Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in Angola.

Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes?

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Abstract
This thesis is a qualitative case study comparing the three Angolan peace processes, the Bicesse Accords, the Lusaka Protocol and the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The thesis seeks to explain why Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) only succeeded in the third and last of the three peace processes. On the basis of the research question the thesis discusses changes in the political environment between the two failed attempts and the last one that succeeded. The approach I have used is to design a list of five criteria considered important for a successful DDR process and analyzed the empirical data in the light of these criteria: 1) Realistic time frame. 2) Creation of a new unified army. 3) Regional approach to weapons control. 4) The role of the UN. 5) Power-sharing.

The civil war in Angola took place from 1975 to 2002 and was predominantly fought between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), for the total control of Angola and its vast natural resources. Questions that keep arising in the aftermath of a conflict are how long will the fragile peace last and what kind of peace-building initiatives will be effective? DDR of former ex-combatants\(^1\) is a political process that is built on mutual trust and will by the parties. DDR is the first step in the transition from war to peace. My findings indicate that the government’s military victory over the UNITA, crowned with the killing of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, finally silenced the guns in the three decades long civil war. Sustainable peace became possible when the biggest spoiler\(^2\) of the DDR process was eliminated and this event unfolded a chain of positive reactions that was not present during the two failed attempts. The MPLA government won the war against the UNITA, which led to the success of criterion 2; completion of the reintegration of UNITA ex-combatants into a new unified army. But prior to this, a regional approach to weapons control (criterion 3), achieved by the MPLA government during the final war (1998-2002), limited UNITA’s military manoeuvrability and weapons supply. The impact that the end of the cold war made, together with the end of the conflict in South Africa were also additional “outside” factors. The solution of criterion 3, which put a stop to cross-border arms flows to UNITA, reduced Savimbi’s spoiling capacity. This criterion seems to have been particularly important for making peace possible during the third and last DDR process.

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1 The term ex-combatant is here used for convenience as a collective term for; fighter, guerrilla, soldier, militia, women and children associated with fighting forces, other non combatant roles which include; drivers, cooks porter and alike that are all associated with armed groups (IDDRS, 2006: 24).

2 “Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial” (Stedman, 1997:7).
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Acronyms

ADRP Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
CAFF Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CCPM Joint Political-Military Commission
CMVF Joint Ceasefire Verification and Monitoring Commission
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FAA Angolan Armed Forces
FALA Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FAPLA Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FBA Folke Bernadotte Academy
FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GA Gathering Area
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GURN Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
HRW Human Right Watch
IAWG Inter Agency Working Group
ICC International Criminal Court
ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice
IDEA International Institute for Democratisation and Electoral Assistance
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IDDRS United Nations Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
ILO International Labour Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
IRSEM Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants
JMC Joint Military Commission
LMU Luena Memorandum of Understanding
MDRP Multi – Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MILOB Military observers
MMC Joint Military Commission
MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MDSD Most Different System Design
MSSD Most Similar System Design
NGO Non Governmental Organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development
OMA Organization of Angolan Women
OUNCA UN Observer group in Central America
PGDR Programme for Demobilization and Reintegration
QF Quartering and Family Area
SADC Southern African Development Community
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons Programs
SIDDR Stockholm’s Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
SC Security Council
SRSG The Special Representative for the Secretary General (United Nations)
SSR Security Sector Reform
TG Technical Group
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCAH Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
UN United Nations
UNAVEM United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UN DPKO United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNMA United Nations Mission in Angola
UNOA United Nations Office in Angola
UN/OSAA United Nations Office for the Special Adviser to Africa
UNPOL United Nations Police
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WFP World Food Program
WB World Bank
Preface

Through my studies at the University of Bergen (UIB), I have enjoyed highly topical and indeed interesting lessons in the fields of Democracy Assistance, International Election Observation and Human Rights Monitoring. The choice of topic for my master thesis was therefore like standing in front of a lunch buffet with all sorts of “culinary” options. What to study, and what to leave out? I wanted to combine my past international experience with my new acquired academic backpack. Finally, I was fortunate to attend the Folke Bernadotte Academy’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants management course. This course opened up new possibilities for combining the study of post-conflict demilitarization with the democracy assistance studies at UIB. The work with this thesis has been demanding, but not least, a very good learning process. Hopefully this study can add to the background material available for the scholar and DDR practitioner.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and extend my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor Einar Berntzen at the Institute of Comparative Politics, you have from the very beginning guided me through this project. Your endless support and numerous feedbacks have been invaluable to finishing my thesis.

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And foremost, I wish to thank my dearest, Gry for your truly support, timeless encouragement and for holding out and believing in me.

Thank you

Lillestrøm, November 2011

Vegard Andersen
Map of Angola

1 Introduction

1.1 Theme and background for the research question

A quick look back at Angola’s modern history reveals a country that has been through four hundred years of colonial rule (1575-1975), slavery, grave exploitation of its natural resources and almost four decades of war. Having set foot in Angola in 1482, the first Portuguese explorers began to trade there and exploit its natural resources. The Portuguese merchants brought weapons and technology and in return they were given slaves, gold and other minerals (Wikipedia, 2011; Store norske leksikon, 2011). After World War II the independence movement began to take shape. The major nationalist organizations were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) a Marxist-Leninist party; National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA); and the União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA) (Accord no. 15, 2004). In 1975, after a fourteen-year long war of independence from Portuguese colonial rule, the Alvor Agreement was signed in Portugal granting the Angolan people their longed for peace and freedom. The Alvor agreement had provided for a transitional government, future elections, an integrated army and final independence. The parties’ different ideology and politics had clearly separated them through the years and ended up with both parties struggling for power to control the whole of Angola. Distrust between the parties was growing and the volatile relationship culminated when the MPLA expelled UNITA and the other parties from the capital Luanda. The MPLA formed a government and appointed Agostinho Neto as President. Peace and freedom were however short-lived; war was inevitable and Angola was thrown back into a bloody civil war that came to be the focus of attention in Angola for the next three decades. The MPLA’s one-party socialist regime ruled Angola with a hard hand; it was dominant, oppressive, authoritarian and corrupt (Meijer, 2004). Several peace attempts were tried, among them the New York Accord from 1988. The New York Accord was an accord signed by Angola, South Africa and Cuba at the UN Headquarter in New York. The Accord granted Namibia independence from South Africa, and called for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which had been supporting the MPLA in the war against UNITA. The first real peace accord that was signed between the MPLA and UNITA was the Bicesse Accords from 1991, providing for multi-party elections, and a unified army. The Bicesse Accords collapsed when Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader refused to accept the election result. The UNITA with its strong allied support from the US
were both certain it would win the election. Because second place was no option for Savimbi and the UNITA, Angola was thrown back into war. The Lusaka peace protocol from 1994 was the result of intense and tough negotiations led by the UN. UNITA was pressed to the negotiation table to sign its unilateral disarmament in return for a place in a transitional government. The peace was again short-lived and the final war from 1998-2002 ended up with UNITA’s defeat at the hands of the victorious MPLA. The Luena Memorandum of Understanding was signed in April 2002 (Porto, Alden and Parsons, 2007).

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of former combatants, (DDR) in the light of Angola’s three peace processes and discuss why only the third and last peace process succeeded. What had changed between the two failed processes and the last that led to peace and stability? The outcome of the three DDR processes will be linked to possible explanatory factors. I have designed a list of five criteria that are considered relevant for a successful DDR process. The analysis and the method may contribute to enhancing the knowledge of monitoring and evaluation of DDR processes. Scholars, like Robert Muggah (2009:4), have stated that new ways of analysing the outcomes of DDR processes are urgently needed.

After almost three decades of civil war, two failed peace processes, which caused over four million people to be displaced and probably one million people killed, the third peace accord – the 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU) finally brought peace and stability to Angola’s war torn society (Accord no. 15, 2004).

The outcome of peace processes, as noted by Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, will have dramatic consequences for thousands of people. Experience has repeatedly shown that fragile peace processes have often broken down and tension has escalated into even more violent conflicts, as, for instance, in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 with over 350,000 and 800,000 killed, respectively. In Sierra Leone the civil war lasted over eleven years before a final peace was achieved, over 75,000 people were killed (Stedman, Rothchild, Cousens, 2002). DDR plays a role in the transition from war to peace by preventing renewed war in fragile post-conflict situations, by laying the groundwork for reducing violence and promoting
reintegration for the ex-combatants. It is also vital that legitimate state institutions should have a monopoly of the use of power.

DDR- processes have over the last two decades become an integrated part of the framework for peace-building within the UN and other international organizations (United Nations Security Council, 2000). Yet, many DDR processes have failed and possibly more could fail in the future. Do we learn from past mistakes? As noted by Kilroy (2010), “DDR cannot bring political agreement on its own, and peace processes which collapse will leave a DDR programme in an untenable position, as seen in the failure of that first DDR attempt in Angola”. Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, (1996) also underscore the importance of DDR processes and in particular long-term reintegration, which plays a crucial role at the national level in terms of a broader conflict resolution process to restore social capital. And conversely failed reintegration can undermine the same peace process that can lead to increased insecurity and violence. One of the problems is that frequently ex-combatants lack the skills, assets, and social networks that would enable them to create sustainable livelihoods. As a result, ex-combatants may return to war or a life of criminality and banditry that could adversely affect the peace process (Colletta et al., 1996). Providing support for ex-combatants is therefore central to any post-conflict reconstruction process (Kilroy, 2010). Because of this reintegration has proved to be the biggest challenge for the DDR programmes and also for the overall peace process, it is the most expensive and resource-intensive and yet so important for a sustainable result (Ibid).

1.2 Why study past DDR processes in Angola?

The Angolan history of war is a basket filled with various ingredients such as: the colonial struggle for independence from Portugal; an era dominated by one-party communist regime; Cold War geopolitical rivalry backed by the US and the USSR, an unstable regional situation with open borders and foreign combatants; Cuban troops on foreign soil; unrestricted use of oil and diamonds to keep the conflict alive and, last but not least, the two rival party leaders’ search for hegemony and power. The Angolan case is interesting because it represents a
mosaic and cluster of factors that all in their way nurtured the war, and when these factors were eliminated one by one, the only option left was peace.

As the three DDR processes in Angola had to be implemented in this context, all these factors were at one time or another influential and some were very prominent. It is from this perspective that it is valuable to study why the third and last DDR process and subsequently the Luena peace process succeeded. What can we learn from these three DDR processes? The then former United Nations Under-Secretary for African Affairs and Special Representative of the UN General Secretary in Angola, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari stated: “Angola’s experiences in conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building would provide valuable lessons for the rest of the world” (Meijer, 2004; Accord article pp. 1). What did he mean? What kind of lessons can we learn? The quote from 2003 may have been correct or at the very best extremely premature at that time. On the one hand Mr. Gambari correctly observed that the killing and suffering had come to an end and therefore saw the achievement of peace as ingenious craftsmanship; on the other hand, he might have summarized all shortcomings and mistakes made during the past peace attempts and that the Angolan case would stand out as an example for every one to learn from. Furthermore, according to observations done by Meijer (2004), the way the peace was negotiated in the aftermath of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding might have implications for future political growth. These lessons and questions will be dealt with during the course of my presentation of the three DDR processes.

1.3 The research question

My thesis is a comparative analysis of three DDR processes in Angola during three different periods from 1991 to 1992, from 1994 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2008. The beginning of the first two periods starts with the signing of a peace accord and ends when the parties resume fighting. The study of the last peace accord from 2002 has shown that peace has lasted. For practical reasons I decided to conclude the study in 2008 when the World Bank’s Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) concluded its support to the DDR process. And the September legislative elections in 2008 also marked the end of the
Luena peace process (Berdal and Ucko, 2009). I will attempt to answer the following questions in my thesis:

Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes? To answer this question I will compare the three processes. In order to structure and systematize the comparison, I will analyze the three processes in relation to five criteria that, according to the literature and lessons learned, are relevant to whether peace processes (of which DDR is a part) succeed or fail. The five criteria, which will be elaborated further in Chapter 3.6, are:

1. Realistic time frame: to secure successful implementation, peace agreements should allow for sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and flexible time frames.

2. Creation of a new unified army: to be successful peace agreements should be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues.

3. Regional approach to weapons control: to be successful, peace agreements should take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament and weapons control, and include a regional approach to weapons control in order to stop cross-border arms flows.

4. The role of the UN: to secure successful implementation of peace agreements, the UN should participate in the negotiations of peace agreements it is later asked to help implement, and be granted sufficient resources to carry out its mandate.

5. Power-sharing: to be successful, peace agreements should contain provisions for power-sharing mechanisms to build trust and confidence on the part of leaders on both sides in order to enhance political will and reduce likelihood of spoilers.
1.4 Overview of the thesis

In Chapter two I will begin by defining the case study method, and explain how I will use the most similar systems design method to analyze the three Angolan peace processes and present relevant literature used in my thesis. Chapter three is devoted to place the DDR phenomenon in a post-conflict context and describe its possibilities and weaknesses along with cross-cutting issues like security sector reform (SSR) and reconciliation. Chapter four will be devoted to the analytical work of my thesis. I will start by giving a brief background of Angola’s three peace accords beginning with the Bicesse Accord from 1991, followed by the Lusaka Protocol from 1994 and lastly the Luena Memorandum of Understanding from 2002. The DDR process will be viewed through these three peace processes and analyzed according to the five criteria I have set for successful DDR. Each DDR process will have a sub conclusion. I will end the chapter by a systematic comparison of the three DDR processes and discuss the factors that contributed to peace in Angola. Lastly, in Chapter five, I will conclude my thesis by summarizing the main findings and discussing some theoretical implications.

2 Research design and methods

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design and discuss the variables around which I will analyze the empirical literature. The chapter begins with a discussion of the choice of case for the comparative study followed by a description of the five criteria that will serve as possible explanatory factors for the success or failure of the three DDR processes. Next, I will specify in what way this is a comparative case study and elaborate on the design of the thesis. The final section will be devoted to the presentation of relevant literature concerning DDR as a tool in a peace-building context.
2.2 The choice of case and variables

Let me start by presenting the background for the choice of Angola as the case for my thesis. My preliminary idea was to do a comparative study and analyze why DDR processes sometimes fail and sometimes succeed. I wanted to find out what factors could be determinant for the different outcomes. In order to decide on the number and the type of case, I studied annual reports from the School for the Culture of Peace (Carmès, Fisas and Luz, 2006; Carmès and Sanz, 2009): “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World 2005; 2008”. These reports provide in-depth multi-country information on all current DDR processes.

Throughout the last decades there have been some examples of successful and some failed DDR processes. According to the Folke Bernadotte Academy (2009), the DDR processes in El Salvador (1992), Mozambique (1992), and Namibia (1989) are considered successful. The overall reason was that the parties were ready for peace and therefore “bought into” the peace process. There are also some examples of failed processes and these include Liberia (1997) and Congo (2003) (Berdal, 2009). By comparing the outcome from these five processes it would be difficult to arrive at a set of conclusions that could give a tendency towards what makes a DDR process a success or a failure. The reason is that when comparing multiple cases (countries), the explanatory factors may differ because of the country context. According to Cornelis Steenken, the different context to consider may be, the Nature of the conflict - civil war, ethnic war, war on resources (diamonds, oil, water etc.) or war on narcotics. Further, the Nature of the peace – the peace agreement, victor or vanquished (winner or looser), externally enforced peace, the presence of peacekeeping forces or absence. The different contexts are also influenced by the Political and the Security situation - by in by all parties to the conflict, state monopoly, weapons proliferation, spoiler activity and frustrated parties. In war torn societies and failed states, the capacity of the national institutions will determine how the rebuilding may succeed. The next important factor is the State of the economy- how was i preserved during the conflict? Destroyed? Is the economy resource based, how is the infrastructure, power centre, human resources and human capital and are there friendly neighbours to help and assist in rebuilding the country. Finally, the Social context to consider- tribal society, ethnic, religion, class structure, economically
To overcome this challenge of these overwhelming factors to consider, I decided to focus my study on one country. Out of the twenty different DDR processes between 1990 and 2008, only Angola has experienced three consecutive peace processes with provisions for DDR in each of them and the outcome shows two failed attempts and one successful. The study of three DDR processes in the same country during three fixed time periods enables me to better control the background factors, as opposed to a multi-country study where background factors can vary greatly. Using Angola as an empirical framework provides a unique opportunity to do a comparative analysis of three successive peace processes over twelve years: two failed attempts and one successful.

Variables are divided into either dependent or independent: the former is what the researcher wants to explain, which in my thesis is why the DDR process only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes, peace or no peace is therefore the value of the dependent variable. The latter are what explanatory factors influence the dependent variable.

As possible “independent variables” I have attempted to design a list of criteria or factors that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes. The list will be based on literature from United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards Operational Guide (IDDRS, 2006); L. Lenisse Edloe, 2007; Stockholm’s initiative on DDR (SIDDR, 2005); Stedman et al, 1997; The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA, 2009). The criteria are listed briefly below and will be thoroughly described in paragraph 3.6 in the theory chapter:

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3 Too many donors focus on some, often success, countries, while leaving too often aside other, often fragile, countries. This tendency leads to an increasing gap between “aid darlings” and “aid orphans” (EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy, 2007).
Box 2.1: Five criterions considered being important for a successful DDR process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion 1</th>
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<td>Realistic time frame: to secure successful implementation, peace agreements should allow sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and flexible timeframes.</td>
<td>Reorganization of the armed forces into a new unified army: to be successful, peace agreements should be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues.</td>
<td>Regional approach to weapons control: to be successful, peace agreements should take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, and weapons control, and include a regional approach to weapons control in order to stop cross-border arms flows.</td>
<td>The role of the UN: to secure successful implementation of peace agreements the UN should participate in the negotiations of peace agreements it is later asked to help implement and be granted sufficient resources to carry out its mandate.</td>
<td>Power-sharing: to be successful, peace agreements should contain provisions for power-sharing mechanisms as a means to create trust and confidence on part of leaders on both sides in order to enhance political will and reduce likelihood of spoilers.</td>
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2.3 The case study

The case study method defined by Gerring (2004), is an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Rivedal, 2009:4). A question that is raised is often contemporary, where experience or perception of a phenomenon is often prominent. Robert K. Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; “When the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 1984: 23). Qualitative method design is used when the researcher wants to examine and describe the human interpretation and experiences of a phenomenon often with the question “how” or “why”. Comparison enables us to identify differences and similarities that are important for understanding the reason for the outcome of processes or historical events. The thesis is a case study of Angola, but it is also a comparative case study since I compare three separate peace processes at different points in time within a single country.
2.4 Research design and the comparative method

“Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes?” I will begin by explaining how this thesis is a comparative study of Angola through both its failed and successful DDR processes. This thesis seeks to compare and analyze three DDR processes in Angola beginning with the Bicesse Accord 1991 - 1992, followed by the Lusaka Protocol from 1994 - 1998 and the final Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU) from 2002 - 2008. The comparative method is most often used when a country is the unit of analysis and the focus is on the similarities and the differences among countries, rather than the relationship between variables. The variables explaining the outcome are often a “product of multiple casual factors acting together” (Landman, 2004: 130). In my thesis it is the different DDR processes that constitute the units in the analysis. Comparison is divided into two system designs: the most similar systems design (MSSD) and the most different systems design (MDSD) (Landman, 2003). Landman notes that in MSSD, comparison is done by controlling for those factors that are similar across all analyzed units and only focusing on those factors that are different that account for the outcome (Landman, 2003: 6). To answer the proposition set for this thesis I will therefore use the MSSD in analysing the three Angolan DDR processes. During the first two attempts the parties did not comply with the DDR processes, which caused the peace process to fail and war to resume. With the last peace process both parties complied with the arrangements set for DDR and the peace process was a success - war did not resume. What had “changed” during the period between the two failed attempts and the last successful one that finally made it possible for peace to prevail?

A DDR process is a complex exercise with many uncertain factors that may influence the outcome. The study of three DDR processes in the same country over three fixed time periods enables me to have greater control over the background factors, as opposed to a multi-country study, where background factors can vary greatly, because the variables are often a “product of multiple casual factors acting together” (Landman, 2004: 130). Applying the MSSD enhances therefore the validity of my thesis by comparing units that are similar. In order to strengthen the construct validity\(^4\), I have designed a list of five criteria that are considered to

\(^4\) Construct Validity: identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 2009: 40).
be important to a successful outcome. The list has been derived from empirical studies done by Edloe, 2007; the United Nations IDDRS Operational Guide (IDDRS), 2006; the Stockholm initative on DDR (SIDDR), 2006; and Stedman et al., 1997. The design enables me to make sure I am analyzing the same criteria in all three DDR processes in a structured manner. Another test to judge the quality is the external validity\textsuperscript{5} test. On the one hand DDR processes are highly context sensitive: explanatory factors for success or failure may vary from case to case. The sample, only three cases, is too small to generalize the results and my purpose with this thesis is therefore not to generalize or to develop a generic list for successful DDR processes. Countries are far too different and what has worked in one country may not be the same in another country. Using a structured approach when analysing the empirical data by the development of a list of criteria enhances the reliability\textsuperscript{6}. Lastly, frequently citing sources strengthens the possibility that others may use the same method to arrive at the same result.

2.5 Literature review

I will interpret the empirical data in light of the theoretical framework of the study. My analysis concentrates on DDR processes that have been conducted in parallel with the three peace agreements from 1991 during the Bicesse Accords, in 1994 during the Lusaka Protocol and the last from 2002 during the Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU). With regard to the LMU from 2002 the programme officially concluded in 2008, it marked the end of the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in Angola. Although MDRP formally ended in 2008 the long-term reintegration process will go on locally for several years.

My empirical data are basically collected from secondary sources - as opposed to the use of primary sources where the researcher makes his or her own observations and interviews. The validity may be impaired due to the fact that I have to relate to others' research and data. Since I am aware of this challenge, I have reviewed my literature with this in mind and the sources

\textsuperscript{5} External validity, defining the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized (Yin, 2009: 40)

\textsuperscript{6} Reliability is to make sure that another researcher following the same procedure all over again will arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009: 45).
have been critically and carefully selected. This brings me to the extensive and flourishing literature on the subject of DDR. Because DDR has become more and more common as an element of the peace-builder’s “toolkit” as noted by Kilroy (2010), there is a considerable and growing amount of post-conflict literature available. DDR is not an option anymore but a vital component in modern peace-building. I will limit myself to only referring to literature relevant for the case study of Angola.

There are some authors and researchers that reoccur in the literature I have studied who should be mentioned specifically. This applies to Mats Berdal, Nat Colletta, Robert Muggah, John Stedman, Caroline A. Hartzell (2007). These researchers have been influential in the study of post-conflict resolution and DDR. They have been responsible for numerous publications that are frequently cited. In the special case of Angola, the authors Gomes Porto, Chris Alden and Imogen Parsons have in their book From Soldiers to Citizen carried out a social, economic and political research study of post-war Angola and particularly on the reintegration of ex-combatants. Policy documents and standards for developing DDR programmes evolved during the past decade. During the years 2004 - 2006 a group of fourteen UN departments, agencies, programmes and funds and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) composed the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG- DDR). The IAWG – DDR developed “The Integrated DDR Standards” (IDDRS) (2006). Other documents that are important are the UN best practice and lessons learned guides developed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN DPKO; UNDP, 1999). Additionally there are groups of donors from different countries (i.e. Japan, Norway, Canada). The World Bank and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) has all been contributing to policy documents and standard operating procedures for planning, developing and executing DDR programmes. Other policy documents such as thematic guidelines, i.e. the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UN Women) handbook on DDR, build on Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The handbook “Getting it right, doing it right” which specifically addresses and acknowledges that female and male ex-combatants and their dependants have different needs in the DDR process (UNIFEM, 2004). Lastly, valuable information on comparative analyses can be obtained from the annual and comprehensive reports on current DDR programmes by the School for a Culture of Peace at Barcelona Autonomous University (Carmès et al., 2006, 2009) and the annual “Small Arms
Survey” (2003, 2005). In addition to the literature research, I was fortunate to participate in the "DDR manager course" hosted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in Stockholm, Sweden in 2009. Some of the information received at the FBA has been used in my thesis. The FBA uses the Chatham rules, therefore when I cite from the FBA I will only cite FBA, 2009. This course focused on background, development, planning and implementation of the DDR programs throughout the world.

3 DDR processes: definitional and theoretical issues

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will be devoted to explore the concept of DDR. I will begin by giving a short introduction and background of DDR processes and follow up with a definition of the DDR acronym. Next, I will place DDR within the peace-building context, and then I will present cross-cutting issues such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), truth and reconciliation. Lastly, I will go into detail and describe the criteria that the literature on the lessons learned considers important for a successful DDR process. I will use these criteria as the basis for my analysis of each peace process.

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7 When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.
3.2 Background and definitions

The UN has long experience with conflict resolution, but according to United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO), it was not until 1989 through its UN Observer group in Central America (OUNCA)\(^8\) that the term DDR was first to be used (UN DPKO, 1997).

According to the School for a Culture of Peace, by 2008 there were a total of fifteen active DDR processes and eleven of these were in Africa. During the twenty years of DDR, the UN has been engaged in over twenty-four processes but the outcome particularly in the African context has shown mixed results. The most successful cases were Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola and Uganda. Other cases, however, have been especially ineffective, with the result that many ex-combatants have not been able to secure employment and transform to a civilian life-style. An example is the long-lasting case of Sudan with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from 2005 with no accompanied DDR process (School for a Culture of Peace 2006; 2009).

DDR processes, as stated in the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Operational Guide (IDDRS), should be an integral part of peace keeping operations, both under the auspices of the UN and other regional organizations. DDR is an important part of the efforts to create an atmosphere so that the transition from war to peace will have the opportunity to succeed (IDDRS, 2006). Although most DDR processes have been implemented with the UN in the lead, other agencies and organisations may also take the lead or be complementary. The African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) or the World Bank (WB). In Angola the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, World for Food Program (WFP) and the International Labour Organization ILO were all supporting the DDR process. The MDRP and the WB assisted in the demobilization and reintegration process. MDRP concluded the Angolan project in 2008 (MDRP, 2008; School for a Culture of Peace, 2009).

\(^8\) UN Observer Group in Central America, OUNCA) carried out a voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance in 1989-92 (UNDP, 1997).
Furthermore, as stated in the IDDRS and by UNDP, DDR should run in parallel with other supportive programmes that follow in the wake of peace agreements. Following an armed conflict or a natural disaster, assistance is needed to facilitate the return of internally displaced (IDP), ex-combatants and refugees to their communities. Focusing on individual beneficiary groups tends to accentuate differences of experience related to the crisis and may split communities apart. Focusing on the community as the centre of this reintegration unifies communities and prepares them to move forward. This could be achieved through community based reintegration programmes (UNDP, Bureau for Crizes and Recovery Prevention annual report, 2009). Other programmes that DDR normally are linked to are SSR programmes for the wider security of the state, such as developing a national army and restructuring the justice sector including police and judges. SSR, also supports humanitarian challenges, economic development and social integration (IDDRS, 2006).

DDR also focuses on other cross-cutting issues like gender, child soldiers, and health-related issues such as HIV/AIDS. According to Human Rights Watch, child soldiers constitute around 8-10% of the armed groups to be demobilised, in Angola estimates were around 11,000. Unicef is often the leading and coordinating agency and works closely together with the DDR programmes (HRW, 2003).

The goals for the DDR process as highlighted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) may for practical reason be divided in to phases with short-term and a long-term goals.

The short-term goal is to restore security and stability. Immediately after the peace talks it is important to seize the moment and start demilitarisation by the collection of arms and dissolution of the military structures. One of many issues during peace talks is the mistrust between the warring parties, and by progressive disarmament mistrust can be reduced. This phase normally can take up to five months. The long-term goal is to help the ex-combatants to begin a new life by a sustained social and economic reintegration process. This phase obviously takes more time and will be part of a more comprehensive development plan. The reintegration phase can take two to four years or longer depending on the overall security, social and economic development in the country, donors and international assistance (Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2009).
Definitions

Combatant

The IDDRS Operational Guide defines a combatant in the DDR context according to an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, a combatant is a person who:

“Is a member of a national army or an irregular military or is actively participating in military activities and hostilities or is involved in recruiting or training military personnel or holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization or arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of an military structure or having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes” (IDDRS, 2006:24).

Combatants may have various connotations but include a wide range of meanings; fighter, guerrilla, soldier, militia, women and children associated with fighting forces, other non combatant roles which include; drivers, cooks porter and alike that are all associated with armed groups,

The acronym DDR can be confusing for some who are not familiar with the term, so I will elaborate in order to shed some light on the subject. In the literature you will often find many variations of the term “DDR” Examples of different acronyms are: DR, D&R, DDR, DRP, DRR, DDRRR. Normally the first “D” or “D1”, stands for Disarmament, the second “D” may be described as “DD” or “D2” is Demobilization, the next “R” is either Reinsertion, Reintegration, Repatriation, or could be a collection of all of them. The “P” normally stands for programme or process. An example where “all” acronyms are used is from the UN DDR programme in Congo: “DDRRR”, the “RRR” defined as Repatriation, Reinsertion and Reintegration. The use of so many different acronyms only tells us that DDR is customized and adapted to the context of each country. The other term that is used frequently, is the term “DDR program” and “DDR process”. In the literature the terms are often used interchangeably but they are quite different. A DDR program takes place inside of a DDR process, which is inherently much longer as it includes cross-cutting issues as
rehabilitation and longer term political, socio and economical reintegration. The latter needs more accept and takes longer time to be fully integrated back into society. According to Store norske leksikon a process refers to transition and development through phases, and a programme refers to a specific plan of action (Store norske leksikon, 2011). However according to Ball and van der Goor:

” DDR should be approached as a process, not a program. While DDR processes will consist of a series of programs aimed at addressing the various needs facing ex-combatants, their dependents, and the communities where they settle, it is important to recognize that DDR does not consist of distinct, linear activities. Instead, these programs are embedded in a broader dynamic, integrated process” (Ball et al., 2006:11).

Ball et al., stresses the importance of seeing the DDR initiative, as a transition from combatant to civilian shareholder which is a process both mentally and physically.

The IDDRS has described the following definitions for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (IDDRS, 2006:26)

The DDR process can have five phases, starting with weapons surrender followed by assembly and discharge of the ex-combatants, then to short to medium term reinsertion benefits and over to the last phase, reintegration. This five phases are however debated, the UN advocate that reinsertion is formally part of Demobilization and not a phase on its own. But for the purpose of visualizing I have used Balls figures as shown below. Figure 3.1 below shows this in a linear fashion, but these phases may occur differently according to the context they are implemented in.

![Figure 3.1: Sequence of the DDR process (Nicole Ball, Luc van der Gor, 2006).]
Disarmament:

“Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes” (UNIDDR, 2006:26)

Disarmament is usually seen as the first step, removal of weapons (light and heavy), ammunition and explosives from an individual is a highly symbolic act that signifies the end of his or her active role as a combatant.

Disarmament can be divided into four phases 1) information campaigns society 2) collection and registration 3) storage and stockpiling 4) destruction.

Depending on the type of DDR program, security and resources, the phases can be take place all in one or separately. However, during disarmament it is important to have an effective, efficient and comprehensive plan and it needs to be monitored and verified by a neutral party, the UN or other organisations. The disarmament can be static or mobile depending on the security situation in the area; the advantage is that mobile disarmament permits a more rapid response. The eligibility criteria for the participation in the DDR programme are normally discussed during the peace talks and should be included in the programme documents.

Disarmament may also involve the collection of weapons from civilians in special Small Arms and Light Weapons programs (SALW). The aim is to reduce access to weapons through redistribution or by destroying them.

Demobilization

“Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion” (IDDRS, 2006: 26).
During the demobilization phase the combatants are assembled in camps/cantonments to be registered and undergo basic vocational training for new meaningful work. An important aspect of the demobilization is the psychological separation of a combatant from the military command structure in order to change from a military to a civilian mindset. While in the camps one is well taken care of and given basic necessities - such as clothing, food, health care, as well as shelter for the demobilized and his/ her immediate family.

Demobilization is, as mentioned above, the transition from military status to civilian status. Whereas disarmament is primarily a role for the military with assistance from the civilian component of the peace-keeping mission, demobilization is merely a civilian programme with military assistance. The distinction is very important for the psychological effect since the ex-combatants throughout the process are re-acquiring their civilian status. The duration of the demobilization phase can vary greatly, from days to months.

Reinsertion

“Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year.” (IDDRS, 2006:26).

Reintegration

“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (IDDRS, 2006:26).
This is the phase where the individual gets back his civilian status, as well as help in obtaining work so that he/she can have a stable income to support his/her family. Some international organizations and different countries (donor countries) will often be financially responsible for reintegration projects. Ex-combatants are a special group and present challenges because they may pose a potential threat to security, and stigmatization may be a challenge for the individual because ex-combatants may be viewed with fear and suspicion when they return. Many of the ex-combatants lack a social network and for these reasons social reintegration must be addressed shortly after they return to their communities. Inclusion into formal and informal social networks such as family reunification, psychosocial support and counselling are therefore important to explore and engage in from the outset.

For the success of the reintegration programme it is important that the disarmament and demobilization phases have been effective and efficient and prepared the ex-combatant for his or her way back into civilian life. According to the School for a Culture of Peace (Caramès et al., 2006:4), the length of a DDR programme can be up to 3½ years. The disarmament and demobilization phase usually lasts a few months. The rehabilitation and reintegration phases tend to last two years.

3.3 DDR and peace building: why is DDR so important?

In order for the parties to arrive at the negotiating table and sign a peace agreement, several processes should take place simultaneously. As indicated by the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA) at the “Second International conference on DDR and stability in Africa”⁹, recent DDR processes have typically been established within the context of peace processes. Although different circumstances may have led to the peace talks, the dynamics of the talks often determine the scope, range and sequencing of the DDR process. What led the parties to the negotiating table?

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Was there a regime change in which an international peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations or a coalition of states that have joined forces and forced the parties to negotiate? In these circumstances DDR decisions are normally postponed until after the election of a post-war government, with armed groups left to reside in the assembly points. Examples include Zimbabwe (1979), Namibia (1988) and South Africa (1990s).

Did peace talks come as a result of an agreement to end hostilities in which one party has laid down arms?

Or, lastly, was peace accomplished through war, as was the case of the third and last peace process in Angola? In these types of scenario the governments are extremely interested in rapidly putting forward a DDR programme to make sure the defeated party cannot pose a threat any more (UN OSAA, 2007).

Paris and Sisk have noted that during peace negotiations there are several factors that need to be addressed. Among them are: the root of the conflict, exchange of prisoners, return of refugees, human rights issues, reconciliation, interim government, security sector reforms (SSR), time for the first democratic elections, Small Arms and Light Weapons arms reduction programmes (SALW) and finally the DDR process. The more comprehensive the peace accords the better. Therefore all the elements listed above should be included in the peace accords. These mentioned factors are also interdependent as the successful completion of each phase is essential to the success of the other (Paris et al., 2009).

In the aftermath of a conflict, involvement in peace-building initiatives has become vital in stabilizing a fragile peace. Still, in many conflicts where peace-building has been tried the conflicts still persist. Stedman draws the line back to the 1980s when the focus on conflict resolution was more on the tools and conditions for bringing the parties to the negotiating table than on whether the parties actually kept their promises to uphold their part of the agreement. Stedman points to the linear view that successful agreements lead to lasting peace as exemplified above. The same strategy was employed during the 1990s but the linear view was defied and the outcome became different. The parties were reluctant to fulfil their commitment to peace. The period after the signing of a peace agreement was filled with a high degree of mistrust,
risk and uncertainty. Too little effort was spent on activities that promoted sustainable peace. The conflicts in Rwanda, Angola and Liberia are well documented for this (Stedman, 2002).

Peace-building as an integrated UN strategy was not incorporated before former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros–Ghali used it in his “Agenda for Peace” in 1992.

“Peace-building was an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Peace-building, as Knight argues, should involve promoting human rights, strengthening national institutions, monitoring elections and creating conditions for sustainable development (Knight, 2009). DDR in this context will be understood as a post-conflict peace-building strategy.

Figure 3.2 (below) describes a “best case” scenario for the transition from conflict to peace and recovery. It is during the formal cessation of the conflict that DDR programmes are implemented. Even at the peak of the conflict DDR interventions may be explored with the parties, but most of the planning and design will be done during the post-conflict and post-ceasefire phase, whereas the implementation is carried out during the transition period (IDDRS, 2006).

Figure 3.2: Implementing DDR during transition from conflict to recovery (United Nations Integrated DDR Standards 2006).
The UN OSAA, (2007), stated that “the most important precondition for peace, stability and human development in emerging post-conflict societies in Africa are comprehensive and effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes”. The statement is underscored by the not so positive statistics compiled by Marshall (2005) in a comparative report on the status of conflict trends in Africa. His findings document that in those countries that had relapsed back into war, failure of DDR directly or indirectly contributed to 60% of the cases (Ibid). Important as it is to know its possibilities, DDR planners and implementers also need to be aware of its weaknesses and shortcomings. Ball et al. have taken a closer look at the dilemmas concerning DDR processes. Obviously there are limitations to what a DDR process can achieve due to its rather narrow range in political and security objectives. First and foremost, a DDR process cannot substitute for the parties’ unwillingness to lay down their arms. There must be a will to engage in a political process; a DDR process does not have enforcement activities; preventing a conflict from recurring can not be done physically. However mitigation is within the scope of its mandate and, lastly; because of its limitations a DDR process cannot produce development and guarantee the sustained reintegration of the ex-combatants back into social life. Longer-term programmes such as SSR, SALW and reconciliation must be coordinated and run in parallel (Ball et al., 2006).

Civil wars in the African context often result in the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers and irregular rebel fighters including women and children. A possible reason for this is the lack of opportunity and desperations to find other ways to sustain. As noted by Knight, after the guns have silenced and the peace talks are progressing, one of the most important tasks is to provide security by demilitarization, including getting control of the enormous amount of small arms and light weapons (SALW) circulating in society and the demobilization of the combatants so they don’t pose any threat to peace (Knight 2009). Nor must one forget the environment that the ex-combatants return to after being demobilized: unemployment, a devastated infrastructure, wrecked economy, competing for jobs with other large groups of refugees coming back after the war. All these factors often are described as “fertile ground” for banditry, insecurity and a possible outbreak of a new war (Ibid).
3.4 Security Sector Reform (SSR)

As Knight observes, insecurity in post-conflict societies is a growing concern, a challenge to political, economic and social development. Institutions meant to provide for security are often deeply involved in the conflict and in no state to mitigate or promote the rule of law and human rights. Many regimes, particularly in Africa, have a reputation for corruption and misappropriation of state resources. While the professionalism of the justice and security institutions has long been subverted to political ends by those in power. The consequence is that the people distrust the institutions that should protect them (Knight, 2009). The terminology SSR is defined by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and constitutes four core areas:

“1) Core security actors; (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); 2) security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); 3) justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and 4) non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)” (OECD/DAC, 2007).

States emerging from autocratic rule and civil conflicts must transform their security sector to be able to provide the necessary security level in the post-conflict situation in order to prevent a security vacuum but also to support the aspiring democratic governance for sustained peace (Knight, 2009).

According to Colletta, Samuelsson and Berts, the link between SSR and DDR is often thought of as SSR coming after DDR, but the decisions on the type of demobilization, number of soldiers and integration into a new combined army is actually decided prior to demobilization. DDR is normally dependent upon a functioning security system not only for general stability but also for the capacity to absorb ex-combatants into the regular security apparatus. Similarly, weaknesses in DDR programmes are often explained when identifying flaws in the existing security system (Colletta et al., 2008). SSR and DDR should therefore work closely
together to ensure maximum synergic effect. An integrated approach with other long-term development initiatives is therefore particularly important (OECD/DAC 2007). With this in mind one should remember that often-authoritarian regimes and weak transitional governments by nature are often reluctant to engage in highly sensitive issues such as transitional justice and truth-seeking tribunals. Because of this both DDR and SSR can play a vital role to support initiatives promoting human rights and reconciliation.

3.5 Transitional justice and reconciliation

Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violation of human rights as defined by International Transitional Centre for Justice (ITCJ). In the aftermath of a civil war, genocide or brutal dictatorship issues of human rights violations must be addressed. Transitional justice seeks recognition for the victims and lays the foundations for the wider process for peace, democratic development and reconciliation. Historically the legal foundation was laid down by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the four Geneva conventions of 1949 (ICTJ, 2011). Noted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), in the immediate post second-world war era with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals freshly in mind one thought the trend was towards greater accountability for atrocities against humanity, but silence, amnesia and amnesty was rather the rule (IDEA, 2008). It was not until the 1980s and onwards with the global growth of human rights organizations that saw a policy shift politically and morally to fight against impunity. It was the cooperation with international organizations such as the UN, and major human rights NGOs that developed norms and practices to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Examples of these are the ad hoc tribunals of The Hague (for the former Yugoslavia) and Arusha (for Rwanda) and of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Ibid).

According to the ICTJ, transitional Justice is depended on accountable leadership and good institutions as also mentioned above with SSR. The processes are often difficult and delicate; the reasons for this may be because of a fragile peace process. Institutions to oversee and execute the process, the courts, are corrupt and weak, often the perpetrators are still in power.
and therefore reluctant to engage in a long and probably dangerous political transitional process. Because of this complexity it may not only be the result of one action but a mixture or a combination of measures to give justice to the affected; amnesty for truth (the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)), criminal prosecutions, vetting or other institutional forms of reform, reparation programmes for victims, memorialisation efforts, security system reform (SSR), gender justice, various local and indigenous practices of dispute settlements and reconciliation (ICTJ, 2010). A report by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted especially the role of local trials and dispute settlements in his 2004 report on “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies” (Ibid).

Observed by the Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, (OUSAA, 2007) transitional justice focuses on justice and accountability and DDR focuses on stability and security. Even though the programmes work through different means, both aim at long-term peace and stability. Failure of DDR processes to establish good disarmament programmes and re-establish legitimate state control of the use of force may jeopardize the security situation and diminish the prospects for transitional justice. Conversely DDR carried out in situations without recourse to or in coordination with justice mechanisms can increase tension and create gross inequities between ex-combatants and victims and miss opportunities for a sustained reintegration (UN/OSAA, 2007). Arguments that often speak in disfavour of DDR as noted by the ICTJ, are that DDR programmes reward bad behaviour, the ex-combatants receive all benefits and the victims by contrast receive nothing. The risk is that increasing disadvantages may give rise to new grievances that could increase tension and resistance by the local community towards the ex-combatants (ICTJ 2010). How to enclose both groups of beneficiaries, the victims and the ex-combatants? The International Centre for Transitional Justice advocates that guaranteeing that claims of victims will be addressed through reparation and strong links between these programmes should be adapted because justice-enhancing measures may also facilitate better grounds for reintegration in the receiving communities.
3.6 Key criteria considered to be important for a successful DDR process

In this part I will go into detail with each criterion that is considered to be important for a successful outcome of DDR processes. DDR is part of a wider peace process and external factors may influence the progress and outcome of the DDR process. A successful DDR process must take an integrated approach not only through its technical disarmament and demobilization but also through trust building and political reconciliation. Described by Berdal et al., “DDR programmes, however well designed and resourced, can never carry “peace processes” on their own but must, if they are to be successful, form part of wider political process” (Berdal et al., 2009:6). In her paper Edloe (2007) argues that experience has shown that early and thorough consideration of a DDR plan is most likely to lead to a sustainable peace. This means that DDR must be thought of and implemented in the peace accords itself and not dealt with at a later occasion. Muggah (2009) raises the question of what constitutes a “successful” DDR process, and how to measure it? Muggah et al., says that: “[...] there is a mounting unease among policy-makers and aid workers that DDR lacks clear benchmarks or metrics” (Muggah et al., 2009:3). Muggah et al. have observed that there is a gap between, on the one hand, what policy-makers see as important, and on the other hand, what the practitioner and peace-keepers in the field prioritise. The DDR practitioners in the field naturally prioritise concrete delivery – the evidence based DDR – at the expense of thoroughly elaborated monitoring and evaluation reports (Ibid). Regardless of method, “Appropriate metrics of success, the indicators, impacts and outcomes of DDR – together with an analysis of what and why it does or does not work – are urgently required” (Muggah et al., 2010:4). The lack of good metrics and success indicators has also been a challenge when designing my thesis. The factors and criteria for analysing the Angolan DDR processes will be discussed below.

Some of the weaknesses of DDR processes have been the rather “fixed” sequencing of the concept by emphasising too much on the “DD” at the expense of confidence building and the longer-term activities such as the reintegration phase. Muggah argues that because programme goals often have been set only to measure success by the number of weapons collected rather than to the extent these initiatives have actually provided stability or improved human security, successful DDR processes are therefore a question for debate (Muggah, 2005). Only relating to the “DD” outcome may be misleading and give false impression to the stakeholders involved. However, this is still the case in many programmes,
and as Muggah states in his paper, there is growing evidence to the contrary. The number of arms collected is not proportional to the improved “level” of peace achieved. Funds are more easily spent on activities like weapons reduction programmes as they are more “visible” and thereby more controllable than long-term reintegration programmes (Ibid).

Many organizations like the UN (UNDP, UN DPKO), the World Bank, SIDDR, and various scholars and practitioners all experienced in DDR have made large and comprehensive reports about the lessons learned. Their reports derive from experiences from various DDR processes and have tried to come up with a set of useful criteria on how to find right ways of introducing DDR in each particular situation. Berdal et al. have observed that DDR programmes should be developed in a local context and state that “there are limitations and perhaps dangers in applying universal DDR strategies in highly specific local conditions” (Berdal et al., 2009:8). DDR programmes should therefore be nationally orientated and make use of experiences from previous programmes and learn from their mistakes and shortcomings.

In the light of the need to come up with better analyses of success and failures I have designed a list of five criteria or factors that are considered important for determining the success or failure of a DDR process. Each element in the list has been carefully analyzed and extracted from literature reviews in the field of DDR. The selection of each criterion addresses both strategic and political issues and, more specifically, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The five criteria are developed from the SIDDR working group (2006), the UN Integrated Demobilization and Reintegration Standards Operational Guide (IDDRS 2006), Edlooe (2007), Stedman et al. (1997) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) DDR Management Course (2009). The empirical data from the three Angolan peace processes will be viewed and analysed in the light of these criteria.

**Criterion 1.** Realistic time frame: to secure successful implementation, peace agreements should allow sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and flexible time frames. Sufficient time and flexible time frames is described by both the IDDRS in the Operational
Guide, and by Edloe in her research: “Best practices for Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)”. To start with the IDDRS it describes that a DDR process should be planned and coordinated within the framework of the peace process. Furthermore, it should be flexible and carefully adapted to meet the specific needs of a particular country. Planning should therefore involve safety and security, coordination; assessment, monitoring and evaluation; information and sensitization; and lastly a transition with an exit strategy (IDDRS, 2006).

According to Edloe: “A peace agreement must provide for details of the DDR process from the outset” (Edloe, 1997: 5). Edloe argues for the importance of including DDR into the framework of the peace process, and the time frames should be realistic. The reason for this is that the warring parties may be reluctant to comply unless it is not part of the initial peace treaty. Furthermore as noted by Edloe:

“Planning of the DDR process must include flexible time frames set for the beginning and end of the disarmament and demobilization phases; including plan for the collection of weapons; number and plan for cantonment sites; building institutions for overseeing and management of the DDR process” (Edloe, 2007:5)

The time frames must be detailed enough to allow for a specified time for the beginning and the end of each phase so that one does not proceed to the next phase before the previous one is completed. Moreover, as she has shown with reference to the DDR processes in Guatemala and Sierra Leone, that “early consideration and implementation of a DDR plan in a peace agreement reduces the risk that warring parties will resume fighting and increases the likelihood that they will maintain an agreed-upon ceasefire” (Edloe, 1997: 6).

**Criterion 2.** Reorganization of the armed forces into a new unified army: to be successful, peace agreements should be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues. The IDDRS Operational Guide states the need to establish links with other security, humanitarian, peace-building and recovery programmes:
“DDR is a key component for national and international efforts towards establishing, a secure environment, without which reconciliation and long-term development will not be achieved. Links should therefore be established from the start among DDR and other security, humanitarian, peace building and recovery programmes” (IDDRS, 2006:39).

The link with the legislative institutions is important in order to broaden the concept of DDR. SSR (reforms of the security system) lays the foundation for DDR and allows for the granting of amnesty (IDDRS, 2006). Linking DDR to SSR enables the DDR process to be integrated within the long-term development and reconciliation process. Licklider (2008), states that “Integration means that individuals are brought into the new military in positions similar to the ones they occupied in prior organisations which were in combat with their own” (Knight, 2009: 9). Furthermore, according to Knight, those soldiers who do not demobilize may have a future in a new unified army. As the experiences of the DDR/SSR process in Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, (DRC) show “the adoption of an effective SSR hinges on the success of the process of demobilizing combatants” (Knight, 2009: 14).

Moreover, a unified army can often provide order and also the creation of jobs in a divided society. This type of reintegration is a critical factor for successful post-conflict peace building (Knight 2009). Rupiya and Njeri (2000) indicate that the warring factions may use the creation of a unified army as a window of opportunity for future reconciliation. Furthermore according to Knight:

“Progress on integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation and constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups” (Knight, 2009:5).

Knight, also points to failure of military integration, “[…] often leading to or constituting an element of a wider failure of the peace process […]” (Ibid:8).
According to Ball et al.: “DDR should be viewed as a part of a broader security, stabilization and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention” (Ball et al., 2006:11). This is also in alignment with the IDDRS Operational Guide that advocates the importance of integrated approaches. Security in all sectors of the society such as Army, Police and other relevant Security forces should be addressed in parallel.

**Criterion 3. Regional approach to weapons control:** to be successful, peace agreements should take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament and weapons control, and include a regional approach to weapons control and management in order to stop cross-border arms flows. According to the IDDRS Operational Guide: “Disarmament is the first stage of the DDR process, and operational decisions made at this stage will have an impact on the whole process” (IDDRS, 2006:21). The IDDRS stresses that the disarmament should be comprehensive and include the collection of weapons from individuals and from arms supply. In the immediate post-war environment there is a window of opportunity to establish links with both security and development through a SALW program. The SALW program should be directed to include a national strategy to reduce the proliferation of guns (Ibid). Edloe argues that DDR processes must: “Develop a regional approach to achieve disarmament”.

It is a well known saying that “weapons knows no boundaries”, but according to Edloe “demilitarization knows no boundaries” as well, and she recommends developing a regional approach to disarmament. Edloe says that:

> “By employing regional approach in southern Africa, the UN has been able to focus on confidence-building and transparency measures in a region where there is a history of regional conflict and violence” (Edloe, 1997:11).

Edloe refers to the successful work of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that intervened in the civil war in Liberia (1989-1996) and negotiated an agreement for lasting peace and prevented the conflict from spreading throughout West Africa. The opposite of this statement reaffirms the importance of the observation: “Well-executed national disarmament efforts have proven futile when no attention is paid to cross-border arms flows” (Edloe, 1997:11). Still with this positive experience one needs to focus on the context this was executed in. This initiative has inspired
African leaders and has built confidence in resolving conflict. Building on this experience successful disarmament needs to be linked to a regional approach and in addition a UN sanctioned arms embargo.

Moreover, an arms embargo ensures a formal commitment of neighbouring states to comply by not supplying arms into the conflict area. These initiatives are the best to address problems of proliferation of small arms and cross-border transfers (Edloe, 2007). In Mozambique, which is described as a success case (Stedman, 2002), the reunification of 15,000 men and the disarmament and demobilization of the surplus ex-combatants on each side probably aided to the completion of DDR before the 1994 elections (Karbo, Tony and Mutisi, Matha (2007).

**Criterion 4.** The role of the UN: To secure successful implementation of peace agreements, the UN should participate in the negotiations of peace agreements from the outset and be granted sufficient resources to carry out its mandate. As stated by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the primary objective by establishing national institutions and joint committees is to ensure local ownership, the parties must be shareholders in their process (FBA, 2009).

Ball et al. say that:

“Successful DDR processes require the support of key international actors in developing mediation mechanisms and exerting coordinated political, economic and security pressure for implementing DDR in the context of the broader peace process” (Ball et al., 2006:9).

Ball et al. see the role of the international community to assist in the establishment of what she calls high-level security commissions to support DDR and other SSR activities. On the other hand, the international community should pressure the parties to comply by the deployment of bilateral or multilateral security forces with a robust mandate that can enforce the peace agreement (Ibid). Stedman argues that:

“Where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited and
peace has triumphed. Where international custodians have failed to develop and implement such strategies, spoilers have succeeded at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives” (Stedman, 1997:6).

Stedman points to the role international actors can play or not play in settling the peace. Providing the UN or other organizations with a robust mandate, resources and a clear knowledge of the intention of the parties to the conflict. This strategy can make the difference of the outcome and the life or death for the many hundreds of thousands of people depending on the peace agreement.

According to the UN DPKO: “The military observers play a vital role in building confidence among the ex-combatants during the disarmament process” (UN DPKO, 1999:71). International neutral observers can do this by verifying and monitoring the progress of disarmament and demobilization. Furthermore, as noted by the IDDRS: “Neutral international monitors should assess the strength, arms-to-combatant ratio, profile and number of those associated with armed forces” (IDDRS, 2006:172). Trust among the parties is often an obstacle to peace, and international observers have an important role to inform the parties and build trust during the disarmament and demobilization phase (FBA, 2009). The IDDRS points out that through communication and sensitization national ownership and broad based participation can make it easier for ex-combatants to be accepted in the communities that receive them. Participation in the DDR process should be broad-based and represent government ministries, civil society organizations, and the private sector (IDDRS, 2006). Furthermore, the UN can provide neutral military observers (MILOBs), peace-keeping forces and neutral police (UNPOL) to monitor progress and assist in each DDR phase. The military component may contribute to the DDR programme by providing security at the disarmament and demobilization sites and securing routes that will be used by the parties as well as providing transport. Furthermore the MILOBs and UNPOL may engage in information gathering and sensitization, programme-monitoring and reporting on the compliance of the parties to the peace accord. UNPOL may also assist the local police in law and order (IDDRS, 2006).
According to the UN DPKO, “The United Nations should be involved early on in the negotiation process, particularly those departments and agencies that would be required to implement the elements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan” (UN DPKO, 1999:27). The UN should also encourage the parties to incorporate the DDR process into the final peace agreement. Additionally the UN should also have resources to provide negotiating guidance and assistance in design, monitoring and verification of the DDR process (Ibid). It is therefore important that the UN should be early involved since the UN often will be in charge of the independent monitoring and verification of the peace agreement and be allocated the resources needed to perform its task.

**Criterion 5.** Power-sharing: to be successful peace agreements should contain provisions for power-sharing mechanisms as a means to create trust and confidence on part of leaders on both sides- in order to enhance political will and reduce likelihood of spoilers.

Timothy D. Sisk (1996) state (according to Stedman, 1997) that: “

[…] successful power-sharing depends on "a core of moderate, integrated elites [that] has a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny," Most recommendations for power-sharing in civil wars simply assume parties are willing to share power (Stedman, 1997:8).

Furthermore: “[…] the most perfectly crafted power-sharing institutions in the world are useless if one of the parties does not want to share power” (Ibid:8). Stedman argues that crafters of peace settlements must be prepared for spoiling activities and violence in the wake of a peace agreement. Most DDR practitioners and scholars identify the importance of political will and trust as a primary success factor.

According to Ball et al., there must be a buy- in from the parties to a conflict:

“ For DDR to succeed, both the leaders involved in the peace negotiations and their field commanders need to be prepared to assume responsibility for implementing the peace agreement including the DDR process, and to exert the leadership necessary for its implementation” (Ball et al., 2006:9).
As noted by Edloe, “The most successful DDR programmes were those in which all parties to the conflict demonstrated a desire to respect the terms of ceasefire and peace agreement as was the case from 2002 in Sierra Leone” (Edloe, 2007:7). According to the UN DPKO\(^{10}\), experience from DDR processes in both Sierra Leone and Liberia has shown that: “Key amongst the many issues that contributed to the successful implementation of DDR in both countries was the building of trust between the parties.” (UN DPKO, 2010:25). The trust-building measures in Sierra Leone had two inception points. On the one hand, the DDR programme had to avoid the notion that the perpetrators were being rewarded through participation in the programme. On the other hand, the former combatants needed to gain benefits that met their needs and aspirations in order to participate in the DDR programme (UN DPKO, 2010). Moreover, building on experience from Côte d’Ivoire: “[…] lack of trust in the peace process constitutes a major challenge for the implementation of an effective disarmament process and the reunification of Côte d’Ivoire (UN DPKO, 2010:8).

Power-sharing may in some circumstances also be useful to build trust among former warring parties, as noted by Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2007), Sidney Noel (2005) and Helga Malmin Binningsbø (2006);

“[…] power-sharing is a common feature of negotiated settlements to civil war. The logic of creating power-sharing and power-dividing institutions is that these mechanisms minimize the capacity of any one party to control the post-war state and potentially use this position of influence to threaten the interests of survival of their rivals” (Hartzell et al., 2007:92).

Moreover, as indicated by Helga Malmin Binningsbø (2006), her studies tend to conclude that there is a positive relation between power-sharing and peace duration:

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\(^{10}\) United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN DPKO), launched in 2010 its DDR - “in peace operations” retrospective paper Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration retrospective is intended to increase awareness of the role of DDR in past and current peace operations.
“[…] power-sharing democracy is the best approach to achieve sustainable peace in all post conflict societies, regardless of how the conflicts end […] the more comprehensive the post-conflict power-sharing, the longer is the post-conflict peace survival” (Binningsbø, 2006: 19).

According to Sidney Noel:

“Typically, power-sharing mechanisms are intended to serve the dual purpose of promoting post-conflict peace-building and serving as a foundation for the future growth of democratic institutions. […] The guiding principle, implicit or explicit, is that power-sharing is essential for the building of sustainable peace and democratic governance in ethnically divided societies” (Noel et al., 2005: xi).

Ian S. Spears (Noel et al., 2005), argue that there are different experiences of power sharing and from his observations one should be cautious about its effect in every context. Successful cases such as the one from South Africa between the National Party and African National Congress, (ANC) stand out in stark contrast to the more troublesome experiences from other parts of Africa where power sharing didn’t have the anticipated effect:

“Power-sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of post-conflict governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however, the results have been the same: inclusive power-sharing agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if accepted, have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long term” (Noel et al., 2005: 184).

Of the reasons for there being more difficulties in Africa Spears observes: “Instead of power-sharing, local disputants often prefer other more self-interested and, in their view, more durable approaches to peace – such as complete victory over their opponents” (Ibid: 185).

Building trust as seen in this part can be done in several ways. However selecting the choice of option should be carefully assessed. It should not be based on a “blue-print” peace-building lessons learned reports, but be employed according to the context of the country and in close cooperation with the parties. The challenge of power-sharing based on the above mentioned

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11 Binningsbø’s findings build on research from Hartzell 1999, Hartzell et al. 2001, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Walter 2002). Cited with permission 03.06.2011
literature is the fact that rivals have to share power. Previous antagonists need to abandon their interest in total control of the state, they must share power with the one they least trust. Secondly, institutions set to provide for trust building and power-sharing are often not transparent and not capable of effectively serving its proposed function, particularly in countries devastated from years of civil war.

Harzell et al. note “The willingness of adversaries to endure these costs over time has the potential to serve as a costly indicator of their commitment to an enduring peace” (Hartzell et al., 2007:4).

In the next chapter I will start by presenting the background and evolution of the Angolan conflict from the early days of independence from Portugal in 1975 to the peace negotiations that led to the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord in 1991. My analysis will be devoted to the three peace processes that had provisions for a DDR process; the Bicesse, the Lusaka and the Luena peace processes. The procedure I intend to use is first, to briefly present the background to each peace process followed by an analysis of the empirical data using the five criteria considered important for a successful DDR process as mentioned above. The analysis will be summed up in a sub-conclusion and presented in a table. The same procedure will be used to analyze the Lusaka and the Luena DDR process. Finally, I will do a systematic comparative analysis of the outcome of all three DDR processes. The findings will be presented in a summary report and in a table.
4 Analysis: Comparing the three Angolan peace processes

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide information on the three peace processes which are the basis for my analysis. I will start with a short introduction to the background of the Angolan conflict. Next, I will present each peace agreement and follow up with an analysis of the performance of the DDR process conducted during each peace process. The DDR processes will be analyzed according to the key criteria considered important for a successful DDR process: 1) Realistic time frames, 2) Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army, 3) Regional approach to weapons control, 4) The role of the UN, and 5) Power-sharing. Following the analysis of each DDR process I will present the findings in a table.

The nature of the conflict

In 2002 after 27 years of war Angola was ranked as 161 out of 173 countries in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (UNDP, 2002). In order to set the scene, “no other post-conflict situation has been faced with all the complexities and challenges of failed DDR processes in a war to peace transition scenario” (Porto et al. 2007: 33). In the wake of Angola’s protracted and long-lasting war, which left the country in ruins, the national economy had virtually collapsed, hundreds of thousands died and many more were indirectly affected. The infrastructure was shattered and a vast part of the country was inaccessible for the humanitarian agencies. The government system was highly unaccountable and a demoralized and traumatized civil society was left to start rebuilding the country (Ibid). As a consequence, by the end of 2002 Angola was a humanitarian catastrophe of unseen proportions. According to estimates by the UN, the total cost for the humanitarian operation was as much as $ 233 million. (Ibid).

The roots of the “modern” conflict go back to the early 1960s with the Angolan uprising against a white (Portuguese) colonial minority. The Angolans were used as “slave” labour for
the exploitation of their own natural resources. The white minority confiscated most of the arable land and this was the reason for the struggle for independence and liberation and the upsurge of nationalist movements, namely The Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), the National Front for the liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Popular Movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Accord, 2005).

Throughout the post-WW II era the nationalist movements grew stronger, they developed guerrilla tactics and shaped their ideologies, which also separated them politically. The armed attack on a Luanda prison in 1961 has been celebrated as the beginning of the armed struggle for independence that lasted for fourteen years; the MPLA has ever since claimed it was their responsibility.

In January 1975 the colonial power Portugal and the three parties (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) met in Alvor Portugal to sign an agreement that granted Angola her independence and a handover of power to a transitional government. Shortly before the declaration of the independent state in September 1975 the largest parties, the MPLA and UNITA, had installed themselves in the capital, Luanda. The announcement of independence saw the start of an inevitable power struggle that would last for almost three decades. The Alvor agreement provided for a transitional government, the creation of an integrated army, future elections and final independence, but the coalition government was functioning poorly as the members doubted each other’s commitment to the peace process. The relationship between the MPLA and the other movements was far from good. The MPLA excluded the FNLA and the UNITA from the capital and formed the government and declared independence with Agostinho Neto as President. Agostinho Neto was succeeded in 1979 by José Eduardo dos Santos. The Alvor agreement soon collapsed and the country descended into civil war (ICTJ, 2008).

The MPLA established a one-party socialist regime, a “classical” Marxist-Leninist party; it suppressed the Catholic Church, private business and also the freely organized civil society. Over time the state became authoritarian, increasingly corrupt and more repressive. This led to increasing unease and an even stronger opposition against the authoritarian regime (Accord
As Meijer has observed, the roots of the conflict reveals a long history of rivalry, mutual exclusion, one-party rule and authoritarianism. Financially the MPLA government had good revenues from oil and diamonds plus foreign income in order to finance the war against the UNITA and to fund the growing lifestyle of the elite (Meijer, 2004).

With the intensified war and UNITA’s occupation of parts of the countryside and the east and south of Angola the government and no access to vast parts of the country. This eventually became a problem and, lacking opportunities, many migrated to the cities in search of better prospects. Luanda during this time grew to an estimated population of four million (Accord no. 15, 2004). At the height of the war more than four million people were internally displaced and more than 450,000 fled across the borders to Namibia, Zambia and Congo. Out of a total of 13.1 million Angolans, they made up almost one fourth of the population (Porto et.al, 2007).

**Foreign interests**

Between 1970 and 1980 the Soviet Union and the US became increasingly more involved in Angola, not that they had specific interest in Angola but more as a war by proxy. The Soviet Union supported the MPLA and the United States supported UNITA. This changed during the 1990s when the US became more dependent on the oil off Angola’s coast. According to Stedman (1997), when the Angolan war was at its height, the country’s oil accounted for between 11 to 12 per cent of USA’s oil needs in 1997. This marks an important shift in the US policy, from a cold war era geo-political rivalry to a more economically driven interest in the war. The US actually changed “horses” and ceased both its covert and overt support to UNITA to the benefit of the MPLA Government. According to Wikipedia, in the early 1960 Fidel Castro had began his “Second Revolution” attempting to bring Marxism – Leninism to the African continent. His first failed attempt was Zaire, and then Castro went to have contact with UNITA and Savimbi but negotiations stalled due to the fact that Savimbi did not aspire to a Communism and Castro ended up to have talks and future cooperation with the MPLA party. Castro wanted to assist the MPLA to overthrow the Portugeese colonial power, to aid this he ended ut with a toal of 50,000 Cuban troops. Cuban troops were was a great asset for the MPLA fighting the UNITA and its South African allies. The regional support for UNITA came from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and South Africa, and the MPLA
had support from Congo-Brazzaville. South Africa at that time had borders with Angola (before Namibia became independent) and therefore had special interests in the conflict from a security point of view. A US brokered agreement in 1989, the New York Accord, resulted in the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the creation of an independent Namibian state and paved the way for the first Angolan peace process in the Bicesse Accords in 1991, followed by the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 and the Luenda Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. The UN with a small team of military monitors would monitor (UNAVEM I) the withdrawal of the South African and Cuban troops (US Dep. State, 2008).

4.2 The Bicesse Accords – “Peace through elections”

The Bicesse Peace Accords signed in May 1991 at Bicesse in Portugal was the first comprehensive peace agreement between the government of Angola (MPLA) and the UNITA. Officially the talks started a year ahead in April 1990 under the auspices and heavy involvement of the Troika (Portugal, USA and USSR). The Troika put itself in the driving seat of the process and left the UN in an observer status. From the outset UNITA wanted the UN to be present with a strong mandate, but the MPLA, on the other hand, reluctantly accepted a role for the UN. The MPLA saw the UN as an intrusive infringement of its sovereignty. The peace accord forced the MPLA to adopt a multi-party system and hold elections after a transition period of eighteen months, during which the two forces were to be demilitarized and form a new unified army. The MPLA would remain the legal government and make preparations for the upcoming elections. The UNITA was probably too certain to win the election and had rejected to form any coalition government with the MPLA. A coalition government could have avoided the “winner takes all” outcome and might have contributed to trust-building and established transitory political rules (Messiant, 2004).

A tripartite structure was established to monitor and verify the process 1) The Joint Military and Political Commission (CCPM), composed of the Government, UNITA and the Troika (Portugal, Russia and the United States), but the Troika had only status as observers. 2) The Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) and 3) the Joint Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA).
The CCPM was the overarching body of the entire joint monitoring body at all levels, full members were only those of the government and the UNITA and decisions were to be taken by consensus. It was clear from the beginning that neither of the parties had any intention to abandon its search for hegemony and was not interested in democratization or reconciliation. The UNITA joined the peace process to win the forthcoming election, which it was certain to win, to achieve state power.

An important clause in the Bicesse Accords was the agreement by the parties to refrain from acquiring arms during the peace process, the so-called “triple zero” clause. This also meant that the “good friends” of the two, the US and the Soviet also would cease to supply arms.

Within 60 days, The Bicesse Peace Accords planned to quarter an estimated 200,000 soldiers (on both sides) and create a new strong army of 50,000 men. It is however worth noting the scale and vast numbers of soldiers to demobilize, which is often overlooked and must have created an enormous task to accomplish in just 60 days! The new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) would consist of 20,000 soldiers from both sides (15,000 soldiers, 3,000 non-commissioned officers, and 2,000 officers), and an additional 6,000 for the Air Force and 4,000 for the Navy (the strengths to be decided at a later stage), the surplus UNITA and government troops would be demobilized (Porto et al., 2007). Regarding the creation of the new army, the Bicesse Accords stated the following: “The process of formation of the Armed Forces shall begin with the entry into force of the ceasefire and end on the date of the elections, and shall evolve simultaneously with the assembly, disarmament and integration into civilian life of the troops being demobilized” (Accord 15, 2004:69).

The first multi-party elections would be held in September 1992, after the creation of the new FAA army. “By the time the elections are held, only the FAA shall exist; there may be no other troops whatsoever. All members of the present armed forces of each party who do not become members of the FAA shall be demobilized prior to the holding of elections” (Accord no. 15, 2004: 69).
Analysis of the Bicesse DDR process

In the following I will analyze the Bicesse DDR process with reference to the criteria or factors that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes.

Realistic time frames

Messiant notes that the Bicesse peace process was very much like other accords at that time: a transitional period followed by an electoral process with the objective of democratization of the political institutions (Messiant, 2004). But none of the parties were really interested in democracy: only military victory and hegemonic power would be the ultimate goals of the deadly pursuit. Porto et al. note that demobilization did not start until one year after and was progressing very slowly; only 61 per cent of the troops were quartered by February 1992 (Porto et al. 2007). The ambitions for a quick DDR were not realistic seen in the light of that many soldiers on both sides. This may have been caused by inadequate planning and implementation, but also due to the fact that none of the parties trusted each other to give up their military strengths. Stedman notes that later that spring in May 1992 only 6,000 had been demobilized (Stedman, 1997). It is important to emphasize that quartering and demobilization is not the same. According to the 2006 IDDRS Operational Guide the ex-combatants normally spend a few months in the quartering areas as they go through the transition phase in order to be demobilized. This has changed in recent times and now demobilization it only 5-10 days at the maximum. However the length depends again on the context, the security situation and terms of the peace agreement (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011).

Porto et al observed that among the reported problems was the “head count” (registration); the first estimated figures during the peace talks were highly inflated (Porto et al. 2007). This may have been due to tactical, strategic or political reasons. Leaders on both sides exaggerated how many troops they had to mount pressure on the other party during the peace talks. This phenomenon of inflation is, however, a strategy not unknown during DDR processes (Ibid). Furthermore, Porto et al. have noted that UNITA claimed its force to be 75,000, but a lot of the soldiers who showed up at the quartering areas were under-aged and also unarmed (Ibid). A probable cause may be that UNITA saved their best men and weapons
for a later stage. Even though demobilization packages were handed out, including money (five months salary) and clothing kit, there were reports that a number of troops had “auto-demobilized” after registration (Porto et al., 2007). Registration is important for the individual because if the ex-combatant does not register and is handed the special “Demobilization card” he/she is not entitled to certain demobilization benefits like reinsertion kits (food, clothes and such).

Porto et al. also discovered that as many as 12,000 soldiers had gone missing from October 1991 to February 1992. Those “auto-demobilized” were believed to have left because of lack of pay and food supplies in the camps (Ibid). According to IDDRS Operational Guide the standards of living should be acceptable, but if the standards in the quartering area are too high the combatants may be reluctant to leave after discharge (IDDRS, 2006:152). Porto et al. state that many of those who “auto-demobilised” never handed in their weapons (Ibid). A lot of weapons that were unaccounted for would thereby be circulating among the population. If attached to ex-combatants the weapons could pose a threat to security and to the entire peace process. On the other hand, weapons could be sold or used in other conflicts. A well planned disarmament programme with the support of the UN and other organizations could have prevented the proliferation of weapons. Messisant argues that the UN with its very limited resources and capacity did not have the possibility to adequately oversee and verify the implementation of the DDR process (Messiant, 2004). Porto et al. note that banditry and crime by government ex-soldiers were also reported in the surrounding area of the camps (Porto et al., 2007). These security problems could have been avoided if UN has had the mandate and troops available. This was another example of many shortcomings of the Bicesse process. Time for proper planning and allocation of resources to assist in the quartering areas are important with such a large amount of troops to be quartered.

Porto et al. found that by the time of the election in September 1992, the parties had revised their troops' strengths to a total of 151,930; and the UNITA had demobilized 10,402 troops out of 25,000 scheduled. The government had demobilized 123,887 troops (Porto et. al 2007:43). As Stedman notes, this had upset the balance of power between the parties. The UNITA used the time to reorganize and build up its military strength. During the cantonment phase UNITA had maintained its discipline, was unified and could be mobilized quickly. The government forces on the other hand had suffered a decline in their fighting morale and there
were episodes of drunkenness (Stedman, 1997). All in all this can be viewed as a shift in military balance to the benefit of UNITA.

The Bicesse Accords had provisions for Disarmament and Demobilization and Reintegration of both the MPLA and the UNITA into the new FAA army. Plans and provisions for the reintegration of the ex-combatants into civilian life were poorly addressed in the accords. Because the reintegration phase may last between two to three years, planning of this phase should have been addressed earlier to attract possible donors. Since reintegration is the most time-consuming part of the program it should have been outlined in the early stages in the peace accords (School for a Culture of Peace, 2006). Porto et al. note that the Inter-ministerial Office to Support the Demobilized Military of Angola (GIAMDA) was created in November 1991 to implement the reintegration and assist structures developed for social and vocational reintegration in the communities. Although up to $447 million were allocated to the reintegration program, it was never implemented because the peace process crumbled (Porto et. al 2003). According to the FBA the momentum must be kept during the DDR process, when DDR is not planned correctly, one loses the momentum and the possible strengths this political and stabilizing process may have. From a DDR perspective one may therefore say that the provisions for “DDR” were addressed, but when it came to specific planning and implementation the process failed. The time frame as noted by Messiant (2004) was unrealistic, too rigid and resulted in a situation where DDR was not accomplished before the election date. This was also the case in Mozambique, but in Mozambique the UN postponed the elections when military and political conditions for holding an election were not met (Ibid).

Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army

The Bicesse Accords specifically addressed the formation of a new unified army by reintegrating an equal amount of troops from both the MPLA and the UNITA. However, according to de Beer and Gamba only 8,800 out of the planned 40,000 soldiers had reported to the FAA the day before the election (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). Furthermore, the Bicesse Accords stated that it was the CCPM that would be responsible for the overall political supervision of the ceasefire process, and its decisions would be made by consensus. This
meant that the two parties alone were responsible for upholding the peace accord! When the progress of the integration of the new Army did not meet the time frames, the parties improvised and nominally created the FAA. Just prior to the election in 1992 the UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee’s analysis of the situation gave a grim prospect: “…by the time of the election there were now three armies spread around, lots of unregistered weapons among the civil population, decline in law and order and slow progress in extending the central administration…” (Porto et al. 2007:43). Important to note is that when the war broke out again, the MPLA and the government forces were now the same: namely the FAA. The FAA grew stronger and as de Beer and Gamba states, “according to the FAA commander General João de Matos, by the end of 1993 the FAA had grown to 85,000 troops and more were in training” (de Beer and Gamba, 2000:14). The elections should instead have been postponed to allow for the completion of the reorganization of the FAA. Reorganizing of the army as a tool for security sector reform is important for both sides in the conflict; it is important for the military balance that both parties are equally present in a new army. Another factor is that it lays the ground for short- and long-term stability through reconciliation between the two forces. This was yet another example that the elections were the goal for the Bicesse peace accords.

The regional approach to disarmament and weapons control

The “triple zero” clause mentioned in the peace accord, affirming that the Troika should refrain from distributing arms, was an important achievement that could have had a preventive role in the arms race between the two parties. The accords stated specifically that the US and the USSR should refrain from supporting the parties with arms, but no less important was that they should encourage other countries do so as well (Accord no. 15, 2004). The first part of the clause pertaining to the direct supply of arms from the US and the Soviet Union was believed to be followed, at least officially. The last part concerning the regional approach, “…encourage other countries to do so as well…” did not come into effect until after 1998, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

On the one hand, to monitor the process there was the UN, that neither had the resources to enforce weapons control nor any impact on trust-building. On the other hand, there was the international community (the Troika), which turned a blind eye.
According to Messiant (2004), disarmament proceeded slowly because both armies were reluctant to hand in weapons. A reason for this was that neither side was in earnest nor trusted the other. According to Stedman, both parties kept small secret armies, a clear violation of the peace accord, and there were rumours that UNITA had secretly hidden away some armed battalions in neighbouring Zaire, with a plan to use them if they needed to mount a rapid strike offensive (Stedman, 1997). Another example, according to de Beer and Gamba, was when UNITA secured the important oil town Soyo, a diamond rich area in the north-east in 1993, the government therefore found it necessary to hire a South African private military company to strike back (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). As noted by Steenken, as a proof of UNITAS control in several rural areas, the UNITA sent farmers to be demobilized and kept their soldiers back in the fields and thereby undermined the whole DDR and peace process. From this and similar experiences the DDR program did not have any effect: the international community did not take the regional approach to weapons control seriously. Regional weapons control could have prevented the influx of weapons that made it possible for the parties to continue rearming their troops. On the other hand according to Steenken, it is almost impossible to enforce control over porous borders, especially with such marginal resources allocated (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011).

Regarding disarmament, Porto et al. identified a concern with the disarmament procedures. When the soldiers came with their weapons to the collection point, the UN would verify and sign documents for the proof of disarmament. With regard to storing and collection of arms the Bicesse peace Accords never instructed a double key system (one key kept locally by the local commander and one with the UN) (Porto et al., 2007). As a consequence, verifying the disarmament was difficult since the weapons store could easily be opened and weapons stolen and recycled back to uphold the war machinery. Porto et al. also identified another problem that was emerging: many government troops who “self-demobilised” (i.e. left the units without joining the DDR process) kept their weapons and did not officially disarm. Due to the unsecured structures, weapons were circulating and there was a rise in crime and banditry (Ibid). On the individual level a lot of soldiers kept their weapons, due to the low level of security and that they probably hoped they could be sold at a later stage.
De Beer and Gamba stipulate the total disarmament to include some 34,425 weapons; 97 percent were personal or light crew weapons, and 30-40 per cent were unserviceable (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). These findings indicate that the parties were hardly serious in complying with the disarmament process. The heavy guns were kept away for future use, which again undermined the whole peace process. Other initiatives that should have been dealt with in the peace accords were the development of a national disarmament plan to prevent new hostilities and banditry. The aim is to reduce general criminal activity and possible spoilers of the peace process. A more comprehensive approach on security would have been a significant factor for post conflict stability during the transitional phase. Unresolved issues have a tendency to be solved with bullets rather than diplomacy. As pointed out above, a comprehensive approach towards disarmament was not taken seriously during the Bicesse Accords. The parties did not reduce their arms; instead they acquired more. The international community (the US and the USSR/Russia) with most to say did not instruct their allies nor the regional organizations to take disarmament seriously. Stedman (1997) argues for the possibility that if Savimbi had not been able to maintain his military strength in October 1992 and the international community had held back their arms supply, he might have been brought back to the peace track. This just underscores the importance of the regional and international factor in the DDR process. The arms race could go on because violation of the peace accord was not punished.

*The role of the UN*

Institutionally the The Bicesse peace accords established a verification and monitoring commission (CMVF) to oversee and verify the process. The UN was invited to assist in the monitoring and verification process. The UN played a very marginal role and was not involved until the very end of the negotiations. The Accords stated: “The UN will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties at the request of the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola (GPRA) (Accord no. 15, 2004:69).

According to Porto et al. the signatories to the Bicesse Accord (MPLA and UNITA) decided to allow for a UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM I January 1989- May 1991); first, to verify the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops that came to assist the MPLA during the 1970s
and 1980s, as agreed during the New York Accords (1989). Secondly, the UN Secretary-General proposed an extended mandate to also verify the ceasefire and neutrality of the Angolan Police under the Bicesse Accords. The New York principles, signed in New York in December 1988 between Angola, South Africa and Cuba, were negotiated by the US. It called for a withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola and cooperation and abstention from violent action between Angola and South Africa for the creation of an independent Namibia. Noted by Steenken, UNAVEM I thereby became a success, it monitored the withdrawal of foreign troops. A side effect was that it also clearly reduced the effectiveness of the MPLA, because it had lost its support from the Cuban troops (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011). Porto et al, note that eventually the UNAVEM II’s mandate became to observe and verify the elections and oversee the implementation of the different aspects of the Bicesse Accords (Porto et al., 2007). Because of its limitation in resources, only $132m for a seventeen-month mission and staff of only 350 military observers and 260 Police observers, the UNAVEM II could not intervene in any of the violations and was strictly limited in doing their job during the process because of its mandate. As a result the compliance of the peace accord hung solely upon the two parties alone. The UN Special Representative for Angola Margaret Anstee stated “…UNAVEM II was a misguided exercise in peace-keeping minimalism.” (Porto et al., 2007: 42). The UNAVEM II was not involved during the initial peace talks or the planning of the DDR process, but was later mandated to observe and verify the elections and oversee the implementation of the peace accords. The electoral process was organized and directed by the National Electoral Council (NEC) where all organized parties where represented. One can ask why the UN allowed itself to be involved in such a mission. Maybe it actually believed that the two parties could come to an agreement after the election where they would accept the results and bury their hatchets. On the other hand, there was possibly a misunderstood perception of what the UN could do. Maybe the UN was too credulous in believing that the parties would comply when the “mighty UN” monitored them. Another question is whether a well-quipped and resourceful UN could have secured the peace after the 1992 elections. The answer is probably not. Even if the UN had more resources to monitor and verify, the outcome would probably not have been different. The key issue was that both parties were too determined to win and not give up their hegemony. Stedman notes that the UN monitors from January to September 1992 reported over sixteen cease-fire violations which all of them could have escalated into full-scale war. This time, as Stedman
notes, the parties were so determined to proceed with the elections that they ignored each others’ violations (Stedman, 1997). The motivation and will of the parties is a crucial factor for the success of the peace process. These cease-fire violations had, as Stedman notes, the potential to restart the war, but when the parties could gain “something” (secure their position through an election victory), they were determined to continue the peace process.

*Power-sharing*

Messiant notes that the aim of the Bicesse peace process was to stop the fighting and end one-party Marxist-Leninist rule by adopting a new multi-party system (Messiant, 2004). Stedman states that during the transition period both the parties had been urged to form a transitional government (Stedman, 1997). A transitional government could have started political talks and helped the democratic process and created trust between the parties. However, from the outset neither of the two parties wanted any reconciliation or democratization. Stedman has noted that prior to the peace accords the MPLA had been under great pressure to join the process and had no intention of giving up its power (Stedman, 1997). The MPLA was in power and knew that UNITA was strong militarily and was unsure of how the election would turn out, and therefore it was probably not in the MPLA’s interest to risk the vote. UNITA, on the other hand, had joined the peace talks because they were certain of winning the elections. Democratisation or not as Messiant has noted, none of them was probably interested in a democratic process; securing their hegemony was their only interest (Messiant, 2004). According to Spears (2005), a statement by Jonas Savimbi prior to the elections shows how confident he was to win the elections “If I lose the elections, this is my country and I am an ordinary citizen. No one will push me to go back to the bush anymore” (Noel et al. 2005:193). Savimbi did not keep his word when he lost the election. His actions in the post-election period also undermined the efforts of any possible power-sharing.

As stated by Margaret Anstee, the UN’s Special Representative to Angola “[…] power-sharing might have helped bring an end to Angola’s ongoing violence”, but the then Namibian prime minister replied: “Then you want second-class democracy for Africa! In the UK one party wins and governs, the others lose and don’t and that is the way it should be. That is the way here” (Noel et al., 2005:187). These two statements only confirm that there is
no quick fix to a long rooted conflict where the conflict is not right or ripe for solution and both leaders stand apart and distrust is so overwhelming.

Vines and Oruitemeka have studied the dynamics and politics during the transition phase and state that the UNITA was afraid that it could lose credit with the voters by taking responsibility in a pre-election government that it feared would fail. Furthermore, Vines and Oruitemeka note that the election campaign was fought along ethnic lines. Jonas Savimbi tried during his campaigns in the rural areas to win supporters with the aim of alienating what he called the “corrupt, urban Afro-Portuguese” MPLA government, in contrast to UNITA, that was a “non corrupt genuinely rural-based party” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:200). In retrospect, this changed the face of the conflict from power to ethnically based and these above mentioned reasons might all have aided the return to war.

The two sides maintained the status quo during the transition period: none of the sides were interested in disarming, or leaving occupied territory. Porto et al. note that during the transition period, the MPLA had access to funds, control over media, state administration and had the resources to mobilize the electorate so they could secure the vote. The US and UNITA on the other side just wanted a quick peace process and had pushed forward to set an early date for the elections (Porto et al., 2007). In hindsight it was probably a mistake by the UNITA to let the MPLA have full access and use all the state’s resources during the election campaign. According to Porto et al., Edoardo dos Santos from the MPLA party won the presidential election by 49, 7 per cent vs. Savimbi 40 per cent, and a second round was required. The UNITA also lost the legislative election to the MPLA by a clear vote (UNITA 34 per cent and MPLA 54 per cent) (Ibid). There was no trust among the parties: when the election results were announced on 17 October 1992, Savimbi had already put his army on marching orders (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). Savimbi had rejected the election results and called them fraudulent. However, the UN and its observers labelled the election “free and fair” (Christine Messiant, 2004; Accord no. 15, 2004:19). According to the UN, the UNITA had early claimed the elections fraudulent with allegations of widespread and massive systematic irregularities. The NEC responded to this by sending investigators along with UN representatives to all 18 provinces, but did not find any conclusive evidence of systematic and
massive fraud and thereby the elections were considered to have been generally "free and fair" (UN/UNAVEM II, 2000).

During the Bicesse Accords the goal was to make peace through democracy (change “bullets” for “ballots”!). But when the wrong party won the election (the MPLA instead of the UNITA) democracy and peace collapsed and was followed by another “penalty lap” – civil war. UNITA refused to play the “democracy game” when it lost the first round, thereby overturning the whole gaming table and returning to the “old civil war game”, which it still hoped to “win”. The price UNITA had to pay was loss of legitimacy “symmetry” to the MPLA. UNITA lost legitimacy because they were bad losers who staged an armed rebellion. A mistake by the Troika was not to have had a contingency plan to manage or prevent the outbreak of new hostilities when Savimbi decided to go back to war. An important question that should have been asked was: what would Savimbi do if he lost the elections? Stedman notes that just prior to the election, as late as the summer of 1992 the US was almost certain that UNITA would win. They were worried that the MPLA would not accept electoral defeat and throw the peace process into a crisis (Stedman, 1997). This actually shows that the Troika and particularly the US did not have any contingency plan to deal with the situation that brought Angola back into a new war. According to Messiant, the Troika later admitted that they lacked a good understanding of the political situation between the two sides (Messiant, 2004). On the same basis one can also state that a “winner takes all” contest was never a unifying strategy for lasting peace.
Sub-conclusions from the Bicesse DDR process

The Bicesse Accord had good intentions: to open up for multiparty elections and integrate the two armies into a new unified national army. However, the path for disarmament and demobilization was long and winding and did not proceed as planned. The most important milestone, the creation of a unified national army scheduled to be operational before the election was not accomplished. UNITA had reported fewer than fifty percent of its troops to the FAA. The FAA was nominally created a day ahead of the election and on Election Day the worst nightmare unfolded - there were now not one but three armies scattered around. The result was catastrophic. Savimbi could not tolerate the outcome of the election and set aside the result, calling it fraudulent, and went back to the old war game. He could do this because his army was still intact and the stake was too high to settle for a second place. The timing was probably not even right; everything was rushed ahead and there was no political process prior to the election and the few seeds for democratization did not have any place to grow.

A regional approach to weapons control and disarmament of the wider community was a major issue during the Angolan civil war. Both the parties had enough reserves in oil and diamonds to continue the arms race. Despite the “triple zero” clause, both armies managed to acquire arms through regional channels. The borders were “leaking” and the understaffed UN could do nothing about it, there were no mandate or resources by the UN to enforce violations of the peace accord. With hindsight, one can on the one hand blame the set up of the DDR process for having had too unrealistic and rigid time frames to adjust the election date when progression stalled. On the other hand, Savimbi’s ultimate goal was the same anyhow: to win either politically or on the battlefield. The last but not least important of the criteria, power-sharing, was non-existent. A winner takes all approach was not unifying, nor did the Troika involve itself in breaches of the peace accord. Sanctions for violations were not addressed by the international community and the Troika only turned a blind eye. Table 4.1 sums up the Bicesse peace process in terms of our five analytical criteria.
Key criteria considered important for successful peace/DDR processes | Result of the DDR process with analysis
---|---
Realistic timeframes | Unrealistic. Too rigid, not flexible enough to meet deadline for election
Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army | Not successful. UNITA only reintegrated 50% of its combatants into the new FAA. FAA was only nominally created a day ahead the elections.
Regional approach to weapons control | No regional approach, “Triple zero” clause not effective. Proliferation of arms through cross-border.
The role of the UN | The UN was not part of the negotiations of the peace accords and UNAVEM II was too understaffed to be influential. The UN could do nothing but acknowledge that the peace process collapsed.
Power-sharing | No provision for trust-building power-sharing through a government of national unity

Table 4.1 Analysis of the Bicesse DDR process

### 4.3 The Lusaka Protocol – “Peace through power sharing”

According to Stedman, when fighting resumed, both the MPLA and the UNITA had been under constant international pressure to resume talks. Ending the war was important to ease the burden of the Angolan people. During the year after the collapse of the Bicesse peace process, another 300,000 Angolans were killed. On the one hand, the UNITA was pushed to the negotiating table by the South African foreign minister Pik Botha, who unilaterally presented a peace plan with the formation of a government of national unity and a plan to set the date for new elections. Furthermore, Stedman notes that at the same time the US also understood that power-sharing had to be the key to reconciliation and tried to press the MPLA on the other side (Stedman, 1997). As Messiant notes, also the Abidjan Protocol by mid-1993 was rejected by the UNITA. This can be viewed against UNITA’s military superiority, as Messiant further states (Messiant, 2004). UNITA did not have anything to gain by going back to the negotiation table; it saw its military capabilities as powerful enough to defeat the...
MPLA. However, as Messiant observes, times changed, particularly when support was withdrawn from its biggest ally, the US. By mid-1993 the US withdrew its support and recognized MPLA (hereafter the government or MPLA government will be used interchangeably) as the legitimate winner of the 1992 election. This opened up for UN sanctions and prohibition of providing arms to UNITA (Messiant 2004). Support from the US throughout the war had played a crucial role for UNITA during the negotiations, but also by attempting to destabilize the government by its economic embargo (Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2008). According to Messiant, as a consequence of reduced revenues and military fortunes, UNITA in October 1993 issued a communiqué reaffirming the validity of the Bicesse Accords. This communiqué paved the way for new talks and on 15 November 1994 in Lusaka, Zambia, after a series of military setbacks, UNITA was now forced to sign the peace accord. The UN Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, facilitated the talks. The UN’s status as facilitator and mandate was now secured and put the UN in a crucial role in the process; the UN led the negotiations for the first time. The most important aspect of this peace accord was that the vanquished party should have a place in power and the armed factions involved should not have the means to change the course of the events (Messiant, 2004). This meant that the DDR process had to be taken seriously by the parties, the donors and the UN.
According to the Lusaka Protocol, these were the agendas for the Angola peace talks between the Government and UNITA:

1) Military issues:
   a. Re-establishment of the cease-fire;
   b. Withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces including integration of UNITA generals into the government armed forces;
   c. Disarmament of civilians;
   d. Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization;

2) The Police: Incorporation of 5,500 UNITA troops into the Angolan National Police;

3) United Nations’ mandate, the role of the Observers of the Peace Accords and the Joint Commission;

4) National reconciliation;

5) Completion of the electoral process and other pending issues.

Box 4.1: Agendas for the Angola peace talks between the Government and UNITA during the Lusaka Protocol

Politically the Lusaka Protocol did take into consideration many of the shortcomings of the Bicesse process by avoiding a “winner takes all” solution. Messiant has identified that the time frames were more flexible, and a power-sharing system was agreed upon by both parties to form a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). UNITA had now lost its legitimate “symmetry” as a political rival to the MPLA government and was considered a rebel. As a consequence UNITA was the only party to be demobilized and disarmed. In fact, in order to participate in the government UNITA now had to show proof of disarmament. The important “triple zero” clause forbidding the parties to re-arm was not part of the Lusaka Protocol itself, just repeated in an annex (Messiant, 2004).

To oversee and implement the DDR process, a new body, the Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel (IRSEM) was created. IRSEM was responsible for a number of activities such as vocational training, infrastructure, community resettlement and micro-credit, although its impact has been minimal (Porto et al., 2007: 44).
Analysis of the Lusaka DDR process

In the following I will analyze the Luena DDR process with reference to the criteria or factors that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes.

Realistic time frames

Messiant has noted that previous mistakes and shortcomings from the Bicesse Accords were planned to be solved through not so rigid timelines. As an example, the date for the second round of the presidential election was to be decided at a later stage (Messiant, 2004). The reason for this was that they wanted to complete disarmament and then decide when the second round of the presidential elections was to take place. UNITA had to show proof of disarmament first. The timetable and sequencing of activities were to be monitored by the UN. According to the Lusaka Protocol annex 9 “…no task shall be initiated until the previous one has been concluded, and that where conditions permit, the timetable can be brought forward by agreement between the Government and UNITA” (Conciliation resources, 1994:75).

According to Porto et al., the Lusaka Protocol signed on 15 November 1994 called for a minimum number 62,500 UNITA troops to be quartered. The quartering eventually begun in January 1995 but the demobilization did not commence until 1997. The Lusaka protocol planned for demobilization in two phases: the first phase included the under aged soldiers and the second phase concerned adult soldiers, but in practise they took place at the same time. According to Steenken, as result of these faults and lessons learned during the Lusaka DDR process the IDDRS Operational Guide took this into consideration when the 2006 guidelines were written. Children and adults should be separated. Children should immediately be sent to Interim Care Centres (ICC). In the ICC the children would then be unified with family members (IDDRS, 2006, Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011). The reason for this is that the children as soon as possible should break the ties with their commanders. There is a risk that the children may still seek cohesion and trust with their former commanders. Children may also have difficulties in understanding the meaning of the DDR programme and see it as a new mobilization.
Furthermore, as an improvement from the Bicesse Accords, the state administration was to be normalized before the demobilization started, but according to Porto et al., this was changed during revisions between 1996 and 1997 (Porto et al., 2007). The state administration and its institutions are important in order to cope with and plan the large amount of returnees to the communities. Porto et al. have furthermore observed that in order to gather and disarm UNITA troops fifteen “Selection and Demobilisation centres” were established and run by the UNAVEM III. Still under the auspices of UNAVEM III the demobilization process went slowly; it was incomplete and involved only a few key UNITA troops. By the end of 1995 UNITA chose to suspend its further participation in the process in protest against the government’s seizure of UNITA held territory. However, diplomatic talks in 1996 between the Portuguese President Soares and US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, put pressure on the UNITA leader to proceed with the DDR process and increase the pace of quartering (Ibid).

According to Porto et al., by December 1997 (during the two years of UNAVEM III), 78,886 UNITA troops had been registered and quartered, of which 8,607 were under aged and 11,051 disabled. Of these quartered (78,886), around 26,000 “deserted” from the programme. Half a year later in May 1998 almost 50,000 UNITA troops had been demobilized; 10,880 were incorporated into the FAA; 5,059 were under aged and 10,771 disabled (Porto et al., 2007:45). Comparing the two DDR processes, the Bicesse DDR process managed to demobilize 10,402 soldiers (less than 50% of 25,000 eligible for demobilization) whereas the Lusaka DDR process demobilized 50,000 soldiers (75% of 76,360 eligible for demobilisation). However, even with greater “success” in demobilisation during the Lusaka process, UNITA was constantly interrupting and delaying the process, and reports emerged that UNITA was regrouping and forcibly recruiting through training camps in Jamba. A lot of soldiers were also reported missing, self-demobilized or deserted. Porto et al. stated that during the Bicesse DDR process some 12,000 deserted, and during the Lusaka DDR process some 26,000 soldiers deserted (Ibid).
Human Rights Watch was critical of the DDR program of the Lusaka process, saying it discriminated against the children, especially girls. Children under the age of seventeen who had fought during the war were denied some of the benefits of the adults, even though some of them carried out the same duties. The criticism that came up was that adult soldiers would receive reinsertion packages (reinsertion packages included ID cards for demobilized soldiers, five months’ salary, transport allowance for their return home), while many of the soldiers who were seventeen and younger were not eligible for these packages. Throughout the Lusaka DDR process as many as 9,000 boy soldiers from both sides were enrolled in the demobilization programme. However, the programme was only partially successful, since girls were not included in the programme. It was a mistake not to give the girls the same benefits as the boys. Child soldiers released from the FAA did not receive any benefits as former fighters. These young ex-combatants were placed back in the communities with their families and relatives with no assistance such as food, shelter or education programmes (Human Rights Watch, 2003). A common concern for both these groups was the uncertain future that they would face with their “back pack” of a violent history of psychological traumas. The need for counselling and community reintegration was therefore high.

Porto et al., report that the resettlement and reintegration was a complex exercise for the government. It involved coordination with many agencies such as the UNITA, different UN agencies and NGOs and there were difficulties with coordination among them too. Initially when the soldiers presented themselves for registration (head count), they were asked where they wanted to settle. After a while some UNITA soldiers wanted to change their destination of return. The FAA overruled this wish; “resettlement assistance was only a benefit not a right” For some this meant that they were not able to change their destination. The International Organization for Immigration (IOM) argued that many tried to change their destination and leave together with other UNITA ex-soldiers; the thought was that this could be a risk of new mobilization (Porto et al., 2007). Porto et al., note that there were also problems attached to the payment of special subsidies for assistance and reintegration (SEAR). Over half of the demobilized soldiers did not receive their second payment (60 per cent) and only a quarter (25 per cent) received their third payment. The office responsible for payment was also beset with mismanagement and fraud as stated by UNDP (Ibid). Porto et al. also identify critiques and general shortcomings of the planning of the reintegration
process which did not take into consideration the different socio economic background of ex-combatants. The reintegration programmes during the Lusaka process were developed from socioeconomic surveys conducted on FAA government soldiers during the Bicesse process (four years earlier) (Ibid). As a consequence the same profiling was used on UNITA soldiers. It is important to do the profiling during the planning phase of the operation in order to get a clear picture of the challenges and constraints the ex-combatants and the implementers for DDR programs may encounter. Another important reason in the case of Angola was that the economy in the meantime had gone worse because of the war and therefore needs of the ex-combatants may had changed. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the FAA soldiers during the Lusaka process. When planning reintegration projects or issuing resettlement packages it is important to take into account their profile. For the Government this meant that most of the ex-combatants were relatively young (26 years), came from rural areas; very few had any formal education; they came from large families and most of them want to be farmers.

The first survey to cover both Government and UNITA soldiers was done as late as in 1995 (Porto et al., 2007: 47).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Average age: 26 years 8% below 18 years, 56% below 25 years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>27% did not have any education, Only 12% had more than primary school (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;) grade, 2% had more than 6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family situation</td>
<td>27% did not have families Average families: 6 people 60% had three family members 89% from rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military service</td>
<td>Average 8 years in the army (1/3 of the life of the soldier) 55% were soldiers for more than 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred occupation</td>
<td>7% health technicians, 40% farmers, 21% students, mechanics or carpenters, 11% motorists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Profile of a FAA soldier during the Lusaka Protocol (Porto et al., 2007:47)

According to Porto et al. there were great plans for reintegration projects: the Community Counselling and Referral Service for Demobilized Soldiers (SeCor), the “Training for Self-
Employment for Ex-Military Personnel from Angola (TSE)” and the “Community Based Quick Impact Project (QIP). Additionally there were plans for “working brigades” to keep people busy in heavy infrastructure labour on roads and bridges. The problem was that many of these plans never saw daylight; they were too expensive and politically sensitive. On the political side, Savimbi had refused having his men be degraded to manual labour by participating in the “working brigades”. On the other side, when the war broke out again all projects ceased (Porto et al., 2007). The UN IDDRS Operational Guide specifically turns the focus on individual reintegration so the ex-combatants can be engaged in micro projects to reduce the long-term security risk they present. The communities should be provided with tools and capacities to support reintegration. Important is also to reintegrate all groups in the community, not just the ex-combatants but also the IDPs, refugees, and other special groups (IDDRS, 2006: 161). When the war broke out again in late 1998 many ex-UNITA soldiers were still in the quartering camps with no real alternatives other than joining the war. If more reintegration projects had been materialized, many more ex-combatants could have had the chance to decide their own future. The Lusaka process allowed for a more flexible timeline than the Bicesse had, but according to Porto et al., UNITA, had as the government argued, taken advantage of the flexible time frames to regroup and rearm, (Ibid).

**Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army**

According to the Lusaka Protocol, the formation of a unified army was important for several reasons; for reconciliation; the need to only have one single national non-partisan armed force. Verification and monitoring of the progress and compliance was under the UN mandate. The composition of the army would reflect the principle of proportionality between the Government and the UNITA’s armed forces, which was also agreed upon in the former Bicesse Accord (Reconciliation Resources, 1994).

As Porto and de Beer noted, when the joint army was sworn in on 10 July 1996, 10,800 UNITA troops had reported to service out of a total of some 25,000. Furthermore according to Porto et al., the process was compounded with difficulties: demobilization and formation of the joint army were taking place at the same time; simultaneously there were reports that UNITA was regrouping (Porto et al., 2007).
On the one hand, it is understandable that Savimbi would keep his units intact until his power was secured, for this he needed a strong army. On the other hand, it was a violation of the peace accords, but it did not seem that he was committed to the peace process anyway which again was a key problem to the whole process. According to the Lusaka Protocol 5,400 UNITA troops were to be integrated into the National Police. Again according to the Lusaka Protocol annex 5, the National Police was intended to be “…a non-partisan institution, it should be an instrument for reinforcing national reconciliation” (Reconciliation Resources, 1994: 73). One of the tasks for the National Police was to collect and store all armaments in the hands of civilians. The UN should oversee the verification. In retrospect it is estimated that the MPLA Government issued some 3-4 million weapons to the population at times of crises and this is still a problem today (Conciliation Resources, 2011).

Regional approach to disarmament and weapons control

As referred to by Messiant, a critical factor and prerequisite for the Lusaka peace process was the disarmament of UNITA. However, on the other hand, UNITA needed both political and economical guarantees before it could disarm. Because Savimbi thought the peace accord was unfair, he constantly violated the peace process. According to an UN official both parties notoriously rearmed and violated the Protocol: “UNITA violated the agreement by day, the government by night” (Messiant, 2004).

The so-called “triple zero” clause that had been important for the Bicesse Accord, even if not strictly adhered to, was not so prominent and not part of the Lusaka protocol itself. According to Messiant, there was nothing in the text prohibiting foreign countries from re-arming the “legitimate government”, but it constituted a real breach for UNITA while it was no longer a problem for the government, at least not in legal terms…” (Ibid).

However, Annex 3 of the Lusaka Protocol specifies that, “…military forces cannot receive any military equipment, lethal or otherwise…” (Reconciliation Recources, 1994:73). De Beer and Gamba state that despite this “[…] the Soviet Union and Portugal sold military equipment to the Angolan government while the United States was widely suspected of covertly funding UNITA[…]” (de Beer and Gamba, 2000:83).
Because the parties had abandoned the “triple zero clause”, tanks and heavy weapon were believed to come in from both sides. Furthermore, as observed by de Beer and Gamba, the government purchased over one hundred infantry fighting vehicles and spent over US$ 300 million on fighter aeroplanes, helicopters, missiles and a variety of ammunitions. These purchases arrived from Russia, France, Brazil, and Switzerland and were possible with cash from its oil revenues (Ibid). As the Small Arms Survey noted, in 1993 UNITA was under UN sanctions, but could still acquire arms through illicit channels. The “Fowler report” stated in the “Small Arms Survey” (2001) submitted to the UN Security Council, that UNITA bought firearms from Bulgaria through a South African arms dealer, Ronnie De Decker in the early 1990s. The deal was worth some US$ 4-5 million. From the mid-1990s arms could be bought through the then president Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). Zaire and Angola share borders and arms easily crossed them. UNITA purchased its rocket launchers and surface-to-air missile system from Ukraine and Bulgaria. UNITA’s Arms deals were financed by the sale of diamonds, yet no sanctions took place on these contries. (Small Arms Survey, 2001: chapter 5).

When the first combatants entered the assembly areas, it became clear that the protocol obligations were not going to be fulfilled. Weapons that were handed in were also unserviceable and in poor condition. UNITA did not hand in any heavy weapons and was maintaining its arms supply (Ibid).

Porto et al., state that when the Bicesse peace process broke down, the government had issued weapons to “Ninjas” who were trained in non-standard policing practices supported by a civil defence initiative. Up to a million AK 47s were handed out in Luanda alone, and only few had been recovered (Porto et al., 2007). The Lusaka Protocol did take into consideration this challenge. Annex 3 states that “[…] civilians should be disarmed by the National Police and verified by the UN […]” (Reconciliation Resources, 1994: 73). During the Angolan civil war mercenaries from neighbouring countries such as South Africa had from time to time fought on both sides during the conflict. Foreign soldiers represented a security problem and in some cases could actually prolong the war. Annex 3 in the Lusaka Protocol aimed at the “[…] Repatriation of all mercenaries in Angola” (Reconciliation Resources, 1994:73).

Messiant reports that it was obvious that none of the parties were interested in disarming; even the international community “understood” that UNITA kept its arsenal of weapons until
its political and economic position were secured. UNITA did this to achieve a better position to renegotiate during the peace talks.

With this in mind the international community turned a blind eye, and accepted UNITA’s many false declarations that they had disarmed, even though there was evidence of the contrary (Messiant, 2004).

**The role of the UN**

In accordance with the Lusaka Protocol a joint commission was again formed, but this time the UN headed it. A technical working group was also established to advise on the DDR process. Even with the UN in a leading role as Messiant (2004) notes, the Troika was still at the heart of the operation. Although all the right mechanisms to assure local ownership during implementation and verification were established, it seemed almost for “nothing”. Savimbi and the UNITA had no intention of laying down their weapons.

In 1995 UNAVEM II (June 1991- February 1995) became UNAVEM III (February 1995- 30 June 1997), receiving a two-year mandate from Security Council resolution 976. As well as extending its mandate the UN strengthened UNAVEM III with 7,000 peace-keeping troops in addition to its already 350 military observers and 260 police observers. UNAVEM III’s role in the DDR process was to monitor and verify the process of national reconciliation; assist in the quartering areas; registration and disarmament and camp coordination; assist in the mediation between the parties; verification of the neutrality of the Angolan National Police; to supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; verify information received from the government and UNITA regarding their forces, as well as troops movement; disarming of civilians; coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process, as well as participating in mine-clearance activities; to declare formally that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential election had been fulfilled and to support, verify and monitor the electoral process. In addition, a number of NGOs were also assisting in the process around the assembly areas and camps (United Nations, UNAVEM III, 1997).
Porto et al. note that none of the UN missions, neither UNAVEM II nor UNAVEM III had any particular success. UNAVEM II had constraints because of its weak mandate and its shortness of resources. But according to the UN:

“As a neutral body, UNAVEM II was an indispensable channel for communications and repeatedly drew the warring parties back to the negotiating process while fulfilling other vital functions, such as its support for humanitarian activities. To some extent, the Mission became important as a preventive measure to check further escalation” (UN /UNAVEM II, 2000).

UNAVEM III was a highly costly and ineffective mission at $1 million a day, and when the operation did not run as smoothly as anticipated, it withdrew (Porto et al., 2007).

UNAVEM III was planned to be phased out by February 1997 and replaced by an observer mission, MONUA (United Nation Obeserver Mission in Angola) (July 1996- February 1999) with a mandate to monitor the collection of weapons from civilians, supervise their proper storage or destruction and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. After the withdrawal of the main infantry units, a reduced number of military observers would be retained in Angola to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the existence of any UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches (United Nations, UNAVEM III, 1997). In late 1998 with the gradual worsening of the security situation and the collapsed peace process, MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence. As noted by the UN DPKO, upon the termination of MONUA in 1998, it was clear that the Angolan government did not support an extension of MONUA (UN DPKO, 2001). Even with a more robust force the UN could do nothing, but monitor the worsening situation that was gradually spiralling down. With no possibility to force the two parties to comply with the peace accord the UN had outplayed its role. UNAVEM III did not have the capacity to stop The growing cross-border arms flows is a National responsibility and the UNAVEM III did not have resources to support this enforcement.
A central element in the Lusaka Protocol was to achieve peace through power-sharing. Mistrust and non-compliance with the DDR process characterized the Lusaka peace process period. As Stedman observed, the climate was not suitable for a sustained peace. On the one hand, Savimbi had been forced back to the peace negotiations, but he had no wish to disarm or demobilize or even resume political talks with the government. The government, on the other side, reluctantly joined the peace talks in order to “please” the international community (Stedman, 1997). Even with adjustments that took into consideration the mistakes of the Bicesse Accords (power-sharing in a unified interim government), UNITA was still reluctant to cooperate. As Messiant notes, the Government of Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) installed, as late as in 1997, consisted of only a few of UNITA’s members and was exclusively led by the MPLA party. “The GURN was therefore “reconciled” and “united” only by name, as Messiant points out (2004). Its democratic and transitional effort had existed only in the peace protocols but not in practice or in the field.

**Sub-conclusion for the Lusaka DDR process**

The Lusaka DDR process was a sad interlude that only created more harm than good. The planning by the UN was founded on weak assumptions using old data and poor understanding of the underlying causes of the conflict. UN had negotiated the peace and had aimed at learning from the shortcomings of the previous Bicesse Accord. This time the time frames were more flexible. Some has argued they were too flexible, so that the UNITA could use the peace to regroup and rearm. The UN wanted to avoid a fixed date for the second round of presidential elections and therefore the time frame was not so rigid. However, the war broke out and the second round was never held. The next important lesson from Bicesse was that “winner takes all” contests should be avoided, but it was precisely what the contestants wanted. Savimbi didn’t want to share a coalition with the MPLA party. Therefore the government of national unity (GURN) did not have the intended trust-building effect. The UNAVEM III did however manage to demobilize some 50,000 ex-UNITA combatants, which was almost two thirds of what was planned for. Reintegration of former UNITA combatants into a joint army (FAA) and Police were both in the interest of reconciliation and future stability. However, when war resumed in late 1998 only 10,800 had reported to service (under
50 per cent). A regional approach to weapons control was not effective until the very end of
the Lusaka period, when the regional and international community imposed stricter sanctions.
With no mandate to intervene the UN could just monitor and verify that both parties
undermined and set aside the Lusaka Protocol and kept on rearming in secret. Both the joint
national committees and the presence of international observers had no effect on the parties’
willings to disarm. Even with a reinforced UN with some 7,000 peace-keepers it could do
little but watch the downward spiral of mistrust. Trust-building through the transitional
government did not seem to have any stabilizing effect. In order to participate in the peace
process and be part of the transitional government, Savimbi had been forced to unilateral
disarmament, which was not in the interest of UNITA. Disarmament was the ticket to join the
peace process. But, Savimbi had a dilemma, on the one hand he was forced to disarm in order
to participate in the process and on the other hand he felt the peace accord was in UNITA’s
disavour. He could therefore not demilitarize before its political status was secured. The
Lusaka DDR process failed because of several combined factors: the timing was not right;
both parties were able to sustain its war machinery with fresh supplies despite the fact that
they were officially part of the DDR process; there were no real incentives for playing the
“peace game”; a shared government of national unity did not foster any trust and even the
Troika turned a blind eye on the many breaches and violations of the peace process. When the
MPLA government resumed the war the UN could do nothing but withdraw its contingent.
### Table 4.3 Analysis of the Lusaka DDR process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key criteria considered important for successful peace/DDR processes</th>
<th>Result of the DDR process with analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realistic timeframes</td>
<td>To loose time frames and no date for second round of elections. Too flexible time frames led to regrouping and rearming of UNITA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army</td>
<td>Part of the peace accord but not successful. Fewer than 50% of UNITA combatants reported for service in the new FAA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional approach to weapons control</td>
<td>Absent. Sanctions against UNITA did not have effect until the very end of the period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the UN</td>
<td>Not successful. The UN negotiated the peace protocol, UNAVEM III, was reinforced with 7000 peace-keepers, but could not intervene in the breaches of the peace process because of the lack of cross-border weapons control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power - sharing</td>
<td>Not successful. Provisions for power-sharing in the form of a government of national unity (GURN) was part of the Lusaka Protocol, but did not have the political effect of trust building. Savimbi acted as a spoiler and refused to participate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.4 The Luena Memorandum of Understanding - “Peace through war”

Lack of trust between the government and Savimbi during the Lusaka process escalated in the outbreak of renewed war in 1998. A key factor is Messiant explains both parties had prepared for new confrontations, because the arms race had continued unpunished. The government had judged its capabilities strong enough to wage a new war. The international community blamed UNITA for the collapse of the peace process by not disarming in the first place. Thereby the government also had the international community on its side, and the imposition of increased sanctions made UNITA weaker in many ways (Messiant, 2004). I will elaborate on what these sanctions were in my analysis below. Rupiya and Njeri note that the war that raged between 1998 and 2002 also had a strong impact on the Angolan people: from one...
million IDPs up to this point it now increased to more than 4.5 million by 2000 (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). As noted by Messiant, at the MPLA’s fourth Congress in Luanda on 5 December 1998, President Dos Santos did the inevitable: 1) He kicked out the UN, and 2) launched the “peace through war” strategy to finally eliminate the UNITA (Messiant, 2004). The strategy of the government became a “one bullet solution”. As Meijer states: “the killing of UNITA’s leader Savimbi by Angolan government forces was decisive in ending Angola’s conflict” (Meijer, 2004). According to Vines and Oruitemeka, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU) was signed in April 2002 by UNITA chief of staff General Geraldo Abreu Kamorteiro and the head of Angola’s armed forces, General Armando da Cruz Neto. The LMU was built on the preceding Lusaka Protocol from 1994 and Bicesse Accords from 1991 (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). The difference this time, as Steenken and Parsons explains, was that the Luena Memorandum more belonged to the winning part. The LMU was not a negotiated settlement; the UNITA had been militarily defeated, politically isolated and demoralized due to the shifting of power. (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011 and Parsons, 2004). As Berdal et al. point out, the talks took place primarily between the two military forces. The treaty did not leave any room for constructive political talks or third party involvement, and it also left out civil society. This may be due to the fact that the political wing of UNITA was partly absent and not unified at that time (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). As a consequence, the Luena Memorandum failed to address political issues such as the broader democratisation process.

According to Vines and Oruitemeka, UNITA abolished its armed wing in August 2002 declaring itself disarmed and becoming a political party in October. In December 2002, the MPLA Political Bureau and the UNITA standing committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding closing the outstanding issues from the Lusaka Protocol, and on 9 December 2002 the UN lifted its sanctions on UNITA. Shortly after observers declared that “UNITA’s return to war would be unlikely, if only because of its inability to wage war” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:206). Isasìas Samakuva, as noted by Berdal et al., was elected as new leader at UNITA’s ninth congress in June 2003, defeating the interim leader General Gato who led UNITA after Savimbi’s death. UNITA was now a political party and had to “formulate policies that appeal to ordinary Angolans”, as Samakuva formulates the principal challenges facing the new UNITA (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:206).
In the original text of the LMU, there were seven phases, as listed below, the timeline described as “D-Day” explains how long the phases would last. The process was to begin on the day of signing of the LMU (D-Day) and be completed after 262 days (D-Day + 262).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>Signing of the memorandum and declaration of bilateral ceasefire (D-Day).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of the UNITA military forces (D-Day + 2 days).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>Consolidation and re-establishment of the Ceasefire, including total cessation of military actions throughout the national territory and the non-dissemination of hostile propaganda (D-Day + 001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of demilitarization of UNITA military forces Quartering, disarming and repatriation of foreign military forces in the areas of the national territory Under control of UNITA military forces (D DAY +002 to D +047).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5)</td>
<td>Integration of Generals and Senior Officers from the UNITA military forces into the National Police, in accordance with the existing structural vacancies (D Day + 048 to D + 078).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6)</td>
<td>Demobilization of the excess personnel from the UNITA military forces and the extinction of the UNITA military forces (D-Day + 79 days to D +80 days).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7)</td>
<td>Vocational reintegration of demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces into national life (D Day +81to D + 262 days).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, the LMU had provisions for national reconciliation through a global amnesty for all crimes committed during the war. Foreign military forces were to be repatriated within D-Day + 47 days as stated in the LMU (Reconciliation Recources, 2002).

To oversee the Luena Memorandum two structures were created: a new Joint Military Commission (JMC) and a Technical Group (TG) representing the two parties involved: the UNITA and the government with observers from the Troika and the UN. In August 2002, the Security Council authorized a UN observer mission, the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA). The UNMA would “contribute to the consolidation of peace” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:207).

Vines and Oruitemeka note that the Angolan government with assistance from the World Bank launched a Programme for Demobilization and Reintegration (PGDR). To lead and oversee this programme the Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegrating of Ex-Combatants
The IRSEM (IRSEM) was re-established. The IRSEM was created in 1995 after the Lusaka Protocol but was not really functioning until the Luena Memorandum. Later in March 2004 the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) launched the Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (ADRP) jointly with IRSEM. The MDRP ended in 2008. Further, the DDR programme in Angola was budgeted at $246.3 million, of which $123.5 million was allocated for disarmament and demobilization. Included in the budget were five months’ Transition Support Allowance (TSA), transport and kits for the quartered soldiers. The Angolan government had budgeted for 63 per cent of the overall costs of the PGDR (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009).

The LMU also had provisions for reconciliation and trust-building. As noted by Vines and Oruitemeka, UNITA would receive $13-14 million per year from the state to renovate its party. Additionally, President dos Santos gave posts to six ambassadors, jobs to three provincial governors and four deputy governors. The FAA would also accept the reintegration of 5,000 members of the UNITA including 18 generals and 40 to the National Police (Ibid).

According to Vines and Oruitemeka, quartering and demobilization were to be executed quickly and were initially planned to take eighty days with a total of 50,000 soldiers. But as the programme progressed twice as many soldiers reported to the quartering areas. The revised plan became to demobilize 85,000 in 2002 and an additional 20,000 in 2003. Thereby the number of UNITA soldiers to demobilize would be 105,000 and 33,000 government troops (Ibid). Demobilization officially took place on 2 August 2002, as all former UNITA soldiers would first be integrated into the FAA, and then demobilized (Parsons, 2004). The FAA was in charge of the camps, which involved identifying and registering the combatants, organizing transportation to areas of settlement and paying salaries. Vines and Oruitemeka point out that by July 2002, 85,585 former combatants and 288,756 family members were registered in the quartering areas. 14,854 combatants came later, possibly held back until the UNITA was confident with the progression of the peace process. On 23 October 2003 the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the Gathering Areas had been closed and emptied (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). The disarmament programme managed to collect some 33,000 small arms and 300,000 rounds of ammunition, as noted by Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009 and Parsons, 2004. Circulation of small arms was high due to almost three decades of war, and it was estimated by Parsons that around 3-4 million small arms were in the hands of civilians. During the war the government had also armed the civil
According to Vines and Oruitemeka, (2009) between 1999 and 2007 the Angolan Ministry of External Relations reported that about 158,000 weapons were retrieved from the civilian population, and prior to the 2008 elections the government implemented a campaign to re-launch its disarmament initiative and managed to collect 42,000 firearms. The reintegration programme was planned in late 2002, as Parsons notes (2004), but did not commence until April 2004 after negotiations with the World Bank over funding issues. By 2005, “only 24 projects worth 94 million had reached 23,500 ex-combatants in six provinces” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:209). It was the IRSEM that was responsible for the implementation of integration. The IRSEM had offices in all of Angola’s 18 provinces as a base to implement its projects. The projects were: assistance for development programmes; monitoring and coordinating of reintegration activities such as economic and social reintegration. TSA were paid for the equivalent of five months in the Armed Forces, between $300 and $900. The IRSEM was responsible for transportation and resettlement packages and issued an additional $100, and a “reintegration kit” of household items and such, together with ID documents (Escola de Culura de Pau, 2008). Vines and Oruitemeka point out furthermore that it was not just economic reasons for the delay of almost two years for the start up of the programme but it was also due to low institutional capacity (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). Between 2004 and 2008 many projects saw the light of day, and according to Berdal et al. President dos Santos realized that the programme was progressing too slowly and in November 2005 pledged to “speed up the reintegration”. This did have a positive impact in two ways: directly through further reintegration and for “consolidating peace” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:210).

According to the MDRP, by August 2008, 97,390 ex-combatants were demobilized, 92,297 direct beneficiaries have completed reintegration activities (MDRP fact sheet, 2008). See figure 4.4 below.
In the following I will analyze the Luena DDR process with reference to the criteria or factors that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes.

**Realistic timeframes**

According to Vines and Oruitemeka, and Porto et al., the complexity of the planning and implementation of the Luena DDR process manifested itself in serious challenges. The government had planned a swift demilitarization of initially 50,000 former UNITA combatants in only eighty days, however the DDR process ended up with demobilizing 105,000 UNITA combatants.

Initially, 18 Quartering Areas, QAs (later named Gathering Areas (GA) to reflect the transition from soldier to civilian) were planned for, but this number had to be expanded to 35 with extra satellite areas around 16 of the country’s provinces, as Vines and Oruitemeka note. The first phase (disarmament and demobilization) was prematurely declared complete after only four months into the process. It was not until 23 October 2003 that OCHA officially
reported that the GAs had been closed and emptied. The official DDR process ended up by
demobilizing a total of 138,000 soldiers, 105,000 from the UNITA and 33,000 from the
Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009, Porto et al., 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program item</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gathering Areas</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA soldiers</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total demobilized</td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child soldiers on both sides (CAFF)</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabel 4.5: Total demobilized UNITA and FAA soldiers during the Luena Memorandum of Understanding per October 2003.

Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2005), it also included an estimated 11,000 children associated with fighting forces (CAFF). The reduction of the FAA by a total of 33,000 men was the result of assistance from the Portuguese Institute of Military Studies (Escola de Culture de Pau, 2009). According to Vines and Oruitemeka, “Demobilisation and disarmament since the Luena Memorandum can be judged largely successful, but when many former combatants would now consider themselves demobilised, reintegration levels have been more disappointing” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:209). However, according to Hitchcock, there were enormous logistical problems for which the JMC and TG and humanitarian partners were unprepared. In order to understand the challenge it is worth looking at the size of how large Angola is. Angola is at the same size as both France and Germany together coupled with additional weak infrastructure. Furthermore, a “lack of adequate planning and unrealistic timetables resulted in huge numbers of ex-combatants not receiving the necessary supplies of attention” (Hitchcock, 2004:39). There were also reports of malnutrition and other health problems in the camps (Ibid). The numbers of eligible ex-combatants were according to Porto et al., subject to constant revision and negotiations between the government and the UNITA’s Management Commission. The government wanted a swift DDR process and it was under pressure internally and internationally to normalize the situation quickly. A complete DDR process would therefore be seen as
evidence of the success of an end to the war (Porto et al., 2007). The cost of the DDR process was probably also an important reason why the government initially only planned to demobilize 50,000 UNITA combatants. Demobilization is a benefit for the ex-combatant and an economic challenge for the government: the less it had to support the ex-combatants the better. The constant negotiations between the government and the UNITA may have been an economic issue as well. Hitchcock stresses that the government’s eagerness to close the GAs quickly even before the demobilization was complete, resulted in low morale and negative experiences among the ex-combatants. The problem was compounded, as many had to leave before they could receive demobilization cards and could not get the benefit owed to them. In addition, the reintegration program was not sufficiently planned and not operational when they left the GAs. The challenge is two-fold: on the one hand, the ex-combatants need to stay long enough in the camps to be properly demobilized. On the other hand, if the quartering becomes too long, the ex-combatants start to build their own “settlement” around the camps and the reintegration phase will be prolonged (Hitchcock, 2004). As Porto et al., (2009) comment, many camps became their own communities with schools, basic health care and markets. Some agencies also distributed seeds for farming but this had a twofold impact. On the one hand, when people started to cultivate crops, the government feared that a new enclave of UNITA ex-combatants would settle in the area. On the other hand, because the reintegration process was not begun, the ex-combatants didn’t know how long they were staying and needed the food they could harvest. Obviously, this slowed the return of some ex-combatants and internally displaced people (IDP) in some areas but an enclave of UNITA ex-soldiers did not develop (Ibid).

Phase two, reintegration, went slowly, as observed by Porto et al. It was not until 2004 that the ARDP was fully launched and funding by the World Bank was secured. Hitchcock argues that from the outset there was no clear framework for reintegration, which is why it took two years to secure the funding. Reintegration projects were also few: only vocational training and economic support actually materialized, and there the government seemed to lack the will and means to support the programme further. Additionally, these shortcomings illustrate the importance of planning for all three phases prior to the commencement of the DDR process (Hitchcock, 2006). Porto et al. conducted a field study on the economic standing, livelihoods and expectations two years after the end of the war.
Their “…survey showed that the ex-combatants had yet to achieve a level of economic reintegration that would be sustainable to move him/her beyond the levels of vulnerability. This meant that the former combatant was greatly dependant on secondary assistance from humanitarian agencies. The reason was partly because of few jobs and lack of formal education, those harvesting land were greatly dependent on whether the agricultural season was bad or good…” (Porto et al., 2007:115).

Important for all demobilized soldiers is to have demobilization documents, as these documents entitle the holder to receive reinsertion packages. 79 per cent of those interviewed in Porto et al.’s study did have the formal documents, but even then around 40 per cent were left without the reinsertion assistance, as Hitchcock too notes (2006). These packages often represent a critical transition safety net during the first few months after demobilisation to cover the basic needs.

Porto et al. point out that a factor of concern was the community reception of ex-combatants. There was a belief that because ex-combatants belonged to a reintegration programme and had received reinsertion packages (benefits that other resettled did not receive), tensions could arise between them and other vulnerable groups that did not have individual benefits. On the question of how the ex-combatants were welcomed, almost 90% of the interviewed group stated that the community they resettled in received them very well. They were allocated land, housing, food, and goods. Those (10 per cent) who were not welcomed said the complaints were mostly verbal abuse or social discrimination (Porto et al., 2007). This was not the case in all provinces, as noted in a report by the Norwegian Refugee Council on the “profile of internal displacement in Angola”. This report stated security concerns and some cases of violence in a local municipality in the Moxico province. Locals were protesting against the return of a former UNITA general to their community. This protest prompted around 2000 former UNITA solders to leave the municipality (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008). DDR planners are familiar with this episode, as I learned at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. During the war the civilian population that was left behind in the villages was often under great pressure from the military forces and was pressed to cooperate, involuntarily recruited or in many cases killed (FBA, 2009). Land held by UNITA forces was inaccessible to many humanitarian organizations because of the war and this led to humanitarian catastrophes (Stedman, 1997).
Porto et al.’s study also dealt with the question of what made the ex-combatants feel reintegrated. Most of those interviewed answered that owning, borrowing or renting a house was the most important factor. 60 per cent of those interviewed who did not have access to a house did not feel integrated. As for the future, finding a job was the most important priority. Having a job and access to a house helped ex-combatants feel reintegrated. Those who had a permanent formal job in the public sector were the ones with the highest sense of reintegration. Those who did not feel reintegrated did not have a house nor had too high expectations from the demobilization (Porto et al., 2007). The survey was carried out in the three provinces that received the largest caseloads of ex- UNITA combatants for return and reintegration. A total of 46,000 out of 105,000 (45%) were to be integrated in to the provinces of Huamo, Bié, and Huila. These three provinces also saw the fiercest fighting (Ibid). Among the lessons learned from the field study of Porto et al. is that it is important to be realistic about the expectations a reintegration programme can accommodate, and it is also important to know the community which the ex-combatants are being reintegrated back to.

A study performed by the MDRP by the end of its six-year programme, in 2008 disclosed the following as shown in table 4.5 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>were formally employed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
<td>were unemployed (whole nation about 25%);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61%</td>
<td>of ex- combatants were self-employed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93%</td>
<td>considered themselves reintegrated into their communities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95%</td>
<td>had access to agriculture land;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98%</td>
<td>had established families.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6: Socio-economic study performed by the MDRP program in 2008 (MDRP, 2008; Redvers, 2009)

The survey was based on interviews with 10,500 ex- UNITA combatants. Further progress show that 84,409 beneficiaries have received direct or indirect reintegration support, and the government has decided to finance a follow up project following the closure of the MDRP programme to meet the target of 128,000 (MDRP, 2008).
Reorganization of the armed force/creation of a new unified army

As stated by the LMU and the School for a Culture of Peace (2009), the reorganization plan of FAA was to involve the reintegration of 5,000 UNITA soldiers and later a reduction of 30,000 men from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) aided by Portugal. The number from each category is mentioned in annex 2 of the LMU and aimed to incorporate some 3000 soldiers and 2000 officers and non commissioned officers, including 12 Generals and 18 Brigadiers. Some of the remaining Generals (6) and Brigadiers (14) were to be at the hand of the General Staff of the FAA. Additionally, 40 Generals were integrated into the National Police (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). The integration was important in order to achieve a united national army and police.

Integration of the agreed UNITA soldiers into the FAA began with a selection on 15 July 2002 and the integration formally started on the 20 July 2002. According to Porto et al., the government prematurely announced on 2 August 2002 that the demobilization and demilitarisation process of the UNITA was complete and that UNITA military forces had ceased to exist. This shows the eagerness of the government to see the end of UNITA as a military capacity as the announcement was made while UNITA combatants were still arriving at the quartering areas.

Regional approach to disarmament and weapons control

According to Rupiya and Njeri, the pressure on UNITA grew in the years between 1998 and 2002, following the collapse of the Lusaka process. There was much at stake and the government had now mortgaged the country’s oil potential for the next two decades in order to equip its forces to win the final war. Together with imposed travel, trade, fuel and military sanctions the situation grew worse for Savimbi. Furthermore, as noted by Rupiya and Njeri, a regional approach by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) branded UNITA as “a pariah organisation serving the interests of imperialists” The effect of the SADC position was to close off the neighbouring states for rear bases. The ability of the UNITA to function at a regional level, which had been so crucial for its guerrilla tactics, was now closed off. Rupiya and Njeri also state that the “final nail” in the coffin came when the US ceased to support its overt and covert operations. The US had been a long-standing ally of the UNITA,
but when Savimbi refused to acknowledge the elections in 1992, US support was gradually reduced. Another factor looked at by Rupiya and Njeri was the fact that needing Angola’s oil, the US was now economically driven to change “horses”, because “gambling” on the wrong horse would have future economic consequences (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). Savimbi was condemned by the international community as a rebel, and the US could no longer support his actions. In practical terms the FAA had closed the borders to Namibia and thereby prevented UNITA from mounting operations inside Namibia. In addition, as Rupiya and Njeri state, the Namibian forces were securing the borders while the FAA was deploying its forces into UNITA’s backyard (Ibid).

UNITA became weaker militarily for several reasons: the sealing of the borders by the Namibian defence forces, together with international sanctions, a government that freely could purchase arms because it was a legal act to defend itself against a rebel force, and the FAA were conducting operations that reduced UNITA’s manoeuvres and playground. A combination of the mentioned factors may all have had a significant effect on UNITA’s military power.

The sanctions against UNITA were still effective during the peace talks and thereby UNITA was deprived of its possibilities to rearm and regroup. Furthermore, according to the LMU, foreign military forces within areas under UNITA control were to be quartered, disarmed and repatriated within 47 days (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). The foreign fighters were mainly from the DRC and Rwanda of Hutu and Tutsi origin. The UN with assistance from the UNHCR would repatriate them to their countries of origin (Ibid).

Disarming UNITA resulted in the disappointing collection of only 33,000 light weapons and 300,000 rounds of ammunition, according to Vines and Oruitemeka (2009). The relatively small amounts can be viewed in various ways. On the one hand, UNITA’s munitions stocks were actually depleted during the last phases of the war and they did not have any more weapons to surrender. On the other hand, UNITA did hide weapons for later use in case the peace process did not evolve as anticipated. The weapons-to-man ratio was only 3 to 1, which
is very low. According to the estimations of Vines and Oruitemeka, probably 90 percent of the hand weapons were actually collected and about 10 per cent remained with the civilian population (Ibid).

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) programme was not part of the LMU as a special item as was the case under the Lusaka protocol. According to Vines and Oruitemeka (2009), during the peace talks, UNITA repeatedly reported unease about the large number of weapons in the hands of the civilian population. This unease is understandable because the ex-UNITA soldiers knew the power a weapon could have: UNITA disarmed while the FAA and the civilians had guns. As Vines and Oruitemeka describe, the challenge in the years to come would be to register and collect those arms. Angola with its over three decades of war probably had 2-2.5 million weapons unaccounted for. The government did however try to combat the proliferation of arms and through the years from 1999 to 2007 the government had collected about 158,000 weapons of various calibres from the civilian population. Berdal et al. also note that prior to the 2008 election the government re-launched its disarmament campaign to hand in illegal weapons and collected some 42,000 firearms. Data from a small arms survey show that in three provinces, Huambo, Bié and Huila, over 70 per cent had weapons in their household and almost 50 per cent said they were easily available. Most of the people interviewed had weapons for security reasons (Berdal et al., 2009). Crime and banditry have increased in the big cities over recent years but none of these crimes can be particularly traced back to ex-UNITA soldiers (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009).

The role of the UN

Paulo, Manuel J, (2004) has looked at the role of the UN in Angola and observed that the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) was mandated to chair the JMC, and monitor the quartering areas with thirty observers as guarantor of the agreement. Paulo points out that the UN’s failure in the past undermined its ability to play a major role in the LMU. The government’s notion was that the UN was on UNITA’s side during the Bicesse and the Lusaka processes (Paulo, 2004). The government wanted a quick DDR process and wanted to do it in its own way, since the influence of the international community did not succeed in the former two processes. However, the UN was mandated through OCHA to coordinate
humanitarian relief with all other UN agencies (Ibid). According to the LMU, the UN and the Troika were only observers during the signing of the peace treaty, a treaty that was negotiated solely between the UNITA and the government. Furthermore, the Troika and the UN were also permanent observers of the JMC and members of the TG. The TG would consist of ten military experts from the UN and ten from the Troika and 20 from the FAA and the UNITA. (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). As mentioned by Vines and Oruitemeka (2009), the UNMA should “contribute to the consolidation of peace”. The UN was sidelined and the then UN special representative Ibrahim Gambari protested against an amnesty for all war crimes committed during the war. But the amnesty law was passed unanimously by the Angolan Parliament in spite of UN resistance (Berdal et al., 2009: 205). The reason for the protest was that the “the UN does not recognize any amnesty as applicable to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” (Paulo, 2004).

The Join Military Commission (JMC) was a forum where the UNITA could raise important questions concerning outstanding issues. To the dismay of UNITA, the JMC was dissolved on 21 November 2002, almost a year before the completion of the DDR process. Berdal et al. note that UNITA was now afraid that dissolving the JMC would lead to difficulties in sustaining the dialogue with the government (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). It appeared that UNITA needed a neutral partner to voice their concerns related to its future. The government, on the other hand, wanted no foreign involvement because they were in a new position of power and military strength.

**Power-sharing**

A power-sharing government between the UNITA and the MPLA was formally established during the Lusaka peace process as a trust-building measure. The international community promoted the idea because it thought that the UNITA and the MPLA could govern Angola together. But the government of national unity (GURN) was never wanted by UNITA nor the MPLA, as stated by Messiant (2004). The MPLA government’s military victory over UNITA rendered power-sharing irrelevant in the LMU. Hence, there were no immediate plans for elections in the LMU (legislative elections were scheduled for 2006, but postponed and not held until 2008) or a transitional government (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). This fact is an
important observation because elections and transitional governments are often the first choice of democracy assistance by the international community. Both the international community and power-sharing measures were absent in the LMU peace process. This observation is developed from notion that the earlier interference of the Troika and the international community probably did more harm than good to the peace process. According to Rupiya and Njeri, the government of Angola defined the LMU as follows: *integration* of former UNITA combatants into the new unified national army, *invitation* of UNITA to the negotiating table (even though UNITA was defeated); *political recognition* of UNITA; *acknowledging* possible spoilers; *respect* ethnic and regional diversions between north and south; *focusing* on national *reconciliation* and social reintegration (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). Generals and high-ranking officers may have the potential of being spoilers of the DDR process and thereby they were given posts in the new army and police. According to Rupiya and Njeri, eighteen Generals were at a later stage publicly retired and provided with pensions and benefits for the rest of their lives (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). This is an example that underscores the importance of taking care of potential spoilers of the DDR process. The FAA wanted to focus on UNITA’s political transformation and probably foremost to emasculate UNITA of its military capacity. Especially for the UNITA, as Rupiya and Njeri argues, it was important for their self-image to have a share in the national unified army, as opposed to total emasculation (Ibid). The government could achieve this by integrating 5,000 former UNITA combatants into the FAA. However, as Porto et al., and Vines and Oruitemeka note, the government did little to improve political consolidation during the peace negotiations. UNITA was divided politically in the aftermath of the war and the negotiations were primarily done through the FAA and the UNITA militaries (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009; Porto et al., 2007). Between May and November 2002 the government lifted sanctions on travel for UNITA officials. This permitted UNITA to re-open offices, move around and try to revive itself as a political party. However, as Rupiya and Njeri (2004) have noted, they were met with challenges to reconciliation by the communities that suffered during the war. The government recognized that UNITA had a considerable army and it was important for the government to keep the UNITA army intact until the quartering and disarmament phase was completed. The risk was an UNITA army in total collapse and a drawn-out guerrilla war (Ibid).
Vines and Oruitemeka note that the success of the disarmament and demobilization came from the fact that the UNITA ex-combatants were in an acute state of combat fatigue. Poverty led to a daily struggle for survival and most UNITA ex-combatants had no choice but to integrate.

In the aftermath of the peace process a sour taste has emerged as the lessons learned from the Luena peace process become clearer. As Meijer has noted, most Angolans welcomed the peace that put an end to nearly four decades of war through the government’s “peace through war strategy”. Meijer argues on the one hand that a negative peace is better than no peace at all. But on the other hand, as she points out, peace without a real negotiated settlement, as was the case during the Luena peace process, may backfire. Furthermore, Angola’s long history of rivalry and mutual exclusion, one-party rule and authoritarianism were not dealt with correctly during the peace negotiations and the price of how this was resolved may be high indeed. Lastly, the lessons from this experience will probably unfold over time and unfortunately when the many hopes and expectations from the peace process are not met (Meijer, 2004). Meeting expectations is crucial, as the Stockholm Initiative on DDR has identified. A key element is to manage expectations from the outset, to identify incentives and disincentives at an early stage and to use these to influence the choices of individuals and military groups (SIDDR, 2006; Colletta et al., 1996).

Vines and Oruitemeka were not so pessimistic and have stated:

“The DDR process, in Angola (ed.), can nonetheless be judged as largely successful because returning to war is no longer an option for UNITA, which has after its defeat made a successful transition from armed guerrilla movement to opposition party”.

(Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009: 217).

However, as bright as the future may be, the political transformation of UNITA has not brought any political change in Angola. The MPLA is still the biggest party; in the September 2008 legislative elections the MPLA won a landslide victory and is now occupying 191 of 220 seats in parliament. This election also marked the end of the Lusaka peace process.
Sub-conclusion for the Luena process

As mentioned above, the Luena DDR process can largely be viewed as successful. However as mentioned it was a vicors peace, the peace came at the right time and place. The victor took advantage of all military, political, social and even economic circumstances to force its peace. The overall DDR process managed to demobilize 93 per cent of its targeted ex-combatants. During the MDRP’s six-year programme it aided the government in the reintegration process and support was given to 66 per cent of ex-UNITA combatants. Reorganization of the FAA was completed with assistance from Portugal and the integration of former UNITA combatants, high-ranking officers and Generals can also be viewed as successful. The regional approach together with the increased sanctions were effective during the last stages of the war and it closed the net in on UNITA’s arms supply and manoeuvrability. SALW programmes should have been more effective considering the large amount of weapons circulating among the civilian population. It is important to recognize that planning and implementation of the DDR process could have benefited from assistance from the UN, especially in running the quartering areas. But the international community and the UN in particular had outplayed its role during the first two peace processes and thereby were left with only a minor role. For the benefit of reconciliation, the MPLA government chose not to treat UNITA as a defeated army, instead offering recognition of the UNITA as a political entity. Power-sharing, which was advocated during both the Bicesse and the Lusaka peace processes, was discarded and not an option during the Luena negotiations. UNITA was practically defeated and the government had the upper hand and determined the rules of the game. The positive outcome of the Luena DDR process was due to the following combination of factors: Savimbi, the biggest spoiler of peace was no longer part of the equation, and through a regional approach to weapons control the MPLA government was able to reduce the manoeuvrability of the UNITA in its own backyard (in the neighbouring countries), cutting off its weapons supply and cross border rest bases. Consequently, UNITA’s stocks of armaments became depleted and its troops fatigued so that its remnant chose to negotiate on the terms offered by the militarily superior MPLA government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key criteria considered important for successful peace/DDR processes</th>
<th>Result of the DDR process with analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realistic timeframes</td>
<td>Partly successful. The numbers of UNITA soldiers became twice as many as anticipated. Government tried to close the quartering areas when soldiers were still arriving. The DD phase lasted 1 ½ year longer than planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army</td>
<td>Successful. The integration of ex-UNITA combatants was completed along with the demobilization of 30,000 FAA soldiers. However, the focus on SSR and weapons reduction was not complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional approach to weapons control</td>
<td>Successful. The sanctions, the regional approach did minimize the UNITA’s ability to manoeuvre its forces and to purchase new weapons. The net that was closing in around UNITA was highly effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the UN</td>
<td>Irrelevant. No provisions for UN or third party involvement in the negotiations of the peace agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-sharing</td>
<td>Irrelevant. No provisions for power-sharing. Trust building was achieved through other means. UNITA was again recognized as a political entity and sanctions were lifted. UNITA could reintegrate some 5000 ex-combatants into the FAA. The biggest spoiler of the previous peace process was eliminated. The UNITA was depleted and forced to abide by the rules set by the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7: Key criteria for the Luena DDR process
4.5 Comparative analysis of the three Angolan DDR processes

In this part I will present a comparative analysis of the Bicesse, the Lusaka and the Luena DDR processes. Additionally, I will elaborate on the changes in the political situation that made the Luena DDR process successful. The data for the comparative analysis are based on the findings from the previous sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.

The background of the conflict in Angola has roots back to the early years after the country’s independence from Portugal in 1975. The Bicesse Accord from 1991 - 1992, and the Lusaka Protocol from 1994-1998 both failed to stop the downward spiral of war, whereas the last peace process in 2002, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, managed to create a lasting peace. A key question is thus why the war flared up again in 1992 and 1998, and what had changed during the years up to the signing of the LMU in 2002.

The Bicesse peace process in 1991 aimed at creating “Peace Through Elections”; but the underlying challenge was that both the MPLA and UNITA had so much faith in winning the election that the second option - losing was excluded. The power play was a significant factor; with power came the ability to control Angola's rich natural resources such as oil and diamonds. The situation between the parties before the election was that the MPLA had ruled the country corruptly with a heavy hand and all power was centralized in a one-party regime. UNITA, on the other hand, had up until the 1992 election gained legitimacy locally and internationally and had great confidence in winning the election. At the time UNITA was militarily equal with the MPLA, and had control over large areas of land, the central highlands. UNITA’s tactic was to focus on the corruption of the MPLA regime and the need for multiparty elections and new democratic institutions. When UNITA lost the elections, it accused the MPLA of fraud. The international election observers, on the other hand, labelled the elections “free and fair”. As a reaction, UNITA now set aside the principles of democracy by not approving the legitimate winner. They went back to playing the game they best knew - the old war game - to beat their rival through a military victory. At that time UNITA probably had a military force large and strong enough to be a serious threat to the MPLA. This is
illustrated in the peace accords: the troops to be included in the new army were to be shared equally as well as disarmament and demobilization of surplus combatants. The UN presence during the Bicesse Accords was only as an observer, but in the subsequent DDR process, the UN became responsible for its implementation and execution. With its limited resources (350 military observers) the UN was thus doomed to fail. One question is whether there could have been peace through the Bicesse Accords if the UN had succeeded in implementing the DDR process. It is impossible to say because this option never got a chance to be tested. But on the basis of both parties' quest for hegemony, it is difficult to imagine that it would have made any difference. At this time both sides were playing the “winner takes all” solution and losing was not an option. It was therefore only the victorious party that had something to gain by maintaining the peace. On the other hand, if both parties had agreed to demilitarize prior to the election, none of the parties would have had the strength to be a threat to the other. In a nutshell, this is the concept of DDR: demilitarize so that the parties do not have the means to be a security threat anymore.

In 1994, under the Lusaka Protocol, the UN had been leading the negotiations. A second round in the presidential election was scheduled and a transitional government (power-sharing) would provide increased stability, trust and reconciliation. The situation had changed since 1992; through its internationally approved election the MPLA had been recognized as the winner and had formed a legitimate government. UNITA now saw a shift in its support from the US and the international community: UNITA had lost its main contributor and its legitimacy. Being pressured from all sides to return to the negotiating table UNITA reluctantly resumed peace talks. The 1993 UN sanctions against UNITA that resulted in an arms embargo were ineffective because UNITA still managed to gain access to weapons through illegal channels via the sale of diamonds. When the signing of the peace agreement took place, Savimbi refused to attend, but instead sent the General Secretary of UNITA, General E.N. Manuvakola. It was obvious that the power balance had changed, UNITA was the only party to be disarmed and demobilized. Reintegration into the armed forces was to be negotiated at a later date. This may be an indication that UNITA had lost the upper hand. The UN (UNAVEM III) was now supplied with some 7000 new peacekeeping troops and 350 military observers who would monitor and ensure a well planned and executed DDR process. But the peace process and the DDR process did not work out as planned. While the UN on the
one hand was busy collecting weapons and demobilizing, both the government (MPLA) and the UNITA rearmed and mobilized their forces in secret. Weapons that were supplied constituted a constant breach of the peace agreement. The relationship between the Government and UNITA was deteriorating through lack of trust. The Lusaka process had attempted to remedy the experiences of the Bicesse process, but even with more flexible time frames, and a coalition government of national unity (GURN) it was not sufficient. In retrospect, the Lusaka Protocol had theoretically better chances of success (in terms of our five criteria) but in practice this time there was also only one solution for the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Due to outside factors the DDR process under both the Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol was unsuccessful, and as a consequence the peace processes also failed. The UN had not managed through the DDR process to collect enough weapons nor had it demilitarized the agreed number of troops so that the parties would not be a threat to the peace anymore. The regional approach to weapons control did not become effective until after the war broke out again.

When the war broke out again in late 1998 the Government changed its tactics: it threw out the UN and announced a new strategy "Peace Through War", which was a "one bullet solution". The government knew that it was stronger now than the UNITA and the only option now was to crush UNITA and gain military victory. The government even tried to have Savimbi internationally criminalized. Another motivating factor in the governmental change of tactic was the opportunity finally once and for all to end the era of conflict and instability. The Government that now consisted mostly of members of the MPLA party had access to power and resources and wanted to grow stronger. With a more stable Angola they could use its power to develop cooperation with international contractors for the recovery of the country's natural resources. The recovery would in turn provide more money and more power to the MPLA party. Both sides had too much to win. Therefore there could just be one winner of this conflict. Dos Santos became the last man standing when Savimbi was killed in battle. After Savimbi was killed in April 2002, and the subsequent loss of UNITA’s vice president, UNITA lost its senior management. This was one of the crucial factors that enabled the third peace process possible to initiate. The leaderless UNITA at this time got an “offer it could not refuse“ - the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. There were several coinciding reasons for the fall of UNITA: UNITA had at this time lost its senior management, their combatants were
fatigued through many years of war, they were split politically between a local wing and an exile wing and they probably had no other choice but to sign a peace treaty with the government. The time was practically right for letting peace have a chance. The remnants of UNITA quickly realized that if they were to gain anything at all from this situation, it would be by making peace and becoming integrated into the new army. Joining the FAA was probably the most reasonable option they could hope for at this time. The other option was to continue the war with the risk of being totally eliminated. The LMU had opened up for a total of five thousand UNITA ex-combatants to be included in the new army and police forces. The government of Angola almost single-handedly took charge of the peace process and it budgeted for 63 per cent of overall costs and it left out the UN and the Troika to only remain as observers. The FAA was technically responsible for the DDR process. Even with major logistical problems, poor conditions in demobilization camps and the reintegration process that did not start until two years after the peace agreement, the DDR process is considered successful: A total of 30,000 weapons were collected, 105,000 UNITA soldiers were demobilized and over 90,000 had received reintegration assistance as of 2008. In the end the “peace through war” tactic became successful because the MPLA government finally achieved a solution to the previous lack of regional weapons control by stopping the cross-border flow of arms to UNITA.
## Comparative analysis of the three Angolan DDR processes

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realistic timeframes.</strong></td>
<td>Too rigid, not flexible and unrealistic to meet deadline for the election.</td>
<td>Too loose time frames and no date for second round of elections. Too flexible time frames led to UNITA regrouping</td>
<td>The numbers of UNITA soldiers became twice as many as anticipated. Government tried to close the quartering areas still when soldiers were arriving. DD phase lasted 1 ½ year longer than planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army.</strong></td>
<td>Not successful. UNITA only reintegrated 50% of its combatants in the new FAA. FAA was only nominally created a day ahead the elections.</td>
<td>Not successful. Fewer than 50% of UNITA combatants reported for service in the new FAA.</td>
<td>Successful. The integration of ex - UNITA combatants was completed along with the demobilization of 30,000 FAA soldiers. However, the focus on SSR and weapons reduction was not complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional approach to weapons control.</strong></td>
<td>No regional approach, “Triple zero” clause not effective, Proliferation of arms.</td>
<td>Sanctions against UNITA did not have effect until the end of the period.</td>
<td>Successful. The sanctions, the regional approach did minimize the UNITA’s ability to manoeuvre its forces and to purchase new weapons.. The biggest ally the US ceased to supply the UNITA with arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The role of the UN.</strong></td>
<td>Not successful. The UN was not part of the negotiations and only invited to monitor but UNAVEM II was too understaffed to be influential. The UN could do nothing but acknowledge that the peace process collapsed.</td>
<td>Partly successful. The UN negotiated the peace protocol, UNAVEM III was reinforced with 7000 peace-keepers, could not intervene in the breaches of the peace process because of the lack of cross-border weapons control.</td>
<td>Irrelevant. No provisions for third party or UN involvement in the negotiation of the peace agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power-sharing.</strong></td>
<td>Absent. No provision for trust-building power-sharing through a government of national unity.</td>
<td>Present. Provisions for a transitional government (GURN) in place, but did not have the political effect of trust building. Savimbi acted as a spoiler and refused to participate.</td>
<td>Absent. No provisions for power-sharing. Trust-building was achieved through other means. UNITA was again recognized as a political entity and sanctions were lifted. UNITA could reintegrate some 5000 ex-combatants into the FAA. The biggest spoiler to the previous peace process was eliminated. UNITA was reduced and forced to abide by the rules set by the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: Comparative analysis of the three Angolan DDR processes
5 Conclusion

DDR plays a role in the transition from war to peace by preventing renewed war in fragile post-conflict situations. The comparative approach and analysis of my thesis may contribute to enhance knowledge of the interplay of the factors that were considered to be important for bringing an end to the war in Angola. The framework designed for my analysis may also prove useful for evaluating similar cases. The purpose of the thesis has been to discuss the following question: Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes?

In this chapter I will focus on the findings of my analysis and elaborate on some implications related to the theoretical framework I have used. First, I will briefly revisit each chapter and discuss the contents of my thesis. In Chapter two, I described the case study method and the use of the Most Similar System Design, and concluded with a presentation of important DDR literature. Chapter three was devoted to the presentation of relevant theory in order to place DDR processes in a peace-building context and elaborate on crosscutting issues such as: Security Sector Reform, and transitional justice. Lastly, the chapter elaborated on the five criteria believed to be important for the success or failure of DDR processes. Let me briefly repeat the five criteria: criterion 1. Realistic time frames: to secure successful implementation, peace agreements should allow for sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and flexible timeframes; criterion 2. Reorganization of the armed forces into a new unified army: to be successful peace agreements should be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues; criterion 3. Regional approach to weapons control: to be successful peace agreements should take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament and weapons control, and include a regional approach to weapons control in order to stop cross-border arms flows; criterion 4. The role of the UN: to secure successful implementation of peace agreements, the UN should participate in the negotiations of peace agreements it is later asked to help implement, and be granted sufficient resources to carry out its mandate; criterion 5. Power-sharing: to be successful peace agreements should contain provisions for power-sharing mechanisms to create confidence on the part of leaders on both sides. Power-sharing enables the parities to start political negotiations in a coalition government for the benefit of reconciliation and trust-
building that may pave the way for future elections and a democratic process. In Chapter four, after a short introduction to the background and root causes of the Angolan conflict I turned to the analyses of each peace process based on the empirical literature. I analyzed each of the three DDR processes in the light of the five criteria. The chapter concluded with a systematic comparative analysis of all three DDR processes.

After having briefly summarized the contents of the thesis I now turn to the findings in the analysis.

In the case of Angola the two most powerful rivals’ search for hegemony during the last three decades left an estimated population of one million dead, over four million displaced and a country in ruins. The interlude between the two failed peace attempts brought even more killings and devastation to the country. The DDR process that should have prevented the armies from being able to wage war on each other did not succeed in the first two attempts.

The findings from the Bicesse Accord showed that the reorganization of the armed forces (criterion 2), which had the potential of promoting peace through reconciliation, fell short and was not completed because the time frame (criterion 1) was too rigid and unrealistic. When the Bicesse Accords was negotiated the UN did not take part during the talks but was later given a considerably important role to monitor and verify the implementation of the peace agreement with resources that absurdly underestimated the enormity and complexity of the tasks. The UNIVEM II was understaffed and did not have the resources to fulfil its mandate (criterion 4). Since the Bicesse Accord was a “Peace through Election” – an accord implying a “winner takes all”- election, the peace agreement did not contain any measures of power-sharing (criterion 5). Neither the MPLA nor the UNITA wanted power-sharing arrangements. In the light of the outcome, power-sharing might have prevented the resumption of war. When the defeated party, the UNITA, refused to accept the election results it was now able to go back to war, because the DDR process and the reorganization of the armed forces (criterion 2) had not been completed because of the unrealistically short time frame (criterion 1) and UNITA was able to wage war due to a failed regional approach to weapons control (criterion 3).
The Lusaka Protocol with its “Peace through power-sharing” agreement reflected the lessons learned from the Bicesse Accord. With regard to the time frames (criterion 1), the rigid and unrealistically short time frames in the Bicesse Accord led to the obvious failure of the implementation of the DDR process. The Lusaka Protocol therefore tried to accommodate the previous shortcomings and provided for more flexibility in the time frames. On the other hand, the experience from the Lusaka process showed that the time frames should not be “too loose or too flexible”. The spoiler, UNITA, took advantage of the flexibility and sabotaged the DDR process by procrastination. While power-sharing (criterion 5) was absent in the Bicesse Accord, power-sharing became a central element of the Lusaka Protocol, but the spoiler Savimbi refused to take part in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). With regard to criterion 4, the UN did now play a leading role during the negotiations leading up to the Lusaka Protocol and was also given more resources to oversee and implement the agreement. UNAVEM III was given over 7000 peace-keeping troops. However, the positive effect of meeting criterion 4 in the Lusaka Protocol was counteracted by the negative effect of the absence of a regional approach to weapons control (criterion 3). Despite the UN imposed sanctions on UNITA, the UN was still unable to prevent UNITA from continuing to purchase weapons (through its control of diamond resources), and thus act as a spoiler. Hence, the negative effect of criterion 3 neutralized and revoked the positive effect of a stronger mandate and more resources to the UN (criterion 4). Hence, the UN did not accomplish its mandate and the mission it was set to do during the Lusaka process. The MPLA government concluded that the Lusaka process had failed, and that the only option left was “Peace through War”.

During the final war (1998-2002), the MPLA government managed to achieve regional control of the supply of weapons to UNITA (criterion 3). Through agreements with its neighbouring countries and increased UN sanctions, the MPLA managed to “seal off” and take control of its borders, and thereby stop weapons delivery to UNITA. With the subsequent killing of Savimbi, the biggest spoiler was physically eliminated. Therefore, in the Luena process, the MPLA government was in a position to decide the peace conditions offered to the politically divided and militarily weakened UNITA. Power-sharing (criterion 5) was now out of the question and irrelevant. UNITA had much to lose if it continued to fight, but had “something” to gain by accepting the MPLA’s offer: reintegration into the FAA (fulfilment of criterion 2) and the acceptance of UNITA as a political party. Since the Luena process is an
internal government affair, UN participation (criterion 4) was irrelevant and without any consequence for the Luena process.

Based on the results of my findings I will argue that *peace was achieved* when the MPLA government won a military victory on the battlefield through its “peace through war” strategy. A strategy that had been tried over many years of civil war, finally the government built capacity and outmanouvred UNITA- the time was right – the opportunity was there. The concomitant death of the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi who was thought of as the greatest spoiler of the DDR process, may therefore have eased the post-conflict transitions phase and the immediate reconciliation. UNITA was militarily defeated, it was politically divided and the only option to being totally eliminated was to demilitarize and continue its search for power through political means. Hence, *sustained peace* became possible when UNITA and Savimbi were no longer able to spoil the peace process. The most important factor that created this atmosphere was the prior regional approach to weapons control that reduced UNITA’s military manoeuvrability and its ability to purchase weapons (criterion 3). UNITA ex-combatants could now finally be reintegrated of into the unified army (criterion 2).

**Theoretical implications**

I would like to reflect on some theoretical implications from the conclusions of my thesis. The theoretical framework developed for the purpose of analyzes of the three DDR processes has come about from relevant theory by renowned scholars and practitioners. DDR processes do not evolve in a “vacuum” and parallel processes concerning the peace process will therefore have positive or negative effect on the outcome and it is difficult to attribute the success to DDR alone. The five criteria developed for this thesis are in a way interlinked and depend on the parties’ compliance with the DDR process. This thesis has analyzed three Angola DDR processes with the aim of ascertaining the factors that determine their successes and failures. The theoretical framework of the thesis does, however, allow us to discuss some theoretical implications with regards to my conclusion.
I would like to start with the Lusaka peace process, which in many ways was a product and a refinement of the previous Bicesse process. The UN was not involved during the Bicesse process and the international community later thought that a stronger and more involved UN could guarantee and safeguard the Lusaka peace process. The UN had learned from its previous experience, went forward, facilitated and took a leading role during the Lusaka agreement. Theoretically the Lusaka agreement did have what the Bicesse agreement did not have; a peace agreement negotiated by the UN; a strong and well-equipped UN peace-keeping force mandated to verify and monitor the peace agreement; provisions for a transitional power-sharing government (GURN); and lastly, disarmament should be concluded before entering the GURN. But, sadly there were no political will from the parties in the conflict to act on it. These were among the lessons from the Bicesse peace process that were implemented during the Lusaka agreement. The only factor that the UN and the international community not could control was UNITA; once again UNITA spoiled the peace process.

Theoretically, the Lusaka peace process should have had all chances of succeeding but the spoiling activity of the UNITA could not be controlled. UNITA could do this because it had the means and the opportunity – through its resources in the diamond trade and with the cooperation of “good friends” that provided arms through Angola’s “porous” borders.

Power-sharing (criterion 5) was at this time probably seen as one of the biggest shortcomings of the Bicesse agreement. According to Stedman (1997), power-sharing was also proposed during the Bicesse Accord in its early phases, but rejected by the parties due to the absence of political will. Later during the Lusaka Protocol when the UN was in the lead, it was employed as a consequence of the lessons learned from the Bicesse process. In the aftermath of the Bicesse peace process Margaret Anstee (at the time UN’s Special Representative to Angola) argued; “[…] power-sharing might have helped bring an end to Angola’s ongoing violence” (Noel et al., 2005:187). Anstee’s argument is also backed by later studies, by scholars like Binningsbø, who in her preliminary findings has identified that; “[…] power-sharing democracy is the best approach to achieve sustainable peace in all post-conflict societies, regardless of how the conflicts end” (Binningsbø, 2006:19). On the contrary, the use of power-sharing as a means of trust-building is however contested, as I have discussed in chapter three. The reply to Anstee’s suggestions about a power-sharing government was heavily contested by the then Namibian prime minister: “Then you want second-class democracy for Africa! In the UK one party wins and governs, the others lose and don’t and that is the way it should be. That is the way here” (Noel et al., 2005:187). On both occasions
it was an internationally believed idea that power-sharing would create trust and reconciliation. A question is what did the UN understand about the personal agendas of the two party leaders? As mentioned by Steenken members of the international community had to be aware of elements of the parties hidden agendas but were blinded by the then “cold war” ideologies and politics (Steenken, personal communication 19 August 2011). Beforehand Savimbi was even reluctant to take part in the government of unity- and showed this by not personally showing up to sign the agreement; later he also withdrew his officials from the government in protest at the unilateral disarmament of the peace agreement. The UN, the international community and the Troika in particular later admitted that they did not fully calculate the internal agendas of the parties (Messiant 2004). With reference to an earlier statement by Stedman in chapter three: “[…] the most perfectly crafted power-sharing institutions in the world are useless if one of the parties does not want to share power” (Stedman, 1997:8). The Lusaka agreement reveals the limitations of what the UN or the international community can achieve if the parties, or one of the parties, in this case UNITA, do not want to abide by the rules. So although lessons were learned from the failure of the previous process by installing the UN in the lead, this had minimal effect. This particular example shows the need for a strong mandated UN peace-keeping force (criterion 4) in parallel with a regional approach to weapons control (criterion 3) sanctioned by the international community.

Lastly, during the final war the MPLA government managed to secure the borders and limit the UNITA’s possibility to rearm and regroup in the neighbouring countries. This achievement was probably, apart from the elimination of Savimbi, the single most important factor in facilitating peace (criterion 3). During the Luena peace process UNITA was, cut off from its weapons’ supply and diamond trade and therefore did not have the means or the opportunity to spoil the peace process. The Angolan government was single-handedly in charge of the peace process (a nationally owned process); power-sharing was now irrelevant and had no practical implication; the UN was discredited and had no role in the peace-building process. However, in the aftermath of the peace process the political climate in Angola would probably have benefited from a power-sharing government, which could have assisted UNITA in its transformation into a political party.
The Angola case shows that even under the best circumstances a positive outcome from (criterion 1, 2 and 3; the Lusaka process) an internationally negotiated peace agreement will have great limitations on what it can achieve if the parties are reluctant to comply and they are still in position of the means and opportunities to wage war.

A peace through war strategy was sadly the only way to advance the process and end the vicious circle of war, but we still don’t know what the eventual long-term outcome of one-party state will bring to Angola.
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