this political mediation process’.\(^{76}\) The 2005 report likewise states that ‘[a] strong membership party SPD is for us an important contribution to strengthening our democracy’.\(^{77}\)

In its first report, the CDU sets out to recruit especially more young people, women and workers to diversify demographically those representing it officially, given the preponderance of middle-aged men in the party’s membership.\(^{78}\) This goal is put explicitly in the context of the Basic Law’s Article 21: ‘Among the tasks assigned to the parties by the constitution is the pool of candidates for the parliaments’. The 1995 report describes members as ‘the vital, democratic roots of our party, they make sure that the CDU’s policies remain vivid, in touch with the people, and open-minded’.\(^{79}\) Finally, the 2005 report prescribes how the party can ensure democratic linkage through membership:

Only a party that constantly seeks entrenchment in all reachable societal groups lives in the real world. Therefore the strengthening of the CDU as a membership party – with elected representatives and officials of all social strata, age and occupational groups as well as both genders – is a key element on the way to becoming Bürgertpartei CDU.\(^{80}\)

**Maintaining electoral competitiveness.** Both parties acknowledge that members still matter for electoral-strategic reasons. In the 1993 report, the SPD acknowledges members’ outreach functions and the importance of the fees for the financial state of the party.\(^{81}\) The 1995 report encourages members to participate in campaigning, referring to them as ‘campaign helpers’.\(^{82}\) The 2005 report stresses the importance of strengthening the SPD as a membership organisation in the former DDR states, as electoral competitiveness depends upon it.\(^{83}\) The CDU mentions members as workers, candidates and funders in the 1989
and the 1995 report describes a broad and diversified membership as ‘the foundation of our political success’. The 2003 report underlines in particular members’ outreach function.

**SPD: ideological affinity.** Finally, the SPD, unlike the CDU, connects its organisation to its ideology. The 1993 report observes that ‘if the SPD wishes to change society towards more fairness and solidarity, it must have a local presence. Its members and functionaries must be trustees and contact persons’. The opening paragraph of the section that deals exclusively with recruiting members in the 1995 report reads: ‘[t]he Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands strives for a solidarity, fair, democratic, open as well as ecologically responsible society. The SPD’s organisation and working methods must be oriented towards these political goals’. Most explicit is the 2005 report, which declares: ‘The discussion, whether to be a membership and people’s party or an electoral association/a network party of professionals and representatives, is not new. We declare: for social democracy there is no alternative to the principle of a membership and people’s party’.

**Arguments for organisational innovation**

**Adapting to societal change.** Reflective of the less comprehensive organisational innovation measures, these are both less discussed and more vaguely explained. The SPD and the CDU perceive an imperative to adapt as organisations to a changing society, including accommodation of the new ways of political participation that have emerged. The SPD reasons thus:

The party must preserve itself under changed societal conditions and ensure that it conveys its orientations to people as well as takes in their legitimate interests and translates them to policies. The effective turning of the party towards society, the opening up of party arrangements to non-members, making use of internal and external expertise in the political work ... are steps towards that.

Machnig elaborates what societal change implies: ‘The party now stands ... before the task of reacting politically and organisationally to the developments of the information and
The CDU refers to the broad variety of new participation forms in their justification of the Bürgerpartei reforms:

As a citizens’ party the CDU must take in and respond to the new societal realities. … The CDU must accommodate in a positive way the new forms of political-social articulation through networks, citizens’ initiatives and informal groups and speak to them in all their diversity.

Discussion and conclusion

Taken together, the eight reform proposals by the SPD and the CDU yield two main findings. Firstly, both the SPD and the CDU mostly seek to consolidate their membership organisations. Both emphasise traditional membership recruitment and maintenance, combined with expansion of intra-democratic rights. However, both are also open to innovation by opening up their parties to non-partisans in order to adapt to societal change. The introduction of temporary membership could be seen as a move to consolidate the membership organisation. On the other hand, as an implicit acknowledgement of modern citizens’ presumed hesitation towards formal, long-term political involvement, it is better labelled an innovative measure. In sum, the parties’ preferred response to member loss is organisational consolidation, yet combined with some degree of organisational innovation. Plausibly, the parties are warming up to more innovation, as there is no sign of the decline trend turning.

Furthermore, the SPD is more wedded to the mass membership model than the CDU, making the association between its ideology and mass membership. Also, the proposition of the network party was never advanced by the party itself, only its one-time party manager. The 2005 report flat-out dismisses the idea. On the contrary, the comprehensive 2003 reform proposal by the CDU centred on the concept of the network party. Thus, the CDU is more open to organisational innovation without an ideological affinity between mass membership and Christian democracy.

Secondly, the SPD and the CDU emphasise their organisational legacies and a legal-normative imperative to account for their commitment to mass membership. Together, and at a general level, the two arguments form a path-dependent rationale for grassroots membership: preserving a tradition as mass membership parties begun by organisational choices made at a distant point in time. The SPD has been one since its 1875 founding, and the CDU transformed into a mass membership party in the post-war era,
and both view mass membership as encouraged by law since 1949 (and reinforced by a second law in 1967).

The findings have important implications for the academic debate. Firstly, more research on demand for membership is needed, as these particular two parties emphasise benefits that go beyond the strictly electoral-functional, which is the focus of the existing literature. While the SPD and the CDU also cite electoral competitiveness, preservation of a path-dependent tradition of mass membership makes up the bulk of their argument for it. This is thus a case for mass membership based on historical choices made by the parties rather than necessity: The CDU governed for nearly 20 years upon its founding without a mass organisation, and the SPD dismisses the electoral-professional party model not as ineffective, but as incompatible with their organisational identity.

Secondly, as ideology influences parties’ view of membership, it can be expected that parties of different ideological hue will respond to decline in different ways. For example, social democratic parties are likely to favour organisational consolidation to a greater degree than parties on the right, if they regard membership loss as a threat to their organisational identity.

Thirdly, in polities that constitutionally recognise parties’ place in democracy, parties may be more likely to opt for organisational consolidation than parties in polities with no such recognition. This presupposes that parties themselves perceive an imperative for mass membership in the legal framework. As demonstrated in Ingrid van Biezen’s research project on parties’ place in constitutions and public law, Germany was a pioneer in the recognition of parties’ positive contribution to democracy in their constitution. Further research should investigate how constitutional recognition or non-recognition of parties’ democratic role impacts response to membership decline. If mass membership is indispensable to party linkage, the legal framework could be critical to supporting both.
Notes


3. Van Biezen et al., ‘Going, Going, ... Gone?’, p.40.


5. The data for this article were collected during field work at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn, from 29 May to 10 June 2011.


19. A similar framework has been proposed by Ulrich von Alemann and Tim Spier, see U. von Alemann and T. Spier, ‘Die deutschen Parteien unter veränderten Rahmenbedingungen’, Politische Bildung 42/1 (2009), pp.32 – 49.


23. Casas-Zamora, Paying for Democracy; Fogg et al., ‘Conclusion’; Nassmacher, ‘Structure and Impact of Public Subsidies to Political Parties in Europe’.


36. Scarrow, Parties and their Members.


39. Scarrow, Parties and their Members, p.46.


46. Scarrow, Parties and their Members, p.20.


48. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Moderne Parteiarbeit in den 90er Jahren, p.460.

49. SPD-Parteivorstand, Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Mitgliederentwicklung’, p.13. A recent study by Campbell finds, however, that participation in East Germany is significantly undermined by enduring socialist values, see R. Campbell, ‘Socialist Values and Political Participation in Germany: A Barrier to “Inner Unity”?’, West European Politics 34/2 (2011), pp.362 – 83.


52. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Reform der Parteiarbeit; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bürgerpartei CDU. Reformprojekt für eine lebendige Volkspartei.


54. SPD-Parteivorstand, Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Mitgliederentwicklung’, p.4.

55. Ibid., p.23.

56. SPD-Parteivorstand, Bericht und Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe Mitgliederpartei, pp.15 –
16.
57. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Moderne Parteiarbeit in den 90er Jahren, pp.456, 461.
61. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Moderne Parteiarbeit in den 90er Jahren; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Reform der Parteiarbeit; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bürgerpartei CDU. Reformprojekt für eine lebendige Volkspartei.
62. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Reform der Parteiarbeit.
63. SPD-Parteivorstand, Bericht und Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe Mitgliederpartei.
67. SPD-Parteivorstand, Bericht und Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe Mitgliederpartei, pp.3–4.
68. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Moderne Parteiarbeit in den 90er Jahren, p.459.
69. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Reform der Parteiarbeit, p.278.
70. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bürgerpartei CDU. Reformprojekt für eine lebendige Volkspartei, p.2.
76. SPD-Parteivorstand, Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Mitgliederentwicklung’, p.5.
77. SPD-Parteivorstand, Bericht und Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe Mitgliederpartei, p.5.
78. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Moderne Parteiarbeit in den 90er Jahren, p.457.
79. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Reform der Parteiarbeit, p.278.
80

Volkspartei, p.3.


82. SPD-Parteivorstand, Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Mitgliederentwicklung’, pp.18 – 19.

83. SPD-Parteivorstand, Bericht und Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe Mitgliederpartei, p.10.

84. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Moderne Parteiarbeit in den 90er Jahren, pp.454, 460.

85. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Reform der Parteiarbeit, p.278.

86. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bürgerpartei CDU. Reformprojekt für eine lebendige Volkspartei, p.8.


89. SPD-Parteivorstand, Bericht und Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe Mitgliederpartei, p.9.


92. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bürgerpartei CDU. Reformprojekt für eine lebendige Volkspartei, p.3.